

**DISENTANGLING THE DYNAMICS OF SMALL POWER-BIG POWER
RELATIONS: A CASE STUDY OF THE US-GHANA RELATIONS
UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC**

BY

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DECLARATION


I, Anasenchor Orlapu, humbly declare that this work is my own original work carried out under the supervision of Prof. Kwame Boafo-Arthur, Dr. Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah and Dr. Seidu Mahama Alidu in the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. I hereby do state that this is not a reproduction of somebody's work *either* in part *or* whole. I also do confirm that all sources of material employed in this study have been duly cited and acknowledged.

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
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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents [Mr. Mejane A. Mark (My Father), Madam Amelewe Nkpawiasse (My Mother)] and brother [Mr. Jackson Kofi Anasensor].



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My profound gratitude goes to the Almighty God for sustaining my life and giving me the strength and insight to push to a successful end. My heartfelt appreciation also goes to my parents [Mr. Mejane A. Mark (My Father), Madam Amelewe Nkpawiasse (My Mother)] and brother [Mr. Jackson Kofi Anasensor (brother)], my supervisors [Prof. Kwame Boafo-Arthur, Dr. Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah, and Prof. Seidu Mahama Alidu], Dr. Isaac Owusu-Mensah (Lecturer), and my MPhil mates for their immense supports, counsels, and directions throughout this work. I appreciate you!!! God bless. Amen!!!



TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
CSSTA	Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
CDM	Concept of Defensive Moralism
EIS	Efficacy of Immune System
ECSELL	Enhancing Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GAIT	Government Accountability Improves Trust
GIPC	Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITC	International Trade Centre
IIA	Investment Incentive Agreement
ILEA	International Law Enforcement Academies
IS	Immune System
KIA	Kotoka International Airport
LIS	Large Immune System



MoTI	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MFARI	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration
NACOC	Narcotics Control Commission
OIS	Outputs of Immune System
OS/ATA	Open Skies/Air Transport Agreement
QSD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SIS	Small Immune System
SPS	Sanitary and Phytosanitary
TIFA	Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
US	United States
USSR	Union Soviet Socialist Republics
USTR	United States Trade Representative
UG	University of Ghana
WB	World Bank

Contents

DECLARATION	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iii
TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS	iv
AGOA African Growth and Opportunity Act	iv
LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES	xiii
Abstract	xiv
CHAPTER ONE	1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	1
1.0. Introduction	1
1.1. Background to the Study	1
1.2. Statement of the Research Problem	3
1.3. Research Objectives	7
➤ Main Objective	7
➤ Specific Objectives	7
1.4. Research Questions	7
➤ Main Question	7
➤ Specific Questions	8
1.5. Operationalization of Concepts	8
1.5.0. Introduction	8
❖ Immune System	8
❖ ‘Theoretical’ and ‘Empirical’ Successes	9
❖ Antibodies	9
❖ Moral defenses	9
1.6. Significance of the Study	10
1.7. Organization of Work	10
CHAPTER TWO	12
LITERATURE REVIEW	12
2.0. Introduction	12
2.1. Hegemony	12
2.2. Uni-polarity vs. Multi-polarity	13
➤ Uni-polarity	13
➤ Multi-polarity	14
2.3. Small States vs. Big States	14

➤ Small States	14
➤ Big States	15
2.4. Structural Reorientation: The Breakdown of Uni-polarity into Multi-polarity—1940s-2020s	16
2.4.0. Introduction	16
➤ Economic Reorientation.....	16
➤ Military Reorientation	17
2.5. Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-China Relations in the Middle East and East Asia	19
2.5.0. Introduction	19
The confrontation-conflict approaches:.....	19
The engagement-cooperation approaches:	23
2.6. Examining the Dynamics of the Principle of Balanced Neutrality in Medium Power-Big Power Relations in Aisa and Oceania	26
2.6.0. Introduction	26
2.7. Disaggregating the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the First Republic (1960-1966).....	34
2.7.0. Introduction	34
The engagement-cooperation approaches:	34
The confrontation-conflict approaches:.....	36
CHAPTER THREE.....	47
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	47
3.0. Introduction	47
3.1. Strategic Hedging.....	47
3.1.0. Introduction	47
❖ Balancing	48
❖ Bandwagoning	48
❖ Cooperation.....	49
❖ Conflict	50
➤ Strategic Hedging (cont.)	50
✓ The Definition of Strategic Hedging	51
❖ Definitions Pinned on the Strategies of Hedging.....	51
❖ Definitions Pinned on the Major Aim of Hedging—the Need to Avoid Threat	52
➤ The Conditions, Reasons, Characteristics, and Modus Operandi of Hedging	53
❖ The Conditions (What Triggers States to Hedge?).....	53
❖ The Reasons (Why do States Hedge?)	54
❖ The Policy Elements and Characteristics of Hedging	54

❖	The Modus Operandi (How do States Hedge?).....	55
➤	The Indicators of and Mechanisms for Identifying Hedging Behavior in the International System...	56
➤	The Forms (or Types) of Strategic Hedging	59
➤	The Merits and Demerits of Hedging.....	60
❖	The Merits of Hedging	60
❖	The Demerits of Hedging	61
	3.2. The Concept of Defensive Moralism	61
	3.2.0. Introduction	61
❖	The Concept of Moralism	63
❖	The Controversy over ‘Covetousness’	64
➤	Stage One: The Outbreak of a “Live problem”/“Live issue”	69
➤	Stage Two: Treaty Drafting and Adoption.....	70
❖	Treaty Drafting:.....	70
❖	Treaty Adoption:	75
➤	Stage Three: The Injection of the Treaty/Act/Charter [Implementation].....	77
➤	Stage Four: The Re-activation Reinforcements [RR].....	79
❖	The Emergency Re-activation Plan [ERP]	79
❖	The Development Re-activation Clauses [DRC]	80
	CHAPTER FOUR	83
	METHODOLOGY	83
	4.0. Introduction	83
	4.1. Research Paradigm.....	83
	4.1.0. Introduction	83
	<i>The positivist paradigm:</i>	84
	<i>The interpretivist paradigm:</i>	84
	4.2. The Research Design	85
	4.3. The Qualitative Method	86
	4.4. Sources of Data	88
❖	Primary Data	88
❖	Secondary Data.....	88
	4.5. The Sampling Design	89
	4.6. Sampling Technique	90
	4.7. Sample Size.....	90
❖	The Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria	93
	4.8. Research Instrumentation	94

❖	The Interview methods.....	94
❖	The Interview Discussion Guide (IDG).....	96
➤	Research Approach	97
❖	The Response Rate	97
❖	How to Increase the Response Rate	97
4.9.	Data Management and Analysis	98
❖	Data Management: the Strategy to Store, Transcribe, and Code Data	98
➤	Data Analysis	102
❖	The Analysis under the Qualitative Data	102
4.10.	The Ethical Principles of Research.....	103
4.11.	Reliability and Validity.....	104
4.12.	Limitations and Challenges	105
❖	The Problems with Prejudices and Biases, the Conceptualization of the Research Problem, and Theory Development	105
❖	The Challenges Involved in Data Gathering and Analysis	106
	CHAPTER FIVE	107
	DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS	107
5.0.	Introduction	107
5.1.	Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic.....	107
5.1.0.	Introduction	107
➤	The Engagement-and-Cooperation [1998-2017]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic Relations	108
❖	<i>A Plethora of Reciprocal Presidential Visitations</i>	109
➤	The Confrontation-and-Conflict [2018-2022]: The Promotion and Protection of National Interests 112	
•	Minor Conflict	112
✓	<i>UG-Chubb Conflict</i>	112
•	Major conflicts.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
✓	<i>US-Ghana ‘Shithole Conflict’</i>	116
✓	<i>US-Ghana ‘Deportees Conflict’</i>	117
➤	The Engagement-and-Cooperation [2020s and onward]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic Relations	119
❖	<i>The Democrats’ Initiatives</i>	119
❖	<i>The Events in the Post-Pelosi’s Visit</i>	120
❖	<i>President Akufo-Addo Visits US Following B3W Initiative</i>	121
➤	The Confrontation-and-Conflict [2019-2024]: The Promotion and Protection of National Values ..	122

5.2. Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana’s Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China	125
5.2.0. Introduction	125
➤ Ghana’s Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Ideological Level	126
➤ Ghana’s Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Economic Level	128
❖ Foreign Direct Investment [FDI]	128
❖ Trade	130
➤ Ghana’s Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Military [Security] Level 133	
5.3. Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ under the AGOA	136
5.3.0. Introduction	136
❖ The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s Democracy	136
❖ The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s economy	140
✓ Successes: Reciprocal Access into Domestic Markets	140
✓ US Exports into Ghana	140
✓ Ghana’s Export into the US	141
✓ The AGOA ‘Backlashes’ Ghana’s Exports into the US Market	149
❖ The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s Health	151
❖ The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s Infrastructure	153
❖ The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s Security	156
5.4. The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations	163
5.4.0. Introduction	163
➤ The Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality	163
➤ Ghana’s Immune System	165
❖ Ghana’s Moral Defenses and Economy	165
✓ Moral Defenses	166
✓ Economy	167
✓ Workforce	171
✓ Infrastructure [Road and Energy]	172
➤ The Politicization ‘of’ and the Role of the Public ‘in’ the US-Ghana Relations	172
❖ The Politicization of the US-Ghana Relations	173
❖ The Role of the Public in the US-Ghana Relations	173

➤ <i>The Position of Ghana in the East-West Hegemonic Struggles</i>	174
CHAPTER SIX	177
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS	177
6.0. Introduction	177
6.1. Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic	177
6.1.0. Introduction	177
➤ The Conflict-and-Cooperation [1990s-2020s]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic Relations	178
The foregoing <i>findings</i> show that Ghana’s posture towards the US is a <i>stable hedging</i> (.....	178
6.2. Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana’s Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China	181
6.2.0. Introduction	181
6.3. Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ under the AGOA	184
6.3.0. Introduction	184
➤ <i>‘Theoretical Successes’ and ‘Empirical Successes’ vs. ‘Side Effects’ and ‘Backlash Effects’</i>	184
6.4. The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations	185
6.4.0. Introduction	185
➤ <i>The Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality</i>	185
➤ <i>Ghana’s Immune System</i>	186
➤ <i>The Politicization ‘of’ and the Role of the Public ‘in’ the US-Ghana Relations</i>	187
➤ <i>The Position of Ghana in the East-West Hegemonic Struggles</i>	188
CHAPTER SEVEN	190
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS	190
7.0. Introduction	190
7.1. Summary of Findings	190
7.1.0. Introduction	190
7.1.1. Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic	191
7.1.2. Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana’s Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China	191
7.1.3. Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ under the AGOA	192
7.1.4. The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations	193
7.2. Conclusions	193
❖ Ups and Downs in the US-Ghana Relations	194

❖ Salad of Outcomes	194
❖ Long- and Short-Sightedness in the US-Ghana Relations	195
7.3. Recommendations	195
7.4. Contributions to Knowledge and Policy	198
7.5. Areas for Further Research	198
Bibliography:	199
Jackson, R.P.(2018).7,000 Ghanaians to be deported from USA. Accessed at: https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/ghanaians-to-be-deported-from-usa.html , on 15 September, 2022.	210
THE INTERVIEW DISCUSSION GUIDE	225
Research Objectives	225
➤ Main Objective	225
➤ Specific Objectives	225



LIST OF TABLES/FIGURES

Figure 1:	The Efficacy of the Immune System	72
Figure 2:	Diagrammatical representation of Institutions and participants	92
Figure 3:	Relationship between Input, Output and Outcome Factors	101
Figure 4:	US and China's FDIs in Ghana (2013-2021)	129
Figure 5:	Ghana's Export to US and China (2003-2019)	131
Figure 6:	Ghana: real GDP growth [annual percent change], IMF	167



Abstract

This study primarily aimed to examine how Ghana has been working to manage its relations with the US and, then, take the middle-of-the-road-position in the US-China hegemonic struggles under the Fourth Republic. The study adopted the qualitative method to collect and analyze the primary data. It used both the structured interview and unstructured interview to engage its participants. The unstructured interview not only promoted a free flow discussion but also provided the participants with the latitude to express themselves well. This allowed the study's questions to *develop* and *refine*, thereby unraveling sensitive issues during the exercise. The study found that the US-Ghana relations witnessed reciprocal Presidential visits and major policy initiatives in *late 1990s-2000s*. However, it reversed into the 'shithole' and 'deportees' conflicts in *2018-2020s*. Then again, the US-Ghana relations re-witnessed major official visits and policy initiatives in *2020s and onwards*. Besides, the study found that: [a] Ghana positions itself between Democracy (The West) and Socialism (The East) and [b] The US hegemonic declines, the declines in large scale US aid to Ghana, US sanitary and phytosanitary [SPS] measures, and the US-Ghana skirmishes under President Trump prompted Ghana to 'de-align' with the US and 're-align' with China in the area of, inter alia, trade and foreign direct investment. Still, it found that: [a] Under the 'successes', the AGOA has contributed to enhance, among others, democracy and commerce in Ghana, [b] Under the 'side effects', the AGOA has worked to worsen, inter alia, health and sanitation issues in Ghana, and [c] Under the 'backlash effects', the AGOA has contributed to undermine, among others, local industries and traditional values/norms in Ghana. Furthermore, the study found that: [1] Ghana's ironclad principle of *balanced neutrality* is a strong [or positive] *force* in the US-Ghana relations and [2] The nation's 'moral defenses', its roller coaster economic growth, and swelling debts are weak [or negative] *forces* in the US-Ghana relations. The study concluded that the 'side effects' largely lack the potential to: [a] allow the US to "turn" around to invade and exploit Ghana's resources and (b) backlash the core purpose for which the AGOA was created. However, the 'backlash effects' largely have the potential to: [a] allow the US to "turn" around to invade and exploit Ghana's resources and (b) backlash the core purpose for which the AGOA was created. Finally, it calls on the US to help: [a] build railway lines and roads within and across Ghana, [b] expand and intensify its capacity building programs, and [c] inject cash into the Small Holder Farmers [SHFs], Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises [SMEs] in Ghana. This will go a long way to boost the nation's competitiveness in the US market.



CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.0 Introduction

This study primarily aimed to disentangle the dynamics of the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. In addition, the study aimed to scrutinize the extent to which Ghana is well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations. This chapter [Chapter One] presents the Background to the Study, Statement of the Research Problem, Operationalization of Concepts, Research Objectives, Research Questions, Significance of the Study, and Organization of Work.

1.1 Background to the Study

Hopkins (1990: 409) argues that “hegemony” is a “cyclical pattern”. This suggests that the international system often undergoes structural reorientation, disaggregating **power** into several levels and reorienting the **behavior** of states within that system (Chan, 2019; Ye, 2020). The more the international system reorients, the more it reorients the relations between small powers and big powers within the system (Tiwary and Roy 2021; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Tran and Sato, 2018; Gerstl, 2020; Ye, 2020). The literature, for example, often points to three levels of power disaggregation and segregation: (1) small powers, (2) major/big/medium powers, and (3) hegemon(s)/system leader(s) (Tiwary and Roy 2021; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Tran and Sato,

2018; Gerstl, 2020; Ye; 2020; Chan, 2019). Mostly, the indicators that determine one's position within the three levels of power disaggregation and segregation include, among others, the economy, military, technology, and culture (Ye; 2020; Chan, 2019). Mongolia, for example, is a small power (Soni, 2018), Australia is a middle power (Chan, 2019), and the US is a system leader/hegemon (Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018).

The prevailing conditions within (a) the international system, (b) the sub-regional system, and (c) the domestic system often affect *alignments* within the system. The US-USSR struggles under the Cold War, for example, triggered alignment, re-alignment, de-alignment, and non-alignment within the system (Telepneva, 2019; Katsakioris, 2021). Today, the on-going *structural reorientation* and the outbreak of the *US-China hegemonic struggles* tend to push small and medium powers to: [a] align, re-align, de-align, and non-align themselves with big powers and vice versa and [b] take the middle-of-the-road-position within that *reorientation* and *struggles*. In Asia, for example, the meteoric rise of China as both a regional and global economic and military power often ushers it and small and medium powers into conflict over security issues, islands, and maritime resources. This, thus, propels small and medium powers in Asia to: a) align with the US to promote security under the '*US pivot*', and b) align with China to promote economic growth under China's '*economic booming*' (Tran and Sato, 2018; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Tran and Sato, 2018; Gerstl, 2020). The current study primarily aimed to

examine how Ghana—a small country located in the heart of West Africa—has been working to: [a] manage its relations with the US and [b] take the middle-of-the-road-position in the on-going US-China hegemonic struggles under its Fourth Republic.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

In Ghana, the Fourth Republic, which began in 1993, saw intense US-China hegemonic struggles just as the First Republic saw intense US-USSR Cold War struggles. However, the Fourth Republic lasted more than the First Republic [1960-1966], Second Republic [1969-1972], and Third Republic [1979-1981], suggesting that the US-China hegemonic struggles unfold more in the Fourth Republic than in the Third Republic [1979-1981]. The declines of the US began in the late-1960s (Martins, 2007; Schurmann, 1974 in Hayes, 1988), while the rise of China began in the 1990s (Martins, 2007; Layne, 2012). Thus, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of China in the 1990s (Martins, 2007; Layne, 2012) signified the fall of one section and the rise of the other section of the same Eastern bloc, suggesting that the struggles between the Western bloc [US and Europe] and Eastern bloc [Russia and China] over Ghana linger under the Fourth Republic *of* Ghana.

In IR, the record shows that the world's emerging hegemons often aspire to establish and maintain their dominance and supremacy in strategic areas that have the potential to make and unmake them in the world (Zhengyu, 2013; Layne, 2012). These strategic areas, according to Zhengyu (2013) and Layne (2012), include the Middle East/Persian Gulf, East Asia/Indo-Pacific region, and Western Europe. In Zhengyu's (2013) and Layne's (2012) views, these

strategic regions propelled: (a) the ‘rise’ and ‘fall’ of Great Britain in the past and (b) the ‘rise’ and the roller coaster ‘fall’ of the US in recent times. The establishment of the ‘US pivot’ in East Asia, for example, seeks to reverse China’s *hegemonic rise* and, thus, sustain US hegemony in the world (Pant and Joshi, 2015). These studies (Zhengyu, 2013; Layne, 2012) have, however, failed to emphasize the strategic importance of the South, particularly Ghana, in the East-West hegemonic struggles.

Then again, the uncertainties surrounding global power shifts tend to mount unprecedented pressure on all states within the system, pushing them to restructure their *strategies* and *tactics* within that system (Tiwary and Roy, 2021; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Tessman, 2012; Sherwood, 2016; Medeiros, 2005; Jackson, 2014). Under the Cold War, for example, Tiwary and Roy’s (2021: 3-4) work showed that India, at times, deployed ‘confrontation’ [“via a limited exercise in Soviet-backed balancing”] and, in other times, ‘cooperation’ [“India’s continued affinity for non-military American vehicles to fulfil public aspirations”] towards the US to achieve its national interests between 1966 and 1971 [“India’s intent of arresting American influence in its neighbourhood”]. Still, Schreer (2013) and Chan (2019) sought to disentangle the dynamics in the Australia-China relations, noting that Australia, at times, approaches China with ‘confrontation’ [i.e. Australia’s military and security agreements with the US] and, in other times, approaches China with ‘cooperation’ [i.e. Australia’s trade and investment relations with China] to achieve its national interests [i.e. Australia’s security and economic interests] under the current US-China hegemonic struggles. These scholars (Tiwary and Roy, 2021; Schreer, 2013 & Chan, 2019) clearly disentangled the dynamics in the US-India

and Australia-China relations, showing how the political leaders sought to place these countries in the middle-of-the-road-position in global hegemonic struggles.

In the global south, most scholars have equally sought to examine the dynamics of conflict-and-cooperation in the US-Ghana relations under the First Republic (Nkrumah, 1965; 2010; Noer, 1984; Bekoe, 2012; Nwaubani, 2001). Indeed, Noer's (1984) and Nwaubani's (2001) works, for example, revealed that Nkrumah, at times, approached the US with 'confrontation' [through his verbal attacks on the colonizers and US foreign policy in Congo] and, in other times, he approached the US with 'cooperation' [through Nkrumah's visit to the US to engage the US political leaders on aid] to achieve Ghana's national and foreign policy interests [the construction of the Hydroelectric Dam project and the reversal of US colonial tendencies in Congo] under the First Republic. Still, some scholars have sought to examine *the US-Ghana relations under the Peace Corps, Enhancing Civil Society Effectiveness at the Local Level [ECSELL]*, and *Government Accountability Improves Trust [GAIT] programs* under the Fourth Republic (Bekoe, 2012; Owusu-Mensah, 2015). Though these works revealed how Ghana's first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, sought to place his nation in the middle-of-the-road-position in global hegemonic and power struggles [Noer (1984); Nwaubani (2001)] and examined US assistance to Ghana [Bekoe (2012); Owusu-Mensah (2015)], the studies have been unable to [1] disentangle the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations and [2] scrutinize Ghana's attitude towards belligerent global hegemons under the Fourth Republic.

Then again, Wu's (2016) work shows how public pressure worked to alter the relations between Taiwan and China under the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement [CSSTA] in East Asia.

Wu's (2016) work, however, failed to scrutinize how public pressure has worked to shake the US-Ghana relations under the GITMO-2 [2016] and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) [2018]. How, then, does the nation [Ghana] seek to maneuver through [a] *public pressure* in the domestic system and [b] *uncertainties* in the international system to achieve its national interests under the Fourth Republic?

Under the Fourth Republic, these studies (Tiwary and Roy, 2021; Pant and Joshi, 2015; Chan, 2019; Bekoe, 2012; Owusu-Mensah, 2015) have been unable to: a) disentangle the dynamics of conflict-and-cooperation in the US-Ghana relations, b) scrutinize how Ghana's current position reflects Nkrumah's policy of 'balanced neutrality' towards global belligerent hegemons, and c) disaggregate the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into 'theoretical successes', 'empirical successes', 'side effects', and 'backlash effects' under the AGOA. The current study, thus, seeks to: a) disentangle the dynamics of conflict-and-cooperation in the US-Ghana relations, b) scrutinize the extent to which Ghana's current position reflects President Nkrumah's policy of 'balanced neutrality' towards the US and China, c) disentangle the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into 'theoretical successes', 'empirical successes', 'side effects', and 'backlash effects' under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (**AGOA**) [taking *one* out of *many* US-Ghana treaties], and d) scrutinize the extent to which Ghana is well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations.

1.3 Research Objectives

➤ **Main Objective**

To identify and explicate the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic.

➤ **Specific Objectives**

1. To disentangle the dynamics of *conflict-and-cooperation* in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic.
2. To appraise the dynamics of Ghana's ironclad principle of *balanced neutrality* towards the US and China under the Fourth Republic.
3. To disaggregate the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into 'theoretical successes', 'empirical successes', 'side effects', and 'backlash effects' under the AGOA?
4. To scrutinize the extent to which Ghana is well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations under the Fourth Republic.

1.4 Research Questions

➤ **Main Question**

How can the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations be explicated under the Fourth Republic?

➤ **Specific Questions**

1. How can the dynamics of *conflict-and-cooperation* in the US-Ghana relations be disentangled under the Fourth Republic?
2. In which ways can the dynamics of Ghana's ironclad principle of *balanced neutrality* towards the US and China be appraised under the Fourth Republic?
3. How can the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations be disaggregated into 'theoretical successes', 'empirical successes', 'side effects', and 'backlash effects' under the AGOA?
4. To what extent is Ghana well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations under the Fourth Republic?

1.5 Operationalization of Concepts

1.5.0 Introduction

This sub-section seeks to outline some *unique concepts* and elucidate their *unique meanings* in this work/study.

❖ **Immune System**

The current study borrowed the term 'immune system' [IS] from the natural sciences, specifically, the field of medicine. In this study, the IS of a state refers to the complex network of, inter alia, the moral defenses, workforce, road network, judicial system, business-related

laws, energy sector, private sector, monitoring and evaluation system, and military defenses that allow that state to *receive* and *translate the 'antibodies' within* treaties, acts, and charters into 'empirical successes' on the ground.

❖ 'Theoretical' and 'Empirical' Successes

The 'theoretical successes' exist on paper, while 'empirical successes' exist on the ground. Specifically, the 'theoretical successes' refer to the 'antibodies' [clauses] within treaties/acts/charters, while the 'empirical successes' refer to the 'actual successes' within the members states.

❖ Antibodies

This study equally borrowed the term 'antibodies' from the natural sciences, specifically, the field of medicine [*health and healing*]. Here, the term 'antibodies' refers to the specific 'clauses' that have been developed in treaties/acts/charters with the aim to boosting a state's IS fight developmental challenges.

❖ Moral defenses

In this study, the so-called **moral defenses** refer to the ability of a treaty's **drafter** and **recipient** to *boost* its 'antibodies', *normalize* its 'side effects', and *eradicate* its 'backlash effects' to allow the IS utilize that treaty.

1.6 Significance of the Study

1. The research findings shall contribute to enhance the knowledge base in the field of IR. Most studies, for example, do not really pay attention to the ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ in treaties, acts, and charters in IR. This study/work, thus, seeks to deal with these issues to close the gaps in IR literature.
2. The research findings shall contribute towards developing and re-shaping policies and programs in the US-Ghana relations. The clarification of the ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ in the US-Ghana relations shall contribute towards developing and re-shaping the AGOA to *improve* the ‘theoretical successes’ and ‘empirical successes’ and *address* the ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’ in SSA.

1.7 Organization of Work

The work is structured under seven [7] chapters as follows:

Chapter One: This chapter is made up of the *Introduction, Statement of the Research Problem, Research Questions and Objectives, Operationalization of Concepts, Significance of the Study, and Organization of Work.*

Chapter Two: The chapter consists of the *Literature Review.* This chapter covered the following thematic areas: (a) Structural Reorientation: The Breakdown of Uni-polarity into Multi-polarity—1940s-2020s, (b) Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-China Relations in the Middle East and East Asia, (c) Examining the Dynamics of the

Principle of Balanced Neutrality in Medium Power-Big Power Relations in Aisa and Oceania, and (d) Disaggregating the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana relations under the First Republic.


Chapter Three: This chapter constitutes the *Theoretical Framework* underpinning the study.

Chapter Four: It is made up of the *Methodology* for the study.

Chapter Five: The chapter constitutes *Data Presentation and Analysis* on the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic.

Chapter Six: It is made up of the *Discussion of Findings*.

Chapter Seven: This last chapter constitutes the *Summary of Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations, Contributions to Knowledge and Policy, and Areas for Further Research*. Finally, the student attached the Interview Discussion Guide [IDG], bibliography, and all relevant materials to the thesis.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

The literature review seeks to disentangle the Dynamics of Small Power-Big Power Relations within the international system. In light of this, the review seeks to scrutinize the extent to which the emergence of *structural reorientation* triggers *behavioral reorientation* in the international system. This *structural reorientation* tends to push small and medium powers to, sometimes, approach big powers with *engagement-cooperation* and, in other times, approach big powers with *confrontation-conflict* to achieve their foreign policy objectives in IR. The chapter begins with the *definition* of key concepts such as ‘hegemony’, ‘uni-polarity’, ‘multi-polarity’, ‘small states’, and ‘big states’.

2.1 Hegemony

The term ‘hegemony’, whose origin stretches back to Ancient Greece, is often defined based on the *realist* and *non-realist* standpoints (Joseph, 2008). In the realists’ standpoint, hegemony refers to the dominance of a great state over other states based on its “material resources or power capabilities” (Joseph, 2008: 109; Chase-Dunn et al., 1994). In the non-realist or Gramscian standpoint, however, hegemony means political leadership that rests on “[...] the consent of the led [...]” (Bates, 1975: 352; Gross, 1986; Litowitz, 2000; Lahiry, 2013: 176). Here, the hegemon seeks to “restructure the world in its own image” (Chase-Dunn et al., 1994: 364), and attempts to influence the world with its culture and values (Lahiry, 2013). Largely,

the current international system operates based on Antonio Gramsci's, an Italian Marxist thinker, conception of hegemony (Litowitz, 2000). In academia, scholars view the term 'hegemony' as a "cyclical pattern" (Hopkins, 1990: 409).

2.2 Uni-polarity vs. Multi-polarity

➤ Uni-polarity

The term 'polarity' refers to the "relative distribution" of power capabilities within the international system (Krahmann, 2005). In Layne's (1993: 5) view, a unipolar system is a system in which a "single power is geopolitically preponderant because its capabilities are formidable enough to preclude the formation of an overwhelming balancing coalition against it." In a unipolar system, a "single power" possesses the material capability to launch a "politico-military action" worldwide (Wilkinson, 1999). Following the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, "no other power [...] has increased its overall portfolio of capabilities sufficiently to transform its standing" and "No other great power has enjoyed such advantages in material capabilities - military, economic, technological, and geographical", leaving the US as the only "single pole" (Walt, 2009; Ikenberry et al., 2009: 1 & 6; Graebner, 2001; Magbadelo, 2005; Jordan, 2013). In Layne's (2012: 203) view, however, "[...] the "unipolar moment" [...] the Pax Americana - the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945 - is fast winding down", ushering the world into a *multipolar system*.

➤ **Multi-polarity**

A multi-polar system is often defined as a “[...] world characterized by multiple centers of power” (Posen, 2009: 347). Similarly, Umbach (2006: 1) defined, a multi-polar system is a system in which “[...] there are diverse poles that are equal in their political weight and justification.” Martins (2007: 17), for example, observed that the US “has been in a period of hegemonic decline [...] since 1967.” Equally, Layne (2012: 22) observed, “Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world’s dominant manufacturing power. Today, [...] China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation.” Furthermore, Wilkinson (1999: 142 & 164) observed, most countries such as, among others, India, Britain, Russia, France and, of course, China possess the right material capabilities to launch “politico-military action” at a “regional level, and, on a small scale or cooperatively, beyond”.

2.3 Small States vs. Big States

➤ **Small States**

To Sweeney and Derdzinski (2010), scholars generally do not agree on how to conceptualize the terms ‘small states’ and ‘big states’. Most scholars, however, tend to pin the definition of ‘small states’ on *size* and *material capabilities*. First, “[...] indicators of 'size' are sought, such as population, area, GNP, military capability, etc.”, and second, “[...] the essence of 'smallness' is either lack of influence on the environment, or high sensitivity to the environment and lack of immunity against influences from it, or both” (Wiberg, 1987: 339; Soni, 2018; Lee and Smith, 2010; Amstrup, 1976; Lamoreaux and Galbreath, 2008). Some scholars have, for example, argued that ‘small states’ lack the military capability to formulate and execute policies outside

their boundaries, making them less influential within the international system (Noreen et. al., 2017; Galal, 2020; Rickli, 2008; Lamoreaux and Galbreath, 2008). Today, “Small states comprise between half and two-thirds of the world’s states depending on the criteria used for classification” (Kurecic, 2017: 280).

➤ **Big States**

The definition of ‘big states’ is often pinned on (1) status symbols [e.g. having a seat in the UN Security Council], (2) size [e.g. GNP, geography, population, military size, and budget etc.], and (3) economic position within the system (Wiberg, 1987; Freedman, 2020). Ciorciari (2011: 62), for example, observed that “When statesmen and scholars speak about great powers, they usually refer to the handful of states with the most formidable capabilities and influence.” In *realist* terms, Donnelly (2005: 34) equally wrote, great powers are “states with the capacity to inflict punishing damage, even the threat of death, on any other power in the system.” For example, the material capabilities of countries such as, inter alia, the US, China, Russia, India, Britain, and France allow them to alter the regional and global systems (Hurrell, 2006; Bijian, 2005; Galal, 2020; Katz, 2018; Yang, 2013; Heimann, 2015; Narlikar, 2011; Oneal, 2007). Thus, Heimann (2015: 188) concluded, “Actors may seek great power status not only because it fosters self-esteem, but also because gaining it gives them various other advantages - influence, economic advantage, and even security.”

2.4 Structural Reorientation: The Breakdown of Uni-polarity into Multi-polarity—1940s-2020s

2.4.0 Introduction

This sub-section seeks to examine the reorientation of the international system in response to changes in the *core determinants* of hegemony. The system often reorients itself in response to changes in the economy and military of individual countries within that system. Thus, according to the liberalists and realists, the *economy* and *military* are the core determinants of hegemony in IR (Donnelly, 2005).

➤ Economic Reorientation

The US, according to Martins (2007: 17), “[...] has been in a period of hegemonic decline [...] since 1967 [...]”. The reason, Ye (2020: 214) elucidates, is that “the rise of China causes a redistribution of power in the existing international system [...]”. Kennedy (1987: 29) reported, “Even before the United States entered the Second World War, it produced about a third of the world’s manufactures [...]. By 1945, [...] the US share of world manufacturing output was closer to half—a proportion never before or since attained by a single nation.” Similarly, “The US share [...]” of the world’s GDP “[...] at the end of World War II”, Layne (2012: 22) corroborated, “was nearly 50 percent”.

However, Martins (2007: 21) observes, “Between 1967 and 1982, US growth trailed the world-economic average. Between 1983 and 2000, it once again exceeded the average.” Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s, China’s annual economic growth skyrocketed, triggering a “[...]”

redistribution of power in the existing international system [...]” (Ye, 2020: 214; Lee, 2006). For example, China’s share of the global GDP surged in the 1980s [2%] and 1990s {6%}; subsequently, “China’s share of world GDP (15 percent) will draw nearly even with the US share (18 percent) by 2014”, and “[...] measured by purchasing-power parity, China’s GDP may already be greater than that of the United States” (Layne, 2012: 22). Today, Martins (2007: 21-22) reported, “[...] the United States, though it has surpassed Japan, has not managed to surpass the East Asian bloc, which has been propelled by the economic vitality of China and India.” Thus, Layne (2012: 22) concluded, “China is on course to overtake US as the world’s largest economy [...].”

➤ **Military Reorientation**

As it emerged as the world’s hegemon, the US, *first*, did not waste time to chase the then hegemon [Britain] out of its territory: “[...] Britain bowed to the reality of America’s overwhelming regional power and withdrew its naval and military forces from North America” (Layne, 1993: 28). *Second*, “[...] it sought to establish its postwar dominance in the three regions deemed most important to its interests: Western Europe, East Asia and the Middle East/Persian Gulf” (Layne, 2012: 26). The US, for example, ruled using military decrees, tested nuclear weapons *at will*, and freely used the sea routes in the Pacific following Japan’s defeat in WWII (Hayes, 1988). Furthermore, the Soviet Union was unable to extend its power over Western Europe because of US atomic weapons (Strange, 1987). Indeed, it was the only country in possession of a nuclear “winning power” (Russett, 1985).

However, “First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military”. Second “[...] the Economist recently

projected that China's defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025” (Layne, 2012: 22; Chen and Feffer, 2009: 48; Lee, 2006). Bitzinger (2011: 8-9), for example, reported that “[...] since the late 1990s, China has moved [...] to being the second-largest defence spender in the world, outstripping Japan, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Today, only the United States spends more than China on defence”. Today, “The impact of this transformation [or investment] has been particularly noticeable in the past few years in the form of a much more assertive, even aggressive, China, increasingly willing to use its military to protect and advance its national interests” (Bitzinger, 2011: 7). The point, however, is that global power alternations dictate that “[...] hegemons must inevitably replace each other through the device of major wars [...]” (Holsti, 1985, p. 678).

The sub-section has been able to scrutinize the concept of *hegemony* [the drivers and sources] and the ‘*rise*’ and ‘*fall*’ of hegemons. The abovementioned studies have, for example, enlightened us on how some key *indicators*—including, among others, GDP and military expenditure—help to *measure* a nation’s ‘economy’, ‘military’, and ‘influence’ and *determine* the power alternations in the international system, thereby allowing us to examine the extent to which these indicators work to boost Ghana’s ‘economy’, ‘military’, and, of course, ‘influence’ within that system. This *structural reorientation* [or the power alternation] tends to trigger *behavioral reorientation* within the system.

2.5 Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-China Relations in the Middle East and East Asia

2.5.0 Introduction

The dynamics in the US-China relations often unfold in the form of *conflict* and *cooperation* in strategic places that *make* and *unmake* hegemons. Zhengyu (2013: 55) captures it as follows, “As was once true for Great Britain, the position of America in the world today as the dominant maritime power and system leader stands primarily on two pillars. One is the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass core (Europe and East Asia) [...]” The fact that the Middle East hosts Iran [“America's greatest antagonist” (Huntington, 1997: 4)] and East Asia hosts China “[The] Pentagon has identified China as the only potential hegemon on the horizon that stands a chance of challenging the unipolar power of the United States” (Chen and Feffer, 2009: 48)] necessitates the need to resort to *conflict and cooperation* in these strategic areas. This subsection delves into the literature to examine how the US and China employ the confrontation-conflict and engagement-cooperation approaches to “[...] establish its postwar dominance in [...] East Asia and the Middle East/Persian Gulf” (Layne, 2012: 26) and ‘[...] strives to become a global power’ (Bitzinger, 2011, p. 7), respectively.

The confrontation-conflict approaches: The “[...] United States [...] has been the incumbent hegemon [...] in East and Southeast Asia [...] since World War II” (Layne, 2012: 28). However, as it emerges as a hegemon, “China has objected to the US presence in the South China Sea and warned America not to get involved in these regional disputes” (Tran and Sato, 2018: 80). To back this warning with action, China has sought to augment its internal and external balancing strategies against the US and its allies over the past decades. For example,

the increase in China's share of world's GDP in the 1980s [2%] and the 1990s [6%] (Layne, 2012: 22) augmented its internal balancing against the US and its allies (Chen and Feffer, 2009; Pant and Joshi, 2015: 53; Bitzinger, 2011; Chen and Feffer, 2009; Shambaugh, 1996). The 1995 Chinese nuclear testing and the 1996 Chinese military aggressiveness in the Taiwan Strait represented a show of force and capability, sending strong signal to the US and its allies (Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018: 199).

In terms of its external balancing strategies, China not only built “naval facilities” in Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka but also intends to expand them. Today, in India and the US, the fear remains that China may soon convert these “installations” into serious “military facilities” in the future (Pant and Joshi, 2015: 53). Besides, China has sought to balance against the US through the Shanghai Group initiative—a security alliance founded on the 26th April 1996 with China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as its members—and the arms transfers between China and Russia (Ye, 2020; Haggard, 2004). Today, the “[...] maritime threats [...]” have been building up on both the Chinese and the American sides (Shambaugh, 1996; Shambaugh, 1999/2000), and “if the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain [...]” (Layne, 2008: 13).

In the Middle East, the US is rapidly losing its grounds due to the deployment of ‘hard power’ against Iraq [1991, 2003], the threats to deploy ‘hard power’ against Iran after the discovery of its nuclear program [2002], and President Obama’s talk of “red lines” during the Syrian conflict [2011]. China, on the other hand, has sought to deploy military and non-military approaches in the Middles East, helping it to make significant impacts in that region (Bishara, 2012; Salman

and Geeraerts, 2015; Salman et al., 2015). China imports huge quantities of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq's oil, and its state-owned companies have made significant inroads in these countries (Arango and Krauss 2013; Salman et al., 2015; Chaziza, 2015; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015). Mainly, China's oil interest in the Middle East is meant to (a) sustain a permanent overseas navy and (b) strengthen its capability to launch overseas military operations (Mackenzie, 2010; Garlick and Havlova, 2020; Salman et al., 2015).

In addition, senior military officers in China have visited senior military officers in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and vice versa. Moreover, China has provided, and continues to provide, arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the Chinese military has engaged these countries in an "operational level" (Newmyer, 2009; Alterman, 2009; Salman et al., 2015). In 2007, for example, China sold DF-21(CSS-5) solid-fuel and medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia (Keck, 2014). In Saudi Arabia, "Although Riyadh believes that China is not an alternative to the US defensive umbrella [...] military relationships with Beijing is an alternative in Riyadh's strategic security calculation" (Chaziza, 2015: 446-447). This suggests that China's foreign policy motives and aims in the Middle East seek to chase the US out of that region in the long run (Chaziza, 2015; Salman et al., 2015).

Today, "China's rising power [...]" causes the "United States great anxiety related to defending its hegemonic position" (Ye, 2020: 214). The annual US military budget, the over \$700 billion (Cox, 2010), constitutes its internal balancing strategies against China and its allies. In the "[...] United States military [...]", more technological advances have been made in the four years since the Gulf War than in the ten previous years!" (Shambaugh, 1996: 286). Today, the US Navy, according to Shambaugh (1996) and Salman, et al. (2015), is far advanced than the Chinese

PLAN. In terms of its external balancing, Kennedy (1987), citing Ronald Steel, indicated that the number of US “defense treaties” with the outside world was 42 and the number of its soldiers in 30 countries was 1, 000, 000 in the early-1970s. Today, Chan (2019: 5) reported, the US is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue [QSD] or the QUAD—the members include the US, Australia, India and Japan. The record has it that the QUAD has undertaken unprecedented joint military exercises—titled ‘Exercise Malabar’—since its inception in 2007 (Chan, 2019).

In addition, Pant and Joshi (2015: 47 & 54) reported, “[...] India has featured on the American radar as an important strategic partner”, and the George W. Bush “administration perceived India as a rightful competitor with China.” In 2012, for example, Leon Panetta, then US secretary of defense, visited India and stated that “defense cooperation with India is a lynchpin in this [pivot] strategy”, and

Since the thrust of the “pivot” has been on the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans have gained tremendous traction in the new US strategy [...]. The “flagship” naval program between the Indian and US Navies—the MALABAR exercise series—has gathered momentum since 2002. Just after President Obama announced his plans for a pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the 2012 exercise, conducted in the Bay of Bengal, saw unprecedented contribution from the American side—the Seventh Fleet’s Carrier Strike Group 1, which included among other ships a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and a nuclear submarine, participated. Though its scope may have been decided long before, coming in the wake of the pivot this exercise conveyed a forceful message (Pant and Joshi, 2015: 58).

Furthermore, under the US “pivot to Asia”, the US has been able to mobilize Taiwan, Japan, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and Malaysia under its naval and air forces without restrictions in these regions. Now, the US has been working to ‘annex’ Vietnam and Myanmar under its naval and air forces, as well. In fact, China’s disputes with India and

Vietnam over territories, for example, reduce its influence in Asia and, thus, allow the US to establish its dominance in that part of the world (Lee, 2017; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018). Thus, Layne (2012: 28) concluded, “The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia”, and “This contest for regional dominance is fueling escalating tensions and possibly could lead to war.”

The engagement-cooperation approaches: Sometimes, the US and China tend to resort to the *engagement-cooperation approach* notwithstanding the use of the *confrontation-conflict approach* in the hegemonic struggles (Jisi, 2005; Mackenzie, 2010; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Medeiros, 2005; Buszynski, 2012; Ye, 2020). The US, for example, has been leading the crusade to integrate and bind China into the existing *norms, orders, and rules* in the international system (Ye, 2020; Medeiros 2005; Yoder, 2019). In Medeiros’ (2005: 147) words, “The US approach combines engagement, binding [...] mechanisms. US policies aim to bind China further into the existing international system of norms, rules, and institutions and to shape its evolving interests and values through bilateral and multilateral engagement.” Ye (2020: 214) observes, “The United States plays the role of a benevolent hegemon by constructing a multilateral institutional network, which includes [...] maintaining a free and open economic order and promoting democracy as a universal value.” The US, for example, “has done little to restrict China’s growing influence in international institutions, encouraging its membership in the World Trade Organization”, and “expanding its weight in the International Monetary Fund” (Yoder, 2019: 944).

China, on the other hand, is very much aware about the cost involved in a direct confrontation with the US and, thus, seeks to avoid acts—excessive military alliances, excessive military build-ups and excessive exportation of arms and military technology to US opponents—that will provoke the US (Jisi, 2005; Mackenzie, 2010; Buszynski, 2012; Garlick and Havlova, 2020; Salman et al., 2015). China’s foreign policy towards the Middle East, for example, seeks to avoid a direct armed confrontation with the US through the adoption of moderate military engagements with that region (Mackenzie, 2010; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Garlick and Havlova, 2020; Salman et al., 2015). Garlick and Havlova (2020: 83-84 & 99), for example, reported, China is “[...] attempting to spread its bets as far as possible between the two major regional powerhouses, Saudi Arabia and Iran [...], Beijing recognises that it would not be sensible to undermine the region’s security provider, the United States, since this could result in increased Chinese entanglement in regional geopolitics and could also unnecessarily antagonise the US” and, thus, “China must [...] navigate pressure from the United States to relinquish support for Iran”. In 2009, for example, President Obama initiated the US-China cooperation—tagged the *Strategic and Economic Dialogue*—with the aim to dealing with, inter alia, nuclear proliferation and terrorism worldwide (Chen and Feffer, 2009: 51). In 2012, China agreed to get rid of 18% of its importation of Iranian oil in response to US pressures (Katzman 2013; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Fite, 2012; Garlick and Havlova, 2020). Still, the US and China have been working together to deal with the Iranian nuclear problem under the Iran Nuclear Deal or the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] (Tabatabai, 2017; El Khalfi, 2020).

The abovementioned studies reveal that the US still retains a strong upper hand over China under both the confrontation-conflict and engagement-cooperation approaches. Notwithstanding, the studies underscore how a struggling hegemon [the US], in its “roller

coaster [...] transition [...]” (Schurmann, 1974 in Hayes, 1988: 352), attempts to solicit the support of third parties to [1] reverse the ‘rise’ of “covetous states” (Zhengyu, 2013: 55) and [2] sustain its global supremacy (Layne, 2012; Shambaugh, 1999–2000). Besides, the studies reveal that China’s disputes with the ASEAN members and military aggressiveness reduce its influence in Southeast Asia, thereby allowing the US to assert its influence in that region (Lee, 2017; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018). Similarly, the US is rapidly losing its grounds in the Middle East as a result of its military aggressiveness in that region. China, on the other hand, is rapidly gaining grounds in the Middle East as a result of the use of military and non-military tactics in that region (Salman et al., 2015; Chaziza, 2015).

Clearly, these evidences underscore the extent to which China has been working along with the US to achieve the latter’s foreign policy objectives—(a) energy security, (b) subvert terrorism and terrorist networks, and (c) reverse the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (Alterman, 2011)—in the Middle East. The point is that China’s foreign policy in the Middle East seeks to avoid acts [excessive military alliances and excessive exportation of arms and military technology to US opponent—Iran] that will provoke the “region’s security provider” [the US], providing “Beijing the clout to exercise its power more assertively in the region” (Garlick and Havlova, 2020: 99; Mackenzie, 2010; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Salman et al., 2015; Salman et al., 2015: 592). In sum, the studies have made us to understand that the US and China tend to, at times, resort to the *confrontation-conflict approach* and, in other times, the *engagement-cooperation approach* to achieve their foreign policy objectives within the system.

2.6 Examining the Dynamics of the Principle of Balanced Neutrality in Medium Power-Big Power Relations in Aisa and Oceania

2.6.0 Introduction

This sub-section argues that [a] small and medium states often reorient their behavior following a “[...] redistribution of power [...]” in the international system, and [b] just as the international system reorients itself in response to economic and security changes [as the preceding discussion shows], so does the behavior of small and medium states reorient in response to economic and security demands [as the following discussion shows].

Economic Demands and Hedging

In IR, structural reorientation often triggers behavioral reorientation, pushing political leaders in, inter alia, Asia and Oceania to resort to the *principle of balanced neutrality* to exploit global hegemonic struggles and power shifts. The Japanese *middle-of-the-road* position in the US-China hegemonic struggles, Matsuda (2012) and Wallace (2013) argue, allows Japan to exploit those struggles and power shifts: In the 1980s, for example, Japan’s export to China was about 7% out of its total exports, and its imports from China was about 5% out of its total imports. The Japan-China trade saw a significant upsurge, moving from 7.2% [1990] up to 20.9% [2000] and surpassing the Japan-US trade figures in the 21st century. Then again, China’s “[...] cheap labor cost [...]” and “[...] dynamic domestic market [...]” led Japan to heavily invest in China. Today, Japan directs a larger proportion of its FDI, *first*, into the US and, *second*, into China (Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Matsuda, 2012; Lim and Cooper, 2015; Wallace, 2013).

Besides, some scholars pointed to President Ma's modus operandi, which, according to them, allowed Taiwan to improve upon its economic relations with China, resulting in the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement [ECFA] between the two nations (Wu, 2017; Wu, 2016). Today, "[...] Taiwanese investors [have] received strong economic incentives to shift the businesses of labor-intensive manufacturing to mainland China" (Wu, 2016: 481-482). Today, "China and Taiwan's legal and economic ties also make it possible to imagine "ultimate unification" when the conditions are ripe" (Wu, 2017: 208). Still, "One reason for Beijing's increased confidence is that Taiwanese leaders will not engage in any hard balancing behavior because Taiwanese investors received strong economic incentives to shift the businesses of labor-intensive manufacturing to mainland China" (Wu, 2016: 481-482). In 2014, however, the Taiwanese public staged a protest against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement [CSSTA], claiming that Taiwan may lose its political sovereignty to China under a deep Taiwan-China relations:

The leaders of the student protesters even argue that the existing agreements between China and Taiwan would not be equipped with domestic law status, and should not be reviewed and passed by the Legislative Yuan [...]. Facing strong resistance and protests from domestic student groups, Ma's administration could not blindly align with China just for more economic benefits. Ma and his strategists had to give serious consideration to the strong opposition voices, reflecting how democratic politics plays a critical role in Taiwan's political development (Wu, 2016: 486).

Finally, Australia wishes to maintain its relations with China, as the former's economic growth depends on the latter's economic growth. In Cobb's (2007) view, Australia will be able to reduce the aggressiveness of the US and China towards it if it entices them to invest in its Gorgon Gas Field: "China is already falling into place" (Cobb, 2007: 77). Then again, in 2015, Australia and China signed the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement [ChAFTA] and, "since

then”, the Australia-China trade shot up from A\$137 billion [2015] to A\$165 billion [2017] (Chan, 2019).

Security Demands and Hedging

In Asia, Tiwary and Roy (2021: 3-4) reported, India adopted limited balancing/bandwagoning [“via a limited exercise in Soviet-backed balancing”] and co-operation [via the importation of US non-military vehicles] towards the US between 1966 and 1971. However, Pant and Joshi (2015: 53) observe, (a) “The end of the Cold War forced India to mend fences with the world’s only remaining superpower”—the US, (b) the current uncertainties surrounding the US-China hegemonic struggles produce a threat to India, and (c) “India views growing Chinese naval power with concern.” The evidence, for example, suggests that the US, India, and China are currently interlocked in disputes over the Indian Ocean, “unsettled Himalayan frontier”, and Pacific Ocean (Pant and Joshi, 2015). Similarly, Vidal and Pelegrín (2018: 199) observed, it was the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Communiqué and the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that helped to normalize the relations between Japan and China. During the drafting stages, for example, Japan not only apologized for its past military aggressiveness but also expressed deep regrets. However, “Japan’s military past” and Japan’s “recognition of history”, on the one hand, and China’s military aggressiveness, on the other hand, often created frictions within the Japan-China relations. In the 1980s, for example, Japan issued some new textbooks in which it sought to revise its historical past “in a benign vein”, triggering the anger of the Chinese public. Conversely, the 1995 Chinese nuclear testing, the skirmishes over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the 1996 Chinese military activities in the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese military build-ups, and the skirmishes over the Exclusive Economic Zone “shifted the Japanese perception” towards China “in a negative direction” (Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018).

Still, some scholars pointed to the Taiwan-China struggles in which the former considers itself as an independent country, while the latter considers the two as one country. These struggles have dragged on for decades, culminating in the “1992 Consensus.” The “1992 Consensus”, Wu (2017: 210) reported, dictated that “Taiwan and the mainland make up one China while agreeing to differ on which government is its legitimate representative.” Finally, China’s refusal to recognize international rules and unstable policy choices tend to upset Australia (Chan, 1019; McDowall, 2009). Then again, Chan (2019) argued, the Trump administration’s withdrawal of US commitments to allies in Europe and international treaties—including, among others, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Paris climate agreement—pushed Australia to rethink and explore alternative bi, tri, and multi-lateral options.

Small and medium states have adopted various strategic approaches to contain China and maneuver through the US-China hegemonic struggles through [a] political engagement *with* and positive depictions *of* China and [b] limited balancing and bandwagoning. **India:** India has sought to contain China and maneuver through the uncertainties surrounding the US-China hegemonic struggles via (a) “rapid economic growth fueled India’s naval expansion” and its “growing capabilities suggest that it can be an important player in maintaining the maritime balance in the Indo-Pacific” region, and (b) “interest based cooperation” towards the US and China (Pant and Joshi, 2015: 57 & 61). Besides, “Maritime security cooperation between India and the United States has become a strategic necessity, especially for sustaining a favorable strategic equilibrium as Chinese power rises.” Today, the US and India’s navies have, for example, launched the “US-India Disaster Response Initiative” with the aim to boosting

capacity to respond to disasters on the Indian Ocean: “New Delhi’s core strategic objectives in the region are largely compatible with those of Washington [...]. Given the fact that the Indian Navy had recently commissioned a nuclear-powered submarine, this focus on submarine rescue suggested a new leap in naval cooperation” (Pant and Joshi, 2015: 51, 57 & 58). However,

Notwithstanding expectations in Washington, Delhi has been a reluctant supporter of the American pivot [...]. India would not like to choose sides in this great game, at least before the dust settles, allowing it to make informed choices. Former prime minister Manmohan Singh has underscored uncertainty as the driving force behind India’s reluctance [...] (Pant and Joshi, 2015: 61).

In addition, some “domestic factors” tend to propel “India’s cautious approach”: some in India’s military have urged India to adopt “interest based cooperation” towards the US and China to avoid taking sides. Besides, India is aware that any reckless military action may provoke the surrounding regional powers (Pant and Joshi, 2015: 61).

Japan: The Japanese government has sought to bind China into bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral institutions including, among others, the ASEAN, the Japan-China Security Dialogue [since 1993], the Japan-China Counter-Terrorism Consultation [2011], the Japan-China High Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs [2012], the ASEAN+3, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], the Asia Europe Meeting [ASEM], the ASEAN+6, the East Asia Summit [EAS], the ASEAN+8, and the Round of Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement. These efforts ultimately seek to make China a “responsible”, “benign”, and a less aggressive state (Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Matsuda, 2012; Lim and Cooper, 2015). Besides, Japan has pursued its internal balancing strategies through the modernization of its Self-Defense Forces and the acquisition of the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 and the Sea-Based Midcourse

Defense [SMD] system. In addition, the external balancing and bandwagoning strategies have been pursued through, among others, the US-Japan Joint Security Declaration [1996], the US-Japan New Defense Cooperation Guidelines [1997], the Armitage Report [2000], the Koizumi's Seven Point Plan to aid the US counterterrorism efforts [2001], the US-Japan procurement of the V-22 Osprey aircraft, and the attempt to strongly back the American-Japanese alliances with the "reinterpretation" of the Japanese constitution (Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Matsuda, 2012; Wallace, 2013; Wallace, 2013). Notwithstanding, Wallace (2013: 484), citing Sudo (1992), remarked that "Japan's current strategy, however, is not a simple mercantilist one of paving the way for the 'economic animal' to penetrate the region and extract resources as it may have been in the past."

Taiwan: In Taiwan's case, the uncertainties surrounding the current global power shifts, together with the reduction in US security assistance to Taiwan, prompts Taiwan to adopt political dialogues, limited balancing, and limited bandwagoning towards China. First, in 2008-2016, President Ma worked to reset the Taiwan-China relations, and "none of the 22 states that have formal diplomatic ties with Taipei has defected to Beijing" (Wu, 2016: 479-480). Second, "One reason for Beijing's increased confidence is that Taiwanese leaders will not engage in any hard balancing behavior [...]" towards China (Wu, 2016: 481-482).

Australia: McDowall (2009: 85-86 & 88) sought to examine "how [...] Australia manage [d] to distance itself from the nascent strategic rivalry between the United States and China [...]", noting that Australia adopted a "positive depictions" of China. The "positive depictions" of China involve the projection of "positive images of China [...] mixed with occasional

cautionary depictions of China” to the outside world. This dispelled “Chinese fears of containment” and, thus, strengthened the Australia-China relations. Notwithstanding, Australia’s 2009 White Paper emphasized the need to “act independently”, noting that Australia’s policy of defence must “[...] continue to be founded on the principle of self-reliance [...]” (Schreer, 2013: 36-37). Still, Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper examined how to “strengthen all elements” of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) through the acquisition of modern military equipment such as submarines, aircraft-carriers, and fighter jets (Jennings, 2016: 53). Besides, Australia’s 2013 White Paper stressed that the “principle of self-reliance” operates “within the context of our Alliance with the United States and our cooperation with regional partners” (Schreer, 2013: 37). For example, it is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue [QSD] or the QUAD: In 2008, Australia exited the QUAD to avoid provoking China, but it “ironically [...] renewed interest” in it (Chan, 2019: 5).

Now, let us invoke Ye (2020: 217) to understand China’s *confrontation-cooperation approaches* toward the small and medium powers:

[...] China’s strategic response to weaker powers can also be categorized as coercion-oriented, reassurance oriented, and half-measured, depending on the policy choices of weaker powers: balancing, reconciling, or hedging. For example, when the [...] peripheral countries choose to utilize reconciliation, China’s strategic [...] hedging will be [...] reassurance-oriented toward peripheries. As such, when the ... peripheral countries adopt balancing, China’s [...] will be [...] coercive oriented [...].

Vidal and Pelegrín (2018: 206) reported that “China’s Law of the Territorial Sea”, which “[...] intimates that it might use force to assert its claims over Senkaku”, was in response to the small and medium powers strategies against it. For example, when Taiwan’s Tsai [the incumbent

President since 2016] refused to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, “Beijing began its retaliation, and Taiwan tilted further toward the maritime alliance” (Wu, 2017: 210).

The abovementioned studies underscore how India, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia tend to adopt political and economic engagements, limited balancing, and limited bandwagoning to (a) manage skirmishes with China, and (b) maneuver through the US-China hegemonic struggles. First, these studies propel the current study to examine the extent to which Ghana seeks to adopt “interest based cooperation” towards the US and China to avoid taking sides in the US-China hegemonic struggles. Second, the studies uniquely reveal how a middle power [Japan] tends to invoke the powers of intergovernmental organizations [e.g. the ASEAN] against a powerful revisionist state [China] in East Asia. These scholarly works, thus, allow us to examine the extent to which Ghana tends to invoke the powers of the UN to resist and contain the US under the US-Ghana relations.

Third, Wu’s (2016) work on the 2014 public demonstrations under the Taiwan-China CSSTA relations [2014] allow us to scrutinize the 2016 and 2018 public demonstrations under the US-Ghana GITMO-2 [2016] and SOFA relations [2018]. Fourth, Sudo’s (1992 in Wallace, 2013: 484) work on the US-Japan relations allow us to examine how Ghana’s “[...] current strategy, however, is not a simple mercantilist one of paving the way for the ‘economic animal’ to penetrate the region and extract resources as it may have been in the past.” Finally, the studies allow us to examine the extent to which Ghana’s “strategic response to” US “[...] can [...] be categorized as coercion-oriented, reassurance oriented, and half-measured, depending on the policy choices of [...]” US—*conflict* [or] *cooperation*.

2.7 Disaggregating the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the First Republic (1960-1966)

2.7.0 Introduction

The US-Ghana struggles under the First Republic revolved around (a) colonialism and imperialism, (b) the Peace Corps, (c) the Volta Dam project, (d) the personality of Kwame Nkrumah, and (e) the Cold War (Aluko, 1975; Noer, 1984; Bekoe, 2012; Nartey, 2019). Noer (1984: 68), for example, remarked that Ghana's Volta Dam project was "part of the Cold War struggle in Africa." In effect, Nkrumah often switched between the US and USSR with the aim to exploiting the "East-West competition to extract gains" (Gerits, 2015: 952; White, 2003). Indeed, President Nkrumah needed "direct US aid" to construct the Volta Dam project and Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson needed Ghana to reverse the frontiers of communism, suggesting that "the USA and Ghana needed each other" (Nwaubani, 2001: 602). This provided the grounds on which the US and Ghana switched between the engagement-cooperation and confrontation-conflict approaches.

The engagement-cooperation approaches: In 1951, Nkrumah declared that "I would like to make it absolutely clear that I am a friend of Britain [...]. I am no communist and never have been" (Nwaubani, 2001: 601). Following these remarks, the US and Ghana established a cordial relation in the late-1950s and early-1960s under the engagement-cooperation approaches (Nwaubani, 2001; Gerits, 2015). Mostly, the "presidential visit", according to Shai et al (2017: 161), "symbolises the strong relations between the countries involved". In July 1958, for example, Nkrumah visited the US following President Eisenhower's invitation and, according

to the *Times*, “seldom was a guest from a small country more welcome” (Nwaubani, 2001: 603). During this visit, the two presidents issued a joint statement, indicating that (a) the two discussed how to obtain a “direct US aid” to construct the Volta Dam project and (b) private companies in the US have expressed interest in financing the Volta Dam project (Noer, 1984).

Besides, President Nkrumah was given the opportunity to address the US Congress on the 24th July, 1958. In this Cold-War address, “[...] Nkrumah linked his reading of ‘Africa for the Africans’ [...] with the US foreign policy doctrine of 1823. ‘Our attitude [...] is very much that of America looking at the disputes of Europe in the 19th century. We do not wish to be involved.’ Just as the United States wanted to keep the Europeans out of the US continent, Ghana believed that ‘the peace of the world in general is served, not harmed by keeping one great continent free from the strife’” (Gerits, 2015: 954). Then again, President Nkrumah pledged not to nationalize foreign assets in this address (Noer, 1984; Gerits, 2015). In Ghana, the initial stages of the Nkrumah-era, thus, created the enabling environment for the proliferation and existence of US investments such as, among others, the Abbot Labs [the pharmaceutical company], the Kaiser Corporation, and the Volta Aluminum Company (Noer, 1984; Mount, 2013; Gerits, 2015).

Furthermore, President Kennedy’s formulation and implementation of the 1961 Peace Corps program strengthened the US-Ghana relations under the First Republic. Mainly, the Peace Corps program was developed with the aim to propagating American ideals and promoting development in the third world. The US, then, chose Ghana as the first beneficiary country in the affected region—Africa. Even though “President Kwame Nkrumah was initially skeptical of

this US foreign policy,” he “eventually warmed up to the concept” and “called on all Ghanaians to accept the Peace Corps Volunteers and should not do anything to discourage them.” President Nkrumah, for example, was not happy with the Ghanaian *Times*’ “scathing” remarks against the Peace Corps, “agency of neo-colonialism, [and a] clever mode in [the] vicious game of teleguide company”, and he “was forced” to invite the US ambassador and “[...] personally apologized for it.” The Peace Corps program helped to boost education, particularly in the area of teaching, in Ghana (Bekoe, 2012: 227, 230 & 231).

The confrontation-conflict approaches: Let us examine the factors that often triggered the US-Ghana counterattacks under the First Republic. First, *Nkrumah’s anti-colonial spirit*: The first major factor that often triggered Nkrumah’s anger against the US had to do with his anti-colonial spirit. In the 1930s, for example, Nkrumah left the shores of Ghana to study overseas where he [a] led most students’ unions [the African Students’ Organization of America and Canada (the President) and the West African Students Union in Britain (the Vice President)] and [b] wrote “his first critique on colonialism” (Gerits, 2015: 953; Nimako, 2010). This, thus, suggests that the US-Ghana relations, as demonstrated under the **engagement-cooperation approaches**, were sitting on a time bomb [i.e. President Nkrumah’s anti-colonial spirit and impending emotional outburst] in the late-1950s and early-1960s.

Second, *the US foreign policy in the Congo*: The Nkrumah-Lumumba relations date back to the late-1950s when the latter attended the *Accra* ‘All-Africa Peoples Conference’ in 1958 (Nwaubani, 2001). The *Accra* Conference marked “[...] the beginning of Lumumba’s Pan-Africanist affirmations [...]”. It also marked his transformation from a liberal to a radical

nationalist” (Musambachime, 1967, in Nwaubani, 2001: 611). Indeed, Lumumba’s “radical” spirit was revealed when the King of Belgium—King Baudouin—arrived in Leopoldville [now Kinshasa] to “witness the transfer of power” to the Congolese state on 30th June, 1960. In their speeches under the ceremony, King Baudouin extolled Leopold II “as a civilizer” and Joseph Kasavubu, then incoming President, promised to deepen the Belgium-Congo relations. However, Patrice Lumumba, then incoming Prime Minister, sought to expose the colonial exploitations of Belgium in an “unannounced speech”. This speech irritated King Baudouin who “[...] had to be persuaded by the Belgian Prime Minister, Gaston Eyskens, not to walk out of the ceremony” (Gerits, 2015: 958; Namikas, 2013).

In addition, on 11th July, 1960, Moise Tshombe announced the secession of the richest province in the Congo [Katanga] and Belgium, without the consent of the Congolese government, activated its troops to protect the lives and properties of Europeans in that crisis. In response, Lumumba requested the US government to assist the Congo to (a) expel Belgium’s troops in the Congo and (b) halt the crisis in Katanga. The US, however, refused to grant Lumumba that request, leading him to turn to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union provided Lumumba with 60 trucks, 10 planes, military advisers and, weapons, which, in turn, irritated the US (Kalb 1982; Gibbs, 1991; James, 1996; Hoskyns, 1965). The Soviet Union’s aid to the Congo “[...] confirmed the worst fears of the Eisenhower Administration. The President and his advisers realized that the Soviet leader was taking an unprecedented step, one which threatened to alter the balance between the two superpowers. It was the first time the Russians had ever intervened militarily in a conflict thousands of miles from their borders” (Kalb, 1982: xiii).

Even though the US and Ghana were “deeply involved” in the Congo crisis, the two never agreed on that crisis (Nwaubani, 2001). The US and Ghana dragged the skirmishes over the Congo crisis unto the floor of the United Nations [UN]: During the 20th September, 1960 UN General Assembly, for example, the “US President Dwight Eisenhower defended his Congo policy. Nonetheless, the most intriguing speech came from Nkrumah, who entered the General Assembly as a vindicated man. The crisis in the heart of Africa validated his worldview in which the threat of ‘balkanisation in Africa’ loomed large. The Belgian support for secession and international intervention strengthened him in the conviction that Africa’s problems could only be solved by a joint African front” (Gerits, 2015: 958).

Eventually, the death of Patrice Lumumba on 17th January, 1961 rekindled Nkrumah’s anti-colonial spirit against the West and, thus, affected his non-aligned position in the Cold War (Telepneva, 2019; Gerits, 2015). Noer (1984: 68), for example, reported, ““Following the murder of Lumumba, Nkrumah launched his most virulent attacks on America. He accused Washington of cooperating in Lumumba's death to aid “puppet regimes” in the Congo. Encouraged by government leaders, a mob of over five hundred people marched on the American Embassy in Accra, shouting “down with US imperialism in Africa” and “America murdered Lumumba.”” Immediately, the US, in turn, fired back, “Secretary of State Dean Rusk finally instructed Russell to tell Nkrumah that his actions threatened the entire Volta project” (Noer, 1984: 68). Still, on 7th March, 1961, Nkrumah visited the White House after addressing the UN General Assembly: ““In a rare gesture, Kennedy met him at the airport and rode with him to the White House. Most of the meeting concerned the Congo, with Nkrumah engaging in what one observer called "a monologue on the subject." When Kennedy tried to discuss the

Volta project, Nkrumah returned to the Congo. They reached no agreement and made no announcement on the Volta project”” (Noer, 1984: 69).

Third, *Nkrumah's re-alignment with the East*: Though the US had expressed worries over the opening of the Chinese Embassy in Accra, “On the specifics, Flake [then US ambassador to Ghana] recalled that Ghana had always recognized China, but had never taken the initiative to exchange diplomatic missions. He believed that Ghana must have accepted the opening of an embassy by the Chinese as ‘a routine process’”. Thus, “[...] by September 1960, Nkrumah was not ‘leaning toward the Soviet bloc’ and that the state of ‘communism’ in Ghana at the time was not strong enough to strain USA/Ghana relations” (Nwaubani, 2001: 605-606). The story, however, changed within the space of nine months when Nkrumah re-aligned with the Eastern powers in mid-1961 up to mid-1960s (Aluko, 1975). The imperialistic policies of the Western powers in the Congo moved Nkrumah to re-align with the Eastern powers in mid-1961 (Telepneva, 2019). In July 1961, while President Kennedy and US officials were deeply contemplating and reflecting on the decision to fund the Volta Dam project, Nkrumah undertook an eight-week tour to Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. In a speech in Moscow, Nkrumah extolled the Soviet Union for supporting the independence of Africa, called for China’s diplomatic recognition, and condemned the imperialistic policies of the US and Europe in the Congo (Noer, 1984; Katsakioris, 2021: 264). Indeed, the “[...] number of economic, technical, and cultural cooperation agreements signed during or shortly after this trip confirmed the momentum of the Soviet-Ghanaian partnership” (Katsakioris, 2021: 264). Then again, “[...] immediately after Nkrumah’s return from his trip to the East, preparations were made to create Ghana’s first secret training camp at Mankrong, a remote locality in Ghana’s

Eastern Region, with the Soviet Union providing the instructors and weapons” (Grilli, 2018: 65). The Soviet Union also provided Ghana with a nuclear reactor to boost the nation’s energy sector following the trip to the East in mid-1961 (McLane, 1974).

Eventually, the US Congress, the US press, the CIA, and President Kennedy’s father [Joseph Kennedy] and brother, in turn, fired back at Nkrumah. The President’s father [Joseph Kennedy], for example, furiously asked his son, “What in the hell are you doing with that communist Nkrumah?” (Noer, 1984: 72). The US-Ghana skirmishes not only delayed US aid for the Volta project (Thompson, 1969) but almost jeopardized it (White, 2003). However, President Kennedy had already committed himself in a letter he personally wrote to Nkrumah on the 29th June 1961: “I am delighted to be able to advise you that all major issues involved in negotiations for the United States’ Government's share of the financing of the dam and smelter have been resolved. The United States' Government's representatives are now working with your representatives here to develop the necessary documents for signing and final closing.” On 29th September, 1961, Nkrumah wrote to Kennedy to remind him of his commitments in that letter: “In view of your personal letter to me on the 29th of June, I had assumed your government would definitely participate in this project.” In December, 1961, President Kennedy had no other option than to approve the loan in the midst of the US-Ghana skirmishes. The US, however, managed to get Nkrumah to pledge “never to expropriate VALCO property. He also promised more political freedom in Ghana, as Randall had demanded earlier” (Noer, 1984: 70 & 72).

But then, the more the Ghana-USSR-China relations strengthened, the more the US-Ghana relations weakened. White (2003: 113), citing Thompson (1969), reported that “The US, although now more wary of Nkrumah, thus agreed to finance the Volta Dam project, signalling Ghana’s short swing back to the West. Only shortly thereafter in 1962, however, there was an assassination attempt on Nkrumah in the small Ghanaian town of Kulungugu. Nkrumah suspected US ‘complicity’, and this marked his last shift back to Eastern alignment.” In 1964, the Ghana-China relations, for example, grew stronger following the arrival of the Chinese Prime Minister [Zhou Enlai] and Foreign Minister [Chei Yi] in Ghana (Mount, 2013). However,

Nkrumah’s relations with the US investors and their government left much to be desired. At a meeting 26 February 1964 with CIA officials, Rlusk, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Averell Harriman, Edgar Kaiser insisted that the Kaiser Corporation could not remain in Ghana unless Nkrumah changed his behavior. The pharmaceutical company Abbot Labs decided to withdraw from Ghana. The Volta Aluminum Company, owned by Alcoa at the time, wondered whether to remain (Mount, 2013: 5).

Still, in 1965, in his book [1965] entitled, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, Nkrumah made no distinction between the US PCVs and the US Information Agency [USIA] (Bekoe, 2013). In this book, Nkrumah sporadically lambasted the US: “Dating from the end of 1961, the US has actively developed a huge ideological plan for invading the so-called Third World [...]” (Nkrumah and Nkrumah 1965: 34). The Johnson administration was highly displeased with President Nkrumah: In 1965, for example, Nkrumah embarked on a tour to Vietnam while the US was still at war with Vietnam and, “to Nkrumah’s disappointment”, Johnson “was not interested” in the scheduled US-Ghana negotiation. In response, “Nkrumah circulated copies of his book *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism* to African leaders; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mennen Williams, thought that the

book “contain[ed] unmistakably hostile charges against USG [United States Government] motives, actions, and intentions [...]” (Mount, 2013: 4). On 20th November, 1965, the US, in turn, refused to grant “Ghana’s long-pending request” for food assistance worth over \$100 million as a result of the release of this book (Telepneva, 2019).

Then again, Nkrumah angered the US with the decision to train hundreds of Ghanaian students and troops in the Soviet Union (Noer, 1984; Katsakioris, 2021). The decision to train hundreds of students in the Soviet Union was championed with the aim to training “socialist-minded” students who will (a) take up the mantle of leadership and (b) strengthen the Ghana-Soviet Union relations in the post-colonial world. To achieve these objectives, Nkrumah sent over six hundred students into the various tertiary institutions in the Soviet Union between 1957 and 1966 (Katsakioris, 2021). In addition,

By 1966, it was estimated that 1,000 Ghanaian army cadets were under training in the USSR. The number of Soviet military personnel stationed within Ghana grew rapidly so that by 1966 an estimated one thousand were present. Many of those were engaged in the operation of guerrilla training centers established by Nkrumah in 1961 to combat the forces of "colonial Imperialism" (Babbitt, 1989: 78).

Consequently, Telepneva (2019) observed, President Nkrumah’s “anti-American” spirit grew more and more towards the latter part of his rule in mid-1960s. On 24th February, 1966, the National Liberation Council [NLC] overthrew Nkrumah with the US and “other Western countries” helping to set “up the situation” (Telepneva, 2019: 4). To Mount (2013: 6), however, “The Johnson administration appears to have played no role in the demise of the Nkrumah government, even if this point remains controversial.”

The abovementioned studies underscore the significance of the **engagement-cooperation** and **confrontation-conflict approaches** in the US-Ghana relations. The studies underscored the extent to which the ‘political’ [presidential visits] gave way to the ‘economic’ [the proliferation of FDIs] under the First Republic and, thus, allow us to examine how the ‘political’ [presidential visits] tends to give way to the ‘economic’ [the proliferation of FDIs] under the Fourth Republic. In addition, the abovementioned studies underscored the significance of the *remote* and *immediate* factors in explaining the actions and inactions of states in IR: Nkrumah’s anti-colonial spirit and impending emotional outburst—*developed in the 1930s*—partly led us to understand why Lumumba’s death in early-1961 (a) rekindled his anger against the West [the US] in early-1961, (b) led him to de-align with the West [the US] and re-align with the East [the Soviet Union and China] in mid-1961, and (c) moved him to write a book against the West [the US] in mid-1960s.

2.8 General Studies on the Impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act in Sub-Saharan Africa

2.8.0 Introduction

This sub-section examines the origin, purpose, and impact of the African Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA] in the target region—Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA].

The AGOA was signed into force in 2000, terminated in 2015, and renewed in 2015. The US developed the AGOA to [1] grant SSA quota-free and duty-free access into the US market and vice versa and [2] expand its hegemony in SSA (AGOA, 2000). In the case of [1], some scholars have observed that countries such as Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, South Africa, Madagascar, and Swaziland have been able to capitalize on the AGOA to boost their exports

into the US market (Kaplinsky, 2008; Goburdhun, 2007). However, some scholars have observed that others such as Botswana and Nigeria have struggled under the AGOA as a result of low skill levels, poor infrastructure, high transportation costs, bureaucratic ineptitudes, and US decision to exclude Nigeria's non-oil exports (Frazer, & Van Biesebroeck, 2010; Mokhawa, Gladys & Osei-Hwedie, 2003; Fwatshak, 2007/2008). Then again, the refusal to address the underlying causes of SSA marginalization—lack of fair and better terms of trade—subverts the prospects of the AGOA in the target region—SSA (Melamed, 2006; Almquist, 2009; Kebonang, 2007).

However, in the case of [2], the AGOA stipulates that:

- (a) *IN GENERAL.—The President is authorized to designate a sub-Saharan African country as an eligible sub-Saharan African country if the President determines that the country—(1) has established, or is making continual progress toward establishing—(A) a market-based economy that protects private property rights, incorporates an open rules-based trading system, and minimizes government interference in the economy through measures such as price controls, subsidies, and government ownership of economic assets; (B) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection under the law; (C) the elimination of barriers to United States trade and investment, including by—(i) the provision of national treatment and measures to create an environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment [...]* (AGOA, 2000: 254).

The abovementioned provision suggests that the US seeks to propagate and expand its hegemony in SSA under the AGOA. The US, for example, jettisoned the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2011, Central African Republic in 2004, Cote d'Ivoire in 2005, and Mauritania in 2006 following their inability to make “[...] continual progress toward establishing [...]” its *hegemonic* requirements in SSA. However, it did not hesitate to reinstate Ivory Coast and

Swaziland upon “[...] making continual progress toward establishing [...]” its *hegemonic* requirements in SSA. In “*Generosity Undermined: the Cotonou Agreement and the African Growth and Opportunity Act*”, Kebonang (2007) argued that these requirements undermined the prospects of SSA to export into the US market under the AGOA. The abovementioned studies enlighten us on the origin, purpose, and impacts of the AGOA in SSA, leading the current study to investigate the impacts of the AGOA in Ghana.

In sum, these studies shed light on a) how *structural reorientation* triggers *behavioral reorientation* within the international system, b) how some political leaders in, inter alia, India, Australia, and Ghana worked to place their countries in the middle-of-the-road-position in global hegemonic struggles, and c) the origin, purpose, and impacts of the AGOA in SSA. In the case of Ghana, Aluko (1975: 56), for example, remarked that “All Ghanaian governments since independence have used the terms nonalignment, neutralism, true neutrality, or **balanced neutrality** to represent the guiding principle underlying the country's policy with respect to the Great Power.” The current work/study, thus, aligns itself with that of Wu (2016, 2017): “*Taiwan's Hedging against China*” and “*Pivot, Hedger, or Partner: Strategies of Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons*”. In these works, Wu (2016, 2017) argued that Taiwan has strategically positioned itself within the current US-China hegemonic struggles and structural reorientation to take advantage of those struggles and reorientation.

For example, Wu (2016, 2017) argued, Taiwan, at times, approaches China with *political engagement* and, in other times, it approaches China with *confrontation* to achieve its aims within the system. Still, Wu (2016, 2017) continued, the citizens in Taiwan protested against a **deep** China-Taiwan relations to prevent the subjugation of the *latter* under the *former*.

However, the focus of the above studies was on the China-Taiwan relations, while the focus of the current study is on the US-Ghana relations. Besides, the studies have failed to: (a) disentangle the dynamics of conflict-and-cooperation in the US-Ghana relations and (b) disaggregate the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into ‘successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ under the Fourth Republic. Thus, the current study/work travels deeper than the abovementioned studies as it seeks to breakdown the US-Ghana relations into ‘successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ under the AGOA.



CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


3.0 Introduction

Mostly, theories, according to O'Brien and Williams (2004), emerge and evolve with the aim to helping: a) elucidate and understand why events occur in the world, b) predict *future* events to prepare for those events, c) prioritize and focus on vital issues, and d) organize support for a policy, program or project. The chapter will begin with Strategic Hedging and, then, turn to the Concept of Defensive Moralism [CDM].

3.1 Strategic Hedging

3.1.0 Introduction

Strategic hedging—the current and prominent International Relations [IR] theory (Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019; Silva, 2018)—champions limited “balancing and bandwagoning” (Koga, 2018: 635; Lim and Cooper 2015: 700; Goh, 2016: 8) and “cooperation and conflict” (El-Dessouki and Mansour, 2020: 2; Tunsjø, 2010: 29; Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019: 367) in IR. To fully comprehend the dictates of strategic hedging, let us examine ‘balancing’, ‘bandwagoning’, ‘cooperation’, and ‘conflict’ and, then, return to it.



❖ **Balancing**

In very simple terms, Waltz (1987: 17) defined balancing as “[...] allying with others against the prevailing threat”. In IR, the two forms of balance of power are: 1) ‘soft’ balancing and 2) ‘hard’ balancing. In He and Feng’s (2007: 393) view, “soft balancing refers to the efforts to undermine the relative power of the threatening state through diplomatic coordination and institutional constraints.” Hard balancing, on the other hand, consists of two types: a) internal ‘hard’ balancing and b) external ‘hard’ balancing. Under internal ‘hard’ balancing, the smaller state attempts to augment its military and economic strength relative to that of the stronger state. Under external ‘hard’ balancing, however, the smaller states attempt to form alliance with the aim to defending themselves against the stronger state. In both cases, balance of power theory construes power differential as a ‘threat’ to the security of the smaller states and, thus, seeks to balance this power differential (Waltz, 1993; Levy, 2004; Steff and Khoo, 2014). In terms of its major aim, balance of power seeks to attain “self-preservation” and “avoid losses” in an anarchic system (Saltzman, 2012; Schweller, 1994).

❖ **Bandwagoning**

In IR, Waltz (1987: 17; 1985) construed bandwagoning as the opposite of balancing: “When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger” or “giving in to threats”. In very simple terms, bandwagoning refers to the attempt to ride along with either the *likely* victor or the victor of war freely (Schweller, 1994; Donnelly, 2005). The aim of bandwagon is “self-extension” or the “opportunity for gain”

[i.e. “riding free on the offensive efforts of others to gain unearned spoils” (Schweller, 1994: 74)], and its *feature* is the “carnival appeals” (Clarke, 1982 :439).

In IR, the two major types of bandwagoning include 1) jackal bandwagoning and 2) piling-on bandwagoning: “Just as the lion attracts jackals, a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist powers”, while ““Piling-on bandwagoning” occurs when the outcome of a war has already been determined. States typically bandwagon with the victor to claim an unearned share of the spoils” (Schweller, 1994: 93 & 95). A jackal bandwagoning, for example, occurred in mid-1940s when the Allied powers delivered a campaign message to the non-aligned countries, threatening to exclude them [the non-aligned countries] in the UN Conference if they [the non-aligned countries] do not side along with them [the Allied powers] against the Axis powers by 1st March, 1945. On 23rd February, 1945, Turkey declared war against Japan and Germany following that campaign message. A piling-on bandwagoning, for example, occurred during the early-1990s when the US mobilized a group of countries against Iraq—in the Gulf War—following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Schweller, 1994).

❖ Cooperation

In IR, the term ‘cooperation’ broadly means the unification of states with the aim to achieving a particular aim. It tends to manifest itself in several ways [political and economic cooperation] and at different levels [bi-lateral cooperation and multi-lateral cooperation] in IR. In liberals’ view, “The laws of nature dictated harmony and cooperation between peoples. War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human nature” (Burchill, 2005: 58), while in realists’ view, “Anarchy can defeat even our best intentions [...]. Without insurance schemes that reduce the risk of cooperating, and without

procedures to determine how to divide the gains, even those who want to cooperate may remain locked in a vicious cycle of mutually destructive competition. For example, states may engage in costly and even counter-productive arms races because arms control agreements cannot be independently verified” (Donnelly, 2005: 37).

❖ **Conflict**

Conflict is defined as a “[...] relationship between two or more parties that centers on differences, disagreement on some issue of common interest or concern, divergence, incompatibilities, clash of wills and the like [...]” (Awedoba, 2009: 5). Similarly, Conflict is “defined as a situation where parties are pursuing incompatible goals” (Galtung, 1971: 81), and “[...] there may be conflict resolution in the sense that incompatible goals are no longer pursued [...]” (Galtung, 1965: 357). Largely, non-armed conflicts may metamorphose into armed *conflict* [when it, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), results in 25 battle-related deaths] and, then, *war* [when it, according to the UCDP, results in 1000 battle-related deaths/year] (Sungho et al, 2009). Now, let us continue with Strategic Hedging.

➤ **Strategic Hedging (cont.)**

Scholars generally agreed that the term ‘hedging’ was borrowed from *finance* into the arena of IR (Fiori and Passeri, 2015; Tran and Sato 2018; Chan, 2019). In *finance*, for example, hedging maintains that the investor will be able to offset risks *if* he/she does not put all his/her eggs into one basket (Fiori and Passeri, 2015). In IR, however, the meaning and usage of the term ‘hedging’ do not only “differ” and remain “unclear” (Koga, 2018; Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019) but also are “inherently difficult to quantify” (Salman and Geeraerts, 2014: 3). To some, “The

concept of hedging is not new to the international relations literature” (Tessman and Wolfe, 2011: 218), whereas to others, “Hedging is a concept which recently emerged in international relations theory” (Silva, 2018: 199). Thus, though hedging remains “fashionable” in IR theory (Gerstl, 2020: 108), it has created “conceptual confusion” in that IR theory (Koga, 2018: 636). Some of the advocates include, among others, Gao Bai [Duke University, North Carolina], Brock Tessman [University of Georgia], Wojtek Wolfe [Rutgers University-Camden], Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Evelyn Goh, Mohammad Salman [Free University of Brussels/Vrije Universiteit Brussel], and Gustaaf Geeraerts [Fudan University].

✓ **The Definition of Strategic Hedging**

To reiterate, strategic hedging champions the adoption of a “mixed strategy” between limited “balancing and bandwagoning” (Koga, 2018: 635; Lim and Cooper 2015: 700, Goh, 2016: 8) and “cooperation and conflict” (El-Dessouki and Mansour, 2020: 2; Tunsjø, 2010: 29; Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019: 367) in IR. The evidence, however, shows that most scholars tend to pin the definition of ‘hedging’ on either **a)** the strategies of hedging [as noted above] or **b)** the major aim/reason/motive of hedging—the need to avoid threat. Let us skim through a few definitions to illustrate this *trend* in the up-coming pages.

❖ **Definitions Pinned on the Strategies of Hedging**

Let us examine Goh’s (2016) definition and compare and contrast it with Tunsjø’s (2010) and that of Ciorciari and Haacke (2019: 367). In Goh’s (2005: 2, 2016) view, hedging is “a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead, they cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at

the obvious expense of another.” Now, let us compare and contrast Goh’s (2016: 8) definition with Tunsjø’s (2010: 29) definition: Hedging is a “contingent strategy that combines elements of cooperation, competition and rivalry simultaneously.” Finally, let us compare and contrast Tunsjø’s (2010: 29) definition with that of Ciorciari and Haacke (2019: 367): “Hedging normally refers [...] to a national security or alignment strategy, undertaken by one state toward another, featuring a mix of cooperative and confrontational elements. It is often contrasted with balancing or bandwagoning, concepts developed during the Cold War era to depict the alternative strategies of resisting or accommodating a mighty or menacing great power.” Clearly, these scholars sought to pin the definition of hedging on the *strategies* of hedging.

❖ **Definitions Pinned on the Major Aim of Hedging—the Need to Avoid Threat**

Once again, let us examine Kuik’s (2016) definition and compare and contrast it with Zhengyu’s (2013) and that of Tran and Sato (2018). To Kuik (2016: 504), hedging is an “[...] insurance-seeking behavior under high-stakes and high-uncertainty situations, where a sovereign actor pursues a bundle of opposite and deliberately ambiguous policies vis-à-vis competing powers to prepare a fallback position should circumstances change.” Now, let us compare and contrast Kuik’s (2016: 504) definition with Zhengyu’s (2013: 53) definition: Hedging is the “[...] pursuit of and investment in policies meant to protect the nation against the effects of geopolitical and economic uncertainty.” Finally, let us compare and contrast Zhengyu’s (2013: 53) definition with that of Tran and Sato (2018: 77): hedging is a “set of multiple approaches, which act simultaneously as a strategy to help the employing states minimize their threats while maximizing their opportunities in relations with other nations in an uncertain environment.” Clearly, these scholars sought to pin the definition of hedging on the major *aim/reason/motive* of hedging—i.e. the need to avoid threat.

➤ **The Conditions, Reasons, Characteristics, and Modus Operandi of Hedging**

❖ **The Conditions (What Triggers States to Hedge?)**

First, uncertainty under uni- and multi-polarities: Here, the more a state becomes skeptical about the intention of other states, the more it is likely to adopt hedging towards those states. For example, lack of trust between the hedging state and the hedging target may move the former to adopt hedging towards the latter. Second, structural uncertainty under multi-polarity: Mostly, small states tend to resort to hedging when the outcome of hegemonic struggles between two or more major powers remains uncertain (Puri, 2017; Salman and Geeraerts 2015; Goh, 2005). Third, a reduction in the relative strength of allies under a military alliance: The more the military capability of an alliance declines, the more the allies resort to hedging (Tessman, 2012).

Furthermore, perception of risks and threats: Here, the inability to balance against an aggressive regional power triggers hedging towards it (Guzansky, 2015; Tran and Sato, 2018). In addition, a huge power differential: Hedging occurs as a result of the power differential between the small power and the big power. Here, the inability of the small state to finance 'balancing' moves it to adopt hedging towards the big power. Finally, trade-dependence: The more the minor power depends on trade to build its economy and military, the more it adopts hedging towards the major power (Wu, 2016; Tran and Sato, 2018).

❖ **The Reasons (Why do States Hedge?)**

In IR, most small and medium powers/states tend to employ hedging to 1) cope with uncertainties under uni-polarity [i.e. when the intention of others remains unclear] and structural uncertainties under multi-polarity [i.e. when the outcome of hegemonic struggles remains unclear], 2) offset threat to national security, 3) improve upon economic opportunities, 4) secure protection for strategic resources, 5) prepare for conflict with the system leader, 6) avoid direct confrontation with the major powers, 7) sustain “balanced relations” with two big powers, 8) offset risks and improve upon opportunities, and 9) defy and accommodate a major power (Gerstl, 2020: 111; Kuik, 2008; Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019; Jackson, 2014; Tessman & Wolfe, 2011; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Tessman, 2012; Sherwood, 2016; Guzansky, 2015; Medeiros, 2005-06; Tiwary and Roy, 2021).

❖ **The Policy Elements and Characteristics of Hedging**

In Kuik’s (2016: 504) view, “hedging must entail three policy elements: (a) an insistence on not taking sides among competing powers (or, in the case of big powers, not fully aligning ones’ own interest and support with another power); (b) the practice of adopting opposite and counteracting measures and (c) the use of the opposite acts as instruments to pursue the goals of preserving gains while cultivating a ‘fallback’ position.” In effect, hedging behavior often exhibits some unique characteristics: First, it is often “premised on structural uncertainty.” Mostly, small and second-tier states resort to hedging when {a} the outcome of hegemonic struggles between two or more major powers remains unclear under multi-polarity and {b} the intention of others remains unclear under uni-polarity and multi-polarity (Korolev, 2019: 422; Kuik, 2008). Second, hedging is premised on the “principle of relative equidistance.” Here,

small states seek to maintain a “dual-track, proportional engagement” with two or more major powers (Korolev, 2019; Jackson, 2014: 335). Third, it is premised on the principle of cooperation/engagement and confrontation/conflict with the hedging targets (Tunsjø, 2010; Ciorciari and Haacke, 2019).

❖ **The Modus Operandi (How do States Hedge?)**

Binding Engagement: This type of hedging seeks to “socialize and integrate a Great Power into the established order” in IR (Kuik, 2008: 167). Binding engagement, for example, includes binding the hedging target [or that “Great Power”] in various “institutionalized bi lateral and multilateral platforms.” Here, the hedging state seeks to restrict the freedom of the hedging target [or that “Great Power”] to act aggressively (Gerstl, 2020, Kuik, 2008: 167-169; Hiep, 2013). *Political and Economic Engagement:* Political engagement refers to diplomatic relations between the hedging state and the hedging target. Here, the number of diplomatic visits and the number of diplomatic agreements, including the depth of those agreements, help to measure political engagement (Gerstl, 2020; Kuik, 2008: 167-169; Hiep, 2013). The economic engagement/pragmatism refers to the hedging state’s attempt to boost its trade, tourism, and investment relations with the hedging target (Gerstl, 2020, Kuik, 2008: 167-169; Hiep, 2013). Kuik (2008: 167), for example, wrote, economic pragmatism refers to a “[...] policy wherein a state seeks to maximize economic gains from its direct trade and investment links with a Great Power, regardless of any political problems that might exist between them.” *Limited Balancing:* This refers to internal balancing where the hedging state seeks to boost its military and economic capabilities relative to the hedging target. *Limited Bandwagoning:* Here, the hedging

state seeks to boost its security and political relations with the hedging target through military or security agreements (Kuik, 2008; Gerstl, 2020; Han and Paul, 2020).

➤ **The Indicators *of* and Mechanisms *for* Identifying Hedging Behavior in the International System**

Under this sub-section, the student seeks to examine the indicators *of* and the mechanisms *for* identifying hedging in the international system. The sub-section follows the foot prints of Tessman and Wolfe (2011) and Salman and Geeraerts (2013) to unravel these indicators and mechanisms in the international system.

Tessman and Wolfe (2011: 220) sought to present four indicators *of* and mechanisms *for* identifying hedging behavior in the international system, claiming that “If all the criteria are not met, the behavior is not an example of strategic hedging, but rather an instance of traditional hard balancing, normal diplomatic friction, simple power maximization, or something else.” These mechanisms “consists of four criteria, which we envision as a series of filters that, in succession, allow the analyst to sift out cases of strategic hedging.” The first: that “Improve, in an observable, significant, and specific way, the competitive ability of the hedging state should it someday enter into a militarized dispute with the system leader [...], and / or improve the ability of the hedging state to cope without public goods or direct subsidies currently being provided to it by the system leader.” The second: that “Avoid direct confrontation of the system leader via the formation of an explicit military alliance aimed at the system leader (external balancing), not constitute an extensive arms buildup (internal balancing), or involve the initiation of a militarized interstate dispute.”

The third: that “Be strategic, in the sense that it is coordinated at the highest levels of government, and that it involves an issue area that has been explicitly recognized as of major national security interest to the hedging state.” The fourth: that “Involve observable domestic or international cost(s) to the hedging state, including but not limited to acceptance of significant economic inefficiencies or diplomatic backlash” (Tessman and Wolfe, 2011: 220). Geeraerts and Salman (2016: 63) sought to expand Tessman and Wolfe’s (2011: 220) mechanisms under the sub-heading, “*Indicators of Strategic Hedging Capability*”, claiming that these “capabilities give an idea of possible behavior” in IR. Geeraerts and Salman (2016), thus, hammered on (a) economic capability [measuring *Gross Domestic Product [GDM], foreign exchange and gold reserves and government debt*], (b) military power [measuring *military expenditure and growth of military arsenal*], and (c) central government [measuring *democracy*]. This sub-section examines them as follows.

Economic Capability: Here, the main argument is that the economic might of a nation determines its behavior in the international system. Geeraerts and Salman (2016: 64), thus, sought to examine the impacts of (a) Gross Domestic Product [GDP], (b) Foreign Exchange Rate and Gold Reserves, and (c) Government Debts on strategic hedging. First, the scholars rated GDP as a positive indicator in strategic hedging: “GDP is an important criterion for measuring strategic hedging capability; it supports the national economy, helps the provision of foreign aid, and increases the ability to bear additional costs resulting from hedging policies.” Second, foreign exchange and gold reserves have been rated as a positive indicator in hedging: “High volume of foreign exchange reserve and gold makes the hedging state ready to accept domestic and international costs in the short-term as part of hedging behavior. Consequently, foreign exchange reserve is used as a positive indicator to measure strategic hedging

capability.” However, Geeraerts and Salman (2016: 64-65) rated government debt as a negative indicator in strategic hedging: “Recently, government debt relative to GDP has risen in several great powers more than at any time since the Second World War. This ratio is projected to grow for years to come [...]. In the meantime, increasing government debt ratio of GDP could undermine the implementation of hedging policies. Therefore, it has been used as a negative indicator” (Geeraerts and Salman, 2016: 64-65).

Military Power: Here, Geeraerts and Salman (2016: 65) found *military expenditure* as a positive indicator, and *growth of military arsenal* as a negative indicator in hedging. To them, military expenditure has been rated as a positive indicator in hedging. The point is that the ability of a nation to protect its citizens against internal and external aggressions depends on the amount of money spent to upgrade and expand the size of its military: “Importantly, increases in the military expenditure lead to improvement of the competitive military ability of the hedging state. The size of military spending, therefore, is a positive indicator of the level of hedging.” However, the hedging state’s excessive arms buildups may lead to direct confrontation with the system leader and, thus, undermine hedging: “In this context, military spending relative to GDP is used as a negative critical indicator for measuring strategic hedging capability” (Geeraerts and Salman, 2016: 64-65). Finally, **Central Government:** The argument is that it takes a strong central government to effectively pursue one’s foreign policy objectives in the international system. In other words, it takes a strong central government to manage the economic and military resources towards the attainment of foreign policy objectives in the international system. However, Geeraerts and Salman (2016: 66) rated *democracy* as a negative indicator in hedging: “[...] high levels of democracy [...]” tend to reduce a “[...] central authority’s capability to make decisions, and thus to a decline in coordination at the highest levels of

government, which is one of the most important conditions for strategic hedging”, making *democracy* a negative indicator in this sense.

➤ **The Forms (or Types) of Strategic Hedging**

The various types of strategic hedging include a) Type A hedging, b) Type B hedging, c) Stable hedging, and d) Unstable hedging. ***Type A hedging:*** In a uni-polar system, the system leader not only seeks to resist the alternation of power but also solidifies its supremacy. This often ushers the system leader into diplomatic conflicts [e.g. diplomatic boycotts], armed conflicts, and economic conflicts [e.g. trade wars] with the smaller and second-tier states. In addition, as the uni-polar system leader/hegemon declines, it tends to unleash ‘threats’ and restrict ‘opportunities’ [e.g. it reduces the provision of the global common good—e.g. fighting terrorism, protecting shipping lanes etc.], thereby jeopardizing the security of the small and second-tier states in that system. Type A hedging provides the small and second-tier states with a ‘strategy’ to explore alternatives to counter these ‘threats’. For example, it pushes the second-tier state to boost the capacity of its economy [e.g. increasing the number of trade partners] and the capability of its military [e.g. boosting technological capacity] to prepare for a possible clash with the declining hegemon/system leader. China, for example, tends to adopt Type A hedging as a result of its roller coaster relation with the US (Tessman, 2012; Salman et al, 2015; Tessman and Wolf, 2011; Salman, 2017).

Type B Hedging: In a uni-polar system, the hegemon may stop offering military assistance/aid [e.g. fighting terrorism, fighting maritime pirates etc.] and economic assistance/aid [e.g. public goods, guarding shipping lanes/paths etc.] to the small and second-tier states [both allies and

non-allies] following its declines and overload. Here, Type B hedging pushes the beneficiary [the small and second-tier] states to explore alternative sponsorships/aids and alternative alliances to offset the shortages and withstand the uncertainties under global power shifts (Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Kaul et al, 1999; Salman, 2017).

Stable Hedging: A stable hedging pitches the hedging state between conflict and cooperation with the system leader. On the one hand, the hedging state adopts measures to promote friendly relations with the system leader and, on the other hand, adopts measures to subvert the supremacy of the system leader. **Unstable Hedging:** An unstable hedging is one with a “fluctuated pattern of positioning”. Largely, this type of hedging lacks most of the ‘essentials’ or ‘elements’ of strategic hedging and, thus, leans towards either *cooperation* or *confrontation* with the system leader (Tran and Sato, 2018).

➤ **The Merits and Demerits of Hedging**

Briefly, let us examine the merits and demerits of ‘hedging’. The sub-section will begin with merits and, then, turn to demerits.

❖ **The Merits of Hedging**

Hedging offers the following merits: First, strategic hedging allows a state to reduce and, if possible, eliminate risks and threats in the international system. Second, strategic hedging allows a state to reduce its vulnerability and dependence on others, thereby allowing it to “self-insure” and “act more securely” in the international system. Here, strategic hedging “avoids the worst outcome and therein reduces the risk” (Keating and Ruzicka, 2014: 761; Meyerson, et al.,

1996; Ruzicka and Keating, 2012: 4). Third, strategic hedging promotes rationality in foreign policy decision making. For example, it promotes a “[...] more integrated analysis of hard and soft power” and, thus, eliminates opportunism in IR (Lake, 1996; Lee, 2012; Salman and Geeraerts, 2014: 1).

❖ **The Demerits of Hedging**

Strategic hedging, however, presents the following demerits: First, strategic hedging “limits the gains should the partner be trustworthy” and, thus, “lowers the expected value of the position and potentially promotes structural logics with negative consequences.” Second, strategic hedging “may perpetuate self-reliance where [...] more risk is possible”. Hedging, for example, has the potential to promote a “false sense of security” and, thus, fuel “risk-taking behavior” in IR (Keating and Ruzicka, 2014: 761; Ruzicka and Keating, 2012: 4-5). Finally, strategic hedging’s inability to disentangle relations into ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ prompted the development and adoption of the Concept of Defensive Moralism [CDM] under this study.

3.2 The Concept of Defensive Moralism

3.2.0 Introduction

The student drew on the literature to develop the Concept of Defensive Moralism [CDM] with the aim to disentangling treaty-based relations into ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’. The realists, on the one hand, employ Machiavelli’s tactics to breach the moral defenses of states and, on the other hand, build strong

defense and deterrence capabilities against those tactics (Binyon, 2015; Donnelly, 2005). The focus of the CDM is, thus, on the *moral defenses*:

The advent of World War II, and later the Cold War, put even greater pressure on state and federal governments to test U.S. citizens. At both the state and national levels, new legislation and judicial precedents reinforced the idea of the government imposing loyalty oaths on its citizenry. Massachusetts introduced a new loyalty oath in 1949 requiring public employees to affirm their support of the state and federal constitutions and to oppose any attempt to overthrow the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Sletcher, 2010: 35 & 36).

In 2019, for example, President Donald Trump’s snoop on the Iranian Nuclear Agreement—which, in his view, failed to protect US security interests (El Khalfi, 2020)—suggested that the President was attacking the *moral defenses* that went into the *diplomatic war* with Iran. The CDM, thus, upholds that we will be unable to understand the Iranian Nuclear Program, especially its potential consequences, without examining the *moral defenses* that went into the *diplomatic war* with Iran.

In IR, the realists [Realism] emphasize human nature and constructivists [Constructivism] emphasize “normative structure”, while neo-realists [Neo-realism] emphasize “material structures” and Marxists [Marxism] emphasize “material structure of the capitalist world economy” (Reus-Smit, 2005: 196; Donnelly, 2005). The abovementioned theories, however, failed to disentangle treaty-based relations into ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ in IR. Some scholars, for example, observed, “[...] diplomatic norms and the daily practices from which they are constituted [...] became so deeply internalized over the years that many scholars no longer appreciated their regulative, evaluative,

constitutive, and practical effects [...].” Today, “[...] diplomatic studies, and its scholars remain marginalized in IR and stereotyped as theoretically reluctant [...].” (Murray et al., 2011: 712 & 720), and “Many an IR theorist has criticized the subfield of diplomatic studies for its focus on apparently mundane and unimportant aspects of international life, arguing instead that more fundamental mechanisms and structural forces are the actual determinants of the balance of power [...]. Diplomacy, according to much of IR theory, is epiphenomenal or redundant” (Pouliot and Cornut, 2015: 297-298).

How, then, can we bridge this gap in IR? In Murray et al.’s (2011: 712, 716 & 722) view, “To bring these internalized norms and practices to light [...] the best way forward is not to try to develop a “grand theory” of diplomatic practice, but rather to develop middle-range theories that can be empirically tested within defined settings [...]”, and “[...] the timing is ideal for diplomatic scholars to expand their theoretical horizons [...]. Whether the unit of analysis is the individual diplomat or the broader structural diplomatic apparatus or traditions, the main interest of the scholar is how certain practices take form”. Now, let us proceed to examine the concept of ‘Moralism’ in IR.

❖ **The Concept of Moralism**

The moralists and realists have extensively dealt with the concept of ‘moralism’ in international relations (White, 1917; Machiavelli, 1970; Thilly, 1900; Coady, 2005; Morgenthau, 1962; Thompson 1984; Sleat, 2014; Xu and Ma, 2016: 547). Sleat (2014: 324), for example, argues that “We cannot properly understand politics without attending to morality also.” The moral law is given for the purpose of attaining “certain ends” including, among others, (a) the promotion of healthy actions and demotion of harmful actions, (b) the promotion of the interest of the

society and demotion of the interest of the individual, and (c) the call on individuals to be “more active” in promoting the “safety and welfare” of fellow humans (Thilly, 1900). However, the moral laws “cannot be followed blindly” (Nadeau and Westra, 2015: 426), suggesting that “You can love your fellow-man without hating yourself [...]” (Thilly, 1900: 228). Consequently, Xu and Ma (2016: 547) observed, “Moral identity influences individual ethical predispositions when making moral decisions. For individuals who have successfully internalized moral standards and principles, morality-related schémas are salient in their life experiences. They demonstrate the preference for deontological ideals and are more sensitive to rule-based behavior than outcome-based behavior.” This, thus, suggests that some individuals possess high moral standards, while others possess low moral standards (Aquino and Reed, 2002).

❖ **The Controversy over ‘Covetousness’**

Ward (1908: 7) employed the term “his most **coveted** possessions” to remind us of the inter-state subjugations and exploitations between the Global North [the colonizer] and South [the colonized] under colonialism. Similarly, Zhengyu (2013: 55) employed the term “balancing against **covetous** states” to illustrate hegemonic struggles and power transfers between hegemons in the Global North. The term ‘covet’, according to the evidence, means “to want to have something very much, especially something that belongs to someone else” (Cambridge dictionary) “[...] without due regard for the rights of others” (thesaurus.com). In light of this, the moral law outlawed ‘covetousness’ in all inter-relations, stating that “Thou shall not covet [...] anything that belongs to thy neighbour” (Thilly, 1900). The word ‘neighbour’, as used in the moral law, refers to **relations** at both the **inter-personal** and **inter-national** levels. Normally, a resident of house **A** and that of house **B** are said to be ‘neighbours’, at the inter-personal level, when the two share a geographical borderline. Similarly, the geographical

borderline running between Ghana and Togo makes the two nations ‘neighbours’ at the international level.

However, can one describe the two *persons* or *nations* in question as ‘neighbours’ when the two do not share a geographical borderline? The answer lies in the preamble of the UN Charter: “We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, [...] and for these ends, to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours [...]” Here, ‘*geography*’ and ‘*interaction*’ are, thus, the core pillars on which ‘neighborhood’ is defined. Even though Ghana does not share a geographical *borderline* with the US, the two states are, nevertheless, ‘neighbours’ in the UN—i.e. so long as the two remain members *of* and interact *in* the UN. Therefore, a ‘neighbour’ is someone you either share a *borderline* with or *interact* with at the inter-personal and inter-national levels.

The abovementioned pieces of evidence, thus, suggest that the moral law sanctions ‘morality’ in all inter-relations and, thus, frowns on ‘covetousness’ in inter-national relations. Thilly (1900: 225-226), for example, sums it up as follows: “The ethical rule forbids acts detrimental to others, and urges the performance of conduct relieving suffering [...]. Hence: thou shalt not!” The individual’s ethics, Williams (1923: 23 & 31) continues, are applicable to the “conduct” of the state, and “morality must, in fact, of necessity exist” within the state. The “[...] trustee who is charged with the welfare of others [...] is under moral obligation to regulate his conduct [...]”, and for “[...] morality [...] to become operative, it must find lodgment in human conscience [...]” Indeed, “A man”, Thilly (1900: 225) corroborated, “believing in and understanding the progress of the human race may experience the desire to contribute to its

development by adapting his behavior to such high ideals.” Thus, Tufts (1918: 302) observed, “For if there is anything essential to the existence of a modern state, it is the loyalty of its citizens [...]” In effect, Rossow (1962: 563) and Nicolson (1950) condemned the “old diplomacy”, which has been “tainted [...] with certain Machiavellian [...] overtones”, and “These [...] never were and certainly are not now characteristic of the best of the classical diplomatic tradition, wherein good faith, discipline, and loyalty have always been far more honored [...].”

Jennings et al. (2015: 104), however, observed that it is difficult to account for “human moral functioning and behavior” in a society. In view of this, leaders [throughout history] have often been asked to swear oaths, calling on the supernatural forces and humans to witness as judges and avengers (Spurr, 2001). Traditionally, a chief, for example, could be dethroned if he breaks the oaths including, among others: (a) the misappropriation of funds, (b) the wrongful sale of properties belonging to the society, (c) drunkenness, (d) revealing the origin of citizens or subjects, and (e) the use of abusive languages. This is equivalent to the act of impeachment in modern democracies (Bamfo, 2000).

However, the “realist writings” reveal that realism (a) opposes “idealism and morality in foreign affairs”, and (b) concerns itself with “the national interest as a focal value for foreign policy.” The “realist theme” is “that morality sometimes (or commonly) demands the impossible of international policy and ignores the realities of power” (Coady, 2005: 122 & 126). Sleat (2014: 316), citing Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, noted that

[...] moralism is a theory that makes "the moral prior to the political" or that takes politics to be "a kind of applied ethics," in

the sense that "morality offers constraints [...] on what politics can rightfully do" or insofar as moral values or ideals provide the sole or principal guide for political action. Realism, in contrast, "gives a greater autonomy to distinctively political thought" or "must start from and be concerned in the first instance not with how people ought ideally (or ought 'rationally') to act, what they ought to desire, or value, the kind of people they ought to be, etc., but, rather, with the way the social, economic, political, etc., institutions actually operate in some society at some given time, and what really does move human beings to act in given circumstances.

Consequently, the realists overturned the ‘moral law’ and ‘ruled’ [argued] in support of the ‘immoral law’, legalizing ‘covetousness’ in IR (Tufts, 1918; Kardas, 2010; Edwards, 1998; Olasode et al, 2015). Thus, realism is often “seen to pose a threat” to the role of moralism in international relations: “The realist target is, or should be, not morality but certain distortions of morality [...]” (Coady, 2005: 123). Binyon (2015: 42), for example, observed, “In the past [...]” young British diplomats “[...] would watch their superiors in action, learning the art of negotiation and the trademark suavity that concealed a Machiavellian mind” and “how to blog and tweet without giving away diplomatic secrets.” Now, the term ‘suave’ means “(esp. of men) having a pleasant and charming manner that may not be sincere” and ‘suavity’ means “a man’s behavior that is polite, pleasant, and usually attractive, but often slightly false” (Cambridge Dictionary).

Let us re-visit the bonds of 1844 [Gold Coast, now Ghana] and 1886 [Nigeria] for better understanding. Even though the British appeared “polite, pleasant, and [...] attractive” in the bonds of 1844 and 1886, they “concealed a Machiavellian mind” in those bonds: In Nigeria, Inyang and Basse (2014: 1948) reported, “The first major coup in the hinterland occurred in 1886, when the British intervened to end the arduous Ekitiparapo War between Ibadan and the

alliance of Ekiti, Ijesa, Egba, Ijebu, and Ife forces. All sides were weary of fighting this war, which had been going on for fifteen years, and welcomed the British as peacemakers. **The British terms designed in a standard treaty, while bringing an end to the main fighting of the war [...]** [the act of appearing “polite, pleasant and usually attractive” (Cambridge Dictionary)], “[...] **opened the door to full-scale colonisation, however**” [the act of a “concealed Machiavellian mind” (Binyon, 2015: 42)]. Consequently, the failure of young British diplomats to learn these arts of “[...] negotiation and the trademark suavity that concealed a Machiavellian mind [...]” moved Binyon (2015: 42) to lament that “Young British diplomats today have no time for such a gentle induction.”

Binyon’s (2015: 42) “[...] gentle induction [...]” stipulates that “[...] a strict commitment to Machiavellian ethics, with its heavy emphasis on the primacy of the state, the survival of the state, and advancing states' interests, complemented the tendency to exclude ethical dimensions of international politics” (Kardas, 2010: 1026). Here, “The state knows neither right nor wrong, justice nor mercy [...] “politics is politics,” just as “business is business” [...]. All ethicists are hereby solemnly suspended from their occupations so far as states are concerned”, and when the state was “[...] governed solely by greed for power and gain [...] no ethical pretense was needed for conquest or plunder” (Tufts, 1918: 300, 302). These evidences suggest that “When the state consisted of an absolute monarch, or an absolute few, governed solely by greed for power and gain, secure by its resources of armor, or cavalry, or castles, as against the great mass of subject peoples or individuals, no ethical pretense was needed for conquest or plunder. But now the state finds that even for such wars, moral justification is necessary strategy. It must make its wars appear wars of self defense [...]” (Tufts, 1918: 302).

Here, the realists place emphasis on human nature, emphasizing “the limitations which the sordid and selfish aspects of human nature place on the conduct of diplomacy” (Thompson 1984: 20). Machiavelli (1970: Book I, Chapter 3 in Donnelly, 2005: 30), the boss of the realists, called on states to act [in IR] as if “all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers.” Thus, Morgenthau (1962: 7) concluded, the “social world [is] but a projection of human nature onto the collective plane.” Here, the “[...] believers in independent morality maintain that God commands actions because they are right”, while “their opponents maintain the reverse” (Whewell, 1852: 51 in Irwin, 2015: 865). The “[...] basic conflict of economics is that people act in ways to maximize their self-interest pit against the respected rules and laws” (Xu and Ma, 2016: 537). Thus, from the CDM’s perspective, the “[...] distortions of morality [...]” (Coady, 2005: 123) refer to the “theoretical successes”, “empirical successes”, “side effects”, and “backlash effects” in “Treaties”, “Bonds”, “Acts”, and “Conventions”.

Now, let us proceed to deal with the CDM under some Four [4] Stages, beginning with Stage One [**The Outbreak of a ‘Live problem’ or ‘Live issue’**], Stage Two [**Treaty Drafting and Adoption**], Stage Three [**The Implementation**], and Stage Four [**The Re-activation Reinforcements**].

➤ **Stage One: The Outbreak of a “Live problem”/“Live issue”**

In IR, the pursuit of “security” begins with the outbreak of a “live problem”/“live issue” [e.g. war, poverty, hunger, etc.] in the Social World [SW]. The outbreak of a “live problem” in SW is tantamount to the outbreak of a “live virus” [e.g. the COVID-19 virus] in the medical world

[MW]. Here, the term “security” not only refers to military security (Barkawi, 2011; Nye, 1990) but also economic and ecological security (Zekic, 2016; Zeytinoglu, 2012; Bredgaard, 2005; Lovell, 1989; Nye, 1990). In SW/IR, the “live problem”/“live issue” exhibits two major characteristics: First, the fact that the outbreak of this “problem” or “issue” [e.g. war, poverty, hunger, etc.] remains alive, diffuses quickly across the world, and works to kill makes it a “live problem”/“live issue.” Appadorai’s (1944: 326) work, for example, shows how a “live problem”/“live issue” *originates* in SW [In US, “Another **issue** is whether the amending body could effectively alter the representation of a state in the Senate. The **issue** is not at present a **live** one [...]”], while Easton’s (1957: 389) work shows how that “live problem”/“live issue” *dies* in that SW [“The occurrence of a demand [...] does not thereby automatically convert it into a political *issue*. Many demands **die** at birth or linger on [...]”].

Second, the “live problem”/“live issue” has a definite *origin*, and is able to *spread* and *metamorphose* into a new variant at its *destination*. For example, President Barrack Obama observed, “[...] we have a continuing interest in Africa’s security, in Africa’s economy, in Africa’s social and political development because we live in an **interrelated world** and what **happens here** has an impact **everywhere**” (Cook, 2010: 3).

➤ **Stage Two: Treaty Drafting and Adoption**

❖ **Treaty Drafting:**

How do sovereign states often deal with the ‘live problem’ detected under Stage-One? It begins with the *drafter* of a treaty/act/charter: Here, the **drafter** captures a ‘*live problem*’/‘*live issue*’ which causes insecurity [say, the **causes** of WWII, poverty, hunger, etc.] and, then, ‘weakens’ it

to develop treaties/acts/charters. In other words, international treaty drafters tend to capture a *'live problem'* or *'live issue'*, which they intend to fight, and use 'it' to develop treaties, acts, and charters. The approach is very much like what happens in MW: The producer of a vaccine captures the 'live virus' and, then, weakens it to produce that vaccine. The 'problem'/'issue' that drove the creation of the UN and the adoption of the AGOA was a *'live problem'*/'*live issue'*, not a *'dead problem'*/'*dead issue'*. Consequently, the *'live problem'*/'*live issue'* that drove the creation and the adoption of, inter alia, the United Nations (UN) [in 1945], the Lome Partnership Agreement [in 1975], the Cotonou Partnership Agreement [in 2000], the China-Africa Bilateral Investment Treaties [BITs], and the AGOA [in 2000] influenced the **drafting** of the UN 'Charter', the Lome 'Convention', the Cotonou 'Treaty', the China-Africa 'BITs,' and the AGOA. The **'act-of-treaty-drafting'**, thus, involves an attempt to *capture* and *weaken* the *'live problem'*/'*live issue'* that often breeds *'insecurity'* in IR. However, the drafters—as humans—tend to bring their “good intentions,” “human oversights,” “selfish interests,” and “theoretical leanings” to bear on “drafting”, which, in turn, bring the act-of-drafting under the “95%” confidence level and “5%” margin of error.

Thus, under the '95%' confidence level, the drafters expect (a) the treaty/act/charter to assist the beneficiaries/recipients/members to develop 'antibodies' to fight developmental challenges when it is injected into the **affected** region [a region that is 'sick'] and (b) the recipients to capitalize on the already-made 'antibodies' [e.g. the AGOA's third-country fabric program] to fight developmental challenges when it is injected into the affected region—this is the 'success' of the treaty/act/charter. However, under the '5%' margin of error, the drafters expect the treaty/act/charter to pose some challenges to the recipients. The treaty/act/charter, for example,

may produce some ‘side effects’, which are not only *normal* but also *inevitable*. In the worse-case scenario [let us assume], the drafters may expect the treaty/act/charter to reverse the purpose for which it was created, as it may either a) fail to eradicate the ‘*live problem*’ and worsen matters or b) re-introduce the ‘*live problem*’ into the domestic or international system—this is the ‘backlash effect’ of the treaty/act/charter. In the case of the AGOA (2000), Carr (2004) and Olarreaga and de la Rocha (2003) described its “antibodies” as, “[...] special provisions [...]” (Olarreaga & de la Rocha, 2003: 102) and “[...] ‘windows’ of opportunity and access [...]” (Carr, 2004: 35), while Edwards and Lawrence (2014: 344) captured its ‘antibodies’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ as, “[...] both the success and limitations are the predictable consequences of the manner in which the preferences have been constructed.” The CDM, thus, draws on the following diagram to outline the “successes,” “side effects,” and “backlash effects” of the treaty/act/charter as follows.




Fig.1




Fig 1: The Efficacy of the Immune System [EIS]

- **The efficacy of the immune system:** In **Fig. 1**, the treaty goes straight into the LIS [the large immune system] when it is injected. The LIS refers to the target region: The AGOA and some US military activities, for example, target, among others, Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA], Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean. The SIS [the small immune system], however, refers to the individual countries within the LIS [the target region]. The EIS [the efficacy of the immune system] refers to the ability of the LIS and SIS in the recipients to override the ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’ and, then, translate the ‘theoretical successes’ into ‘empirical successes’. Consequently, the state with either the strong IS or the moderately strong IS will be able to convert and translate the ‘theoretical successes’ into ‘empirical successes’, while the state with a weak IS will be unable to convert and translate the ‘theoretical successes’ into ‘empirical successes’. In **Fig. 1**, the reaction of either the strong IS or the moderately strong IS results in ‘empirical successes’ and ‘side effects’, while the reaction of a weak IS results in ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’.
- **The successes:** The *successes* of the treaty refer to both the ‘theoretical successes’ and ‘empirical successes’. The ‘theoretical successes’ refer to the ‘antibodies’ [clauses] that have been implanted within treaties to assist the recipients, while the ‘empirical successes’ refer to the ‘actual successes’ [or ‘implementation successes’] on the ground. In 1945, for example, one of the UN founding fathers’ praises for the drafting and the adoption of the UN Charter in San Francisco [the US], *“Inexorable tides of history are carrying us toward a golden age of freedom, justice, peace, and social well-being”* (Eban, 1995: 39), suggested that he/she was praising the ‘theoretical successes’ in the *then* yet to be implemented UN Charter. The ‘theoretical successes’ and ‘empirical successes’ are measured against the ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’. In effect, if the

treaty's 'antibodies' outweigh its 'side effects' and 'backlash effects', then, it has the potential to convert and translate the 'theoretical successes' into 'empirical successes'. The Fairtrade Labelling Organization (FLO), the World Fair Trade Organization (WFTO), the European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) and the Network of European World Shops (NEWS), for example, defined Fair Trade as "[...] a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency, and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes to the sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing the rights of disadvantaged producers and workers, especially in the South" (Walton, 2010: 433). Thus, from the CDM's viewpoint, the 'antibodies' must seek to balance the power tilts on the pivot.

- **The side effects:** In the treaty/act/charter, there are clauses that trigger 'side effects' when invoked in IR. The 'side effects' refer to the inevitable and normal shocks that originate out of the treaty, but lack the potential to (a) allow one party, as Donnelly (2005: 35-36) rightly put, to "later [...] turn" around to invade and exploit the other's military and economic resources under that treaty/act/charter [e.g. the AGOA, EPAs etc.], and (b) backlash the core purpose [i.e. the long term promotion and protection of the political, cultural, and economic sovereignty and security of all parties] for which the treaty/act/charter was created. The Preamble of the UN Charter, for example, stipulated that the core purpose of the UN is the determination to "[...] save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." Similarly, the core purpose of the North-South relations must rest on the determination to "[...] save succeeding generations from the scourge of [...]" colonialism, "which [...] has brought untold sorrow to mankind" in the Global North and South. Thus, from the CDM's perspective, anything that lacks the potential to trigger World War III [as in the case of the UN] and colonialism [as in the case of the North-South relations] is to be treated as a 'side effect'. In fact, the treaty/act/charter, for example, may pose some threat to the 'sanitation' and 'health' sectors in the recipient countries, which is not only normal but also inevitable. In the case of a vaccine, this falls under the category of, inter alia, headache, blood clotting, rise in body temperature, diarrhea, dizziness, and nausea in the natural sciences. However, the parties in question [i.e. the drafter and the recipient] must be ready and willing to *normalize* the 'side effects' to allow the 'immune system' take advantage of the treaty/act/charter. This is measured by looking out for (a) the number of treaty-related forums [e.g. AGOA forums, UN forums, et cetera.] between the drafter and the recipient and (b) the extent to which these forums have worked to *normalize* the 'side effects'.
- **The backlash effects:** In the treaty/act/charter, there are clauses that trigger 'backlash effects' when invoked in IR. The 'backlash effects' refer to the abnormal shocks that originate out of the treaty and have the potential to (a) allow one party to "later [...] turn" around to invade and exploit the other's military and economic resources under that treaty/act/charter [e.g. the AGOA, EPAs etc.] and (b) backlash the core purpose [i.e. the long term promotion and protection of the political, cultural, and economic sovereignty and security of all parties] for which the treaty/act/charter was created. Therefore, from the CDM's viewpoint, anything that has the potential to trigger World War III [as in the case of the UN] and colonialism [as in the case of the North-South

relations] is to be treated as a ‘backlash effect’. The treaty/act/charter, for example, must not cross the red-zones to look into one’s military software system. In fact, under the 5% margin error, for example, **one** ‘backlash effect’ has the potential to either obstruct or overturn the successes under the 95% confident level. In the natural sciences, this is equivalent to a vaccine re-introducing the deadly virus into the human system. Waltz (1987: 17; 1985) and Donnelly (2005: 35-36), for example, captured it as follows, “[...] bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger” or “giving in to threats” (Waltz, 1987: 17), and “In hierarchic political orders, actors tend to ‘jump on the bandwagon’ of a leading candidate or recent victor [...]. ‘Bandwagoners’ attempt to increase their gains (or reduce their losses) by siding with the stronger party. In anarchy, however, bandwagoning courts disaster by strengthening someone who later may turn on you. The power of others—especially great powers—is always a threat when there is no government to turn to for protection” (Donnelly, 2005: 35-36). From the CDM’s perspective, the ‘backlash effects’ may be measured by looking at the extent to which the treaty/bond crosses the red-zones to undermine [or sacrifice] one’s political and economic *sovereignty, growth, and progress*. However, it is important to state that a ‘side effect’ may be misconstrued to mean a ‘backlash effect’ and vice versa, sparking public dissatisfactions and demonstrations in IR. The appraisals on the ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ at the end of the ultimatum will determine as to whether or not a treaty re-injection is needed to normalize the ‘side effects’ and eradicate the ‘backlash effects’.

The bottom line is that a well-developed treaty/act/charter must have lots of “antibodies” more than “side effects” with **zero** “backlash effects.” To attain this standard, the **drafter/s** must activate his/her [or their] *moral defenses* to ensure that the treaty/act/charter evolves within the limits of the “95%” confidence level and the “5%” margin of error. He/she must activate their moral defenses to **a)** scrutinize, identify, and boost the “antibodies,” **b)** scrutinize, identify, and normalize all “side effects”, and **c)** scrutinize, identify, and eradicate all “backlash effects” within the treaty/act/charter. The inability of the **drafter** to ensure that the treaty/act/charter evolves within the limits of the *confidence level* and the *margin of error* represents a breach of his/her moral defenses.

❖ **Treaty Adoption:**

This stage calls on the recipients/members to ratify/sign the treaty/act/charter/bond to usher relations into the empirical world. This stage is, thus, the stage where one may either sign

his/her life warrant or death warrant in IR. Indeed, it is (1) a simple stage if the drafter of the treaty/act/charter involves/consults the recipients/members in the *drafting stage* and (2) a complex stage if the drafter of the treaty/act/charter refuses to involve/consult the recipients/members in the *drafting stage*. In the case of the latter [i.e., (2)], Thompson (2004: 463), writes:

Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) opposed the Africa bill from 1997, offering alternative approaches to a comprehensive trade bill for Africa. First, they pointed out, in contrast to extended Cotonou discussions with Africa by the EU, the US government failed to engage African governments in negotiations; this trade act is unilateral, not even bilateral.

This stage, thus, deals with the **residual** “side effects” and “backlash effects,” which may have infiltrated the *drafting stage* into the *adoption stage* as a result of the drafter’s human oversights, selfish interests, and theoretical leanings. Thus, it is at this stage that the work of the statesman/woman—i.e. the ‘recipient’ of the treaty or the small or minor power—actually begins in IR: he/she is required to activate their *moral defenses* to **a)** scrutinize, identify, and boost the “antibodies,” **b)** scrutinize, identify, and normalize all “side effects,” **c)** scrutinize, identify, and eradicate all “backlash effects,” and **d)** scrutinize, identify, and boost the critical areas of the nation’s “immune system”. Here, the diplomats must recollect the realists’ emphasis on “the limitations which the more sordid and selfish aspects of human nature place on the conduct of diplomacy” (Thompson 1984: 20) and react as if “all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers” (Machiavelli, 1970 in Donnelly, 2005: 30) and, thus, seek to “[...] blog and tweet without giving away diplomatic secrets” (Binyon, 2015: 42). The recipient’s failure to crosscheck and

boost the “antibodies,” normalize the “side effects,” and eradicate the “backlash effects” represents a breach of his/her *moral defenses* in IR.

➤ **Stage Three: The Injection of the Treaty/Act/Charter [Implementation]**

The injection [implementation] of the treaty/act/charter requires that the recipients/beneficiaries must have the right “immune system”—like the human immune system—needed to receive and translate the “theoretical successes” into “empirical successes.” A weak immune system [WIS], together with its indicators, refers to: 1) weak moral defenses, 2) low maneuvering skills, 3) a low-skilled workforce, 4) deplorable road networks, 5) a weak judicial system, 6) weak intellectual property rights laws, 7) a weak energy sector, 8) a weak private sector, 9) a weak monitoring and evaluation system, and 10) weak military defenses, while a strong immune system [SIS], together with its indicators, refers to: 1) strong moral defenses, 2) high maneuvering skills, 3) a high-skilled workforce, 4) excellent road networks, 5) a strong judicial system, 6) strong intellectual property rights laws, 7) a strong energy sector, 8) a strong private sector, 9) a strong monitoring and evaluation system, and 10) strong military defenses. The moderately strong immune system [MSIS] stands between the WIS and SIS. Thus, the state with either the SIS or MSIS will be able to convert and translate the ‘theoretical successes’ into ‘empirical successes’, while the state with the WIS will be unable to convert and translate the ‘theoretical successes’ into ‘empirical successes’.

The statesman/woman must locate and identify potential sectors/areas and re-direct the treaty/act into those potential sectors/areas. In other words, the statesman/woman must react like the medical expert who seeks to locate the appropriate sites [i.e. upper arm, lower arm, buttocks etc] and routes [i.e. IM (90 degrees), sub-cut (45 degrees), intra-dermal (just under the skin)] to

successfully inject the treaty/vaccine into the system. Then again, the statesman/woman must react like the medical expert who will not allow the temperature of his/her body to affect the temperature of a vaccine. Here, the statesman/woman must, for example, neutralize his/her political *likes* and *dislikes* in the determination of who gets *what*, *when*, and *how* to attain the desired result/outcome. In addition, the temperature level inside the storage facilities [whether in the producer's storage rooms, the national storage rooms, the regional storage rooms, the cold boxes, the district export fridges] and the transportation engines [whether in the cold aeroplane or in the cold vans] needs to be regulated to the accepted level, and the human carriers [e.g. the carriers of the export boxes] need to *hold*, *lift*, and *transport* the storage facilities under hygienic conditions.

In MW, it is important to state that the medical experts [Doctors, Nurses, etc.] usually do not find it difficult to identify and deal with the “side effects” and “backlash effects” because a) the patients often visit the hospitals to lodge verbal complains to them, and b) the medical lab often helps them to *diagnose* and *treat* the “side effects”/“backlash effects.” However, in SW/IR, unlike the human system/patient in MW, the domestic system [the **state**] or the international system [the **group of states**] is *unable* to lodge a verbal complain; it tends to manifest the “side effects” and “backlash effects” to the ‘eyes’ of, among others, the drafter, the statesman/woman, the scholar, and, of course, the citizens. Indeed, this makes the job of the drafter, the statesman/woman, the scholar, and the citizens much more complex as they, unlike the medical experts in MW, are required to sink their intellectual shafts to unravel and deal with the “side effects” and “backlash effects” in SW/IR.

➤ **Stage Four: The Re-activation Reinforcements [RR]**

The term ‘reinforcement’, as the dictionary put it, not only means the “process of strengthening” but also the “process of establishing a [...] pattern of behavior” (Definitions from [Oxford Languages](#)). The ‘behavior pattern’ is defined as the “recurrence of two or more responses which occur in a prescribed arrangement or order” (Sam, 2013). The ‘behavior pattern’, in other words, is a “recurrent way of acting by an individual or group toward a given object or in a given situation” (thesaurus.com). The “[...] patterns of [behavior](#) develop through [operant conditioning](#) [...]” The operant conditioning refers to the “[...] [procedure](#) wherein **behavioral alterations** take place as an act of the consequences of [behavior](#)” (Sam, 2013). In IR, the drafters of a/an treaty/act/charter often implant the Re-activation Reinforcements [RR] with the aim to re-dealing with the ‘live issue’ or ‘live problem’ as and when the need arises. The RR include: 1) The Emergency Re-activation Plan [ERP], 2) The Development Re-activation Clauses [DRC], and 3) The Ricardian Re-activation Plan (RRP).

❖ **The Emergency Re-activation Plan [ERP]**

In IR, the Emergency Re-activation Plan [ERP] seeks to either neutralize the ‘backlash effects’ or replace a flopped treaty/act/charter entirely. Mostly, the circumstances and conditions surrounding the implementation of a treaty will determine as to whether or not the ERP is needed to re-deal with the ‘live problem’. Let us recall that, under the ‘5%’ margin of error, the treaty/act/charter may either a) fail to eradicate the ‘live problem’ and worsen matters or b) re-introduce the ‘live problem’ into the domestic or international system. In the case of a), let us recall, for example, the creation of the UN following the inability of the League of Nations to prevent the outbreak of WWII. In the case of b), it will be difficult, Ulgen (2015) lamented, to

denuclearize the world so long as the US [a veto wielding state] and Russia [another veto wielding state] refuse to do so. In fact, a clash between these UN Security Council members and nuclear weapon states could plunge the world [UN] into Mutual Absolute Destruction [MAD] in the future—this is the likely ‘backlash effects’ of the UN Charter. This often pushes the drafters to either neutralize the ‘backlash effects’ or replace that treaty/act/charter under the ERP. Clearly, in IR, this establishes the “pattern of behavior” in which the drafters of a treaty tend to implant and invoke the ERP with the aim to either neutralizing the ‘backlash effects’ or replacing a flopped treaty as and when the need arises.

❖ **The Development Re-activation Clauses [DRC]**

The Development Re-activation Clauses [DRC] refer to the legal clauses that have been implanted within or outside treaties/acts/charters with the aim to re-activating ‘relations’ to propel development within the member states *periodically*. The DRC is, however, subject to the appraisals at the end of the ultimatum, including: **1)** the negative impacts of the treaty/act/charter on the fortunes of the *drafter* and *recipient* and **2)** the positive impacts of the treaty/act/charter on the fortunes of the *drafter* and *recipient*. In the case of **1)**, the drafter may turn either a particular clause or the whole treaty/act/charter down when the impacts on the political and economic fortunes turn out to be negative. In the case of **2)**, however, the drafter may re-activate the treaty/act when it is still needed to improve upon the political and economic fortunes of the *drafter* and the *recipient*. The European Economic Community [EEC] [now the European Union (E.U.)], for example, activated the Lome Convention [LC] in 1975 and replaced the LC with the Cotonou Agreement [CA] in 2000 and, then, replaced the CA with the Economic Partnership Agreements [EPAs] in 2021. Clearly, in IR, this establishes the “pattern

of behavior” in which the drafters of a/an treaty/act/charter tend to implant the DRC with the aim to re-activating treaty-based relations *periodically*.

❖ **The Ricardian Re-activation Plan (RRP)**

Here, the colonizer [the Global North] sought to strictly follow the prescriptions and dictates of the Ricardian Theory of Comparative Advantage (1817) to institutionalize the Ricardian Re-activation Plan [RRP]. In 1817, in the midst of the Industrial Revolution and colonialism, David Ricardo, in his book “On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation”, developed the Theory of Comparative Advantage, calling on states to export the products in which they have strong comparative advantage and import the products in which they have weak comparative advantage (Filipe and Vernengo, 2002/2003). Thus, in light of the theory of comparative advantage, the colonizers sought to anchor the comparative advantage of the Global North in the production of processed materials and the comparative advantage of the Global South in the production of raw materials. In the North, for example, the “[...] cost of labor in Southern India was considerably lower than in England”, resulting in the “invention of Arts, and Mills, and Engines” in England. In “[...] the 1700s, a hand-spinner in India took about 50,000 hours to process one hundred pounds of cotton. Crompton’s mule in England cut the time to 2,000 hours. By 1825, further developments had reduced the time to 135 hours” (Go, 2016: 136-137). In the South, however, “In 1840 the East India Company claimed in a petition to British Parliament that ‘this Company has in various ways, encouraged and assisted by our great manufacturing ingenuity and skill, succeeded in converting India from a manufacturing country into a country exporting raw produce’” (Habib, 2017: 12). Then again, Britain’s attempt to extract raw materials *from* and return processed materials *into* the Gold Coast left the latter with an underdeveloped industrial sector (Sakyi, 2010).

The colonizer's actions [a] tilted the North-South relations and developed the southward-and-northward attachments in that North-South relations and [b] translated these tilts and attachments into the re-reinforcement [or the "pattern of behavior"] needed to re-activate the North-South relations in light of the Theory of Comparative Advantage. Thus, under the RRP, Galtung (1976: 40), for example, observed that "[...] the essence of the 1975 Lome Convention is the continuation of internationalized capitalism, the continued flow of raw production factors in one direction and processed materials in the other." Thus, in IR, states do not only seek to 'develop' relations but also 'reinforce' [establish 'patterns of behavior'] them.

These theoretical arguments enhance our understanding on [1] the contending debates in IR literature and [2] the objectives of the current study. In other words, in this and many studies, scholars such as Tessman and Wolfe (2011), Geeraerts and Salman (2016), and Orlapu (2023) have sought to ground the assumptions of these theory [*strategic hedging*] and concept [*the CDM*] in empirical, historical, and contemporary analysis to boost their relevance, applicability, practicality, explanatory, and predictive power in IR. The argument of scholars such as, among others, Garlick and Havlova (2020), Yoder (2019), Bekoe (2012), Nwaubani (2001), and Noer (1984) shows that Ghana's and China's posture towards the US under the First Republic and current anarchic system, respectively, is pitched between conflict and cooperation. The thesis, thus, argues that if Ghana's posture [the hedging state] towards the US [the hedging target] is tilted towards either conflict or cooperation, it is termed as an *unstable hedging*. However, if Ghana's posture towards the US is pitched between conflict and cooperation, then, it is termed as a *stable hedging* under the Fourth Republic.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the methodology for this study. It discusses the various options selected, justifying each option at each stage. First, the chapter briefly examines the *Research Paradigm*, *Research Design* and, then, proceeds to deal with the *Qualitative Method*, *Sampling Design*, *Research Instrumentation*, and *Research Approach*. Second, it examines the *Data Management and Analysis*, *Ethical Principles of Research*, *Reliability and Validity*, and *Anticipated and Actual Limitations and Challenges*. Chronologically, these sub-themes have been dealt with in the up-coming pages.

4.1 Research Paradigm

4.1.0 Introduction

The research paradigm, according to Taylor and Medina (2011: 2), “[...] comprises a view of the nature of reality (i.e., ontology) – whether it is external or internal to the knower; a related view of the type of knowledge that can be generated and standards for justifying it (i.e., epistemology); and a disciplined approach to generating that knowledge (i.e., methodology).” Largely, Wildemuth (1993) observed, the positivist paradigm and interpretivist paradigm have dominated the terrain of research notwithstanding the various paradigms in academia. The positivist paradigm, the author further asserted, is linked to the quantitative method in the natural sciences, while the interpretivist paradigm is linked to the qualitative method in the social sciences.

The positivist paradigm: The advocates of the positivist paradigm include, inter alia, Wittgenstein, Auguste Comte, Bernstein Geertz, Giddens, and Francis Schrag. The positivist paradigm is the “[...] belief system that is based on a realist ontology and the epistemological belief that external realities can be known objectively” (Morçöl, 2001: 382). Indeed, it tends to emphasize the “[...] systematic, controlled, empirical, and critical investigation of natural phenomena guided by theory and hypotheses [...]” (Kerlinger, 1986: 10). To the advocates, the adoption of this rigorous scientific method does not allow the biases, interests, and values of the researcher to taint data *gathering, management, and analysis* in research (Willis, 1995; Wildemuth, 1993; Morçöl, 2001; Taylor and Medina, 2011; Creswell, 2008; Schrag, 1992). However, the criticism includes, among others, [1] positivism tends to equate people to mechanistic systems and [b] it tends to reduce complex human interactions and dynamics to mere variables in research (Schrag, 1992).

The interpretivist paradigm: The advocates of the interpretivist paradigm include, inter alia, Frederick Erickson, Carruthers, Guba, Lincoln, and Cassam. Basically, the interpretivist paradigm, according to Carruthers (2009: 123), is “[...] one that accesses information about the subject’s current circumstances, or the subject’s current or recent behavior, as well as any other information about the subject’s current or recent mental life.” Indeed, “The quality standards that regulate interpretive knowledge construction are [...] distinctly different but ‘parallel to’ the validity, reliability and objectivity standards of positivism” (Taylor and Medina, 2011: 5). The interpretivist paradigm, however, refutes the positivist paradigm, claiming that the “same behavior” may have “different meanings” in “different cultural context” (Wilkinson, 2020;

Carruthers, 2009; Cassam, 2014; Erickson, 1986; Jones and Jenkins, 2008; Rorty, 1979). To the interpretivist paradigm, the researcher's subjectivity [culture, beliefs, assumptions, interests, values, etc.] help to enhance the quality of data *gathering, management, and analysis* in research (Taylor and Medina, 2011; Ellis and Bochner, 2000; Taylor and Settelmaier, 2003). However, the interpretivist paradigm, according to critics, tends to ignore (a) *rules* and *standards* in data *gathering, management, and analysis* and (b) the external conditions that tend to produce rules, beliefs, and actions (Fay, 1975; Howe, 1992).

The current study, which sought to understand the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations, is situated within the interpretivist paradigm. The interpretivist paradigm allowed the current study to place emphasis on how the *researcher* and *participant* interpret the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. In other words, this paradigm allowed the interviewer and interviewee's culture, beliefs, assumptions, interests, and values to improve the quality of data *gathering* and *analysis*. To Wildemuth (1993: 451), "[...] if the research question is concerned with the meaning or significance of a particular action within a particular context, then an interpretive study would be conducted."

4.2 The Research Design

Research design, according to Burnham et al (2004: 30), represents "the logical structure" of the entire study. Equally, research design means to create, contrive, devise, and execute a research project (Nelson, 2013). The various research designs include, among others, experimental designs, survey designs, cross-sectional designs, longitudinal designs, case study designs, and comparative designs (Burnham et al, 2004; O'Sullivan and Rassel, 1995; Cresswell, 1994). This study relied on the *case study design* and *survey design* to investigate the

dynamics in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. Here, the adoption of the case study design allowed the current study to launch an in-depth investigation into the dynamics of the US-Ghana relations. The case study design, for example, allowed the current study to explain the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions surrounding the US-Ghana relations. Teegavarapu, et al. (2008), for example, observed that the *case study design* allows the researcher to explain and analyze the ‘why’ and ‘how’ questions in details.

Besides, the *survey design* allowed the study to extrapolate the characteristics and attributes of the population using just the sample. In Cresswell’s (1994) view, the researcher can easily capitalize on it to extrapolate the attributes of a *population* using just a *sample*. Thus, Grunow (1995: 93) concluded, the *research design* is used “[...] for structuring components and procedures of empirical research in the context of research questions [...].” The adoption of the *case study design* and the *survey design*, thus, required us to adopt the qualitative method to examine our input factors [the nature of the international and domestic systems], output factors [strategic hedging and immune system] and outcome factors [‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’] under this study. Now, let us scrutinize the application of the qualitative method under the current study.

4.3 The Qualitative Method

In the social sciences, the three main methods of research are the qualitative method [QM], quantitative method [QM], and mixed-method [MM]. The current study, however, adopted the qualitative method to collect and analyze the primary data. The decision to use the qualitative method was justified on grounds that the focus of the study was to collect in-depth data under

the *case study design* and *survey design*. To Burnham et al. (2004: 31), for example, the qualitative method collects “information in depth” on few cases, while the quantitative method collects “limited information” on large cases. Similarly, Durant-Gonzalez (1986) corroborated, the qualitative method allows researchers to gain experience, collect, and analyze in-depth data. Then again, Toye et al (2016) observed that the qualitative method allows the researcher to study a phenomenon from different perspectives.

To Mead (2010: 453), the adoption of the scientific method results in the “[...] the narrowing of inquiry itself. Research questions are getting smaller, and data-gathering is contracting.” In view of this, Elster (2009) argued, it is important to employ the qualitative method to obtain substantive knowledge on the field. Consequently, the qualitative method helped to [a] provide logical explanation of events and [b] expand our understanding on the US-Ghana relations. The qualitative method, for example, allowed the student to “[...] move past simple average treatment effects”, as “qualitative data [...]” helped to “[...] describe important contemporaneous conditions of change” (Paluck, 2010: 59 & 62).

However, the study was not blind of some of its flaws: The qualitative method is unable to collect data on large cases (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006), and it hardly allows generalizations in research (Burnham et al, 2004). Finally, the qualitative method is highly subjective—i.e. it allows the researcher to feed his/her prejudices and biases into data gathering and analysis (Daniels, 1978; Keppie, 2006; Burnham et al., 2004).

4.4 Sources of Data

❖ Primary Data

Here, the study established contact with government officials in the designated institutions and some citizens in Accra and interviewed them. The institutions in question included the Ministry of Trade and Industry [MoTI]; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration [MFARI]; the US Embassy in Ghana [used website records]; the US White House [used its Briefing]; the New York Court, US [used its verdict]; the Embassy of China in Ghana [used website records]; the Parliament of Ghana; the American Chamber of Commerce [used website records], and Burma Camp. These institutions possess the requisite knowledge and information related to the US-Ghana relations. Thus, the contact was meant to gather data on the dynamics of the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. The study laid hands on *field materials* to buttress its *primary data*.

❖ Secondary Data

The study used the internet to download journals, magazines, and books to generate the secondary data. In addition, it consulted, among others, the Department of Political Science Library (UG), the Faculty of Law Library, the University of Ghana Balme Library, and the African Studies Library to gather the secondary data. Undoubtedly, these sources are the right repositories of academic materials.

4.5 The Sampling Design

The two main sampling designs are (a) the probability sampling design and (b) the non-probability sampling design (Burnham et al., 2004). The study relied on the non-probability sampling design—i.e. the judgment of the researcher—to collect and analyze the research data. The current study, which sought to investigate the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic, did not intend to use the sample statistics to predict the population characteristics. Here, “If accurate inferences are to be made of population characteristics on the basis of sample statistics, probability samples are preferred.” However, the non-probability sampling designs “[...] are [...] useful if it is not important to obtain accurate estimates of population characteristics” (O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1995: 116 & 126). Second, the current study foresaw the lack of a springboard on which to build probability sampling designs and make accurate prognosis. In other words, anticipated (a) lack of comprehensive government directorates and (b) high levels of non-response rate debarred the adoption of probability sampling design under this study.

The abovementioned pieces of evidence suggest that “Response rate also affects our choice of sample size. [...] if some units cannot be found or if [...] some refuse to respond, the sample’s accuracy will be affected in a way that cannot be accurately determined.” Therefore, “[...] factors such as the anticipated nonresponse rate need to be considered when determining sample size” (O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1995: 136). These evidences suggest that “sampling bias is still a significant problem” not only for the internet/mail/web surveys but also the face-to-face surveys and telephone surveys (Orr, 2005: 263; Rivera, et al., 2002; Clark, 2006; O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1995). Thus, Rivera et al. (2002: 683) concluded, “The selection of an appropriate sample

design is a key decision that affects the type of conclusions that one can draw later during data analysis.”

4.6 Sampling Technique

The purposive sampling technique and convenience sampling technique are among the main sampling techniques in research (Sudman, 2001). The study relied on the *purposive* sampling and *convenience* sampling techniques to launch key informant interviews across board. The purposive sampling technique allows the researcher to target the right institutions and individuals with the requisite knowledge and information related to the issues under study (O’Sullivan and Rassel, 1995). In Ghana, the institutions with the requisite knowledge and information related to the US-Ghana relations include, among others, MoTI, MFARI, the US Embassy in Ghana, the Embassy of China in Ghana, the Parliament of Ghana, and Burma Camp. Largely, O’Sullivan and Rassel (1995) observed, the purposive sampling depends on ‘expertise’ to target participants, while convenience sampling depends on ‘accessibility’ and ‘availability’ to target participants.

4.7 Sample Size

The student set out to interview an anticipated target of thirty-five [35] participants based on the amount of resources—money and time—at his disposal. However, the saturated/actual target was twenty-seven [27] participants: The answers were almost similar by the time he reached out to the 27th participant. Thus, under the *case study* and *survey designs*, the study granted interviews in the designated institutions and centers until it reached saturation. These included the individuals in the formal sector [e.g. the Parliament of Ghana, Tertiary Institutions, etc.] and

the informal sector [e.g. trotro drivers, market women, taxi drivers etc.]. The study engaged [a] Parliament [two participants], MFARI [two participants], Burma Camp [two participants], MoTI [one participant], the US Embassy, Ghana [one participant], [b] the Graduate Students' Association of Ghana [GRASAG], University of Ghana (Legon) [four IR students/participants], and [c] citizens in the Market Centers and Trotro/Taxi stations in Accra [fifteen participants]. In addition, the study relied on the documentary method to generate data—i.e. field materials and records of the ITC Trade Map, the World Bank [WB], the International Monetary Fund [IMF], the Ghana Investment Promotion Center [GIPC], the US Embassy [Ghana], the US White House, the New York Court [US], and the Chinese Embassy [Ghana]—to buttress the primary data. **Fig.2** provides us with a diagrammatical presentation of our *institutions and participants* in three [3] strata.

INSTITUTIONS AND PARTICIPANTS	NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN DESIGNATED INSTITUTIONS
<i>First Stratum: Government Institutions</i>	
1. The Parliament of Ghana	Two [2] participants
2. MFARI	Two [2] participants
3. MoTI	One [1] participant
4. Burma Camp.	Two [2] participants
5. The US Embassy, Ghana	One [1] participant

6. The US White House, the New York Court [US], the US Embassy [Ghana], the Chinese Embassy [Ghana], the ITC Trade Map, the World Bank [WB], the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the Ghana Investment Promotion Center [GIPC].	Relied on website records and verdicts
<i>Second Stratum: Semi-autonomous Institutions</i>	
1. GRASAG, University of Ghana, Legon [specifically, IR students/participants were selected from the Dept. of Political Science and Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)]	Four [4] participants
<i>Third Stratum: Ghanaian Citizens</i>	
1. Trotro/Taxi Stations and Market Centers [trotro and taxi drivers and market women]	Fifteen [15] participants
TOTAL	27 participants

Fig. 2: Diagrammatical representation of Institutions and participants

In **Fig.2**, the individuals in government institutions [*First stratum*] formulate, approve, disapprove, and implement the treaties, policies, programs, and verdicts that underpin the US-Ghana relations. Furthermore, the IR students [*Second stratum*] study and analyze the impacts of the treaties, policies, programs, and verdicts that underpin the US-Ghana relations. This, thus, suggests that these individuals possess the requisite knowledge and information related to the US-Ghana relations [*Here, the student relied on the purposive sampling to target participants in the first and second strata*]. Finally, the actions and inactions of governments in the US-Ghana

relations *affect* the actions and inactions of Trotro/Taxi drivers and market women [*Third stratum*], while the actions and inactions of these individuals *affect* the actions and inactions of governments in the US-Ghana relations [*Here, the student relied on the convenience sampling to target participants in the third stratum*].

The views of participants in the *third stratum* were solicited to determine how they felt upon hearing that the US has 1) brought two Guantanamo Bay ‘terrorists’ into Ghana [2016] and 2) proposed to build a military base in Ghana [2018]. To ascertain whether these citizens understand the US-Ghana relations, the student asked, “Do you know that Ghana has relations with the US?” In response, most of them said, “Yes, even beyond that we have relations with China.” Then again, he asked, “Do you remember that the US brought two Guantanamo Bay ‘terrorists’ into Ghana in 2016?” And, “When you heard it, how did you feel?” Some of them responded, “Yes, yes, yes, I remember clearly. I felt very bad. Mahama, how can you bring them to jeopardize our peace? We went on demonstration to ask Mahama to return them.” The study, thus, analyzed these views to ascertain how *public opinion* acts as a *restraining* force in the US-Ghana relations under Objective Four only.

❖ **The Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria**

The current study’s *participant* attained twenty-five [25] years old and directly or indirectly participated in the demonstrations against the US-Ghana relations under the GITMO 2 [2016] and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) [2018]. The *participant* who is twenty-five [25] years old **today** [the period of the current study] must have attained eighteen [18] as at 2016 [the era of the GITMO-demonstration]. Therefore, under this study, the inclusion criteria refers to the

participant's characteristics, including, among others, being more than 25 years old, participating directly or indirectly in the demonstrations against the US-Ghana relations under the GITMO 2 [2016] and SOFA [2018], and having a fair idea about the US-Ghana relations, while the exclusion criteria include, among others, being less than 25 years old, de-participating directly or indirectly in the demonstrations against the US-Ghana relations under the GITMO 2 [2016] and SOFA [2018], and lacking a fair idea about the US-Ghana relations. This inclusion and exclusion criteria helped to obtain *biased free* results.

4.8 Research Instrumentation

❖ The Interview methods

This sub-section scrutinizes the research environment and the appropriate interview method [s] needed to succeed in that environment. The study adopted both the structured interview and unstructured interview to engage its participants. The unstructured interview not only promoted a free flow discussion but also provided the participants with the latitude to express themselves well. This allowed the study's questions to *develop* and *refine*, thereby unraveling sensitive issues during the data gathering exercise. The unstructured interview, thus, allowed the researcher to [a] develop *new* themes and [b] obtain an *in-depth* understanding on the dynamics of the US-Ghana relations from the perspectives of the participants. To Wu (1967), for example, the structured interview produces same responses, whereas the unstructured interview produces varied responses.

Research institutions and scholars usually rely on the face-to-face, internet, telephone, and mail interviews to launch surveys and polls (Fricker et al, 2005; Berrens, 2003). The face-to-face interview emerged as the most “dominant and accepted” method until the 1970s (Leeuw, 1993). In the US, for example, research institutions and scholars have largely been relying on the face-to-face interview—“the gold standard”—to carry out surveys and polls since the 1940s (Yeager, 2011: 710). The emergence and popularity of telephone surveys, however, dates back to the 1970s (Yeager, 2011) following the invention of the telephone in the late-1840s (Groves, 1990). In Groves’ (1990) view, the emergence of the phone expanded the “social group” and facilitated communication among it. Though the phone was initially restricted to the rich, “public pay telephones” made it possible for the poor to use it. Furthermore, most countries succeeded in achieving a high coverage following the adoption of telecommunication policies in those countries (Groves, 1990). Brick et al (1995), for example, reported that almost 94% of citizens live in households with phones in the US. In Ghana, Hatt et al. (2017: 19) recently reported that “Over the 25 years since the original GSM launches, mobile operators have connected 19 million unique mobile subscribers, equivalent to a population penetration of 67%. This means Ghana strongly outperforms relative to Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (44%) and is more on a par with several European countries.”

However, the nation [Ghana] has been unable to achieve a high internet coverage or internet usage (“5.3 users per 100 inhabitants”) over the past decades (Fosu, 2011). Notwithstanding, Orr (2005: 263) observed, “While sampling bias is still a significant problem for general population web surveys, these concerns do not apply to all research populations. For populations that are highly connected to the Internet such as interest groups, government agency

staff members, university students, faculty, teenagers, activist organizations, and elected officials, web surveys can be an efficient way to collect information.” Thus, the current study reached out to the elites using the face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, and internet interviews [e.g. workers in government ministries and agencies, elected politicians and appointed officials, university students] and the non-elites using the face-to-face interviews and telephone interviews [e.g. trotro and taxi drivers].

❖ **The Interview Discussion Guide (IDG)**

First, under the current study, the major **input factors** are the ‘nature of the international system’ and ‘nature of the domestic system’, the major **output factors** are ‘hedging’ and ‘immune system’, and the major **outcome factors** are the ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’. To O’Sullivan and Rassel (1995: 185), developing a questionnaire “involves: deciding what variables to measure; writing questions that accurately and adequately measure the variables [...]” Second, the current study developed the questions—on the IDG—under major- and sub-themes after a thorough literature review. The literature review, for example, led to the *identification* and *refinement* of the input and output factors. The IDG enabled the study to dive deep into the US-Ghana relations to explain, inter alia, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions surrounding those relations. The current study, thus, attempted to feed it with *more* open-ended and *less* closed-ended questions in *alternating* style.

This suggests that the IDG, which was administered to all participants across board, generated in-depth data under the current study. To achieve this, the study not only developed different type of questions [e.g. factual questions, behavior questions, opinion questions, knowledge

questions etc.] but also expressed them in very simple language. O’Sullivan and Rassel (1995: 187), for example, remarked that the ““investigators who know question type [...] avoid collecting the “wrong” data”” in research. Besides, Burnham et al. (2004: 95) advised that the questions “must be self-explanatory and concise so that they are easy to understand.” Thus, Hubbell (1994: 63) concluded, the IDG is “at the heart of the empirical method”, and one must “devote considerable care in developing” it ““in order to get “good” data.””

➤ **Research Approach**

❖ **The Response Rate**

The response rate, Kennedy et al (2008: 28) asserted, “[...] is simply the ratio of completed interviews to the total number of eligible households where contact was attempted”. Similarly, the response rate, according to Allison and Yoshida (1989: 68), is “[...] the number of completed interviews divided by the number of eligible numbers in the sample”. The available evidence showed that a high response rate is often pitched between 70% and 80% across board (Biemer and Peytchev, 2012; Allison and Yoshida, 1989).

❖ **How to Increase the Response Rate**

First, the study employed and deployed the dual-frame designs to increase its response rate during the field exercise. The interviewer, for example, **converted** refusals and **substituted** participants to boost the response rate during the interviews. Under substitution, a non-sampled unit was made to replace a sampled unit, while under conversion, a second/third interview method [e.g. the telephone interviews, internet/mail interviews] was employed to interview a

sampled-unit who could not be reached on the first interview method [e.g. the face-to-face interviews]. Second, the study pre-informed the sampled group—through advance letters and telephone calls—to increase the response rate. Third, the researcher adopted ‘persuasions’ to increase the response rates during the interviews. Finally, the student sent messages to remind participants and, then, made follow-up calls to boost the response rate.

4.9 Data Management and Analysis

❖ Data Management: the Strategy to Store, Transcribe, and Code Data

The techniques in research refer to the strategies the researcher adopts to collect and analyze the primary and secondary data. Burgess (1931), for example, pointed to: (a) data-gathering techniques and (b) data-handling techniques. To Burgess (1931), data-gathering techniques refer to questionnaire, experimentation, observation, documentation, and consensus, while data-handling techniques refer to description, comparison, synthesis, and analysis. Thus, under the data-gathering techniques, the student remained attentive, listened, took notes of the salient points, and recorded [with permission] during the interviews. Then again, the student attempted to download materials and store information on his computer. Folders contained downloadable information, while field notebooks contained written information.

The data-handling techniques required the student to (a) transcribe the audio-information into the field notebooks and (b) code the open-ended questions—this is the qualitative coding that required the study to search for the various themes and identify the relations between them. Here, the student adopted open coding and selective coding to develop the themes. First, the open coding allowed the student to develop all the themes required to analyze the data under

Findings and Discussions [Chapter Five]. Second, the selective coding allowed the study to target the major theme: Most participants, for example, were talking about the ‘impacts’ of the US-Ghana relations during the interview exercise. This led the researcher to selectively take it out and redevelop it into, inter alia, ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, ‘backlash effects’, and ‘immune system’, resulting in the development of the CDM under Theoretical Framework [Chapter Three].

The recurrent themes, which formed the basis of analysis, emerged after comparing the answers in the documentary and interview data. To achieve this, the data-handling techniques were carried out under three [3] major themes: the input factors, the output factors, and the outcome factors. First, the input factors are: [1] the nature of the international system and [2] the nature of the domestic system. Now, the indicators that were used to measure the nature of the international system [the first input factor] included, among others, (a) the US-China hegemonic struggles, (b) the West African Extremist-Western Powers struggles, and (c) the kind of agreements between the US and Ghana. The indicators that were used to measure the nature of the domestic system [the second input factor] included, among others, (a) Political—democracy, elections, public opinion, and public demonstrations; (b) Economic—GDP performance, government debts, debt-to-GDP ratio, and gold reserves; (c) Socio-cultural—culture in general and bills on LGBTQ+; (d) Religion—affiliation and attachment [obedience to God and state and belief in God], and (e) colonialism.

Second, the output factors are: [1] hedging and [2] immune system (IS): The indicators for hedging included, inter alia, (a) ‘cooperation and conflict’, (b) ‘limited balancing’, (c) ‘limited bandwagoning’, (d) ‘balanced neutrality’, (e) ‘binding engagement’, (f) ‘political and economic engagement’, and (g) ‘the co-ordination of steps at the highest level of government’, while the indicators for the IS included, inter alia, (a) ‘moral defenses’, (b) ‘economy’, (c) ‘monitoring and evaluation system’, and (d) ‘infrastructure’. The outcome factors are: [1] ‘successes’, [2] ‘side effects’, and [3] ‘backlash effects’. Now, the indicators that measured the ‘successes’ included, among others, (a) economic growth, (b) enhanced sovereignty, (c) enhanced health system, and (d) a strong military. The indicators that measured the ‘side effects’ included, among others, (a) public fear and panic, (b) public strikes and demonstrations, and (c) negative impacts on the health sector.

Finally, the indicators that measured the ‘backlash effects’ included, among others, (a) weak sovereignty, (b) colonialism, and (c) jihadist incursions. Here, O’Sullivan and Rassel (1995: 173), for example, advised the student to scrutinize “each question separately” and condense the “[...] information. He should also consider the context within which comments were made and what triggered the comments.” Even though, Burnham et al. (2004: 41) observed, coding open-ended questions “[...] can be a laborious and difficult process, [...] it is also interesting and stimulating [...]. It also enables the researcher to get a better understanding of how the participants actually feel about the issues being investigated.” The following diagram elucidates the nexus between our *input*, *output*, and *outcome* factors.

FIG.3: The Diagrammatical Relationship between the Input Factors, Output Factors and Outcome Factors




Fig. 3: Strategic Hedging Model: developed by the author

In **Fig.3**, the first factor represents the input factor, the second factor represents the output factor, and the third factor represents the outcome factor. The study sought to scrutinize how the **output factors** [hedging and IS] allow the small power [Ghana] to manage the **input factors** [e.g. the US-China hegemonic struggles and US 'threats'] to produce the **outcome factors**

['successes', 'side effects', and 'backlash effects']. Then again, it sought to measure the extent to which democracy [e.g. the freedom to vote and protest], culture [e.g. LGBTQ+], and religion [e.g. submission] move the public to either protest or approve the decision as to whether to hedge in IR. Here, the study upholds that a robust economic growth—*high GDP performance, low government debts, sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio, adequate gold reserves etc.* (Tessman and Wolfe, 2011; Geeraerts and Salman, 2016; Chen and Feffer, 2009;)—in turn, boosts Ghana's ability to effectively hedge—*i.e. build a robust bargaining power and military might/assertiveness* (Ye, 2020; Layne, 2012; Chen and Feffer, 2009; Pant and Joshi, 2015)—and, thus, counter, among others, US dominations/exploitations and the threats of US hegemonic declines and vice versa.

➤ **Data Analysis**

❖ **The Analysis under the Qualitative Data**

O'Sullivan and Rassel (1995: 173 & 175) advised the analyst to “[...] focus on trends and patterns [...] and tries to interpret [...]” the data. The point is that “In the qualitative tradition, one often focuses primarily on the impact of combinations of variables and only occasionally focuses on the effects of individual variables. [...] this can be seen with the assumption that individual events do not have a cause; rather one must include a variety of [...] relevant factors [...]” (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 234). In sum, the major aim was to achieve reliability: “Reliability refers to the extent to which studies can be replicated” (LeCompte and Goetz, 1982: 35). The analysis stage, thus, allows the “[...] reader to follow the analytical procedures and present sufficient evidence to show that the conclusions are strongly supported” (Burnham et al., 2004: 42). Similarly, O'Sullivan and Rassel (1995: 173) observed, “The analysis must be systematic and verifiable. Systematic analysis follows a prescribed sequential process. The

analysis is verifiable if another researcher can use the same process, information, and documents to reach a similar conclusion.”

The study critically scrutinized the relationship between the **input factors** [e.g. the nature of the international system], **output factors** [e.g. hedging], and **outcome factors** [e.g. the ‘backlash effects’] under this sub-section. First, the researcher brainstormed and developed an outline for the analysis stage. Second, the researcher drew on the recurrent themes in the interviews, field documents, and literature to analyze the data. Third, the analysis was not only explicit but hammered on [1] strong and weak points and [2] effects and impacts. Finally, the researcher adopted [a] ‘The participants unanimously agreed that [...]’, ‘In the participants’ view [...]’ and [b] ‘tables’, ‘quotations’, ‘examples’, ‘triangulations’, ‘synthesis’, ‘corroborations’, ‘agreements’, and ‘disagreements’ to analyze the data.

4.9.0 The Ethical Principles of Research

First, the ethical principles required the student to, among others, forward the statement of the research problem and introductory letters to the designated institutions ahead of time. Second, these principles required the student to schedule appointments using official means such as the emails and phone calls. Third, the principles required the student to respect appointment times and remain composed during the interview exercise. Furthermore, the student stressed the *status and rights* of the participants: here, the student reminded participants that they have the right to either *agree* or *refuse* to answer questions. Then again, the student assured his participants that their views would be used for academic purposes only.

In addition, the student was required to carry out the interview exercise within his *Institutional Research Board guidelines and requirements*. Moreover, the student protected the participant's *confidentiality* and *anonymity*, and obtained his/her *consent* before recording and quoting their words directly. Then again, the student maintained a “professional distance” and listened to his/her participants: “To have objected to the interviewees' opinions would have risked the curtailment of the interview or the self-censorship of the interviewee” (Clark, 2006: 420). Last but not least, the ethical principles of research moved the student to present the research findings without falsification and fabrication: “Transparency is the cornerstone of social science” (Moravcsik, 2014: 48).

4.9.1 Reliability and Validity

Here, the student sought to “[...] look for information sources which are *credible, unbiased, and accurate*” (Haskins, 2006: 7). The student, for example, made sure that the IDG got to the **right** participants in the **designated** institutions. Then again, the student used institutional email addresses to [1] crosscheck and identify participants and [2] dealt with them using these official email addresses. The interview in the designated institutions was meant to gather biographical data on, among others, the ‘dynamics’, ‘successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ in the US-Ghana relations. Besides, the student laid hands on some documentary/field materials to buttress the primary data in these institutions. Finally, the student established contact with some *Ghanaian* citizens to solicit their views and opinions on the US-Ghana relations. Here, the interviews largely revolved around the demonstrations against the GITMO 2 and SOFA in 2016 and 2018, respectively.

In the case of the secondary data, the student used the **right** search engines [e.g. Google Scholar, Jstor.org, SAGE journals, etc.] to download and read academic materials. Furthermore, the student consulted, among others, the Department of Political Science Library [UG], the Faculty of Law Library [UG], the University of Ghana Balme Library, and the African Studies Library [UG] to gather the secondary data. In Haskins' (2006: 9) view, "[...] the more reliable the source [...], the more weight should be given to the evidence."

4.9.2 Limitations and Challenges


❖ The Problems with Prejudices and Biases, the Conceptualization of the Research Problem, and Theory Deployment

The researcher's prejudices and biases may intrude and invade the whole research design in most instances (Daniels, 1978). The researcher's biases, for example, may influence the sample selection and data analysis (Keppie, 2006; Burnham et al., 2004). Furthermore, many have been unable to delimit and outline the research problem clearly (Gunderson, 1967). Then again, most students find it difficult to explain how the theory may guide them in research designs. This often happens when the students import the theories from other disciplines (LaPorte, 2014). The abovementioned studies pushed the researcher to (a) review and update his statement of the research problem and (b) suppress his biases throughout the stages. Moravcsik (2014: 49), for example, stressed that "At most, the need for scholars to" promote transparency "will encourage and assist them to conduct less biased research".

❖ The Challenges Involved in Data Gathering and Analysis

Some government and academic institutions refused to respond to my [1] introduction letters and [2] follow-up visits. Besides, some participants in government ministries and agencies often thought that they do not have the requisite intelligence needed to respond to the researcher. To Pollock (1983), most citizens have lost trust in politics. Now, citizens do not respect political institutions and politicians (Abraham and Finifter, 1981), resulting in low support *for* and participation *in* politics (Craig, 1980).

Finally, the coding stage proved “[...] least attractive [...] : mind-numbing, repetitive work [...]” and “[...] onerous task [...]” (McBride, 1994: 556). Here, McBride (1994) (a) raised the student’s awareness about his flaws and weaknesses and (b) stressed the need to improve upon his skills to take on the research *ahead of time*. In other words, McBride (1994) helped to prepare the student to withstand the “[...] mind-numbing [...]” and “[...] onerous task [...]” under the data management and analysis stages.



CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter seeks to present and analyze the findings on the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. The chapter deals with four [4] major sub-headings, including [a] Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic, [b] Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana's Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China, [c] Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into 'Theoretical successes', 'Empirical Successes', 'Side effects', and 'Backlash effects' under the AGOA, and [d] The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations. Chronologically, the chapter proceeds to deal with these sub-headings as follows.

5.1 Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic

5.1.0 Introduction

This section presents the first objective of the study, which seeks to disentangle the dynamics of conflict-and-cooperation in the US-Ghana relations. The findings have been presented in this section under these sub-themes: [a] The Engagement-and-Cooperation [1998-2017]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic Relations, [b] The Confrontation-and-Conflict [2018-2022]: The Promotion and Protection of National Interests, [c] The Engagement-and-Cooperation [2020s and onward]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic

Relations, and [d] The Confrontation-and-Conflict [2019-2024]: The Promotion and Protection of National Values. The sub-section deals with these sub-headings in a chronological *order* as follows.

➤ **The Engagement-and-Cooperation [1998-2017]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic Relations**

❖ **The Drivers of the US-Ghana Relations**

The participants in the Government of Ghana, US Embassy, and GRASAG [UG] agreed that the *forces* in the domestic and international systems tend to drive the US-Ghana *engagement-and-cooperation*. The domestic forces in US, according to them, include the desire of the US to (a) promote *democracy* in Ghana and, thus, use it as a springboard to promote *democracy* as a universal value in West Africa, and (b) liberalize the Ghanaian market for its export products. Then again, according to GRASAG [UG] participants, the US wishes to (a) extract raw materials in Ghana [a labour intensive and raw material exporting country] to feed industries and firms in the US [a capital intensive and processed material exporting country] and (b) promote and protect US investments in Ghana [*NB: These points have been adequately dealt with under the third objective—pages 136-163*].

The international forces, according to participants in the Government of Ghana, that tend to drive US interest in Ghana include, among others, (a) the desire to undermine *communism* and promote *democracy* in Ghana in the ideological struggles between the West [the US and Europe] and East [China, Russia], (b) the need to procure oil for US overseas military operations in the US-China hegemonic struggles and the West African Jihadists-Western nations struggles, and (c) the desire to use Ghana as a strategic launchpad for US overseas

military operations in the US-China hegemonic struggles and the West African Jihadists-Western nations struggles [NB: *These points have been adequately addressed under the third objective—pages 136-163*]. To an MFARI participant, “the US uses Ghana to expand its hegemony.” Similarly, a participant in Parliament of Ghana corroborated, “Ghana is one of the critical areas where the Superpowers battle over hegemony.”

The domestic and international forces, according to participants in the Government of Ghana and GRASAG [UG], that tend to drive Ghana’s interest in the US include, among others, (a) the desire to use the US as a market for Ghana’s exports, (b) the need to promote and protect Ghana’s investments in the US, (c) the desire to import US [a capital intensive and a processed material exporting country] capital intensive products into Ghana [a labour intensive and raw material exporting country], and (d) the need to partner with the US to ward-off jihadist incursions within and outside its borders. For example, a participant in Parliament of Ghana remarked that “In the geopolitics of the world, the US remains a critical partner.” Another participant in Parliament of Ghana, for example, observed that “TIFA widens our trade with the US [because] the US is a superpower with the largest economy in the world” [NB: *These points have been adequately dealt with under the third objective—pages 136-163*].

❖ **A Plethora of Reciprocal Presidential Visitations**

The US-Ghana relations witnessed a peaceful and fruitful period in the late-1990s-2000 [the Clinton-Rawlings era], 2000-2008 [the Bush-Kufuor era], 2009-2017 [the Mills-Obama era], and 2017-2024 [the Akufo-Addo-Biden era]. For example, Ghana, for the fourth [4th] time, returned to multi-party democracy on 7th January, 1993 [the Fourth Republic]; on 23rd March, 1998, i.e. six (6) years into that Fourth Republic, the US President, Bill Clinton, visited Ghana.

On 24th February, 1999, i.e. one year after Bill Clinton's visit to Ghana, then Ghanaian President, Jerry John Rawlings, officially and reciprocally visited the US. Still, on 20th February, 2008, the US President, George W. Bush, visited the Osu Castle, Ghana. On 15th September, 2008, i.e. seven (7) months after George W. Bush's visit to Ghana, then Ghanaian President, John Agyekum Kufuor, officially and reciprocally visited the White House, the US. Then again, in 2009, President Barack Obama, the 44th President of the US, visited Ghana. In 2012, i.e. two (2) years after President Barack Obama came to Ghana, then Ghanaian President, John Evans Atta Mills, officially and reciprocally visited the US. However, a participant in Parliament of Ghana observed that:

The US President travels to Ghana for official purposes, while the Ghanaian President travels to the US, at times, for official purposes and, in other times, for pleasure—to, among others, visit families/relatives and enjoy holidays.

Furthermore, the study found that the 1998-2012 US-Ghana Presidential visits were accompanied with major policy initiatives. One MFARI participant, for example, recounted that the US and Ghana signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement [TIFA] and the Investment Incentive Agreement [IIA] on 26th February, 1999 in Washington DC [the US] following President Clinton's visit to Ghana on 23rd March, 1998 and President Rawlings' visit to the US on 24th February, 1999. Moreover, a MoTI participant continued, President Clinton signed the AGOA into force on 18th July 2000, and declared Ghana eligible on 2nd October, 2000. It is important to state that Ghana hosts the AGOA hub in the West African sub-region. Still, the two parties signed the Open Skies/Air Transport Agreement [OS/ATA] into force in 2000. Then again, President George W. Bush pronounced some major policy initiatives during his visit to Ghana [2008], stating that:

I do want to announce today that—I am announcing a new initiative dealing with disease [...] to target what they call neglected tropical diseases, such as hookworm or river blindness [...]. I want to also announce today that we're going to [...] help you on fighting malaria.” In response, the President of Ghana remarked that “I should thank the President for the initiative he's just announced of creating a fund to fight the neglected diseases on the continent” (The White House Briefing, 2008).

In addition, President Barack Obama’s visit [2009] was equally accompanied with major policy initiatives and slogans such as Power Africa [PA] and the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI). Here again, it is important to mention that YALI’s Regional Leadership Center is based in Ghana. Largely, these programs have been developed to [1] train young African public, civic, and business management leaders [YALI] and [2] boost power/electrification/energy [PA] in Africa. In addition, one MFARI participant opined, “The US and Ghana have signed mutual visa waiver agreements to boost ministerial and diplomatic relations between the two nations.” These mutual visa waiver agreements, an MFARI participant continued, allow the US and Ghanaian ministers and diplomats—the waiver diplomat passport holders—to crisscross the borders to transact government business in the US and Ghana. Now, it is important to state that it was President Nkrumah’s visits to the US under the First Republic that gave birth to a plethora of reciprocal presidential visits under the Fourth Republic. In her speech to the Parliament of Ghana on 31st July, 2019, then US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, put it as follows:

Today, on behalf of the Congress of the United States, I am deeply honored to address you and reaffirm that partnership. Today, we reaffirm the message of friendship delivered by then-Prime Minister Nkrumah to the US Congress six decades ago when he said, ‘The friendship, which today exists between the United States and Ghana will endure so long as our two countries exist’.

Thus, these Presidential visits, according to participants in the Government of Ghana, signified the “strength”, “seriousness”, and “quality” of the US-Ghana relations. One MFARI participant, for example, remarked: “In diplomacy, exchange of visits between countries shows the quality of the relationship, and visits at the Presidential level is a serious one.” These findings reinforce Shai et al’s (2017: 161) observation that the “[...] presidential visit symbolises the strong relations between the countries involved”.

➤ **The Confrontation-and-Conflict [2018-2022]: The Promotion and Protection of National Interests**

Here, the minor conflicts are those that begin with non-state organizations and metamorphose to involve the state in the long run. The major conflicts, however, are those that begin with and exist purely between state institutions. We begin with the minor conflict and, then, turn to the major conflicts.

• **Minor Conflict**

✓ ***UG-Chubb Conflict***

Originally, this minor conflict, according to one MFARI participant, began with some two major non-state organizations [the University of Ghana (UG), on the one hand, and CPA Ghana and ACE American Insurance Company (Chubb), on the other hand] and metamorphosed to involve the state [the Government of Ghana] along the line. A Memorandum and Order (2022) from the New York Court [US] corroborated that on 15th September, 2015, UG and CPA Ghana entered into a contract in which the former [UG] agreed to give out land and grant concessions to the latter [CPA Ghana] to “finance”, “construct”, and “operate” some infrastructure

facilities/projects on UG’s campus. Under the contract, the two parties agreed to allow Chubb issue a risk insurance policy to cover some:

losses, including any default by UG on an arbitration award” and appoint a non-party expert to determine the Termination Value as and when the “Agreement is terminated due to an event of default by UG [...]. In May, 2016, CPA notified UG that UG had not satisfied one of its obligations under the Agreement – namely, UG had not procured the requisite letter of credit for CPA. CPA subsequently issued a notice of default, which UG failed to cure. On May 1, 2018, CPA delivered to UG a notice of termination. [Then] [...] CPA assigned to Chubb all rights of recovery and interests in the Termination Value Award [\$165, 000, 000] (Memorandum and Order, 2022: 2-4).

Another MFARI participant reported that, as the disputes worsened, UG moved to involve the Government of Ghana [the mother institution], channeling its correspondence to Chubb [in the US] through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration [in Ghana] and Ghana’s Mission [in Washington DC, the US]. These participants, for example, revealed that the failure of UG to pay the Termination Value Award [\$165, 000, 000] moved Chubb to sue UG in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, with the aim to compelling UG pay the Termination Value Award [\$165, 000, 000]. However, in light of UG’s motion, the New York Court ruled that “For reasons explained herein, respondent’s [UG] motion to dismiss is granted” on 15th August, 2022 (Memorandum and Order, 2022: 1).

Following this *ruling*, UG issued a statement:

The University welcomes the decision of the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York. The University is now hopeful that the matters and proceedings which remain outstanding in relation to the “Africa Integras Project” can be resolved equitably and finally between all concerned parties. The parties are currently in negotiations aimed at achieving amicable settlement. The University is committed to ensuring that it obtains the best outcome that serves the public interest and the interest of the University (Registrar, 2022).

Here, an MFARI participant concluded that the dismissal of the case partly in response to [1] UG’s alternative—“the respondent [UG] seeks a stay of this matter pending the ongoing arbitration between UG and CPA in London”—and [2] the fact that UG is “[...] committed to ensuring that it obtains the best outcome [...]” mean that:

The UG-Chubb legal dispute has the potential to explode into US-Ghana legal dispute, especially, if Chubb moves to involve the US government in future.

Similarly, on 21st August 2024, the District of Columbia Court, US, ordered Ghana to pay a Termination Value Award of \$111 million to the Ghana Power Generation Company following the former’s termination of a power purchase agreement with the latter on 18th February, 2018. Speaking on this issue on TV3 evening news, the former Ghanaian Power Minister who superintended over that emergency power agreement, Dr. Kwamena Donkor, indicated that Ghana has unlawfully terminated it and, thus, advised that “[...] we must respect agreement. We must be careful when drawing up agreement.”

- **Major Conflicts**

- ✓ ***Ghana-Kosmos Conflict***

Here, some MFARI and MoTI participants observed, the power differential between the US and Ghana often (a) undermines the regulatory power of the small state [Ghana], which, in turn, allows the US investors and exporters to breach local laws and safety standards such as, inter alia, the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 [ACT 123], the Import and Export Act, 1995 [Act 503], the Labour Act, 2003 (ACT 651), and the Ghana Investment Promotion Center Act, Act, 2013 [ACT 865] with impunity, and (b) ushers *Ghana* and *US investors* into fierce conflicts in Ghana. A MoTI participant, for example, pointed to the Ghana-Kosmos conflict in which the

former [Ghana] accused the latter [Kosmos] of attempting to “[...] sell its 23.5% stake in the jubilee field [...] to Exxon” (Statesman, 2009) without its [Ghana] approval. Cook (2010: 22), for example, observes,

Perhaps the most notable controversy between the Ghanaian government and Kosmos was an effort by Kosmos to sell its stake in Ghana to Exxon Mobil for a reported \$4.2-\$4.3 billion. The deal, which Kosmos had contended was sealed under an “exclusive binding agreement” reportedly signed between Kosmos and Exxon Mobil in September 2009, expired in August 2010 following the GNPC’s refusal to recognize the sale agreement, which was necessary for the sale to go forward.

Then again, The Statesman (2009) continued,

But officials in Accra, the capital of Ghana [...] want to be done with Kosmos Energy, the tiny Dallas-based explorer that found the oil field in 2007. Kosmos has been trying to sell its 23.5% stake in the jubilee field [...] to Exxon [...]. However, Ghana’s oil minister and Thomas Manu, head of Ghana National Petroleum Corp., said they don’t consider Kosmos-Exxon deal done and that they have the right to cancel any contract. Mr. Manu contends that Kosmos is putting its interest in getting a good price over Ghana’s interests, [stating that] Kosmos has set dangerous precedents that, if allowed to go unrectified, will do continuing damage to Ghana.

The Ghana-Kosmos disagreement, according to a participant in Parliament of Ghana, was “[...] rather unfortunate as it almost jeopardized our relations with the US”. Thus, Cook (2010: 20) concluded that “Development of Jubilee has been controversial and has at times threatened to become an impediment in U.S.-Ghanaian relations, primarily in relation to the nature of Kosmos Energy’s entry into the Ghanaian oil sector, and in relation to efforts by the U.S.-owned firm to sell its stake in Jubilee.”

✓ *US-Ghana ‘Shithole Conflict’*

The US-Ghana “**shithole conflict**”, according to The Washington Post (2018), unfolded when President Donald Trump and US lawmakers met in the Oval Office to deliberate on how to protect US-based African, Haitian, and El Salvadorian immigrants on 11th January, 2018. During the meeting, President Donald Trump reportedly “grew frustrated” with the discussion, leading him to remark that “Why are we having all these people from shithole countries come here?” On 13th January, 2018, President Akufo-Addo responded via his Twitter account, stating that:

The language of @realDonaldTrump that the African continent, Haiti and El Salvador are “shithole countries” is extremely unfortunate. We are certainly not a “shithole country”. We will not accept such insults, even from a leader of a friendly country, no matter how powerful.

First, the question as to *whether* or *not* these **remarks** represented **conflict** divided the participants into two camps. The first camp, for example, argued that the Donald Trump-Akufo-Addo remarks did not represent **conflict** in the US-Ghana relations. An MFARI participant, for example, argued that:

It was a provocative statement which has the potential to trigger conflict. The Ghanaian President made his views known without triggering conflict. I do not see that as conflict, but a condition that triggers conflict. But our President condemned that statement.

The second camp, however, reasoned that the Donald Trump-Akufo-Addo **remarks** represented **conflict** in the US-Ghana relations. Second, the ‘responses’ to the question as to *whether* or *not* the Donald Trump-Akufo-Addo remarks worked to undermine Ghana’s prospects divided the participants in the Government of Ghana into two [2] major camps. The first camp, for example, argued that President Trump, unlike President Obama’s Power Africa and YALI initiatives, did

not pronounce and pursue any major policy initiatives towards Ghana. Consequently, the first camp concluded that the Donald Trump-Akufo-Addo remarks did not undermine the prospects of Ghana under the US-Ghana relations. The second camp, however, demurred, arguing that the Donald Trump-Akufo-Addo remarks worked to undermine the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. Here, one participant in Parliament of Ghana, for example, remarked that “The Donald-Trump-Akufo-Addo remarks slacked the US-Ghana relations under YALI and Power Africa initiatives.”

✓ *US-Ghana ‘Deportees Conflict’*

The US-Ghana “**deportees conflict**”, according to one MFARI participant, unfolded when the US sought to employ *force* and *pressure* to deport some alleged 7,000 Ghanaians in 2018. On 11th June, 2018 in Accra, then US Ambassador to Ghana, Mr. Robert Jackson, for example, remarked that:

First, we are talking about 7,000, not 60,000 Ghanaians who are in various stages of being deported from the United States and on that issue just as we have a responsibility to patrol our borders, countries around the world have a responsibility to issue travel documents to their citizens so that they can return to those countries (Jackson, 2018).

The *pressure* that the US unleashed on Ghana, a participant in Parliament of Ghana described, was “hot” and “extreme” given the power differential between the US and Ghana. Notwithstanding, the Government of Ghana, she asserted, “stood its grounds” against the US *pressure*. On 20th June, 2018, for example, the Public Affairs Section of the US Embassy in Ghana issued a statement in which it indicated that the Government of Ghana has refused to accept the 7, 000 deportees. On 22nd June, 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ghana, issued a rejoinder, stating that:

The Ministry wishes to place on record that it continues to engage its Missions in the United States of America on the matter and has already communicated their concerns to the US Embassy in Ghana about the need to do due diligence and establish the nationalities of the deportees before they are issued travel documents.

In addition, the rejoinder asserted:

[The] [...] Ghana Missions have the obligation to ensure that the right processes are followed [...]” and the “Ministry wishes to indicate its continued commitment to ensuring that the relevant measures are put in place to resolve [...] the issues [...] in a manner which will be mutually beneficial to both Ghana and the United States of America (MFARI Press Statement, 2018: 1).

On 31st January, 2019, the US announced its *sanctions*, stating, “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) today announced, in coordination with the Department of State, the implementation of visa sanctions on Ghana due to lack of cooperation in accepting their nationals ordered removed from the United States” (US DHS, 2019). One MFARI participant observed that the visa restrictions affected diplomatic, educational, and economic activities; the US either refused to issue visas or issued visas when the purpose-for-the-journey had elapsed. Even though the US may have managed to push China [a major power] to relinquish 18% of its importation of Iranian oil in response to its pressure (Katzman 2013; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Fite, 2012; Garlick and Havlova, 2020), in this standoff, however, the Government of Ghana [a small power], one participant in Parliament of Ghana indicated, succeeded in preventing the Government of the US [a hegemon] from deporting a significant number of ‘alleged’ Ghanaian immigrants, along with its security and economic implications, into Ghana. Besides, the participants in the Government of Ghana observed that President Trump’s ‘shithole’ remarks and hostile immigration policies towards Ghana produced some blowback

effects: they undermined US influence and promotes that of China in Ghana. Thus, a participant in Parliament of Ghana, concluded that:

Trump's actions might not be a true reflection of what our relationship with the USA represents.

➤ **The Engagement-and-Cooperation [2020s and onward]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic Relations**

❖ ***The Democrats' Initiatives***

The participants in the Government of Ghana observed that the US-Ghana relations re-witnessed a peaceful and fruitful period during the 2020s, as the period saw high level inter-state visits [the Joe Biden-Akufo-Addo era]. For example, one participant in Parliament of Ghana reported that it was the Democrats—Joe Biden, then Presidential candidate and Nancy Pelosi, then US House Speaker—who spearheaded the *US Ghana reconciliation process* following the Republicans' hostile immigration policy—led by then President Trump—towards Ghana. Specifically, this participant asserted, the Democrats launched the *US Ghana reconciliation process* following the Trump Administration's "implementation of visa sanctions" on Ghana on 31st January, 2019. A key MFARI participant corroborated that the 2019 Nancy Pelosi's state visit to Ghana, for example, was meant to (a) mend fences and ties with Ghana and (b) reaffirm the US-Ghana relations in the post-Trump era.

During the Speaker's address to Parliament of Ghana on 31st July, 2019, Nancy Pelosi did not hesitate to hit the nail directly on its head:

Today, on behalf of the Congress of the United States, I am deeply honored to address you and reaffirm that partnership. Today, we reaffirm the message of friendship delivered by then-Prime Minister Nkrumah to the US Congress six decades ago when he said, 'The friendship, which today exists between the United States and Ghana will endure so long as our two countries exists'.

That friendship endures because of the people. We are blessed in America with over 200, 000 Ghanaians who are just a vitality to our country. It endures because of the security cooperation we engage in to keep the world safe. It endures because of our history (Pelosi, 2019).

❖ ***The Events in the Post-Pelosi's Visit***

Some two major events, according to a key MFARI participant, followed Nancy Pelosi's state visit to Ghana: (a) Joe Biden defeated President Trump in the 2020 elections, resulting in the 20th January, 2021 inauguration of Joe Biden as the 46th President of the US, and (b) President Joe Biden did not waste time to launch his Build Back Better World [B3W] and Build Back Better [BBB] initiatives on 12th June, 2021 and 28th October, 2021, respectively. The latter [BBB] was designed to rebuild the US, while the former [B3W] was designed to rebuild the world. Here, a participant in Parliament of Ghana emphasized that President Joe Biden's policies, unlike that of President Donald Trump, not only emphasized 'America First' but also the 'world'. Scull and Healy (2022: 3), for example, reported that:

The B3W, CGI, and the Global Gateway all hold promise as potential vehicles [...]. The idea is to leverage public funds to co-shake risk and further mobilize trillions [...] for [...] infrastructure projects around the world [...]. Though not explicitly stated, these infrastructure initiatives were partially conceived as a geopolitical counter to China's influence via the Belt and Road Initiative [BRI]. China is ultimately expected to fund over \$1trillion in overseas development spending on its BRI through 2027, dwarfing existing commitments from G7 countries.

Thus, one may conclude that, in the case of the US-Ghana relations, Joe Biden's *victory, inauguration*, and his *B3W* gave him the leverage to take over the *US Ghana reconciliation process* while Nancy Pelosi returns to Congress.

❖ ***President Akufo-Addo Visits US Following B3W Initiative***

On 23rd September, 2021, i.e. three [3] months after Biden launched B3W, President Akufo-Addo officially visited the US White House, where he, according to a key MFARI participant who was part of the President’s official team, informed the Biden administration that the US has been unable to carry out any significant/major infrastructure project since the construction of the Akosombo Dam in the 1960s. Following President Akufo-Addo’s 23rd September, 2021 visit to the US, a participant in Parliament of Ghana continued, the Biden administration dispatched a seven (7) member delegation [led by Mr. Daleep Singh, the United States Deputy National Security Advisor] into Ghana on 4th November, 2021. The aim of the visit was simple: Mr. Daleep Singh’s team met with, inter alia, the Vice President of Ghana, Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia, and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Ken Ofori-Attah, to discuss how to assist Ghana under Biden’s B3W initiative. During the meeting, Mr. Daleep Singh, for example, indicated that:

Ghana is our first stop in Africa after COP26 to meet with partners about President Biden’s Build Back Better World initiative. We will work together to support high-quality, sustainable improvements to address the demand of countries with major infrastructure needs (US Embassy, 2021).

Consequently, a key MFARI participant concluded, the US: (a) tasked Ghana to identify three (3) “cosmic”, “large scale”, and “impactful” projects to be undertaken under Biden’s B3W initiative, and (b) the Vice President, in turn, tasked then Minister of Finance, Mr. Ken Ofori-Attah, to identify these major projects.

➤ **The Confrontation-and-Conflict [2019-2024]: The Promotion and Protection of National Values**

✓ *The LGBTQ+ Issues*

LGBTQ+ is one of US “foreign policy interests” which it seeks to “promote and protect” around the world. However, the US Department of State has often observed that LGBTQ+ persons have often been maltreated in Ghana under its Human Rights Reports in 2011 and 2012. President Mills [2011] and President Akufo-Addo’s remarks [2018] against the legalization of LGBTQ+ subverted US attempts to promote and protect LGBTQ+ persons in Ghana. Notwithstanding, an MFARI participant reported, the US, together with local- and foreign-based LGBTQ+ groups, continues to explore ways to promote LGBTQ+, ushering the US and Ghana into *months* and *years* of conflicts, especially, under the Akufo-Addo-Joe Biden era. The US Embassy [Ghana], for example, celebrates the annual LGBT Pride to promote and protect LGBTQ+ persons in Ghana. During the 2019 LGBT Pride celebration, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Mr. Christopher J. Lamora, remarked that:

[...] I’m honored by the presence of so many members of Ghana’s LGBT community. Because really, at its core, tonight is about celebrating you [...]. Your uniqueness, your awesomeness, and your pride! [...]. Every one of your situations is different, of course, but there’s at least one thing all of my Ghanaian LGBT brothers and sisters who are here tonight have in common. Each and every one of you is demonstrating — right at this moment, just by being here — courage and self-respect. And I admire and applaud you for it [...]. And at the same time you’re working so tirelessly to improve your own lives, you’re also laying the groundwork for a brighter future for the next generation of LGBT Ghanaians coming up behind you. They will be grateful to you for it (US Embassy, 2019).

Then again, the media reported that some LGBTQ+ Advocacy Resource Centre has been opened in Accra on 31st January, 2021. Furthermore, on 4th February, 2021, President Biden issued a memorandum to tie *US foreign assistance to LGBTQ+*, stating that:

The United States belongs at the forefront of this struggle — speaking out and standing strong for our most dearly held values [...]. Through this memorandum, I am directing all agencies engaged abroad to ensure that United States [...] foreign assistance promote and protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons. Specifically, I direct the following actions [...]. When foreign governments move to restrict the rights of LGBTQI+ persons or fail to enforce legal protections in place, thereby contributing to a climate of intolerance, agencies engaged abroad shall consider appropriate responses, including using the full range of diplomatic and assistance tools and, as appropriate, financial sanctions, visa restrictions, and other actions (The White House Briefing, 2021).

This memorandum, thus, ties the prospects and continuity of *future* and *existing* US assistance such as, among others, Power Africa, YALI, and B3W initiatives to the *willingness* to “[...] promote and protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons [...]” in Ghana. However, on 25th February, 2021, the Ghana police moved to shut the LGBTQ+ Advocacy Resource Centre [Accra] down on the orders of Ghana’s political and religious leaders. In response, then US Ambassador to Ghana, Stephanie S. Sullivan, during the 28th June, 2021 LGBT Pride celebration in Accra [Ghana], remarked that:

Akwaaba to our home and thank you so much for joining us here today to commemorate Pride Month. This year has been challenging for Ghana’s LGBTQI+ community. From the shuttering of the LGBTQI+ Advocacy Center in Accra, the arrests of 22 friends gathered in the Eastern Region, talk of an anti-LGBTQI+ bill, and most recently, the arrest and lengthy pre-bail detention of 21 human rights defenders in Ho, the community is facing increased anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric and actions [...]. During my tenure as US Ambassador to Ghana and especially this past

year, I've made it a priority to urge national leaders in Ghana to uphold constitutional human rights protections and to adhere to international human rights obligations and commitments for all individuals. This especially includes the people in this room (US Embassy, 2021).

This prompted one MFARI participant to conclude that “The US often takes our national values and national security issues for granted.”

✓ ***Ghana's Parliament moves to Pass Anti-LGBTQ+ Bill***

In August 2021, a Private Member [Honorable Samuel Nartey George] presented an anti-LGBTQ+ Bill before the Ghanaian Parliament to reverse the attempts of the US, together with local- and foreign-based LGBTQ+ groups, to “promote and protect” LGBTQ+ persons in Ghana. One participant in Parliament of Ghana remarked that “The destiny of this country [Ghana] is in the hands of Ghanaians. So, any attempt to superimpose LGBTQ+ on us undermines our sovereignty, culture, and traditions. We haven't gone there to condemn it in the US, but here we do condemn it.” The participants in MFARI and Parliament of Ghana substantiated this point, with the latter remarking that “We have a friendly relation with the US, but there are red lines. This nation [Ghana] cannot, and will not, legalize LGBTQ+ in Ghana.” The researchers, then, delivered the next question, “Did the US sanction Ghana because of the anti-LGBTQ+ Bill?” In response, one participant in the Government of Ghana said, “Not as I know”, while the other said, “Well, I heard that some MPs have been denied visas”. These responses, thus, suggest that the *'LGBTQ+ tensions'* have been well managed under the Joe Biden-Akufo-Addo regimes more than the *'immigration tensions'* under the Donald Trump-Akufo-Addo regimes. Most importantly, a key MFARI participant observed, the US is not likely to sanction Ghana as it still seeks to “promote and protect” LGBTQ+ persons in Ghana.

Indeed, on 27th March, 2023, US Vice President, Kamala Harris, visited Ghana as part of effort to reverse the passage of the Anti-LGBTQ+ Law: “I feel very strongly about the importance of supporting the freedom and supporting the fighting for equality among all people, and that all people be treated equally. I will also say that this is an issue that we consider, and I consider to be a human rights issue, and that will not change” (Harris, 2023). The Ghanaian Speaker of Parliament, Alban Bagbin, however, fired back on the 28th March, 2023: “As the [US] Vice President just did yesterday, this thing should not be tolerated. That is undemocratic. What is democracy? That someone should have to dictate to me what is good and what is bad? Unheard of, because we have decided to devalue ourselves and go begging? Come on, we have more than enough. God has created more than enough for every Person [...]. The Bill will be passed” (Bagbin, 2023). Even though Parliament eventually passed the Anti LGBTQ+ Bill as indicated by the Speaker, some participants, pastors, and citizens in Ghana believe that an “unseen hand” [referring to the US] has prevented the Ghanaian President, Akufo-Addo, from signing the Bill in Law.

5.2 Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana’s Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China

5.2.0 Introduction

This section presents the second objective of the study, which seeks to appraise the dynamics of Ghana’s ironclad principle of balanced neutrality towards the US and China under the Fourth Republic. This section, thus, presents the findings under the following sub-themes: [a] Ghana’s

Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Ideological Level, [b] Ghana's Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Economic Level, and [c] Ghana's Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Military [Security] Level. Chronologically, the sub-section deals with these sub-headings in the upcoming pages.

➤ **Ghana's Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Ideological Level**

The participants in the Government of Ghana reasoned that Ghana positions itself between Democracy [The West] and Socialism [The East]. In other words, Ghana tends to ideologically lean towards the West [Democracy] and East [Socialism] strategically. One participant in Parliament of Ghana, for example, put it as follows:

In our local settings, we say that when two elephants fight, the grass suffers. We don't want to be the grass. So, our position is neutral. We can't get involved. The two nations [US and China] have different orientations, [and] If you look at the democracy that we practice, this our Fourth Republic, is more of the American orientation. If you look at our background as a country, our socialist orientation, is more the China, the East. We have a blend [...] so we are not taking sides in this matter. When China comes here, we look at China and what they bring on the table. When we deal with the USA, we deal with them [...]. We are not going to take a position.

Then again, some participants in MFARI and MoTI corroborated this point, with the latter stating that:

Ghana's democracy reflects America and its socialist background reflects China.

In light of this, Ghana often draws on this ideological balanced neutrality to empirically milk the US and China in the areas of economy and security. The study found that some four [4] major factors prompted Ghana to adopt balanced neutrality towards the US and China: **First**, the participants in the Government of Ghana reported that the US economic declines and China's miraculous economic rise help to explain Ghana's **type B hedging** [*Type B hedging occurs when the ability of a declining hegemon to support the small and medium powers [e.g., aid/trade] weakens, pushing them to explore alternative sources of aid and trade (Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Kaul et al, 1999)*]. Large scale US aid to Ghana, according to President Akufo-Addo, has declined since the *US-Akosombo-Dam-loan* in 1961. **Second**, the uncertainties surrounding the current US-China hegemonic struggles under the Fourth Republic (Pant and Joshi, 2015; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Matsuda, 2012; Wallace, 2013). **Third**, the participants in the US Embassy and MoTI observed that the AGOA SPS measures often make it difficult for Ghana to penetrate the US market, making the AGOA's *SPS measures* good indicators for explaining Ghana's behavior under **type B hedging**. Under the AGOA, for example, the US wrote:

Therefore, sanitary or phytosanitary [SPS] measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements, and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures, quarantine treatments including relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary for their survival during transport; provisions of relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety. Unfortunately, governments often seek to disguise measures [...]. These measures create significant barriers to US agricultural exports, and USTR is committed to identifying and removing these barriers (USTR, n.d.).

Then again, the 2010 and 2017 AGOA Forums observed that:

[...] AGOA's chief shortcomings continues to be its underutilization. According to the Congressional Research Service, 81% of US imports from sub-Saharan Africa in 2007 were from three countries: Nigeria, Angola and South Africa. Many AGOA beneficiary countries exported less than \$1 million worth of goods each to the United States in that same year. For AGOA to more fully deliver on its promise of a robust and development-friendly trading relation between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa, the issues underlying this underutilization must be addressed (AGOA Forum, 2010: 2) [and] There is demand for various products in the US. However, AGOA countries cannot easily export into the US market under its stringent standards (AGOA Forum, 2017: 55).

Fourth, some participants in MFARI and MoTI observed that the US-Ghana skirmishes under President Trump pushed Ghana to explore *new* and strengthen *existing* alternative sources of trade, making the *US-Ghana struggles* under Trump a good indicator for explaining Ghana's behavior under **type B hedging**. However, a key participant in MFARI remarked:

The Ghanaian leaders know that they do not do anything to show [US] that they are shifting alliance to China, which is why they must tread a middle road.

The abovementioned forces pushed Ghana to draw on its principle of balanced neutrality to milk the US and China in *investment, trade, and security*.

➤ **Ghana's Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Economic Level**

❖ **Foreign Direct Investment [FDI]**

The current study draws on Frimpong and Nubuor (2013) to establish the year in which Ghana began to make a significant shift towards the adoption of balanced neutrality towards the US

and China in the area of foreign direct investment/infrastructure projects. These scholars, for example, observed that:

[...] the PRC [...] [built] [...] Ghana’s National Theatre [...]. According [to] statistics gathered from Ghana’s Ministry of Finance the \$7,114,897 interest free loan from the Bank of China was signed in 1985 [...] disbursement of the money was completed in 1990. What is rather obvious is that the project allowed Chinese construction companies to gain a footing in Ghana (Frimpong and Nubuor, 2013: 122).

The current study, thus, draws on Frimpong and Nubuor’s (2013) observation, “*What is rather obvious is that the project allowed Chinese construction companies to gain a footing in Ghana*”, to establish that Ghana began to make a **significant shift** towards the adoption of balanced neutrality towards the US and China in the area of foreign direct investment/infrastructural projects in mid-late-1980s. Some participants in MFARI and MoTI, for example, reported that President Akufo-Addo travelled to China to sign the “One Belt One Road Memorandum of Understanding” with President Xi Jinping on 1st September, 2018 and, then, switched to the US to *exploit* and *milk* President Biden’s B3W on 23rd September, 2021. The following diagram throws more light on these issues.

FIG.4: US and China’s FDI in Ghana [2013-2021]

YEAR	2013-2014		2015-2016		2017-2018		2020-2021	
	No. of projects	amount (US\$ M)	No. of projects	amount (US\$ M)	No. of projects	amount (US\$ M)	No. of projects	amount (US\$ M)
US	26	1217.01	13	23.28	8	21.78	16	41.83
CHINA	68	1774.92	60	328.88	105	498.73	51	776.67

Fig.4: Source: developed by author using GIPC data.

Fig.4 shows that the US and China have undertaken a roller coaster investment throughout the period under review [2013-2021]. The value of US FDI was US\$1217.01 in 2013-2014 but dropped to US\$23.28 in 2015-2016 and further dropped to US\$21.78 in 2017-2018 but rose up to US\$41.83 in 2020-2021. The value of China's FDI was US\$1774.92 in 2013-2014 and dropped to US\$328.88 in 2015-2016 but rose up to US\$498.73 in 2017-2018 and further rose up to US\$776.67 in 2020-2021. Clearly, in these roller coaster investments, the US has struggled to maintain large scale investments when compared with China's investments in 2013 up to 2021 [the period under review].

The table, for example, shows that the US spent US\$1, 217.01 working on 26 projects, while China spent US\$1, 774.92 working on 68 projects in 2013-2014. Still, the US spent US\$41.83 working on 16 projects, whereas China spent US\$776.67 working on 51 projects in 2020-2021. The table shows that the values of US FDI in Ghana fall below that of China, beginning in 2013 up to 2021. The US and China often direct FDIs into areas such as, inter alia, energy, water, agriculture, and roads. Thus, this study draws on the *primary data*, *secondary data*, and the *GIPC data* to uphold that the US hegemonic declines and the declines in large scale US aid to Ghana help to explain Ghana's *strategic* 'de-alignment' with the US and 're-alignment' with China in the area of FDI [or infrastructure projects].

❖ *Trade*

Here, a MoTI participant, for example, reported that Ghana signed unto AGOA to boost its trade relations with the US in 2000 and, then, switched to issue a joint Communique with China to boost its trade relations with China in 2007. Similarly, a participant in Parliament of Ghana

corroborated that “We began to trade with the US and moved to enhance our trade with China”. Here, let us invoke the records of the ITC Trade Map [Fig.5] to establish the year in which Ghana began to make a significant shift towards the adoption of balanced neutrality towards the US and China in the area of trade [see Fig.5].

Fig.5: Ghana’s Export to US and China (2003-2019)

Unit: US Dollar thousand

YEAR	US	CHINA
<i>Value in 2003</i>	67,691	32,281
<i>Value in 2004</i>	64,297	15,822
<i>Value in 2005</i>	83,487	41,720
<i>Value in 2006</i>	106,347	38,805
<i>Value in 2007</i>	83,937	32,695
<i>Value in 2008</i>	108,114	71,599
<i>Value in 2009</i>	100,811	46,019
<i>Value in 2010</i>	102,796	51,251
<i>Value in 2011</i>	444,851	257,853
<i>Value in 2012</i>	<u>296,700</u>	<u>626,810</u>
<i>Value in 2013</i>	326,172	457,594
<i>Value in 2014</i>	308,938	830,204
<i>Value in 2015</i>	317,720	1,112,868
<i>Value in 2016</i>	196,985	941,810
<i>Value in 2017</i>	407,970	2,381,361
<i>Value in 2018</i>	613,839	2,032,273
<i>Value in 2019</i>	704,282	2,808,597

Fig.5: Source: ITC: Trade Map

The ITC Trade Map data [Fig.5] shows that the values of Ghana’s export into the US in 2003 [67,691], 2004 [64,297], 2005 [83,487], 2006 [106,347], 2007 [83,937], 2008 [108,114], 2009

[100,811], 2010 [102,796], and in 2011 [444,851] topped the values of its exports into China in 2003 [32, 281], 2004 [15,822], 2005 [41,720], 2006 [38,805], 2007 [32,695], 2008 [71,599], 2009 [46,019], 2010 [51,251], and in 2011 [257,853].

However, some four (4) interesting events occurred in 2012: (a) Ghana moved to reduce the value of its export into the US from 444,851 in 2011 down to 296,700 in 2012 and, then, pushed the excess into China in that 2012. In 2012, Ghana's trade 'de-alignment' with the US and 're-alignment' with China, for example, increased its export into China from 257, 853 in 2011 up to 626, 810 in that 2012, the highest since 2003, [b] it is important to note that Ghana's **2012** export value into China [**626, 810**] was the first time its export value into China beat its export value into the US [**296, 700**] since 2003, (c) in 2012, Ghana not only moved to increase its trade values with China over its trade values with the US but sought to sustain the trade 'de-alignment' with the US and 're-alignment' with China up to 2019, and (d) the values of Ghana's exports into China changed *from thousands* [2003 up to 2016], apart from 2015, *into millions* [2017 up to 2019] [Trump's era], underscoring the *Trump effects* in Ghana's trade 'de-alignment' with the US and 're-alignment' with China [NB: *The data in ITC Trade Map ends at 2019, preventing a post-Trump assessment*].

Consequently, the current study draws on the *primary data, ITC trade records, US records*, and the *AGOA Forum records* to conclude that the US SPS measures and the US-Ghana skirmishes under President Trump help to explain Ghana's *strategic* 'de-alignment' with the US and 're-alignment' with China in the area of trade [NB: *the effects of US SPS measures have been amply dealt with under the third objective*].

➤ **Ghana's Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China at the Military [Security] Level**

To date, the US-Ghana *security* relations, according to MFARI and Burma Camp participants, is robust than the US-China *security* relations. The US, participants in MFARI and Burma camp reported, provided Ghana with Export Control and Related Border Security assistance, Antiterrorism Nonproliferation Demining and Related Programs, and some Foreign Military Financing. The nation, the participants continued, benefits under US Africa Command [AFRICOM] and hosts its activities within the sub-region. Furthermore, Ghana has regularly taken part in the Exercise Obangame Express [EOE]—*The “largest multinational maritime exercise in Western Africa”*—under AFRICOM. Then again, the nation has been receiving training under the US International Military Education and Training (IMET) program over the past years. Still, the US military Exercise Reception Facility, which is used as a launchpad for US-Ghana military activities in West Africa, is based in Ghana. Moreover, a participant in Parliament of Ghana remarked that:

In 2018, the US and Ghana went into the Status of forces Agreement [SOFA] with the aim to dealing with security issues confronting the two nations.

On 3rd-16th August, 2021, the US USS Hershel “Woody” Williams—the US warship for the US Africa Command area—visited the Tema Port as part of efforts to boost the US-Ghana maritime security relations. The US Crew and Ghana's Special Boat Squadron undertook joint exercises in the Gulf of Guinea, prompting Capt. Chad Graham to remark that:

It was great having our Ghanaian embarkees aboard to interact with the crew, and to participate in the maritime security capabilities exercise we conducted. In-person interactions like this go a long way toward solidifying national partnerships, and we look forward to building on our two navies' relationship in the future (US Embassy, 2021).

However, participants in MFARI and Burma Camp reported, the uncertainties surrounding the US-China hegemonic struggles, the declines in large scale US aid to Ghana, and the US-Ghana skirmishes under President Trump have pushed Ghana to re-think and re-explore alternative sources of security in recent times. Let us invoke the Chinese Embassy's records to establish the year in which Ghana began to make a significant shift towards the adoption of balanced neutrality towards the US and China in the area of security relations. In 2015, China provided Ghana with the "needed funds" to purchase some four (4) Z-9EH helicopters. During the commissioning on the 23rd September, 2015, Mr. Sun, then Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, remarked that the gesture truly represents:

[...] a landmark of China-Ghana cooperation on financing, arms trade, as well as energy [and] [...] the Chinese side always views China-Ghana bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, and is committed to conducting cooperation with Ghana [...] (Chinese Embassy, 2015).

The then President of Ghana, Mr. John D. Mahama, in turn, commended the Chinese government for:

[...] providing the needed funds to Ghana to purchase the helicopters via the China Development Bank (CDB) and regarded it as another example of Ghana-China friendship (Chinese Embassy, 2015).

The current study, thus, draws on Ambassador Sun's statement that the 2015 commissioning of the four (4) Z-9EH helicopters represents, "[...] a landmark of China-Ghana cooperation on financing, arms trade, as well as energy", to establish that Ghana began to make **a significant shift** towards the adoption of balanced neutrality towards the US and China in the area of security cooperations in **2015**. Furthermore, on 4th -8th June, 2018 [*for the first time*], the 28th


Escort Task Group of the Chinese PLA Navy visited Ghana, prompting then Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, Shi Ting Wang, to remark that:

This visit to Ghana is a journey of peace, friendship and cooperation. It will surely inject new vitality into the further development of the relations between the two countries and two Armed Forces [...]. China is willing to make joint efforts with Ghana to grasp the opportunity of this visit to further enhance relations between the two Armed forces and two countries and to jointly make greater contributions to safeguarding world peace and regional stability (Chinese Embassy, 2018).

In response, the Deputy Minister of Defense, Hon. Major D. Oduro, and the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt. General O. B. Akwa, welcomed the visit, indicating that:

[...] the visit demonstrates that the bilateral and military relations have entered a new development stage. Ghana expects to further deepen cooperation with China in various fields including the military field (Chinese Embassy, 2018).

Thus, the current study draws on the *primary data*, *American Embassy's records*, and *Chinese Embassy's records* to conclude that the uncertainties surrounding the US-China hegemonic struggles, the declines in large scale US aid to Ghana, and the US-Ghana skirmishes under President Trump help to explain Ghana's *strategic* 'de-alignment' with the US and 're-alignment' with China in the area of security relations.



5.3 Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ under the AGOA

5.3.0 Introduction

This section presents the third objective of the study, which seeks to disaggregate the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ under the AGOA. The sub-section argues that though the injection of the AGOA ‘antibodies’ revamps Ghana’s democracy, economy, health and sanitation, energy, and security [i.e. the successes], it produces “side effects” and “backlash effects” within these *specific* sectors, as well. This sub-section deals with these issues in the upcoming pages.

❖ The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s Democracy

✓ *Successes: The AGOA Supports Good Governance*

In the AGOA (2000) Section 127 (1)(C), the US developed and injected one of the strongest ‘antibodies’ with the aim to “supporting democratization” and “good governance” in Ghana. This ‘antibody’, according to participants in the Government of Ghana, was injected at a critical moment in the history of Ghana’s *democracy*. For example, (a) the ‘antibody’, a participant in MFARI observed, was injected after the military coup that rocked Ghana between the Third Republic [1979-1981] and Fourth Republic [1993 to date], and (b) it, the participant further observed, was injected at a time [2000] when the Fourth Republic [1993] was only seven/eight [8] years old. The US, then, adopted various ways to translate this ‘antibody’ into ‘empirical successes’ on the ground.

First, the participants in MFARI, US Embassy, and GRASAG [UG] agreed that the AGOA has contributed to strengthen democracy in Ghana. The US, for example, hooked the AGOA's "Eligibility Requirements" to:

The President is authorized to designate a sub-Saharan African country as [...] eligible [...] if it has established, or is making continual progress toward establishing—(A) market-based economy that protects private property rights [...] (B) the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due process, a fair trial, and equal protection under the law; (C)(i) the provision of national treatment and measures to create an environment conducive to domestic and foreign investment; (ii) the protection of intellectual property [AGOA, 2000: sec.104] [and] If the President determines that an eligible sub-Saharan African country is not making continual progress in meeting the requirements described [...] the President shall terminate the designation of the country [...] (AGOA, 2000: Sec. 104[b]).

These "Eligibility Requirements", according to the participants in the Government of Ghana, US Embassy, and GRASAG [UG], worked to sustain *Ghana* on the path of democracy since the inception of the AGOA in 2000.

Second, the AGOA created the Development Fund with the aim to sponsoring elections in Ghana (AGOA, 2000: Sec. 127[3][C]). The participant in the US Embassy, for example, observed that the US supported the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers [CODEO] to set up the Parallel Vote Tabulation [PVT] system to help tabulate the results along with the Electoral Commission [EC] in the 2008 and 2012 elections in Ghana. In addition, the US, a participant in MFARI corroborated, provided Ghana with over \$7 million to support the 2016 elections, injecting part of the said amount into: (a) providing technical assistance to the Electoral Commission [EC] and (b) the election-related activities of the Center for Democratic

Development [CDD] and CODEO. Then again, a participant in Parliament of Ghana, reported that the US, through USAID, supported CDD and CODEO to re-activate the PVT to re-tabulate the results along with the Electoral Commission [EC] in the 2020 elections. Furthermore, the US, according to one MFARI participant, trained and deployed 4000 election observers during the 2020 elections.

Third, two [2] participants in the Government of Ghana and one [1] in GRASAG [UG] observed that one of the reasons why the US Presidents often visit Ghana is to *encourage* Ghana on the “continual progress toward establishing” the rule of law and political pluralism in Ghana.

President Obama’s 2009 *visit and remarks* reinforced this point:

Well, part of it is lifting up successful models. And so, by travelling to Ghana, we hope to highlight the effective governance that they have in place (Obama, 2009: 28).

Finally, the US has worked—and continues to work—to train many *future* Ghanaian leaders under the YALI initiative. The US Embassy [Ghana], for example, reported that “Through the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and other exchange programs, thousands more talented Ghanaians have developed their leadership skills and gotten to know America.” The *fact* that Ghana was able to run five [5] peaceful elections attests to the success of the AGOA election-related supports.

✓ ***The AGOA ‘Backlashes’ Ghana’s Sovereignty***

Though the preceding discussions show that the AGOA promotes free and fair elections in Ghana [the “empirical success”], it subverts the power of the elected government to act in the

domestic and international systems [the “backlash effects”]. The AGOA requirement that Ghana must “[...] not engage in activities that undermine United States [...] foreign policy interests” (AGOA, 2000: Sec.104 [a][2]) works to superimpose US “decisions” and “values” on it in the domestic and international systems. *First*, in 2003, Thompson (2004), for example, reports, the US [under President Bush] forcefully moved Angola, Guinea, and Cameroon to support its invasion of Iraq in the UN Security Council. *Second*, in Ghana, the media reported that some LGBTQ+ Advocacy Resource Centre has been opened in Accra on 31st January, 2021. Then, on 4th February, 2021, President Biden issued a memorandum, warning that:

When foreign governments move to restrict the rights of LGBTQI+ persons or fail to enforce legal protections in place, thereby contributing to a climate of intolerance, agencies engaged abroad shall consider appropriate responses, including using the full range of diplomatic and assistance tools and, as appropriate, financial sanctions, visa restrictions, and other actions (The White House Briefing, 2021).

However, on 25th February, 2021, the Ghana police moved to shut the LGBTQ+ Advocacy Resource Centre [Accra] down on the orders of Ghana’s political and religious leaders. In response, in her speech during the LGBT Pride celebration in Accra on 28th June, 2021, then US Ambassador to Ghana, Stephanie S. Sullivan, remarked that:

This year has been challenging for Ghana’s LGBTQI+ community. From the shuttering of the LGBTQI+ Advocacy Center in Accra, the arrests of 22 friends gathered in the Eastern Region, talk of an anti-LGBTQI+ bill, and most recently, the arrest and lengthy pre-bail detention of 21 human rights defenders in Ho, the community is facing increased anti-LGBTQI+ rhetoric and actions [...]. During my tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Ghana and especially this past year, I’ve made it a priority to urge national leaders in Ghana to uphold constitutional human rights protections and to adhere to international human rights obligations and commitments for all individuals. This especially includes the people in this room (US Embassy, 2021).

However, in August 2021, a Private Member presented an anti-LGBTQ+ Bill before the Ghanaian Parliament to reverse the attempts of the US, together with local- and foreign-based LGBTQ+ groups, to “promote and protect” LGBTQ+ persons in Ghana. Thus Welsh (1882)

concluded that issues about how to safeguard the independence of other states do not emerge pivotal under the principles of free trade agreements.

❖ **The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s economy**

✓ *Successes: Reciprocal Access into Domestic Markets*

In 2000, the US declared Ghana eligible following “[...] making continual progress toward establishing [...] a market-based economy [...] the rule of law, political pluralism, and the right to due process [...]” (AGOA, 2000: sec.104 [a][1][A][B]), which, in turn, allows Ghana to ride on one of the strongest ‘antibodies’—[i.e. quota-free and duty-free access]—into the US market and vice versa (AGOA, 2000: Sec.104 [C]; Sec.111 [b][1] & Sec.112[a]).

✓ *US Exports into Ghana*

The participants observed that the flow of US capital intensive and high-tech products into Ghana is important in the sense that: (a) Ghana lacks the technological capability needed to produce these capital intensive and high-tech products and (b) it cannot do without these capital intensive and high-tech products. These products include, among others, excavation machines, computers, oil drilling equipment [hoisting systems, pumps, cranes etc.], turbine, vehicles, and aircrafts. The ‘turbine’, for example, allows Ghana to generate electricity to sustain “production” across its different sectors.

✓ *Ghana's Export into the US*

Similarly, the participants observed that the flow of Ghana's labour intensive and raw materials into the US is important in the sense that:

The US market is one of the largest markets with one of the world's largest GDPs (\$ 18,569.1 billion or ¼ of the world's GDP), it also has the highest GDP per capita among the major countries (\$ 57, 254) with a population of 325,025,585 in 2016. As a result, AGOA is a real opportunity for the African continent (AGOA Forum, 2017: 17).

Consequently, one participant in Parliament of Ghana concluded that the AGOA 'antibodies' allow the US to export capital intensive [or processed] materials into the Ghanaian market, while Ghana exports labour intensive [or raw] materials into the US market. Similarly, a participant in MoTI corroborated:

The differences in comparative advantage means that the US largely exports high-tech products into Ghana, while Ghana largely exports raw materials into the US.

The AGOA, according to the US participant, has adopted various measures to enable Ghana take advantage of the US market: First, the AGOA works to attract US FDI *into* and boost the capacity of local industries and firms *in* Ghana to enable it [Ghana] penetrate the US market. During the 2017 AGOA Forum, Mr. Peter Barlerin, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the State Department [Africa Bureau], for example, substantiated that:

The AGOA [...] eligibility criteria were introduced to encourage African countries to make progress in developing a stable and attractive environment for investment (AGOA Forum, 2017: 32).

In Ghana, most US investors have invested in, inter alia, the technological sector [Affiliated Computer Services], the cocoa processing sector [Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland], the oil and gas sectors [Hess, Kosmos Energy, Vanco and Anadarko], and the mining sector [Newmont

Mining]. In addition, some US companies that are equally active in Ghana include Coca-Cola, ExxonMobil, Cargill, and IBM. In 2015, the American Chamber of Commerce [Ghana], for example, reported that US FDI resulted in US\$ 800 million tax within the space of ten [10] years in Ghana. Besides, the US Embassy [Ghana] reported that:

American investment remains strong, evidenced by the 37 US companies that have made new investments in Ghana in the last five years. Even more exciting is the 79 new investments or trade deals that have been made over the past year, totaling \$800 million.

An MFARI participant, for example, reported that in June, 2022, Mr. Don Graves, [the Deputy Secretary of Commerce, US Department of Commerce], together with some US business-minded persons, travelled *into* and met with the business men and women *in* Ghana. This MFARI participant described the end result of this visit as a “positive one”: (a) the business-minded delegation injected “[...] lots of ideas [...]” into the private sector in Ghana and (b) some US companies such as Google, Trimble Inc., and Fox expressed the willingness and readiness to engage the private sector in Ghana. Here, one participant in Parliament of Ghana corroborated that:

Through the West Africa Trade and Investment Hub, USAID has forged ten [10] partnerships with Ghanaian businesses to catalyze over \$70 million of investments, export over \$200 million of goods, and create over 25, 000 jobs.

The attraction of US FDI into Ghana, according to the abovementioned participants, helps to [a] add value to Ghana’s raw agricultural and non-agricultural exports into the US market and [b] boost government revenue in Ghana.

In the case of Ghana’s private sector [e.g. the Association of Ghana Industries (AGI) and the Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE)—Blue Skies, Printex, Akosombo

Textiles and Tex Styles Ghana Limited, farmers etc.], the AGOA provides it with some three [3] inter-related ‘antibodies’ to build its *capacity* as a result of the lack of *resources, skills, global-gap certification, and logistics* in that sector. The participants in the Government of Ghana and US Embassy outlined the success of these ‘antibodies’ as follows: First, the AGOA provides the private sector with “technical assistance” to boost its international competitiveness (AGOA, 2000: sec. 113[c][1][A][B]). In 2004/2005, for example, the US, Fwatshak (2007/2008) reports, launched capacity building programs to (a) propel the production of some products [e.g. nuts, fruits, and cotton] and (b) boost skills on US SPS measures in most SSA states. The US often teams up with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation [OPIC], USAID, the United States African Development Foundation [USADF], US Trade and Development Agency, US Exim Bank, the Department of Agriculture, the Global Development Alliance (GDA), and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa [ECA] to build the capacity of the small and medium-sized enterprises [SMEs], the Small Holder Farmers [SHFs], and the Customs Division in Ghana. The 2021 AGOA Forum reported that the US government provides roughly \$450 million annually to support “trade capacity building activities” within sub-Saharan Africa (AGOA Forum, 2021: 4).

On 2nd May, 2018, for example, the ECA African Trade Policy Center, the Government of Ghana, and the African Union Commission organized a workshop—“AGOA Capacity Building and Skills Development Workshop”—to sharpen the skills and the expertise of the producers and the exporters under the AGOA in Accra, Ghana. Still, on 24th September, 2019, the Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry [GNCCI] and USAID organized a workshop—“Sensitization and Capacity Building Workshop”—to build the capacity of the producers and

exporters in Accra, Ghana. The US has equally instituted programs to build the capacity of the private sector during the annual AGOA Forums.

During these *workshops* and *forums*, the *relevant* experts helped to upgrade the skills of the producers and exporters on product development, technology, competitiveness, market intelligence [market requirements and standards] and market access. The US ICT experts, for example, helped to sharpen the skills of the producers, exporters, and the Customs Division on customs automation system, cutting-edge electronic payments system, and secure digital commerce system. Largely, these *capacity buildings programs* were designed to ensure that the *producers* and *exporters* meet the requisite standards governing designing and spinning of textile and apparel products, branding and packaging of textile and apparel products, harvesting and storage of plants and livestock, handling and feeding of livestock, and transportation of plants and livestock to avoid the refusal of products, monetary penalties, detention of products, seizure of products, and recall of products.

Second, under the AGOA's rules of origin, the *fabric* or *yarn* used to produce a garment must originate from "[...] either in the United States or one or more beneficiary sub-Saharan countries [...]" (AGOA, 2000: sec.112 [3]). However, the US implanted an 'antibody'—i.e. the Third-Country fabric provision/program—to allow "[...] lesser developed beneficiary sub-Saharan African countries [...]" to import and use *fabric* or *yarn* "[...] regardless of the country of origin of the fabric [...]" or yarn (AGOA, 2000: sec. 112 [b][3][B][i][ii]). One participant in MoTI remarked that:

In Ghana, the producers and exporters have been able to capitalize on the third-country fabric program to import Chad, Benin and Burkina Faso's fabric and yarn which enable them to add value to the export products into the US

Third, the AGOA provides local industries and firms with *financial* support (AGOA, 2000: sec.123 [b][4], [c][1][e]); sec.124 [a]). This ‘antibody’ allows the US to go beyond the “technical assistance” and the “third-country fabric provision/program” to inject physical cash into the private sector in Ghana. For example, Mother’s Shea Ltd—a shea butter producing enterprise in Ghana—was one of the beneficiaries in Ghana:

USADF awarded Mother’s Shea an expansion grant of \$250,000 in 2019 for a three-year project that is enabling the enterprise to purchase in bulk shea nuts so it can transform them into butter year-round to meet the demands of the Target launch and service more buyers. In addition to locking in good prices on nuts through the project, the year-round processing provides on-going employment for the 10,000 women who work with Mother’s Shea as nut pickers and processors. Year-round employment increases the women’s incomes, which are already twice the Ghanaian minimum wage (USADF, 2021).

Today, under the AGOA, the records, for example, show that the value of Ghana’s exports into the US was US\$325.3 million between 2001 and 2010 and US\$1,756 billion between 2011 and 2020. This, thus, suggests that the AGOA eligibility requirements allow Ghana to step on the shoulders of the US into the US market. Consequently, Edwards and Lawrence (2016: 350 & 357) captured the “stimulation” following the injection of the “antibodies” as follows: the “[...] preferences combined with the third-country fabric rule can have powerful financial effects [...]. This allows AGOA producers to offset cost disadvantages due to the lower productivity of their workers and greater distance from suppliers and markets and helps explain why the initial responses to AGOA [...] were so powerful”, which even allowed “[...] countries such as

Namibia, Malawi, and Botswana became clothing exporters for the first time after AGOA [...].” In Ghana, Debrah (2007: 1071), for example, observes, “The greatest success so far has been in textiles: several companies have already registered with the Ghana Free Zones Board and established garment-making factories to take advantage of the US government’s African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) [...].”

✓ *Side Effects in Negotiations*

The AGOA call on Ghana to, among others, establish “[...] a market-based economy that [...] minimizes government interference in the economy through measures such as price controls, subsidies [...]” [AGOA, 2000: Sec.104 (a)(1)(A)] and remove the “[...] barriers to United States trade and investment [...]” [AGOA, 2000: Sec.104 (a)(1)(C)] has produced serious “side effects” within Ghana’s business sector. One participant in Parliament of Ghana, for example, questioned:

How are we to define the barriers to investment? What is often termed as a barrier to investment, the local laws and safety standards, or what? How are we to differentiate between the barriers to investment and the local laws/Acts and safety standards? Who [the US and Ghana] even has the upper hand in the definition of these barriers?

Interestingly, a participant in Parliament of Ghana answered these questions in one simple sentence as follows: “The barriers to investment are those the US construes as barriers.” Here, some MFARI and MoTI participants stressed, the power differential [involves] in the determination of these matters often: (a) undermines the regulatory power of the small state [Ghana], which, in turn, allows the US investors and exporters to break the local laws and safety standards—the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 [ACT 123]; the Import and Export Act, 1995

[Act 503]; the Labour Act, 2003 (ACT 651) and the Ghana Investment Promotion Center Act, 2013 [ACT 865]—with impunity. These measures, Kebonang (2007) corroborated, tend to work against Ghana’s domestic policies, and subvert its ability to negotiate for *fair and better* terms of trade under the AGOA. The application of Sec.104 (a)(1)(A) and Sec.104 (a)(1)(C) in the US-Ghana relations, for example, subverts the latter’s interests, which, in turn, triggers conflict of interest within the US-Ghana relations (Grossman and Helpman, 1995; Baru, 1994). In 2009, The Statesman (2009), for example, hinted on the Ghana-Kosmos conflict in which the former [Ghana] accused the latter [Kosmos] of attempting to “[...] sell its 23.5% stake in the jubilee field [...] to Exxon” without its [Ghana] approval:

But officials in Accra, the capital of Ghana [...] want to be done with Kosmos Energy, the tiny Dallas-based explorer that found the oil field in 2007. Kosmos has been trying to sell its 23.5% stake in the jubilee field [...] to Exxon [...]. However, Ghana’s oil minister and Thomas Manu, head of Ghana National Petroleum Corp., said they don’t consider Kosmos-Exxon deal done and that they have the right to cancel any contract. Mr. Manu contends that Kosmos is putting its interest in getting a good price over Ghana’s interests”, stating that “Kosmos has set dangerous precedents that, if allowed to go unrectified, will do continuing damage to Ghana.”

✓ ***The AGOA ‘Backlashes’ Local Industries***

The participants in the Government of Ghana observed that the requirement to remove the “[...] barriers to United States trade and investment [...]” (AGO, 2000: SEC.104 [a][1][C]) produces serious ‘backlash effects’ within the nascent *industrial sector* in Ghana. The US participant observed that the importation of *US* capital intensive and high-tech products—computers, turbine, aircraft etc.—do not affect our local industries, as the local industries do not produce such high-tech products in Ghana. However, Free-trade agreements usher domestic industries into serious competitions with foreign industries, leading to their collapse and

resulting in joblessness and impoverishment (Smith, 1989). For example, the participants in MFARI and Parliament of Ghana observed that most of our local industries—such as the footwear and poultry industries, among others—have been struggling and some have collapsed with the influx of US products such as fruits and nuts, vegetables and fish, fats and oils, salt and meat, seafood and honey, dairy/milk products and eggs, melons and beverages, shampoos and soaps, animals and feathers, hides and skins, hair and leather, footwear and clothing, cotton and plastics, fabric and yarn, wool and carpets, plants and flowers, wood and furniture, textile and fabric products into Ghana.

Here, the damages that Sec.104 (a)(1)(A)] and Sec.104 (a)(1)(C) inflict on local industries/firms *far* outweigh the benefits that Sec.111 (b)(1), Sec.112 (a), Sec. 113 (c)(1)(A)(B), Sec. 112 (b)(3)(B)(i)(ii), Sec.123 (b)(4)(c)(1)(e)], and Sec.124 (a) offer them. A MoTI participant, for example, observed that the local products have been unable to compete with the foreign products over ‘perception’, ‘packaging’, ‘market share’, ‘quality’, ‘prices’, and ‘inventories’ within the domestic market in Ghana. Consequently, a participant in Parliament of Ghana lamented that:

We have allowed the US to move us to lose our negotiating power. So far, we have behaved as if these international agreements are better than what we have locally. So, at the least attempt, we are making concessions and once you make one concession, you keep making concessions. This is what they want, if you give it to them, you can't turn around and blame them. What is it about AGOA? There was a time that we had state factories producing footwear, shoes, etc. How did that happen that today we go into some trade agreement with the US and we had to lose our local factories?

Then again, a participant in MoTI lamented that the requirement to remove the “[...] barriers to United States trade and investment [...]” (AGOA, 2000: SEC.104 [a][1][C]) has the potential to subvert the “One District, One Factory [1D1F]” and the “Planting for Food and Jobs [PFJ]” initiatives under the current NPP government. This, thus, prompted Mastel (2004: 4) to remark that “[...] developing countries do not do well in direct negotiations with the larger United States because of the disparity in economic influencing—often giving up more than they are getting.” Thus, the participant in Parliament of Ghana concluded that:

We have everything to preserve and [we] should not allow little, little things to destroy them. It is time for us to sit down and re-evaluate everything that we have done and look at a more sustainable paradigm shift.

✓ *The AGOA ‘Backlashes’ Ghana’s Exports into the US Market*

Here, the participants in MFARI and MoTI observed that the AGOA requirement to remove the “[...] barriers to United States trade [...]” (AGOA, 2000: SEC.104 [a][1][C]) allows the US to flood the Ghanaian market with its export products, while the rules of origin “[...] documentation regarding the country of origin of the covered articles includes documentation such as production records, information relating to the place of production, the number and identification of the types of machinery used in production, the number of workers employed in production, and certification from both the manufacturer and the exporter” (AGOA, 2000: Sec.113 [a][2]) together with the SPS measures “[Therefore, sanitary or phytosanitary measures include all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, requirements, and procedures including, inter alia, end product criteria; processes and production methods; testing, inspection, certification and approval procedures, quarantine treatments including relevant requirements associated with the transport of animals or plants, or with the materials necessary

for their survival during transport; provisions of relevant statistical methods, sampling procedures and methods of risk assessment; and packaging and labeling requirements directly related to food safety” (USTR, n.d.)] prevent Ghana from flooding the US market with its export products in the US-Ghana relations.

Similarly, a participant in MoTI asserted that it is often difficult to satisfy the AGOA *rules of origin* and *SPS measures*, which is partly why Ghana has been unable to take advantage of the AGOA since its inception in 2000. The observations of the 2010 and 2017 AGOA Forums buttress the views of these participants:

[...] AGOA’s chief shortcomings continues to be its underutilization [...]. For AGOA to more fully deliver on its promise of a robust and development-friendly trading relation between the Unites States and sub-Saharan Africa, the issues underlying this underutilization must be addressed (AGOA Forum, 2010: 2) [and] There is demand for various products in the US However, AGOA countries cannot easily export into the US market under its stringent standards (AGOA Forum, 2017: 55).

A participant in MoTI, for example, observed that the local producers and exporters lack the requisite skills needed to harvest and store plants and livestock, handle and feed livestock, and transport plants and livestock to meet the US SPS measures in Ghana. Then again, the US participant observed that the ‘system’ that traces the origin of goods and awards certificates to the producers and exporters often malfunctions in Ghana. “Unfortunately”, the United States Trade Representative [USTR] observed:

[...] governments often seek to disguise measures [...]. These measures create significant barriers to US agricultural exports, and USTR is committed to identifying and removing these barriers (USTR, n.d.).

Thus, according to one MoTI participant, the USTR has often refused, superimposed monetary penalties, detained, seized, and recalled Ghana's export products at the US border. This, thus, suggests that the AGOA allows the US to either 'invade' or 'exploit' Ghana's economic resources under the rules of origin and SPS measures.

❖ **The 'Theoretical Successes', 'Empirical Successes', 'Side Effects', and 'Backlash Effects' in Ghana's Health**

✓ *Successes: The AGOA Revamps Health Services*

In the AGOA (2000) SEC.105 [d][e], SEC.121 [b][3], and SEC.127 [b][3][B], the US developed and injected a health-related 'antibody' with the aim to improving "health" (SEC.121 [b][3]) and "strengthening health care systems" (SEC.127 [b][3][B]) in Ghana. One participant in Parliament of Ghana observed that the health system in Ghana is marred with *challenges*, ranging from *low doctor-to-patient ratio* down to *logistics* and *financial* problems. Similarly, a MoTI participant remarked:

The outbreak of COVID-19 exposed the weaknesses within the health system in Ghana. The nation [Ghana] is still struggling to strengthen its health system.

Thus, the injection of this 'antibody', according to the abovementioned participants, helps to strengthen the health sector in Ghana. During his 2008 visit to Ghana, President George W. Bush, for example, pronounced that:

we [i.e., he and then President Kufor] talked about the Millennium Challenge Account [...]. I do want to announce today [...] a new initiative dealing with disease, and that is—our plan is to make it available—a total of \$350 million over 5 years—to target what they call neglected tropical diseases, such as hookworm or river blindness [...]. I want to also announce today

that we're going to devote nearly 17 [...] million dollars this year to help you on fighting malaria (Bush, 2008).

The US, according to an MFARI participant, provided Ghana with over \$30 million to deal with the COVID-19 virus. Moreover, he continued, the US provided Ghana with 9.5 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines by March, 2021. In addition, a participant in Parliament of Ghana reported, the US provided Ghana with as many as 1, 229, 620 doses of Moderna COVID-19 vaccines on 4th September, 2021. The abovementioned pieces of evidence, thus, suggest that it partly took the interventions of the US to reactivate the Ghanaian economy following the 2020 COVID-19 *lockdowns* and *quarantines* in Ghana.

✓ ***Side Effects: The AGOA Pollutes Environment and Unleashes Diseases***

The participants in the Government of Ghana agreed that the AGOA call on Ghana to remove the “[...] barriers to United States trade and investment [...]” [AGOA, 2000: Sec.104 (a)(1)(C)] has produced serious “side effects” within the *sanitation* and *health* sectors in Ghana. In other words, the AGOA clears waste products in the Global North and dumps them in the Global South when Sec.104 (a)(1)(C)] is invoked. The participants *in* MFARI and Parliament of Ghana, for example, observed that this is simply an attempt to clean *the US* up with waste products and make Ghana a *dirty* or *dumping ground* for those products. The influx of *US* used products such as, inter alia, computers, vehicles, aircraft, animal products, used clothing, used footwear, cotton, plastics, textile and fabric products, furniture and wood convert into millions of tons of waste products in Ghana. Consequently, one participant in Parliament of Ghana lamented that:

The District Assemblies, the Municipal Assemblies and the Metropolitan Assemblies have been unable to enforce the local laws and safety standards such as, inter alia, the Environmental Promotion Act, 1994 [ACT 490] and the Public Health Act, 2012 [ACT 851] against these products, which, in turn, work to subvert the current NPP government's attempt to make Accra the cleanest city in Africa.

Similarly, Grafe and Mauleon (2000: 64) bemoaned, “Up to now, the question of whether the traditional gains from free trade are sufficient to offset the loss of environmental quality has not been addressed in the literature on international economic integration.” *First*, these waste products, for example, clog gutters, which, in turn, trigger flooding and sanitation issues in cities during the rainy seasons. *Second*, in 2022, the Scientific Office of the Ghana Standard Authority [GSA] reported that second-hand products often result in health hazards such as *refrigerant effect/poisoning* in Ghana. *Third*, Sec.104 (a)(1)(C) subverts the NPP government's attempt to make Accra the cleanest city in Ghana. For example, the impacts of Sec.104 (a)(1)(C) in Rwanda moved it to superimpose a ban on US waste products, triggering the anger of the US to jettison it under the AGOA.

❖ **The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s Infrastructure**

✓ ***Successes: The AGOA Builds Roads and Provides Power***

In the AGOA (2000) SEC.123 [b][3], the US developed and injected one ‘antibody’ to help stamp out the infrastructure *deficits* in Ghana, stating that “One or more of the funds, with combined assets of up to \$500, 000, 000, should be used in support of infrastructure projects in countries of sub-Saharan Africa.” The participants in MFARI, US Embassy, GRASAG [UG], and MoTI observed that infrastructure projects such as water ports, the generation and

distribution of electricity, the construction and expansion of road networks, and airports help to boost the *competitiveness* of the SHFs and SMEs in regional and global markets. The US has the requisite repertoire [fund, technology, and skills] needed to deliver quality infrastructure projects *within* and *across* Ghana. Thus, the participants in the Government of Ghana and US Embassy outlined US contributions towards infrastructure projects in Ghana as follows: Most US companies have the requisite technology to use oil and gas to carry out off-grid generation and distribution *of* electricity *within* and *across* Ghana. Chevron, for example, has invested in the West Africa Gas Pipeline [WAGP] project with the aim to delivering *affordable* and *clean* energy in Ghana.

Furthermore, the US worked to improve electricity, roads, agriculture, education, and water under a five-year \$536 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact [2006-2012] under the ‘Power Africa’ [PA] initiative. Then again, the US worked to improve, inter alia, electricity, roads, agriculture, sanitation, water, and education under a five-year \$500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact [2016-2020]. Still, in 2021, the US pronounced that it will inject over \$45 million into, inter alia, the improvement of community water and sanitation in *Northern Ghana* over the next five [5] years. The N1 Highway in Accra, for example, was named after President George W. Bush [the “George Walker Bush Highway”] in recognition to the money he gave—[out of the Millennium Challenge Account]—for the construction of that Highway. The George Walker Bush Highway [N1 Highway] links the Port of Tema to many rural agricultural communities in Ghana. Then again, the US, through USAID, supported as many as hundred and sixty nine [169] communities to attain Open Defecation Free status in 2021. In addition, the US, through the MCC Ghana Power Compact, constructed four

[4] power substations—the Pokuase Bulk Supply Point [BSP](2021), the University of Ghana Medical Center Primary Substation, Legon (2022), the Ellen Moran Primary Substation, Kanda (2022), and the Kasoa BSP (2022)—in Ghana.

✓ *Side Effects within Energy Sector*

Still, the participants in the Government of Ghana—i.e. MFARI and MoTI—reasoned that the requirement to remove the “[...] barriers to United States trade [...]” (AGOA, 2000: SEC.104 [a][1][C]) tends to produce serious ‘side effects’ within the *energy* sector in Ghana. In 1994, the Parliament of Ghana passed a law to ban the importation of second-hand products such as, inter alia, freezers, computers, refrigerators, TV sets, heaters, fans, refrigerator freezers, electric irons, and microwaves into Ghana. To them, the nation, however, has been unable to implement this ‘law’ partly because of the requirement to remove the “[...] barriers to United States trade [...]” (AGOA, 2000: SEC.104 [a][1][C]) under the AGOA. The experts in the Scientific Office of the Ghana Standards Authority [GSA] and the Ghana Energy Commission [GEC] corroborated this point with the argument that these products tend to exert pressure on Ghana’s energy sector given the enormous amount of *power* they require to function. The Spokesperson for GEC, Mr. Victor Owusu, for example, lamented that:

The rate at which used gadgets are being imported, and their impact, is reaching crisis point. [Then again], The GEC estimates that a total ban on used refrigerator imports alone could yield an average energy saving of 550 kWh per refrigerator per year, and a monetary saving of over \$35 per refrigerator per year (IRIN, 2008).

❖ **The ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ in Ghana’s Security**

✓ *Successes: The AGOA Intercepts Terrorists and Pirates*

The US—in the AGOA (2000) SEC.121 [b][5]—developed and implanted an ‘antibody’ that allows Ghana to “[...] cooperate with the United States on terrorism and narcotics enforcement [...]” in the West African sub-region. The participants in the Government of Ghana reasoned that the injection of this ‘antibody’ is extremely important: First, most drug lords tend to use Ghana as a transit point to move illegal drugs [cannabis, cocaine, and heroin] into the markets in *North America and Europe*. Second, the *threat* of pirates and terrorism *looms and surrounds* Ghana in the North, South, East, and West of its borders. In fact, terrorist groups such as, inter alia, ISIS-West Africa [ISIS-WA], al-Mulathamun Battalion [AM], Ansar Al-Dine [AA], Boko Haram [BH], and Al-Qa’ida [AQ] continue to kill citizens in, inter alia, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo, and Nigeria. Third, Ghana’s borders largely remain porous, making the *threat* of pirates and terrorism very *credible*. Fourth, the Drug Law Enforcement Unit [DLEU] under the Ghana Police Service (GPS), the Customs Division, and the Narcotics Control Commission [NACOC] lack the requisite repertoire [fund, skills, and logistics] needed to deal with pirates, drug traffickers, and terrorists in Ghana. Consequently, some participants in MFARI and Parliament of Ghana unanimously delineated and outlined the successes of this ‘antibody’ as *follows*:

In 2012, the US established the International Law Enforcement Academies’ [ILEAs] Regional Training Center in Accra, Ghana. The ILEA allows the US to train the Ghana Drug Law Enforcement Unit [DLEU], the Customs Division, and NACOC in, inter alia, cyber-crimes and

drug trafficking investigations. This training, for example, allows NACOC to deploy narcotics detection dogs at the Kotoka International Airport [KIA] in Accra. Also, the US provided KIA with aviation screening equipment to boost security in that airport. Still, the US worked to expand the DLEU—in terms of offices and personnel—and provided it with vehicles, as well. These measures produced some successes: NACOC, for example, reported that drug trafficking had markedly reduced by 2016.

Furthermore, the US and Ghana's militaries have been working together to tackle maritime insecurity [pirates] and terrorism in Ghana. The MFARI participant, for example, reported that the US provides Ghana's navy with naval ships, patrol boats, traffic devices, and shares intelligence with it to intercept pirates and, thus, guarantee the safe passage of our oil tankers and container ships in the Gulf of Guinea. Besides, a participant in Parliament of Ghana further observed, the US and Ghana's militaries have been working together to tackle terrorism in Tamali, Northern Ghana. First, it is the US soldiers, the abovementioned participants asserted, that know how to maneuver their way to elicit information within the local communities in Northern Ghana. Second, the US military regularly trains the Ghanaian military and deploys sophisticated drones to detect unusual movements across the Northern border. A key MFARI participant, for example, remarked that "This is something that the public doesn't know and if they were to withdraw a quarter of the support, Ghana will be exposed." However, a participant in Parliament of Ghana reasoned, the US only uses Ghana to promote and protect its interests *first* [to guarantee the passage of its ships and fight terrorism], making Ghana's *benefits* "collateral benefits". Indeed, another participant in Parliament of Ghana corroborated that "Once it satisfies their strategic interest, US will come in to support us fight terrorists."

✓ *The Side Effects in Public Sentiments*

The participants in the Government of Ghana observed that the provision that “[...] no country should receive the benefits of debt relief if that country does not cooperate with the United States on terrorism [...]” (AGOA, 2000: SEC.121 [b][5]) often produces ‘side effects’ within public *sentiments* and *security* in Ghana. In Ghana, these participants asserted, the mounting levels of government debts and the inability to service those debts tend to move successive governments to give in to such *provisions*. These *conditionalities* and *vulnerabilities* moved successive governments to give in to the GITMO-2 [2016] and SOFA [2018] in Ghana. However, the ‘side effect’, according to MFARI and MoTI participants, was that the GITMO-2 and SOFA touched on the *sensitivity* of citizens, which, in turn, triggered the 2016 GITMO-2 demonstrations and 2018 SOFA demonstrations in Ghana.

The participants in the markets and trotro/taxi stations substantiated this point with the *answer* ‘YES’ in response to the *question*, “Do you think that the US-Ghana relations under the GITMO-2 [2016] and SOFA [2018] triggered public fear and panic in Ghana?” However, in response to the question, “Did the GITMO-2 and SOFA trigger fear and panic in you?”, the participants in the Government of Ghana and GRASAG [UG] said ‘NO’, while the participants in the markets and trotro/taxi stations said ‘YES’. Then again, the 2016 GITMO-2 demonstrations and 2018 SOFA demonstrations, according to the abovementioned participants, triggered *other* ‘side effects’ in Ghana. The demonstrations, for example, (a) required resources [e.g. the Ghana police, money, and time] to manage them, (b) probably resulted in the destruction of properties, and (c) resulted in police-citizen struggles.

✓ *The Backlash Effects under the GITMO-2*

The US/AGOA requirements, according to the participants in the Government of Ghana, moved the then NDC government to give in to the GITMO-2 in 2016: The US-Ghana agreement that required the *latter* to accept and allow some two Guantanamo Bay detainees [Khalid Muhammad Salih Al-Dhuby and Mahmud Umar Muhammad Bin Atef] to live within it for a two-year period. In fact, the US, prior to the transfer, acknowledged that “The decision to transfer a detainee is made only after detailed, specific conversations with the receiving country about the **potential threat a detainee may pose after transfer** and the **measures the receiving country will take in order to sufficiently mitigate that threat** [...]” (US Embassy, 2016). Today, ‘top’ government [Ghana] representatives/participants do not only disagree on the ‘**status**’ but are unable to unravel the ‘**where about**’ of the detainees in Ghana. The ‘responses’ in the first camp, for example, read:

[a] “[...] they were not terrorist at all [...] the US found that they were not terrorist at all” [and] “[...] the American government didn’t find a scintilla of evidence of their involvement in terrorism [...]” and [b] “[...] I heard that they’ve left Ghana [...]” and “I don’t think they are still in Ghana” and “[...] they serve the two years in Ghana and left the country since then [...].”

Consequently, the first camp concluded that the detainees do not pose a “security threat to Ghana.” The second camp, however, reasoned that:

[a] the detainees, “whether proven guilty or not, were arrested on suspicion of terrorism-related acts” and [b] these detainees “[...] are still in Ghana because we haven’t been told that they’ve left [...]. In fact, there were even some reports that they have married Ghanaian ladies.”

Hon. Shirley Ayorkor Botchway's, the Minister of MFARI, speech in Parliament [2018]

buttress the second camp's position:

It is to be noted that no exit arrangement were originally discussed between the two governments to end the bilateral arrangement by the time of negotiations. The US has also been clear in our discussions with them that per the agreement, returning them to the United States is not an option open to discussion or negotiations. This means that all obligations relating to the two subjects has now become the responsibility of Ghana (The Mirror, 2018).

Consequently, the second camp concluded that the detainees pose a “potential threat” to the nation's security in *future*. The participants in this camp, for example, observed that the presence of the two detainees in Ghana provides them with the opportunity to *live, multiply, train, plan, and hit* Ghana in future just as the presence of the 9/11 terrorists in the US provided them with the opportunity to *live, train, plan, and hit* the US in 2001.

The real ‘threat’, however, lies within the inability of ‘top’ government participants to unravel the ‘**where about**’ of the two detainees in Ghana:

“[...] I heard that they've left Ghana [...]” and “I don't think they are still in Ghana” and they “[...] are still in Ghana because we haven't been told that they've left [...].”

Similarly, President Akufo-Addo, in his response to the ‘**where about**’ of Aisha Huang—the Chinese who was deported for illegal mining in Ghana—remarked that:

I'm not still sure whether she was in fact deported, or whether she fled the country the first time and has now come back. There still seems to be some uncertainty about it.

The abovementioned ‘responses’, thus, suggest that the ‘**top**’ has either lost control over or overlooked some *key* security issues within the nation.

✓ ***The Backlash Effects under the SOFA***

The ‘rumor’ as to whether or not the US intends to establish a military base in Ghana precedes the 2018 US-Ghana relations under the SOFA. However, it was the SOFA [2018] that rekindled the ‘rumor’ and triggered the SOFA demonstrations [2018] in Ghana. Here, the focus is to examine the rumor’s validity and security implications under the SOFA. In fact, three [3] camps emerged during the interviews on the field: Mostly, the US, which forms the first camp, denies that it wants to establish a military base in Ghana. During his 2008 visit to Ghana, President Bush, for example, told President Kufuor that:

[...] we do not contemplate adding new bases. In other words, the purpose of this is not to add military bases. I know there's rumors in Ghana: "All Bush is coming to do is try to convince you to put a big military base here." That's baloney. Or as we say in Texas, "That's bull" (Bush, 2008).

In 2018, the US Department of State and the US Embassy [Ghana] restated that the aim of the SOFA was not to establish a military base in Ghana. The assertion of the second and third camps [the participants in the Government of Ghana], however, refutes the assertion of the first camp [the US camp]. The second camp, for example, argued that the US has established the military base in Ghana:

“Where is the base located?”, the researcher probed, “It exists as part of the local military establishment”, the second camp retorted.

This camp pointed to the US West African Logistic Network [WALN] at the Kotoka International airport [KIA], Accra, to buttress its argument.

The third camp emphasized that the US, indeed, made the demand on Ghana, promising to reward Ghana with huge sums of money if it [Ghana] allows it [US] to establish the military base in Ghana. However, it was the 2018 SOFA demonstrations, the third camp posited, that moved the Ghanaian leaders to revoke and annul it out-rightly. The 2018 SOFA demonstrations and Ghanaian leaders, for example, upheld that the US demand allows it [US] to re-colonize Ghana. To them, the agreement naturally undermines Ghana's sovereignty, as it does not allow Ghana to prosecute US soldiers on its soil. In fact, in Burkina Faso, for example, the unwillingness of France to demolish its military bases to complete its decolonization process frequently draws anti-French protests in that nation. Then again, the second and third camps reported that the leaders and citizens felt that the agreement has the potential to unleash serious terrorist attacks on Ghana.

But, "Did the US sanction Ghana following the latter's refusal to allow the former establish it?", the researcher probed, "No, the US hasn't done that because it is still pursuing it", the third camp retorted.

Besides, the 2018 SOFA demonstrations, according to the MFARI participant, sent a direct message to the US Embassy [in Ghana] that the grounds were not ripe for the establishment of the US military base in Ghana.

In the AGOA (2000) SEC.112 [b][3][C][ii], the US developed one 'mechanism' to detect and eradicate the 'backlash effects' on its economy:

Whenever the Secretary of Commerce determines [...] that there has been a surge of imports of an article described in this paragraph from a beneficiary sub-Saharan African country, the Secretary shall determine whether such article from such country is being imported in such increased quantities as to cause serious damage, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive articles. If the Secretary's determination is affirmative, the President shall suspend the duty-free treatment provided for such article under this paragraph.

5.4 The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations

5.4.0 Introduction

This section presents the fourth objective of the study, which seeks to scrutinize the extent to which Ghana is well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations. The findings have been presented in this section under the following sub-themes: [a] The Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality, [b] Ghana's Immune System, [c] The Politicization *of* and the Role of the Public *in* the US-Ghana relations, and [d] The Position of Ghana in the East-West Hegemonic Struggles. Now, let us proceed to deal with these sub-headings *one* after the *other* as follows.

➤ The Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality

The participants in MFARI, MoTI, GRASAG [UG], and Parliament of Ghana observed that the principle of *balanced neutrality* has been the ironclad “guiding principle underlying” Ghana's strategy *since* independence in 1957. In other words, the nation's Presidents have almost always invoked it in the North-South relations since Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's First President,

developed and pronounced it in the *US* Congress [1958]. Under our *second objective*, these participants have, for example, demonstrated the extent to which Ghana is able to switch between the US and China to (a) *sign investment and trade agreements* and (b) *milk infrastructure, trade, and military opportunities* without incurring the wrath of the two superpowers, making its ironclad principle of balanced neutrality more *dynamic* in the highest sense. President Akufo-Addo, for example, travelled to China to sign the “One Belt One Road Memorandum of Understanding” with President Xi Jinping on 1st September, 2018 and, then, switched to the US to *exploit* and *milk* President Biden’s B3W on 23rd September, 2021. This, according to the participants in MFARI and Parliament of Ghana, suggests that the question as to *whether or not* the B3W [US] was developed to counter the BRI [China] (Scull and Healy, 2022) matters little to President Akufo-Addo [the leader of a non-aligned state], as he sees both the BRI and B3W as juicy opportunities to *exploit* and *milk*. To achieve this, the abovementioned participants asserted, the nation [Ghana] often adopts three (3) strategies:

First, we realized that Ghana ideologically positions itself between the West [democracy] and East [Socialism], which is why it often refuses to do anything that has the potential to: [a] undermine its long held ideals and values *towards* the West [the US and Europe] and East [Russia and China] and [b] subvert its economic and security interests *with* the West [the US and Europe] and East [Russia and China].

Second, the Ghanaian Presidents, according to MFARI and MoTI participants, tend to ride on the winds of underdevelopment to switch between the US and China with *ease* and *certainty*. To

achieve this, a participant in GRASAG [UG] corroborated, the Ghanaian Presidents tend to ‘say’ that:

[1] Mr. Biden and Mr. Jinping, you know that I am less developed, which is why I have been crisscrossing for help and [2] Mr. Biden and Mr. Jinping, you know that your inability to do it all for me pushes me to see your ‘adversary’ for help.

Third, the nation, according to MFARI and MoTI participants, coordinates its strategic hedging from the highest level of government. On 7th April, 2022, one MFARI participant reported, when the United Nations General Assembly [UNGA] sought to expunge Russia out of the United Nations Human Rights Council [UNHRC] following its invasion of *Ukraine*, the Ghana Permanent Mission [Ghana Perm] in New York studied the situation and communicated its ‘position’ on the matter down to the MFARI in Ghana. The MFARI, in turn, communicated Ghana Perm’s ‘position’ to the Seat of government [the Presidency] in Accra, Ghana. Finally, the *Presidency* gave the green light for Ghana Perm to vote “abstain” on whether to ‘expunge’ or ‘not to expunge’ Russia out of the UNHRC. Consequently, the participants concluded that the nation’s ironclad principle of *balanced neutrality* is, thus, a strong [or positive] *force* in the US-Ghana relations.

➤ **Ghana’s Immune System**

❖ ***Ghana’s Moral Defenses and Economy***

Here, the ‘moral defenses’ and ‘economy’ are intertwined: the *former* works to defend and build the latter, while the *latter* works to boost the *former*. The study scrutinizes how the ‘oaths of office’, ‘trainings’, and ‘economy’ work to boost the ‘moral defenses’ against *breaches* and *infiltrations* in the US-Ghana relations.

✓ *Moral Defenses*

The participants within and outside the circles of the Government of Ghana agreed that the ‘oaths’ of office largely has *minimal to zero* effects on *Ghana’s* accredited representatives at home and abroad. In fact, two [2] participants in the Government of Ghana said ‘NO’, while three [3] said ‘somehow’ in response to the question, “Does the oath of office have effect on you?” Furthermore, the ‘responses’ to how ‘appointments’ are made into the various positions/departments—such as, inter alia, the high commission, the deputy high commission, the treasury, the head of chancery, the trade attaché, the defense attaché, and the education attaché—in Ghana’s overseas missions/embassies divided the participants in the Government of Ghana into two [2] major camps. The first camp, for example, indicated that it is the MFARI that is largely responsible for all the 56 missions abroad: It often posts diplomats into the key positions—such as the head of Chancery—in these overseas missions. These diplomats, the first camp posited, usually go through rigorous training.

Then again, the MFARI often works with, inter alia, MoTI and the Ministry of Education to post well trained staffs—the trade attaché and the education attaché—into these missions. The second camp, however, indicated that the ‘appointments’ are mostly based on the patronage system, resulting in both the traditional/career diplomats and the non-traditional/non-career diplomats. This camp reported that in the past, the overseas staff was made up of 80% non-career diplomats and 20% career diplomats. Today, the overseas staff, it continued, is made up of 50% career diplomats and 50% non-career diplomats. One participant in the Government of Ghana, for example, remarked that:

The 50% non-career diplomats are the kids of politicians who are unable to construct better sentences.

✓ **Economy**

The participants within the Government of Ghana believed that Ghana’s roller coaster economic growth and swelling debts worsen the conditions surrounding the ‘appointment’ [the largely illiterate 50% “kids of politicians”] and the ‘induction’ [the ineffectiveness of the ‘oath’ of office] of the Ghanaian statesman/woman, which, in turn, weakens his/her ‘moral defenses’ in IR. Similarly, the participants in GRASAG [UG] observed, a weak economy weakens the effectiveness of the oath of office, while a strong economy boosts the effectiveness of the oath of office in government representatives in Ghana. The following diagram, which measures Ghana’s **real GDP growth**, throws more light on the issue.




Fig.6: Ghana: Real GDP Growth [annual percent change], IMF

Fig.6 shows that Ghana’s ‘economy’ has “[...] ridden a roller coaster of transition [...]” under the Fourth Republic. The nation’s real GDP growth, which was 4.8 in 1993, plunged down to 3.5 in 1994 but rose up to 4.2 in 1995, 4.8 in 1996 and, then, up to 5.8 in 1997 but, then again,

plunged down to 5 in 1998, 4.5 in 1999 and, then, down to 3.6 in 2000. However, the real GDP growth rose up to 3.8 in 2001, 4.6 in 2002, 5.1 in 2003, 5.4 in 2004 and, then, up to 6.2 in 2005 but, then, plunged down to 5.8 in 2006 and down to 4.1 in 2007 but rose up to 9 in 2008 and, then again, plunged down to 5.7 in 2009. The real GDP growth, however, shot up to 7.8 in 2010 and up to **13.9** in 2011 plunged down to 8.4 in 2012, 7.2 in 2013, 2.9 in 2014 and down to 2.1 in 2015 but rose up to 3.4 in 2016 and up to 8.1 in 2017 plunged down to 6.2 in 2018 rose up to 6.5 in 2019 plunged down to 0.4 in 2020 rose up to 4.2 in 2021 and, finally, up to 5.2 in 2022 (IMF, 2022).

Clearly, in this “[...] roller coaster transition [...]”, the highest GDP growth occurred in 2011 [13.9], while the lowest GDP growth occurred in 2020 [0.4]. The 1993-1994 recession pushed Ghana to solicit IMF bailout in 1995 [\$258m], and the 1997-1998 recession pushed the nation to solicit IMF bailout in 1999 [\$209.4m]. Still, the 1998-2000 recession pushed the nation to take refuge under IMF bailout in 2003 [\$258m] notwithstanding the 2001-2003 growth. Then again, the 2012-2015 great recession propelled it to solicit IMF bailout in 2015 [\$918m]. Finally, the 2019-2020 great recession pushed it to take refuge under IMF bailout in 2022 [3 billion] notwithstanding the 2021-2022 growth. Ghana’s debt levels in 2012 [11,992.7m], 2013 [16,115.2m], 2014 [17,836.6m], 2015 [20,073.3m], 2016 [21,058.6m], 2017 [22,212.8m], 2018 [23,173.8m], and in 2019 [26,738.8m] (World Bank, 2022) show that the more the nation borrowed, the more its debt levels surged.

Today, the participants in the Government of Ghana reported, Ghana’s debt-to-GDP [78.3%] not only crossed the debt-to-GDP threshold [73.70%] but its gold reserves have been unable to

service these debts, pushing it to solicit IMF debt relief via the US/AGOA initiatives under weak ‘moral defenses’. In the AGOA (2000) SEC.121 [b][5][6], however, the US wrote, “[...] in order to prevent adverse impact on a key industry in many developing countries, the International Monetary Fund [IMF] must mobilize its own resources for providing debt relief to eligible countries [...]” **but** “[...] no country should receive the benefits of debt relief if that country does not cooperate with the United States on terrorism [...].”

These AGOA ‘clauses’ have often moved the IMF to grant Ghana debt reliefs on US beggar-has-no-choice terms and conditions. The 2003 IMF debt relief *for* Ghana under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries [HIPC] initiative and Obama’s ‘commands’ under the 2016 GITMO-2 illustrate US beggar-has-no-choice terms and conditions. In her 2018 speech in Parliament, Hon. Shirley A. Botchway, put it as follows:

*It is to be noted that no exit arrangements were originally discussed between the two governments to end the bilateral arrangement by the time of negotiations. **The US has also been clear in our discussions with them that per the agreement, returning them to the United States is not an option open to discussion or negotiations.** This means that all obligations relating to the two subjects has now become the responsibility of Ghana (The Mirror, 2018).*

Furthermore, as shown in this study, the participants lamented that the US has broken through the Ghanaian ‘moral defenses’ to flood the local market with its home used products and subvert government industrialization policies. For example, one participant in Parliament of Ghana lamented that “We have allowed the US to move us to lose our negotiating power.” The study, thus, concludes that Ghana’s ‘moral defenses’, roller coaster economic growth, and swelling debts are, thus, weak *forces* in the North-South relations.

➤ **Ghana's Monitoring and Evaluation System, Workforce, and Infrastructure [Road Network and Energy/Power]**

✓ *The Monitoring and Evaluation System*

Generally, the participants in MFARI, MoTI, and Parliament of Ghana agreed that Ghana signed unto the AGOA [2000] with either ineffective National AGOA Implementation Committee [NAIC] or no NAIC at all. This, according to one MoTI participant, ushered the various AGOA stakeholders such as, inter alia, the Ghana Export Promotion Council [GEPC], the Association of Ghana Industries [AGI], and the Federation of Association of Ghanaian Exporters [FAGE] into the 2000-2016 dark period. The 2000-2016 dark period, a participant in MFARI corroborated, witnessed poor *monitoring and evaluation* and *information distribution and coordination* between and among the AGOA stakeholders in Ghana. Even, some updated information on the AGOA website remained obscured to the AGOA stakeholders during the 2000-2016 dark period in Ghana. A participant in MoTI, for example, recounted that the USTR had to detain Ghana's exports because the exporters failed to download the updated Textile Certificate of Origin. Then again, a participant in the US embassy observed, the 'system' that awarded the Certificate of Origin often malfunctioned during the 2000-2016 dark period. These challenges prompted the then Minister for MoTI, Mr. Alan Kyeremanten, to inaugurate the National Technical Committee for Textile and Garment [NTCTG] to reverse the abovementioned obstructions in 2018.

✓ *Workforce*

The participants within the Government of Ghana and US Embassy reported that Ghana signed onto the AGOA [2000] with a *workforce* whose skills remain below international standards.

The World Bank's observation buttresses this point:

Low skills in Ghana have contributed to a workforce structure shaped like a steep Egyptian pyramid or the Eiffel Tower. The huge base is made of unskilled workers employed in low-finance agriculture, fishing, and other extractive activities that require the use of little technology. The bottom comprises 26.7 percent workers who did not complete basic education and 35.3 percent who never attended school (Panford, 2014).

The US/AGOA, according to the US participant, places premium on *storage* and *transportation*.

The participant in MoTI, for example, reported that the US expects that the temperature level inside the storage-facilities [whether in the producer's storage rooms, the national storage rooms, the regional storage rooms, the cold boxes, the district export fridges] and the transportation engines [whether in the cold aeroplane or in the cold vans] needs to be regulated to the accepted level, and the human carriers [e.g. the carriers of the export boxes] need to *hold*, *lift*, and *transport* the storage facilities under hygienic conditions. However, the Ghanaian *workforce*, according to the MoTI and US participants, has struggled with the standards governing designing and spinning of textile and apparel products, branding and packaging of textile and apparel products, harvesting and storage of plants and livestock, handling and feeding of livestock, and the transportation of plants and livestock, resulting in the *infection* and *detention* of export products at the US border.

✓ ***Infrastructure [Road and Energy]***

Generally, the participants in MFARI, MoTI, and GRASAG [UG] agreed that Ghana signed unto the AGOA [2000] with ‘poor’ infrastructure [*road and energy*]. The major roads, according to these participants, that connect the ports to the rural agricultural communities are largely rough roads. To MFARI and MoTI, these type of roads tend to retrogress the movement of export products *from* the farm gates to the ports, resulting in losses, especially, during the rainy seasons. Besides, the participants in GRASAG [UG] and MoTI observed that the Akosombo Power Dam, the nation’s most powerful Dam, struggles to meet today’s energy demand following the explosions in *population size* and *economic activities*. The dumsor period [2012-2017], for example, witnessed prolong power outages, resulting in the collapse of industries and redundancies in Ghana. Consequently, MFARI, GRASAG [UG], and MoTI drew on the abovementioned pieces of evidence to conclude that Ghana’s monitoring and evaluation system, workforce, and infrastructure [*road and energy*] are, thus, weak [or negative] *forces* in the North-South relations. In sum, twelve [12] participants ranked Ghana’s IS as *moderately strong*, while ten [10] ranked it as *moderately weak*.

➤ **The Politicization ‘of’ and the Role of the Public ‘in’ the US-Ghana Relations**

This sub-section seeks to scrutinize: [a] the ‘linkage’ between the politicization of the US-Ghana relations and the role of the public in the US-Ghana relations and [b] the impact of this ‘linkage’ on the US-Ghana relations.

❖ *The Politicization of the US-Ghana Relations*

The participants in the Government of Ghana and GRASAG [UG] acknowledged that the US-Ghana relations have been politicized under the usual NPP-NDC rivalry [the two major political parties] in Ghana. The participants in GRASAG [UG], for example, observed that in 2016 it was the NDC government that led Ghana into the US-Ghana relations under the GITMO-2. The NPP, then minority and opposition party, kicked against the GITMO-2 under the then NDC government. However, in 2018, it was the NPP government that led Ghana into the US-Ghana relations under the SOFA. The NDC, the current minority and opposition party, kicked against the SOFA under the current NPP government. Though the NDC and NPP cited sovereignty, colonization, and security issues in support of their actions and inactions, a key participant in the Government of Ghana observed, “there is more to seeing than meet the eye.” The participants concluded that it was the usual NPP-NDC rivalry that motivated the actions and inactions of the NPP and NDC under the GITMO-2 [2016] and SOFA [2018]. Some two [2] participants in the Government of Ghana and one [1] participant in GRASAG [UG], however, indicated that it was the oversight and watch-dog responsibilities that motivated the actions and inactions of the NDC and NPP under the GITMO-2 [2016] and SOFA [2018].

❖ *The Role of the Public in the US-Ghana Relations*

Some three [3] participants in the Government of Ghana and two [2] participants in GRASAG [UG] unanimously admitted that the NPP, NDC, and Media have often incited the public against the US-Ghana relations in Ghana. The participants in GRASAG [UG], for example, reported that the NPP incited its supporters against the GITMO-2 [2016] and the NDC incited its supporters against the SOFA [2018] to score political points in the 2016 and 2020 general

elections. In response to the question, “Can the act of resisting the ‘voice’ of public demonstrations cause a government to lose power?”, the participants in the Government of Ghana and GRASAG [UG] said ‘YES’. Some participants in market and trotro stations, for example, said ‘YES’ to the question, “If your demonstration fails to influence the government to change course, would you vote against it?”

Then again, in response to the question, “Did you vote against the ruling governments because of the GITMO-2 [2016] and SOFA [2018] in the past elections?”, ten [10] participants in market and trotro/taxi stations said that they voted against the then NDC government in the 2016 elections because it “stubbornly” brought the “two terrorists” into Ghana. These ten [10] participants, however, indicated that the SOFA did not move them to vote against the current NPP government in the 2020 elections, since they did not see US military base in Ghana. A key MFARI participant, for example, observed that it was the ‘voice’ of the 2018 SOFA demonstrations that moved the NPP government to revoke the US-Ghana military base agreement under the SOFA. This study, thus, concludes that the NPP-NDC politicization of the US-Ghana relations is a negative *force* in the North-South relations, as it often incites the public [*a restraining force*] against the US-Ghana relations on the usual NPP-NDC rivalry.

➤ **The Position of Ghana in the East-West Hegemonic Struggles**

The participants in GRASAG [UG] observed that history absolutely underscores the strategic importance of Ghana in the East-West struggles in terms of, among others, ideology, politics, economic, and location. For example, a participant in Parliament of Ghana observed, the quest

to emerge sovereign under the Cold War partly depended on the quest to emerge sovereign in Ghana—the South. However, one participant in MFARI remarked:


Our very first President, Osagyifo, said we are not looking East, we are not looking West, we are looking forward. And so, we joined the non-aligned movement, so we can't align to the geopolitics of this world.

However, a participant in Parliament of Ghana observed, the *fact* that we were not involved 'in' did not mean that we were not affected 'by' the Cold War. To him, Nkrumah's flirtation with the West [US and Europe] and East [USSR and China] showed that the Cold War ideological struggles between the West [*democracy*] and East [*socialism*] heavily affected Ghana. The participant in Parliament of Ghana, for example, remarked:

If you look at the democracy that we practice, this our Fourth Republic, is more of the American orientation. If you look at our background as a county, our socialist orientation, is more the China, the East. We have a blend [...]. When China comes here, we look at China and what they bring on the table. When we deal with the USA, we deal with them [...]. We are not going to take a position.

This suggests that the US-Ghana relations [Ghana and the West] and the China-Ghana relations [Ghana and the East] go beyond ideological ties. On 23rd September, 2015, then Chinese Ambassador to Ghana [Mr. Sun Baohong], for example, indicated that “[...] the Chinese side always views China-Ghana bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, and is committed to conducting cooperation with Ghana [...]” (Chinese Embassy, 2015). Then again, on 31st July, 2019, then US House Speaker [Nancy Pelosi], told the Parliament of Ghana that ““Today, on behalf of the Congress of the United States, I am deeply honored to address you and reaffirm that partnership. It **endures** because of the security cooperation we engage in to keep the world safe. It endures because of our history”” (Pelosi, 2019).

The US and China, for example, designed most of the US-Ghana and China-Ghana trade and investment agreements with the aim to allowing the US and Chinese companies compete over, inter alia, the *mining, oil, and gas* sectors in Ghana. In 2009, for example, one US company—Kosmos—proposed to sell its “[...] 23.5% stake in the jubilee field [...]” only to another US company—Exxon Mobile. However, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation [CNOOC] immediately showed up to bid for that “[...] 23.5% stake in the jubilee field [...]”, ignoring Kosmos’—US company—plan to sell it only to Exxon Mobil—another US company (The Statesman, 2009). Largely, the US and China view the ‘oil’ as one of the most strategic ‘resources’ that allows them to effectively convert the non-armed ideological struggles into armed struggles on the battlefield. The position of Ghana in the East-West hegemonic struggles is, thus, a ‘positive’ *force* in the North-South relations.



CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the *dynamics* in the US-Ghana relations in light of the Theoretical Framework, the Findings, and the Literature Review. The chapter deals with four [4] major sub-headings, including [a] Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic, [b] Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana's Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China, [c] Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into 'Theoretical successes', 'Empirical Successes', 'Side effects', and 'Backlash effects' under the AGOA, and [d] The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations. The chapter deals with these sub-headings in a chronological *order* as follows.

6.1 Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic

6.1.0 Introduction

This section discusses the first objective of the study, which sought to disentangle the dynamics of conflict-and-cooperation in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. Here, the discussion centers around [1] the *inevitability* of conflict in the US-Ghana relations and [2] the *personality* of an individual in IR.

➤ *The Conflict-and-Cooperation [1990s-2020s]: The Promotion and Protection of Political and Economic Relations*

The foregoing *findings* show that Ghana's posture towards the US is a *stable hedging* (Tessman & Wolfe, 2011; Tran and Sato, 2018) pitched between conflict and cooperation. The findings, for example, showed that the US-Ghana relations witnessed *cooperation* under both the democrats [the Clinton-Rawlings (1990-2000), Obama-Mills (2009-2017), and Akufo-Addo-Joe Biden relations (2016-2020)] and Republicans [the Bush-Kufuor relations (2000-2008)]. The drivers of these co-operations include the need to promote and protect democracy, investments, exports, imports, and security, among others (Nwaubani, 2001; White, 2003; Gibbs, 1991; Noer, 1984; Thompson, 1969, Bekoe, 2012). The findings also indicate that there have been periods of *conflict* between the two states under both the Republicans [the Akufo-Addo vs. Donald Trump (2016-2020) Shithole and immigration skirmishes] and Democrats [the Obama vs. Mills (2009-2017) Kosmos conflict and the Akufo-Addo vs Joe Biden (2020-2024) LGBTQ+ skirmishes] under the Fourth Republic. Similarly, the US-Ghana relations witnessed "conflict" and "cooperation" under both the Republicans [the Nkruma-Eisenhower relations (1953-1961)] and Democrats [the Nkrumah-Kennedy (1961-1963) and Nkrumah-Johnson relations (1963-1966)] under the First Republic (Nwaubani, 2001; Noer, 1984; White 2003; Telepneva, 2019).

Here, a comparison between the two Republics shows that the US-Ghana conflicts were less intense and more intense under the Republicans and Democrats, respectively, in the First Republic, and less intense and more intense under the Democrats and Republicans, respectively, in the Fourth Republic. First, the foregoing findings reinforce hedging's inevitability of conflict (Gilpin, 1986; Waltz, 1991; Donnelly, 2005) in the US-Ghana relations, which, according to Nwaubani (2001) and Noer (1984), were/are driven by "self-interest" and "state-centrism."

Second, from hedging perspective, the abovementioned evidences underscore how the US and Ghana “[...] remain locked in [...] cycle of [...] destructive [and beneficial] competition” (Donnelly 2005, p. 37), as they seek to promote and protect “state-centrism” and “national-interest” (Morgenthau, 1985; Tessman & Wolfe, 2011). Consequently, “Statesmanship thus involves mitigating and managing, not eliminating, conflict; seeking a less dangerous world, rather than a safe, just, or peaceful one” (Donnelly, 2005: 31).

Though the abovementioned pieces of evidence showed that “conflicts” have been inevitable elements in the US-Ghana relations, they have been intense under the *Republican Trump* than the *Democrats Obama/Biden* in those relations. Here, we stress the ‘personality’ of an individual in IR: First, President Akufo-Addo’s daring spirit under the Fourth Republic reflects that of President Kwame Nkrumah under the First Republic. Even though the US may have managed to push China [a major power] to relinquish 18% of its importation of Iranian oil in response to its pressure (Katzman 2013; Salman and Geeraerts, 2015; Fite, 2012; Garlick and Havlova, 2020), in the Akufo-Addo-Trump Immigration Skirmishes, however, the Government of Ghana [a small power] succeeded in preventing the Government of the US [a hegemon] from deporting a significant number of ‘alleged’ Ghanaian immigrants into Ghana. Still, the government of President Akufo-Addo’s responses to Donald Trump’s remarks and US policies are reminiscent to that of the government of President Nkrumah against the US over US policies towards the Congo and the death of Patrice Lumumba on 17th January, 1961 (Telepneva, 2019; Gerits, 2015; Noer, 1984). These findings reinforce the realists’ emphasis on the “[...] limitations which the sordid and selfish aspects of human nature place on the conduct of diplomacy” (Thompson 1985: 20). Indeed, diplomacy provides big powers with “direct access”

into small states, and allows them to “act” and “govern” in small states (Barkawi, 2011). Here, “The basic conflict of economics is that people act in ways to maximize their self-interest pit against the respected rules and laws” (Xu and Ma, 2016: 537). In effect, Machiavelli (1970: Book I, Chapter 3 in Donnelly, 2005: 30) called on states to act [in IR] as if “all men are wicked and that they will always give vent to the malignity that is in their minds when opportunity offers.”

Second, the unique waves that the Nkrumah’s factor rippled throughout the US-Ghana relations under the First Republic (Nwaubani, 2001; Noer, 1984; Katsakioris, 2021) reflect those that the Trump’s factor rippled under the Fourth Republic. President Trump’s ‘shithole’ remarks and hostile immigration policies have undermined US influence in Ghana. The participant in the Parliament of Ghana put it as follows: “Trump’s actions might not be a true reflection of what our relationship with the USA represents.” These findings corroborate that of Chan (2019): President Trump did not hesitate to withdraw US commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and international treaties such as, among others, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Paris climate agreement. The just ended November 2024 US elections, in which Mr. Donald Trump won, has pushed Europe to rethink its security in recent times (Chan, 2019). Similarly, the current study’s participants observed that Trump’s presidency reversed Obama’s YALI and PA in Ghana; his reelection in the 2024 US elections [November, 2024] may [1] reverse Biden’s B3W in Ghana and [2] re-trigger the US-Ghana immigration struggles.

6.2 Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana's Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China

6.2.0 Introduction

This section discusses the second objective of the study, which sought to scrutinize the dynamics of Ghana's ironclad principle of balanced neutrality towards the US and China. The discussion revolves around [1] patterns of neutrality and global power shifts and [2] the eruption of an unusual political event and balanced neutrality.

The findings suggest that patterns of neutrality tend to match global power shifts in IR. Ghana resorted to the middle position in the US-USSR Cold War under the First Republic (Nwaubani, 2001; Gerits, 2015; Noer, 1984; Mount, 2013; White, 2003; Thompson, 1969) and, as the findings show, in the current US-China hegemonic struggles under the Fourth Republic. In his address in the US Congress on the 24th July, 1958, then President Nkrumah, for example, stated that “Our attitude [...] is very much that of America looking at the disputes of Europe in the 19th century. We do not wish to be involved.’ Just as the United States wanted to keep the Europeans out of the US continent, Ghana believed that ‘the peace of the world in general is served, not harmed by keeping one great continent free from the strife’” (Gerits, 2015: 954). Today, Aluko (1975: 56) observed, “All Ghanaian governments since independence have used the terms nonalignment, neutralism, true neutrality, or balanced neutrality to represent the guiding principle underlying the country's policy with respect to the Great Power.” Similarly, India took the middle position in the US-USSR Cold War (Tiwary and Roy, 2021) and in the current US-China hegemonic struggles: ““Notwithstanding expectations in Washington,” Pant and Joshi (2015: 61) reported, “Delhi has been a reluctant supporter of the American pivot [...].

India would not like to choose sides in this great game, at least before the dust settles, allowing it to make informed choices. Former prime minister Manmohan Singh has underscored uncertainty as the driving force behind India's reluctance [...].”

The abovementioned evidences, thus, [a] reinforce Tessman and Wolfe's (2011: 220) observation that the *hedging state* is often “[...] strategic, in the sense that it [i.e. strategic hedging] is coordinated at the highest levels of government [...]”, and [b] demonstrate that the principle of balanced neutrality *shifts* as and when global hegemony *shifts*. For example, the US, according to Martins (2007: 17), “[...] has been in a period of hegemonic decline [...] since 1967 [...]”. Similarly, Layne (2012, p. 22) observed, “Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world's dominant manufacturing power. Today, [...] China is the world's leading manufacturing nation.” These findings suggest that the 1960s declines of the US began to have effects on its ability to assist small states like Ghana by/from the mid-1980s. The current study, for example, draws on Frimpong's and Nubuor's (2013) observation, *Ghana's National Theatre* “[...] loan from the Bank of China was signed in 1985 [...] [and] completed in 1990. What is rather obvious is that the project allowed Chinese construction companies to gain a footing in Ghana”, to establish that the 1960s declines of the US moved Ghana to make a **significant shift** towards the adoption of balanced neutrality towards the US and China in the area of the economy and security in mid-1980s.

However, the findings further show that the ‘eruption’ of an unusual political event may undermine *balanced neutrality*, deflecting a hedging state from one pole [a Great Power] to the other in IR. For example, President Trump's ‘shithole’ remarks and hostile immigration policies towards Ghana somewhat affected Ghana's middle position in the US-China hegemonic

struggles. In the US-Ghana trade [Fig.5], for example, the findings show that [a] in 2012, Ghana not only moved to increase its trade values with China over its trade values with the US but also sought to sustain the trade ‘de-alignment’ with the US and ‘re-alignment’ with China up to 2019 and [b] the values of Ghana’s exports into China changed from *thousands* [2003 up to 2016] into *millions* [2017 up to 2019] [Trump’s era], underscoring the *Trump effects* in Ghana’s trade ‘de-alignment’ with the US and ‘re-alignment’ with China under the Fourth Republic. The death of Patrice Lumumba [1961], Telepneva (2019) and Noer (1984) observed, rekindled President Nkrumah’s anti-colonial spirit against the West [US], thereby affecting his non-aligned position in the US-USSR Cold War under the First Republic.

The abovementioned findings align with that of Vidal and Pelegrín (2018: 206): “China’s Law of the Territorial Sea”, which “[...] intimates that it might use force to assert its claims over Senkaku”, was in response to the small and medium powers strategies against it. For example, when Taiwan’s Tsai [the incumbent President since 2016] refused to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus, “Beijing began its retaliation, and Taiwan tilted further toward the maritime alliance” (Wu, 2017: 210). Then again, Chan (2019) reported, President Trump’s withdrawal of US commitments to allies in Europe and international treaties—including, among others, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and Paris climate agreement—pushed Europe and Australia to rethink their security. The victory of Mr. Donald Trump in the just ended US elections [November 2024] has pushed Europe and Australia to rethink their security in recent times. It was Trump’s presidency that pushed Ghana to ‘de-align’ with the US and ‘re-align’ with China;

his reelection in the 2024 US elections may re-push Ghana to *further* ‘de-align’ with the US and ‘re-align’ with China in the post-Biden era.

6.3 Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’, and ‘Backlash Effects’ under the AGOA

6.3.0 Introduction

This section discusses the third objective of the study, which disaggregated the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into ‘theoretical successes’, ‘empirical successes’, ‘side effects’, and ‘backlash effects’ under the AGOA.

➤ *The ‘Theoretical Successes’ and ‘Empirical Successes’ vs. ‘Side Effects’ and ‘Backlash Effects’*

The current study’s presentation of its *findings*, however, differs from that of McDowall (2009), Chan (2019), Wu (2017), Wu (2016), Vidal and Pelegrín (2018), Matsuda (2012), and Wallace (2013) in terms of *focus*. Largely, these scholars (McDowall, 2009; Chan, 2019; Wu, 2017; Wu, 2016; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018; Matsuda, 2012; and Wallace, 2013), for example, sought to unravel only the ‘empirical successes’ in, inter alia, the US-Australia, China-Australia, Japan-US, and Japan-China economic/military relations, ignoring the need to juxtapose the ‘theoretical successes’ and ‘empirical successes’ against the ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’ in those relations. However, from the CDM’s viewpoint, the ‘empirical successes’—i.e. Japan-China trade saw a significant upsurge, moving from 7.2% [1990] up to 20.9% [2000] and surpassing the Japan-US trade figures [...]—are incomplete without the ‘theoretical successes’. For example, the ‘theoretical successes’ in the 2004 US-Australia Free Trade Area Treaty [i.e.

the elimination of custom duties, tariffs, and quotas—Articles 2.3 (1), 2.5, 2.9, and 2.11] and the 2010 China-Taiwan Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement [i.e. the elimination of custom duties, tariffs, and quotas—Article 2 (1-2)] allow us to measure and understand the ‘empirical successes’ in treaties/acts/charters, reinforcing the CDM’s criticisms against existing theories and their arguments.

6.4 The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations

6.4.0 Introduction

This section discusses the fourth objective of the study, which scrutinized Ghana’s readiness to take advantage of the North-South relations. Here, the sub-headings are: [a] The Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality, [b] Ghana’s Immune System, [c] The Politicization *of* and the Role of the Public *in* the US-Ghana relations, and [d] The Position of Ghana in the East-West Hegemonic Struggles.

➤ *The Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality*

The study revealed that the principle of balanced neutrality has been the ironclad “guiding principle underlying” Ghana’s strategy *since* independence. Similarly, Aluko (1975: 56) observed, “All Ghanaian governments since independence have used the terms nonalignment, neutralism, true neutrality, or **balanced neutrality** to represent the guiding principle underlying the country's policy with respect to the Great Power.” Here, the question as to *whether* or *not* the B3W [US] was developed to counter the BRI [China] (Scull and Healy, 2022) matters little to Ghanaian Presidents, as they consider the East-West hegemonic struggles as juicy

opportunities to *exploit* and *milk*. Here, the behavior of Ghana reflects the behavior of Taiwan, Myanmar, India, and Australia (McDowall, 2009; Cobb, 2007; Chan, 2019; Wu, 2017; Tiwary and Roy, 2021). For example, Pant and Joshi (2015: 61) reported, ““Notwithstanding expectations in Washington, Delhi has been a reluctant supporter of the American pivot.... India would not like to choose sides in this great game, at least before the dust settles, allowing it to make informed choices. Former prime minister Manmohan Singh has underscored uncertainty as the driving force behind India’s reluctance [...].”” Thus, the behavior of the Ghanaian Presidents underscores strong hedging skills in the US-Ghana relations and, thus, reinforces strategic hedging in IR.

➤ ***Ghana’s Immune System***

The study unraveled intense economic relations between the superpowers in the North [US and China] and the small power in the South [Ghana]. However, Ghana has “[...] allowed the US to move [...]” it “[...] to lose our negotiating power [...]”, allowing the *latter* to trample upon the *former’s* industries and exploit its resources. In the context of the CDM, this underscores weak moral defenses [or a weak IS] in the US-Ghana relations. Similarly, Japan, according to Vidal and Pelegrín (2018), Lim and Cooper (2015), Matsuda (2012), and Wallace (2013), has robust economic relations with the US and China. However, Wallace (2013: 484), citing Sudo (1992), observed and remarked that “Japan’s current strategy, however, is not a simple mercantilist one of paving the way for the ‘economic animal’ to penetrate the region and extract resources as it may have been in the past.” In the context of the CDM, this underscores strong moral defenses [or a strong IS] in the US-Japan relations.

The “AGOA [...] has been something of a success [...]” (Mccaskie, 2008: 332) as the “AGOA [...] ushered in increasing economic growth [...]” (Shai, Molapo & Sodi, 2017: 165). However, SSA has struggled to revamp its “IS” to improve [a] infrastructure and legal system and [b] deal with the “side effects” and “backlash effects.” Frazer and Biesebroeck (2010) observes, poor infrastructure and bureaucratic systems have worked to undermine SSA’s ability to fully translate the AGOA into success. The findings that Ghana has been unable to take advantage of the AGOA aligns with Mokhawa and Osei-Hwedie’s (2003) observation: High transportation costs, weak infrastructure, and poor institutions act to constrain Botswana’s efforts to diversify its economy under the AGOA. In effect, Katherine (2009) recommended, the US will need to support long term programs, promote good governance, stabilize institutions, and build capacity to boost and sustain the AGOA. These observations highlight the CDM’s argument on the performance of the various IS in SSA under the AGOA.

➤ ***The Politicization ‘of’ and the Role of the Public ‘in’ the US-Ghana Relations***

The study found out that the US-Ghana relations have been politicized under the usual NPP-NDC rivalry [the two major parties] in Ghana. The NPP incited the public against the GITMO-2 under the NDC government to win votes [2016], while the NDC incited them against the SOFA under the NPP government to win votes [2020]. A key MFARI participant, for example, reported that the SOFA demonstrations prevented the NPP government to ‘fully cooperate’ with the US under the SOFA in 2018. However, the US military activities against terrorists in Ghana’s Northern border, he further asserted, “[...] is something that the public doesn’t know and if they were to withdraw a quarter of the support, Ghana will be exposed.” This, thus, suggests that the politicization of the US-Ghana relations undermines and subverts the quest to


promote and protect the *national interest* in Ghana. Similarly, Wu (2016) reported, the Taiwanese public staged a protest against the China-Taiwan Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement [CSSTA] in 2014: “The leaders of the student protesters even argue that the existing agreements between China and Taiwan would not be equipped with domestic law status, and should not be reviewed and passed by the Legislative Yuan [...]. Facing strong resistance and protests from domestic student groups, Ma’s administration could not blindly align with China just for more economic benefits. Ma and his strategists had to give serious consideration to the strong opposition voices, reflecting how democratic politics plays a critical role in Taiwan’s political development” (Wu, 2016: 486). In the context of strategic hedging, this underscores the power of the public as a *negative* or *restraining* power in IR.

➤ ***The Position of Ghana in the East-West Hegemonic Struggles***

The study found that Ghana, like the Middle East, is one of the strategic grounds on which the US-China hegemonic struggles unfold in the South. **First**, the then Chinese Ambassador to Ghana, Ambassador Sun, for example, observed that “[...] the Chinese side always views China-Ghana bilateral relations from a strategic and long-term perspective, and is committed to conducting cooperation with Ghana [...]” (Chinese Embassy, 2015). Similarly, the then US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, indicated that the US-Ghana relation [s] “[...] endures because of our history” (Pelosi, 2019). **Second**, the US and Chinese companies have been battling over the control of, inter alia, oil and gas in Ghana. Similarly, the US and China, according to Mackenzie (2010), Garlick and Havlova (2020), Zhengyu (2013), and Layne (2012), have been struggling over the control of oil in the Middle East. **Third**, the US and China have been struggling to gain strong military grounds in Ghana just as the US and China, according to

Zhengyu (2013) and Layne (2012), have been struggling to gain strong military grounds in the Middle East.

Furthermore, the current study found that President Donald Trump's hostile *remarks* and *policies* towards Ghana undermined US 'influence' in Ghana, paving the way for China to establish its 'influence' in Ghana. Notwithstanding, the US is Ghana's 'stronghold' against drug lords, pirates, and terrorists in West Africa. Equally, Bishara (2012) and Salman and Geeraerts (2015) observed, the US deployment of 'hard power' against Iraq [1991, 2003], the US threats to deploy 'hard power' against Iran [2002], and President Obama's talk of "red lines" during the Syrian conflict [2011] undermined US 'influence' in the Middle East, paving the way for China to establish its 'influence' in that region. Notwithstanding, the US, according to Garlick and Havlova (2020: 89), performs the "[...] role as the active security provider in the Persian Gulf'/Middle East. Finally, China's disputes with India and Vietnam over territories reduce its influence in Asia, allowing the US to establish its military supremacy in that region (Lee, 2012; Vidal and Pelegrín, 2018). The "position" of Ghana in the East-West hegemonic struggles is, thus, a 'strong' *force* in the North-South relations.



CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the summary of findings, conclusions, recommendations, contributions to knowledge and policy, and areas for further research: It begins with the *summary of findings*, *conclusions*, moves to deal with the *Recommendations*, and, then, turns to *contributions to knowledge and policy* and *areas for further research*.

7.1 Summary of Findings

7.1.0 Introduction

This study was designed to scrutinize how Ghana *manages* its relations with the US and *treads* a middle-road in the US-China hegemonic struggles. The study's objectives are: [a] To disentangle the dynamics of *conflict-and-cooperation* in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic, [b] To appraise the dynamics of Ghana's ironclad principle of *balanced neutrality* towards the US and China, [c] To disaggregate the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into 'Theoretical successes', 'Empirical successes', 'Side effects', and 'Backlash effects' under the AGOA, and [d] To scrutinize the extent to which Ghana is well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations. The study adopted the qualitative method to collect and analyze the primary data. This allowed the study's questions to *develop* and *refine*, thereby unraveling sensitive issues during the data gathering exercise. The qualitative method, thus, allowed the student to [a] develop *new* themes and [b] obtain an *in-depth* understanding of the

dynamics *of* the US-Ghana relations from the perspectives of the participants. The findings have been summarized in the up-coming pages.

7.1.1 Disentangling the Dynamics of Conflict-and-Cooperation in the US-Ghana Relations under the Fourth Republic

This section presents the first objective of the study, which sought to disentangle the dynamics of conflict-and-cooperation in the US-Ghana relations. The study found that the US-Ghana relations not only witnessed presidential visits [e.g. Clinton visited Ghana in 1998 and Rawlings visited the US in 1999] but were accompanied with major policy initiatives [e.g. YALI, PA] between *1990s and 2000s*. The Ghanaian youth, for example, had the chance to be trained in the US under the YALI. However, it witnessed the ‘shithole’ and ‘deportees’ conflicts, which restricted US visas and undermined US influence in Ghana in *2018 to 2019*. The *2020s and onwards* re-witnessed major official visits [e.g. Mr. Daleep Singh and his team visited Ghana] and policy initiatives. The US, for example, tasked Ghana to identify three [3] ‘cosmic’, ‘large-scale’, and ‘impactful’ projects to be undertaken under Biden’s B3W.

7.1.2 Appraising the Dynamics of Ghana’s Ironclad Principle of Balanced Neutrality towards the US and China

This section presents the second objective of the study, which sought to appraise the dynamics of Ghana’s ironclad principle of balanced neutrality towards the US and China. The study found that Ghana positions itself between Democracy (The West) and Socialism (The East). Besides, the declines in large scale US aid to Ghana prompted Ghana to ‘de-align’ with the US and ‘re-align’ with China in the areas *of* FDI and trade. The ITC Trade Map [Fig.6], for example, shows

that the values of Ghana's export into the US in 2003 up to 2011 topped the values of its exports into China within the same period. The Map, however, shows that Ghana's export into China in 2012 up to 2019 topped the values of its exports into the US in 2012 up to 2019. Besides, the GIPC data [Fig.5] shows that the US spent US\$1, 217.01 working on 26 projects, while China spent US\$1, 774.92 working on 68 projects in 2013-2014. Here, the US SPS measures and the US-Ghana skirmishes under Trump moved Ghana to 'de-align' with the US and 're-align' with China in the areas of FDI and trade.

7.1.3 Disaggregating the Impact Dynamics in the US-Ghana Relations into 'Theoretical Successes', 'Empirical Successes', 'Side Effects', and 'Backlash Effects' under the AGOA

This section presents the third objective of the study, which sought to disaggregate the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into 'theoretical successes', 'empirical successes', 'side effects', and 'backlash effects' under the AGOA. It found that, under the 'successes', the AGOA has contributed to: [a] upgrade Ghana's Electoral Commission [EC] to boost Ghana's democracy and [b] open the US market for Ghana to boost Ghana's exports. Under the 'side effects', however, the AGOA has worked to worsen, inter alia, sanitation and health [e.g. refrigerant poisoning] with the importation of US used products [e.g. refrigerator, iron, pants, inter alia] into Ghana. Finally, under the 'backlash effects', the AGOA has contributed to undermine local industries and traditional values in Ghana. The AGOA, for example, attempts to introduce LGBTQ+ into Ghana against the will of Ghanaians.

7.1.4 The Extent to which Ghana is well Positioned to take Advantage of the North-South Relations

This section presents the fourth objective of the study, which sought to scrutinize the extent to which Ghana is well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations. The study found that Ghana's ironclad principle of *balanced neutrality* is a strong [or positive] *force* in the US-Ghana relations. President Akufo-Addo, for example, travelled to China to sign the "One Belt One Road Memorandum of Understanding" with President Xi Jinping in 2018 and, then, switched to the US to *exploit* and *milk* President Biden's B3W in 2021. Then again, it found that the nation's 'moral defenses', its roller coaster economic growth, and swelling debts are weak *forces* in the US-Ghana relations. The nation's roller coaster economic growth, for example, almost always pushes it to solicit US/IMF support under weak 'moral defenses'. Finally, the study found that Ghana's monitoring and evaluation system, workforce, and infrastructure [road and energy] are weak [or negative] *forces* in the US-Ghana relations. The nation's workforce, for example, fails to meet international standards, which, in turn, undermines and subverts its ability to compete in the US market.

7.2 Conclusions

The study has been able to disentangle the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic. It believes that Ghana's position on the Anti-LGBTQ+ Bill—whether it accepts or rejects—has implications in the sub-region. The decision of Ghana on it—whether it accepts or rejects—may move other countries to follow suit within the sub-region, which is partly why the US seeks to reverse its passage in Ghana. The study makes the following conclusions based on the above findings, discussions, and summary.

❖ **Ups and Downs in the US-Ghana Relations**

The Fourth Republic witnessed conflict-and-cooperation just as the First Republic witnessed conflict-and-cooperation. This, thus, suggests that the US-Ghana relations are [a] characterized with ups [fruitful moments] and downs [turbulent moments] and [b] these ups and downs are ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ in the US-Ghana relations.

❖ **Salad of Outcomes**

Even though the AGOA works to resolve the bigger COVID-19 problem/virus in the health sector [the ‘success’], it triggers refrigerant poisoning within that health sector [the ‘side effect’]. Politically, though the AGOA promotes free and fair elections [the ‘success’], it subverts the power of the elected government to enforce its policies and laws in the business, health, and sanitation sectors [the ‘side effects’]. Then again, the AGOA, on the one hand, sustains Ghana on the path of democracy with its eligibility requirements [the ‘successes’] and, on the other hand, breaches the nation’s sovereignty to superimpose LGBTQ+ on it [the ‘backlash effects’]. Economically, the AGOA, on the one hand, builds the capacity of the local food and textile industries [the ‘successes’] and, on the other hand, subverts government industrialization policies [e.g. Planting for Food and Jobs] and collapses the local food, textile, and footwear industries [the ‘backlash effects’]. This shows that the US-Ghana relations are made up of ‘salad’ [a dish with mixture of vegetables] of outcomes.

❖ Long- and Short-Sightedness in the US-Ghana Relations

Some participants shortsightedly traced the GITMO-2 [2016] to Obama and LGBTQ+ [2021] to Biden without tracing them to the year Ghana signed onto the AGOA [2000]. In the AGOA, the US only outlined the issues in very ‘*broad*’ terms, leaving the ‘*specifics*’ for successive governments to deal with them in light of their worldviews. For example, it was Obama’s ‘commands’ under the GITMO-2 [2016] that allowed us to understand what the AGOA [2000] means by “[...] no country should receive the benefits of debt relief if that country does not cooperate with the United States on terrorism [...]” (AGOA, 2000: SEC.121 [b][5]). Then again, the more-than-two-decades old AGOA’s [2000] ‘command’ that Ghana must “[...] not engage in activities that undermine United States [...] foreign policy interests” (AGOA, 2000: Sec.104 [a][2]) was never understood until Joe Biden issued his LGBTQ+ ‘commands’ in 2021. The US developed the AGOA to achieve long term objectives, while Ghana signed onto it ‘*blindly*’ without looking into the future. This, thus, suggests that the US [drafter] displays long-sightedness, while Ghana [recipient] displays short-sightedness in the US-Ghana relations.

7.3 Recommendations

From the above findings, discussions, summary, and conclusions, the study makes the following recommendations.

First, in light of the First and Third Objectives, the study calls on Ghana to involve the UN in its negotiations with the US to help resolve the US-Ghana back-and-forth under the ‘backlash

effects’ [e.g. LGBTQ+]. The UN, for example, should be used to get the US to understand that Ghana operates within a certain cultural environment. In other words, it calls on Ghana to employ the laws of the UN to bind the US in the US-Ghana relations.

Second, in light of the Third Objective, it calls on the stakeholders [The US and Ghana] under the AGOA to review the AGOA through the lens of the CDM. During the interviews, some participants, having read some AGOA clauses to them, ‘yelled’ out to colleagues, “come and see what they have written.” This suggests that Ghanaian officers—especially following change of government—do not read to update themselves on treaties [e.g. the AGOA] the nation has signed and rectified. Consequently, the study calls on them to review these treaties through the lens of the CDM.

Third, some AGOA ‘antibodies’ such as boosting ‘infrastructure’ in Sub-Saharan Africa [SSA] (AGOA, 2000: SEC.123 [b][3]) remain under ‘delivered’ under Objective Three. In light of these shortfalls and deficits, the study calls on the US to help: [a] build roads, railway, and power lines within and across Ghana and SSA, [b] expand and intensify its capacity building programs, and [c] inject cash into SHFs and SMEs in Ghana. The railway lines, for example, will help reduce the stress *on* and the destruction *of* roads. This will go a long way to boost the position of Ghana in the US-Ghana relations.

Fourth, when the ‘Olympic Whistle’ was blown for the *North-South race* to begin in 1844 [the year in which the Gold Coast, Ghana, was *legally* colonized], those who blew that Whistle were

the very ones who rendered the *South* motionless, only freeing it in 1957 [the year in which Ghana gained its *independence*] to begin that *race*. The introduction of democracy must not usher us [Ghanaians] into a state of confusion: If, as a nation, we believe the *adage* that “two heads are better than one”, then, the emergence of two major parties/’two heads’ [i.e. NPP and NDC] under the Fourth Republic is arguably better than the emergence of one major party/’one head’ [i.e. CPP] under the First Republic. The politicization of the US-Ghana relations sacrifices *national interest* to serve *selfish interest*. Mathematically, the South [Ghana] needs hundred and thirteen [113] years to catch up with the North [UK/US]; therefore, the ‘two heads’ [NPP and NDC] must not be seen colliding over everything, but unite to disagree with the US over the ‘backlash effects’ in the *US-Ghana race*.

Finally, in light of Objective Three, the study calls on the US to: [1] undertake a post-GITMO-2 assessment to unravel the ‘**where about**’ of the two detainees in Ghana and [2] update Ghanaians on the ‘**where about**’ of the two detainees in Ghana. Ghanaians want to know the whereabouts of the two detainees in Ghana. During the interviews, most government participants do not seem to know the *whereabout* of the two detainees; it is a serious security matter that leadership does not seem to know the whereabouts of the detainees. The issue surrounding Aisha Huang—*when the President said he was not sure whether she was first deported and brought back*—reinforces this argument. The study, thus, calls on the US to investigate to wipe out rumors and, thus, allay fear and panic within Ghanaians.

7.4 Contributions to Knowledge and Policy

❖ Knowledge

- ✓ The study's new Concept—the CDM—fills the gaps in existing theories such as, among others, realism, liberalism, and hedging.
- ✓ The findings on the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations fill gaps in those who ignore the 'theoretical successes', 'empirical successes', 'side effects', and 'backlash effects' in the literature (e.g. Noer, 1984; Nwaubani, 2001; Schreer, 2013; Chan, 2019; Gerstl, 2020; Wu, 2016).

❖ Policy

- ✓ It identifies the key actors, together with their responsibilities, under the AGOA—i.e. The US [as the drafter] and Ghana [as the recipient]
- ✓ It opens the 'eyes' of the US and Ghana to review the AGOA through [1] the lens of the CDM and [2] consultation. Some scholars such as Thompson (2004) reported that the US drafted the AGOA without consulting Ghana. This study, thus, places a tool—the CDM—in the hands of the US and Ghana to review the AGOA and make amendments.

7.5 Areas for Further Research

This study provides potential areas for further research—i.e. disentangling the dynamics in the UK-Ghana and China-Ghana relations.



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UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE INTERVIEW DISCUSSION GUIDE

INTRODUCTION:

I am a PhD research student in Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon. My research topic is “Disentangling the Dynamics of Small Power-Big Power Relations: The Case of the US-Ghana Relations in the Fourth Republic.” The following questions have been designed to allow me disentangle the US-Ghana relations into ‘successes’, ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’. Please, provide accurate responses to these questions. The answers you provide remain confidential and will be used for academic purposes only.

Research Objectives

➤ **Main Objective**

To identify and explicate the dynamics in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic.

➤ **Specific Objectives**

- 1 To disentangle the dynamics of *conflict-and-cooperation* in the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic.
- 2 To appraise the dynamics of Ghana’s ironclad principle of *balanced neutrality* towards the US and China under the Fourth Republic.
- 3 To disaggregate the impact dynamics in the US-Ghana relations into ‘Theoretical Successes’, ‘Empirical Successes’, ‘Side Effects’ and ‘Backlash Effects’ under AGOA.
- 4 To scrutinize the extent to which Ghana is well positioned to take advantage of the North-South relations under the Fourth Republic.

SECTION A: BACKGROUND:

1. Gender: Male..... Female.....
2. Age:
25-30
30-35
35-40
40-45
45-50
50-55
55-60
60-65
65-70
70 and above
3. Education:
4. Religion:
5. Institution:
6. Position:

SECTION B: TO EXAMINE THE CONFLICT-COOPERATION IN THE US-GHANA RELATIONS UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

➤ **Diplomacy and Economic:**

1. Do you think ‘conflict’ and ‘co-operation’ are *necessary* in international relation?
2. How did President Bill Clinton’s visit to Ghana in 1998, President George W. Bush’s visit to Ghana in 2008 and President Obama’s visit to Ghana in 2009 contribute to strengthen the US-Ghana relations?
3. How do Ghanaian Presidents’ visits to the US strengthen the US-Ghana relations under the Fourth Republic?
4. How frequent do the politicians [Ministers and MPs] in the US and Ghana visit the US and Ghana under the Fourth Republic?
5. How frequent do the businessmen and women in the US and Ghana visit the US and Ghana under the Fourth Republic?
6. How are the US-Ghana relations structured—coercive-oriented [tit for tat] or co-operation-oriented [where even ‘sanctions’—*the conflict approach*—drags belligerent parties to the negotiating table—*the engagement approach*].
7. What often moves Ghana to adopt a balanced-engagement with the US and China under the Fourth Republic?

8. How would you describe President Trump’s remarks that some countries in Africa are “shithole” countries and that of President Akufo-Addo’s response that “We will not accept such insults, even from a leader of a friendly county, no matter how powerful”?
9. Did the remarks in question 7 undermine the political and economic relation between the US and Ghana afterwards?
10. In 2019, the US department of homeland security [DHS] and the department of state issued visa-sanctions against Ghanaians, including Ghanaian diplomats to the US, as a result of Ghana’s “lack of cooperation” in accepting the 7000 Ghanaians deported from the US Equally, in 2021, it was alleged that some MPs in Ghana have been denied US-visa because of their positions against the LGBTQ+ Bill. Do you see such instances as:
11. Are the allegations in question 9 true and did they also affect our economic relation with the US?
12. Do you think that President Trump’s remarks—some countries in Africa are “shithole” countries—and these visa-restrictions work to reduce the US influence in Ghana?
13. Examine the number of economic and political visits and agreements between the US and Ghana and the challenges involved in acquiring US visas
14. Outline some instances when Ghana sought to shape the interest and bind the US using the platform of the UN under the Fourth Republic
15. Economically, in which way does Ghana invoke the powers of the UN to resist and contain the US under the Fourth Republic?
16. Economically, in which ways does Ghana co-ordinate its balanced neutrality steps at the highest level of government?
17. In which way does Ghana tend to use its Jubilee Field to demote the spirit of aggressiveness and promote the spirit of friendliness between it, the US and China?
18. Do you think that the colonizer’s son/daughter, grandson/daughter and great grandson/daughter is **naturally** created to colonize and re-colonize the colonized’s son/daughter, grandson/daughter and great grandson/daughter in the North-South relation?
19. Do you think that the colonized’s son/daughter, grandson/daughter and great grandson/daughter is **naturally** created to be colonized and re-colonized in the North-South relation?
20. Under the Fourth Republic, do you recollect some instances of fierce disagreement [conflict] between Ghana and the US? If so, how was that disagreement [conflict] resolved?

➤ **Diplomacy and Military**

21. How did President Bill Clinton's visit to Ghana in 1998, President George W. Bush's visit to Ghana in 2008 and President Obama's visit to Ghana in 2009 contribute to strengthen the US-Ghana military relation?
22. How do Ghanaian Presidents' visits to the US strengthen the US-Ghana military relations under the Fourth Republic?
23. How would you describe the 'depth' of Ghana's military relations with the US under the Fourth Republic?
24. Is Ghana's military relation with the US meant to protect Ghana against (a) some external aggressions and (b) support the US against China in the future?
25. How would you describe the 'depth' of Ghana's military relations with China under the Fourth Republic?
26. Is Ghana's military relation with China meant to protect Ghana against (a) some external aggressions and (b) support the China against the US in the future?
27. Militarily, in which ways does Ghana co-ordinate its balanced neutrality steps at the highest level of government?
28. Militarily, in which way does Ghana invoke the powers of the UN to resist and contain the US under the Fourth Republic?
29. Does the US seek to examine the "parameters and extent of reform and modernization" within the Ghanaian military?
30. Which of the following countries tend to adopt aggressive methods in West Africa
 1. The U.S
 2. China

Do you think that the use of these methods reduces the influence of the **selected** country in Ghana? **YES/NO.**
Explain in either case.....
31. Does the US seek to superimpose limits on the China-Ghana relation in terms of military technology and arms transfers between Ghana and China?

SECTION C: TO EXAMINE THE ‘THEORETICAL SUCCESSES’ IN THE US-GHANA TREATY-BASED RELATION UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

The Act establishing AGOA offers the following ‘theoretical successes’ or ‘antibodies’ [something designed to boost Ghana’s ability to fight its developmental challenges] to boost Ghana’s overall development. **Please, comment on how the US works to realize these objectives in Ghana.**

➤ **Diplomacy and Economic**

- a. the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to US-Ghana trade and investment
- b. boosting regionalism in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa—e.g., the African Continental Free Trade Area
- c. strengthening the private sector in Ghana
- d. the facilitation of the development of civil societies and political freedoms in Ghana
- e. reduction of bribery in international trade
- f. the third country fabric provision
- g. the establishment of effective visa systems and provision of air traffic control equipment
- h. debt relief for Ghana
- i. technical assistance to Ghana in trade and investment
- j. funds for the construction of infrastructure in Ghana
- k. strengthening primary and vocational education in Ghana
- l. strengthening the health system in Ghana
- m. strengthening agriculture in Ghana
- n. the promotion of democracy, good governance and conflict resolution
- o. Promote environmental protection which will, in turn, promote economic growth
- p. elimination of desertification in Ghana

- q. Comment on the extent to which AGOA forums have worked to enhance the ‘antibodies’ [the theoretical successes], boost the empirical successes, normalize the side effects and eradicate the backlash effects’ since its inception.
- r. Which of the following do AGOA capacity building programs seek to promote most in West Africa?
 - a. The production and exportation of raw materials
 - b. The production and exportation of processed materials
- s. Did the US involve SSA/Ghana in the drafting of the ACT establishing AGOA?

➤ **Diplomacy and Military**

- t. training Ghana’s military in anti-transshipment
- u. training Ghana’s military in anti-terrorism warfare
- v. equipping Ghana’s military with the necessary technology and weapons
- w. technical assistance to Ghana’s military
- x. funds for the construction of military infrastructure in Ghana

SECTION D: TO ASSESS THE EXTENT TO WHICH GHANA IS WELL POSITIONED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE US-GHANA TREATY-BASED RELATION UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

➤ **Diplomacy and Economic**

The moral defenses—[defined as the ability of Ghana **to assert itself** during bilateral and multilateral negotiation—e.g., Ghana vs. US and Ghana in the UN]

1. How are diplomats appointed in Ghana—select either (a) largely appointed based on training in designated schools or (b) largely appointed based on political affiliations.
2. Comment on how the option selected, in the above question, work to either enhance or undermine their ability to assert themselves during diplomatic engagement with the outside world.
3. Briefly outline the extent to which the acts of oath-taking have worked to reinforce the ability of Ghanaian actors to assert themselves in bilateral relations with the US on trade and investment.
4. Did Ghana review and request for changes in the ‘antibodies’, ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’ before signing and rectifying the ACT of AGOA in 2000.

5. In which ways do corruption-levels, GDP, debt-to-GDP-ratio, inflations, etc. contribute to either enhance or undermine Ghana's moral defenses [the ability **to assert itself**] during bilateral relations on trade and investment?
6. The workforce—comment on the skills levels in Ghana vis-à-vis international standards/practices,
7. In which ways do the bureaucratic process involved in starting a business in Ghana [registration, acquisition of electricity, land acquisition etc.] contribute to either boost or undermine the business environment in Ghana?
8. Comment on the nature of our road network vis-à-vis the transportation of foodstuff in Ghana
9. Comment on Ghana's judicial system and the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the nation
10. What do you make of Ghana's energy-sector and its ability to support industries and businesses
11. Do you think that the private sector is strong enough to propel economic growth in Ghana?
12. Comment on Ghana's monitoring and evaluation system
13. Do you agree that a robust economic growth—high GDP performance, low government debts, sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio, adequate gold reserves etc.—in turn, boosts Ghana's ability to effectively hedge—i.e., build a robust bargaining power and military might—and thus, counter US exploitation, the threats of US hegemonic-declines, US military threats and take side in the event of War [WWIII] between the US and China and vice versa.
14. Which factors tend to propel US and China's interest in Ghana and (b) do you believe that the US and China's interests in Ghana may fade-off with the fading-off of the these propelling factors?
15. Do you believe that Ghana still remains the battle ground on which ideological battles—democracy and communism—unfold?
16. Do you believe that it remains the spring board on which the US and China spreads democracy and communism in the sub-region?
17. The US and China seek to extract oil in order to sustain overseas military operations—**NB: here, the student seeks to investigate the extent to which the US and Chinese**

companies struggle to take over the Ghanaian oil sector in terms of explorations and production.

18. It has enormous natural resources that help to attract the US and China
19. The strategic location of Ghana in West Africa
20. Can Ghana capitalize on these advantages—i.e., **a to f** under question 20—to **assert itself** before the US and China?
21. Do you think that **a to f** make Ghana to appear much more better “on the American radar” than, say, Togo, Nigeria or Ivory Coast in the sub-region?

➤ **Diplomacy and Military**

22. Briefly outline the extent to which the acts of oath-taking have worked to reinforce the ability of Ghanaian military diplomats to assert themselves in bilateral relations with the US on military engagement.
23. Did Ghana review and request for changes in military ‘antibodies’, ‘side effects’ and ‘backlash effects’ before signing and rectifying the ACT of AGOA in 2000.
24. In which ways do corruption-levels, GDP, debt-to-GDP-ratio, inflations, etc. contribute to either enhance or undermine Ghana’s moral defenses [the ability **to assert itself**] during bilateral relations on military engagement?
25. Does Ghana act/serve as the spring board on which the US and China collaborate to battle with and defeat jihadist incursions?
26. The views have been expressed that the US-Ghana military relation may trigger the anger of West-African terrorist groups against Ghana. Do you believe that Ghana is well prepared to take on these terrorist groups in future?
27. Rate Ghana’s immune system
 - a. Strong
 - b. Moderately strong
 - c. weak

NB: A weak IS [immune system] refers to: 1) weak moral defenses, 2) a low-skilled workforce, 3) deplorable road networks, 4) a weak judicial system, 5) weak intellectual-property-rights laws, 6) a weak energy-sector, 7) a weak private sector and 8) a weak monitoring and evaluation system *while* a strong IS [immune system] refers to: 1) strong moral defenses, 2) a high-skilled workforce, 3) excellent road networks, 4) a strong judicial system, 5) strong intellectual-property-rights laws, 6) a strong energy-sector, 7)

a strong private sector and (8) a strong monitoring and evaluation system. The moderately strong IS stands in between the strong IS and the weak IS.

SECTION E: TO EXAMINE THE ‘EMPIRICAL SUCCESSES’ IN THE US-GHANA TREATY-BASED RELATION UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

Comment on the extent to which AGOA has worked to translate the ‘theoretical successes’ into ‘empirical successes’ over the past two decades. On the one hand, do you think that the US has been instrumental in supporting Ghana under these ‘antibodies’ and, on the other hand, do you think that Ghana has been able to translate these ‘antibodies’ [the ‘theoretical successes’] into ‘empirical successes’?

➤ **Diplomacy and Economic**

- a. the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to US-Ghana trade and investment
- b. boosting regionalism in Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa—e.g., African Continental Free Trade Area
- c. strengthening the private sector in Ghana
- d. the facilitation of the development of civil societies and political freedoms in Ghana
- e. reduction of bribery in international trade
- f. the third country fabric provision
- g. the establishment of effective visa systems and provision of air traffic control equipment
- h. debt relief for Ghana
- i. technical assistance to Ghana in trade and investment
- j. funds for the construction of infrastructure in Ghana
- k. strengthening primary and vocational education in Ghana
- l. strengthening the health system in Ghana
- m. strengthening agriculture in Ghana
- n. the promotion of democracy, good governance and conflict resolution
- o. Promote environmental protection which will, in turn, promote economic growth
- p. elimination of desertification in Ghana

- q. In Ghana, do you think that AGOA's trade and investment represented "powerful tools both for economic development and for encouraging broader participation in a political process in which political freedoms..." flourished since its inception in 2000?

➤ **Diplomacy and Military**

- r. Ghana's successes in anti-transshipment
- s. Ghana's successes in anti-terrorism warfare
- t. Ghana's successes in military technology and weapons
- u. Successes with US technical assistance to Ghana's military
- v. Successes with the construction of military infrastructure in Ghana under the auspices of the US

SECTION F: TO SCRUTINIZE THE 'SIDE EFFECTS' AND 'BACKLASH EFFECTS' IN THE US-GHANA TREATY-BASED RELATIONS UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

The Act establishing AGOA contains the following 'side effects' [something that lacks the ability to colonize Ghana under AGOA, but produces some 'headache' to the US-Ghana relations] and 'backlash effects' [something that has the ability to re-colonize Ghana under AGOA]. Please, comment on the extent to which these side effects and backlash effects work to undermine Ghana's quest to boost its **economy** and build its **military** under AGOA.

➤ **Diplomacy and Economic**

- a. side effect—reduction/elimination of government control: how does this weaken government control in areas such as safety and health standards
- b. Side effect—the removal of trade barriers to US trade: how does this open the way for the influx of US home used products into Ghana?—e.g., the Out-of-Cycle Review.
- c. Side effect—comment on the impact of (a) and (b) on the environment, health and the energy sectors in Ghana?
- d. Side effect—what are the impacts of AGOA's rule of origin to Ghanaian traders under AGOA?
- e. Backlash effect—AGOA requires Ghana to refrain from activities that undermine US national and foreign policy interest: comment on how this provision undermines Ghana's ability to assert itself during bilateral and multilateral negotiations on trade and investment—e.g., Ghana's ability to assert itself in the UN on important issues.
- f. Are there some red-lines that cannot be crossed in the US-Ghana economic relation and, if so, how do the two parties enforce these red-lines against themselves under the Fourth Republic

➤ **Diplomacy and Military**

- g. The Act establishing AGOA states that a country shall not be eligible if it not “...provide support for acts of international terrorism and cooperates in international efforts to eliminate ... terrorist activities”, compelling Ghana to accept GITMO-2 in 2016. Do you see this as a serious side effect where the nation had to accept terrorists who are now living within us, marring us and producing or establishing a community whose future motive—good or bad—cannot be determined?
- h. Side effect—do you think that Ghana’s co-operation with the US on terrorism tend to produce public fear and panic—e.g., GITMO-2 (2016) and the Status of Forces Agreement (2018).
- i. Side effect—comment on the extent to which you find public protest in response to the US-Ghana relations a serious ‘threat’ to government business in Ghana?—e.g., under GITMO-2 (2016).
- j. Are these public protests justified given that the ratio of police-to-citizen ratio does not meet UN standards?
- k. Backlash effect—AGOA requires Ghana to refrain from activities that undermine US national and foreign policy interest: comment on how this provision undermines Ghana’s ability to assert itself during bilateral negotiations on military engagement—e.g., Ghana’s ability to assert itself in the UN on important issues.
- l. Backlash effect—AGOA requires Ghana not to spend “...excessively on it military”: comment on the extent to which this provision undermines Ghana’s ability to build its military in a ways that allow it to hedge, tackle jihadist incursions, withstand US military aggressiveness in the future and take side during a decisive war between the US and China in the future.
- m. In West Africa, the US-Ghana military relation is largely intended to deal with.....
- n. Backlash effect—do you see the prospects of jihadist attacks on Ghana as a result of its relations with the US?
- o. Are there some red-lines that cannot be crossed in the US-Ghana military relation and, if so, how do the two parties enforce these red-lines against themselves under the Fourth Republic

SECTION G: TO SCRUTINIZE THE ‘ROLE’ OF THE PUBLIC IN THE US-GHANA TREATY-BASED RELATION UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC.

1. Do you support Ghana's relations with the outside world?
2. Did the US-Ghana relations under GITMO-2 [2016] and the Status of Forces Agreement [2018] cause some fear and panic in you? **Explain how you actually felt.....**
3. How did you get to know about GITMO-2 and the Status of Forces Agreement?
4. Did you directly [you joined the demonstrations] or indirectly [you did not join, but you supported it] take part in the public demonstrations against the US-Ghana relations under GITMO-2 in 2016?
 - i. Explain, either YES or NO.....
5. Did you directly [you joined the demonstrations] or indirectly [you did not join, but you supported it] take part in public demonstrations against the US-Ghana relations under GITMO-2 and the Status of Forces Agreement in 2018?
 - i. Explain, either YES or NO.....
6. Outline the impacts of the 2016 and the 2018 public demonstrations on public properties in Ghana
7. In which ways did your actions [i.e., the demonstrations] in 2016 and 2018 work to influence governments' actions under those agreements?
8. If your demonstration fails to influence the government to change course, would you vote against it?
9. Did you vote against the governments because of GITMO-2 [2016] and the Status of Forces Agreement [2018] in the past elections?
10. Today—2022, do you think that the information [from the media, friends, politicians] which led you to engage in the demonstrations against GITMO-2 in 2016 and the Status of Forces Agreement in 2018 was **[right]** or **[wrong]**?
 - i. Explain, either YES or NO
11. Which factors tend to propel your actions [demonstrations] against the US-Ghana military relations in Ghana?
12. The US and China are currently embroiled in a struggle to attain hegemony—i.e., lead the world economically, politically, militarily and technologically. Explain why you think Ghana should either take side or not take side in this struggle.

13. In which way does your religion support your action [demonstrations] against the US-Ghana relations?
14. In which way does the Ghanaian socio-cultural environment—culture in general, bills on LGBTQ+, receptiveness of Ghanaians—align or de-align itself with that of the US?
32. Do you think that the colonizer's son/daughter, grandson/daughter and great grandson/daughter is **naturally** created to colonize and re-colonize the colonized's son/daughter, grandson/daughter and great grandson/daughter in the North-South relation?
33. Do you think that the colonized's son/daughter, grandson/daughter and great grandson/daughter is **naturally** created to be colonized and re-colonized in the North-South relation?

Thank you.

