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Strategic accountability for Publicdischarge and
sustainability of natural optimism
resources – public discharge and
optimism in sub-Saharan Africa
Emmanuel Tetteh Asare Received 11 December 2020
Department of Accounting, College of Humanities, Revised 16March 202122May 2021
University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana, and 22 July 2021
Accepted 22 July 2021
Bruce Burton and Theresa Dunne
School of Business, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK
Abstract
Purpose – This study aims to explore individual perceptions about how the government, as the main
architect of policies and regulations, discharges strategic accountability in Ghana’s oil and gas sector and, in
so doing, promotes resource sustainability.
Design/methodology/approach – The study reports on a series of interviews with key actors using
institutional theory as a lens for discussion and interpretation of results. This approach forms the basis for a number
of specific contributions to knowledge regarding strategic accountability around natural resource discoveries.
Findings – Whilst many deeply-set problems appear to persist, the paper reports some favourable movement in
public perceptions regarding institutional accountability that has not been identified previously. The empirical
findings demonstrate how the three elements of institutional theory work together in an emerging country’s natural
resource industry to drive a potentially holistic strategic institutional legitimacy, contrary to the existing pervasive
picture of detrimental regulative, normative and cognitive institutionalism foundwithin the region.
Practical implications – The findings suggest that, contrary to existing regional evidence regarding
institutional financial accountability practices around natural resources, Ghana has made favourable strides
in terms of strategic accountability discharge. This discovery implies that with persistence and commitment,
a meaningful degree of intelligent strategic accountability can be achieved and, with appropriate empirical
methodology, identified and rationalised.
Social implications – The persistent coercive pressure from the Ghanaian society that caused the
government to listen to overtime and take positive steps in the institutionalisation of their strategic
accountability process which translated into a holistic institutional legitimacy that has eluded the sub-region
for decades, is a glimmer of hope for other societies within the sub-Saharan region that all is not lost.
Originality/value – The paper suggests an empirically driven approach to understanding the
institutionalisation of strategic accountability practices and their impact on sustainability around natural
resources in sub-Saharan Africa. The focus on the strategic aspect of accountability – rather than the financial
as in most prior work – and the consideration of opinions at more than a single point in time permits the
identification of novel evidence regarding accountability in emerging economies.
Keywords Sustainability, Institutionalism, Ghana, Natural resources, Strategic accountability, Sub-Sahara
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
1.1 Purpose Sustainability Accounting,
Management and Policy Journal
This study explores individual perceptions about how the government (represented by state © EmeraldPublishingLimited
2040-8021
institutions as accountors) discharges strategic accountability in Ghana’s oil and gas (O&G) DOI 10.1108/SAMPJ-12-2020-0437
SAMPJ sector. Issues relating to policy enactment, implementation and impact are all highlighted in
an attempt to assess relationships between the state (as accountors) and key stakeholders
(oil companies and citizens, as accountees), in the broader context of the need for resource
sustainability. Although a range of problems clearly exists, by focussing on strategic
accountability and assessing opinions at two points in time we are able to provide novel
evidence that discharge practices in emerging nation natural resource settings are more
nuanced than previously suggested. The findings indicate that elements of institutional
theory combine positively in this context, challenging the normal impression of harmful
regulative, normative and cognitive institutionalism.
The emphasis on governmental behaviour in the Ghanaian O&G industry reflects its role
in regional tradition – and national regulatory frameworks – as the main architect of
strategic accountability discharge processes. The government has de jure responsibility for
instituting rules in the O&G sector that take account of a wide range of societal stakeholders
(via Act 592 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana; the Petroleum Revenue Management Act,
2011; 2015 and the Public Interest and Accountability Committee, 2011; hereafter “PIAC,
2011”). Act 592 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana mandates the government to ensure that
institutions operating within the O&G field do so on the basis of extensive transparency [1].
The legal framework is designed to address any tendency for conflicts by triggering the
discharge of strategic accountability for all stakeholders as part of a drive for sustainable
development (Petroleum Revenue Management Act, 2011; hereafter “PRMA, 2011”). In this
context, strategic accountability refers to an obligation arising from the government’s long-
term intentions, plans, objectives and policies that are driven by their effects on stakeholders
within the Ghanaian O&G sector. The extant literature on institutional accountability has
focussed primarily on the financial dimensions of the concept (Tricker, 1983; Stewart, 1984;
Sinclair, 1995; Dhanani and Connolly, 2012) whilst others (Gray et al., 1996; Messner, 2009;
Roberts, 2009; Cooper and Johnston, 2012) have concentrated on accountability in general
and/or amalgamated multiple forms, thereby limiting philosophical discourse about the
other forms of discharge.
In the present study we focus instead on the longer-term oriented strategic accountability
notion, one of the four forms – along with fiduciary, procedural and financial – identified by,
inter-alia, Dhanani and Connolly (2012). Given the importance that these and other authors
place on the strategic form of accountability in a range of contexts, the lack of focus on this
issue in studies of sub-Saharan Africa and resource-rich developing nations more generally
represents a substantive gap in the literature. The deficiency in understanding is especially
concerning for emerging African nations, where multi-stakeholder participation in political,
social and economic decision-making is scant (Chanda et al., 2017). Examination of strategic
accountability appears particularly relevant to Ghana where authorities have had several
years to reflect on prior mismanagement of the nation’s gold, cocoa and related bounties
(Heller and Heuty, 2010). The present study, therefore, explores individual perceptions on
how strategic accountability is discharged in the nation’s O&G sector, in particular issues
relating to policy enactment and implementation, as well as the impact on key stakeholders
(the oil companies and the citizens).
1.2 Ghanaian natural resources – history and institutional context
Oil exploration in The Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana) was initiated in 1896, with the West
Africa Oil and Fuel Company making the first significant discovery (Obeng-Odoom, 2015).
From 1983 to 2007, the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation coordinated strategic
production efforts by partnering with firms including Kosmos Energy, Tullow Plc,
Anadarko Petroleum Company and E O Group, culminating in the discovery of three
significant commercial O&G fields in the Tano area (KPMG, 2015). The main productive Public
site, the “Jubilee” field, was discovered 130 km offshore in 2007, southwest of the port city discharge and
Takoradi with an estimated 800 million barrels of proven reserves and upside potential of
about 3 billion barrels of oil (PIAC, 2011). Tullow Ghana is the main operator of the Jubilee optimism
field and has been producing between 80,000 and 120,000 barrels of oil per day since
December 2010 (Dogbevi, 2010; PIAC, 2013) [2].
These reserves place Ghana in a position to achieve significant economic growth if the
resources are harnessed in a transparent and accountable manner, rather than the wasteful
path followed with gold (Amoako-Tuffour, 2010). If Ghanaian society is to experience any
meaningful benefit from the nation’s more recent oil discoveries, then there appear to be
lessons to learn from its history. Ghana has a long tradition of gold mining with total
production estimated to be 2,488 metric tons (80 million ounces) between 1493 and 1997
(Tsikata, 1997; Ghana Minerals Commission, 2000). Between 1983 and 1998, gold mining-
related foreign direct investment exceeded $4bn, representing more than 60% of all such
activity in the country (Ghana Minerals Commission, 2000) and around 5% of gross
domestic product (GDP) (Ghana Minerals Commission, 2006). Despite these apparently
extensive, long-standing riches, Ghanaians as a whole have benefitted very little from the
abundance, with mismanagement and corruption – entrenched by a lack of transparency
and accountability – defining related governance structures over the years and decades
(Amoako-Tuffour, 2010, 2011).
Despite the acknowledgement of the mistakes made with the gold resources, Ghanaians’
living standards have seen only moderate improvements in the wake of the more recent oil
discoveries, with the main impact often characterised as the resultant harm to the natural
environment (Amponsah-Tawiah and Dartey-Baah, 2011; Crawford and Botchwey, 2017)
[3]. Blundo and Olivier de Sardan (2006) maintain that self-centred policymakers,
government officials and related institutions often deliberately fail to enact regulations to
create situations where no formal rules are governing natural resource management.
However, even where these formal rules and regulations exist, powerful institutions ensure
that they lack effectiveness, thereby enabling continued enrichment at the expense of the
citizenry (Amponsah-Tawiah and Dartey-Baah, 2011; Hilson et al., 2014). In such
circumstances, corruptive activity crowds out any form of accountability other than cursory
rhetoric (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006) [4]. This is precisely how Hilson et al. (2014)
portray Ghana’s mining sector, where a “perpetual informality” (p. 292) is identified [5].
However, amidst this apparently pervasive lack of robust procedure, government officials
and institutions within the sub-Saharan region typically suggest that all is well and that the
population is happy (Wiwa, 1994). Boele et al. (2001) suggest that this propensity for
institutionalised deception, manipulation and concealment regularly infuriates citizens,
resulting in the accountability vacuum being filled by various forms of conflict and uprising.
The embedded informality in Ghana’s gold mining sector triggered a public outcry
regarding the lack of a robust legal and regulatory framework in the nation’s emerging
O&G sector and the need for the establishment and strengthening of institutions to monitor
performance and adherence to the law as part of more intelligent accountability (Amoako-
Tuffour, 2010; PIAC, 2011; Obeng-Odoom, 2014). Whilst the nation’s regulatory framework,
therefore, reflects the theoretical importance of accountability around natural resources,
contemporary investigation of discharge outcomes in practice is needed to understand the
extent to which the situation has improved in Ghana, as the failures around the gold
resources. As the strategic aspect of accountability emphasises the impact of decision-
making over time (Dhanani and Connolly, 2012), Ghana, where institutional authorities have
been able to witness the long-term impact of governmental actions in a previous context and
SAMPJ potentially learn from this, appears to represent an ideal location for the form of inter-
temporal analysis of individual perspectives used here. In addition, as set out in Section 2.3
below, this research context provides the opportunity to identify and rationalise the
manifestation of each element (regulative, normative and cognitive) of the institutional
theory framework adopted.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the prior work and
theoretical contention upon which the paper builds. Section 3 then describes the data and
methodology used before, in Section 4, the empirical data is explored and discussed. Section 5
concludes the paper by summarising the main findings, exploring their implications and making
suggestions for future research in the area.
2. Extant literature and theoretical framework
2.1 Perspectives on accountability
The accountability concept remains one of the most elusive in social science research,
largely because it involves accounting to either one’s self or various groups of stakeholders
simultaneously (Schedler et al., 2000) [6]. Accountability has been described by authors in a
variety of means, but the definition offered by Gray et al. (1996 p. 38): “the duty to provide an
account (by no means necessary a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which
one is held responsible” has been prominent in debates for many years (Mulgan, 2000;
Mainwaring, 2003; Bovens, 2005; Dubnick, 2002). However, Munro and Hatherly (1993
p. 369) define accountability as “[. . .] the willingness and ability to explain and justify one’s
actions to self and others”; in this respect, it encapsulates a self-will dimension that goes
beyond the statutory duty to provide accounts to varied stakeholders [7].
Roberts (2009) contributes to this debate by calling for accountability via multi-
stakeholder face-to-face engagement where all parties can influence decision-making (Black,
2008). Building on this line of reasoning, McKernan (2012) argues that if accountability
discharge is to promote fairness and justice in a substantive manner, face-to-face encounters
where all parties have a voice are critical. Messner (2009) suggests that this type of approach
fosters shared responsibility and goal-congruence amongst parties, an approach which
extant literature posits is lacking across most of natural resource-rich sub-Saharan Africa
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a, 2002b; Gary and Karl, 2003; Hodler, 2006; Bhattacharyya and
Hodler, 2010; Josiah et al., 2010; Marques de Morais, 2010; Belal et al., 2013; Wanyama et al.,
2013; Katsouris and Sayne, 2013; Odalonu, 2015; Egbon et al., 2018; Ejiogu et al., 2019).
2.2 The strategic accountability notion
The current paper focusses specifically on strategic accountability because, as noted above,
most authors have investigated the concept of accountability in general terms or with a
focus on purely financial discharge. Strategic accountability is associated with an
organisation’s core purpose, as articulated in its vision, objectives, operational plans and
subsequent reporting (Dhanani and Connolly, 2012). The conventional understanding of the
notion extends to the consequences of actions designed to achieve institutional goals,
including their impact on society and the environment (Goodin, 2003; Keating and Frumkin,
2003; Gray, 2006). Empirically, Dhanani and Connolly (2012) link instances of strategic
accountability within charities in the UK to stakeholder pressure, in particular the efficacy
of objectives, proposed activities, programmes and/or projects. The appropriateness of a
focus on strategic accountability around Ghana’s recent O&G discoveries is suggested by
the notion’s focus on inter-temporal outcomes, as this embraces the potential for institutional
lessons to be drawn from the nation’s unfortunate experiences relating to earlier discoveries
of mineral resources, notably gold. The focus here on strategic accountability also reflects
the need to explore critical issues relating to discharge that are not, as is common in the Public
literature, dominated by short-term financial concerns, but instead reflect the longer-term discharge and
impact of decision-making processes. The strategic orientation of much of the decision- optimism
making in the modern O&G industry (Ugor, 2013a, 2013b) suggests that such issues should
be at the centre of the analysis, yet in prior research, the frame has been narrowed to such an
extent that major societal impacts of institutional behaviour are essentially absent from
consideration.
Dhanani and Connolly (2012) argue that strategic accountability is principally concerned
with “the causes that organisations work towards” (p. 1146). In the context of the O&G
sector in Ghana, this thinking links most obviously to a summative expected obligation
arising from government and O&G firms’ long-term intentions, plans, objectives and
policies, as driven by their enactment and impact on stakeholders. Specific examples of the
latter that might trigger strategic accountability discharge include the legal and regulatory
framework of the O&G sector in Ghana, as this largely determines the formal objectives of
the state authorities. The industry’s legal and regulatory framework in Ghana consists of
some key regulations including the PRMA (2011) – as amended by PRMA (2015) – which
has a singular purpose, involving the provision of: “a framework for the collection, allocation
and management of O&G revenue in a responsible, transparent, accountable and
sustainable manner for the benefit of the citizens” (PRMA, 2011, p. 4). This formulation
reflects the PRMA’s status as the state’s main strategic tool for enhancing public
accountability and transparency around revenue management in Ghana’s O&G sector
(Amoako-Tuffour, 2011; Obeng-Odoom, 2014). Further regulatory instruments that trigger
strategic accountability include the Oil and Gas (Local Content and Local Participation)
Regulations, 2013 (L.I. 2204). The stated purpose of the latter is to promote the maximisation
of value-added, technological and skills transfer, plus job creation, to be achieved principally
by engaging local expertise, goods and services within the nation. Finally, the Petroleum
Exploration and Production Act (2016) is a strategic policy tool that aims to ensure that
upstream O&G operations are conducted based on core values of transparency,
accountability and good governance for sustainable development.
Much higher levels of financial accountability regarding natural resource revenue
management are the norm in developed economies such as the USA, UK, Australia and
Norway –where robust de jure regulation is reflected in effective legal enforcement – than in
developing economies including those in Africa [8]. However, the lack of empirical focus on
the manifestation of strategic discharge in prior empirical work means that understanding of
inter-temporal outcomes in the area is limited and the need to address this gap in knowledge
is one of the main motivations for the present study. In doing so we demonstrate that the
picture in Africa – certainly in so far as Ghana’s O&G sector is concerned – is more
complicated than the prior evidence based on financial outcomes suggests, with a range of
apparent subtleties evident [9].
2.3 Institutional theory – regulative, normative and cognitive facets
Most articulations of institutionalism emphasise the common social pressures that
attempt to embrace and define reality (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Rowan, 1982; Scott, 2001;
Palthe, 2014). In this manner, cultural practices, expectations, values and behaviours/
habits become normalised (Morris et al., 2015). This institutional regularisation shapes
the impulses of actors such that their behavioural patterns make them easily identifiable,
even if the practices involved are arbitrary (Scott, 2001; Greif, 2005). Some of the key
influences in particular regions, therefore, often appear to encompass analogous elements
SAMPJ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001; Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005; Mahalingam and
Levitt, 2007; Palthe, 2014).
Palthe (2014), drawing on Scott (2001) and Mahalingam and Levitt (2007), view
institutional theory as shaping actors in regulative, normative and cognitive fashions. The
analysis categorises the regulative aspect of the theory in terms of legal and authoritative
formal structures, thus leading to its de jure character. In this regard, actors are required to
adhere to legal regulations, laws, policies and statutes, often through coercion, as institutional
desires to shape society in a particular manner spread (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Accompanying
social processes and obligations can assume a rule-like nature in such scenarios (Meyer and
Scott, 1983) with actors obliged to follow dictates (Palthe, 2014) and institutions that rely on
regulation to achieve desired results often being coerced to design internal structures that align
with national or global standards (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Scott (2014) builds on Powell
and DiMaggio’s work in maintaining that organisations, which dwell on institutional de jure
regulative pressures do so to obtain a form of “pragmatic” legitimacy. In the context of the
present study, institutional de jure regulative structure is represented by the legal and
regulatory framework of the Ghanaian oil industry previously discussed.
In contrast, normative institutional theorists place more emphasis on informal structures
such as norms, de facto principles and practices that are not legally enforceable but are
instead socially constructed (Selznick, 1949). Essentially, normative institutionalism creates
systems that promote values about preferred behaviours and norms, setting out how
institutional processes should be effected (Palthe, 2014). Outcomes reflect the employment of
legitimate means to pursue desired objectives without being obliged by extant rules, thereby
driving normative institutionalism underpinned by moral legitimacy (Deegan, 2014; Scott,
2014). In the context of the present study, we construe the elements of normative
institutionalism to be more resonant of de facto institutional practices in the Ghanaian oil
sector, the actual norms and desired values that are socially created andwillingly pursued.
Cognitive institutional theorists stress cultural and conceptual values, often dwelling on
social identity and personal desires, with actors’ behaviour assumed to be primarily wilful
and “wants” coming to dominate “shoulds” (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Institutions rely
more on established cultural and conceptual beliefs in operationalising their objectives,
with traditional values and social beliefs vital within institutional structural adjustment
programmes. Ultimately, actors engage in cognitive institutionalism to gain cognitive
legitimacy, another form of culturally-supported institutional legitimacy (Suchman, 1995;
Scott, 2014). The relevance of institutional theory, including its interplay with accountability
discharge for sustainable development, is often argued as requiring meaningful cultural
contextualisation (Palthe, 2014; Morris et al., 2015). In Western and Anglo-centric terrains,
the conceptualisation of strategic accountability has tended to focus on the regulative
dimension – although not to the complete marginalisation of normative and cognitive
aspects – of institutional discharge (Miller and Banaszak-Holl, 2005; Gray et al., 2014; Palthe,
2014). This emphasis reflects the tendency for cultural norms that involve de jure rules and
regulations to be (largely) respected and followed in the accountability process (Stewart,
1984; Laughlin, 1990; Sinclair, 1995; Broadbent et al., 1996; Roberts, 2009; Dhanani and
Connolly, 2012, 2015; Gray et al., 2014). In contrast, in developing nations, including those
located in sub-Saharan Africa, most attention has been placed on de facto normative and
cognitive institutional behaviour (Shaxson, 2007a; Wanyama et al., 2009, 2013; Global
Witness, 2010, 2012; Transparency International, 2015; Chanda et al., 2017). Extant
literature, therefore, suggests fluidity in the interplay between accountability issues and
institutional behaviour, hence our decision to combine the two in our study. In particular, we
incorporate the three facets of institutional theory identified above into the first detailed
investigation of strategic accountability discharge in a sub-Saharan African setting, Public
identifying perceptions regarding institutional behaviours that are more nuanced and discharge and
equivocal than the consistently negative perspectives documented previously regarding the
financial attribute of the notion. optimism
Several previous empirical studies exploring accountability around natural resource
governance in Africa reflect the importance of institutional influence. In a pan-African
analysis of power structures, Ribot (2003) identifies a tendency for decentralisation policy to
lead to pernicious outcomes; a lack of genuine governmental desire for local accountability –
reflected in a lack of support for local democracy – means that narrowly entrenched
concentrations of influence remain in place. A related multi-national study by Campbell
(2008) relating to Canadian-owned mining firms operating in Africa suggests that
institutional resistance to change in the nations concerned manifests itself in an “enforcement
vacuum” (p. 383) and that problems will persist until a “broader framework of ensuring
resources are developed to contribute to the improvement of the livelihoods of the populations
in the communities and countries concerned” (p. 384) is recognised as critical. More recently,
Gross-Camp et al. (2012) investigate the efficacy of an eco-system payment scheme in
Nyungwe National Park in Rwanda. The authors suggest that the Rwandan arrangements
have achieved a few of their aims, largely because of a lack of understanding regarding the
political context of key relations and conversations. In particular, the findings indicate that
“institutional histories play an important role” around “local receptivity” (p. 30) with the
nature and extent of engagement with relevant stakeholders often vital in determining
substantive outcomes. Similar conclusions regarding the interplay of institutional and
individual interests are reached in Black and Watson’s (2006) analysis of natural resource
governance and accountability in Ethiopia and Mozambique, with the role of culture an
important contextualising factor in this regard in both nations. Finally, work by Aladeitan
(2012) points to the importance of fully recognising the institutional roles played by both the
state and legal doctrine – including the interface with geological systems – in debates about
ownership of the Niger Delta’s natural resources. Despite the wide range of research sites and
contexts involved, this body of work reflects the pervasive importance of institutional
influence in natural resource settings in Africa, suggesting that the employment of an
institutional theory lens was important for the present study. In addition, each of the earlier
studies emphasises the outcomes of decision-making over time, suggesting that utilisation of
this theoretical perspective to make sense of strategic elements in accountability discharge is
appropriate. One other common factor in this prior literature is the use of macro-level analysis
and prescriptive contention. These limits in the breadth of approach may be significant in
investigations of Africa’s developing nations, where institutional practices have been
purported to be extremely damaging, but without meaningful space being offered to
individual viewpoints.
3. Data and methods
The exploratory nature of the investigation suggested the use of face-to-face semi-structured
interviews [10] to facilitate in-depth conversations with potentially knowledgeable actors
(Spradley, 1979; Yin, 1984). The views of five key groups –Oil Companies (“Ocs”); Government
Institutions (“Gis”); Think Tanks and Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) (“TTNs”);
Media and Advocacy (“MA”) and Academic and Research Institutions (“ARIs”) – were sought
regarding the nature and extent of strategic accountability discharge relating to government
policy and related processes. The selection criterion and interviewee categorisation were
designed to reflect the identification of groups with a potential interest in strategic processes in
the oil sector in Ghana by the nation’s PIAC and PRMAs.
SAMPJ The interview participants were selected using purposive, nonprobability sampling [11].
A total of 51 interviews were conducted over three phases:

 between November 2013 and March 2014 (30 interviews); and

 August to October 2017 (10 interviews) and August to October 2018 (11 interviews),
with each lasting between 45 and 90 min.
The multi-period approach was designed to allow the long-term impact of strategic
processes to be reflected in the evidence. The later series of interviews involved at least two
respondents from each category of interviewees in the initial fieldwork. In addition to
permitting examination of trends over time in strategic accountability discharge, the 2017/
2018 fieldwork provided the opportunity to capture the effect over time of ongoing changes
in Ghana’s political and industrial framework [12]. Table 1 provides details regarding the
make-up and key demographics relating to the interviewees.
All interviews were transcribed and an initial read-through was conducted to
identify key recurring themes in the text. When interrogating the data, strategic
accountability issues were aligned with relevant respective institutional theory
elements, in particular issues concerning the legal and regulatory framework of
Ghana’s O&G sector. The documents that trigger strategic accountability in the
framework set out by the PRMA were, therefore, classified and coded according to the
main tenets of regulative institutional theory. For example, issues that were clearly
de jure in nature, where accountors should act according to the legal regulations of the
O&G industry, were organised principally based on regulative institutional theory.
Similarly, issues that were inherently informal and practices that are not legally
enforceable (and are instead socially constructed) were treated as being de facto – in
line with Selznick (1949) – and therefore categorised, coded and interpreted via the
tenets of normative institutional theory. Matters raised in this context typically hinged
on moral and ethical judgements, systems of conscience, habits and norms, duty and
responsibility, i.e. circumstances under which accountors ought to act responsibly and
do not have to obey legal rules – in the Powell and DiMaggio (1991) sense – as would be
the case in regulative de jure circumstances. Finally, issues relating to cultural and
conceptual beliefs, values, social beliefs and assumptions were dealt with primarily
based on cognitive institutional theory. In this respect, the coding reflected personal
desires, where accountors’ behaviour might be wilful in the sense of bringing a “want
to” bearing to situations at hand rather than an “ought to” or “have to” attitude.
By relating these elements of institutionalism to our present investigation we were
able to align prevailing elements with their respective strategic accountability
issues, unpacking complexities and drawing meaningful insights. Inspection of the
transcriptions indicated that the points made by participants generally related to one of
three broad themes [13]. The themes identified on this basis and reflected in the
structure of the next section were:

 Strategic policy enactment.

 Strategic policy implementation.

 The socio-economic impact of strategic policies.
Before finalising the structure for the discussion of the results, the quotations selected for
inclusion across the themes were re-examined to check that they were consistent with the
broad direction of the discussions. In each case, we link the points made to specific issues in
the underpinning theory and extant literature described above.
Public
No. of
Group interviews Code discharge and
optimism
Government institutions
Ministry of finance – top management 1 GI 01
Petroleum commission – top management 1 GI 02
Ministry of energy and petroleum – top management 1 GI 03
National petroleum authority – top management 1 GI 04
Former minister of state 1 GI 05
Former minister of state 1 GI 06
Ghana national petroleum company – top management 1 GI 07
Oil companies
Tullow – senior manager 1 OC 01
Kosmos energy – senior manager 1 OC 02
Anadarko petroleum company 1 OC 03
Eni 1 OC 04
ExxonMobil 1 OC 05
Civil society groups (CSGs) think tanks and NGOs
Africa centre for energy policy – top management 1 TTN 01
Imani centre for policy and education – top management 1 TTN 02
Integrated social development centre – senior policy analyst 1 TTN 03
Extractive industry transparency initiative – senior advocate 1 TTN 04
Public interest accountability committee – senior advocate 1 TTN 05
Media and advocacy
Journalist – lead journalist (2); senior journalist (5) 7 MA 01–06
Judicial system – senior advocates 2 MA 07–08
Academics/research and consultants
University of Ghana, Legon – senior member/consultants 1 ARC 01 02
Ghana institute of management and public administration – senior member/consultants 2 ARC 03 04
Kwame Nkrumah University of science and technology – senior member/consultant 1 ARC 05–06
Table 1.
Note: This table details the 51 interviewees taking part in the study in 2013–2018 and the codes used to Interviewee
refer to each individual in the text – The subsequent interviews are embedded in the first 30 distribution
4. Empirical evidence and discussion
4.1 Strategic policy enactment
The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992) requires clear and timely articulation of the
O&G industry’s de jure regulatory framework, with multilateral stakeholder involvement
(particularly local participation) in strategic policy formulation required as part of the
accountability process. The interviewees were, therefore, asked for their opinions regarding
how this legal and regulatory framework operates on the ground, including issues relating
to timeliness (i.e. the length of time taken since the discovery of oil in commercial quantities
to establish the legal and regulatory framework), appropriateness of the contents and the
level of stakeholder involvement/engagement in the process.
Responses from across the groups suggested that the timeframe over which strategic
policies had been formalised was seen as worthy of commendation. The fact that Ghana had
enacted a legal and regulatory framework within a year of commercial oil discovery was
viewed as impressive, particularly given perceptions about practices elsewhere in the
region. However, the interviewees were less sanguine when asked about the level of
stakeholder engagement witnessed during the enactment process. Some concerns were
expressed in this regard by all groups of interviewees (except for the oil companies who
SAMPJ expressed content with the situation). The opinions of TTN 03, one of the think tank/NGO
representatives that took part in the 2013–2014 interviews, regarding the lack of stakeholder
involvement were typical of those held by several participants, although he went further in
suggesting that the efficiency of the enactment process might partly reflect the extent to
which many affected parties were by-passed:
“Within a couple of years of a full commercial discovery, government institutions came up with a
legal and regulatory framework to govern the industry, particularly oil revenues, which is good.
But honestly, as you are aware, stakeholder engagement in the enactment process was not
satisfactory; the government only involved selected stakeholders. Also, they did not allow the
general public time to debate the issues [. . .] the enactment process was hurried through because
the government had the majority in Parliament, which is unfair”.
Overall, however, when asked about legal and regulatory practices in the Ghanaian oil
industry relative to those in other sub-Saharan developing nations with extensive natural
resources, the responses were reasonably encouraging and summed up via interviewee
ARI 01:
“The government has done well in ensuring that they enacted a legal and regulatory
frameworkfor our oil industry within a year of commercial discovery – which is remarkable –
however, the level of stakeholder engagement in the process fell short of our expectation, which
also had a negative effect on the content. But I must admit that even with that shortfall, our
situation in thisrespect is far better than what pertains within the sub-Saharan region [. . .].
Nigeria tookmany years to enact a legal and regulatory framework for their industry”.
Many participants suggested that this strong performance in regional terms can be
attributed to Ghana’s relative degree of political stability. One of the interviewees, MA 01,
contextualised this point via both national characteristics and the lessons learned from the
mistakes made with gold:
“Being able to enact a legal and regulatory framework to govern our oil and gas sector with such
levels of participation within a year of discovery is a remarkable achievement within sub-Saharan
Africa. Remember, Ghana has always led the way and been a good example in the region. For
example, look at our political system; it’s been very successful and a good example to the whole of
Africa. We adopted democracy in 1992 and have held peaceful elections since then until now [. . .]
this is remarkable, particularly in the African context [. . .]. Do you know why? We are a peace-
loving state and we care for each other [. . .] besides, this time I believe the leaders have no other
choice than to make amends for past mistakes with our gold [. . .]”.
By highlighting strategic accountability rather than, as is conventional, purely financial
aspects of institutional discharge, it, thus, appears possible to identify issues relating to
regulatory impact where the first perceptions of meaningful improvements exist within sub-
Saharan Africa. In terms of comparisons with developed nations, however, the consistent
view was that significant progress is still required. For example, an interviewee from one of
Ghana’s regulatory bodies, GI 02, whilst again noting that some lessons from the gold
resource experience had been learned, observed that:
“In terms of multi-stakeholder participation in instituting a legal and regulatory framework to
govern our oil industry, the state has done well when compared to other resource-rich states in the
region [. . .] we had no choice but to get it right this time, reflecting on the mistakes with our gold
[. . .]. However, when compared to developed countries such as Norway, the UK and Australia
[. . .] we have a long way to go and Ghana must do better”.
As regard strategic policy enactment the interviews as a whole were suggestive of relatively
robust de jure regulatory strategic accountability at the government level, with timeliness,
appropriateness of the contents and the level of stakeholder involvement/engagement in the
process within the Ghanaian O&G sector all moving in the right direction. The government Public
of Ghana appears to have recognised, to some extent, the need for improvement, with the discharge and
opportunity for hindsight offered by the nation’s experiences with earlier natural resource
windfalls playing a role. Whilst Ghana appears to have learned from previous events and optimism
made some positive strides around the strategic management of its newly-found oil wealth,
other oil-producing countries within the region have been very slow in providing pragmatic
legal regulations to support the institutionalisation of their accountability processes, with
weak de jure frameworks appearing to have become embedded (Bhattacharyya and Hodler,
2010; Global Witness, 2010, 2012; Amaeshi et al., 2016; Egbon et al., 2018). Whilst it is worth
re-iterating that this body of work does not, unlike the present study, explicitly explore the
strategic aspect of discharge it is clear that Ghanaian outcomes are still not seen as being
comparable in any meaningful sense with developed economies such as Norway that have
accessed plentiful natural resources in recent decades.
4.2 Strategic policy implementation
The legal and regulatory framework underpinning Ghana’s O&G sector requires that, as
well as multilateral stakeholder involvement in the strategic policy enactment process, key
documents relating to implementation should be made widely available (PRMA, 2011, 2015).
Given this focus on perceptions relating to institutional engagement, the elements in the
interviews concerning policy implementation emphasised de facto accountability outcomes
around normative and cognitive behaviour. In this respect, the interviewees were asked
about the availability of strategic policy documents produced by the government and, if so,
whether it was possible to judge the extent to which the courses of action set out within
these had been implemented. Interviewees from all five groups suggested that the
availability of information regarding strategic policies was very limited. Whilst some
information was noted as being accessible via the relevant institutions’ websites, concerns
were expressed regarding practical and technical barriers facing ordinary Ghanaians. The
lack of transparency around implementation was also raised, with the interviewees
suggesting that it does not support substantiable development. These issues were
particularly pronounced in the 2013/2014 interviews (thus three years from the start of
commercial production), but by the time of the discussions in 2017 and 2018, it was evident
that some improvements had occurred regarding stakeholder engagement at the policy
implementation stage, with institutional willingness to meet and engage with citizens in a
range of settings apparently growing. This trend was attributed to the state gradually
yielding to public pressure and learning from past experiences within the region. In terms of
the 2013–2014 discussions, typical viewpoints include these concerns expressed by
interviewee TTN 01:
“Genuinely, apart from the oil companies, I can confidently say that all other stakeholders –
particularly the public – were not truly represented in the strategic policy implementations in the
oil industry and this is not good for the country”.
And GI 05 (a senior government managerial figure) who stated that:
“I am not happy with the multi-stakeholder involvement in the oil and gas policy implementation
at all. The public is side-lined (apart from the oil companies) and you know why”.
Similarly, OC 02 argued that:
“[. . .] although we’re witnesses to the commendable work done with the timely implementation of
the regulatory framework of the Ghanaian oil industry, we’re not particularly impressed with its
accessibility to the public and implementation process [. . .]”.
SAMPJ OC 01, GI 04 and MA 03 supported OC 02’s assertion, further stressing that citizens should
have access to institutional representatives in a range of I. Whilst these interviewees
acknowledged that some information is available on various governmental websites, they
suggested that it may not be widely accessible given Ghana’s socio-economic and
technological situation and the nation’s government institutions should, therefore, find more
pragmatic and innovative ways of informing the citizenry about implementation processes.
More generally, it was widely perceived that consistent pressure from Ghanaians will be
needed to prevent de-facto regional failures from becoming embedded and impeding the
implementation of policies that would ensure the sustainable management of the O&G
revenues. These views are summarised in a comment made by interviewee GI 06 (a former
top minister):
“ [. . .] have you ever seen any national policy change in a positive direction that came
from thefree will of government here? No! it takes strong and consistent pressure from the
citizens andpressure groups to make a change [. . .] governments need those pressures from
citizens to do theright thing [. . .] mount the pressure [. . .]”.
During the follow-up fieldwork in 2017/2018, interviewees MA 01, OC 03, TTN 03, GI 03
and ARI 02 all acknowledged improvements relating to strategic accountability discharge
but expressed the need for caution and the avoidance of complacency. The progress noted
was non-trivial but embryonic, with the adoption of best international practices required to
ensure that momentum was not lost. In this regard, a number of the respondents believed
that Ghana should strive to develop institutions strong enough to support the type of
constructive de facto normative and cognitive strategic accountability processes practiced in
the O&G sectors of developed nations such as Norway and the US. For example, in 2017
interviewee TTN 01 – in one of several instances, where contrary to the suggestion in prior
literature, the perceptions suggested overlap between cognitive and normative institutional
propensity – argued that:
“When you compare Ghana to the other oil-rich countries in the region, Ghana is doing well with
respect to the implementation of the strategic policies in the oil industry. You are aware of the
norm all over the region where state governments and their agencies will unilaterally enact
strategic policies in their oil industries and fail completely in their implementation. Meanwhile,
they paint such pictures to the world as if all is well. When the citizens complain they use political
propaganda and other impression management tactics to normalise their pain [. . .] and keep the
people locked in to accept the order of the day [. . .]. This has happened over the years and it has
become the norm for people in the sub-Saharan region. Thank God the norm in Ghana is slightly
better, but we must do much more to escape this horrible regional trend completely”.
When the government institutions were asked about their decisions to implement the
regulations in a particular manner, they explained that the mounting pressure from the
citizenry groups – coupled with lessons learned from the mining sector and evidence of best
practice in certain areas – compelled them to conform, although they admitted that they
could do better. In this regard, GI 05 (in the 2018 interviews) expressed a degree of cautious
optimism, suggesting when questioned about policy implementation that prior experience
and societal influences [14] had impacted favourably on strategic discharge outcomes in the
nation’s O&G sector:
“Ghana is on quite a good path [. . .] the institutions and institutionalisation in the oil industry are
quite healthy and commendable. Though much more needs to be done, considering the poor
regional normative trend, we are [doing] better. I will attribute this improvement to the enormous
consistent public pressure and lessons learned from neighbouring resource-rich states and from
past experiences from cocoa and gold [. . .]. Maybe the government has started listening”.
The improvements in the level of de facto strategic policy availability and respective content Public
implementation evidenced in the interviews are suggestive of a level of positivity rarely discharge and
highlighted in prior financial accountability-focussed work in the field. The outcome
translates into an impression of stronger normative (moral) and cognitive institutional optimism
legitimacies in Ghana than that which emerges from the literature on similar emerging
economies in the sub-Saharan region, but with some way to go before outcomes become
comparable to those in resource-rich developed nations. Having established the broad nature
of views regarding the execution of policy, the discussion now turns to the issue that is
arguable of most relevance to Ghanaian citizens – socio-economic outcomes – as
institutional activities take effect.
4.3 The socio-economic impact of strategic policies
An extensive body of work suggests that systemic deficiencies in financial accountability
discharge have led to adverse social impacts around natural resources in sub-Saharan
Africa, with a few privileged actors benefitting greatly whilst wider society continues to
experience economic malaise and regression (Gary and Karl, 2003; Goodin, 2003; Shaxson,
2007a, 2007b; Vicente, 2010; Global Witness, 2012; Ugor, 2013a, 2013b; Wanyama et al.,
2013; Global Witness, 2014; Ikerionwu, 2014; PIAC, 2016; Chanda et al., 2017). The
cumulative effect of these studies suggests very poor regulative, normative and cognitive
accountability within the region, supported by (and reflective of) weak regulatory regimes
and respective disenfranchisement of the people, culminating in poor pragmatic, moral and
cognitive legitimacies (see also Lawal and Oluwatoyin, 2011; Onwe, 2012; Adegbite, 2015;
Morris et al., 2015). Again, however, the dominant focus in the literature has been on
financial communication, e.g. the harm caused by a failure to produce reports that are easily
accessible for indigenous populations. In contrast, the interviews carried out for the present
study focussed on perceptions regarding how Ghana’s citizens are able to assess and
influence the impact of institutional policies over time.
During the initial interviews in 2013 and 2014 those taking part – other than the individuals
from the O&G firms themselves – expressed dissatisfaction about the socio-economic impact
of the strategic policies followed in the sector. However, in the subsequent interviews in
2017–2018, there was evidence that the focus on aspects of accountability discharge other than
the purely financial was permitting perceptions to emerge of some limited improvements,
certainly relative to regional norms. The concerns evidenced in the 2013–2014 interviews were
reflected in commentsmade by interviewee GI 04, who declared that:
“The nation is not better off with this oil. Everything is shrouded in secrecy, less transparency
and poor accountability. Tell me: apart from the big men enriching themselves with our oil
money, what impact have we felt? Nothing”.
Interviewee TTN 05 appeared similarly exasperated, linking concerns about social welfare
to the employment of O&G resources as collateral for a large overseas loan:
“Policy implementation to a large extent has been unilateral and the citizens complain bitterly
about increasing poverty [. . .] amidst marginalisation and self-aggrandisement, which are
worrying concerns. I am particularly unhappy about the whole process in acquiring the Chinese
$3bn loan and some other agreements with unpleasant impacts that are clear to all. However, the
government institutions make the situation seem normal and they downplay and undermine the
issues being raised”.
Whilst this interviewee emphasised the role of the state regarding the discharge vacuum,
others pointed to the pernicious effect of inter-relations amongst government and O&G
firms. For example, intervieweeMA 05 stated that:
SAMPJ “I see a kind of culture where people are brainwashed to accept falsehood [. . .]. When the
government, in collaboration with the oil companies, enact policies and Acts which they know
they will never implement and make the people believe that it is the normal way of life, just as it
has been in the sub-Saharan region, does it make it okay”?
Overall, the outcome of the 2013–2014 interviews that related to socio-economic consequences
in Ghana were suggestive of de facto normative and cognitive institutionalisation that is
in line with regional accountability trends. However, and as was the case with policy
implementation, the interviews conducted in 2017 and 2018 revealed evidence of a perception
that some improvements had occurred in terms of the impact on citizens. In this case, de jure
regulatory issues dominated many of the conversations, with reference made to adherence to
(some) of the requirements of the Oil and Gas (Local Content and Local Participation)
Regulations (2013) L.I. 2014 Act, as well as the PRMAs of 2011 and 2015. For example, one of
the think tank/NGOs interviewees, TT 05, suggested that Ghana could now point to regional
discharge standards that were relatively high, albeit with advances needed to mirror the
standards of regulative institutional behaviour observed in developed nations:
“When it comes to the impact of these policies on us as citizens what can we say? We know that at
least we are better off than most other resource-rich countries in the sub-Saharan region [. . .] but
there is so much more we could gain from our oil resource if our leaders were a bit more
transparent and accountable so as to minimise the issue of corruption in our oil sector. We are
feeling better [regarding the] management and governance of our oil resources due to the firm
legal and regulatory framework relative to most of our fellow African countries, but we would be
happier at the level where the UK, Australia and probably Norway are”.
Interviewee MA 01 made similar contentions, but went beyond de jury legal and regulative
matters and raised issues relating to de facto normative and cognitive outcomes:
“We are happy about the Petroleum Revenue Management Act amendment of 2015, which I
believe was due to the enormous pressure we gave to the government. They had no choice but to
comply, though in neighbouring African countries such as Nigeria and Sudan we see the
governments refusing to bow to any amount of pressure from the citizens, no matter how much.
They rather respond with brutality and oppression when the citizens persist. In this regard, I’ll
say that Ghana has done better [. . .] relatively [. . .]. Also, to an extent, the laws and regulations
have been applied, which makes Ghana’s situation different from the usual norms,
conscientisation and oppressive regimes in the surrounding resource-rich nations”.
The views from the interviewees mobilise all three elements of institutionalism within the
O&G sector in Ghana. The timely enactment of the industry’s legal and regulatory
framework and the respective application of these regulations appear to have culminated in
some positive impact on society, signalling pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacies that
drive wholistic institutional sustainability. Several 2017/2018 interviewees expressed
perceptions that pointed to a cautious acknowledgement of recent improvements in
behaviour. From a regulatory point of view, interviewee GI 01 argued that “Ghana has done
relatively well with shareholder inclusion and democracy” whilst conceding that
governmental institutions have “much more work to do” in terms of societal welfare. From
the firms’ perspective, interviewee OC 4 made a similar point, claiming a “significant
achievement relative to the performance of other oil-rich nations” regarding the impact of
the Local Content Regulations and the PRMAs. This positivity was attributed to the broad
effect of a “culture of multi-lateral policy formulation” and “tolerance” suggesting that, from
the firms’ standpoint, the impact of strategic change reflects both institutional and
individual attitudes and behavioural tendencies.
Irrespective of the factors facilitating and driving the perception of moderate Public
improvements in accountability relating to strategic policy impact, the impression of some discharge and
advancement between 2013–2014 and 2017–2018 was pervasive. This shift suggests a
gradual, but tangible, improvement in institutional behaviour that, in turn, reflects an optimism
increase in multi-stakeholder involvement and the willingness of government leaders and
institutions to engage with the citizenry, rather than simply announcing a course of action
and assuming its smooth and unhindered propagation. It is apparent that a positive shift in
the discharge of strategic elements of accountability around Ghana’s O&G resources has
taken place.
5. Synthesis, conclusion and implications
This study has explored individual perceptions regarding the Ghanaian Government’s
discharge of strategic accountability in its role as the architect of policies and regulations for
sustainability in the nation’s O&G sector. The outcome of the study indicates that the
government was able to establish a functional de jure legal and regulatory framework for
the discharge of strategic accountability in the O&G sector within a year of commercial
production, which was commendable. Notwithstanding this positivity, the content
appropriateness and level of stakeholder engagement in the strategic accountability process
were not seen as being comparable to outcomes in developed economies, but the situation
was seen as better than elsewhere within the sub-Saharan region. This outcome suggests
regulative institutionalism within the Ghanaian O&G sector that translates into a pragmatic
strategic legitimacy of some value to the nation’s citizens. The evidence suggests that the
government was compelled by external and internal pressures over time (in tandem with a
willingness to learn from experiences with earlier mineral bounties) to recognise and interact
with broad societal interest(s).
Regarding the availability and implementation of the regulatory framework, the study
has established that whilst the respective government institutions were not initially thought
to have broken away from the poor normative institutionalism pertaining within the region,
the latter interviews detected improvements, even over the four to five year period
separating the empirical investigations. Essentially, Ghana appears to have emerged from
the de facto deleterious normative and cognitive institutional practices that pervade sub-
Saharan Africa to represent an environment where regulations are not just enacted but are
also implemented, with respective impacts felt over time. A number of the interviewees from
government institutions willingly sided with the citizens in exposing the weaknesses in the
system and acknowledging the government’s meagre strategic accountability performances
in 2013/2014. However, as with the stakeholders, a view was evident amongst these
individuals that pressure on central government had led to improvements by 2017/2018.
This evidence of state representatives providing opinions that align with those of other
groups is consistent with a moral and cognitive strategic institutional legitimacy that, whilst
unexceptional in developed economies, has rarely been uncovered elsewhere certainly as
regard natural resource management.
It is evident from the 2013/2014 dialogues that Ghanaian citizens – including government
institutions – had substantive concerns regarding strategic accountability, with sub-optimal
de jure regulative and de facto normative and cognitive forms of discharge that support
Wanyama et al.’s (2013) call for a root-and-branch change of hearts in developing countries.
However, when such pervasive conclusions have been suggested in prior studies, these
generally draw on findings regarding solely financial aspects of accountability. In our view,
the reasons why studies of financial accountability within the sub-region have consistently
suggested destructive behaviour and pointed to socio-economic underdevelopment requires
SAMPJ further interpretivist study to identify the specific issues at play. Whilst the rationale for the
differences were not within our scope as they will require additional substantive empirical
and theoretical analysis, we have provided a clear indication that exploration of individual
perspectives generates a complex, nuanced picture and that future research could usefully
provide further space for subtle variations in opinions to be aired. By shifting the focus here
to the strategic elements in the process and examining opinions in this context at different
points in time, the evidence reveals perceptions of previously unidentified positive shifts in
discharge practices. Slow, but non-trivial improvement in the de jure and de facto
institutionalisation of the entire strategic accountability process appears to be a
characteristic of the modern O&G industry in Ghana. This outcome is encouraging and,
perhaps, indicative of hope for the sub-Saharan region and a precursor for sustainable
development within the O&G sector, with a potential for meaningful economic growth in
future decades. Whilst it was equally evident that standards are not yet seen as having
reached developed world levels, the current state of strategic accountability in the sector is
showing tangible signs of fostering the intelligent form of [strategic] accountability
suggested by O’Neill (2002), one that encompasses:
“[. . .]. Active enquiry and participation rather than bland acceptance [that is] extended over time
by talking and asking questions, by listening and seeing how well claims to know and
undertakings to act [hold] up over time” (p. 76).
The extent to which the improvements in strategic accountability documented in the present
study can permeate other discharge types, including those of a financial nature, remains an
open question. However, the findings reported here suggest that – as a result of broadening
the research frame – it is possible to demonstrate the existence of institutional willingness
for societal engagement in a major sub-Saharan resource-based industry that justifies a
degree of cautious optimism regarding the future.
Although the elements of institutional theory (regulative, normative and cognitive) that
are manifested here may differ in terms of key dimensional areas of legitimacy (i.e.
pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacies, respectively), they work together in mutually
reinforcing each other to contribute to a holistic institutional context in the discharge of
strategic accountability in the Ghanaian O&G industry. Within the sector, the application of
combinations of regulative, normative and cognitive institutional elements was manifested
in their respective legitimacies to earn public trust and confidence in accountability
practices, working together to create a form of wholistic strategic institutional legitimacy
which inspires hope for sustainable development. The focus on the strategic aspect of
accountability – rather than the financial as in most prior work – appears to have permitted
the emergence of evidence that extends knowledge around natural resource governance in
emerging economies, specifically an outcome that challenges documentation of pervasive
and damaging regulative, normative and cognitive institutionalismwithin the region.
This study contributes to debate around a specific form of accountability – strategic – in
a particular national and sectoral context by uncovering gradual but identifiable improvements
within the Ghanaian O&G sector that have previously remained hidden, as evidence mounts of
detrimental sub-Saharan practices. Given the right approach and commitment from relevant
institutions, society, pressure groups and individuals, intelligent strategic accountability within
the sub-Saharan region of the type required to foster sustainable resource development is
achievable. For an institution to be deemed as socially responsible and to maintain social
confidence and trust, the need exists for combinations of the regulative, normative and
cognitive institutional elements to be reflected in practice. In this respect, whilst the regulative
element enables an institution to comply with rules, regulations and legalities, the normative
element enables the institution to conform to established norms, de facto benchmarks and Public
practices that are socially constructed, in this context being ethical in the discharge of strategic discharge and
accountability. Finally, the cognitive element enables the institution to observe shared cultural,
social and conceptual beliefs, enabling the voluntary discharge of strategic accountability in optimism
line with extant values.
Based on the study’s outcome, we would advocate future research that focusses on other
forms of accountability in similar modern settings, potentially fiduciary and/or procedural
to establish a pervasive picture regarding discharge outcomes. The present study has
shown that by moving beyond a purely financial lens, apparently, well-established patterns
in evidence can be open to challenge. A single-nation approach was adopted here because
Ghana’s O&G reserves essentially represented the second wave of natural resource
discovery, allowing the impact of strategic decisions relating to previous experience to have
been assimilated and learned from. Future research endeavour will be able to explore the
extent to which the apparent improvements over time evidenced in this site are replicated
more widely. Ghana’s democratic processes and institutions are relatively robust by
regional standards and the need for improvements in institutional behaviour in the industry
was significant in pre-election debate and expansion in the industry in the period falling
between the study’s empirical phases. The extent to which the improvements in
accountability apparent in Ghana are indicative of a more general regional pattern – or in
natural resource-rich developing nations across the globe – is a question that requires
consideration, but the evidence presented here suggests that an emphasis on strategic
discharge facilitates the emergence of a more comprehensive impression of practical
outcomes than has been the case to date.
Notes
1. Whilst the regulations in Ghana typically specify “petroleum” in their title, their application
extends to oil and gas resources as a whole. As the PIAC note (PIAC, 2017, p. 22) “The PRMA
was enacted to provide a framework for the upstream petroleum sector on the collection,
distribution and management of all revenue associated with the sale or other commercial
activities of oil and gas resources produced in Ghana for the benefit of Ghanaians.”
2. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the Jubilee field alone could yield $20bn to
the nation between 2012 and 2030 (PIAC, 2013). The USEIA (2017) estimated total reserves in
Ghana to be 5–7 billion barrels of oil and 6 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves, ranking Ghana 6th
in Africa and 25th globally.
3. Akabzaa and Darimani (2001) suggest that there has been an annual loss of over 41.7 billion new
Ghana cedis (an equivalent of 4% of total GDP) to the economy through environmental
degradation caused by mining activities and related corrupt practices.
4. The latter authors argue (p. 5) that by not enacting a legal framework – or by rendering an
existing one ineffective – “the “real” function of the state is removed from its ‘official
functioning’” in terms of laws and regulations, becoming informal and generalistic in practice. A
typical example in Ghana’s natural resource sector is the “galamsey” (looting and sharing) trend,
encompassing illicit mining where overseas and some small-scale local operators act with
impunity as a result of the entrenchment of informality in the industry (Fisher, 2007; Teschner,
2012; Andrews, 2015).
5. Van Bockstael (2014) characterises Liberia’s mining industry in a similar manner, referring to
persistent informality as a defining trait.
6. Mulgan (2000 p. 55) refers to accountability as “a complex and a chameleon-like term” because of
its multifaceted nature.
SAMPJ 7. Cooper and Johnston (2012) argue that some accountors wield so much power that they manipulate
information to suit the way in which (and to whom) they account. Consequently, accountability
rendered to stakeholders in this form loses its true essence and is reduced to rhetoric. Such
circumstances can arise when the stakeholders (accountees) lack the power to enforce any meaningful
discharge (Gray et al., 1996). Bovens (2006) argues that accountability can remain meaningless and
unfullfiled without legal sanctions, complementing Cooper and Johnston’s argument that the most
powerful must be held to account by stakeholders (Burritt and Welch, 1997; Mulgan, 2000; Schedler
et al., 2000; Mainwaring, 2003). Bovens (2005) identifies three distinct elements within the related
discussions, all of which have been called into question in resource-rich emerging nations: the
obligation to account to stakeholders by the accountor; the right of the accountee to question the
accountor and hold the accountor responsible for actions; and the accountee’s right to legally and
implicitly ensure forcible sanctions against the accountor. Building on Burritt and Welch (1997) and
Bovens (2005)’s assertions, Shaoul et al. (2012) advocate for multi-stakeholder participation in decision-
making and call for more accommodating institutional settings that guarantee all stakeholders’ right
to equity. Shaoul et al. also call for an ethical stakeholder management approach for public institutions
for the greater good of citizenry, where the egotistical tendencies of public office holders are curtailed –
an issue often pointed to as the source of problems in African resource governance (Wanyama et al.,
2009; Chanda et al., 2017).
8. World Bank (2012); Ugor (2013a, 2013b); Ikerionwu (2014); Dar (2014); Lehmann (2015); Ejiogu
et al. (2019).
9. In this regard, Dhanani and Connolly (2012)’s contention that mere formulations of policies and
intents are in themselves insufficient to ensure the development of meaningful strategic
accountability – with implementation and subsequent reflective reporting also vital – is relevant
(Herzlinger, 1996).
10. A copy of the document used to guide the interviewees is available from the authors on request.
11. Etikan et al. (2016: p. 2) suggest that this approach facilitates the accessing of viewpoints in an
“articulate, expressive”manner as this provides the space for “reflective” discussions.
12. For example, elections took place in December 2016 and these witnessed the New Patriotic Party (NPP)
of Nana Addo unseat the incumbent, John Mahama’s, National Democratic Congress (NDC); Mbaku
(2016). The issues explored in the paper played a role in the surrounding debate before and after the
vote, with the new government announcing a large-scale expansion plan for the Tema refinery, one of
Ghana’s largest (Ocloo, 2017). Strauss and Corbin (1998) argue that follow-up work of this nature has
inherent benefits in identifying the inter-temporal robustness of any evidence which, in turn, suggests
a causal relationship between parameters and particular outcomes (in the present case perceptions
regarding the nature of strategic accountability discharge).
13. The transcripts were “interviewed” in the manner suggested by Spradley (1979) i.e. via the
identification of commonly-used words and phrases that underpin major recurring thematics.
The approach is consistent with Glaser and Strauss (1967)’s “constant comparison” method
suggested as suitable for identifying major thematic consistencies and variations in viewpoints.
As Flick (2009, p. 318) notes, this process is most appropriate in situations such as those here
where individuals with potentially “instructive” observations have been targeted and the
analysis intended to highlight issues of “defining” nature.
14. As evidenced in a different context (UK charities) by Dhanani and Connolly (2012).
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Further reading
Odoom, I. (2018), “China’s $2bn bauxite facility: lessons from the infamous CDB $3bn loan”, available
at: www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/China-s-2bn-bauxite-facility-Lessons-from-
the-infamous-CDB-3bn-loan-682658# (accessed 20 November 2019).
Corresponding author
Emmanuel Tetteh Asare can be contacted at: etasare@ug.edu.gh
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