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ANALYSIS OF INFORMAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES
IN URBAN GHANA: THE CASE OF KUMASI AND TAMALE

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that with the exception of references to other works, which I have duly acknowledged, this thesis is the result of my personal efforts and that neither in whole nor in part has this work been presented elsewhere for the award of another degree.

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DEDICATION

This thesis, and whatever it contains of worth, is entirely dedicated to my late parents, Mr. Stephen Bagson and Mrs. Stella Kubio Bagson, whose toil, sweat, and complete commitment to my education have brought me this far.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AIC	Australian Institute of Criminology
ATR	African Traditional Religion
BNI	Bureau of National Investigation
CBD	Central Business District
CPTED	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CSDG	Conflict, Security and Development Group
DFID	Department for International Development
DOVVSU	Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit
EA	Enumeration Areas
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPI	Global Peace Index
GPS	Ghana Police Service
GPS	Global Positioning System
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
ICPC	International Centre for the Prevention of Crime
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IGP	Inspector General of Police
ISSER	Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
KII	Key Informant Interview
KMA	Kumasi Metropolitan Area
MESTI	Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation
MP	Member of Parliament
NCA	National Communication Authority
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	New Patriotic Party
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SCB	Strong Community Bonding
SITU	Statistics Information and Technology Unit
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TCPD	Town and Country Planning Department
TMA	Tamale Metropolitan Area
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime

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ABSTRACT

Globally, the twenty-first century has been considered as an age of urbanization and globalization. These contribute to cities as key nodes, with potential to lead in socio-economic development: increasing connectivity in goods, information, people and, consequently, creating jobs within economies of scale and of scope. Most city managers have often assumed that development is synonymous with economic growth, ease of access to social services, and a foregone conclusion that with prosperity follows enhance safety of life and property. Nonetheless, recent studies have increasingly revealed that cities can also become active hubs of social exclusion characterised with increasing inequality in the access to social services including policing. Recognising the criminogenic tendencies and insecurity associated with cities life, this study interrogates how the marginalized, in the access to state policing services, respond to their security needs in the cityscape. Using a mixed methods approach, this study interrogates this subject by assessing the role of informal crime preventive strategies in the maintenance of internal security, using the Ghanaian cities of Kumasi and Tamale as a case study. A major finding of the study is that the generally held perception that informal crime prevention strategies are the preserve of the poor, conflicts with the reality as the practice cuts across the entire social structure within the urban space. Thus, the study does not only recommend the recognition of some of these informal strategies but also calls for their integration into the existing formal systems. In the long run, the study recommends that local authorities be encouraged to recruit and train their own police forces to benefit from the rich local knowledge and also to meet the context specific nature in crime prevention situations.

CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

The notion of a secure and productive city has been core in modelling the theoretical orientation of cities by city planners and managers. With the mandate to design and realise sustainable cities, most city planners envisage the city as an environment of intense prosperity, and enhance safety of life and property (Alexander & Pain, 2012; Bagson & Owusu, 2016; Owusu et al., 2016; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2017). However, achieving this objective with or without the support of non-state institutions has been, to a large extent, globally inconsistent. Although some common trends exist in the ability to secure the urban space, be it through the growth and development of cities from the pre-industrial through to the post-industrial perspective, or from the pre-colonial to the post-colonial eras, the fact is that variations in the capacity of states to provide adequate security to their citizenry is uncontested (Sjoberg, 1955; Lane, 1974; Lynch, 2002; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013; Wig, 2016).

For instance, in the context of the developed world, the provision of safe and liveable, simple, traditional societies of the pre-industrial cities was aided by the relatively simple land use forms of largely residential and commercial activities. Strategies to secure neighbourhoods were facilitated by the close proximity of dwelling units—and in some cases entire settlements were walled off, with a single entry point that was locked at night for security reasons (Sjoberg, 1955). Furthermore, economic activities such as craftsmanship were carried out within the neighbourhoods, which not only provided security to the immediate surroundings by the presence of the continuous watchful eyes but also, through the formation of guilds, protected the interests of artisanal groups and therefore acted ‘as social security agencies’ of members (Sjoberg, 1955, 440). According to Lane (1974), issues related to kinship, religious functionaries,

and age-grading were instrumental in augmenting neighbourhood social control systems, even though the significance of social control strategies seems to have waned in the industrial cities (Lane, 1974).

The behavioural change accompanying the industrial revolution, according to Lane (1974), also saw an increasing incidence of crime. In addition, it ushered in a sense of individualism as well as a rapid drift of excess labour from the rural agriculture-based areas into the urban space. In the main, the employment opportunities within the industries not only contributed to increasing the numbers of the middle-income population and the disintegration of social order, but also increased the opportunity for criminality and violent behaviours (Lane, 1974).

Consequently, the limited ability of the traditional social control mechanisms to match up with the complexities associated with the emerging wealthy middle class and with the exotic lifestyle warranted the formation of police forces, as happened in London with the promulgation of the London Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 (Lane, 1974). The police force, since the post-industrial revolution era, has undergone intensive restructuring in attempts to match up to the fast-developing complexities associated with criminality and the world development system in contemporary times, especially in the developed world. However, the initial challenges of policing, as noted by critics such as Emsley (1986), did not stop further improvement in urban policing. Emsley (1986) adequately demonstrates the limitation of the police following its formal inception in the nineteenth century: it included crime detection but not prevention; there was a lack of systematic investigative processes; and offenders or suspects of crime were arrested more on the basis of chance than planned and informed intelligence.

However, with the passage of time, police services have undergone several structural transformations, and they have incorporated advanced technology to aid intelligence gathering by using fingerprints and forensic science as well as enhancing the use of telecommunications, photographic records, and continuous updates of centralized data-based systems. These advances, particularly in the developed world, have achieved considerable successes (Lane, 1974), although many developing countries continue to be saddled with security challenges—or, as Hall (2002: 4) puts it, they develop ‘inverted forms of good cities’.

In most parts of developing countries, the provision of internal security in the pre-colonial era was largely through the collective efforts of chiefs, councils of elders, family heads, and kinship, who together ensured that their subjects lived in conformity with generally acceptable social behaviours (Murdock, 1967; Diamond, 1997; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013; Wig, 2016). In this perspective, Wig (2016) details the important role ethnic-based institutions such the Zulu Kingdom of South Africa, the Ashanti Kingdom of Ghana, and the Buganda Kingdom of Uganda played and continue to play in the provision of internal security. Even though kinship has lent strong support in the maintenance of peace and security, particularly in the past, its significance today appears patchy (Mamdani, 1996). Englebert (2009), however, believes chiefs still remain instrumental in the maintenance of internal security, despite the fact that some chiefs, in the past, facilitated the colonists’ economic interests—an approach that made their subjects lose confidence in their ability to maintain security in a fair manner. It thus appears today that most cities in developing countries are challenged in maintaining internal security, owing to the rapid rate of urbanization, globalization, and trade liberalization, which have partly occasioned unregulated spatial

and demographic growth, informality, and slums—among other crisis-inducing factors (Tostensen et al., 2001).

These challenges notwithstanding, the fact remains that, conventionally, the act of enhancing public peace and security of life and property has been dominated by state led institutions such as the police and other supporting law-enforcement bodies (Owusu et al., 2015; Bagson & Owusu, 2016; Hopkins, 2017). To this extent, the successes in maintaining urban safety and liveability have been contingent on the ability of security agencies to deploy appropriate technology as antidote to local security needs (UN, 2007). This means that, successful crime prevention techniques involve the use of innovative technology and indigenous knowledge often in collaboration with civil society and their leaders (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Lippert, 2009). The leading position of the state in ensuring internal security is further promulgated in current development discourse as stipulated in the Sustainable Development Goals 11 and 16—notwithstanding the critical urban safety requirements within Clause 39 of the New Urban Agenda adopted by national governments in Quito in 2016.

Unfortunately, most urban governments in developing countries lag behind in this pursuit (Adu-Mireku, 2002; Tankebe, 2008; Ceccato & Wikstrom, 2012; Haining, 2012). The growing complexities of cities in the developing world has experienced limited formal planning and ordering but pursue the line of growing slums and informal settlements (Obeng-Odoom, 2010a; Songsore et al., 2014), accompanied by emerging social vices. The consequences of such deficiency in the provision of public safety is reflective in people's sense of insecurity and fear (Adu-Mireku, 2002; Badong, 2008). Flowing from this development, some individuals have responded to the security challenges by employing non-state strategies such as magic and superstition (Badong,

2008) whilst others rely on security dogs, the services of caretakers, and retrofitting their apartments as a means of providing safety (Owusu et al., 2015).

Such tendencies do not let go questions about marginalization in the securitization of the urban built environment, about who stands to benefit from the inadequate state security services, and about how the marginalised ensure the safety of their lives and properties – a subject which appears limited in urban security audit. This study diligently unpacks this issue in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises in Ghana, bearing in mind their similarities in the experience of rapid urbanization as economic and industrial hubs. Nevertheless, dissimilarities in the rate of urbanization, politico-economic situations, and socio-cultural orientations underlie the provision of security, particularly in the use of informal crime prevention strategies. Also, the different geographical locations of the two cities in this study provide insight beyond the micro-level details (Bagson & Owusu, 2016) or macro-level broad generalizations (Owusu et al., 2016). This thereby brings into focus, concurrently, broader comparative perspectives on informal crime prevention strategies across cities in southern (Kumasi) and northern (Tamale) Ghana.

The study's general objective—to unpack the informal strategies used within the urban space to respond to security challenges—is pursued from five main perspectives. First, the study examined the current institutional arrangements for maintaining urban safety in Ghana. This was achieved through critical examination of the command and administrative structures of the Ghana Police Service, as well as through a detailed examination of the police-civil population ratio within the research locations compared to the UN standards ratio of 1:500 (Arthur, 2012).

Second, the study assessed respondents' perception of safety within their communities, complemented by available police crime statistics—although it should be noted that there are limitations associated with the use of police data (Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2002; Tankebe, 2013; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). Third, the study examined the major challenges impeding the provision of security in the research locations. This was aided by the use of satellite imagery to examine the spatial expansion of the study locations between 2000 and 2016. Subsequently, the coordinates of the police stations and posts within the research locations were used to construct maps in order to illustrate the spatial distribution of police station vis-à-vis the extent of the built environment. Fourth, using both qualitative and quantitative survey data, the study further examined how those who feel insecure protect themselves. Fifth, the study explored the synergy and/or trade-offs between formal and informal crime prevention strategies to identify the maximum benefits from the complementary role of the two crime prevention strategies.

1.2 Statement of the problem

In recent years, urbanization has contributed to increase in economic growth and social development in cities. According to UN-Habitat (2016: 1), cities today are instrumental in creating job opportunities, entrepreneurial development, and increasing connectivity of goods, information and people. The employment embeddedness of the economic and social development has also initiated mass movement of youth from the countryside to the urban areas in search of employment opportunities (Grant & Oteng-Ababio, 2016; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016).

Currently, more than half (54%) of the world's population lives in urban areas and the world urban population is further estimated to grow by a rate of 1.5 to 2 percent

annually (Owusu & Oteng-Ababio, 2015; Turok, 2016). The UN posits that, the African continent is the most rapid in its urbanisation process compared to other regions and that almost 90 percent of the 2.5 billion new addition to the urban population by 2050 will reside in Africa and Asia (UN, 2014). Even though Potts (2009; 2012) have doubts on the reported rapidity of urbanization in many Africa countries because data inadequacies, its current urban population growth rate and spatial expansion undoubtedly pose security challenges for communities, enterprises, the ecosystem, and governments (UN-Habitat, 2015).

Indeed, even though a large proportion (approximately 60%) of African's population still lives in rural areas (Turok, 2016) the potentials of the continent's rural to urban transition is uncontested (UNDESA, 2015). African urban population has grown 14-fold between 1950 (33 million) to 2014 (over 450 million) and will reach an estimated urban proportion of approximately 58 percent by 2050 (UNDESA, 2012, 2015). The consequences of such volumes of urban population include poor and unsustainable land management (Cobbinah & Niminga-Beka, 2017) as well as increases in vulnerability and insecurity of urban dwellers who have limited capacity to afford the security services provided by private security companies nor the opportunity to be serviced by under-resourced state security agencies (Badong, 2009; UNDESA, 2012).

The situation in the West African sub-region is no different. With an average annual urban population growth rate of 1.6 percent for the period of 2010–2015, the region has experienced an increase in its urban population from 30 percent in 1990 to 44 percent in 2014, translating into about a 47 percent increase in a little over two decades (UNESA/PD, 2014). In a similar vein, Ghana's urbanization process has been phenomenal; with about 29 percent of urban population in 1970, the country reached 51

percent urban population in 2010 (GSS, 2012, 2013). Cobbinah and Nimminga-Beka (2017: 388) assert that ‘Ghana’s contribution to global urbanisation is negligible’; however, the intensity of its negative effects on urban dwellers are widespread (Grant & Yankson, 2003; Afrane & Ahiable, 2011; Ahmed & Dinye, 2012).

In developing countries, in general, such rapid urbanization processes tend to overwhelm the capacity of city authorities to provide adequate infrastructural services to the teeming urban population (Herbert & Grobelski, 2014; UNDESA/PD, 2014). The situation generates pressures on the limited infrastructure (including transportation, health, water and sanitation, and electricity) and results in dwindling access to these facilities—and in this case to urban security services, which are necessary to create and maintain a safe and liveable city (Pimheiro & Vallicelli, 2006; UNODC, 2011; Oteng-Ababio & Melara, 2014; Moser, 2018).

It can thus be inferred that the debate on urban governance, which has often been about development—generally assessed on the basis of economic growth and access to social services, and presumably concluded that development is synonymous with prosperity and enhanced life and property security—may be somewhat off the mark, or at least limited in relevance. Indeed, cities are becoming active hubs of social exclusion particularly in the access to social services; this is in consonance with Grant (2015) view that marginalized groups such as the poor, women and the youth suffer deficits in access to the benefits of urban way of life. This indicates that, the assumption that with development and prosperity, safety of life and property is enhanced is after all nonlinear and that social exclusion and inequality as product of development may proffer crime and insecurity. More precisely, the rise in crime can be attributed to the crisis in governance, increased poverty, the inadequacy of the criminal justice system,

and overall social exclusion. As correctly noted by UN-Habitat (2016), this rise in crime tears the social fabric of cities, threatens the quality of life of inhabitants, and erodes the social capital of the urban poor. Hence, the increasing levels of urban crime, violence, conflict, and insecurity contribute greatly to lowering the feeling of security in general, to threatening the process of democratic consolidation and, in the long term, to generating urban decay (Turok, 2016).

Prior studies (Owusu et al., 2015; Bagson & Owusu, 2016; Wrigley-Asante et al., 2016) have recognized that security is a basic service that should benefit all citizens without distinction, but the increasing inequality in access to security services provided by both the state security agencies and the profit driven private security companies cannot be ignored (Badong, 2009). UN-Habitat (2016) further reveals that the fundamental reason behind this development is the spiralling rise in anti-social behaviour, disorder, and delinquency in the changing societies of cities, especially in rapidly urbanizing regions like Ghana that have been characterized by a progressive loss of cultural traditions and identity—especially among the youth (Okoampa-Ahoofe, 2014). This development also resonates with a statement made in 2001 by the then Executive Director of UN-Habitat, who affirmed that ‘human settlements are places where crime and delinquency are increasing significantly’. In the African context, in particular, as a consequence of the inefficiency of the criminal justice system (Coldham, 2000; Badong, 2009; Eme & Okoh, 2009), it is now evident that the inability of cities to cope with the rapid urbanization process—due to poor planning, management, and governance—has led to a situation accompanied by a dramatic increase in insecurity, crime, conflict, and violence. This development induces the desire for non-state agencies as alternatives to providing security services within the urban space.

In most developing countries, including Ghana, the city planners and authorities tackle the sense of insecurity within the urban space differently. The challenge has recently been exacerbated by the process of trade liberalization and globalization, compounding the woes of most city authorities, including the increasing informality and slums' development in the face of low infrastructural investment (Obeng-Odoom, 2010b; Peng et al., 2010; Mabala, 2011; Grant, 2012; Songsoore et al., 2014). The Ghanaian situation presents a more daunting challenge owing to the accompanying exponential spatial expansion, particularly within small and medium-sized cities (WB, 2014; Owusu & Oteng-Ababio, 2015). This increasing sprawl on large customary land takes place with little reference to spatial planning and zoning (Adarkwa & Akyaw, 2001; Yeboah & Shaw, 2013; Adaku, 2014; Fox, 2014; Cobbinah et al., 2015), a process that has been aided by the land tenure system whereby land is held in trust for people by the family head, who also has the leverage to sell land for and on behalf of the members. In the process, land is normally traded without reference to the Department of Town and Country Planning of the formal local authority and its planning schemes; thus, in most communities, development precedes planning. Suffice it to add that the increasing proportion of the urban population has resulted in uncoordinated congestion, a growth of informality, and dispersed physical development especially at the fringes—all with limited investment in infrastructure.

In the last two decades, various studies have shown the correlation between the governance of cities and prevalence of crime in urban areas (see Owusu et al., 2015; Bagson & Owusu, 2016; Wrigley-Asante et al., 2016). The reality is that most local governments are often insufficiently equipped to manage the urbanization process and particularly to provide basic services and opportunities for jobs and employment, for youth in particular (UN-Habitat, 2016). The physical result is the creation of

stigmatized or marginalised neighbourhoods located in the poor areas of the cities and the emergence of an ‘architecture of fear’ and gated communities in the well-off neighbourhoods. The slums and informal settlements become a growing ground for deviant behaviour and crime (Badong, 2009). UN-Habitat (2016) conclusively submits that such a situation generates lawless areas and economic decline, further enhances poverty and exclusion, and ultimately threatens the democratic foundations of society. In addition, the rapid urbanization process also compromises the social structure and behaviours that hitherto contributed adequately to the control of the social structure and human behaviours. With the breaking down of the social crime prevention mechanism, city authorities are called upon to ensure public safety and liveability, a prerequisite for social and economic development and prosperity (Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). Notably, the limited security services provided by the under-resourced state led statutory institutions appear to function under the ambit of the political elite and the higher income level class of urban dwellers (Atuguba, 2009; Olonisakin et al., 2009). Hence, the term marginalised as used in this context broadly refers to urban dwellers who have limited or no access to the formal security services.

The inability of the authorities to ensure safety for all due to the problems identified makes this study quite relevant, as it seeks to unravel how those marginalized by the formal crime preventive system satisfy their security needs in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises in Ghana. Kumasi and Tamale are the only two inland metropolitan areas in the country and among the first four most urbanized cities as in 2014. The other two (coastal) cities are Accra and Takoradi. The strategic geographic locations of Kumasi and Tamale metropolises contribute to rapid urbanisation at average annual population growth rates of 5.4 percent (Millennium Cities Initiative, 2010) and 4.4 percent (The World Bank, 2014) respectively. For instance, located within the middle belt of Ghana,

Kumasi metropolis is adequately connected to most parts of the country by a relatively good road network, and to other cities by railroad and air. The Kumasi metropolis is supported by active commercial activities within the Central Business District (CBD), notably the Kejetia lorry park, the Adum multiple shopping area, and the central market (Cobbinah & Amoako, 2012). Other active economic nodes include the four notable satellites markets within the metropolis: Bantama market, Atonsu market, Asafo market, and the Oforikrom market, and the industrial hubs such as the Suame Magazine, the Kaase/Asokwa industrial area, and the Anloga wood market. The widespread economic activities intermingling residential and educational facilities, as well as the uncontrolled and unplanned sprawl, appear to create unequal access to the limited formal security services provision within the metropolis.

Similarly, the Tamale metropolis is an emerging city with a fast-developing CBD characterized by modern supermarkets, commercial banks, and the central market. Other functional satellite markets include the Lamashegu, Kalpohini, Kukuo, and Aboabo markets. The outstanding capacity of the city to provide relatively better services, especially in the area of health and education, as compared to other towns in northern Ghana makes Tamale a more attractive city in northern Ghana. Supported by a relatively good road network, Tamale metropolis adequately links up with the surrounding districts and further connects Ghana to other countries to the north. These proxies activate city life and continue to attract masses of people into the metropolis, creating exclusion in access to the limited formal security services.

Recognising the factors fuelling the urban growth and urbanization within and around Kumasi and Tamale, this study seeks to analyse the informal crime prevention strategies residents of the selected cities rely on as alternatives to the services provided

by the formal security system. Informal crime prevention strategies, in this study, are perceived as techniques or coping strategies that are not part of the formal security services provided by state institutions, but are used by individuals, groups and organizations in the light of the inability of the state to adequately secure life and property within the urban space. This was done by first assessing the current formal institutional arrangements for maintaining peace and safety in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises. Secondly, the study assesses the perception of safety within the urban space and the challenges formal institutions encounter in the pursuit of safe and secure urban areas. Finally, the study assesses the informal crime prevention strategies that urbanites fall back on to navigate through their personal lives and how they address the safety requirements of their property.

1.3 The research questions

The overarching question for the study is this: What role do informal crime prevention strategies play in law and order in urban Ghana?

Specific questions that follow from the above include these:

- a. What are the current institutional arrangements for maintaining peace and order in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises?
- b. What are residents' perceptions of the level of safety of life and property in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises?
- c. What are the major challenges impeding the provision of safety in Kumasi and Tamale metropolises?
- d. What are the informal crime prevention strategies employed by those whose security is compromised within the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises?

1.4 The research objectives

The broad objective guiding the research process in the study is to unpack some of the informal strategies used by the marginalized within the built environment to respond to their security challenges.

Following the above, the specific objectives for the study are:

- a. To review the official institutional arrangements for maintaining safety in Ghana and then in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises
- b. To analyse residents' perceptions of safety within their communities in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises
- c. To examine the major challenges impeding the formal provision of safety of life and property in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises
- d. To assess the informal crime prevention strategies employed by those whose security is compromised within the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises

1.5 Justification of the study

Extant literature indicates an increase in the process of urbanization within the developing world; its rapidity is noticeable in the Sub-Saharan African region as well as in the cities and towns of Ghana (Songsore, 2008; Martine, 2011; AfDB, 2012; UNESA/PD, 2014). In Ghana, despite the World Bank's (2014) report of positive economic transformation in the cities, there are growing signs of negative social and behavioural changes in urban Ghana that appear to challenge efforts to build a peaceful urban environment (Arthur, 1991; Songsore, 2008; Muggah, 2012). Earlier research into urban crime in Ghana has been more focused on the trends of incidence of reported offences as reflected in police data, notwithstanding the challenges associated with police records (Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2002; Tankebe, 2009, 2011, 2013), and by

extension the use of media reports on crime (Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). There is a dearth of knowledge, however, in the study of security and its relationship to urban sprawl in Ghana, as well as in knowledge of how unsecured urban dwellers secure themselves within the urban space in response to the state's limited investment in formal securitization.

Against the backdrop of spatial expansion and its relationship to crime prevention, this study is justified, as it reveals the major informal strategies used in crime prevention in urban Ghana. It also highlights the challenges associated with the current spatial distribution of the Ghana Police Service, given the spatial and demographic expansion of the urban space. The study will conclude with an analysis and interpretation of the inter- and intra-city use of informal strategies in crime prevention in the cities of Kumasi and Tamale.

1.6 Definition of concepts

Cognizant of the importance of concepts and their context-specific influence, the researcher's use of terms is guided by the definitions that follow:

Crime

The researcher adopted a more specific definition of crime by Marshall and Clark (1952), which is nonetheless in sync with the broad interpretation of crime as spelled out in Section 1 of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29) of the Republic of Ghana. According to the Criminal Code, (1960, Act, 29) "crime means any act punishable by death or imprisonment or fine". Cognisance of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act, 29), the researcher's conceptualisation of crime is guided by the definition of crime put forward by Marshall and Clark (1952), which states that a crime is an 'act or omission

prohibited by public law for the protection of the public and punishable by the state in a judicial proceeding in its own name’.

Crime prevention

The study has adopted the definition of the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC), which states that crime prevention is ‘any action that causes a reduction in the level of criminal activity and the resulting harm, or in the number of criminal offenders and their victims’. Similarly, the use of this concept relies on the view of Bodson et al. (2008), which posits that crime prevention involves every strategy or action initiated by an individual or law enforcement agency to curtail the process of an incidence of crime and its effects on the individual or the larger society. The researcher found these definitions appropriate as they are in congruent with the globally accepted definition of crime prevention postulated by the New York State Police (n.d). According to the New York State Police (n.d), “crime prevention is the anticipation, recognition, and appraisal of a crime risk, and the initiation of action to remove or reduce it”. Moreover, the study adopted these definitions because “the country [*Ghana*] has no national crime prevention strategy” (Badong, 2009: 5).

Informal crime prevention

Informal crime prevention strategies are viewed in the perspective of Herbert and Grobelski (2014) as essentially a form of community-based participation or of a bottom-up orientation to crime prevention. The strategies include informal social control techniques that are enforced by members of a community through gossip, threatening looks, social dissociation of perpetrators or of suspects of crime, and other punitive actions as determined by community consensus. These informal strategies are equally non-state driven but are guided by common values and norms of the immediate

neighbourhoods, and their application does not discount formal state crime preventive strategies (Hills, 2014). The study found these definitions very instructive in the conceptualisation of crime prevention in the Ghanaian context.

1.7 Thesis structure

The study has been structured into eight chapters.

Chapter One covers the background of the study, the problem statement, the research questions and objectives, the justification for the study, and the definitions of concepts. The chapter ends with an outline of the structure of the study.

An in-depth review of relevant literature is conducted in Chapter Two. For a comprehensive review, the chapter is divided into three broad sections. The first section covers issues of urbanization and the associated challenges, especially with regard to the provision of internal security within the urban space. This section specifically examines issues of densification, informality, and spatial expansion and looks at their implications for the maintenance of law and order. The second section provides details of specific socio-ecological theories of crime and criminogenic outcomes. This section ends with a conceptual framework as a pathway to the study. The third section analyses the institutional arrangements for maintaining public safety and security, from criminologists' perspectives to problem-based policing, and then looks at the case of maintaining internal security in the Ghanaian context.

Chapter Three consists of descriptions of the study locations (Kumasi and Tamale metropolises) and the methodology used in the study. The chapter includes a description of the study design, sampling techniques, and the methods of data collection and analysis.

Chapters Four to Seven contain the findings of the study. While Chapter Four gathers the findings on the current institutional arrangements for the provision of internal security in the research locations, Chapter Five comprises the findings on the public's perceptions of the safety of their neighbourhoods. Chapter Six looks at the findings on the challenges associated with the provision of internal security in an environment of rapid urbanization and spatial expansion. Chapter Seven reveals the informal crime prevention strategies that urban dwellers employ as coping strategies to circumvent situations of crime. Finally, Chapter Eight provides a summary, conclusions, and recommendations. The rest of the chapter focusses on the study's contributions to knowledge, limitations of the study, and suggested areas for further research.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the existing literature to expose the interplay of the consequences of urbanization and their implications for crime prevention. As indicated in the previous chapter, the rapid rate of urbanisation in the developing world in general results in both spatial and demographic expansions, which have resulted in some challenges limiting the efforts of the state mandated agencies to adequately provide internal security. This chapter therefore makes a critical review of the implications of the rapid urbanisation on the formal provision of internal security and the growing interest in the use of the informal crime prevention strategies within the urban space. This is in line with the general objective of the study, which is to examine the informal strategies used by the marginalized who have limited or no access to the internal security provided by the formal security agencies. The chapter begins by examining the trends of urbanization and the accompanying consequences, such as densification, informality, and sprawl, and their implications for urban safety and security. It then interrogates socio-ecological theories such as the Social Disorganization Theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942), the Collective Efficacy Theory (Sampson et al., 1997), and the Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The review of the theories informs the construction of a conceptual framework for the study. The chapter ends with a review of the institutional arrangements detailed for crime prevention.

2.2 Urbanization and security

Urbanization is a process that leads to an increase in the number of people living in urban areas (Drescher & Iaquina, 2002). As a process, it has received significant

scholarly attention because of the link it has with economic, social, and cultural changes within a society. It is therefore not surprising that one is able to find a clear distinction between the lifestyle in a city and that of the countryside (Gilbert, 1999). Notably, the process of urbanization has never been uniform across space and time, with the process leading to varying intensity even within a continent or a country (UN-Habitat, 2010). In addition to the social changes associated with urbanization (urbanism), there has also been a significant increase in the number of small and medium-sized towns (Owusu & Oteng-Ababio, 2015), thus refocusing the discourse from the growth of large cities, which—according to experts (Zeng, 2010)—are gradually seeing some decrease in terms of growth rate in recent times.

Historically, by the close of the nineteenth century, the global urban population stood at about 3 percent (UNDESA/PD, 2012), but this rose to about 14 percent within the first half of the twentieth century (UNDES/PS, 2006). However, in the second half of the twentieth century, especially in the 1950s, about 30 percent of the world's population lived in urban areas (UN-Habitat, 2010). According to UN estimates, the world's urban population will increase from 54 percent as of 2014 to 66 percent by 2050. While the pattern of urbanization and the process associated with it have been uneven, it is understood that urbanization in developed countries is greatly associated with industrial development in major urban centres. This therefore provided jobs for migrants from rural areas and led to the mechanization of agriculture as lands in rural areas were released for commercial agricultural production. This economic transformation is the major difference between urbanization in developed and developing countries (Pacione, 2009).

Beyond the global patterns and variations in urbanization, the effects of the urban process have also been an important issue. Earlier urban scholars argued that there is a clear link between urbanization and social fragmentation (Muggah, 2012). More pointedly, it was argued that urbanization affected pre-existing social ties and the bonding that was a feature of rural and smaller settlements. Elaborating on this point, Muggah (2012: 16) notes:

Social ties established through living in close proximity could be 'disorganized' by new associational forms of interaction that favoured transient market transactions over deeper kinship ties. These new relations were temporary, transitory and instrumental. Building on the findings of nineteenth century sociologist Emile Durkheim, proponents of the Chicago School noted how the progressive 'fraying' of communal ties resulted in anomie and eventually violence.

In addition to the above negative effects of urbanization on the provision of urban security, there is also the challenge of ensuring adequate extension and supply of basic services such as water, sanitation, quality and affordable housing, and jobs for the urban populace— particularly for the teeming urban youth, most of whom have migrated from rural areas into urban centres to eke out a living (UN-Habitat, 2008). The problem is more acute in cities in the global South, particularly in Africa and Asia (ibid.). The problem has become intractable due to serious governance deficit, lack of trust in local governing structures, and weak capacity of local governments to raise the necessary revenue for infrastructure development. This has invariably led to the non-competitiveness of cities in developing regions (Pacione, 2009). Furthermore, the increasing social inequalities in urban areas has increased urban poverty, informalization, and the reduction in resilience to environmental changes such as the negative impact of climate change and variability (UN-Habitat, 2010).

In addition to the above problems associated with urbanization, there is also the issue of urban safety and security. Indeed, urbanization and expansion of urban settlements have been noted to have strong links with increases in crime and violence (Kreager et al., 2011; Frimpong, 2016). For instance, it is estimated that between 1980 and 2000, a period that witnessed a considerable rise in urban population, global crime incidence rose about 30 percent, ‘from 2300 to over 3000 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants’ (UN-Habitat, 2012: vi). For Moser (2004), the recent rise in urban violence and crime incidence is an expression of exclusion and uncertainty in the way that authorities have dealt with the urbanization process in their countries. Despite the link between urbanization and rising levels of insecurity, Gilbert (1999) has warned about the hastiness in drawing a linear relationship between urbanization as an independent variable and crime as a dependent variable. According to Gilbert, the problem is more related to governance and the management of the urban process through policies and the establishment of institutions.

Apart from the increased crime incidences in urban areas, there have also been increased concerns regarding the risk (both actual and perceived) of becoming a victim of crime (Ceccato & Wikstrom, 2012). These concerns are evidenced in expressions of fear and uneasiness among urban residents and thus raise the point that, beyond dealing with actual crime, policy makers should try to assuage fear and other safety concerns within the urban space, since this is also a quality of life issue (Skogan, 1999). Indeed, the seriousness of this point is corroborated by recent studies and victimization surveys (UNODC, 2010). In addition to the above, a number of studies have shown that fear of crime and crime itself may not necessarily be linked (Skogan, 1999; Cordner, 2001), thus suggesting that urban insecurity is a complex issue and demands a more nuanced understanding and policy response.

For decades now, significant efforts have been made in attempts to identify the causes of urban insecurity and crime in particular. According to Muggah (2012), the causes of urban crime and insecurity should be viewed as direct and indirect. The point here is that the way cities grow and develop may in itself lead to the aggregation of risks, which are similarly linked to the socio-spatial characteristics of the urban environment (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999; Ceccato & Wikstrom, 2012). These factors include increased urban density, poverty, inequality, urban sprawl, and institutional or governance crisis (Muggah, 2012). However, it needs to be pointed out that these factors are not in any way isolated, but rather are interlinked. In the sections that follow, attention is given to these issues, particularly those related to urban density, informality, and urban sprawl. Arguments are made with respect to the implications of these factors for crime incidence and for formal and informal arrangements in the provision of security.

2.2.1 Urban density and implications for security

The link between urban population density and crime has received scholarly attention in both past and recent scholarship on crime (Muggah, 2012). According to the Chicago school of human ecology, urban population density increases heterogeneity, which reduces the interpersonal relationship or social organizational aspect of the urban social fabric (Wirth, 1938; Kubrin, 2009). This argument, as a principal component of the Social Disorganization Theory, has featured prominently in most of the ecological theories of crime, some of which form the theoretical basis of this research and are explicated below. Another important issue is that urban density—manifested in the overcrowding of urban settlements, particularly in the inner cities—is noted to be associated with increased risk of urban dwellers to become victims of violence and various forms of victimization (Pain, 2000).

It has been reported that, in the Americas, particularly in the United States, homicide rates and crime rates recorded in densely populated areas are significantly higher compared with those in sparsely populated regions and urban centres (UNODC, 2011). Furthermore, some authors are of the view that the link between urban population density and insecurity is the predisposition of such environments to social disorder and various forms of organized crime (UN-Habitat, 2007; Muggah, 2012). In addition, the physical characteristics of densely populated settlements facilitate criminogenic activities, which include prostitution, drug peddling, and various forms of delinquent acts (UN-Habitat, 2007). Nonetheless, some scholars have argued that the link between urban density and crime may not be as straightforward as has been suggested; rather, the issue is about increasing inequality and inability on the part of local authorities to provide security for slum dwellers because, in most cases, these slum dwellers bear the brunt of criminal victimization (ibid).

Despite the link between urban population density and crime, there have been suggestions that this claim may mask the variations across space and the nuances behind this linkage. Muggah (2012: 44) notes that ‘cities like Santo Domingo, Guatemala City and Kathmandu, have very high murder rates in relation to their population, but other very large cities such as Dhaka, Mumbai and Cairo have homicide rates below the national average’. There have been suggestions that even though the truth behind urban population density, particularly densely packed informal communities, and violence is something that cannot be overlooked, the issue may be related to homelessness—which is also an outcome of poverty and inequality currently pervasive in cities in the global South. Not only are the urban poor at risk of engaging in criminogenic acts, they are likewise at risk of various forms of victimization, particularly sexual violence, assault, and theft (UN-Habitat, 2007).

2.2.2 Urban informality and security

Another important issue that increases the social risks of a country falling victim to crime and insecurity is the growth of informality. Informality refers to activities outside the realm of governments' regulations and contrary to the expectation that urbanization increases with increasing formalization (Hart, 1973; Ghani & Kanbur, 2013). Furthermore, Ghani and Kanbur (2013) note that increases in informality are an outcome of increases in poverty and inequality within the urban space, and this informality is a direct result of the emasculation of the formal sector of the urban economy, primarily associated with years of economic restructuring and adjustment. In other words, the current spate of rapid urbanization in the developing world offers limited job opportunities in the formal urban sector, but rather appears to absorb excess labour into the informal sector.

According to Jutting (2009), the majority of women and youth in most urban centres are currently engaged in informal business activities, which can at best be described as survivalist; and these people are therefore most likely to be plunged into poverty and deplorable living conditions. However, in the view of Harris and Tadora (1970), the informal sector rather attracts poor people but does not make people poor, implying that recent urbanization is associated with the transfer of poverty from rural to urban settings. This thinking is inconsistent, however, with the thoughts of Chen (2006), who asserts that not every job within the informal sector yields a low income. Nevertheless, the persistence of informality vis-à-vis instances of remarkable economic growth warrants the concerns of policy makers regarding issues of poverty and inequality and how the informal sector might be streamlined to get benefit from this sector. Again, this raises issues about how local government should engage with the informal sector, and

how they should be viewed by state agencies such as the police when it comes to matters of security and criminality (Moser, 2004).

The above point is significant especially when there has been a long-held view about the strong linkage between poverty, which appears to be a key feature of the informal sector, and criminogenic outcomes. But as has been indicated in the earlier part of this section, while poverty may increase the social and personal risk of one engaging in criminality, there is evidence pointing to the fact that there is a correlation between differences in income and crime prevalence—with high-income areas experiencing property-related crime, while low-income areas experience violence-related crime such as assault (Muggah, 2012).

2.2.3 Urban spatial expansion and implications for safety and security

Another significant issue that hinges on the safety and security in the urban space is uncontrolled peri-urban growth and urban spatial expansion. Indeed, the increasing outward expansion of most urban settlements, if not properly managed, may significantly affect urban sustainability, especially in the developing world (Darkwah & Cobbinah, 2014; Cobbinah et al., 2015). In Africa, urbanization is characterized by physical spatial expansion, which may at best be described as disordered and uncontrolled, and technically described as urban sprawl (Cobbinah et al., 2015). Many urban areas record spatial expansion rates faster than the average population growth rate; this in turn places a number of strains on the limited resources of governments, which are hard pushed to provide adequate internal security over the expanding built environment. This widens the inequality gap in access to state security services (Angel et al., 2005; Seto et al., 2012).

The increased population, coupled with the limited government efforts to regulate land use plans, results in diverse urban growth forms—which then affect the delivery of vital services to urban settlers (Fox, 2014). In addition, uncontrolled urbanization results in congestion and limited ease of access and mobility within neighbourhoods in many developing countries (Gulyani & Talukdar, 2010). This breeds insecurity within neighbourhoods as well as high competition to access public services (Fox, 2014). Population density in inner cities and the associated negative externalities such as crime have been among factors for the movement of people to urban peripheries. Predominantly middle- and high-income urban dwellers relocate to low-density areas, mostly on the fringes of cities (Cullen & Levitt, 1999; Ellen & O'Regan, 2010); but on some rare occasions, the poor likewise exit the urban core to the peripheries to benefit from the relatively low cost of accommodation (Adaku, 2014) and the readily available informal transportation systems, as shown in the case of Ghana (Briggs & Yeboah, 2001).

In the literature on urban studies, increasing population within the urban core not only contributes to increased values for land and rent, but also comes with social ills that compel the exit of population from the core to the peripheries of the urban area (Adaku, 2014). In the developed world, movement outward from the urban core is primarily in pursuit of benefits such as less competition for public services (water, sanitation, health services, and education), as well as of low-density development (Knaap et al., 2000). However, unlike the middle and upper classes that form the majority of the flight from the urban core in the developed world, the exodus from the urban core in the developing world is across all categories of income levels, for various reasons (Grant, 2007). For instance, just as the middle- and high-income classes move for the sake of serene and large sites and to boost their public status as the owners of houses (Grant,

2007), the poor equally move to avoid high rent within the urban core and to work as caretakers of construction sites and lands owned by the middle- and high-income classes who commonly build incrementally (Adaku, 2014).

2.3 Socio-ecological theories of crime and criminogenic outcomes

Theories have an overarching ability to give meaning to social, economic, and political dynamics; but variations in geographic and socio-economic orientations partly limit the full explanatory powers of social theories. Limited scholarly attention to urban crime and insecurity in the developing world has compelled some researchers within the region to adapt theories based on the developed world to understand the urban crime situations in the developing world (Arthur, 1991; Salahub, Gottsbacher & de Boer, 2018). It is therefore within this context that the researcher sought to employ Western-based socio-ecological theories of crime as the theoretical basis of this study. Influential among these socio-ecological theories reviewed are the following: the Social Disorganization Theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942), Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979), and the Collective Efficacy Theory (Sampson et al., 1997). Indeed, the researcher is of the view that this theoretical triangulation benefits from relevant complementary support from each theory, in order to update the different theoretical orientations and their significance for explaining human philosophies across geographical variations.

2.3.1 Social Disorganization Theory

The Social Disorganization Theory is an outcome of years of research of the Chicago school of human ecology, led by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay. The core principle guiding the theory is that place matters in determining the occurrences or otherwise of

crime. In their ground-breaking research on delinquency in the city of Chicago, Shaw and McKay (1942) associated the incidence of crime with the nature of the immediate surroundings, and not necessarily with the personal characteristics of the individual involved (such as age or gender).

According to Shaw and McKay (1942), neighbourhoods characterized by poverty, residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, and unemployment, as well as high levels of mortality and disease, are most likely to experience a breakdown of social organization—which then serves as an enabling environment for neighbourhood crime and delinquency to flourish. They noted that neighbourhoods with such social ills appear not to have the capacity to collectively organize themselves to achieve communal objectives such as fighting crime. In other words, in the midst of poverty, ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, and a dilapidated environment, the neighbourhood loses informal social control mechanisms and then breeds a subculture in which the youth initiate behaviours unacceptable to the older generations. This further exacerbates social disorganization and increases the potential risks for crime within the neighbourhood. Using United States census data and other city-level data, scholars have failed to refute Shaw and McKay's propositions that neighbourhoods characterized by poverty, a mobile resident population, ethnically mixed population, and a depleted immediate environment are more likely to encounter frequent incidences of crime and delinquency (Laub, 1983; Heitgerd & Bursik, 1987; Bursik, 1988; Taylor & Covington, 1988; Wikström & Loeber, 2000; Sampson et al., 2002).

In evaluating the soundness of the theory and the robustness of the methodology adopted by Shaw and McKay, there has been an improvement in the theory with respect to the actual mechanisms that facilitates criminogenic outcomes within the

context of a socially disorganized society (see Sampson & Groves, 1989). The application of the Social Disorganization Theory is widespread, especially in explaining street crime and delinquency in the Western world (Sampson & Groves, 1989; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Kubrin, 2009). Kubrin (2009) in his study concluded that a socially disorganized neighbourhood becomes incapacitated in the use of informal social control systems or institutions to monitor and curb undesirable behaviours of youth within the neighbourhood.

Sampson et al. (1997) defined informal social control as the means to regulate socially undesirable behaviours, implying that neighbourhoods with strong social control institutions are more likely to experience reduced incidences of crime than socially disorganized neighbourhoods are. Social ties and density within neighbourhoods are said to be strong determining forces influencing the effectiveness of the informal social control institutions (Triplett et al., 2005). These ties are commonly cultivated via familiarization among neighbours fostering the underlying goal of building common desirable values as roots of informal social controls. Regardless of the influential role of informal social control in mediating the full effects of neighbourhood characteristics on the occurrence of crime, this was a significant omission on the part of Shaw and McKay in their explanation and application of Social Disorganization Theory in the study of crime and delinquency (Sampson & Groves, 1989). Hence, Sampson and Groves' (ibid.) major contribution to the Social Disorganization Theory rested on the diligence applied in the measurement and explanation of the mediating role of informal social control. In examining social control, Sampson and Groves (1989) established that neighbourhoods characterized by limited physical interactions and scant friendship among members, coupled with teeming unregulated youth groups, are likely to experience frequent incidences of crime and delinquency—a finding that was

subsequently corroborated by other studies, such as those of Lowenkamp et al. (2003) and Sun et al. (2004).

In this connection, neighbourhood characteristics affect the economic, social, and general security situations of most inhabitants in the Western world (Swatt et al., 2013); but with dissimilar socio-cultural and neighbourhood characteristics, coupled with increasing informality and urban sprawl, it is uncertain to what extent neighbourhood characteristics matter in explaining the probability of crime and the perception of safety in the developing world—and in the urban space of Ghana. It is also unclear how a neighbourhood's socio-cultural dynamics influence the ability of its inhabitants to galvanize a social control force in a largely dominant service economy, one which is characterized by private small to medium-sized informal commercial enterprises intermingling residential facilities in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises—unlike the largely planned land use forms in the industrial world.

Contributing to ideas about the inability of neighbourhoods to stimulate and sustain informal social control in the mist of poverty, residential turnover, and ethnic heterogeneity, there also appeared the path-breaking Collective Efficacy Theory of Sampson et al. (1997)—who identified the intermediary role of a collective neighbourhood force in the control of crime.

2.3.2 Collective Efficacy Theory

Subsequent to Sampson and Groves' (1989) study, which sought to understand the mechanism behind the Social Disorganization Theory in crime causation, Sampson and colleagues formulated the Collective Efficacy Theory as a further attempt to understand the social processes behind the incidence or non-occurrence of neighbourhood crime and delinquency. Sampson et al. (1997) propounded the Collective Efficacy Theory to provide further insight on the ecological orientation of criminological theories emanating from the Chicago school of criminology. In their study, Sampson et al. (1997: 918) define collective efficacy as 'social cohesion among neighbours combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good'. Collective efficacy was conceptualized in their research as fostering communal interconnections, among a localized group, supported by the collective goodwill of members to champion a common course—such as the prevention of crime and delinquency. In their attempt to answer why crimes such as violence persist in lower-class socio-economic and residentially mobile neighbourhoods, Sampson et al. (1997) referred to the instructive influence of social and organizational characteristics responsible for the differences in the crime rates across different socio-economic neighbourhoods but not necessarily to the demographic characteristics of the members of the neighbourhood. In consonance with Elliott et al. (1996), as well as Sampson and Groves (1989), Sampson et al. (1997) proposed that the variation in crime rates in different socio-economic neighbourhoods is a consequence of the (in)ability of neighbourhoods to collectively work towards the achievement of a common goal and benefit from dependable internal communal social control mechanisms.

In other words, control strategies, as provided in mainstream policing, are considered external to community-based social control mechanisms and therefore most unlikely to

be patronized in more socially cohesive neighbourhoods. Hence, for the communal interest in the safety of a community, locally determined values are preferably and collectively pursued in attempts to prevent criminogenic tendencies rather than engaging agencies not considered members of a community (Janowitz, 1975). This means that security requirements are largely location-specific, evolving from the social, economic, cultural, political, and organizational or institutional characteristics therein. Borrowing from Janowitz (1975), Sampson et al. (1997) operationalized social control as the ability of a community to regulate the behaviours of its members towards a collectively crafted goal, to result in the peace and security of the neighbourhood. This is achievable through the collective but largely spontaneous actions of members of the community to avert behaviour deemed unacceptable in the eyes of the general public. Thus, the closest member(s) to detect such behaviours take the initial step to stop it, with the entire community ever ready to support the curtailment of such communally distasteful behaviour.

However, informal social control goes beyond the control of community-level crime to encapsulate efforts at sustaining the general well-being of residents, including the ability to attract external support for the supply of utilities to the community (Skogan, 1992). Guided by the unique socio-cultural and politico-economic dynamics, communities execute peculiar strategies towards the achievement of communal goals, based on mutual trust and solidarity in conjunction with individuals' differential proactive responses to criminogenic circumstances (Coleman & Coleman, 1994; Sampson et al., 1997). The socio-economic composition of the neighbourhood is influential in determining the kind of social control to be galvanized to stimulate and maintain peace and security in the vicinity. It also means that in a context of distrust, informal social control becomes disabled or ineffective in the achievement of

communal goals. Put differently, in the presence of mutual trust and solidarity among members in a community, it becomes a foregone conclusion that residents are more likely to intervene to avert a locally defined unacceptable behaviour, be it from a community member or a stranger within the community. This then forms the basis of collective efficacy, as identified by Sampson et al. (1997) as a means to control socially unacceptable behaviour, irrespective of the demographic composition of the neighbourhood. Its strength relies on social and organizational structures within the community.

The Collective Efficacy Theory has been variously used beyond its renowned effectiveness in the explanation of variations in violent crime rates across different socio-economic neighbourhoods, and it has also been used to explain variations in the fear of crime in neighbourhoods (Swatt et al., 2013). However, its application in unpacking the complexities surrounding the use of informal crime prevention in the developing world context appears limited, especially when the theory is placed in the context of the increase in urbanization and middle-income population, and the accompanying changing lifestyle activities. Changing lifestyle activities create complex opportunities for criminogenic tendencies to thrive within the urban space, given the world's trade liberalization, urbanization, and globalization.

2.3.3 Routine Activity Theory

Equally important is the Routine Activity Theory, which seeks to explain the probability of crime occurring within space and time. As an environmental criminology theory propounded by Cohen and Felson (1979), Routine Activity Theory posits that the potential for crime to occur is higher within a space and time when there is an intersection of a suitable target, a motivated offender, and an incapable or absent

guardian. In explanation, Cohen and Felson (1979) noted that a suitable target is conceptualized as a person/object/place that is attractive, obviously visible, accessible, easy to conceal, and requires minimum efforts by the potential offender to move it. Furthermore, the motivated offender's perception of the suitability of the target informs the decision to commit or not commit a crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Similarly, a capable guardian acts as a barrier between the suitable target and the motivated offender in a crime prevention situation.

In practice, a capable guardian has been conceptualized to include mechanical installations such as closed-circuit television, alarms, fences and walls, and barbed wire. A very important complement to these guardianship items is the role of a capable human being such as a police officer, friends, and neighbours—whose presence will enhance the effectiveness of the mechanical installations and possibly deter the occurrence of crime (Felson & Clarke, 1995). The guardian can be formal, as in the use of a state or non-state security guard, or informal and spontaneous, such as watchful eyes in the street (Tewksbury & Mustaine, 2003).

Operationally, the motivated offender's decision-making process is morally informed by the cost of engaging in a criminal activity. If the cost is determined to be high (cost being the possibility of detection and arrest, or the preliminary activities leading to the act of committing the crime costing more than the value of the perceived suitable target), then it becomes rational not to proceed to commit the crime. Thus, the offender is not motivated to commit the crime. This implies that the tendencies of a potential, motivated offender to commit crime can be influenced by purposely raising the cost of committing the crime—for example, by making access to a suitable target difficult by fortifying the access, or increasing surveillance (Owusu et al., 2015), or increasing the

intensity of the punishment-to-crime ratio (Ehrlich, 2008). It is therefore a foregone conclusion that, if the police—as a mandated institution for maintaining internal security—are adequately resourced, they will have the ability to deter criminality and enhance safety within the built environment. Conversely, if the inability of the powers that be (formal or informal) to deter crime is pronounced, a motivated offender has a higher tendency to engage in criminal activity. This, therefore, means that the presence of a capable guardian is crucial in averting crime.

The empirical application of the Routine Activity Theory has been widespread, albeit within the developed world (Sampson & Laub, 1995; Campbell et al., 2003; Daday et al., 2005; Logan et al., 2006). In their scholarly work, Campbell et al. (2003) emphasize the relevance of the opportunity to commit crime as dominant in a crime event, especially in violent and property crimes within social environments. Moreover, the innovative research work by Logan et al. (2006), similar to the work of Daday et al. (2005), noted that individuals whose lifestyle is centred around the consumption of illicit drugs, alcohol, and out-of-home nocturnal activities are more exposed to being victims or perpetrators of crime.

The Routine Activity Theory attempts to highlight the implicit nature of guardianship in people's daily activity, albeit disguised by their non-engagement in crime (Cohen & Felson, 1979), and it seeks to make the act of guardianship (among ordinary citizens' lives and property) explicit prior to the possible inception of criminal activity, given the ability of a motivated offender to outwit guardianship. The Routine Activity Theory therefore guides the current study in giving meaning to the manner in which urban dwellers enhance guardianship given the emerging and changing lifestyles within the Ghanaian urban space. The theory likewise helps uncover how changing lifestyle

exposes or limits the opportunities of a motivated offender to commit crime, considering the increasing numbers of suitable targets associated with the increasing middle-income population in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises.

2.4 Maintaining public safety and security: Strategies and policies

The maintenance of public safety and security have been viewed from different perspectives, although the common aim is to provide internal security. Specifically, this section reviews concepts of providing safety, from the criminologist perspectives to the problem-based policing strategies globally employed. It focuses on the perspectives of maintaining internal security in the Ghanaian context, highlighting the influence of socio-cultural mechanisms. The section ends with a review of community policing and the role of informal stakeholders in maintaining law and order.

2.4.1 Perspectives from criminology

Criminologists have been at the forefront when it comes to identifying the causes of crime and the strategies that are aimed at curtailing the incidence and the fear of crime. This incidence and fear tend to lower the quality of life (Geason & Wilson, 1988) and act as antitheses to the core tenets of resilient cities (Desouza & Flanery, 2013). Typically, in their bid to contribute to the development of resilient cities and a move towards crime-free urban space, criminologists interrogate the social and psychological dynamics that breed crime or criminal tendencies, and they then recommend strategies to overcome these causes on the individual and the larger community levels. However, after decades of unearthing the social and psychological causes of crime and seeking antidotes to counter the incidence of crime, the rates of incidence and fear of crime are still rising, especially within urban spaces (Adigun, 2013; Swatt et al., 2013).

In a holistic approach to addressing the crime situation within the urban space, criminologists strongly advocate for at least four non-mutually exclusive strategies to maintain urban security in support of economic growth and human development. Although variously named by different scholars, the core principles of reducing the opportunity or de-motivating a potential offender is paramount, in addition to inducing a community participatory approach in crime prevention (Perlgut, 1981). According to Perlgut (*ibid.*), among other strategies four crime prevention strategies are very important: corrective prevention, punitive prevention, mechanical prevention, and environmental prevention. In the view of Perlgut (*ibid.*), these crime preventive measures work on the principle that offenders are rational beings who estimate the cost of committing a crime and the benefits thereof. Hence, in an event where the cost of the opportunity available to commit the crime is less than the benefits, then the tendency to commit the crime is high—and the reverse situation is a disincentive for crime to occur. In other words, eliminating the opportunity or increasing the cost of accessing a suitable target deters the incidence of crime (Becker, 1999; Cornish & Clarke, 2003). However, critics of this view posit that such deterrence might just as well displace the incidence of crime to another location, or a persistent criminal might just re-estimate the situation with a different strategy to commit crime (Cornish & Clarke, 1986).

The corrective prevention strategy relies on the principle of eliminating crime-inducing situations or conditions capable of motivating a potential offender to commit crime (Perlgut, 1981). In this connection, correction as a crime prevention measure aims to change the social conditions and institutions, such as families and peers whose actions or inactions influence criminal behaviour (Hope, 1995). In addition, environmental and social conditions such as poverty, dilapidated dwelling places, slums, and socially fragmented communities breed criminals and motivate the desire to commit crime

(Sampson & Groves, 1989; Sun et al., 2004). Consequently, in the realm of maintaining urban security—and given possible recidivism and the use of correction as a crime prevention measure—Welsh and Farrington (2010) propose that the incidence of crime tends to decrease when socially undesirable conditions are reversed and made conducive for habitation. This involves developing neighbourhood conditions that can contribute to meeting the desire for gainful employment and providing equitable access to nutritional food, good health and sanitation facilities, and recreational centres. Nevertheless, Welsh and Hoshi (2006) express doubts about how effective changing the social setting can be in substantially preventing crime or the tendency to commit crime. Waller (2006) adds that strategies to intervene and retard the course of crime or prevent the incidence of crime in the first place should be the right way to go.

Advocates of the mechanical preventive method propose the use of hardware in the form of security installations to enhance the safety of potential targets (Perlgut, 1981), even though this hardware has been commodified (Lynch, 2002). Commonly used hardware includes the use of locks, security cameras, alarms, lighting, barbed wire, and grilles that limit the opportunity of an offender to access a suitable target. This strategy separates the target from the offender and increases the cost or opportunity of committing a crime (Kruger & Landman, 2003). With respect to the use of landscape from the perspective of the mechanical preventive method, Owusu et al. (2015) noted that ‘the nature of the buildings and lay-out of a community in terms of how easy it is to enter and exit can attract offenders to commit crimes and to escape arrest’. This means that perception or fear of crime is partly influenced by the ease of access to a suitable target; hence, fortifying access decreases the opportunity for crime to occur. Farrell et al. (2010) propose that mechanical installations reduce the incidence of crime, especially burglary; but according to Newman (1996), the general environmental

outlook—and specifically the landscape architectural design—potentially contribute to a decline in the incidence of crime.

2.4.2 Problem-based policing and core principles

Notwithstanding variations in the mode of policing at the local level, the UN General Assembly crafted a set of principles as a guide to establishing a flexible framework to maximize cooperation among police in their line of duty and between police and citizens, whose peace and security is paramount to the police service. The UN recommends eight problem-oriented principles that prioritize human welfare in crime intervention and encourages the full participation of the community in the fight against crime at all times. The principles aim at engaging the general public in the fight against crime and boosting public trust and confidence in a police–community collaborative effort to create and sustain a safe and secure neighbourhood. These eight core principles of the UN General Assembly Resolution 34/169 on a code of conduct for the police are as follows:

Article 1

Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed upon them by law, by serving the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession.

Article 1 outlines the core mandate of the police and other supporting agencies, describing them as law enforcement officials tasked with preventing crime and intervening in the course of potential tendencies to disorder and public discomfort. It is therefore the prime duty of the police service to lead in the quest for internal security,

soliciting the protection and direction of the national constitution and the general public in its proactive crime prevention strategies.

Article 2

In the performance of their duty, law enforcement officials shall respect and protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons.

On the other hand, Article 2 stipulates the need for law enforcement agencies, especially the police, who lead in the maintenance of internal security, to constantly and impartially uphold local and international human rights conventions in their line of duty. The police are reminded of the need to enhance inclusivity of all stakeholders within the local area in crafting a liveable space.

Article 3

Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the extent required for the performance of their duty.

Article 3 reminds the police to engage in a minimal use of force—and only when objectively necessary—in performing their legitimate duty of preventing crime and maintaining public order, taking cognizance of human rights conventions at both national and international levels. For instance, the use by the police of firearms should be extremely restricted and apply only in cases where the potential offender endangers the lives of other people and where the use of reasonable force is inadequate to apprehend the offender.

Article 4

Matters of a confidential nature in the possession of law enforcement officials shall be kept confidential, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require otherwise.

In the retrieval of confidential matters or information, Article 4 requires that police officers strictly treat such matters with a high degree of solitude, preventing dissemination to the public in any form whatsoever in order to preserve the privacy of the offender or to prevent repercussions for the victim and the larger community. The use of such confidential matters should be restricted to aiding the process of preventing crime and maintaining peace and security.

Article 5

No law enforcement official may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, nor may any law enforcement official invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any other public emergency as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

Furthermore, Article 5 consciously limits the role of the police in providing security. The article categorically directs police officers in their line of duty to never induce severe physical or psychological pain on perpetrators or victims of a crime for the purpose of obtaining information; nor should police officers engage in the use of any form of abuse as a means to fighting crime, maintaining public order, or intimidating an offender or a third party.

Article 6

Law enforcement officials shall ensure the full protection of the health of persons in their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention whenever required.

Article 6 stipulates that a police officer should not deny an offender in custody or a victim in his/her care access to medical care. It becomes the responsibility of the police to ensure a state of continuous good health of all suspects or offenders in their custody.

Article 7

Law enforcement officials shall not commit any act of corruption. They shall also rigorously oppose and combat all such acts.

Article 7 prohibits any act of corruption or abuse of power on the part of a law enforcement officer, especially officers who in the line of duty compromise the rules of engagement for their personal interest. Consequently, an act of corruption or attempted corruption should be viewed from a national or local perspective, since the definition of corruption varies geographically.

Article 8

Law enforcement officials shall respect the law and the present code. They shall also, to the best of their capacity, prevent and rigorously oppose any violations of them. Law enforcement officials who have reason to believe that a violation of the present code has occurred or is about to occur shall report the matter to their superior authorities and, where necessary, to other appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing or remedial power.

Article 8 draws attention to the need to inculcate internal decorum and discipline within the law enforcement agencies. This establishes not only a yardstick to ensure appropriate conformity to the rule of law in the quest for safety and security, but also a self-check on the dignity of the law enforcement body.

Adopting these principles into the strategies of policing in the developing world has been a chequered affair. At best, the principles of policing as outlined by the UN are represented in most democratic countries within the developing world, but translating

the principles into addressing practical situations faces many challenges. For instance, the attempt to ensure equal access to the police at all times is far from the reach of many developing countries. In the Ghanaian context, the undisputed deficit in the capacity of the police to provide equal access to all the Ghanaian population is obvious (see Atuguba, 2003; Aning, 2008; Tankebe, 2008; Badong, 2009; Bagson & Owusu, 2016). This results in unequal access to the police service, which violates a basic human right to access state security. Another factor limiting the adoption of the UN principle of policing comes in the area of reported cases of inhuman treatment of suspected criminals, who allegedly have to endure long waits for justice in the overloaded system in Ghanaian courts (Adinkrah, 2005). The limited capacity of the police and subsequently the overloaded court system boost public suspicion of corruption within the Ghana Police Service. These factors also increase the unwillingness of the public to report cases to the police, given the public mistrust in the competence of law enforcement officers (Adinkrah, 2005; Atuguba, 2003). Nevertheless, the Ghana Police Service still remains the leading state body in maintaining internal security.

2.4.3 Maintaining urban security in the Ghanaian context

The relevance of internal security for economic growth and social development cannot be overemphasized. Different efforts and strategies have been used in precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial times to ensure sustained internal security within the boundaries of the country. For instance, during the precolonial era in Ghana, apart from the revered role of heads of families and age-grading, ethnic or kingdom-based leadership was largely responsible for the maintenance of internal security. Traditional policing such as the *Ahenfie police* (guards of the palace) in the precolonial Ashanti Kingdom and other such locally based law enforcement bodies ensured conformity

within traditional areas. The traditional police were duty-bound to protect and defend the jurisdictions of chiefs to whom they paid allegiance. The colonialists initially struggled with the traditional police to gain control over traditional areas, but the former finally gained control and consolidated the formation of a police force during the colonial period for the protection of colonialists and their economic interests (Gillespie, 1955; Teku, 1984; Pokoo-Aikins, 2002). However, Atuguba (2003) acknowledges that little knowledge exists on the mode of formation and operation of the colonial police force in Ghana.

Notwithstanding the differences of opinion on police force formation in Ghana, Gillespie (1955) provided details of historical events and illuminated negotiations between the chiefs along the coast of Ghana and the colonists, before and after signing the Bond of 1844 and the urgent need to protect and defend the implementation of the agreement. The negotiations involved the recognition of a sort of self-governance or defence from the indigenes; and to ensure peaceful coexistence, a mean line of action was required. In addition, Teku (1984) noted that Captain George MacLean formed a police force of 129 men in 1831 as an agency to enforce the Treaty of Peace signed between the colonists, the king of the Ashanti Kingdom, and the chiefs who ruled along the coast of Ghana. Furthermore, Pokoo-Aikins (2002) acknowledged some form of policing during the colonial era but emphasized the formation of a structured police force from the beginning of the World War II. It is clear that some forms of policing, both formal and informal, existed in Ghana during the precolonial and colonial period, in consonance with Atuguba's (2003) strong emphasis on the imperialist interest of the police force during the colonial era.

Maintaining internal security in postcolonial Ghana has its own perspectives, although it appears as a continuation of the (pre)colonial strategies of ensuring peace and security. The interplay of multiculturalism, political diversity, and active economic activities accompanying the rapidly urbanizing population has warranted national governments to stimulate and maintain peace and security through a formal, impartial, and non-ethnic-based means to contain the expected economic and structural transformations associated with urbanization processes (Herbert & Grobelski, 2014). As a concomitant of urbanization, the influx of population continually affects the way of life of urban dwellers, transcending ethnic particularity and requiring knowledge of human development to foster safe and all-inclusive, economically active environments. These will contribute to urban environments that limit the potential for fostering fear of crime and limit the threats to life and property; notably under the stewardship of a nationally oriented legislation and policies on the provision of internal security.

2.4.4 Constitutional and legal framework on the provision of internal security in Ghana

Since its introduction in the colonial era, the Ghana Police Service has been mandated by the 1992 constitution as the lead institution in the provision of internal security (Article 200 (3) of the 1992 constitution). This mandate is further delineated in the functions of the service as stipulated in Section 1 of the Police Service Act 1970 (Act 350), which among other things, states that:

It shall be the duty of the police to prevent and detect crime, to apprehend offenders, and to maintain public order and the safety of persons and property.

In pursuing this mandate, the police service has ensued on some structural decentralisation. Despite the extensive physical decentralisation of the police service, from the national to regional, divisional, districts headquarter levels and the police stations or posts, the centrality of its command structure is widely known (SITU, 2014). To augment the internal security services provided by the police, the 1992 constitution further mandated other state agencies to offer support in the provision of internal security. The expected complementary functions granted the other state institutions step up the police's attempts to meet the wide spread security challenges associated with contemporary cities as highlighted by Arias (2011). According to Arias (2011), the need to look beyond traditional policing modalities is compelling within the urban millennium. In the same direction, the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana has enabled some responsibilities to some state institutions as summarised in Bagson and Owusu (2016) (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1: State institutions in the provision of security services in Ghana

State	Legislation	Main objective	Remarks
Ghana Police Service	Article 200; Act 1970 (Act 350)	To maintain internal security	Increasing patrols in cities but perceived as corrupt
Ghana Armed Forces	Article 210; Act, 1962 (Act 105)	To defend the territorial boundaries of Ghana	Enhancing civil–military relationship to defuse public feared use of violence
Ghana Immigration Service	Immigration Act 2000 (Act 573)	To control and manage borders	Perceived inability to protect the national borders
Ghana Prison Service	Article 205	To reform and rehabilitate prisoners	Public perceive prisons as the hub for recruiting criminals
Ghana Fire Service	ACT 219 of 1963 amended as Fire Service Act 537 – 1997	To protect life and property	Public perception about rescue missions other than fire fighting is limited
Customs, Excise & Prevention Service	CEPS Law 1993, PNDCL 330	To collect, account and protect tax revenues	Accused of facilitating tax invasion
Bureau of National Investigation	Security and Intelligence Agencies Act (Act 526) 1996	To keep a close watch over the government	Work is shrouded in secrecy, hence losing public confidence in intelligence gathering
Economic & Organized Crime Office	Act 804	To prevent and detect crime as well as seize the benefits of crime from perpetrators	Accused of partiality in criminal investigations
Judicial Service	Articles 125 of 1992 Constitution	To resolve conflicts according to the law	Accused of corruption and administration of injustice

Source: adapted from the Constitution of Ghana (1992) as cited in Bagson and Owusu (2016)

Despite the individual efforts by the other state agencies (see Table 2.1) toward maintaining internal security, achieving their common aim of maintaining internal security is guided by the National Security Council as established in the 1992 constitution, Article 83. Specifically, the functions of the National Security Council as stipulated in Article 84 of the 1992 constitution, which among other things include:

- a) *Considering and taking appropriate measures to safe-guard the internal and external security of Ghana;*
- b) *Ensuring the collection of information relating to the security of Ghana and the integration of the domestic, foreign and security policies relating to it so as to enable the security services and other departments and agencies of the Government to co-operate more effectively in matters relating to national security;*
- c) *Assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments and risks of Ghana in relation to the actual and potential military power in the interest of the national security; and*
- d) *Taking appropriate measures regarding the consideration of policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security.*

These constitutionally mandated collaborations among state security agencies appear operationally disjointed not only within the national security apparatus in Ghana (Atuguba, 2003) but in many other African countries (Anderson & Killingray, 1992). According to Atuguba (2003), the wide spread dominance of the armed forces in both internal and external national security affairs in the African continent demonstrate “the very antithesis of democracy” in the region (p. 1). However, this trend must change with the increasing growth in the tenets of democracy and good governance in the continent, which expects the operations of the state security agencies to work neutrally irrespective of particular governments or regimes but to the plight of the citizenry.

In Ghana, the establishment of the ten (10) member Police Council (See Article 203 (1), 1992 Constitution) legally permits the Council to appropriately advice the

President on relevant policies for creating and maintaining internal security. Another important body contributing to and overseeing the issues of defence and internal affairs is the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior. Among other responsibilities, the Committee is detailed “to examine all questions relating to defence and internal affairs” as stipulated in the Standing Orders of Parliament, November 2000, Order 158. Similar to the legal mandate of the Police Council, this committee is duty bound in the formulation of policy, legislation as well as other oversight security responsibilities in the interest of national security. In addition, the role of civil society groups and individuals in the maintenance of internal security as prescribed by law cannot be ignored (see Article 12 to 33, 1992 Constitution of Ghana).

Despite these constitutional arrangements to oversee the functioning of the Ghana police service in a democratic environment, the police are still overwhelmed with increasing levels of crime, pockets of tribal conflicts among other challenges as posited by Atuguba (2003) to adequately maintain internal security. In this light, the Police Service Act, 1970 (Act 350) and Legislation Instrument (LI) 1571, 1994 mandate the formation and operations of private security companies under the supervision of the Ghana Police Service. Nevertheless, African Security Dialogue and Research [ASDR] (2008) indicates that the Act lacks details on the management of the private security sector in the country. Notably other non-state actors in the provision of internal security, which are more location specific and driven by socio-cultural orientations are not scarce in Ghana.

2.4.5 Socio-cultural mechanisms in maintaining security in Ghana

The colonial history associated with Ghana’s homeland security system appears to have influenced the indigenous system of maintaining security offered through the authority

of chiefs and kinship (Badong, 2008). Nevertheless, some socio-cultural practices linger as a fall-back for most ordinary citizens to maintain security within their immediate environment and at the individual level. The authority of the chiefs in maintaining internal security has not been totally eliminated, partly because of the Native Authority Ordinance, which empowers chiefs to resolve disputes even though they inculcate elements of the Western judiciary system in their dispute resolution processes (Dzivenu, 2008). Ordinary citizens, primarily the poor and vulnerable with economically limited access to the formal legal system or private security companies, continue to depend on informal crime prevention strategies that are of indigenous socio-cultural orientation (Olonisakin et al., 2009).

The struggle between formal and traditional institutions with respect to security provision and the maintenance of law and order has featured prominently in the political and legal history of Ghana. For instance, during the regimes of Nkrumah (in the 1950s) and Jerry Rawlings (1981–1992), attempts were made to reduce the mandate of the traditional system in providing security by enhancing community participation in local governance, which inadvertently curtailed the traditional system of governance. These socio-cultural base security systems are what Badong (2008) described as ‘non-commercial, non-state private actors’, which are people-centred and very flexible in meeting the security needs of the majority who are inadequately secured by formal security systems. However, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana still recognizes and supports the chieftaincy institution and expects its contribution to maintaining internal peace and security.

Other equally active socio-cultural options to access security and protection in the African context—and particularly in the Ghanaian case—are the involvement of

deities. The reliance on deities to provide security services is supported by strong traditional beliefs in their power to provide security. For instance, during the construction of a modern market in Kumasi that appeared to threaten the livelihood security of taxi drivers, they invoked the powers of Antoa Nyamaa (a river deity) on the life of the metropolitan chief executive. The chief executive reacted convincingly that the new market was in the interests of the larger population against the individualistic illegal occupation by taxi drivers (Akosah-Sarpong, 2012). The metropolitan chief executive's almost spontaneous reaction after the drivers' invocation of the Antoa Nyamaa demonstrates the people's belief in the deity for protection or for security purposes. Such disagreements occur when traditional systems are ignored in attempts to address current development challenges (Njoh, 2006). In his scholarly works, Njoh (2006) emphasized that the obvious slow pace of development in Africa compared with other regions is because of 'the lack of African culture in African's socio-economic planning, which is still driven by overly euro-centric paradigms'.

There are, however, some indigenous cultural practices that cannot be dissociated from the security system within the West African region—and within Ghana in particular. As posited by Njoh (2006), some persistent security challenges exist partly because of the lack of integration of culturally based security practices with the current situation. Hence, the absence of culturally based security planning—in which practices or practitioners of juju, marabou, voodoo, and witchcraft are not part of the security process—is thwarting security efforts within the West African region (Akosah-Sarpong, 2003). As Akosah-Sarpong (2003: xx) noted, 'you read through West Africa's security policies and you don't see any hint of attempts to take into consideration its environment, its culture, and its history'. Hence, the limited effect of local institutions and values in the security arrangement in Ghana is widening the inequality gap in

access to formal security services (Akosah-Sarpong, 2012). Increased involvement of local institutions and values will be in harmony with the large informal sector in the Ghanaian development reality—making it a people-centred concept and enhancing inclusivity. However, the Ghana Police Service does not rest in its efforts to educate the practitioners of juju, mallams, and other spiritualists to desist from assisting criminals execute their activities (Akosah-Sarpong, 2003). Consequently, the interactions between the formal and informal crime prevention practitioners will further safeguard some of the traditional investigative strategies of ensuring positive conformity and will reduce the misinterpretation of some of the laws of the state (Badong, 2009).

2.4.6 Community policing and the role of informal stakeholders in maintaining internal security

The concept of community policing gained its currency within the last quarter of the twentieth century in the Western world, as a renewed public–private partnership aimed at reducing crime and creating safer communities by engaging the general public in crime prevention efforts (Kelling & Moore, 1988; Cordner, 2001; Kempa, 2007; Terpstra, 2009; Shilston, 2015). In the developing world, community policing gained patronage during the first part of the twenty-first century as a partnership between the police and communities, with the common aim of preventing or controlling crime (Skilling, 2016).

The concept of community policing is an evolutionary offspring and a supporting body of mainstream policing, which advocates collaborative efforts by community members, relevant government agencies, non-governmental and non-profit agencies, civil society organizations, and the police in the quest to stimulate and sustain safer, more liveable communities. Characterized by an evolving and geographically specific mode of

operation in an attempt to match the fluid nature of crime, community policing is conceptualized in various forms (Terpstra, 2009; Shilston, 2015). The philosophy of community policing is identical to the principles of democracy as reflected in the description of community policing by Skogan and Hartnett (1997). Skogan and Hartnett (ibid.) described community policing as problem solving and crime prevention strategies that engage the general public. In other words, the significance of community policing is partly drawn from its strategic involvement of a local, context-specific approach to combating crime at the community level, and it benefits from strong support from the national crime prevention organization or authority.

The core mandate of community policing is geared towards crime prevention and enhancing the quality of life of members of a community according to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE] (OSCE, 2008). It therefore involves a continuous building of police–public partnerships towards reducing crime rates and improving public trust and confidence in the police-led crime prevention process. Thus, increasing interaction between the police, the general public, and organizations with interests in a community potentially retards the tendencies towards criminality. In the same vein, OSCE (2008) notes that, in efforts to improve the police–public partnership in the pursuit of community policing, the police must be visible and accessible to the public and known by them; respond to communities’ needs; listen to communities’ concerns; and engage and mobilize communities and be accountable for their activities and the outcome of these activities.

These goals can be achieved by decentralizing the order of command of the police service to the community level so that officers on the front line make relevant, on-the-spot decisions suitable to the course of action on the ground (OSCE, 2008). In other

words, the traditional top-down command structure commonly associated with mainstream policing should give way to a bottom-up approach in the community policing domain. Consequently, community-based organizations, civil society organizations, and local government representatives such as the Assembly member and unit committee members, as in Ghana, play a crucial role in the community policing concept. Reiner (2010), for instance, outlines the concept of community policing by emphasizing the need for collaboration among relevant stakeholders in fighting crime as the most suitable way to go. Stakeholders' collaboration draws from the strong efforts of the collaborators to result in a near-perfect and appropriate remedy to a criminogenic situation.

The heterogeneity of stakeholders acting in their individual capacities but towards the collective aim of achieving a crime-free community calls to mind the important role of informal stakeholders in the philosophy of community policing. Thus, community policing is characterized by a wide variety of partnerships with common agendas in crime prevention and improved quality of community life (Rogers, 2006). As partners in the concept of community policing, informal stakeholders, such as members of the community, contribute to the concept by reporting incidences of crime or tendencies that are criminogenic in nature (Brown & Dandurand, 2007; Skilling, 2016). Skilling (2016) identified strong community support as being important to the development of community policing by its assisting the police in locating hotspots in order to increase surveillance and retard the opportunity for potential criminals to commit crime. According to Brown and Dandurand (2007), the community has a responsibility to support the reintegration of previously incarcerated persons and to accept them back into the community as law-abiding citizens in order to prevent possible recidivism. Thus, the stakeholders' collaboration within community policing becomes a suitable

tool to enable a smooth integration of ex-convicts, without prejudice or fears of recidivism. Consequently, the role of traditional leaders such as chiefs, religious leaders, clan, and family heads cannot be over emphasized as stakeholders within the community policing concept.

However, some challenges cannot be dissociated from the concept of community policing, especially with regard to issues of building a formidable force from the expected partnerships (Johnson et al., 2000; Ikuteyijo, 2009). For instance, Johnson et al. (2000) noted the reluctant attitude of traditional police officers to allow diverse groups to participate in police operations and crime prevention in particular, as the police perceive public participation as interference in their own professional courses of action. Likewise, limited accountability from the police toward the public and lack of public participation in policing in some developing countries is a large challenge, reducing public confidence in developing partnerships with the police in recent times (Ikuteyio, 2009; Skilling, 2016). For instance, in his study, Olusegun (2009) highlighted the opportunities for corruption and the grossly unethical behaviour of police officers following the introduction of the community policing concept in Nigeria; and Oliver (2004) disputes the effectiveness of community policing as a strategy for crime prevention in the twenty-first century.

2.5 Conceptual framework

Triangulating the foundational theoretical frameworks of Social Disorganization Theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942), Collective Efficacy Theory (Sampson et al., 1997), and Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) offers a synthesized theoretical pathway to understanding the probability of crime to occur or not within the urban space. They demonstrate the reproduction of (in)security within the built environment

and are commonly applied in situations of urbanization and the latter's implications for changing lifestyle activities in the ever-dynamic urban environment. Ghana's unprecedented urbanization process, accompanied simultaneously by largely unregulated spatial expansion, complicates the causality and the underlining crime preventive strategies within the urban space. In reality, each of the three theories in their original incarnation offers analytical power when applied to crime scenarios within the built environment. They each address criminogenic outcomes regarding the relationship of the factors of urbanization, globalization, and neoliberal economic tendencies—and the consequences of these factors for the probability of crime incidence.

As indicated earlier, Social Disorganisation Theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942) demonstrates that neighbourhood structures have the potential to influence the incidence of crime as well as the (in)ability of the neighbourhood to collectively control the situation related to crime within the immediate environment. The inability of a neighbourhood to adequately take control of its crime situation signifies a socially disorganized society, one characterized by the breakdown of essential neighbourhood institutions due to the loss of community norms and values that foster trust and confidence in the efforts by members to control criminogenic tendencies (Kubrin & Weitzer, 2003). Thus, a neighbourhood in which members share values and norms is more likely to be able to secure its immediate environment against crime and to experience enhanced safety than a neighbourhood with a high level of poverty, mobile population, and relatively loose social relationships. In other words, a communal sense of identity that is transmitted from generation to generation maintains a well-preserved society; one that is capable of securing its neighbourhoods by collective action to intervene in the course of crime.

Projecting from the communal sense of a collective action to intervene in the course of crime, based on communal trust and social cohesion, illustrates the underlying tenets of the Collective Efficacy Theory as postulated by Sampson et al. (1997). Given its widely applicable explanatory ability, the Collective Efficacy Theory derives its potency from the combined powers of social cohesion and the willingness of members of a neighbourhood to intervene to reduce the incidence of crime. However, challenging this ability to explain the possibility of the occurrence of crime or otherwise are the increasingly predictable routine activities commonly engaged in by residents of the middle- to upper-class socio-economic neighbourhoods—whose daily activities keep them away from their home neighbourhoods for relatively predictable periods of time each day. Cohen and Felson (1979) in their Routine Activity Theory indicate that the likelihood of crime to occur is dependent on the intersection within time and space of a motivated offender with a suitable target, in the absence of a capable guardian. Hence, the potential to avoid crime relies on the ability to separate the motivated offender from a suitable target by engaging a capable guardian, be it the police or private guard or the use of mechanical installations such as alarms and CCTV.




Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework on securitization of the contemporary urban space

Source: Adapted from Shaw and McKay (1942), Sampson et al. (1997) and Cohen and Felson (1979).

Figure 2.1 illustrates the conceptual framework for this study. It is largely guided by the philosophies underpinning the theoretical framework explained earlier, but it contextualizes them in the situation of the concurrence of rapid urbanization, trade liberalization, and globalization affecting the Ghanaian urban space. The study conceptualized that contemporary cities, especially in the twenty-first century, are greatly impacted by the consequences of rapid urbanization, neoliberal trade liberalization policies, and globalization. The ability of governments to translate this rather unusual mixture of global processes into positive economic and people-centred development results in two types of cities, or in a city with two different phases. These illustrate the physical and socio-cultural tendencies with the potential to determine the criminogenic options as stipulated within the Social Disorganization Theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942).

On the one hand, there is a city or parts of a city characterized by the strong governance structures associated with regulated spatial planning and considerable investment in infrastructure, including the provision of public services such as security services. According to Shaw and McKay (1942), such a city or space is organized and therefore has the ability to organize its members to pursue a common course—for example, fighting crime. On the other hand, some cities or parts of a city experience weak governance structures, unregulated spatial planning, increasing informality, unemployment, and a poor investment culture in the areas of infrastructure and services. Shaw and McKay (*ibid.*) defined such neighbourhoods as socially disorganized and with limited ability to self-organize in pursuit of a common goal. Put differently, such neighbourhoods commonly experience crime and are therefore unsafe. Although sharing pathways towards a secure urban space, as shown in Figure 2.1, each city encounters a different intensity of criminogenic tendencies and outcomes. These

differences can be evened out by the inception of influential mediating factors such as the economy, social and political dynamics within the governance structure, and religious and cultural beliefs governing the way of life of the people. According to the Collective Efficacy Theory (Sampson et al., 1997), such mediating factors have the potential to serve as a binding power to build the social capital necessary to avert criminogenic situations. Similarly, Cohen and Felson (1979) indicate that the positive effects of such social capital further separate a suitable target from a motivated offender and hence reduce the potential for the incidence of crime.

For instance, in a situation of well-regulated physical development planning and available public services, including policing services, within an economically sound and politically stable city, it is conceptualized that neighbourhoods will experience reduced criminal opportunities and a relatively secure urban space. Similarly, a city of weak governance structure and poor public services, but with sustained cultural beliefs and norms serving as a binding power among neighbourhoods, will most likely result in an enhanced social structure and community identity—and hence in a secure society. However, a poor economic or unstable political situation offers a higher probability of a fluid social and community structure and an unsecured urban space. Interestingly, the Ghanaian urban space reflects complexities in which there appears to be a prevalence or fear of crime in gated (fortified) neighbourhoods, which intuitively are economically sound and well-planned areas; and the near absence of crime in lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods offers a new frontier for the development of the aforementioned theories and their analytical relevance within the Ghanaian urban environment.

2.6 Chapter summary

Urbanization as a global process continues to increase steadily at different rates across the globe but unilaterally affects the world's development systems. The developing world appears to be experiencing an exceptionally high rate of urbanization in the twenty-first century, coupled with limited government efforts to contain the ramifications of the process. Characterized by uncoordinated physical development, urban sprawl, slums, and informality, securing the urban space has become a difficult problem for national institutional arrangements to ensure internal security. This development compels the study to examine the informal crime prevention strategies that the marginalized rely on as an alternative to secure their lives and properties. A move in that direction requires a triangulation of ecologically oriented criminological theories—Social Disorganization, Collective Efficacy, and Routine Activity theories—which proves useful in understanding the dynamics of the probability of crime in the developing world context. Despite the difference in phases between and within contemporary cities, the conceptual framework evolving from the triangulated theories illustrates a common pathway to attaining some level of security within the diverse urban environments in the developing world—and in the Ghanaian urban space in particular. In this study's attempt to unravel the different informal strategies urbanites rely on in Kumasi and Tamale metropolises, it is important to give a detailed description of the methodological approach guiding the research process in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE: THE STUDY AREA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the existing literature and some of the gaps within the literature with respect to urbanisation and security of the urban space. The current chapter focuses on the description of the study area and the methodological approach used. This chapter is split into two broad sections. The first section covers a detailed description of the study area, while the second examines the various methods employed in the data collection, processing, and analysis. The methodology section is captured in two sub-sections. The first sub-section examines the methodology used in the overall project titled 'Exploring Poverty and Crime Nexus in Urban Ghana', of which this thesis is an off-shoot. The second sub-section focuses on the collection, processing, and analysis of qualitative data to solicit additional data on informal crime prevention strategies across different socio-economic neighbourhoods specifically for this thesis. This involves the collection of coordinates regarding the location of the various police stations and posts within the research locations. The section ends with a description of the techniques used in extracting satellite images of Kumasi and Tamale metropolises to reflect the spatial expansions over a period of 16 years using land cover changes.

3.2 Description of the study area

As already indicated, the study's main objective is to examine some of the informal crime prevention strategies used within the Ghanaian urban space. To achieve this objective, two research locations were purposefully selected: Kumasi, the capital of the Ashanti Region; and Tamale, the Northern regional capital (the details on why these research locations were selected are in chapter one and further highlights discussed in subsequent sections).

3.2.1 Kumasi, the Garden City of Ghana

Founded in the seventeenth century, the city of Kumasi (Figure 3.1) is located in the transitional forest zone with a total land area of 254 sq km (Poku-Boansi & Inkoom, 2011) and accommodates an average of 15 trees per hectare (MESTI & TCPD, 2013). The vegetation of the Ashanti Region is classified as moist semi-deciduous, with suitable soil for the cultivation of crops, and an inhabitable ecosystem to support its biotic and abiotic components. Typical of tropical climates, the region experiences two distinct rainfall seasons in a year: from April to June, the major rainy season; and then from September to November, the minor rainy season. The temperatures in Kumasi are also relatively stable (approximately 25 to 27°C) but experience limited harmattan seasons in January and February (Holliman et al., 2007).

The city's wide spread of greenery, modelled along the lines of Western city planning, earned it an accolade as the Garden City of Ghana in 1945 (Quagraine, 2011). In the main, most residents and visitors in the city experience the benefits of the dense foliage, which forms a canopy along the streets of the CBD and its immediate surroundings (Adjei-Mensah, 2014). According to Adjei-Mensah (2014), the considerably large interspace of greenery and different varieties of trees within the city attracts tourists of diverse background. Tontoh (2011) reveals that Kumasi had a vegetative cover of 74.08 percent of its total land area in 1986, a reason the city earned the accolade as the Garden City (Korboe, 2001; Quagraine, 2011).




Figure 3.1: Map of Kumasi Metropolitan Area showing study communities

Source: Author's own construction, 2017

However, in recent times, increasing urbanization resulting in sprawl and multiple land use, coupled with poor urban governance, has contributed to the loss of the Garden City status (Adjei-Mensah, 2014; Koranteng, 2017). Specifically, Koranteng (2017), in analysing satellite images of Kumasi between 1986 and 2003, revealed that a large proportion of the green vegetation has been replaced by housing facilities expanding outward from the core of the city.

Similarly, Poku-Boansi and Inkoom (2011) illustrated the spatial expansion of Kumasi from a total land size of 25 sq km in 1950 to 254 sq km in 2011. The demographic densification and the spatial expansions of the built environment of the city have overstretched the capacity of city authorities to provide infrastructural services. This has compromised the ability of the Ghana Police Service and other supporting state agencies to provide adequate internal security within the borders of Ghana (Owusu et al., 2015; Bagson & Owusu, 2016), a situation that warrants further examination of how urban dwellers engage informal crime prevention strategies to secure life and property.

3.2.2 The population and local economic dynamics in Kumasi

The Ashanti Region, the most populous of the ten administrative regions in Ghana, holds 19.4 percent of the total national population of 24,658,823, according to the 2010 population and housing census. The region's average annual population growth rate of 2.84 percent is slightly above the national average of 2.69 percent for the first decade of the twenty-first century, but less than that of Greater Accra and Northern Regions that, respectively, have population growth rates of 3.27 and 3.14 percent within the same period (GSS, 2013). The region's population density of 196 persons per sq km is greater than the national average of 103.4 persons per sq km; however, the Kumasi

metropolis records a much higher average density of 8,075 persons per sq km (GSS, 2014). The increasing population density cannot be dissociated from the possibility of weakening social ties and increasing anonymity—and hence of reducing the tendencies of the urban social structure to galvanize collective action in the fight against common social ills such as crime.

The local economy of Kumasi is driven by its rich mineral resources and its fertile land for the cultivation of both cash and food crops. Within the city of Kumasi, shopping and trading activities are predominant in and around the Kejetia, Adum, and Asafo markets. Indeed, Kumasi metropolis is noted for its large traditional market place. For instance, its Central Market is a host to over 10,000 department retail stores where assorted products are sold. In addition, the city has approximately 28 satellite markets and other economic nodes, such as the Suame Magazine, Asokwa industrial area, and the Anloga wood market.

Recognizable within the city's economic dynamic is the supportive transport network system radiating from Kejetia—a popular transport terminal within the CBD. The central location of Kumasi, coupled with the convergence of the major transport networks, has generated an active economic hub within the middle belt of Ghana.

The social life in the city is as active as the economic and cultural structures. The city is noted for its renowned cultural heritage and relatively peaceful and revered tradition. A prior study attributed the largely peaceful nature of the city to its well-entrenched monarchical kinship, which keeps the family firm notwithstanding the 'dramatic fluctuations in the economic and political environment of Ghana' (Clark, 1999). According to Clark (1999), the 'kinship allows the innovation of principles of connection and accountability to counter the principles of disconnection and

irresponsibility for consequences, which the neoclassical principles of the open economy make paramount'. In other words, the Ashanti monarchy has stood up to the competitive economic liberation policies of Ghana and the seemingly insatiable desire for profit in the contemporary market system.

In recent times, tourism is emerging as an important economic sector in Kumasi. The Palace of the Ashantehene—one of the famous monarchs in Africa—has become a popular tourist attraction. An equally important tourist attraction is the Kumasi Cultural Center, which maintains the unique cultural heritage of the Asante Kingdom. There are other cultural activities and festivals, which have acted as magnets in attracting potential tourists to the city. Prominent among them is the celebration of the Akwasidae festival by the Ashantehene. This festival, celebrated on a selected Sunday in the year, attracts tourists not only from Ghana but from the sub-region generally, and indeed globally.

3.2.3 Tamale: The rising star of the north

Historically, the city of Tamale emerged from cross-trade routes, among others the Daboya salt trade route and the Salaga slave trade routes (Dickson, 1969; Briggs, 2010; Ntewusu, 2014). Tamale, however, gained much prominence after the British colonists relocated the headquarters of the then Northern Territories from Yendi to Tamale in 1906 (MacGaffey, 2006), not only to benefit from ease of access to the city but also to avoid the German control over Yendi in 1901 (ibid.). Its vantage location and relatively good road network gives it a direct link not only to the two major cities in Ghana (Accra and Kumasi) but also to the Sahelian region of North Africa.

Tamale (Figure 3.2) is located in the savannah woodland ecological zone and is the largest region by total land area in Ghana, representing 29.5 percent of the country's

total land area (GSS, 2013). Typical of the savannah woodland ecological zone, the region experiences one rainy season per year, the dry winds of the harmattan from November to February, and relatively high sunshine from March to May. In many instances, the few water bodies within the metropolis hardly survive the heat of the dry season; hence, not only is access to potable water in the metropolis limited, but also water to serve agricultural purposes is a considerable challenge within the region.




Figure 3.2: Map of Tamale Metropolitan Area showing study communities

Source: Author's own construction, 2017

The land is characterized by a few short trees and shrubs intermingled in tall grasses; and given the little vegetative cover, soil erosion contributes to the degradation of the largely sandy, clayey, and laterite soil types within the metropolis. The present soil type does not adequately support the cultivation of food and cash crops, despite the single and short rainy season. This therefore means that the single and erratic rainy season reduces employment opportunities in the once predominantly agricultural region.

3.2.4 The population and local economic dynamics in Tamale

As the most populous region in northern Ghana, the Northern Region hosts a population of 2,479,461. The regional population density is 35.2 persons per sq km, representing 66 percent less than the national population density of 103.4 persons per sq km in the year 2010 (GSS, 2013). This is attributable to the negative net migration (-332,597) recorded in 2010 (GSS, 2014); in other words, the region experiences about four times more people leaving than entering. Despite the negative net migration at the regional level, the city of Tamale, as the only metropolis within northern Ghana, has been a centre of attraction—especially during the government increase in investment in the agricultural sector in the 1970s (Songsore, 2011).

Thus, in a period of three decades (1970–2000), the city has had its population more than doubled: from 83,653 in 1970 to 202,317 in 2000 and subsequently recording 54 percent increase of population from 2000 to 2010 (GSS, 2014). The city's population is projected to be about 563,916 in the year 2020. MacGaffey (2006) described Tamale, based on its population growth, as the fastest-growing city in the West African sub-region. According to Songsore (2011), improvements in the areas of educational infrastructure, the services sector, and possible job opportunities may account for the increasing population in the city.

The local economy of Tamale is predominantly driven by the agricultural sector and is supplemented by the fast-growing informal market place within the CBD and a promising services sector. The Tamale central market is the largest open market place in northern Ghana, sandwiched between retail shops. With a relatively well-connected road network to adjoining districts and beyond, active private, informal small-scale traders engage in brisk economic activities with dwellers of the hinterland (GSS, 2014). Unfortunately, the related job opportunities created by the increasing numbers of NGOs and formal commercial services such as banking and insurance are out of reach of the largely unskilled youth within the metropolis. There is, therefore, an increasing youth cohort in the metropolis who cannot be dissociated from disruptions related to political, religious, and chieftaincy issues (Bagson & Owusu, 2016; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016).

In general, the social structure of Tamale has changed over the years from a very stable and peaceful town in the early twentieth century (Soeters, 2012) to a seemingly stable but ethnically, religiously, and politically divided populace (Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the relatively peaceful city continues to attract tourists to its renowned cultural centre, the site of a merger of traditional and modern architecture, as well as of the famous central mosque within the city centre. Furthermore, the annual celebration of the Damba festival showcases the rich culture of the Dagombas—the major ethnic group in the region (GSS, 2014). In the traditional setting, the Yaa Naa, overlord of the Dagbon traditional area, appoints and supports the Gukpegu Naa to oversee the security and development of Tamale (Soeters, 2012).

3.3 Crime types, trends, and dynamics in Ghana

Based on the different socio-economic, political, and cultural dynamics underlying security situations, this section provides a brief overview of the trends in crime at the

national level and then focuses on the regions of the study locations. According to Aksoy (2017), different location characteristics require specific crime prevention strategies; hence, knowledge of the types and trends of crime will be important in crime prevention attempts. Despite the challenges associated with police data, including non-reporting (Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2003; Maguire, 2012), some crimes that commonly affect the physical and psychological well-being of the victim do not suffer severe under-reporting (Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). Such criminal acts include murder, robbery, rape, and defilement—which the Ghana Police Service describes as serious crimes—and these were used in this study. Moreover, the exceptionally high levels of reported cases of threats warranted inclusion in an attempt to expose its trends over the period for which data is available for review (2000 to 2013).

At the national level, a total of over one million assault cases were reported between 2000 and 2013. The overall incidence of assault cases dropped by 17 percent over the period, but the highest number of reported incidence of assault cases was in 2007 (Figure 3.3). Defilement experienced an oscillatory increase of more than three times between 2000 and 2013, while rape shows a non-linear decline (53%) within the same period. Furthermore, armed robbery quadrupled in a non-steady manner from the year 2000 to an apex in the year 2006 but gradually declined by 42 percent to the year 2012 and rose again (10%) in 2013. Murder cases, although with the lowest values compared with the other serious crimes, increased from 387 cases in 2000 to 551 cases in 2013, which is a 42 percent increase over the period. Thus, leaving aside the cases of rape and assault, which declined by 53 percent and 17 percent respectively, the reported cases of murder, robbery, and defilement increased disproportionately between 2000 and 2013 (Figure 3.3).




Figure 3.3: National serious crime trends in Ghana from 2000 to 2013

Source: SITU, 2014

Cognisance of the increases in incidence of some crimes over the period (2000-2013) and the limitedness of the Ghana Police Service, the interest of this study remains unravelling the informal crime prevention strategies urbanites employ to secure their lives and properties within their neighbourhoods. However, Felson and Boba (2010) highlighted how instrumental the settings of the immediate environment influence the occurrence or otherwise of crimes; hence the frequency of the serious crimes is due for further examination in the Northern and Ashanti Regions.

3.3.1 Crime types, trends, and dynamics in the Ashanti Region

The overall change in proportion among the four major crimes in the Ashanti Region indicates an increase in the number of cases of armed robbery (71%), murder (39%), and defilement (25%), while the cases of rape encountered a sharp decrease (104%) between 2000 and 2013. Further interrogations into the trends of individual crimes

reveals that, with a steady increase from the year 2000, reported cases of armed robbery reached a maximum of 828 cases in the year 2006 and then encountered a 265 percent decline to the year 2009, increasing steadily again to the year 2012 (Figure 3.4). Hence, with an average of 360 cases per annum, 8 persons, within the Ashante region, are likely to report murder cases per 100,000 individuals, notwithstanding a 33 percent drop in cases from 2012 to 2013.




Figure 3.4: Major crime trends from 2000 to 2013 in the Ashanti Region
Source: SITU, 2014

Accounting for 39 percent of the total number of major offences from 2000 to 2013 in the Ashanti Region, defilement recorded a 25 percent increase within the same period (Figure 3.4). Specifically, with a 61 percent increase in the number of cases from the year 2000 to 2003, reported cases of defilement experienced a sharp oscillatory transition from 2003 to 2008, after which it declined (22%) to 2013. Hence, with an average incidence of 369 cases of defilement over the 13-year period, there is the likelihood of 8 persons being victims of defilement per 100,000 individuals. However, 12 percent of the total reported major crimes within the period were rape cases. For the years 2000 and 2013, the cases of rape dropped significantly (104%), notwithstanding

an average 113 cases per annum over the 13-year period and an incidence of 2 persons per 100,000 individuals. As shown in Figure 3.4, reported cases of rape have had a fairly constant oscillatory movement over the entire period. Unlike the rest of the major crimes—which at least decreased, even if unequally, from 2012 to 2013—the cases of rape increased from 51 cases to 68 cases during the period under study. Furthermore, murder accounted for the least proportion (10%) of the total reported major cases for the period but exhibited a 39 percent increase from the year 2000 to 2013. On average, there are 96 reported cases of murder per annum in the region, and two persons per 100,000 individuals encountered murder with respect to the average reported annually.

3.3.2 Crime types, trends, and dynamics in the Northern Region

The highest proportion (32%) of the total reported crime incidents in the Northern Region is accounted for by defilement, which had an 87 percent increase between 2000 and 2013 (Figure 3.4). In addition, with an annual average of 27 cases, the tendency of being a victim of defilement is one person in every 100,000 individuals in the region. Defilement underwent an uneven increase from the year 2000 to 2008, decreased by 34 percent to 2010, and then steadily increased again to the year 2013.

The second-highest number of serious crime incidences are murder cases, which constituted 28 percent of the total major crimes reported over the period of 2000 to 2013, an overall increase of 35 percent (Figure 3.4). Notably, the average annual number of murder cases is 24 and has a probable incidence of one per 100,000 individuals. Figure 3.4 illustrates an oscillatory but relatively constant number of reported cases of murder from the year 2000 to 2006 and then increases by 59 percent from 2006 to 2013. The cases of armed robbery accounted for 23 percent of the total reported cases but showed an overall increase of 76 percent between the years 2000 and

2013. Hence, with an average annual number of 19 cases and a probable incidence of one per 100,000 individuals, armed robbery cases have been increasing non-linearly from 2000 to 2013 (Figure 3.5).




Figure 3.5: Major crime trends from 2000 to 2013 in the Northern Region
Source: SITU, 2014

Comparatively speaking, reported cases of rape hold a proportion of 16 percent of the total reported cases in the region over the period. As indicated in Figure 3.5, rape cases show a downward trend from 2002 to 2008 and were at the highest ever reported number of cases in 2009; since then, they have again shown a downward trend. Hence, unlike the other major reported crimes within the period, rape cases declined from 2012 to 2013.

3.4 Research methodology

This study is an off-shoot of a three-year national research project titled ‘Exploring Poverty and Crime Nexus in Urban Ghana’. The national project is part of a global project titled ‘Safe and Inclusive Cities’, which was co-funded by Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) from 2013 to 2015. Ghana’s chapter of the global project was implemented by the University of Ghana, spearheaded by collaborative efforts between the Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER) and the Department of Geography and Resource Development.

Ghana’s chapter was guided by a broad objective of “exploring the relationship between poverty and the incidence of crime in relation to the different socio-economic characteristics of 12 neighbourhoods comprising low-class, middle-class and upper-class, in four cities of different sizes in Ghana, namely Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale”. From this broad objective, four specific objectives were developed as follows:

- *Map and highlight the prevalent types of crime across socio-economic neighbourhoods within urban Ghana;*
- *Explore the relationships between neighbourhood and household socio-economic characteristics and the occurrence rates, types and impact of crimes;*
- *Assess the effectiveness of strategies both formal and informal for addressing urban crime in urban neighbourhoods; and*
- *Assess the study’s implications for neighbourhood crime mapping and law enforcement intervention*

It was based on these objectives that the main and specific objectives of this study were formulated and stated in chapter one.

3.4.1 Research design

The research design is a blueprint that unfolds the connections between the principles of research strategies and the actual details in empirical field work. In this first section, the study adopts an exploratory sequential mixed methods design in which the output of qualitative field data informed the design, construction, and administration of quantitative data collection instruments. The study therefore benefits from the complementary advantages of both qualitative and quantitative research strategies, advantages that are absent in the individual strategies when one or other is used in isolation (Creswell et al., 2006). The combination of strategies serves as a quality check on both the qualitative and quantitative data obtained (Teye, 2012).

3.4.2 Sampling design

A multistage cluster sampling design was employed in the sample survey of the household heads in both Kumasi and Tamale metropolises. In the first place, the two cities were purposively selected not only because they are the two most urbanised cities inland Ghana (GSS, 2014) but they are also the major rural-urban migrants' destinations within the middle and northern Ghana respectively (Owusu et al., 2016). Furthermore, they are very active high economic and industrial activities centres linking the coastal part of Ghana to countries north of Ghana.

The second stage of sampling involved the selection of three different socio-economic neighbourhoods (lower-, middle- and upper-class) from each city. The selection criteria for the different neighbourhoods was based on the level of formal spatial planning, access to social services and social relationships within the neighbourhoods as used by other scholars (Benneh and Gyasi, 1993; Songsore and McGranahan, 1998 and Agyei-Mensah and Owusu, 2010). Specific characteristics that informed the selection of the different neighbourhoods are due for consideration.

Aboabo-Kumasi and Aboabo-Tamale were selected as the study locations representing the lower-class neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods are typically characterized by intense congestion, unkempt immediate environment and generally poor sanitary conditions. As illustrated by Songsore (2003) the general deprivation in the access to services and the health implications of the immediate environment is suggestive of survivalist coping strategies within the urban space. Notably, dominance of multiple household apartments (compound houses) in which household share facilities such as courtyard, washrooms, toilet among other facilities foster social cohesion – an important element within the ambit of informal crime prevention strategies. Also the absence of fence walls enables free mixing of people and therefore promote natural surveillance in the houses and neighbourhoods in general (Owusu, et al., 2016).

Oforikrom and Zogbeli constituted the middle-class neighbourhoods sampled from the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises. The middle-class neighbourhoods have relatively better formal spatial planning of physical structures, less congestion, and better ease of access within neighbourhoods than the lower-class neighbourhoods (Benneh and Gyasi, 1993; Agyei-Mensah and Owusu, 2010). The immediate environment is also characterised by Semi-detached and separate houses types with separate toilets, water supply and bathrooms within each apartment. Social interactions among neighbourhoods is less intense compared to the lower-class neighbourhoods.

Lastly, the upper-class neighbourhoods were represented by Ahodwo and Russian Bungalows in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises respectively. In direct contrast to the lower-class neighbourhoods, the upper-class neighbourhoods have well planned residential areas with relatively very good access to social services and ease of access within neighbourhoods. These neighbourhoods are generally occupied by high level public and civil servants as well as top business persons in the city. The dominance of

detached housing types cannot be ignored which are associated with individual's efforts in fortifying their apartments to ward off criminals and consequently induces the tendency of individualistic or self-centred ways of living (Songsore and McGranahan, 1998; Agyei-Mensah and Owusu, 2010; Owusu et al., 2016).

Finally, based on sample proportion to size, enumeration areas were randomly selected from each of the selected neighbourhoods (Table 3.2). Subsequently, 15 households were systematically sampled, from each enumeration area, on a random start and further selections at regular intervals to reach a total sample size of 1,335 household heads.

Table 3.1: Selected communities, household/FGD/KII sample allocations

City	Community	Community SE status	EAs	Households Sampled	No. of FGD	No. of Interviews
Kumasi	Ahodwo	Upper-class	4	60	2	27
	Oforikrom	Middle-class	31	465	2	
	Aboabo	Low-class	24	360	2	
Sub-Total				885	6	27
Tamale	Russian Bungalow	Upper-class	3	45	2	27
	Zogbeli	Middle-class	15	225	2	
	Aboabo-Tamale	Low-class	12	180	2	
Sub-Total				450	6	27
Grant total				1335	12	54

Source: GSS, 2014

3.5 Data sources and management

The study used both primary and secondary data sources. The secondary data were obtained from the GSS, the Ghana Police Service, books, journals, and the Internet, among other sources. Specifically, data on the demographic characteristics of the six communities as well as extracts of data from the 2010 population and housing census were obtained from the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS, 2014). Second, the crime data was sourced from the Ghana Police Service, data whose inherent challenges many writers have correctly reported in the past—including the under-reporting associated with official police data (Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2002; Tankebe, 2013; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). The police data were very helpful in determining the capacity of the police in terms of the number of police stations/posts as well as the number of personnel at each post. This piece of data was instrumental in estimating the police–civilian population ratio at the national, regional, and community levels.

On the other hand, part of the primary data were empirically obtained from the larger survey intended for the national project (see Appendix one). Closed-ended items dominated the questionnaire, but there were some open-ended items to enable respondents to offer opinions not captured within the options provided. The supplementary data were collected through KIIs and FGD (see Appendix two). The KII guides were unstructured, and the guides contained largely open-ended questions. The interviews were thus conducted under very flexible conditions, appropriate to the situation as desired by respondents. This enabled a conducive environment for the respondent to freely express his/her opinions on neighbourhood safety and knowledge of the use of informal strategies for crime prevention. All the KIIs were audio recorded, with permission from the respondents, and were transcribed to capture, verbatim, the

opinions expressed by respondents. Thematic analysis was then conducted and the findings were integrated into the quantitative finding during the discussion.

3.5.1 Qualitative data management and analytical strategy

In addition to the qualitative and quantitative data the researcher obtained from the three-year national project on ‘Exploring Poverty and Crime Nexus in Urban Ghana’, further qualitative data was collected to gain a deeper understanding of respondents’ perceptions of safety within their neighbourhoods. The extra qualitative research gave an opportunity to unearth informal crime prevention strategies that urbanites depend on as an alternative to the formal policing provided by the government, as well as eliciting respondent perceptions of general community-level safety.

The selection of key informants

The reconnaissance visits made earlier informed the identification and purposive selection of the key informants as an add-on to the in-depth interviews conducted during the national survey (Owusu et al., 2016; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). A meeting with the local government representative (Assembly persons) identified in each of the selected communities assisted in the identification of key informants among religious/opinion/community leaders. They provided relevant local knowledge on the perception of crime situations and informal crime prevention strategies within their neighbourhoods. For each community, three religious leaders were identified, representing each of the three main religions in Ghana (traditional African religion, Islam, and Christianity), four opinion leaders (2 males, 2 females), and two youth leaders (1 male, 1 female). In addition, further in-depth interview sessions were held with prominent mallams, diviners, and pastors to solicit their opinions on informal crime prevention strategies within the cities. For the six communities selected, nine key

informants were selected from each community, which translated into a maximum of 54 key informants for the two cities (see Table 3.2).

The selection of focus group discussants

In order to have a common view and a basis for quality check on the issues arising from the KIIs, two FGDs were held in each selected community, based on gender (one male group, one female group). Each group had seven discussants to facilitate conclusions on majority opinions on the issues discussed.

Quantitative data management and analytical strategy

The quantitative data obtained were cleaned, edited, and then submitted to the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) v. 23 for appropriate transformation and analysis. In gauging respondents' perceptions of safety within their neighbourhoods, scholars (see Adu-Mireku, 2002; UNODC, 2010; Breetzke & Pearson, 2014) have used the Likert type item: How safe do you feel in your community currently? Options to the question range from 'Very safe' to 'Very unsafe'.

Responses were dichotomized into safe and unsafe and recoded (as Safe = 1; Unsafe = 0) in order to meet the dependent variable requirements of binary logistic regression (Pallant, 2005). Binary logistic regression was adopted as the main analytical technique for gauging respondents' perception of safety within their neighbourhoods. This analytical technique was considered most suitable partly because of the categorical nature of the dependent variable. More importantly, binary logistic regression has the unique ability 'to test the predictive power of a set of variables [categorical and continuous] and to assess the relative contribution of each individual variable' (Pallant, 2005: 114).

A set of categorical and continuous variables, at the individual and contextual as well as theoretical levels, constituted the independent variables. At the individual level, age and length of stay of the respondent in the community were captured as continuous variables, while the categorical variables were dummied as follows: sex (male = 1; female = 0); marital status (Married = 1; Not married = 0); average monthly income (GHC 1–1,500 = 0; 1,501 and above = 1); level of education (High school and below = 0; Above high school = 1).

In addition, contextual independent variables portraying community-level surveillances were dummied and regressed against safety, to test their explanatory power on residents' perception of neighbourhood safety. These were extracted from items within the questionnaire such as 'Do other households share this dwelling with you?'—with the options as 'Yes' or 'No' recoded (as Yes = 1; No = 0). Secondly, questions such as 'Do you have street lights in your community?', and 'Do you feel the need for more police patrol/presence in your community?'—with responses as 'Yes' or 'No' recoded (as Yes = 1; No = 0).

Other variables of the Social Disorganization Theory orientation were likewise extracted: 'In general, how would you assess the level of crime in your community within the past five years?' The options were dichotomized and dummied (as Increase = 1; Decrease = 0). Secondly, respondents were asked: 'Is disruption around (youth hanging around, making noise, vandalizing and starting fights) or truancy (children not being in school when they should be) a problem in the neighbourhood? The options were dichotomized and dummied (as Not a problem = 0; A problem = 1).

Finally, Likert-scale type items were used to measure the two constituents of the Collective Efficacy Theory as used by Sampson et al. (1997). Firstly, a five-item Likert

scale was used to estimate whether members of the community would be willing to intervene in the course of crime or disorder on behalf of the community if they found: youth loitering in the community, youth fighting among themselves, youth showing disrespect to adults, or youth breaking into other people's houses. The second constituent involves the measure of the level of social cohesion and trust, as a communal means to reducing crime within the community. The following questions within a five-item Likert scale, with responses ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, were used: 'People in this community are willing to help their neighbours'; 'This is a close-knit neighbourhood'; 'People in this community can be trusted'; 'People in this community generally do not get along with each other'; and 'People in this neighbourhood do not share the same values'. Negative statements were reversed and the responses summed up so that a higher score indicates higher collective efficacy.

Mapping of crime hotspots and police stations/posts

Mapping crime hotspots not only provides an opportunity for the police to appropriately provide crime prevention strategies within specific locations, but also enables users of such places to take self-help precautions when they find themselves within the vicinity. Moreover, crime hotspot mapping provides a pictorial overview of crime variation spatially. In addition, police stations/posts were mapped to assess the spatial distribution of these police facilities, given the rapid spatial expansions within the two cities. All things being equal, an equitable distribution of police stations/posts (per location-specific population) expedites citizens' equal access to the police; and equally important is the fact that the mere presence of the police serves as a deterrent to perpetrators of crime. Mapping crime hotspots and police stations/posts facilitated the spatial analysis of crime hotspots and police stations/posts within Kumasi and Tamale

metropolis areas. In this direction, a Global Positioning System (GPS) device was employed and the process was assisted by community leaders.

3.6 Ethical issues

Prior to the field work, an ethical clearance certificate was sought from the University of Ghana Ethics Committee of the College of Humanities. Satisfied with the ethical clearance certificate, the metropolitan assemblies then connected the researcher with the local government representative (Assembly member) of the selected communities to commence the field work. The Assembly member then introduced the researcher to the traditional/opinion/religious leaders within each selected community. The purpose of the study, as stated earlier, to assess the informal crime prevention strategies in urban Ghana: the case of Kumasi and Tamale was disclosed to the participants before the interviews. Participants were assured of a high level of confidentiality on the collection and use of data during and after the field work.

3.7 Chapter summary

The study locations, Kumasi and Tamale, exhibit different physical and socio-economic characteristics. Kumasi is within the semi-deciduous vegetative region supported by two rainy seasons, which enable all-year-round farming. Economically, Kumasi is rich in natural resources and has the largest informal market place in West Africa, with a brisk centre. Its location in the middle part of Ghana and the relatively good road network facilitate the movement of goods and services in and out of the city. Despite the active socio-economic nature of the city, the continuing reverence accorded to the monarchical system seems to maintain relative peace. On the other hand, Tamale is located in the savannah zone of northern Ghana with only one rainy season and a

prolonged period of dry season. It has a vibrant informal economy and an increasing formal services sector, evidenced by the growing number of banks, insurance companies, hotels, and so on. Although it appears to be a homogenous city, the underlying religious, political, and ethnic factions pose a threat to the security of life and property. Despite the different overall physical and socio-economic characteristics between the two cities, there are some common features within each of the different socio-economic neighbourhoods (lower-, middle-, and upper-class). The security implications of their neighbourhood's characteristics are worth considering.

The lower-class neighbourhoods (Aboabo-Kumasi and Aboabo-Tamale) are synonymous with limited spatial planning, intense congestion, dilapidated residential facilities and limited access to social services including formal security services. Nevertheless, the multiple household apartments within the neighbourhoods promotes strong social bonding, which leverages efforts in the provision of some informal crime prevention strategies. However, the middle-class neighbourhoods (Oforikrom and Zogbeli) are associated with some spatial planning, and have relative access to social services including road networks, are less congested, and have separate or semi-detached apartments. Residents tend to be less socially bonded compared to the case in the lower-class neighbourhoods, and commonly engage in livelihood activities outside the neighbourhoods. The majority of the residents are part of the increasing middle class within the Ghanaian urban environment. Despite residents' relative access to formal security services, they appear more vulnerable to crime because of non-cohesion among residents. Similar to the middle-class neighbourhood is the upper-class neighbourhoods (Ahodwo and Russian Bungalow) but contrast the lower-class neighbourhoods since the upper-class neighbourhood is more planned. The upper-class neighbourhoods are primarily occupied by top politicians, senior civil servants, top

business executives and generally higher-income earners. Some residents have officially assigned formal security services whilst others engage the services of private security agencies. The detached housing facilities hampers social cohesion within the neighbourhood but encourages independence among residents. This increases the sense of fear of crime among residents but residents' ability to afford security installations and the services of state and private security agencies makes the vicinity appear secured.

The study was guided by the mixed methods approach, using both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data was obtained from a national project 'Exploring Poverty and Crime Nexus in Urban Ghana' and analysed using SPSS. Specifically, the SPSS software proved useful in generating the descriptive statistics and the binary logistic regression analysis. In addition, KIIs were conducted, transcribed, coded, thematically analysed, and integrated into the output from the quantitative data in order to explore the narratives within the quantitative output. Aspects of the data output revealed the institutional arrangements for crime prevention in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises as detailed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR CRIME PREVENTION IN GHANA

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided the methodological pathway to unravel the current institutional arrangements for crime prevention in Ghana. A synthesis of aspects of Ghana's 1992 Constitution (Article 200) revealed that the Ghana Police Service is the leading agency for maintaining internal security as stipulated in the Ghana Police Act (Act 350) of 1970. The Constitution mandates the Police Service to perform this function in collaboration with other state agencies, including the military, Fire Service, Prison Service, Bureau of National Investigation, Immigration Service, Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, as well as with the citizenry. However, from the results of the study, it appears most respondents are ignorant with regard to the role these agencies play. According to the results of the surveys, it emerged that most respondents see the Ghana Police Service as the sole entity responsible for maintaining internal security, although a few alluded to the complementary role being played by the courts, the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process, and the local government authorities, in particular, Assembly persons and some unit committee members.

This chapter, using the knowledge and perceptions of the respondents, analysed the current Police Service operational structure and human capacity. In addition, it examines the respondents' perceptions of the role of the identified agencies in the quest for urban safety and liveability. The chapter first examines the performance of the current police structure and capacity in terms of its human resources. The data used for the analysis were sourced mainly from the Police Service, especially from the Crime Statistics Unit at the police headquarters. Thereafter, the chapter examines the

respondents' perceptions of the activities of the police, the judiciary system, ADR, and local government authorities who assist in maintaining peace and security.

4.2 Maintaining internal security: The role of the Ghana Police Service

The operational structure of the Ghana Police Service dates back to the colonial era. As noted by Atuguba (2007), the service has undergone various social transformations, manifesting in the form of human right abuses and gross oppression in the colonial era, through to the postcolonial military regimes, and to the current situation where attempts are being made to maintain peace and security under the country's democratic dispensation. Despite the changing nature of the Police Service, the administrative structure of command remains intact.

The vertical structure of the Ghana Police Service has the Inspector General of Police (IGP) as the head, stationed at the national headquarters in Accra. As noted by Boyuo (2012), the vertical command structure is made up of the commissioners and deputy commissioners, and below them the other ranks of the service.

Administratively, the police operational organogram can be described as a largely vertically structured. At the top is the national headquarters in Accra, immediately followed by 11 regional headquarters across the ten political regional capitals, including Tema and its environs as a region within the police operational command (SITU, 2014). Next, below these, are a total of 55 divisional headquarters, distributed within the 11 regions. Further descending through the hierarchy, there are a total of 208 district headquarters distributed within the 55 divisions nationwide, and then 769 police stations/posts sited within the 208 district headquarters. It was observed that the demarcations of the police administrative structure do not necessarily stay in line with

the political demarcation of the country, which, in some cases, runs parallel to the jurisdictions of traditional rulers, given the social construction of boundaries.

This study revealed that the social construction of boundaries, the political demarcations, and the jurisdictions of the police administrative structure appear operationally disjointed. The disconnections limit access to services, especially security services, within the already sprawling urban space, and this limited access to policing services is compounded by access issues within the informal settlement areas. Hence, in a KII with an opinion leader in Kumasi, the interviewee stated that, because of the illegality surrounding informal settlements, seeking the services of the police becomes an indirect way of reporting oneself to the police. As the interviewee stated:

We avoid the police as much as possible. Even if one is a victim of crime, we do not involve the police but make attempts to solve things among ourselves. (Personal interview with 54-year-old man, opinion leader, Ahodwo, 04/12/2016)

Some scholars confirm the increasing spatial spread of settlements within urban Ghana and the associated weak governance structures, as well as the population spillover beyond political boundaries and then the consequences of inadequate access to urban services (GOG, 2012; Oteng-Ababio & Melara, 2014). This situation is further worrying because, according to ISSER (2009), population spillover from large cities is not captured in census data for the urban areas in which settlers depend on services, despite the significant role of population numbers in spatial planning. Notably, in siting police stations and posts, the density of commercial and economic activities as well as of the immediate population plays an important role. This, therefore, means that in the absence of accurate data on population, on economic activities, and on clear political

demarcations, among other factors, access to policing services will continue to be a challenge.

The police stations and posts represent the police at the community level, and the distribution of the police personnel and stations/posts is partly determined by the population density and the level of activities. It is therefore a foregone conclusion that denser areas and high-activity regions require more policing services than the reverse; in confirmation, Boyuo (2012) noted that urban areas are more likely to have more police stations/posts than rural areas.

4.2.1 Analysis of the police human capacity

The heterogeneity of many urban communities makes it necessary for the establishment of an independent formal institution for the maintenance of internal security. On the contrary, in a simple traditional society particularly in the era of pre-industrial or precolonial cities internal security was maintained by the ethnic-based traditional leaders and kinships. Complex socio-economic dynamics within the cities of the twentieth century necessitates the formation and strengthening of an impartial and non-ethnic-based institutions to instigate and maintain peace and security within the urban space. As previously noted, the 1992 Constitution of Ghana established the Ghana Police Service, which is mandated to lead in the provision of such adequate and non-discriminatory security services within the territories of Ghana.

The police therefore expected to constantly take cognisance of the security situations of each immediate environment in the provision of community level security and success is defined by the number of reported cases (Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2003; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). Principally, following skill training and periodic in-service training, specific number of police officers are given the responsibility to render security services to

particular geographical locations in fulfilment of the constitutional mandate and ethical code. Using secondary data, this section provides findings on the analysis of the police–civilian population in Ghana from 1947 to 2017.

Table 4.1 shows recent police–civilian population ratio nationwide as an entry point to evaluating the ratios within the research locations. An over view of the data indicates an overall increase in the number of police personal as well as the civilian population in the country over the period. Specifically, the available data shows a police–civilian population ratio of 1: 1,485 in 1947, the worst ratio ever recorded in the history of Ghana, but the ratio improved to 1: 438 in the year 1971, the best ratio ever recorded in Ghana. The ratio however dropped to 1: 1,283 in the year 2001. There was some improvement between 2001 and 2014 (1:926), but this is insufficient progress. Nevertheless, further modest improvement in the police-civilian population ratio (1: 848) has been reported by Tandoh (2017) during the inauguration of the Ghana Police Command Centre in Accra. The data therefore indicates that, except for the year 1971 (1:438), the numerical strength of the Ghana Police Service has never met the UN-recommended ratio of 1:500. Thus, the service currently provides internal security with a deficit of 23,000 personnel since it is expected to provide adequate policing services to the population of about twenty-eight million (Table, 4.1). In other words, about 46 percent of the total population of Ghana is not policed.

Table 4.1: Trends in Ghana’s national population and police–population ratio (1947–2014)

Year	Population of Ghana (million)	Current police strength	Expected police strength	Police/population ratio
1947	4.01	2,700	8,020	1:1,485
1952	4.06	3,480	8,120	1:1166
1957	6.00	6,000	12,000	1:1000
1971	8.50	19,410	17,000	1:438
1992	16.00	15,484	32,000	1:1,033
1999	18.50	16,212	37,000	1:1,141
2001	18.50	14,412	37,000	1:1,283
2014	27.00	29,155	54,000	1:926
2017	28.00	33,000	56,000	1:848

Source: Adapted from Aning, (2006); SITU, (2014); and Tandoh, (2017)

At the regional levels, the Ashanti and Northern Regions, in which lie the research locations of this study—Kumasi Metropolitan Area (KMA) and Tamale Metropolitan Area (TMA)—require analysis. This will help provide a focus and comprehensive understanding of the two metropolitan areas as far as the maintenance of internal security by the police is concerned. Examining secondary data from the Ghana Police Service, the study found that, in accordance with the structure of the police command, the Ashanti Region is manned by one regional headquarters, which coordinates the operations of a total of 14 divisional and 34 district police stations. This structure of command accommodates a total of 3,938 police personnel (SITU, 2014) to police the

regional population of 4,780,380 (GSS, 2013). From this data, the police–civilian population ratio at the regional level is 1: 1,214—which implies that, all things being equal, one police officer is expected to provide security to 1,214 civilian population at a time. This situation is considerably worse (143%) than the UN-recommended standard of 1:500 police–civilian population ratio. Put differently, about 59 percent of the Ashanti regional population is not policed by the Ghana Police Service (Table 4.2). The proportion of the population not policed (59%) in the Ashanti Region is worse than the national overall proportion of population not policed (46%) in the year 2014, but somewhat better than the proportion of population not policed (70%) in the Northern Region as a whole.

Table 4.2: Proportions of Ashanti and Northern Regional populations not policed as at 2014

Region	Total population	Police population	Proportion not policed (%)
Ghana	27,000,000*	29,155	46
Ashanti	4,780,380**	3,938	59
Northern	2,479,461**	1,482	70

Note: * 2014 national population; **2010 regional population
Source: SITU, 2014

In the Northern regional command, there are two divisional stations at Tamale and Yendi under the regional headquarters in Tamale, and 15 district police stations across the region as at 2014 (SITU, 2014). With the Northern regional population of 2,479,461, following the 2010 population and housing census (GSS, 2013), the current police strength stands at 1,482 personnel (SITU, 2014). These populations translate to a

police–civilian population ratio of 1:1,673—a condition about 335 percent times worse than the UN-recommended standard of 1:500 police–civilian population ratio.

Narrowing down to the research locations, KMA has a total of four divisions and eight districts stations in charge of a total population of 2,035,064 (GSS, 2013). As indicated in Table 4.3, with a population of 2,035,064 and current police personnel strength of 1,238, the KMA has a police–civilian population ratio of 1:1,644, which translates into about 329 percent worse than the UN-recommended standard of 1:500 police–civilian population ratio. In other words, with a recorded deficit in police strength of 2,832 as at 2014, 70 percent of the total population of KMA is marginalized from the services of the police within the metropolitan area. Also worrying is that, aside from the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood, the absence of police stations in the lower- and upper-class socio-economic neighbourhoods of Aboabo-Kumasi and Ahodwo, respectively, is obvious.

Table 4.3: Police–civilian population ratio of research locations

City	POP'2010	Current police strength	Expected police strength	Deficit in police strength	Police – population ratio	population not policed (%)
Ghana	27,000,000*	29,155	54,000	25,000	1:926	46
Accra	2,070,463	3,096	4,141	1,045	1:669	25
Kumasi	2,035,064	1,238	4,070	2,832	1:1,644	70
Tamale	371,299	235	743	508	1:1,580	68

Note: * 2014 national population; UN recommended police–population ratio is 1:500
Source: SITU, 2014

Similar to the situation in the KMA, the TMA is host to the regional headquarters and the metropolitan police station. There are two police posts located at Lamashigu and Sakasaka, concurrently marking the main entry/exit of the CBD of the city and along the Accra–Pagaa road, respectively. There is however, no police station located in the middle- and lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods even though these locations host a highly heterogeneous and considerable proportion of the total population in the city. In explaining the social disorganisation theory, Shaw and McKay (1942) demonstrated that such population features breed criminal activities and crime concealment. In other words, there is an unbalanced distribution with the current siting of the police stations in the city notwithstanding the deficit (508 personnel) in the police numerical strength (Table 4.3). By implication, the deficit means that about 68 percent of the total population in the Tamale Metropolitan Area is not policed. Despite the grossly inadequate police–civilian population ratio, there are other state agencies—such as the military, Prison Service, Immigration Service, and Bureau of National Investigation—that support in the provision and maintenance of internal security; but, as stated earlier, respondents demonstrated limited knowledge of the role of these other state agencies in maintaining internal security. Nevertheless, respondents’ perceptions of the other agencies, such as the judiciary system, ADR process, and local government representatives, were assessed.

4.3 Gauging stakeholders’ perspectives on agencies’ performance

Discussions in this section are centred on respondents’ perceptions of the performance of the police, the judiciary system, ADR process, and local government representatives (Assembly persons and unit committee members) in their contributions to maintaining peace and security in neighbourhoods. Respondents’ perception of these agencies were

assessed based on four themes derived from the KIIs and FGDs conducted prior to the quantitative survey. These themes included the following: the agencies’ commitment to fighting crime, public trust in the agencies, whether the agencies treat all citizens equally, and whether the agencies are corrupt. In addition, the respondents’ lived experiences and narratives, extracted from the transcriptions of the KIIs and the FGDs, were used to support counts of the perceptions expressed in percentages.

4.3.1 Stakeholders’ perception of the performance of the Ghana Police Service

During the survey, the respondents were asked to assess the performance of the Police Service in their pursuit of maintaining law and order in the country. The analysis of the responses is captured in the form of their perceptions as presented in Table 4.4. The results from both research locations make for interesting reading. The majority in Kumasi (53%) and in Tamale (62%) agree that the police are committed to fighting crime. With respect to trust in the police, respondents appear undecided, as the magnitude of the proportions are very close.

Table 4.4: Stakeholders’ perceptions of the performance of the Ghana Police Service

Variable	Study locations					
	Kumasi			Tamale		
	Agree	Disagree	Don’t know	Agree	Disagree	Don’t know
Committed	52.7	34.4	13.0	62.4	12.0	25.6
Trust	43.2	41.2	15.6	44.0	15.1	40.9
Corrupt	32.0	47.3	20.7	58.4	26.4	15.1
Equality	56.0	18.0	26.0	36.0	56.2	7.8

Note: Committed = agencies’ commitment to fighting crime; Trust = public trust in the agency; Corrupt = whether the agency is corrupt; Equality = whether the agency treat all citizens equally

Source: Household survey, 2014

On the other hand, respondents' views on whether the police are corrupt are different: while 47 percent of the respondents in Kumasi disagree that the police are corrupt, the majority (58%) in Tamale agree that the police are corrupt. Moreover, concerning respondents' perceptions of whether the police treat all citizens equally in the line of duty, it was found that the majority (56%) in Kumasi agree but an equal proportion (56%) in the city of Tamale disagree.

It can be said from the results that respondents in Kumasi have a positive perception of the police, since they perceive the police to be committed (53%), not corrupt (47%), and treating citizens equally (56%)—but respondents appear ambivalent on their perception of the police as trustworthy. However, the general perception of the police in Tamale, as evidenced in Table 4.4, appears more on the negative side because, aside from respondents' positive view on police commitment (62%) to work, 58 percent agree that the police are corrupt, 56 percent indicate the police do not treat citizens equally, and their perception on trust seems undecided. The difference in perception of the police between the two cities can be attributed to the differences in the social and cultural dynamics. Whereas Kumasi is more homogenous and supported by a revered monarch in maintaining internal security, Tamale is a calm but polarized society associated with religious, chieftaincy, and political factions, whose encounters with the police are generally not troublesome. Thus, Tamale has more police deployment per head of population than Kumasi (Table 4.3). Further assessment of these agencies at the neighbourhood level was informative.

At the neighbourhood level, cross-tabulation was performed to assess stakeholders' perception of the police according to place of residence. As shown in Table 4.5, the majority (75%) who perceive that the police are committed to work are residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi, while in Tamale the majority

(67%) with a similar perception are residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood. With respect to trust, the majority, representing 70 percent and 57 percent, are residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi and Tamale, respectively. In the case of corruption, almost equal proportions across the neighbourhoods who form the majority in each neighbourhood, agree the police are corrupt in Kumasi; similar perceptions were expressed in the case of Tamale. In terms of the police exhibiting equality to all citizens in the quest to maintain internal security, the majority who disagree that the police treat citizens equally, representing 48 percent and 61 percent, reside in the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods of Kumasi and Tamale, respectively.

Table 4.5: Stakeholders' perceptions of the performance of the police at the neighbourhood level

Variable	Options	Study locations					
		Kumasi (%)			Tamale (%)		
		Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High
Committed	Agree	50.8	51.2	75.0	66.5	63.2	42.2
	Disagree	35.6	35.5	18.3	11.5	11.7	15.6
	Don't know	13.6	13.3	6.7	22.0	25.1	42.2
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Trust	Agree	40.3	41.9	70.0	39.6	45.3	55.6
	Disagree	42.8	42.6	21.7	17.6	13.9	11.1
	Don't know	16.9	15.5	8.3	42.9	40.8	33.3
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Corruption	Agree	56.4	55.7	56.7	61.0	55.6	62.2
	Disagree	17.5	17.0	28.3	22.5	30.0	24.4
	Don't know	26.1	27.3	15.0	16.5	14.3	13.3
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Equality	Agree	33.9	29.0	43.3	30.8	38.6	44.4
	Disagree	48.3	47.5	40.0	61.0	53.8	48.9
	Don't know	17.8	23.4	16.7	8.2	7.6	6.7
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household survey, 2014

4.3.2 Stakeholders' perception of the performance of the judiciary system in Ghana

This section presents the results on stakeholders' perception on the ability of the judiciary to contribute to maintaining internal security in urban Ghana. With reference to Table 4.6, whereas 27 percent of the respondents in Kumasi disagree that the

judiciary is committed to maintaining security, 42 percent similarly disagree in the case of Tamale. However, some noticeable proportions—49 percent and 45 percent for Kumasi and Tamale, respectively—do not know if the judiciary are committed to doing their work. This was supported by a key informant in Aboabo-Kumasi:

A number of cases do not go to the courts because of interventions from family heads, religious leaders, the Assembly man, and other community leaders—who often plead with victims of crime to withdraw cases in order to have them addressed at home. Sometimes it is good for the victim because of the discomfort associated with follow-ups in the courts in an era when one has to work hard to make ends meet. (Personal interview with 63-year-old man, opinion leader, 21/11/2016)

Table 4.6: Stakeholders’ perceptions of the performance of the judiciary system in Ghana

Variable	Study locations					
	Kumasi			Tamale		
	Agree	Disagree	Don’t know	Agree	Disagree	Don’t know
Committed	23.5	27.3	49.2	13.3	41.6	45.1
Trust	12.7	38.0	49.4	30.0	27.6	42.4
Corrupt	32.5	13.3	54.1	35.6	16.9	47.6
Equally	18.4	32.4	49.2	26.9	32.2	40.9

Source: Household survey, 2014

Furthermore, perceptions on trust of the judiciary were different with respect to the two cities. Whereas 38 percent of the residents in Kumasi disagree that the judiciary can be trusted, 30 percent of the respondents in Tamale agree that the judiciary system can be trusted. Again, 49 percent and 42 percent of stakeholders in Kumasi and Tamale, respectively, do not know whether the judiciary can be trusted. This is similar to

findings by Crook (2005), who noted that a large segment of Ghanaians are ignorant of how the judiciary system works.

Regarding respondents' perceptions on whether the judiciary system is corrupt, the majority (54%) in Kumasi do not know, and an equally noticeable proportion of 48 percent of respondents in Tamale do not know if the judiciary is corrupt. This large display of ignorance by the respondents could be explained by a view expressed by an opinion leader in Oforikrom:

It is difficult to prove an issue of bribery and corruption—and most importantly, the one who gives and the one who takes are found culpable of the crime if exposed. So it will be difficult to find an outstanding decision on the status of corruption of the judges, despite recent media reports of corruption in the judiciary. (Personal interview with 49-year-old man, youth leader, Oforikrom, 23/11/2016)

As shown in Table 4.6, while 49 percent of the respondents in Kumasi do not know if the judiciary treat all citizens equally, 41 percent of the respondents expressed the same opinion in Tamale.

At the neighbourhood level (Table 4.7), the majority (55%) of the residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi disagree that the judiciary is committed to maintaining security, while 47 percent of the residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale disagree that the judiciary are committed to their work. Also worth noting is the result that indicates that more than half of the residents in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in each of the cities do not know whether or not the judiciary is committed to its work. With respect to trust in the judiciary, 45 percent from the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood agree that the judiciary can be trusted—while in a similar neighbourhood in Tamale, 40 percent

agree that the judiciary can be trusted. Again, the majority (53%) who reside in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi do not know if the judiciary can be trusted, unlike the 47 percent in a similar neighbourhood in Tamale who have the same perception of the judiciary. In the case of corruption, the majority, 58 percent and 51 percent, of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhoods of Kumasi and Tamale, respectively, do not know whether or not the judiciary is corrupt. In terms of stakeholders' perception of the ability of the judiciary to treat all citizens equally, residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhoods in Kumasi and Tamale—representing 37 percent and 40 percent, respectively—agreed.

In an interview with an opinion leader, he gave a historical explanation of why Ghanaians may not want to deal with the judiciary and therefore a reason for the large proportions of ignorance:

The history of courts in Ghana makes the formal or state court system appear unfriendly. Reflecting on the community tribunals, which are now transformed into district or magistrate courts at the community level or the first-instance courts, the role the tribunal courts played in respect to human rights abuses during the military regime is still a thorn in the image of the courts in Ghana, and that makes people uncomfortable dealing with the courts. (Personal interview with 65-year-old man, opinion leader, Ahodwo, 16/11/2016)

In assessing respondents' perceptions of corruption in the judiciary, the results from the study show that, even though the largest percentages still indicate that they do not know if the judiciary is corrupt or not (Table 4.7), equal proportions of 17 percent in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in both cities agree that the judiciary system is corrupt. In an FGD in Zogbeli, a discussant provided a narrative of his encounter with the judiciary system and how people get their way through bribery:

The conditions of service of the judiciary are not good, considering the value of some cases they handle; so in order get the best of the judges using a fairly structured system, one may have to give out 'something' to attract their maximum efforts engaging the processes of the courts. (FGD, Zogbeli, 18/01/2017)

In assessing respondents' perception of whether the judiciary treat citizens equally, the results show that 33.3 percent of the residents in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi disagree; but in Tamale, almost equal proportions (23.3% and 30.0%) of the residents agree and disagree, respectively.

Table 4.7: Stakeholders' perceptions of the performance of the judiciary system at the neighbourhood level

Variable	Options	Study locations					
		Kumasi (%)			Tamale (%)		
		Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High
Committed	Agree	17.5	9.2	10.0	15.4	11.7	13.3
	Disagree	35.3	37.8	55.0	44.5	38.1	46.7
	Don't know	47.2	52.0	35.0	40.1	50.2	40.0
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Trust	Agree	24.4	20.0	45.0	29.1	28.7	40.0
	Disagree	28.6	26.7	25.0	32.4	24.2	24.4
	Don't know	46.9	53.3	30.0	38.5	47.1	35.6
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Corruption	Agree	32.5	31.4	41.7	41.2	30.5	37.8
	Disagree	16.4	11.0	13.3	14.3	18.8	17.8
	Don't know	51.1	57.6	54.1	44.5	50.7	44.4
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Equality	Agree	22.8	12.7	36.7	28.0	23.3	40.0
	Disagree	31.7	33.3	30.0	34.6	30.0	33.3
	Don't know	45.6	54.0	33.3	37.4	46.6	26.7
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household survey, 2014

4.3.3 Stakeholders' perceptions of the performance of the ADR process in Ghana

The ADR process in Ghana is promulgated by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2010 (Act 798), which gives an opportunity to an independent person to settle disputes between parties that acknowledge traditional methods for resolving disputes. These

independent authorities or people include traditional authorities, religious leaders, and kinsmen. Using the themes described earlier, respondents were asked to assess how well these authorities contribute to maintaining peace and security. As shown in Table 4.8, the majority in Kumasi, assessing the four themes, do not know the functions of the ADR process. For instance, 63 percent of the respondents indicate that they do not know whether the ADR process is committed to fighting crime; in Tamale the majority (66%) agree that the ADR process is committed to fighting crime. The differences occur partly because of reverence paid to the Ashantihene and other chiefs within the region. People generally feel uncomfortable assessing the performance of the chief, and that may account for the high proportion of the respondents claiming ignorance about the ADR process in Kumasi. In the case of Tamale, the existence of factions—be they political, chieftaincy, or religious, as noted in the work of Oteng-Ababio et al. (2016)—make the leaders of such groups instrumental in the settlement of disputes among members; but the police or the courts become the popular choice if disputes involve people of different groups as concluded in the FGD in Aboabo-Tamale.

Table 4.8: Stakeholders’ perceptions of the performance of the ADR process in Kumasi and Tamale metropolises

Variable	Study locations					
	Kumasi			Tamale		
	Agree	Disagree	Don’t know	Agree	Disagree	Don’t know
Committed	31.1	5.6	63.3	65.8	8.2	26.0
Trust	30.4	6.7	62.9	58.0	14.4	27.6
Corrupt	9.4	24.3	66.3	24.4	43.3	32.2
Equally	26.8	9.3	64.0	54.9	17.6	27.6

Source: Household survey, 2014

The successes of the ADR process in solving disputes within groups can be found in the work of Grande (1999). In the case of Tamale, the majority agree that the ADR process is a committed one (66%), can be trusted (58%), and treats all citizens equally (55%); and a large proportion (43%) disagree that the process is corrupt. In agreeing about the generally creditable performance of the ADR process as one means of resolving criminal issues, a key informant in the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale stated:

The ADR is more people-centred and systematically irons out the pain in the victim—and, more importantly, allows the victim to appreciate the regret of the perpetrator. It also gives the perpetrator the opportunity to accept the fault, apologize, and compensate the loss to the victim, supported by the entire community. (Personal interview with 56-year-old female, opinion leader, Russian Bungalow, 25/02/2017)

With regard to whether the ADR process is corrupt, in the case of Kumasi, even though 66 percent do not know whether ADR is corrupt or not, 24 percent of the total respondents in Kumasi disagree that the ADR process is corrupt. In Tamale, the highest proportion (43%) disagree that the ADR process is corrupt. This is in line with discussants in an FGD in the Aboabo-Tamale, where there was a general consensus, expressed by one discussant:

ADR is a plausible means to resolving criminal issues because it encourages direct participation by the parties involved, and that gives the parties the opportunities to express themselves in the context of the offence—not through a third party, who might not have a full view of the problem and also may invite corruption. So, in the absence of the third party, I think the process is not corrupt. (Personal interview with 36-year-old man, youth leader, Aboabo-Tamale, 19/02/2017)

This finding is consistent with Torell's (1994) view that the full participation of all parties within a suitable environment creates satisfaction and trust in the process.

At the neighbourhood level, while 51 percent of the respondents who reside in the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi agree that the ADR process is committed to resolving criminal offences, 70 percent of the respondents who agree that ADR is a committed process to resolving criminal offences are residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale.

Table 4.9: Stakeholders' perceptions of the performance of the ADR process, according to neighbourhood status

Variable	Options	Study locations					
		Kumasi (%)			Tamale (%)		
		Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High
Committed	Agree	51.4	15.5	30.0	64.8	70.4	46.7
	Disagree	6.4	5.2	5.0	7.7	8.5	8.9
	Don't know	42.2	79.4	65.0	27.5	21.1	44.4
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Trust	Agree	50.0	15.9	25.0	61.0	59.2	40.0
	Disagree	8.1	5.2	10.0	11.5	17.0	13.3
	Don't know	41.9	78.9	65.0	27.5	23.8	46.7
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Corruption	Agree	11.9	6.7	15.0	23.1	25.6	24.4
	Disagree	40.6	12.5	18.3	45.6	46.2	20.0
	Don't know	47.5	80.9	66.7	31.3	28.3	55.6
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Equality	Agree	41.9	15.3	25.0	57.1	56.1	40.0
	Disagree	14.4	5.2	10.0	15.4	20.2	13.3
	Don't know	43.6	79.6	65.0	27.5	23.8	46.7
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household survey, 2014

In terms of trust, 50 percent of the residents in the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi agree that the ADR process can be trusted. Similarly, the majority (61%) who reside in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale agree that the ADR process can be trusted. This is in line with an opinion

expressed by a female resident of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale in an interview:

I trust the ADR, especially in situations where the perpetrator is a member of the community—because it truly leads to character reformation of the perpetrator, as the community’s knowledge of the ill-behaviour puts shame in the perpetrator, who may never repeat the act. (Personal interview with 38-year-old female, trader, Aboabo-Tamale, 16/02/2017)

The trust and confidence in the commitment of the ADR process to addressing criminal issues is dependent on its reliance on locally based knowledge, as noted by Grande (1999). The ADR process therefore appears to be successful in the city of Tamale since groupings formed along political, chieftaincy, and religious lines, as reported by Oteng-Ababio et al. (2016), have considerable respect for their group leaders who also act as mediators during ADR. Consequently, residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods in Kumasi and Tamale, representing 41 percent and 46 percent, respectively, disagree that the ADR process is corrupt.

In assessing whether the ADR process treats citizens equally, the results show that 42 percent of the residents in the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi agree that the ADR process treats citizens equally. In Tamale, an almost equal proportion of the residents of both the lower- and middle-class socio-economic neighbourhoods agree that the ADR process treats all citizens equally in its quest to maintain peace and security.

4.3.4 Stakeholders' perceptions of the performance of the local government representative

Local government representatives in this study include the Assembly persons and members of the unit committee. This section presents the results on stakeholders' perceptions of the role of the local government representative in maintaining peace and security within localities. In gauging respondents' perception on the commitment of the local government authorities, an almost equal proportion for the cities of Kumasi (56%) and Tamale (57%) agree that local government representatives are committed to fighting crime (Table 4.10).

Table 4.10: Stakeholders' perceptions of the performance of local government representatives

Variable	Study locations					
	Kumasi			Tamale		
	Agree	Disagree	Don't know	Agree	Disagree	Don't know
Committed	56.2	28.8	15.0	56.6	27.6	16
Trust	49.9	35.4	14.7	51.3	32.7	16.0
Corrupt	29.0	39.7	31.3	30.0	42.2	27.8
Equally	43.8	36.7	19.4	46.9	36.7	16.4

Source: Household survey, 2014

In a similar fashion, 50 percent of the respondents in Kumasi and 51 percent in Tamale all agree that the local government representative can be trusted in the resolution of criminal offences. On the issue of corruption, the largest proportions from Kumasi

(40%) and Tamale (42%) disagree that local authorities are corrupt. This reaffirms the confidence respondents have in the ability of the local government authorities to maintain internal security. In addition, almost equal proportions of 44 percent and 47 percent for the cities of Kumasi and Tamale, respectively, agree that the local government authorities treat citizens equally. The role of local government representatives therefore appears to be critical in efforts to maintain peace and security within neighbourhoods, since residents have considerable trust and confidence in the Assembly person and the unit committee members.

At the neighbourhood level, the majority (73%) of the residents in upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi agree that the local government representatives are committed to fighting crime, whereas in Tamale the majority (63%) who reside in the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood agree that these authorities are committed to fighting crime in their neighbourhoods (Table 4.11). In terms of trust, in Kumasi the majority (68%) who reside in the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood agree that the local government representatives can be trusted in their efforts to provide internal security.

In the case of Tamale, the majority (57%) who are residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood agree that the local government representative can be trusted in their work. Thus, while the highest proportion of trust in the local representatives is from the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Kumasi, in Tamale the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood demonstrates more trust in the local government representatives compared with the other neighbourhoods.

In assessing the local government representatives as to whether or not they engage in corrupt practices, 58 percent of the residents of the upper-class socio-economic

neighbourhood in Kumasi disagree that the representatives are corrupt. In contrast, 50 percent of the residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale disagree that the representatives are corrupt. In regard to the role of the local government representatives' ability to treat all citizens equally, the results show that 68 percent of the residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood agree that the representatives treat people equally. In Tamale, the majority (53%) who agree that the representatives treat people equally are residents of the lower-class socio-economic area. In testifying to the instrumental role of local government representatives in the fight against crime, an opinion leader in Aboabo-Kumasi said:

Any time responsible members of this community make an arrest of a suspected criminal, they bring the offender to me and I am compelled to lead them to the police station to avoid the likelihood of the group lynching the suspect—because of the limited public trust in the police. So my presence not only saves the life of the suspect but initiates the process of letting the law take its course. (Personal interview with 63-year-old man, Assembly man, Aboabo, Kumasi)

Table 4.11: Stakeholders' perceptions of the performance of local government representatives, by neighbourhood

Variable	Options	Study locations (LG)					
		Kumasi (%)			Tamale (%)		
		Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High
Committed	Agree	51.4	57.6	73.3	62.6	55.2	37.8
	Disagree	35.3	27.1	3.3	25.8	29.8	24.4
	Don't know	13.3	15.3	23.3	11.5	15.2	37.8
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Trust	Agree	43.6	52.5	68.3	57.1	49.3	37.8
	Disagree	43.3	32.7	8.3	31.9	35.9	20.0
	Don't know	13.1	14.8	23.3	11.0	14.8	42.2
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Corruption	Agree	36.7	24.7	16.7	26.9	33.2	26.7
	Disagree	32.8	42.8	56.7	50.0	39.5	24.4
	Don't know	30.6	32.5	26.7	23.1	27.4	48.9
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Equality	Agree	39.4	44.1	68.3	53.3	44.8	31.1
	Disagree	41.4	36.6	10.0	35.2	40.4	24.4
	Don't know	19.2	19.4	21.7	11.5	14.8	44.4
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household survey, 2014

4.4 Chapter summary

The Ghana Police Service is the lead agency in the provision of internal security, as mandated by the 1992 Constitution (Article 200) and the Police Service Act (Act 350) of 1970. With the continuous increase in the population of Ghana, however, the police–

civilian population ratio has not met the UN-recommended standard of a 1:500 ratio, even though the current ratio (1:848) is certainly an improvement over the last two decades. It is notable that public perceptions of the complementary role of other state agencies—such as the military, Fire Service, Prison Service, Bureau of National Investigation, Immigration Service, Customs, Exercise and Preventive Service—are limited. However, the populace did demonstrate considerable understanding of the role of the judiciary system and ADR processes, as well as of local government representatives, in maintaining internal peace and security. Differences in the socio-cultural, economic, and political settings between the two cities appear to inform respondents' perceptions of the contributions of these agencies to providing safe and liveable urban environments. The present institutional arrangements for the maintenance of internal security remarkably ignores the contributions of informal strategies in maintaining peace and security within neighbourhoods. Nevertheless, the study further examined participants' perception of neighbourhood safety in the next chapter.

CHAPTER FIVE: PERCEPTION OF SAFETY IN URBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS IN GHANA

5.1 Introduction

Having established in the previous chapter stakeholders' perceptions of the role of the Police Service and other supporting agencies in maintaining internal security, this chapter delves into unpacking respondents' assessment of the level of safety within their neighbourhoods. The chapter specifically examines how individual- and neighbourhood-level characteristics explain respondents' perceptions of safety within different socio-economic residential areas in Kumasi and Tamale Metropolitan Areas.

5.2 Gauging urban safety from the respondents' perspective

In assessing the public perception of safety in the two cities, respondents were asked, during the quantitative survey, to indicate how safe they currently felt in their communities. Based on the quantitative data analysis, it was found that the majority (79%) of the respondents in the two cities perceive their communities as safe. This confirms the Global Peace Index (GPI) report, which ranked Ghana and Sierra Leone as the most peaceful countries in the sub-region (GPI, 2017). It also agreed with Chazan's (1982) assertion that the diligence in maintaining the balance between ethnic divisions and politics in Ghana has contributed significantly to building and maintaining peace in the country. A follow-up question was then posed during the qualitative data collection, on people's construction of safety in order to understand participants' narratives underlying the individual and neighbourhood level determinants of safety. The qualitative data revealed that individuals' construction of safety was influenced by social and physical environmental factors, as well as by sources of information on issues concerning crime and personal life safety.

In an interview session, a key informant emphasized the recent proliferation of mass media as an important element determining the level of safety people perceive. This is similar to findings by Rieckmann and Schanze (2015). Even though access to social media may be limited by illiteracy (GSS, 2014), the increasing number of other forms of mass media such as radio stations and television stations have become an effective source of information in the Ghanaian context. This was further supported by findings emanating from an interview with a key informant in Aboabo-Kumasi:

I get really disturbed whenever I turn on the radio, because of the increasing reports of crime all over the country; and even though I do not often see or witness crime scenes in my community, I get terrified because just as crime occurs somewhere else, it could just be in your community. (Personal interview with 54-year-old man, opinion leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 16/01/2017)

Similarly, in an FGD in Zogbeli among a group of seven men, it was collectively agreed that increasing quantities of and access to mass media, especially to radio and television stations and, in recent times, social media platforms, has contributed to increasing perceptions of safety issues, as was captured in the discussion:

I have received a couple of calls from friends and relatives, who do not reside in Tamale now, telling me about tension in Tamale; in fact, sometimes those of us in Tamale get the information on Tamale from outsiders, and this shows how far the media can spread information. (Personal interview with 35-year-old man, youth leader, Zogbeli, 22/02/2017)

This is supported by the publication by the National Communication Authority (NCA), revealing that licences were granted to 224 radio stations and close to 55 television stations in Ghana (NCA, 2010). The increasing use of social media is facilitated by

localization of the mass media content to enhance effective communication (Ugboajah, 1985), even though other scholars caution that localization of the mass media has the potential to compromise the standards of professional journalism (Kunczik, 1999).

Cognizant of the influences of mass media on perceptions of safety, this study further used quantitative data to estimate the broad levels of respondents' perceptions of safety in the research locations. Disaggregating the quantitative data into the community levels (Table 5.1), it was found that the majority (85%) of the residents of the upper-class neighbourhood in Kumasi perceive their neighbourhood as safe. In Tamale, the majority (91%) who perceive their neighbourhood as safe are residents of the middle-class residential area. The higher level of perception of safety in the upper-class socio-economic residential areas cannot be dissociated from the nature of the immediate built environment, where conscious efforts are made to 'design out' crime within the neighbourhood, as was reported in the findings of Owusu et al. (2016). These neighbourhoods not only have well laid-out plans, but in many cases are well protected by the use of CCTVs, fence walls, and private security, among other strategies.

Table 5.1: Perceptions of safety by socio-economic neighbourhood

Variable	Research locations					
	Kumasi (%)			Tamale (%)		
	Socio-economic neighbourhood			Socio-economic neighbourhood		
	Low	Middle	High	Low	Middle	High
Safe	75.8	63.7	85.0	80.8	90.6	69.6
Not safe	23.1	35.5	15.0	17.1	8.4	24.4
Neutral	1.1	0.9	0.0	2.1	1.0	6.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Household survey, 2014

In expressing an effort to ensure his personal safety, an opinion leader in the Ahodwo community stated:

I enhance my personal security by putting this fence wall [pointing to the wall] and the barbed wire, and this will make it difficult for a criminal to get into my compound. (Personal interview with 52-year-old man, opinion leader, Ahodwo, 12/12/2016)

This is in line with other scholarly findings that the incidence and fear of crime is commonly unequally distributed due to different neighbourhood characteristics (Mellgren, 2011; Landman, 2012)—and thus the perception of safety will vary (Peterson, 2006). Unlike many houses in the upper-class neighbourhoods, where the use of high fence walls has been an instrumental strategy to ward off crime, in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale, with a large proportion (91%) of residents' reporting perceptions of safety, the residents' perceptions are built on social capital and good neighbourliness. The study moreover found that good social cohesion is enhanced in the middle-class neighbourhood, because of the frequent interaction among members and supported by the large number of compound houses—a common housing style in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale.

5.3 Determinants of urban safety and liveability

Determinants of level of safety have been explained using demographic characteristics (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Newman, 1996; Sampson et al., 1997; Peterson, 2006), which leads to the proposition that crime is not evenly distributed. Hence, particular characteristics favour the commission of crime and the perception of safety, whereas other characteristics reduce the probability of crime even though the reduction largely applies to property crime. Table 5.2 shows the various demographic characteristics of

the respondents in the survey. They are broadly categorized into individual-level and neighbourhood-level characteristics, in order to facilitate a detailed examination of the different variables in people's perceptions of safety in Kumasi and Tamale.

These demographic variables appear very similar for the two study locations, despite the differences in the social, cultural, economic, and political dynamics between the two cities, as explained earlier. As in Table 5.2, the average age of respondents for the two cities is 41 years, which is consistent with the largest adult population cohort, 25–59, as reported in the 2010 national housing and population census (GSS, 2014). Also, the relatively long period of residence in a particular neighbourhood strengthens an individual's identity and is probably suggestive of some level of acceptance and affiliation with the community. Thus, one-unit increase in each of these composite variables (willingness to intervene and social cohesion) results in an increase in the odds of people willing to intervene in the course of crime and an increase in the odds of social cohesion among residents. Nonetheless, there are other noticeable demographic differences. For instance, whereas the majority (54%) of the respondents in Kumasi are female, in Tamale the majority (57%) of the respondents are male. This gave a fair balance of the gender ratio, given the male-dominant household headship in the Ghanaian context. Another interesting difference is respondents' perception of youth disorder as a problem or not within the neighbourhoods. While the majority (62%) in Kumasi indicated that youth disorder is a problem, in Tamale the majority (64%) percent of the total respondents indicated youth disorder was not a problem in their community. It would therefore be informative to investigate how these demographic differences and similarities pan out in the binary logistic regression that follows, after presenting an outline of the codes of the variables used in the regression.

Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of individual and neighbourhood characteristics

		Research locations	
		Kumasi (%)	Tamale (%)
Mean age		41*	41*
Mean length of residence		22*	23*
Mean willingness to intervene		9.7**	10.4**
Mean social cohesion		13.9**	12.8**
Gender	Male	41.4	54.3
	Female	58.6	45.7
Marital status	Married	59.9	68.4
	Not married	40.1	31.6
Mean consumption income	1–1500	96.9	85.1
	> 1502	3.1	14.9
Level of education	High school and below	92.5	77.4
	Above high school	7.5	22.6
Shared dwelling unit	Yes	87.1	89.8
	No	12.9	10.2
Street light	Yes	93.9	81.8
	No	6.1	18.2
Need police patrol	Yes	96.2	90.5
	No	3.8	9.5
Level of crime	High	55.1	61.3
	Low	44.9	38.7
Youth disorder	Problem	61.9	36.4
	Not a problem	38.1	63.6

Notes: * in years; ** no units

Source: Household survey, 2014

As indicated in Table 5.3, respondents' perception of neighbourhood safety, as the dependent variable, was dichotomized into 'Safe' or 'Unsafe', in order to satisfy the fundamental requirement of logistic regression as stipulated by Sarantakos (1998) and Pallant (2013). Using binary logistic regression as an analytical tool in SPSS, the dichotomized dependent variable was regressed on a mixture of continuous and

categorical independent variables, to determine how well each explained respondents' perception of safety. The dichotomized independent demographic variables include gender, marital status, consumption income per month, and level of maximum education—while the continuous variables include age and period of residence in the neighbourhood (Table 5.3). The independent neighbourhood-level variables were likewise dichotomized, and these include whether a respondent lives in a multiple households' dwelling unit, whether a respondent needs police patrols in the neighbourhood, the presence of street lights within the neighbourhood, level of crime, youth disorder, willingness of neighbours to intervene in the case of criminality, and social cohesion (see Appendix one).

Table 5.3: Codes of the dependent and independent variables

Variables	Codes	
	Reference categories	Non-reference categories
Dependent variable		
Neighbourhood safety	Safe = 1	Unsafe = 0
Independent variables		
Demographic characteristics		
Period of residence	Continuous variable	
Age	Continuous variable	
Gender	Male = 1	Female = 0
Marital status	Married = 1	Not married = 0
Consumption income	1,501 and above = 1	1-1,500 = 0 (Cedis)
Level of education	Above high school = 1	High school and below = 0
Shared dwelling unit	Yes = 1	No = 0
Neighbourhood conditions		
Street light	Yes = 1	No = 0
Police patrol	Yes = 1	No = 0
Level of crime	High = 1	Low = 0
Youth disorder	Problem = 1	Not a problem = 0
Willingness to intervene	Continuous variable	
Social cohesion	Continuous variable	
Neighbourhood socio-economic status		
	Lower	
Middle		
Upper		
	Middle	
Lower		
Upper		

Source: Household survey, 2014

5.3.1 Evaluation of the binary logistic regression model

As indicated earlier, binary logistic regression analysis was conducted to estimate respondents' perception of safety in each of the two cities. Each model was evaluated in order to determine its suitability to predict how a variation in the dichotomous outcome variable is predicted by the independent variables. The following evaluations were conducted before the regression analysis was done: collinearity diagnostic test, overall model test, and goodness-of-fit tests (Hosmer-Lemeshow test, Cox and Snell R Square, and Nakelkerke R Square).

The collinearity test was conducted to help identify possible multicollinearity among the independent variables. In the collinearity test, the values of Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) were used. The Tolerance indicates how much variability of one independent variable is not explained by the other independent variables in the same model (Pallant, 2013). According to Pallant (2013), a Tolerance value of less than 0.10 suggests high correlation between the specified variable and the other independent variables – a proxy of multicollinearity. However, the inverse of the Tolerance value is the VIF test value. Hence a VIF test value greater than 10 suggests multicollinearity (Pallant, 2013). In the case of data from Kumasi, the least Tolerance value recorded was 0.67 (VIF = 1.5), which suggests no obvious multicollinearity between the independent variables. However, there was considerably high correlation between the independent variables and the dependent variable with the least correlation coefficient of 0.71. Similarly, the least Tolerance value recorded in Tamale was 0.84 (VIF = 1.2) thus reducing the tendency of multicollinearity between the independent variables. Also the least correlation coefficient value of 0.78 was recorded between the dependent variable and the independent variables. These tests results suggest that the set of

independent variables (see Table 5.3) were worth regressing on the dichotomous dependent variable without violating the multicollinearity requirements.

After identifying the set of suitable independent variables, it was necessary to assess the suitability of the overall models. In determining the suitability of the overall model, the concept of a better fit model was drawn from Peng et al. (2002). According to Peng et al. (2002), “a logistic model is said to provide a better fit to the data if it demonstrates an improvement over the intercept-only model” (p. 5). The intercept-only model analysis is described as an analysis without the predictor variables in the model. Hence, in the intercept-only model, cases correctly classified gave an overall percentage of 51.3 and 58.4 percent for data from Kumasi and Tamale metropolitan areas respectively. This automated guess by SPSS indicates that the majority of the cases (Kumasi - 74.8% and Tamale - 80.3%) in each city perceived their neighbourhoods as safe. Comparatively, the classification test within the SPSS environment gives the opportunity to determine how well the model performs in correctly categorising each respondent’s perception of neighbourhood into safe or not safe when the independent variables are entered against the intercept-only model. The models, with the independent variables, correctly classified 65.1 percent and 78.3 percent of all cases in Kumasi and Tamale metropolises respectively. This reflects an improvement over the intercept-only model of 51.3 percent and 58.4 percent in the case of Kumasi and Tamale in that order. Similarly, the Omnibus test of model coefficients confirms the models as best fit for the analysis since the significant values in both cases were less than 0.05 (Kumasi: chi-square value = 73.4, df = 4, $p < 0.05$; Tamale: chi-square value = 69.2, df = 4, $p < 0.05$).

Further confirmatory test on how fit the model was for the analysis was done using the Hosmer and Lemeshow test. With a significant value of 0.30 and chi-square value of

13.4 using the data from Kumasi and significant value of 0.1 and chi-square value of 10.6 in the case of Tamale, it is suggestive that the models are worthwhile since the p-values, in both cases, are greater than 0.05 in accordance with Pallant (2013). Further examination of the usefulness of the models was conducted using the Cox and Snell R Square and the Nagelkerke R Square values as stipulated by Peng et al. (2002) and Pallant (2013). These R Square values referred to as “pseudo R square statistics” (Pallant, 2013: 167) indicate the variation of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. Data from the Kumasi metropolitan area gave the Cox and Snell R Square value of 0.22 and Nagelkerke R Square value of 0.29. This means that 22 percent to 29 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables. In a similar case, the data from Tamale indicate R Square values of 0.31 and 0.44 for the Cox and Snell, and Nagelkerke values respectively. This shows that between 31 percent and 44 percent of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable in Tamale. Satisfying these conditions paved the way for a detailed analysis on how the individual independent variables predict the outcome on the dichotomous dependent variable in the case of each city.

5.4 Urban safety and liveability: Insights from Kumasi

As shown in Table 5.4, three of the seven demographic variables attained statistical significance upon regressing with neighbourhood safety in Kumasi. The results show that by increasing the age of a respondent by one year, the odds of perceiving the city as safe is increased by 1.022 times. In percentage terms, as age increases by one year, a respondent has a 51 percent chance to perceive the neighbourhood as safe. This indicates that older people are more likely to perceive the neighbourhood as safer than younger people, consistent with findings from Kanan and Pruitt (2002) but contrary to

Pain (2000), the latter reporting that advance in age results in increased level of vulnerability and the perception of insecurity within a neighbourhood. Also consistent with the regression results of this study, discussants of an FGD in Oforikrom concluded that older people have established identity with the neighbourhood and that boosts self-confidence in safety. Thus knowledge of the immediate environment enhances the capacity of a guardian and the likelihood to increase the gap between the suitable target and the motivated offender, as postulated by Cohen and Felson (1979). This implies that self-construction of boundaries and familiarity with the immediate environment add up to the perception of safety. However, it cannot be ignored that the recent rapid rate of urbanization and congestion within the urban space in Ghana (WB, 2014) is increasingly making it difficult for residents to adequately adjust to the social and physical changes under way.

Furthermore, even though the majority (71%) of the total respondents (885) in Kumasi perceive their neighbourhoods as safe, there are some differences with respect to gender. As indicated in Table 5.4, males are 1.88 times more likely than females to perceive the neighbourhood as safe, and this difference is statistically significant as the p-value is less than 0.05. In probability terms, males are 65 percent more likely to perceive the neighbourhood as safe compared with females within their community. In a similar vein, Pain (2000) and Mirrless-Black et al. (1998) concluded in their separate studies that women generally entertain a greater sense of insecurity than men do. In an interview with a youth leader in Ahodwo, he explained that men are more likely to react or demonstrate some self-defence than women are in the event of crime, and this may be boosting self-confidence in men more than in women. In addition, an FGD in Aboabo-Kumasi with a group of seven women revealed that women prefer to engage in

precautionary actions rather than reactive measures. For instance, a 35-year-old resident said:

I do not wait to fight crime, but I take personal measures such as staying indoors at night and avoiding isolated places—since these are times and places where crime is likely to occur. So this makes me feel safe in the neighbourhood. (Personal interview with 35-year-old female, youth leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 23/02/2017)

This presupposes that people perceive a higher level of safety within familiar environments, even though Wrigley-Asante (2016) found that specific types of crime are successful among acquaintances. In further delineating how the immediate environment and acquaintances explain the perception of safety, the respondents were asked whether they share their dwelling with others. The regression results indicate that respondents who share a dwelling unit with other households are 1.87 times more likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safer than are households who do not share their dwelling unit with other households. In probability terms, respondents who share a dwelling unit with other households are 65 percent more likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe than those who do not share their dwelling unit with other households. In confirmation of the regression results, a female resident in Oforikrom stated:

We are five different households in this compound, and almost all day long someone will be within the compound—and that is a form of guarding the place. Members also demonstrate the willingness to assist whenever one of us is a victim of crime or to intervene to stop crime from occurring; and this makes me feel safe, especially in the compound. (Personal interview with 45-year-old female, opinion leader, Oforikrom, 24/02/2017)

This is in line with Baba and Austin's (1989) assertion that an individual's satisfaction with the environment influences the perception of safety. It is therefore clear that the relatively available support one can call upon within the immediate vicinity influences one's perception of safety.

In assessing surveillance within the communities, aside from the presence of street lights, all other variables were statistically significant, as shown in Table 5.4. In attempts to understand respondents' perception of the need for police patrols within the neighbourhoods in order to increase surveillance, respondents were asked this question: 'Do you feel the need for more police patrols/presence in your community?' It came to light that respondents who answered in the affirmative were 0.087 times less likely to say the city is safe. It is therefore the case that respondents who have a sense of insecurity feel the need for police patrols in their neighbourhood. In probability terms, respondents who indicated that they need more police patrols within their neighbourhood have 8 percent less chance of saying their neighbourhood is safe than respondents who perceive no need for more police patrols. Even though the literature reports doubts about the ability of the Ghana Police Service to secure the urban space because of limited capacity and alleged corruption within the service (Appiahene-Gyamfi, 2002; Tankebe, 2013), at least there is still some trust, within Kumasi, that the police can provide some security—and hence the need for the police patrols, as expressed by some respondents who feel unsafe in their neighbourhoods. This was also captured in an interview with a key informant in Ahodwo:

Even just a random or periodic movement by the police within the community can ward off crime, and not necessarily the major road patrols that we see them [police] do sometimes. (Personal interview with 65-year-old man, opinion leader, Ahodwo, 12/11/2016)

Table 5.4: Estimates of logistic regression of neighbourhood safety on demographic and neighbourhood conditions in Kumasi metropolis

Variables	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Demographic characteristics					
Period of residence	0.993	0.006	0.332	0.980	1.006
Age	1.023	0.007	0.004	1.007	1.038
Male	1.880	0.350	0.001	1.303	2.710
Married	0.822	0.157	0.306	0.564	1.197
Consumption income	0.968	0.529	0.953	0.331	2.828
Level of education	1.142	0.399	0.704	0.575	2.268
Shared dwelling unit	1.873	0.557	0.035	1.046	3.356
Neighbourhood conditions					
Street light	1.133	0.447	0.753	0.522	2.455
Police patrol	0.087	0.091	0.020	0.011	0.679
Level of crime	0.256	0.055	0.000	0.166	0.392
Youth disorder	1.831	0.419	0.008	1.168	2.868
Willingness to intervene	1.146	0.042	0.000	1.066	1.230
Social cohesion	0.88	0.032	0.000	0.819	0.945
Neighbourhood socio-economic status					
Reference category: Lower					
Middle	0.869	0.175	0.489	0.585	1.291
Upper	1.412	0.649	0.453	0.573	3.479
Reference category: Middle					
Lower	1.149	0.231	0.489	0.774	1.707
Upper	1.623	0.733	0.283	0.670	3.935
_cons	21.117	28.411	0.023	1.511	295.003

Observation = 885 R-squared = 0.22 Chi-squared = 73.4

Source: Household survey, 2014

Another critical factor that influences people's perception of safety is the level of crime (Baba & Austin, 1989). To investigate this factor, respondents were asked: 'In general, how do you rate the level of crime in your community?' The results show that respondents who perceive a high level of crime within their neighbourhoods were 0.256 less likely to perceive their neighbourhood to be a safe place to live than respondents who perceive a low level of crime—and this was statistically significant, with a p-value of less than 0.05. In probability terms, respondents who perceive a high level of crime within the neighbourhood were 20 percent less likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe. This is similar to the findings of Baba and

Austin (1989). Furthermore, respondents were asked if youth disruption around their neighbourhood was a problem—that is, if youth hanging around or truancy is a problem in the neighbourhood. Respondents who perceive youth disruption as a problem have 1.831 times the odds of perceiving their neighbourhoods as safe more than those who do not perceive youth disruption as a problem, and the difference was statistically significant as the p-value was less than 0.05. In probability terms, respondents who perceive youth disruption as a problem within the neighbourhood have 65 percent chance of perceiving the neighbourhood as safer than respondents who perceive youth disruption as not a problem within their neighbourhood. An interview with a religious leader in Aboabo-Kumasi revealed:

It is unfortunate that we have a number of our youth unemployed and therefore hanging around in the neighbourhood, but I can tell you that they watch over the community for any intrusion or the commission of crime. (Personal interview with 41-year-old man, opinion leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 14/11/2016)

This therefore suggests that the presence of youth all day long improves surveillance and, by extension, guardianship in the community. It also indicates that there is indeed a generally low rate of youth employment within the country, especially among youth in urban areas. These residents' perceptions of safety run contrary to the existing literature's position that high youth unemployment breeds insecurity within neighbourhoods (WB, 2014).

Furthermore, constructing a composite variable from a five-item Likert scale which measures respondents' willingness to intervene in youth deviant behaviour, it was found from the model that, if the willingness to intervene is increased by one unit, the odds of perceiving the city as safe is increased by 1.146 times. In other words, a unit increase in the willingness to intervene results in a 14.5 percent greater likelihood that a

respondent will perceive the city as a safe place to live. This finding confirms Sampson et al.'s (1997) notion of benefiting from existing social capital in the prevention of crime and improving community safety, but it contradicts Shaw and McKay's (1942) assertion that idling youth within communities promotes social disorganization, facilitates the transmission of a negative subculture, and increases the level of crime.

In assessing whether neighbourhood cohesion and trust affects the perception of safety, it was found that, if cohesion and trust among residents is increased by one unit, the odds of perceiving the city as safe is decreased by 0.88 times. This indicates limited community-level cohesion and trust, probably a consequence of the fluidity of the urban population and the degradation of social ties in the urban space.

By extension, the study assessed variations in the perceptions of safety among the three categories of neighbourhoods in the city. As indicated earlier, each city was categorized into three neighbourhoods: lower-, middle-, and upper-class socio-economic neighbourhoods; and to enable systematic comparison, the lower-class community was made the reference category. This facilitated the comparison between the other communities and the reference category. In a subsequent phase of analysis, the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood was made the reference category in order to compare the middle- and upper-class socio-economic residential areas. Hence, the reference category demonstrates the odds of perceiving a neighbourhood as safe.

In this regard, the data revealed that residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhoods are 0.869 times less likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, than are residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood; however, this difference was not statistically significant, since the p-value is greater than 0.05. In probability terms, residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood have a

46 percent greater likelihood of perceiving their neighbourhood as unsafe, compared with residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood—even though the difference is not statistically significant. The similarity in terms of the socio-cultural environments between the middle- and lower-class neighbourhood may account for the insignificant differences that exists between the two residential areas, as noted by Owusu et al. (2016).

Correspondingly, residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood are 1.412 times more likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, than are residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood; however, this difference is not statistically significant. In probability terms, residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood have 59 percent greater likelihood to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, compared with residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood.

In the same vein, residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood are 1.624 times more likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, than are residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood. In probability terms, residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood have a 62 percent greater likelihood to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, compared with residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood—but the difference is not statistically significant.

No statistically significant differences were found probably because neighbourhoods are not as distinct as they were categorized: there are situations in which upper-class residential areas are located in a largely lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood, and vice versa. This intermingling within the social structure illustrates Cohen and Felson's (1979) idea of narrowing the gap between the suitable target and the motivated offender, and hence the chances of crime occurring are higher and the

perception of safety lower. Given the proportions of perceived safety across the neighbourhoods in the city of Kumasi, it is suggestive that the safest neighbourhoods are the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhoods, followed by the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods, and lastly the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhoods. A subsequent chapter reveals how residents cope with these different levels of perception of safety across the various socio-economic neighbourhoods.

5.5 Urban safety and liveability: Insights from Tamale

Similarly, perception of neighbourhood safety in Tamale was estimated using the individuals' demographic characteristics and the neighbourhoods' conditions. In Tamale, only two of the seven demographic characteristics (gender, and living in multiple households) showed statistical significance (Table 5.5). The model reveals that males are 0.026 times less likely than females to perceive their neighbourhood as safe. In probability terms, males have a 2.5 percent greater likelihood to perceive the neighbourhood as unsafe than females have within the city of Tamale. Even though this is contrary to the findings of other studies (Mirrless-Black et al., 1998; Pain, 2000), an FGD in Aboabo-Tamale confirmed there is higher sense of perceived insecurity among men than among women. The discussants in an FGD concluded:

We cannot hide away from the periodic political-, chieftaincy-, and religious-related misunderstandings that occur in our communities; and these usually involve men, because women do not go to war. Hence men are more affected than women, and men will therefore feel unsafe compared with women. (FGD, Aboabo-Tamale, 17/02/2017)

Table 5.5: Estimates of logistic regression of neighbourhood safety on demographic and neighbourhood conditions in Tamale metropolis

Variables	Odds Ratio	Std. Err.	P>z	[95% Conf. In]	
Demographic characteristics					
Period of residence	1.010	0.018	0.557	0.976	1.045
Age	1.006	0.017	0.720	0.973	1.040
Male	0.026	0.606	0.006	0.055	0.277
Married	0.799	0.364	0.625	0.327	1.955
Consumption income	1.074	0.946	0.935	0.191	6.039
Level of education	0.519	0.255	0.183	0.198	1.362
Shared dwelling unit	1.945	1.624	0.025	0.018	0.045
Neighbourhood conditions					
Street light	0.692	0.476	0.593	0.179	2.666
Police patrol	0.327	0.357	0.007	0.038	0.784
Level of crime	1.109	0.592	0.845	0.389	3.159
Youth disorder	0.183	0.132	0.019	0.044	0.755
Willingness to intervene	1.321	0.137	0.007	1.077	1.619
Social cohesion	0.918	0.092	0.400	0.754	1.119
Neighbourhood socio-economic status					
Reference category: Lower					
Middle	2.963	1.458	0.027	1.129	7.773
Upper	0.039	0.071	0.077	0.001	1.416
Reference category: Middle					
Lower	0.337	0.166	0.027	0.128	0.885
Upper	0.013	0.024	0.015	0.001	0.436
_cons	29.847	70.019	0.148	0.300	2962.933
Observation = 450		R-squared = 0.31		Chi-squared = 69.2	

Source: Household survey, 2014

In assessing the perception of safety with respect to respondents living as multiple households in a single dwelling unit, it was found that respondents who share dwelling units with other households were 1.945 times more likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe compared with households living in single dwelling units. In other words, residents in multiple-household dwelling units are 66 percent more likely to perceive their residential area as safe compared with residents in households in single dwelling units. Furthermore, residents who require police patrol were 0.327 times less likely to perceive their community as safe, compared with respondents who

require no police patrol within the neighbourhood. Put differently, respondents who require police patrol are 25 percent less likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, compared with those who require no police patrol.

Furthermore, respondents were asked if youth disruptions, such as youth hanging around or truancy, are a problem in the neighbourhood. The logistic regression results indicate that respondents who said that youth disruption was a problem in the city were 0.183 times less likely to perceive the neighbourhood as safe. In other words, respondents who perceive youth disruption as a problem within their neighbourhood are 16 percent less likely to perceive the neighbourhood as safe, than are respondents who do not perceive youth disruption as a problem—which is consistent with the findings from Frimpong's (2016) study of neighbourhoods in the city of Sekondi-Takoradi metropolis.

In assessing the willingness of residents to intervene if they see somebody committing a crime, it was found that if respondents' willingness to intervene is increased by one unit, the odds of perceiving the city as safe is increased by 1.321 times. In other words, a unit increase in the willingness to intervene results in a 57 percent greater likelihood of a respondent perceiving the city as a safe place to live. This confirms Janisz's (2014) conclusion that people have a higher sense of safety when they perceive the presence of others who will intervene in the course of crime. Similarly, in assessing neighbourhood cohesion and trust, it was found that, if cohesion and trust among residents is increased by one unit, the odds of perceiving the city as safe is diminished by 0.918 times. This indicates some level of distrust among residents, since the probability of togetherness results in greater perception of insecurity in neighbourhoods. It is not unusual because of the sharp division among the indigenes in the city of Tamale along political, religious, and chieftaincy lines. As indicated by Oteng-Ababio et al. (2016), the city

appears calm on the surface but is tension-packed within its social-cultural, economic, and political structures.

In comparing perception of safety across the different socio-economic residential areas, similar to the analytic strategies employed in Kumasi, the data reveals that residents of the middle-class neighbourhood are 2.963 times more likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, compared with residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood. This difference is statistically significant, since the p-value is less than 0.05. In probability terms, residents of the middle-class neighbourhood are 75 percent more likely to perceive their community as safe, compared with residents of the lower-class neighbourhood.

Similarly, residents of the upper-class neighbourhood are 0.039 times less likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, than are residents of the lower-class socio-economic residential area. This difference is statistically significant at 10 percent alpha level. In probability terms, residents of the upper-class area are 4 percent less likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, compared with residents of the lower-class area. In the same vein, residents of the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood are 0.013 times less likely to perceive their neighbourhood as safe, than are residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood. This difference is statistically significant, since the p-value is less than 0.05. In probability terms, residents of the upper-class area are 1.3 percent less likely to perceive their residential area as safe, than are residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood. Hence, in Tamale, the middle-class neighbourhood appears to be the safest place to reside, followed by the lower-class socio-economic residential neighbourhood—while the least safe place is the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood.

5.6 Chapter summary

Generally, perceptions of safety have been determined by many factors, largely ranging from physical to social environmental factors that occur in a non-exclusive manner. With specific reference to the Kumasi metropolis, analysis of the individual level demographic characteristics revealed that, increase in age, being male, and living in multiple-household apartments significantly influence people's perception of a safe neighbourhood. On the other hand, analysis of the neighbourhood level data indicate that the need for police patrol, level of perceived crime, unruly behaviour by the youth, willingness to intervene, and social cohesion significantly influence the perception of safety. Generally, this study shows that the safest place to live in Kumasi is the upper-class area, followed by the lower- and middle-class socio-economic residential areas, in that order. In a similar fashion, the study shows that respondents in Tamale metropolis perceive their neighbourhoods as safe, albeit that females as well as residents of multiple-household apartments perceive significantly higher levels of safety with respect to the individual level demographic characteristics. In addition, the study unravels that youth disorder, the need for police patrol, and willingness to intervene in the course of crime significantly influence people's perception of neighbourhood safety in the city of Tamale. At the neighbourhood level in Tamale, the study indicates that the middle-class area appears to be the safest place to live, followed by the lower- and upper-class socio-economic neighbourhoods, in that order. Having established levels of perception of safety among residents, the study gave a detailed analysis of the key challenges impeding the provision of internal security in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX: CHALLENGES IMPEDING THE SECURITY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY IN KUMASI AND TAMALE

6.1 Introduction

The general perception of safety within the study locations did not overshadow some individual and neighbourhood level characteristic as key determinants of safety as illustrated in the previous chapter. This chapter critically examined the challenges associated with the security of life and property in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises. As earlier indicated, both Kumasi and Tamale have witnessed increased urbanization, the consequences of which are not only that their respective populations have increased dramatically but, more importantly, that they have witnessed an unprecedented spatial expansion, both of which factors have implications for maintaining internal security. To elucidate this latter relationship—that is, the relationship between spatial expansion and maintaining security—this sub-section first establishes the spatial extent of the study locations as they exist today vis-à-vis the current capacity of the Police Service to maintain safety of life and property in the two cities. Secondly, respondents' perspectives on challenges to maintaining safety are interrogated.

6.2 Delineating the spatial expansion of the built environment in Kumasi and Tamale

The spatial expansion of the cities of Kumasi and Tamale were demonstrated using the district shape files acquired from the RS/GIS laboratory of the University of Ghana, and using Landsat imagery extracted from <https://earthexplorer.usgs.gov/>. Images were acquired primarily in the dry season, to minimize possible clouds effects—except for

available cloud contaminations in the year 2000, in which case images of the city of Kumasi were acquired in the wet season (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Landsat images for the classification of Kumasi and Tamale Metropolitan Areas

Place	Satellite	Image reference	Processed bands	Acquisition data	Path/Row
	Landsat 7	LE71940532000074EDC00	Band 7,5,3	14-Mar-00	194/053
	Landsat 7	LE71940542000074EDC00	Band 7,5,3	14-Mar-00	194/054
Tamale	Landsat 8	LC81940532016030LGN00	Band 7,6,4	15-Feb-16	194/053
	Landsat 7	LE71940552000138EDC00	Band 7,5,3	17-May-00	194/055
Kumasi	Landsat 8	LC81940552016030LGN00	Band 7,6,4	15-Feb-16	194/055

Source: Author's own construction, 2017

The band combinations in Table 6.1 were the most suitable because they provide a 'natural-like' rendition while penetrating atmospheric particles, smoke, and haze. Thus, minimizing the cloud effects and using a suitable band combination result in a clear overview of the spatial expansion and land use diversity, as posited by other scholars (Yang & Lo, 2000; Moller-Jensen et al., 2005). Specifically, vegetation appears in shades of dark and light green during the growing season; urban features are white, grey, cyan, or purple; sands, soils and minerals appear in a variety of colours; and water is black or dark blue (Figure 6.1).








Figure 6.1: Composite images of Landsat 8 bands: 7,6,4; and Landsat 7 bands: 7,5,3
Source: Author's own construction, 2017

The respective band combinations of the images were calibrated to reflectance and stacked to produce a composite image, which was then made a subset to the Kumasi and Tamale metropolitan areas. Finally, training samples (25 for each study site) were taken from high spatial resolution Google Earth imagery.

6.2.1 Spatial expansion and the security of life and property in Kumasi

The geographic location of Kumasi provides it with the advantage of centrality, supported by relatively well-connected transportation networks (road, railway, air). The city is therefore an active economic hub, experiencing an influx of population from other regions of the country and neighbouring countries. The economic vibrancy and the population dynamics cannot be dissociated from the phenomenal spatial expansion of the city as shown in Figure 6.2.



- Legend**
KMA (2000)
-  Built up
 -  Vegetation
 -  Open Space



*Coordinate System: UTM Zone 30N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
Datum: WGS 1984*




Figure 6.2: The expanding spatial extent of Kumasi, from 2000 to 2016
Source: Author's own construction, 2017

Table 6.2: The expanding spatial extent in Kumasi from 2000 to 2016

2000	Area (sq/m)	Percent	2016	Area (sq/m)	Percent
Built up	95,354,493	44.5	Built up	149,531,710	69.9
Vegetation	112,220,960	52.4	Vegetation	54,079,183	25.3
Bare	6,740,111	3.1	Bare	10,443,844	4.8
Total	214,315,564	100.0		214,054,738	100.0

Source: Author's own construction, 2017

There is continuous in-fill development, as reflected in the reduction of the vegetative cover and the increasing built-up area. Specifically, the city experienced a reduction in the vegetative cover from 52 percent to 25 percent of its total land area, from the year 2000 to 2016. Similarly, the built-up area increased from 45 percent in the year 2000 to 70 percent of the total area in the year 2016, while the open space increased from 3 percent to 5 percent for the same period. Thus, there has been elongated ribbon-type development of residential areas intermingled with commercial activities along major roads radiating from the CBD, especially towards the southern part of the metropolis. In addition, the city has not only experienced a significant roll-back of the vegetative cover but also a densification of the CBD. This finding confirms reports from the Town and Country Planning Department of the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (2010) that residential facilities within the city increased from 43.7 percent of total land use in 1995 to 44.1 percent in 2005.

The expansion of the open space appears to accommodate the increasing numbers of hawkers and parking lots for commercial and private vehicles, spanning from Kejetia to the central market and then to the railway station linking Adum, which form a large portion of the CBD. This observation finds a place in Amoako et al.'s (2014) work on land use inventory within the CBD of Kumasi. Their study reported that the

commercial area covers 70 percent of the total land use area of the CBD. This fluidity of the population increases anonymity, which serves as an incentive or a conduit to concealing acts of criminality because of difficulty of identification among the large population and is therefore a challenge to the provision of adequate security in the vicinity. This relates to other scholarly findings that demonstrate that increases in congestion increase the potential occurrence of criminality (Peterson, 2006; Owusu et al., 2016).

Ordinarily, the expansion of a built-up area requires an equally wide spread of the police, to enable an adequate police presence to ostensibly ward off criminal activities. As noted earlier, assessing the capacity of the Police Service within the city found that about 70 percent of the people within the KMA are deprived of the security services of the Ghana Police Service, because of the limited police manpower capacity. Hence, in assessing the spatial expansion and the challenges to the provision of security, the spatial extent of influence of the Ghana Police Service was estimated by mapping the spread of police stations and posts within the city. Given the fact that, for reinforcement of a police station in distress or backup from other stations and support of police patrol teams within the city, a station or post ought to have the capacity to adequately respond to and comfortably prevent or stop crime situations within its jurisdiction. In this regard, Figure 6.3 illustrates the spatial distribution of police posts and stations within KMA, as it was in the year 2014.




Figure 6.3: Spatial distribution of police posts and stations in Kumasi Metropolitan Area
 Source: Author's own construction, 2017

Apart from the general deficit in the police–civilian population ratio in Ghana as a challenge to providing security, the location of police stations/posts and how the police are able to access the populace, and vice versa, are yet other challenges. As shown in Figure 6.3, police stations/posts in Kumasi are largely skewed toward the CBD. Acknowledging the increasing human activity within the CBD, which warrants the relatively high police presence, the spatial expansion of the city should not be ignored in the distribution of police posts and stations. Figure 6.3 shows that the police posts and stations extend sparsely toward the north-eastern part of the metropolis, from Suame police station to Tafo-Pankrono police station, and then to the south-eastern part, spanning from Asukwa police station to the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology police station. Conversely, the south-western parts of the metropolis, extending from Ahodwo to Atwima Amanfrom and Kwadaso, have limited police presence. However, there are some police stations sparsely located around Asukwa, Ridge, and North Suntreso. Hence, the uneven distribution of the police stations and posts, with respect to the spatial expansion, illustrates a probable disproportionate access to the police for security services in the city. It is suggestive that the spatial expansion of the city is not in line with the spatial distribution of the police posts and stations, a situation Tankebe (2008) described as an unfair distribution of police operatives and primarily to the disadvantage of the poor in society. In addition to the spatial expansion posing a challenge to the provision of security in Kumasi, a corresponding increase in population density (GSS, 2013) signals another challenge to the provision of security.

6.2.2 Demographic expansion and the security of life and property in Kumasi

In light of the spatial spread of the city without an equivalent expansion of the police stations, respondents were asked to mention some situations or factors impeding the provision of security. Results from the KIIs and the FGDs indicate that increasing population and, consequently, congestion within the CBD challenge the provision of security at both the personal and community levels. In an interview with a key informant, he stated:

The centre of the city is just too congested with vehicles, people, and buildings; this obstructs visibility, and therefore it becomes difficult to identify and intervene in a criminal act. (Personal interview with 43-year-old man, trader, Ahodwo, 13/02/2017)

Further responses indicated that limited ease of access resulting from congestion particularly within the CBD, is facilitating criminality—as a 46-year-old seller of used-fabrics within the CBD intimated in an interview:

Congestion is good for hawkers, who sell their wares by the sidewalks, but most theft occurs on the same sidewalks—most victims being travellers who may want to do some shopping while in transit. The high occurrence of crime on the pavement is because the congestion makes it difficult to make an arrest or identify the offenders. (Personal interview with 46-year-old woman, opinion leader in Oforikrom, Kumasi, 12/02/2016)

Respondents' concerns about the increasing congestion and unfamiliarity among the populace are confirmed by studies such as those of Songsore (2009), UNDESA/PD (2012), and Shaw and McKay (1942)—which indicate that congestion and heterogeneity result in a decrease in social organization and an increase in the potential of crime to occur. The police have likewise expressed concerns that the urban

environment is complicating their professional operations. In an interview with a police officer, it was revealed that the increasing population density has been a challenge to policing the urban space, not only because of the limited access to crime scenes but also because of the overwhelming congestion of the physical built area and the increased population itself, which make police surveillance ineffective and inefficient. The police officer added:

The location of crime scenes has always challenged the effectiveness of the police, compounded by the inadequate street and house labelling as well as the soaring population. (Personal interview with 51-year-old man, police officer, Kumasi, 24/02/2016)

The congestion seems to facilitate the breeding of the ‘underworld’ population, as indicated by a trader in Adum. This is similar to the findings of O’Flaherty and Sethi (2015), who reported that larger cities are associated with increased rates of crime due to the increased intersection between targets and offenders. Hence, the active economic activities and relatively good road networks leading to the city are incentives increasing the human and vehicular populations and inhibiting effective police surveillance in the CBD and within residential areas. The increasing congestion and limited spatial planning practices not only contribute to a breaking down of social order but also narrow the routes of access for the police, thereby posing a challenge to crime prevention. In a similar vein, other scholars have indicated that unplanned CBDs are characterized by limited ease of access and increased insecurity within neighbourhoods (Gulyani & Talukdar, 2010; Darkwah & Cobbbinah, 2014; Fox, 2014).

6.2.3 Unemployment as a perceived challenge to providing security

In examining responses regarding the challenges to providing security, it was found that a number of respondents mentioned unemployment as an important problem in securing the urban environment. For instance, it was generally agreed in an FGD at Oforikrom in Kumasi that, notwithstanding the large numbers of artisans within the community (estimating that about three out of five people in the community are artisans), the limited opportunities to make a living from the skills acquired pushes some youth onto the streets and into the CBD. As one female discussant stated:

Unemployment drives our children into the streets where they have a higher tendency to acquire bad habits, such as becoming perpetrators of street crimes—pick pocketing, frauds, assault, robbery, etc.—and generally acquiring uncontrollable behaviours—which saddens us a lot. (Personal interview with 54-year-old woman, opinion leader, Oforikrom, Kumasi, 17/01/2017)

A study by Adel et al. (2016) confirms the fact that unemployment is an important challenging issue in the provision of security. In addition, Poku-Boansi and Afrane (2016) noted that one challenging situation in relation to crime in Ghana is unemployment, especially among the teeming youth, whose quest for life in the urban environment is very great. A key informant added:

The increasing unemployment situation within this neighbourhood is making it difficult for parents to control their children, as they continue to interact with badly behaved youth in the community. (Personal interview with 58-year-old man, opinion leader, Oforikrom)

One important manifestation of youth unemployment is increasing factions and youth gangs, which may be systemic and whose existence cannot be downplayed.

6.2.4 Emerging youth gangs and vigilantism

The emergence of youth gangs in the study communities was noted as a challenge to maintaining law and order. Participants' views with respect to emerging gangs and the incidence of crime were reflected in the following excerpts from key informants. In an interview with an opinion leader in Aboabo-Kumasi, the informant explained how gangs continue to persist through time in the neighbourhood and that this has been a bother not only to the police but also to residents, who find no comfort moving around the community especially at night where these gangs loiter. In an interview with a youth leader, he stated:

Apart from the potentials of the entire group engaging in crime, the individual member's criminal activities are well covered up by other members of the group; and an attempt to report the criminal activities of these groups or their members puts the life of the reporter in danger. (Personal interview with 50-year-old man, youth leader, Ahodwo, 18/01/2017)

The ability of gangs to expand in numbers and operations has been well articulated by Katz and Webb (2006). These authors further note the efforts by state security to control gangs, even though members of gangs have very strong bonds and the ability to build their capacity and challenge state security agencies. Expressing fear about the continued ability of gangs to sustain themselves, an informant stated:

The emerging youth groups are recruiting centres for criminals in this community. Look, they are just becoming too many—for instance, around the bridge, the post office area, the abandoned clinic project, and the video centres. These are the places they meet to plan for criminal activities. (Personal interview with 63-year-old man, opinion leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 21/01/2017)

From the perspective of a 53-year-old opinion leader in Oforikrom:

These groups are made up of strong, suspected criminals. The members do not engage in any known legal jobs, but look at the way they spend, the way they dress. Where do you think they get the money to do all these things if not by stealing? If your child gets near them, then you are in trouble because he will come home negatively changed in behaviour. (Personal interview with 53-year-old man, opinion leader, Oforikrom, Kumasi, 26/01/2017)

The emergence of youth gangs and their ability to sustain themselves despite the periodic police raids on their gathering sites continue to be a challenge in the city. Some respondents identified the consumption of cannabis as the likely factor contributing to the gangs' togetherness.

6.2.5 Consumption of cannabis as a perceived cause of crime

Consumption of cannabis has been a well-known stimulant influencing human behaviour in diverse forms, notwithstanding its medicinal importance in acceptable quantities and circumstances. The increase in consensus by participants that consumption of cannabis is a contributing factor to increasing incidence of crime can be attributed partly to the fact that cannabis, such as weed or Indian hemp, is easily accessible and affordable (Selby, 2011). The relatively high cost of heroin and cocaine limit their consumption in Ghana; but according to Selby (ibid.), a rolled piece of Indian hemp costs as little as Gp50.

The case of Kumasi is no different, as discussants in Ahodwo, Kumasi mentioned the open consumption of cannabis around the neighbourhoods where the youth commonly meet and engage in the consumption of weed, marijuana, and cocaine as stimulants for

the commission of crime. The following is an excerpt from the remarks of one of the study's respondents:

If I lead you to either the school park around the post office area or around the bridge within the Aboabo here [Kumasi], you will see them smoking wee [cannabis] openly, and at night they disappear. Where do you think they go? OK, to rob—and I think the substance is giving that fearless attitude to commit crime. (Personal interview with 68-year-old woman, opinion leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 20/01/2017)

In existing literature, the relationship between the consumption of cannabis and the potential to commit crime is well established. In regard to the findings in this study, Bennett et al. (2008) reported that a drug user is three to four times more likely than a non-user to engage in criminal activity. Thus, in light of the limited capacity of the police, the increasing numbers and capacity of people who consume cannabis, coupled with their role in criminal activities, pose a considerable challenge to the maintenance of law and order within the city. Furthermore, the increasing consumption of cannabis in Ghana places the country in the lead in the consumption of cannabis in Africa, and third in the world (UNODC, 2007). Interestingly, some members of gangs who engage in the consumption of cannabis have strong political party affiliations and sometimes receive protection from the political elites, as was alleged in a FGD in Aboabo-Kumasi.

6.2.6 Political interference in the course of justice as a perceived cause of sustained crime

Findings from the key informants indicate that there are strong social ties among suspected perpetrators of crime within the Aboabo and Oforikrom communities and beyond. Participants in an FGD in Aboabo-Kumasi concluded that social ties among these miscreants is further enhanced by the support they get from some political

leaders, who by their power reduce sentences or prevent prosecution of suspected criminal cases of members of these criminal gangs, most of whom are party affiliates.

Congruent with political leadership's alleged defence of members of criminal gangs, some participants made statements in support of the role of politicians in sustaining crime within the cities:

It is very difficult to get rid of these youth groups that are commonly engaged in crime within the community, because they have strong political lineage, from which they draw support whenever they are caught in the act of crime. You will call for their arrest by the police, but they will soon get back to the community unreformed. (Personal interview with 54-year-old woman, opinion leader, Ahowdo, Kumasi, 24/01/2017)

It is unfortunate that sometimes some party executives with concerns from the victim of the offence follow up to the police station to plead to have a criminal case addressed informally; but it appears the informal ways, many at times, are not effective—hence the suspect is released and relapses into crime. (Personal interview with 43-year-old man, police officer, Kumasi, 03/02/2017)

It is evident from reports in the Ghanaian media that politicians undoubtedly offer support to free party enthusiasts who have run-ins with the law. For instance, on 11 March 2010, Ghana News Agency—one of the most dependable sources of news in Ghana—quoted a northern regional crime officer lamenting that

[...] as soon as someone was arrested in connection with an offence, calls from various politicians come from every angle to influence the police to release the person. (GNA, 2010)

The power dynamics between the politicians and the police in relation to combating crime continues to be a challenge in Kumasi.

6.2.7 Inadequate or absence of street lighting within residential areas

The importance of street lighting in improving surveillance cannot be over-emphasized in regard to the provision of security. In the case of Aboabo-Kumasi, a 51-year-old women's leader remarked:

Houses are too close to one another, and the disappearance of the sun casts patches of thick shadows at every turn; and these dark spots accommodate the ill-behaved youth who attack people, mostly threatening them with knives or guns for their possessions. (Personal interview with 51-year-old woman, opinion leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 06/02/2017)

Efforts by the city authorities to increase visibility within the city have increased the installation of security cameras on major sections of roads within the township, especially at roundabouts such as Roman Hill, Airport Roundabout, Suame Roundabout, Ashanti Regional Coordinating Council, and Komfo Anokye Teaching Hospital Roundabout, but the absence of street lights at night hinders the cameras' purpose of reducing crime (Owusu-Akyaw, 2016). According to the Africa News Service (2005), the Greater Accra Regional Commander of Police, ACP Douglas Akrofi Asiedu, stated that the lack of street lights has made it a considerable challenge to fight crime within the city of Accra. In other words, the provision of street lighting has the potential to reduce the incidence of crime, as was found by Farrington and Welsh's (2002) meta-analysis of 13 evaluation studies from the USA (8) and Britain (5).

6.2.8 Unoccupied lands and buildings

The interspace of greenery and public places in a city not only adds to the beauty of the city but, if not properly managed, can be taken over by miscreants and pose threats to life and property within the vicinity. In addition, an interview with the Assembly man of Aboabo-Kumasi revealed that an abandoned community clinic project has become a meeting place for youth who allegedly plan their criminal activities and later converge to share their booty. Such abandoned projects or unoccupied and unmonitored lands therefore become threats to safety because these areas become meeting points for smokers of Indian hemp and other cannabis forms, as was concluded in an FGD in Oforikrom.

Furthermore, the common practices of incremental building and speculative buying of land in urban Ghana usually result in incomplete building projects and sometimes unoccupied lands in the midst of residential facilities, both of which then serve as hideouts for criminals within the city.

In a KII with an opinion leader, he stated that unoccupied lands within the community accommodate potential criminals:

There is abandoned land in Aboabo-Kumasi—that is, the swampy area around where the rail line passes through the community—and it is now occupied by youth gangs who are noted for criminal activities. Hence, if we had adequate enforcement of planning regulations, that abandoned land would have been taken care of and would not be occupied by these ill-behaved youth. (Personal interview with 63-year-old man, opinion leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 13/02/2017)

A youth leader further added that increasing informal settlements are taking up such abandoned lands around Aboabo-Tamale:

The area occupied by the scrap dealers was an abandoned land site but has become a no-go area for the ordinary person, because it is now occupied by miscreants who are ever-ready to attack innocent people. (Personal interview with 46-year-old man, youth leader, Aboabo-Kumasi, 16/02/2017)

Thus, the effects of poor urban planning in Ghana on the incidence of crime have been a hindrance to policing within the urban space, as indicated by Africa News Service (2005): ‘the Greater Accra Regional Commander of Police, ACP Douglas Akrofi Asiedu, has said poor planning of the city is posing a major threat to effective policing’. It therefore goes without saying that a well-planned neighbourhood is more likely to experience reduced incidence of crime than an improperly planned one (Kreager et al., 2011).

Furthermore, the increasing number of commercial video and electronic game centres act as meeting places for criminals, and the regulation of these centres would help to reduce the cases of crime within the community, as stated by a youth leader in the Aboabo-Kumasi neighbourhood.




6.3 Spatial expansion and the security of life and property in the city of Tamale


As shown in Figure 6.4, the spatial dimension of the TMA has changed over time. Specifically, the built environment has increased from 1.3 percent to 4.4 percent of the total land area, for the period 2000 to 2016, respectively. This finding is not in isolation—for instance, Fuseini and Kemp (2016) report that the TMA has experienced an increase in its built-up area from 1677 ha to 2982 ha, representing 78 percent spatial expansion of the city between 2001 and 2014, at a rate of 4.4 percent per year. Furthermore, the results of this study indicate that open spaces within the city have also

increased, from 68.4 percent of the total land area of the city in the year 2000 to 71.6 percent in 2016. The increase in open spaces over the years is confirmed in the work of Oppong and Yeboah (2013), who attributed the increase in the open space to family, religious, or political disputes sometimes holding up unused lands within the city and contributing to the increase in the open spaces. On the other hand, vegetative cover within the city was reduced from 30.3 percent of the total land area in 2000 to 24 percent in 2016.



Legend
Tamale Metro (2000)

-  Built up
-  Vegetation
-  Open Space



Coordinate System: UTM Zone 30N
Projection: Transverse Mercator
Datum: WGS 1984




Figure 6.4: The expanding spatial extent in Tamale from 2000 to 2016

Source: Author's own construction, 2017

Table 6.3: The expanding spatial extent in Tamale from 2000 to 2016

2000	Area (sq/m)	Percent	2016	Area (sq/m)	Percent
Built up	8,162,789	1.3%	Built up	28,598,095	4.4%
Vegetation	196,205,561	30.3%	Vegetation	155,497,755	24.0%
Bare	443,609,572	68.4%	Bare	463,354,976	71.6%
Total	647,977,922	100%		647,450,826	100%

Source: Author's own construction, 2017

The spatial expansion of the city was confirmed in an interview with an opinion leader, who lamented that peasant farmers now have to travel further outside the city to farm—which was not the case in the past. Opong and Yeboah (2013), in explaining the expansive nature of Tamale, attributed it to the relocation of some indigenes to the fringes in order to engage in farming. Hence, other factors accounting for the spatial expansion include the increasing value of land within the city, according to an opinion leader in Aboabo-Tamale.

This increases not only the open spaces within the city but also the insecurity in the peri-urban zone, because of scarce and therefore expensive access to urban services such as water, roads, health care, good sanitation, education, and policing services (UN-Habitat, 2010; Fuseini & Kemp, 2016). The spread of the built environment of Tamale was confirmed to have increased from less than 3 sq km in 1907 (MacGaffey, 2006) to 922 sq km in 2010 (Fuseini & Kemp, 2016).

The horizontal spread of residential facilities and of the built area in general demands an equal proportion of the spread of police stations and posts, but the present state of affairs exhibits an unbalanced situation between the spatial expansion and the location of the police within the city (Figure 6.5). As explained earlier in this study, with the

present police–civilian population ratio of 1:1,580, about 68 percent of the population in Tamale is not policed, and this compels further investigation into the city’s spatial expansion and the distribution of police stations (Figure 6.5).




Figure 6.5: Spatial distribution of police posts and stations in Tamale Metropolitan Area

Source: Author's own construction, 2017

As illustrated in Figure 6.5, the regional police headquarters and the divisional police station are located close to the CBD, which hosts active commercial activity in the day and much activity with street dwellers at night. Similar to the findings from the American Planning Association (APA) (2006), the location of police stations close to areas of active human activities is a supportive means to crime prevention, even though other socio-political considerations may at times also influence the siting of police stations.

As shown in the Figure 6.5, the other two police posts are strategically located in Lamashigu and Sakasaka, along the major international road linking Ghana to the Sahelian region (northern Africa). Figure 6.5 therefore is suggestive that the police stations in the Tamale metropolis are not typically located within residential areas but are centred on active economic areas, which appears to demonstrate the colonial philosophy of policing and is consistent with Atuguba (2003). For instance, Figure 6.5 shows that the north-eastern part of the metropolis, extending from Salamba towards the fringes of the Kalpohin estates and along the Dagomba road, contains residential facilities gathered around the road toward the far east residential areas, which are without a police station or post. Similarly, with residents within the south-eastern part spanning from Jakarayili to the fringes of Zibogo, Tugu Yapalse, Kuku, and Changni—all these areas accommodate large populations but have no police station within their neighbourhoods. The situation from the north-western to the south-western sector is no different: there is no police station or post for the residents in Banvim, Yong, and other surrounding communities such as Warizehi, Aboabo, Zogbeli, and the residential facilities along the Nyohani-Tolon road. It is therefore clear that the continuous spatial expansion is further stressing the already limited capacity of the police within the metropolis.

6.3.1 Demographic expansion and the security of life and property in the city of

Tamale

During the KIIs, respondents mentioned several factors and issues within the city that challenge the ability to maintain peace and security. During transcripts' analysis, it was noticeable that the increasing population was referred to in many of the interviews. A cross-check with the GSS confirms the increase in the city's population over the years. According to the GSS, the population of the TMA has been on the increase from 40,443 inhabitants as reported in the 1960 census to 371,351 inhabitants in the last national census in 2010 (GSS, 2013). With the city's highest ever population growth rate of 7.3% between 1960 and 1970, Tamale experienced another significant population growth rate (4.8%) compared with other cities in Ghana, between 1984 and 2000, which translated into a more than doubling (116%) of the city's population (GSS, 2013). Even though the average inter-census population growth rate of Tamale for the 2000–2010 censuses is lower (2.5%) than the regional population growth rate (2.9%), the city's population density (319 persons per sq km) is more than 12 times the regional population density of 26 persons per sq km (GSS, 2012). The population growth within the city remains high, as revealed in an interview with a 65-year-old retiree (a returned migrant who had worked in the gold mines at Obuasi, southern Ghana for 35 years). He stated:

I have observed with pain that the morals within the Zogbeli community is almost non-existent—for instance, children respected elders by greeting them and walked to school with happiness when we were young, but now there is a lot of disrespect, stealing, and quarrels—and I meet unknown faces every now and then. It is really difficult to say I am safe because we all live in fear. If not political tension, it is chieftaincy or religion. It is really bad, but we are too many of different backgrounds to

be controlled by the community morals again. (Personal interview with 65-year-old man, opinion leader, Zogbeli, 24/11/2016)

The consequence of the increase in population over the years is the congestion in the streets and between houses. Active and competitive commercial activities on the roads also limit the movability of motor vehicles and pedestrians within the township. Further confirming the congestion on the roads, a 31-year-old female petty trader (vegetable seller) in the central market lamented the uncontrolled congestion on the roads that impedes the work of the police from making arrests in the neighbourhoods. More importantly, she warned:

When there is a fire outbreak, we watch helplessly as officers of the fire service find it difficult to access some residences because of the narrow and congested streets. (Personal interview with 31-year-old female trader, Aboabo-Tamale, 24/11/2016)

The increasing use of motor vehicles, active commercial activities, and active pedestrian population in a largely informal setting impede crime prevention within the city. In an interview with a senior police officer, he indicated that among the major challenges associated with the increased population in the city that affect the effectiveness of policing are the congestion on the streets and in residential areas, inconsistent labelling of streets and houses, and poor road networks within residential areas.

6.3.2 Unemployment as a perceived challenge to providing security

Another very important factor perceived to be affecting efforts to prevent crime is unemployment. The key informants explained the predominance of unemployment

among the youth in particular as a challenge to providing security in the city. The high unemployment situation was perceived locally to be reflected in the increasing number of idle youth, who are ready to work but have no opportunity to do so. In Tamale, an FGD among seven discussants was in general agreement that unemployment was a large problem, because it continues to serve as a conduit through which the underworld recruits its members. A particular situation can be cited: A school management committee chairman, a resident of Zogbeli community, remarked that unemployment is one of the key issues driving the youth into crime:

In recent times, it has become common to see the youth, especially the men, sitting in groups all day long playing cards or draughts or engaging in endless debates, because they have no jobs. These long hours of idleness have the potential to degenerate into intentions to engage in crime or into tendencies to become influenced by others to get involved in unacceptable behaviour—and that can be worrying for crime prevention. (Personal interview with 68-year-old man, opinion leader, Zogbeli, Tamale, 26/11/2016)

The results from this study can be related to the work by Adel et al. (2016), who admonished that unemployment correlates with rates of crime. Given that unemployment can lead to the commission of crime in a city such as Tamale, where about 68 percent of the total population is not policed, then the security of life and property within the city is much in doubt.

However, in an interaction with an imam in Aboabo-Tamale, he revealed some exceptions to the cases of unemployment and its supposed leading of residents into crime and posing a challenge to security in the neighbourhood. The imam, in his cautious view, stated:

Unemployment or poverty is not a good reason for criminal activity, because though there is evidence of unemployment within the community, respect for elders keeps some unemployed youth away from criminal activities; they remain humble enough to make a living by lawful means. (Personal interview with 51-year-old man, religious leader, Aboabo-Tamale 16/01/2017)

Some scholars conclude that given the mind-set of Ghanaian youth and a lack of self-control, boredom and the burden of apparent worthlessness are important compelling factors that have a strong tendency to sway some youth into criminal activities (Seidu, 2014; Poku-Boansi & Afrane, 2016). In a similar study, Hooghe et al. (2010) reported that an increase in unemployment correlates with increases in criminality. This therefore suggests that increasing unemployment feeds the criminal world and hence challenges crime prevention agencies. Consequently, the increasing situation of unemployment in Ghana potentially brings cohorts of the unemployed together, and the existence of such groups cannot be ignored in the development of gangs.

6.3.3 Emerging youth gangs or vigilante groups as a challenge to providing security

A KII with an opinion leader in Aboabo-Tamale revealed the near perfect manner in which youth gangs in Tamale work in unison, despite the underlining divisions along religious, chieftaincy, and political lines. In a similar vein, a youth leader in Zogbeli reported:

One common protective mode of operation suspected gang members adopt in Tamale is their immediate escape, upon detection, into the Aboabo forest. Once in the forest, the suspect receives maximum protection and support from their colleagues, and therefore it becomes inadvisable to follow a suspect into the forest. This has been a challenge to maintaining law and order in Tamale. (Personal interview with 34-year-old woman, youth leader, Zogbeli, 23/01/2017)

In a separate interview with a police officer, the officer acknowledged the increasing number of youth groups in the forest and further stated that the police efforts to permanently eject them from the forest had been a challenge, as the groups return each time they are raided by the police. One interviewee, a youth leader, emphasized the influence of emerging youth groups as challenges to the provision of security in the city:

I think crime is more widespread now as compared with, say, five years ago, because of the increase in the number of youth gangs in the city, who have no regard for the police. It is within these gangs that bad behaviours are learned, including how to commit crime. (Personal interview with 39-year-old man, youth leader, Aboabo-Tamale, 24/11/2016)

The emergence of youth groups and the influence they have on their peers, as well as the tendency to engage in unlawful activities, are well reported for the Ghanaian context (Okumah, 2014; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). Furthermore, closely related to the persistence of youth gangs in the city is the youth engagement in the consumption of cannabis.

6.3.4 Consumption of cannabis as a perceived cause of crime

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), Ghana stands out as the highest in the consumption of cannabis in Africa and third in the world ranking; specifically, consumption in Ghana is more than five times the average consumption in the world. For instance, in the year 2007, the World Drug Report indicated that about 21.5 percent of Ghanaians aged 15 to 64 years consumed cannabis in some form in the year 2006 (UNODC, 2007).

The mention of cannabis as one of the challenges to fighting crime in Tamale was found in an average of one to two mentions among the lower- to the upper-class residential neighbourhoods, respectively. Suspected criminals who stay in the forest (within Aboabo-Tamale) are alleged to be engaged in the consumption of cannabis and the planning of criminal attacks in the city of Tamale and beyond. Also, consumers of cannabis who engage in crime usually reconnect in the forest to share the booty at the end of every successful criminal activity, as was revealed by a youth leader in Zogbeli and confirmed by discussants in an FGD in Aboabo-Tamale. In addition, other common spots within the TMA where suspected criminals commonly meet to consume cannabis are the timber market and the metro mass transit station. Discussants within the Aboabo-Tamale community perceived that the consumption of cannabis (mostly weed)—and sometimes of cocaine—stimulate the intentions of some youth who live around these areas to get involved in crime.

It is obvious that these gangs consume cannabis before they engage in criminal activities, because the smell of weed as one passes by the forest (Aboabo-Tamale) is more intense in the evening than before noon in the day time. That is why it is dangerous to go around the forest or the metro mass terminal at night, because that is what they sit there and do: consuming cannabis and attacking innocent citizens. (Personal interview with 38-year-old man, youth leader, Aboabo-Tamale)

The strong suspicion that the consumption of cannabis greatly influences the tendency to commit crime is in line with Logan et al. (2006) as well as Daday et al. (2005), whose research findings suggest that individuals engaged in the consumption of illicit drugs have a greater potential for being victims or perpetrators of crime. However, it is unfortunate that the Ghana Police Service find it difficult to completely eliminate these groups and their bad habits within communities, partly because of the interference by

some political leaders, chiefs, and local government representatives (Assembly persons), as was lamented by a key police officer in Kumasi.

6.3.5 Political interference in the course of justice as a perceived cause of sustained crime

Political interference has been a challenge to security in the Ghanaian urban space in recent times, as participants in an FGD recounted the cases of political interference that appear to have truncated criminal procedures and led to the release of suspected criminals. These acts by politicians therefore sustain the general perception that political interference encourages some criminal acts within communities in the TMA. Excerpts of some accounts of political interference that were recounted by participants during the interview are worth noting:

Recently, some political leaders' intervention led to the release of a suspected criminal from police custody, accused of the theft of a motor bike within the vicinity. Such political interference has therefore become an incentive to sustaining ill-behaved youth groups in Tamale. (Personal interview with 52-year-old man, Russian Bungalow, Tamale, 24/11/2016)

In a similar report, the *Ghanaian Chronicle* (12 November 2010) quoted former Minister of Interior Martin Amidu, in his write-up on 'crime, politics and national security', as stating:

[...] politicisation of crimes, and allied offences such as human rights abuses, which is overtly demonstrated by our contemporary politicians, has actually made the neutral role of some of our security agencies, such as the Ghana Police Service, in combating crimes difficult. (Ghanaian Chronicle, 12th November, 2010)

Furthermore, Boateng et al. (2014) reported on the encounters the Ghana Police Service face in their quest to enforce the law, by quoting the deputy regional commander of the Upper West Region:

[...] politicians encouraged their supporters to resist arrest, and threatened the police with dismissals and transfers, adding that such threats and intimidation put the police in a dicey situation. (Boateng et al., 2014)

However, not only does political interference emerge as an external force influencing situations of crime and therefore challenging policing in communities, but also the absence or inadequate supply of street lights is an obvious challenge within many communities—an unmet responsibility of the government in providing such social services.

6.3.6 Inadequate or absence of street lighting within residential areas

Lighting the streets increases visibility and therefore enhances surveillance on the streets and within neighbourhoods. Given the importance of street lights in crime prevention, participants acknowledged the limited, or complete absence of, street lights within communities, especially in the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods. Even though some residents acknowledged that there are intermittent street lights on major roads, street lights are rarely present on the narrow lanes within communities in the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods.

In an interview with a 37-year-old female trader in the Tamale central market, who is a resident of Zogbeli, she remarked that returning home in the evenings after trading strikes a fear of being victimized in her on a daily basis:

There is widespread darkness around the school park in Zogbeli, and thieves hide there to attack innocent pedestrians; and this has continued for some time now. However, with the initiative of the Assembly man, the community members are contributing some money and soliciting support from the Assembly to install street lights—at least around the school part, even if there are no lights in between our homes. (Personal interview with 37-year-old woman, youth leader, Zogbeli, Tamale)

Lending support to the need for street lights in between houses in the Zogbeli community, a 67-year-old man, a respected opinion leader, remarked:

With improved lighting within the neighbourhoods, the cases of theft of motor bikes, domestic animals, and birds (goats, sheep, fowls), as well as sexual harassment of women, will be reduced in the community. (Personal interview with 67-year-old man, opinion leader, Zogbeli, Tamale, 06/02/2017)

Coleman (2014) acknowledged Ghana government's recognition of the importance of street light in combating crime and enhancing businesses, but the increased cost of investment and maintenance of street lights hinder the expected widespread installation of street lights within cities in Ghana and many developing countries in general. In a similar vein, Antwi-Otoo (2010) noted:

[...] the Bawku Police Command has blamed the increase in crime, especially killings, in the municipality on the lack of street lights in the township. (Antwi-Otoo, 2010)

The Ghana News Agency (21 June 2015) reported that the Ghana government declared

[...] the initiative is to improve night-time visibility in dangerous road sections and during adverse weather conditions, improve night-time security and enhance socio-economic activities. (GNA, 2015)

Furthermore, participants in an FGD in Tamale mentioned the limited supply of other services, such as water and sanitation, in large sections of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhoods. The quest for these services leads to some exposure to crime. Among the discussants in the Aboabo-Tamale, access to toilet facilities in the community is a large problem, because many houses do not have in-built toilet facilities; hence, attempts to take advantage over the nearby forest and other unoccupied lands, in response to nature's call, can result in attacks on innocent people by criminals who live in the forest. Detailed investigation into the contributions of unoccupied lands and buildings to criminal activities is therefore warranted.

6.3.7 Unoccupied lands and buildings as perceived contributing factors to crime

Inadequate city planning or non-rigorous enforcement of planning regulations frequently result in abandoned projects, especially government projects, or unoccupied lands, both of which serve as conducive meeting points for gangs—a situation commonly seen in Tamale. Thus incomplete or abandoned buildings within the city serve as hideouts for miscreants, as was revealed in an FGD in Zogbeli. Within the city of Tamale, as reported by Yeboah (2000), disputed lands and buildings are unkempt within the CBD, and such places are becoming homes or meeting points for miscreants. In a similar perspective, an opinion leader in Russian Bungalow stated that some open spaces around Russian Bungalow are occupied, but the legal basis of these occupants is unknown.

6.3.8 Chieftaincy and religious divisions

Peculiar to the challenges associated with provision of security in Tamale is the frequent mention of chieftaincy and religious divisiveness. In a KII, an opinion leader in Aboabo-Tamale stated:

Since the death of the overlord of Dagbon, it has been difficult talking about these two issues [chieftaincy and religious issues]. People take a very strong stand, and it should not surprise you that families do not want to have anything to do with each other because of the chieftaincy dispute. (Personal interview with 65-year-old man, opinion leader, Aboabo-Tamale, 23/01/2017)

It was collectively agreed upon in an FGD that the most un-talked of issues in Tamale are the issues related to the chieftaincy, because talks on that raise tensions and therefore affect the peace and security of the entire region. In an interview with a former Assembly man, he remarked:

The chieftaincy dispute has been a long-standing problem that affects the peace and security of the city, and we continue to pray that one day Dagbon will find a lasting peace. (Personal interview with 71-year-old man, opinion leader, Zogbeli, 12/01/2016)

These findings are consistent with the scholarly work of Ladouceur (1972), which traced the history of the chieftaincy in the Dagbon state and the effect on development of the entire region.

6.4 Chapter summary

The desire for a secure urban environment or neighbourhood in order to foster economic, social, and political development cannot be over-emphasized. But the desire

for a secured and peaceful space within cities in Ghana is being challenged by various physical, social, cultural, and political issues and by their exacerbation by current global development issues of urbanization, globalization, and neoliberalism. In the context of Kumasi and Tamale, even though specific routine activities with the potential to limit efforts to provide security are cross-cutting, their intensity varies. Some specific issues thwarting efforts to provide security include the rapidly sprawling cities, the increasing informality, emerging uncontrolled youth groups, political interference and the decriminalizing of criminal offences by politicians, inadequate street lighting, youth unemployment, and unoccupied lands and incomplete buildings within the urban space, as well as the peculiar issue of chieftaincy and religious factionalism in the case of Tamale. These factors all variedly challenge the state agencies in the quest to maintain internal security. Put differently, the current spatial arrangements challenge the state efforts toward maintaining urban security in addition to the limited capacity of the Ghana Police Service to adequately provide internal security, which results in unequal access to the state security services. This compels an examination of the informal strategies employed by residents as alternatives to the limited state security services to circumvent crime within the Kumasi and Tamale metropolitan areas. The details follow in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN: INFORMAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES IN KUMASI AND TAMALE

7.1 Introduction

The results so far indicate that there is inequality in maintaining urban safety in the two research localities. It thus goes without saying that, within these cities, crime prevention strategies or approaches are variedly pursued in line with the immediate environmental needs. Indeed, the study has so far established the fact that the current crime prevention strategies include arrest of suspects, engaging the judicial system and correctional institutions, and in a very rare case death sentence (the last execution carried out in Ghana was in 1993). Theoretically, “these measures are more correctly referred to as crime control” (Welsh & Farrington, 2010: 2). Conceptually, crime prevention more often refers to efforts or strategies that serve as disincentives for crime to occur in the first place. What remains common in understanding crime prevention and crime control strategies is the fact that both intend to forestall the occurrence of crime in the future. On the other hand, whilst crime prevention commonly operates outside the formal judicial system, crime control fully rests within the operational limits of the formal justice system (*ibid.*).

It is against this background that this section examines the major informal crime prevention strategies employed by those marginalized by the formal system within the built environment of the two metropolises and how they use such strategies to navigate their security challenges. Admittedly—and as clearly demonstrated by the results of the study—there is no one-size-fits-all method, as different people have different opinions and thus employ different strategies. There are of course exceptions, as the results of this study clearly revealed some commonalities irrespective of people’s socio-economic status. In this respect, the discussion of the informal crime prevention strategies is

considered as an alternative approach to the more state led (formal) approach to crime fighting; and it will therefore recommend and highlight the need for governments to recognise and inculcate these emerging or self-organising strategies into the more formal crime prevention strategies.

The discussions that follow are based on responses from the respondents in the survey, as well as on those from the KIIs. It purposely did not address some of the crime control measures or criminal control measures used in some communities, such as lynching of suspected criminals, since these acts are considered illegal. Also, there was a growing consensus not only on the unlawful nature of such measures but more importantly the tendency to their abuse (with some criminals using them to settle personal scores).

This section sets out to address two main questions as they relate to informal situational crime prevention strategies in the research communities. First, it interrogates what we know about the use of informal strategies in the communities; and second, what we need to know concerning the effectiveness or otherwise of the strategies.

7.2 The prevalence of informal crime prevention strategies in the research locations

The data from the research locations (Kumasi and Tamale) reveal different types of informal crime prevention strategies employed in the two metropolises (see Table 7.1). This is not surprising because, it is evident in literature that criminal activities are not evenly distributed and therefore require different preventive strategies (Bagson & Owusu, 2016; Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016; Owusu et al., 2016). Nevertheless, property crimes such as robbery and burglary occur more often in middle- and upper-class residential areas as this study shows. This is possibly because of offenders' ease of

access to easily concealable goods such as jewellery, and electronic as well as physical cash within such neighbourhoods. Hence, households' perception of personal safety and estimated levels of crime tend to differ based on their respective socio-economic status, and so correspondingly the various strategies they adopt to address any security concerns may vary accordingly.

As previous studies (see Bagson & Owusu, 2016; Owusu et al., 2016) have indicated, lower-class areas are generally associated with high crime rates being facilitated by limited neighbourhood planning and general decline in access to infrastructure and public services. As Peterson et al. (2006: 169) noted:

Even the most casual observer is aware of the ways in which such spatial concentrations of disadvantaged [...] populations are associated with high levels of social problems including street crime. At the same time, they see that low crime, violence, and other social ills pervade in more economically advantaged [...] communities.

From the study respondents, it was obvious that the use of burglar proofs is prevalent in the two metropolises, with about 30 percent (see Table 7.1) of respondents in each city referring to use of burglar proofs as informal crime preventive strategies. Indeed, the use of burglar proofs and locks, which come in various forms and types (formal and informal), is in line with a recent popular catch-phrase that has caught on with most residents in the communities: '*Don't Invite Theft! A Guide to Your Home and Business Security*'. During the KIIs, a security expert passionately explained how one can reduce the chances of one's home being burgled, adding quite emphatically:

If you own a house or manage a business, the fear of a burglary, a robbery, or a major shoplifting loss is probably never far from your mind. Most often these are crimes of opportunity. They happen because

the criminal spots an easy chance and takes it. So make it tough on him or her. You can dramatically reduce the chances of your home or business being burgled, with some common sense and the installation of simple effective security measures such as good locks, window locks, and security grills. Odds are, if you are careless, the burglars will hit your business sooner or later—so practise good security. (Personal interview with a security expert in Kumasi; October, 2016)

Table 7.1: Informal crime prevention strategies in research locations

Informal crime prevention strategy	Research locations (in percentages)	
	Kumasi	Tamale
Alarm/CCTV	3.48	*
Locks/burglar-proof	29.50	30.67
Use of dogs	6.87	2.44
Fence wall	11.04	*
Caretakers/security guard	15.43	17.33
Community solidarity	17.00	31.11
Prayer/magic	16.66	18.45
Total	100.00	100.00

Source: Household survey, 2014

The results from the study showed that the use of community solidarity is very common in both cities. It was found that this community solidarity involves a series of activities and programmes aimed at creating awareness on crime prevention strategies at home and the neighbourhood in general. This concerns people working on a common agenda, in this case, towards enhancing personal and community level safety. This phenomenon is what Shaw and McKay (1942) described in social disorganisation theory as an organised society. Building community solidarity and becoming what has been described as ‘eyes-on-the-street’ (Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016) are a commendable

way to get involved in local level crime prevention efforts (Owusu et al., 2015). During interactions with the Assembly men in the two research locations, it was established that the eyes-on-the-street activities enable neighbours to immediately make report of suspicious behaviours to the police. This invariably assists and enables the police to better target and act on criminal behaviour in the community. Most of the agencies observed to be involved in these watch-dog activities include guards of shops in the street, residents and regular commuters of a street.

As noted earlier (see Owusu et al., 2015; Bagson & Owusu, 2016), the good community solidarity enjoyed in these localities is particularly aided by their architectural designs, especially in many lower-class neighbourhoods where multiple household apartments prevail and are commonly occupied by individuals of the lower-income category (ISSER, 2013). Such multiple-household apartments engender social cohesion (Sampson, 2012), which increases the chances of strong guardianship within the neighbourhoods in most of the times. Indeed, the absence of walls around multiple household apartments increase visibility in the neighbourhoods – a key principle in crime prevention through environmental design (Newman, 1996; Lersch, 2007).

Characteristically, the use of such neighbourhoods as commercial and residential areas as well as the readily available unemployed youth contributes to natural surveillance (eye-on-the-street) as revealed in this study. As already noted, these conditions encourage social bonding among residents which is a disincentive to property crime such as robbery as intimated by Appiahene-Gyamfi (2003) and Owusu et al. (2015). These factors notwithstanding, it was gathered during the in-depth interviews with the police and city authorities that lower-class neighbourhoods breed criminals. For instance, a key informant interview with an Assembly man in Kumasi, made a statement with respect to crime in Oforikrom (a middle-class residential area):

If you talk about burglaries, stealing, break-ins, and robberies, the perpetrators are mostly found in Aboabo, Eighteen, and Ashtown [all lower-class residential areas]. They come from there to rob people [middle-class households] in this place. (Personal interview with Assemblyman of Oforikrom; October, 2016)

This perception was further collaborated in interviews with some key informants especially police officers in charge of the Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit (DOVVSU) and discussants in FGDs—who reiterated that the frequency of crimes such as rape and defilement appear higher in lower-socio-economic communities. This finding can be found in some earlier studies (see Wrigley-Asante, 2016).

Another important result worth examining is the use of prayer and magic, which attracted almost 17 and 18 percent in Kumasi and Tamale, respectively. Typically, some of the key informants during the field work were of the opinion that the disproportionate use of such informal crime prevention strategies is outmoded, evinces ‘backwardness’, and can potentially compromise the essential role of local government—which is to ensure community safety. As indicated in Table 7.1, residents’ dependence on prayer and magico-religious tendencies cut across both metropolises—although, like all informal strategies, there are bound to be intra- and inter-community variations (see subsequent sub-sections for detailed discussion). Suffice it to add, however, that the efficacy (in the perception of adherents of the practice) of magic and prayer is in line with Guri and Laate’s (2008) analysis of ‘community organizational development in south-western Ghana’, which indicates that punishment evolving from ritual institutions can be deadly for the perpetrators. Their appraisal, however, revealed that modernity appears to be an instrumental reducing agent overshadowing the existence of some of these deadly institutions or practices. In

this light, Guri and Laate's (2008) advocated that positively functional indigenous institutions that seek to improve wellbeing and safety require continuous efforts to sustain them.

7.2.1 Informal crime prevention strategies and the maintenance of safety in Kumasi

The use of informal crime prevention in the research locations is not in doubt, as prior studies (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013; Wig, 2016) have indicated these strategies are age-old approaches especially among indigenous people. Even though the introduction of formal crime prevention strategies appears to have reduced the use of informal strategies, the results indicate that there still persist commonalities that some residents in Kumasi depend on. This is not only because of their socio-cultural beliefs and lived experience but, more critically, due to the dwindling trust and limited access to formal crime prevention strategies (as indicated earlier). Thus, the use of formal and informal approaches and the evidence from respondents concerning what works should be examined more closely. This will reveal a series of legitimate tools the police have and those the community can use to reduce crime and build public safety.

As illustrated in Figure 7.1, residents of the middle-class socio-economic areas have engaged, at different levels, in all the seven major informal crime prevention strategies, whereas the upper- and lower-class socio-economic areas engage in five and four of the seven strategies, respectively. This is reflective of the desire and extent to which residents as individuals or groups take charge of the security of their lives and property. It also illustrates what Stepputat et al. (2007: 15) describe as

the increasing securitization of everyday life [which] reinforces the spatial and social segregation between well-policed wealthy areas and poor areas where informal or illicit security providers impose their

own rules with little formal interference from state authorities—which is not to say that state representatives do not have influence.




Figure 7.1: Informal crime prevention strategies in Kumasi

Source: Household survey, 2014

According to the study results, the use of locks/burglar proofs is a prominent strategy among the respondents in Kumasi and across the socio-economic status levels. However, its usage was particularly prominent (32%) in the middle-income communities, compared to the low-income (28%) and high-income (20%) communities. There were several reasons for this. According to the participants in the FGDs, Ghana’s being rated a lower middle-income country, earning between \$3,976 to \$13,275 per head annually (an average per capita income of about \$1,820), signifies that the middle-income group is expanding. This expanding middle-income group manifests clearly in the emerging sprawling neighbourhoods since, in principle, owning one’s own house is one of the major needs for most rising middle-income group members. In general, in its modern form, these new communities of residential housing

estates appearing in the peri-urban areas are often characterized by a closed perimeter of walls and fences. They usually consist of small residential streets and include various shared amenities. Some respondents argued that they have a negative effect on the net social capital of the broader community and tend to compromise their security. This explains why many use burglar proofs to ward off potential criminals, and those who can afford it employ the services of private security guards.

According to the key informants, although cities are witnessing economic prosperity—and, by extension, spatial development—unfortunately these new neighbourhoods are also experiencing their share of criminal activities, particularly residential burglaries. During the FGDs, participants unanimously acknowledged the fact that there is really no such thing as a burglar-proof home, since even a high-tech security system can be breached; and if someone is dedicated enough, skilled enough, and has the proper tools, they can break into a property regardless of the security system. FGD participants, however, contended that residents in these newly developing areas do take proactive steps to prevent future victimization by making their residences harder targets, emphasizing that these basic preventive measures can deter the average criminal and send them elsewhere. In an FGD with seven men in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood, it was revealed that the common use of burglar proofs proves useful because residents spend considerable parts of the day outside the community and therefore rely on the burglar proofs in their attempts to prevent crime. The effectiveness of such devices has been examined by Kruger and Landman (2003) and Perlgut (1981), with the increasing commodification of these devices being noted by Lynch (2002).

Interestingly, the use of community solidarity and magico-religious strategies remains the preserve of the lower- and middle-income communities in Kumasi as indicated in

Figure 7.1. As earlier noted, these neighbourhoods enjoy high social cohesion, and this is particularly so in Kumasi—which, despite being the second-largest city in Ghana, is virtually a homogenous society with about 80.7 percent of the residents from the Asante ethnic group (GSS, 2013) and further appear to be bounded together by the revered monarchical chieftaincy structure as revealed in this study. It was revealed that the absence of informal social control among the residents of the higher-income neighbourhoods is frequently thought to be an inducing agent to criminogenic tendencies in the vicinity. However, for residents in the lower-income areas, crime was not perceived to be a ‘problem’. Their narrative suggests that particular features of the area, including its resident and demographic profile, geographic location, and the presence of some degree of informal social control, enable tenants to contain crime. Of great significance is the disproportionate use of magico-religious crime prevention strategies, which, for all intents and purposes, are deemed to be outmoded, evince backwardness, and can potentially compromise local government’s essential role of ensuring community safety. Be that as it may, it was observed that many residents in the lower-income communities perceive these magico-religious strategies to be capable of commanding supernatural powers.

7.2.2. Informal crime prevention strategies and the maintenance of safety in Tamale

As shown in Figure 7.2, aside from the use of dogs as an informal crime prevention strategy—a particularity of the residents of the middle-income neighbourhood—about 30 percent of the respondents in the city of Tamale rely on community solidarity as an informal crime prevention strategy. From this figure, 39 percent of the residents of the lower-income neighbourhood, as well as 27 percent and 25 percent of the residents of the middle- and higher-income neighbourhoods accounting respectively rely on

community solidarity as a crime prevention strategy. Put differently, it can be deduced that the use of community solidarity as a crime prevention strategy declines with increasing socioeconomic neighbourhood status or exhibits a negative relationship.




Figure 7.2: Informal crime prevention strategies in Tamale
Source: Household survey, 2014

This is in line with earlier work that found a reliance on community solidarity for the security of neighbourhoods from the pre-colonial era to contemporary times (Murdock, 1967; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2013). Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) further demonstrated the significant contributions of neighbourhoods to the securitization of a community especially in situations where governments do not have the capacity to provide adequate internal security. The dependence on community solidarity was revealed by an opinion leader in Aboabo-Tamale:

We know that we do not have a police station in our community, so the best way to survive the increasing numbers of people coming into our community and the consequent fear of crime is to seek communal support—and that is how we secure our lives and property. (Personal interviews with an opinion leader, Aboabo-Tamale, 21/02/2017)

This interview extract is in line with Steputat et al.'s (2007) description of aspects of Kincaid's (2001) model of security as 'informalisation of security in poorer neighbourhoods where citizens organize themselves against common crime'. Also of noticeable impact (31%) among the informal crime prevention strategies in the city of Tamale is the use of locks and burglar proofs. Figure 7.2 shows that 37 percent of the residents of the middle-income areas commonly use locks and burglar proofs as crime prevention strategies. During an FGD in the middle-income areas, participants indicated an increasing desire for sophisticated locks and burglar proofs to secure their properties, partly because many of the residents spend much of their time outside the community, and their inability to engage a private security company compels the use of locks and burglar proofs. In an interview with a youth leader in Zogbeli, he stated:

Residents are now buying locks to secure their residences because residential facilities are becoming vulnerable to crime, especially during the daytime when the community becomes almost empty—since people engage in livelihood activities outside the community, and children also leave their homes to attend school. (Personal interview with a 32-year-old man, youth leader, Zogbeli, 14/02/2017)

Similarly, 27 percent of the residents of the low-income neighbourhood are more likely to engage in prayer and rely on magic than residents of the middle- (15%) and high-income (13%) areas. In an FGD with seven female members in Aboabo-Tamale,

participants expressed despair at their inability to access the police services, which had set in motion a decline in trust among most residents in the police and therefore placing their hopes and trust in God. Expressing strong conviction on the support of magic in the prevention of crime, an opinion leader and resident of Aboabo-Tamale recounted the successes in the use of magic for retrieving stolen items in the community, citing a case involving his brother to buttress his claims:

My brother, who trades in textiles, once had his goods stolen; but upon consulting a mallam [Islamic scholar] in the community, the thief returned the items to the spot they were stolen; so the use of magic and prayer in the community is very supportive in crime prevention. (Personal interview with an opinion leader, Aboabo-Tamale, 16/02/2017)

7.3 The use of informal crime prevention strategies in Kumasi and Tamale

In as much as the selected study sites within each city (lower-, middle-, and upper-class neighbourhoods) individually possess unique demographic characteristics it appears that feeds into different criminal experiences and different strategies to prevent the incidence of crime. Given the differences and similarities in the socio-cultural practices in the two cities (Kumasi and Tamale), it came as no surprise when the study identified differences in the use of informal crime prevention strategies, although there were many broad similarities (as individually discussed above). The following discussion presents an overview of different individual and neighbourhood levels characteristics in the use of informal crime prevention strategies in the two cities—and particularly among the three socio-economic neighbourhoods.

Predominantly, the use of locks/burglar proofs as well as caretakers/security guards was very common in the two cities, albeit the sophistication of the type of locks/burglar

proofs was greater in the affluent and higher-income socio-economic neighbourhoods. During the KIIs, it was revealed that an important feature of upper-class neighbourhoods in Kumasi is the dominant use of the services of private security organizations (PSOs). In addition, the upper-class neighbourhoods were characterised by walls and barbed wires surrounding detached houses and therefore increasing the gap between the targets and the potential offender. This outlook associated with higher income residential areas was similarly reported by Owusu et al., (2016) as a strategy of crime prevention.

The situation in Tamale, however, presents a different scenario, owing to the unique features of the upper-class neighbourhood (Russia Bungalow). Although Russia Bungalow is noted for its relatively 'modern' residential facilities, they are devoid of (high) walls with barbed wire, a dominant feature of houses in high-income areas in Kumasi. Rather, the houses in Russia Bungalow have been secured with hedges or wooden planks, and these crime prevention methods have further been complemented with the use of locally bred dogs and with 'watchmen' recruited among the local community members—unlike the case of Kumasi, where residents use the services of PSOs and exotic dogs. Indeed, it was observed during the field work that the absence of high walls/fence in the high-income areas in Tamale (Russian Bungalow) facilitates interaction and solidarity among residents—unlike the dominant use of high walls/fence with private security around residential facilities in Kumasi, which invariably has affected the latter's level of community solidarity. It can therefore be tentatively concluded that the use of community solidarity or the building of community cohesion declines with increasing affluence or increasing socio-economic status in both cities. Another noticeable difference in the use of informal crime prevention strategies within areas in the two cities is the use of alarms/CCTV as a

common strategy across the three socio-economic communities, though this is not a priority in the city of Tamale.

It was clear from the analysis of the data that the use of magic and religion, particularly African Traditional Religion (ATR), cut across geographical boundaries as well as the socio-economic spectrum in the quest for ‘appropriate crime preventive strategies’ (see also Oteng-Ababio et al., 2016). In Kumasi, it was realized that ATR, popularly and often wrongfully termed ‘juju’, offered a method of control often used by the citizenry to keep potential criminals at bay and, in some cases, in perpetual bondage. The analysis indicates that this control mechanism was widespread and very popular among all segments of the society—and in some cases, it serves even to impede attempts to institute effective formal crime preventive strategies. In such instances, the protection of the citizenry becomes unduly hindered. These instances made it clear that formal crime prevention strategies should be understood from the perspective of people’s belief systems, making it pertinent for policymakers in particular to understand this emerging perspective if appropriate and sustainable crime preventive measures are to be fashioned to stem the tide of such practices.

A case in point was reported on 15 October 2008 by Issah Alhassan, a *Ghanaian Chronicle* reporter in Kumasi, with a caption: ‘Invocation of Antoa Nyamaa by NDC Otumfuo’s Chief Priest pounces on Agyekum, S.K. Boafo agrees but Gen Mosquito justifies his man’s action’ (see Box 1 for detailed discussion). Ironically, this incident not only dominated the electronic and print media for months, but also attracted diverse comments from the then government and its functionaries, the traditional authorities, and other party bigwigs across the political divide in the country.

A similar incident occurred on 3 February 2014, when supporters of the then opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the Okaikoi North Constituency in the Greater Accra Region stormed the national headquarters of the party in Asylum Down and evoked the powerful ‘Antoa Nyama’ deity on the Member of Parliament (MP) for Okaikoi Central Constituency, accusing him of meddling in the election of constituency officers for the party. The supporters, who stormed the party office clad in red armbands with a bottle of Schnapps, a two-page petition, and placards bearing the inscription ‘Patrick Boamah must stay away from Okaikoi North’, ‘Patrick Yaw Boamah you are a devil to the NPP’, poured libations and evoked the powerful Ashanti deity on the MP and his supporters in the constituency.

On 4 March 2016, Daniel K. Kenu reporting on *Graphic online* under the caption: ‘Curses galore at NPP Manhyia North Constituency’, reported on how an initially peaceful press conference organized by some aggrieved members of the NPP at the Manhyia North Constituency in the Ashanti Region degenerated into an invocation of the powerful Ashanti deity, Antoa Nyamaa, to kill any of the regional party officials who might attempt to foment trouble by employing the services of ‘macho-men’ during the rerun of their polling station election. The press conference, held by 195 disenfranchised voters, was also used to invoke curses so that the gods would completely wipe out the family of the individual who might have hired thugs (macho-men), who were allegedly hired by the Ashanti Regional Chairman of the party—Bernard Antwi-Bosiako, otherwise known as Chairman Wontumi—to assault them the previous week.

Box 1: Invocation of Antoa Nyamaa by NDC OTUMFUO'S CHIEF PRIEST POUNCES ON AGYEKUM, SK Boafo agrees but Gen Mosquito justifies his man's action

SOME prominent chiefs and traditional priests have expressed their discontentment at the Ashanti Regional Chairman of the opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC), Mr. Daniel Ohene Agyekum's public invocation of the Antoa River god, in an attempt to prove his party's innocence, following an allegation of bloody attack on some members of the NPP. The NDC Regional chairman's action has been condemned and described as untoward, unnecessary and a very bad example of political leadership in the country. Barely 24 hours after the Regional chairman's action, opinions of some traditional rulers and fetish priests were sought as to the relevance of Mr. Agyekum's action and its devastating consequences on the nation's quest for a more vibrant, democratic and political maturity. The Nsumankwaahene, chief in-charge of spiritual matters for the Asantehene, Baffour Domfeh Gyeabour III, told various radio stations in Kumasi, yesterday, that the NDC Chairman's curse was borne more out of hatred rather than a desire to establish innocence.....

Assessing the spiritual consequences on matters of that nature, a powerful fetish priest at Atwima Atwedie, Komfo Eric Nana Subruku, observed that the gods do not act in haste in such instances, but instead conduct an extensive investigations before arriving at a decision as to whether to grant the request of the person who cast the spell or not. He, however, did not see anything wrong with the NDC's chairman's action but pointed out that the invocation of gods should have been the last option. Meanwhile, callers and text messages into radio programmes in Kumasi have condemned the act and accused the NDC of wrongful act. The former Ashanti Regional Minister, in a bizarre conduct, last Monday, publicly invoked the powers of Antoa River god and 34 other deities of Asanteman, to prove the NDC's innocence of a reported bloody attack on some members of the ruling New Patriotic Party, at Anlo-Sobolo in the Subin constituency.

On his part, the Minister of Chieftaincy and Culture and the Member of Parliament (MP) for Subin, the area where the clash occurred, Hon S. K. Boafo, expressed bewilderment at the attitude of the NDC Chief Scribe, reports George Kyei Frimpong. 'I'm really surprised, I'm shocked to hear that Ohene Agyekum indeed made those statements, he has been a Regional Minister before, and no amount of provocation should make him want to kill somebody,' the Minister stressed. According to Mr. Boafo, Mr. Agyekum's statement suggested that he had the intention to kill, adding that he should do the gentlemanly thing by apologising to the public for the sake of peace. The General Secretary of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), Mr. Johnson Asiedu Nketiah, however, jumped to the defense of Mr. Agyekum and justified the option he took. He argued that the NDC Regional Chairman also invoked the Antoa god on himself (Agyekum), the NDC and those who had lied against the party, and so the public should stop accusing the Regional Chairman falsely. He maintained that it was important that sometimes agitated people used the deities to settle contentious issues, adding 'What then are the gods for if not for justice?' Reacting to calls that Mr. Agyekum could have used better means to settle the issue, Mr. Asiedu-Nketiah noted, 'there were several options for him, but he has decided to go for this one. If he had gone to court, someone would have asked him why he didn't resort to Antoa for justice.' He explained that the gods were there for justice, and that the people of the Ashanti Region usually consulted the oracles for justice, since it was the most effective way of securing it. 'I'm surprised that the Nsumankwahene could be condemning the use of invocations. He should rather be happy that people are using his god for justice,' he concluded.

Source: Issah Alhassan in Kumasi, Ghanaian Chronicle, October 15, 2008

<https://www.modernghana.com/news/186410/1/invocation-of-antoa-nyamaa-by-ndc-otumfuos-chief-p.htm>

As already indicated, the study results confirmed the use of religion and magic in Tamale. However, the analysis revealed that, while the residents in Kumasi relied more on ATR and beliefs, the people of Tamale had unbridled trust in mallams (an honorific title given to Islamic scholars in Africa; see Box 2). In recent times, the police in Tamale have arrested several of these mallams whose sole purpose is to play on the ignorance of their unsuspecting victims. For example, in August 2013, the police arrested a mallam fraudster barely a week after a similar arrest was made involving a self-acclaimed mallam who defrauded several persons of thousands of Ghana cedis. From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in both Kumasi and Tamale, residents use both prayer and magic, but the frequency of such practices differs across geographical areas, irrespective of the socio-economic status.

Box 2: Fake Mallams Defraud Tamale Residents

SOME CRIMINAL entities posing as ‘Mallams’ or spiritualists are springing up in the Tamale Metropolis and some parts of Northern Region. They are treacherously extorting huge sums of money from their victims mostly businessmen and women under the guise of making them richer. These criminals who call themselves ‘money doublers’ and healers of all kinds of diseases are using the media as a platform to popularize themselves and misinforming their victims to believe that they are credible and have the powers to double their business capitals, give spiritual protection and give children to desperate barren women, among others. What seems to have made these criminals gain more groups and receiving high patronage or customers from the business community is the rate at which the media, especially television and radio stations, spice the advertisement of these self-styled Mallams, which compel people to see them as credible spiritualists. They have defrauded several business people in and outside the Northern Region with huge sums of money, and most of these cases have been reported to the Tamale Police.

Last weekend for instance, several people phoned in to join discussions on the issue of fake money doublers invading Tamale and victimizing people on Kesmi FM super morning show, a Tamale based radio station, and hosted by Fred Chidi. The Northern Regional Police Public Relations Officer, ASP Ebenezer Tetteh, who was interviewed on the show, confirmed the invasion of the fake money doublers but denied that they were behind most of the violence in the area. Even though the public insisted that the money doublers were those behind the recent shooting and killing of two persons and the burning of a radio station in Tamale, the Police PRO said that the Police were yet to confirm that, since their investigations were still ongoing. Also, members of the Concerned Citizens Association of Tamale (CCAT) are blaming the Tamale Police of treating the criminals with kids gloves.

According to the President of the CCAT, Alhassan Basharu Daballi, most people in Tamale had lost total confidence in the Police, because of the way and manner they had allegedly ‘compromised on their professionalism and integrity by aiding the money doublers’. Speaking in an interview with *The Chronicle* in Tamale, the President of CCAT insisted that, some of the top Police officials in the Metropolis did not only wine and dine with the money doublers, but also go to them for spiritual powers. He maintained that several cases of fraud and extortions had been reported against these money doublers but the Police had always failed to act on them, a situation he said was making the perpetrators more powerful. He said some of the money doublers now control a large number of youth who support their criminal activities. Mr. Daballi alleged that the recent shooting incident in Tamale that led to the killing of two persons, Alhassan Naziru and Mustapha Abdul Rashid were masterminded by two rival money doublers. He therefore called on the Minister of Interior and the Inspector General of Police to transfer all the long serving police officers in Tamale to another region, as the surest way of reversing the trend.

From Edmond Gyebi, Tamale

<http://thechronicle.com.gh/fake-mallams-defraud-tamale-residents/>

Suffice it to add that both cities have seen unprecedented population growth and spatial expansion, which coincides with increasing crime rates. Other studies (see Doan & Oduro, 2012; Owusu & Oteng-Ababio, 2015) have also associated rising levels of

urbanisation and sprawling in Accra and Kumasi to rise in the frequency of criminal activities. According to Grand (2009), the rapid rate of urbanisation in recent times is probably being engendered by the global neoliberal economic policies and consequently the bulging middle class urban dwellers even though the income inequality gap is widening. At the same time, slums and poverty appear evident as land has become an expensive commodity within the Ghanaian urban space.

Associated with the influx of global capital to large Ghanaian cities is the influx of expatriate staff of multinational corporations (MNCs), UN agencies, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and so on, as well as nationals of West African countries fleeing civil and political unrest and economic downturns in their own countries (Owusu, 2008). Owusu adds that while the influx of international migrants puts pressure on housing and other services, it also exacerbates the existing inequalities within cities. More importantly, in the view of the police, this influx also brings criminals, further compounding the security situation:

The influx of criminals from other parts of West Africa, especially of Nigerians, has changed the situation with crime. This 'new' type of armed robbery associated with killing started with the Nigerians, but Ghanaians are currently involved. In fact, the police are able to detect the status or nationality of criminals based on the nature and intensity of the brutality meted out to victims. For example, only on a few occasions do Ghanaian criminals get involved in killing, rape, and firing guns during crime. On the other hand, crimes involving Nigerians are commonly associated with killings and other forms of brutality. (Interview with police key informant, Accra)

7.4 Chapter summary

The use of informal crime prevention strategies in the cities of Kumasi and Tamale is quite significant, although the strategies vary across the different socio-economic divides. For instance, whereas the use of caretakers/security guards as well as locks/burglar proofs is common among residents of Kumasi, among the common informal strategies used in Tamale are magico-religious tendencies, locks/burglar proofs, caretakers/security guards, and community solidarity, and these traverse all socio-economic neighbourhoods. Specifically, the use of community solidarity and prayer/magico-religious tendencies decreases with increasing socio-economic status of the neighbourhoods in the both cities.

Furthermore, the study has revealed practical advice and strategies that can help one actively reduce the incidence of crime and make life safer and more relaxed in a community. The results show that just by introducing a few common-sense practices (such as adopting the eye-on-the-street approach) into one's daily routine, one can give oneself, family, friends, and neighbours much greater peace of mind. Put differently, the results revealed that by ensuring community cohesion and solidarity, the community and the police together can help to prevent and reduce crime. The results, particularly from the lower-income communities, point to the fact that it takes only a little effort to make a criminal's life more difficult, and such strategies are very practical, affordable, and based on sound common sense principles. Thus, carefully appreciating and making good use of these preventive measures wherever possible will complement in areas where the formal sector falls short.

This common-sense approach is crucial, since all too often city managers hear from citizenry and police chiefs alike that 'We need more cops.' The study acknowledges that, in reality, while these are often genuine calls, in many cases the answer is not

about providing more personnel; rather, it tends to be the case that security agencies rely too often on tactics that are heavily dependent on personnel rather than on tactics that engage and require others in our communities to help reduce crime. For example, and as highlighted by a discussant in an FGD, retail stores are in the best position to reduce shoplifting; apartment owners are in the best position to prevent burglary or drug dealing on their property; malls are the best situated to reduce auto theft from their parking lots; and bars and nightclubs can create crime havens or minimize offending opportunities. In practical terms, holding these entities to account is less costly than providing additional police stations and policing personnel (which are legitimate government constitutional responsibilities), and an added benefit is that this will appropriately place the responsibility for crime control on those who have the most power, authority, and ability to reduce it. Otherwise, everyone else will be subsidizing the shortcomings of property owners and will therefore be formalizing some of the tried and tested informal strategies that hold the key to maintaining a safer city. The next chapter then gives a summary of the key findings of the study, relevant conclusions from the findings and specific recommendations pertaining to the role of informal crime prevention strategies in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolitan areas.

CHAPTER EIGHT: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Introduction

As indicated in the previous chapters, increasing urbanization and globalization vis-à-vis growth in economic fortunes and opportunities have given birth to various crimes and criminal activities in Ghana. These developments have altered the effectiveness and efficiency of the current institutional arrangements for protecting life and property. While sections of society bemoan the shortfalls in the activities of security agencies, whose responsibility it is to provide internal security, others who have completely lost hope turn to calling for other interventions, including the use of informal preventive methods. This study therefore focused on ascertaining the role of informal preventive methods within the urban space of Ghana, drawing on the experiences of residents in Kumasi and Tamale. Using a mixed methods approach, the study set itself the following specific objectives: to examine the official institutional arrangements for crime prevention and control in Ghana; to assess residents' perception of safety within the research locations; to examine the major challenges impeding the provision of safety in the research locations; and to examine how those who feel insecure secure themselves in the research locations.

8.2 Summary of major findings

The major findings are summarized in tandem with the objectives outlined in the previous section. The first objective, which examined the official institutional arrangements for crime prevention, was undertaken by examining the human capacity of the police in terms of the police–civilian population ratio, given the increasing urban population and spatial expansion. The study found that the current police–population

ratio does not match up to the requirements for adequate policing as recommended by the UN—a ratio of 1:500. Moreover, the capacity of the police is further stretched by the rapid spatial expansion being experienced in urban Ghana. In pursuing the second objective, the respondents' perceptions of safety were gauged using individual- and community-level demographic characteristics. It was found that not only do various demographic characteristics differently affect peoples' perception of safety but sources of information contribute to peoples' construction of safety within their environment. Thus the influence of mass media on peoples' perception of safety was widely recognized in the KIIs. The study then assessed the changes impeding efforts by the police, communities, or individuals. Using responses from key informants, the study revealed the various socio-cultural as well as environmental factors that challenge efforts by the police as well as by the populace in the quest to maintain law and order. Finally, the study assessed how those who feel insecure go about securing themselves within the research locations. The long-held perception that the use of informal crime prevention strategies is the preserve of the poor proved incorrect, according to the findings of this study. The following sections further explain the major findings emanating from this study.

8.2.1 Official institutional arrangements for crime prevention and control in Ghana

Mandated by the Constitution of Ghana to maintain internal security, the Ghana Police Service has been operating on a vertically structured order of command, along with the supporting role of other state agencies such as the military, Prison Service, Fire Service, and Immigration Service. As a lead agency in the provision of internal security, the Police Service relies on directives from the national headquarters regarding their mode of operations, supported by 11 regional headquarters located in

each of the ten administrative regions, including Tema as a police administrative region. These regional headquarters are then supported by 55 divisional headquarters, 208 district headquarters, and 769 police stations/posts nationwide. These administrative arrangements appear to suffer not only from the bane of rapid urban sprawl and population overflow of official boundaries, but also from the social construction of boundaries that, at times, are in contrast with the official state and police administrative boundaries. In other words, social construction of boundaries, Ghana's decentralized political demarcations, and police administrative structures appear functionally disjointed.

This disconnect complicates access to policing services, given the operational limitations associated with the Ghana Police Service. In addition to the deficit in police operational materials, such as vehicles and operational equipment, the police–civilian population ratio has never met the UN standard ratio of 1:500, except in 1971 when the police–civilian population ratio reached 1:438. It is important to note that the current national police–civilian population ratio of 1:926 as at 2014 is a definite improvement over the previous two decades, albeit this study found that, with the current ratio, 46 percent of Ghanaians do not have access to policing services. Furthermore, the ratio will become worse if other units of the Police Service, such as servicemen in the health and education sectors are not engaged in the core mandate of the police. At the regional levels, 59 percent (at a ratio of 1: 1,214) and 70 percent (at a ratio of 1: 1,673), respectively, of the total populations of the Ashanti and Northern Regions do not have access to policing services. The situation is even worse at the local levels, where 70 percent (at a ratio of 1:1,644) and 68 percent (at a ratio of 1:1,580), respectively, of the total populations of the metropolitan areas of Kumasi and Tamale have inadequate access to state policing services.

While there appears to be some public trust in the Police Service's commitment to fighting crime, as well as trust in the institution, respondents in the TMA have more confidence (45%) in the institution than respondents in the KMA (26%). The study further assessed other agencies who, in their line of duty, contribute one way or the other to maintaining internal security. These agencies include the ADR process, the local government authorities such as the Assembly men and unit committee members, and the judiciary system in the country. In this regard, while 55 percent of the respondents in Tamale have trust in the use of ADR to resolve criminal offences, as against 20 percent of the respondents in Kumasi, a large proportion (63%) of Kumasi's population do not know about the work of ADR. It can therefore be conjectured that there is more communal spirit in Tamale, in spite of the existence of strong religious, political, and chieftaincy factions. In Kumasi, on the other hand, a factor of increasing individualism cannot be discounted. Nevertheless, respondents from both cities demonstrated confidence and trust in the ability of local government representatives (Assembly persons and unit committee members) to resolve issues of insecurity within neighbourhoods, and this helps to sustain some perception of safety within communities.

8.2.2 Residents' perceptions of safety within the research locations

When assessing respondents' perception of safety, based on the quantitative survey data, it was found that the majority (79%) of Ghanaians perceive their neighbourhoods to be safe—a confirmation of the Global Peace Index report, which indicated that Ghana is the most peaceful country within the West African sub-region. The qualitative data indicated that, even though peoples' construction of safety is generally determined by their social and physical environments, the mass media as a source of information

was also noted as an influential factor determining perceptions of safety. This is probably increasingly the case, given the proliferation of mass media, especially social media, in recent times. The contribution of radio and television stations as sources of information cannot be discounted in raising anxiety and therefore influencing peoples' perceptions of safety. Thus the spread of daily information on issues of crime, through mass media, was reported by some participants in the qualitative survey.

At the regional level, 71 percent of the respondents in Tamale perceived their neighbourhoods to be safe, while about 82 percent of the total respondents in Kumasi consider their neighbourhoods to be safe. The variations in the proportions of perception of safety are accounted for by the different socio-cultural and political landscapes of the two metropolises. One significant difference is the revered traditional authority in Kumasi, whose command is highly respected, while Tamale appears divided along chieftaincy, political, and religious lines. These differences between the cities have some impact on peoples' perceptions of safety.

In Tamale, being female or being a resident of a multiple-household apartment (compound house) strongly affected perceptions of safety, while experiences of neighbourhood youth disorder, willingness of neighbours to intervene in the course of crime, and the desire for police patrol significantly influence perceptions of neighbourhood safety. With respect to community-level safety within the TMA, the middle-class socio-economic residential areas appear to be the safest places to live, followed by the lower- and upper-class socio-economic residential areas, in that order.

At the individual demographic level in Kumasi, the results indicated that increase in age, being male, and living in a multiple-household apartment significantly influence respondents' perception of safety. At the neighbourhood level in Kumasi, five

statistically significant determinants of perception of safety are worth noting: feeling the need for police patrol, level of perceived crime, youth disorder, neighbours' willingness to intervene in the course of crime, and social cohesion differently influence people's perception of safety. For the safety of specific communities, the study found that the high-income socio-economic neighbourhood appears to be the safest place to live in Kumasi, followed by the low- and middle-income socio-economic residential areas, in that order.

8.2.3 Major challenges impeding the provision of safety in the research locations

In the attempt to provide internal security, efforts by private individuals, communities, or the state (in conjunction with its supporting agencies) are affected by a number of physical, socio-cultural, and economic dynamics within Kumasi and Tamale. Even though the local issues are cross-cutting, their intensity varies between and within cities—apart from the influences of global processes such as urbanization, globalization, and neoliberalism.

The study found that experiences of uncontrolled spatial expansion of the built environment in both cities not only create further physical distance between residents and the police, but also limit access to general infrastructural services. Consequently, vacant lands and incomplete or unoccupied buildings dotted within the built environment serve as hideouts for potential offenders, thereby increasing the vulnerability of suitable targets to potential offenders.

Secondly, various forms of informality (the increasing informal economy, informal settlements) hamper the desired efforts to prevent crime, as informality poses challenges of identification of potential offenders and therefore weakens the ability of guardians to effectively monitor and protect targets of interest. In this regard,

congestion within the urban space has become a critical obstacle to providing security. The study found the increasing emergence of uncontrolled youth groups and rising youth unemployment to be factors limiting crime prevention in both cities. There is a higher tendency of members of this youth cohort to engage in crime, and their increasing numbers challenge the limited police forces available.

These immediate factors are further amplified by continuous political interference in the criminal justice system, with politicians allegedly interfering in the prosecution of criminal cases. This in turn largely consolidates networks of 'powerful' youth groups, whose acts seems to be 'above the law'. It has therefore become a challenge for the law enforcement agency to act appropriately to curb crime, because of fear for their own lives and jobs when politicians get involved. Other factions that attracted attention, but specific to the city of Tamale, are issues of chieftaincy and religious factionalism. Even though these groupings enhance some community solidarity at smaller group levels, they do not foster intergroup solidarity or encourage efforts to derive maximum benefit from a city-wide social capital. These divisive tendencies challenge efforts at securitization of the city as a whole. In spite of this, individuals and some communities cultivate various coping strategies to survive the challenges of crime and criminality within the urban space.

8.2.4 Informal crime prevention strategies in the cities of Kumasi and Tamale

In an attempt to ascertain the use of informal crime prevention strategies in the cities of Kumasi and Tamale, respondents were asked to mention the most dependable informal strategy that households rely on. Findings from the study indicate there are seven commonly used informal strategies in the research locations: the use of alarms/CCTV,

locks/burglar proofs, dogs, fence walls, caretakers/security guards, community solidarity, and prayer/magic.

In the city of Kumasi, residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood, the most unsafe place of residence (as noted earlier), engage in all seven predominant strategies but in different proportions. The use of locks/burglar proofs is the most used coping strategy, and the least used are alarms/CCTVs. This general desire for mechanical strategies among residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood is informed by the fact that residents spend considerable amounts of time outside their community during daytime, making cost an influential factor in the usage of these devices in a neoliberal economy.

Residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood, the second-most unsafe area to live in Kumasi, depend on four of the seven common informal strategies: the use of locks/burglar proofs, caretakers/security guards, community solidarity, and prayer/magic. The use of prayer/magic is the most common strategy among residents of the lower-class socio-economic neighbourhood, accounting for 12 percent of the total respondents in the city—while the use of caretakers/security guards (6%) represents the least used strategy.

Finally, among the five strategies employed by residents in the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood, the use of fence walls (2%) predominates, while an almost equal proportion (1%) engage dogs, caretakers/security guards and locks/burglar proofs. Comparatively, the use of locks/burglar proofs is the commonest informal strategy in Kumasi, but reliance on community solidarity and prayer/magic decreases with increasing socio-economic status of a residential area.

In the city of Tamale, on the other hand, five common informal crime prevention strategies were found: prayer/magic, locks/burglar proofs, dogs, community solidarity, and the use of caretakers/security guards. The most unsafe place in Tamale is the upper-class socio-economic neighbourhood (as noted earlier). Residents largely depend on the use of locks/burglar proofs, while the least trusted strategy is the reliance on prayer/magic, representing 4 percent and 2 percent, respectively. The second-most unsafe neighbourhood is the lower-class socio-economic area, where residents commonly depend on community solidarity and prayer/magic, in that order. The safest place of residence is the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood, where residents largely employ locks/burglar proofs to cater to their security needs. In all, while residents of the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale predominantly use locks/burglar proofs and caretakers/security guards, the confidence in the efficacy of prayer/magic and community solidarity decreases with increasing socio-economic status of the neighbourhood.

8.3 Conclusions

The spatial and demographic expansions in towns and cities in Ghana are not isolated from the effects of global development processes, such as those of urbanization, globalization, and trade liberalization as illustrated in the conceptual framework. Uncontrolled expansion has likewise been a common development feature in the cities of Kumasi and Tamale. This horizontally uncontrolled physical development limits access to public services, including access to state policing, a common feature within socially disorganised neighbourhoods as stipulated in the social disorganisation theory of Shaw and McKay (1942). According to Shaw and McKay (1942) neighbourhoods characterised by residential mobility, ethnic heterogeneity and unemployment are most

unable to organise themselves in the pursuit of common objectives such as fighting crime. In a similar dimension, the uncontrolled demographic and physical expansions observed within the cities of Kumasi and Tamale induce some residential mobility and ethnic heterogeneity and therefore the inability for residents to fight for common courses. This results in a situation that weakens guardianship and increases the perception of insecurity within the neighbourhoods particularly in this study's locations where state capacity to adequately police the immediate environment is limited. This finding therefore supports the conclusion by Shaw and McKay (1942) that the environment matters in the desire for a secured neighbourhood but the specificity of the theory that depleted neighbourhoods suit criminogenic tendencies does not necessarily result in crime nor the perception of insecurity in the lower-class neighbourhoods in both cities.

Furthermore, the increasing urban sprawl results in a blurring of boundaries between the police operational areas, local government jurisdictions, and social construction of identity by the indigenes, a situation that limits the full effects of the Collective Efficacy Theory of Sampson et al. (1997). Critical in the tenets of Collective Efficacy Theory is the heavy reliance of informal social control on social ties and density; however, the different construction of self-identity intermingling inconsistent neighbourhood boundaries within the same environment as observed in this study limits the efficacy of the theory. These indistinct boundaries result from the weak enforcement of physical development planning policies that, in turn, hinder the efforts of the state police. Hence, this study revealed that public trust in the police and the judiciary system is dwindling in favour of the use of local government representatives and locally formed ADR processes, to resolve criminal offences at the community levels.

Indeed, a variety of perceptions of safety is apparent between and within the cities of Tamale and Kumasi which is consistent with the Routine Activity Theory postulated by Cohen and Felson (1979). According to the theory, the vulnerability of an individual or a place to crime is associated with the routine activities within time and space. Consequently, individual and community level demographic characteristics and the routine activities therein determine the extent to which the intersection of a motivated offender, suitable target and the presence or absence of a capable guidance stimulate criminogenic conditions.

In this study, while at the individual demographic level, being a female and a resident of a multiple-household apartment are significant determinants of safety perceptions in Tamale; increasing age, being male, and living in a multiple-household are statistically significant determinants of safety perceptions among residents in Kumasi. On the other hand, neighbourhood-level concepts influencing the perception of safety in Kumasi include the level of perceived crime, willingness of neighbours to intervene in cases of crime, youth disorder, and social cohesion. In the case of Tamale, feeling the need for police patrol, youth disorder, and the willingness of neighbours to intervene in the cases of crime significantly explain the perception of safety within residential areas. Put differently, determinants of safety vary at the individual and community levels in tandem with the Routine Activity Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Specifically, upper-class socio-economic places of residence are the safest places to live because of the increase in guardianship ranging from mechanical installation to the use of state and non-state security agencies. This phenomenon reduces the possible intersection between the motivated offender and a suitable target and therefore increases the perception of neighbourhood safety. The middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood is perceived the least safe residential area in Kumasi because residents largely engage

in routine activity outside the community, which reduces guardianship and creates an opportunity for an intersection between the motivated offenders and suitable targets. In Tamale, the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood is the safest place of residence, followed by lower- and upper-class residential areas, in that order. With respect to the Routine Activity Theory, guardianship is more effective in the middle-class socio-economic neighbourhood in Tamale than in the lower- and upper-class socio-economic communities in that order. As a way of improving security and safety, residents engage in various informal coping strategies (such as the use of security locks, social cohesion, use of dogs, multiple household apartments among others) to maintain some level of safety of life and property.

This study therefore shows that dependence on informal crime prevention strategies is not only found among the poor, as is generally thought, but the use of these strategies spans the entire social structure in towns and cities of Ghana. In broad terms, informal crime prevention strategies played the role of guardianship as stipulated in the routine activity theory. However, whilst this study unravelled the use of magico-religious tendencies as guardian against crime in urban Ghana, even though the use increases with decreasing socio-economic neighbourhood status, Cohen and Felson (1979) Routine Activity Theory makes no mention of this form of guardianship. Cohen and Felson (1979) conceptually restricted guardianship to mechanical installations and the presence of capable human being but in the absence of these options magico-religious abilities have proved viable in peoples' construction of safety within the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises in Ghana.

8.4 Recommendations

The bane of providing adequate or efficient internal security in Ghana has been the disconnect between the land tenure system, spatial planning, and services provision. In most communities in the country, land is communally owned and is held in trust by the chiefs and family heads on behalf of their subjects. These controllers of land then have the leverage to dispose of the land at will and on behalf of families; in most cases, such disposal is not in conformity with Assembly planning schemes. This has resulted in situations where development in most parts of the country, especially in emerging cities and towns, precedes spatial planning—making access to social infrastructure a remote possibility for many residents. In other words, uncontrolled urban sprawl has become the norm in most communities, and residents in these communities can hope to get services or infrastructure such as roads, water, electricity, and police stations only at some point in the future.

These tendencies consign these neighbourhoods to continuous insecurity, as they become not only the hideouts of criminals but also the targets of crime—because of lack of ‘guardians’, as postulated by Cohen and Felson (1979). It behoves city authorities, therefore, to rigorously enforce spatial planning as a *sine qua non* to development within the urban space. This can be done through the Land Administration Project, whose main objective is to reduce poverty and enhance economic and social growth by improving security of land tenure, thereby accelerating access by the populace to land management by the development of an efficient system of land titling, registration, and administration. The assemblies should likewise make efforts to reduce the duration of processing for building permits. Situations where property developers have to queue for months—and sometimes years—before building permits are processed serves only to encourage these developers to circumvent the

process in their haste to accomplish their objectives. This in turn, complicates the limited operational capacity of the police to secure the urban space.

In effect, attempts to formalize some of the informal crime prevention strategies—those relying on the already existing concepts of community solidarity and reliance on local government authorities—will stimulate locally based content in the provision of security. Community policing, which evolves from informal policing, will attract benefits from the local social capital, thereby increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of crime prevention efforts. Even though attempts have been made in the area of community policing and community watchdog committees, the enthusiasm and commitment demonstrated so far leave much to be desired. These efforts should and can be improved considerably. In the move to improve and benefit from the community police and watchdog committees, members need to be properly vetted in a collaborative effort between traditional authorities and the Criminal Investigation Department of the Police Service, in order to eliminate miscreants who might take advantage of situations to commit crimes.

In the long term, attempts should be made to encourage each metropolitan, municipal, and district assembly to recruit and train its own police force. This should not be done in an empirical vacuum, and it will therefore warrant comprehensive research—which the assemblies should be able to fund. When properly executed, this will not only militate against or minimize the issue of ethnically or politically induced recruitment, but it will also essentially, and more importantly, recruit officers locally with rich local knowledge and experience to secure and protect these communities. Once recruited from the community, such a force will carry the history and needs of the community at its heart, and this will facilitate security and, all things being equal, ensure success.

8.5 Contributions to knowledge

In its modest form, this study contributes in three ways to the existing knowledge relevant in the analysis of informal crime prevention strategies. Firstly, the study found that the demographic and spatial expansions in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises is narrowing the gap between motivated offenders and suitable targets since the police-civilian population ratio lacks behind the UN recommended standards of 1:500. Except in 1971 when the police-civilian population ratio was 1:438, the ratio has not been up to the UN recommended standard since 1947. Secondly, the study unravelled that the general conception that the use of informal crime prevention strategies is the preserve of residents of lower-class neighbourhoods is incorrect. Specifically, the study found that confidence in the use of magico-religious tendencies as informal crime prevention strategies increases with decreasing socioeconomic status of the neighbourhoods in Kumasi and Tamale metropolises. The study therefore suggests another dimension of guardianship, collectively called magico-religious tendencies, which is absent in the conceptualisation of guardianship in the routine activity theory by Cohen and Felson (1979). They limited guardianship to mechanical installations and the presence of capable human being. Thirdly, the study unravelled that respondents' social construction of neighbourhood boundaries, Ghana's decentralised political demarcations, and police administrative structures appear structurally and functionally disjointed. This appears to reduce peoples' confidence in the police to adequately provide internal security notwithstanding the limited human and material resources capacity of the police service over the years.

8.6 Limitations of the study

There are some noticeable limitations that need to be acknowledged in this study. Firstly, the non-inclusion of inferential statistics in examining the informal crime prevention strategies disabled the predictive potentials of the study on these strategies. However, narratives of the lived experiences of the research participants gave an insight into the present scope of patronage of the informal crime prevention strategies in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolises. Secondly, strict delineation of the challenges associated with the use of informal crime prevention strategies within the two cities was limited by the large use of secondary data from the urban crime project. Nevertheless, details of the challenges of maintaining general internal security in the Kumasi and Tamale metropolitan areas have been pursued in the study.

8.7 Areas for further research

In view of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from this study, further investigations will broaden our understanding of securitization of emerging towns and cities in the face of spatial and demographic expansion and densification. For instance, an empirical study on the effects of types of crime on the decision on preferred place of residence will enable us to unearth the potential for the use of locally based knowledge on specific crime prevention strategies. Moreover, an investigation into demographic variation and strategies of informal crime prevention strategies in emerging cities in Ghana has the potential to contribute further to knowledge in this area.

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APPENDIX ONE

**Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER)/
Department of Geography and Resource Development
University of Ghana**

CRIME AND POVERTY NEXUS IN URBAN GHANA

HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY



Supervisor ID No:

Interviewer ID No:

EXPLORING CRIME AND POVERTY NEXUS IN URBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS IN GHANA		
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE		
Section A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION		
1.	City:	Neighborhood: <div style="text-align: right;"> How long have you stayed in your neighborhood: </div>
2.	Age (as of your last birthday): years	
3.	Sex:	

	<input type="radio"/> Male	<input type="radio"/> Female
4	Household size	
5.	Occupation:	
	<input type="radio"/> Professional/technical/managerial	<input type="radio"/> Unskilled manual <input type="radio"/> Agriculture
	<input type="radio"/> Sales/services	<input type="radio"/> Clerical <input type="radio"/> Pensioner
	<input type="radio"/> Skilled manual	<input type="radio"/> Unemployed <input type="radio"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>)
6.	Marital status:	
	<input type="radio"/> Single (never married)	<input type="radio"/> Divorced
	<input type="radio"/> Consensual/cohabitation	<input type="radio"/> Separated
	<input type="radio"/> Married	<input type="radio"/> Widowed
7.	Ethnicity: (see codes)	
	<input type="radio"/> Akan	<input type="radio"/> Gurma <input type="radio"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>)
	<input type="radio"/> Ga-Dangbe	<input type="radio"/> Ewe
	<input type="radio"/> Mole-Dagbaani	<input type="radio"/> Guan

8.	<p>Religion:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Christian <input type="checkbox"/> Moslem <input type="checkbox"/> Traditional <input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>).....</p>
9.	<p>What is your average monthly household income (<i>in Ghana cedis - GH¢</i>)?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 1 – 500 <input type="checkbox"/> 1,001 – 1,500 <input type="checkbox"/> 2,000 – 2,500</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> 501-1,000 <input type="checkbox"/> 1,501 – 2,000 <input type="checkbox"/> Above 2,500</p>
10.	<p>What is your highest level of education completed?</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> None (No formal education) <input type="checkbox"/> JSS/JHS/Middle Sch <input type="checkbox"/> HND/Diploma <input type="checkbox"/> Postgraduate</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Primary <input type="checkbox"/> SSS/SHS/Vocational/Technical <input type="checkbox"/> Graduate (Tertiary) <input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>).....</p>
Section B: HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS	
11.	<p>Type of housing:</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Separate housing <input type="checkbox"/> Room(s) [compound housing] <input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>).....</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Semi-detached housing <input type="checkbox"/> Kiosk/container/improvised home</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Flat/apartment <input type="checkbox"/> Uncompleted building</p>

12.	<p>How many room(s) does this household occupy? (<i>Count living rooms, dining rooms, an kitchen and store room</i> <i>d bedrooms but not bathrooms, toilet and</i>)</p> <p>Number.....</p>
13.	<p>Do other households share this dwelling with you?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No</p>
14.	<p>What is your present occupancy status?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Owner-occupier <input type="radio"/> Renting <input type="radio"/> Rent free <input type="radio"/> Perching <input type="radio"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>).....</p>
15.	<p>What is the main source of lighting for your household after sunset?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Electricity (mains) <input type="radio"/> Solar energy <input type="radio"/> No light (<i>skip to Q 16</i>)</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Kerosene <input type="radio"/> Generator <input type="radio"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>):</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Gas lamp <input type="radio"/> Candles/torches (flashlights)</p>
16.	<p>How regular is your main power supply after sunset?</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Regular <input type="radio"/> Cut more than twice a week</p> <p><input type="radio"/> Cut once or twice in a week <input type="radio"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>).....</p>

21.	If you do not have in-house toilet facility; what is the average time spent travelling to the nearest toilet facilities?
22.	If you do not have in-house toilet facility; what is the average time spent waiting at this toilet facility?

23.	What is the main source of water supply for this household?			
	a. Drinking ____ <i>(See codes below)</i>		b. General use /____/ <i>(See codes below)</i>	
	<i>Codes for Q. 22 (a)</i>		<i>Codes for Q. 22 (b)</i>	
	Indoor plumbing.....	01	Indoor plumbing.....	01
	Inside standpipe.....	02	Inside standpipe.....	02
	Water truck/tanker service.....	03	Water truck/tanker service.....	03
	Water vending	04	Water vending	04
	Pipe in neighbouring household.....	05	Pipe in neighbouring household.....	05
	Private outside standpipe/tap.....	06	Private outside standpipe/tap.....	06
	Sachet/bottled water.....	07	Sachet/bottled water.....	07

	Public standpipe.....	08	Public standpipe.....	08
	Borehole.....	09	Borehole.....	09
	Protected well.....	10	Protected well.....	10
	Unprotected well.....	11	Unprotected well.....	11
	River/stream.....	12	River/stream.....	12
	Rain water/spring.....	13	Rain water/spring.....	13
	Dugout/pond/lake/dam.....	14	Dugout/pond/lake/dam.....	14
	Other (specify):	15	Other (specify):	15
24.	On the average, what is the maximum time you spend to access water for your household?			
	a. For Drinking:.....			
	b. For General use:.....			
25.	How does your household dispose off refuse?			
	<input type="checkbox"/> Collected <input type="checkbox"/> Burned by household <input type="checkbox"/> Public dump <input type="checkbox"/> Buried by household <input type="checkbox"/> Dumped elsewhere <input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>).....			

<p>26.</p>	<p>What is the main construction material used for the outer wall of your building?</p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Mud/Earth <input type="checkbox"/> Burnt bricks <input type="checkbox"/> Wood/bamboo <input type="checkbox"/> Landcrete <input type="checkbox"/> Metal sheet/slate/asbestos <input type="checkbox"/> Thatch <input type="checkbox"/> Stone <input type="checkbox"/> Cardboard <input type="checkbox"/> Cement/sandcrete blocks <input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>)..... </p>
<p>27.</p>	<p>What is the main construction material used for the floor of your building?</p> <p> <input type="checkbox"/> Earth/mud <input type="checkbox"/> Wood <input type="checkbox"/> Stone <input type="checkbox"/> Cement/concrete <input type="checkbox"/> Burnt bricks <input type="checkbox"/> Vinyl tiles <input type="checkbox"/> Ceramic/marble/tiles <input type="checkbox"/> Other (<i>please specify</i>)..... <input type="checkbox"/> Terrazzo </p>

28.	<p>What is the main construction material used for the roof of your building?</p> <table><tr><td data-bbox="434 331 792 360">⑤ Palm leaves/raffia/thatch</td><td data-bbox="1301 331 1554 360">⑤ Cement/concrete</td></tr><tr><td data-bbox="434 400 551 429">⑤ Wood</td><td data-bbox="1301 400 1518 429">⑤ Asbestos/slate</td></tr><tr><td data-bbox="434 469 752 497">⑤ Corrugated iron sheet</td><td data-bbox="1301 469 1503 497">⑤ Roofing tiles</td></tr><tr><td data-bbox="434 537 613 566">⑤ Mud /earth</td><td></td></tr><tr><td data-bbox="434 590 584 619">⑤ Bamboo</td><td data-bbox="1301 590 1823 635">⑤ <i>Other (specify)</i>.....</td></tr></table>	⑤ Palm leaves/raffia/thatch	⑤ Cement/concrete	⑤ Wood	⑤ Asbestos/slate	⑤ Corrugated iron sheet	⑤ Roofing tiles	⑤ Mud /earth		⑤ Bamboo	⑤ <i>Other (specify)</i>
⑤ Palm leaves/raffia/thatch	⑤ Cement/concrete										
⑤ Wood	⑤ Asbestos/slate										
⑤ Corrugated iron sheet	⑤ Roofing tiles										
⑤ Mud /earth											
⑤ Bamboo	⑤ <i>Other (specify)</i>										

29.	Indicate which of the following assets are available to your household:				
No.	Item	Quantity	Ownership		
			Male	Female	Joint
I.	Room furniture set				
II.	Sewing machine				
III.	Stove				
IV.	Refrigerator/fridge				
V.	Air conditioner				
VI.	Fan				
VII.	Radio				
VIII.	Desktop computer/laptop				
IX.	Video player				
X.	Camera				
XI.	Bicycle				
XII.	Motorcycle				
XIII.	Mobile phone				
XIV.	Telephone fixed line				

	XV.	Television (TV)				
	XVI.	Blenders				
	XVII.	Washing machine				
	XVIII.	Private car				
	XIX.	Commercial car				
	XX.	House				
	XXI.	Land (plots)				
	XXII.	Livestock				
	XXIII.	Water tank				
	XXIV.	Microwave				
	XXV.	Financial savings (<i>formal</i>)				
	XXVI.	Financial savings (<i>informal</i>)				
	XXVII.	Insurance (<i>excluding health</i>)				
	XXVIII.	Health insurance				

31.	<p>If strong community bonding exists, what is the main basis for this SCB?</p> <p>⑤ Ethnic association ⑤ CBOs/CSOs</p> <p>⑤ Religious bonding ⑤ Other (<i>please specify</i>):</p> <p>⑤ Trade associations</p>					
32.	<p>How would you rank (<i>in order of severity</i>) the statements about your community? (<i>Rank in the order of severity: 1 as strongly agree and 5 as don't know</i>).Read out statements to respondent</p>					
No.	Statements	1 (Strongly agree)	2 (Agree)	3 (Disagree)	4 (Strongly disagree)	5 (Don't know)
Community						
I.	People in this community are willing to help their neighbours					
II.	This is a close-knit neighbourhood					
III.	People in this community can be trusted					
IV.	People in this community generally do not get along with each other					
V.	People in this neighbourhood do					

		not share the same values					
33.	How would you rank (in order of severity) the statements about Children in your community? (Rank in the order of severity: 1 as very likely and 5 as don't know).						
No.	Statements	1 (Very likely)	2 (Likely)	3 (Unlikely)	4 (Very unlikely)	5 (Don't know)	
Children							
I.	Children loiter in your community						
II.	Often find community members fighting among themselves						
III.	Children in this neighbourhood showing disrespect to adult's						
IV.	Someone breaking into the respondent's house						
34.	Do you have regular resident meeting(s) in your community where issues of neighbourhood security are discussed? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No (If no skip to Q.36)						

35.	<p>If yes, how often did you attend these resident meetings held in the past 12 months in your community?</p> <p>Ⓔ Every month Ⓔ Every six month</p> <p>Ⓔ Every three month Ⓔ Every twelve month</p>
------------	---

36. How would you rank in order the following statements about your community? (Rank 1 as once a week and 5 as never).							
No.	Statements	1 (Once a day)	2 (About once a week)	3 (About once a month)	4 (Several times a year)	5 (About once a year)	6 (Never)
I.	How often did you borrow or exchange things with neighbours such as food, tools, and other?						
II.	How often did you ask someone from the neighbourhood over to your house or go to their house for a meal, to play cards, watch TV, or talk, etc?						
III.	How often did you ask your neigh for help, (like moving stuff, or taking care of a child, etc?)						

	IV.	How often did you go out for an evening with someone from the neighbourhood (to movie, sports events, for a drink, or others?)						
	V.	How often did you talk to someone in the neighbourhood about shopping, programmes for kids etc.?						
37.	Is disruption around (i.e. youth hanging around, making noise, vandalizing and starting fights) or truancy (kids not being in school when they should be) a problem in the neighbourhood? <input type="radio"/> Not a problem <input type="radio"/> Somehow a problem <input type="radio"/> A big problem							
38.	On the whole, do you like or dislike this neighbourhood as a place to live? <input type="radio"/> Like it a lot <input type="radio"/> Dislike it <input type="radio"/> Like it <input type="radio"/> Dislike it a lot							

Section D: ASSESSMENT OF CRIME IN THE RESEARCH LOCALITY

39. In general, how will you rate the level of crime in your community?

Ⓞ Very high Ⓞ High Ⓞ Moderate Ⓞ Low Ⓞ Very low

40. What is the most feared crime in your community?

41. How would you rank (in the order of severity), the following crimes in your community? (Rank in the order of severity: 1 as very high and 5 as very low).

No.	Type of crime	1 (Very high)	2 (High)	3 (Moderate)	4 (Low)	5 (Very Low)	6 (N/A)
Crime against household							
I.	Theft of car/car hijacking						
II.	Theft from car						
III.	Car vandalism/theft of car parts						
IV.	Theft of motorcycle						
V.	Theft of bicycle						
VI.	Theft of livestock						

VII.	Burglary with entry						
VIII.	Attempted burglary						
IX.	Kidnapping						
X.	Other (<i>please specify</i>).....						
Crimes against the individual							
I.	Drugs (peddling/addiction)						
II.	Robbery						
III.	Personal theft						
IV.	Rape						
V.	Defilement						
VI.	Incest						
VII.	Prostitution						
VIII.	Assault/threat						
IX.	Consumer fraud						
X.	Corruption						
XI.	Other (<i>please specify</i>).....						

51.	Does your community have a neighbourhood crime watch-dog committee? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No <input type="radio"/> Don't know
52.	How safe do you feel in your community currently? <input type="radio"/> Very safe <input type="radio"/> Not safe <input type="radio"/> Safe <input type="radio"/> Don't know

53.	How safe do you feel walking at night in your community?		
	<input type="radio"/> Very safe	<input type="radio"/> Safe	
	<input type="radio"/> Not safe	<input type="radio"/> Don't know	
54.	How safe do you feel walking alone in your community during day time?		
	<input type="radio"/> Very safe	<input type="radio"/> Not safe	
	<input type="radio"/> Safe	<input type="radio"/> Don't know	
55.	In general, how would you assess the level of crime in your community within the past five years?		
	<input type="radio"/> Increased <input type="radio"/> Decreased <input type="radio"/> Stayed the same <input type="radio"/> Don't know		
56.	What measures do you take to prevent crime in your home? (Multiple responses allowed).		
	No.	Prevention measures	Tick appropriately
	I.	Installed burglar alarm	
	II.	Electronic fencing	
	III.	Security doors/special door locks	
	IV.	Special window/door grilles	
V.	Use of dogs		

	VI.	High fence/wall					
	VII.	Caretaker or security guard					
	VIII.	Community solidarity					
	IX.	Barbed wires/bottles, sharp ends of walls					
	X.	Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)					
	XI.	Prayer/other religious options					
	XII.	Nothing					
	XIII.	Other (<i>please specify</i>):					
57.	Which of the following crimes are you and your households most likely to be victim of in your community? (Rank in the order of likelihood: 1 as Very likely and 5 as Don't know). Read out statements to respondent						
	No.	Type of crime	1 (Very likely)	2 (Likely)	3 (Unlikely)	4 (Very unlikely)	5 (Don't know)
	Crime against household						
	I.	Theft of car/car hijacking					
	II.	Theft from car					
	III.	Car vandalism/theft of car parts					

IV.	Theft motorcycle					
V.	Theft of bicycle					
VI.	Theft of livestock					
VII.	Burglary with entry					
VIII.	Attempted burglary					
IX.	Kidnapping					
X.	Other (<i>please specify</i>)					
Crime against the individual						
I.	Drugs peddling/addiction					
II.	Robbery					
III.	Personal theft					
IV.	Rape					
V.	Defilement					
VI.	Incest					
VII.	Prostitution					
VIII.	Assault/threat					

	IX.	Corruption					
	X.	Other (<i>please specify</i>).....					

Section E: VICTIMS OF CRIME		
58.	Have you or any member of your household ever been a victim of any crime? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No (<i>Skip to section G</i>)	
59.	If yes, indicate the type of crime and the number of times you have been a victim? (<i>read out responses: multiple responses allowed</i>)	
	No.	Type of crime
		Number of times
	Household crime	
	I.	Theft of car/car hijacking
	II.	Theft from car
	III.	Car vandalism/theft of car parts
	IV.	Theft of motorcycle
	V.	Theft of bicycle

VI.	Theft of livestock	
VII.	Burglary with entry	
VIII.	Attempted burglary	
IX.	Kidnapping	
X.	Other (specify)	
Crime against the individual		
I.	Drugs peddling/addiction	
II.	Robbery	
III.	Personal theft	
IV.	Rape	
V.	Defilement	
VI.	Incest	
VII.	Prostitution	
VIII.	Assault/threat	
IX.	Corruption	
X.	Other (specify)	

Section F: HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF CRIME

60. Please remind me, did you say you personally or a member of your household has ever been a victim of crime?

Yes No (*skip to next section G*)

61. If yes, please specify what type of crime you experienced?

.....
.....
.....

62. Did the crime experience affect you and your household in any way?

Yes No (*skip to next section G*)

<p>66.</p>	<p><i>Emotional Effect:</i> In what way(s) did the crime experience affect you emotionally? (<i>Read out responses: multiple responses allowed</i>).</p> <p>⑤ It has given me excessive fear</p> <p>⑤ It has made me very angry</p> <p>⑤ It has made me distrustful of others</p> <p>⑤ It has made me feel the need to be more security conscious</p> <p>⑤ It has made me better appreciate the criminal justice system/Police</p> <p>⑤ It has made me appreciate other persons the more</p> <p>⑤ Other (<i>please specify</i>).....</p> <p>⑤ It has left me with chronic fear</p> <p>⑤ It has made me to regret coming to live in this neighbourhood</p> <p>⑤ It has made me distrustful of the criminal justice system/the Police</p> <p>⑤ It has made me value my life the more</p> <p>⑤ It makes me feel like I will be attacked again</p> <p>⑤ It makes me feel I have already been attacked again</p>
<p>67.</p>	<p><i>Psychological Effect:</i> In what other way did the crime experience affect you psychologically? (<i>Read out responses: multiple responses allowed</i>).</p> <p>⑤ It has created a panic attack in me</p> <p>⑤ It makes me fear to go out sometimes (please, specify how often).....</p> <p>⑤ It has given me sleepless nights (please, specify how often).....</p> <p>⑤ It has made me distrustful/suspicious of other persons</p> <p>⑤ It has made me over protective of my property/household/family, etc.</p> <p>⑤ It has made me too conscious of my environment/too sensitive</p>

	<p>⑤ It has strengthened my (religious) faith</p> <p>⑤ It has weakened/challenged my (religious) faith</p> <p>⑤ Other psychological effect on you (<i>please specify</i>).....</p>
<p>68.</p>	<p><i>Mental Effect:</i></p> <p>In what other way did the crime experience affect you mentally? (<i>read out responses: multiple responses allowed</i>)</p> <p>⑤ It has left me thinking all the time</p> <p>⑤ It makes me think that the crime will be repeated</p> <p>⑤ It has made me know /think I/anyone can die at anytime</p> <p>⑤ It has given me a different perspective on life</p> <p>⑤ It has left me with a mental picture of the crime scene/incident.</p> <p>⑤ It has left me thinking that I am not safe</p> <p>It has made me forgetful</p> <p>Other effect (<i>please specify</i>).....</p>
<p>69.</p>	<p><i>Physical Effect:</i></p> <p>In what other way did the crime experience affect you physically? (<i>read out responses: multiple responses allowed</i>)</p> <p>⑤ It has left some wound/scars on me</p> <p>⑤ It has maimed/made me lose some part of my body or part of a family member's body</p>

⑤ It made me lose part of my property (including domestic and commercial animals) ⑤ It has left a mark on my property

⑤ Other (*please specify*).....

70. Financial Effect:

In what other way did the crime experience affect you financially? ⑤

I have had to spend money on my health due to that experience

⑤ I lost my job due to the crime experience (*Please, tell me specifically what happened regarding this*

.....
.....
.....

⑤ I have had to spend money on something else (personal belongings, property, replacing lost property, etc.) as a result of the crime experience. (*Please, tell me specifically what happened regarding this:*

.....
.....

	<p>.....</p> <p>⑤ I have had to lose trading capital/investment/property, etc. to use in taking care of the financial shock due to the crime experience.</p> <p>⑤ I has made me need/pay for more property insurance.</p> <p>⑤ Other financial effect(s) on you (<i>please specify</i>):</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
--	--

Section G: CRIME REPORTING

71.	<p>Have you or any member of your household ever report crime incident(s) to the police?</p> <p>⑤ Yes ⑤ No</p>
72.	<p>If no, why not?</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>

73.	If yes, why did you report to the police?
74.	If you reported to the police were you satisfied with their response? <input type="radio"/> Yes <input type="radio"/> No
75.	If no, why not?

Section H: ASSESSMENT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM <i>(Rank in the order of 1 as Strongly agree and 5 as Don't know). Read out statements to respondent</i>							
76.	No.	Statement	1 (Strongly agree)	2 (Agree)	3 (Disagree)	4 (Strongly Disagree)	5 (Don't know)
Police							
	I.	The security services arrest criminals within the community promptly					
	II.	They respond in a timely manner					
	III.	They are committed to fighting crime					
	IV.	They are trustworthy					
	V.	They treat all citizens equally					
	VI.	They are transparent					
	VII.	They are corrupt					
	VIII.	They have are lackadaisical attitude					
The Courts							

I.	Dispense justice fairly					
II.	The judges are corrupt					
III.	They dispense justice timely					
IV.	The courts are generally performing well					
Informal structures/Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)						
I.	They respond in a timely manner					
II.	They are committed to fighting crime					
III.	They are trustworthy					
IV.	They treat all citizens equally					
V.	They are transparent					
VII.	They are corrupt					
VIII.	They have lackadaisical attitude					
District assembly/unit committee/assemblymen and women						
I.	They respond in a timely manner					
II.	They are committed to fighting crime					

Please, kindly provide me with the following details in case I need to come back to you for further clarification.

Mobile phone number:

House No.:

Description of residence:

Signature:

Date of interview:

APPENDIX TWO

GUIDE FOR KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS AND FOCUS GROUP

DISCUSSIONS

Name of City/metropolis:

Introduction

This interview is aimed at unpacking some of the informal strategies used by the marginalized within the urban built environment to respond to their security challenges. This study is part of a national project aimed at “exploring the subject of crime and poverty relationships in the four major cities in Ghana, namely Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi and Tamale”. The project is funded by International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and UK Department for International Development (DFID).

All information collected here will be treated with high level of confidentiality and will be used only for academic purposes. You are not compelled to participate and you are also at will to withdraw from the research at any point in time. However, I will be very grateful if you could be part of this exercise. Do I have your permission to go ahead with the interview? Yes..... No.....

Do you have any question to ask before we start the interview?

Time and date:	Settlement:		
Name:	Age:	Sex:	Position:
Length of stay in community			

A. TARGET GROUP: Ghana Police (CID) – two officers

1. General assessment of crime overview in the community

- i. Indicate crime prone areas in the community
- ii. Crime levels in low-income areas
- iii. Challenges in maintaining security in the low income areas

2. Types of informal crime prevention techniques

- i. Mention common informal actors and their role in crime prevention
- ii. List the various options of informal crime prevention techniques within the city
- iii. Which options are commonly use within the city?

3. Challenges in using or collaborating with informal crime prevention actors

- i. Is there a need to collaborate with informal actors in crime prevention? Why?
- ii. Type of collaboration
- iii. Difficulties in collaboration

4. Future prospects of the informal crime prevention techniques

- i. The future role of informal sector
- ii. How to enhance cooperation

B. TARGET GROUP: RELIGIOUS/OPINION LEADERS AND COMMUNITY MEMBERS

1. Community crime level

- i. General crime level in the community
- ii. Any reasons
- iii. Perpetrators and any knowledge about them

2. Role in informal crime control

i. How and in what ways do you help in crime prevention (modus operandi)

1. Tools or mechanisms use in your quest to prevent crime (take pictures and some narratives of how efficient the tools/mechanisms are in use (**where applicable**))

ii. Who patronizes your services in crime prevention and why?

1. Young or old (why?)

2. Men or women (why?)

iii. How often do people come to consult you or ask for your services?

3. Efficiency of role

i. On what conditions do people call on you for your services?

ii. In general how efficient are your efforts to crime prevention in your community?

1. What is the success rate?

a. Give narratives of some success stories

b. What is the youth perception on your ability to prevent crime?

4. Relationship with others security providers

i. Apart from the police, what other options are available for crime prevention in your community?

1. Which of these options do you use or would recommend someone to use?

ii. What is your relationship with the formal crime prevention actors such as the police like? (**probe further to find out whether the relationship is competitive or collaborative and why**)

- iii. What is your relationship with other informal crime prevention actors such as community watch dogs, Pastors, Iman, Malam etc. (probe further to find out whether the relationship is competitive or collaborative and why)

5. What challenges you in your attempt to prevent crime and how do you circumvent them?

6. How do the following groups challenge you in your line of duty?

- i. Community/residents
- ii. Police
- iii. Other security providers

7. Future prospects of your role in crime prevention

- i. What are the prospects of religious/traditionalist leaders in crime prevention
- ii. Do their interventions contribution to lower/increase incidence of crime in the community? How?

C. TARGET GROUP: PRACTITIONERS/CONSULTANTS OF MAGICO-RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES IN CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMITTING

1. Background information

- i. Who patronize your services?
- ii. What necessitate their desire for your services?
- iii. What is the common intend of the quest for your services (preventing and/or committing crime or self-defense etc?)

2. Length of practice

- i. How long have you been providing this service

3. Sustainability within current spate of globalization, urbanization, and technology

- i. In term of cost and benefit to you and your clients respectively
- ii. Clientele level in the use of informal crime prevention strategies vis-à-vis clients reliance on orthodox means to crime prevention or committing
- iii. Effectiveness and future prospers of magico-religious practices within the urban space

4. Challenges and how you circumvent them

- i. Explain, in brief, the challenges you face in your quest to provide magico-religious services
- ii. How do you overcome these challenges?