YALE-UN ORAL HISTORY 
Jan Eliasson 
Interview II 
April 11, 2000 
New York, N Y 
Interviewer: This is an interview with Jan Eliasson, State Secretary of the Swedish 
Foreign Ministry. You have long worked with Iraqi issues. What role did you play in 
bringing the Iran-Iraq war to an end? 
Jan Eliasson: I was serving with Prime Minister Olof Palme in the early eighties as his 
assistant when he was Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for the Iran-Iraq 
war. We negotiated with the Iranians and the Iraqis for several years. It was a tense 
period. It was between 1980 and 1982 that we conducted shuttle diplomacy between 
Baghdad and Tehran. Olof Palme, as we all know, was assassinated in 1986. In 1988, I 
was asked by Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to be his Personal Representative on the 
Iran-Iraq issue, after the cease-fire had been agreed upon between the parties, and after 
Resolution 598, which regulated the peace later on between Iran and Iraq, had been 
agreed upon. 
The Secretary-General found, after arduous and long negotiations in Geneva, that 
he could not spare the time to do this negotiation himself, so he therefore asked me to 
join him in Geneva in August 1988. I spent parts of fall 1988 in Geneva, and also 
conducted shuttle diplomacy to bring about the implementation of Resolution 598. 
Intensely in 1988, but I continued till 1992, when I entered the United Nations in another 
capacity. At the time I was U N ambassador, but in 1992, I became Under-Secretary 
General for Humanitarian Affairs. In that context, I changed perspective on Iraq, because 
up until then, I had been dealing with war between Iran and Iraq, the regulation of 
Resolution 598. But after 1992, I worked with Iraq from a different perspective, namely 
the humanitarian perspective. At that time, as you may know, there was quite a difficult 
situation for the Kurds in the north. They had been organized into special areas, and we 
had to conduct special humanitarian programs in the North. 
I: Did this only concern the Kurdish or was this also with the Shia's in the south? 
JE: It was supposed to be all of Iraq, but the emphasis of the program was on the 
Kurdish situation. It was also easier to work in the north, because in the south there was 
considerable repression by the regime in Baghdad. There had been an uprising in the 
south by the Shiite community and it had been very harshly repressed and therefore our 
programs were difficult to conduct. I want to tell you that I very much wanted to expand 
the program to the south, but it wasn't easy. I kept perspectives then on Iraq from the 
humanitarian side. For two years I stayed as Under-Secretary-General. My last contact 
with Iraq was 1997, when Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked me, together with former 
Foreign Minister Brahimi and the former U N Ambassador of Argentina, Cardenas, to go 
to Iraq to try to persuade the Iraqis to cooperate with us. Those were my three areas of 
cooperation with Iraq. 
I: To go back to the role that you had in ending the Iran-Iraq war, how did you 
prepare for it? 
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JE: Well, to tell you the truth, we had a very short time to prepare. Prime Minister 
Olof Palme received a call by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt 
Waldheim, who asked him to come to New York the following day. He called him in his 
suburban house and Olof Palme told me that he was actually on his way over to bring a 
bottle of wine to his neighbors; they were having a little dinner. He was back in the 
house to pick up this bottle of wine. When he was there, the phone starts ringing, and he 
says to himself "Should I answer or not? After all, I have dinner with friends." But he 
picked up the phone and there was Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, asking him to go 
as Personal Representative for Iran-Iraq. 
The war had started in September 1980. This was the 10 t h of November 1980. 
He took one day to consider the issue and decided to accept the following evening, the 
11 t h. He called the then Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten and asked whether he could have a 
person from the Swedish Foreign Ministry to help him. I was then newly appointed head 
of the African and Asia department, and the two, Ola Ullsten and Olof Palme agreed that 
I would be the one to be asked. But the call did not take place until the following 
morning at 7 o'clock. So 7 o'clock in the morning, Olof Palme called. I didn't know 
about this at all. So he said, "I've been asked to be the Personal Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Iran-Iraq. I need someone to help me. I've talked to Ola Ullsten 
last night. I didn't want to call you late last night. I want to ask you now. Could you 
join me?" I said, "Do I have time to decide?" "Well," [he said], "The press conference 
starts at 9:30 and the flight leaves at eleven o'clock for New York." I said, " N ew York, 
so we don't go to the area?" "No," [he said], "We must spend some days in New York to 
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prepare for the mission and discuss with the experts at the U N . " I decided that same 
morning, and we left. To tell you the truth, it was a very difficult preparation. I had 
followed the conflict, of course, from my profession. Then we spent three or four intense 
days discussing with everybody who knew anything, including the parties, 
knowledgeable ambassadors, including the five Permanent Members of the Security 
Council. Then we went out, because we had a very clear mission to try to stop the 
fighting and we also had a Security Council resolution to base our work on. 
I: This is my second question here. How did you and Olof Palme work together 
when he was the Secretary-General's Personal Representative? 
JE: We worked very closely together, of course, but we also had a team. We were not 
a completely Swedish team. There was a colleague, Diego Cordovez, who later became 
Under-Secretary-General and then dealt with Afghanistan. Diego, by the way, is 
Ecuadorian. Then we had Iqbal Riza, who was a Pakistani, and who is now Secretary-
General Kofi chef de cabinet. We had later Giandomenico Picco, an Italian. We had an 
international team. We were working very closely with not only the Secretariat, the 
Secretary-General and his staff, but also with the Permanent Five. There was a Security 
Council resolution which was the basis of our work and we were in constant dialogue 
with the five Permanent Members of the Security Council in New York and Geneva. 
We had a problem. The first resolution of the Security Council only asked for a 
cease-fire in place; it did not ask for the withdrawal of troops from the international 
border. That gave us considerable problems with the Iranians, because the Iranians 
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claimed that of course if there is a cease-fire, there also has to be a requirement to go 
back to international borders. 
I: But at that time, weren't the Iraqis the only ones who were outside the borders? 
JE: Yes, the Iraqis were far inside Iranian territory and the Iranians, in order for them 
to agree to a cease-fire, wanted to have guarantees that the Iraqi troops would withdraw 
to the Iraqi border. In fact, this was our biggest problem in order to have credibility with 
the Iranians, who had a tremendous suspicion toward the outside world. You must 
remember that the background was the hostage-taking of Americans and the great fear 
that the Khomeini regime would export revolution to the outside world. In fact, most of 
the world's sympathies at that time were on the side of the Iraqis, so the Iranians were 
very suspicious that the world would accept the Iraqi invasion. 
Therefore they absolutely insisted on the withdrawal of the Iraqis troops to the 
border. Olof Palme and I discussed this in depth, how we would deal with that problem. 
We came to the conclusion that, yes, there was no mention of the withdrawal in the 
resolution - which, in fact, was a disadvantage for the credibility of the Security Council 
at that time - but we also could make reference to international law. According to 
international law, you may not acquire territory by force. It's a rule of international law 
that was not written into the resolution. 
So we said to the Iranians that it may not be part of the resolution but in fact we 
are all bound by international law and that you may not take territory by force. That 
helped us to establish dialogue with the Iranians. They accepted our negotiations but 
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they also saw a certain split, a distance between us and the Security Council resolution. 
It was a fascinating period, particularly in the beginning when the Iranians had so little 
experience with international negotiations. 
I: So you mean that the Iraqis had more experience? 
JE: The Iraqis were more experienced. The Iraqis had much better prepared dossiers. 
You might even have thought that they knew that this was coming. They had maps, they 
had arguments and we met of course always Saddam Hussein. We spent several hours, 
over 20-25 hours with him. We spent a lot of time with the then Foreign Minister 
Hamadi, and the later Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, who is extremely skillful and very 
sophisticated, and knowledgeable, and with a tremendous grasp of details which I am 
sure you will hear about from Hans Blix, Kofi Annan, and Rolf Ekeus later on. 
They were also very proud of never changing their views and positions. They 
said, "You go to Iran, you hear one thing from the mullahs, and then you hear another 
thing from President Bani Sadr, but from us you will hear the same thing. If you trust us, 
if you make an agreement with us, it will hold, but for the other side, you will never 
know who is in charge." At the beginning, the Iranians were less knowledgeable, less 
sophisticated, didn't know much about international law. They were bound by shari'a 
law and the Quran, and not by international law. But later, it changed. The Iranians have 
tremendous potential, they are educated people, and they came in, and later proved that 
they had similar skills. 
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I: You have long worked with Iraqi issues. How would you describe the necessity 
and efficiency of U N S C O M inspections during that time? 
JE: I think they did a very effective and useful job. 
I: It was hard since it was the first time it had ever been done. 
JE: Yes, of course it was the first time ever that this type of forced disarmament had 
taken place but in fact, it was an almost remarkable success. They were definitely 
successful in almost bringing about the elimination of nuclear capacity. It is hard also to 
conceive that the Iraqis could still keep the long-range missile capacity. Of course the 
most difficult area is, as you know, biological and chemical weapons, which are difficult 
to detect and also easy to conceal, and very easy to produce different combinations in 
different places. Therefore, with the issue of biological and chemical weapons, there has 
to be a much greater trust in the intentions of the Iraqis and that trust hasn't really existed. 
That's why the inspections are still needed as we will now see with Mr. Blix's experience 
with this task. 
I: Yes, exactly. Would you like to see them operate or work differently from the 
way they did? 
JE: I was there in 1997 for the Secretary-General and at that time, the Iraqis showed 
us videos of inspections taking place, where perhaps the manner in which the inspections 
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were taking place was not correct. Even if we deal with a country that has been guilty of 
war crimes or atrocities - in this case, they used chemical weapons against their own 
population and definitely against the Iranians around 1984 - I think there is a minimum 
standard of correct behavior. At least, the video portions they showed us, which of 
course were also part of the Iraqi propaganda, showed that some of the inspections were 
not done in such a way that inspired confidence. I think there has to be an element of 
correctness and that was not always there. But all in all, I think they did a good job. I 
was impressed by the skill and professionalism of the staff. It is important that the 
recruitment is as international as possible, and I hope that Dr. Blix will be successful in 
having a truly international recruitment for this important task, which is a common task 
to the United Nations. 
I: Do you think that UNMOVIC should work differently from UNSCOM? 
JE: Well, the Security Council had a long, and I would say to some, painful, 
discussion about the mandate for U N M O V I C and there were certain changes in the 
mandate. I still think that you cannot get away from the fact that there has to be on-the-
ground inspections. You have to, by your own eyes, by your presence, see that things are 
in order, and I would hope that the Iraqis would realize that it is in their interest to have 
inspection on the ground. Unless this inspection is done on the ground to confirm that no 
weapons of mass destruction are produced, only then can the sanctions be lifted, and we 
all know the tremendously painful tragic effect of the sanctions for the Iraqi people. I 
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would hope that they would realize that there have to be pretty detailed inspections but 
that the good thing coming out would be the lifting of sanctions. 
I: How were the operating procedures changed for UNMOVIC in comparison to 
UNSCOM? For example, now the Iraqis know how U N S C O M and the West work, and 
they know how to find a way around it. 
JE: Well, the problem is, of course, that i f there are bad intentions, it is very difficult 
to get anywhere. That's why there has to be, also on the Iraqi side, a realization that they 
cannot continue this game. Some years ago, it was absolutely clear that they had 
concealed and that they had deceived the international community. Mr. Ekeus and his 
team found that it was obvious that they had given false information, and you can't do 
that because, i f that is done, you ask yourself, "What else do they hide?" 
Especially when it comes to, as we said earlier, biological and chemical weapons, 
it's hard for anyone on the outside to have a hundred percent certainty of what you think 
is the case. In the case of nuclear weapons, you know that there is a need for so much 
equipment, that you can indeed prove it. With biological and chemical [weapons], there 
has to be an element of faith, and that unfortunately has been sadly lacking. 
I: During the work of U N S C O M , many countries were working very closely, and 
sharing sources of information and intelligence. Do you think that this could lead to a 
danger in a future situation, that actually these countries, between each other, know too 
much about each other? 
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JE: I don't think so. I think that it's important for the United Nations to have a 
system of receiving classified important information to deal with crises. The ideal case 
would of course be that the United Nations itself had this capacity, but you can't expect 
that the United Nations could have the sophisticated equipment and also perhaps the 
methods to bring in the information that exist within countries like the Permanent Five 
(the United States, U K , France, China, and Russia). 
I would also think that it would be a good thing i f one could receive information 
from different countries. Then of course it's up to each country to decide whether they're 
willing to take the risk of sharing this information with the United Nations. It's up to 
them to make that calculation. I think its important that i f you receive information from 
one country, you should also ask for information from other countries, because otherwise 
there might be suspicions that you have special relationships with one or two other 
countries and have special channels of communications with them. 
I: That country would be more vulnerable than the other countries. 
JE: Exactly, and I think it might sound paradoxical, but you have to be transparent 
and open about dealing with classified information. If you receive classified information 
from let's say, the United States, one should be able to say to Russia, We have asked the 
Americans about information, we asked them to provide what they know, now we ask 
you, what can you help us with? Then of course the calculation that they will have to 
make is, Is this a risk that this will come to the other side? Fortunately, we live in a time 
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which is not the Cold War, so relations between Russia and the United States have 
improved considerably in the nineties as compared to the eighties and seventies. But I 
think that you would get a better answer to this question, from first Rolf Ekeus, and later 
on from Hans Blix, who is going through exactly this problem. 
I: Iraq is very divided in terms of its people and religions and so forth. How was the 
national stability during the time of the inspections and do you think that the tension on 
Iraq actually led to domestic peace, or more stability than there was before? 
JE: In Iraq? 
I: Yes. 
JE: Could you repeat that question? 
I: I think it [Iraq] is pretty unstable, when thinking about the situation with the 
Kurds and Shiites, and when the severe tension was actually on Iraq [from abroad], did 
that lead to increased domestic stability within the country? 
JE: I see. Well, I think the fact that the world's eyes were directed to particularly the 
Kurdish situation, led to a restraint and a caution on the side of the Baghdad government. 
They had of course paid a very a high price, with the invasion of Kuwait, and Saddam 
Hussein was saved by his skin at the end of that war. He knew that he was going to be 
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very hard-pressed. The Americans and the British were conducting the operation, and 
also to make sure there were no flights over the Kurdish area, and this was a reminder to 
the regime, that there could be also very concrete reactions. So they were watched. On 
the other hand, Iraq is a tremendously close and isolated society. First of all, because of 
the character of the regime, but also, perhaps tragically, by the sanctions. This means 
that the population is receiving only the official news, that i f anyone dares to suggest 
something different, I wouldn't want to sign on their life insurance. So, it was a very sad 
form of stability, stability under repression, and under the fear of another military 
confrontation. 
For the people of Iraq to talk about this period as a positive period is very 
difficult; they had a combination of repression and, as you know, a very low standard of 
living, as compared to how the Iraqi lived when I came there at the beginning of the 
eighties. Then there were boys and girls in school uniforms, very well fed, in good 
housing districts. In fact, one of the good things about that regime was very little 
corruption. Health clinics were built, schools were built, roads were built, the oil riches 
were pretty well distributed. That Iraq is the Iraq of the past. I was there in 1997, after 
17 years - well, I'd been there all through the eighties, but I hadn't been there between 
1992 and 1997 - those five years, I saw a serious deterioration of the physical conditions. 
But also sadly, in the eyes of people, an emptiness, a situation without hope. Therefore it 
is important that, in the future, of course, Iraq would be allowed back into the 
international community, because this could be a very dangerous type of society that 
could be developed. But that's another story. 
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I: France has always treated Iraq differently from what the rest of the Western world 
has done. Why is this so? Was it something to do with their nuclear weapons policy, or 
is it mainly because of treaty relations? 
JE: I think it has nothing to do with their nuclear policy. I hope to God not.. .no, I 
think it has to do with historic relations. It has to do possibly with economic and 
commercial interests. I said earlier that most of the world had sympathy for Iraq at the 
beginning of the war because Iran was seen as the culprit although, in retrospect, that 
picture should be rectified. At that time, there were also very substantial deliveries of 
arms to Iraq. Those deliveries came, to a large extent, from Russia and from France. So 
today, one of the greatest debts that Iraq has to the outside world is to France. So France, 
and also Russia, have an interest in bringing Iraq back into the international community, 
to be getting enough oil to pay back their debts. Iraq and France have had this long term 
economic and commercial relationship which I think perhaps played the most important 
part. Plus, in the beginning, there was sympathy with Iraq vis-a-vis Iran. 
I: Besides Russia and France, China has also been very friendly. Does that also 
have to do with the same thing? 
JE: Well, with China, I think it's also that they don't have the same sensitivities as 
some others about the democratic character of the society. China has always been 
negative to the actions of Western powers, especially i f it is done on their own, and not 
[through the] the Security Council and the United Nations. It would seem that also in 
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issues related to Kosovo and other areas, China has stood for respect of national 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and shown a reluctance for military action. They have 
agreed or abstained in certain situations, but the picture is clear. Iraq has met with the 
greatest sympathy in the Security Council by China. For some periods also, with Russia, 
and on sanctions with France. But when it came to the invasion of Kuwait, I want to say 
that it was striking how unified the international community was. When Iraq invaded 
Kuwait, everybody took a stance on that. There was no hesitation. China did not 
hesitate. Russia did not hesitate, and of course France did not. Then there was a 
complete support for the action, which was one reason for the success - well, it's never a 
success to see people die - but after all, the invasion was turned back and he [Saddam 
Hussein] had to get back. That was also a result of the unified U N position. Not only 
was the Security Council unified, but also the General Assembly. 
I was at that time U N ambassador, and I was traveling around the States, giving 
speeches about negotiations between Iran and Iraq which was a special subject of mine. I 
remember one time, after the invasion of Kuwait, and after the U N took this stand, and 
after the operation had succeeded and the Iraqi troops had withdrawn to Baghdad, I 
received a standing ovation. I was representing of course the U N and someone who had 
dealt with Iraq, in the United States, as you know, where there is a pretty UN-skeptical 
attitude. So there was unity when it comes to clear cases of breaches of international law. 
I: It's not often that it happens. 
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JE: There was a problem later on, when it came to the reaction to the Iraqi action 
against UNSCOM. There was always a very difficult discussion with Britain and the 
U.S. on one side of the Security Council, France usually on their side on the key issues, 
but still on sanctions, not taking the same view. Then Russia and China particularly 
being very skeptical of U N S C O M . That weakened the United Nations vis-a-vis the Iraqis 
and the Iraqis could of course use that, take advantage of the split in the Security Council. 
I: Do you think that was the reason why it was so important for Rolf Ekeus to keep 
it as independent as possible? 
JE: Definitely. He was still met with suspicion, as he will probably tell you. And of 
course, Butler was received with even more suspicion. 
I: How willing were the Iraqis to negotiate? 
JE: In the beginning of the war in 1980, they were very reluctant to negotiate. They 
felt that they had the military initiative. They also felt that Iranian society was in 
disorder. They also felt that there was a risk of Iranian export of revolution of a religious 
character, and as you yourself have said earlier, there is a large Shi'a community in the 
south of Iraq. Very few people know that the holiest places for the Iranians, or the 
Persians, or the Shi'as, are two places in Iraq [the cities of Najaf and Kerbala], where in 
fact Khomeini spent time. The Iraqis threw him out. Khomeini was there in the middle 
of the seventies; he was there for a long time. He was thrown out by the Iraqis because 
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he was considered a nuisance, I think, inside their own society. He was at one of the two 
holiest places and he was thrown out. In fact, he was thrown out to France, where he 
stayed. When Khomeini arrived in Iran, you may remember, he came by a flight from 
Paris to Tehran. But the point is simply that the Iraqis were feeling at the time that yes, 
they had the military initiative, yes, Iran was dangerous, and they were in fact hoping for 
some type of military victory. Even there were those who were speculating that Iraq 
wanted to take the southern province of Iran, which is called Khuzistan.. They call that 
province by an old Arab name, Arabistan, and the Iranians always said, "Look, they are 
changing names. They want to invade, they want to occupy this territory." 
I: They actually warned you? 
JE: The Iranians were extremely suspicious. They of course said, "Yes, they want to 
occupy us;" that they will not hand over territory. That's why we had to remind them 
about international law, the non-acquisition of territory by force. If the Iraqis had 
attacked them, which they claimed, and they had a good case to say that, then in the end, 
by international law, territories should be returned. That's why we had a negotiation 
basis with them. Now I come to your question again: in the beginning they didn't have 
any, or very little interest, in negotiation. We went through the motions. Later on, when 
the Iranians took back the territory, sometimes with tragic elements, child soldiers and so 
forth, and when the Iranians came to the international border, they unfortunately decided 
to go into Iraq, to punish the Iraqis. By that, they lost the moral high ground. They could 
have gained a lot, in my view, at that time to say, "Here, we have thrown them out but we 
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will stop at the border." That could have given them a tremendous boost internationally, 
but instead they continued into Iraq. Then the Iraqis became interested in negotiating, 
then the attitude changed. 
We had two methods of negotiation: one was to try to have a comprehensive 
settlement, a settlement with all the elements which later turned up in Resolution 598. 
But when that failed, we also tried something which we called a step-by-step approach, 
which I would call with a metaphor like "Pulling out the teeth of the war." 
I: Make it weaker. 
JE: Make it weaker, to ban attacks against the other side by artillery that could hit 
civilians, to ban attacks against traffic in the Shatt al Arab, in the Gulf area, to ban the use 
of chemical weapons - which should be banned anyway. To pull the teeth out of the war 
so you would reduce the level of warfare, and then negotiate in a calmer climate. We 
also suggested something which was a joke to begin with, but then turned out to be pretty 
serious. We suggested that the parties should respect or accept what we called a "verbal 
cease-fire," in other words, tone down the propaganda in the words. Don't hate each 
other so much in the press, don't condemn too much, lower the tone. Why don't you 
have a cease-fire in words? And this was half a joke, and then both of them realized it 
was very important, because it's only when you reduce the level of hatred that you can 
make a compromise. 
So, in sum, a long answer to a short question, in the beginning, very little interest 
in the negotiations. After a couple of years, greater interest. In the end, I think the 
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agreement on 598 was brought about by a combination of a realization that nothing could 
be gained by either of the sides, and simply war-weariness. They had paid a tremendous 
price, maybe 7-800,000 people had been killed, maybe 3 million refugees had been out 
on the roads, and the material destruction was incredible. But here is a point. I compared 
the end results of Resolution 598 with our proposals in the early eighties when we went 
to the area, and the tragic conclusion is that there was a minimal difference in the 
proposals that we made in the early eighties and the end result in 1988. In the meantime, 
during seven years, 700,000 people had been killed, 3 million refugees, enormous 
material destruction had been produced. What was the point? They could have agreed to 
this in 1981 or 1982. 
That's the tragedy of war. But you know, when war starts, it's like the genie 
getting out of the bottle. You can't get it back, and the war creates mechanisms of hatred 
within a population. You have to make legitimate the sacrifice to your own population. 
You have to punish the other side. If your brothers and sisters have been killed, then in 
another month, it's even more brothers and sisters killed, and then in a year, it's hundreds 
of thousands, and then the longer the war goes on, the more difficult it is to back down. 
One tends to become philosophical about this. 
I: Do you think that the Iraqi inspection question has been handled through the right 
means? 
JE: Well, we talked about that earlier. I think the first step, the decision on 
U N S C O M , was a very firm and good answer and I think in world history, it could turn 
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out to be important that you find a method of really dealing with the basic ills. So the 
resolution was good, and I think Rolf Ekeus did a very good job, but as I said earlier, 
there were some problems with the way the inspections were taking place, the manner in 
which the inspections were taking place. That, I think, could be rectified. I also think it's 
important that the members of the Security Council see this as a common task, that they 
all, all of them, work united. There was a tendency that this was considered an American 
issue, or a U.S./U.K. issue. That is not right, because this should be an international 
concern. So I think, I hope, that the Permanent Five in the Security Council see this in 
the future as a common task. Otherwise, it could be exploited by the Iraqis. So the more 
you can have unity in the Security Council, the better. 
I: This is very difficult. 
JE: It's very difficult. But after all, they agreed on the resolution, and the resolution 
is now the basis for UNMOVIC. The key question now is whether Iraq will cooperate. 
I: Should one have been careful from the very beginning? But as you talked about 
the question in the situation between Iraq and Iran, you were a little more pro-Saddam. 
JE: No, I think you are right. There was a period where the work was too much 
influenced by the Iranian hostage taking, which was of course, a terrible action, and a 
very grave mistake by the Iranians. I think also there was a fear, probably at the 
beginning justified, about the export of revolution. The character of the regime was such, 
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when it comes to human rights and treatment of minorities, that there was a feeling of 
repulsion and definitely strong criticism, and rightly so, from all over the world. I think 
this influenced the judgment of the conflict, which was in fact another thing. 
I: But it took so long for -
JE: It took so long, and even when it became clear, around 1983-4, that chemical 
weapons were used, in my view, in the beginning first by the Iraqis - possibly later on by 
the Iranians, which is not to be condoned either - but it was started by the Iraqis. The 
Iraqis talked during our negotiations about terrible weapons that they could use. 
I: You mean, threatening you? 
JE: They were threatening not us, but the Iranians. They were saying that they may 
have human waves, they may have hundreds of thousands of young soldiers, or even 
children, but that will not help. We [the Iraqis] will have something to reply. That was 
always, by us - we thought in terms of them developing some type of weapon. It turns 
out that it was possibly, probably, chemical weapons, possibly also biological weapons. 
There were rumors already at the time of nuclear capacity. But, in retrospect, yes, I think 
we condoned the Iraqis too much. There was some type of irrational sympathy for Iraq 
who were fighting the Iranians, so that we nurtured the phenomenon, a regime which was 
on its way to develop weapons of mass destruction and not only develop them but also 
use them. I think we have now paid a tremendous price in seeing those weapons in the 
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hands of a regime which was also willing to use them against its own population. I think 
that says it all. 
I: What are the main reasons and motivations in the development of all the weapons 
programs? 
JE: I think, in the beginning, I'm almost convinced that it was the fear of the survival 
of the nation. They were fearful that Iran would, with a larger population and greater 
mobilization capacity, win the war. 
I: But did the Iranians have any intentions? 
JE: Well, the Iranians, according to shari'a law, were thinking always in terms of 
punishment. If you attack someone, there has to be a punishment. The punishment was 
not the classical view, but also punishing them physically. We had a situation once 
where we suggested they withdraw to the international borders. Then they said, "Yes, 
and then we have to punish the soldiers." [We asked] "What do you mean, punish the 
soldiers?" [They said] "Well, according to shari'a law, they should have lashes." This 
was at the very beginning, they didn't have much of an international law. But then, they 
claimed that i f someone breaks into your house, there has to be a punishment, they have 
to be punished, at least the officers. And of course this was not possible for us. But then 
the following day we found a quotation from the Quran, thanks to our friend Iqbal Riza, 
who is Muslim. He found a quote with which to open the negotiations saying that, "If the 
21 
enemy turns its back at you, you are not allowed to attack him." So we told them, in the 
Quran, it's also this recognition, so then they changed their attitude. But what was the 
question? 
I: What were the reasons and motivations in developing the main weapons 
programs? 
JE: In the beginning, it was no doubt that the Iraqis felt that they had to have a 
capacity to deter the Iranians from invading Iraq. That gave them a great motivation to 
develop the weapons. Later on, after the war was over, there was another motivation. It 
was to achieve a superior power position in the Middle East, to develop a regional 
leadership role, and possibly also the factor is not only the relationship between Iran and 
Iraq but also between Israel. They saw the capacity that they had developed during the 
war as an instrument to develop their great power as a nation. Those are the two reasons. 
The first reason was because of the war, and perhaps the legitimate fear that they were 
going to be invaded. But they of course used a method which is absolutely unacceptable. 
They broke all international conventions. But I would be interested to hear from Rolf 
Ekeus how it's done, have him answer the question politically. 
[end of Side One, beginning of Side Two] 
I: With whom did you go to Iraq, and what was the main purpose? 
22 
JE: Well, I went in three capacities: the negotiations with Olof Palme and also later 
on, when I myself was the Personal Representative, with the U N team in both cases. I 
went to Iraq also in 1997, for the mission for Kofi Annan, to try to get the Iraqis to 
cooperate with UNSCOM. The third function was between 1992 and 1994, when I was 
Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and we established the program, the 
humanitarian program, mainly in the north, in the Kurdish area. We also tried to 
establish the program in the south for the Shi'a groups, but unfortunately it was more 
difficult. We had great cooperation from the Kurdish authorities and it's no secret that 
we also sent in much of the material, the food, the medicine, from Turkey, which was a 
very difficult issue vis-a-vis the Iraqis. It was of course not quite in conformity with 
what they considered respect of their territorial integrity. But I opened up an office in 
Baghdad, I established an office there. I was careful to have the office in the capital, 
although we had local offices of course also in the north. The program in the beginning 
was stumbling. It was very difficult because we had to get money from voluntary 
contributions. There was no Food for Oil program, so we could not get the sale of oil and 
by that get food, as was established in 1995. So we had to get a quarter of a billion 
dollars every year, 250 million dollars, by voluntary contributions. 
I: And this was mainly governmental? 
JE: Yes, mainly governmental. There were some NGOs [non-governmental 
organizations] establishing themselves slowly. The most active ones were C A R E 
Australia, who took care of the food distribution, World Food Program U N was very 
23 
active, UNICEF was there, different U N specialized agencies. Later, more NGOs came 
in; I think also Save the Children and others. They were working also through Turkey, 
but it was a period when I noticed the slow deterioration of the situation among the 
people, the humanitarian situation, a situation which has deteriorated even more during 
these recent years. Although the Food for Oil Program meant quite a relief, not only 
when it comes to fund-raising but also to the situation on the ground, there were still 
deficiencies. To feed a population of 22 million of this nature, with this program, is not 
possible, and the program took some time to expand to the sites that were needed, and 
also to get rid of some of the bureaucracy. For instance, we couldn't send tires for 
ambulances or spare parts to the oil industry, because they could be used according to 
some for dual-use [for weapons]. 
I: Who actually decided what could be used as dual-use? 
JE: It was a Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council, which was 
set up, and the Sanctions Committee worked by instructions from the fifteen governments 
of the fifteen members of the Sanctions Committee. In other words, U K had to go back 
to London, and U.S. had to go back to Washington, and so forth. Then they came back 
and it was a rather difficult bureaucratic exercise. 
I: Did you have people stationed there? 
24 
JE: Yes, we had an office in Baghdad and we had local offices, particularly out in the 
Kurdish area. We tried to establish offices also in the south and for a limited period of 
time, I think we had UNICEF and the World Food Programme in Basra, but they couldn't 
work very well. So our main presence was in Baghdad and the Kurdish area. 
I: Was transportation mainly done by cars or was it by air? 
JE: No, mostly by cars, by trucks going in from Turkey. There was a considerable 
trade from Turkey to Iraq, and of course back. Some material came from Baghdad but 
mostly via Turkey, by road. 
I: Your trips to Iraq to negotiate, you wanted to get very many different things out 
of each of the trips, but did you get the answers that you wanted? Did you get out of it 
what you wanted? 
JE: You mean the first part of the negotiations, the early eighties? Or do you mean 
later on? 
I: I was actually thinking about all three of them. Did you reach your goals, and 
was there anything that surprised you? 
JE: No, in the beginning the Iraqis were not very cooperative because they felt they 
had military victory within reach, and they also were extremely fearful of the export of 
25 
revolution. So there was not much cooperation, although they were courteous and logical 
as they said all the time. 
I: They said that they were logical? 
JE: Logical, yes, they were logical, and you could trust what you hear from the Iraqi 
side. In other words, they were implying that from the Iranian side, there was a change of 
leadership and you never knew if you talked to someone who could decide, was it the 
mullahs or was it Bani Sadr, the president in the early stages of the revolution. So they 
were courteous, they were well-organized, but when it came to real political will to find a 
settlement at the beginning of the war, no. This changed when Iran took over, when the 
Iranian initiative led to the withdrawal, led to bringing the Iraqis back to the border, and 
of course when Iranians entered their territory, it was a different thing. We tried also to 
get step-by-step solutions, but it wasn't easy. We got something important though. The 
bombardments of the civilian population that took place were ended by an agreement on 
the 11 t h of June, I think, 1984. This was interesting, because it was one of the successes 
actually of negotiation. We had a pretty somber picture when it comes to success, but in 
1984, we took the initiative of asking the two sides to stop the bombardment of the 
border areas, which had hurt civilians to tremendous and tragic degrees. Both sides 
accepted. We sent a cable Friday to the two sides. We asked them to respond by 
Sunday, not to each other, but to us, so that the commitment was made not to the other 
side, because they refused to have anything to do with each other at the time, but they 
26 
could of course accept us. So they sent the cable to the Secretary-General of the U N , and 
said that yes, we would respect not bombarding civilian targets across the border. 
I: What made them accept this? 
JE: Well, I think that they both paid a heavy price for this, and it of course led to the 
suffering of a lot of people and I think both sides saw the disadvantages of these rockets 
coming into their land and their villages. So it was in both sides' interest. But the 
negotiation construction was interesting. I think it should be kept in mind for other 
conflicts when parties don't want to have anything to do with each other, that you don't 
ask them to agree between each other, but you ask them to agree with a third party. This 
takes off the political burden to make a "deal" with the other side. They responded to our 
humanitarian requests that the civilians should not suffer. So they said, Yes, due to your 
humanitarian reasons, we will accept. In the later stages, the Iraqis were very reluctant. 
They didn't like our humanitarian program, because the Iraqis wanted to have the lifting 
of sanctions immediately, so they were very suspicious of us. If we had a well-
functioning humanitarian program, the world would not notice that the Iraqi population 
was suffering. In fact, the Food for Oil Program was not accepted until 1995. It was 
devised in 1993, but it took two years for it to be established, partly because the Iraqis 
feared that it would take away the pressure of world and public opinion to take away 
sanctions. 
I: That's why it took so long? 
27 
JE: Right, plus also some negotiations among the fifteen [on the Sanctions 
Committee], not quite similar views between, lets say, the United States on the one hand 
and China on the other. The last part of cooperation was of course when we came at the 
end of 1997, to persuade Tariq Aziz and the Iraqis to cooperate with UNSCOM. That 
was very tough. I think, on the surface it looked like a failure, our mission, but it was not 
a failure. We sent a very strong message to them that they had to cooperate, and I think a 
couple of weeks after we had visited, after the mission, the Russians put in a great push -
I think Ivanov and Primakov - told the Iraqis to cooperate - and then they agreed. So 
this was the first crisis vis-a-vis Iraq, though there was another one in February, which 
we also overcame it. But then came the third one, when the bombings took place. Three 
times we attempted. It looked like a failure in the beginning, but I think it was a success 
from the point of view that they, in the end, did agree to cooperate. But it took some 
time. 
I: Interesting, actually, that it took Russians to do the final -
JE: Yes, I think that without the Russians pushing in the end, I don't think it would 
have worked. There's an interesting parallel to Kosovo, where also in the end, when 
Ahtisaari went to Belgrade, remember that the most important person in his group was of 
course Chernomyrdin, the former Prime Minister of Russia. When Milosevic saw 
Chernomyrdin on the side of Ahtisaari, he realized that Russia was not on his side. In the 
same way, Saddam Hussein also felt that he would not be saved by the Russians. That 
28 
shows the importance of unity in the Security Council. Remember, we talked about 
Kuwait earlier, the invasion of Kuwait and the unified response and how solid the U N 
was. If you are split, it's always exploited, by Milosevic or by Saddam Hussein. 
I: We touched the subject about the bombardment of urban areas. What role did 
you and Palme have in this period? 
JE: We were very instrumental. I remember phone calls to Iqbal Riza and from Iqbal 
Riza, who was then the contact point to the Secretary-General, and in fact I think Iqbal 
and I worked out the formula, together. Of course, I discussed this with Palme. We also 
had this firm deadline. We didn't want to just put in a request. We said, You have to 
answer by Sunday night at six o' clock, to put a certain drama in the initiative. Then, of 
course, I don't recall who thought of this, but whoever did had a brilliant idea, and I 
won't take the credit myself, but it was very smart that we didn't want them to respond to 
each other. They should respond to us, to Olof Palme and to the Secretary-General. We 
were very instrumental. 
I: I know that you had a big role in drafting Resolution 598, but what were you 
actually doing? What was your direct role in it? 
JE: Well, Olof Palme had died on the 20 t h of February, 1986. I started as U N 
ambassador in March 1988. I took on the new task as Personal Representative of the 
Secretary-General in the end of August 1988. The resolution was being discussed, or 
29 
rather an action was discussed in the beginning of 1987. At the time, the Cold War was 
coming to an end, at least some wise people felt that this was in the air. One of them was 
Perez de Cuellar and he took the initiative to suggest the Foreign Minister's meeting in 
the beginning of 1987. At that meeting [which took place later], there was a high degree 
of consensus that one would indeed make a common effort and really put pressure from 
all five members and the Security Council on both sides to end the war. Capitals were 
working, Perez de Cuellar's office was working, I was contacted by some members of the 
Security Council, and I went to some capitals to discuss the elements of the resolution, 
because I had six, seven years of experience with the issues and Palme and our team had 
presented comprehensive settlement ideas back in 1981 and 1982. Those elements were 
indeed very useful and they were put partly into the resolution later on. The main work 
was done in May/June of 1987, and the resolution was adopted by one of the sides in 
1987 and by two of them in July 1988, and the cease-fire came into place. Very much 
also thanks to Saudi Arabia, which played a very constructive role in the end. And then 
of course, the negotiations about the implementation of Resolution 598 started in the end 
of August in Geneva. 
I: You talked about Saudi Arabia's importance. What kind of importance? How 
could they have been important? 
JE: Well, Saudi Arabia is of course a very prestigious nation in the area, but they had 
also supported Iraq considerably during the war. Iran was for most of the period of the 
war also a threat to Saudi Arabia. The export of revolution to Sunni communities, Sunni 
30 
societies, was a real threat. Therefore, Iraq was given considerable support from Saudi 
Arabia, and if then the leadership of Saudi Arabia required Iraq to end the war, this was 
in their interest, too. I think it had an impact. Even some Iraqis have admitted that the 
Saudi influence in ending war was instrumental in making them agree to the cease-fire 
and Resolution 598. 
I: And isn't it also that the Iraqis owed them a lot from the war? 
JE: Indeed, quite a lot, both politically and above all financially, billions of dollars. 
I: Could you describe the problems you encountered trying to bring the two parties 
together in implementing the provisions of Resolution 598, and what was each side trying 
to achieve? 
JE: There was a tremendous degree of suspicion between the two, after this war, with 
all this hatred, also the historic hatred between Arabs and Persians, or at least the distance 
between the two. But then, the whole personal element - Saddam Hussein, Khomeini -
feelings were running very high. The negotiations at the end of August, beginning of 
September, were extremely difficult, extremely tiresome. I felt all the time that we were 
going to have a negotiation breakdown. I was keeping them busy all the time, because I 
didn't want them to have any excuse to leave. So I invented new questions, and I t old 
them that the Security Council would eagerly wait for their answers. I kept them working 
from early morning to late in the night, and still I tried to look fresh in the morning to 
31 
receive them and give them the impression that we were prepared to be there forever, i f 
needed, and we were prepared for every session and negotiation. 
I even had contact with the airport in Geneva. There was at the same time, the 6 t h 
and 7 t h of September 1988, a non-aligned movement meeting in Cyprus, and we were 
fearful that they would sneak out there and go out as a pretext that they would go to this 
non-aligned meeting and then we wouldn't see them [again]. So my office was even in 
contact with the airport. We had an agreement that if the engines were warming up, or i f 
they asked for permission to leave, we would be informed. So that showed the 
nervousness around that negotiation. 
Their suspicion took many forms. I can tell you even some funny parts about the 
sensitivities. They [the parties] had to enter the room at the same time, so we had 
security people in both side rooms with walkie-talkies to make sure that they entered the 
room at exactly the same second, so that one side would not be put in the position - a 
humiliating position, to them - of waiting for the other side. 
I: Everything took place in Geneva? 
JE: In Geneva, at the Palais des Nations, the big palace. Majestic rooms, I remember. 
Another funny example was the shape of the table. It's classical diplomacy negotiations 
that the shape of the table could be an issue of dispute. But it was. We had, in fact, the 
meeting organized to begin with in the form of a table of the form of a " U " , with us of 
course connecting the two. They realized that if they have a " U " , you would have to look 
at each other straight into the eyes, and they then suggested - it was both sides who 
32 
wanted this - that the table should be changed to a triangle so that the two sides would 
not face each other, and they could talk through us, the third party. They still wanted to 
give the impression that there were no direct negotiations, but through us. Perez de 
Cuellar and I joked about this sensitivity: "How do we bring them together?" We came 
on the idea that we should have a coffee table at the tip of a triangle, where the two sides 
were to meet. We had brewed coffee coming in, waited long for the pause to break, good 
cookies were brought in! Then we broke it [the pause, tension], and the Secretary-
General said, "Now I invite you to the coffee table." They reluctantly approach ed the 
table, moved like cats around it. And then they started talking. That was the beginning 
of contact. 
I: Around the coffee table? 
JE: Yes. 
I: Do you think they liked it? Liked the coffee [break], I mean? 
JE: Yes, indeed. There were at first discussions between the interpreters, then 
between delegation members who knew the language. There was one other story though. 
I just thought about it. There were two people in the delegations who were very open to 
contacts and discussions. One was Ismat Kitani, who later worked with the U N , Iraqi. 
The second one was Cyrus Nasseri, who was the Iranian ambassador to Geneva. I invited 
them to something in my hotel that I jokingly called "Confidential Breakfast." Let us 
33 
have a "Confidential Breakfast" together! So both of them accepted after a couple of 
weeks of these types of talks, because I needed to have them sit with me and discuss 
between us. We couldn't do it in the negotiation room. 
I: Do you mean that you were alone during these negotiations? 
JE: Yes, at that time I was alone. With the Confidential Breakfast, it was the three of 
us, so the three of us had breakfast at the Hotel Intercontinental. We all three of us refer 
to this as the "Confidential Breakfast of October 1988." This was the first time I could sit 
in the same room with the two parties, with people in responsible positions, and discuss 
the different formulas of negotiation. This shows the sensitivities in the beginning. 
I: Great stories! 
JE: I hope it comes out on the tape recorder! 
I: How did you assess Iraq's chemical warfare capacity on the basis of your 
observations during the Iran-Iraq war? 
JE: Well, we had reports about the use of chemical weapons, already I think in the 
end of 1983. We took it very seriously but we felt that it couldn't be a negotiation issue, 
because it was a very serious charge, of course by the Iranians, which had to do with the 
respect of international conventions and humanitarian rules of warfare. 
34 
I: So at that time it was just rumors? 
JE: It was rumors till the end of 1983. Then, in 1984, a mission was sent by the 
United Nations to the area. This mission was led by Iqbal Riza, who did a very good job, 
not surprisingly, but he did a very good job. This report, I think, puts a rather clear 
burden of responsibility on the Iraqis. So though it did not exclude also chemical 
weapons used by the Iranians, it gave certainly the impression - which was the right one 
- that Iraq has started the use of chemical weapons. At that time it was obvious that it 
was not only rumor, because there were Iranian soldiers brought back from the front to 
the hospitals in Tehran. I was there myself in 1983-1984, and I didn't go there physically 
myself, but we had people who had been visiting these hospitals. There was no doubt in 
our mind that, in fact, chemical weapons had been used against those soldiers. There 
were terrible, terrible, terrifying sights. They died, of course. But there were those who 
were in great pain, and the effect of those weapons was obvious. Anyway, the U N report 
came out and interestingly enough, Iqbal Riza came into trouble. He was criticized by 
Iraq for the report. There were also some other actions that were taken against him and 
he was not working with Iraq-Iran issues for some time after that. Which was of course 
not fair, because he did a very good job. So we saw it [chemical warfare] coming, and 
this was another example of the world's soft and rather unclear reactions to the Iraqi side. 
You asked earlier about whether we should not have been tougher. If you get a report 
which puts a rather strong burden of responsibility on one country about the use of 
35 
chemical weapons, I think there should be a very strong international reaction. 
Unfortunately, it did not come about. 
I: And you want us to be aware of it for the future? 
JE: Yes, of course! How could you imagine, how could you in the future deal with 
other conflicts i f you make a judgment that you like one party more than the other? 
That's why he [Saddam Hussein] could use methods that are not in conformity with 
international law. It doesn't make sense. 
I: Could you briefly describe your working experience with Iraqi and Iranian 
representatives? What was your impression of Saddam Hussein, Tariq Aziz, Rafsanjani, 
and Velayati? 
JE: Well, there's a story on each. Saddam Hussein, the undisputed leader, 
tremendous sense of unlimited power, a respect that almost entered the area of fear, and 
obedience, a combination. You could almost feel the fear in the room. He was not used 
to informal remarks or direct questions. He looked at me in a combination of amusement 
and irritation as I asked some very basic questions about their intentions, going back to 
internationally recognized boundaries. Questions that had never been posed to him, 
evidently. We had long negotiations. 
I: Why do you think that was? People didn't dare to [ask him questions]? 
36 
JE: No, in certain political cultures, the leaders don't get the difficult questions, don't 
get the bad news. You know, as with the Greek messengers, you share bad news, your 
chance of survival is not very high. That's the beauty of democracy, that you are 
sometimes beaten up, but you are not surprised at criticism. Apart from the cultural gap, 
you have to sharpen your arguments, and he didn't know the answers to some of the basic 
questions. But I spent hours and hours with him. I remember he walked me down to his 
map-room, where he showed me with a big stick where the troops were, that they in fact 
could invade all of the area but they were restrained, they only need a buffer zone from 
Iranian aggression. He took great pains in describing the situation to me and I felt there 
was a lack of information, lack of critical questions, posed to him, that I was probably the 
first one to pose these questions. I had a similar experience when I was there with Olof 
Palme in the early eighties. I met him alone, of course, once when I was also 
implementing 598. 
Tariq Aziz is extremely skillful. He is tough, he's knowledgeable, he is shr ewd, 
smart, has a tremendous power of details but also good political sense. So as a 
negotiation partner, he is respectable but very difficult. Professionally, I have sympathy 
for him. He is a Christian. We spoke much about our children. He had a twelve-year-
old son at the time. The son must be thirty now. We spoke about not being with the 
family. You have to connect sometimes; even with the most difficult partners, you have 
to develop a human relationship. We developed in a strange way a rather close 
relationship. Rolf Ekeus could tell you more because he spent more time with Tariq Aziz 
than I did. I spent hundreds of hours with him, but I think Rolf spent even more. The 
37 
others that you mentioned: Rafsanjani was always there. He was the one who stayed. 
Everybody was leaving, Bani Sadr left, some other leaders were killed, Rajai was killed, 
Beheshti was killed. Rafsanjani was the Speaker of Parliament. Later, of course, he 
became President. He was the survivor, he was very smart. Very shrewd, very 
pragmatic. He kept the nation together after the divisions of the early eighties. Very 
intelligent, and also a person for whom you could feel a reluctant admiration of dealing 
with situations. Velayati is a pediatrician, children's doctor. He was impressive with his 
working capacity. He worked forever, always. He slept three hours a day. He was 
working on his thesis, because he was also teaching at Tehran University. 
I: At the same time? 
JE: At the same time. Not all full-time, of course. He was writing lectures, he went 
to international conferences in the Hague and in Switzerland on pediatric practices. 
Once, he told me he was playing tennis, and I said I was playing tennis too, and he said, 
"OK, let's have a game." So I said, "What time?" He said, "five o'clock." And so I 
said, "Of course, five o' clock in the afternoon." [And he said], "No, five o'clock in the 
morning, after prayers!" He has now left. He is closer to Khameini than he is to Khatami. 
I had hoped that he would be on the reform side, but I'm not sure now. 
I: How effective was the U N in monitoring the cease-fire? 
38 
JE: I think we really didn't have a headache with any of the two sides. They were so 
sensitive to the cease-fire. They knew that a breach of the cease-fire could lead to war, 
and we really didn't have serious problems with the cease-fire. It was also relatively easy 
to supervise because the great part of the cease-fire line was the river Shatt al Arab, and 
the river is of course easy to supervise. There was also a tremendous war-weariness after 
this war. They had paid such a heavy price. It was pretty easy. 
I: Pretty much both of them wanted to have a cease-fire? 
JE: Yes, after some time. I told you about the difficult period at the beginning. It 
could easily have been broken in the first three or four months, but after half a year or so, 
it was stable. From then on, the focus shifted. The Iraqis saw their enemy not in Iran but 
in Kuwait, more and more. Remember how they shifted their attention? They got so 
aggressive about Kuwait. They felt that Kuwait had not contributed enough, they had oil, 
that this was a former part of Iraq, so the focus shifted from Iran to Kuwait. 
I: I hope I have time for one more question, about Sweden gaining insight on the 
nature and intentions of the Iraqi regime from the assignment of two senior Swedish 
diplomats on the Iraqi disarmament effort. 
JE: Well, it was actually three. You have Rolf Ekeus of course, who was asked in 
1991 to do UNSCOM. Hans Blix did the same job but for the nuclear sector, since he 
was the Director General for IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. We had also 
39 
other Swedes. We had experts on chemical weapons, who were in Iraq. We had officers 
in U N S C O M , Swedish military officers. We had a diplomat Johann Molander, who was 
helping both Blix and Ekeus. I have a colleague Elisabeth Borsiin-Bonnier, who worked 
on chemical weapons, so I would say we had 15-20 Swedes. The most known people are 
of course Rolf and Hans. But Sweden, including myself, has of course, spent twenty 
years following Iraq from different perspectives. It seems as though we never end 
working with it. I hope one day we can see a peaceful, prosperous, democratic country. 
It's been a high Swedish priority. We have long traditions, of course, in the Middle East, 
and I think one should continue to develop knowledge of the Middle East. I think it's 
important that a country in the northern part of Europe shows an active interest and 
shows that it wants to do something. It sends a very important message, that Sweden is 
not looking inward, that the European Union is not looking inward. 
So I really hope that my colleagues in the Foreign Ministry and others keep an 
interest in this area, because too often in history, a lot of tragic developments have started 
in that area and spread. Conflict in the Middle East, conflict in the Gulf, would have 
serious effects on the whole international atmosphere, on the international economy, and 
of course on the degree of fundamentalism in the Islamic faith. 
I: Mostly in Iran? 
JE: Not only in Iran, because you have fundamentalists in many Arab countries, also 
in North Africa. 
40 
I: But I thought in the Middle East area, it was mainly Iran. 
JE: Yes, of course Shi'as are mainly there [in Iran], but there are fundamentalist 
movements also in Sunni communities. If you have a conflict in the Middle East, where 
the Palestinians would be the victims, or i f you have an explosion in Iran-Iraq, you would 
have immediate effects, politically, economically, and socially all over the Muslim world. 
That's why I think it is good that Sweden put these resources into the Middle East and 
Iraq-Iran, and I hope that we will continue to follow this road. 
I: Thank you so much. 
JE: Thank you. 
41