ARTICLE
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x OPEN
Banking disclosure and banking crises in Africa:
does board gender diversity play a role?
Daniel Ofori-Sasu 1,2✉, Maame Ofewah Sarpong3, Vivian Tetteh4 & Baah Aye Kusi2
The paper aims to investigate the impact of board gender diversity in explaining the rela-
tionship between bank disclosure and the predicted probability of banking crises in Africa.
The study employs robust panel estimates based on an aggregate dataset of banks in 42
African countries over the 2006–2018 periods. From the study, board gender diversity (more
women on boards and the presence of women on boards) has a positive impact on infor-
mation disclosure of banks. We find that board gender diversity and bank disclosure have the
possibility of reducing a banking crisis. We observe that board gender diversity enhances the
reductive effect of bank disclosure on a predicted probability of a banking crisis. The impli-
cation is that women on boards provide prudent decisions on financial information disclosure
that significantly reduce the possibility of a banking crises in order to ensure stable banking
systems.
1 University of Ghana Business School, Legon, Ghana. 2 Central University, Tema, Ghana. 3 ISSER, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana. 4Data Link Institute of
Business and Technology, Tema, Ghana. ✉email: doforisasu@yahoo.com
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x 1
1234567890():,;
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
Introduction
In recent years, the banking crises has become common resource dependency theory recognizes the need for women’soccurrence and periods of crises have brought a certain level of participation in top hierarchy roles in corporate governance anddisruption in most economies, not only in Africa but the world that firms can depend on women in corporate boardrooms as
at large (Hoggarth et al., 2001). The need for greater monitoring resources to enhance firm value. This supports the work by
of banks has emerged due to the common occurrences of banking Adeabah et al. (2018), who found that female directors on boards
crises. One possible way to instil market discipline in the mon- promote bank efficiency. However, studies have not provided
itoring process is through the inclusion of managers who have empirical evidence on how board gender diversity helps in
distinctive characteristics and in turn, can offer a great oppor- reducing possible banking crises in order to achieve a stable
tunity to influence the board’s decisions, and improve banking banking system (see, Oba and Fodio, 2013; Owen and Temesvary,
system stability (Al-Amarneh et al., 2017). Corporate governance 2018; Pathan and Faff, 2013). The signalling theory posits that
literature show that women contribute unique benefits and firms with good performance tend to make voluntary disclosures
resources, as they tend to bring diverse backgrounds, human more readily, as doing so is regarded as an easy means for the
capital and provide the board with unique information needed to company to distinguish itself from its peers (Bhattacharya and
address agency problems, foster stakeholder value and aid miti- Ritter, 1983), hence leading to a lower possibility of a crisis in the
gate possible crisis situations (Qi and Tian, 2012; Carter et al., banking system. Existing studies debate that disclosure is good for
2010; Grassa, 2018). However, the threat of disciplining action by banks as it offers greater prudence (Hossain, 2008; Eng and Mak,
market participants (particularly, depositors and investors) puts 2003; Chau and Gray, 2002) while others argue that disclosure is
management under heightened scrutiny which encourages greater bad for banks since banks have a general tendency to under
prudence and efficiency among board members. Moreover, early disclose (Clatworthy and Jones, 2006). Banks may have the ability
detection of banks’ risk exposures, weak governance system and to use greater information disclosure as a signal to attract more
banking can contain the problem in a specific bank from deposits (Grassa, 2018), and hence increase bank performance.
spreading to the entire industry. Thus, the amount of information However, full bank disclosure is not the optimal choice for banks
that banks disclose matter because the absence of information and may affect bank performance differently. Given that, existing
prevents market discipline from taking place. The attention given literature shows a positive impact of board gender diversity and
to banking information disclosure and the role that board gender bank disclosure on performance, the question, however is, whe-
diversity plays in moderating the amount of information dis- ther or not board gender diversity and bank information dis-
closed in the banking sector, particularly in Africa, is yet to gain closure lead to a reduction in possible banking crisis?
empirical support in the literature. Moreover, there has been an increasing number of women in
This study seeks to examine the impact of board gender top management and this has increased research in the area of
diversity in explaining the relationship between banking infor- board gender diversity. Conversely, research explaining the rela-
mation disclosure and the banking crisis in Africa. In line with tionship between gender diversity on board and disclosures on
the wake-up call hypothesis, this study first provides the rela- the possibility of the banking crisis is still growing in the banking
tionship between board gender diversity and disclosure in the sector. The study argues that increased disclosure and presence of
African banking system. It shows that board gender diversity women on boards should reduce the possibility of a crisis. This is
increases information disclosure of banks and supports the because board gender diversity provides managers with unique
argument of Lara et al. (2017). Disclosure can be defined as the information that allows for better decision-making and financial
act of releasing all relevant financial information pertaining to a reporting (Qi and Tian, 2012) and increases public disclosure
bank that may influence an investment decision (Baumann and (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and corporate performance (Camp-
Nier, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Lanam, 2007). Corporate bell and Minguez-Vera, 2008). Therefore, reporting or commu-
governance literature has explained the effect of governance on nicating information about a bank’s financial conditions reduces
information disclosure among banks (Bidabad et al., 2017; information asymmetry between the bank and market partici-
Bidabad and Sherafati, 2019). For instance, Bidabad and Sherafati pants while the diverse roles of women on boards provide an
(2019) explained that a better governance system results in incentive in protecting the interest of stakeholders, thereby
achieving goals like accountability, transparency and protection reducing agency problems and the possibility of a banking crisis.
of shareholders’ rights. Therefore, a better governance system The study fills this gap by providing evidence to support the
enhances disclosure. Despite the extant literature on the effect of independent relationship between board gender diversity (women
individual characteristics of corporate governance on corporate on boards) and bank disclosure and a predicted probability of
disclosure from a different context (Chantachaimongkol and banking crisis.
Chen, 2018; Al-Janadi et al., 2016; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009; Aksu Finally, the study investigates the role of board gender diversity
and Kosedag, 2005), less attention has been given to the effect of in explaining the relationship between bank disclosures and
board gender diversity on bank disclosure, particularly in Africa. banking crises. For a bank to operate efficiently, improve per-
For instance, Chantachaimongkol and Chen (2018) show that the formance, reduce the future occurrence of crisis and control its
extent of corporate disclosure in ASEAN is positively linked to risk exposures prudently, it is important to understand board
the number of board meetings, but it is negatively linked to board gender diversity and bank information disclosure. This can be
size, and board independence. In line with this argument, few argued in relation to prior disclosure studies that combine cor-
studies have analysed board gender diversity on corporate dis- porate governance and directors’ financial information experience
closure (Terjesen et al., 2015). The current study fills this gap by with disclosures (Erhardt et al., 2003; Matsunaga and Yeung,
examining the effect of board gender diversity on bank disclosure 2008; Chau and Gray, 2002). For instance, Erhardt et al. (2003)
in Africa. explained that gender diversity leads to improved performance
Secondly, it shows the independent effect of board gender and better financial performance leads to an increase in the
diversity and disclosure on the possibility of a banking crisis. amount of information disclosed by firms (Nalikka, 2009) in
While the resource dependency theory is expected to predict a developed economies. Further, theoretical ambiguity surrounding
negative relationship between board gender diversity and banking the role of gender diversity amidst the growing number of women
crises, the signalling theory is expected to predict a negative in management in explaining the relationship between informa-
relationship between bank disclosure and banking crisis. The tion disclosure and banking crisis, emphasizes the need for
2 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x ARTICLE
empirical analysis in ascertaining the effects. Nevertheless, to and bank disclosure (Francoeur et al., 2008). The resource
date, it appears there is a lack of studies that have dwelt on this dependency theory advances that female directors provide closer
gap in empirical literature from an African perspective. monitoring, participate more in committee meetings, and are
Given the discussion above, the paper contributes to bank more likely to ensure banking system stability.
governance literature by specifically considering the impact of It is argued in the literature that, a country’s financial and
board gender diversity on bank disclosure in Africa. The paper banking industry experiences a significant number of defaults
contributes to the board gender diversity and corporate disclosure (large increase in nonperforming loans), causing a reduction
literature by offering new insight into the influence of women on in the large part of bank capital and runs on banks, leading to
boards and bank disclosure on the possibility of a banking crisis a systemic banking crisis. This problem is transmitted to
occurring in Africa. Further, the paper contributes to the litera- involve a large number of institutions of the banking system.
ture by providing insight for managers, shareholders, researchers A significant number of financial institutions were affected,
and policymakers to estimate the role of women on boards in especially during the meltdown (Laeven and Valencia, 2010).
empirically explaining the disclosure-banking crisis nexus from The financial market turmoil, which started in 2007/2008 and
an African perspective. Africa presents an interesting case because turned into a global financial crisis affected the banking sector.
the banking crisis occurs at unknown intervals throughout history The results caused significant losses, massive write-downs,
in some African countries (Laeven and Valencia, 2018). More- increased impairments which altered banks’ capital ratios and
over, there have been several changes to governance standards liquidity; and the functioning of many credit markets was
and voluntary disclosure framework among banks in Africa influenced, when almost all banks recorded losses. However,
(Egboro, 2016; Adeabah et al., 2018). It is on this premise that the all these circumstances made the publication of banks’ assets
study empirically examines the role of board gender diversity and financial reporting, frequently under scrutiny, reflecting
(women on boards) in explaining the relationship between bank one of the causes of the crisis. The annual reports of the banks
disclosures and the banking crisis in Africa. during the crises were expected to provide useful information
The rest of the work is organized into four sections. Literature for the prevention of other crises in the future and also to
review of related studies is contained in the section “Literature explain to users what went wrong in the credit markets
review: theories, empirics and hypothesis development”, and (Bogolsaw, 2008). Thus, non-disclosure of financial reports
section “Data and methodology” discusses the data and metho- affects investors’ confidence in the financial system and could
dology. The empirical results are contained in section “Empirical further lead to systemic crises in the banking sector. On one
results and discussion” and section “Conclusion and policy hand, Gul et al. (2011) argue that societies enjoying a feminine
implications” concludes the study. attitude tend to be more secretive, affecting information dis-
closure practices (Chau and Gray, 2002). Women, according
to Fondas (2000) are more independent as they are not part of
Literature review: theories, empirics and hypothesis the “old boys” network, thus can increase the firm’s value. On
development the other hand, women might provide more insights about
This study draws inspiration from theories associated with corpo- companies, supporting the work by Bernardi et al. (2002) that
rate governance, financial disclosure and banking crisis. These the presence of women on boards will improve board mon-
include the resource dependency theory and the signalling theory. itoring (Carter et al., 2010), enhance the quality of public
In line with board gender diversity–corporate disclosure nexus, the disclosure through better monitoring (Gul et al., 2011) and
resource dependence theory explains the rationale for the board’s ensure a stable banking system that reduces the possibility of a
function of linking a firm to the external environment, providing banking crisis. Women on boards contribute unique benefits
advice and counsel and meeting the information needs of the and resources because they tend to bring diverse expertise and
various stakeholders (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Bear et al., 2010). leadership competencies, soft-skill resources, human capital,
The diversity characteristics of the board members that have been and backgrounds needed to improve company performance
discussed in the current literature are board gender diversity. Board and protect the interest of shareholders (Folkman and Zenger,
gender diversity is a mechanism to improve and increase corporate 2012). Thus, the presence of women on boards leads to
governance and disclosure. The diversity of the board brings dif- increasing firms’ value (Fondas, 2000).
ferent views and perspectives and problem-solving skills, leading to In economic literature, the disclosure relates to the signal-
better quality decision-making at the board level (Lara et al., 2017). ling theory that states that informational asymmetry is
In view of that it is argued that females on boards, with respect to reduced through the disclosure of risk-related information by
communication channels, are able to better monitor, due to their the management of the informed party to investors (Anifo-
experiences, networking and socialization skills, thus, resulting in wose et al., 2017). The role of information disclosure in the
enhanced information environment (Lucas‐Pérez et al. 2015; Liu banking sector is to disclose financial information to users in
et al. 2014). Following earlier studies, the study is motivated by the making a better investment decisions (Watts and Zimmerman,
fact that the resource dependency theory induces a positive impact 1986). It is possible for depositors’ behaviour of making
of women on boards in explaining corporate disclosure. investment decisions to be altered any time information is
Prior studies apply the resource dependency theory to under- available. According to Berger and Davies (1998), disclosure is
pin the importance of board gender diversity for various firm- beneficial as it allows investors to punish bad financial inter-
level outcomes, such as financial performance (Liu et al., 2014; mediaries for higher risk-taking and reward good financial
Miller and del Carmen Triana, 2009) and the possibility of a institutions for greater prudence. Despite, the benefits of
banking crisis. Theories used to explain the importance of board financial disclosure or transparency to users, information
gender diversity and how it influences banking system stability to disclosure by banks can cause investors to misinterpret par-
include stakeholder theory and resource dependency theory. ticular information revealed by a single bank to reflect the
Stakeholder theory advocates that the interest of the firm lies on weaknesses of the entire banking system, and this could be
stakeholders and that the firm must be managed in the interest of costly, as it can trigger investor or creditors’ panic—leading to
these stakeholders. Thus, companies involving more women on bank failure and crisis (Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005). A
their boards reflect protecting the interest of various stakeholders, number of corporate attributes have been used in previous
thus, a positive relationship between women’s presence on boards studies to explain the determinants of the financial disclosures
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x 3
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
of banks. Financial disclosure is made in annual reports to H2: Board gender diversity and bank disclosure reduce a
provide traditional users with information useful to them predicted probability of banking crisis;
when making investment and regulatory decisions.
Empirically, Kang et al. (2010) examined the effect of cor- H3: Board gender diversity enhances the negative impact of
porate disclosure on banking stability in Kong Chian. They bank disclosure on a predicted probability of banking crisis.
found that not only does corporate disclosure enhance stability
in the banking system, but the diversity of board members has
been one of the most important governance regulatory Data and methodology
mechanisms (Kang et al., 2010) that helps to reduce the pos- The study finds out the impact of board gender diversity in
sibility of crises in the banking sector. Watts and Zimmerman explaining the impact of bank disclosure on the banking crisis
(1986) empirically show that financial information disclosure in Africa. The study employs an unbalanced panel dataset of
increases the value of a firm because it helps financial state- 42 African countries over the 2006–2018 period. We use the
ment users in making better investment decisions. They pooled ordinary least square (OLS) panel, random effect
expanded that model, fixed effect model, two staged the least square (2SLS),financial information disclosure is beneficial to
firms as it allows depositors to reward good banks for greater and dynamic system generalized methods of moment (GMM)
prudence. Further, increasing participation of women on and the logistic regression model, but were applicable based
boards enrich board information and strengthen nancial on the specification of the models.fi
disclosure, as women on boards play an important role during Country data on macroeconomic indicators were obtained
the communication and decision-making process as to which from the World Development Indicator (WDI) while data for
(relevant) information to disclose in the reports (Erhardt et al., bank-specific variables were obtained from Bank scope and the
2003). Thus, Erhardt et al. (2003) found that women on boards Global Financial Development Databases.
strengthen financial disclosure and by so doing, improve
banking performance. However, during crisis situations, banks Model specification. Following the baseline model specification,
are less relevant to disclose financial information. Thus, the the study examines three (3) key hypotheses as expressed below:
magnitude and significance of the impact of disclosure on bank
performance are weaker in countries with banking crises The effect of board gender diversity on bank information dis-
compared to those who have never experienced a banking closure.
crisis.
More so, gender diversity increases the level of information BankDisclosure ¼ β NumWoB þ β WoB
voluntarily disclosed by companies—thus, a positive rela- ijt 1 ijt 2 ijt
2
tionship between the extent of disclosure and rm pro tability þ β3NumWoBijt þ β4LERNERfi fi ijt ð1Þ
(Erhardt et al., 2003). Nalikka (2009) finds that firms with þ β5OWNijt þ β6GDPperCapjt
female chief financial officers are associated with higher þ β7ExRatejt þ β8InfRatejt þ λj þ δt þ μi þ εijt :
voluntary disclosures in annual reports, using data from
companies listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Mitton
(2002) indicates the benefits of greater information disclosure Equation (1) shows the effect of board gender diversity on bank
in East Asia and presents in his findings that greater perfor- information disclosure. Board gender diversity is decomposed
mance during periods of crisis is linked to greater disclosure into the number of women on boards and the presence of women
quality while countries affected by the crises had lower dis- on a board. We expect women on boards to have a positive
closure. It is shown that greater disclosure requirements can impact on the information disclosure of banks. This supports the
enhance market discipline, reduce the cost of the banking resource dependency theory that female directors on boards
crises (Rosengren, 1999); and reduce the possibility of a crisis provide closer monitoring, participate more in committee meet-
in the banking sector (Tadesse, 2016). Grassa (2018) studied ings, and are more likely to improve information disclosure
whether banks should disclose more information based on (Terjesen et al., 2016). However, we expect a negative relationship
depositor discipline in East Asia, and found that healthy banks between the number of women on boards and information
can raise deposits by disclosing more information, while weak disclosure of banks. This is because banks that provide a smaller
banks cannot. number of female directors on their boards are more likely to
From the theoretical and empirical reviews, it is evident that reduce information disclosure. We introduce the square term of
the relationship between disclosure and the possibility of a the number of women on boards into the model and expect a
banking crisis may be influenced by board gender diversity. positive relationship between the square term and information
However, empirical evidence of this effect is non-existent in disclosure of banks. This implies that an additional increase of
the African context. It is worthwhile noting that studies that women on boards brings more diverse views and skills on the
investigate the direct or individual effects of board gender board, and hence promotes information disclosure of banks based
diversity and bank disclosure on banking stability exist. The on the resource dependency theory.
literature is however silent on how board gender diversity In what follows, the study looks at the effect of board gender
affects disclosure–crisis nexus. Moreover, the existing litera- diversity on the relationship between bank disclosure and a predicted
ture on board gender diversity, bank disclosure and banking probability of a banking crisis. The study shares the approach where
crises have focused largely on single countries, developed the dependent variable is a dummy variable that distinguishes
countries and developing countries (see Nalikka, 2009; Ani- between years of banking crisis and years without banking crisis in
fowose et al., 2017; Chantachaimongkol and Chen, 2018; by Africa. We use a qualitative response logit model to estimate the
Adeabah et al., 2018). probability of the occurrence of a banking crisis.
Based on the above literature review, the following hypothesis
is made: Effect of board gender diversity and bank information disclosure
on the banking crisis. The panel logistic regression method is used
H1: Board gender diversity (women on boards) increases to analyse the predictive ability of the banking crisis in Africa
bank disclosure; since the dependent variable takes the value of zero 0 and one (1).
4 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x ARTICLE
The model is expressed as follows: test indicates that the variables are normality distributed around
BankCrisis ¼ β NumWoB þ β WoB their mean. The variance inflation factor (VIF) shows thejt 1 ijt 2 ijt
þ þ ð  Þ acceptability of each explanatory variable in the dataset. Follow-β4BankDisclosureijt β5 NumWoB BankDisclosure ijt ing the rule of thumb with a threshold of 10 for VIF, VIF values
þ β6ðPres WoB  BankDisclosureÞijtþ β7LERNERijt ð2Þ were below the threshold of 10, indicating that the variables are
þ β8OWNijt þ β9GDPperCapjt þ β10ExRatejt all acceptable in the model. Some tests were conducted and these
þ β11InfRatejt þ λi þ δj þ μt þ εijt: include Breusch and Pagan LM test results. Moreover, the 2SLS
was conducted to deal with possible endogeneity that might be
The study uses panel logistic regression to analyse the effect of present in the model. However, the nature of the dependent
board gender diversity and bank disclosure on the predicted variable, which is a dummy variable (probability distribution),
probability of a banking crisis. To deal with possible endogeneity calls for the use of a logistic regression model. This is presented in
between the variables, the study employs the dynamic panel Table 6.
estimation. Following Ozili (2018), we use the dynamic panel
estimation techniques including the system-GMM estimation and
the model is specified as. Empirical results and discussion
¼ þ The study presents descriptive statistics of the explanatory vari-BankCrisisjt αBankCrisisjt1 β1NumWoBijt ables. Summary statistics and Pearson’s correlation are used to
þ β2WoBijt þ β4BankDisclosureijt screen and test the reliability of the dataset. These are presented
þ β5ðNumWoB  BankDisclosureÞijt ð Þ in order to ensure consistency, efficiency, reliability and robust-þ 3β ðPres WoB  BankDisclosureÞ þ β LERNER ness of findings (see Table 2). Return on asset (ROA) is averagely6 ijt 7 ijt
þ β OWN þ β GDPperCap þ β ExRate about 9.1%. The average number of women on Boards was 18 ijt 9 jt 10 jt
þ þ þ þ þ while there was an average of 10% for a woman to be present on aβ11InfRatejt λi δj μt εijt : board. Bank disclosure recorded an average of 5.19, ranging
In Eqs. (1)–(3), subscript i denotes the cross-sectional between 0 and 10. The average Lerner index of banks is 0.52,
dimension (bank), i ¼ 1; :::;N ; j denotes cross-sectional dimen- ranging between –1.1979 and 2.22. The average percentage of
sion (country specifics), j= 1,…,M; and t denotes the time-series board members owning shares in the company is 51.97%. The log
dimension (time), t = 1, …, T; βi; i ¼ 1; :::; 11, are regression of GDP per capita recorded a mean of 2.76. Exchange rates
parameters to be estimated; λ is the bank fixed effect i; δ is the recorded an average of 6.645 rates to the dollar and inflationi j
country fixed effect; and μ is the time fixed effect t; and ε is recorded an average of 8.86. Table 3 reports the Pearson corre-t ijt
idiosyncratic error term which controls for unit-speci c residual lation coefficient matrix to check for possible multicollinearityfi
in the model for the ith bank in the jth country at period t. between the explanatory variables. For multicollinearity to occur,
The error term of the model was tested for their assumptions of the correlation coefficient between any two variables should be
normality, autocorrelation and homoscedasticity. The coef cients 0.7 or more (Kennedy, 2008). We find no multicollinearity pro-fi
of variables were tested to address the presence of multi- blem and we proceed to run the regression.
collinearity among the predictors.
Prior to estimating the interaction effect of board gender Regression results. The study finds out whether board diversity is
diversity and bank disclosure on a predicted probability of important in explaining the effect of bank disclosure on the
banking crisis, the study looks at the independent effect of board banking crisis in Africa. First, we find out the effect of gender
gender diversity and bank disclosure on a predicted probability of diversity on bank disclosure. Second, we conduct an independent
banking crisis. effect of gender diversity and bank disclosure on the probability
From Eq. (2) the study expects a negative impact of board of a banking crisis. Finally, it examines the role of board diversity,
gender diversity and bank disclosure on a predicted probability of specifically women on boards in explaining the relationship
banking crisis. This supports the resource dependency theory and between bank disclosures and the banking crisis in Africa.
the signalling theory. The resource dependency theory argues that
women are more independent as they promote network Board gender diversity and bank disclosure. We present a
experience, thus can increase the firm’s value and reducing the robustness check by employing pooled OLS panel, fixed effect
possibility of a banking crisis. The signalling theory shows the model, random effect model, two-staged least square (2SLS) and
benefits of financial disclosure or transparency to users, and that the logistic regression model to analyse the effect of women on
information disclosure by banks increases the firm value and boards (diversity) on disclosure of banks. We test for the
reduces the possibility of the banking crisis. appropriate estimation model that best explains our results by
Next, the study interacts with board gender diversity and bank using the Hausman test and Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian
disclosure and regresses it on the predicted probability of a Multiplier Test. Board gender diversity was measured using the
banking crisis. The study computes the net effect and interprets number of women on board and the presence of women
the results based on marginal effects. Our interpretations are close on board.
to the work of Bramber et al. (2006) and we expect that board From Table 4 (Models 1–4), the number of women on boards
gender diversity enhances the negative impact of bank disclosure was negatively linked to bank disclosure. This suggests that a
on a predicted probability of banking crisis. decrease in the number of women directors limits the amount of
Description of all variables, measurements and expectations of information disclosed. Thus, smaller number of women on board
the results are presented in Table 1. decreases bank disclosure. The study found a positive impact of
the square of the number of women on boards and bank
Estimation technique. The study conducts some diagnostics disclosure. This implies that banks that increase the number of
tests. Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables women onboard above-average levels promote banking disclo-
employed in the models to screen for outliers that have the sure. The resource dependency theory predicts a positive
potential to affect the efficiency, consistency and biasness of the relationship between board gender diversity and corporate
estimated coefficients. The summary statistics do not show any disclosure as board gender diversity is expected to increase board
evidence of outliers and the Shapiro–Wilk (SWILK) normality independence, decrease information asymmetry, and hence
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x 5
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
Table 1 Summary of variables.
Variable Measurement Priori expectation
Dependent variables
Banking crisis Dummy Variable for Banking Crisis BankCrisis= 1, if banks in country j have experienced crisis Expected to change as
(BankCrisis) within a year, 0 otherwise predictors change
Independent variables
Board Gender Presence of Women on Women on Board=Dummy variable: 1, when a woman is Negative/positive
Diversity Boards (WoB) an executive member, and 0 otherwise
Number of women on Boards Proportion of women to men on the board
(NumWoB)
Greater proportion of women on sqNumber of Women= the Square of the ratio of women to
Board (sqNumber of Women) men on the board
Bank Information Disclosure Information BankDisclosure= categorical variable (0–10): level of Negative/positive
Disclosure (BankDisclosure) investor protection through disclosure of ownership and
financial information or level of releasing relevant financial
information pertaining to a bank (from no disclosure= 0, —
to — maximum disclosure= 10).
Control variables
Bank specific Competition(LERNER) Lerner Index (LERNER)= PriceMarginalCostPrice Negative
variables Ownership (OWN) Percentage of board members who hold shares in the bank Negative
Macroeconomic Exchange rate (ExRate) Annual Exchange rate per year Positive
variables GDP growth (GDPpercapt) Natural logarithm of GDP per capital Negative
Inflation rate (InFratet) Inflation rate per year Positive/Negative
Source: Computation from World Development Indicator (WDI), World Governance Indicator (World Bank), Global Financial Development Database and Bankscope and Authors’ computation.
Table 2 Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max SWILK VIF (mean VIF= 1.27)
Banking Crisis 0.0591 0.2359 0 1 0.00***
Number of Women 1.1011 1.5186 0 11 0.00*** 1.98
Women on Boards 0.0985 0.1248 0 1 0.00*** 1.97
Bank Disclosure 5.1982 2.3684 0 10 0.00*** 1.01
LERNER 0.5100 0.4930 −1.1979 2.2209 0.00*** 1.03
OWN 0.5197 0.4996 0 1 0.00*** 1.01
GDPperCap 2.7602 4.0427 −17.4726 24.2148 0.00*** 1.04
ExRate 6.645 7.81 0.9165 10.2657 0.00*** 1.07
infRate 8.8618 5.5289 −1.8006 33.2242 0.00*** 1.03
Women on Boards=Dummy variable: 1, when a woman is an executive member, and 0 otherwise; Number of women on board measured as the proportion of Women on Board; Bank
Disclosure= categorical variable (0–10): level of investor protection through disclosure of ownership and financial information or level of releasing relevant financial information pertaining to a bank
(from no disclosure= 0, — to — maximum disclosure= 10); Lerner index is the only measure of competition; Ownership (OWN) is the percentage of board members who hold shares in the bank;
Exchange Rate (ExRate) is the Annual Exchange rate per year; GDP per capita (GDPperCap) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital.
Table 3 Pairwise correlation matrix and the significance of the variables.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of Women (1) 1
Women on Boards (2) 0.6897 1
Bank Disclosure (3) −0.597*** −0.671*** 1
LERNER (4) −0.391*** −0.363*** 0.574*** 1
Own (5) 0.282* 0.213*** 0.102*** −0.482*** 1
lnGDPperCap (6) 0.649* 0.448*** 0.325*** −0.131*** −0.107*** 1
ExRate (7) −0.221* 0.697* 0.317*** 0.1064** 0.092 0.2619*** 1
InfRate (8) −0.009 −0.368* 0.357** −0.0291 0.118* 0.438* 0.1023* 1
Women on Boards=Dummy variable: 1, when a woman is an executive member, and 0 otherwise; Number of women on Boards measured as the proportion of Women on Boards; Bank
Disclosure= categorical variable (0–10): level of investor protection through disclosure of ownership and financial information or level of releasing relevant financial information pertaining to a bank
(from no disclosure= 0, — to — maximum disclosure= 10); Lerner index is the only measure of competition; Ownership (OWN) is the percentage of board members who hold shares in the bank;
Exchange Rate (ExRate) is the Annual Exchange rate per year; GDP per capita (GDPperCap) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital.
Significance level: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
increase information disclosure. Again, the presence of women on relationship between gender–board diversity and corporate
board has a positive impact on bank disclosure (see Models 1–4). disclosure.
This supports the resource dependency theory that induces a From our results, although the number of women on boards
positive impact of gender-board diversity on corporate disclosure. has a negative and significant relationship on disclosure across
It agrees with the work of Lara et al. (2017), who found a positive the models, we observe that the square of women on boards has a
6 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x ARTICLE
Table 4 The relationship between board gender diversity and bank disclosure.
Variables Pooled OLS panel Fixed effect Random effect 2SLS
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Number of Women −0.104*** (0.0231) −0.104*** (0.0186) −0.104*** (0.0185) −0.161*** (0.0326)
sqNumber of Women 0.0789*** (0.0240) 0.0784*** (0.0131) 0.0789*** (0.0138) 0.127*** (0.0329)
Women on Boards 1.279*** (0.368) 1.278*** (0.258) 1.279*** (0.258) 2.372*** (0.547)
LERNER 0.294*** (0.0662) 0.314*** (0.0604) 0.294*** (0.0638) 0.107 (0.111)
OWN 0.0685 (0.0638) 0.0652* (0.0363) 0.0685* (0.0365) −0.0401 (0.0896)
LnGDP per capita 0.0263** (0.0105) 0.0256** (0.00902) 0.0263*** (0.00906) −0.00357 (0.0197)
Exchange Rate 1.43e−05 (1.11e−05) 1.04e−05 (9.41e−06) 1.43e−05 (9.76e−06) 7.01e-05** (2.96e−05)
Inflation Rate 0.0128** (0.00566) 0.0163*** (0.00289) 0.0128*** (0.00432) −0.00824 (0.00988)
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument (Board Expenses) 0.00318**(0.00135)
Constant 4.961*** (0.0823) 4.927*** (0.0783) 4.961*** (0.0918) 5.536*** (0.184)
Observations 2869 2869 2869 2869
R-squared 0.013 0.013
Hausman test
Chi 11.26
Prob > chi 0.0808*
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test
Chi 0.00
Prob > chi 1.00
The dependent variable is bank disclosure which is a categorical variable (0–10). For robustness checks, it employs the pooled OLS, Fixed Effect, Random Effect and the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS).
Women on Boards=Dummy variable: 1, when a woman is an executive member, and 0 otherwise; Number of women on boards measured as the proportion of Women on Boards; level of investor
protection through disclosure of ownership and financial information or level of releasing relevant financial information pertaining to a bank (from no disclosure= 0, — to — maximum disclosure= 10);
Lerner index is the only measure of competition; Ownership (OWN) is the percentage of board members who hold shares in the bank; Exchange Rate (ExRate) is the Annual Exchange rate per year; GDP
per capita (GDPperCap) is the natural logarithm of GDP per capital. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
positive and significant relationship on disclosure (see Models which may interfere with the goal of achieving banking stability.
1–4). This suggests that an increasing degree of women on boards Moreover, women on boards may bring independent views that
confirms a positive relationship between board gender diversity align the interest of shareholders with board directors and protect
and disclosure through resource dependency theory and the interest of owners to achieve the objective of attaining
stakeholder theory where women play an important role in banking system stability.
protecting the interest and information of investors and We observe that the presence of women on a board, is
stakeholders. Our results show non-linear or an indirect negatively and significantly linked to the possibility of the
U-shaped relationship between the number of women on board banking crisis in the regression (Model 5). This shows that
and bank disclosure. Thus, protection of shareholder’s interest or the presence of women on boards has a direct negative effect on
banks’ financial information (disclosure) reduces but reaches a the possibility of the banking crisis. This can be explained that the
limit as the number of women on board grow. Thus, disclosure presence of women on the boards provide an incentive to reduce
may decrease as the number of women on boards increases to a the banking crisis while controlling for a prudent information
point where the relation hits the optimal or maximum point from disclosure environment.
which disclosure will increase. The implication is that banks The study found that disclosure has a negative and significant
should keep an optimal number of women on boards in order to relationship with the predicted probability of a banking crisis (Model
enhance disclosure. 5). This can be explained that disclosure reduces information
asymmetry and confirms the signalling theory that disclosure is
Independent effect of board gender diversity and bank disclosure beneficial as it allows investors to take higher risks and reward good
on banking crisis. Next, we find out the independent effect of financial institutions for greater prudence. This shows that increasing
board gender diversity and disclosure on the predicted probability disclosure is likely to reduce the possibility of a banking crisis. This is
of banking crisis, using the logistic model. We conduct a because banks in countries with strong information-sharing
robustness check (pooled OLS panel, fixed effect model, random mechanisms are able to decrease the banking crises.
effect model and two-staged least square (2SLS)) to identify the The negative impact of board gender diversity and bank disclosure
consistency and efficiency of the estimates, as shown in Table 5. on the banking crisis is consistent and robust across all the models
However, we interpret our results using the logistic regression (Models 5–9). The findings can be explained that a large proportion
model (Model 5) due to the nature of the dependent variable (i.e., of women on boards and the presence of women on boards increase
a dummy variable (probability distribution). the amount of information disclosed, especially for banks who
In Table 5, our results present a negative and significant are prone to taking more risk and whose market had yet to perceive
relationship between the number of women on boards and serious problems. Moreover, women on boards bring diverse
predicted probability of banking crisis (model 5). This shows that opinions in the boardroom, bring strategic inputs to the board,
increasing the number of women on a board is likely to decrease influence decision making and ensuring leadership and boardroom
the likelihood of a banking crisis. This is in line with the work by behaviour, and hence increase banking system stability and reduce
Lucas‐Pérez et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2014); as this implies that the likelihood of a banking crisis.
more women on boards may reduce the problem of cohesiveness, In what follows, we investigate the joint effect of board gender
control and flexibility of decision making, decrease communica- diversity and disclosure on the predicted probability of a banking
tion costs, as well as reducing gender conflict and imbalances crisis.
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x 7
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
Table 5 Robust checks: Independent effect of board gender diversity and bank disclosure on banking crisis.
Variables Logistic regression Pooled OLS panel Fixed effect Random effect 2SLS
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Number of Women −0.496*** (0.0482) −0.0426*** −0.0421*** −0.0426*** (0.00205) −0.0873*** (0.0211)
(0.00544) (0.00225)
Women on Boards −3.245*** (0.859) −0.218*** (0.0378) −0.211*** (0.0216) −0.218*** (0.0194) −1.590*** (0.205)
Bank Disclosure −0.973*** (0.317) −0.00327** −0.00312** −0.00327*** 0.00610 (0.0101)
(0.00154) (0.000775) (0.000902)
LERNER 1.835*** (0.186) 0.110*** (0.0123) 0.117*** (0.0208) 0.110*** (0.0217) −0.0693 (0.0512)
OWN 0.899*** (0.185) 0.0448*** (0.00857) 0.0450*** 0.0448*** (0.00324) −0.00452 (0.0455)
(0.00368)
LnGDP per capita 0.104*** (0.0186) 0.00503*** 0.00569 (0.00477) 0.00503 (0.00413) −0.0561***
(0.00102) (0.00885)
Exchange Rate −0.000872*** −1.76e-05*** −1.86e-05*** −1.76e-05*** −4.39e-05***
(6.34e-05) (1.58e-06) (4.45e-06) (3.72e-06) (1.12e-05)
Inflation Rate 0.0892*** (0.0134) 0.00482*** 0.00543 (0.00401) 0.00482 (0.00346) −0.0144***
(0.000706) (0.00453)
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Instrument (Board 0.00764***
Expenses) (0.000509)
Constant −4.722*** (0.500) −0.0679*** −0.0766* (0.0378) −0.0679** (0.0308) 0.720*** (0.0803)
(0.00907)
Observations 2,917 2,917 2,917 2,869
R-squared 0.116 0.120
Pseudo-R square 0.6122*** 0.5648***
Hausman test
Chi 15.18
Prob>chi 0.0337**
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test
Chi 0.00
Prob>chi 1.00
The dependent variable is banking crisis, constructed with dummy, equal to 1 if a country experienced banking crisis. For robustness checks, it employs the pooled OLS, Fixed Effect, Random Effect and
the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS). Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Interaction effect of board gender diversity on the relationship (presence of women on a board and number of women on a
between bank disclosure and banking crisis. We use the logistic board) and banks’ information disclosure on the banking crisis.
model to examine the role that board gender diversity plays in This was done by using the system-GMM analysis that controls
explaining the relationship between bank disclosures and banking for possible endogeneity between board gender diversity,
crises. The dynamic system GMM model is employed as a disclosure and banking crisis.
robustness check. In Table 6, the previous year’s crisis in the banking sector had a
In Table 6, we find that the unconditional effect of bank positive impact on the current banking crisis (see Models 12 and
disclosure was negatively and significantly linked to the banking 13). This shows that the banking crisis in the past is persistent
crisis. The coefficient of the presence of women on boards is over time. Bank disclosure has a negative and significant
positive. However, the coefficient of the interaction term between relationship with the banking crises (Models 12 and 13). This
the presence of women on boards and bank disclosure was indicates that increasing the level of bank information disclosure,
negative and significant. Thus, the conditional effect of bank reduces information asymmetry and builds investor confidence
disclosure is negative and significant (see model 10). For instance, and thereby attracting more investment opportunities for higher
using model 10, the net effect of bank disclosure on the presence returns to the banks. Hence, bank disclosure has a reductive effect
of women on boards based on the coefficients is as follows: on the banking crisis.
Banking crisis=−0.109+ (−0.0299)(presence of women on The estimated net effect of bank disclosure on banking crisis
board)=−0.1389, when a woman is present on a board. The conditioned on board gender diversity shows that the negative
net effect is negative and this suggests that the negative impact of impact of bank disclosure on banking crisis is magnified in the
bank disclosure on the predicted probability of banking crisis is presence of board gender diversity (see Models 12 and 13). The
enhanced when a woman is present on board. Thus, the presence implication is that women on boards should provide a prudent
of women on boards increase the reductive effect of bank decision on financial information disclosure that would significantly
disclosure on the likelihood of a banking crisis. enhance banking profitability in periods with the banking crisis.
In Model 11, the conditional effect of bank disclosure is
negatively and significantly linked to the predicted probability of
banking crisis (see Model 11). The net effect is estimated to be Conclusion and policy implications
−0.1336. This suggests that the reductive effect of bank disclosure The study extends the existing literature on gender board diver-
on the predicted probability of banking crisis is enhanced when sity and disclosure in the African banking system. The aim of the
the number of women on boards increases. In Models 12 and 13, study is to investigate the role of board gender diversity (presence
the study analyses the interaction effect of board gender diversity of women on boards and the number of women on boards) in
8 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |           ( 2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x ARTICLE
Table 6 Interaction Effect of board gender diversity on the relationship between bank disclosure and banking crisis.
Logistic regression Dynamic GMM
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13
Banking Crisist−1 0.925*** (0.00591) 0.858*** (0.0153)
Bank Disclosure −0.109*** (0.0400) −0.155*** (0.0433) −0.997*** (0.275) −0.654*** (0.248)
Number of Women 0.365*** (0.0397) 0.525*** (0.0796)
Women Present on a Board −3.844*** (0.798) −2.611*** (0.492) −0.0429*** (0.00206) −1.247** (0.495)
Women on Board*Bank Disclosure −0.0299** (0.0142) 0.146* (0.0850)
Number of Women*Bank Disclosure 0.217** (0.109) −0.185*** (0.0686)
LERNER 1.840*** (0.178) 1.818*** (0.183) 1.825*** (0.182) 0.120 (0.491)
OWN 0.973*** (0.179) 0.913*** (0.182) 0.885*** (0.182) 0.460*** (0.117)
LnGDP per capita 0.132*** (0.0172) 0.113*** (0.0181) 0.110*** (0.0182) −0.0965 (0.0769)
Exchange Rate −0.00108*** −0.000943*** −0.000966*** 7.21e-05
(7.20e-05) (7.22e-05) (7.22e-05) (0.000185)
Inflation Rate 0.0822*** (0.0115) 0.0889*** (0.0128) 0.0894*** (0.0130) 0.0622*(0.0339)
Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -5.945*** (0.343) -6.486*** (0.384) -5.296*** (0.293) −0.886 (0.656)
Pseudo-R square 0.5088*** 0.6114***
Hansen Test 0.001 0.293
AR(1) 0.000 0.000
AR(2) 0.199 0.748
Observations 2,917 2,935 2,935 4,330
Net Effect −0.1389*** −0.1336*** −0.9826*** −0.8577***
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
explaining the effect of bank disclosure on the banking crisis. The managers to use greater information disclosure as a signal to
study employs different panel estimates based on a dataset of 42 attract more market participants.
African countries over the 2006–2018 periods. First, the study Future research can look at how board gender diversity and
examines the effect of board gender diversity on the disclosure of information disclosure are associated with banking stability in the
banks. It further explains the independent effect of board gender different regulatory frameworks for other regions.
diversity and disclosure on the banking crisis. Lastly, it analyses
the interaction effect of gender diversity and disclosure in Data availability
explaining the possibility of the banking crisis. From the study, All data analysed are contained in the paper.
the presence of women on boards impact information disclosure
of banks positively while the number of women on boards has a Received: 26 May 2021; Accepted: 13 December 2021;
non-linear relationship with band disclosure. The non-linear
relationship can be explained that a smaller number of women on
boards reduces bank disclosure but above the average number of
women on boards triggers a positive impact on bank disclosure. References
This indicates that women on boards play a significant role in Adams RB, Ferreira D (2009) Women in the boardroom and their impact on
enhancing the level of information disclosure in the banking governance and performance. J Financ Econ 94(2):291–309
system in Africa. Adeabah D, Gyeke-Dako A, Andoh C (2018) Board gender diversity, corporate
We observe that women on boards negatively lead to the governance and bank efficiency in Ghana: a two stage data envelope analysis
(DEA) approach. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of
possible occurrence of a banking crisis. We find that banks Business in Society 19(2):299–320
with more women on their boards have the possibility of Akhtaruddin M, Hossain MA, Hossain M, Yao L (2009) Corporate governance and
reducing a banking crisis. We find that a greater level of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports of Malaysian listed firms.
information disclosure by banks reduce the possibility of a Journal of Applied Management Accounting Research 7(1):1–23
banking crisis. Thus, disclosure was negatively linked to the Aksu M, Kosedag A (2005) The relationship between transparency and disclosure
banking crisis. Again, we observe that bank disclosure reduces and firm performance in the Istanbul Stock Exchange. J Soc Sci 3(10):11–34Al-Amarneh A, Yaseen H, Iskandrani M (2017) Board gender diversity and dividend
the predicted probability of a banking crisis when women are policy: case of Jordanian Commercial Banks. Corp Board: Duties Compos 13:3
present on a board. Al-Janadi Y, Rahman RA, Alazzani A (2016) Does government ownership affect
The implication is that women on boards should bring their corporate governance and corporate disclosure? Evidence from Saudi Arabia.
unique roles and soft skills when making decisions on the board, Manag Audit J 25-35 https://doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-12-2015-1287
especially protecting the rm around a certain level of disclosure Anifowose M, Rashid HMA, Annuar HA (2017) Intellectual capital disclosure andfi corporate market value: does board diversity matter? J Account Emerg Econ
environment, so as to reduce banking crisis. The study provides 22:33–54
evidence to support that bank disclosure reduces the predicted Baumann U, Nier E (2004) Disclosure, volatility, and transparency: an empirical
probability of banking crisis while the negative impact is ampli- investigation into the value of bank disclosure. FRBNY Econ Policy Rev
ed in the presence of board gender diversity. 10(2):31–45fi
The implication is that banks should keep an optimal choice of Bear S, Rahman N, Post C (2010) The impact of board diversity and gendercomposition on corporate social responsibility and firm reputation. J Bus
information disclosure and optimal size of women on boards, so Ethics 97(2):207–221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0505-2
as to reduce possible banking crises and maintain a stable banking Berger AN, Davies SM (1998) The information content of bank examinations. J
system. Further, women on boards are expected to encourage Financ Serv Res 14(2):117–144
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |            (2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x 9
ARTICLE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x
Bernardi RA, Bean DF, Weippert KM (2002) Signaling gender diversity through Matsunaga, SR, Yeung PE (2018) Evidence on the Impact of a CEO’s Financial
annual report pictures: a research note on image management. Account Experience on the Quality of the Firm’s Financial Reports and Disclosures.
Audit Account J 15(4):609–616 AAA 2008 Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (FARS) Paper,
Bhattacharya S, Ritter JR (1983) Innovation and communication: signalling with Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1014097
partial disclosure. Rev Econ Stud 50(2):331–346 Miller T, del Carmen Triana M (2009) Demographic diversity in the boardroom:
Bidabad B, Sherafati M (2019) Bank information disclosure, financial transparency mediators of the board diversity–firm performance relationship. J Manag
and corporate governance in rastin banking. International J Shari’ah Corp Stud 46(5):755–786
Gov Res 2(1): 2019 Technical Paper ISSN 2578-0387 Mitton T (2002) A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the
Bidabad B, Amirostovar A, Sherafati M (2017) Financial transparency, corporate East Asian financial crisis. J Financ Econ 64(2):215–241
governance and information disclosure of the Entrepreneur’s Corporation in Nalikka A (2009) Impact of gender diversity on voluntary disclosure in annual
Rastin Banking. Int J Law Manag 59(5):636–651 reports. Account Tax 1:1
Bogolsaw D (2008) How to fix financial reporting. http://www.businessweek.com Oba VC, Fodio MI (2013) Boards’ gender mix as a predictor of financial perfor-
Bramber T, Clark WR, Golder M (2006) Understanding interaction models: mance in Nigeria: an Empirical Study. Int J Econ Financ 5(2):170–178
improving empirical analysis. Political Analysis 14(3):63–82 Owen AL, Temesvary J (2018) The performance effects of gender diversity on bank
Campbell K, Minguez-Vera A (2008) Gender diversity in the boardroom and firm boards. J Bank Financ 90:50–63
financial performance. J Bus Eth 83(3):435–451. https://doi.org/10.1007/ Ozili PK (2018) Banking stability determinants in Africa. International Journal of
s10551-007-9630-y Managerial Finance 14(4):462–483
Carter DA, D’Souza F, Simkins BJ, Simpson WG (2010) The gender and ethnic Pathan S, Faff R (2013) Does board structure in banks really affect their perfor-
diversity of US boards and board committees and firm financial performance. mance? J Bank Financ 37(5):1573–1589
Corp Gov 18(5):396–414 Qi B, Tian G (2012) The impact of audit committees' personal characteristics on
Chantachaimongkol N, Chen S (2018) The influence of corporate governance earnings management: evidence from China. J Appl Bus Res
attributes and national characteristics on information disclosures: a case of 28(6):1331–1343. https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i6.7347
ASEAN. European. J Account Financ Res 6(5):47–72 Rosengren E (1999) Will greater disclosure and transparency prevent the next
Chau GK, Gray SJ (2002) Ownership structure and corporate voluntary disclosure banking crisis?. In The Asianfinancial crisis: Origins, implications, and
in Hong Kong and Singapore. Int J Account 37:247–265 solutions (pp. 369–376). Springer, Boston, MA
Clatworthy MA, Jones MJ (2006) Differential patterns of textual characteristics and Tadesse S (2016) Stigma against tuberculosis patients in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
company performance in the chairmana’s statement. Accounting, Auditing & PLoS ONE 11(4):e0152900
Accountability Journal 19(4):493–511 Terjesen S, Aguilera RV, Lorenz R (2015) Legislating a woman’s seat on the board:
Egboro, Edwin M (2016) The 2008/2009 banking crisis in Nigeria: The hidden institutional factors driving gender quotas for boards of directors. J Bus Eth
trigger of the financial crash. Journal of Economics, Management and 128(2):233–251
Trade. 1–16 Terjesen S, Couto EB, Francisco PM (2016) Does the presence of independent and
Eng LL, Mak YT (2003) Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board
accounting and public policy 22(4):325–345 diversity. Journal of Management & Governance 20(3):447–483
Erhardt N, Werbel J, Shrader C (2003) Board of director diversity and firm Watts RL, Zimmerman JL (1986) Positive accounting theory. Prentice-Hall, Eng-
financial performance. Corp Gov 11:102–110 lewood Cliffs, New Jersey
Folkman J, Zenger J (2012) Are women better leaders than men? Harv Bus Rev
http://hbr.org
Fondas N (2000) Women on boards of directors: gender bias or power threat?. Competing interests
In Women on corporate boards of directors (pp. 171–177). Springer, The authors declare no competing interests.
Dordrecht
Francoeur C, Labelle R, Sinclair-Desgagnè B (2008) Gender diversity in corporate Ethical approval
governance and top management. J Bus Eth 81:83–95 Ethical approval to conduct this study was not applicable.
Goldstein I, Pauzner A (2005) Demand-deposit contracts and the probability of
bank runs. J Financ 60(3):1293–1327
Gul F, Srinidhi B, Ng AC (2011) Does board gender diversity improve the infor- Informed consent
mativeness of stock prices? J Account Econ 51(3):314–338 This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of
Grassa R (2018) Deposits structure, ownership concentration and corporate gov- the authors.
ernance disclosure in GCC Islamic banks: Empirical evidence. J of Islam
Account and Bus Res 9(4):587–606
Hillman AJ, Dalziel T (2003) Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating Additional information
agency and resource dependence perspectives. Acad Manag Rev Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Daniel Ofori-Sasu.
28(3):383–396. https://doi.org/10.2307/30040728
Hoggarth G, Reis R, Saporta V (2001) Costs of banking system instability: some Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints
empirical evidence. Bank of England Working Paper No. 144
Hossain M (2008) The extent of disclosures in annual reports of banking com- Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
panies: the case of India. Eur J Sci Res 23(4):659 680 published maps and institutional affiliations.–
Kang E, Ding DK, Charoenwong C (2010) Investor reaction to women directors.
Kong Chian: Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School of Business
Kennedy P (2008). A guide to econometrics. John Wiley & Sons
Laeven L, Valencia F (2010) Resolution of banking crises: the good, the bad, and the Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
ugly. International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper 10/146, June 2010 Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
Laeven L, Valencia F (2018) Systemic banking crisis revisited, IMF Working Paper, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
18/206 appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Lanam L (2007) Consumer disclosure as consumer protection. J Insur Regul 26:2 Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
Lara JM, Osma G, Mora BGA, Scapin M (2017) The monitoring role of female material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless
directors over accounting quality. J Corp Finance 45:651–668 indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
Linsley PM, Shrives PJ (2005) Transparency and the disclosure of risk information article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
in the banking sector. J Financ Regul Compliance 13(3):205–214 regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
Liu Y, Wei Z, Xie F (2014) Do women directors improve firm performance in the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/
China? J Corp Financ 28:169–184 licenses/by/4.0/.
Lucas‐Pérez ME, Mínguez‐Vera A, Baixauli‐Soler JS, Martín‐Ugedo JF, Sánchez‐
Marín G (2015) Women on the board and managers’ pay: Evidence from
Spain. J Bus Eth129(2):265–280 © The Author(s) 2022
10 HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES COMMUNICATIONS |           ( 2022) 9:12 | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-01019-x