Department of Philosophy and Classics
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://197.255.125.131:4000/handle/123456789/23076
Browse
6 results
Search Results
Item Two Steps Forward: An African Relational Account of Moral Standing(Philosophy & Technology, 2022) Jecker, N.S.; Atiure, C.A.; Ajei, M.O.This paper replies to a commentary by John-Stewart Gordon on our paper, “The Moral Standing of Social Robots: Untapped Insights from Africa.” In the original In this paper, we set forth an African relational view of personhood and show its implications for the moral standing of social robots. This reply clarifies our position and answers three objections. The objections concern (1) the ethical significance of intelligence, (2) the meaning of ‘pro-social,’ and (3) the justification for prioritizing humans over pro-social robots.Item Bioethics In Africa: A Contextually Enlightened Analysis Of Three Cases(Developing World Bioethics, 2021) Jecker, N.S.; Atuire, C.Across sub-Saharan Africa, bioethics is an emerging field of scholarly inquiry informed by contextual features distinct to the region. a cultural mix comprised of European influences, indigenous traditions, Christian faiths, and Muslim communities, a bioethics for the sub-Saharan region must be responsive to this milieu. This paper asks: What values and methods can best promote the practice of bioethics in Africa? We set forth a strategy that leans one way or another in response to the contextual features of a particular setting. Since our aim is to be responsive to context, we begin with a series of cases and develop values and methods in response to each case as we work through its ethical analysis. Section 1 introduces a case involving setting priorities for public funding of services that produce large benefits for a small group of people, using the example of dialysis in Ghana. Section 11 presents a situation involving determining the permissibility of a double standard of quality for healthcare devices in rich and poor nations, using the example of explanting peacemakers from deceased people in wealthy nations for use by people in low and middle-income nations. Section 111 describes a scenario where international groups clash with religious and spiritual healers over the chaining of people with severe mental illness at prayer camps and healing centres in Ghana. Section IV articulates a three-pronged strategy for engaging in bioethics brought to light by the case analyses and defends it against objections. Throughout the paper, we tag certain views as African and others as Western to indicate ethical beliefs commonly found in these regions and less commonly found elsewhere. We do not mean to imply that all Africans hold a certain ethical stance or that all Westerners do, nor do we mean to suggest that people outside these regions do not hold the views in question.Item The Moral Standing of Social Robots, Untapped Insights from Africa(Philosophy & Technology, 2022) Jecker, N.S.; Atiure, C.A.; Ajei, M.O.This paper presents an African relational view of social robots’ moral standing which draws on the philosophy of ubuntu (humanness). The introduction (Section 1) places the question of moral standing in historical and cultural contexts. Section 2 demonstrates an ubuntu framework by applying it to the fictional case of a social robot named Klara, taken from Ishiguro’s novel, Klara and the Sun. We argue that an ubuntu ethic assigns moral standing to Klara based on her relational qualities and pro-social virtues. Section 3 introduces a second fictional case, taken from McKeown’s novel, Machines Like Me, in which a social robot named Adam displays intrinsic qualities, such as sentience, rationality, and deductive moral reasoning, yet lacks close social ties to particular people. We argue that Adam is not a person in the African sense; however, he qualifies as a person according to many standard Western views, such as Kantian and utilitarian ethics. Section 4 further elaborates the African relational view by comparing the moral standing of social robots and humans in a forced-choice scenario. Section 5 replies to objections. We conclude that an African relational approach captures important insights about the moral standing of social robots that many Western accounts miss and should be better incorporated into global frameworks for designing and deploying social robots.Item Bioethics’ Duty to Conference in Qatar: Reply to Magnus(The American Journal of Bioethics, 2024) Jecker, N.S.; Savulescu, J.; Atuire, C.; et al.Is it unethical to host an international bioethics conference in Qatar? In an editorial in this issue, David Magnus (2024) argues that conferencing in Qatar or other places where human rights violations occur, is not ethically justified. According to Magnus, the International Association of Bioethics’ (IABs’) decision to host the 2024 World Congress of Bioethics (WCB) at a Qatari-based university was “a major mistake by the IAB board.” We hold a much different view. In the face of unjust laws and human rights violations, more than one response is ethically defensible, as some of us have argued (Jecker and Ravitsky 2023; Jecker et al. 2024a; Jecker et al. 2024b; Jecker, Verweij, et al. 2023; Ghaly, El Akoum, and Afdhal 2023). Boycotting is one way to seek to change an unjust situation, but so too is engaging with people who are willing to host, hear, and take seriously challenges and objections to their prevailing norms (Jecker, Ravitsky, et al., 2023). Qatari-based hosts have invited bioethicists from around the world to engage with them in an open exchange of ideas, and offered a conference venue where this can occur. Bioethicists should engage and should foster open and respectful dialogue. To avoid redundancy with arguments, some of us have developed elsewhere (Jecker and Ravitsky, 2023; Jecker et al. 2024a; Jecker et al. 2024b; Jecker, Verweij, et al. 2023; Ghaly, El Akoum, and Afdhal 2023), we limit our response mostly to points not considered previously.Item The Ethics of International Bioethics Conferencing: Continuing the Conversation(The American Journal of Bioethics, 2024) Jecker, N.S.; Atuire, C.; Ravitsky, V.; et al.Our article, “Proposed Principles for International Bioethics Conferencing: Anti-Discriminatory, Global and Inclusive,” urged a critical conversation with bioethicists around the globe on the ethics of international bioethics conferencing (Jecker et al., 2024). Focusing on site selection, we tentatively set forth seven principles: anti-discriminatory, international, green, fair-minded, leave no one behind, free exchange of ideas and epistemic justice. We appreciate the vigorous response our proposal generated and the overall recognition of the ethical importance of the topic. We are grateful to Van Der Graaf and colleagues, who were the first in the literature to pinpoint the need for sustained debate within bioethics on the ethics of ethics conferencing (Van Der Graaf et al., 2023). We cannot do justice to all the points colleagues raised across 15 separate commentaries. In this short response, we focus on objections and proposed addenda to the seven principles.Item Global sharing of COVID-19 therapies during a “New Normal”(Wiley, 2022) Jecker, N.S.; Atuire, C.A.This paper argues for global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments during the COVID‐19pandemic and beyond based on principles of global solidarity. It starts by distinguishing two types of COVID‐19 treatments and models sharing strategies for each in small‐group scenarios, contrasting groups that are solidaristic with those composed of self‐interest maximizers to show the appeal of solidaristic reasoning. It then extends the analysis,arguing that a similar logic should apply within and between nations. To further elaborate global solidarity, the paper distinguishes morally voluntary, sliding‐scale, and mandatory versions. It argues for an all‐hands‐on‐deck approach and gives examples to illustrate. The paper concludes that during the COVID‐19 crisis, global solidarity is a core value, and global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments should be considered a duty of justice, not of charity.