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MANAGEMENT

**POLITICISATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR BUREAUCRATS IN
GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, **ABUBAKARI MOHAMMED** declare solemnly that apart from other literary works cited which are duly referenced and acknowledged, this dissertation has been the aftermath of my original research work, at the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management. No part of this work has been submitted to any institution for the award of any other degree.



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ABSTRACT

Ghana has been touted as a beacon of democracy, good governance, and a story of hope for Africa and other developing nations in the world. This is largely due to the successes it has chalked in consolidating its democracy, through successful and successive elections since 1992. However, Ghana appears not to have a strong, effective, and efficient public sector. Whereas there is no single factor that has compromised the quality and effectiveness of the public sector, one cannot disregard politicisation as one of the contributory factors. The study sought to examine why the appointment of heads of public institutions is politicised and the long-term implications in Ghana's fourth republic. The study adopted an exploratory approach in qualitative research and primary data was augmented into relevant secondary data. It sampled eighteen (18) respondents through face-to-face interviews using semi-structured interview guides on respondents from the field of Academia, Think tanks/CSOs and the Public Service. Empirically the study found out that politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats has been around for a long time and the causal factors are colonial legacy, trust and loyalty, party support, clientelism, patronage, and cronyism. It was also found out that the practice has intensified in the fourth republic due to the Winner-Takes-All nature of the 1992 constitution, creation of "jobs for the boys", campaign resources and loyalty, moneycracy associated with political campaigning, patronage, clientelism, and the involvement of bureaucrats into politics. Again, it was realized that politicisation has indirectly affected the mandate of most public sector organizations, stifle development, affects public sector reforms and has the tendency of injuring Ghana's fledgling democracy. Participants believe that strengthening of existing laws will help curb this phenomenon. The study among other things recommended that incremental policies, bureaucratic autonomy and a review of the president's power of appointment would help minimize politicisation in Ghana's bureaucratic set-up.

CERTIFICATION


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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my wife, children, and parents.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BNI	Bureau of National Investigations
CD	Chief Director
CDD	Centre for Democratic Governance
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CGP	Central Governance Project
CLOSSAG	Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana
COCOBOD	Ghana Cocoa Board
CSAPR	Civil Service Annual Performance Report
CSC	Civil Services Commission
CRC	Constitutional Review Commission
DFID	Department for International Development
DP	Development Partners
FSHS	Free Senior High School
GoG	Government of Ghana
GPHA	Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority
HCS	Head of Civil Service
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
IO	International Organizations
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	New Patriotic Party
PI	Public Institutions

PSC	Public Services Commission
PSR	Public Sector Reform
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SA	Special Assistance
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank
WTA	Winner-Takes-All

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 General Introduction

The study focuses on the reasons accounting for the politicisation of heads of Public Institutions (PI) in Ghana's fourth republic. This chapter looks at the study background, problem statement, objectives, and research questions. The chapter will further look at the significance of the study, its limitations, as well as the organization of the study.

1.1 Background

Ghana has been touted as a beacon of democracy, good governance, and a story of hope for Africa and other developing countries in the world. This is largely due to the successes it has chalked in consolidating its democracy, through successful and successive elections since 1992 and for its record of good governance and respect for human rights, which are key pillars of democracy (Sithole, 2012). Ghana's reputation as a model African democracy owes much to its ability to change governments through the ballot box and its enviable title of promoting human rights, free speech, a strong media, civil society organizations, and high regard for rule of law (Gyampo, Ofori-Mensah & Owusu Mensah., 2013).

However, Ghana does not have a strong, effective, and efficient public sector (Ayee, 2018). Whereas there is no single factor that has compromised the quality and effectiveness of the public sector, one cannot disregard politicisation as one of the contributory factors. A fundamental myth, in the running of the public sector in Ghana, is the supposed interference, of governments in toying with the sector, as and when they deem necessary and in some cases when there is a change of government from one democratically elected political party to another, one such area of interest is the "proceed on leave, constructive dismissal, transfer,

sacking and/or resigning for alleged inefficiency” of Chief Executive Officers, Chief Directors and other Heads of Public Services who are protected by the 1992 constitutions, and other Acts of Parliament (Ayelazuno, 2019).

The public sector in Ghana has attracted the interest and concern of politicians, citizens, public servants, and development partners (DP) since independence, the reason being that, as exemplified by the Asian development states, no country can make meaningful stride towards its development and governance capacity without retooling its public sector to be a professional, meritocratic and effective one, capable of delivering value for money (Ayee, 2018). Therefore, for Ghana to develop, it must strengthen its public sector, to a strong, effective, and efficient one devoid of government interference in its management.

The return to multiparty democracy in 1992 has witnessed transitions being marred with tension, rancour, ill-feeling and smacked of a military takeover. (Asante, 2019; Joyce, 2015; Ninsin 2016). This has resulted in major shake-ups in both the political and administrative set-ups of the country with personal being asked to proceed on leave and some transferred to other less glamorous institutions (Aryee, 2013). However, Asante (2019), Joyce (2015) and Nkansah (2012) believe that it should be attributable to the lack of a legal document guiding political transitions in Ghana.

In 2017 however, not even the passage of the Presidential Transition Act 2012 (Act 854), as amended in October 2016 saved matters (Ayee, 2018). Some heads of public institutions suffered the same fate as the previous transitions (Asante, 2019; Joyce, 2015). Ayee (2018), believes that the Act was either misinterpreted, misapplied, or was not followed, further

aggravating the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats. Ofori-Mensah (2016) describes the Act as having numerous problems but singled out Section 14 as worrying.

Section 14 of the Presidential Transition Act 2012 (Act 845), requires the chief executives or director-general (however described) of public boards or corporations to cease to hold office upon the assumption of office by a person elected as President of the Republic of Ghana (Graphiconline, 2019). Even though, the removal of these officeholders is explicitly stated in Article 191 of the 1992 constitution. Article 191 (b) states: “A member of the public service shall not be dismissed or removed from office or reduced in rank or otherwise punished without a just cause” (1992 Constitution of Ghana). The establishing Acts of the various public institutions particularly the condition of services spells out the condition under which an officer may be dismissed or his/her appointment tempered with. Even though Article 195 Clause 1 of the Constitution gives the President of the Republic the power to appoint public service officers, it does so with the advice of the governing board of the specific corporation, “given in consultation with the Public Services Commission” (1992 constitution of Ghana).

Worth mentioning is the fact that the Supreme Court of Ghana has brought a finality to the inconsistency brought forth by Section 14 of the Presidential (Transition) Act 2012 (Act 845), in its ruling, in the petition filed by, Mr. Theophilus Donkor. The plaintiff as a result of the large-scale dismissals of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and other senior bureaucrats by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo after assuming Office in 2017 invoked the original, interpretative jurisdiction of the supreme court to seek an interpretation of Article 2(1) and 130 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. The reliefs sought were to the effect that CEOs of public corporations and institutions under Article 190 Clause 1(b) of the 1992 constitution, are part of the Public Services of Ghana and thus their appointments are therefore protected by the

constitution. The Plaintiff further declared that the removal of CEOs of public corporations based on the assumption of the Office of a new president was not “a just cause” as envisaged under Article 191(1b) of the constitution.

The Supreme Court unanimously granted the above reliefs and also declared that: “...section 14 of the Presidential Transition Act 2012 (Act 845) requires all Chief Executives, Chief Executive Officers, Director-Generals (howsoever called) and members of governing boards of public corporations to cease to hold office merely on account of the assumption of office of the person elected as President of the Republic of Ghana, the said section 14 is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, particularly Articles 70(1)(d)(iii), 190 and/or 191(b) of the Constitution” (Donkor v Attorney General, 2017 Writ No: J1/08/2017, 12/06/19).

The court, however, indicated that members of governing boards of statutory boards and corporations appointed per article 70(1)(d)(iii) of the Constitution are not members of the Public Service and their tenure is not governed by articles 191 and 195 of the Constitution. (Donkor v Attorney General, 2017 Writ No: J1/08/2017, 12/06/19).

This ruling has the effect of restraining future presidents from dismissing CEOs of State institutions. Whether this will bring finality to the issue of axing heads of public institutions can best be answered in the next major transition.

1.2 Research Problem

Most scholarly works seem to suggest that the politicisation of the public sector in Ghana cannot be disregarded when considering the factors that account for the dwindling nature of the Ghanaian bureaucratic set-up (Ayee, 2018; Ayelazuno, 2019). This has a long history,

dating back to independence, as aptly stated by Quartey (2007), Cited in Asamoah and Yeboah-Assiamah (2018:8)

“The trend started under the First Republic when Dr. Eustace Akwei, the first Ghanaian Director of Medical Services was dismissed by Dr. Nkrumah on some flimsy charges which were not even properly investigated. Under the Second Republic, as many as 568 public servants were dismissed at a go”

It has however been very rife since the inception of the fourth republic (Asamoah & Yeboah-Assiamah, 2018).

Anecdotal evidence points to the fact that the electoral transitions in the fourth republic notably in 2000, 2008, and 2016 have witnessed a constant politicisation because senior bureaucrats and other public servants were sacked or asked to proceed on leave by presidential fiat, thereby extending the acrimonious nature of party campaign being adopted by the two leading political parties the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) to the bureaucratic set-up of the country (Ayee, 2018).

For instance, in the year 2001, after urging all hands-on deck in his maiden speech to parliament on January 7th, 2001, president Kufuor through his finance minister Mr. Osafo-Mafo sent the heads of six state-run financial and insurance institutions on forced leave and went ahead to replace the Chief Executive Officer of Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), John Newman, by the body's deputy chief executive, Sam Appiah who was in charge of marketing. (Reuters-Abidjan, 2001 as reported by Ghanaweb, 2001).

Similarly, In 2009, President Mills promised to be a father for all, but just six days into his administration on Tuesday, 13 January 2009, 30 Civil Servants were sacked on the orders of his transition team, the dismissed civil servants were A5 Foreign Service officers at the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs who received their appointment letters and had been officially sworn into office, “Ministry sources said the Mills' Transition Team Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs had expressed doubts about their political affiliation” their dismissal letters were copied to Dr. Tony Aidoo, Chairman of the Government Transition Sub-Committee on Foreign Affairs (Opoku, 2009 cited in Ghanaweb 2009).

In 2017 following the defeat of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in the 2016 general elections, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) and the Director-General of the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority (GPHA) had their appointments terminated, while the Chief Executive of the Ghana Gas Company was asked to proceed on terminal leave effective 1st February 2017 (Graphiconline, 2017).

Analytically there have been several works that attempted to ascribe meaning and explain the politicisation of public bureaucracy in Ghana's fourth republic and the period before. Gyampo and Graham (2017) and Ijon (2019) describe Ghana's current political dispensation as a “Winner-Takes-All” (WTA) a worrying phenomenon for both the citizens and policymakers as well as development patterns. According to Gyampo (2015), the 1992 Constitution grants extensive powers to the President in appointing several officials and agencies of the state in a manner that makes these bodies somewhat his appendages. Again, Ayelazuno (2019) believes that the awesome powers to appoint and sack, known in recent political discourses in Ghana as “the power to appoint and disappoint” public officials make them serve at the pleasure of the government rather than being neutral. Abdulai and Hickey (2016) describe the nature of the political system since 1992, as competitive clientelism. One key feature of competitive clientelism relating to Ghana is the politicisation of state institutions, which has crippled the effectiveness of the state capacity (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017a). Thus, to them, the nature of the

political system has given rise to politicisation in Ghana over the past two decades. Ayee (2013) and Kopecký (2012) have also contributed by looking at how the patronage system in Ghana has led to the politicisation of the Ghanaian public sector. Kopecký on his part did a comparative study of Ghana and South Africa and concluded that the patronage system is very rife in Ghana. A situation he blames on both the NDC and the NPP. Anaman (2016), Nissin (2016 & 2006), Gyampo et al. (2013), and Nkansah (2012) have also examined the transfer of power in Ghana's transition and its associated challenges in the Fourth Republic. Again, scholars like, Gyampo et al. (2013) and Ofori-Mensah (2013) also studied how the Transitional bill in Ghana was implemented in 2013.

Despite the insights from the foregone studies, there seems to be little research on the politicisation of the appointment of Chief Directors, and other heads of public institutions in Ghana, especially during an electoral transition in Ghana as chronicled above from 2001 to 2017. The closest has been the works of Appiah and Abdulai (2017b) and Asamoah and Yeboah-Assiamah (2018) which looked at the relationship between politics and Administration. This research however seeks to look at the politicisation of the appointment of chief directors and other heads of public institutions and its implications on Ghana's development.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

The main objective of the study is to examine why the appointment of heads of Public Institutions (PI) is politicised and the long-term implications in Ghana's fourth republic.

1.3.2 Specific Objective

Specifically, the study seeks to:

1. Examine why the appointment of heads of public institutions is politicised in Ghana.
2. Examine the implications of politicisation of the appointment of heads of public institutions on developmental policies and reforms.
3. Identify the appropriate policy guidelines to curb the politicisation of the appointment, of heads of public institutions in Ghana's fourth republic.

1.4 Research Questions

The study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Why is the appointment of heads of public institutions politicised in Ghana?
2. What are the implications of the politicisation of the appointment of heads of public institutions on developmental policies and reforms?
3. What appropriate policy guidelines will help curb the politicisation of the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions in Ghana's fourth republic?

1.5 Significance of the Study

The contribution of this study can be viewed along three strands: research, practice, and policy/legislation. Concerning contribution to research, the study goes beyond current research on the politicisation of the public sector, the winner-take-all (WTA) system, problems of political transition, clientelism and patronage in Ghana, to dealing with the politics of sacking heads of the public institutions and document the very reason why their employment contracts are politicized. The findings of the study contribute to the existing body of data on the politics and management of the public sector in Ghana and beyond and provide a future research direction in this area.

Concerning contribution to Ghana's governance system, empirical data of the study is useful to governmental agencies as well as all stakeholders contributing to Ghana's governance system and management of the public sector. The outcomes and findings of this study also provide a sense of direction for donor agencies and non-governmental organizations that may collaborate with state agencies towards achieving the good governance element of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Concerning contribution to policy and legislation, this study responds to practicable situations, on the politics of sacking heads of the public institution in Ghana and document the very reason why, elected officials, continue to interfere in the workings of the bureaucratic set-up, and help shape future policy directions.

1.6 Research Limitation

The study focuses on why the appointment of heads of public institutions are politicised in Ghana's fourth republic, the study is therefore limited in scope, difficulty in assessing secondary and primary data, time constraints and the associated implications of Corona Virus (Covid-19).

1.7 Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter one entails the introduction of the study which details the background of the study, statement of the research problem, objectives of the study, research questions, significance of the study, the scope of the study, limitations of the study, and organization of the study. The second chapter reviews the relevant theoretical and related empirical literature on the topic. Chapter three detailed the research methodology used for the study, which includes the research design, data collection methods, yardstick for the

data analysis, and discussion. It further highlights the strategy and paradigm and discussion of sample techniques and size. The Fourth chapter covers an overview of the politicisation of Ghana's Public Sector (PS) and interference by elected officials, it also presents a detailed analysis of the research, data presentation, interpretation, and discussion of the collected data. Chapter five gives a summary of the findings, implication of the study on literature, theory and development, conclusion, recommendations, and suggested areas for further research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This section encompasses the theoretical framework made up of theory(s) explaining the phenomenon under study and a review of significant literature relating to electoral transitions and politicisation of Ghana's bureaucracy in the fourth republic.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This section presents the framework underpinning this study. Being a political concept, several concepts such as coalition theory, winner-takes-all (WTI), and many other theories can be used to explain the transition and politicisation of bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the political settlement and the politics-administration dichotomy theories are adopted to expound the phenomenon under study.

2.1.1 Political Settlement Theory

For many decades, the political settlement theory did not catch the attention of many scholars until Mushtaq Khan popularize it in the early 1990s with his series of works on development (Bell, 2015). Political settlement theory argues that fierce conflict stabilizes only on the condition that resources, opportunities, or benefits that are of political (positions) or business in nature are consistent with the distribution of power in a society (Cheng., Goodhand & Meehan, 2018; David & Sagnayeva, 2019). To the Department for International Development-DFID (2010), it is the appreciation of a common understanding forged, mostly between the governing elites of a country, about how power is distributed and organized. They include all the formal institutions for managing the political and economic relations like the electoral process, parliament, peace agreements, constitutions, market regulations as well as several

informal arrangements of a country, which often are tacit agreements that back the political system. In effect, the political settlement creates the basic rules that govern economic relations and resource allocation (DFID, 2010). On their part, Di John and Putzel (2009) opined that political settlement is a power distribution channel that a contending social grouping or class that forms the basis of the state. However, Khan (2010:4) defines a political settlement as “a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and sustainable in terms of economic and political viability”. To achieve this the governing class (elite) shape the outcomes and influence the worldview of others, through powers that emanate from overwhelming support for elections, affluence, and the ability to cause violence or wage war (Rao, 2010).

According to Abdulai (2020:4), there are two broad dimensions to political settlements:

“The first is dominant ruler/party settlements where power is highly concentrated among a narrow ruling elite, such that there is little prospect of the ruling coalition losing power in the near future” and secondly “is competitive clientelism, where power is distributed more widely among elite groups and there is a high likelihood that ruling political elites can be replaced by excluded elite factions in the short to medium term”

This research, however, uses Khan’s Clientelist’s Political Settlement theory to explain how and why the Ghanaian bureaucracy is politicized in the fourth republic, where formal procedures exist but are disregarded by elected political leaders to suit their whims and caprices. According to Abdulai and Hickey (2016), Ghana’s political system since 1992 can best be described as one churning the path of competitive clientelism. Amongst the distinctive feature of the competitive clientelist settlement of political system, relates to the politicisation of the bureaucratic state institution through patronage appointments, which has a grave consequence for state capacity and of the bureaucracy of the state (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017a).

Given the time to clutch on to power and the seeming threat of losing power not to talk of the four-year election period given by the constitution in Ghana, political leaders have little or no incentive to equip in the futuristic policy of building the capacity of the bureaucratic institutions (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017a; Levy, 2014). In the quest for perpetuating their stay amid a competitive opposition, the ruling elite will ordinarily use the public bureaucratic structure as a means through which “the discretionary allocation of rents: market privileges; patronage public employment; single-sourced procurement contracts; preferential access to natural resources” (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017a:8).

2.1.2 The Theory of Politics-Administration Dichotomy

One of the popular theories in the realm of public administration is the theory of politics-administration dichotomy. It has existed for over a century but remains one of the most disputable and strange concepts amongst the scholars of public administration (Tahmasebi & Musavi, 2011). Over the years, it has taken centre stage in advancing the debate in public administration and other fields of study that one may think would have been exhaustive, yet it never goes away (Svara & Overeem, 2006). At the core of this debate is the way and manner political leaders and administrators relate or ought to relate (Tahmasebi & Musavi, 2011). This was put in motion when Woodrow Wilson, proposed to separate the field of administration from political institutions. To him,

“The field of administration is a field of business. It is removed from the hurry and strife of politics... Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the administration tasks, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices” (Wilson, 1887:18, cited in Tahmasebi & Musavi, 2011:131).

As alluded earlier, scholars were divided on whether politics should stay away from the realms of administration or not and have therefore contributed to the debate in the following manner: Woodrow Wilson's aim according to Stillman (1973) was to insulate the politicisation and interference of party organisations from the realm of administrative affairs of the state. Again, he was protecting politicians but was strengthening administration (Svara, 1998). Wilson advances his argument in his book, *The Study of Administration* by explaining government to mean public administration as the detailed and systematic execution of public law, but the general laws are outside of and above administration. That the broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative (Wilson, 1966).

Ironically, in his later writings on the subject matter, Wilson welcomed the idea that politics and administration should act side by side to improving the state (Martin, 1988). That notwithstanding, his overarching aim was to promote democracy in a manner that the excesses of democracy will not be the burden of administration (Yang & Holzer, 2005).

Frank Goodnow (1900) disregarded the three functions of government but instead conceptualize it into two, thus the expression of the popular will and the execution of that will, that both can be separated because the function of politics was to express the will and that of the demonstration was to execute the will. He further asserted that political control of the administration would render the latter ineffective (Tahmasebi & Musavi, 2011). Many scholars believe that both Wilson and Goodnow advocated for the separation of politics and administration to eliminating the spoils system, political appointments of administrators, and patronage (Caiden, 1984; Rosenbloom, 2008).

Marx Weber, in contributing his bit to the debate of politics-administration dichotomy as opposed to the thinking of Wilson and Goodnow, argued that administration is the most powerful of the two and that it will be dangerous for politics to be admitted in administration (Tahmasebi & Musavi, 2011) and further advocated for the separation of the two (Weber, 1968). To him, the civil servant should not be partisan but be neutral and the politician must not be allowed to interfere with the workings of the civil servant. Thus, to the above, they aimed to keep partisan politics out of the realm of administration but not to distinctly keep them at bay (Van Riper, 1984).

Later scholars, however, diverged from the earlier views espoused by Wilson and Goodnow. Scholars like Caiden (1984), Golembiewski (1977), and Van Riper (1984) argue that the ideas of separating politics from the administration were not feasible and accuse the proponents of the theory as defining it in a narrow sense which typifies the mappings of their time. Van Riper (1984) for instance, argues that it was made possible to suit the scientific management process which was a feature of administration at the time.

In sum, however, the separation of politics from the administration was to reduce the politics in the administrative process of a country's bureaucracy by recommending technical competence, neutrality, and hierarchy (Demir & Nyhan, 2008).

2.1.3 Practicality of the Theories on the Study


The two theories complement in finding answers to the questions posed by this research. The political settlement theory (Clientelist Political Settlement) as adopted for this study explains how power dynamics (most especially in electoral transition) affect the appointment of senior bureaucrats in Ghana. Specifically, it shows how the political elite's desire to winning the next

election affects the distribution of positions to party loyalists within the Ghanaian public sector, thereby promoting clientelism and patronage. This assertion has been greatly supported by the works of scholars like Abdulai and Hickey (2016), Appiah and Abdulai, (2017a) and Levy, (2014).

The adoption of the theory of politics-administration dichotomy, on the other hand, alludes to the concern that administrators must be left to run the bureaucratic set-up of the country based on the tenets of competence, neutrality, hierarchy and autonomy (Demir & Nyhan, 2008). That even though the government has been given the extensive power of appointment under the 1992 constitution, the ruling elite ought to respect the roles of bureaucratic bodies like the Public Services Commission in the appointment and or sacking of senior bureaucrats. Thus, politicians set the agenda but the execution must be left in the hands of a neutral and autonomous administrator, thereby limiting politics in the administrative process of the state.

Finally, the application of the theories alludes to the assertion that politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats, is made possible due to the extensive powers of the president under the 1992 constitution and the Winner-Takes-All (WTA) nature of the 1992 constitution.

Figure 2. 1: The Nexus of Political Settlement and Politics-Administration Dichotomy



Source: Author's Construct (2020)

The construct above depicts the nexus of the two theories on the study. From the construct, Clientelist Political Settlement influences the nature of the Political elite and vice versa. Politics-Administration Dichotomy tends to limit the influence of politics on the administrative set-up of the country, labeled as (A). However, the extensive power of appointment and the Winner-Takes-All nature of the 1992 constitution being influenced by the Clientelist Political Settlement, leads to the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats, hence the administrative set-up of the country.

2.2 Electoral Transitions

The political history of the world has evolved to its current state through a wave of transitions. One such transition is an electoral transition which is synonymous with democracy. Defining or explaining transition is a daunting task due to the activities constituting the process of transition and the types of transitions espoused by many scholars. According to Jubb (2001) in Asante (2019:10), a transition is made up of inter-party transition- “where presidential office experiences a change of party control” and Intra-party transition- “where the party in power is successful in retaining political power”. Political transition according to Hogue (2016) is the handing over of political power from one presidential administration to another. Anaman (2016) believes that transition in politics is centred on a democratic regime and is based on the rule of law and the conduct of multi-party elections. According to Gyampo et al. (2013:3), a transition is the

“The administrative and political processes by which an incoming government emerges, the outgoing hands over the government to the incoming leadership and the incoming president, in the case of Ghana, takes over power to form a new government which covers a time frame, activities and processes to elect a leader and transfer the governance of a country from one administration to another”

Transitions in Ghana has created a block of winners and losers amongst the ruling elite, and the practicality of this is felt in the entitlement of the transfer of political and administrative powers from a group of ruling elites either from the same political party or from another political party (Ninsin, 2016). The fourth republic, even though has witnessed both scenarios has seen only two political parties-the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) alternating power amongst themselves. To address the objective of this research, Political Transition would be defined as the transfer of political and administrative

power of a state from one political party (NDC) to (NPP) or vice versa after a democratically held election in Ghana. (Ninsin, 2016).

2.2.1 Brief History of Ghana's Transition

Ghana transitioned to political independence on 6 March 1957, from Great Britain when Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People's party won all the elections conducted by the Colonial Government in 1951, 1954, and 1956 (Anaman & Bukari, 2019; Buah, 1998; Davidson, 1972). The country experiences a period of political instability of 27-years from the first military coup of 24 February 1966 to 7 January 1992, when the fourth republican constitution was promulgated. This came in the form of five successful and several unsuccessful military coups (Anaman, 2006; Anaman & Bukari, 2019). However, since attaining independence, Ghana has witnessed four democratic transitions from military rule to civilian rule.

In the 1990s, several African countries, including Ghana were confronted with political pressures for democratic reforms (Frempong & Asare, 2017; Kumah-Abiwu, 2011), with elections being regarded as the true and acceptable way of changing regimes (Ayee, 2016). Being central to democracy, frequent and competitive elections afford the citizenry the right to sanction the performance of an incumbent government. The current transition dubbed the Fourth Republic is the focus of this research. The fourth republic began with the November-December elections in 1992, this saw Ghanaians electing a new government to climax their fight not to live under any form of military regime but a democratically elected government, (Ninsin, 2016). Since that landmark election, Ghana has been praised for conducting successful multiparty elections for the past 25 years (Asante & Asare, 2017; Owusu-Mensah, 2015), and the country has stabilized and conducted several democratic transitions every four years,

chalking three turnovers in the process, thereby consolidating its democracy (Amakye-Boateng, Gyamfi, & Afrane, 2019; Ninsin 2016). And the entire country has embraced elections as the means of changing power in line with the dictates of democracy (Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017).

2.2.2 The First Inter-Party Transition (2000/2001)

The first test towards democratic consolidation came in the year 2000 when the elections conducted in that year were won by the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) over the incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC). In 2000 after the elections, both the incoming and the outgoing political elite groups formed a transition team on the spur of the moment (Ninsin, 2016). Thus, two rival political groups are to meet and decide on the modalities of the transition and to implement it. The transition team met on 1st January 2001 barely a week to manage the process of handing over the political and administrative power on 7 January 2001, a move believed by many that the NDC never thought of losing the elections so did not prepare for it (Asante, 2019). Many Scholars including Joyce (2015) are of the view that that transition was divisive and damaging to the countries emerging democracy. There were serious concerns about trust regarding the process and counter-accusations due to a lack of information, the process nurtured a regime of acrimony between the new and old administration leading to delay in the policy direction of the new government (Joyce, 2015).

The lack of information, according to Asante (2019) lead to the seizure of vehicles and other assets of former government officials which stained the transition process. It was difficult to distinguish between state property and private one. A case in point was when four vehicles belonging to the state were confiscated from the former vice president and the defeated presidential candidate of the 2000 election, John Evans Atta Mills which subjected him to

public ridicule (Doworkpor, 2017; Ghanaweb, 2002). These challenges, however, spear the need for a formal regulatory framework to ensure a smooth and orderly transition in the future (Joyce, 2015).

2.2.3 The Second Inter-Party Transition (2008/2009)

The year 2008 saw yet another landmark achievement in the fourth republic because for the second time an opposition party NDC has outstared the incumbent NPP to power. This meant power must change hands again and the representatives of the two rival parties must meet face to face to consummate a process in which both had a huge stake which was a recipe for open hostility and acrimonious exchanges (Ninsin, 2016).

Again, no legal framework existed to guide the process, but there was a marginal improvement from the 2000/2001 transition. This time around there were improved transition notes and reports prepared by civil servants and Presidential Aids (Joyce 2015). Another plus for the 2008/2009 transition was the formation of the transition team which was formed on January 4, 2009, to manage and plan the successful execution of the presidential inauguration (Asante, 2019). These improvements helped the new government eased into governance and maintain focus on effective projects and programs (Joyce, 2015). Thus, unlike the 2000/2001 transition which had only the previous political past of coups de tat to draw lessons from, the 2008/2009 transition benefited from the experience of the first transition for a relatively improved transition process. (Asante, 2019).

But the events of the first transitions did cast its shadows, the transition witnessed seizures of vehicles and other vehicles purportedly belonging to the state with officials of the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) visiting homes of some past ministers to search for an alleged

139 missing public vehicles (Nkansah, 2012). In effect, this trend when continue could have a serious repercussion on the infant democracy of the country.

2.2.4 The Presidential Transition Act and the 2016/2017 Transitions

As earlier projected, the 2000 and 2008 transitions were fraught with challenges that are injurious to the democratic consolidation of the country, hence the need for a regulatory framework to guide transitions. A framework for guiding transitions became necessary because issues of transitions had turn chaotic in the sub-region, hence the need for Ghana to maintain its image as a beacon of democracy (Asante 2019).

The quest for Presidential Transition Act was initiated by President Kufuor when he established the Central Governance Project (CGP) to begin work on a legislative roadmap (Joyce, 2015). And in 2007 the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), a privately-run Think tank teamed up with the CGP to start discussing the issue of transitional legislation with all political parties in Ghana. Together they came up with a model presidential transition document which later gave birth to the Presidential Transition Act, 2012 (Act 845).

2.2.5 The Presidential Transition Act, 2012, Act 845

The IEA-led coalition gave birth to the establishment of the presidential transition Act, 2012 and this was subsequently used in the 2012/2013 and the 2016/2017 elections. According to the IEA (2013), the primary objective of the act was to offer an outline for managing the political transfer of power from an out-going democratically elected President to an incoming President. According to Gyampo et al. (2013) however, the Act was to deal with the acrimony and rancour that has characterized presidential transitions in Ghana. Ofori Mensah (2011)

believes that the Act stands on the key attributes of Transparency and Accountability, Institutional Clarity, and Time frame for managing transitions.

- **Transparency and Accountability:** The Act was to forestall the incidence and violence as the Act requires outgoing officials to provide evidence of periodic stocktaking, and declaration of state properties that may be in their possession (Gyampo et al., 2013). To Gadugh (2017) the Act has killed the mischief of confiscation and seizure of property and assets in possession of the previous government.
- **Institutional Clarity:** The Act mandates the setting up of the Presidential Estates Unit (PEU) which is tasked to keep an inventory, take custody, and maintain executive assets. The Unit was to be headed by the Administrator-General, who was to ensure the general procedural progress of the transition process. The Act also mandates the setting up of a transition team within twenty-four hours after the declaration of elections to directly manage the transition process. Again, the establishment of a three-member Advisory Council, with the Speaker of Parliament as the chairman to resolve conflicts in the transition process and bodies charged with the responsibility of playing various roles aimed at addressing the identified challenges of transitions and thereby, ensuring peaceful transitions (Asante, 2019).
- **Structured time frame:** The Act gives clarity on when the transition team should be constituted (24 hours after the Electoral Commission declares the results). It states when parliament should be constituted and when ministers and other officials are to vacate their official residence and hand over state properties (Asante, 2019).

The crux of the Act is what has been discussed above but there was some amendment made in 2016 (Ghana's Parliament Amends Presidential Transition Act, 2016) the amendment changed the swearing-in of parliament from two days to that of the president to 24 hours before swearing-in of the president. In effect, the Act has addressed most of the lapses seen in the 2000 and 2008 transitions.

2.2.6 The Third Transition (2016/2017)

The presidential transition act was first used in the 2012 transition; however, it was not tested in its entirety due to the intra-party nature of the transition (Gyampo et al., 2013). Again, in line with the contextual definition of transition by this paper, it is only proper to look at the 2016 transition.

The third major wave of transition was in 2016 when the NPP came back to power defeating the incumbent NDC's John Dramani Mahama. This time after the declaration of the 2016 presidential elections on December 9, 2016, the team was duly constituted on the 10th of December and was inaugurated on the 11th December (Newsghana.com, 2016). The Incumbent President John Dramani Mahama and the President-elect Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo were named as co-chairs of the Team. Again, The Advisory Council, Handing-over notes, The Presidential Estates Unit, the Vacation of Official Residence, and the Swearing-in of the President were all constituted and executed their mandate as per the Act. However, what was to be a success was marred by some pockets of disagreements and rancour that smacks of the pre-Transitional Act era (Asante, 2019). The government in February 2017 formed a task force to identify, locate and retrieve state asserts that were yet to be handed over by the past administration (Office of the President's letter No. OPS/452 vol. 4/17/139 dated 3rd February 2017). In the process, Mr. Kofi Adam, the National Organizer of the NDC for instance, had

five of his vehicles seized which were later released to him (graphic.com, 2017) and Mr. Afriyie Ankrah, a former Minister for Youth and Sports, also had his vehicle seized causing him to accuse the government of exercising bad faith (Citinewsroom.com, 2018).

2.2.7 Politics of Electoral Transitions in Ghana

In Ghana transitional elections settles the matter of which political elite qualifies to exercise state power per the constitution (Ninsin, 2016). This, however, comes against the backdrop of an intense dispute over the control of state assets such as land, houses, cars, and at its low point, public toilets (Gyampo, 2010). Again, there is a dispute over the state of the economy, the national debt stock, the rate of inflation, etc. (Anaman, 2016). Thus, all the transitions that the country has witnessed, saw a dispute over who controls the wealth of the nation.

It is a fact that there are tension, anxiety, and insecurity as a result of the transitional process and this has affected people in senior administrative and executive positions. The three transitions in Ghana have seen the in-coming government issuing a directive to all outgoing officials and political appointees to vacate the state-owned houses assigned to them and hand over their vehicles, these drugs on for the first few months of the new government as earlier stated (Joyce, 2015). Nisin (2016) contends that there are recrimination and anxiety within the ranks of the political elite such as the retention, redeployment, or retrenchment of public officers who were regarded as political appointees, including those engaged in the country's diplomatic missions abroad. The new government's policy always affects the heads of a wide range of state institutions such as the civil service (e.g., Chief Directors and Directors), public corporations (engaged in production, and service delivery), educational institutions, district assemblies, governing councils of public boards and corporations, the Council of State, and the Bank of Ghana (Ninsin, 2016). The governing councils and officers of the security and quasi-

security agencies are also reconstituted. Between May and July 2009, the President made about 272 new appointments to the governing boards/councils of not less than 60 state/public bodies. All this is normally done within the first few months into the new administrations when the new government has dissolved the previous governing boards and councils (Ninsin, 2016). These changes leave the top hierarchy of the affected public services in a state of uncertainty as they wait for vacancies to be filled for new policy direction.

At the individual level, transition politics is seen as a sense of loss, fear, and insecurity among politicians and political appointees, public sector administrators, and their relations (Gyampo & Graham, 2017). The affected persons might have occupied key decision-making positions at various levels of state and quasi-state institutions; others may remain in their current official positions but would be weighed down by a sense of uncertainty and fear (Attafuah 2013). Invariably personal responses to the tense transition situation impacted adversely on state institutions in various ways – either as institutional weakness or as institutional paralysis (Gyampo & Graham 2017).

The tension, uncertainty about one's position or the direction of public policy under the incoming government, the fear of redeployment, retrenchment, or fear of prosecution, cumulatively affected the morale, disposition, and commitment to work on the part of people operating in the institutions of the state (Ijon, 2019). Similarly, uncertainty about the policy direction of the new government, including policies and attitude towards the private sector, especially concerning macro-economic management policy, the state's fiscal matters, as well as the management of existing contracts, including payment of arrears owed to the private sector companies and its debtors affected the capacity of private sector corporate entities to do business (Ahwoi, 2011).

2.3 Concept of Bureaucracy

Bureaucracy is inevitable to the composition of the state and thus forms an integral part of the workings of the modern state, it is the basic means for policy implementation and vital to the governance of a country (Makinde, 2005; Vogler, 2019). Olatunji (2013) believes that bureaucracy exists to manage large state institutions to be more efficient and accountable for the people. And that governments create public bureaucracy as a means of distributing state resources to the people (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017b). It is the public bureaucracy that determines what should be done; how it should be done and who benefits (Osawe, 2015). According to Appiah and Abdulai (2017b), interest groups and individuals jostle for the control of bureaucracies because it is the vehicle used by the government for the distribution of resources. Putting more weight on the centrality of bureaucracy is the “god” of the concept, Max Weber who believes that it is the ideal and rational type of administration useful for the achievement of positive results (Weber, 1964).

The term bureaucracy is a borrowed term from the field of sociology into the field of public administration (Akume, 2012). It was derived from two words “bureau” and “Kratos.” The word “bureau” refers to the office, while the Greek suffix “Kratos” means power or rule or the power of the office (Wasim, 2011). Scholars like Appiah and Abdulai (2017b:2) in conceptualizing the term contends that it is used in two main ways in public Administration literature but went ahead to conceptualize it in line with Max Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy as “formal legal organization with a hierarchical structure of authority whereby merit-based criteria are used to appoint, retain, promote, and reward or sanction officials who perform functionally specialized duties in an impersonal manner”. As a concept bureaucracy has been at the receiving end of several criticisms from various scholars (Osawe, 2014). Some scholars see it as an ambivalent term that can be taken to mean different things, Akindele, Olaopa, and

Obiyan (2002). Again, to Sarker and Wu (2019) bureaucracy means a group of policymakers and administrators from the nonelective process who are characterized by skill and exercise the power of government or public administration under constitutional rules and hierarchy of authority. Though bureaucracy is an indispensable part of the government system, sometimes it is considered a threat to democracy. In developing countries, bureaucracy uses its power under the illegal support of elective representatives and gradually becomes a democratic threat (Delaporte & Maurel 2018). All the above definitions are adopted for trying to answer the questions of politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in this research.

Bureaucrats on the other hand are public administrators who are appointed to work under the executive arm of government (Mohammed, 2018). therefore, Senior bureaucrats by this paper refer to the administrators occupying the higher echelons of the bureaucratic set-up in Ghana (Chief Directors, Chief Executive Officers) and are to be apolitical in the discharge of their functions.

2.4 Ghana's Public Service

The public services of Ghana amongst others include the civil service, the judicial service, the education service, customs, excise, and preventive services. However, this section looks at the Public Service Commission (PSC), the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and the Politics of Public Service Recruitment.

2.4.1 The Public Service Commission

The PSC has a checked history dating back to 1947 when the colonial government adopted the recommendations of the Harini Committee for the formation of public services commissions in the colonies of the Gold Coast, Nigeria, the Gambia, and Sierra Leone.

Article 194 (1) of the 1992 Constitution states that “there shall be a Public Services Commission which shall perform such functions as assigned to it by this Constitution or by any other law. In article 196, it is stated that “The Public Services Commission shall have such powers and exercise such supervisory, regulatory and consultative functions as Parliament shall, by law, prescribe, including as may be applicable, the supervision and regulation of entrance and promotion examinations, recruitment, appointment into or promotions within the Public Services and the establishment of guidelines on the terms and conditions of employment in the public services”.

Under the current dispensation, the Public Service Commission (PSC) was formed in 1994 by an Act of Parliament (Act 482) according to Chapter 14 of the 1992 Constitution. It comprises of the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson; three full-time members; and the Chairperson of the National Council for tertiary education; and three individuals with considerable experience in the administration of public services.

According to the law establishing it, the duties of the commission include, but are not limited to: advise the Government on the mode for appointment to public offices as well as persons to hold or act in public offices; promote efficiency, accountability, and integrity in the public services; prescribe appropriate systems and procedures for the management of personnel records within the public services; identify, explore and promote the recruitment of suitable personnel into the public services acting in collaboration with educational authorities; provide a standard framework for evaluating and classifying jobs in the public services; and to oversee the human resources development activities of the public services organization to ensure planning and career development in the public services. The President acting in consultation with the Council of State appoints the Chairman and other Members of the Commission. The security, autonomy, and sanctity of the PSC are also reinforced in this section of the Act.

2.4.2 The Civil Service

In Ghana, the civil service is an integral part of the public services. It is surcharged for the execution of government policies and programs in Ghana. They do not only keep the machinery of government running but also provide services to the Ghanaian public. It is the largest employer of the Ghanaian workforce, providing some 3,820,705 (PBB-HCS, 2019) Ghanaians work to do. Even though they are not to be political, they form part of the executive branch of government, a major part of the public services of Ghana and which is directly under the full regulation of the Public Service Commission. The Ghanaian Civil service is one of the lasting legacies of the colonial rule in Ghana as its hierarchical arrangement is along with the British Civil Service. The head of the civil service is appointed by the president with the advice of the Public Service Commission, which is a constitutional provision. The Public Service Commission (PSC) oversees staffing in both public and civil service in Ghana. The Civil Service Law, 1993 PNDCL 327, states the mission of the civil service is “to assist the Government in the formulation and implementation of government policies for the development of the country.” Functions of the civil service include the execution of day-to-day government policies; the collection of revenue for the government; acting as a conduit between the general public and the government (explaining the policies of the government to the people and, on the other hand, getting input from the people to the government on any policies that are being implemented); advises the government on how to execute a new policy direction and strategy for the good of the public or otherwise; it, therefore, provides for stability (thus the Civil Servant is expected to be non-partisan and therefore functions to serve every government that comes into power).

2.4.3 Head of The Ghana Civil Service (HCS)

The Head of the Ghana Civil Service, as the name suggests, is the head of the entire Ghana civil service. He is answerable to the President through the Civil Service Council. He implements the decisions of the Civil Service Council. On a day-to-day basis, he manages the entire service through the Management Services Division (MSD), PRAAD, and the various Directorates at OHCS.

2.4.4 The Chief Director (CD)

The Chief Director, the bureaucratic head, and the spending officer of the OHCS. The Chief Director is the chief advisor to the Head of the Civil Service on all matters relating to the smooth operations of the OHCS and the Civil Service in general. The Chief Director also coordinates the activities of the various Directorates and Units of the OHCS.

2.4.5 Politics of Recruitment into the PS

Recruitment into the public sector is based on meritocracy and non-discriminatory. The appointment and recruitment of employees of the Ghanaian civil service are carried out by the Public Services Board. Civil servants, irrespective of their political affiliation, cultural or religious background, are required by law to remain impartial to partisan politics. They're expected to represent the government of the day. For example, Article 26(1) of the Political Parties Act forbids elected authorities from speaking out in favour of or against a political party or a candidate running for election (Asante & Gyimah- Boadi 2004). However, many scholars including Asamoah and Yeboah-Assiamah (2018:8) and Asante and Gyimah- Boadi (2004) believe this can only be found on paper and does not reflect the real situation on the ground. The standards for entry, promotion, transfer, and termination of appointment are done to suit

social and political class and that politicians and bureaucrats reward their loyal supporters with well-paid and juicy contracts, this has compromised on the neutrality of the PS (Asamoah & Yeboah-Assiamah, 2018). There is a widespread perception that cronyism, family and friends, nepotism, and ethnicity have also plagued appointment into the PS, however, with regards to the Head of Public Service Commission, Head of Civil Service, and Chief Director, the ethnic card could not be backed by any real data (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

2.5 Other Related Concepts

2.5.1 Patronage

Patronage has been around long enough to take its place amongst the much-researched concept in Public Administration and Politics literature, Grindle (2012) in her book, *Jobs for the boys* describes it as a system for all-season giving, credence to its ubiquitous and survival for centuries as well as regimes. It is generally conceived as a type of particularistic interaction between patrons and clients that has occurred in both conventional and contemporary cultures, in both democratic and non-democratic systems, in diverse forms of organizations, and at the local, state, national, and even supranational level (Kopecký, Mair & Spirova, 2012). Patronage may be considered as a butter trading procedure where an array of goods are exchanged between the patron (political leader) and client (party loyalties), thus the political leader offers “goods” in the form of laws, exposure to the regulatory system, services that are public, in some cases accommodation or employment in juicy positions in exchange for (alleged) assistance in winning elections, campaign money or donations, party loyalty, and vital information and strategy accessible to the client (Enns-Jedenastik 2014). Even though there are several forms of patronage this work will review the literature around the field of Party Patronage which will help address the objectives set out in this research.

Party patronage in a more generic way is understood to mean ‘the use of public resources in particularistic and direct exchanges between clients and party politicians’ (Müller, 2006 cited by Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014). Ennser-Jedenastik (2014) believes that many scholars of public administration consider patronage as illegality. A greater number of scholars believe that patronage is an affront to democracy, rule of law, and a typical characteristic of a decay political system (Bearfield, 2009). It is this position taken by scholars like Bearfield (2009) that made others conclude that the focal or epicentre of patronage is in developing countries (Kopecký, 2011) where political decay is almost a feature. On the other hand; Jean Blondel (2002) posits that the support base of a party is very vital to democracy and the overall political system and that patronage is one of the ways of linking the government of the day to the rank and file as well to the apparatus of the state. A position shared by Flinders and Mathews (2010) and Muller (2000) even though they contend that the process is not reflective of a strong democratic process and does not promote probity and accountability.

Even though the above explains, patronage to the core, this paper is zeroing down on the appointment of senior bureaucrats cloaked with rewards for their loyalty and party support in electoral transition. To this end, Kopecký and Scherlis (2008) believe that party patronage is the power of a party to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life. However, the broader effect of patronage has been the reward and control (Kopecký et al., 2012). Thus, with reward, the party hands out positions and jobs to party members for party loyalty, control, and influence on policies (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014).

2.5.1.2 Patronage in Ghana

Ghana being a developing country may not be immune to the assertion espoused by Kopecký et al. (2012), that patronage exists in most developing countries. Even though much has not been documented on patronage in the country, Kopecký (2012) believes that both the NDC and the NPP who won elections since 1992, have all engaged in acts of patronage in an equal measure must especially with the appointment of senior bureaucrats in Ghana. Comparing Ghana and South Africa, motivation is higher for patronage in Ghana, and that almost all sectors within the bureaucratic set-up witness appointments when there is a change of government with the Judiciary only least affected (Kopecký, 2013).

2.5.2 Clientelism in Ghana

Closely related to patronage is clientelism. Most scholars use the terms interchangeably, so it is important to review some findings of the politicisation of Ghana's bureaucracy with regard to clientelism. According to Hicken (2020) Clientelism generally is the exchange of goods and services for political support based on a two-way relationship, called **Dynamic relationship**, or delivery of service by a politician, called **Contingency relationship**; **Hierarchy relationship** on the other hand involves a politician in a higher and citizens in a lower position and a continuous relationship termed **Iteration**.

In their study on Competitive clientelism and the politics of core public sector reform in Ghana, Appiah, and Abdulai (2017a) revealed that, clientelism exists in most Ministries in Ghana's public sector, and this has compromised on the quality and effectiveness of those ministries. Again Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah (2012) in Appiah and Abdulai (2017a) posits that there are constant clientelisation and politicisation of the bureaucratic set-up of the country which has

almost always resulted in ineffectiveness and the appointment of senior bureaucrats based on presidential fiat and political affiliation other than merit has contributed to this ineffectiveness.

Hopper (2017) and Lassou (2017) believe that the danger that the clientelist nature of some institutions in the country assumes, is dangerous not only for the effectiveness of the public service but also it is an aberrance to good governance, public sector reforms, development planning, and accountability.

2.5.3 Winner-Takes-All

Closely related and given meaning to the topic under discussion and zeroing in on answering the research questions posed is the concept of Winner-Takes-All. As reiterated earlier the powers given to the executive president under the fourth republican constitution have caught the attention of several scholars (Debrah 2005; Ninsin 2008). It is widely believed that the power of appointment given to the president is all-embracing that ought to be given a second look. Scholars like Boafo-Arthur (2003) and Gyampo (2015) strongly contend that these powers can only be meaningful if it is exercised based on meritocracy, all-inclusiveness, and partnership with other political elites. These uncontrolled powers given to the president has so many consequences and paramount amongst them is the power of appointment (Ahwoi, 2011; Oquaye, 2013) which does not only breed dictatorship within the ruling elite but also undermine constitutionalism and weaken state institutions in the discharge of their mandates (Gyampo & Graham, 2014).

By way of definition, Ijon (2019) is of the view that WTA is a zero-sum game of the electioneering process, where the winner of an election takes the total gory and benefits associated with the election. While Gyampo (2016:5) is also of the opinion that WTA is an

“extremely divisive and partisan sub-culture that excludes all the other Ghanaians who do not constitute the ruling party from the national governance and decision making in a manner that dissipates the much-needed talents and brains for national development.” Thus, WTA is the conscious effort aim at excluding and marginalizing citizens who are not part of the ruling class.

2.5.3.1 Effects of WTA on the Politicisation of Ghana’s Bureaucracy

Like any social science concept WTA has both positive and negative effects on the political dispensation in the country. With regards to the politicisation of Ghana’s bureaucracy. Ijon (2019) posits that WTA leads to a conscious wastage of the human resources of the country. Thus, all the nurtured brains within the bureaucratic set-up of the country are relegated to the appointment of the new order, who may be party loyalties’ and hence rewarded for their hard work into bringing the political elite to power, this leads to a total wastage of the human resource of the country. Again, the ruling elite does not even give the neutral Ghanaian who may be apolitical any appointment. In effect, appointments are made on party membership and one’s contribution to the party’s success (Ijon, 2019). To curb this, there should be a constitutional review commission to review article 195 of the 1992 constitution to reduce the extensive power of appointment given to the president Ijon, 2019.

Again, the powers of the Executive President given by the constitution to make appointment makes him/her the dominant public figure in all aspect of public affairs (Ijon, 2019). Article 195 of the 1992 constitution states that “...the power to appoint persons to hold or act in an office in the public services shall be vested in the President...’ since the president has that overburdened power of appointment his actions does not only affect the public service but also the other arms of government, thereby affecting accountability. There should be a review of

the 1992 constitution to tie the hands of the executive president to appoint other members of the opposing party and neutral Ghanaians (Ijon, 2019).

The WTA posture of the 1992 constitution has characterized all regimes under the fourth republic in a divisive manner and the public sector is no exception (Gyampo & Graham, 2016). And that the feeling of exclusion and rejection in the governing process and the trickling effect on Ghana's bureaucratic set-up is inimical to good governance a situation which was never anticipated by the designers of the 1992 constitution (Abotsi 2013). The president of the day must be encouraged to extend a hand to other opposing parties for competent people to govern the country (Abotsi 2013).

Again, appointments based on meritocracy are relegated to the background, leading to square pegs in round holes, with catastrophic consequences on national development (Abotsi, 2013; IEA, 2014). Thus, appointments are made for political expediency to only bureaucrats who are partisan and have paid their dues in the electioneering process, to the marginalization of the entire citizenry who may not be party apparatchiks (Gyampo 2010). To help in solving the above Gyampo and Graham (2017) are of the view that, the appointment of senior bureaucrats must be transparent, competitive, well-advertised, inclusive, bi-partisan, and based on competence.

The Independence, competence, professionalism, and performance of Ghana's Bureaucratic set-up are compromised with the excessive powers of appointment given to the president, given that some of these institutions established under the constitution are to be independent, protect the citizens against the arbitrary use of the powers of the president (Gyampo & Graham, 2017). The legal instruments establishing the State Enterprises Commission/Public Service

Commission must be revisited for a possible reduction of the role and influence of the executive president (Gyampo & Graham 2017).

The extensive powers of the executive have led to a practice of appointing chief directors by the president to head public services which neutralize and compromise efficiency within the public service (Gyampo & Graham 2017). This according to Oquaye (2013) and Prempeh (2003) undermines the role of chief directors and other senior officers in the administration of the public service and renders them gullible and manipulative in the hands of the executive. Gyampo and Graham (2017) however believe that to curb this practice A strong tenure-track and technocratic public service must be established, there should be an efficient body staffed by competent people that can manage the affairs of the country without the interference of an elected government or coalition.

In sum, the WTA posture of the 1992 constitution of Ghana has led to revelations towards the politicisation of the bureaucracy in Ghana as espoused by the scholars above.

2.6 Politicisation of Bureaucracy

Politics is ubiquitous, so it is not surprising that the bureaucracy in Ghana and other developing countries is perceived to be politicised. The politicisation of bureaucracy is the replacement of impersonal principles of the functions of bureaucracy with personal principles (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017b). Specifically, Peters and Pierre (2004) in their attempt to define the politicisation of bureaucracy believed that less or no emphasis is placed on meritocracy when it comes to selection, retention, promotion, and rewarding public servants. Thus, recruitment, dismissal, and posting of bureaucrats go against the ethics of neutrality of the public service (Mulgan, 1998). According to Ennsner-Jedenastik (2014), the Politicisation of Bureaucracy may

be policy-related, managerial, or partisan. Policy related (Mulgan 1998) is of the view that recruitment, dismissal, or promotion of bureaucrats is based on their disposition towards a particular policy. Managerial politicisation, however, relates to the sacking of a senior or top civil servant and replacing them with a party person, when there is a change of government. Partisan Politicisation is loosely related to Managerial politicisation, but here political party members are rewarded for their roles in winning political power to civil service positions (Thabane, 2017). All forms of Politicisation have not been ranked or ordered, however, scholars like Peters and Pierre (2014) believe that the worst form of politicisation is where recruitment and dismissal or promotion of bureaucrats is akin to their partisan politics and deep clientelist allegiance to those in authority. This paper conceptualizes the politicisation of bureaucracy to mean all of the above.

2.6.1 Effects of Politicisation of Bureaucracy

Like many concepts of public administration, the politicisation of bureaucracy has both positive and negative effects.

2.6.1.1 Positive Effects

Thinking emotionally may make one wonder why some scholars believe that, the politicisation of bureaucracy has a positive effect. But to those scholars' politicisation is good due to the following reasons:

- Trust is of the essence in politics and that putting the resources, policy direction and technical competence that come with the execution of the mandate of a party in power into the hands of party loyalties or sympathizers of the government will make them succeed (Sossin, in Matheson, Weber, Manning & Arnould, 2007).

- Again Panainte-Culeac (2012) is of the view that the political agenda should be supreme and so must not be left in the hands of technical career bureaucrats who may have a different belief towards those policies.
- Others are of the view that it heightens greater accountability from the bureaucrats as they know the consequences of not acting (Mulgan 1998).
- It is also an avenue to making sure that bureaucrats are whip in line with the electoral preferences of the electorate after winning a democratically held election (Bersch, Praça, & Taylor, 2017).
- Other scholars believe that some party loyalties appointed based on their affiliation to a political party get entangle in the bureaucratic nature of doing things thereby not cottoning to the whims of their appointing authorities (Peters & Pierre 2004).

2.6.1.2 Negative Effects

Scholars like Asamoah and Yeboah-Assiamah (2018) however, believe that all the benefits that a country tends to derive from a bureaucrat who is apolitical are derailed by the politicisation of the bureaucracy. This section presents the negative effects of the politicisation of bureaucracy.

- According to Peters (2004) when a public service is politicized it is tinted by inefficiency and slows down the fluidity with which government policies and programmes must flow.

They again posit that, when partisan senior officers are appointed, it leaves in its way a huge question of fairness from the officers in the discharge of their duties (Peter and Pierre 2004).

- Also, there is always a syndrome of mistrust between the technocrats and the politicians when there is a change of government (Mulgen, 1998) which does not promote continuity.
- Again, it dumps the spirit of the career bureaucrats and stifles his promotion (Pierre 2004).
- Some scholars are of the view that the bane and decline of the public service in most developing countries is a result of interference by politicians (Shergold 2005).
- Thabane (2017) believes that those appointed by politicians in most cases lack the technical competence to act, and, in most cases, use emotions at the expense of professionalism.

2.7 Chapter Conclusion

The Chapter highlighted the literature on the politicisation of the bureaucratic set-up in the country with a special interest in administrators occupying the top echelons of the bureaucracy in Ghana, as well as the theories underpinning this research. The Political Settlement theory and the Politics-Administration theory served as the underpinning theories. The Chapter also critically examined the literature on electoral transitions, bureaucracy, Winner-Takes-All as well as the politicisation of the Ghanaian bureaucracy in Ghana's fourth republic. It was evident that Ghana's political system since 1992 can best be described as one churning the path of competitive clientelism (Abdulai & Hickey, 2016) which has led to the politicisation of the bureaucratic state institution through patronage appointments (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017a).

Again, the reviewed literature suggests that electoral transitions in the fourth republic have been acrimonious, creating a block of winners and losers amongst the ruling elite (NPP & NDC) (Ninsin, 2016); given rise to clientelism and patronage. This is as a result of the politician's desire to clutch on to power and the seeming threat of losing it, not to talk of the four-year election period given by the constitution in Ghana, thus political leaders have little or no incentive to equip in the futuristic policy of building the capacity of the bureaucratic institutions (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017a; Levy, 2014) but rather to politicise the appointment of senior bureaucrats who will intern do their bidding.

Also, some scholars believe politicisation is good due to trust and loyalty guaranteed from the bureaucrats appointed by the executive (Sossin, in Matheson et al., 2007). Others however believe that it derails the service of the necessary technical competence, neutrality, and hierarchy which the proponents of the separation of politics from the administration, are clamoring for (Demir & Nyhan, 2008).

In sum, the literature reviewed above points to the fact that the extensive powers of the president under the 1992 constitution have fueled the politicisation of the Ghanaian bureaucratic set-up (Gyampo & Graham 2017) and for that matter the interference of the appointments of senior bureaucrats.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

Methods and strategies employed in scientific research give it the necessary acceptance and credibility in the larger sphere of academia. This chapter details the necessary methods and strategies that this research adopted, it considers the research philosophy or paradigm, design, the population considered as well as the data sources. The research instruments, procedure, data analysis, and ethical issues that, were considered. The chapter ends by making a strong linkage with how the objectives and questions of the study were achieved.

3.2 Research Paradigm

The worldview, beliefs, and philosophical assumptions of a researcher, characterizes scientific research. What the researcher considers as knowledge, truth, or worthy of consideration in conducting scientific research, of a society or population is determined by their worldview and philosophical assumptions. In social science research, it is considered a paradigm. According to Creswell and Creswell, 2017, a research paradigm or philosophy is the summation of all the beliefs and values (worldview) of a researcher, that guides research being undertaken. In effect, a research paradigm or philosophy elucidates how and what should be researched and how findings should be arrived at and interpreted.

As a prerequisite of scientific research, this research adopted the interpretive research paradigm to study and interoperate the study elements by inculcating the human factor into the phenomenon of study. The proponents of the interpretivist paradigm are of the view that the world is better understood by interaction with the elements of a social phenomenon. Thus, what is termed reality is a social construct (Tuli, 2010). The interpretivist paradigm is used to helping

a researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the varied and diverse worldview of people which is greatly influenced by beliefs and value systems (Boateng, 2016)

Again, the interpretivist paradigm helped to advance the understanding of the assumptions of social phenomena attributed to by the population under study. In discovering the reality of the assessments, thoughts, or views and experiences of the participants (Thanh & Thanh, 2015) towards assessing the politicisation of the appointment of senior public servants in electoral transitions. It is worthy of note that, adopting this research approach, emphasizes the consequences of the parameters and the data taken as well as seeking deeper knowledge and understanding of participants' experiences (Thanh & Thanh, 2015).

3.3 Research Approach

This research employed qualitative research for data collection, interpretation, and analysis to solve the research questions and objectives posed. Qualitative research according to Creswell and Creswell, 2017 is a research method used for exploring as well as understanding what researchers ascribed to elements or population of the study. It was adopted because the topic is not widely researched and the subject area has not been widely addressed (Creswell & Creswell, 2017).

With a qualitative approach adopted, some directors and workers of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) within the Ghanaian Public Sector, academic professors, and research fellows working with some think-tanks and Civil Society Organisation (CSOs), relevant to answering the research questions posed by this research were interviewed for relevant information using an interview guide. The qualitative research approach was considered because it affords the respondents the chance to narrate their own experiences concerning the

issue of the political interference of government in the appointment contract of senior public servants during political transitions in Ghana. Again, with this approach, the biases of the responders were elicited, thus their value judgments which may conflict with the general perception was eliminated (Wang, 2013).

Again, the qualitative research approach was used because it affords the researcher the chance to interact fully with officials selected within the sample, seeking their in-depth knowledge of the research questions and the objectives. (Creswell, 2014; Flick, 2013). Thus, it allows participants to give their experiences and views, no matter how complex the phenomena under study were.

3.4 Research Setting

Ghana is a unitary state, with a strongly decentralized system of governance. But despite this accolade, this research was conducted in Accra. This is because the appointment of top or senior public officials is being done in Accra where almost all, of the National headquarters of Ministries, Departments, and Agencies are located. Again, being the seat of the Ghanaian government, it is presumed that all the political decisions emanated from Accra.

Accra is the administrative capital of Ghana and is in the southern part of the country. Even though it is the smallest Region, covering an area of 3245-kilometer square or 1.4 percent of the total area in Ghana, it is having the highest population density in the country, mainly due to migration and the unitary nature of the Ghanaian Administrative system (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). It houses the seat of government, parliament, the highest court of the land, and head office to several MDAs, which explains the divergent nature of the region.

3.5 Population

The research population consists of public services which include the civil service, academic scholars with publications relating to the research area, and think-tanks and CSOs in the research settings. This is to enhance the depth of the information taking cognizance of the knowledge that, the population offered, in achieving the overall research objective. Thus, the population had technical knowledge and expertise relating to the politicisation of the appointment of senior public officials in an electoral transition in Ghana.

3.6 Inclusion Criteria

The selected population above was considered, based on how the topic is sensitive to the overall development of the country, their work can undermine the executive and make them unpopular. Again, the research considered individuals whose position at the various institutions was protected by the laws and Acts of Parliament and cannot be easily punished for partaking in this research. All participants included in this research have spent at least 5 years in their line of work and have witnessed a political transition in the country. This was aimed at getting the relevant and in-depth information that will help answer the research questions and objectives posed by the research.

3.7 Exclusion Criteria

The researcher exempted participants who did not fall within the public sector, academia and CSOs. Again, participants within the public sector, academia and CSOs who have less than five years of working experience with their various organisations or institutions were also exempted. The reason was that the researcher assumed that they do not have in-depth knowledge and relevant information on the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in Ghana.

3.8 Sample Size

In scientific research, the generalization of findings to the larger target population demands that a researcher samples his/her participant based on certain characteristics of the target population. By way of definition, sampling simply refers to a section of a target population under research (Bell, Bryman, & Harley, 2018) thus a segment or portion of the entire or larger population that a researcher has chosen to represent the larger population in his/her study (Creswell & Poth, 2017; Polit & Beck, 2010).

This research considered eighteen (18) participants from the target population. According to Dworkin (2012), an extremely greater number of scholars are of the view that 5 to 50 participants are adequate in conducting qualitative research.

Again, the sampling was done bearing in mind the depth of knowledge of the participants considered brought to bear in answering the questions and objectives of the study.

Table 3. 1: Summary of Respondents Interviewed

Selected Organisation(s) and Institution(s)	Participant(s)
Academia	
University of Ghana	1. Associate Professor 2. Senior Lecturer 3. Senior Lecturer
Think tank/CSOs	
Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)	4. Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director
Centre for Democratic Governance (CDD-Ghana)	5. Senior Research Fellow 6. Research Analyst
IMANI-Centre of Policy and Education	7. Research Consultant
PenplusByte	8. Programmes Manager 9. Research Assistant
Public Services	
Public Services Commission	10. Deputy Director F&A
Office of Head of Civil Service.	11. Assistant Director/Head of Reforms
Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations.	12. Director F&A 13. Deputy Director of Research
National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)	14. Director F&A 15. Director of Human Resource
Office of the Senior Minister	16. Deputy Director F&A
Ministry of Food and Agriculture	17. Director F&A
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.	18. Director F&A
Total	18

Source: Field Data (2020)

3.9 Demography of Respondents

The demographics considered under this section are gender, educational level, job position, and the number of years in an organization or as a professional of a chosen career. The background information of the participants was vital to putting the entire finding of the research into perspective and how best the research questions were answered.

3.9.1 Gender

Gender here dwelt much on the roles of participants other than, the sex distribution of the research, thus how both men and women understood the research questions and how best they related to them based on their roles. In this regard, eleven (11) participants were male and seven (7) were female. Both exhibited a depth of knowledge in their current positions and related well to the research questions based on their chosen career. The diversity of the distribution was key in making the research a credible one.

3.9.2 Level of Education

Concerning the level of education, three of the participants have a Doctor of Philosophy Degree (PhD) in disciplines related to governance and politics of which one is an Associate Professor (Assoc Prof) and the rest of the participants have a master's degree from a diverse background. The level of education was key, because of the sensitive nature of the research questions to the positions occupied by some of the participants in their various institutions.

3.9.3 Job Position

The job positions of respondents comprise six (6) Directors at the various public service institutions, three (3) Deputy Directors, One (1) Assoc Prof., and Two (2) Senior lecturers. Others are Two (2) Senior Research fellows, Two (2) Research Assistants/Analysts, a Research Consultant, and a Programme Director, all with Think tanks/CSOs in Ghana.

The diversity of participants and job positions and descriptions helped further the richness of depth of the research towards providing answers to the research questions.

3.9.4 Number of Working Years

To further give credibility to the findings, the number of working years was taken into consideration. The directors of the various public institutions have worked for at least 10 years within the public sector while the professors in academia have at least worked for 7 years. The consultants with the CSOs have over 5 years of experience while the research fellows have been with their institutions for over 10 years serving in various capacities either on a full-time or part-time basis. The number of years was also key in terms of requisite skills and knowledge of the respondents towards providing answers to the research questions and objectives.

3.10 Sampling Technique

The nature of the research suits a purposive sampling technique, which scholars like Gentes, Charles, Ploeg and McKibbon (2015) believe is the most widely used technique in qualitative research. Purposive sampling is a non-probability method of sampling that gives the researcher the laxity of choosing their participants or elements of the target population to engage the entire research process (Boateng, 2016; Flick, 2014). To this end, Etikan and Bala (2017) contend that this technique gives the researcher, the go-ahead to select the elements that provide the relevant information for the phenomenon under study based on their judgment. Due to the novel and sensitive nature of the research, it was prudent to adopt a purposive sampling procedure to choose from the target population those with in-depth knowledge of the politicisation of the appointment of senior public officers in an electoral transition in Ghana. This to the best of the researcher's knowledge was best in answering the questions and objectives of this research.

The greatest limitation of this research technique is the element of value judgment from the researcher and can be erroneous when not applied well (Alvi, 2016).

3.11 Sources of Data

The sources of data in any scientific research are central to answering the research questions and achieving the objectives of the research. This research adopted both primary and secondary data.

3.11.1 Primary Data

The information collected by the researcher directly on the field is referred to as the primary data. This is made up of interviews, experiments, and observations by the researcher (Mesly, 2015; Mohajan, 2017). The study adopted a face-to-face interview to elicit the primary information from the sample of the target population made up of respondents from the public services, Experts in academia, and CSOs. The face-to-face interview enabled direct interaction between the researcher and the respondents. To facilitate the interview better to get the necessary information on time, an interview guide was developed. Interview guides assist the interviewer to get the right information from respondents (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016). There were also some semi-structured interviews to further enrich the depth of the primary data (Bryman, 2017; McIntosh & Morse, 2015).

3.11.2 Secondary Source

In scientific research, Mesly (2015) believes that secondary data mostly complement the primary data collected from the field. This research considered textbooks, the internet, published journals, and organizational reports (e.g., Civil Service annual reports) scholarly articles, journals,

literature, and books that were relevant to the issue of politicisation of the appointment of senior public officials in an electoral transition in Ghana.

3.12 Method of Data Collection

This research conducted an in-depth face-to-face interview using a detailed interview guide. Participants were allowed to provide relevant information as well as contributions in addition to what is stated in the interview guide. The interviews were conducted in the English language. An introductory letter, introducing the researcher and research area was taken from the Department of Public Administration and Health Service Management to the target participants, an appointment was booked for the various interviews conducted. The introductory letter served as evidence that the work is an academic exercise. The interviews were conducted at a convenient time for the respondents. The conditionality and anonymity of the participants were assured and participants were made aware that, it is a voluntary exercise and they can opt-out at any point in time. The duration for each interview lasted for an average time of (35) minutes. The interview guide was made up of open-ended questions. The interviews were recorded but upon the approval of the participants.

3.13 Data Analysis

The data was analysed thematically in line with the objectives of the study. The audio recordings were transcribed exactly as it sounds into text. The data was read thoroughly and analysed in line with the six steps of qualitative analysis (Braun, Clarke, Hayfield & Terry, G, 2019; Braun and Clarke, 2006). The researcher studied the depth and breadth of the content of the data. Initial codes were generated and this was assigned to the relevant data. Then the codes were translated into a broader theme. The theme was then reviewed and collapsed into each other breaking down some of the themes separately. The researcher then defined the themes

and refine them for the analysis of the data within them. The refined themes were used in analysing the data.

3.14 Ethical Consideration

It is incumbent on the researcher to protect their right as well as the participants of a research piece, this is termed ethics in research (Fouka & Mantzourou, 2011).

To this end, the researcher complied with all the laid down ethical standards of any academic research in the form of anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy of the participants. In designing scientific research, Creswell (2014) is of the view that ethical considerations cannot be compromised since objects of study are human beings. Again, participants were made aware that, partaking in the research is voluntary and can opt-out at any point and any stage of the process, even without any explanation, and this would be taken in good faith. According to McLeod (2015) participants must be allowed to leave or withdraw from an interview with their views, opinions, and information.

All the ethical considerations were considered to ensure that no third party can trace the identity of the participants, the data collected was protected and participants would be made aware as to how the data was treated. Lastly, all the secondary data used was cited and duly acknowledged.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the analysis and findings of the study. The general finding and the analysis are centred on the objective of the research. It looks at the appointment of senior bureaucrats as enshrined in the 1992 constitution and the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in Ghana. Lastly, it considers some alternative causes of action proposed by the respondents considered under this research. The identity of respondents is not revealed to ensure their anonymity in the research.

4.1 Why are the Appointment of Heads of Public Institutions Politicised in Ghana

Appointments in Ghana have been perceived to be politicised as given credence by the civil service which is the largest group of the public sector in the country in its 2017 and 2018 Civil Service Annual Performance Report (CSAPR). In 2017 the report cited political interference as one of the challenges that stifle the operations of the service. It stated that there was

“...frequent requests for the suspension or removal of some Chief Directors and Heads of organisations affected work in the Service” (CSAPR, 2017:71).

This was further reiterated in the 2018 CSAPR under the caption “Political Administrative Interferences” which states that there was:

“... unsolicited political intrusions into some purely administrative proceedings of the service. Some Political heads requested the suspension or removal of Chief Directors and Heads of an Organisation without recourse to laid-down administrative processes and structures. Such occurrences have the potential of marring the working environment and largely affecting productivity...” (CSAPR, 2018:59).

To have a deeper understanding of why this phenomenon happens, the respondent's interviews came out with reasons that can be termed as the drivers of politicisation and some that are peculiar to the fourth republic.

4.1.1 The Driving Factors of Politicisation in Ghana

This section looks at the driving factors of politicisation of the Ghanaian bureaucracy which will be followed by other factors that are peculiar to the fourth republic. Amongst other factors, this research identified colonial legacy, game of trust and loyalty, the desire to fulfill social contract and party support/contribution, patronage, and clientelism as the general factors fueling politicisation in Ghana.

4.1.1.1 Colonial Legacy

Colonial Legacy or colonialism refers to the annexation of a weaker country by a stronger one to rule and exploit them of land and other resources (Mooney, 2020). Most of the respondents believe that it has contributed significantly to the politicisation of the country's bureaucratic set-up and for that matter the interference of politicians in the appointment of senior bureaucrats. Notwithstanding the assertions by some scholars that, the colonial master left one of the most effective public services at independence (Aryee, 2013).

One respondent aptly said that appointment was done by the queen through her governors who dish out positions only to those they think can promote the course of the colonial master.

“From the cradle of colonization all higher appointments were done by the Queen, through her governors who appoint district colonial officials, that's when all the politicisation began, they selected people whom they think and

believe would help them perpetuate their stay and even fight against the ideals of the freedom fighters” (Senior Research Fellow, 5).

On the other hand, a professor of politics was of the view that colonial legacy has not only led to the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats but also the lackadaisical attitude of the Ghanaian in handling administrative duties. He posits that:

All appointments were to promote Pax Britannica, which means peace of Britain, and these appointments were made to officials who could say ‘yes sir’ to the governor and their officials. “...the independent fighters realize that they have to frustrate the colonial government by sabotaging the administrative machinery of the state” (Associate Professor, 1).

A director working in the public sector made an inference that the way the bureaucrats conducted themselves from the colonial era to date has not changed, at independence, the country adopted the ways the colonial master run the public sector. The only difference was Ghanaian(s) appointing Ghanaians.

“We inherited our language, ethics, hierarchy, etc. in running our public service, all from the ‘white man’ it is proper to assume that we inherited the politicisation as well, yes, I believe it’s so” (Director F&A, 12).

Colonial legacy has its positives aspect, which in Ghana’s case has been developmental, but inferring from above, it has contributed greatly to the kind of politicisation that has characterised the appointment of the senior bureaucrats in the country. The above position is shared by scholars Aryee (2018) who stated that the public sector and its current form could be traced to the colonial bureaucracy which was made up of civil and local government services with a sole mandate of promoting “Pax Britannica” literally meaning “British Peace” and senior appointments were not only done by the governor but also it was the preserve of the British.

4.1.1.2 Game of Trust and Loyalty

Trust is an integral part of politics; it is not surprising that most of the respondents attributed the level of trust and loyalty that politicians have both on the system and the personnel running the country's administrative set-up. Thus, trust and loyalty in this context mean, the confidence that politicians have in both the human resource and the administrative machinery of the state. A senior lecture believes that in Ghana, the politician only believes in the bureaucracy as the administrative machinery of the state only when they are in government, the opposition does not trust the bureaucrats but when they are elected to power, they restructure the public sector.

“Politicians when in opposition do not trust the bureaucracy as the administrative machinery of state, the reason being that they are not the ones who appointed the bureaucrats. But when in government that is when they realize that they can run the country with bureaucrats” (Senior Lecturer, 3).

A deputy director with a public sector Organisation believes that the politician engages the services of a technocrat to help them draft their policies like the manifesto, just to check their level of loyalty.

“During political party campaigning, politicians do a thorough background check on senior bureaucrats and other positions of influence, to know who is for them and who is not for them, as soon as they are elected to power, those they don't trust to support their cause will surely go no matter their competence” (Deputy Director F&A, 16).

A member of a CSO in stressing how trust and loyalty matter to the politician opine that:

If the politician doesn't trust you, they do not even appreciate your contributions as a CSO or Think tank who is apolitical, they always consider you as an enemy of their regime and would not want to implement the policy you propose, your research is considered as biased. “You can imagine the poor administrator who works for the state. Just consider the way the Auditor-General was treated recently; has to proceed on what I call “by force leave” (Research Consultant, 7).

Thus, to the above respondents, there is the politicisation of the appointment of heads of public institutions based on trust and loyalty. Politicians interfere because they do not trust the administrative machinery of the state when in opposition and based on their relationship with the technocrat. Trust and loyalty confirm the works of Sossin, in Matheson et al. (2007), who believe that the bureaucratic set up in any country is compromised by the ruling elite, but even went further to state that, putting the resources, policy direction, and technical competence that come with the execution of the mandate of a party in power into the hands of party loyalties or sympathizers of the government will make them succeed (Sossin, in Matheson et al., 2007).

It also confirms the findings of Asamoah and Yeboah-Assiamah (2018) to them, there is politicisation in Ghana's bureaucracy which has affected the selection of civil servants. The politician always appoints based on trust and loyalty. Loyalty to the politician goes beyond patriotism to the state but "praise-singing" and sycophancy which one demonstrates either by explicitly defending or chastising one political party in the news media.

4.1.1.3 The desire to fulfil Social Contract

Social Contract, the treaty amongst individuals or groups that brought organized society into being, towards securing mutual protection, welfare, and regulating the relations amongst members of society, has been identified as one of the reasons why there is huge politicisation of the country's bureaucracy. Political parties by putting themselves up for the legitimacy to rule enter into a social contract with the people. Thus, much is expected of the politician by the populace. The political parties also want to fulfil this contract to renew their mandate.

A political scientist was of the view that:

In Ghana, the four-year period of conducting the election is too short for the politician, who is hell-bent on renewing their mandate with the people to “joke with”. (Senior Lecturer, 3).

Thus, the above participant believes that politicians will go to all lengths to fulfil their mandate to win the next election.

He further asserted that:

“...because the NPP government wanted to deliver on the FSHS policy, they would come out with a set of loyal bureaucrats who can help the government deliver on that promise to the education ministry” (Senior Lecturer, 3).

A senior research Assistant with a think-tank believes that the politician would do anything to achieve results, including sacking or demoting personnel within the civil or public service, especially coming through a political campaign where the opponent has been labelled to be non-performing.

He has this to say:

“... in Ghana ride after the election, the politician is thinking about how best they can appease the electorates and so will do anything to succeed in that regard, they will change anything that comes their way” even appointments at the lower level within the public administrative machinery suffer how much more the head whose loyalty is questionable (Research Assistant, 9).

The social contract as espoused by the early political thinkers is one of the reasons why there is the constant meddling of politicians in the hierarchy of the bureaucratic set up in the country. Respondents were of the firm belief that, the politician has the desire not only to fulfil the contract with the Ghanaian people but also will go at any length to fulfilling it, including breaking public sector rules in the process, bearing in mind the four-year periods of the next election. This finds space in Panainte-Culeac (2012) who is of the view that the political agenda should be supreme if one wants to succeed and so must not be left in the hands of technical career bureaucrats who may have their belief towards those policies. Success here may be

subjective. If it is for the long term then the above point contradicts the position given by Given Appiah and Abdulai (2017a) and Levy (2014) that the time to clutch on to power and the seeming threat of losing power and the four-year election period, does not serve as an incentive to equip in the futuristic policy of building the capacity of the bureaucratic institutions but are just quick-fixers.

4.1.1.4 Party Support/Contribution, Patronage, and Clientelism

In conducting this, research, various respondents seem to correlate the support an individual gives to a political party to patronage and clientelism. And they believe is one of the factors fueling the politicisation of the Ghanaian bureaucratic set-up. By political support or contribution most respondents believe, is the amount of resource and time committed to a political party's activity towards bringing them to power.

Research Analyst with a Think tank opines that:

Politics in Ghana is based on one's contribution to the party either in the form of human, material, or financial resources. If the party is elected to power, those who contributed are rewarded. These rewards come in the form of positions based on one's contribution to the party or the winning candidate. (Research Analyst, 6).

This is as a result of the fact that there are no clear-cut laws for political party financing in the country, a position echoed by a senior lecture that raising money to campaign in the country is a daunting task that is done in secrecy. He asserts that:

... the laws on political party financing are not being implemented to the latter, political parties go to individuals to solicit for support in return for a position in their administration. The process is not transparent so political parties take advantage and abuse the system... (Senior Lecturer, 2).

That is to say, politicians will even sack a performing administrative head of an institution because that position was sold long before they come to power in exchange for campaign cash. The above points to the fact that the Ghanaian public sector is plagued with politicisation, most especially at the administrative level of chief directors and chief executives. Party support and campaign resources are in line with the works of Sakyi, Agomor and Appiah (2015: 21):

“.... that a lot of rich individuals fund more than one political party and mostly in varying amounts. While some interviewees considered funding by such rich individuals and businesses as a sign of commitment to their party, the majority, on the other hand, emphasized that they do it not for benevolence but purely as an investment in order to get some reward whenever their party won political power” (Sakyi et al., 2015:21).

Closely related to the above is the respondent's continual use of the words patronage and clientelism. A simple meaning attached to their explanation is the reward party loyalists get after winning an election and the reward is in the form of public resources. It is worth mentioning that, patronage has its positives such as getting loyal and committed bureaucrats to work in harmony with the elected officials.

However, a professor of politics was very emphatic and used the word patronage, as a means of fueling the politicisation in our body politics as a nation and for that matter, our bureaucratic set-up. He asserts that:

When a candidate wins an election, he must reward his followers and they do that with the resources of the state, some of the rewards come in the form of appointments to boards of agencies or organisations within the public sector, they always push for their men to occupy the top echelons of the public sector, and they do it with impunity (Associate Professor, 1).

Another, contribution of a Senior research fellow has it that, patronage has been normalized in the country and that if a government does not reward its followers with positions within the public sector, then that government should be ready to lose the next election.

The best reward to give to a supporter is a public position so that they may feel important to act and support the party the more. It is a common feature to see party loyalists agitating against the appointment of people whom they feel have not contributed to the party coming to power giving juicy positions (Senior Research Fellow, 5).

The party agitates to coheres their leaders to doing appoints along party lines other than on merit. The data on patronage confirms that of Kopecký (2013). His findings suggest that Ghana is not immune from the politics of patronage and concluded that, both the NDC and the NPP who won elections since 1992, have all engage in acts of patronage in an equal measure, especially in the area of the appointment of senior bureaucrats. Comparing Ghana and South Africa, he concluded that motivation is higher for patronage in Ghana and that almost all departments, agencies, and ministries within the public sector witness appointments when there is a change of government with the Judiciary as the only least affected (Kopecký, 2013).

Clientelism generally is the exchange of goods and services for political support based on a two-way relationship called **Dynamic**, or delivery of service by a politician called **Contingency; Hierarchy** relationship involves a politician in a higher and citizens in a lower position and if the is relationship continuous, it is termed **Iteration** (Hicken, 2020).

Participants could very well relate to the explanation given by Hicken (2020). Most of the participants believe that there is a continuous and never-ending relationship between the politician and most of the bureaucrats, which has come about as a result of enticement from the politician for a favour into making a government in power unpopular and by so doing they promote the bureaucrats when they are voted to power.

Beyond the patronage nature of the system, there is also a huge syndicate of politicians offering positions in exchange for information or political support and loyalty from bureaucrats. A research fellow with a think tank believes that:

“Politicians reward their supporters with promotions to be in an acting position when they are in power and if they win a second term, they make them substantive CEOs or chief Directors. Out of power, they promise them, and in most cases, they deliver on their promise when they are elected to power (Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director, 4).

A professor of political science believes that the politician cannot just do everything by themselves and will always need the support of the technocrat, even in the drafting of their manifestos.

One of the reasons for forming a political grouping is to win political power, winning elections demand a good strategy from the party. The party ends up engaging the services of people in academia, CSO as well as administrators and promises them positions as well as their support and loyalty. In the event of the party coming to power, these people are rewarded and in most cases with positions that are higher than their current positions or profession (Associate Professor, 1).

Thus, the politician trades with the technocrat for their support to win the next election, but in return pay them with positions, thereby fueling Politicisation within the public service. With regards to Clientelism, it goes to support the findings of Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah (2012) in Appiah and Abdulai (2017a) which contends that there are constant clientelisation and

politicisation of the bureaucratic set-up of the country which has almost always resulted in the ineffectiveness of the sector and that the appointment of senior bureaucrats on the bases of presidential fiat grounded on political affiliation other than merit has contributed to this ineffectiveness.

4.1.2 The Driving Factors of Politicisation in Ghana's Fourth Republic

Ghana's fourth republic has survived eight elections, and three turnovers making it the longest and most stable republic to date (Ahmed, 2019). This is attributable to the country's record of good governance and respect for human rights, which are key pillars of democracy (Sithole, 2012).

However, the road has not been all roser, one of the issues thwarting this stride is how political heads relate to those running the administrative machinery of the state. There is constant interference on the part of the politician to the extent that, the appointment, dismissal, promotion, and demotion of senior administrative officials have become a 'yoyo' in the hands of the politician. In an attempt to ascertain its severity, why this act is on the ascendency in the fourth republic and prevalent in political transition, various respondents cited the following: The winner-takes-All nature of the fourth republican constitution, creation of "jobs for the boys", Campaign resources and loyalty, moneycracy associated with political campaigning, the acrimonious nature of political party campaigning, patronage and clientelism, and the involvement of bureaucrats into politics.

4.1.2.1 Winner-Takes-All (WTA)

The 1992 constitution of Ghana, even though can be described as a hybrid, fusing both the presidential and parliamentary system of governance can also be described as a WTA (Gyampo & Graham 2014). With all intent and purpose, the constitution does not state this feature

directly, but the quantum of power given to the executive president to operate has left scholars and many analysts with no choice but to describe it as such (Ijon, 2019). One of the indicative features of WTA in the 1992 constitution is the extensive power of appointment given to the executive president by the constitution (Gyampo & Graham, 2017). The president to a very large extent has used this power to the detriment of all forms of appointments including senior bureaucrats whose contracts are terminated with the least provocation.

Most of the respondents who participated in this research are of the view that politicisation of the bureaucracy is a result of the unflinching power of the president to appoint and “disappoint”.

A senior lecture has this to say:

The 1992 constitution gives the president the power to make several appointments to public institutions, some in consultation with the council of state, boards of cooperation's and in the case of senior bureaucrats, with the PSC. Directly or indirectly the president has a hand in all these appointments, in their desire to control the administrative machinery of the state, they appoint their cronies to head these public institutions. (Senior Lecturer, 2).

The above point goes against the spirit of the age-old debate of politics-administrative dichotomy; thus, it leads to administrative interference.

A research consultant with a CSO believes that the president's power under the constitution is so enormous that, they control PSC because the head of the commission is also appointed by the president.

... the president is the most powerful individual in terms of appointment to both lower and upper positions in the country. The PSC regulates the appointment of senior bureaucrats in the country, presumably without interference from any individual, but the simple question is who appoints the head of the PSC, if it's the president then your guess is as good as mine (Research Consultant, 7).

Again, a senior research fellow with a Think tank, in describing how enormous the appointing powers of the president is, asserts that the president can influence all appointments with impunity.

The sitting president in Ghana, to borrow the words of Jean Bolden, in describing the powers of parliament “...can do anything except to turn a man into a woman...”, the president can do anything with regards to appointments and always finds a clause in the constitution to defend themselves, “a case in point is the auditor general being asked to proceed on leave”, for senior bureaucrats, as a chief director, it is a common feature in our current dispensation (Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director, 4).

Another director was of the view that the appointing powers of the president are so enormous that, no law in the country can curtail it and that the oversight or the approval powers of the PSC with regards to the appointment of senior bureaucrats is just a farce.

Now the system of appointing senior bureaucrats, like chief directors is open, the president can present a name to the PSC for consideration and almost always they are approved, to me the PSC is just giving integrity to the process but in truth, they cannot reject the nominee of the president (Director F&A, 18).

From the above submission by the participants interviewed by this research, there is an overwhelming stand that, politicisation has become an integral part of the appointments of senior bureaucrats in the fourth republic and the WTA posture of the constitution has intensified it. The above position is grounded in literature, taking cognizance of the works of Gyampo and Graham (2017) and Oquaye (2013) and Prempeh (2003), while Gyampo and Graham believe that, the WTA has led to a practice of appointing chief directors by the president to head public services which neutralize and compromise efficiency within the PS, Oquaye, and Prempeh admonish that, it undermines the role of chief directors and other senior

officers in the administration of the PS and renders them gullible and manipulative in the hands of the executive.

4.1.2.2 Jobs for the boys

Jobs for the boys, in this context, is the dishing out of public positions for party faithfuls and apparatchiks who helped the government of the day during its political party campaigning (Gyampo, 2010). Running a successful political campaign in Ghana's fourth republic is a daunting task and involves a strong support base, involving so many actors in the entire process. After an election, the winning party must reward its faithful and loyal supporters bearing in mind the short period for conducting elections in Ghana. Nisin (2016), opined that, in Ghana, the preparation of the next election starts after the president is sworn in. It is therefore important for the government to reward its loyal supporters with jobs from the PS. Many participants believe, this has contributed to the constant politicisation the country witnessed in the fourth republic especially the period after elections.

A director with a public service organization didn't mince words in his continuation to this study. He believes a change in government means a change in personnel within the public sector and an avenue for creating jobs for party loyalists. The executive even ends up duplicating the duties of heads of public institutions and to a very large extent brings in their men to run affairs.

After the 7th of January when a president is sworn in, public administrators face a period of uncertainty, this is the period where the party rewards its loyalists after promising them jobs during campaigning. first, the senior bureaucrats are moved or sacked to make up for some vacant position for the politician to reward his people, then those lower administrators follow. In some cases, they create jobs even when there is none and these lead to duplication of duty and redundancy in the office (Deputy Director F&A, 12).

A senior research fellow who used the phrase “Jobs for the boys” share a similar view, but went further to alluded that, there are certain key positions that are the preserve of party loyalists, so that the politician can be able to get their policies through:

He advanced his argument as:

In Ghana’s fourth republic, the politician will always politicise the appointment of senior bureaucrats based on two reasons, one “to create jobs for his people” and second “to control the administrative machinery of the state”, they do this to get their policies through, but the latent effect is that they are rewarding party loyalist with public sector appointment (Senior Research Fellow, 5).

A political professor believes that the politician comes into power against the backdrop of lofty promises to his supporters and loyalists. They must reward them with positions and jobs within their administrative set-up and to him, heads of institutions are replaced and they, in turn, will create the environment to appoint other supporters to occupy other lower positions.

The entire party structure and the party loyalists who contribute to the success of the government is made up of, grass-roots, rank and file, caucuses and if you like vigilante group affiliated to the party... when a party is elected to power, all these blocks must be rewarded with jobs in the public sector and other informal sectors. Against the grand scheme of things, heads of public institutions are replaced with party loyalists to do the bidding of these blocks within the party (Associate Professor, 1).

He again asserted that, in the event of any difficulty in replacing the heads, Special Assistance (SA) and or Consultants are attached to the various ministries to render the work of heads of public institutions ineffective.

A new feature within the bureaucratic set-up is the appointment of SA and Consultants to ministers in the various ministries, who advise the minister on

policy direction and the workings of the ministries. A situation that has rendered the work of the technocrat ineffective (Associate Professor, 1).

Jobs for the boys based on the above explanations given by the various respondents have become a feature of the modern political climate of the country and synonymous with patronage and clientelism. This has driven the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in the country to a level unmatched in the period before the fourth republic. A revealing feature is that, after the appointment of the senior bureaucrats, the government uses them as means to appointing other lower positions and uses them as a tool to driving their policies. Also, the appointment of special assistance and consultants is a way of rendering the technocrat ineffective. The appointment of special assistance which respondents alluded to is shared by both 2017 and 2018 CSAPR.

“...the influx of Personal/Special Assistants of Political heads without them going through proper recruitment processes of the Civil Service did not help matters” (CSAPR, 2017:71) and

“Intrusion of Special Advisors into main functions of the Civil Servants rendered the carrier Civil Servants feeling not adequate enough to do their work” (CSAPR 2018:59).

With regards to the Creation of Jobs for the boys, it buttressed the findings of both Appiah and Abdulai (2017a) on clientelism and Kopecký (2012) on Patronage as earlier discussed.

4.1.2.3 Campaign Resources and Moneycracy

Democracy is expensive, this is a common phrase being echoed around when the politician wants to justify their position on profligate spending. However, the reality of the phrase “democracy is expensive” is felt when one avails themselves to contest for a political position in Ghana. It demands a lot of energy, the endurance of internal context, and a strong financial

base. A weak party financing law has made politicians aspiring to occupy the higher position of the land resort to a group of business moguls, who are faceless to finance their campaigning for rewards when they come to power. There is also another twist, to getting one elected in the country in the fourth republic, “Moneyocracy” loosely defined as the use of money to get one elected. This has been a constant feature of Ghana’s fourth republican elections either in local, intraparty, or general elections.

Campaign resources and Moneyocracy, also affect appointments in Ghana’s fourth republic. Most of the participants have the ensuing explanations.

A lecturer with a public university in Ghana believed that, in Ghana, before one is elected, they are indebted in one way or the other to, individuals, friends, and many business owners in the country because they are the people who finance their campaign.

In Ghana, the process of political campaigning is a treacherous one and involves a lot of money, there is no proper law guiding the conduct of campaign financing. Individuals and political parties use their own money or resort to friends and other associates, in return they are rewarded with positions in their government or awarded hefty contracts. In this republic, senior bureaucrats’ positions suffer politicisation because the politician will just reward a party financier with such a position (Senior Lecturer, 3).

Again, a programmes manager with a CSO was of the view that party or campaign financing out to be given attention by scholars, because to him it even breeds corruption and mistrust in the political process and strongly affects all forms of appointment in the country including, the appointment of senior administrators.

...no one individual is ready to finance their campaign just to serve their people as politicians always claim. They have their financiers whom they promise position within the public sector... the whole process tends to breed corruption, and these officials may never be prosecuted under the watch of the government in power (Programmes Manager, 8).

Moneyocracy in Ghana's political space has also contributed significantly to the growing politicisation of the country's bureaucracy. Individuals seeking to serve, buy themselves into positions of influence and appointment. Since 1992 there has been an incidence of politicians influencing the outcome of an election with money. Participants strongly believe that these politicians when elected will ultimately try to recoup what they invested in their campaigning. A research assistant with a CSO, aptly believes that one of the means to recoup campaign funds is to control the public sector and once the appointing authority gets their people in the top echelons of the country's bureaucracy, their mission is almost complete.

People seeking to serve us, the citizenry pump a lot of money in their campaigning trying to buy our conscience and once they succeed, it's payback time for them, they appoint their people in the higher positions of the public administrative set-up, just to control and have their way... this is not good for democracy but they do it anyway and get away with it (Research Assistant, 9).

Again, a senior lecturer in a public university buttressed the above point and even question our political party leaders for paying a tight-lipped on a phenomenon that has been reported in the media circles for about two decades. He asserts that:

In Ghana the laws are weak on political party campaigning, we hear of "moneyocracy" anytime there is a political party primary. In the general elections, there has been an incidence of voters being given broom, salt, etc. all these have been reported by the media, we know it and we don't talk about it. (Senior Lecturer, 2).

The effects of his claims are that elected officials will try to control everything in the country including public appointments so that they will get hold of the administrative machinery of the state to recoup their money.

Campaign financing and moneycracy have been one of the reasons why there is a politicisation of the appointments to the top echelons of the Ghanaian bureaucratic set-up. While many blames it on weaker laws others are of the view that it serves as a reward mechanism for party financiers and some believe it breeds corruption but in, all it leads to the politicisation of the top hierarchy of the public sector in Ghana. With Campaign financing the findings of Sakyi et al. (2015) as stated above holds, however issues of moneycracy have been confided to newspaper reports and the work of Bentil and Adu (2019) whose findings discovered that monetization of political struggle has adverse implications for a competitive political contest, leading to disqualification of citizens with capable minds from contesting in a multi-party democracy, other than appointments.

4.1.2.4 Politics of Acrimony

Politics in the country has been very acrimonious in the fourth republic, a position shared by many scholars. Politics of insult, name-calling, and hostile environment created during electoral transition does not only put off some “decent people” from politics but also has created a regime of witch-hunting in the top echelons of the administrative machinery of the state. Many of the respondents interviewed in this research are of the firm belief that the country’s political parties have been very hostile during campaigns, all to win power at all costs. After the election, the politician settles the scores with major shakeups in most public institutions and the first casualties are the senior bureaucrats heading the public institutions.

A participant within a public sector organization believes that there is a whole lot of mistrust, name-calling, accusations, and counter-accusations in our political landscape which has given cause for an appointing authority to interfere in the makeup of the bureaucratic set-up in the country.

She postulates that:

“...during political campaigning, the environment is very hostile, with documents being leaked around, political opponents resort to name-calling and insults leading to a serious trust issue within the public sector. After elections heads of public institutions are punished for what they did or did not do in defending the government” (Director of Human Resource, 15).

These heads by extension are sacked if they find themselves in the bad books of the losing party and vice versa.

Again, the desire to punish one’s opponent after an acrimonious campaign has been the goal for the politician, a move to appease their supporters and reward loyalists, in this context within the public sector. This is echoed by a deputy director with a public sector organization, he asserts that,

The is always a desire on the part of the politician to punish their opponent after elections to please their supports and be seen to be working... In all this those running the administrative machinery of state are not spared, especially if the bureaucrat is labelled to be a sympathizer of the opposing party (Deputy Director F&A, 16).

A fellow with a Think tank believed that the antagonistic nature of politics in the country has led to a crisis during electoral transitions. To him, major transitions in the country have witnessed a wanton display of arrogance and power from the major political parties, which resulted in the sacking of some high-profile members of some public cooperation and the seizure of cars and properties belonging to the losing party, which has further deepened the cracks of politicisation in the country.

“Transitions in this country have not been properly handled, and I dare say that not even the introduction of the Presidential Transition Act, 2012, Act 845 has tamed politicians to treat each other in a decorous manner. Seizure of properties of political opponents purporting to belong to the state and sacking of public bureaucrats deem to be aligned to the losing party has further

amplified politicisation in the country's bureaucratic sphere” (Senior Research Fellow, 5).

From the above positions espoused by various respondents, most of the respondents are of the view that politics and transitions in the fourth republic have been clouded with acrimony. And the two major political parties are guilty of the growing canker. While others blame it on the way transitions have been handled in the country, others believe that it is done to appease party loyalists. The acrimonious debate has been espoused by scholars and other publications like Joyce (2015) and Ninsin (2016) confirms that of responses above. They admonished those transitions have been acrimonious, divisive, and damaging to the country's emerging democracy leading to several senior bureaucrats losing their positions.

4.1.2.5 The Administrative Politician

Throughout the discussion on trying to find reasons why there is a politicisation of the Ghanaian bureaucratic set-up with special attention on the top echelons of the bureaucratic ladder, most of the arguments tend to be skewed towards the politician and his desire to achieve at all costs. Participants, however, have some rather staggering revelations of the administrator dubbed the “the administrative politician”.

One of the reasons why Woodrow Wilson and his click of thinkers popularize the theory of politics-administration dichotomy was to allow the administrator to work without any kind of interference from the politician (Tahmasebi & Musavi, 2011). On the contrary several respondents in one way or the other laid some of the blame for politicisation within the fourth republic at the doors of the administrator.

A research fellow and a programmes officer with a Think tank in the country believe that the bureaucrat cannot be left out when looking for reasons why there is constant politicisation in

the top hierarchy of the bureaucracy. He stated the desire for the bureaucrat to head an institution and enjoy the entitlements and benefits that come with it:

...within the public service, the top positions come with a lot of benefits and entitlements that officers at the lower levels don't get to enjoy. This desire for quick promotion has created an atmosphere where the bureaucrat always succumbs to the whims of the politician. They sometimes go to the extent of advising a political party on a strategy to approach policy for political expediency other than the national interest. If their preferred party gets elected, they are rewarded with promotions to the top echelons of administration
(Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director, 4).

A senior lecture was of the view that every individual is a political animal and believe that, most public bureaucrats within the fourth republic have either resign to contest a political position or been appointed by a political party. That those decisions are believed to have been nurtured over a period, which had consequences in the way they carried themselves as administrators.

...since the inception of the fourth republic, data has shown that bureaucrats venturing into politics has been on the ascendancy... One cannot blame them because "man is a political animal" as espoused by Aristotle, but the decision to be in politics might have been taken a long time and may have affected the administrator's views on policy in the past. For the bureaucrats to be given a political appointment, they might have exhibited an inclination towards appointing authority. In sum, bureaucrats are also becoming political and this has contributed greatly to the politics of the appointment of senior bureaucrats.
(Senior Lecturer, 3).

A deputy director working within the PS in Ghana opines that technocrat are politicians in disguise, they are effective when their preferred candidates are in power. And will always try

to help a government succeed, they will write the best of speeches for the politician, in the same vein they mislead an opposing party just to make them unpopular.

As technocrats, we vote so we have our preferred candidates and party, but others put up their best when their party is in power, which is bad. They go to extent of making a government policy unpopular and write misleading speeches for political heads to deliver with the sole aim of sabotaging the government of the day for their preferred party (Deputy Director of Research, 13).

Another public sector director also believes that to get a contract within the service after your retirement, means you must be in bed with the politician. Again, others have political ambition after retirement, so they always will position themselves in an advantageous position and nurture that ambition because one cannot nurture a political ambition at age sixty.

.... As a bureaucrat, you retire at age sixty and if you are lucky, you get a contract for two or so years depending on the sector. The surest way to get a contract extension is when the government finds you “relevant” to their course. Again, after sixty only a few experience bureaucrats will go into private businesses as consultants to succeed, so most people take up politics as a new challenge which they must have conceived a long time ago (Director F&A, 18).

Lastly, a director with a public institution believes that the politician will always try to have their way and for the bureaucrats to protect their work, they act in conformity to the dictates of the politician. Thus, bureaucrats are political because the politician made them so.

To me, bureaucrats are political only to the extent of protecting their jobs...the politician will always want to have their way, and if a bureaucrat tries standing their way, your hard earn reputation and work will go down the drain, the safer way is to be political and defend government policies and save your job. As soon as you are sacked, the laws, media, or CSO cannot save you. “The recent case involving the Auditor General tells it all” (Director F&A, 14).

The above extensive discussion reveals that the politicisation of the position of senior bureaucrats in the country is a double edge saw. Some participants blaming the conduct of some senior bureaucrats as a contributory factor. The above disposition is also not very much grounded in literature, and can best be described as perceptions. One can only make an implication that, if an officer is appointed in an acting capacity, then they will most likely be in favour of the ruling elite.

4.2 Implications of Politicisation of the Appointment of Senior Bureaucrats

The interference of politicians in the workings of the Ghanaian bureaucratic set up as discussed earlier has been on the ascendancy in the fourth republic. The appointment of senior bureaucrats which is the focus of this study has had implications on the overall development and political agenda of the state. Respondents' views on the effect of politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in Ghana's fourth republic were thematized as follows: the effects on the mandate of a public institution, public sector reforms, developmental outcomes, and finally on Ghana's emerging democracy.

4.2.1 Politicisation of Appointment and Mandate

Mandate, as defined by dictionary.com, is the "official order or commission to do something". Thus, in this context, it is an official order, that gave birth to a sector within the public or civil services of Ghana. Participants in making their contribution were to a large extent divided but believe politicisation of senior bureaucrats affects the execution of the mandate of the various administrative sectors of the bureaucracy.

Some believe that the mandate until revised or change, through an Act of Parliament, cannot be altered with the transfer or sacking of the administrative head. However, the execution of

the mandate of some PS institutions by some bureaucratic heads makes one wonder if they are truly on course to delivering on the mandate as enshrined in the establishing Act of an institution.

A director with a public institution has this to contribute;

The mandate of an institution does not change and cannot be changed overnight, it must go through some changes in the law that gave the institution its mandate. So, at first, glance whoever is appointed to lead must not go contrary to the mandate. What happens is that these politically motivated heads do have a leadership style that does not effectively promote the mandate of the institution but towards a policy to heling their appointing authority gain popularity (Director F&A, 17).

Again, an assistant director and head of reforms postulated that even though the mandate of the institution cannot be altered by an administrator, they are unlawfully reshaped by the policies of the government in power, and having their man at the helm of affairs hastens the process.

All public sector institutions have their mandate as we have here, these mandates are what even define us and make us unique from other public sector organizations. The political head can direct a particular policy to an institution that does not go in line with the mandate of that public institution. This mostly happens when the head is appointed by the executive to champion that policy (Assistant Director/Head of Reforms, 11).

A research consultant with a Think tank share a similar view:

Ordinarily, the defining features of public cooperation cannot be changed by the personnel manning or overseeing its execution, but leadership style counts a lot in public administration. A politically motivated appointment to head an organization can disrupt the public organization in question of its mandate. And in Ghana, only a few heads of public institutions can stand the pressures of the executive (Research Consultant, 7).

Some of the participants believed that the politician does not care about the mandate, if that mandate does not push their policies, to them of it's no effect. Thus, politicisation affects the mandate if it is not in tune with the policy direction of the government of the day.

A research fellow with a Think tank has this to say:

... one of the reasons why the politician will appoint their people to head a particular bureaucratic institution is to push their policies. As a result, the mandate of the said institution is affected if the policy does not go in line with the mandate. The politician will still go ahead and use that institution because they have their men at the helm of affairs. To my understanding, the politician in Ghana is not a respecter of the mandate of most public institutions (Senior Research Fellow, 5).

A senior lecturer buttressed, the above points by stating that, the politician will not respect the mandate of an organization if they do not go to promote their political fortunes.

.... government trusts the laws governing public institutions only when it promotes their political fortunes. They believe universities are independent and can come out with policies that promote teaching, research and learning, but the politician will kick against any initiative that has implications on their political fortunes. Imagine being in a public institution where the government can appoint a chief director based on political fiat. The mandate of the said institution will defiantly suffer (Senior Lecturer, 3).

The consequences of this interference on the mandate of the organization are felt through the following:

A senior research fellow with a Think tank believes that it rubs the populace of the services to be enjoyed by a public sector:

“The overall effect is that a public institution is unable to deliver to the good people very well. If the mandate of say Ghana water is to provide clean water to the people of Ghana and the sector is politicised and they lose focus they will

end up not being effective on providing water for all, but rather water for some”

(Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director, 4).

A deputy director with a PS institution believes that, once the mandate is compromised, public sector workers are made redundant.

“Mr. researcher, once our mandate is tempered upon, we are made redundant for a period until we adjust to the new normal” **(Deputy Director F&A, 10).**

A senior lecture believes it leads to the state cooperation losing its identity which can promote inefficiency.

“I will say the cascading effect of politicisation is the loss of the identity of the public institution, these have led to inefficiency on the part of bureaucrats through no fault of theirs” **(Senior Lecturer, 3).**

The above explanations by the various participants point to the fact that politicisation in the top echelons of the Ghanaian bureaucracy has negative effects on the mandate of a public sector. However, there is no work to the best of my knowledge that looks at the effects of politicisation of a Public Sector on its mandate.

4.2.2 Politicisation on Public Sector Reforms (PSR)

Ghana like most African countries has undertaken many reforms in the public sector. Many of these reforms are geared towards a transformation of the public sector into becoming more productive, efficient, and delivering world-class service towards ensuring sustainable development (Essuman-Mensah, 2019). Even though some of the results and outcomes have been modest and unsatisfactory, one of the issues that these reforms aim to address is the issue of politicisation of the public bureaucratic set-up (Essuman-Mensah, 2019). Having concluded that there is politicisation in the appointment of the heads of public institutions, various

respondents gave their account of this creeping phenomenon on the execution of Public Sector Reforms (PSR) in the country.

A lecturer with a public university believes that the politicisation of the public sector has a serious consequence on the success or failure of a PSR. He stated that:

...the success or failures of a PSR hinges on the desires and commitment of the administrator in charge of a said reform. Interference in the bureaucratic structure of a sector championing a reform is likely to suffer delay for its implementation. It sometimes leads to total failure if the new person at the helm of affairs is not committed to delivering on the said PSR. If the said reform is not having the full support of the appointing authority of the administrator, then it suffers a setback. On the other hand, if both the appointing authority and the administrator are for the reform it tends to succeed (Associate Professor, 1).

Thus, if a government supports a PSR, politicizing the appointment of the head of an implementing agency does not affect the reform. Likewise, if they do not support the reform politicisation of the implementing agency leads to a setback.

Again, a senior research fellow with a CSO share in the above submission but went further to state that, politicians claim credit for every good policy or initiative, if they are the ones who solicit funds for such a reform, they go all out to support it, but if it was started by their opponent, they do not want to lend their full support to such a reform hence politicisation of the top hierarchy of the bureaucracy leads to failure.

He stated that:

In Ghana, a politician wants to get credit for every single policy or project. If they are in support of a reform or if they start a reform in the public sector they put in their best. In that situation, it does not matter who is the bureaucratic head... but if it was started by their opponent, the politician doesn't normally put in their best for it to succeed. In that case, a change or interference in the appointment of the senior administrator by the government leads to a failure of

such reform. Even though several factors have a serious effect on PSR, I strongly believe the politicisation of the implementing body is one of the reasons (Senior Research Fellow, 5).

Some participants believe, politicisation in the context of this research does not directly affect a reform, but rather it affects the implementation. They based their argument on the sources of funding for such reforms and the organization championing them.

A consultant with a Think tank has this to say:

Most of the reforms that are carried out in the country with regards to the public sector are mostly donor-funded. When a policy is funded by say International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank (WB) it does not suffer when the senior bureaucrat is replaced by a politician. In the same vein, if the reform is funded with Government of Ghana (GoG) funds, then it suffers a setback when the senior bureaucrat is replaced or when the new government does not support the reform. But in most cases, an interference in the public sector motivated by politics affects the implementation component of PSR in the country (Research Consultant, 7).

A director within the public sector shares the same position as stated above:

... PSR is champion by international organizations and some donor agency or a bilateral agreement between Ghana and say the Danish Government. These reforms do not easily fold with a change of government or politicisation of the bureaucracy in the country, what normally happens is that its implementation is not very swift. Politicians know the consequences of interfering with such reforms (Director F&A, 12).

But another director thinks otherwise, to her donor-funded PSR, is politicised in the country, so its implementation also suffers from either a change of headship in the administrative machinery of the state or a change in political leadership.

In this country policy or reform has a political twist to it. Either it is being supported by party A or B. so donor-funded reforms are also politicised at both the level of governance and administration. The leadership style and the strings being pulled by the politician affect mostly implementation especially if the administrative head is appointed by the politician to serve at their pleasure (Director F&A, 18).

Lastly, a programme manager with a Think tank was of the firm opinion, the only thing that will make both administrators and bureaucratic heads surcharge the success of a PSR is when the funds are available for them to use.

...for donor funded reforms, the funds are mostly available and the politician or the bureaucratic head will spend.... Other than that, the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats affects every aspect of administration including PSR (Programmes Manager, 8).

The positions echoed above, by the various respondents is a testament that politicisation of the top hierarchy of the bureaucracy in Ghana affects reforms based on the organization funding the reform, the desire of political and administrative head to execute them. By way of implication, Essuman-Mensah (2019) is of the view that almost all reforms that Ghana embarks on having the component of depoliticizing the public sector from Government interference.

4.2.3 Developmental Outcomes and Politicisation

Every governance aims to provide development that will improve the well-being of the people. Thus, development is an integral part of nation-building. One of the best ways of ensuring quality development is when the political head grants the administrator the autonomy to operate.

Several respondents believe that the constant politicisation of the countries bureaucratic arrangement has serious effects on development. While others were of the firm belief that it does not promote continuity of development, other participants are also of the view it leads to the total neglect of development by the previous government since the country does not have a prototype national development agenda.

A senior research fellow with a Think tank was very emphatic with his submission. To him, the country is not developing due to the constant politicisation of all aspects of public life including the politicisation of appointment.

Within the fourth republic, the county has conducted most of its policies in developing the nation along political lines. The politician allocates resources based on electoral fortune and hence does not allow the administrator to come out with the best policy for addressing our development challenge. This is even worse when the administrator is appointed by the government of the day. They control the administrator to execute policies that are tailored along with their electoral fortunes other than policies that benefit the nation (Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director, 4).

A senior lecture with a public university believes that a politically motivated administrator lacks the autonomy to operate and this has affected the entire developmental outcomes in the country. And he strongly blames it on the politicisation of the appointment of the bureaucrat.

The reason why some countries have a strong economy and are making exploits in their developmental agenda is that they have a strong public service devoid of government control and interference. In the best examples of the world, there is bureaucratic autonomy and the politician is guided by the unbiased advice of the technocrat. That is not the case in this country, the politician determines the policy direction in terms of development. It thus becomes worse if the bureaucrat was appointed by the politician (Senior Lecturer, 2).

A director within a public sector organization believes, that the administrator will always protect their jobs at the expense of development:

She alluded that:

.... the politics within the bureaucratic arrangement of this country, has a far-reaching consequence than most people think. Administrators always work based on the demands of the executive just to protect their jobs. If the politician wants development even at a place where development is not needed, the administrator has no choice but to succumb to it. What is even more frightening is that, when a chief director is appointed by the government, developmental policies and direction is at the behest of the appointing authority (Director of Human Resource, 15).

Another deputy director has this to say:

. we work with the executive, but we are not to conform to whatever they ask us to do... they must take our advice because we have the statistics and the data to advise, but if the politician is not ready to listen to your advice you don't have a choice but to go by it and protect your job. In some jurisdictions when you disagree with a policy you resign, but in Ghana, we protect our jobs (Deputy Director F&A, 16).

The director's assertion implies that the administrator will hasten things to please their appointing authority.

In Ghana, there is no continuity in the developmental projects that are carried out in the country according to a participant with a Think tank. A situation he blames on the politicisation of the administrative structure of the state.

He posits that:

.... policy continuity is larked in this country. With developmental policies being the worse affected. the examples abound... the politician in Ghana does not

want to continue with what their predecessors have started or initiated. To help them achieve this agenda they replace most of the admirative heads in senior management positions. These new “politically motivated” bureaucratic heads to a very large extent play along with the wishes of their appointing authority (Research Analyst, 6).

Again, he stated that:

...with all the hue and cry about the ills of a bailout and donor support, most developing countries still need them to develop. One of the conditions for getting these supports is less politicisation of the bureaucracy, so politicisation affects development (Research Analyst, 6).

The above explanations given by the participants suggest that politicisation in the country has a huge impact on developmental outcomes. This stand is equally shared by Peters (2004) who believes that the politicisation of the public sector slows down the fluidity with which government policies and programmes flow and by extension, development is stalled.

4.2.4 Implication on Ghana’s Democracy

Ghana’s democracy, even though has been hailed as one of the best in Africa (Sithole, 2012), has some debilitating problems that scholars believe that it out to be looked at. One of the issues is the politicisation of the appointment of the heads of public institutions in the Ghanaian bureaucratic arrangement, a situation which Gyampo and Graham (2017) and Ijon (2019) believe is a result of the WTA posture of the constitution which gives the president an extensive power of appointment. Be as it may, the various respondents interviewed in conducting this research believe politicisation of the bureaucratic set-up has the potential of ruing the countries democracy.

A senior programme officer with a CSO in Accra believes that one of the basic tenets of democracy is the respect for rule of law. That interfering in the appointment of the chief director and other top-level appointments by the politician rubs the country with some basic tenants of democracy such as rule of law.

He made his submission as:

In Ghana when it comes to appointments, the appointing authority does not respect the laid down procedures, because they want to have control over those institutions. There is a total disregard for rule of law when they want to have their way, they interfere in the appointment of senior bureaucrats and this weakens the bureaucracy... the gushing effect is that the country's democracy is also weakened because the laws of the country are not respected (Programmes Manager, 8).

A professor of politics added his voice by asserting that, the politicisation of the administrative machinery of the state apart from having disregard for rule of law can breed dictators in the long run.

...having disregard for rule of law as a leader has so many implications for Ghana's democracy and the most worrying is that, it can breed dictators in the long run. The effects may be not visible now, but with all the extensive appointing powers if a government fills all appointments with their cronies without respect for the laid-down procedure, it will mean that one day the leader can be a constitutional dictator (Associate Professor, 1).

He again states that the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats does not inspire confidence in the public sector and foreign donors will not support the countries democratic process:

... when there is less politicisation of the bureaucratic set-up, it attracts donor support in terms of the county's electoral process. Most of the election-related budgets in the country are donor funded. So, if the county's institutions are

seen to act without interference from government, foreign donors will support in promoting the country's democracy. (Associate Professor, 1).

A director with a public sector organization is of the firm belief that politicisation has the effect of dumping the spirit of patriotism because it can lead to voter apathy during elections.

She posits that:

...when we politicised our bureaucracy, the populace may not have confidence in both the political system and the administrative machinery of the state. The citizenry will not want to be a part of a system that favour only a few and so patriotism will be dampened and some citizens may not partake in the country's electoral system (Director F&A, 17).

The above points raised by various respondents is in line with Abotsi (2013) who was of the view that politicisation of the country's bureaucracy does not promote good governance, while Ijon (2019) thinks it does not promote strict accountability, which is inimical to the country's young democracy.

In concluding the above objective, even though some scholars in their contribution to literature have sought to project the good side of bureaucratic politicisation, the above assertions say otherwise. And that, the mandate of a Public Sector Organisation (PSO), PSR, developmental outcomes, and Ghana's democracy has suffered some negative impact partly due to politicizing the appointment of senior bureaucrats in the country.

4.3 Policy Guidelines to Reducing Politicisation in the Public Sector

This section analyzes the responses offered by respondents considered by this research on the various alternative cause of actions on cubing the politicisation of the appointment of senior

bureaucrats in Ghana. The section is divided into three themes, namely, what can be done in terms of the policy, how it can be done, and what actions can bring about change.

4.3.1 What can be done in terms of Policy?

Interestingly, while some respondents believed there is a need for a new policy direction, Others are of the view that the current laws and regulations need to be strengthened.

A professor with a public institution in the country is of the firm certainty that the powers of appointment given to the president are too much. He believes that appointments that the president does in consultation, approval, and/or with the advice of other bodies such as the Council of State (COS) and PSC, must be reviewed.

He states that:

The appointing powers of the president are so enormous under the 1992 constitution, even though some of the appointments is being done in consultation or with the approval or advice of the council of state, parliament, PSC, etc., the appointment of chief directors and other senior bureaucrats under Article 195(1) of the 1992 constitution, must be reviewed to give more powers and autonomy to the PSC... the PSC must be strengthened to avoid any government interference in their work (Associate Professor, 1).

Again, this position was also shared by a research consultant with a CSO, he proposed that the appointment of public offers like chief directors must be based on merit devoid of political interference. He further states that the PSC must do so in consultation with the governing boards of such institutions and that the only way to doing that is to give the PSC the appointing powers and be backed by law.

... appointment of Article 195(1) officers must be the duty of the PSC in consultation with the governing board of that agency of state.... There must be laws to back this. And the appointment should be on merit, the merit component

of the law must be clearly defined to avoid any ambiguity of interpretation
(Research Consultant, 7).

Others are of the view that the current laws as they stand are in good standing, however, the fact that the president appoints the head of the Civil and Public service is the only thing that ought to be looked at:

A public sector staff (A deputy director) believes, the laws are okay but her worry is the appointment of the head of the civil and public service by the president, which means that PSC will just be appendages of the president's nominee of a position.

“To me, the current situation is not very bad... my problem has to do with the appointment of the head of civil service (CS) and PSC which is done by the president. The implication is that they cannot just reject the president's nominee no matter how rigorous their interview and selection processes are...” The PSC's independence is doubt and their behaviour in approving the nomination of the president is just like *“parliament approving the president's nomination to ministerial appointments... they always go through”*. There must be a law tying the president's hands of appointing only amongst three most senior public servants within the PSC to head the service **(Deputy Director of Research, 13).**

Another angle to the alternative course of action has to do with, the various forms of redress for those who have been wrongly treated or suffered as a result of politicisation. Most of the participants even though could not fully explain the process of seeking redress within the public service believe the process is ambiguous and takes a lot of time to get justice.

A deputy director believes that the process of seeking redress is just frustrating.

Seeking redress for wrongful dismissal and for not being promoted to a senior position within the service is not very clear to most people and can be very frustrating... “In my humble opinion, the PSC code of conduct should make the

process very simple and less stressful, so that aggrieved PS personnel can take advantage of” (Deputy Director F&A, 10).

Another PS director was of the view that the process of seeking redress is just a total waste of time and resources because it takes a longer time to get justice.

The various means of seeking redress in the service is so complex and slow that, before one exhausts the entire process, they are nearing retirement, if you are lucky the various labour unions can take up your case, if not you have to endure a process which in most cases does not provide justice. A friend (Name and department withheld) who was due for promotion to the status of a director was never promoted, he fought his case through the Civil service adjudicating process, he was never promoted but went on retirement while the process was ongoing... we need a law that can fast track the various forms for seeking redress in the service (Director F&A, 17).

A research fellow and a Programme Officer with a Think tank share the same opinion as above, and even states that the politicisation within the public sector leaves the personnel involved with no choice, they are hardly reinstated and even if they are reinstated, there is an antagonism when they return. So, he also advocated for the strengthening of the laws to hasten the adjudicating process.

“In all this, I believe that the laws governing the PSC should be strengthened devoid of any interference by the executive and if they interfere, the PSC should be able to address them. Again, solving the issues relating to politicisation on time will reduce the antagonism that reinstated officials confronts in office.” (Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director, 4).

The above positions point clearly to the fact that the laws as they stand, needs to be reviewed, the various positions shared by the individual participants may be subjective but in one way or the other it conforms to the recommendation of the appointment of senior public officials as

enshrined in Article 195(1), by the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), which proposed that:

“All public officers who are appointed under Article 195(1) should be appointed by the President, acting in accordance with the advice of the governing councils or boards of their respective institutions in consultation with the Public Services Commission, except that persons who hold or act in offices in public institutions of higher education, research or professional training should continue to be appointed by the governing councils of those institutions exclusively” (CRS, 2011:283).

4.3.2 How it can be done

Participants made various contributions to how the politicisation syndrome can be addressed. Some of them were of the view that there should be a drastic reform both in terms of Law and empowering PS employees, while others think that a regular retreat for ministers and senior bureaucrats is the way to go.

A lecturer of politics at a public university believes that there should be a review with regards to the constitution and other codes of conduct towards ensuring bureaucratic autonomy and a PS devoid of any government interference. He proposes that a commission like the constitutional review commission should be the best way to start.

He postulates that:

...there should be a review of the president’s powers of appointment and code of conduct for public officers and empowering the public sector to be autonomous... something like the Constitutional Reviews Commission (CRC) is the way to go... “I believe this can help reduce politicisation of the appointment of heads of public institutions in the country...” (Senior Lecturer, 3).

Again, a line director with a public service organization shared a similar view but stressed that sector ministers must respect the neutrality of the bureaucrat.

He posits that,

As a bureaucrat, I am neutral based on my code of conduct, PSC can always punish me if I go contrary to the dictates of my profession, but sector ministers do not just get it, they will replace me based on hearsay... I believe when sector ministers respect the neutrality of the public servant, politicisation will reduce
(Director of Human Resource, 15).

A senior research fellow with a Think tank believes that a retreat must be organized for both ministers and senior bureaucrats to learn basic administrative procedures and the dos and don'ts on the part of both the senior bureaucrats and the ministers.

He made the following contribution:

...one of the reasons why there is constant interference within our bureaucratic set up has to do with, "some ministers don't know their basic roles" and as a result, they will try to interfere with the workings of the bureaucrat. I believe if a refresher course, a retreat, or joint orientation is organized for them at say Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), it will help them understand each other which can help reduce the incidence of politicisation
(Senior Research Fellow, 5).

Again, an assistant director with a public sector organization, is of the firm belief that labour organizations must help individuals in fighting for wrongful dismissal, they must not leave the individual to do it on their own because the process is just cumbersome.

Labour organizations must stand-in for their own and defend any act of interference by the political head other than allowing the individual to always be fighting their wrongful dismissal by themselves. The power of the group alone will be a deterrent to politicians when interfering with the appointment of senior bureaucrats
(Assistant Director/Head of Reforms, 11).

Another director with a public sector organization aptly shares in the above submission and stresses the effectiveness of a group during a demonstration.

...yes, fighting a system controlled by politicians will always be a daunting one, but if a group like the Civil and Local Government Staff Association of Ghana (CLOSSAG) is fighting on behalf of their member(s), it will always yield results. When they even threaten a demonstration, the government of the day will act swiftly... this can help in reducing the incidence of politicisation in the public sector (Director F&A, 14).

The above points as discussed by various respondents means that to curb the politicisation in the country, there should be a commission to review all the existing laws on the appointment of senior bureaucrats, promotion of autonomy, and a retreat for both the political and the administrative heads to learn something on administrative procedures and practices.

4.3.3 Alternative Causes of Action That Can Bring Change

The research by this theme seeks to know from the various respondents across Academia, PS, and CSOs, what cause of action will lead to a change in the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in Ghana.

One of the research assistants, with a Think tank, indicated that to bring change the bureaucrat must be efficient and effective to win the trust of the politician.

...even though the politician will want to have their men around based on trust and loyalty, they also want to deliver on their promises, so they will work with a bureaucrat who is very efficient and effective. For me I think bureaucrats must be efficient and effective, this will win the trust of the politician towards their policy direction and it will reduce politicisation (Research Assistant, 9).

A political science lecturer, believes that the politician should stop meddling in the affairs of the bureaucrat, whether in government or out of government. They must stop using bureaucrats as spies leaking documents when in opposition just to defame their opponent.

To cause a drastic change, the politician must allow the bureaucrat to work without any interference. And, stop using them(bureaucrats) to leaking documents and making their opponents unpopular... bureaucrats must be allowed to be autonomous in the discharge of their duties (Senior Lecturer, 2).

A director with a public sector also thinks that bureaucrats should stop being in bed with politicians for quick promotion.

...most of the politicisation we see in Ghana's bureaucracy is as a result of bureaucrats being contracted by the politician to serve their interest, they accept the offer in return with quick promotions which they don't deserve. If bureaucrats can desist from this act, then the level of politicisation will reduce (Director F&A, 12).

A programme officer with a CSO thinks that Ghana should go back to adopt the characteristics of the bureaucracy that the country had just after independence. And bureaucrats must be empowered to play their roles diligently.

He has this to say:

.... Ghana had a very good and vibrant PS post-independence, that is why most Ghanaians work in the United Nations (UN) and other International Organizations (IO). The country was the envy of other African countries as they came in to learn from us, now our PS is in tatters and to restore it we must go back and adopt the post-independent PS where politicisation was very minimal (Programmes Manager, 8).

Lastly, another research fellow with a Think tank in Accra, believes that there should be strict punishment of bureaucrats who abuse their office for a political party's advantage or for being inefficient.

...most bureaucrats are political and so hide behind the politician to abuse their office and the code of conduct for public service. Such bureaucrats must be punished in accordance with the governing laws of the office they occupy... this

will not only serve as a deterrent to others but will minimize politicisation in the country's bureaucratic set-up (**Senior Research Fellow /Programmes Director, 4**).

Participants have given their take on the best possible cause of action, which ranges from empowering the bureaucrats to be more effective and autonomous, to a politician being advised to desist from using bureaucrats to making their opponents unpopular. Others are also of the view that bureaucrats should stop meddling in politics and lastly the laws must punish bureaucrats who abuse their office.

4.4 Chapter Conclusion

This Chapter provided the analysis and discussions of both primary data from the field and the secondary data on the politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in Ghana's fourth republican era. The data collected was analyzed based on themes related to the questions and objectives of the research. It was evident from the respondents that politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats has been around for a long time and the causal factors are colonial legacy, trust and loyalty, the fulfilment of a social contract, policy implementation and inefficiency, party support, clientelism and patronage, as the main driving factors of politicisation in Ghana. Again, the practice has intensified in the fourth republic due to the Winner-Takes-All nature of the fourth republican constitution, creation of "jobs for the boys", Campaign resources and loyalty, moneycracy associated with political campaigning, the acrimonious nature of political party campaigning, patronage and clientelism, and the involvement of bureaucrats into politics. It was also realized that politicisation has indirectly affected the mandate of an organization, stifle development, affects public sector reforms and has the tendency of injuring Ghana's fledgling democracy. Lastly, respondents offered some

policy guidelines to curb this phenomenon, with the strengthening of laws as the most recommended by participants.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The summary of findings, data collected, conclusion and recommendation of this research are presented in this chapter. The research sought to examine why the appointment of heads of public institutions is politicised and the long-term implications in Ghana's fourth republic. The study was guided by the political settlement theory and the politics-administration-dichotomy theory. The study adopted an exploratory approach in qualitative research and used two sources of data, namely primary and secondary data. The primary data was obtained through face-to-face interviews using semi-structured interview guides on respondents from the field of Academia, Think tanks/CSOs and the Public Service. The secondary data was obtained from books, news portals, journal articles and civil service annual reports. The findings are based on the objectives of the research derived from results obtained from the field. The recommendations provide an alternative cause of action to dealing with the issues of the politicisation of appoints of senior administrators in Ghana's fourth republic, thereby promoting trust and confidence in the country's fledgling democracy.

5.1 Summary of Key Findings

The interference of elected officials in the bureaucratic set-up of the state has been a never-ending tussle in the field of Public Administration. Much has been written on the subject matter of the Politicisation of the appointment of bureaucrats by politicians, across the world. While some believe it is healthy for a smooth takeoff for an incoming government to deliver on their mandate, others believe it is detrimental to the workings and autonomy of administrators towards giving out their best for a nation's development.

In Ghana there has not been much contestation amongst scholars as to whether there is politicisation in the administrative machinery of the state by the politicians, while some believe it is the WTA posture of the constitution, which gives the president so much power of appointment, others blame it on colonial legacy, the acrimonious nature of the Ghanaian political landscape and others are of the views that it is as a result of the clientelist and patronage system that characterise the body politics of the country. Admittedly copious literature pointed to an increase in the interference of politicians in the appointment, dismissal, or removal of senior public officials within the fourth republic which heightens during an electoral transition, with the ACSR 2017 and 2018 identify politicisation as a challenge to the service. The research sought to examine why the recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions are politicised in electoral transitions and the long-term implications in Ghana's fourth republic. Firstly, the study examined why appointment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions are politicized in Ghana's fourth republic. Secondly, it examined the implications of politicisation on the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions on developmental policies and reforms. The last objective was to outline policy guidelines to curb the politicisation of the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions in electoral transitions.

5.1.1 Why are the Appointment of Heads of Public Institutions Politicised in Ghana

On this objective, the study found out that politicisation of the administrative machinery of the state has been widespread and very synonymous in Ghana since the colonial era. The data alluded that, colonial legacy, trust and loyalty, the fulfilment of a social contract, policy implementation and inefficiency, party support, clientelism and patronage, are the main driving factors of politicisation in Ghana.

Respondents were of the view that colonial legacy influenced the appointments of senior offices because the queen was the only one responsible for appointment through her governors, and the rebellion to self-government led to the attitude of people towards the PS as one to be neglected, hence the term “Aban Adwoma”. Again, it was found out that politicians want to work with people whom they trust and can be loyal to carry out their planned policy and programmes, thus if a public officer cannot be trusted they must go. The study also found out that inefficiency cannot be compromised by the elected official even though, the understanding of inefficiency is subjective to the politician. Respondents also believe that party support or contribution, clientelism and patronage, have been used by politicians to interfere in the appointments of senior bureaucrats in the country.

Again, other drives with respect to the fourth republic were also considered. It was found out that, the Winner-Takes-All nature of the fourth republican constitution, creation of “jobs for the boys”, Campaign resources and loyalty, moneycracy associated with political campaigning, the acrimonious nature of political party campaigning, patronage and clientelism and the involvement of bureaucrats into politics as the reasons behind Politicisation in the fourth republic and most especially in election years. The politician just does it with impunity.

It was found out that the excessive powers of the president to make almost all appointments in the public sector have been one of the motivating factors for politicisation in the fourth republic. Respondents also considered the amount of human or material contribution to political party campaigning, the use of money to buy voters’ conscience, the intense acrimonious nature of the political party campaigning and the involvement of bureaucrats in party campaign to getting favour for promotion are the reasons why there is constant politicisation in the fourth republic. With regards to how the politician interfere respondents believe that they do outright dismissal,

rendering of an official redundant, constructive dismissal transfer and the famous proceed on leave.

5.1.2 Implications of Politicisation of the Appointment of Senior Bureaucrats

With regards to the implication of politicization on appointments, the findings are summarized based on these four themes: the effects on the mandate of a public institution, public sector reforms, developmental outcomes and finally on Ghana's emerging democracy.

On the mandate of a public sector organization, the data suggest that the politicisation of the appointment of the headship in a public sector does not necessarily affect the mandate of that institution directly as it may need a change in the establishing Act to effect that change. But almost all respondents believe that the politician will indirectly skew the mandate to favour a policy that they want to roll out. Thus, the leadership style can affect the mandate to achieve a political end.

On PSR, it was found out that, it affects reforms in terms of execution and funding plays a critical role in politicising a reform. Respondents believe that if it was initiated by an NDC government, NPP will not execute it when in government, unless funding is readily available. Again, if it is donor funded, the politicisation of the PS does not affect PSR but if it is funded by GoG, then it suffers.

In terms of development, the data points that the politicisation of senior bureaucrats affects development because the technocrat's opinion on development is not considered. Again, most of the respondents believe that those appointed are not competent enough to spearhead national development.

With Regard to Ghana's infant democracy, respondents believe it does not promote good governance, has a potency of breeding a constitutional dictator and an increasing political sub-culture in the country's body politics.

5.1.3 Policy Guidelines to Reducing Politicisation in the Public Sector

In line with this objective, an alternative cause of action was proposed by various respondents. Most of the participants believe that the appointing powers of the president must be reviewed, to give the PSC the power to manage all appointments without any interference. Some also believe that the PSC must be retooled to be more effective and accountable to the populates. Again, bureaucrats who engage in political activities must be punished severely by the PSC. Some advocated for the Labour Unions to fight for aggrieved works and not to leave the individual to go through the rigorous adjudicating process which normally comes to nothing. Lastly, some advice that the report of CRC (2011) on appointment must be considered.

5.2 Contribution to Theory, Literature and Policy

5.2.1 Theory

The research used two theories, the political settlement theory and the politics-administration dichotomy to finding the reasons why there is constant politicisation of the top hierarchy of the bureaucracy in the fourth republic.

With regards to political settlement theory, although the work is concentrated on the politicisation of senior bureaucrats, it brought to fore how within a settlement, the elite will go to all lengths to perpetuate their stay in power and the various mode of attaining those powers was given meaning by the research. Political settlement is "a combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and sustainable in terms of economic and political viability" (Khan 2010:4). And to achieve and sustain the powers within a settlement, the

governing class (elite) shape the outcomes and influence the worldview of others, through powers that emanate from overwhelming support for elections, affluence, and the ability to cause violence or wage war (Rao, 2010). Thus, the political elite has used all means including using the bureaucratic set-up to shape and maintain their power in the country by dishing appointments to loyalty other than hard work.

With the Politics-Administration dichotomy theory, even though there is still a raging debate on whether politics should be separated from administration or not, this work adds up to the debate not by taking sides but by coming out with the realities of the modern administrative set-up to bear. The findings of the research are along argument put forward by Demir & Nyhan (2008) that separation of politics from the administration was to reduce the politics in the administrative process of a country's bureaucracy by recommending technical competence, neutrality, and hierarchy. The reality is that there is politicisation in Ghana's fourth and the findings proposed by this research is aimed at reducing it and making the bureaucracy an autonomous one.

5.2.2 Literature

The study made contributions to the concept of politicisation within the bureaucratic set-up of the country by the executive and its associated problems which have been studied in bits by various scholars. While Gyampo and Graham (2017) and Ijon (2019) talked about WTA in the Ghanaian political landscape, their findings with regard to politicisation are greatly supported by this research. Again, this confirms the works of (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017a), Ayee (2013) and Kopecký (2012). The clientelist assertion by Appiah and Abdulai (2017a) has been confirmed by this research while Aryee (2013) and Kopecký (2012) stands on patronage associated with appointments of senior bureaucrats has also been confirmed by this research. It further gives currency to the contributions of Anaman (2016), Nissin (2016 & 2006),

Gyampo et al. (2013), and Nkansah (2012) on the transfer of power in Ghana's transition and its associated challenges in the fourth republic. Again, the revelations of this research confirm the trust and loyalty factors unraveled by Asamoah and Yeboah-Assiamah (2018). The data gathered can be used in future research on politicisation within the public sector.

5.2.3 Policy

The findings of the study will help in policymaking in Ghana and other developing countries that are challenged by constant politicisation within the PS to adopt policies that may be incremental and can assume a national character. With this research, development partners will better understand the Ghanaian administrative terrain so that they can propose the best possible policies to partner the country with. Again, there should be policies jeered at making the administrative machinery of the state an autonomous one.

5.3 Conclusion

Even though politics is ubiquitous, it must be guided by rules and regulations to shaping the conduct of political office holders vis-à-vis other institutions of the state. This research set out to find the extent and magnitude of the politicisation of heads of public institutions in Ghana's fourth republic, how and why it happens, its effect on development and alternative actions to curb it. The findings of this research reveal that there is indeed politicisation in the Ghanaian Public Sector as captured in the 2017 and 2018 Annual report of the Civil service of Ghana and this is fueled by factors that even dates back to the precolonial era like colonial legacy, trust and loyalty, the fulfilment of a social contract, policy implementation and inefficiency, party support, clientelism and patronage, Cronyism, Nepotism, and Ethnicity. Secondly, the research looked at how and why there is constant politicisation of the top hierarchy of the public sector and the following revelations come up, Winner-Takes-All nature of the fourth republican

constitution, creation of “jobs for the boys”, Campaign resources and loyalty, moneycracy associated with political campaigning, the acrimonious nature of political party campaigning, patronage and clientelism and the involvement of bureaucrats into politics. Again, it was realized that the phenomenon of replacing heads of public institutions with a political motive, has a huge implication on the mandate of institutions within the public sector, not to alter the mandate all together but to change the focus of the operations of the sector. Also, public sector reforms suffer in terms of implementation and both political and economic development, as well as Ghana’s fledgling democracy, are all affected, due to total disregard for rule of law. The findings of the research also reveal some proposals to curbing the issue of intrusion in the public sector by elected officials. While some believe the current laws governing appointments in the PSC must be strengthened, others believe that the president’s powers of appointment ought to be controlled and some believe the PSC must be empowered to serve as a check on appointments and not to just approve any nomination by the president. Finally, the study makes recommendations in the form of meritocracy in the selection of public officials, the autonomy of the civil service, incremental policies must be adopted and a national development plan binding on all successive governments must be the way forward.

5.4 Recommendation

In line with the findings as discussed in this research, the following recommendations are made towards curbing the politicisation in the high echelons of the bureaucratic set-up in Ghana:

- The research found out that appointments were being done based on presidential fiat and party basis, in line with this, this research recommends merit base recruitment into the public sector in Ghana. Long service and effective bureaucrats must be rewarded with the promotions that they deserve. This will not only boost the morale of the

bureaucrat but also the nation will benefit from the institutional memory they have acquired through long service.

- The research also recommends that Ghana should adopt incremental policies. Incremental Policies ensures continuity by successive governments, this will reduce politicisation in the public service because the government must continue with the projects by his predecessor. Thus, it may be better to continue with a chief director who has started a project, than change them for the project or policy to fail.
- It was also realized that the autonomy of the bureaucrat was not guaranteed and so most people work to protect their job other than working for the tenants of the service or the good of the country. When the autonomy is guaranteed, the technocrat will be able to work without any fear and can contribute genuinely to the country's good.
- Moneycracy must be punished both at the political party level and national level, this will reduce the amount of investment being made in political party campaigning for a candidate to be indebted to so many faceless financiers that, they must reward them with administrative positions.
- Again, the research recommends a national long-term development plan which is binding on all successive governments as recommended by the constitutional review commission. This to a very large extent will reduce politicisation because when a blueprint is being followed expert knowledge is paramount other than loyalty to a political party.
- Lastly, the bureaucrat must desist from venturing into the arena of politics and concentrate on their profession while still in the service. They must not meddle or fall for the tricks of the politician into compromising on their office for a political party's gain. The PSC must punish all bureaucrats found to be involved in any act of party politics.

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APPENDIX



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

ELECTORAL TRANSITIONS AND THE POLITICISATION OF THE APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR BUREAUCRATS IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC

INTERVIEW GUIDE

Introduction

This **interview guide** seeks your honest opinion on the Politicisation of the appointment of senior bureaucrats in the electoral transition in Ghana's fourth republic. This study is an academic exercise that serves as a partial requirement for an MPhil in Public Administration. Please note that the information gathered is kept confidential and would be used for only academic purposes.

Thank you!

Demography of Respondents

1. Gender.....
2. Educational level.....
3. Number of Years in Organisation.....
4. Sector.....
5. Position.....

Research Questions

What is the extent and magnitude to which the recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions are politicised in Ghana's fourth republic?

(Several literary works seem to suggest that, the appointment of senior bureaucrats is politicised)

1. What do you think accounts for it?
2. When did that start?
3. What motivates this practice?

4. Is it becoming more intense in Ghana's fourth republic?

How and why are the recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions politicised in Ghana's fourth republic?

Several scholarly articles, newspaper, and online portals in Ghana seem to suggest that heads of public institutions are asked to proceed on leave, demoted to a less glamorous office, or resign in electoral transitions:

1. Why is the appointment of senior bureaucrats politicised in electoral transition?
2. Who do you blame? (Politicians or Bureaucrats)
3. How is the appointment of senior bureaucrats politicised?

What are the implications in the Politicisation of recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions on developmental policies and reforms?

There is documentary evidence that bureaucracy in the country is on the decline in efficiency and effectiveness since the inception of the fourth republic

1. What is your assessment of this phenomenon on the mandate of a public institution?
2. What is your assessment of this phenomenon on reforms?
3. How does it affect development outcomes?

What appropriate policy guidelines will help curb the Politicisation, recruitment, promotion, and dismissal of heads of public institutions in electoral transitions?

1. What can be done in terms of policy or to curb this phenomenon?
2. How can it be done?
3. What particular action will be responsible for bringing change?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME