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YALE-UN ORAL HISTORY 
Mariano Fiallos 
James Sutterlin, Interviewer 
July 29, 1997 
Managua, Nicaragua 
James Sutterlin: This is a Yale project recording of an interview with Mariano 
Fiallos, former President of the Supreme Electoral Council of Nicaragua, in Managua on 
July 29, 1997. The interviewer is Sutterlin. 
In beginning to discuss developments in Nicaragua, I would just mention that in 
my understanding the United Nations had pretty broad functions here at the time of the 
elections and the transition. The first was the verification of elections, the preparation for 
free elections. Second, was the verification of compliance with Esquipulas II. Then, the 
third was assistance in the demobilization, the disarmament, the repatriation and the 
reintegration of the Nicaraguan resistance into Nicaraguan society. So, I would propose 
that our discussion be focused on those three areas. I would begin, because I know of 
your Presidency on the Supreme Electoral Council, by asking some questions and for 
your comments on the matters relating to the elections in which there was a transition of 
government. 
The first question I have really is what was the relationship between the election 
council and O N U V E N , the United Nations organization? 
Mariano Fiallos: Yes, there was a relationship, but it started in March 1989. 
Actually, the Electoral Council had been in action since '84 and we had some 
connections, not with O N U V E N but with PENUTA and other people in order to get an 
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electoral organization set up in Nicaragua for the 1984 elections. They were also 
observed, but not by the United Nations, just by countries belonging to the United 
Nations and private organizations. When the United Nations arrived, one of the problems 
that we had, as an electoral organization, was that the elections had been advanced from 
November to February, as a result of the accords in Costa del Sol, after Esquipulas. 
So that at that time, we were involved in the elaboration of a new electoral law to 
make this law accord with the accords of Esquipulas. The first task of the United Nations 
related to electoral matters was to watch the National Assembly and to examine the new 
electoral law that was being enacted. They stayed here from March until May, a mission 
that was smaller or greater depending on the stage of the electoral process. They came 
here and the head of the mission was Iqbal Riza from Pakistan and the second in 
command was Horatio Boneo from Argentina and then came other . . . 
JS: Let me just interrupt there for a moment. Elliot Richardson was the Secretary-
General's Special Representative. Did you have contact with him? 
MF: Yes. Very much, but he came later. He came later and just a few times. Iqbal 
Riza and Boneo headed the working team here. Then the President of the United States 
apparently wanted to have someone in whom he had confidence. Apparently, the United 
Nations was glad to do it and appointed Elliot Richardson. The government here was not 
very glad about it - the Minister of Foreign Affairs - at this turn of affairs. But I had 
some contacts with people who knew Mr. Richardson and I had the history and I was very 
satisfied that he was selected as the head of the mission, as the Personal Representative of 
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the Secretary-General. When he came we had several meetings up to the day of the 
elections and afterwards. He was, I think, very helpful in convincing the political parties 
and the government that the electoral organization was doing well, in the sense that it was 
preparing to do a good election and we had the expertise and also the will, the political 
will to do it. 
We developed a very good relationship. I visited him later in Washington, DC at 
his office; he invited me. One of the big differences between elections here and - you 
mentioned Cambodia - also, you did not, but I will mention Namibia. In those cases, it 
was the United Nations that organized the elections. In the case of Nicaragua, it was the 
Electoral Council of Nicaragua, which organized the elections and the United Nations -
what they did was a matter of verification, investigation and also they were very good at 
giving some advice, which I usually took as a President and transmitted it to the other 
members of the Electoral Council. There was a big difference that is important between 
Cambodia and Namibia and other places and Nicaragua at that time. Besides, there were 
here very, very, many other observers who were not the United Nations. There was the 
organization of American States, President Carter's organization; but the two more 
important ones in the sense that they did go to the whole country were the United Nations 
and the Organization of American States. They collaborated with us in the sense that they 
gave technical advice on how to organize the elections and also they did a good job, from 
my point of view, of helping to convince the political parties, including the government 
political parties, that the Council was capable and willing to do a good job. 
Of course, they had been examining the 1984 election which had some problems 
but which were not problems of technical organization as to having the voters come to the 
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voting booths and vote. There were problems of the climate surrounding the election. 
But I think that the Council, at that time, did a very good job, technically speaking. Now, 
it was recognized by observers in '84. So, '84 is important because it was the antecedent 
that permitted Nicaragua to have an electoral organization capable of fulfilling the 
expectations of Esquipulas, the Central American Presidents, the OAS, the United 
Nations, etc. This is very important, from my point, because they did have little trouble, 
the verification team, have little trouble, having to do as they did in other countries, much 
more than they did here. Because it was organized. 
I know that because later I went to Haiti, to Angola and to Mozambique with the 
United Nations - Mozambique and other places and I saw what the situation there was 
and saw the difference between the organization there and the work of the United Nations 
there and the work of the local authorities. Even in Mozambique the United Nations 
convinced the President, Joaquim Chissano the parties that a mixed national Mozambique 
and United Nations tribunal should be set up as a last resource and I was a member of that 
tribunal. 
You were asking what the relationship was - it was very good with the U N team. 
JS: And O N U V E N was helpful to you? 
MF: Very helpful in two aspects: technical and political, which I have mentioned. 
JS: You might be interested - this is not part of the interview - but, you mentioned 
Namibia and actually, when the elections were being prepared here, the Secretary of 
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State, Jim Baker, wrote to Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar expressing some 
dissatisfaction with the way things were going here and said he wished that the Secretary-
General would arrange to have the elections in Nicaragua the way they were in Namibia. 
The Secretary-General wrote back, with exactly your answer, and said, "The situation is 
totally different." Namibia is a new country whereas Nicaragua was a sovereign state. 
MF: We have been doing elections since 1810. Not very good elections, perhaps, but 
we had a lot of experience on what to do and what not to do. So, we had 180 years in 
doing elections. Not universal suffrage, because in 1810 nobody did elections with 
universal suffrage. But in 1810 we did elections as they were done in other parts under 
the Spanish crown in the period of the Napoleonic invasion. 
JS: Tell me, the U N organized a quick count of the elections which, at least, from the 
U N point of view, was seen as quite important because that information was available 
very early and permitted some direct contact with President Ortega, at that time. Did you 
find that this was important and did you have access to this same information? 
MF: Oh, yes certainly. I already knew that they were doing that because I was working 
with Horatio Boneo. You know that quick count, to be effective, had to be based on the 
sample - the sample has to be representative. The information from the units of the 
sample had to be authentic. A l l of those characteristics of the good count were put there 
by the United Nations. I gave on that subject all the information that was needed without 
making it public, to the United Nations mission here so that they could have the sample. 
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Then we reached an agreement that a copy of the "deed" of the Junta containing the 
opening, closing, counting and classifying of the votes, called the acta, the escrutinio in 
Spanish, I don't know how to call that in English. 
JS: It's scrutiny or record. 
MF: Was to be given to all of the U N observers. It was, in fact, given to them, and 
they used very quick means of communication. They had several jeeps for vehicles. 
They had decent, very good means of communication with radio. At 9:38, I was given 
the results that were between half a percent of the final actual results. It was a very good 
- and it was the only one. The OAS did some similar work but they were very behind. 
They did not have the information. Later on they used actually the resources of the U N . I 
had the results in my office - not in my office, in the headquarters of the elections in the 
Managua Convention Center and they were ready at 9:36 or 9:38. Horatio Boneo gave 
me that and then he said that we should sign. He was so sure that they were going to be 
exactly the results, and they were. I informed both the government party and the 
opposition parties. 
JS: You did, as soon as you had that information. I believe that Elliot Richardson and 
Baena Soares both went to see the President, is that your information on that night? 
MF: Yes. He had that report and I also informed Antonio Lacayos and Alfeo Cessa-
they were the representatives at that time - and other representatives of the political 
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parties. But then the important ones, at that point, were the ones who were nearer 40 or 
so percent. That was, anyhow, a very tense evening. We had an accord with the political 
parties. When I say we, I mean the Electoral Council, not to release any information 
before midnight or before it reached at least 15 per cent of the total number of polling 
places or polling stations. I think you call them, in the United States, polling stations. 
JS: Either one. Polling places. 
MF: Polling places, polling stations. Anyhow, there was a lot of pressure to release the 
information direct from the juntas before - but I did not. This agreement had to be 
fulfilled, in my opinion. It had been signed by both Antonio Lacayo and Alfeo Cessa and 
by somebody else, I don't remember just now. It was also undersigned or witnessed by 
Elliot Richardson and Iqbal Riza way before the election. The idea was to avoid having 
the release of the information affect the outcome - not necessarily on the voting but on 
the performance of the counters, the ones who were going to transmit - we must 
remember that the transmission was also made by us. 
JS: It was made by you. 
MF: The quick transmission of results was organized by us with people from the 
government communications office. But the responsibility was ours. So, it was very 
important that all the information was transmitted, most of the information, at least even 
if it was not yet processed. So, it caused a moment of - a few hours of high tension. 
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Personally, I still think it was necessary to do that - otherwise, there could have been 
problems. Not with the government or the political or the Frente people - more the 
people who were there. Also, the people from UNO, if they had this information, too 
they would tend to be in a festive mood. Of course I was looking at the results and saw 
actually it was UNO that was winning. Anyhow, when we did the agreement, it was not 
known, so it was for both possibilities. I think that it was a very good decision to keep 
that agreement. Besides, I am a lawyer and have been formed on the idea of pacta sund 
servanda. 
JS: Let me ask you, perhaps, a delicate question. Do you think that the presence of 
the United Nations and of the OAS was helpful in assuring that the results of the election 
would be respected by the government? 
MF: Yes, I think so. Because, I think that the government, in this case, the Frente was 
totally convinced that it was going to win. Even though some people from the party, and 
some people outside of the party had been warning, including me (I belong to the party) 
that the victory was not so sure as they were thinking; but they continued to be [certain] -
that would be a very dangerous moment because it was really, I think - I mean I know it 
was - a surprise. They did not know how to act; they were not psychologically or 
politically prepared for losing. I think that the intervention, at that moment, and the 
presence of the United Nations, the presence and conversations with Elliot Richardson, 
and the OAS and Carter were important. They were coming and going from my center of 
operations. 
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JS: They were speaking with Mrs. Chamorro, I think, that night. 
MF: Oh, yes. Because, on the other hand, although the conviction was not so strong on 
the part of the people of the ONU, they were not ready for winning. The Frente was not 
ready for losing. O N U was not ready for winning. Both of them came as a surprise -
more of a surprise to the Frente because they were so sure. They did not listen to 
anything that would be against that belief. 
JS: After the elections were over, both President Ortega and President-elect Chamorro 
requested the United Nations to let O N U V E N stay for a while to assist in the transition. 
Was that important, from your point of view? Do you think that there was something 
helpful that U N A V E M could do at that point? 
MF: In that respect, I would have to express a caveat, in the sense that I was in the 
middle of the part we have been talking about. I was part of it, an actor - with other 
people, of course, the other members of the Council, and so forth. In that second part of 
this - once the electoral results were recognized and we began the process of very fine 
solving of the disputes about the votes, - the other part, I was excluded from the process 
of changing from the Ortega administration to the Chamorro administration - not because 
I didn't want to live with that. I didn't have either the time or my position did not ask for 
that. That period was very difficult for us because we had to verify each junta, electoral 
votes, and we have four thousand and then all of the material - electoral material -
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brought to the regional centers (there were nine) and also to keep custody of them and 
finally announce the provisional results - announce the results of a provisional character 
and then after reviewing any complaints, disputes or appeals from the parties - give the 
final results. That was something in which we didn't have any interference from any 
party. I can speak as a citizen, I think that it was good. 
END OF SIDE 1 OF TAPE 
START OF SIDE 2 OF TAPE 
MF: The people in Nicaragua thought that once the election was won we should erase 
the Ortega government and its actions or resolutions or what ever. Of course, that was 
not only a political mistake but, in my point of view, it was impossible to accomplish, at 
that moment. Many people thought that the accords that were reached, some of them 
public, some of them secret were a treason to UNO that had supported Mrs. Chamorro. I 
think that it helped to keep the country going. Now, I should add that the same point of 
view is being held toward the present government in the sense that Aleman has not done 
all he should to erase all Sandinista influence and all Chamorista influence from the 
government and to take back everything to the position before '79. 
JS: Let me ask a question in this connection. I was just in E l Salvador last weekend 
and spoke with former President Cristiani on this subject and he said that in El Salvador 
he thought the electoral process was now in good shape with the help of the United 
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Nations, but that the final test had not been made. That is, the transfer of power and the 
president and he didn't know yet whether El Salvador could do that. My question to you, 
is: Now that you have had quite a number of years and you have had a further election. 
Do you feel that on the basis of the experience that you have in the past that orderly 
transfer of power is now possible and likely here in Nicaragua and for the future? 
MF: Here, I think, that I would have to separate what is the electoral process from what 
the acceptance of that process is and the implementation of the results is. 
JS: That's the distinction that Cristiani was making. 
MF: You may have an excellent electoral organization or a good one or even a 
visionary good one and the results would not be accepted. That's the defect of the 
electoral organization; it means it has not been able to convince the people and the parties 
that there is peace. That happened in Angola. The election was not so bad; there were 
some mistakes made by the observers of the United Nations at the moment of the 
declarations of the final results. But the problem was that they were not accepted and 
they are still fighting. The last news I listened to or read was that Zavimbi was again 
worried about the problem that he would face with the fall of Zaire's government. 
Because he controls, he was being helped by the former president and he controlled the 
northern diamond producing area. 
So you have an example that in E l Salvador, I would have to say that the electoral 
organization of E l Salvador is good, but it's not excellent in the sense that it has political 
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representation all around and in the case of Nicaragua, the 1996 election deteriorated. It 
is for me -1 should not be perhaps saying that in the sense that I am out of it and some 
people could feel that it would be just putting down what I am not doing. But, the 
problem is that the National Assembly in the end of 1995 did a lot of changes in the 
electoral [system] that motivated my resignation. So, I am not saying this today - I said 
that publicly in January 1996 and tried to make - to have the electoral - the National 
Assembly revise the changes that they were doing just less than a year before the election. 
Usually, there is a rule that you don't change the rules of an election. So, those changes 
could not be implemented until the law was duly enacted or promulgated. After the 
Council, itself, had been able to change - because, that law, among other things, forced 
the Electoral Council to change all its personnel in the department, some 58 new officers. 
That could not be done right away, as it was, it had to be done in April. You had new 
personnel in the key positions around the country, six months before the elections. So 
that's the reason why I resigned in January. So I am not saying this after the fact - I said 
the same before. 
I think that the administration of the present Electoral Council did very well 
considering the circumstances. It was forced to change its personnel, it was forced to 
appoint people from lists presented by the political parties, et cetera. At present, there is 
one factor. The credibility of the electoral process has been diminished. I think the 
blame resides in the politicians in general and the National Assembly in particular. Not 
the executive. Dona Violeta was not involved in that - the government. On the contrary, 
they were helping or trying to help in that vision of the electoral law. Second, the 
problem is that President Ortega was totally convinced of his winning. He wasn't ready 
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to transfer power. But he did. There was a tremendous world awareness of that problem 
and he readily, after he talked to me about that, accepted his defeat at 6:00 in the morning. 
By then, the Council had the results, at 6:00 in the morning. He called me and Antonio 
Lacayo called and told me that those results were liable to change and I said we had 88 
percent of the votes and it was impossible that they were changed - the result of the 
election. Not totally impossible, I corrected myself, I remember that very well. But the 
probability would tend to be zero. I am a lawyer and I studied statistics. That was in 
1990. Now, in 1996, the results were very late in coming, very late, very, very, late. That 
was the problem. There was no re-election involved; that is in favor of acceptance. But 
the government wasn't committed. Had the second party been with Antonio Lacayo 
perhaps a situation similar to 1990 would have produced - I am totally sure that Dona 
Violeta would have never gone against the results. Or Antonio Lacayo. I am totally sure; 
this is a personal belief. But now, in the future, you have lack of confidence by the 
people in the politicians. Not total lack - but the confidence level, let's say, has gone 
down. I tried to speak - to correct myself - when I find myself speaking as a politician 
but it is down. We have to wait what happened with these dialogues, et cetera, to be able 
to make a forecast. 
JS: That leads me to my next question, which is, again, to you as a very wise 
observer. One of the purposes . . . 
MF: Let's make it just "observer". 
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JS: In any event, one of the purposes of the U N , of course, was in fact, to strengthen 
the institutions of democracy; to encourage the reintegration of the resistance through 
retraining of the police and obviously through assistance in the elections. In other 
countries, El Salvador and South Africa, for example, they have had truth commissions in 
which the United Nations has participated. You had something like that here but it was 
not - and the United Nations, I think, did not participate in it. 
MF: Not really a commission, just a verification or - but it didn't work. I don't mean 
that it didn't work - it was not willing to work. I mean it was not meant to work. 
JS: Then, my question really is - is this an essential part of the democratization 
process? In other words, the absence of the Truth Commission here, has this hindered the 
reintegration of Nicaraguan society? Would it have been better to have had a truth 
commission in which everybody admitted their guilt in order to avoid some of the 
divisions that, as you say, still exist? 
MF: I don't think so. Because in El Salvador the Truth Commission functioned very 
much. But I am totally in agreement with President Cristiani in the sense that the real 
issue is still to be - the real test is still to come. I don't think that in E l Salvador which is 
the one that I know - that the Truth Commission did - I think that truth commission are 
very well for a specific thing, but not for a country. 
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JS: You indicate that Nicaragua specifically - where there do remain quite a few -
well distinctions even and hostility between different groups in the country, that this 
would not have helped. 
MF: Well, perhaps. It is very difficult to give a no or a yes. Perhaps. But I don't think 
very much. I think that what we are witnessing, now, in Nicaragua, is a very difficult 
situation in which you have to take into account first the economic problem, the 
unemployment among other things. Then you have to take into account that the former 
government was very successful in some of the things that they did like stabilizing the 
currency; but in applying the conditions of the financial world institutions it did not create 
the conditions for production to progress. It's not been going. I think that, without that, 
the situation will aggravate. 
The second is that the former government was headed by Dona Violeta who is a 
person that has personal style and the style was tending to eliminate friction as much as 
possible. She did that not only with the Frente; she did that with the Contras and she did 
that with Aleman. That has radically changed so we have now - we don't have the 
promising future as to of economics and we don't have a president of the government 
who is trying to oil the machinery. Make it just move. Of course, you realize that in that 
case - I am very personal. 
JS: Yes. I know. That is what I asked for. I want to ask your personal view on 
another question. You mentioned the economy. There have been various U N 
organizations involved in providing financial or economic assistance including the 
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financial institution. Have you noticed, in observing here, conflict between the programs 
of the various U N assistance organizations or have you had the impression that they have 
worked fairly well together? 
MF: No, I haven't noticed. I haven't noticed, but I haven't looked 
JS: Because in some places that the World Bank and the IMF have insisted on 
conditionality, you mentioned that. The UNDP has had a more humane approach. It did 
cause trouble in El Salvador but I didn't know whether you had noticed trouble here in 
Nicaragua. 
MF: No, not that I have noticed. You see what happened, from my point of view, is 
that the governments beginning in 1988 with the Frente government have been in such 
need for foreign assistance that they have been pushed or forced to do many things that 
were against their own thinking. In 1988, there was a currency exchange; something that 
was called compactacion, I think, to reduce the size of the government. It was not 
successful; that was in February 1988. It was practically the beginning of the electoral 
process and you know that electoral campaigns tend to raise good intentions. It did not 
work - Dona Violeta complied - but it caused a lot of problems and at present it is 
causing a lot of problems. But then the question is it absolutely necessary to put into 
action those changes that caused so many human problems - family problems in the 
country, the society. Are they absolutely necessary to produce more which is the basic 
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problem? I don't know. I would not apply them in such a way but I don't think it can be 
answered scientifically. It would have to be a political decision, an emotional decision. 
JS: Another general question which is a political question. That is the success with 
which in Nicaragua the resistance has been reintegrated into society. The U N had a 
special responsibility to do that in terms of CIAV which was mainly OAS inside 
Nicaragua but also O N U C A had some responsibilities there. Was this successful, do you 
think? Were these programs helpful in the reintegration? 
MF: Yes, I think so. Because, otherwise they have been reintegrated - the groups that 
are still using arms are more the responsibility of the Nicaraguan society and government 
in the sense that they have not dealt with them. I wouldn't have the recipe to do it, but 
you can see that government still has not dealt with that. In this case I mean the two 
governments both Dona Violeta's and, so far, Aleman. And also the Assembly I mean 
because it is the seat of power. 
JS: A question that I had, in this connection, also, relates to the OAS and the U N . 
Did you detect personally, or did you sense, any difference in the impartiality of the two 
organizations? 
MF: They were first - I would have to say, to some extent, not cooperating. 
JS: They didn't get along? 
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MF: It happened. The OAS, in 1990, was for me, from my point of view, was the 
same organization as the United Nations organization. Then, after 1990, the OAS has 
been more inclined towards the positions of the conservatives - very conservative. I 
don't know if that answers your question. It has not been impartial in these elections - it 
was not. They were giving declarations that were very improper. 
JS: They were? In this most recent election? 
MF: In the 1996 process. It was one added problem for the electoral organization. 
JS: For that one, the United Nations was not present. 
MF: No, wasn't present. In 1990 they did not do that but in 1996 the OAS did. The 
head of the mission here was Mr. Santamaria. I personally think he was a very bad choice 
from the OAS. Because he was first a member - a national from one of the countries 
from the region that had been involved in E l Salvador against the Frente. Second, he was 
a member of the party, A R E N A . That was a part of this problem. So I think that they 
should have chosen somebody from elsewhere. Secondly, he gave many interviews to the 
press in which he went beyond what his task was and obviously he was trying to discredit 
the liberal parties. Now, whether that was - I should correct myself, in the sense that it 
was not he, it was a commission - whatever personal ideas he had, I do not know but the 
electoral process was being discredited until October the 20 t h by the liberal politicians and 
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also the OAS did some damage to that. After October 20 it was the Frente that began to 
discredit the electoral process. Again, I have to say that I did say that publicly on 
November 6, because I considered that the Frente was not acting correctly. 
JS: I would judge from what you are saying that, in your view, it would have been 
useful to have the United Nations here. 
MF: Certainly. But they did not - the government did not want it. It was something 
that I realized in October of last year because they did not want to ask the United Nations. 
I think that was a policy not of the United Nations but of the US government that the 
United Nations was considered to be outside of the province. 
JS: Just to clarify. I don't think the US had anything to do with it. In back of this 
there is a larger question that I would like to ask. Perez de Cuellar was very reluctant, 
actually, to agree to the first request for assistance because of his training as a lawyer and 
his respect for the position in the charter on not interfering in domestic affairs. Actually, 
he eventually came to the view that the elections in Nicaragua had an importance in terms 
of the peace process so that they were of international security importance and, therefore, 
it was justified to come in and help prepare the elections - monitor the elections, and so 
forth - without bothering about interference in the sovereignty of Nicaragua. Did you 
have the impression, at the time, that there was a problem of interference in sovereignty 
by the outside elections monitoring by the United Nations? 
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MF: Oh, yes. Depends on how you define sovereignty. You see sovereignty is a very 
difficult subject to define. Now, Nicaragua is a country, at that time in 1990, it was in a 
very difficult situation - it was an explosive situation. How sovereign can you be and 
how sovereign can we be now? 
END OF SIDE 2 OF TAPE 
START OF SIDE 3 OF TAPE 
JS: We had discussed the partiality or non-impartiality of the OAS. Did you have any 
problems with any of the U N personnel that were here in the course of the elections? 
MF: No. Neither with the OAS. They behaved. Of course there are many people who 
think that Iqbal Riza was pro-Sandinista. If you interview some radical right leaders and 
ask that question you will get that answer, unless they don't want to. Nicaraguan 
politicians sometimes are very careful. 
JS: The last question I would ask is: What do you think is the lasting impact of the 
United Nations' participation in the electoral process and also the transition process? 
MF: I have to answer that question, because you got me in a very pessimistic moment. 
JS: Just look at Cambodia. Not that I would compare . . . 
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MF: No, no. I was going to mention that but - this is a situation in which a lot of 
money was spent, action was taken, the elections were held. Just now it looks like we are 
going back to the '80s. Yes, I have been reading about Cambodia. But in Nicaragua, the 
problems - at present I am pessimistic, so don't take my point of view about this issue. 
Take it with a grain of salt. 
JS: Because again, I asked this because it is more or less a philosophical question but 
it is part of the present philosophy of the United Nations and also a good many 
academicians at Yale. That is that democratization is important in terms of the human 
rights of the people. But it is also important in terms of the prospects for peace. Because 
countries that are democratic, at least in recent history do not fight against each other and 
they are less likely to have internal struggle if there is, in fact, that degree of 
democratization. Even ethnic conflicts seem to be less likely in fully democratic 
countries. Really, my question is: To what extent do you think that the United Nations' 
can and should participate more directly in developments in a country such as Nicaragua 
in order to continue to assist in the process of democratization? 
MF: That's an issue question. My answer is yes. Because although it is very difficult 
to substantiate empirically a betterment of conditions, I think that Nicaragua as a country 
- going back to the idea of sovereignty - which can not get away without some kind of 
organizational country intervening in some degree. I personally prefer the United 
Nations. My answer would be yes. Now, the idea for me would be that the people here 
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are suffering with problems that need help - from my point of view, the World Bank and 
the Monetary Fund have very non-humane points of view and try to apply recipes - or 
appear to do so with less humane things in mind. That is my point of view. 
JS: Very good. Thank you very, very much. 
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