Department of Philosophy and Classics
Permanent URI for this collectionhttp://197.255.125.131:4000/handle/123456789/23076
Browse
4 results
Search Results
Item Two Steps Forward: An African Relational Account of Moral Standing(Philosophy & Technology, 2022) Jecker, N.S.; Atiure, C.A.; Ajei, M.O.This paper replies to a commentary by John-Stewart Gordon on our paper, “The Moral Standing of Social Robots: Untapped Insights from Africa.” In the original In this paper, we set forth an African relational view of personhood and show its implications for the moral standing of social robots. This reply clarifies our position and answers three objections. The objections concern (1) the ethical significance of intelligence, (2) the meaning of ‘pro-social,’ and (3) the justification for prioritizing humans over pro-social robots.Item The Moral Standing of Social Robots, Untapped Insights from Africa(Philosophy & Technology, 2022) Jecker, N.S.; Atiure, C.A.; Ajei, M.O.This paper presents an African relational view of social robots’ moral standing which draws on the philosophy of ubuntu (humanness). The introduction (Section 1) places the question of moral standing in historical and cultural contexts. Section 2 demonstrates an ubuntu framework by applying it to the fictional case of a social robot named Klara, taken from Ishiguro’s novel, Klara and the Sun. We argue that an ubuntu ethic assigns moral standing to Klara based on her relational qualities and pro-social virtues. Section 3 introduces a second fictional case, taken from McKeown’s novel, Machines Like Me, in which a social robot named Adam displays intrinsic qualities, such as sentience, rationality, and deductive moral reasoning, yet lacks close social ties to particular people. We argue that Adam is not a person in the African sense; however, he qualifies as a person according to many standard Western views, such as Kantian and utilitarian ethics. Section 4 further elaborates the African relational view by comparing the moral standing of social robots and humans in a forced-choice scenario. Section 5 replies to objections. We conclude that an African relational approach captures important insights about the moral standing of social robots that many Western accounts miss and should be better incorporated into global frameworks for designing and deploying social robots.Item An African philosophical perspective on barriers to the current discourse on sustainability(Wiley, 2022) Ajei, M.O.Since the publication of the Report of the Brundtland Commission, Our Common Future, the idea that the “triple bottom line” can cohere harmoniously to yield progressive rates of GDP growth, and a sustainable stock and welfare of the resources of Earth's ecosystems has been rigorously challenged.1 These challenges have triggered theoretical refinements of the assumptions and conclusions of Our Common Future and strategies for the achievement of sustainability. My paper wonders whether the dominant traits of such refinements and strategies have succeeded in discarding the burdens of the triple bottom line and defends two theses; that the notion of “sustainable development” as deployed in Western developmental ethics is potentially incoherent in that it is premised on the pursuit of conflicting goals, viz., economic growth and environmental protection; and that when deployed in the African context in particular, the concept has little practical purchase given its lack of engagement with indigenous values conceptions. Consequently, I propose some African normative perspectives as viable basis for further refinement of the conceptual tool kits of sustainability into a notion that has broader global resonance and uptake.Item Being Gay and African: A Contradiction in Being?(Taylor & Francis Group, 2022) Ajei, M.O.Discussion of sexuality in African cultures has a long history, but since the 1990s ethical reflections on homosexuality on the continent have often degenerated into furors and provoked a spate of anti-gay legislation in several countries. Refutations of homophobic dispositions encounter as barrier a pervasive belief in African cultures, that childbearing for community replenishment is a cherished moral duty. Several philosophers consider these to be exaggerated inhibitions that unjustifiably impede social acceptance of homosexuality, and have proposed as a solution what they consider to be self-justifying political-moral principles, that terminate in value-pluralistic ideas such as the acceptance of the equality of sexual orientations and vindication of the right to the freedom to choose and satisfy sexual desire. I question the adequacy of such self-justificatory normative principles and consider the solutions they proffer as depreciating the moral point of the African pro-natalist position. Consequently, I develop a moral argument grounded in the ontology of Kwame Gyekye’s moderate communitarian theory of personhood as the most persuasive justification for homosexuality.