


UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

**MOBILITY AND BORDER CONTROL PRACTICES IN GHANA:
A CASE STUDY OF PAGA BORDER POST**



BY

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**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY
OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE
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DECLARATION

I, Eric Quartey, hereby declare that, except for references to other people's work, which have been duly acknowledged, this dissertation is the outcome of my independent research conducted at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, under the supervision of Prof. Joseph Teye. I, therefore, declare that this dissertation has neither in part nor in whole been presented to any other institution for academic award.

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the Almighty God, for all things are possible to him. To my father, Ex WO1 Ebenezer K. Quartey for his invaluable support and inspiration which has enabled me to reach another milestone in my pursuit for academic excellence, my siblings especially Frank Quartey and finally to my lovely wife Gloria and kids; Ebenezer, Eunice, Elvin and Elsie.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations
CBM	Coordinated Border Management
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
GIABA	Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GRA	Ghana Revenue Authority
IBM	Integrated Border Management
IGF	Internally Generated Funds
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KNWD	Kasena Nankana West District
NMP	National Migration Policy
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation for Development
PISCES	Personal identification secure comparison and evaluation system
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service

ABSTRACT

Issues of international borders have been of security concern to governments particularly, in the post 9/11 era. The securitization discourse has taken centre stage as governments move towards tightening their border controls against ‘perceived threats’ such as terrorism.

Many African countries face the difficult task of securing their borders. Numerous challenges encountered in this regard means that borders have become transnational crime zones. In recent times, transnational security threats and terrorist acts are increasingly gaining grounds in the West African sub-Region and Ghana being part of the Region is at risk of being affected. It has therefore become imperative to examine how cross-border mobility is controlled in Ghana with emphasis on Paga border post with a view of assessing how secured the country’s borders are.

The study employed a mixed method approach. A sample size of 92 Immigration officers within the various units of GIS were selected through multistage sampling procedure. Instruments used for the study were structured questionnaires and in-depth interviews. The quantitative data were analysed using SPSS and the qualitative through the use of thematic analysis. The results revealed that in controlling movements across the borders, required document is passport (80.4%), followed by ECOWAS card. Again, passport is the main document examined during security checks, use of equipment/gadgets for checking people who cross the border is not a practice. Intense patrolling and blocking of routes provide effective ways of managing illegal crossings. The findings also indicated that major nationals who cross the border post frequently are ECOWAS citizens other than Ghanaians with business, visit and tourism as perceived purposes. Activities engage in by these nationals are trading in general goods and motor/bicycle spare parts. Lack of modern equipment for work and logistical constraints are the main challenges encountered in controlling movements across the border. With respect to potential transnational security threats, terrorism and drug/arm trafficking emerged as prominent.

The study concludes that the challenges Immigration officials encounter in controlling cross-border movement, negate their ability to maintain security and expose the country to transnational security threats/crimes. Consequently, Ghana’s borders cannot be said to be secured. In light of this, it is recommended that the GIS be adequately resourced to effectively discharge its mandate of providing security at the borders. This may be done by way of provision of modern equipment, new facilities and logistics (vehicles, communication gadgets, sensors, surveillance cameras etc.).

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

In the wake of rapid globalization, issues of migration and mobility have gained prominence in the global agenda in recent decades (Awumbilla et al., 2014). Human mobility has been one of the distinct features of the 21st century (Ferreira & de Castro, 2016). Estimates by United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) revealed that the global stock of international migrants increased from 173 million in 2000 to 222 million in 2010, reaching 258 million in 2017, which represents about 3.3 percent of the world's population. Whilst an estimated 57 percent of the 258 million international migrants reside in the Global North, the remaining 43 per cent live in the Global South (UNDESA, 2018). Governments of many nations, especially, the developing countries have acknowledged the potentials of migration for socio-economic advancement and are striving to incorporate mobility into their development agenda at both the national and regional levels (Awumbilla et al., 2014). Migration generates benefits in the form of remittances and diaspora investments which can stimulate the economic development of origin countries, on the other hand, it can also create new inequalities and challenges when it is poorly managed and occurs under conditions of insecurity (IOM, 2015).

Though contemporary migration has been perceived as a security threat (Faist, 2005; Wohlfeld, 2014), the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, reminded Nation-States of the potential security threats of migration, whilst the attacks in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 respectively did not only make the security implications of migration more glaring, but also gave cause for the control of national borders (Coccorulli, 2009; Ogu, 2017). Since those attacks, management of territorial borders has attracted an increasingly high interest from the

perspective of Global North countries. According to Ferreira & de Castro (2016), border management has become one of the main dimensions of Western states' immigration policies. As a way of expanding and reinforcing the policing of their borders, these states have increased the use of biometric and surveillance technologies to monitor, regulate border crossings and generally militarized and securitized border crossings (Adamson, 2006; Walsh, 2010; Kawakubo, 2012).

In respect of Africa, issues of border control and management have not been given the needed priority. Generally, most governments have paid little attention to state borders and their characteristics (Kogut, 1991; Walters, 2006) in terms of what enters and what leaves the borders. Consequently, most borders in sub-Saharan African countries are not effectively controlled, monitored or patrolled, turning borders into transnational crime zones (Okumu, 2011). Increasing volumes of cross-border activities have put pressure on border control systems which gives African countries the urgent need to institute effective border management strategies in order to minimize transnational criminal activities which are increasingly gaining grounds in recent times (Okumu, 2011).

Ghana, a member of ECOWAS and an advocate for trade and economic integration in Africa has signed and ratified a number of treaties relating to effective border control, an instance is the 2006 small arms and light weapons convention of ECOWAS (Sosuh, 2011; Lamptey, 2013). The country's migration policy of 2016 further highlights the significance of effective control of the country's borders in the maintenance and promotion of national security and recommends practices which conform to international best standards. Ironically like other West African states, Ghana has complex challenges and limitations in efforts to control and secure its borders. Although efforts have been made to safeguard the borders, they remain vulnerable to transnational criminal activities (IOM, 2015; NMP, 2016).

The Ghana-Burkina Faso border at Paga in the Upper East Region is the third major land border in Ghana in terms of mobility flows after Aflao and Elubo border posts. It controls migration flows from Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and to some extent Mauritania, into and out of the country. The numerous unapproved routes around the main border and the lack of a clear-cut demarcation between the two countries means that even as attempts are being made to safeguard the border through the visibility of officers, illegal crossings both of goods and humans and illegal transnational activities are still rife in the area. More Importantly, the recent spate of transnationalization of crimes and transnational terror threats across the sub-Region, particularly, the activities of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Paga border being the main gateway to the Sahelian region is a potential target for this terrorist group and others to gain entry into the country. It is against this background that the study focuses on practices involved in controlling cross-border movements in Ghana, the challenges being faced in regulating cross-border movements and how illegal crossings are being managed so as to prevent terrorists, mercenaries, militants' groups and other transnational criminal actors from entering the country to cause havoc.

1.1 Problem statement

Maintenance of security is one of the core reasons why states assert control of their borders and of the movements of people across such borders (Adamson, 2006; Oberoi and Taylor-Nicholson, 2013; IOM, 2017). In recent years, concerns related to terrorism have increased thus, putting the control of borders in the spotlight (Pecoud and Guchteneire, 2006). For instance, the attacks in some Global North countries such as United States (2001), Spain (2004), United Kingdom (2005) and France (2015) by people perceived to be outsiders raise questions about the links between cross-border mobility of people and transnational terrorism. Consequently, a number of countries have instituted strategies with a view to boost border

control and security in order to combat transnational crimes and terrorism (Faist, 2005; Adamson, 2006; Cinoglu and Altun, 2013).

It goes without saying that many nations around the world are unable to fully control their borders, however, the issue has been found to be more pronounced in Africa where demands on the nations' resources are often seen as more critical than investments in controlling the borders. Even though some countries' security agenda recognizes the significance of secured borders, only few have border control strategies. This state of affairs has resulted in the prevalence of threat such as cross-border crimes. (Okumu, 2011).

Borders in West Africa, to say the least, are porous and this has been a source of worry for many governments (Ikome, 2012). Recent terrorist activities in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Niger have heightened concerns over border control and security. The smuggling of rebels, weapons and contraband material into the Sahel from Libya in 2012; the movement of terrorists across borders to conduct attacks in other states exposes the inadequacies of practices relating to border controls in the sub-Region. Borders have become prone to many threats including transmission of deadly diseases, trafficking of people, drugs, small arms and light weapons and acts of terrorism in recent years due to their porosity. Despite States' awareness of the threats and challenges of ineffective border controls, not much has been done by way of implementation of comprehensive border control strategies and policies at the national and sub-Regional levels (Lamptey, 2013; Mensah 2016).

Ghana is surrounded on its land borders by the Republic of Togo, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire and control of these borders have generated a lot of concern lately. Borders seem vulnerable due to weak controls which present easy opportunity for a world-be crosser to pass without checks. It also appears that crossers would selectively present themselves for immigration and customs formalities if they wish to do so. For instance, in 2006, a group of Sudanese refugees entered the country and their entry was not detected at any of the borders.

It was when they attempted to regularize their stay at a Police station in Accra that they were noticed (Sosuh, 2011). There have been cases of light weapons and drug smuggling by herdsmen into and out of Ghana through the land borders which have been identified as transit points for illicit small arms and light weapons to surrounding countries (Sosuh, 2011). The criminal activities by some nationals from the sub-Region particularly, people of Fulani background has been a source of concern for the government.

Although the country has not experienced any notable attack, recent terrorist attacks in neighboring Burkina Faso and Cote d' Ivoire-Grand-Bassam which is 245 miles from Ghana and the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria have heightened fears and have raised questions about whether the country's border security controls are in ready-state to deter, detect, respond or foil any attempt by any transnational terrorist groups from entering the country. Furthermore, Ghana's relative economic strength and political stability has made it an attractive destination for migrants from the sub-Region and beyond. Some of these people from unstable countries and with unknown intent may pose a security threat to the country (NMP, 2016). Scrutinizing these people in order that they do not become a threat to the peace and stability of the country is very crucial and will have to start at the frontiers, thus reinforcing the need for effective border control. (Sosuh, 2011).

The importance of effective border control in the promotion and preservation of national security cannot be overemphasized. Supporting this assertion, Krasner (1999) as cited in Sosuh (2011) argues that a country which cannot assert control of its national borders, cannot control what happens within it. In light of their sensitive functions, many studies have been conducted on border controls and security in many countries. However, in the context of Ghana, the few studies that have been done on borders have focused mainly on cross-border mobility and cross-border trading activities (Lentz, 2003; Addo, 2006; Wrigley-Asante, 2013). Academic researches on border control practices in relation to mobility have been

limited in spite of concerns over growing transnational security threats within the sub-Region (Muggah & Diniz, 2013; Sunday & Oji, 2014). This study attempts to examine the measures employed in controlling cross-border mobility as a way of assessing how secured the country is as far as borders are concerned.

1.2 General objective

The study generally seeks to examine how cross-border mobility is controlled in Ghana with emphasis on Paga border post.

1.2.1 Specific objectives

1. To describe how movements across the borders are controlled.
2. To identify the major nationals who cross the border in Paga and the kind of activities they engage in.
3. To examine the challenges of controlling movement across the borders in Ghana.
4. To identify potential transnational security threats across the borders.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What measures have been deployed to control cross-border movement in Paga?
2. Which main nationals cross the border and what activities they are engaged in?
3. What challenges are encountered in controlling cross-border movement in Paga?
4. What potential transnational security threats is Ghana exposed to?

1.4 Significance of the study

The study is relevant for a number of reasons. Over the last few years, the sub-Region has witnessed an upsurge in transnational security threats and transnational criminal activities have become prevalent (Lampitey, 2013). In view of this, the study would expose the potential

transnational security threats the country faces. It would also offer a comprehensive account of the challenges of controlling cross-border mobility and inform policymakers on the state of Ghana's border security and the need to improve the governance and operating conditions at the borders. Furthermore, the outcome of the study will add to existing literature on migration and security with particular reference to Ghana.

1.5 Organization of the study

The study is presented in six chapters. The first chapter focuses on the background to the study, problem statement, objectives and the significance of the study. Chapter Two contains in-depth literature review of issues relevant to the study. It also deals with the appropriate theoretical and conceptual frameworks for the study. The third chapter dwells on the study area and the methodology underpinning the study. It includes the sampling methods, data collection methods, limitations of the study among others. The fourth chapter gives detailed analyses of the results and discussions on background characteristics of respondents and cross-border activities, whilst the fifth chapter deals with challenges associated with cross-border management. The six chapter presents a summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter commences by presenting relevant literature on mobility and border control, border management, transnational security threats and its implications on borders as well as challenges associated with border controls. It also aims at getting theoretical and empirical information on how borders can be controlled and managed effectively and efficiently to facilitate the smooth flow of goods, services and humans while at the same time safeguarding national security.

2.1 Mobility and its effects on border control

Mobility has been a phenomenon since time immemorial which is characterized by transfer of people, goods and services across both international and continental borders (Castles, De Haas & Miller, 2013). This also applies to internal movements. Cross-border mobility is key in empowering the youth to move in search of economic fortunes. In Africa, historical accounts of movements are associated with the emergence of numerous illegal routes in addition to demarcated routes for border crossing. According to Bakewell & De Haas (2007), borders within Africa have been characterized by high mobility trends due to numerous conditions such as demand for labour and more recently as a result of substantial refugee flows. Again, circulation and exchange in borderland areas, often related to economic dynamics, in which labour and trade play a key role and determine border crossings. Many scholars have also expounded that employment opportunities and commerce propel people to cross borders in the past and present thereby reconfiguring the complexities associated with border crossings.

Notwithstanding the above assertion on mobility and its effect on African borders, factors leading to circulation and migration are mainly involuntary conditions (Koser, 2007; Brettell & Hollifield, 2014). Most conflicts usually emanating from ethnic or tribal agitations have also led to mass movements to neighboring countries putting pressure on borders (Phukan, 2013). These forms of movements using borders have become a sanctuary not only for victims but also perpetrators thus making border controls complex in terms of security.

Migration and circulation across borders are poorly understood, since they are partly induced by globalization, which serves as the impetus for increased mobility. Borders assume key role when it comes to trans-national and trans-continental migration where there is creation of new identities both in the countries of origin and the new locations chosen by the immigrants. This by extension puts pressure on border control leading to the creation of illegal routes for passage (Patrol, 1994; Fernández-Kelly & Massey, 2007).

According to Constable (2010) and Adler (2015), the reciprocal implication of migration on border controls mainly depends on the different kinds of boundary crossers, their motivations, the distance between origin place and destination and the social status of the migrants. There have been empirical works done on migration, both internal and international in order to appreciate the effects and how to control movements across borders (Massey, 1999; Castles, De Haas & Miller, 2013). The studies on management and controlling of borders are as a result of how the state structures of border enforcement create a scenario in which migrants attempting to enter illegally end up having confrontations with border officials. For example, US-Mexico borders have encountered such interactions, which have seen unprecedented number of migrants trying to cross either through legal or illegal means (Scott et al., 1997). Currently people on the move have increased making Nation-States to develop strategies to check flows across borders. Border officials in their quest to control and check flows through regular means have been given certain powers to arrest, detain, search, interrogate all persons,

citizens or not, who are required to present themselves for inspection before they are admitted into the country (Heyman, 1995). According to Singer and Massey (1998), border crossing is mostly aided by social networks of would-be crossers to acquire substantial human capital which help them to cross international borders in subsequent migrations.

The assessment of these social networks helps migrants to cross borders with the assistance of professional human smugglers in order to get to their destinations. However, other studies have expounded that increasing border enforcement allows would-be migrants to patronize illegal routes and even the most experienced migrants rely on smugglers to cross such borders.

Again, empirical works on African borders suggest that they have certain unique strands than those of other borders such as the U.S-Mexico. Zlotnik (2003) explicates that migration from Africa continues on the lines of colonial powers imposition of arbitrary borders, which mostly separate people of the same tribe or ethnic group. This exposes a lot to move to places deemed to have political, economic, social, and cultural spaces to absorb them around borderlands (Asiwaju 1984; Asiwaju and Adeniyi 1989; Simon 1996; Flynn 1997; Nugent 2002; Lentz 2003; Brambilla 2007). Although African borders are considered by many as an arbitrary formation (Asiwaju 1984), section of researchers are of the view that artificial creation of borders in colonial times has not fully increased international and internal mobility (Skeldon, 2006). Africa's current political boundaries have led to some negative consequences as a result of increase in mobility (Touval, 1969; Ottaway, 1999). This assertion has been refuted by Herbst (1989) and Bayart (1996) by taking oppositional stance that these borders are completely arbitrary, arguing that the present-day boundary system represents a rational response by both colonialists and post-independence states.

Many scholars in contemporary times allude to the fact that current borders within Africa are porous in nature, rendering them irrelevant in practice (Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002).

This statement confirms how migrants' cross international borders with ease within the sub Region (Van Dijk, Foeken, and Van Til, 2001; Mali, 2002). Notwithstanding that, Adepoju (2000) posited that West African migrants fundamentally equate cross border movements to internal migration, due to historical unpoliced borders that separate many countries within West Africa. Other researchers have also suggested that the significance of borders is defeated when there is capitalist penetration into origin areas leading to an increase in emigration and also resulting in the creation of international political economy, where both origin and destination areas become part of the larger economy and the social environment (Papademitriou and Martin 1991; de Haan, Brock, and Coulibaly 2002).

2.2 Migrants' activities and cross-border implications

Generally, both developed and developing countries face enormous difficulties in managing their borders including those of African countries, in a manner that protects their territorial sovereignty (Ikome, 2012). Nation-states strive to protect their borders in line with international standards, other than creating barriers that hinder integration and cooperation regionally as well as transportation of illegal arms and human trafficking. High numbers in trading activities across borders as well as migration from origin areas to destination countries in search of better opportunities have placed enough pressure on border control systems. According to Oucho (2006), this development in border-related activities should serve as a wakeup call for countries within Africa to devise efficient ways of managing borders in order to reduce tensions while at the same time put measures in place for smooth border trading activities and legal migration of people. Major activities which mostly evolve around migrants entering and exiting depends on the two countries sharing the border as well as the demand of resources from each country. Many at times, cross border activities are either between states or organizations as well as individual migrants who are business oriented, looking for opportunities outside their origin countries.

Security of border crossing has been explicated by Johnson & Post (1995) and Elden (2006), that with respect to international borders, countries are bound by international laws to secure their boundaries, protect their territories and citizens, which in general classify a state as either strong, weak or failed. Ghana shares land borders with Cote d' Ivoire, Togo and Burkina Faso. These borders play a major role with respect to migrants' activities, which are likely to promote regional integration among member states and countries involved. Scott (2016) expounds that, aside the benefits both sending and receiving countries enjoy, it can also serve as a threat to livelihoods of receiving countries. Hence, it is significant for countries to secure their own borders amidst the complexities surrounding border control.

Generally, there is no concise definition of border security since it encompasses a lot to include border monitoring and protection, border control, border management among others (Ackleson, 2005; Knight, 2006). This assertion therefore categorizes border control to include securing borderlines that is activities that take place along the boundary and controlling ports which basically deal with harbours, border posts and airports. This categorization as a result of the nature of activities associated with border crossing in recent times, impose conditions under which people can legally cross borders with documentations (Passports, Visas, ECOWAS card etc.) as well as movement of goods which are duly taxed or levied. These border control services implications on migrants' activities help to eliminate illegal activities at the border.

Notwithstanding the above assertion, Fassin (2011) posited that, border control practices that affect migrants' activities have taken extra dimensions, by controlling boundary with the use of Immigration and Military officials to enforce laws internally. These to some extent have been confirmed that, enhancing immigration and migration laws goes a step further to screen people using borders, inspecting to prevent the transportation of illegal products and denying the entry of individuals without proper documentations (Anderson et al., 2000).

The management and border control practices in Africa seem to emanate from a number of processes associated with the Global North countries. Brunet-Jailly (2007) opined that, African border security is increasing criminal activities of migrants through tightening of border controls to keep out criminals and terrorists. Again, this tightening of controls according to Pécoud & De-Guchteneire (2006), has led to huge budget on border security. For example, between 2001 and 2006, United States border funding jumped from \$4.6 billion to \$10.4 billion. Border security in contemporary times calls for recruitment of more border patrol agents, fences construction and installation of ground sensors among others. All of these, have helped curbed criminal activities undertaken by migrants and indigenes who ply the border always. This has been made possible through sharing of information among countries' officials responsible for border management.

2.3 Transnational security threats and their implication for borders

Empirically, a lot of literature explains the implications of cross-border crimes and economic integration globally (Nelken, 1997; Chen, 2005). This has also transcended to West Africa, making control and regulation of such crimes across borders difficult to tackle (Shamir, 2005). Evidential write-ups in the area of transnational crimes elucidate that cross-border crime control and regulation is not only a means of ensuring peaceful co-existence with neighbours and stability within regional blocs but, should be seen as a directive in promoting pertinent political and social-economic activities needed for integration among countries' economies. For example, some provisions of the ECOWAS free movement protocol are inevitable in undertaking cross-border activities. Addo (2006) confirmed this assertion that about four to five million people patronize the highways of member countries every month.

Addo (2006) further reiterated that, the porosity of many borders within the sub-Region paves way for trans-border crimes and create instability due to poor initiatives and mechanisms in

detecting illegal movements and activities. These criminal activities at large affect economic activities, rights of human beings in addition to cultural and societal advancement within the regional blocs. Some of the activities associated with border crimes include illegal smuggling of small arms and weapons and trafficking of human beings as the top most crimes, according to Obokata (2005) and Onuoha (2011). Azure (2009) noted that, peddling of narcotics and armed robbery constitute part of transnational crimes, which are mostly coordinated by mercenaries and other recruitment agencies.

Border control and its challenges according to Ukeje & Ela (2013), that the absence of holistic approaches in dealing with cross-border problems within the sub-Region need coherent and robust approaches fused with international standards as spearheaded by ECOWAS, United Nations and the European Union. Continuous weakening of the security sector, unemployment among the youth, social exclusion, forced displacement and mass refugee's movements constitute some of the major cross-border problems in the sub-region (UN report, 2004).

Obadan (1984) noted that, one of the problems which impedes trade expansion within the sub-Region is the absence of uniform pricing of goods, preventing price comparison between national markets, rendering trading among these countries difficult. This setback has opened the flood gate for many migrants who are into business to patronize illegal routes to engage in trading activities across borders. Again, Astain (1990) lamented that, institutional arrangements within the individual countries of West Africa contribute to transnational threats with respect to intra-African trade. He further reiterated that, absence of uniform regulations in relation to trade makes it difficult for traders and businessmen to meet the different standards in each of the countries they transact their trade business. This notwithstanding, is an indication of the increase of transnational activities taking place along the borders and beyond.

Adesina (2014) expounded that the constant presence of terrorists in neighbouring countries is due to porous and uncontrolled borders, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries. He further opined that, while the sub-Region has been at ease with arms and ammunitions, ingredients for producing bombs and radicalism, other sources of transnational threats are linked to the East African bloc with traces from stateless Somalia. Cross-border crimes on the increase include drug trafficking in Africa, which is emerging as a major transshipment route of drugs that are deliberately hidden to avoid the origin and also escape thorough inspection at borders.

Border protection in sub-Saharan Africa has been a challenge, making infiltration by enemies in conflict areas easy. The annual report from UNMAS (2009) stated that, population movements across sub-Saharan Africa due to armed conflict have security implications. For example, refugees fleeing conflicts have the right and protection by international humanitarian law to be received in nearby countries. However, most at times, armed combatants move with genuine refugees and begin to threaten the security of the local populace and refugees in and around the camps after border-crossing. Other scholars such as Mogire & Mogire (2011), Lischer (2015) and Vignal (2017), have cited instances where cross-border attacks or attacks on neighbouring countries have been staged by combatants who initially use refugees as shields. These happenings in the wake of rampant transnational crimes, question the secured nature of borders (Emerson & Solomon, 2018). Studies by Van Schendelm & Abraham (2005) and Addo (2006) show that, weak state capacities to deal prudently with it borders have given criminal syndicates the edge to trade illegally by smuggling contraband goods and ensuring smooth passage of foreigners without proper documentation, in addition to the help of border personnel (Lan & Xiao, 2014). Although there have not been many armed conflicts over borders, borderlands have seen most violent conflicts (Mathews, Lin & Yang, 2014) which re-echo the activities of transnational criminals

across borders. When communities along the borders are neglected and excluded from the center, they become uncooperative and highly secretive, and hardly provide information to government officials on dubious persons.

2.4 Challenges associated with border control

Globally, border security and its management help to promote national security but has been undermined with respect to Africa (Solana, 2003; Bush, 2009). Countries strategies in terms of security tell how secured and peaceful nature of one's border and the ability to transform border security approaches. The negligence of border control systems has largely contributed to increase in border crimes (Titeca & De Herdt, 2010; Nkoroi, 2016). Many of the challenges are as a result of lack of pragmatic approaches in dealing with border control practices.

Firstly, some empirical researches according to Hess (2010) have pointed out that, lack of institutions in the area of management of border issues depict how African countries address problems relating to border crossing. This is evidential in governments' commitment towards border control especially in sub-Saharan Africa and at the same time many countries within the sub-Region lack trained organizations to manage their borders. Again, lack of cooperation at different levels also makes it difficult with respect to border control. This challenge emanates from lack of cooperation at different stages such as the local level, where most border security and control efforts do not involve border communities.

Thomas & Tow (2002) emphasized that, lack of consultation between locals and state authorities when deploying security personnel affect border control since majority of the locals have deep knowledge on border terrain. Lack of integration and coordination among departments at the governmental level, such as immigration, police, customs and other security officials contribute enormously to the challenges (Raad, 1995). Notwithstanding the above assertion, similar outcome is also achieved at the regional level where most government institutions within the sub-Region share intelligence, undertaking joint border

patrols, but are not done frequently to enhance border protection and prevent border-related crimes.

Interestingly, demarcation problem is key contributor to border insecurity in Africa (Moll, 2010). African border management is a very difficult task to undertake especially where border demarcations are not clearly defined and this makes patrolling a country's border likely to result in an invasion of a neighbour's territories. Some scholars have argued that, the genesis of border management challenges within Africa are that, its nature and characteristics are mostly unknown to many governments as well as what enters and exits. This development makes it difficult for borders to be monitored regularly, patrolled or controlled. Again, they have become transit points for illegal activities, making most borders within sub-Saharan Africa transnational crime zones (Herbst, 1989; Johnson et al., 2011).

Andreas (2003), Kolossov (2005) and Pastore, Monzini & Sciortino (2006) have stressed that, key challenges in border management in Africa, especially, the sub-Saharan areas are human smuggling and trafficking activities, where clients are assisted for a fee to cross a border. This has been made so easy due to the porous nature of land borders perceived by many to constitute danger and vulnerability.

Other critical issues which also affect border management has to do with lack of security officials to mount the borders, limited skills with regards to border management, non-harmonization of information between neighbouring countries as well as lack of equipment and facilities. These issues have been described by Oscar (1994) as the backbone of all the problems associated with the borders. Aside the above challenges, inadequate offices and residential facilities for border officials and outmoded communication gadgets contribute to the bigger problem with regards to management of borders.

Finally, globalization affecting African states partially with respect to managing border-related crimes since the use of advanced technology and transformation in international

relations have defeated the purpose of traditional borders. This according to Johnson & Post (1995) and Biemann (2002) have made crimes to be committed without crossing borders as well as trading huge amounts of goods without physical borders, but rather through cyberspace.

2.5 Theoretical perspective

2.5.1 Coordinated Border Management (CBM) Approach

The complexities surrounding migration and mobility in recent times have called for more proactive systems of controlling borders among nations (Niamir-Fuller, 1999). The growing demand to coordinate the work of different agencies or units or departments of the same institution at the border in order to ensure smooth migration or mobility have always relied on the CBM approach. The CBM approach is of enormous importance to border agencies, policymakers as well as international organisations. At both international and domestic levels, CBM as a concept helps to regulate efficiency and effectiveness between border agencies during policy development and operational activities through coordination.

CBM as an approach for running the day to day affairs of an organization offers a theoretical underpinning for managing border posts and its related activities. Due to the robustness of this approach, it offers practical interpretations, operational arrangements, such as joint mobile teams, joint risk management and targeting areas that would not have been addressed using ordinary administrative approach or concept. It focuses on institutions such as Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) which has responsibility on border management, where such institution coordinates activities among themselves to control and manage affairs of their borders.

GIS Commands at the borders apply this approach through a coordinated system, where the sections that control and manage the borders from the topmost hierarchy, who is the Sector

Commander with Units such as General Duties, Patrol, Intelligence and Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Units. This approach helps each unit of the GIS to coordinate their actions in order to improve effectiveness and efficiency of border procedures. The General Duties Unit is responsible for activities relating to the arrival and departure procedures at the controlled borders. It relays information to the other units and also report to the Sector Commander. In relation to the Patrol Unit, it is in charge of manning unapproved routes to prevent, deter, or intercept illegal immigrants and suspected criminals. The Intelligence Unit conducts border surveillance, gathers and analyses information in order to identify and counter risks to border security. Finally, the Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit is an intelligence-led unit and works on areas such as prevention, rescuing, identification and screening of potential cases of human trafficking and smuggling. This sharing of information among Units is as a result of adoption of the CM approach which is more practical when operated under public institution like GIS.

Again, the Coordinated Border Management (CBM) approach goes further to provide a cohesive government response to the challenges of border management. Hence, this approach is viewed by many as a guiding principle for the border agencies.

2.5.2 Integrated Border Management (IBM) Approach

The concept of Integrated Border Management (IBM) is an accepted model for border management in preserving internal security of a country, especially in the area of prevention and detection of irregular migration and border-crime related issues (Carrera, 2007; Leonard, 2009). This concept is an upgraded form of border management approaches due to its operational dimensions set to provide more efficient ways of managing borders.

With respect to the dimensions stipulated in the IBM approach, the first one is the border control system which basically deals with checks and surveillance in the area of important

analysis of risk associated with border control and crime intelligence. Concerning border control, GIS as an institution does same with its Patrol and Intelligence Units, but lacks the needed resources to secure the borders. When operational strategies of border control by GIS are enhanced using the IBM concept in addition to provisions of the needed resources, border control management will be enhanced effectively. Secondly, the IBM approach focuses on detection and investigation of cross-border crimes in coordination with all authorities in the law enforcement unit. This is not different from the GIS set up where the Intelligence and General Duty Units have assigned duties to gather information on all security matters, to develop intelligence and to detect cross-border related crimes. This is achieved with the assistance of other security institutions like GRA-Customs Division and Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) by way of picking up intelligence and coordinating it among appropriate units for onward execution and prosecution. This sometimes becomes problematic due to lack of equipment and communication setbacks, making it difficult to unravel some of the crimes committed along the borders.

Again, a four-tier access control model allows countries to cooperate with respect to information sharing on border surveillance, application of free movement in the area of trade and return. Ghana, being part of ECOWAS cooperates on intelligence gathering and sharing whenever necessary. With regards to inter-agency cooperation for border management, it is basically the practice when it comes to Ghana's borders, immigration, customs and other security officials have assigned mandates to execute. However, there are seemingly challenges since most of the functions overlap, lack of harmonization in terms of information sharing, making cooperation very difficult and allows some border crimes to go untraced.


Finally, on the IBM approach, coordination and coherence among member countries on border control activities is key in ensuring that regional blocs like ECOWAS, EU among others have a common approach to deal with challenges associated with border control.

2.6 Conceptual framework

Border control and management in contemporary times involve a holistic approach in order to prevent border-related crimes (Rosenblum, 2012). However, the cumbersome nature of mobility and the trajectories accompanying it has made border control agencies and departments to rely on shared information through coordination in order to run the border and its related activities effectively and efficiently to prevent border-related crimes.

This approach as illustrated in Fig 2.0 has brought tremendous gains in combating most crimes including transnational crimes. Goh (2013) reiterated that a well-coordinated system like CBM does not only allow information and intelligence to be shared but also it defeats the purpose of hierarchal forms of administration. Basically, the General unit is in charge of all activities relating to the arrival and departure procedures at the main border. The Patrol unit controls movements along the unapproved routes. The Intelligence unit on the other hand gathers information and monitors activities along the border, while the Anti-human smuggling and trafficking unit deals with cases of suspected human smuggling and trafficking. Even though each of these units has a specific function it plays with regards to activities at the border, they work among themselves, share information and report to the head of all the units (Sector Commander), who coordinates the activities of all the units. For example, the Intelligence unit relays information to all the other units to look out for wanted persons and when those persons are arrested, they are handed over to the unit in-charge. Similarly, if the Patrol unit intercepts a trafficker or smuggler or a victim, they would be handed over to the Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking unit for the necessary action to be taken. Due to the CBM and the IBM approaches, each unit provides information that is essential for other units to act where necessary.

Figure 2.0: Conceptual framework



Source: Researcher's own construct, 2019

CHAPTER THREE

STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the study area, methodological design used, the sampling technique employed, the data collection techniques used, data analyses and interpretation. Ethical issues relevant to the study are also presented. The chapter concludes with limitations of the study.

3.1 The study area

Paga is the district capital of Kassena Nankana West (KNWD) of the Upper East Region. In terms of land area, the District covers a total of approximately 1004 square miles (KNWD profile, 2015) and shares boundaries with Burkina Faso to the North and other Districts within the Region, such as Sissala East, Bongo, Builsa North, Bolgatanga and Kassena Nankana Municipalities. Economically, Paga is predominantly agricultural (GSS, 2010) with male and female farming population constituting 68.7 percent and 51.6 percent respectively. Again, Paga is quite known for tourism with tourist attractions such as the sacred crocodile pond, Pikworo slave camp, Zenga pond, the Pottery art centre among others (KNWD profile, 2015). The Paga border serves as the main gateway to the Sahelian region, handling substantial flows of travellers and transit cargo each year. It leads to Dakola in Burkina Faso and a few kilometres south of Ouagadougou. Many natives of Paga are multilingual, speaking native Kasem, Nankani, Moshie, and English among other languages (KNWD, 2015; GSS, 2010).

3.2 Research design

A blend of quantitative and qualitative research methods commonly referred to as mixed-method approach (Creswell, 2009) was adopted in data gathering, analysis and reporting. The choice of the approach was based on the fact that, a good social research requires the use of more than one research approach as they complement the strength and weakness of each other (Ennew & Boyden, 1997; Teye, 2012). The quantitative focused on making statistical generalizations based on the large number of responses obtained on border control practices and mobility as well as the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents.

The qualitative approach, on the other hand focused on key informant interviews with personnel of various units such as General Duties, Patrol Unit, Intelligence Unit as well as the Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit. The use of both research approaches simultaneously made it easier for comprehensive analysis and provided a better understanding of how cross-border movements and control practices are managed in the study area.

3.2.1 Questionnaire survey

For the quantitative data, a structured questionnaire was administered to gather data. This means that questions were both closed and open ended. With the closed ended questions, respondents were given a range of options to choose the most appropriate answer from. The quantitative survey questionnaire was used for the purpose of generalization of results of the findings (Babbie, 1990). The questionnaire used was administered by the researcher and his assistant and was structured to gain responses in the following areas:

- The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents
- Border control and identification of migrants' activities
- Challenges of controlling movement across borders
- Potential transnational security threats

3.2.2 Sample size and sampling technique for quantitative approach

A total of 92 Immigration officers constitute the sample size for the quantitative study. The sample size for the quantitative study was determined from the sample frame using the mathematical formula by Miller and Brewer (2003).

The formula is as follows; $n = \frac{N}{1+N(\alpha^2)}$

Where N= Sample frame

n = Sample Size

α = Confidence Interval

The confidence interval for the study was chosen as 95% and the margin of error as 5%. This was because the study dealt with human beings as subjects whose exactness of information is subjected to biases unlike other physical sciences.

By the formula, N= 120 and $\alpha = (0.05)^2$

Therefore $n = \frac{120}{1+120(0.05)^2}$

$$n = \frac{120}{1+0.3} \text{ hence } n = 92.3077 (92)$$

The result deduced from the formula above gave the sample size of 92 Immigration officers given the confidence level and the margin of error above. Hence 92 officers were sampled and used for the study at Paga in the Kassena Nanakana West District.

The systematic sampling method which consisted of two (2) steps was employed to select Immigration officers at the study area. Firstly, the list of all Immigration officers working as border officials were obtained through administrative procedure. The second step of the

systematic sampling was the use of random sampling technique to select respondents from the various units. To start the random process, the first number was picked between 1 and i^{th} numbers using simple random sampling technique. Here, the first number to the i^{th} number was written on a piece of paper, folded into a bowl and mixed thoroughly. Afterwards, the investigator picked the first number from the bowl and used it as the basis for selecting the rest of the respondents with the sample interval. Finally, the i^{th} term was continually selected from the list of Immigration officers until the sample total was obtained. The random technique for this specific sampling method was to give the respondents in the population equal opportunity to be included in the sample and also to ensure fair representation of the population to form the basis for generalization (Branner, 2005; Bourke, 2014).

3.2.3 Pretesting of instruments

Prior to the administration of the instruments, pretesting was conducted at Namoo border also in the Upper East Region and close to Paga. The choice of Namoo was due to the fact that it has similar characteristics in terms of controlling cross-border movements just like the study area. This enabled the researcher to determine clarity of the questions, reliability and precision of the instruments before the actual data collection commenced. Sanders et al (2007) noted that pretesting helps to check the appropriateness of a questionnaire or interview guide to lessen the likeness of respondents not understanding or not answering questions correctly.

Furthermore, the pretesting was used to predict the amount of time to allocate to each respondent and the number of interviews the researcher would be able to carry out in a day in order to organize the schedule of activities. The duration for the interviews was between 30 to 45 minutes. The experiences from the pretesting aided in improving the final questions before the actual survey.

3.2.4 In-depth interviews

For the qualitative data, an in-depth interview guide was used to gather data from unit heads of GIS at the border post. This enabled the researcher to obtain information in lengthy conversation with respondents in a one-on-one interaction. The researcher sought for insight on information which were not captured by the questionnaire, in order to achieve the aim of the study. One disadvantage of in-depth interview is that just a section of the respondents can participate in the interview; thus its outcomes cannot be generalized.

- The interview guide for the unit heads explored the general practices for control of movements, challenges border officials face in terms of resources, nationals that pose challenges, type of activities engaged in by major nationals who cross the border.
- Again, to ascertain ways to minimize illegal border crossings and how to deal with the transnational crimes and potential transnational security threats along Ghana's border

3.2.5 Sample size and sampling technique for qualitative approach

For the qualitative approach, purposive sampling technique was employed to select twelve (12) key informants, three from each unit; that is the General, Patrol, Intelligence as well as Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Units who have in-depth knowledge on border control and management related issues. This technique was appropriate for the study, because it aided in selecting persons or an area deliberately to provide important information (Patton, 2000; Tongo, 2007).

3.3 Target population

As stated by Bell (2005), population consist of a whole group of individuals selected for a specific study. For this study, the population comprised Immigration officials stationed at Paga border post in the Upper East Region of Ghana.

3.4 Data collection procedure

3.4.1 Quantitative data collection

For quantitative data, instrument for data collection was structured questionnaire with both open and closed ended questions, which aided in collecting information from respondents. This was useful in answering the research questions which were structured into five (5) sections namely; socio-demographic characteristics, border control, operating rules and identification of migrants' activities, challenges of controlling movements across border as well as potential transnational security threats and crimes.

3.4.2 Qualitative data collection

For the qualitative data, an in-depth interview guide was used to collect data from the heads of the General Unit, Patrol Unit, Intelligence Unit as well as Anti-Smuggling and Human Trafficking Unit. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes to about 45 minutes. This enabled the researcher to obtain detailed information on areas such as major national who use the border frequently and activities they engage in, usage of unapproved routes, potential transnational security threats and crimes, challenges of controlling cross-border mobility among others. This was done purposively, since heads of the units have experience with the issues understudy. As Preskill and Jones (2009) opined, the interview guide for qualitative data is generally useful for exploring attitudes and feelings and also to highlight issues that have not been captured in the questionnaires.

3.5 Data analysis

3.5.1 Quantitative data analysis

After retrieving the questionnaires, which were administered to respondents, each questionnaire was checked, coded and analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 20) software. Analytical tools such as descriptive and inferential statistics which included frequency, percentage, cross-tabulation and chi-square test were used for the analyses.

3.5.2 Qualitative data analysis

In-depth interviews were audio recorded by the researcher. All interviews were carried out in English which was the common language both researcher and respondents could communicate in. Thus, interviews recorded were transcribed without much difficulties. The interviews were then coded, put into themes by referring to the objectives. This helped to categorize and analyze the themes thereby reducing many words into coherent and logical phrases and supported the explanations of the quantitative data.

3.6 Ethical consideration

As human beings were the focal elements of the study, issues of ethics were upheld. This was because in as much as the researcher intended to solicit views and ideas from respondents to build new knowledge in the area of study, the rights of the respondents were taken into consideration. Ethical considerations of the study were followed as the researcher did a proper introduction of himself by showing his student's and Immigration Service identification cards to the respondents. The researcher also had to take time to explain the purpose of the study in details and what the study would be used for. This aided in obtaining their consent and the need for them to assist in providing credible information for the study.

Also, the respondent's confidentiality was assured during the data collection period. This was done by concealing their identities, using pseudonyms. Voices recorded from the interviews were treated with upmost confidentiality at the end of the discussion. The researcher also had discussions with the respondents.

3.7 Positionality

The researcher is an Immigration officer working in Bawku. In order not to have biased responses from the Ghana Immigration Service, the researcher employed the services of a research assistant to carry out the in-depth interviews (Teye, 2012). The researcher did not influence or alter responses obtained from the Immigration officers in the analyses. Findings were also clearly and explicitly presented regardless of any prior knowledge or prejudice on the subject of study by the Ghana Immigration Service.

3.8 Limitation

The researcher had some challenges relating to bureaucratic procedures which he had to follow in order to enable him to conduct any interviews. One such challenge had to do with obtaining administrative approval before personnel could be interviewed, which took about two weeks. This delayed the administration of the questionnaire. Also, due to limited time and resource constraints, the study which initially targeted all key border agencies and sample size of about 200, had to be restricted to only immigration personnel stationed at the border. As a result, the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority which is a key stakeholder in border control in Ghana was excluded.

CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND CROSS-BORDER ACTIVITIES

4.0 Introduction

This section presents analyses of the data gathered from the field on the background characteristics and border control practices in the study area. The section discusses the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents including sex, age, and level of education among others and further presents analyses and discussions on border control practices and activities of major nationals who cross the border.

4.1.1 Background characteristics of respondents

Immigration officials in the study area consisted of personnel of General Duties, Intelligence, Border Patrol and Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Units. According to Sosuh (2011) together, these Units within the GIS facilitate, regulate and monitor movements of people through Ghana's borders, residence, employment and removal of foreign nationals as well as collaborating with other sister security services to ensure that people entering and leaving the borders do not pose any security problems to the country. From Table 4.1, out of the 92 respondents sampled, more than two-third (69.6%) were males, while the rest constituted the female population. The disparity between males and females could be attributed to the rigorous and challenging nature of border duties. In terms of the age of respondents, more than a third (34.8%) falls within the workable age cohort (34-39) years, while those within the age of (46-50) years were the least represented age cohort. In addition, 32.6 percent of the same population were within the ages of (28-33) years. Given the age distribution of Immigration officials at the study area, it was unsurprising that more than two-fifth (46.7%) are less than 34 years old. The minimum and maximum ages of respondents sampled were 22 years and 26 years respectively. On the whole, the mean age was 34 years, which is a

characteristic of a youthful age group. Additionally, in relation to the level of education, 53.3 percent were secondary/SSS/SHS graduates and 41.3 percent were university/tertiary graduates. This evidence is an indication that, large proportion of the respondents have higher education. Again, more than half (55.4%) of the respondents were married with those never married constituting 34.8 percent. The slightly high percentage for never married respondents could be attributed to a third of the respondents being very young (28-33) years. Lastly, concerning the years one has served with the organization, more than half (53.3%) of the respondents fall within the range of (8-13) years, while 30.4 percent of the same population have worked within (2-7) years. The rest of the working years is less than 20 percent of the responses from the sampled population.

Table 4.1: Background characteristics of respondents

Socio-demographic variables		Frequency	Percent
Sex	Male	64	69.6
	Female	28	30.4
Total		92	100.0
Age	22-27	13	14.1
	28-33	30	32.6
	34-39	32	34.8
	40-45	15	16.3
	46-50	2	2.2
Total		92	100.0
Educational status	Middle/JHS/JSS	2	2.2
	Secondary/SHS/SSS	49	53.3
	Voc/Tech/Comm	3	3.3
	University/Tertiary	38	41.3
Total		92	100.0

Marital status	Never married	32	34.8
	Informal/Consensual	4	4.3
	Married	51	55.4
	Separated	3	3.3
	Divorced	1	1.1
	Widowed	1	1.1
Total		92	100.0
Number of years worked	2-7	28	30.4
	8-13	49	53.3
	14-19	14	15.2
	20-25	1	1.1
Total		92	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019 *Mean Age= 34 years, Minimum=22 years, Maximum=26*

4.1.2 Required Documents for crossing the border

Crossing borders temporarily or permanently is not a new phenomenon. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 4 to 5 million people cross borders every month within the sub-Region (Addo, 2012). GIS, the government agency charged with the responsibility of regulating movements across the borders recognizes only valid travel documents (passport, travel certificate, etc.). Sections 4 and 12 of the Service Act, Act 573 (2000) which stipulate conditions for entry into and departure from Ghana respectively, makes possession of valid passport or valid travel document a necessary condition. However, perception of documents expected to be carried by travellers according to Immigration officials, which is presented in Table 4.2 reveals that, four out of every five (80.4%) respondents indicated passport is the main document followed by ECOWAS card (12.0%). However, less than 5 percent of the respondents mentioned other forms of documentation required for border crossing. This finding supports that of (Salter,

2004) who noted the most significant document for exiting other countries borders is passport which is officially known worldwide.

A General Duty officer had this to say:

Many people cross this border post every day with different types of documents but, the most recognized and relevant document is passport (**General Duty officer, 2019**).

Table 4.2: Required documents for crossing the border

Required documents	Frequency	Percent
Passport	74	80.4
National I.D Card	4	4.3
ECOWAS Card	11	12.0
Others	3	3.3
Total	92	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.3 Use of equipment or gadgets in checking people who cross the border


The use of PISCES and scanners in processing/checking travellers is uncommon and limited to only major entry points such as Kotoka Airport, Aflao, Elubo, the seaports at Tema and Takoradi and until recently Paga border post (Sosuh, 2011). Processing of travellers at the other entry points are done manually, making it difficult to apprehend wanted or prohibited immigrants. Figure 4.1 presents information on the use of equipment or gadgets to check people who cross the border. Officials who said no to such usages constituted more than half (51.1%), while those who said yes were 48.9%. It is evident from the above that the use of equipment or gadgets in checking people who cross the border is not always a practice and this can be attributed to the absence of scanners (fingerprint, body and body heat), sensors, detectors and others. This is contrary to work done by (Bowerman, 2014) that, recent complexities surrounding border-crossing and the security implication on receiving countries

have led to the introduction of more sophisticated gadgets to be able to scan both persons and luggage on board during border crossing

One Intelligence Unit officer shared this:

We lack equipment like body scanners, sensors, and metal detectors to check people crossing this border post. Unless we receive a tip-off or intelligence from our sources, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to detect anything conceal on the body or in the luggage of a traveller. **(Intelligence Unit officer, 2019).**

Figure 4.1: Use of equipment or gadgets in checking people who cross the border




Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.4 Security checks

People entering or leaving a country through the borders are required to undergo some security checks just like the other points of entry or exit. These may be in the form of documents examination/inspection, profiling, body and luggage/baggage searches. Information on what is or are examined during security checks was ascertained. From Figure 4.2, over two-third (68.5%) of the respondents indicated travel documents, while 17.4 percent indicated both documents and luggage as inspected items. Only luggage or baggage as inspected item was just one-seventh (14.1%) of the total responses. The general implication is

that travel documents is the main thing examined during security checks at the border by Immigration officers. This form of checks meets the standard immigration check-ups internationally as stipulated by international immigration act (Dauvergne, 2004). Examination of luggage/baggage falls exclusively within the ambit of Customs.

Figure 4.2: Security checks



Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.5 Agencies in-charge of controlling the border

Within the broader context of Ghana's national security, a number of different institutions are involved in border security management, with the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority as lead agencies. Whilst, the GIS operates under the Immigration Service Law of 1989 (PNDC Law 226) and the Immigration Service Act 573 (2000) and has the statutory responsibility of regulating and monitoring the entry, stay, employment and exit of foreigners in the country, Customs on the other hand draw their authority from the Customs Act 891 of 2015 and their activities are concentrated on the regulation of all goods across the borders. It is also responsible for conducting examination and verification of documents on imported and exported goods, the collection of duties on

both locally manufactured and imported goods falls in line with its excise function (Sosuh, 2011)

Reference to the agencies in-charge of border control, Table 4.3 reveals that more than three-quarters (77.2%) of respondents unanimously agreed that it is a shared responsibility by both Immigration and Customs officials, while less than 6 percent of the total responses indicated the involvement of other security officials. The reality is that in most countries, border control and security falls within the purview of immigration, customs and in some cases, border police. These agencies are primarily responsible for regulating the flow of people and goods at the points of entry and exit. It is also their duty to detect and prevent illegal crossing (IOM, 2018).

A General Duty officer at the border post had this to share:

Immigration officers cannot do the work alone, because there are other things which go beyond our mandate and that is the work done by Customs with regards to goods. **(General Duty officer, 2019).**

Table 4.3: Agencies in-charge of controlling the border

Officials in-charge	Frequency	Percent
Immigration only	16	17.4
Both Immigration and Customs	71	77.2
Other security officials	5	5.4
Total	92	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.6 Documents guiding operations of GIS and its familiarity

Efficient control of borders requires policies and structures which facilitate and enhance movement management at borders, prevent illegal migration, enabling the detection of

smuggled migrants and trafficked persons and ultimately dismantles organized crime networks (IOM, 2018).

Regarding the availability of specific documents guiding the operations of this institution, Table 4.4 shows that (85.9%) of the respondents responded yes, while 10.9 percent had no idea at all about the existence of such documents. Based on this, evidence exists to suggest that there are documents binding the operations of GIS and one of such is Act 573 of 2000, which is readily available to every personnel. This finding is consistent with Ratner (1996) who expounds that the complex nature of modern control of borders should be guided by some core principles in order to ensure efficient and effective control. Further exploration on the familiarity with the documents was ascertained. Out of the sampled population, more than half (52.8%) were slightly familiar with it, while more than a third (36.0%) were very familiar with such documents. The effectiveness of border control depends largely on documents stipulating the rules and procedures established to enforce the conditions under which entry is permitted including commitment to locating and removing those that breach the conditions of their stay. This assertion is supported by (Dølvik & Visser, 2009), who reiterated that, there is the need for balancing the security laws that facilitate the movement of legal persons and goods to enable the country to benefit from the open relationship with the rest of the world and at the same time preventing the situations that threaten the security of the state.

The overall implication is that large section of the respondents are familiar with such documents and is likely to enhance their performance and inform their decisions on border control.

Table 4.4: Documents guiding operations of organization and its familiarity

Variables		Frequency	Percent
Specific documents	Yes	79	85.9
	No	3	3.3
	Don't know	10	10.9
Total		92	100.0
Familiarity with the content of the documents	Yes, very familiar	32	36.0
	Yes, slightly familiar	47	52.8
	Not familiar	10	11.2
Total		89	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019


4.1.7 Collaboration with other organizations for policy implementation on border control and management

Figure 4.3 presents information on respondents' institution collaborating with other organizations for policy implementation on border control. The majority (80.1%) responded yes in that regard while just 19.9 percent said no. This outcome is in line with Beigbeder (1991), who mentioned that international institutions such as IOM, UNDP among others do work closely with local institutions which handle issues on borders in the area of capacity building and financial assistance in upgrading standards of border control.

A Patrol Unit officer had this to say:

Our institution works closely with a number of organizations including IOM on illegal migration as well as monitoring and intercepting activities of traffickers (**Patrol Unit officer, 2019**).

Figure 4.3: Collaboration with other organizations for policy implementation on border control and management



Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.8 Major nationals who cross the border


Immigration officials regulating human mobility at the border were asked the major nationals who cross the border most often and this is presented in Figure 4.4. Out of the 92 respondents sampled, the majority (73.9%) mentioned ECOWAS citizens other than Ghanaians, while just close to one-fifth (18.5%) cited Ghanaians. However, response on other nationals who use the border post were less than 5 percent. This state of affairs is probably due to the open border policy as a result of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement within the sub-Region (Sosuh, 2011; Lamptey, 2013), which is seen as a fundamental priority that drives sub-Regional integration, by aiding cross-border movement. Agyei & Clotey (2007) noted that as a result of the implementation of the Protocol, population movements within the sub-Region has constituted a relatively large proportion of all immigrants in most of the member states.

One officer noted that:

A lot of people use this border but, the major nationals who cross most often, I will say are ECOWAS citizens. This is because of the less stringent requirements involved

as compared to other nationals (**Immigration officer with the Intelligence Unit, 2019**).

Figure 4.4: Major nationals who cross the border



Source: Field data, 2019

4.1.9 Perceived Purposes for border crossing

Borders in the sub-Region witness crossing of traders and professionals on daily basis for short term transactions, both formal and informal. These intra-regional movements have included female traders, farm labourers and unskilled workers (Awumbilla et al, 2018). In a ranked order, Immigration officials as respondents were asked what they perceive to be the purposes for border crossing by major nationals. The outcome presented in Table 4.5 indicates that, the most significant purposes are business (23.7%), visit (15.3%), tourism (14.4%) followed by transit (14.2%). This finding supports Holmes (1998) that most reasons for crossing borders were economic in nature.

An officer alluded to this fact:

Most of them and I mean people crossing our border do so with different reasons when you interrogate them but, the most common are business purposes.

(General Duty officer, 2019).

An officer with the Intelligence Unit had this to say:

In most cases, non-Africans usually cross the border for tourism purposes especially, visiting the crocodile ponds at Paga (**Intelligence Unit officer, 2019**).

Table 4.5: Perceived purposes for crossing the border

Reasons for crossing borders	Responses (N = 92)	
	N	Percent
Study	41	11.2
Work	35	9.5
Business	87	23.7
Transit	52	14.2
Tourism	53	14.4
Medical	41	11.2
Visit	56	15.3
Others	2	0.5
Total	367	100

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

4.2.0 Activities engaged in by major nationals who cross the border

Cross-border mobility comes with a lot of activities which include trading activities among migrants (Kloosterman, Van der Leun & Rath, 1998). It is estimated that most trading activities engagement are by ECOWAS nationals especially, those from Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso (Anarfi et al., 2003). According to Roth (2007), specific trading activities mostly engaged in are agricultural products from neighbouring countries in exchange for products like salt and fish in addition to non-agricultural products such as vehicle and bicycle spare parts among others. Table 4.6 shows that among the respondents sampled, close to a

third (33.1%) cited trading in general goods by major nationals who cross, followed by motor/bicycle spare parts (14.3%) and food/drink (11.7%), while the rest of activities engaged in were less than 11 percent. This finding confirms that of Funteh (2014), whose view on cross-border activities is that, migrants are mostly involved in general merchandized.

A view was expressed in that regard:

The people who cross the border are mostly Burkinabes, Nigeriens and Malians. They mostly travel to Kumasi to buy goods especially, plastic wares, motor/bicycle spare parts and cosmetics. They return after a few days to cross back to their various countries together with their goods (**Immigration officer with the Patrol Unit, 2019**).

Table 4.6: Activities engaged in by major nationals who cross the border

Trading activities	Responses (N = 92)	
	N	Percent
Electrical appliances	21	7.9
Mobile phones and accessories	28	10.5
Cosmetics	29	10.9
Motor/Bicycle spare parts	38	14.3
Food/Drinks	31	11.7
Vehicles	29	10.9
General goods	88	33.1
Others	2	0.8
Total	266	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

4.2.1 Challenges of controlling movements at the border and nationals who pose challenges crossing the border

Challenges associated with controlling cross-border mobility and particular nationals who pose challenges were explored. Table 4.7 indicates that an overwhelming majority (98.9%) responded positively to facing challenges in controlling cross-border movements with just a

few (1.1%) who said no to such challenges. With respect to nationals posing challenges to border officials, out of the 92 respondents sampled, more than half (58.2%) cited ECOWAS citizens other than Ghanaians as those who pose challenges, while more than a third (36.3%) mentioned Ghanaians as those who pose challenges. However, about 5 percent cited other nationals. Agyei & Clottey (2007) attributed this challenge to the fact that adequate mechanisms on the part of ECOWAS to control the entry of illegal immigrants into member states have been lacking and that many citizens in the sub-Region do not have any valid travel documents.

A General duty officer had this to share:

All nationals including Ghanaians crossing this border in one way or the other pose some challenges to us, but those we encounter the most are ECOWAS citizens apart from Ghanaians. A lot of these citizens cross or attempt to cross without any form of documentation. Some also use their national identity cards, while others choose to use unauthorized routes (**General Duty officer, 2019**).

Table 4.7: Challenges of controlling cross-border movements and nationals who pose challenges crossing the border

Variables		Frequency	Percent
Challenges faced	Yes	91	98.9
	No	1	1.1
Total		92	100.0
Nationals posing challenges	Ghanaians	33	36.3
	ECOWAS citizens apart from Ghanaians	53	58.2
	Other Africans	4	4.4
	Non-African Nationals	1	1.1
Total		91	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

CHAPTER FIVE

CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS-BORDER MOBILITY

5.0 Introduction

This section presents the challenges relating to border control and potential transnational security threats associated with crossing borders. Again, ways of managing these challenges were explored.

5.1.1 Challenges of controlling movements across the border

Most of the challenges are not new developments, they have been long standing ones that have persisted over time (Aning, 2005; Sosuh, 2011). Globally, border officials encounter a lot of challenges in controlling and managing affairs of borders (Flynn, 2000) especially, in developing countries. Border officials' views on such challenges were ascertained, which is presented in Table 5.1. According to the respondents, lack of modern equipment for work (32.0%) and logistical constraints (32.5%) are the main challenges faced. With regards to modern equipment, GIS command posts are woefully under-resourced. Gadgets such as radars, sensors, metal detectors, video surveillance and body scanners are virtually unknown in the operations of the Service. According to Okumu (2011), lack of equipment and facilities to secure and manage borders largely accounts for the state of border insecurity in Africa.

Head of the Border Patrol Unit explained qualitatively that:

Modern equipment for border control is key if borders are to be secured effectively but, per what we have and what we do now, it is difficult to control and protect the border. **(Head of Patrol Unit, 2019).**

Notwithstanding the above challenge, logistical constraints is a key problem which plagues the Institution with respect to border control and security. Inadequate Patrol vehicles, jungle

motor bikes, absence of fire arms and office space hamper the efforts of GIS in fighting major crimes associated with border crossing. These assertions have been noted by international groups such as IOM (2015) and GIABA (2016) that GIS as an institution was rated poorly to compliance of this provision on international standards for border control. Again, more than one-sixth (18.6%) of the respondents cited lack of coordination among border officials. This supports the work of Okumu (2011), who noted that one of the many challenges affecting border management in Africa is lack of cooperation at the local, government and regional levels. A further 14.3 percent mentioned inadequate personnel to manage the borders as a major challenge. The general implication is that these unresolved challenges expose the border to high levels of insecurity and border crimes. This assertion is supported by Weber (2015) who expounded that lack of modern technology in the form of equipment and proper management approaches with respect to border control, expose the border to security threats such as transnational crimes.

Head of the Patrol Unit further shares this:

I have been working here for the past two years, one major challenge is that we don't have the resources to work with. We lack modern equipment for border control as well as logistics like patrol vehicles, jungle motorbikes, communication gadgets among others for effective transmission of information to the various Units and prevent illegal crossing of goods and people **(Head of Patrol Unit, 2019)**.

Table 5.1: Major challenges of controlling movements across the border

Major challenges	Responses (N = 92)	
	N	Percent
Lack of modern equipment for work	74	32.0
Lack of coordination among border officials	43	18.6
Logistical constraints	75	32.5
Inadequate personnel	33	14.3
Others	6	2.6
Total	231	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

5.1.2 Percentage distribution of major challenges encountered by gender

Bivariate analysis between major challenges faced by border officials in regulating movements and gender were explored. As depicted in Table 5.2, among the male population, lack of modern equipment for work and logistical constraints had the largest percentage (84.4%) as the major challenge faced followed by lack of coordination among border officials (51.6%). Similar outcomes were obtained from the female population but, higher among males than females. However, there was no significant association between major challenges encountered as border official and sex of respondents. The general implication is that all border officials are confronted with major challenges irrespective of one's sex.

An officer with the Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit had this to share:

In controlling movements at the border, we encounter a lot of challenges, because we don't have the needed resources. We wish we are provided with modern equipment, if not we will be handicapped and a lot of illegal cross-border activities will go undetected (**Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit officer, 2019**).

Table 5.2: Percentage distribution of major challenges by gender

Major challenges	Sex of respondent		χ^2 test
	Male N (%)	Female N (%)	
Lack of modern equipment for work	54 (84.4)	20 (74.1)	$\chi^2= 2.075$ df=1 p= 0.150
Lack of coordination among border officials	33 (51.6)	10 (37.0)	$\chi^2= 1.965$ df=1 p= 0.161
Logistical constraints	54 (84.4)	21 (77.8)	$\chi^2= 1.136$ df=1 p= 0.286
Inadequate personnel	25 (39.1)	8 (29.6)	$\chi^2= 0.932$ df=1 p= 0.334
Others	6 (9.4)	0 (0.0)	$\chi^2= 2.808$ df=1 p= 0.094

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses


5.1.3 Bribery and corruption

Perception about bribery and corruption in the security services in Ghana is widely known, though empirical evidence to back them are often fable (Norman et al., 2017). According to Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), Immigration officers are perceived to take bribe for smooth facilitation of border crossing at most borders and the Airport (GII, 2017). It was based on this notion that respondents were asked whether in their operations as immigration officials, they have been tempted with bribes. As presented in Figure 5.1, out of the total population, more than half (53.3%) responded yes while, the rest (46.7%) responded no. The overall implication is that attempted bribery among border officials is not as high as overly exaggerated many times.

One General duty officer had this to share:

Our institution is often tagged with bribery and corruption which may be true, but majority of us are not corrupt and we insist on the right thing being done, by allowing only genuine people and goods to pass so as to protect the country (**General duty officer, 2019**).

Figure 5.1: Bribery and corruption



Source: Field data, 2019

5.1.4 Unapproved routes


According to section 2(1) (6) of Act 573 (2000) of the Ghana Immigration Service, entry into the country shall be through an approved place of entry and any contravention of this constitutes an offence. In light of this, information on the use of unapproved routes instead of the designated border is presented in Figure 5.2. Overwhelming majority (96.7%) cited yes to use of such routes by travellers, while just a few (3.3%) stated no to such usage. The overall implication is that usage of unapproved routes aids cross-border crimes as many people cross illegally and smuggle goods and other items into and out of the country without traces. In the

view of Agyei & Clottey (2007), the existence of such routes facilitates informal cross-border trade together with the connivance of corrupt border personnel.

An officer with the Patrol Unit had this to say;

Border residents aid in the creation and the use of such routes. They have deep knowledge of the area. We block those routes every time, but yet they keep creating new ones every day. We don't have the resources to close all, we will need vehicles and personnel to deploy to these areas to clamp down on these miscreants. **(Patrol Unit officer, 2019)**

Figure 5.2: Unapproved routes



Source: Field data, 2019

5.1.5 Managing illegal crossing of borders

Ways of managing illegal crossing of borders were explored from respondents. In ranked order, as depicted in Table 5.3, the most effective ways of managing this menace are; intense patrolling (49.4%), blocking of illegal routes (22.7%) and the use of sophisticated equipment (13.6%). This finding is consistent with Vogl (2015) who explicated that constant patrolling of borders regularly helps to minimize creation of unapproved routes.

Table 5.3: Managing illegal crossing of borders

Managing illegal crossing	Responses (N = 92)	
	N	Percent
Intense patrolling	87	49.4
Block illegal routes	40	22.7
Use of sophisticated equipment	24	13.6
Surveillance/ Use of drones	22	12.5
Others	3	1.7
Total	176	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

5.1.6 Cross tabulation between ways of managing illegal crossings and gender

Management of illegal crossing of borders is a challenge to both developed and developing countries (Wonders, 2006; Martin & Zürcher, 2008). However, IOM (2019) has proposed Border and Identity Solution (BIS) unit which provides efficient border and migration management at borders and prevents illegal crossing. One of its components focuses on border management and gender in relation to its implication on border control. In light of this, respondents' views in terms of their sex on managing illegal crossings were ascertained. As presented in Table 5.4, among the male population, overwhelming majority (96.8%) mentioned intense patrolling followed by blocking of illegal routes (47.6%). Within the same population, usage of sophisticated equipment was (28.6%). However, with regards to the female population, similar outcomes were obtained with the exception of the use of surveillance and sophisticated equipment where responses were unanimous (21.4%). There was no significant association between management of illegal crossing and one's sex.

A Patrol officer had this to say:

The reality is that combating illegal crossing is not an easy task whether you are a male or female official, it all depends on the availability of resources to patrol constantly. **(Patrol Unit officer, 2019).**

The finding corroborates that of Johnson et al., (2011), who noted that managing illegal border crossing involves financial resources to deploy officials for routine patrol in order to minimize creation of illegal borders.

Table 5.4: Cross tabulation between ways of managing illegal crossing and gender

Management of illegal crossing of borders	Sex of respondent		χ^2 test
	Male	Female	
	N (%)	N (%)	
Intense patrolling	61 (96.8)	26 (92.9)	$\chi^2 = 0.228$ df=1 p= 0.633
Block illegal routes	30 (47.6)	10 (35.7)	$\chi^2 = 0.987$ df=1 p= 0.320
Use of sophisticated equipment	18 (28.6)	6 (21.4)	$\chi^2 = 0.453$ df=1 p= 0.501
Surveillance/ Use of drones	16 (25.4)	6 (21.4)	$\chi^2 = 0.137$ df=1 p= 0.712
Others	1 (1.6)	2 (7.1)	$\chi^2 = 2.330$ df=2 p= 0.312

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

5.1.7 Existence of crimes and main crimes associated with cross-border mobility

Border crossings in recent times have been associated with crimes (Väyrynen, 2005). Cross-border dynamics represent a fundamental dimension of trade flows, subverting the laws of nation-states, as in illegal trafficking and terrorism, which exploit the highly porous borders for the purpose of trading arms, drugs and migrants or carrying out attacks in neighbouring

countries (Walther, 2017) It is in this vein that respondents' views were ascertained on the prevalence of border crimes. Table 5.5 reveals that out of the 92 respondents sampled, large proportion (91.3%) responded yes to such crimes at the border, while less than 10 percent responded no. With respect to some of the border crimes, more than two-fifth (47.6%) mentioned goods smuggling, human trafficking (29.8%) followed by drug trafficking (14.3%). Responses on the rest of other border crimes were less than 5 percent. The finding is consistent with studies done on border security within the sub-Region which indicated that the porous nature of borders allows smooth execution of these crimes without traces (Adetiba, 2019). Okumu (2011) also alluded to the fact that criminals capitalize on weak state capacities to control/manage its borders to engage in illegal activities. Sosuh (2016) further noted that these crimes are issues that confront border security in Ghana, adding that these crimes are also facilitated by the use of improved technology such as the internet and mobile phones.

An officer with the Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit had this to say:

Our outfit receives many cases but, most of them go unpunished because we lack the resources to work (**Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit officer, 2019**).


Table 5.5: Existence of crimes and main crimes associated with cross-border mobility

Variables		Frequency	Percent
Do you encounter cross-border crimes	Yes	84	91.3
	No	8	8.7
Total		92	100.0
Main crimes associated with border crossing	Human trafficking	25	29.8
	Drug trafficking	12	14.3
	Goods smuggling	40	47.6
	Robbery	4	4.8
	Animal rustling	2	2.4
	No such crimes	1	1.2
	Others	0	0.0
Total		84	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

5.1.8 Potential transnational security threats.

Many security threats such as armed rebellion, incursion and terrorist activities have largely been linked to insecure and uncontrolled borders. (Okumu, 2011). Figure 5.3 presents information on potential transnational security threats along Ghana's border. The finding suggests that three out of four (75.0%) responded yes to the existence of potential transnational security threats, while a quarter (25.0%) said no. Shedding light on this, Sosuh (2011) indicated that the issues which threaten Ghana's security at the borders are quite similar to those of her neighbouring states, owing to the fact that the crimes are transnational in nature. The general implication is that with the recent spate of growing transnational security threats in neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso, Ghana risk being confronted by such threats unless pragmatic efforts are made to improve control practices and security at the border.

Figure 5.3: Potential transnational security threats

Source: Field data, 2019

5.1.9 Potential transnational security threats identified

The growing incidence regarding the transnationalization of crimes in the sub-Region coupled with the porous nature of borders, ease of movements and upsurge in terrorists' activities expose the country to transnational security threats. According to Sosuh (2011), new and complicated border threats have added to the old ones, manifesting in various activities and these are accompanied by threats such as terrorism and money laundering which are not visible. Some of the potential transnational security threats which may adversely affect Ghana through its borders were explored and presented in Table 5.6. The predominant potential transnational threats identified are terrorism (37.2%) and drug/arm trafficking (24.2%) followed by smuggling of general goods (20.3%). This supports Adamson (2006) that the increase in cross-border movements of migrants within the sub-Region serves as a conduit for terrorism. Human trafficking had the lowest percentage and this could be attributed to mechanisms instituted to minimize it.

An Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit officer shares this in support of the finding:

We are exposed to many potential transnational security threats along the border including terrorism and human trafficking but, my outfit is working in collaboration with the Intelligence Unit and some key informants around the border to help us to identify some of the syndicates in the area of human trafficking, hence it has minimized (**Anti-Human Smuggling and Trafficking Unit officer, 2019**).

Table 5.6: Potential transnational security threats identified

Potential transnational security threats	Responses (N = 92)	
	N	Percent
Terrorism	68	37.24
Drug/Arm trafficking	44	24.2
Human smuggling	33	18.1
Smuggling of goods	37	20.3
Total	182	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

5.2.0 Managing potential transnational security threats

A country's perception of its external threats fundamentally determines its response to border insecurity with regards to border management mechanisms it puts in place (Okumu, 2011). In the wake of recent acts of terrorism across the sub-Region, respondents' views on ways of combating potential transnational security threats were ascertained. Table 5.7 shows that more than one-fifth (23.3%) of the respondents cited constant patrol and further training for border officials (21.3%). Responses on other ways of managing potential transnationally security threats were less than 20 percent. These two important ways of managing potential transnational security threats are key in combating contemporary transnational criminal activities.

Table 5.7: Managing potential transnational security threats

Managing transnational threats	Responses (N = 92)	
	N	Percent
Mass education	55	15.9
Continuous surveillance	68	19.6
Constant patrol	81	23.3
Application of sophisticated equipment	61	17.6
Further training for border officials	74	21.3
Others	8	2.3
Total	347	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

5.2.1 Percentage distribution of managing potential transnational threats by gender

Gender perspective on ways of handling potential transnational security threats were explored. Table 5.8 reveals that among the male population, overwhelming majority (92.2%) cited constant patrol of borders and further training for border officials (81.2%). Within the same population, those who called for continuous surveillance were (76.6 %). However, there was significant association between constant border patrol and sex of respondent ($\chi^2 = 3.430$, $df = 1$ and $p\text{-value} = 0.045 < 0.05$) but higher among males than females.

An officer of the Patrol Unit had this to share:

Border patrolling is an extremely difficult task and it requires a great deal of physical effort to be able to cope with the resistance from border residents and moving into isolated places within the terrain to intercept smuggled goods and apprehend illegal crossers. We sometimes encounter dangerous elements such as armed smugglers/traffickers among others. This is why majority of the Patrol Unit officers here are males (**Patrol Unit officer, 2019**).

Table 5.8: Percentage distribution of managing potential transnational security threats by gender

Management of transnational threats	Sex of respondent		χ^2 test
	Male N (%)	Female N (%)	
Mass education	41 (64.1)	14 (50.0)	$\chi^2= 1.602$ df=1 p= 0.206
Continuous surveillance	49 (76.6)	19 (67.9)	$\chi^2= 0.766$ df=1 p= 0.382
Constant patrol	59 (92.2)	22 (78.6)	$\chi^2= 3.430$ df=1 p= 0.045 (sig)
Application of sophisticated equipment	42 (65.6)	19 (67.9)	$\chi^2= 0.043$ df=1 p= 0.835
Further training for border officials	52 (81.2)	22 (78.6)	$\chi^2= 0.089$ df=1 p= 0.766
Others	7 (10.9)	1 (3.6)	$\chi^2= 1.331$ df=1 p= 0.249

Source: Field data, 2019 ** Multiple responses

5.2.2 Adequacy of resources for work

The agencies in charge of enforcing security at the borders of the country are inadequately resourced, which negatively affects their efforts at improving security (Sosuh, 2011). The same scholar further reiterated that the GIS is also woefully under resourced in terms of vehicles, border video surveillance gadgets such as radar sensors, close circuit television (CCTV) and mobile scanners. As a security organization, the Ghana Immigration Service is saddled with resource constraints just like the other security services. Out of the 92 respondents sampled, overwhelming majority (98.9%) cited no while just a few (1.1%) mentioned yes as shown in the Table 5.9. This lends credence to studies by Lamptey (2013),

that border agencies in sub-Region are poorly resourced, ill-equipped and ill-trained, adding that equipment for work is not always present at some borders. This situation partly explains the porosity of borders and the increase in transnational criminal activities.

Table 5.9: Adequacy of resources for work

Resource availability	Frequency	Percent
Yes	1	1.1
No	91	98.9
Total	92	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

5.2.3 Ways of addressing resource inadequacy

The Ghana Immigration Service plays an instrumental role in the security structure of the country and constitutes an indispensable part of the sub-Region's integration process.

In view of the above, resources should as a matter of urgency be allocated to improve border infrastructure and facilities. Government should see border management as a national security issue and resource the GIS to effectively discharge its mandate of securing the borders. Again, modern technology and equipment should be available for officials manning the borders which will help combat transnational organized crimes. Institutions like IOM and UNDP have been phenomenal in this regard. Again, government should make the GIS to retain about 50 percent of its internally generated funds (IGF), by so doing, the institution on its own can acquire more vehicles, operational accoutrements and infrastructure in addition to the usual government support.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Introduction

This section presents a summary of the study's major findings in relation to the objectives of the study. Also, it provides a conclusion based on the findings and the theoretical underpinnings of the study. Finally, some recommendations are made based on the findings of the study.

6.1 Summary

The study examined how cross-border mobility is controlled in Ghana and issues associated with border control. Using Paga border post as a case study, 92 immigration officials were randomly selected. The key findings are discussed below.

The findings indicated that, higher percentage of the respondents (69.6%) were males with an average age of 34 years old constituting a youthful working population. Large proportion of the respondents were highly educated. In controlling movements across the borders, it is evident from the study that passport (80.4%) is the main document required and examined during security checks (68.5%) by immigration officials. Again, use of equipment/gadgets (48.9%) for checking people who cross the border is not a common practice. Control of the border is mainly by both Immigration and Customs officials (77.2%). With regards to major nationals crossing the border frequently, the finding also revealed that ECOWAS citizens other than Ghanaians dominated (73.9%) and perceived purposes for crossing the border put business at 23.7%, visit (15.3%) and tourism (14.4%). In terms of the activities engaged in by major nationals who ply the border, it was found out that they are mostly engaged in trading activities, dealing in general goods (33.1%) and motor/bicycle spare parts (14.3%). With

respect to challenges of controlling movements across the borders in Ghana, it further came to light from the findings that border officials face a lot of challenges (98.9%) in controlling movements across the border and major ones are logistical constraints (32.5%) and lack of modern equipment in patrolling the border (32.0%), however, more males than females face these challenges, though the chi-square test showed no significant association between sex and major challenges faced as border officials ($p > 0.05$). The usage of unapproved routes by travellers to either enter or exit the country was confirmed (96.7%). Again, ways of managing illegal border crossing saw a large proportion of the respondents calling for intense patrolling (49.4%) and blocking of illegal routes (22.7%).

In terms of encountering cross-border crimes, majority (91.3%) responded yes with smuggling of goods (47.6%), human trafficking (29.8%) and drug trafficking (14.3%) as the main crimes. In relation to potential transnational security threats, three-quarters of the same population (75.0%) alluded to the existence of these threats along the country's border with terrorism (37.2%) and drug/arm trafficking (24.2%) being the prominent threats. The study findings also revealed ways of managing potential transnational security threats, where respondents called for constant patrolling (23.3%) and further training of officers (21.3%). From the perspective of respondents' gender, there was significant association ($p < 0.05$) with respect to constant border patrols in addition to further training for border officials.

6.2 Conclusion

Territorial borders play a critical role as far as the security of states is concerned. The study concludes that Immigration personnel whose responsibility lies in the control of movements across the borders encounter numerous challenges. These do not only undermine the performance of their duties but, expose Ghana to transnational security threats and criminal enterprises. On top of that, the recent spate terrorist acts in Burkina Faso, coupled with the

usage of unapproved by travellers, inadequate logistics and the absence of equipment in checking people who cross the borders put the country at a potential risk of such an attack. Consequently, Ghana's borders cannot be said to be secured. In view of this, the various units within the Service work together in a coordinated effort to overcome some of these challenges. This is consistent with coordinated border management (CBM) approach which provides cohesive responses to border challenges when they surface.

6.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations are made:

- With regards to border control, it is recommended that government should make needed resources available, by provision of modern equipment/gadgets and logistics for patrols in order to minimize illegal transnational activities along the borders as well as prevention of illegal crossings.
- Government should collaborate with international organizations such IOM, UNDP among others to train border officials to enhance their skills in the area of combating transnational crimes through detection and prevention. Regular and frequent in-service trainings and refresher courses should be organized for officers and men to build their capacity and bring them up-to date with best practices.
- In an era of integrated border management, government should consider the idea of merging immigration and customs and other relevant institutions into a single body to manage the affairs of borders in the country. This would pave way for collaboration and coordination, reduce inter-agency rivalry, perceived supremacy and set the stage for the institutions to share facilities, resources and intelligence. Classical example is the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

- Fences and perimeter boundaries should be constructed to boost security at the operation areas as well to minimize unauthorized/illegal crossings.
- People who cross the border regularly including border residents can be put through security clearance and issued with special cards to allow them to cross easily without having to go through the routine security checks each time they cross.
- The Ghana Immigration Service being the first line of defence should as a matter of urgency be provided with fire arms to boost their operations at the borders. Though Act 908 of 2016 mandates officers of the Service to use fire arms in the discharge of their duties, this has been an illusion. Personnel of the Service perform their mandatory duties at the borders with bare arms, in spite of the growing terrorist acts in the sub-Region.
- Since transnational crimes and security threats traverse national borders and no country can fight them alone, it behoves on government to co-operate strongly with neighbouring countries in combating them.

6.4 Areas for future research

The following propositions are areas that require future research.

- Since the study focused on Paga border post with immigration officers alone as respondents, there is the need for future research to expand the target population to include customs personnel and other security officials at the border.
- The geographical scope of the border can be extended to include Aflao and Elubo borders for comparative study on border control practices and how trans-border mobility is managed.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR BORDER MANAGEMENT OFFICIALS

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

CENTER FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

**RESEARCH TOPIC: MOBILITY AND BORDER CONTROL PRACTICES IN
GHANA: A CASE STUDY OF PAGA BORDER POST**

Introduction

I am an MA Candidate at the Centre for Migration Studies of University of Ghana, Legon-Accra. This survey is being conducted as part of my studies. I would be grateful if you could answer the questions below. Your participation in this study is very important but it is voluntary and you can withdraw at any point. Any information provided for this study would be treated with utmost confidentiality and for academic purposes only.

Thank you.

SECTION A: SOCIO – DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS

1. Age on last birthday
2. Sex 1 = Male [] 2 = Female []
3. Educational level
1 = No Education [] 2 = Primary [] 3 = Middle / JHS [] 4 = Secondary/ SSS/ SHS [] 5 = Vocational/ Comm/ Technical [] 6 = University/ Tertiary []
4. Marital status?
1 = Never married [] 2 = Informal/ Consensual [] 3 = Married []
4 = Separated [] 5 = Divorced [] 6 = Widowed []
5. Main Occupation/Position
6. Duty Post
7. How long have you been working with this organization?

SECTION B: BORDER CONTROL

8. What is required of someone before he/ she crosses the border?
1 = Passport [] 2 = National ID card [] 3 = ECOWAS card []
4 = Others [] Specify
9. Do you use equipment/gadgets to check people who cross the border?
1 = Yes [] 2 = No []
10. What are some of the things you inspect during security checks?
1 = Travel documents [] 2 = Luggage/ Baggage [] 3 = Both Documents and Luggage []
4 = Others [] Specify
11. Who are normally in-charge of controlling the border?
1 = Immigration only [] 2 = Both Immigration and Custom []
3 = Other security officials [] Specify.....
12. Are the resources available for working adequate? 1 = Yes [] 2 = No []
13. Have you ever participated in any training program? 1 = Yes [] 2 = No []
14. Are you supervised periodically by your supervisors? 1 = Yes [] 2 = No []

SECTION C: PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATING RULES AND IDENTIFICATION ON ACTIVITIES OF MIGRANTS

15. Is there any specific document/manual that guides the operations of your organization?
1 = Yes [] 2 = No [] 3 = Don't know []
16. If yes to Q15, are you familiar with the entire content of this policy document?
1 = Yes, Very familiar [] 2 = Yes, Slightly familiar []
3 = Not familiar []
17. Does your organization work closely with other organizations in implementing policies on border control? 1 = Yes [] 2 = No []
18. Which nationals use this border post most often?
1 = Ghanaians [] 2 = ECOWAS Citizens apart from Ghanaians []
3 = Other Africans [] 4 = Non-African Nationals []
19. What are some of the purposes why people cross this border?
1 = Study [] 2 = Work [] 3 = Business [] 4 = Transit []
5 = Tourism [] 6 = Medical [] 7 = Visit []
8 = Others [] Specify

20. Those in businesses, which trading activities do they engage in?

- 1 = Electrical appliances [] 2 = Mobile phones and accessories [] 3 = Cosmetics []
4 = Motor / Bicycle spare parts [] 5 = Food / Drinks [] 6 = Vehicles []
7 = General goods [] 8 = Others [] Specify

SECTION D: CHALLENGES OF CONTROLLING MOVEMENTS ACROSS BORDER

21. Do you face any challenges when controlling movements at the border?

- 1 = Yes [] 2 = No []

22. If yes to Q 21, which particular nationals pose a challenge when it comes to movement control?

- 1 = Ghanaians [] 2 = ECOWAS nationals apart from Ghanaians []
3 = Other Africans [] 4 = Non-African Nationals []

23. What are the main challenges you face as border official?

1. = Lack of modern equipment for work []
2. = Lack of coordination among border officials []
3. = Logistical constraints (eg. vehicles for patrol) []
4. = Inadequate personnel []
5. = Others / Specify

24. Do you think the institutional arrangement of your organization allows for effective policy implementation? 1 = Yes [] 2 = No [] 3 = Don't know []

25. Has someone ever attempted to bribe you in your operations?

- 1= Yes [] 2= No []

26. Are there any unapproved routes people use instead of the main border?

- 1=Yes [] 2= No []

27. If yes to Q26, how do you manage illegal crossing?

1. = Intense patrolling []
2. = Blocking of illegal routes []
3. = Use of sophisticated equipment []
4. = Surveillance/use of drones []
5. = Others [] Specify

SECTION E: POTENTIAL TRANSNATIONAL THREATS ASSOCIATED WITH CROSS BORDER MOBILITY

28. As an official of the border, do you encounter cross border crimes?

1 = Yes [] 2 = No []

29. If yes to Q28, what are the main crimes associated with cross border mobility?

1 = Human trafficking [] 2. = Drug trafficking [] 3 = Goods smuggling []
4 = Robbery [] 5 = Animal rustling [] 6 Others = [] Specify
.....

30. In your opinion, are there potential transnational security threats as a result of
how movement is controlled at the border? 1 = Yes [] 2 = No []

31. If yes to Q30, what are some of the potential transnational security threats?

1 2.....
3 4.....

32. In view of recent acts of terrorism in the sub-region, would you say our
borders are secured? 1 = Yes [] 2 = No []

33. In what way (s) do you think issues of transnational threats can be controlled and
managed? (Multiple responses allowed)

1. = Mass education []
2. = Continuous surveillance []
3. = Constant border patrol []
4. = Application of sophisticated equipment []
5. = Further training for border officials []
6. = Others [] Specify.....

APPENDIX B

I am an MA Candidate at the Centre for Migration Studies of University of Ghana, Legon-Accra. This survey is being conducted as part of my studies. I would be grateful if you could answer the questions below. Your participation in this study is very important but it is voluntary and you can withdraw at any point. Any information provided for this study would be treated with utmost confidentiality and for academic purposes only.

Interview Guide for for key informant (General duties and Border Patrol Unit of GIS – Paga Post)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Can you please tell me about yourself (Probe for age, level of education, marital status, years spent in working at the border etc.)?

SECTION 1: BORDER CONTROL PRACTICES AND IDENTIFICATION OF NATIONALS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES

2. What are the formalities one goes through when crossing the border? (Probe for identification of documents, type of documents, equipment use for checking, security checks, number of people who cross daily, resources, training programs, etc.)

3. Can you please give me the breakdown of the major nationals who patronize this border often apart from Ghanaians and the activities they engage in? (Probe for nationality, purposes for crossing, type of activities they engage in, type of goods that crosses the border etc.)

SECTION 2: OPERATING RULES AND POLICIES

4. Are there policies/documents that regulate your operations? (Probe for these policies, level of familiarity of these policies/rules, collaboration with other agencies in implementing policies on border control, etc.)

SECTION 3: CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

CONTROLLING MOVEMENT ACROSS BORDERS

5. What are some of the major challenges you face in manning the border post? (Probe for availability of logistics, adequate personnel, and availability of modern patrol equipment among others, controlling movements along unapproved routes etc.)

6. Is mobility having any impact on the crimes associated with border crossing? (Probe for the type of crimes, who are involve in terms of sex, likely weapons that are smuggle etc.)

7. Are there potential transnational security threats as a result of how the border/movement is controlled? (Probe for types, security of the border, how to deal with such threats, etc.)