

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES**



**THE GHANA ARMED FORCES AND THE NATIONAL DEFENCE
POLICY: MEETING CONTEMPORARY THREATS, CHALLENGES
AND PROSPECTS FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

**BY
TIMOTHY TIFUCRO BA-TAA-BANAH
(10054192)**

**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA,
LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

LEGON CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DIPLOMACY (LECIAD)

LEGON

JULY 2019

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that except for references to other publications which have been duly acknowledged herein, this work is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of the undersigned.

Signature.....

TIMOTHY TIFUCRO BA-TAA-BANAH
(STUDENT)

Date3RD / SEPT / 2020

Signature.....

DR. BONI YAO GEBE
(PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR)

Date.....3RD / SEPT / 2020

Signature.....

DR. KUMI ANSAH-KOI
(SUPERVISOR)

Date.....3rd / Sept / 2020

Signature.....

DR. BENJAMIN KOMLA DELALI DOVIE
(SUPERVISOR)

Date.....03 / 09 / 2020

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the memory of my late brother, Colonel Thomas Ndila Ba-Taa-Banah, whose belief in, and support of my academic prowess never waned.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For the realisation of this work I am deeply indebted to a host of persons and institutions. I am grateful to my Supervisory Team of Dr. Boni Yao Gebe, Dr. Kumi Ansah-Koi, and Dr. Benjamin Delali Dovie for their guidance, patience, and in-depth mentorship. I am grateful to Dr. Nene-Lomotey Kuditchar, Dr. Desmond Klu, Ms. Naa Ansa, and Dr. Ken Ahorsu for their friendship, academic advice, and encouragement. To Angela Tawiah-Ahen, Roselyn Raphael, Collins, Benedictus and Tabaa - my mum, I note with gratitude their love, varied support, and understanding for the precious time spent away. My uncle, Professor Jacob Songsore and his wife deserve to be appreciated for their unyielding faith, concern, and encouragement.

I acknowledge the value of the interviews granted by HE, Maj General Clayton Yaache (retired), HE, Maj General Anum Odotei (retired), and Maj General Henry Kwami Anyidoho (retired). I equally thank them for their interest and encouragement. I am grateful to Colonel DD Gbedawo and Lt Col Ibrahim Imoro-Sanda (retired), my friends and confidants of all time, for their friendship and resourcefulness. I started the Ph.D journey with Lt Col Farouk M-Bashar (retired). His prodding and spirit of tenacity of purpose have been phenomenal. Squadron Leader Isaac Oppong played a yeoman's role in the entire process and I am grateful. I am indebted to Mr. Eric Amartey of Legon for his invaluable assistance. Without him the final production of the work would not have been possible. To the staff of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC), the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC), and National Records I express my gratitude for the access given me to their libraries and various documents of relevance to my studies. I am however solely responsible for all shortcomings associated with the entire work.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AfCFTA	-	African Continental Free Trade Agreement
AFRC	-	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APSA	-	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN	-	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASF	-	African Standby Force
AU	-	African Union
BNI	-	Bureau of National Investigations
CADSP	-	Common African Defence and Security Policy
CANSOFCOM-		Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
CDS	-	Chief of Defence Staff
CEWS	-	Continental Early Warning System
CI	-	Constitutional Instrument.
CSIP	-	Command and Staff Instructions and Procedures
CSSDCA	-	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
DISEC	-	District Security Council
ECCAS	-	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	-	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West African States
ENC	-	Eastern Naval Command
GAF	-	Ghana Armed Forces
GAFCS	-	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
GoG	-	Government of Ghana
KA IPTC	-	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

LI	-	Legislative Instrument
LECIAD	-	Legon Centre of International Affairs and Diplomacy
MACA	-	Military Assistance to Civil Authority
MDIs	-	Ministry of Defence Instructions
MoD	-	Ministry of Defence
MUSEC	-	Municipal Security Council
NADMO	-	National Disaster Management Organisation
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDP	-	National Defence Policy
NLC	-	National Liberation Council
NRC	-	National Redemption Council
NSC	-	National Security Council
OAU	-	Organisation of African Unity
PF	-	Peace Fund
PNDC	-	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	-	People's National Party
PoW	-	Panel of the Wise
REGSEC	-	Regional Security Council
RWAFF	-	Royal West African Frontier Force
SMC	-	Supreme Military Council
SOF	-	Special Operations Forces
UK	-	United Kingdom
UN	-	United Nations
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UNSC	-	United Nations Security Council

UNESCO	-	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USA	-	United States of America
USSR	-	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAFF	-	West African Frontier Force
WNC	-	Western Naval Command
WMD	-	Weapons of Mass Destruction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	i
DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	iii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF FIGURES	xiv
LIST OF TABLE	xv
ABSTRACT	xvi
CHAPTER ONE	1
INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background to the Study.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem	15
1.3 Research Questions	17
1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study.....	18
1.5 Rationale of the Study.....	18
1.6 Conceptual Definitions	19
1.7 Arrangement of Chapters.....	21
Chapter Seven: The Involvement of Ghana Armed Forces in National Development	22
CHAPTER TWO	23
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	23
2.0 Introduction.....	23
2.1 The Place of Theory to this Study.....	23
2.2 Core Assumptions of Realism.....	26
2.3 Neo-Realism	28
2.4 Criticisms of Realism.....	30
2.4.1 <i>Secularisation</i>	31
2.4.2 <i>The Neglect of the Non-State Actor</i>	31
2.4.3 <i>The Non-Military and Economic Dimensions</i>	32
2.4.4 <i>The Liberalists Considerations</i>	33
2.5 Justifying the use of Realism	34
2.6 Conceptual Framework.....	41
2.6.1 <i>Security</i>	44
2.6.2 <i>National Security</i>	44

2.6.3	<i>The Defence Sector</i>	44
2.6.4	<i>Defence Budgeting</i>	45
2.6.5	<i>Defence Policy</i>	45
2.6.6	<i>The Internal Security Domain</i>	46
2.6.7	<i>Accountability</i>	47
2.6.8	<i>Human Security</i>	47
2.6.9	<i>Peace</i>	47
2.6.10	<i>Development</i>	48
CHAPTER THREE		50
LITERATURE REVIEW		50
3.0	Introduction.....	50
3.1	The Concept of Security	50
3.2	Which Values need Protection?	56
3.2.1	<i>Threats</i>	57
3.2.2	<i>How much is enough?</i>	58
3.2.3	<i>Means, Cost and Time</i>	59
3.3	The Value of Security	60
3.4	National Security	62
3.4.1	<i>The Neo-Realist and Security</i>	66
3.4.2	<i>Nature of Security</i>	67
3.4.3	<i>New Concepts of Security?</i>	69
3.5	Defence Policy	70
3.5.1	<i>Some Crucial Aspects of Defence Policy</i>	71
3.5.2	<i>Defence Budget</i>	72
3.5.3	<i>The Strategic Dimension</i>	73
3.5.4	<i>The Diplomatic Dimension</i>	73
3.5.5	<i>Military Conservatism</i>	76
3.5.6	<i>Military Radicalism</i>	76
3.6	Foreign Policy.....	77
3.6.1	<i>Ghana's Contemporary Foreign Policy Linkages with Defence Options</i>	80
3.7	The Ministry of Defence	88
3.8	Regional Security.....	92
CHAPTER FOUR		99
METHODOLOGY		99
4.0	Introduction.....	99
4.1	The Description of the Study Area	99

4.2	The Internal Security Set-up	103
4.3	Research Design.....	111
4.3.1	<i>Research Instrument Design</i>	111
4.3.2	<i>Participant Identification and Selection Criteria</i>	112
4.3.3	<i>Data Analysis</i>	115
4.3.4	<i>Ethical Consideration</i>	115
CHAPTER FIVE		117
AN OVERVIEW OF THE GHANA NATIONAL		117
DEFENCE POLICY FRAMEWORK		117
5.0	Introduction.....	117
5.1	Internal Security during the Colonial Era	118
5.1.1	<i>Imperial Defence</i>	119
5.1.2	<i>Defence Policy in the Inter-War Years – 1918 to 1938</i>	120
5.2	Post-War Imperial Defence Policy	121
5.2.1	<i>Defence Policy under the First Republic</i>	122
5.2.2	<i>Defence Policy under the First Military Regime</i>	122
5.2.3	<i>Defence Policy in the Second Republic</i>	123
5.2.4	<i>The Defence Policy under Military Regimes of the Period 1972 -1979</i>	123
5.2.5	<i>The Defence Policy of the Third Republic</i>	124
5.2.6	<i>Defence Policy under Provisional National Defence Council</i>	124
5.2.7	<i>Defence Policy under the Fourth Republic</i>	125
5.3	The Ghana National Defence Policy of 2012	126
5.3.1	<i>National Interests</i>	130
5.3.2	<i>Threats</i>	131
5.3.3	<i>Strategic Response</i>	131
5.3.4	<i>National Defence Tasks</i>	132
5.3.5	<i>National Defence Objectives</i>	132
5.3.6	<i>Strategic Posture</i>	133
5.3.7	<i>Higher Management of Defence</i>	134
5.3.8	<i>Organisation of Ministry of Defence</i>	134
5.3.9	<i>Defence Mission</i>	134
5.3.10	<i>Specific Tasks</i>	135
5.3.11	<i>Joint Taskforce</i>	135
5.3.12	<i>Tri-Service Institutions</i>	136
5.3.13	<i>Strategic Intelligence</i>	136
5.3.14	<i>The Ghana Army</i>	136

5.3.15	<i>The Ghana Navy</i>	137
5.3.16	<i>The Ghana Air Force</i>	137
5.3.17	<i>Other Institutions for National Defence</i>	138
5.3.18	<i>National Reserve Forces</i>	138
5.3.19	<i>Voluntary Military Training and School Cadet Corps</i>	138
5.3.20	<i>Civil Defence</i>	139
5.3.21	<i>Crisis Management</i>	139
CHAPTER SIX		145
AN EVALUATION OF THE GHANA NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY		145
6.1	Background	145
6.1.1	<i>The International Security Environment</i>	147
6.1.2	<i>Internal Security Concerns</i>	149
6.2	The Roots of the Ghana Armed Forces.....	150
6.3	The Ghana Armed Forces and Governance	152
6.3.1	<i>The National Liberation Council</i>	152
6.3.2	<i>The National Redemption Council</i>	152
6.3.3	<i>The Supreme Military Council II</i>	153
6.3.4	<i>The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</i>	153
6.3.5	<i>The Provisional National Defence Council</i>	154
6.4	The Ghana Armed Forces and Peacekeeping.....	155
6.4.1	<i>The ECOMOG Operations</i>	155
6.4.2	<i>Lessons from Peacekeeping Operations</i>	156
6.5	Defence Policy Making.....	158
6.5.1	<i>Sources of Ghana's Defence Policy</i>	160
6.6	The Strategic Environment	160
6.7	Opportunities and Challenges	166
6.7.1	<i>Strategic Interest</i>	167
6.7.2	<i>National Interest</i>	169
6.7.3	<i>The Threat Landscape</i>	170
6.7.4	<i>Challenges of Climate Change and Conflicts in the Sahel on Defence</i>	171
6.7.5	<i>The Sahel Conflicts</i>	172
6.7.6	<i>Food</i>	173
6.7.7	<i>Energy</i>	174
6.7.8	<i>The National Defence Policy and the Ghanaian Threat Landscape</i>	176
6.7.9	<i>The Employment of Forces</i>	178
6.8	Strategic Response	180

6.8.1	<i>Ghana's Strategic Objectives</i>	181
6.8.2	<i>National Defence Mission</i>	183
6.8.3	<i>Strategic Posture</i>	185
6.9	National Defence Establishment.....	186
6.9.1	<i>Joint Task Force</i>	188
6.9.2	<i>Tri-Service Institutions</i>	188
6.9.3	<i>Strategic Intelligence</i>	188
6.9.4	<i>The Ghana Army</i>	188
6.9.5	<i>The Ghana Navy</i>	189
6.9.6	<i>The Ghana Air Force</i>	189
6.9.7	<i>Other Institutions for National Defence</i>	190
6.9.8	<i>National Reserve Forces</i>	190
6.9.9	<i>Voluntary Military Training and School Cadet Corps</i>	190
6.9.10	<i>Crisis Management</i>	191
6.10	Defence Capability Requirements.....	191
6.11	Civil-Military Relations.....	194
6.12	Identified Weaknesses.....	196
	Conclusion.....	199
	CHAPTER SEVEN.....	200
	THE INVOLVEMENT OF GHANA ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. 200	
7.0	Introduction.....	200
7.1	Ghana Armed Forces in National Development before 1992.....	201
7.2	GAF's Involvement in Development beyond 1992.....	201
7.2.1	<i>Political Advancement</i>	202
7.2.2	<i>Secondment to Public Institutions</i>	203
7.2.3	<i>Economic Security</i>	204
7.2.4	<i>Industrial Development</i>	205
7.2.5	<i>Infrastructural Development</i>	205
7.2.6	<i>Crime</i>	207
7.2.7	<i>Institutional Exchanges</i>	207
7.2.8	<i>Social Development</i>	208
7.2.9	<i>Education</i>	208
7.2.10	<i>Sports and Entertainment</i>	209
7.2.11	<i>Health</i>	209
7.2.12	<i>Social Cohesion</i>	210
7.2.13	<i>Agricultural Development</i>	210

7.2.14	<i>Environmental</i>	211
7.2.15	<i>National Disasters</i>	212
7.3	Human Capital Development.....	213
7.3.1	<i>International Image of Ghana</i>	214
7.3.2	<i>Resistance to GAF involvement in National Development</i>	215
CHAPTER EIGHT		217
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS		217
8.0	Introduction.....	217
8.1	Assessing the viability of Ghana’s Defence Policy	218
8.1.1	<i>Safeguarding National Security</i>	218
8.1.2	<i>Formalised Structure and Operations</i>	222
8.1.3	<i>Logistics and Resources</i>	225
8.1.4	<i>Accountable Financial Management and Resource Use</i>	227
8.2	Ghana’s Defence Policy adaptation to transformation within the global context and expanded mandate of GAF	229
8.2.1	<i>International Defence Arrangements</i>	229
8.2.2	<i>Developing Formal Relationship with Other Countries</i>	230
8.2.3	<i>Joint Military Training</i>	231
8.2.4	<i>Guides in Signing Military Pacts</i>	232
8.2.5	<i>International Conflict Management</i>	233
8.2.6	<i>Managing Cross-Border Threats</i>	234
8.2.7	<i>Keeping International Peace</i>	235
8.2.8	<i>Effective Inter-Regional Conflict Resolution</i>	236
8.2.9	<i>Nation Building</i>	237
8.2.10	<i>Internally Generated Funds</i>	239
8.3	Implications of Ghana’s Defence Policy for National Development.....	241
CHAPTER NINE		244
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS		244
9.0	Introduction.....	244
9.1	Summary of Findings.....	244
9.1.1	<i>Assessing the viability of Ghana’s Defence Policy in safeguarding National Security</i>	245
9.1.2	<i>Adaptation of Ghana’s Defence Policy to transformations within the global context and expanded mandate of GAF</i>	246
9.1.3	<i>Implications of Ghana’s Defence Policy for National Development</i>	247
9.1.4	<i>Findings Related to Realism</i>	250
9.1.5	<i>Findings Related to the Literature</i>	251

9.1.6	<i>Surprises</i>	252
9.2	Conclusions	253
9.2.1	<i>Contribution to Knowledge</i>	254
9.3	Recommendations	256
9.3.1	<i>Policy Recommendations and Practice Implications</i>	256
9.3.2	<i>Recommendations for Future Research</i>	259
BIBLIOGRAPHY		261
APPENDICES		273

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2. 1: Matrix of Conceptual Framework	43
Figure 2. 2: Sources of Defence Policy.....	46
Figure 3. 1: Approaches to Defence Policy Making.....	75
Figure 3. 2: Functions of MoD	91
Figure 3. 3: The Functional Path of Defence Policy for a MoD	92
Figure 4. 1: Map of West Africa showing Ghana and her Neighbours.....	100
Figure 4. 2: Political Map of Republic of Ghana (2019).	101
Figure 4. 3: The System of Governance	102
Figure 4. 4: Organisation for Internal Security	104
Figure 4. 5: Defence Sector of Ghana.....	106
Figure 4. 6: Map of Ghana showing Military Commands (2019).....	108
Figure 4. 7: Maritime Area of Responsibility	109
Figure 4. 8: Contentious Maritime Areas with Neighbours.....	110
Figure 4. 9: Distribution of Respondents	114
Figure 8. 1: Thematic Network on Viability of Ghana Armed Forces Defence Policy	228
Figure 8. 2: Thematic Framework Relevance of GAF Defence Policy to Changing International Relations	240
Figure 8. 3: Thematic Presentation of Impact of NDP on National Development	243

LIST OF TABLE

Table 5. 1: Tabular Presentation of Defence Policy Changes in Ghana. 142

ABSTRACT

The Public Sector space of sovereign states is governed by policies that direct various categories of stakeholders in the attainment of goals of governments. The Defence and Security Sectors of states fall within this category. In this respect, the Ghana Armed Forces, as the lead institution in the Defence Sector, has been assigned by all four Constitutions of post-independent Ghana, the role of protecting the territorial integrity of the state and by extension, the National Interest as well as the security and interests of the citizenry. The Fourth Republican Constitution of 1992, however, stands in sharp contrast to all previous ones in that it has a provision which stipulates that, the Ghana Armed Forces should contribute to national development. Given this historically unique constitutional mandate, the study examined the problem posed by the new mandate in the light of the fact that the assigned developmental duty was neither accompanied by specific operational directives nor an expatiation of what it entails. It is factual that the Ghana Armed Forces has always contributed to national development, albeit passively, whilst discharging its duties under the traditional role. This therefore raises questions about clarity between the tenets of the Ghana National Defence Policy, which is designed to take into consideration the country's commitments to national, regional, continental, as well as global security, and the developmental mandate of the Ghana Armed Forces as required by the Constitution. The study thus pursued the objectives of ascertaining the viability of the National Defence Policy, how it relates to a fluid contemporary threat landscape, as well as prospects for national development. Guided by the theory of realism, a thematic network qualitative analysis was conducted on both primary and secondary data that were collected from the views of experts, academics and civil society including relevant literature. It was concluded that duty bearers require an in-depth knowledge of the tenets of Ghana's National Defence Policy to better appreciate their role in a people-centred mandate and its full implications for the traditions, *esprit de corps* as well as the innovative strategies of the Ghana Armed Forces going into the future. This, by and large, raises questions about the general strategic capability of Ghana's Defence Sector in the context of the rapidly evolving national and international security challenges. It was observed that, the National Defence Policy has been quite resilient and has satisfactorily met the needs of the state and the defence sector. This notwithstanding and as a living document, there is an urgent need for it to retain its viability, relevance, and dynamism. These findings call for several recommendations including the need to continuously review the National Defence Policy, not only to keep it abreast with the fluid threat, technological, and socio-political landscapes, but to also ascertain its relevance to the state in the discharge of her commitments both locally and internationally. To achieve this, a multi-sectorial and inter-ministerial approach to policymaking was recommended.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

The nation-state has turned out to be the standard and the most preferable form of organizing human society. Indeed, it seems that the proliferation of states, especially after the end of World War II in 1945, is a confirmation of Aristotle's assertion that man, being a political animal, can only survive in a state (Johnson, 1990). Ever since the Westphalian State was established in Europe in 1648 (Croxtton, 1999), it has been replicated all over the world, including Africa (Herbst, 1990).

The Treaty of Westphalia did not only end the thirty years of wars amongst European states but also established the primacy of the state in the conduct of all forms of interaction on the world stage. It equally marked the beginning of the modern international system and recognised the important role of states as the main actors. States have exclusive authority within their boundaries. Both neo-realists and neo-liberalists uphold the autonomous nature of states, regarding them as unified entities that act rationally (Krasner, 1995). As such, irrespective of the specificities of where such states have been set up, they are characterized by similar organs, procedures, policies, and institutions programmed to promote the quest for the smooth governance and effective delivery of public goods, political stability, as well as state survival. Such political arrangements are important, given that the international system is anarchic and for that matter does not provide or guarantee the security of any state (Baldwin, 1997). As a result of this, the global context, by definition, is a source of danger and political instability. Whilst political stability concerns the internal coherence of state machinery, the survival of the

state focuses on the nation-state retaining its place among the comity of nations as a sovereign and autonomous entity.

Traditionally, threats to state survival and stability emanated from other sovereign states (Lin, 2011). Hence, in response, the common strategic imperative of all states pursuing their national security objectives was to draw up containment measures which worked to undermine or mitigate the threats posed by other states (Taliaferro, 2000/01). At the core of such strategic imperatives were the elements of state power mainly defined by military capability and a government's economic and diplomatic strategy, as well as its technological prowess (Biddle, 2005), (Volgy et al, 2011). N. J. Spykman observed as early as 1942, that state power depended not solely on "military forces" but on several other determinants such as the "size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technical development, and financial strength." These traditional aspects of state power each possesses inherent/intrinsic value and have collectively held sway for centuries and continue to be relevant in present times. They have, over the centuries, aided the posturing of states and their rulers in communicating how powerful states are in comparison to their neighbours, allies and potential enemies. The most obvious and visible demonstration of state power has been the use of the military. The manifestation of military might and the close link between that and cutting-edge technology have combined well to communicate the strength of modern states. It is worth acknowledging that over-reliance on the military has elicited accusations of global hegemonic tendencies on the part of some states, such as the US, in the recent past. Same was thought of Nigeria, and to some extent Ghana, at the regional level in the 1990s when they led regional efforts, financed, and conducted military operations in the then troubled Liberia to return it to normalcy (Howe, 2001). These did not only ensure the survival of the Liberian state,

but it also created a positive image of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) relative to intra-state conflict resolution.

States have protected their territorial integrity, population and economic interests from external threats by largely relying on their military might and diplomatic networks. The Cold War period was an epitome of the cagey show of military might by the then two superpowers – the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Ratti, 2014). These instruments were used interchangeably and selectively and continue to serve the needs of the nation-state even in the post-Cold War era.

However, the financial requirements for the effective implementation and exercise of the instruments of state power are relatively heavy or expensive. These compel many states to accept some amount of alliances, membership of economic communities/blocs, and mergers to be able to fully meet their stability and security requirements (Sicurelli and Fabrinini, 2014). In all these dynamics of state power, the interest and protection of the citizen remain the ultimate. Apart from the financial burdens, the effect of globalisation as well as the fluid nature of emerging threats make strategizing for state survival more complicated. A state's military stature is highly dependent on the nature of its economy and the decisions of its authorities (Sloan, 2012).

The investments made in ensuring state survival equally gets translated into a level of development. As such the military and all other security agencies which get resourced are in the main agents of development (Olsen, 2011). They provide the needed congenial atmosphere of safety and security for the advancement of economic activities and developmental policies. Development in this context is the amelioration of the state of affairs of the various segments

of the state which affect the total wellbeing of the nation's inhabitants with repercussions on how they relate to state machinery and authority (Chrisman, 2018).

Over the years, a good number of states, Ghana inclusive, have consequently tried moving away from the old concept of self – sufficiency in matters of territorial defence. Learning from history, it has been realised that hardly any state has been successful at self-sufficiency or autarky (Kapstein, 1992). The *modus operandi* has rather been largely the reliance on the world economy for the needed money, materiel and other resources for national Defence or to prosecute wars (Kapstein, 1992). This has been mainly through various financial arrangements for the acquisition of logistics and the financing of functional activities in the pursuit of Defence matters. With the creation of regional bodies such as ECOWAS and other international organizations like the United Nations, the world has seen efforts by states to share their Defence burdens and not necessarily shirk their responsibilities to their citizens. In the West African sub-region, for instance, the operations of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and La Cote d'Ivoire, readily come to mind.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) did also show interest and played active roles in operations in Guinea Bissau, Mali and Gambia. In these operations, collective assets of member-states of the group, and not necessarily the individual states in distress, were used. In furtherance of the idea, and as an adjunct of the concept of Defence of the African Union, a regional pool of resources has been set up. This is in reference to the ECOWAS Standby Force which is earmarked to serve the Defence needs of member-states and the sub-region as a whole. The Force comes with a designated Logistics Base meant to sustain future operations as well as for rapid intervention and to satisfy the concept of the

Responsibility to Protect when the need arises. The Responsibility to Protect is the global commitment made by member states of the United Nations in 2005 to work against and prevent genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes in all their forms (Hakimi, 2014).

With a significantly changed threat landscape, the continuous posturing of states for recognition, survival, and influence has also seen some shifts. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 alleged terrorist attacks on the USA however, it has become clear that the major source of political instability in the global context is not only the state. Indeed, unlike the traditional forms of threats from states, the new/contemporary threats are posed by actors which are multinational, invisible, stateless, fatalistic and averse to negotiation (Acharya, 2007, Quénivet, 2005). Given these attributes, the traditional notion of state strategic imperatives which are based on elements of national power, as highlighted above, have proven inadequate in guaranteeing national security. As exemplified in West Africa, the proximate international context of Ghana, contemporary threats posed by non-state actors may emanate from (a) narcotics entrepreneurs who see the country as a suitable transit zone (b) defeated rebel groups, (c) small arms traffickers and (d) militant groups, such as the Signed-in-Blood Battalion and the Islamic Movement for Azawad (active in present day Mali) which may seek to establish sleeper cells in the country (Gutelius, 2007). Others include the transnational drug trafficking, cyber-crimes, piracy and threats to offshore energy production, and threats associated with migration. Threats emanating from the adverse effects of climate change and societal changes are equally present. The ever-present poverty, the deepening of societal fault lines such as ethnic profiling for political, economic and influential power stand chances of leading to the collapse of the nation and derailing all possibilities of development.

The nexus between development and security continues to remain very important. Consequently, as regards Ghana, both the country and the sub-regional economic bloc - ECOWAS, place a high premium on security for development. This follows the identification of lack of development and poverty as some of the virile sources of instability in West African countries (Shultz, Godson, Hanlon, and Ravich, 2011). All these potential issues necessitate a rethink of both the philosophy and policy of Defence. The sources and nature of threats confronting Ghana currently create the need for the GAF to have an appropriate Defence policy to meet the needs of the nation and its citizens. Thus, Ghana, in keeping faith with its multilateral commitments and in satisfying self-imposed obligations as contained in its current Foreign Policy, has no option but to remain an active participant in the discharge of AU and ECOWAS responsibilities as well. These commitments are not just developmental but also cover matters of security (Bluwey, 2002). In addition to changes in the nature of both internal and external threats confronting Ghana, the Fourth Republican Constitution has expanded the remit of the GAF from strict guarantee of national territorial integrity to being a partner of the Government of Ghana [GoG] in the pursuit of the welfare of the citizenry and of the state (Handley, 2001). Thus, the GAF as an institution has been made to expand and blend its focus from high politics to low politics. Where high politics involve the strategic issues related to state survival and low politics concern the very basic activities concerning the daily welfare of citizens. Its own mission then got crafted to include not just developmental engagements but the well-being of the marginalised and excluded in the Ghanaian society (Addae, 2005). This transformation may come as an institutional cultural shock and in the process elicit resistance in the form of slow or no institutional adaptation to the new mandate (Howe, 2001).

Resistance as noted here may be due to historical factors. It may manifest itself as the expression of being crowded out or being made to be less effective in the conduct of traditional

roles known for the military the world over. Additionally, the level of apprehension that the members may exhibit by being unduly hesitant in responding to new measures and decisions stands a chance of creating a seeming rift between the armed services and their civilian masters. To effectively bridge this gap, there need to be a dynamic policy that should be well understood by all stakeholders and this requires the contribution of all. In this context, a proactive Defence policy is needed to resolve the problem created by the expansion of the remit of the GAF. Especially since the expansion came without corresponding arrangements for the traditional roles of the GAF and the delineation of the balance that must be kept. These form the basis of the problem of this study.

The Ghana Armed Forces

The Ghana Armed Forces traces its roots to the colonial times when Lord Luggard sent a contingent of soldiers called “Glover’s Hausas” to the then Gold Coast from Nigeria for constabulary duties (US Marines, 2004). These elements, as part of the forces of the British West – African territory, were deployed for duty in any colony demanding their services. Additionally, they were used for the war efforts in Africa, the Far East and in some colonies, such as the war of 1900 against the Asante Kingdom (US Marines, 2004). This arrangement saw them in action in territories alien to their own during the First and Second World Wars. Prior to gaining independence in 1957, the Nkrumah Administration had in 1955 constituted a committee to explore possibilities of expanding the then three battalions to include an Air Force and a Navy. The committee was made up of Nkrumah himself, A.L Adu – the Principal Secretary of Defence and External Affairs as well as Rose – UK’s Permanent Secretary of Defence (Robert, 1959).

After independence, the Armed Forces Act – Act 105 was promulgated with its accompanying regulations in 1962. All constitutions since then have provided for the existence of Armed Forces for Ghana, stating the traditional mandate of the Services for the Defence of the territorial integrity of Ghana. This mandate entails the comprehensive Defence of Ghana's interests within her land, maritime, and air internationally recognised boundaries. It also includes the Defence of the country against both internal and external aggression. The main focus of the Armed Forces has thus always been its traditional core mandate even in times of military rule. This is so because during what is termed as periods of military rule, only a handful of serving military officers really get involved in day-to-day governance of the country. Though the Supreme Military Council regime is on record to have had large numbers of military personnel in governance, the overall military presence in governance was still limited since that is not the mandated role of the military. The GAF's institutional memory (Björn, 1980) and its role in national life are rooted in these experiences. Given this, the 1992 Constitution's Article 210(3) which states that the Armed Forces may be deployed to play roles which may advance the development of the nation and as may be determined by the President, can induce resistance. Memories of episodes of military administration of state and the fact that the reversion to democratic governance was engineered with the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) being an important driver of the process, may cast this constitutional requirement as a way of civilians humiliating or downgrading the status of the GAF. Obviously, given that *esprit de corps* is paramount for institutional discipline and cohesion, especially for any military fraternity, it should not be assumed that the new constitutional requirement may not induce friction/resistance and even hostility. Effectiveness in the discharge of duties involving their new role may also not be guaranteed.

Every law and policy must be consistent with the 1992 Constitution and also meet the best practice in similar jurisdictions (Chitor, 2017). Consequently, the added tasks of development, without tampering with the traditional roles of GAF, should also be consistent with the 1992 Constitution and not unnecessarily provoke any conflict or disharmony amongst institutions. Therefore, from the foregoing, the question to ask is whether the GAF, given the radically changed external and internal context, is set up in ways that will make it live up to its new external reality and domestic constitutional requirements. This study specifically explores the case of the Ghana Armed Forces a traditional military institution, in a bid to ascertain the extent to which its policy posture equips it to meet present day security and developmental needs. In this quest, the guiding regime of the GAF, its Defence Policy, is critically examined in relation to how to meet expanded functions regarding the President's prerogative of assignment of functions and developmental goals/functions assigned to the GAF.

Ghana, like all other nations finds herself in an International System largely characterised by anarchy and lacking a credible and strong central authority. Consequently, states must fashion out ways of pursuing the twin goals of prosperity for citizens and security in all its forms. States have mainly concentrated on taking advantage of economic liberalism and "global division of labour" to better their lot for the benefit of citizens. Public officials of states in charge of Defence policy also continue with their preoccupation of achieving autonomy in foreign affairs, national security, and military superiority over would-be rivals. This brings into focus the seeming conflict between the concepts of national security and globalisation. The relationship between the financial, economic and industrial might of a state and its political and military strength has been an enduring one all these centuries. Just as the Economic Sector requires security from the Defence Sector to thrive, so does the Defence Sector need the critical funds from the economic sector to be effective (Ince, 2016). Friedrich List puts it bluntly by stating

that “national wealth is increased and secured by national power, as national power is increased and secured by national wealth”. Consequently, we can conclude that it is through trade that states achieve wealth and by extension ensure national security. In any case, providing the Defence needs of a state is one of the expensive ventures for all states. Policy makers and authorities thus need to invest both time and effort in determining the direction and options to take to ensure state survival whilst meeting citizen expectations. For Paul Kennedy, the imbalances in Defence commitments have been the bane of many strong states throughout history (Kennedy, 1987) and this does not exclude emergent African states.

The Defence sector itself needs to be clearly identified. One can say without equivocation that in Ghana and some nascent democracies where the military has been active in politics, the tendency exists for a good number of public servants and citizens to fail to see defence policies as public policies determined by civilians. They tend to believe that defence policies are too technical, sensitive and complex requiring expert attention and understanding and not meant for public knowledge or debate (Bluwey, 2002). This argument and thinking align defence policies to conditions of national emergency and disasters, thereby creating the erroneous impression that states are constantly under threat of an invasion, subversive activities, or insurrection. This state of affairs may thus justify the dealing with issues of Defence in secrecy and on the blind side of the citizens and a good number of government machinery. For Cleary and McConville, the Defence Sector includes “the armed forces, civil servants, Defence industries and agencies (whether in public or private ownership) and their political leaders” (Cleary and McConville, 2006). The sector is therefore not limited to the military but rather involves all segments of society that have some contribution to make for the survival of the state and the total well-being of the citizen. The sector should be civil controlled. The armed forces of countries tendered to have an inherent need to be different and so seek to be treated

differently from the rest of society (Dandeker, 2002). This is however not limited to military forces alone as some think it is unrealistic for the intelligence agencies and some special parts of the police service to work in a very transparent way (Nwolise, 2014). However, arguments in support of this stance have all fallen through in recent times with the majority upholding civil control of armed services and subjecting them to stringent accountability regimes. Consequently, to avoid duplication and conflicts whilst maintaining the sanctity of purpose as well as remaining focused, there is a need for clearly stated policies to guide stakeholders. Defence policies provide this critical guidance. They aim at ensuring the total security of states. The military just happens to be one of the many institutions that contribute, albeit importantly, to this aspect of the life of nations.

The world has seen the creation of numerous institutions with pacifist outlooks at the national, regional, and international levels. These include the Regional Economic Communities such as ECOWAS, continental organisations such as the AU, and the United Nations Organisation. They, among other things, aim at ensuring the prevention of conflicts, their peaceful resolution if they occur, the sustenance of peace, and the co-existence of states in a peaceful, stable and secure environment. This plethora of things could erroneously lead to the false belief that states could shirk their responsibility of providing for their security and peace to the supra-national institutions.

As part of state assertion of sovereignty, a state is expected to be self-sufficient in ensuring its physical survival and potent enough to contain both internal and external aggressive forces. Granted that military power is not the only source of state power, it still remains the most visible and potent form of showing the resoluteness of a state to contain all threats from adversaries. Where a state decides to use the threat of military force in the furtherance of an

objective, it certainly must have sufficient military assets to do so. Additionally, the Defence assets and posture must convey a sense of deterrence since a credible force is one that is believed to be capable of living up to expectation if armed hostilities have to take place. Well trained and intelligently used defence forces can be significant force multipliers for states' wider political objectives (Chuter, 2006). Apart from giving states options in the international arena, defence forces also give states negotiation capital. It is more prominent and used by states with nuclear power and high projection armies. Their ability to influence issues such as the mandates of peacekeeping forces, their success and associated failures in seeking and getting important command appointments, and the effect of their intimidating presence in conflict situations are all pointers of the indispensable role defence forces play in the world today (Chuter, 2006). The standard bearer of the insignia of a state is also principally its military. Their relevance as a complementary part of the regalia of national pride of a state cannot therefore be overemphasized. However, with changing trends in threat identification, with dwindling resources for Defence research and acquisitions, and with a generally acceptable pacifist approach to conflict resolution, there could be a justification for an argument for the reduction and reconfiguration of Defence structures namely institutions, machinery, decision-making bodies, doctrines, procedures, training models, intelligence networks and budgeting. The military has largely been seen as an institution trained, equipped and kept for going to war. Its services have been mainly intangible though relevant to societal development. However, in some emerging democracies, the association of the military with development is not the norm (Azam, 1995). This is further confirmed by the dominance of pacifist ways of conflict resolution and the apparent reduction in the invasion of states by others.

The traditional threats of inter-state conflicts have reduced significantly since the end of the Cold War (Kaldor, 2005). For instance, the level of antagonism between Ghana and Burkina Faso following the assassination of Thomas Sankara in 1987 has since improved (Hagberg, 2019). The commitment shown by Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and their respective allies to respect a court judgment over their territorial maritime boundary has further pushed away the possibility of resorting to hostilities to resolve conflicts between the two neighbours. This can be further said to be in consonance with Article 15 of the African Union Non-Aggression and Common Defence Pact (Toth, 2019). This pact came into force to operationalise the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) to which all member states of the African Union have given their support. The sharing of treated water and clinker resources between Ghana and Togo has further cemented the friendly relationship between the two. Above all, the membership of Ghana and her neighbours, of both international and regional bodies with numerous protocols and treaties, makes it less likely for them to resort to armed conflict to resolve their differences. In fact, being surrounded by francophone countries poses no threat as such. The threat arises from the Defence pacts and alliances the neighbours have with their former colonial power France and the lack of similar pacts between Ghana and the United Kingdom (UK) (Adu-Amanfoh, 2002). In the event of an armed conflict between Ghana and any of the neighbours, she will be forced to face France, her North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies, and the rest of the Francophone countries in the sub-region. Whilst not completely discounting the possibility, it has become very necessary for policy making relative to Defence to take into cognisance this fundamental shift in the traditional threat landscape.

In contemporary times, Ghana, like all her neighbours, is faced with threats related to poverty and internal cohesion as well as non-state actors who may have a reasonable control of means of violence. This current situation has to be deepened and taken up fully as part of the Defence

policy in use. Consequently, training, funding, research, doctrine, psyche and physical posture have to be sufficiently altered to contain the present-day and possible future or envisaged threats. Elinor Sloan believes that among the most important activities of the present-day state is the use of its armed forces (Sloan, 2012). She confirms the provision of security to citizens as the fundamental and most original responsibility amongst the multitude of functions of the modern state. Much as the existing comprehensive approach with a manoeuvrist philosophy, used by Ghana and her allies, can significantly delay the activities of potent non-state actors, it remains unsuitable for the attainment of the goal of obliterating the activities of non-state actors completely. Clausewitz (1956) and Liddell Hart (1954) and their concepts of total war still make a great deal of sense. The transition from total war to asymmetric warfare is not as swift as has been feared by members of the armed services. Consequently, the Clausewitzian approach of Total War, relative to the conduct of war between states has not been jettisoned completely by armies the world over. This approach favours the matching of strength against strength. The Ghana Armed Forces has equally failed to leave the domain of Total War in both concept and posture. Even with the adoption of the manoeuvrist and comprehensive approaches as doctrinal basis, the recruitment, training doctrines, equipment and work ethics still lean heavily towards the stance of Clausewitz.

Traditionally, the Armed Forces – seen mainly as a conservative institution - has used Defence policies aimed at protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. This mandate made it imperative for the services of the Army, Air Force and the Navy to be established and maintained. The protection of the land space, airspace and maritime space was thus guaranteed. In the specific case of Ghana, a Border Guard service was also deemed necessary and one was kept up to the late 1980s. It got disbanded due to internal conflicts and turf battles and not as a matter of policy.

These historical mandates were executed using the resources available which were procured based on the threat analysis conducted at the time and derived their direction from the existing Defence Policy. The main focus has been the defence of the physical borders, landed resources, citizens, and contributing to the security needs of neighbours in alliance with other sub regional actors, e.g. ECOWAS. Additionally, there has been a consistent participation in international peacekeeping engagements at the sub-regional, regional and global levels.

Ghana has had four constitutions in all with each constitution making provision for the existence of the Ghana Armed Forces and all have maintained the traditional role of an orthodox military. However, the 1992 Constitution specifically included a developmental role. The inclusion of the developmental role, however, did not come with a revision of the psyche, training, procedures, posture, and orientation of the military and its affiliates in the Defence sector.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The Ghana Armed Forces is a traditional public sector institution set up, trained and equipped to satisfy a mandate of the protection of the territorial integrity of the country. It has continued to use solutions such as conventional approaches to warfare, tried and tested in times past both internally and on foreign operations, to cater for threats that have undergone significant mutations. These mutations are attributable to changes in technology, societal setups and globalization, among others. This threat evolution does not only affect the nation's interests locally, but also her interests in the sub-region, on the African continent, and the world at large. The country's Defence Policy therefore needs to undergo constant adjustments and changes to meet the demands of the times and reassure the citizens of the Ghanaian state of their security

as well as the realization of their interests. The challenge confronting the Defence Sector is whether Ghana's National Defence Policy is viable, robust, resilient, and dynamic enough to safeguard National Security and the total well-being of the individual inhabitant.

Ghana has over the years acquitted itself satisfactorily in the discharge of her obligations to the International Community. This has resulted in her deployment of the Ghana Armed Forces not only for direct protection of her territorial integrity but also in furtherance of world peace and political stability especially in Africa. Such operations have been and continue to be conducted under the auspices of the UN, AU or ECOWAS. Thus, the use of defence resources of the country needs to be stringently regulated through proactive and realistic policy measures.

The problem that needs to be addressed is the addition, made by the 1992 Constitution, of a developmental role to the Ghana Armed Forces without explicitly delineating lines of departure from her traditional roles. This means a more people-centred role has been added. This therefore makes it imperative for the Defence Policy, which draws its authority from the Constitution, to be given a closer study to ascertain how the problems created by the changes in times, technology, threat landscape, societal set-up, resource-bases, and attitude of neighbours are being addressed. It also necessitates the evaluation of how this novelty has worked so far and how it operates in practice with resultant impacts on both the military institutions and the National Defence Policy. The labyrinth of how all these fit into the Defence Sector and the needed coordination have to be clarified.

The issue therefore is that the Ghana Armed Forces has had a mandate given it by the 1992 Constitution that is slightly different from its hitherto documented traditional roles. This difference is seen in the express addition of a developmental role to that of ensuring territorial

integrity which is not just the traditional/core mandate of GAF but also a passive developmental role played by the GAF all throughout its history. Especially where development is seen and measured through tangible projects. The apprehension that the assumption of new roles could dilute the effectiveness of the Ghana Armed Forces in executing its core mandate cannot be overlooked without an in-depth examination. There is therefore the need for a study to be conducted into how the GAF has survived with the new policy direction since 7th January 1993 when the 1992 Constitution came into force, and its possible effects going into the future. This comes on the backdrop of the undisputable fact that many of the issues that impact the comfort, well-being, and security of citizens in contemporary times are not necessarily military in nature thereby requiring wider civilian consultation to resolve. How the military is used to contribute to government's realisation of its policies and goals is the challenge of strategists of governments today (Sloan, 2012) including the Ghanaian Government. In the Ghanaian context, the literature has been silent on matters of significantly engaging the military in development beyond its traditional roles dominated by the protectionist approach. This tends to underutilize the immense potentials of the institution.

Thus, the Defence Sector is not only subjected to changes in constitutional roles. It also has to face the challenges of the times; changed threat landscape, fast changing technology with security implications, transnational nature of Defence needs, rapid integration moves by political and commercial actors, and an ever-diminishing resource base for Defence matters. These underlie the problem of this study which aims at unravelling the issue of adding newer roles to Defence Sector institutions without sufficiently spelling out the accompanying measures required for effectiveness and efficiency.

1.3 Research Questions

This study answered the following questions:

- How does Ghana's Defence Policy and organizational structure enhance Ghana's National Security?
- How does the framework adapt to the changing landscape of International Politics especially that of ECOWAS, the dynamics of threats, and the utility to national development of the Defence Policy?
- How can the Defence Sector remain relevant and what needs to be done?

1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study, in the light of the above, is to assess the place/relevance of the existing conventional regime of the Ghana Armed Forces given: first, the recent global transformations in the nature of threats confronting states and second the constitutional provisions of Ghana's Fourth Republic which has expanded the remit of the GAF from its core mandate of protecting state sovereignty from external threats to the pursuit of state developmental aspirations.

The following are derived from the main objective:

- Assess the viability of Ghana's National Defence Policy in safeguarding National Security.
- Ascertain the extent to which the Defence Policy framework adapts to transformations within the global context and the expanded mandate of the GAF.
- Ascertain/examine how the Defence Sector would remain relevant and what needs to be done.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

The Ghanaian state has several institutions which are funded and maintained not just for national pride but to meet the security needs of the citizenry at large. The Ghana Armed Forces

is one of such key institutions with a chequered history of brilliance in external engagements and less glorious stories of attempts at leading internal political governance. As Huntington (1981) observed, “politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism...and substituting extraneous values for professional values.” After sticking to its mandated roles and having been expressly added a developmental role by the 1992 Constitution, and with a significantly changed threat landscape, it is imperative to review the policies and institutions of the military in order to ascertain their continuous relevance, viability, and suitability. This will significantly prove to be beneficial to both the defence institutions and aid the policy directions given by political authorities through defence policies.

1.6 Conceptual Definitions

The following terms which run throughout the study are hereby defined to reflect the context in which they are used in the conduct of the study:

Policy – A course of action deliberately adopted and pursued by a government to achieve set goals within specified time frames. They may be documented or not. A policy is not just what is said or wished for but that which is done (Cleary, 2006).

Defence Policy – It is called Military Policy in some jurisdictions. It stipulates the use of the military in pursuing a nation’s interests including international, regional, and national security interests. Its stakeholders however go beyond the armed services. It entails measures and initiatives that governments may or may not take in strategic decision-making in ensuring the promotion of the national interest of a state relative to the commitment of the armed forces (Addae, 2012).

The Defence Sector - The Defence Sector is larger than the strict military domain. The Defence Sector includes “the armed forces, civil servants, Defence industries and agencies (whether in

public or private ownership) and their political leaders” (Cleary and McConville, 2006). Thus, it goes beyond the military and includes segments of society that play various roles for the national security, survival of the state and the total well-being of citizens. As such, institutions such as the civil Police, Prisons Service, Immigration and Fire Services all play vital roles in the defence space though they are not members of the armed forces.

The Ghana Armed Forces- The Ghana Armed Forces refers to the institutions and members of the Ghana Army that is for land operations, the Ghana Navy that operates on both the inland waters and the sea, and the Ghana Air Force that dominates the airspace of Ghana. These and their integral training and support institutions constitute the Ghana Armed Forces. It should be noted that a good number of civilians work in supporting roles as civilian employees of GAF and thus are persons under the Code of Service Discipline of GAF irrespective of their status.

Human Security – It means the security of the individual in terms of the satisfaction of his/her basic needs. Other aspects include, but are not limited to, the creation of social, political, economic, cultural, and environmental conditions necessary for the survival and dignity of the individual, the protection and respect for human rights, good governance and the guarantee for each individual the choices and opportunities for his/her full development (Burgess, 2008).

Traditional Role of the Military – The traditional role of the Armed Forces, as used in this study, refers to ensuring the territorial integrity of the land, air and maritime space of the country thus insulating it from the physical invasion of external aggressive forces. The role also entails assisting the Civil Authorities in the restoration of law and order as well as fighting internal aggressive elements whose activities are inimical to the well-being of the country and its citizens. These orthodox roles contribute significantly to national development as an enabling environment is provided for other more visible developmental activities to take place.

National Development - National development has to do with the conscious programming of the activities and the use of resources for the improvement of the quality of life of the

inhabitants of a nation. The comprehensive amelioration of all domains affecting the lives of citizens is the desired target. As such the issue is not only economic but also includes social, cultural, and political well-being of all inhabitants (Lawal, 2011). Humans should be able to adapt to their external environments and these environments should record gradual improvements. They should enjoy bio-social needs including the needs for expression of sentiments and wishes. Finally, inhabitants should have unhindered access to improved arrangements for societal attitudes such as civility, dignity, and respect (Gboyega, 2003).

1.7 Arrangement of Chapters

In all there are eight chapters with each concentrating on a major aspect of the study. The order of presentation of the thesis after the analysis of the findings is given below:

Chapter One: Introduction.

- It gives the background to the study and sets the stage for an appraisal of the problem.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework.

- This chapter gives the philosophy for the conduct of the study which is basically the Realist's thoughts.

Chapter Three: Literature Review.

- Available literature on the subject area is reviewed here to identify gaps and review the perspectives of scholars of security and defence.

Chapter Four: Methodology, Research Instrument and Method of Data Analysis.

- This explains how and where the research was really conducted.

Chapter Five: An Overview of the Ghana National Defence Policy Framework

- This is a synthesis chapter that summarises the Ghana National Defence Policy of 2012.

Chapter Six: An Evaluation of the Ghana National Defence Policy.

- This chapter evaluates and comments on the current National Defence Policy.

Chapter Seven: The Involvement of Ghana Armed Forces in National Development

- This Chapter covers the conceptualization of GAF's role in national development.

Chapter Eight: Data Analysis

- The data gathered during the course of the study is analysed and conclusions drawn here.

Chapter Nine: Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.

- A Synopsis of the findings and conclusions are presented here.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

The study was conducted with the guidance of the theory of Realism and related concepts in mind. They served as guide to all aspects of the study and set out the limits within which the study was conducted. This is because the field of Defence is so vast that it is not possible to completely exhaust all the possible theories and concepts of the sector in one single study. Whilst keeping closely to the chosen theory of Realism, there is an attempt to limit the concepts that are associated with the topic. Consequently, the conceptual framework revolves around the major and technical terminologies related to the work.

The chapter also gives a perspective on the nature of theory and its importance to academic work in general and this study in particular. The scholarly justification of the chosen theory in this chapter upholds the continuous relevance of long-standing arguments of state behaviour, some of the existing concepts and the relationship between them as well as how they impact on state survival and on the well-being of citizens. Some key limitations of the theory are also discussed. A graphical representation of the relationship between the chosen concepts is also contained in this Chapter.

2.1 The Place of Theory to this Study

Theory has several compelling uses and meanings. However, for many social scientists, theory seeks to explain, in a deeper descriptive way, the phenomena which may be seen by society as being ambiguous and needing to be made more intelligible, thereby making them understood. Theorists may also engage in weighted predictions meant to prove or disprove hypotheses. In

this case the causal aspects of events and occurrences are unravelled based on studied patterns of previous happenings. For International Relations experts, the patterns of state behaviour in the International System, the predictions of natural patterns of change and the posturing of states and international institutions to events on the international stage, are of interest. The central tendencies are therefore the issues of interest with a reduced desire for point blank predictions. James Rosenau, for instance, views each occurrence as being an “encompassing class or pattern of phenomena” which offers explanations and solutions of parts of a jig-saw (Rosenau, 2000). This may be progressive in nature resulting in the asking by researchers of new questions and attempts at unravelling things beyond their face values. Theory in general, could thus be safely said to be an intellectual construct that helps us in the selection of facts, their interpretation and explanation with the aim of making near-accurate predictions of recurrent happenings and often observed phenomena. It therefore becomes an indispensable tool in trying to appreciate the patterns of behaviour of actors in the International System. These actors are mainly sovereign states.

Arriving at theory, or theory building itself, is another issue requiring consideration. Whilst some may prefer a statistical methodology using formal statements and tested hypotheses, others would rather have the traditional methods of theory building. This traditional approach being the reliance on historical methods and reasoned arguments thereby substituting quantitative and scientific approaches with non-quantitative and comparative case studies. Empirical evidence is more suited for the natural sciences whilst domains such as International Relations comfortably use normative approaches and endeavour to explain what “ought to be”, thereby dealing with intrinsic values and preferences.

There is unanimity on the front of the practitioners of International Relations that theory is necessary, unavoidable, and important in all attempts at explaining present happenings and how they might impact the future of the International System (Jahn, 2016). Theory for this study and International Relations in general should thus progressively and systematically explain state behaviour relying on the use of a number of concepts. This should render the study less complex than the reality of the Defence sector it seeks to explain.

The study has been done within the framework of Realism. Realism has its roots in the ancient world and has impacted studies all throughout time up to this current era. As a major and pace setting theory, Realism has been subjected to numerous interpretations, revisions, and re-packaging. However, what has stood the test of time is the appeal of its core assumptions and beliefs. Try as one might, there always remain a certain amount of space for the Realists to fill in state matters, organisations, or even businesses. For the International Relations scholar who concerns himself with state survival, Realism projects an International Community which has states as its main actors. State survival is therefore paramount and everything possible ought to be done to ensure its sanctity. Consequently, National Security is the heartbeat of such a realist (Khalidzad, 2018). In the search for parameters for state dominance, Hobbes averred that “to end the war against all” and to secure lasting domestic peace and tranquility, citizens defer to a visible sovereign and in return, have the benefit of protection and care (Hobbes, 1957). This means that, for any state to be considered relevant in the International System, it must necessarily be seen to possess an identity and an amount of power at least for self-determination and protection of its citizens. According to Andrew Chitty (2006), Hegel also believes that the state’s “highest duty to itself was its own preservation” and this is realist in nature. For Hegel welfare is the highest aim of ‘governing’ between nations. In this regard, it can be argued that since welfare is an issue of interest, National Interest can safely be said to be the driving factor

for relations between states. In the exercise of state power, the state is guided by needs, desires, aspirations and persuasions of its citizens (Chitty, 2006). All nations, according to Hans Morgenthau, (credited with the development of the classical realist theory of the twentieth-century) are compelled to protect “their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachment by other nations” (Morgenthau, 1951). For him, power remains the goal at all times whether in domestic or international spheres for all states no matter their size or their history.

For Kenneth Waltz, often cited as father of Defensive Realism and who is credited for developing Structural/Neo-Realism, “states are unitary actors, who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation, and at maximum, drive for universal domination” (Waltz, 1986). There are thus several derivatives of the original Realist concept worth studying. So, Realism can thus be said to be that scholarly thinking and practice that seeks to put the state above all else in the nation-state. It professes and is unrepentantly associated with state-centric issues seeking to ensure that the state survives and that all else is secondary. Realism is more concerned with exact or real state of things and not how they ought to be. It is more of an evidence-based approach to assessing affairs of a nation than a speculative approach.

2.2 Core Assumptions of Realism

The fundamentals of all the types and shades of Realism remain largely the same. The theory dominated the field of international politics especially between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War (Wohlforth, 1995). Beyond 1989, Realism has not lost its lustre. It continues to hold sway and re-defines itself with modifications to meet present-day demands of both the international system and the states which are the actors within the system. Some of the cardinal assumptions of the Realists are as follows:

- a. The International System is defined by states and that the actors and units of analysis should be solely states. States are the dominant and rational actors despite the existence of non-state actors in today's world politics.
- b. That central to international politics is conflict of various natures.
- c. The world's setting is anarchic and the struggle for dominance and power is the mainstay with states exhibiting levels of self-reliance for survival. National security is thus of prime importance and tops the hierarchy of international issues that states should concern themselves with.
- d. The might and capabilities of states continue to vary, though the status of legal sovereignty and equality of states are universal.
- e. There should be a separation of domestic politics from foreign politics since the unitary actors are independent states, anyway. Consequently, divergent views within a state are to be resolved authoritatively at home whilst a united front is supposed to be presented to the outside world.
- f. States' decisions and motives are affected by their national interests and not necessarily by the International System because they remain rational for their survival and self-determination.
- g. States are rational and unitary actors.
- h. The International System itself is state-centric.
- i. Finally, the assumption that power is the ultimate in terms of importance relative to an explanation of state behaviour and conduct of leaders.

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff Jr (1990), no matter the field of divergence between Realist theorists, they all seek to answer two principal puzzles namely, (1) what accounts for state behaviour and most especially state survival. Additionally, (2) what determines the

dynamics of the International System and how is it accounted for? Seeking answers to these certainly leads a researcher back to an examination of the state and the International System. Thus, the centrality of the state and the over-arching role of the International System are being re-affirmed.

Having ascertained the near pervasive influence of classical Realism, it is necessary to take a look at some re-branding some scholars have done over the period. It is instructive to note that writers such as Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger had a great impact on the world with Classical Realism. Following them has been Kenneth Waltz, Robert G. Gilpin, Stephen Krasner and Robert Keohane, among others who came with various terminologies and made contributions to the theory of Neo-Realism. It is normal to hear of Structural Realism, Modern Realism, and New Realism (Keohane, 1986). All these derivatives of Classical Realism only seek to modify the concept whilst jealously shielding its core tenets.

2.3 Neo-Realism

The proponents of Neo-Realism, such as Kenneth Waltz, had the benefit of the works of earlier writers such as Hans Morgenthau in the field of International Relations. The Neo-Realists seek to more clearly describe concepts with consistency. For instance, power is still an indispensable variable in political interactions but not seen as an “end in itself”. Whilst acknowledging the place of importance of the classical realist approach to analysing happenings in the international arena, they prefer a multidimensional approach to the hitherto near single-factor approach of Morgenthau. Kindermann specifically states that a ‘much higher degree of concrete and quasi-institutionalised cross-disciplinary cooperation’ is required in the study of state behaviour (Keohane, 1986). Gilpin, on the other hand, also makes an attempt at modifying the rationality of the Classical Realists. He is of the opinion that states dabble in cost-benefit

analysis and seek alternatives. He opines that even for states to choose to go to war, the expected benefits from the war effort must be deemed to outweigh that of staying away from war (Keohane, 1986).

Obviously, such actions by states should be expected to affect the International System. All states, as rational actors and no matter their level of influence, harbour the intention of influencing or even changing the International System to suit them. This could be through territorial, political or economic expansion. However, when the marginal cost of carrying out their intentions of influencing the existing system exceeds the marginal benefit they will get, rationality compels them to reconsider their options. This therefore ensures that there is a semblance of stability in the International System since the cost of change provides a natural barrier to inordinate desires and clamour for change by states. Consequently, actors of the International System, in this case states, are expected to do a cost-benefit analysis before embarking on a quest for change. Again, for the Neo-Realists, the power dynamics or its disposition dictates the conduct/behaviour of states. Where a state wishes to be dominant or where she lacks a fair share of the power, she might resort to cultivating several “networks of relationships” through alliances, pacts, and agreements to off-set her deficiencies (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 2001).

For Kenneth Waltz and his colleague Neo-Realists, the International System is anarchical and lacks structured governmental institutions or hierarchical structures. Consequently, states are seen to be having a “horizontal relationship” with a display of sovereign equality. Thus, the physical structure within which the actors of the International System operate is of essence here.

Structural Realism has had its fair share of impact on scholarly work. In general terms, “structure” is seen as the way “parts” of any identifiable entity or object are arranged. Structural Realism is traced to Kenneth Waltz and it also recognises states as the principal actors devoid of cultural differences among others. The capabilities of states as a result of the resources available to each also define structure but the underlining factor remains the quest of states to either survive or, where they believe survival is a *fait accompli*, they seek to dominate the world. Hence power struggle and its imbalances are also upheld by the Neo-Realists/Structural Realists (James, 1992).

On the domestic front, however, the picture is quite clearer and better appreciated. Institutions of state as well as those of the private sector have a hierarchical relationship in the internal affairs of the state. This streamlines the behaviour of the identifiable parts either along functional or regulatory lines. Thus, we can say that the focus of the Neo-Realist in this domain is the arrangement of the “parts” - in this case states who are accepted as the unitary actors – in the International System (Kauppi, 1993).

2.4 Criticisms of Realism

The work of Realists, be they classical or neo-realist, has been subjected to scrutiny and various criticisms drawn. An unresolved issue amongst realists is whether states seek survival or power maximisation. This is not peculiar to realism alone as all other concepts must necessarily be reviewed and examined. Apart from putting a higher premium on state security and not on human security, general shortcomings identified against the Realist Approach to studying international politics include the little consideration given to non-state actors, its secular posture, and the failure to mainstream non-military and economic powers. The views of Idealism also firmly provide a counter – balance to the realist approach.

2.4.1 *Secularisation*

Though religion has influenced international political outcomes since the beginning of recorded history, realist scholars deliberately do not consider it as a force. This is traced to the premise of secularisation on which the modern state was founded through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The Treaty of Westphalia recognises the state as the only legitimate organisation. Religion has also been placed in the private sphere since the era of the Enlightenment (Philpott, 2002). However, following the events of 9/11 among others, the decision to relegate the influence of religion has been questioned by some scholars such as Samuel Huntington since reality shows that aspects of religious fundamentalism lead to occurrences in the International System which cannot be overlooked.

Non-state actors showed that they could act more devastatingly than state actors. Their demands, however, seem to be unattainable since they often challenge the existence of the Westphalian state. The close relationship and interdependence between Islamic fundamentalist groups and existing states makes the belief of secularisation pale out in the face of reality. Religious states and governments claim the rights of the Westphalian state but refuse the doctrinal basis of the state by rather replacing the doctrine with Islamic beliefs and faith-based practices. Consequently, we can conclude that international politics in its current state is not entirely secularised as demonstrated by a good number of states in the Middle East and Asia.

2.4.2 *The Neglect of the Non-State Actor*

The Realist School of thought upholds the role of the state as the main recognisable actor of the international system following the premise set by the Treaty of Westphalia. States need to continue to occupy places of importance as major units of analysis since they are ultimately responsible for action, especially those that are of a transnational nature (Brown, 2001).

However, the role of international organisations, regimes and non-state actors has effectively shaped and continue to influence the conduct of states on the international plane. For instance, the role of the terrorist groups responsible for the events of the 9/11 effectively resulted in two wars of the current century – the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq. It is therefore difficult to discount the role of non-state actors in the conduct of states or international politics. In any case some of these non-state actors have budgets and programmes that far exceed that of sovereign states thereby displaying a higher potential of influencing decisions on the international plane. To therefore calculate all possible threats to both the state and international community, all these non-state actors – both secular and non-secular need to be analysed comprehensively if outcomes of planning are to be enduring.

2.4.3 The Non-Military and Economic Dimensions

Realists have been accused of not paying enough attention to the effect of non-military as well as economic power on state behaviour and international politics. The modern state continues to draw its power not only from its military might but also from its diplomatic networks and economic might, among others. So, to concentrate on the tools meant for countering anarchy such as the military to the neglect of the others is considered one of the shortcomings of Realism. Peter G. Peterson (1992) categorically says that Realists tend to lay more emphasis on the anarchic International System as the launch pad of their arguments rather than domestic affairs (Sebenius and Peterson, 1992). Use is made of the terminology of International Security (with a mandate of interdependence and security dilemma) instead of National Security by most Realists. This makes it difficult, but not impossible, to focus on domestic issues. This is because the final beneficiary of both levels of security is the individual.

2.4.4 The Liberalists Considerations

The most determined and established critiques of Realism are certainly the Liberalists or Pluralists. For them, the individual is the claimant of right and centre of analysis which is unlike the Realists who place premium on the state. The Liberalist expects the state to play a minimal role in communities espousing liberal tendencies. The state is deemed to be clothed with the power to ensure that the congenial political, economic, social, and cultural environments are conducive enough to allow the individual citizen to express him or herself freely. Liberalism is thus a concept of political persuasion that sets pragmatic and practical set of ideals for society.

The Liberalist ideals were not limited to only the political domain. It affected business practice, the economic, social, religious and scientific domains, among others. The advent of the Industrial Revolution is credited with the modification the political thought of Liberalism was subjected to. The state was allowed to institute mitigating measures against the potentially harmful effects of the inordinate and unregulated economic activities. Thus, individuals in their quest for economic advancement had their liberties and desires curtailed for the common good (Kauppi, 1993). The Liberals assume that there is “an underlying harmony of interests among individuals” hence their acceptance to have the state to play a minimal moderating role. They extend this premise to include states by claiming that common interests could be found among some states, thereby setting the stage for inter-state relations.

The arguments made by the Liberalists include the non-profitability of going to war in the face of an expanded international economy since war, though a determinant of international politics, will most likely negatively affect trading partners. Secondly, they argue that the decision to choose war will have to be affected by public opinion and not left to a select few – politicians

and military technocrats. Unlike the realists, they also argue that the regime of international laws, regulations, and treaties, among others, will see to the resolution of conflicts among states on amicable terms thereby leading to global peace, harmony and security. Finally, they are of the view that the leaders and populations of the Western World have had enough of the vagaries of war and that the cost burden alone was enough to let them choose to remain peaceful. Their position further gets bolstered by the philosopher Immanuel Kant who believes that “reason would be a substitute for the use of force in world politics” thereby fuelling Integration and Pluralist persuasions.

Thus, the highlights of Liberalist thoughts include the role of the state as an arbiter in managing conflicting demands and provision of space for the expression of divergent interests by individuals and groups. Additionally, the unit of analysis is the individual or groups, not the state.

2.5 Justifying the use of Realism

The concept of Realism is very apt for this study which aims at putting into perspective the institutional set – up of a nation’s Defence sector. It thus highlights the strategic importance of the conduct of issues of national security in the pursuit of national interest and by extension – national development.

The choice of Realism permits the study to be conducted on the premise of a state –centred philosophy. The concept of Defence revolves around the survival of states with the well-being of the citizens as one of the important derivatives. Without the state, the Defence architecture cannot be put in place since identifiable entities and interests are prerequisites and these can only be provided by a central authority claiming some rights of sovereignty.

Realists such as Robert Gilpin believe that power encompasses the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states. For Jeffrey Hart, power gets manifested in three ways. First through the control of resources, second through the control of actors, and thirdly through the control of events and their outcomes. However, it remains an undisputed fact that the enduring measurement of state power is its ability to control how and where events occur and the effect or impact of their outcomes. (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff,1990). Some of these outcomes are largely dictated by the use of military force or the threat of its use. The choice to either use such force or the decision to maintain it only for deterrence depends on the policy in place. Consequently, for a study of Defence policies, with the associated national interests and national security, the theoretical framework of realism can be justifiably accepted as the best choice.

Political Realists have been of the opinion that the lack of a central authority or an identifiable and legally recognised sovereign leads to the anarchy the world experiences. Consequently, no entity is charged with the responsibility of maintaining world peace nor the enforcement of agreements between states. For the Realists, war breaks out because no one can stop it. They continue to be of the opinion that International Relations is really a winner – takes all or zero-sum affair and that states can only survive by relying on themselves (Kapstein, 1992). They are of the unwavering opinion that states must be in possession of strong economies, “advanced technology, and a foundation of rich human and natural resources in order to be recognised as powerful (Kapstein, 1992). The Realists also associate themselves with the argument of stability theorists that the world does not automatically experience the benefits of comparative advantage in commerce. They hold that the hegemon dictates the openness or otherwise of the world economy in its quest and willingness to provide the world with collective goods of “economic stability and security.”

The events of the September 11th, 2001 bombing in the United States of America and the subsequent wars and security challenges of the world still gave us cause to believe that Realism remains relevant and influential in the choices made by modern states. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in an era when there was a false impression that the Realist tradition had become “obsolete” and that the reign of the Idealist tradition was in vogue (Bunyavejchewin, 2012). The apparent triumph of the USA and its allies over the USSR was rather short-lived. However, it gave an opportunity for scholars to question the continuous relevance of the Alliance Theory in the case of NATO, and to extol the values of Idealism over Realism. The US response to the 9/11 attacks by invading Afghanistan in 2001 was in conformity with the ideals of Idealism since the support of the International Community was given through the United Nations Security Council (Dobson, Dobson and Marsh, 2007). This is unlike the invasion of Iraq in 2003 which is considered as not being in conformity with the legal procedures required for such an invasion (Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe, 2005). The Idealist assumption relative to international regime was thus not met. The international institution – the UN – was thus the key actor in this case and played an important role in international politics. For instance, Krasner and others believe that regimes are interest-based or driven by the common interest of stakeholders. Krasner specifically defines International Regimes as “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of International Relations.” It is thus expected that there were common interests in going to war in Afghanistan. Still for the Idealist, “the nature of regimes is a positive-sum game” and among the issues of common interest to states is Security (Hansenclever, 2002). Though it is often difficult to build consensus, regimes can more easily facilitate the needed cooperation for decisive action as in the case of Afghanistan in October 2001. In this instance, though the common interest appeared absent or not-convincing enough, the structures of regimes as depicted by the UN were able to

marshal support for the war in Afghanistan. Common interest was therefore not a major prerequisite for the cooperation in the war effort the world witnessed.

Still justifying the relevance of Realism for this study, there is the need to briefly state that Realists often times use the theory of Hegemonic Stability to prosecute their agenda. For instance, the “Coercive Leadership Model” which Duncan Snidal propounded basically explains how the hegemon compels others, relying on its superior force and influence, to buy into its actions and thus contribute to their fruition (Demir, 2005). The hegemon’s justification is that actions being taken are for the collective or common good and thus beneficiaries must make a contribution. The common good in this case is determined by the hegemon with the weaker partners being denied an opportunity to make a contribution in the determination, but on the other hand, being forced to make a contribution for its realisation. This means that the relative power of states is very important. Even where regimes are being used, it can lead to states getting others to vote in their favour. This also tacitly reaffirms the concept of communitarianism of Karl Deutsch.

In sharp contrast the invasion and execution of a regime change agenda in Iraq was not sanctioned by the International Community (Crokatt, 2003). This therefore disproves the claim of obsolescence of Realism. It demonstrated that International Law and institutions may be disregarded, even in present times, by major powers when their national interests are at variance with the position of International Law and institutions (Baylis, 1992). The question that remains to be answered is therefore “whose International Law and institutions matter most on the global stage?”

For instance, the position of President George Bush in 2003 that “...either you are with us or you are with the terrorists...” (Crokatt, 2003), did not grant others an option of choosing a

middle way. Unable to get what the hegemonic US wanted, it ignored the position of the “regime” – the UNSC – and went ahead unilaterally because it had the might, resources, and conviction that its national interest was at stake.

The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 is yet another example of a hegemon acting unilaterally in furtherance of its parochial national interest in disregard of existing protocols and time-tested procedures. A similar unilateral action was conducted in the 2014 by the invasion and annexation of Crimea by Russia (Friedman and Schwartz, 2018). We are tempted to dilate on the reasons for which these powers chose war and their attempts at justifying their actions than considering the causes of such wars. Since the options opened to them had not been exhausted, war was used as a tool for the prosecution of their foreign policies and not the last resort available to them. On 18 October 2018 the President of the United State of America, Mr Donald Trump, in furtherance of his administration’s quest for self-preservation from Mexican immigrants, decided to use the military to conduct operations along the border with Mexico. The aim was to stem the tide of immigrants and thereby achieve a foreign policy objective to satisfy domestic or national policy objectives (BBC, 2018). This might not be a popular move, but it confirms the stance of a realist president who will not shy away from the use of force for national security and state survival.

Again, following the disappearance of Saudi journalist Khashoggi in October 2018, President Donald Trump weighed the options available to the US and had to strike a balance thereby getting his nation to act rationally as expected by Realists. The US needed to push the credentials of a country and self-acclaimed champion of human rights and freedoms globally. She also had to weigh that against trade relations, loyalty of an ally in the Middle East, reliable intelligence sharing partner in the fight against terror, and a multi-billion dollar arms deal

between US and Saudi Arabia (Gaouette, 2018). He specifically said the cancellation of the arms deal will cost the US a lot of jobs. This is yet a realist position in modern times making untenable the assertion that realism might be an obsolete theory of International Relations today.

Consequently, the over-riding justification for the choice of realism is that realism best suits studies involving national security, state power and how the international system sets about resolving the imbalances of power. In the order of priority of international issues, realists place national security higher and top-most. This is because for them, the military and its associated political matters dominate world politics and are termed “high politics”. Sight is not lost of the quest for and use of force and power by states to get others to do their will. Thus, the actual and possible conflicts, how states contribute to the stability or otherwise of the international system, and how force is employed to prevent the violation of territorial integrity or use to resolve disputes all remain the focus of the realist. For a nation to be able to let all these count, it will require a pragmatic, well thought-out, and flexible strategy that will articulate the position of the state in the prosecution of its national agenda, provision of security of citizens, pursuit of national interests, and state survival.

In recent times, the African nation of Ethiopia has demonstrated its Realist tendencies by going ahead with the construction of its \$5 billion Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam despite centuries old agreements governing the use of the Nile River. For Ethiopia, its survival and the well-being of its citizens compelled it to act unilaterally taking into cognisance that the Waters Agreement between the United Kingdom, Sudan and Egypt did not involve her. Ethiopia intends getting its fast-growing population out of poverty by generating 6,000 megawatts from the dam for both domestic use and for export. With a rising population expected to hit about

120 million by 2030 and with a perennial scarcity of water, Egypt has cause to worry. Its only fertile lands are those along the River Nile and its entire population and history are closely tied to the river. She also has responsibility to have the Nile preserved for its citizens and the survival of the historic state. This turn of events has generated power shifts in the region (Hicks, 2017).

Twelve countries share the Nile and its tributaries but as the British sponsored Water Agreements did not involve all of them, the others do not feel bound by the agreements. The Nile arguably made Egypt the great power that she was deemed to be. With Ethiopia now positioning herself to control the volume of water that flows into Egypt, the power dynamics are seeing a change in the region. Egypt under President Morsi in 2013 issued threats of going to war to safeguard water security (Lazarus, 2018). When the threats failed to achieve the desired impact, they went for a diplomatic approach which still appeared to be the best option available to them. This is because being politically savvy, accepting compromises rationally, and demonstrating goodwill on all sides might lead to an enduring solution. This modern-day stance of states gives us the conviction that states, just as the Realist will have it, remain rational and act as unitary entities, as demonstrated by Ethiopia.

In conclusion, Realism in all its forms remains relevant today as it was at the beginning of written history. Realism has significant implications for contemporary threats and how nation-states strategise to contain them, ensure the well-being of their inhabitants, and meet their aspirations and interests. Though present-day threats may not necessarily be conventional and therefore may be more unpredictable, the realist position in assessing threats is still applicable. The goal of ensuring state survival and territorial defence is not limited to only conventional

threats. To resolve many contemporary threats, collaboration among various actors and states is required. This also falls in line with the thinking of realists when it comes to strategy.

Realism equally has implications for national development. Though the realist places a higher premium on the state and therefore acts in a state-centric manner, the final beneficiary of all the state engages in is the citizen. States act rationally because of their varied interests and the constraints of limited resources. Consequently, to develop in the face of want requires the realist position that, states need to be rational in decision making, resource allocation, and policy implementation. Several related concepts support the theory of Realism. Some of these concepts that relate to the security and Defence sectors are the subjects of the next discussion.

2.6 Conceptual Framework


The broad nature of the field of Defence studies makes it susceptible to numerous concepts coupled with varied interpretations. Whilst a theory may be said to be an intense discussion about assumptions, perceptions, ideas and generalisations, a concept may be a phrase, or a word used technically to represent several interrelated ideas. There is a need for the compelling issues, key factors, and variables to be covered in the research to be presented through a convincing explanation either in a graphical manner, narrative form or a combination of the two. The chosen aspects to study therefore succeed in limiting the scope of the study for a satisfactory result to be realised. As Miles et al., (1994) put it, a conceptual framework “identifies which of the key factors, constructs, or variables are in and which are out” (Rocco and Plakhotnik, 2009). Clarity is arrived at with an explicit presentation of the concepts being studied making the focus and design of the work easily discernible. Conceptual analysis is relevant to the testing of hypotheses and the arriving at theories, but its main purview is the clarification of the meaning of concepts being used. Thus, an accurately carved study area is

arrived at and a tool for the segregation/analysis of information and data is also created. This serves as a check for the conduct of the entire study thereby making it easier for policy makers and other potential users of these study to be able to distinguish between alternatives.

Felix E. Oppenheim set out five criteria to guide the use of concepts. First, he argues that concepts should be operational in nature but should not be consigned to quantification. Secondly preference should be for concepts that have linkages with other terms. Thirdly it is desirable when concepts draw attention to easily overlooked major theoretical aspects of the subject of study. Fifth, terminology being used to explain concepts should be relatively easy to understand. By that the customary use of the terms may be different from their current use which should aim at reducing ambiguities, promoting understanding, as well as eliminating inconsistencies and limitations (Oppenheim, 1975). It is however worth noting that though it might be desirable to have terms clearly in easily understood language, they are not acceptable substitutes of the main concepts.

The conceptual framework of this study has been limited to five conceptual areas of state survival. They include the concepts National Security, the Defence Sector, Internal Security, Human Security, and Peace as a prerequisite for Development, and Accountability. The following matrix outlines this conceptual framework:

Figure 2. 1: Matrix of Conceptual Framework



Source: Researcher’s Design, 2018.

The concepts of National Security, Defence Sector, Internal Security landscape, Human Security, and the concept of Peace and Development was handled in this study. The close relationship between these concepts is depicted by Figure 2.1 above. It gives a pictorial view of the layers of importance and magnitude of each. It also shows that the peace enjoyed by the individual citizen and the development of the country remain the final reasons for security and defence measures. These concepts are by no means the only concepts of relevance to Defence studies nor to the Ghana Armed Forces. A country’s Foreign and Domestic Policies for instance are of great importance to the study of the Defence sector. However due to the complexity of the domain and its importance to the survival of Ghana, these have been chosen to guide the analysis and the outcomes of the entire research. They all have an impact on the formulation,

interpretation, understanding, and the operationalisation of a country's Defence Policy, not least that of Ghana.

2.6.1 Security

Security is a state of affairs in a domain that may neither be a physical nor geographical one. In talking about security, one looks at the elimination or absence of both perceived and actual threats to lives and property. The well-being of the persons, institutions – both public and private – as well as the guarantee of institutions meant to ensure that inhabitants are free of want and harassment all constitute major aspects of the security spectrum. Consequently, the security services include the Civil Police, the Customs, Prisons/Correctional Services, the Fire Service, and the Immigration Services. In actual fact it involves all the institutions that are responsible for domestic security including the private security companies.

2.6.2 National Security

National Security refers to the state of affairs that ensure the safety, security and survival of a state and its institutions. It is an essential subset of the security sector. This sector is dominated by all institutions and agencies responsible for domestic tranquillity, but it also includes those responsible for transnational security, namely the Armed Forces of a country, the judicial system as well as those responsible for the state's monopoly over the use of coercive power. This is not limited to elected officials but also involves career and non-elected professionals.

2.6.3 The Defence Sector

Defence is one of the least understood sectors of many countries. This is the case with both practitioners and those outside the sector. This could be attributed to the culture of secrecy that has been the mainstay of the lead stakeholders of the sector. Significant number of best practice

measures requires an amount of restricted sharing of Defence details and this is reinforced by the taking of oaths of secrecy by some senior practitioners as happens in many countries including Ghana. The Defence sector has as its main stakeholders the military institutions, the intelligence community, the quasi-security agencies, the para-military institutions, the civil Defence institutions, and some institutions under the Ministry of Interior.

2.6.4 Defence Budgeting


The objectives and ideals of a state or institution, no matter how appropriate, need to be resourced in order to be of benefit to citizens. Consequently, the financing of Defence projects and activities is crucial for success. The concept of cutting cost in all sectors has gained currency and therefore a balance needs to be done always to ensure that there is an appreciable optimisation of the resources so used. This exercise is done through the employment of stringent budgeting regimes in the Defence sector (Zachary, 2018).

2.6.5 Defence Policy

For the Defence Sector to meet the expectations of the citizenry and associated partners, allies and the International Community, there is the need for guiding principles, norms, institutions, procedures and practices which may be codified and documented for use. In the hierarchy of security documents, it is mostly a National Security Policy that serves as the source document from which all other related policies draw their strength. This policy is also in tandem with the Foreign Policy of the country concerned not forgetting the specified national interests. The Foreign Policy of Ghana for instance considers the dictates of the Common African Defence and Security Policy in determining Ghana's commitment and actions relative to external Defence activities. The Defence Policy thus becomes a subset of the overall National Security Policy in place. It seeks to coordinate the output of all stakeholders in the Defence sector,

avoid conflicts, reduce duplication and ensure the speedy sharing of critical information for the purposes of ensuring total survival of the nation-state. Figure 2.2 below is a typical flow chart of the sources of Defence policies of Ghana.

Figure 2. 2: Sources of Defence Policy.



Source: Researcher’s Design, 2019.

2.6.6 The Internal Security Domain

The internal affairs of the nation-state have always influenced its decisions and actions to the external world. Consequently, the level of security and safety experienced by the inhabitants of a state at each material moment is of significant importance to the level of development that the nation might experience. The direct beneficiaries of a secure nation are the inhabitants, the business community, organisations, and institutions. Internal security entails peaceful co-existence of individuals, groups and institutions. A serene atmosphere for the conduct of business without let or hindrance is a pre-requisite for development. A congenial environment for the expression of rights, freedoms and interests, and the safeguarding of public law and

order as well as Defence against internal aggression are paramount in all progressive societies (Rogerson, 1996).

2.6.7 Accountability

Accountability aims at ensuring a responsible use of the resources and powers given security forces to operate on behalf of the executive branch of a country's government. To promote accountability there must be a deliberate effort to encourage frank reviews of operations. These should not be blame-seeking but to get professionals to learn from mistakes and thereby avoid repeating similar ones in the future.

2.6.8 Human Security

Human security has been variously seen as that aspect of security which concerns itself with the individual's freedoms, liberties, aspirations, and total well-being. According to the United Nations Development Planning (UNDP) programme, human security ensures the protection of the "vital core" of the individual. It can be seen to be an encompassment of all aspects related to human development and well-being such as health, economic, social, religious, food, environmental as well as physical security. The ultimate beneficiary of any sort of security measure should be a human being. Hence human security is justifiably the most important product of the range of security measures put in place by the security forces and their employers.

2.6.9 Peace

Peace has often been erroneously believed to be a situation where we have the absence of war or armed hostilities. Much as this state of affairs is a desired one, there is more to peace than just the cessation of hostilities or their non-initiation. It is a concept that promotes harmony

among humans, institutions and even the ecosystem. It is mostly a product of conduct or behaviour and thus at times requires the institution and application of various restraints in order to prevent it from slipping away.

2.6.10 Development

Development is that which moves a state and its citizens closer to their desired conditions of life. It is thus a measure of progress and advancement in society such that humans get their desires and living conditions met. This is accomplished using resources. These resources are both human and material with the human resources being highly valued. The best and ideal situation is when such living conditions and resource use do not disturb unduly, the balance in the ecosystem. In that case, the present generation is able to survive and live comfortably without endangering the chances of future generations of having same level of living conditions (UNDP, 2002).

For Gboyega (2003), development is an idea which targets a comprehensive improvement of human existence in its entirety irrespective of the social status of individuals. It is thus non-discriminatory and preferred to be sustainable thereby ensuring that present development activities do not adversely affect that of the future. A steady reduction of societal inequalities and poverty in an environment of stable physical security of inhabitants with limitless opportunities are key to development (Gboyega, 2003). This is hardly different from the position of Naomi (1995) who had earlier seen development as not being limited to economic growth, but all other essential services of life meant to improve and sustain the quality of life (Naomi, 1995). Development could thus be seen as being a product of the various partners both from within and outside a country but with the common goal of ensuring that inhabitants lead lives devoid of want and in total security. Development is not just an economic experience but

also a socio-economic, political and societal advancement venture, that seeks to influence all segments of the life of man (Lawal, 2011).

CHAPTER THREE LITERATURE REVIEW

3.0 Introduction

The field of Defence and its associated domains have quite a lot of literature. From the global perspective numerous writers have researched into Defence studies and how these relate to development and the well-being of states and citizens. In the West African and Ghanaian context, a lot of literature also exists and was used in this study. Though the Ghana Armed Forces has been in existence for well over 60 years and that its documented formative history stretches beyond 100 years, a lot more research work remains to be done on aspects beyond its history. Consequently, this study has chosen the field of Defence Policy making for consideration. The aim has mainly been to add to the existing knowledge of the Ghanaian Defence sector and to generate and promote interest in Defence studies locally. With that in mind a wide spectrum of Defence issues was considered in the review of the literature. However, this was limited to cover the following pertinent areas:

- a. The Concept of Security.
- b. The Mechanisms of Defence Policy making.
- c. Foreign Policy's influence on Defence Policy formulation and implementation.
- d. Collective Security measures at the Regional Level.
- e. The nexus between Development, Peace and Security.

3.1 The Concept of Security

The over-arching concept in considering the set-up and purpose of a nation-state is security. This makes it a rather difficult to understand concept as many may draw its meaning to suit their limited and parochial pressing needs. These could include domains that nation-states set as priority areas through policy formulation such as food security, water security, security

against diseases, environmental security, the preservation of rights such as human rights, socio-economic rights, political rights and security against social injustice. These supplement the existing traditional security concerns such as the security against external and internal aggression from both identifiable groups and, especially lately, from non-state actors as well. Consequently, the argument for the classification of security here is for the protection of some values of a given people. Once they feel secure and that their value-system is guaranteed, then they will boast of having security in its normative sense - be it at the individual, community, family, national, international system or humanity levels. Earlier writers in the field such as Arnold Wolfers see security as being “the absence of threats to acquired values” of individuals and states and humanity at large (Wolfers, 1952). This section concentrates on what security is, its importance to the individual, the nation-state and the international system. It also considers how security’s value is weighed against other state objectives and how it should be pursued given that it is in competition with other values for the limited resources at the disposal of the spending authority. Security is that important and worthy of consideration for this study because it is the ultimate reason for all Defence sector mechanisms put in place by Ghana and all other states for the benefit of citizens.

Kolodziej abhorred the over-concentration of attention on the military aspects of national security at the expense of other equally compelling ones during the period of the Cold War especially in fashioning out and implementing of the theory of deterrence (Kolodziej, 1992). His argument was that, the near fixation with war as an instrument of national policy during the period leading to 1989, needed to be moderated to make war a relevant option going into the future. Thus, advocates of environmental, and socio-economic security are really not using concepts that are alien to that used by the Realists discussed in this study. They actually have a shared concept but with emphasis on different aspects of it. Whilst the Realists are more

concerned about the security of the state who in turn has responsibility of ensuring the well-being of the individual, the proponents of human rights and socio-economic security are concerned directly with those aspects of the individual's rights that the state guarantees by providing the needed environment and means for their existence. For David Baldwin (1995) for instance, it is worth identifying the common aspects and differences of the concept of security because first it unravels what the situation is, secondly it lays bare the issues over which persons have divergent views, and thirdly it encourages analysis by allowing the comparison of policies against each other.

Barry Buzan (2011), on the other hand, tries an exploration of the concept of security. His work juxtaposes observations with conceptual analysis. He argues that the individual's personal security has a correlation with the security at both the national and international levels. He thus believes security should not be isolated at any level. What we see is that the concept is very different from the conditions required for its attainment. This is because one needs to understand the concept before setting out to outline conditions for its existence.

For Ullman (2012), security is better understood if consideration is given to what one is willing to pay for it. Consideration is thus for a quantitative value of security in monetary terms. This is the opportunity cost of security. He further makes a case that the threat of loss of security or a state of real insecurity confirms the true value of security. However, in both situations there is still the need to define and arrive at what security really is. It is only then can all these varied positions on security make sense to the researcher. In the 1960s, some scholars such as Klaus Knorr and Richard Smoke argued that security received little attention from academicians (Ullman,2012). Barry Buzan even described the field as an 'underdeveloped concept'. This position notwithstanding, the importance of security cannot be overemphasized. It appears

from the literature that security really received less scholarly efforts than other domains, but its importance has not been adversely affected. It continues to be used as a justification for resource allocation and the denial of civil liberties of persons and institutions, especially during internal emergencies such as in Dagbon¹ of Ghana. Security has also served as a reason for the outright declaration and fighting of wars among states. Thus, security is a key determinant of the conduct of individuals and states, hence its importance.

Barry Buzan (2011), in trying to explain the apparent limited scholarly work on security, attributed the situation to five possible causes. First, he identifies security to be a difficult concept, though not the most difficult of concepts. Secondly the duplication and overlapping of the concepts of power and security also led to the neglect according to Buzan. Thirdly he maintains that there has been a lack of interest in security studies over the years, especially by critics of Realism. He further argues that Security scholars are more inclined towards exploring new technology and busy at that too than having time for security studies. This however only underlines the issue of prioritisation and research interests. Finally, Buzan believes policy makers find the ambiguity associated with National Security useful for their parochial gains and therefore will prefer concentrating on that aspect. The benefit from this is the amount of power and authority allowed them as well as the flexibility of financial controls/accountability in general.

The Cold War era, according to Baldwin, saw scholars being interested in military issues which were branded as security issues. War Studies, Military Studies and Defence Studies were all subsumed because Security Studies appeared more appealing. Where military force was not

¹ The Dagbon Traditional enclave of Ghana experienced protracted internal conflicts over the killing of a king by suspected rival groups. This led to the conduct of various military operations in the area some of which unavoidably affected the routine, rights, and liberties of the inhabitants.

of essence, the discussion was considered as a low politics issue. Consequently, it is safe to say that during the Cold War, military force in all its dimensions constituted a principal or central preoccupation of Security Studies (Digeser, 1994). Security was thus used as an umbrella concept to cover the entire spectrum of state survival - as required by the Realists - and individual rights and well-being - as required by the neo-realists and liberalists. In relation to this study, the over-arching and wide spectrum nature of security constitute a justification for the central role given security and its other derivatives in the Defence sector.

However, given the broad nature carved out for Security in general, and for this study in particular, it goes without saying that there will be some contestations. When a concept is contested it is expected to be of such a value that it becomes difficult to state categorically a universally accepted standard or measure of its value. As such, securing the agreement of stakeholders on all aspects of it is almost impossible no matter the arguments or evidence advanced. This has been the lot of security studies.

The history of security can be segmented. In contemporary times the end of the Second World War, the end of the Cold War, and the events of the September 11, 2001 are some of the significant landmarks that determined the appreciation of the concept of security. Mearsheimer argued that after the Cold War, the apprehensions of states about military security did not end. Scholars seemed to have accepted that these milestones caused changes to some of the questions and answers but they continue to disagree over the specificities (Graham, 1992). For instance, according to W. B. Gallie the concept of security is similar to that of a championship thereby confirming the position of Neo-Realists that security is the most important and most sought after goal of a state (Gallie, 1956). For the Neo-Realists, nation-states like rival teams, compete for security and the states with better or more security are expected by the Neo-Realist

to perform better in ensuring their survival and the well-being of their citizens (Waltz, 1979). However, for Wolfers (1952), states will continue to place varying premiums on security due mainly to their choices and capacity not because of competition. As such for him and contrary to the position of the Neo-Realists, the issue of security being a contested one does not arise.

There certainly have been disputes concerning the true nature and use of the term Security even in present-day Security Studies. Policy disputes exist practically today both in formulation and execution. The fact that the concept is contested presupposes others claim a more precise and clearer understanding of it than others. However, their failure to stick out their necks and offer a definition draws the criticism of Ken Booth who asks, “if we cannot name it, can we ever hope to achieve it?” (Booth, 1998). Barry Buzan observes that a great deal of contradictions arises in considering Security. For instance, the quest for security by individuals can be in conflict with the quest for security by their own state. This is also the case at the national, regional and international levels, not excluding various regimes and alliances in the domain of Peace and Security. As long as we continue to have competing interests and varying capacities, the security landscape will surely continue to live with instances and empirically verifiable disputes between stakeholders over the ends and how to attain them. This notwithstanding, David Baldwin observes that the arguments involving the contested nature of the concept of security are almost unnecessary. He is of the view that if sufficient and adequate explanation is given, the apparent confusion surrounding security - its form, procedures, principles and benefits - will be no more (Rothschild, 1997).

Security as a policy objective of a country requires a comprehensive set of policies and measures for its attainment. Most users of the term security would like to see a situation whereby there is hardly any impediment to the attainment of satisfaction as defined by the

individual or state involved. Specifically, for this study of Defence policy formulation, it is of interest to note that military threats to a state require deterrent postures. As such policies must aim at ensuring that possibilities of suffering military attacks are reduced drastically if not eliminated. Thus, the policies are meant to preserve the existing status quo and help achieve higher values without losing the gains so far made. Buzan advocates for a “referent object” in defining security. (Buzan, 2011). That is to say there need to be an identifiable beneficiary of the condition of security – no matter its nature. He further thinks that the search for an object must be done with the needed conditions and peculiarities of its desired security in mind. This is due to the multiplicity of possible beneficiaries in each segment of the political system requiring self-preservation and security.

3.2 Which Values need Protection?

The beneficiaries of any arrangement, be it security or, in the specific case of this study, the Defence sector, need to outline, in order of priority, its interests and needs. In the specific case of Defence, the values to be protected from threats are to be determined by the entity or group of individuals involved. The list is thus indeterminate as it will be impacted by local contexts and demands. Despite the disparity of views and persuasions, political independence and rights, territorial integrity, confrontation of both external and internal aggressors as well as the protection of the economic relations of a country all constitute elements of value to a nation and its survival. Citizens may be more interested in enjoying their numerous rights such as freedom of movement, free speech, association, physical safety, economic well-being, psychological stability and freedom of choice among others (Brown, 1983). The former United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan on his part called for the “security of people in their homes, jobs and communities” (Baldwin, 1995). The inclusion of domestic challenges and treating non-military external threats such as economic sanctions, embargoes, and fuel

shortages as national security issues, is thus inevitable according to Kofi Annan. The sum total of all these make up the state's National Security elements that require shielding against deterioration of any nature. The centrality of the individual and, by extension, the population in any Defence activity is also stressed by Sloan (2012). She believes that even in irregular warfare, unlike in conventional warfare, the weaker party seeks to control the "population" and not the annihilation of its adversary. This means that the prize placed on the individual remains higher and it is the reason for which any security investment is made (Sloan,2012).

3.2.1 Threats

The prime object and target of Defence schemes is an identifiable threat. In fact, we can say that threats are the *raison d'être* of Defence and Security policies. States view other states as possible sources of threats. With present day terrorism, both home-grown and foreign, the issue of describing the threat landscape is more complicated than before the events of 9/11. Threats are actions and at times series of events that, over a period of time, lead to the degrading of the quality of livelihood of the citizens or inhabitants of a country. They may also be issues that have a potential of limiting the policy space significantly so that a government becomes limited in the choices available to it in improving the wellbeing of its citizens (Ullman, 1983). Natural occurrences, such as floods and invasion of army worms, the outbreak of Ebola, SARS, cholera, among others, can be threats to existing livelihood options. Threats are thus limitless in nature and need to be accepted as being wide and dynamic since one issue may be a threat today but pose less danger with the transformation of technology or the passing of time. Consequently, once an issue ceases to degrade the quality of life or pose difficulties to a government from carrying out its policies of improving the living conditions of citizens, then that issue will cease to be classified as a threat to national security. Determining how much effort needs to be put

in place to ensure that the desired values of a state are acquired and sustained, and that threats of all nature are contained, is the next challenge.

3.2.2 *How much is enough?*

It has never been easy measuring security outcomes either qualitatively or quantitatively. This is largely because of the varying perceptions of industry players and the general public of what is enough and what is excessive. The Ghanaian security landscape has not been any different. Security measures have been, at various stages of the country's history, described as inadequate, sufficient and oppressive. As such the issue of determining the sufficiency or otherwise of security measures needs consideration and possible inclusion in policy documents such as the Defence Policy. In line with this, Wolfers (1952) tried differentiating objective from subjective security with the argument that nation-states needed to guard against underestimating or over-ensuring their security needs. He thus succeeds in introducing an impression that security can be and should be measured. Buzan however sees security as a finite or absolute condition that does not lend itself to quantification. He posits that if arriving at a degree of security was necessary, then how much of it would be deemed to be enough? Unfortunately for Buzan's stance, many absolute things are just unattainable in life and so it is with absolute security. If security is a set objective, then Herbert Simon's position that achieving objectives is "always" an issue of degree will apply ie the theory of bounded rationality. This is more compelling in the face of insufficiencies and competing interests for same resources. If we agree that the attainment of goals can be stated by levels, then Herbert's position is more practicable since it underlines the relativeness of what is good enough security for an individual, an institution, the community, the state or the world at large (Hansen, 1997).

3.2.3 *Means, Cost and Time*

To better manage the Defence landscape and all its affiliates, there is a requirement for a machinery and running it will entail some financial cost. Pursuing security as a set objective, requires a policy document which should stipulate the wide range of means and avenues available to the policymakers and implementers to achieve the desired conditions. An over concentration on military means needs to be discouraged as the defence/security spectrum is not the preserve of the military. Consequently, all the socio-economic as well as political contributors to a nation's survival and the well-being of its citizens should play active parts in fashioning the machinery of Defence.

Policy implementation requires resources. The constant competition of all sectors for the limited resources of a nation means that resources earmarked for security sector could have been used for other purposes. As such security involves cost in various forms. For Melvyn P. Leffler, national security is the protection of a state's core values and pursuit of its interests 'no matter the cost involved' (Melvyn, 1990). Ullman is however of the view that cost matters and should be given a serious consideration. Edwin G. Dolan agrees with the position of Ullman (Melvyn, 1990). Both of them argue that objectives could be set in an utopian way but the reality of competing needs over limited resources leads to prioritization and rational policy – making.

Still on the issue of cost and expenses in the face of competing needs, both Brodie and Lasswell seem to agree that a cost-benefit analysis is required to secure a desirable balance. Whilst Brodie advocates for a tweaking of Defence expenditure to maintain a stable domestic economy, Lasswell wants no foreign national security objective set without prior consideration of the domestic policy (Baldwin, 1995) as well as the cost that it will entail. An issue of moral judgement can also be added to the costing of National Security. Considering the extent to

which some state institutions may be authorized to act either covertly or overtly to save state interests. The murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018 is an example. The United States under Donald Trump decided on shelving her image as a bulwark of human rights and therefore not cracking down on Riyadh tacitly because of what such actions could cost the US – Saudi Relations and the American economy as well as the fight against terrorism (Gaouette, 2018).

Designing the security machinery, resourcing and putting it into action and releasing its output all require time. The desirable timeframe within which objectives should be achieved is set by the authority involved though it is hardly possible to place time limits on all security objectives. Suffice it to say that in determining any security objective, it is desirable to discuss all mentioned specifications. But the critical ones could be limited to that of cost, time, and the means to be used. These should be sufficient in making choices among various alternatives available to the lead stakeholder – in this case the state.

3.3 The Value of Security

An aspect of the defence and security sectors worth studying is the true worth of security. In obtaining the services from investments in security, there need to be a sacrifice of some other values. This underpins the importance of security vis-à-vis other values. Various approaches have been identified by Baldwin in assessing the value of security. These are the core and prime value approaches as well as the marginal value approaches.

Considering how life will be without reassuring human security gives us an impression of the value of security. For Hobbes of old, life risks being ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’ without the existence of the state (Hobbes, 1651). This only goes to assert that security remains

a prerequisite for the realization of the dreams and the enjoyment of all other freedoms and values. However, the natural laws of demand and supply also apply. The more security is made available to an entity, the less value that entity places on any further increment in security. It is only natural for security to be sacrificed from time to time in the pursuit of other objectives required for survival. This requires that not all resources are devoted to security even in war time. Some resources get allocated to other critical areas of the state. More so since absolute security is not attainable.

The core value approach as espoused by Baldwin (2005) places premium on security classifying it as one of the core values of a state. This means that other values are important but not equally crucial. He clarifies that all other values require a secure environment to thrive and hence the primacy of security. In this case it might be difficult to have reasonable resources allocated to the non-core areas until the Security and Defence sectors are adequately satisfied. Baldwin however fails to deal with logical and empirical justifications for identifying non-core domains. The issue of classification of the needs and values of a state has however been well dealt with.

Baldwin's position on the marginal value approach is based on the law of diminishing marginal returns as in Economics. He confirms the Defence/Security sectors as being in competition with other sectors for the available scarce resources. The value of security depends on how much one is getting and how much of it is already available. This will continue to vary from country to country. Allocation of resources should be done rationally depending on how much greater the marginal return on security is as compared to other state values. As one of the cardinal values or objectives of all states, the importance of security varies from state to state, from one historical context to another and also from one set of leadership to another. In all

these, the prevailing context is key. Hence in the context of Ghana and West Africa, the question of food, shelter and poverty drive security considerations. Bernard Brodie thus observed that security is a “derivative value, being meaningful in so far as it promotes and maintains other values” which merit the cost of protection for their realization (Brodie, 1949). This thus calls for trade-offs between state requirements and the individual citizen’s comfort.

3.4 National Security

The concept of National Security is central to the Realist theory on which this study is premised. It is also central to Defence sector studies and therefore of prime importance to understating the relevance of this study.

For Arnold Wolfers, the term “National Security” raises concerns of ambiguity. He did not dismiss it as having no real meaning nor extremely ambiguous when he wrote his “*National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol*” (Patterson, 2013). He advised that the term should be used with specifications so as to reduce the possibility of causing confusion. In the main, what he sought to clarify is that the term is used technically, and the technicality needs to be explained in easily understood words for ease of appreciation by everyone. From his expose, we can infer that the term can be used to mean a means or tool in the pursuit of state survival as in a ‘National Security Policy’. It can also be an “End State” or a final product of various measures – a state of national Security (Wolfers, 1952). General Jacob L. Denvers is of the conviction that National Security cannot be quantified. For him, it is a condition that is difficult to measure or qualify. Either we “are secure or insecure” thereby making no room for a middle way or partial security since to him partial security meant no security at all (Brodie, 1950).

National security according to Baldwin should be treated like any other public policy objective subject to diminishing returns and competition for scarce resources. National Security is often said to be of such great importance and described in such a compelling manner that it gets all the attention and resources to the disadvantage of other policy objectives. Words such “vital issues”, “core issues”, “urgent issues”, and “high priority areas” are used when conveying messages of national security. However, unlike national security, international security is seen as the interdependence of nation-states with respect to their security relations (Baldwin, 1995). International security does not get to be described in similar captivating language. Not even with the intensification of present-day terrorism. This underscores the importance between threats to national security and threats on the global stage in the discourse within a sovereign state.

The regional bodies and continental body of Africa have not shied away from the essence of national security. The Constitutive Act of the African Union upholds the stance of its predecessor – The Organisation of African Unity on National Security. Both the OAU and AU concentrate on the need for member-states to defend their territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence. Thus, they uphold the need for protection of the nation-state against both internal and external aggressors. For Kwame Boafo-Arthur (2005), this classical notion is based on the assumption that the citizens are secure and safe once the nation-state and its regime are safe. However, Naidoo (2005), in presenting a paper at the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) headquarters in Paris, was of the view that governments have been veritable threats to the well-being of their own citizens, even more than other foreign countries have been - especially after the Cold War. He thus argues that states should not continue to be the key referents of security (Naidoo, 2005).

It is instructive to note that, national security under the then OAU and the present AU does not differ. The AU however has specifically placed the individual as the centre of, and ultimate beneficiary of National Security. The concept of Human Security has caught up with the members of the AU. Both the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) place emphasis on the security of the individual and collective security of the African continent. Whilst not downplaying the importance of state security, they both urge all countries on the African continent to, as a matter of necessity, include the security of people, their access to all desired necessities of life, and participation in their chosen affairs without let or hindrance. The CADSP defines the Defence of Africa to include the “traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use of the armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less traditional, non-military aspects which relate to the protection of the people’s political, cultural, social and economic values and ways of life” (Hutchful, 2005). The policy states that the Defence at state level, regional and continental levels are inextricably linked and are not mutually exclusive, thereby extolling the need for collective security.

From the work of Ullman (1983), threats that degrade the life of inhabitants of a state drastically and quickly are of concern to national security. Security status conferred on issues also communicates their importance. When there is a requirement of resources and the tag of National Security is brandished, then we are sure the aim is to demonstrate a certain level of importance and urgency of the issue at stake so as to win the sympathies of the resource allocators.

In furtherance of its place in society, National Security can safely be argued to be an important, well-acknowledged and accepted political symbol. Whilst Arnold Wolfers believes its mention will automatically generate some sympathy, Schultz, Godson, and Greenwood claim that all and sundry accept that security issues are important and deserving of national attention and support. In this case there is a deliberate skewing of attention and allocation of critical resources to security. The security domain is not only of paramount importance. It is also very broad as already seen so far. As such, Lasswell argues that there can only be experts on aspects of it and that we don't have national security experts (Baldwin, 1995).

From the Ghanaian context, Quantson (2005) sees National Security as the “totality of factors that affect the survival, the protection, the safety, the well-being and the contentment of the people.” He thus advocates a people-centred approach to National Security (Quantson, 2005). For him too, the individual is the reason for which National Security should exist.

National Security has constitutional basis in Ghana. The 1992 Constitution firmly establishes a National Security Council in Article 83 spelling out its functions in Article 84 to include, but not limited to, the safeguard of Ghanaian internal and external security. The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act of 1996 – Act 526 establishes the national and regional structures, functions and powers of the National Security set-up. Institutions such as the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI) or Special Branch, the Research Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Police Criminal Investigation Division all play various roles in the security and intelligence landscape of the country. Act 526 therefore seeks to harmonise the landscape for the benefit of the country. It has safeguards against abuse of power and procedures for seeking redress. This Act concentrates less power in the hands of the President of the day than did the 1963 Security Services Act – Act 202. Enormous powers were conferred

on the President by Section 3 in relation to appointments, dismissals and general control of the Services in the quest to “defend the Republic from external and internal dangers arising from activities directed from within or without Ghana which were considered subversive of the Republic and to perform any other functions relating to the security of the state assigned to the Service by the President” (Atuguba, 2005).

Bluway (2002) also believes National Security begins with the establishment of friendly relations with neighbours in the pursuit of the theme of national self-preservation or national survival. For him National Security is a prime aspect of any nation’s Foreign Policy (Bluway, 2002). Thus, Bluway stretches the analysis of threats to a nation’s survival beyond its borders. This ties in well with the Realist position that states should be the main actors in the international system and if they are, then every aspect of existence including likes and dislikes of the citizenry are the state’s responsibility.

3.4.1 The Neo-Realist and Security

The Neo-Realists have always maintained that the primary role and concern of states is security. In fact, it can be safely said that no International Relations theorists emphasise security more than the Neorealists. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, said that in a state of “anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power.” Thus, for him states need to seek first the security status then all other things will then follow suit. These will then gain expression in the comfort, aspirations, freedoms and persuasions of citizens. In other words, security is the bedrock on which all other aspects of both state and individual survival and well-being can flourish.

Waltz defined states according to the functions he expects them to perform such as the making and enforcement of laws, the provision of food, shelter, social amenities and the protection of the territory from both external and internal attacks. He further believes that since the era of Thucydides and Kautilya, international-political studies have been pre-occupied with the use of force and how to control it. The degree of security required is pegged at that which is enough to guarantee survival. However how is the measure of security determined? All measures give an amount of assurance of safety and security for citizens to go about their responsibilities. However, what amount of assurance is desirable and at what cost to the individual and the system? This is pertinent because the attainment of absolute survival or security is not realistic. States, rational as they are, may forego the quest for an increment in security if the marginal benefits are overshadowed by the marginal cost. Of importance to the study of the concept of security should be the value of things to be protected, the amount of security that is desirable, and what it will cost, where cost also includes the forgone opportunities.

3.4.2 Nature of Security

The nature of security itself deserves to be briefly considered. When it is said that states compete for security, according to Baldwin, we can aver that there is a zero-sum approach to security. This is because it means if one state has so much security, others could be having less of it. He further argues that the “security-dilemma” arises because of the variation in the investment made in security by sovereign states. This involves assessing and comparing the level of security of one state with others. Where a strong state is surrounded by other relatively weaker ones, the latter will feel rather insecure. The conduct of comparison is however not a necessity for the sense of security or insecurity.

The National Security Council of Ghana for instance provides a forum for the integration of national, foreign, and military policies as they relate to national survival. Emphasis is not on comparing Ghana's Security and Defence strengths with that of neighbours. Domestic threats thus dominate the Ghanaian threat landscape. The threat posed by youth unemployment, uncontrolled media and technological space, as well as the growing tendencies of home-grown terrorism far out-pace the possibility of an invasion from any of the three neighbours of the country. Security therefore can be safely said not to operate in a vacuum. It operates in a political system which in turn affects the determination and diagnosis of the state's security priorities, threats, goals and the choices of the available options (Quantson, 2005). The political environment has largely conditioned the security system all throughout the history of Ghana – either by the agents themselves and their actions or by the government in power. This position of Quantson Bentum is not different from that of earlier scholars on National Security. Frank Trager and Philip Kronenberg in 1973 stated that “National Security is that part of government policy and action having as its objective the creation of national and international political conditions favourable to the protection or extension of national assets and vital national values against existing and potential adversaries” (Trager & Kronenberg, 1973).

Thus, National Security is the exclusive function of governments and this idea is reinforced by both the Realists' arguments as well as the 1992 Constitution of Ghana whose Article 85 states that “No agency, establishment or other organization concerned with national security shall be established except as provided for under this constitution”. Hence the protection or extension of vital national values and physical assets as well as the safety and security of citizens are the main core objectives of National Security. It is worth noting that the 1992 Constitution puts the individual above all else and so it is with the 2012 National Defence Policy of Ghana.

3.4.3 New Concepts of Security?

Emma Rothschild (1997) has the conviction that all seemingly new concepts of security have their roots in the arguments started in the eighteenth century. The various shades of security such as economic, social, environmental, identity, and food security have not changed since the end of the Cold War nor during the period following 9/11. They remain different forms of security discussed at different levels be it individual, state or international, but not basically different concepts. They certainly will be open to different specifications and the weight placed on each may vary depending on the world circumstances and new occurrences (Rothschild, 1997). Security has thus not changed in substance. The demands might seem to be indeterminate and varied but the essence of security remains the same. Any supposed new concept of security will surely find space in the already existing ones.

Therefore, from the foregoing, security, in all its dimensions and purposes, aims at ensuring that the central figure of all states, which is the individual, is assured of the liberties and rights that have been conferred on all citizens in the free world. Simply put, Security Studies concern the study of the causes, nature and impact, and prevention of war or conflict. Clearly, the threats to the survival, well-being and national security of a state are not confined to only military domains but also include important ones such as the economy, environment, epidemics, crime, social injustice and violent crimes as well as terrorist acts. For many developing countries, the disparities and inequalities in society constitute a major source of worry. This expanded view of security will help find solutions to the multiple vulnerabilities that bedevil the comfort of citizens and humanity at large.

3.5 Defence Policy

Policies are sets of principles or options deliberately put together to guide decision making and implementation for the attainment of set goals of the Defence sector. They may also be an expression of informed intent and conveyed as a procedure or protocol. They seek to match goals with the needed means (Dye, 2017). Policies are governance issues and are thus crafted, implemented and reviewed by those in charge of various institutions especially institutions with public interest. They may be said to be actions and projects that governments and institutions choose to do or not to do (Birkland, 2001).

Defence policies are forms of public policies for the governance of the Defence sector of states. These are known as Military policies in some countries. They basically identify hostile threats and aggressive elements to the well-being of countries based on analytical works of intelligence. They define the scope of a nation's Defence, national security, the existing alliances, and the organization of the Defence sector and how Defence related technology is put to use. It may also stipulate the modalities and employment of Defence resources, as well as the strategic posture towards perceived and confirmed threats. For David Chuter (2006), Defence policies go beyond wishful thinking. They are really what nations do and not mere statements of intent (Chuter, 2006) If a Defence Policy will make available varied and more options to the authorities, the more useful it may be deemed. Defence policies gain expression in various forms. Apart from the outright combat and deterrent postures, Defence diplomacy and civil-military relations are other expressions.

Baldwin in his "Concept of Security" asserts that "individuals and nation-states are sometimes insecure about their identities and they sometimes adopt policies to cope with this insecurity" (Baldwin, 1995). These may be Security and Defence policies amongst others. Ghana and other

African countries are not any different and thus go in for similar policies. The challenges presented by defence policies are different from what is experienced with domestic or national policies. There is a basic problem of comprehension. It appears rather a bit difficult to determine the focus, formulation and implementation modalities of Defence policies if one is not within the Defence sector. As such almost all such persons who are not associated with Defence may rather choose not to bother themselves with comprehending the intricacies involved and leaving the issues to supposed experts (Huntington, 1954). Notwithstanding this, Defence is of monumental importance to the citizen and his opinion in matters of policy need to be respected. Some view the Defence sector as one that requires secrecy in both policy formulation and implementation. This gives the impression that the understanding of what is really Public Policy may not be because it is complicated but rather because it might be relatively uncharted waters for a large segment of society.

Defence Policy must encompass a number of issues related to state survival and the well-being of individuals. First the outline of the components that make up that public policy, second an analysis of how they have become part and parcel of government policy and third, weighing the merits of these alternatives in terms of demands of national security.

3.5.1 Some Crucial Aspects of Defence Policy

A Defence policy, according to Samuel P. Huntington, is composed of the important elements of strategy, budgetary, and diplomatic pillars. Whilst the size of the military forces is determined by a nation's budget, their composition, deployment, disposition, and equipment are determined by the prevailing strategic considerations and assessed threats. The employment of the forces is also influenced in no small way by diplomatic considerations. Consequently, it is seen that these three key elements, though directed separately, are not mutually exclusive of

each other. In 1967, at the height of the Vietnam war, Adam Yarmolinsky – a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Affairs noted that “the military establishment is not just the biggest organisation in the world; it is bigger by several orders of magnitude ...than all other government departments put together” (Deutsch, 1988). This underscored the aspect of budget. Strategy and diplomatic aspects were also required for the prosecution of the war. However, each had its own functional path, but their efforts were all targeted at the resolution of the war in Vietnam.

3.5.2 Defence Budget

Huntington identifies a “Ceiling” and a “Requirements” approach in the quest for alternatives to Defence budgeting. With the ceiling approach there is the setting of an upper limit of the Defence budget that must not be exceeded. Here the priority given Defence is lower and subordinated to other demands of society. In setting the upper limit, most developing countries with weak economies hardly go beyond emoluments and little functional expenses. Defence authorities are thus expected to operate within the limits set for them even in emergencies thereby making the meeting of set objectives almost impossible. When a nation’s survival is at the brink of collapsing, it is possible to have a reversal of the approach to resource allocation. For instance, with the outbreak of the conflict in La Cote d’Ivoire, a lot more budgetary allocation had to be speedily made available since the Defence sector had been operating with the ceiling approach to Defence budgeting.

The requirements approach on the other hand upholds the importance of the Defence/security/military requirements and insists that they be speedily acquired irrespective of cost. In that case, a higher premium is given national security as compared to other sectors.

The argument here is that without a solid defence and security sector, no other individual, institution nor element within the state can benefit from any freedom or right.

3.5.3 The Strategic Dimension

The strategic considerations in Defence Policy formulation are closely related to the distribution of earmarked resources amongst the services and stakeholders. Resource allocation is also based on the level of importance attached to an aspect. Thus, it is also a matter of size and composition in terms of capacity and competences as well as specialities. Just as with the Ghanaian system, the consideration will be whether to spread the resources thinly against all the concepts of security/defence available or to concentrate all the allocated resources of a given year on an identified priority area to the detriment of others for a given financial year. The former, which is very often seen in the Ghanaian context, is what Huntington calls “Strategic Pluralism”, whilst “Strategic Monism” is the second option. Same options are applicable to the physical deployment of forces to prevent, contain, or overcome threats. With the pluralist concept, military forces could be strategically spread to cover Ghana’s territory or concentrated in one particular area from which clinical operations could still be conducted for the sake of state security. Thus, the use of defence resources should be matched with the mode of attainment of specified defence sector goals.


3.5.4 The Diplomatic Dimension

The diplomatic consideration is more of a decision making one. The country involved must decide on how to use its armed forces. This could be through a policy that specifies the conditions and timing for the use of Defence resources. The character of policy here will give an impression of the extent to which state actions will be either determined by Ghana at all times or the extent to which it will be in reaction to the actions of adversaries. An option thus

exists where a country such as Ghana can have a Defence Policy that seeks to outline all the predictable situations, in a dynamic manner, in which the armed forces could be used. This will seek to limit the likelihood of action and initiative of adversaries. Secondly, there could also be a passive option where emphasis will be on the diplomatic preparation for situations that could require the resort to use of force. Thus, attempts are made at the full exploitation of all possible pacific responses to provocations of adversaries. The resort to the use of armed force is the last measure which will not be easily opted for.

These three strands of Defence policy making identified by Samuel P. Huntington are thus closely related. Decisions involving one will surely have repercussions on the others and eventually on the population. In this regard we can safely argue that apart from the Political leadership, the executive institutions responsible for Defence policy making include the Finance system for funds, the Foreign Affairs for diplomacy, and the Military High Command for issues of strategy. Failure to appreciate threats and inability to decide on steps required to contain them is a serious setback in operating a Defence policy. Success requires the full participation of all stakeholders. So, in decision making, they need to consider the effect of decisions being made on areas beyond their primary areas of responsibility. This state of affairs led Huntington to classify the processes of Defence policy formulation into two strands, namely, Radicalism and military Conservatism approaches.

Figure 3. 1: Approaches to Defence Policy Making



Source: Researcher, 2019.

Figure 3.1 above depicts two classes of approaches to Defence policy making. These approaches highlight the inter-relatedness of Huntington's proposals. The first approach here is Military Conservatism which gets translated through budgeting, pluralistic strategic measures, and diplomacy. The second approach of Military Radicalism is manifested by the setting of budgetary ceilings, an application of monism, and dynamism in diplomacy. What these approaches trigger is the shifting of emphasis from one option to the other. When this happens, the identified three elements automatically get varied but remain consistent and balanced which are key attributes of a dynamic Defence policy. This does not prevent having different impacts on the ground. This does not also preclude the occasional combination of choices, by actors, that may seem inconsistent and unbalanced. Thus, room should be made to contain combinations that may be seen as logically incompatible by using the Huntington model. The pressures of the events concerned will finally determine the suitability or otherwise of the choice made. Where a country is willing to apportion a great portion of its society's resources to Defence, a pluralistic strategy is feasible. A high reliance on force with a reduced

use of the diplomatic means is experienced. Such an option entails a capacity to engage in large and sustained military expenditure which is normally the domain of the big powers. A country with a smaller Defence establishment must thus compensate the shortfall with an aggressive, dynamic, and belligerent diplomatic posture to survive. Debrah (2002) believes a small country like Ghana must craft and use diplomacy as a First Line of Defence. She can convey her national interests for her survival and wellbeing to all levels of International Relations using diplomacy since her economic and political might may not be sufficient to influence other states (Debrah, 2002). According to Samuel P. Huntington, a conservative Defence policy will result in the abandonment of diplomacy whilst the radicalistic policy may demand a preventive war.

3.5.5 Military Conservatism

The conservative policies have the characteristics of placing emphasis on strong forces who should be physically available to ensure national security and social institutions as against economic goals. It does not dwell on perceptions and thoughts/desires. It dwells on the reality – on “being”. Since it is impossible to predict the nature of all future wars, the weaponry that will be required, and the exact circumstances that will be met, it is rather a bit prudent to prepare and be ready for a wide range of scenarios and threats. This pluralistic strategy will ensure that almost all conceivable situations of conflict are covered. This confirms the doubt of the conservative school of thought that man cannot plan adequately and exactly for his future security needs. Mainly because the future cannot be sufficiently and reliably predicted.

3.5.6 Military Radicalism

Military radicalism has been associated with advocacy against large standing armies but with a high appeal of sensitivity for domestic economic objectives. It downplays the worth of

physical force as an option to national Defence. Radicalism strives to portray the ability of humans to be masters of their destiny through reasonable conduct whilst seeking improvement through institutional means where they exist. The quest and desire to effectively plan for future events relating to security and Defence of the International System has always been with man.

Conclusion

Defence policies, just like all other national policies, are the brain children of “forces reflecting the interest and drives of politically significant groups in society”. The two approaches of military conservatism and radicalism have and will continue to determine the direction of Defence policy making but with varied emphasis. No policy will be seen to be purely radical, conservative nor irrational in all its domains. Therefore, the most likely feature is to have a blend on some of the details of Defence policy making.

3.6 Foreign Policy

A country’s Foreign Policy is a reflection of its well thought out domestic or national policy and aspirations. That a state will decide to have an aggressive posture towards its neighbours such as the United States under Trump against migrants from Mexico, is determined by her internal policy against illegal migrants. The attainment of the objective is subject to the judicious use of resources available to the state. Ghana has traditionally espoused a non-negotiable posture in favour of the ideals of Pan-Africanism. Since independence the country’s successive governments, including the military juntas, have all followed the tenets aimed at the liberation of the entire continent from the shackles of imperialism and neo-colonialism. She has also, especially during the Cold War, sought to steer away from the controversies of aligning herself to any super-power thereby becoming an active and ranking member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Emphasis was thus, by 1958, placed on “positive neutralism”.

Nkrumah heavily invested the country's energies in the fight to end colonialism/neo-colonialism whilst promoting African Unity.

Ghana deployed her Defence resources including 2,340 troops on 15 July 1960 to The Congo following a request made by the Lumumba administration. This was in conformity with the country's Foreign Policy objective of coming to the aid of an African country in distress. Another 370 Ghanaian civil policemen were also deployed. Ghana's intention to do all within her power and sending all possible aid/assistance for the resolution of the Congolese crisis stemmed from the fact that, both for Nkrumah and Ghana, an Africa-centric Foreign Policy option was being followed (Mohan, 1966). This rather radical approach of Nkrumah was however not being used alone as diplomatic efforts were still pursued by Ghana. Ghana's Foreign Policy thus gained expression in its Defence policy and announced the country's importance as a partner to the great powers of the time.

The United States saw opportunities for its national security in the attainment of independence by Ghana in March 1957. This affected its foreign policy which had virtually hitherto neglected Africa south of the Sahara. In fact, Peter J. Schraeder noted that the region was a foreign "policy backwater and of lowest priority" (Schraeder, 1994). A number of factors accounted for this. These included the concentration of the US on the threats posed by the Communists in taking over or influencing Western Europe, the Middle and Far East, and North Africa where they had military bases and also feared the outflanking of Europe by the communists. Whilst North Africa was therefore of strategic importance, sub-Saharan Africa was of less value to the well-being and survival of the United States and her allies. Additionally, the US practised a "Europe First" policy which affected the amount of attention the US was willing to give the African continent. However, with the arrival of Ghana on the international scene with a charismatic

and influential President, the US sought to ensure he did not turn towards the Communists for assistance of an “obligating nature” or from any other country whose intentions were ‘inimical to the national interest of the United Nations” (U.S. Embassy, 1959). They also aimed at using Ghana as a showcase of the benefits of liberal democracy and development in emerging states (Rosenberg, 1982). Assistance was thus assured Ghana in human capital development and release of resources to finance projects. Nkrumah and his government had pro-Western tendencies and publicly declared such intentions (Nwaubani, 2001). Though Nkrumah had a good number of Marxists friends such as George Padmore, he accepted US sponsorship of the construction of the Volta Dam thereby confirming a level of pragmatism on his part (Nwaubani, 1999). We can thus safely argue that the need for funds for development through construction of the Volta hydro-electric Dam shaped the Foreign Policy of Ghana towards the West during the early days of independence, with rippling effects on the Defence Policy at the time.

Ghana showed consistency in its policy. Though it got assistance from the then United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) to transport troops to Congo to assist the Lumumba government, she still objected to the Soviet position that the Office of the Secretary General be substituted with that of a Committee of three because the then UN Secretary General had shown bias and was accused of using the UN machinery to favour the West.

Nkrumah by his dealings and deep involvement in the Congo, was branded a communist because the US had accused Lumumba of being a communist mainly because he accepted Soviet aid. By deciding to deploy troops in the theatre and also working to have an almost all African Force in place though under the auspices of the UN, we can safely argue that Ghana’s Foreign Policy objectives at the time had affected the Defence Policy being executed by the

Nkrumah administration. This is to say that there is a very close link between the Defence Policy of a country and its Foreign Policy.

3.6.1 Ghana's Contemporary Foreign Policy Linkages with Defence Options

Foreign Policy remains a very important and critical issue. It is about people and fate of nations. If badly handled it can lead to insecurity, loss of lives, creation of Internally Displaced Persons and outright wars. The Foreign Policy orientation of nations in contemporary times is inextricably woven into their domestic agenda. The case of Ghana is not any different. Foreign Policy is traditionally considered to be far removed from the citizenry and hence taken for granted. There is democratic control over the Executive in the formulation, implementation and review of public policy. The highest body of control being Parliament in the case of Ghana (Bluwey, 2002). As such, though the personality and convictions of the President of the day are important there is still a level of formal control over Foreign Policy decisions.

In 2001, the Ghanaian government acknowledged the important role of Foreign Policy in the fortunes of the country by stating that its guiding principle was the vigorous promotion on the international scene of the vital interests of the nation Ghana and her citizens with the aim of achieving prosperity and dignity of all inhabitants and ensuring national security.

The President stated the age-old philosophy of Ghana's external relations which has always been focused or pivoted on Africa (Appiah, 2014). There is a deliberate policy to ensure that the "Africa Policy" is matched with a good, safe and secure neighbourhood thereby justifying Ghana's participation in sub-regional activities including the deployment of troops for peacekeeping in countries such as Liberia, La Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Mali. Thus, in the quest for social and economic well-being of the citizens, Ghanaian governments have always sought to forge closer relations and cooperation with and among sub-regional

nations and indeed on the continent as a whole. John Agyekum Kufour saw ‘peaceful and harmonious relations’ with neighbours as an imperative in 2001. Peace and security are prerequisites for development. This issue of peace and security thus had an effect on the development of the Defence posture and policy of the country.

Ghana’s greatest enemy was identified to be poverty among the populace. The fight against disease, cross-border crimes, weapons proliferation, poverty, and hunger however, “ought to be done in freedom” in order that the citizens may not lose confidence in the democratic practices of the country. The recurring question is how can the required freedom be secured and with what tools?

For instance, John Agyekum Kufour as Commander-In-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces specifically requested the Ghana Navy to coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on issues of transnational nature for purposes of having a consistent and comprehensive policy (Appiah, 2002). This laid the foundation stone for the Maritime Strategy in place and by extension the maritime aspects of the Defence Policy. It also brings to the fore the close relationship between the Foreign Policy and the Defence Policy at the time. In fact, to get a response to terrorism, the Executive Arm of government looked to the Foreign Ministry and not the Defence Ministry. This again confirms the role Foreign Policy plays in determining the Defence Policy options through the Defence component of the Foreign Policy.

In furtherance of the Africa policy of Ghanaian governments, Ghana seeks to host institutions such the African Monetary Fund, African Investment Bank and African Central Bank (Hackman, 2002). Additionally, she accepted to host the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) sponsored by the United States because of her interests in ensuring that the peace

support initiatives are piloted by African states so as to optimize the benefits of the programmes for the African Defence sector (Hackman, 2002). In 2019, Ghana won the bid to host the Secretariat of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA). All these come with their immediate, short-term, and long-term security challenges but are catered for by the robust public safety and security strategy.

Regional relations require bilateral cooperation with countries of the sub-region and others that share common visions with Ghana especially on Pan-Africanism. This requires a strategic alliance for the vision of the African Renaissance Project. The economic domain is not precluded from Foreign Policy issues. Ghana has consistently held onto the creation of wealth and spending it amongst African states. Consequently, as a founding member of ECOWAS, it sees the economic bloc as an indispensable building block to economic and social integration of the West African sub-region and eventually the African continent. Bilateral trade does not however take place between Ghana and West African countries only. Bilateral trade takes place between the country and other countries in Africa and the rest of the world. Trade has been with several countries on all the continents (Asante, 2007).

The Defence component of Ghana's Foreign Policy concerns basically the use of Ghana's military outside the confines of the country. Peacekeeping, peace support operations, and evacuation of stranded Ghanaians readily come to mind. The Office of the Defence Advisor and its critical role as an integral part of the Foreign Mission relative to intelligence and advice cannot be over-looked. The protection of both the territorial and maritime resources is a key vital activity. This calls for a stringent liaison with the Ministry of Defence who has the tools – in the capacities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to provide the needed skills and services.

The pursuit of Foreign Policy must have a focus, a targeted objective which must aim at improving the livelihood of the generality of the citizens. Foreign Policy is about people. For Debrah, the Foreign Policy agenda of a developing country such as Ghana is how the country relates to the external world but with the strategic objective of significantly reducing the poverty and deplorable conditions in which many citizens live (Debrah, 2002). It might thus be right to say that Foreign Policy is a fulfilment of Domestic Policy since the former is almost a projection of the latter. What is important is the accurate identification of national interest and investing in its attainment. Hence the need for complementary policies such Social, Economic, Security, and Defence policies.

Ghana's Foreign Policy at independence was determined greatly by the continuous colonisation of majority of African countries, the apartheid in South Africa, the Cold War, and the abject poverty of the population of the continent (Debrah, 2002). The immediate post-independence policy sought to get citizens from poverty and promote the social and economic development of the country. To do this, a Foreign Policy was designed and aimed at achieving the following five outcomes (Debrah, 2002):

- i. Consolidation of the nascent independence.
- ii. Freeing Africa of colonial rule.
- iii. Promoting cooperation between African countries through a Union government.
- iv. Respect of the dictates of the Non-Aligned Movement.
- v. Working in tandem with International Organisations such as UN, Commonwealth, and later on ECOWAS to bring about desirable peace.

Ghana's Foreign Policy has not departed from this foundation since independence. Indeed, Ghana's pioneering role in the liberation and de-colonisation contributed significantly to the

independence of many African countries and moves towards integration that are still underway today. The constitutional basis of Ghana's Foreign Policy has been enshrined in the 1992 Constitution. In Article 40(a), it states as follows:

“In its dealings with other nations, the government shall:

- a. Promote and protect the interest of Ghana.
- b. Seek the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order.
- c. Promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.
- d. Adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of:
 - (i) The Charter of the United Nations.
 - (ii) The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (African Union today).
 - (iii) The Commonwealth,
 - (iv) The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States and
 - (v) Any other International Organisation of which Ghana is a member.”

The Foreign Policy has basically covered, the Ghanaian and Ghana, the West African sub-region and Africa as well as the International Community. Each successive government since independence has however concentrated or placed emphasis on issues based on its persuasion and the leadership in place. Henry Kissinger believes that due to the experiences which form the leaders in their rise to eminence, “*A leader's vision, personal aspirations, temperament, prejudices, force of personality, ideological persuasion, moral orientation and perception of world issues tend to have a strong bearing on the manner in which these principles are put into action.*”(Kissinger, 1994).

Ghana's Foreign Policy has dwelled over the period on economic diplomacy too. This aims at ensuring an improvement of the livelihood of the inhabitants of the country. Ghana has chosen dialogue and diplomacy over other tools in dealing with challenges to her survival with her neighbours. She has respected the very underpinning principles of her Foreign Policy. Where she has been forced to go beyond, she has chosen arbitration and court procedures such as she did in the case of the Maritime dispute with La Cote d'Ivoire in 2017.

For Annan Cato, Nkrumah concentrated more on foreign relations to the detriment of the domestic situations that equally deserved attention. The Progress Party of K. A. Busia, in its manifesto, chose to pursue a foreign policy tailored to "the capabilities and national interest of Ghana within the context of African Unity." A harmonious relations agenda with the rest of the world on the basis of respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states was also pursued" (Cato, 2002). It is worth noting that the events of 11th September 2001 affected the Foreign Policy of many countries including Ghana by sending the issue of security to the top of the international agenda.

It is also worth noting that, with Ghana's membership of international organisations such as ECOWAS, African Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, Francophonie Organisation, and the United Nations comes with both responsibilities and benefits. The country gets to use her membership to mobilise support for the cause she had set for herself, namely the total liberation of the African continent, the elimination of apartheid, the restoration of the dignity of the African, and the socio-economic well-being of the common African (Cato, 2002).

The relationship between the domestic or national policy, the foreign, and defence policies is an enduring one and is evident in the conduct of all countries. The United States of America has one of the most dynamic Foreign and Defence policies in the world. John Hillen (1998) believes ‘reshaping’ US forces takes a long time. Very often when decisions are being taken relative to US Defence resources and forces, the scenario used is how they wish the forces and resources to be seen in 10 to 20 years’ times. Justifiably, a Defence policy must necessarily address the kind of forces a nation should desire, develop, and plan to use to meet likely military threats as well as support a balanced and “internationalist” foreign policy (Hillen, 1998).

In 1998 the US was assumed not to be facing any major threat from conventional forces nor a nuclear threat of any nature. It was however realized that the numerous new and emerging threats respected no state in particular. These could emanate from rogue states, failed or failing states and terrorist groups. They could take the forms of Weapons of Mass Destruction, biological/chemical weapons, ethnic violence and refugees’ issues (Hillen,1998) as well as new forms of warfare such as information operations. These led planners to reconsider the existing policies and project to have a chosen type and nature of forces that will serve the country’s needs both internally and externally not just in the short and medium terms but also in the long term.

It is however worth noting that the earlier history and posture of the US had been different. Between the two World Wars, some scholars such as William T. R. Fox and Harold Lasswell tried convincing the world that democracy, the promotion of international understanding and cooperation, collective security measures, arbitration, self-determination and nationalism, disarmament, and dialogue held the keys to international peace and security (William, 1949). Focus was therefore placed on International Law and International Organisations rather than

military force. For Quincy Wright for instance, a solution needed to be found for war, since it was “a disease to be cured” and not a prime instrument of state policy or statecraft (Quincy, 1998). However, others like Nicholas J. Spykman and Arnold Wolfers refused to see war as a malfunction or failure of the international system. For them military force was an instrument for the promotion of national security. They were vindicated when the world fell into a war situation again in 1939 making national security a central and prime concern of all states.

The age-old security dilemma calls for caution and prudence in defence policy formulation and implementation especially in a sub-regional setting where states share common concerns and aspirations in an Economic Community such as ECOWAS. Clausewitz’s philosophy has been that war should be studied within the context of International Relations and Foreign Policy. He has the support of Schelling in this regard since he also believes that war and military strategy in general are key in the international bargaining process thereby making “conflict and cooperation inseparable” (Lebrow, 1996).

Policy must help define the threat, the means, the use, and control of defence and military resources. The non-military means available to the nation need to be equally considered in a cost-benefit or marginal utility approach. Policy makers should be more interested in addressing problems from a position of strength but with the right resource-mix in mind. Consequently, they need to be updated on the potentials of each instrument available to them such as the information machinery, economic strength, diplomatic network, and military assets. They need to understand when and under what conditions the choice of war will be necessary and useful. To arrive at a point when it is accepted that the utility of the military choice is preferred, a cost-benefit analysis should have been completed using both the military and non-military variables. Hedley Bull cautions against the hasty choice of military options by

strategists to solve Foreign Policy problems. He recommends a debate with the professionals to help the strategist arrive at the best options in the circumstance (Bull, 1968).

The place of robust policies in taking the right decisions at the right time with the right resource combination cannot be overemphasized. This is necessary if the outcomes of decisions will be enduring and justifiable too. Foreign policies are indispensable sources of countries' defence policies and that also provide options for defence of nations without necessarily using military means.

3.7 The Ministry of Defence

No institution, either public or private, can effectively meet its mandate without guidance and direction. The Defence sector is not any different. A typical Defence Ministry should be in a position to serve as an efficient bridge between the armed forces and the political authorities. It should also serve as a reliable interface between the forces and the public both local and foreign. Apart from transmitting the directives of the political authorities to the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is also expected to be capable of taking important decisions over issues requiring judgments that are not technically military. Other functions of a Ministry of Defence include the provision of a platform for the building of synergy using all Defence institutions resources in times of need, ensuring efficiency and accountability on the management of the Defence sector, and being the interface between the armed forces and other governmental institutions including the legislature and media. The MoD is also answerable for the outcomes of military operations on behalf of government. Military operations have a direct impact on the government of the day and hence the importance attached to them by the political leadership through the Ministry. Equipment acquisitions play a vital role in communicating the overall Security and Defence policies of a country (Taylor, 2006). Consequently, the

procurement function of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is of prime importance not just because of costs involved but the need for acquisition to be done and managed in a system that respect the endorsed Defence Policy.

With all these functions going to the MoD, the military headquarters is therefore left with the responsibility of preparing requisite Defence capacity from recruitment, through training, the exercise of command and control, to the implementation of doctrinal issues. The second key function of the military headquarters is the conduct of operations to meet the desires of the political class. It is very important to note that in their preparations and operations, the armed forces must not violate treaties, agreements, pacts, and legally binding engagements that the government might have entered into (Taylor 2006). For instance, Ghana is a signatory to the Land Mines Convention and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Consequently, it is expected that the MoD will ensure that the GAF in her preparations and conduct of operations do not engage in conduct that will breach the dictates of these conventions.


As such, it is customary in democracies for the armed forces to be strictly controlled by the civilian component. This is because the resultant impact of the actions, omissions, and inactions of the armed services is borne by civilian leaders since they are ultimately responsible (Chitor,2017). The 1992 Constitution of Ghana and the Armed Forces Act, Act 105 of 1962, both explicitly provide for civil control over the Ghana Armed Forces.

In this regard, the Ghana Armed Forces, comes under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Granted that by the copious *expose* above about the large and wide spectrum referred to as the Defence Sector, the military is not the sole player, but it still remains that critical institution in the domain. The Ministry is that department of central government which is in charge of

ensuring that the country is well defended against both internal and external aggression. Though the internal security needs are to be provisioned by the Ministry of Interior – in the case of Ghana – it is well the case that the Ghana Armed Forces works closely with the Civil Police in maintaining stability and order. The MoD does this through the issuance of appropriate directives and policies which serve as a guide for the Defence of the national interest (Chitor, 2017). Policies are conveyed as instructions for implementation at the level of the armed forces. Instructions from the Ministry to the Services HQ are termed Ministry of Defence Instructions (MDIs). Services may also disseminate extracted aspects of MDIs as Command and Staff Instructions and Procedures (CSIP) to Formations and Units. Consequently, the Defence Policy itself is one of the key documents that the Ministry should produce, disseminate, implement, monitor and review. A well-shaped Defence policy should constrain and direct how resources earmarked for the Defence sector should be used (Taylor, 2006). In short, the civil control of the armed forces is getting a professional armed force to be dependent and answerable to the civil authority in place.

Pictorially, the principal functions of the Ministry of Defence in relation to the Defence Policy can be depicted as in Figure 3.2 below. The principal function as shown of the MoD is to give policy directions for the Armed Forces and its affiliates to execute. It does this through the promulgation of Defence Policies. The Defence Policies in turn aim at ensuring that there is clarity in the directives given and that Defence efforts are streamlined and coherent leading to the elimination of duplication, turf battles, and waste. From the diagram the MoD oversees the implementation of the policy as well as its review.


Figure 3. 2: Functions of MoD



Source: Adapted from *Managing Defence in a Democracy*, 2002.

Figure 3.3 below shows how the MoD functions relative to Defence Policy making. The policy formulation is the foremost activity, that is followed by policy implementation by the Armed Forces after which the policy needs to undergo review. Each of these principal activities has a goal and the MoD is expected to monitor and ensure coherence all-round the cycle.

Figure 3. 3: The Functional Path of Defence Policy for a MoD



Source: Researcher, 2019.

The Defence Policy manifests itself in various instruments and forms amongst the armed services and their allies. These include but are not limited to Constitutional Instruments (CIs) and Legislative Instruments (LIs). Apart from CSIPs, the services may use Part One Orders – also known as Battalion Routine Orders, the Standing Orders, and Procedures. Defence policies determine and state how the Defence resources should be employed. In the case of Ghana, key amongst the deployment options of the armed forces is in sub-regional, continental and international peacekeeping operations.

3.8 Regional Security

The African continent has been a beneficiary of various conflict resolution measures and peace missions over the years in fact starting from 1960 with the operation of the United Nations in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At a certain point in time during the late 1990s about a third of UN peacekeeping operations were on the African continent. This led to the involvement

of the economic blocs of the continent such as ECOWAS to get more active in the provision of security for their members.

Just as with the allies of NATO, the allies of the now defunct Warsaw Pact and those of Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), there has always been security concerns for the advancement of development of African states. The realisation dates back to the era before independence through the Pan-Africanist movements but was manifested by Nkrumah's quest for an African High Command. To back the quest to get Belgian troops to leave the Congo and also respect the UN Security Council Resolution, Nkrumah further made a case for an African standing army in the 1960s (Nwaubani, 2001). At the outbreak of the Congo crisis it was the opinion of Nkrumah that no super-power should be allowed to benefit from the crisis since there was apparent power politics at play with competing interests since this was the era of the Cold War.

In apparent pursuit of keeping the great powers away from the Congo, Nkrumah sought to let the UN have monopoly in dealing with the crisis by being in charge of all outside interventions. He also worked to have African troops dominating the UN force. The proposal was to have a "unified African Command" which will be answerable to the UN Security Council. The Ghanaian position was to prevent the secession of the Province of Katanga since that was viewed as having the potential of injuring the "African opinion", being disastrous for the peace process, and even off-setting the balance of political power in the world at the time (Nwaubani, 2001). He represented the African position that the Belgian troops supporting the secessionists in Katanga be compelled by the International Community to withdraw. This was to satisfy the long-avowed position of the Pan-Africanists against the occupation of African territory by foreign troops (Nwaubani, 2001). Nkrumah had described, before the UN General Assembly,

the Congo crisis to be “an acute African problem which can be solved by Africans only”. No wonder that even in 2018 the crisis in Congo continues to persist even with the presence of multi-national forces under the auspices of the UN. To buttress his position, he requested that the UN delegates its role in the crisis to independent African states to find a solution for the Congo.

Since support for the United Nations was not forthcoming and the situation continued to degrade, Nkrumah accepted an offer of two Russian Ilyushin 18 aircrafts to deploy Ghanaian troops to help in the UN operation in the Congo. The assistance did not go down well with the UN Secretary General who had shown a lot of bias towards the Soviet bloc. When Nkrumah complained about the handling of the Congo crisis at the UN General Assembly, the US effectively tagged him of having pitched camp with the Soviets. Not even an immediate statement could let them change their impressions.

For Yoroms (2010), a country’s role in sub-regional security to a large extent is determined by the role conceived and bequeathed to it by its leaders in International Relations thereby determining the Foreign Policy direction. Many African countries have an image of possessing a responsibility for the protection of the interest of the black race everywhere. They also strive to defend this image by claiming historical and cultural ties not just between neighbours but the black race as a whole. This therefore helps define the concept of national interest and security. Essentially looking at the way a country’s security is affected by the happenings in her contiguous neighbourhoods.

Some of African as well as West African states have hegemonic tendencies. For instance, the Nigerian state has had leaders who believed they almost had divine duty relative to the

leadership of the sub-region. Basing their arguments on the large population, the relative strong economy, the military might and the historical/cultural ties. Consequently, by 1999 Nigerian is said to have expended about 13 billion US dollars on sub-regional peace support operations (Bamali and Akinterinwa, 2009). It is estimated that during the Sierra Leonean crisis, Nigeria spent about a million dollars daily (George 2012). This led in part to a national outcry forcing the leadership to stay away from participating in the Guinea Bissau operation of 1999. Despite the readiness of Nigeria to claim some glory in the outcomes of peace support operations in the sub-region and also for the development being enjoyed by some states who were once in conflict, (Bamali and Akinterinwa, 2009), Nigerians were not too enthused at the time of the high expenditure in troubled spots around the region but with little or no apparent benefit to their country (Galadima et al., 2011). In fact, on assumption of power in 1999 and at the General Assembly of the UN, General Obasanjo lamented the “bleeding” of his country’s financial resources for the sake of sub-regional peace and security and intimated a strong desire to scale it down.

Nigeria lifted not just its own troops but troops from Guinea and Gambia for the second Liberian peace support operations undertaken by ECOMOG from 2003 (Bamali and Akinterinwa, 2009). It is also on record that Nigeria under Obasanjo deployed Alfa Jet fighters to help oust a military junta which had overthrown one of the most stable political structures in West Africa – the Ivorian government in 2003. Though the fighters were soon withdrawn, the action goes further to cement the desire of Nigeria to contribute significantly to sub-regional peace and stability.

With the rolling out of the concept of Standby Forces of all the regional trade blocs, it can be safely argued that the role of African armies has been firmly cut out. There was the accusation

that the military of many countries had ventured into politics - a field that was quite alien to them and not their mandated roles. Kranzdoff (1964) emphatically stated in his study that the military and police through the 1960s did not aid nation-building due to numerous structural and human challenges. Samuel Huntington argues that “politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professional competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values” (Huntington, 1954). This requires the institutionalisation of structures and roles to make Defence forces more accountable and sensitive to the roles of others.

Institutionalism, according to Samuel Huntington, is the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability, the level of institutionalization of any political system can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organization and procedures. So also, the level of institutionalization of any particular organization or procedures can be measured by its adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. For the Defence sector, the benefit of these efforts will be the professional employment of Defence forces.

The African Standby Force (ASF) is supposed to be the guarantor of peace relative to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). For Prof. Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, a guarantor of peace must have what it takes to be credible, inspire confidence and generate sufficient deterrence. This requires financial, material, and technical might (Mensa-Bonsu, 2014).

With the Common African Defence and Security Policy, other complementary institutions are expected to support the security structure that has been endorsed by member states. These include the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund (PF) (Mensa-Bonsu, 2014). All these have their replicas at the sub-regional level, such as the ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).

For all of these to gain recognition and be made effective, there need to be a deliberate attempt by the political leaders to make them feasible. This requires Defence policies to outline the nature of involvement and guidance on the use of Defence resources. The political will is very key in determining the fortunes of all security arrangements either for internal stability or external harmony. This is because the political direction impacts on the resource mix, the duration of engagements as well as the partners to work with. It is taking a while longer, but the African countries are gradually coming of age and taking their fate in their own hands.

Conclusion

The Security and Defence fields of study are anchored on the basis that the individual is the final beneficiary of all the defence investments and measures made by the International System, International Organisations, Regional and Sub-regional bodies as well as nations. Consequently, any research aimed at unravelling the nexus between security and development must necessarily consider the values that do not only make for the survival of the nation-state but also the well-being of the individual citizen. For the African continent, the quest for good governance in all sectors of the post-colonial state has been one of the key issues. The frameworks required to convey the benefits of governance to the final beneficiary need to be protected and insulated against both natural and artificial threats. The armed forces are among

the institutions of state inherited at independence that have undergone some evolution over the period. However, the reasons for their existence have not seen much change with time. This therefore need to be reviewed through the formulation of pragmatic defence and security policies that will not only be sensitive to the changing times, socio-economic environment, threat landscape, but also the international defence requirements. Improving the lot of the population, which by no means is static, remains the focus of all that nations should engage in.

CHAPTER FOUR METHODOLOGY


4.0 Introduction

This chapter covers the research method adopted for carrying out this study. It comprises a description of the study area, the institutions that were involved, the sample size, sample technique, research instrument design, data collection procedure, and the framework for analysing the collected data. It thus gives a pictorial presentation of the conduct of the research that led to the findings.

4.1 The Description of the Study Area

The study was conducted in Ghana and involved the Ghana Armed Forces and her affiliates that have a mandate to protect the territorial integrity of the country. Figure 4.1 below is map of West Africa. It shows all the 15 countries including the island of Cape Verde who are members of ECOWAS. They are anglophone, lusophone, and francophone countries. The sub-region is bounded to the West and South by the Gulf of Guinea or the Atlantic Ocean. To the North is the North African countries of Morocco, Tunisia and Libya whilst Chad and Cameroun border it to the East. The region has important river basins. These include the Niger River basin, the Volta River basin and the Mano River basin. Lying in the middle along the coast is Ghana. She is bordered to the West by La Cote d'Ivoire, the North by Burkina Faso, and to the East by Togo. To the South is the Atlantic Ocean. It is important to note that Ghana's immediate neighbours are all francophone countries and all of them have Defence pacts with France - their former colonizer. Additionally, they all belong to the sub-regional Economic bloc – ECOWAS.

Figure 4. 1: Map of West Africa showing Ghana and her Neighbours



Source: Google Maps, 2019.

Figure 4.2 below is a map of the Republic of Ghana – the study country. The territory covers an area of 238,535 km². It has a maritime area stretching 300 nautical miles into the sea with a coastline of 560 kilometres. The Greenwich Meridian runs through the country and links up with the Equator in the territorial waters of the country in the Atlantic Ocean. It is thus a country that lies very close to the centre of the planet earth.

Figure 4. 2: Political Map of Republic of Ghana (2019).



Source: Ghana Today, 2019.

The System of Governance


The country, which was formerly called the Gold Coast, gained independence from the British on 6 March 1957. The country has a population of about 28 million (Factsheet, 2018).

The governance system is a western-styled Presidential system that has term limits for the Presidency. The three arms of government are the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary. Each of the arms of government has its associated institutions and ministries as appropriate.

With the Defence Ministry being one of the key Cabinet Ministries. A Philosophy of Separation of Powers is practised. The Court system is independent and has a network that covers all the Regions of the country. Apart from a National House of Chiefs, there is a Council of State that plays an advisory role to the Executive. A vibrant and free media landscape complements the governance structures.

Figure 4.3 below is a pictorial view of how the three main arms of government relate. Though largely independent of each other, the Executive is required by the Constitution to have some elected members of the Legislature as Ministers thereby leading to a fusion of the two organs to some extent. Additionally, expenditure by the Executive, including spending on matters of Defence, needs to be approved by the Legislature. The budget of the Judiciary is also provided by the Executive. Therefore, there is an interaction of the organs of state in the governance of the country.

Figure 4. 3: The System of Governance



Source: Researcher, 2019.

There are 16 Administrative Regions for the purposes of local governance as part of the practice of decentralized administration. There are also 110 Districts that implement government policies at the very local level. These facilitate the execution of central government's developmental agenda and policy implementation at the local level. The political set-up is complemented by a vibrant traditional authority establishment that grants chiefs an amount of authority over their subjects and the areas under them. Representatives of chiefs are also members of District administrations and thus get to contribute to deliberations and decisions affecting the areas under their control.

4.2 The Internal Security Set-up


Each of the 16 regions and the Port city of Tema has a Regional Police Command. Thus, there are a total of 17 Police Commands with numerous Police Divisions and Stations. Also, in line with Internal Security, the country has the Fire Service, the Narcotics Control Board, the Immigration Service, the Prison Service, and the National Disaster Management Organisation, all of which fall under the Ministry of Interior. The Internal Security forces often have the support of the Ghana Armed Forces in bringing calm and restoring law and order when violent clashes occur between rival ethnic groups. They thus jointly conduct various operations in support of the civil authorities.

There is a vibrant arrangement of various Security Committees. At the Regional level there are the Regional Security Councils (REGSEC). The REGSECs are chaired by the President's representative at the Regional Administration, that is the Regional Minister. The rest of the members are the heads of the security agencies such as the Military establishment, the Prison Service, the Immigration Service, Fire Service, Narcotics Control Board, the Regional Police

Command and the Customs Preventive Regional Commander. The regional NADMO Manager as well as the Regional Security Adviser are also members.

At the District, Municipal, and Metropolitan levels there are the District, Municipal and Metropolitan Security Council respectively. The membership is similar to that of the REGSEC. The leadership of the various security agencies at the district level join the District Chief Executive to make up the DISEC. When there is an issue requiring the presence of an expert, such a personality is invited to give his expert opinion. Figure 4.4 below depicts the hierarchy of the security committees that influence Internal Security in the country. Whilst directives descend from the National Security Council through the Regional Security Councils to the District levels, the chain of reporting from the lowest level also respects the laid down chain of command. Early warning of matters of security importance are also communicated from the grassroots – that is, the Unit Committee level to the national level using same order.

Figure 4. 4: Organisation for Internal Security



Source: Researcher, 2019.

The Defence Sector


The Security and Defence Sector is composed of several state institutions. Of prime importance is the Ministry of National Security and its associated organs; the National Security Council and the National Security Secretariat. They remain policy organs that give the direction and advice required by the Executive arm of Government for the security bodies to take the needed actions. Whilst the Defence and Interior Ministries play active lead roles in determining the level of security of the country, other Ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Local Government, and the Ministry of Health also contribute to the Sector in varying levels. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a key role in determining the deployment of troops outside Ghana either for peacekeeping or for outright combat roles. The decision to opt for the use of force by the nation comes with implications and hence the Executive in arriving at such a decision will rely heavily on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Institutions that also dominate the Security and Defence space include the Ghana Armed Forces, the Ghana Police Service, and the Justice and Correction system. For matters of Internal Security, the Police plays the lead role supported by the GAF if its resources get overstretched. Several other institutions such as the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO), think-tanks, and peace and conflict research establishments all contribute significantly to matters of internal security.

For matters of territorial defence and physical territorial protection, the Ghana Armed Forces plays the lead role. The GAF may be supported by external allies where bi-lateral, multi-lateral or alliances exist. For the Executive to communicate its directives and goals of Defence to the GAF, it validates a Defence Policy formulated and given to the GAF by the Ministry of Defence. Acting jointly on the advice of the Parliamentary Committee of Defence and Interior and the leadership of GAF, the Defence Policy could be reviewed periodically to align its

objectives to the evolving Security and Defence landscape so as to keep it relevant to the dictates of the times.

Figure 4.5 below gives a diagrammatic representation of the Defence Sector of Ghana. The role and influence of the affiliated Ministries and institutions are very significant for the survival of the nation and its citizens. These all need to be covered by any comprehensive Defence Policy and their roles reviewed whenever the policy is undergoing a re-formulation.

Figure 4. 5: Defence Sector of Ghana



Source: Researcher, 2019.

The Territorial Organisation


The country is divided into 3 distinct Military Commands for the purposes of territorial defence as depicted in Figure 4.6 below. These are the Northern Command covering the five northern-most regions with an HQ at Tamale. The Central Command with its headquarters at Kumasi covers the four central regions. The Southern Command has jurisdiction over the six southern regions with its headquarters at Teshie. The Commands are to essentially ensure absolute defence of the designated areas against both external and internal aggression. The Command HQs also have the secondary tasks of coming to the aid of the civil authorities and police in the restoration of law and order as well as the general maintenance of internal security.

The Northern Command covers five regions that share borders with Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to the East and La Cote d'Ivoire to the West. Each of the five regions has a military outpost. The main bases for the Command are located in Tamale, Wa, and Bawku. An Air Force Base is also located at Tamale.

The Central Command also covers five administrative regions sharing borders with Togo to the East and La Cote d'Ivoire to the West. The main bases are located at Kumasi and Sunyani but with outposts spread out to assist the Civil Authority in internal security periodically. The Navy has an inland outpost at Yeji, within the area of responsibility of Central Command, to help in maritime safety on the Volta Lake.

Southern Command has the largest area of responsibility covering six regions. With permanent bases in Takoradi, Accra, Tema, and Ho. Apart from these, there are numerous military installations of all the services and institutions of the military in the Command's area of responsibility (Addae, 2005).

Figure 4. 6: Map of Ghana showing Military Commands (2019)



Source: Ghana Army, 2019.

The naval forces also have two distinct Commands; the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) with its headquarters at Tema and the Western Naval Command (WNC) with the headquarters at Sekondi. The coastline is thus divided among two Commands. Whilst the ENC, among other

functions, provides training facilities for the Navy, the WNC provides needed services for the oil fields of the country. Anti-piracy operations, patrolling to ward off intruders to oil prospecting fields, and protection of fisheries patrols are among the key function of the navy in support of national development. Both Commands, among others, provide surveillance over contentious claims over maritime rights between Ghana her neighbours ie La Cote d'Ivoire and Togo. Figure 4.7 below shows the territorial waters of Ghana.

Figure 4. 7: Maritime Area of Responsibility




Source: Google Maps, 2019.

Figure 4.8 below shows Ghana's Maritime Areas of Interest, the area of responsibility of the Ghana Navy, and the areas that have been under contention with neighbours. The dispute over ownership with La Cote d'Ivoire was settled in 2017 by the Special Chamber of the

International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in favour of Ghana. However, the demarcation of the eastern maritime boundary with Togo remains unresolved. With oil deposits in areas, the international interest and associated defence implications are important despite unfolding pacifist attempts at finding lasting solutions. A more proactive approach is required in handling all possible disputes.

Figure 4. 8: Contentious Maritime Areas with Neighbours



Source: Ghana Navy, 2019.

The Ghana Airforce is responsible for the protection of the country's airspace and to assist the Navy in the conduct of Search and Rescue operations over the maritime area. It has its bases in Tamale, Takoradi and Accra.

4.3 Research Design

An exploratory research design was used in this research to conduct an in-depth analysis of available data. Secondary data was also used. Other sources, including visits to the National Archives and Records establishments, were conducted in order to gain more insight into the relevance of Ghana's Defence Policy to the core mandate of the Ghana Armed Forces of protecting state sovereignty from external threats and internal aggression. The study used qualitative research methods to achieve the study objectives. According to Cooper and Schindler (2008), qualitative research entails the interpretation and making sense of what is seen, and this makes it critical for understanding social phenomena of a study.

4.3.1 Research Instrument Design

This study was conducted along the lines of a typical qualitative study using an exploratory approach. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were employed and served as useful tools for obtaining information that can only be provided by a select few who have firsthand information required to meet specific study purposes/requirements. An elite interview was also conducted. This targeted persons that have in-depth knowledge and significant experience in Defence matters and were therefore able to contribute appreciably to the attainment of the objectives of the study.

Thus, a purposive method was applied in selecting participants. Respondents were persons with over two decades of continuous service in the Defence Sector. They had all also contributed to Defence policy issues including Defence policy making, interpretation, implementation, and review. Though the study centred around the Ghana Armed Forces, there were submissions from other Defence sector institutions including Narcotics Control Board, National Fire

Service, Ghana Police Service, Ghana Health Service, and National Disaster Management Organisation.


4.3.2 Participant Identification and Selection Criteria

The study employed a non-probability sampling technique. Respondents were purposively sampled to be interviewed based on their professional background and contributions to the Defence sector as a whole. Their ability to add to Defence Policy making processes now and in the near future was of essence. About 75% of the respondents were persons who had directly participated in policy formulation, implementation and review. The retired service personnel provided valuable critical assessments of policymaking in the country over the years. Selection of respondents was carefully done since Public Sector policy making is a highly specialized field and only a few workers are directly involved at any time. With the myriad of issues and sectors in the public space, with the requirement to register improvement at all times, and with the determination to meet the aspirations of stakeholders, a study about Defence Policy had to be conducted among persons with the requisite knowledge and experience of educating the researcher of the intricacies of the Defence Sector. The National Defence Policy, being a comprehensive Defence document, is a prime asset for the advancement of the Defence sector. Consequently, key informants were selected based on their ability to provide an in-depth analysis of the aptness of the NDP, make recommendations on its continuous utility to the sector and the country as a whole.

In all, sixty-five (65) persons who were associated with Defence policy making of Ghana were interviewed. Respondents were drawn principally from the rank and file of the Ghana Armed Forces as well as other affiliated services and institutions of the Defence Sector. As such, twenty-five respondents were from the Army, fifteen from the Navy, and ten from the Air

Force. Five civilians from the Ministry of Defence including two Chief Directors, two schedule officers, and one former Minister of Defence also availed themselves for the interview. The Ghana Police Service was represented by three officers. Two representatives each from National Disaster Management Organisation, and Narcotics Control Board were among the respondents. A representative each from the Ghana Health Service, Ghana Fire Service, and Ghana Prison Service were interviewed. Within the military, the respondents were contacted from across corps such as the Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, and the Executive Branches of the Ghana Air Force and Ghana Navy. The reason for the varying number of key informants from the services is that the Army officers are more in number than Naval and Air Force officers. Consequently, many of them get more employed in policy formulation roles than the others. fellows of the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College were also interviewed. Apart from the civilians at the MoD, some civilian research Two members of the Committee that worked and produced the current Defence Policy in 2012 were interviewed. Again, two former Chiefs of Army Staff and one former Chief of Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces were also interviewed. In this regard, both the diversity of the military and Defence Sector were adequately catered for. The views of five foreign military officers and two academicians from the National Defence College of Nigeria were also sought. A copy of the interview guide used is attached as Appendix A. Figure 4.9 below is a histogram depicting the distribution of respondents.

Figure 4. 9: Distribution of Respondents



Source: Field Work - Researcher, 2019.

The period covered by the study was segmented to reflect the major historical occurrences that affected the Ghana Armed Forces and the Defence policies. These include the coming into being of the First Republic, the *coup d'états*, the Second, Third and Fourth Republican Constitutions. Consequently, a bit of mention was made of the colonial era, but much emphasis was on the post-colonial era to date. The post-colonial era was categorised into the periods 1957 to mid-60s, the era of the *coup d'états*, and finally the period after the re-emergence of democratic governance in the early 1990s up to date. Thus, Defence under constitutional

governments and military regimes was thoroughly examined. This helped in gap identification in existing literature and also made known the appreciation of various scholars of Defence issues. Again, sources of material included books, journals, review papers, seminar papers, and the internet/mass-media/newspapers as well as archived documents. Defence documents at the Military Records establishment, and various policy documents were also used.

4.3.3 Data Analysis

Data was analysed using qualitative analytical software referred to as Nvivo. The analysis involved repeatedly reading through the interview transcripts and identifying new themes. Transcription was done after each day's interview. It involved listening to voice recordings of respondents and writing out their responses verbatim. Colour coding was employed in classification of themes. Their responses were then matched with that of others relative to the key issues that were identified. This helped with the measuring of accuracy and representativity thereby serving as a tool of validation of the responses. Again, thematic analysis was used in analysing the data. Data was analysed and presented in themes at three levels as global or overarching themes, organising themes and basic themes (Attride-Stirling, 2001). The overarching themes are the first level of themes that encapsulate all perspectives under the subject matter (Relevance of Ghana's Defence Policy). The organizing themes are the second level themes that summarise underlining perspectives into two or more extracted text quotes from the transcripts and also reveals different views about the global theme. The basic themes are the third level themes that are captured as the extracted quotes from the transcripts.

4.3.4 Ethical Consideration

In conformity with the ethics and standards of the University of Ghana's Ethics Committee for Humanities, strict ethical measures were applied in the collecting and handling of data.

Proposals and interview guides with justifications were submitted to the Ethics Committee before the start of data collection. Additionally, Consent Forms were filled and signed by all persons who were interviewed. Fears of respondents were allayed regarding the purposes of the interviews. Sensitive information given by respondents meant to deepen the understanding of the researcher was treated with the highest form of confidentiality. Such information never featured in the submitted work. The apprehensions of respondents, their desires/wishes of confidentiality were strictly respected.

The study was conducted relying on the guidance of experienced researchers and the contribution of experienced Security and Defence Sector stakeholders. The gleaning of data relating to the largely hitherto unexplored issue of Defence policy matters led the researcher to the archives of GAF with the National Archives and other institutions such as the Records Office of the Ghana Armed Forces.

CHAPTER FIVE

AN OVERVIEW OF THE GHANA NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY FRAMEWORK

5.0 Introduction

This chapter gives a brief history of the policy framework applied in the Defence Sector starting from the colonial era to the current times with emphasis being placed on the 2012 Ghana National Defence Policy. The policies that have guided governments in the creation of military establishments and units, equipping them and deploying them with periodic reorganization have mainly aimed at maintaining efficiency and readiness for the discharge of their mandated roles. The military's role in the execution of government policies is outlined in the Defence Policy. Consequently, the government through the Defence Ministry communicates its Defence strategy to the military through the Defence Policy.

Defence policy making and implementation started in the colonial era as early as 1835 and has continued to guide the life of the Armed Forces. As such, Ghana has had various defence policies regulating its Defence sector and more specifically, the establishment of military units, their reorganisation, and deployment over the years. These have all been aimed at ensuring that the country takes measures deemed necessary for securing her territorial integrity, safeguarding freedom and justice, enhancing national unity/cohesion and lately, the promotion of good governance.

To best understand the concept of defence policy implementation, the study traced how various factors and goals defined defence policy making from 1835 to 2012. The defence policy is a living document which undergoes changes. Therefore, to appreciate its history and culture in

the Ghanaian context requires delving into the country's history, as far back as possible, to see how defence policy making was done from the nascent stages until the present times and what culture has been established in the process.

5.1 Internal Security during the Colonial Era

British imperial concerns and needs gave direction to the defence policies of the colonial era. The preoccupation of the British colonisers was basically for the security of the Gold Coast for the smooth conduct of business. Threats of attacks from indigenes as well as from fellow Europeans were ever-present. The Ashanti Kingdom for instance was not only wealthy but also well organised militarily with an ambition of imposing her supremacy on others and also resisting British rule. This posture led to the numerous recorded wars between the British and Ashanti. The traditional settings had their internal security arrangements before the advent of colonialism and these did not entirely collapse with the presence of the colonisers. However, in many areas their authority was challenged and subsumed by the security arrangements of the British (Agyepong, 2011). Colonial rule can thus be largely said to have been rested on military force since its effective use resulted in the prosecution of the colonial agenda (Janowitz, 1964).

Consequently, the British came out with a policy in the mid-nineteenth century, to raise local forces to complement the white troops who arrived from Europe to defend their interests. This defence policy move has been attributed to the rate of death of the white troops and the cost of maintaining them in a rather hostile environment (Addae 2005). Additionally, black troops from the West Indies and based in Sierra Leone were also deployed in British West African States for operations when needed. It is maintained that by 1900 as a matter of policy, local forces replaced all other West Indian Regiments in the existing West African Frontier Force

(WAFF) which was created for both internal security and the defence of British interests in West Africa (Ekoko, 1983). In this regard, it can be argued that the British colonisers had definite defence policies they were implementing for their own good. First, military forces were basically used as a coercive force to ensure internal security, intimidating rebellious ethnic groups, and a manifestation of British superior power. Secondly, the force was used for the pacification of Ashanti and the Northern territories whose Commissioners themselves were military officers. Thirdly, a major shift in policy relative to the use of troops was recorded during the war of 1873-74 with Ashanti. Here apart from the use of white troops, Glover's Hausas were also used. This marked the beginning of the policy of using troops from a sister country in operations in another West African state. (Addae, 2005). This policy was to be repeated in 1900 when carriers were even transported from East Africa for the Ashanti campaigns. This policy was again employed to contain the February 1948 Gold Coast ex-servicemen induced riots. Troops were brought in from Nigeria following the widespread and violent agitations that rocked Accra.

The colonial era also had a Defence policy outlook that ensured that funding of the military in each colony was the responsibility of the Governor. Consequently, the administration of each colonized territory had to bear the costs associated with security and defence sector activities and not the War Office in London. This policy led to the institution of stringent controls and prudent use of resources by the Governors (Addae, 2005).

5.1.1 Imperial Defence

The use of the African soldier in the two World Wars came after deliberations to arrive at a policy. The main argument was that the African soldier, at the time, was considered not too suitable to use the equipment of modern warfare which had seen an improvement in

technology. Additionally, a decision had to be made on whether the troops could and should be used outside the continent. For the First World War it was decided that the troops be used only on the African continent hence their use against German locations in Togo, Cameroun, and East Africa (Addae, 2005).

The start of the Second World War led to changes in Imperial Defence policy. The British decided to use troops from the Gold Coast Regiment as an expeditionary force in East Africa and then later in Burma. This cemented the Imperial Defence policy regarding the expansion, training, and use of troops from the Gold Coast and other colonies for the defence needs of the British imperialists (Addae, 2005).

5.1.2 Defence Policy in the Inter-War Years – 1918 to 1938

Though the French and British were allies, after the First World War, the British were ever wary of the fact that the Gold Coast was surrounded by the French and that possibilities of hostilities needed attention. Consequently, the 1920s saw the formulation of defence policies to secure the interests of the Gold Coast against external aggression from neighbours. The Gold Coast is said to have recorded its lowest military force within the 1920-1930s and resources were rather directed at civil development (Addae, 2005). Internal security was the focus and the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR), as part of the Slater government's policy, also suffered serious cuts in budgetary allocations. The GCR was to see another policy revision that resulted in an increase in strength for the war-effort of the 1940s. Troops of 2 Infantry Brigade of the Gold Coast were used in The Gambia and later against the Italians in British East Africa (Addae, 2005).

As part of the Defence policy of the colonial era, a defensive strategy centered around a scorched-earth policy was propounded for the Gold Coast by Governor Hudson. It aimed at

containing possible Spanish and French attacks by air, sea, and land. Kumasi was to serve as a rallying point and military garrisons from the North and South were to move there as part of planned moves. All evacuated areas were then to experience the Defence Policy directive of destroying all facilities, equipment and installations that enemy forces could use to their advantage. Dominant businesses were all part of the plan which had pre-planned codes and instructions for activation (Addae, 2005).

5.2 Post-War Imperial Defence Policy

Troops of the Gold Coast, like their other African counterparts, fought the Japanese outside Africa from 1942. It is worth noting that until 1942, as a matter of policy, African troops were only used on the African continent by the British unlike the French. Their use in 1942 in Japan effectively cemented the shift in Defence Policy regarding the deployment of African troops. This meant that the Gold Coast Regiment needed to expand and thus got to 7 battalions in 1945. However, by 1946, all but 2 of the 7 battalions had been disbanded. Another battalion was re-organised after the 1948 riots in Accra and that was the main Unit of the Army in the Gold Coast until independence in 1957 (Addae, 2005).

The end of the Second World War also necessitated a policy review. The debate was whether the African soldier still had any utility for the British War Office and therefore if he could be integrated into the British Defence system, The Jacobs' Committee (Addae, 2005), discouraged it saying that the British troops were capable of handling Defence needs without African troop participation very much unlike what was being practised by their French counterparts. The reversion to the pre-war practice where a British Inspector General was in charge of the RWAFF was also rejected in favour of the West African Command.

5.2.1 Defence Policy under the First Republic

At independence Kwame Nkrumah had an expansionist vision of the Ghana Armed Forces. His approach to Defence Policy making was conservative and ambitious. He wanted his troops to take part in operations outside Ghana. The Rhodesian and Congo crises served as catalysts. Pan-Africanism and the training of freedom fighters in Ghana were all part of his vision. His desire for an African High Command, Africa's liberation and unity all fueled his quest to initially increase the strength of the Ghana Army to a Division. He subsequently rolled out a Defence Policy leading to the establishment of the Ghana Navy and Ghana Air Force. By deploying to the Congo, the Nkrumah government commenced the still fledgling Defence Policy aspect of peacekeeping that has seen Ghanaian troops perform to the admiration of the world (Addae, 2005). Defence Policy during the First Republic was thus offensive in nature because of the vision of the country's leadership and most importantly the dictates of the times. The overthrow of the government in February 1966 however saw an immediate and deliberate reduction of the offensive capacity of the GAF.

5.2.2 Defence Policy under the First Military Regime

Ghana recorded its first successful coup d'état on 24 February 1966 when a joint Police and Military group overthrew the First Republican government. The three-year stay in office of the junta before handing over power to a civilian government saw a number of policy interventions in the Defence sector. Attempts at overthrowing it and re-instating a civilian regime were foiled by its loyalists. The junta was thus wary of its survival and grip on political power and consequently introduced Defence measures that aimed at regime security. Thus, the regime concentrated less on external Defence issues and supporting African freedom fighters militarily. Internal security and how to stay in power were its main concerns (Howe, 2002).

5.2.3 Defence Policy in the Second Republic

The Busia administration's approach to Defence policy was informed by austerity in the public sector. Consequently, there were efforts at ensuring that a gradual reduction of the strength of the military was done until a 'realistic force level' was retained. The internal security of the country was seen as the military's primary role (Addae, 2005). Premium was thus not placed on external aggression. The closest form of aggression was thought to be the possibility of an insurgency that could lead to the return of Nkrumah, who was on exile in Guinea, to power. A Foreign Policy-dependent solution was being followed to contain external aggression. As such a policy of good neighbourliness was deemed sufficient. This was to be supplemented by alliances, treaties, and Foreign Policy overtures (Addae, 2005). The new Defence Policy posture also ensured a move away from close Soviet links back to the West. It was clear the Defence policy direction of the Nkrumah administration had been changed completely.

5.2.4 The Defence Policy under Military Regimes of the Period 1972 -1979

The period between 1972 and 1979 saw a cocktail of military regimes with varied orientations. These included the Supreme Military Council I (1972-1978), the Supreme Military Council 2 (1978-1979), and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (1979). What was common to all of them was the security of the regimes and preventing the country from slipping into outright civil war. Consequently, the Defence policy direction that was witnessed during the Acheampong, Akuffo and the Rawlings' AFRC regimes were basically aimed at ensuring that the military juntas survived using the Defence resources. Stability was their headache and main preoccupation (Addae,2005) whilst external and developmental issues were secondary.

5.2.5 The Defence Policy of the Third Republic

The Third Republic came into office in 1979 and faced stiff stability issues due to the fragile defence and security sectors it inherited. It inherited an indisciplined Ghana Armed Forces whose morale was at its lowest ebb. Direction for the Defence sector was aimed at reigning in retrograde soldiers and starting the reformation of a professional Armed Forces. The same indisciplined elements were able to bring to an abrupt end the stay in power of the elected government in 1981 before it could prosecute any meaningful Defence policy aimed at transforming the sector to one of respect and professionalism.

5.2.6 Defence Policy under Provisional National Defence Council

The Provisional National Defence Council usurped power on 31 December 1981. It had close links to the AFRC because the Head of State had also led the AFRC administration in 1979. As such, its approach to Defence issues and strategy were hardly different from that of the AFRC. The PNDC faced stiff attempts by a host of dissidents who planned and attempted overthrowing it. Numerous dissident cells/groups existed in La Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, and in Europe with the aim of staging an overthrow of the regime. Internally, both civilian and military elements also planned and executed various activities aimed at replacing the military led government. Numerous planned, attempted and foiled *coup d'etats* were recorded. Consequently, regime protection was very paramount and featured as the most important Defence policy factor. Overt military maneuvers such as aggressive border patrols and exercises were frequent activities meant to complement measures aimed at prosecuting a regime protection Defence policy. The direction targeted a constant monitoring for cross border incursions of dissidents and internal activities of subversive elements. These led to some accidents such as the downing of a jet fighter by the Togolese Armed Forces which resulted in the death of two fighter pilots along Ghana's Eastern border and the killing of some Ghanaian

soldiers who fought alongside Togolese dissent elements in the Togolese capital of Lomé. In terms of military partners, the junta got closer to Eastern Europe and Cuba whilst treading cautiously with the West (Howe, 2001).

5.2.7 Defence Policy under the Fourth Republic

The Fourth Republican Constitution came into being on 7th January 1993. It is explicitly stated in the Constitution that the Ghana Armed Forces, apart from its traditional roles, will also contribute to the development of the country as the President wishes. This then meant that the Defence Policy must incorporate and explain what development meant and that which was expected from the Ghana Armed Forces. The first government worked at consolidating democratic rule and bolstering stability. It was a government that transited from a military one to a civilian government and the threats to its survival did not immediately abate with the transformation. Consequently, though the Defence policy had a developmental agenda, regime protection was still pursued.

The second government under the Fourth Republican Constitution spanned the period 2001 to 2008. Stability and regime protection were also pursued by the government as its period of office was seen as a test for Ghana's democratic practices and stability. Wary of possibly politicised Security and Defence sectors and possibilities of unprofessional conduct of errant servicemen, justifiable measures were embarked upon by the government to ensure stability and regime security. The regime made significant strides in bolstering civilian control and oversight over the military (Handley, 2001). The government also got much closer to the country's neighbours thereby reducing suspicions and promoting good neighbourliness. Measures were taken to review both the Foreign and Defence policies of Ghana. In this regard, and being conscious of the need to define the meaning of 'development' as contained in the

roles of the GAF, the government organised sessions with think-tanks including the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) to lay the grounds for the first documented National Defence Policy of the Fourth Republic.

The Third Government of the Fourth Republic (2009 – 2016) finally came out with the most recent Ghana National Defence Policy. The NDP sought to give the desired direction of using the GAF not only as a tool of Defence of the country's territorial integrity but most importantly to respond to the constitutional requirement of being a tool for development. A synthetic presentation of the NDP now follows.

5.3 The Ghana National Defence Policy of 2012

The 2012 Ghana National Defence Policy is the first documented Defence Policy since the coming into being of the Fourth Republican Constitution. It is a multi-sectorial product which had the Chief Director of the Ministry of Defence signing the official promulgation instrument – the Ministry of Defence Instructions (MDI No. 4) on the 15th July 2012 thereby putting it into effect by order of the Minister of Defence. The policy has eight chapters in all with each focusing on an aspect of the wide spectrum of Defence. A summary of the 2012 Ghana Defence Policy which forms the fulcrum of this study is given below.

The first chapter is an introductory one which lays Ghana's permanent aspiration as being and remaining a "sovereign and free democratic state in the community of nations with the right to self-determination and development" (NDP,2012). The right to self-defence is however reserved by the country to protect its interests. The chapter also traces the history of defence policy making in modern Ghana leading to the 2012 NDP. It mentions the very first well-conceived Defence policy for Ghana as that put forward by the Nkrumah Government

immediately after independence. Subsequent administrations have mainly approached Defence policy issues on a rather ad hoc basis.

The chapter sets the background of the NDP and the factors that influenced its formulation to include; (1) the expression of Ghana's sovereignty and the sustenance of democratic governance in the country; (2) the strategic realignment of the international security environment following the end of the Cold War, (3) real and growing threats of global terrorism, illicit narcotic trade, violent inter and intra ethnic conflicts, upsurge in political clashes and intolerance, (4) and challenges associated with oil discovery as well as (5) the ECOWAS protocol on security (NDP, 2012).

Ghana's national security is defined in the chapter as "the aggregate of the security interests of all individuals, communities, ethnic groups and political entities that exist in Ghana". They aim at strengthening the Republic of Ghana by "advancing its interests and objectives, containment of instability, control of crime, elimination of corruption, enhancement of genuine development, progress and growth and improvement of the welfare and quality of life of every citizen" (NDP, 2012).

The symbiotic relationship between a strong Defence sector, supporting Foreign Policy and National Security objectives is also highlighted. The chapter attributes the authority of the NDP to Article 84 of the 1992 Constitution which emphasizes "the protection or extension of vital national values and physical assets including the safety of Ghanaians, the core objectives of national security". The values of "non-aggression and peaceful co-existence, shared security, the sanctity of sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as equality of nations" are extolled.

The chapter re-emphasizes the non-partisan nature of the Armed Forces as it contributes its functions of state. The GAF's complete subordination to the civil power is also contained in the chapter. The chapter concludes by stating that the purpose of the Defence policy is "providing guidelines and mechanisms to contain perceived and real threats against Ghana's national interests. Additionally, it establishes modalities for the development of effective Armed Forces including capacity building for Defence. The policy also underlines the fundamental principle governing the relationship between the civil and military segments of the society" (NDP, 2012).

Chapter two focuses on a realistic Strategic Environment of the country. This is meant to address threat issues and how the state responds to them. The chapter characterizes the Global Environment as being "multi-polar and multi-civilization". The affinity of persons and groups to ancestral lineages leading to security challenges is also discussed. Culture is identified as being both a source of unity and division in the Ghanaian context. The nature of present-day conflicts was also identified as being more intra-state than inter-state. The place of growing terrorism on states is also covered by chapter 2 of the NDP. The relevant domains discussed include, globalization and how it affects Ghana's Defence Sector, State Sovereignty and present-day challenges to it, changing concepts of security and the people-centeredness that is being adopted by many countries including Ghana, as well as the willingness of Ghana to continue to contribute to world peace through the structures of the UN, AU, and ECOWAS. The issue of arms trafficking/dumping in the sub-region and the attendant dangers are also covered. The menace of organised crime ends the discussion on the global environment.

The Regional and Domestic environments are also covered in the chapter. The debilitating effects of poverty and conflict on development of states in the sub-region are discussed. Other

issues include the interdependence of states and globalization leading to shared security challenges. The pandemics in the region, the oil related security challenges and the undying poverty related issues are all mentioned in the policy. More specifically on the domestic front, the porosity of Ghana's borders, organised crime and the abuse of technology all gained mention. The Policy confirms the need for involvement of the GAF in assisting the civil authority in times of need. The use of GAF to forestall environmental degradation and ensuring the prudent exploitation of non-renewable resources is covered. The NDP is then seen to be focused on getting the GAF and its partners ready to contain these threats.

The chapter ends with the following assessment of the identified strategic environment:

- a) Ghana's contiguous Defence and Security environment is fraught with challenges. This is exacerbated by the undemarcated and porous nature of the borders, which pose serious security problems. Until these challenges are completely and satisfactorily resolved, the possibility of external military threat cannot be underestimated.
- b) In spite of concerted efforts by the International Community to ensure peace and security, there still exist pockets of conflict at both the continental and sub-regional levels. Ghana will, therefore, continue to commit her troops to resolve these problems. This would be done in concert with ECOWAS, AU and UN.
- c) The security environment is still fragile and delicate despite the current democratic dispensation. This requires the resourcing of the Ghana Armed Forces to effectively support the civil authority to restore and maintain law and order and promote national development.
- d) The threats of global terrorism, man-made and natural disasters, environmental degradation and the security implications of the oil and gas industry require the

restructuring of the GAF including the establishment of specialist units to deal with these challenges.

- e) Notwithstanding, the current democratic dispensation, there is the need to properly maintain and equip the Armed Forces to cope with their constitutional roles of safeguarding the nation's territorial integrity, remain truly professional and provide the enabling environment without which the process of national development would be difficult to achieve (NDP, 2005).

The third chapter concerns the Challenges and Opportunities of the NDP. It talks of the dynamic security environment, the National Interests, threats, and scenarios that may lead to the commitment of troops.

5.3.1 National Interests

The national interests are traced to the shared values of the citizens and are “broadly described as territorial, political, economic, scientific and socio-cultural” (NDP, 2012). Technological development, human dignity, domestic and regional peace are others. National stability, cohesion and economic growth, the overcoming of preventable diseases, illiteracy, unemployment, hunger, poverty and civil strife, the ability to participate in global economic system and the protection of our cultural heritage are all mentioned. These require a classification of some sort. Hence Vital Interests and Important Interests have been outlined in the policy document. Whilst Vital Interests are the broad concerns that affect state survival such as territorial integrity and economic wellbeing of citizens, Important Interests do not affect national survival, but they rather affect national wellbeing and peaceful co-existence with neighbours.

5.3.2 Threats

On threats the chapter identified both Internal and External threats. Poverty and its related ills could lead to sustained threats to internal peace and security requiring the assistance of GAF to assist the Civil Police. This requires appropriate training and equipping to address. The issue of un-demarcated borders, terrorism, and organised transnational crime are some external threats. The NDP identifies the establishment of foreign military bases as a potential threat. The policy is of the view that though the country does not seem to be faced with an imminent possibility of invasion, the GAF should always be in a state of readiness to contain such threats.

On the possible employment of GAF troops to advance the cause of National Security and Defence, the chapter lists attacks on Ghanaian territory, blockades, internal security and low intensity conflicts, peace support operations, and attacks on embassies, ships and aircrafts. Other situations that will warrant the deployment of GAF include disaster relief, search and rescue, and national development. It is worth noting that the Defence of the territorial integrity of Ghana remains the foremost function of the Defence sector. The contribution to national development has also become a constitutional task requiring the employment of Defence resources, both human and material.

5.3.3 Strategic Response

The fourth chapter focuses on the Strategic Response expected from Ghana to issues of Defence. Consequently, an analysis is done in the chapter covering the physical and geographical aspects of the country and her resource base. It underlines the aspiration of the country to remain at peace with her neighbours for mutual benefit. Following that, the Mission of the Defence Sector is crafted “to provide a reliable security guarantee for the maintenance of peace and stability and sustainable socio-economic development” (NDP,2012).

5.3.4 National Defence Tasks

The associated tasks as contained in the policy are repeated below:

- a) Resist foreign aggression, contain internal destabilization and safeguard democratic governance to create a secure environment favourable for sustainable socio-economic development.
- b) Effectively defend and protect national strategic resources and the legitimate rights and interests of the State, including maritime rights and interests.
- c) Safeguard the dignities, rights, safety, and security of all Ghanaians, protect the diverse national values and cultures, and promote ethnic, religious and political justice and harmony for the attainment of peaceful co-existence, national cohesion and unity.
- d) Support the state in the quest for a fair, transparent, and acceptable resolution of disputes of colonial and historical legacy and current socio-ethno-political and religious contradictions.
- e) Support civil authority to combat crime, and thereby promote peace and security.
- f) Provide intelligence and advice to government on matters of Defence and security in order to curb and or contain breaches of security and thus safeguard the interest of Ghana's security.
- g) Support Ghana's commitments to the UN, AU and ECOWAS on the basis of equality and mutual benefits as well as the preservation of national sovereignty and dignity.

5.3.5 National Defence Objectives

The objectives of the Defence sector as identified and contained in the NDP include the following:

- a. To improve the state of combat-readiness through firepower, mobility, good communication and reliable intelligence in order to maintain GAF in a high state of human and material resource preparedness for national Defence.
- b. To improve logistics and infrastructure for rapid response to all threats, and also enhance the morale of all ranks and employees of all the security forces.
- c. To improve the human resource base and institutional capacity for national Defence.
- d. To improve civil/military relations through good, proactive public relations methods and decentralized civic action programmes.
- e. To ensure Ghana meets its commitments towards the UN, AU, Commonwealth, NAM, and ECOWAS.

5.3.6 Strategic Posture

The NDP in chapter four also discussed the Strategic Posture of the country relative to the deployment of troops, as well as the threat of and use of force. Cardinal strategic concepts that guide the use of the GAF to deter or contain both external and internal aggression include “prevention, protection, deterrence, rapid mobilization, force projection and cooperation with allies backed by forceful diplomacy” (NDP, 2012). These provide the visibility that the country requires at the international stage for her own interests.

Chapter Five covers the National Defence Establishment. It covers the Higher Management of the sector, organization of the Ministry, intelligence services, the tasks, mission, and the Armed Services.

5.3.7 Higher Management of Defence

The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana being the authority for the existence of the Ghana Armed Forces is discussed. The added role of national development to the traditional role of the GAF is mentioned here. Parliament's control of the GAF and Defence is also contained in the policy.

5.3.8 Organisation of Ministry of Defence

The Minister for Defence is identified by the chapter as the “political head of the MoD” adding that he/she formulates the Defence Policy and the CDS provides policy direction for the Armed Forces. The civil component of the MoD headed by the Chief Director, the Military Component of Ministry of Defence made up of the Armed Forces comprising the GHQ and the three Services are all contained in the chapter. The mode of appointments of the service Chiefs is also mentioned as well as the chain of command within the Ghana Armed Forces.

5.3.9 Defence Mission

Under Defence Mission, the NDP outlines clearly the main role of the Ghana Armed Forces which is to “protect by land, sea and air, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ghana against internal and external aggression thereby contributing to the transformation of the economy to achieve growth and accelerating poverty reduction” (NDP, 2012) especially among the vulnerable and excluded. The ultimate goal of the Defence Policy is given as the generation, employment and sustenance of combat-ready, integrated, and rapidly deployable Armed Forces, capable of quick assembling to meet varying contingencies both at home and abroad (NDP, 2012).

5.3.10 Specific Tasks

To satisfy this Mission Statement, the following tasks are outlined in the NDP and reproduced below:

- a) Providing intelligence and advice to government on matters on Defence which are of interest to Ghana's security.
- b) Protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ghana through surveillance and control of Ghana's land and maritime territory as well as airspace.
- c) Protecting Ghana's onshore and offshore strategic assets and resources.
- d) Coordinating national SAR programmes.
- e) Providing MACA.
- f) Embarking on non-combatant evacuation of Ghanaians in crisis-ridden countries in collaboration with MOFA (NDP, 2012).

5.3.11 Joint Taskforce

The chapter also provides the idea of a vessel for operationalizing and achieving the set tasks above. It acknowledges that modern warfare as well as military engagements revolve around joint combined arms effort including coalitions with friendly nations and allies. As such command structures and composition of forces will necessarily reflect diversity to contain identified threats. Interoperability then becomes a challenge to handle. The NDP places the control of Joint Taskforces in the hands of the CDS through the GHQ.

A mobile and flexible Rapid Deployment Force of Battle Group strength is expected to be maintained by the GAF to handle both internal and external crisis at short notice. The aim being to 'bolster Ghana's foreign and security policy objectives' (NDP, 2012).

5.3.12 Tri-Service Institutions

The NDP touches on the institutions of learning in the Armed Forces' set-up. These include GAFSC, MATS, GMA, and KAIPTC. It is intended that new ones as appropriate shall be established and added to them to promote professional career development and efficiency in the Ghana Armed Forces. The NDP talks of adequate funding and equipping to meet the best standards. Peace Support training will also constitute modules in all of them.

5.3.13 Strategic Intelligence

Mention is made of the need for Strategic Intelligence in the NDP. Intelligence that is needed for the sustenance of peace and security. Defence Intelligence shall be exploited through “collation, integration and coordination” in order to meet Defence requirements. The Department of Defence Intelligence shall be adequately resourced to effectively and efficiently perform its core function as well as its supervisory role over Service Intelligence Directorates. The Department, headed by Director General Defence Intelligence (DG DI), shall report directly to the CDS (NDP, 2012).

5.3.14 The Ghana Army

The NDP identifies the primary mission of the Ghana Army as the “Defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ghana in conjunction with the Ghana Navy and the Ghana Air Force” (NDP,2012). It is thus expected to have structures and equipment making it highly mobile and capable of bringing under control both internal and external threats, as well as contributing to both regional and international security operations. A “deterrent defensive posture” is advocated by the NDP with an “aggressive capability to defeat any threat to national security” (NDP, 2012). The maintenance of well-trained combat intelligence systems, balanced forces, flexible and well-motivated workforce are among the requirements of the NDP to contain all

unforeseen threats. The role of specialist units in national development and adequate logistics were not left out.

5.3.15 The Ghana Navy

The NDP envisages an expanded Navy to include specialized units in response to technological advances and the country's increasing maritime responsibilities and interests, especially following the discovery and extraction of oil and gas in commercial quantities. The Navy shall operate independently or jointly with the Ghana Army and Air Force to "guard against aggression from the sea, defend the States sovereignty over its territorial waters, and safeguard the State's maritime resources, rights and interests". Its posture shall be determined by maritime doctrines premised on "national security and Defence policies to achieve national policy objectives including socio-economic development" (NDP,2012). The quest for strategic sea lift capability shall continue in the Ghana Navy to support evacuation operations.

Protection of fishery resources and the enforcement of laws and regulations relating to maritime and riverine activities are also outlined in the NDP. Also included are anti-smuggling and illegal narcotic trade, protection of sea lines of communications, and handling of all disasters such as oil spillage, collision, explosion and plane crashes at sea (NDP,2012). The performance of traditional diplomatic tasks, ceremonial duties and goodwill visits will be sustained.

5.3.16 The Ghana Air Force

The Defence Policy identifies the critical role of airpower in modern warfare, hence the need to ensure "complete synergy between the Ghana Army, Navy and Air Force" (NDP,2012). The NDP charges the Ghana Air Force with the organization and co-ordination of "national air defence to protect Ghana's territorial airspace, deter or contain external aggression by air and

secure key facilities”. It’s structure, equipment and training should effectively support the Ghana Army and Navy to attain national defence and security objectives. As such, the Ghana Air Force shall be adequately resourced to achieve air superiority in times of hostilities, maintain surveillance over the entire country especially over the EEZ, conduct aerial surveys and mount SAR operations in conjunction with ground and naval forces (NDP, 2012). The capacity and resources to provide strategic air lift, medical evacuation, and air transport support for national development shall be maintained. A deliberate policy of modernization of the Air Force shall also be ensured by the NDP.

5.3.17 Other Institutions for National Defence

The NDP directs the Ghana Armed Forces to continue to collaborate with “the GPS, CEPS, GNFS, GIS, NADMO, and NACOB including gathering and sharing of intelligence to achieve national security objectives”. The NDP further directs the Ghana Armed Forces to continue to offer appropriate military training to these institutions to enhance collaboration and interoperability (NDP,2012).

5.3.18 National Reserve Forces

The NDP expects the State to establish a “National Reserve Force composed of retired security services personnel on active reserve lists and volunteers between the ages of 18 and 30 years”. GAF is expected to handle their periodic training through GHQ Training.

5.3.19 Voluntary Military Training and School Cadet Corps

The NDP recognizes the existence of School Cadet Corps. As such state support in terms of infrastructure and logistics to support their training in the tertiary, junior/senior high schools is reflected in the NDP. MoD has responsibility for it as well as budgetary issues.

5.3.20 Civil Defence

The NDP reiterates the Constitutional requirement that the safety and security of the state is the responsibility of every citizen. The State thus “reserves the right to employ every able-bodied Ghanaian in her defence to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity at all times” (NDP, 2012). The NDP expects the establishment of an effective civil defence structure with appropriate logistics to provide suitable training and orientation to the citizenry for potential civil Defence duties (NDP, 2012).

5.3.21 Crisis Management

The 1992 Constitution provides that the NSC shall consider and take appropriate measures to safeguard the internal and external security of Ghana. The NSC is the highest crisis management body in Ghana. The NDP authorizes the use of the GAF and other Security Services in the discharge of its constitutional mandate. The NSC sets the criteria and parameters for the management of crisis with the CDS directing the planning and execution of military tasks. For disasters the NADMO shall be a lead agency for the management of man-made or natural disasters. The military and other statutorily mandated bodies or agencies shall support it to manage and contain the crisis. For Internal Security issues, the NSC shall continue to give directions for rapid return to normalcy. In war situations, the MoD shall be the lead agency in crisis management in collaboration with other Ministries. Other security agencies and organizations shall be co-opted as the C-in-C may deem necessary (NDP, 2012).

The sixth chapter of the Ghana National Defence Policy dilates on Defence Capability requirements. It covers resource capacity of the stakeholders, human resources, national Defence infrastructure and Defence logistics. Defence Logistics and industrial base,

recreational facilities, medical services, housing, inter-ministerial support, and budgeting are the other issues covered.

The NDP identifies Defence as the “primary guarantor of security which engenders socio-economic development of a nation”. In this light it advocates for adequate resources for the GAF to meet its constitutional mandate which now includes a contribution to national development as the President will direct. An upward review of budgetary allocations to meet globally accepted targets of 1.5 – 3% of GDP is recommended in the NDP.

The seventh chapter of the Ghana National Defence Policy covers Civil-Military Relations and underpin the principle of “civil supremacy over the Armed Forces”. It says the cordial civil-military relations are based on civil control over the military or the principle of “subordination of the military to civil authority”. The State recognizes the special place of the military as the only institution in the society, which is constitutionally and directly charged with “the Defence of the state from external aggression and the maintenance of her territorial integrity and that this fundamental duty, places enormous powers and responsibility on the military” (NDP, 2012). There is no competition but just an understanding of the complementary roles being played by parties.

Some policies and programmes promote civil-military relations. These include:

- i. The secondment of serving military personnel to civil institutions such as REGSECs, DISECs, and the Ports, based on their expertise.
- ii. Effective Media Relations,
- iii. Outreach programmes in various domains including
 - a. Military medical services.

- b. Vaccination in rural areas.
- c. Engineering resources and assistance to communities during disasters.
- d. Rural bridge construction in hard to reach areas.
- e. Air ambulance services to accident victims.
- iv. Periodic joint training with civil institutions.
- v. Military assistance to Civil Authority (MACA).
- vi. The Provision of needed humanitarian assistance during disasters,
- vii. The unconditional adherence to democratic principles by the Defence institutions.

These programmes have brought civilians and the military closer and need to be sustained as suggested by the NDP.

The final chapter of the 2012 Ghana National Defence Policy highlights the essence of a secure environment for the state, institutions and individuals to realise their full potentials and aspirations. The Defence Policy therefore provides the guidelines for building a credible and efficient national Defence for the present and the foreseeable future.

The potential sources of instability and insecurity have been reviewed, the NDP has been fashioned to ensure the capacity of the State to “deter or defeat aggression, safeguard its natural resources, promote democratic governance and sustain internal peace and security whilst contributing to national development” (NDP, 2012). A defensive posture of the GAF is to be maintained through structural reviews, equipment upgrades, training schedules with a capacity to support international PSOs and the fight against terrorism.

The complete subordination of the military to civil control and authority and the ideals of democratic governance remain the ideals of the NDP. Periodic reviews of the NDP is advocated

to ensure dynamism and that meets the dictates of the times. Adhering to the NDP and subsequent reviews should promote credible Defence postures to ensure peace, stability, and prosperity in Ghana (NDP, 2012).

Over the years starting from the colonial times there have been various motivations and reasons for changes to policy and directives guiding the employment of the military. Table 5.1 below presents a pictorial development of the Defence Policy of Ghana. The table gives the pivotal years of policy changes, a description of the nature of the policy, the targeted outcomes or end-state, and the source of motivation.

Table 5. 1: Tabular Presentation of Defence Policy Changes in Ghana.

POLICY YEAR	POLICY DESCRIPTION	GOAL	ORIGIN / REASONS FOR POLICY
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1835	Security and Defence of colonised territories.	Law and order for governance, ward off rival colonisers, overcome and dominate local resistance groups.	British colonisers. Trade was the motivation.
1879	African soldiers suitable for duty only in Africa.	To be used for operations on the African continent alone.	British War effort. African troops considered less amenable to superior training and handling sophisticated weaponry at the time.
1914	Defence of British interests	Use of African troops worldwide.	Augment number of British forces in security and war efforts.
1945	Africans considered suitable for British war efforts outside Africa.	Used in combat in Far East.	Austere measures and longer association with African troops.

1957	“Africanisation” of the GAF and Expansionist Policies	Promote decolonization and concept of African High Command.	Pan – Africanist influences. A conservative approach to defence policy making.
1966	Homeland Security	Regime Security	Shift from African agenda
1969	Internal Security	Safe and Secure Society Internal security made a core function of GAF.	Austerity measures – opting for a less ambitious Defence posture.
1972	Security of regime	Stability of Political Environment	Unstable political environment. Coup d’etats and possible insurgency.
1979	Aggressive	Regime Security	Insecurity and Instability
1980	Regime security	Political Stability/ Professionalism of GAF.	Unstable political environment/indisciplined military elements
1981	Aggressive	Regime security and state survival/re-orientation towards active/visible developmental projects.	Host of dissidents in neighboring countries. Hostility both from within and without.
1993	Consolidation of stability	Regime security / Professionalism of GAF	Progressive consolidation of democratic/civilian control of the Armed Forces.
2012	Multi-Sectorial Policy	Provide impetus to national development	Dictates of the 1992 Constitution. Civil control of Defence Sector.

Source: Researcher, 2018.

Conclusion

The Ghana National Defence Policy of July 2012 is a product of several years of work which has been impacted seriously by the history of the country starting from the colonial times when organised military units along western lines were recorded. The document needs to remain a living document to retain its relevance and appeal to the institutions and society at large. This

chapter was a synthesis chapter that summarized the content of the National Defence Policy.

The next chapter will focus on an evaluation of the policy and a brief prelude into the history of the Armed Forces that influenced the thought process.

CHAPTER SIX

AN EVALUATION OF THE GHANA NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

6.1 Background

The Defence Policy of the Ghana guides the Armed Forces and its partners in the Defence Sector in the execution of various tasks the Executive branch of the government of the day prescribes. To better appreciate the content of the most recent National Defence Policy (NDP), it is imperative to briefly trace the history of the Ghana Armed Forces and how it has related to the life of the ordinary Ghanaian and public institutions over the decades. This history has immensely contributed to the Defence policies that have been implemented over the decades. Above all, the history of the Armed Forces continuous to influence present-day Defence policies so as to avoid the pitfalls of the past. It is also important to review the NDP, summarised in the preceding chapter, and to suggest areas that need more attention to make it and its institutions more relevant to the Ghanaian society.

Ghana, like all other nations, has the essential state institutions and organizations that make for state governance and relations with the external environment. These include the Legislature, the Judiciary, institutions of research and learning as well as policing institutions. The country also has armed institutions such as the Ghana Armed Forces and some quasi-military institutions including the Ghana Immigration Service, the Prison Service, the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority, and Ghana National Fire Service. These institutions and their derivatives play various Defence and security complementary roles that are critical to the well-being of the ordinary Ghanaian as well as the continuous existence of the country as a sovereign state. Each of them was created at a certain time in the history of the nation, has evolved over the period, and may still be undergoing some amount of transformation in the quest to better

serve the populace. For the Defence domain to experience less confusion and be efficiently managed, various legal instruments/frameworks as well as policies have been created by the state authorities. Key amongst these legally binding documents is the Constitution of Ghana which is the fundamental law that gives birth to all the Defence/Security sector institutions among others.

The 1992 Constitution, like all other constitutions before it, makes for the existence of the Ghana Armed Forces. In Article 210 (Constitution, 1992) it also gives Parliament the sole prerogative of creating any armed force that the people's representatives may deem needed for national survival. It further outlines the roles of GAF to include but not limited to the traditional protection of the territorial integrity of Ghana and the Defence of the country against internal and external aggressors. The GAF has also a constitutional role in contributing to the development of the country as the President may direct.

It is very important to note that Article 210 (3) of the 1992 Constitution is a departure from the earlier constitutions. The earlier constitutions just dilated on the traditional roles of the Armed Forces. For instance, Article 54 (1) of the 1960 Constitution required the Ghana Armed Forces to defend the country, contribute to public order and offer relief services in times of emergencies. The 1969 Constitution presents a rather interesting picture of the Armed Forces. The Constitution virtually assumed that all stakeholders knew the role and functions of the Armed Forces as it did not outline these roles. Article 152 (1) comes close to stating the use of the Armed Forces when it says that the Armed Forces Council will advise " Cabinet on all major matters of policy relating to Defence and strategy including the role of the Ghana Armed Forces, military budgeting, finance and administration" (Constitution, 1969).

6.1.1 The International Security Environment

An external threat to the existence of Ghana was virtually non-existent according to the Marines in the mid-1990s (US Marines, 2019). However, there were periods of anxiety and tension as well as few escapades with the Togolese and Liberian authorities basically because of the issues of regime security. Whilst Ghana and Togo traded counter accusations about dissidents operating from each other's territory and even with the connivance of each other, the Liberian dispute centred on the unacceptable ill treatment of Ghanaians by the Doe administration (US Marines, 2019).

It was the case that the parties resorted to diplomacy to resolve all issues of tension. In Jan 1976, there was a request by Togo for a review of the common border demarcation which Ghana rejected citing the 1956 UN sponsored plebiscite. In September 1982 Ghana was forced to close her border with Togo following the use of Togolese territory to torment the JJ Rawlings administration. Again, in September 1986 there was tension between the two countries leading to border closure and protests by the Foreign Secretary of the PNDC government of Ghana when armed dissidents were arrested for attempting to overthrow the PNDC government having crossed into Ghana from Togo. The Eyadema government in turn also claimed Togolese dissidents hand attempted assassinating the Togolese strong-man after crossing into Togo from Ghana. She followed up with the deportation of 233 Ghanaians from Togo. This was followed in January 1989 with another deportation of 120 Ghanaians (US Marines,2019).

Despite all these, Ghana welcomed 55000 Togolese refugees following clashes between the Togolese Armed Forces and opposition/dissident elements in January 1993. Border closures aside, the armed forces of both countries were put on high alert temporarily. The Foreign Secretary of Ghana warned the Togolese authorities to choose democratic reforms in order to

avoid such disturbances (US Marines, 2019), virtually confirming the accusation by Togolese authorities that Ghana was aiding the dissidents. Relations with the Ivory Coast have not been entirely smooth. Apart from age-old rivalries, a football match between ASEC Mimosas of Cote d'Ivoire and Asante Kotoko led to the killing of hundreds of Ghanaians and the destruction of their businesses in Cote d'Ivoire in 1993. The Ivorian envoy in Ghana had to be withdrawn as he was seen armed with a pistol in public in the Ghanaian capital at a state function. These notwithstanding, Ghana decided to resort to dialogue and mediation even in the face of provocation. In 2014 the two countries opted for International Arbitration to solve their maritime boundary dispute which Ghana eventually won. The offshore oil prospects have the potential of helping solve energy concerns of the country.

With Liberia relations got strained following the deportation of some 350 Ghanaians from Liberia. This was after the return to Liberia of about 400 Liberians from Ghana. Whilst the Ghanaian authorities claimed they were not deported the Doe administration thought otherwise and retaliated. Despite the cold relations, Ghana continued to deploy troops to maintain the peace in Liberia with ECOMOG all throughout the country's period of crises.

Since Ghana is affected by the effects of globalization, security shocks on the global stage also affect her. After the terrorists' attacks on the Twin-Towers in America, Ghana was also ushered into a period that required a critical and revised security architecture not just for the defence of the state but for the security of the citizen. Ghana, a lead Pan-Africanist state, made its voice heard and contributed significantly in the drafting, adopting and implementation of anti-terrorist policies on the national, sub-regional, and continental levels.

6.1.2 Internal Security Concerns

The internal security situation of the country is of immediate and major concern to defence policy makers. Ghana has its fair share of internal strife that needs security and defence policies to handle. These are political, social, religious and economic in nature. Ethnic divisions dating back to the pre-independence era have and continue to pose a threat to the cohesion and security landscape of Ghana. There has been a constant trend of tensions and conflicts cutting across the country due to ethnic, identity, land, chieftaincy, religious, and political interests. These have in the main worked against the growth of nationalism. The issue of societal cohesion apart, Ghana contends with a myriad of economically related threats including poverty and societal inequalities.

The upsurge in the use of technology brought in a proliferation of criminal acts hitherto unknown to the Ghanaian society. The engagement of some youth in cybercrime, the competition by criminals with security agencies for the gathering of intelligence and its use, and the sophistication of the movement of banned drugs all rely on technology – a product of globalization.

Internally, Ghana is also a victim of sub-regional protocols of integration. The perennial presence of nomadic herdsmen, the cross-border movement of criminals, the effects of transnational organized crime, and the creeping presence of terrorism related tendencies all impact on the internal security of the country.

The physical environment has not been spared either. Rapid deforestation, land disputes, pollution of water bodies and illegal mining activities all tend to negatively affect the defence and security situation of the country. These are mainly due to the lack of opportunity, poverty,

poor governance systems, and unemployment. Emerging threats such as kidnapping, and contract killings can safely be attributed to the exposure of the Ghanaian society to uncensored films and the ease with which foreigners get settled in Ghana. To contain all these and still meet the hospitable Pan-Africanist's ideals, the country needs to have a robust and tailored made Defence as well as Security Policy reflecting the attributes of both the national and foreign policies. These policies are largely affected by the history of the country, the defence and security sectors and their institutions, as well as the threat landscape.

6.2 The Roots of the Ghana Armed Forces

A good number of writers on the Ghana Armed Forces such as Lt Col Festus Aboagye trace the history of the Ghana Armed Forces to the pre-colonial times. However, this study makes the distinction that the history of the presence of armed forces in Ghana is not analogous to the history of the current Ghana Armed Forces as an institution. Before the arrival of Europeans, the territory had various chiefdoms with their traditional institutions that included armed groups. These were used by the traditional authorities for the exploratory purposes including conquests, acquisition of territories, protection of their subjects and property, trading purposes, and for the exertion of influence among others. The same established groups were used to resist colonization and wars were fought including the Asante wars of 1873-74 and 1900.

With the arrival of the earlier European trading companies, armed services were also used to protect trading concerns and ward off rivals. The subsequent arrival of Europeans with a colonization agenda led to more radical organization of formal armed groups. These included the Glover Hausas of Nigeria who served as a nucleus for the formation of the Gold Coast Constabulary in 1879. This force took part in the Yaa Asantewaa war of 1900 and got integrated into the West African Frontier Force as the Gold Coast Regiment (Chitor, 2017).

The WAFF was later designated Royal West African Frontier Force in 1928. The mandate was for it to provide military services for British interests in Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and Gambia. This resulted in its participation in both the First and Second World Wars. Troops from Ghana participated in campaigns in Togo, Cameroon, and East Africa during World War 1. It is also estimated that about 65 000 soldiers of Ghanaian origin took part in World War 2 as part of RWAFF in Gambia, East Africa, and Burma (Marines, Country Study, 2019).

At independence, the Ghana Armed Forces was a simple and modest one organized along infantry lines. However, it was transformed to reflect the national pride Kwame Nkrumah sought to project of the black race to the rest of the world and also meet his concept of a High African Command. A separate Navy and Airforce were thus established. It is reported that the military capacity exceeded the nation's requirements and placed economic burdens on the state (US Marines, 2019). Due to objection by British officers to the use of the Ghana Armed Forces for political reasons, Nkrumah released all British officers from the military in September 1961 and started the "Ghananisation" programme which saw an accelerated promotion among the ranks of the Armed Forces.

The First Republic under Nkrumah saw the creation of a large Armed Forces that was well equipped. Some of the significant things were the establishment of a presidential guard department that was staffed by both soldiers and civilians. This was complemented with a myriad of intelligence institutions. The establishment of these institutions with a different leadership and subsequent machinations created discontentment in the traditional military institutions leading to divisions. During the period, military efforts were shared with other independence seeking African countries. Ghana sent its first peacekeepers to the Congo under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation in 1960.

6.3 The Ghana Armed Forces and Governance

The Ghana Armed Forces has always had a mandate that excludes the active involvement in politics and the direct administration of the state. However, the country has recorded several successful military take-overs and a lot of botched coup d'états. These have been the outcome of adventurism and the pre-meditated search for political power by some elements within the ranks of the Armed Forces and not an assigned role.

6.3.1 The National Liberation Council

This National Liberation Council (NLC) was created after the successful overthrow of the one-party CPP government of Kwame Nkrumah on 24th February 1966. Nkrumah was accused of political repression, corruption and abuse of power. The NLC, first led by Colonel E.K. Kotoka, was in power until October 1969 when it handed over power to a civilian administration following the successful conduct of elections. The Progress Party led by Dr KA Busia won the elections and thus took over the running of the state.

6.3.2 The National Redemption Council

The government of Dr Busia was overthrown on 13th January 1972 by the National Redemption Council (NRC) headed by Lt Col IK Acheampong. This was transformed into the Supreme Military Council (SMC) in 1975. The coup leaders accused the Busia administration of corruption and mal-administration but also had serious problems with austerity measures which affected military expenditure. It is worth noting that the SMC had issues with the involvement of the Ghana Armed Forces in roles that were not traditionally outlined for it. These included bringing relief to flood victims and participation in reconstruction works, anti-cholera activities, as well as the conduct of anti-smuggling patrols along the country's borders (Marines, Country Study, 2019). This could explain why the framers of the 1992 Constitution

explicitly documented the participation in developmental programmes as a role of the GAF. The most significant activity of the NRC was the attempt to change the constitution and pass a Union Government concept that was to see the replacement of party politics with a system of governance that incorporates the military, the police and civilians in forming Ghanaian governments. It was the belief of Acheampong that the combination will lead to a more united nation, de-tribalise the nation, and advance economic development.

6.3.3 The Supreme Military Council II

A palace coup was organized on 5th July 1975 and Acheampong was replaced by Gen FWK Akuffo as Head of State. This followed increasing loss of confidence in the leadership of the state, provided by the SMC, by the populace. However, the changed did very little to reverse things. The SMC II is on record to have faced eighty strike actions by workers in four months. The SMC II however succumbed to public pressure and declared a return to party politics with the lifting of the ban on party politics on 1st January 1979.

6.3.4 The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew the SMC II on June 4th, 1979. This followed a failed coup on 15 May 1979 led by Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings. His trial, by Court Martial, that was opened to the general public however served as a launch pad for him to gain public sympathy and overwhelming support as he spoke about the loss of confidence in the SMC II leadership and its inability to meet the aspirations of the ordinary citizens. The AFRC for the period of its stay in power carried out what was termed “House Cleaning” meant to re-set national values such as the probity and accountability of leaders among others. The exercise resulted in executions and extra-judicial killings. Alleged corrupt persons faced the wrath of the revolution. People were made to refund evaded taxes and many others ended up

in prison after trial by mostly unqualified persons in Public Tribunals (Marines, Country Study, 2019). The AFRC allowed planned elections to take place on June 18th 1979 but handed over to the People's National Party (PNP) government of Hilla Limann on 24 September 1979.

6.3.5 The Provisional National Defence Council

The most recent successful coup in Ghana's history so far took place on 31 December 1981. It was led by Flt Lt JJ Rawlings again and supported by lower ranks of the Armed Forces as in his earlier coups. His reason was that the PNP government had failed to stem corruption and deteriorating economic conditions. The Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) was however made up mainly of civilians who were charged to serve sacrificially. The regime suffered several *coup d'état* attempts and dissident activities from outside the country. The PNDC created a vigilante group - the People's Militia - which numbered around 5000 at a point. Their mandate was to be a home guard force with additional responsibility of averting and controlling civil disturbances and possible insurrections. A National Civil Defence Force or the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution was also established and open to all citizens who were willing and able to perform military service. Their responsibility was to defend the revolution, and to lessen the pressure on the regular Armed Forces in times of crisis by guarding key and vulnerable points/installations. (Marines, Country Study, 2019). It succumbed to pressure and ensured the writing of a new Constitution that ushered in the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution and an era of multi-party politics on 7 January 1993.

From the forgoing, it is clear that the Ghana Armed Forces, apart from its traditional role, has had some of its membership getting involved in state governance by usurping power contrary to the laws of the country and its own regulations as well as global best practice. This adventure into politics had varied effects on the image of the Ghana Armed Forces both locally and

internationally. The impact on the history, development and psyche of the country, present an interesting mix of positives and setbacks.

6.4 The Ghana Armed Forces and Peacekeeping

The exploits of the Ghana Armed Forces in peacekeeping have been acclaimed world-wide. In pursuit of age-old Foreign Policy objectives, Ghana has been working for world peace and uses its tools including the military in this regard. Ghana has and continues to deploy peacekeepers under the auspices of ECOWAS, the AU and the UN. The troops have operated under various mandates providing services under pure traditional peacekeeping, second generation peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, and peace enforcement roles. These have been in West Africa, East Africa, the Middle East and the Far East. The GAF has also provided military observers and staff officers to UN missions in Africa, Europe, the Americas, and Asia.

The first deployment of troops outside the Gold Coast on missions was in support of the war efforts of the British during World War 1. However, since becoming independent, the first troop deployment was to the Congo in support of the beleaguered Lumumba government in 1960. Ever since then, Ghana has never been absent from peacekeeping theatres worldwide. Among countries where Ghana has sent contingents include Sinai – Egypt, Lebanon, Cambodia, Sudan, Rwanda, Congo (DRC), The Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and La Cote d'Ivoire. Military observers have also served in other countries the world over.

6.4.1 The ECOMOG Operations

The ECOWAS member-states decided to deepen collective security measures in order to propel the ideals of trade and integration that are the objectives of the trade bloc. Realizing the nexus between peace, development and integration, the leaders of the body which was created in 1975

opted to create an armed wing – the ECOWAS Monitoring Group – to intervene and halt humanitarian catastrophes in Liberia in the 1990s and later in Sierra Leone. The same force was deployed in La Cote d'Ivoire during her crisis before the takeover by the UN.

The open-ended participation of the Ghana Armed Forces in sub-regional operations leading to casualties affected morale of troops as many saw the operations as not being very relevant to Ghana. This was first recorded in the ECOMOG operations in Liberia (Marines, Country Study, 2019). It was a classic example of a disconnect between policy makers and field actors.

6.4.2 Lessons from Peacekeeping Operations

The GAF has received numerous honours from the peace missions. A lot more lessons have been learnt by returning troops who use the experience garnered to the benefit of not just the GAF but the country as a whole. Contingents on missions have served as worthy ambassadors of the country, they have advertised widely the products of Ghanaian industries, and have also contributed to encouraging the arrival of tourists in Ghana.

Participation in peace support operation have contributed immensely to the public appeal of the Ghana Armed Forces both at home and abroad. Thus the image of the Ghana Armed Forces over the period has been strongly associated with brilliance in peacekeeping and this brings honour to both the institution and country as a whole.

The psyche of Ghanaian soldiers returning from external operations has been observed to have consistently undergone some transformation. Whilst a few troops show mild to severe signs of post-trauma-stress syndromes, a majority display a high level of exposure and awareness to international awareness. Participation in humanitarian operations outside Ghana have equally

conscientised Ghanaian soldiers to see the need to protect the peace back in their own country and seek to avoid the pitfalls of other nations. Consequently, the intrinsic values of *esprit de corps*, cohesion, patriotism, and nationalism get ingrained in them systematically.

Training and self-improvement are second nature to the Ghanaian military. The operation theatres have served as professional learning grounds for troops. They get exposed to best practices, cutting-edge technology equipment, and present-day technical procedures whilst serving with other nationals. Pre-deployment training is complemented with in-theatre training by both national and Mission training experts. These often end in the conduct of realistic exercises to test participating contingents. The benefits of these arrangements are enduring to both the skills of the soldiers and the period of their deployment.

Contingents also get more enlightened on the need to protect citizens and contribute to national development after learning from others. This is because for most peacekeeping missions, the principal task has often been the protection of civilians. In the main, participation in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions, have been of great benefit to the Defence sector of Ghana. This is because other stakeholders such as the Prison Service, the Health Service, and the Ghana Police Service take part in peace operations and each participant returns an improved actor than before.

Conclusion

The Ghana Armed Forces has a rich, diverse and interesting history. Its participation in direct governance of the state after *coup d'états* have met with varied appeals from the general populace depending on the dictates of the times. The apparent lack of respect for policies, mandated roles, and regulations did more harm to the image of the GAF. However, since 1992,

when the Fourth Republican Constitution was adopted and came into force in 1993, the Ghana Armed Forces has made strides in keeping to its mandated roles and contributing its quota to national development as required by the Constitution.

The Defence Policy is a product of work that was largely informed by the history of Ghana and the Ghana Armed Forces hence the forgoing narrative on the GAF. In this regard, the 2012 National Defence Policy, which is the most recent documented policy directive and constitutes the subject matter of this chapter of the research, needs to be subjected to critical review.

6.5 Defence Policy Making

Ghana has had various policies relating to her Defence sector dating back to the colonial era. The period immediately after independence saw a change in policy in Defence decision making under President Kwame Nkrumah. Nkrumah's Pan-Africanist persuasions heavily affected the doctrine, posture, planning, training, equipment, budgeting and philosophy of the Armed Forces. From a deliberate "Ghananisation" policy through which he sought to replace British officers with Ghanaian officers, to the deployment of troops in the Congo in July 1960, Ghana was implementing a Defence policy that had long-term decolonization and pan-Africanist objectives. The more ambitious ideas of the "African High Command" did also affect the Defence investments at the time. The Busia's regime (the Second Republic) however adopted austere measures and this affected Defence spending significantly. The military regimes since 1966 mostly prosecuted Defence policies that were biased towards regime security virtually to the neglect of the citizen.

The period of the Cold War saw Ghana featuring on the world stage as a non-aligned state and an active member of the Non-Aligned Movement. This also affected her Defence options.

Whilst being wary of the two power blocs and keeping them virtually at bay, Ghana concentrated on her own regime security. Thus, Defence policy issues were mainly determined by regime security during that era. The period following the fall of the Berlin Wall had a great effect on the security of the African continent. This brought back Ghana's age-old position and interest in Pan-Africanist ideals. Consequently, Ghana, acting in concert with other like-minded countries, such as Nigeria and Guinea, pursued defence policy objectives that saw the deployment of troops and equipment worth millions of United States dollars in conflict-stricken countries such as Liberia, La Cote d'Ivoire, and Sierra Leone.

A decade after the Cold War, Ghana's Defence strategy in favour of Pan-Africanist ideals had not changed. However, its Fourth Republican Constitution – The 1992 Constitution – gave a firm direction for the employment of the Defence forces of the Ghanaian state. This new/reviewed direction called for an equally new Defence Policy with a different strategic direction. Whilst not abandoning core traditional roles of territorial defence with affinity for Africanist, regime-security, and world peace agendas, the 1992 Constitution-induced Defence Policy assigned a developmental role to the Ghana Armed Forces.

The Kufour administration (2001- 2008) established the “Positive Good Neighbour Policy” which sought to actively extend a hand of friendship, cooperation, and dialogue to all neighbours irrespective of ideology or persuasion. The promotion of prosperity and respect of rule of law are the goals (Nduom, 2002). This resulted in improved relations with immediate neighbours and enhanced chances towards sub-regional integration.

The rest of this chapter seeks to discuss the most recent Defence policy of Ghana – the Ghana National Defence Policy of July 2012. Explore what went into its formulation, examine its

implementation so far and evaluate how it has met its own set objectives. It will also identify any shortcomings and possible avenues for a more robust policy.

6.5.1 Sources of Ghana's Defence Policy

Ghana's Defence Policy has been greatly influenced by her history. This ranges from the introduction of institutional armed groups to the development of a traditional Armed Forces. The engagements of the Armed Forces itself in both local and external activities have in no small way affected Defence policy making. The association with political power and the overthrowing of elected governments by some self-seeking members have equally impacted Defence decisions. There are several source documents and policies that affect Defence Policy making in Ghana. These include the 1992 Constitution, the Foreign Policy of Ghana, the National Security Policy, The Armed Forces Regulations Volumes 1 – 4, the practice of Military Law in Ghana, and Treaties as well as the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) of the AU. In using any or all of these, the guiding principles have been the National Interest of Ghana, her National Security, and the aspirations of the Ghanaian citizen.

6.6 The Strategic Environment

In determining the strategic Defence environment of Ghana, the 2012 NDP used the end of the Cold War as the baseline period and identified a global, regional, and domestic environment for consideration. As part of the global environment, global politics, and culture, the nature of current conflicts, international terrorism, globalization, state sovereignty, and the changed concept of security were considered. Equally affecting the global context of the NDP is the UN Security Council and decisions therefrom. The threat of dumping of arms and ammunition in conflict areas of the West African sub-region, as well as other Post-Cold War security challenges are also prevalent. The challenge to state sovereignty as contained in the NDP is

that states continue to lose grounds in the domain of sovereignty due to their inability to control the media space, and other trans-border crimes. It thus warns that military operations need to be in conformity with best practices all the time since they are effectively monitored and reviewed by global partners through the use of technology. It is worth noting that on the change in the concept of security, the NDP acknowledges the ever-changing concept of and the threats to National Security. The NDP emphasis the need for military planning to give prominence to the security of individuals and non-military aspects of operations. It further advocates a holistic, people centred, comprehensive and collective approach to Defence matters. The National Defence Policy in setting the strategic framework therefore mirrors the global threat considerations of Ghana's Foreign Policy. This similarity confirms the close relationship between the Foreign Policy, National Security Policy and the Defence Policy of Ghana. As part of the responsibilities of belonging to the global environment, Ghana is obliged to contribute to world peace by providing various services from peacekeeping, through peace enforcement, mediation and negotiation efforts.

At the regional level, the strategic environment with a background of a Region with poor indices of development, unemployment, poverty, and disease was highlighted by the NDP. Illiteracy and social inequalities, and their attendant challenges inform the content of the NDP. The forays of the military into partisan politics, the fragility of nascent democracies on the African continent, the breeding of home-grown terrorists, and the ever-present foreign interest in the natural resources of the continent were not overlooked by the NDP. The burdens of avoidable deaths due to preventable or curable diseases, humanitarian crisis due to conflicts and movement of refugees/IDPs, and the scourges of food shortages. Additionally, the Gulf of Guinea's potential as an alternate source of petroleum and gas, religious extremism and environmental degradation were all considered in formulating the Defence Policy. The Policy

therefore charges Ghana to promote Defence by working closely with other African countries in the spirit of collective security in finding lasting solutions to the Regional Defence challenges. In the operationalization of the regional aspects of the Defence Policy, it can be safely argued that the country's membership of the African Union and ECOWAS means that by extension her Defence resources could be put at the disposal of the African and ECOWAS Stand by Forces. This could explain Ghana's active roles in the West African sub-region such as leading the fight against an Ebola pandemic in the Mano-River Region in 2015 and her participation in numerous ECOMOG operations.

The domestic environment concerned itself with the meeting of the aspirations of the Ghanaian people on all fronts, be they socio-economic, political, and the furtherance of the ideals of the country's democratic credentials. The challenges posed by multi-ethnic societies, porous borders, weak internal institutions, weak law enforcement agencies and corrupt public services all constitute part of the domestic background that the NDP considered. The diversity of the natural resource base which, though capable of accelerating the country's development, has really not changed the fortunes of the ordinary Ghanaian. The challenges emanating from all these impacted the crafting of the NDP which realised that the conduct by the GAF of Military Assistance to Civil Authority (MACA) was relevant and should be maintained since the Civil Police alone cannot meet the domestic requirements of security. It is worth noting that the NDP is responsive to present day threats and emerging ones that have an association with sophisticated and technologically aided modus operandi. Outsmarting the proponents of this multifaceted and complicated field requires not just resources but top-notch training for Defence and security operatives. Consequently, the NDP admits that there is the need for some resources from Ghana's Oil find and other natural resources to be used to equip and train

Defence agents for them to be able to provide the needed protection over the country's resources.

Closely related to the domestic issues is the physical environment itself which also requires security for the survival of the citizens. The extraction of the natural resources has a direct bearing and impact on the flora and fauna of the country and by extension the entire ecosystem. With shrinking forest reserves, indiscriminate sand winning, illegal mining, possible oil spillages and leakages, there is the need for the NDP to foresee and prepare for any eventualities. The NDP thus clearly stated that the challenges needed to be addressed holistically as they fall due. The NDP identified the crucial need for the training of the GAF and other stakeholders to be able to surmount these challenges.

In this regard, the conduct of joint training and operations by the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Armed Forces, and some sector Ministries such as the Ministry of Environment Science and Technology are justified. Some of these activities include OPERATION VANGUARD conducted to stem the devastation of the forest and pollution of rivers by illegal miners, OPERATION HALT which aims at ending the plundering of the timber reserves of the country, as well as OPERATION COWLEG which seeks to minimize the negative impact of the presence of nomadic herdsmen on local farmers. There are well over ten of such operations which all target the domestic environment identified by the NDP. In general, the National Defence Policy has been deliberately oriented to not only train GAF, but to also equip it and other related stakeholders to be able to deal with these imminent threats.

The general outlook of the Strategic Environment of Ghana therefore calls for a Defence policy capable of covering all interest areas of the country with particular attention on areas where the

country has linkages and capable of presenting an amount of leverage over threats. Ghana is expected by the NDP to continue to engage in all forms of deployment of troops in a bid to contribute to peace and stability of the world, the continent and the sub-region. In this regard, the NDP is categorical that such deployments will be done under the auspices of the UN, AU, or ECOWAS. This is in response to isolated conflicts at all levels despite awareness and numerous preventive peace initiatives worldwide.

A very serious note needs to be taken of the fact that the National Defence Policy is very silent on unilateral deployments of the resources of GAF outside Ghana. The question regarding what constitutes a provocation that will require immediate armed response and how that should be initiated need to be clearly contained in Defence Policies. For instance, though the NDP acknowledges that the porosity of the country's borders poses possible threats of external military aggression, unilateral preventive deployment and strikes for self-protection have not been mentioned. Since the NDP does not discount an armed invasion of Ghana despite the country's efforts to live in peace with its neighbours, it was expected that it will go further to outline possible courses of action to be taken during moments of extreme provocation.

Internally, the state of security is still seen as being fragile by the NDP thereby requiring the resourcing of the GAF to be effective in its support to the local authorities and civil police in the maintenance of law and order as well as the promotion of national development as required by the 1992 Constitution. The NDP being wary of the forays of the GAF, in times past, into direct governance and usurping of political power, makes it clear that the GAF is to play a support role to Civil Authority when needed and that the GAF is subject to the control of the political authority. It admonishes the GAF to remain "truly professional" in the provision of the enabling environment for national development. Additionally, the NDP recommends the

continuous building of capacity of the GAF to handle man-made and natural disasters as well as life-threatening catastrophic incidents. In this regard the NDP requested for the establishment of specialist units to deal with them. Such specialist units will be trained, set apart and equipped for as many foreseeable disaster situations as possible. Ghana's Defence Policy has a distinctive flavour – that of advocating for the accomplishment of traditional Defence sector roles but with a higher requirement for the development of the country as directed by the Executive arm of government.

To see this through, the NDP recommends the proper maintenance and equipping of the GAF to cope with its mandated constitutional role of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country and contributing meaningfully to the development of Ghana as required by article 210(3).

From the foregoing, the strategic environment of Ghana has thus been quite calm and stable over the period because of proactive efforts put in place by the authorities. However, the country remains susceptible to challenges posed by changes in the international, regional, and sub-regional levels with security implications. Apart from threats of armed attacks and present-day terrorism, minor threats could also emerge with slight or serious changes with wider implications capable of threatening national security. This calls for the maintenance of a determined focus on the country's security in order not to allow existing standards of security to degenerate. This background provided by the NDP has shaped the country's Defence policy planning, budgeting, and operations.

Generally, in exploring the need for equipping GAF to stand prepared for both traditional and emerging threats including terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and oil-associated threats, an

overt proposition is not expected. This is more striking with the increase in terrorist activities in Burkina Faso which shares a border and has trading ties with Ghana. However, the choice of equipment must match the nature of the identified threats. If the strategic framework imposed on the country demands a certain amount of capacity, the position taken by the NDP means that the appropriate equipment should be procured for the GAF. The likelihood and consequences of changes in the international and regional Defence landscape may demand some equipment whose procurement may take time. As such there is the need for a certain amount of foresight and pre-emptive acquisitions need to be made periodically. This also serves the purpose of deterrence. It might be plausible and cost-effective to raise and maintain flexible forces since an accurate prediction of the future can hardly succeed in the current circumstance especially in the field of Defence. Flexible forces will provide useful options in the event of an incident requiring military deployment. It should however be appreciated that the GAF may fail to prepare for the future by being flexible in such a way that many of the threats requiring its attention may outpace its capacity. Additionally, a foundation for long term planning may also elude GAF if its NDP is not subjected to frequent purposive reviews. The current NDP for instance did not overlook terrorism but the changing nature of both home-grown and foreign terrorist activities are in-exhaustive and require an adjustable policy to contain.

6.7 Opportunities and Challenges

The NDP puts in evidence the high-profile nature of Ghana's image on the global stage and suggests that to maintain the position of prominence requires her to identify both the challenges and opportunities that exist and then strategise to best serve her own interests either unilaterally or in concert with others. As such the national interest and the obvious threats to it have been well diagnosed in the NDP. The determination of interests, the identification of threats, and strategizing to contain all situations are significant evolving challenges.

6.7.1 Strategic Interest

Hugh White argues that, if properly conceived and developed, “the concept of strategic interest can provide a reliable and durable foundation for long-term defence planning by allowing identification of long-term strategic objectives which will remain valid even if systemic change in the international order brings new, different, and greater threats” (White, 2008). The notion of national interest happens to be the umbrella concept from which all other interests take their origin. It is basically that which covers everything about the rest of the world that affects Ghana’s well-being in all dimensions that one can think of. In a nutshell, Ghana’s national interest stretches from the happenings in the international security and economic order, through the machinations and quibbles on the continental stage, the forays of terrorist cells in the sub-region to the effects of army worms on the maize farms in the Accra Plains. The national interest also covers the state of sanitation in the public market to the treatment meted out to Ghanaian illegal immigrants in the forlorn deserts of North Africa. National interest therefore has no bounds, and this is not peculiar to Ghana. From this broad conception of national interest, a narrower category of security interest can be identified. Security by itself also has a broad nature. Since it covers threat areas such as environmental, physical, transnational, economic, social, and natural hazards among others. A sub-set or smaller segment of the security spectrum that propels Defence policy making can also be identified.

Thus, we can retain strategic interests as those interests which relate to the risk of conventional military threats against Ghana. They are those elements of the international order that affect, directly or indirectly, the likelihood or seriousness of an attack against her. They reflect the ways that Ghana’s vulnerability to attacks might be increased or decreased due to changes in the international system, the distribution of power and influence, and the balances of military capabilities.

It should be noted that the use of the armed forces is not only against conventional military attacks. The circumstances determine which assets to use. Consequently, the GAF may be used as directed by the 1992 Constitution for other purposes either than in response to armed military threats. These could include the protection of wider security interests and national interests keeping the suitability and cost of the use of the armed forces in mind. The core purpose of the GAF is responding to the risk of military attacks. Decisions on the type of forces required and how to manage the risk of direct attack remain the central issue of Defence planning.

The strategic interests lead to the identification of strategic objectives. The prime purpose of strategic objectives will be to protect the strategic interests. Reducing, minimizing or eliminating the impact of military threats against Ghana becomes the challenge. This might require the examination of the full range of policy instruments available to Ghana and given the circumstance, identify which ones are most suited for the prevailing threat. For tackling national strategic objectives, all the instruments are brought to bear. Military strategic objectives on the other hand are those that are meant to be achieved substantially or basically through the use of the armed forces if necessary. Thus, military strategic objectives cover those interests that are achieved using the armed forces in the protection of strategic interests.

According to Hugh White, every Defence policy must pass the test of practicality. By that he meant that any objective that is listed must be realistically attainable. Gaps may naturally exist between the existing factors affecting Ghana's vulnerabilities and the measures in place to address them. The strategic interests and ambition of Ghana today out at sea for instance far outpace the capacity of her navy and affiliates to achieve them because they lack the sea power. This compels countries to fail in translating all their strategic interests into measurable objectives. Thus, Ghana like other small powers have no control or influence either militarily

or otherwise over threats from the international system that affect their security. Though a good Defence policy should maximize a country's influence, pragmatism requires a recognition of its limits. Defence planning will thus have to be playing a balancing act by getting an equilibrium between a country's fears and its willingness, ability, and readiness to pay for the cost of addressing threats.

6.7.2 *National Interest*

The aspirations, goals, and shared values of Ghanaians define the country's national interests. The spectrum of these interests is very wide. It spans from the territorial, political, and diplomatic domains through socio-economic, cultural, health, and societal cohesion aspects to issues of domestic and regional peace. The interests of Ghana can thus be broadly said to be for the total well-being of the individual citizen with a reflection on the comprehensive outlook of the country on the global stage. The NDP notes that the safeguard of these interests requires concerted efforts of national actors including the military. This goes to confirm once again the fact that the Defence sector is not solely a military sphere.

The NDP classifies Ghana's interests into vital, important and peripheral interests. Vital interests determine the survival of Ghana. They are territorial integrity, sovereignty, safety and security of the physical territory of Ghana. They extend to the total well-being of citizens, the preservation of cultural heritage, critical national infrastructure, natural resources as well as the sanctity of Ghana's democratic institutions. Defending these essential interests is not negotiable and the nation will go to all lengths including the decisive use of the Ghana Armed Forces to shield itself and preserve the vital interests. Without protecting a country's vital interests, survival cannot be guaranteed.

The important interests identified by the NDP fall under a class of values that do not necessarily degrade the survival of the country but affects her well-being and co-existence with the International Community. They however advance the stated vital interests. They include combating international terrorism, trans-national crime, advancing international peace and security, protection of the global environment, and the containing of disasters. To cater for the important interests, the NDP recommends the use of economic and diplomatic overtures either unilaterally or in concert with allies. The check however is that the expected return should be commensurate or higher than the risk and cost involved. Thus the marginal utility of employing defence and security resources is of essence to the Ghanaian.

The NDP finally identifies Ghana's peripheral interests as her commitments and obligations to the International Community as a responsible nation in good standing. Apart from the respect of internationally binding treaties and conventions, Ghana must continue to be an active stakeholder in matters of international peace and security from the national, through the sub-regional, regional to the global level. In this regard, the NDP expects the deployment of Defence resources including personnel to provide needed technical support to peace processes. Though the NDP did not specifically mention Ghana's interests in Pan-Africanist issues, they certainly constitute very critical and indispensable part of the country's interests. This is justified by the country's lead role in issues of African unity and advancement of the black race since the pre-colonial times.

6.7.3 The Threat Landscape

The West African sub-region is faces diverse threats that emanate from traditional sources, non-state actors, the weather and climate, political and social set-ups as well as economic challenges such as poverty. The sheer manifestation of indiscipline by citizens, growing

intolerance, and religious extremism all add to the threats faced by the sub-region. The National Defence Policy of Ghana identifies some of these.

6.7.4 Challenges of Climate Change and Conflicts in the Sahel on Defence

The Sahel region stretches from Senegal on the Atlantic Coast in the West through Mauritania, Mali – Niger to Chad, Sudan and Eritrea onto the western coast of the Red Sea. This covers 6400 km. To the south the Sahel strip covers the northern fringes of Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, through Northern Nigeria, and Chad. The Sahel is thus characterized by semi-arid and arid conditions as it lies between the southern limits of the Sahara Desert and the upper limits of the grasslands and forests of Africa.

A large percentage of the population within the zone survive through subsistence farming and raising of animals. About 50 million persons of the population of the Sahel are nomads with herds. Artisanal fishermen also live along the river bodies and carry out their trade there. It also has the lakes Chad and a large part of the river Niger flowing through it. This zone though endowed with great potentials for the local population also faces some serious challenges especially related to the eco-system, climate change, water security, food security, and energy challenges. Another challenge that deepens and worsens existing threats to security and defence are the numerous conflicts in the Sahel involving both state and non-state actors. The effects of these threats posed partly by climate change, to the life is so grave that Kenyan came out with the concept of Environmental Soldier to be executed by the military and civil society (Diop, B. 2011).

6.7.5 *The Sahel Conflicts*

The conflicts in the Sahel have the potential of derailing the stability and development of countries in the sub-region with rippling effects on their neighbours. Countries such as Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Tchad have been mired in conflict with Jihadists' organisations that have threaten the stability of the countries for a long time. These have effectively drawn back the developmental prospects of the afore-mentioned countries and with significant effects on their neighbours. These conflicts have also had significant adverse effects on the prospects of integration of the countries in their economic blocs, the development of democratic structures and the transformation of their security sector agencies to internalise democratic and best practices.

The causes of the conflicts in the Sahel strip of Africa are varied. They range from climate change and resource-scarcity induced inter-communal violence, through the failure of traditional and state institutions to mediate and manage teething issues, to ideological differences. Inequalities in society have led to low-level insurgencies in some places whilst bad governance has also produced an army of both rural and urban poor (Ba-Taa-Banah, 2010).

For instance, an estimated 80% of arable fields in the Sahel have undergone degradation thereby reducing land required for both crop cultivation and pastures for animals. This has led to 33 million persons of the region falling within persons said to be food insecure (Buhaung, H. 2016). Other poor climatic conditions such as rising temperatures, erratic rainfall patterns, contribute to droughts and perennial floods which all undermine food production for the soaring population of the area. (UN, 2008). This situation compels herders to move southwards in search of pastures for their cattle. Transhumance then becomes a source of tension between herders and crop farmers. This often ends in violent clashes resulting in thousands of deaths each year. It is interesting to note that the ACLED noted that the impact of the activities of

Boko Haram in 2018 were less deadly than that of the clashes between herders and crop farmers (ACLED, 2019).

The porosity of the borders of the region also favours conflict and criminal activities. The movement of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), human trafficking, human smuggling, and drugs are among the drivers of conflict and crime in the region. The spillover of conflicts from one country to another is commonplace as with the creeping of the Malian insurgency into Burkina Faso and Niger.

Diminished venues and options of personal livelihood and lack of opportunity make the youth and able-bodied of the region a ready source of labour for extremists' groups that promise some form of survival. These also serve the labour needs of other deviants in society and repressive governmental institutions, vigilante groups of political parties, drug barons, and some business elites. (Crisis Group, 2020).

Thus with a largely discriminatory and unfair internal political landscape, a high level of illiteracy and societal inequality, a history of inter-communal conflicts, deepening cultural and societal fault lines, and a high dependence on unreliable agriculture, the Sahel region is considered not only fragmented and impoverished but also ecologically fragile (Busby and von Uexkull, 2016).

6.7.6 Food

With dwindling rains, the surface water used by majority of the population is seeing a reduction. This affects irrigated agriculture, watering of animals, and domestic use. This has a direct impact on food security in the Sahel region and neighbouring countries such as Ghana.

With over 33 million persons in the region of the Sahel being tagged as insecure in food matters, mal-nutrition has become synonymous with certain countries of the region. These food challenges also have direct impacts on domestic livestock raising. A resultant effect is the diminishing sources of protein in the diet of the people with the attendant health implications.

6.7.7 Energy

The effects of the climate change on the energy requirements, sources, and consumption in the sub-region are quite enormous too. Less rainfall results in less water entering the reservoirs of hydro-electric dams. As such the energy produced from such dams such as the Kainji dam in Nigeria and Aswan dam in Sudan have over the period suffered reduction in power production. This phenomenon also affects hydro dams on the continent. The Akosombo and Bui dams in Ghana have struggled to produce enough energy for the domestic and industrial requirements of Ghana over the years. Much as direct blame is not placed on climate change, the level of water in the reservoirs have consistently been an issue of worry. Additionally, there are perennial water spillage of the Bagre Dam in Burkina Faso which causes flooding in northern Ghana leading to internally displaced families and destruction of cultivated farms. This seasonal occurrence has had the potential of affecting the cordial relations between the people of the affected area and the Burkina Faso authorities. Until plans by the Government of Ghana to construct a multi-purpose dam to collect and make economic use of the flood waters is completed the floods will surely continue.

Changing weather patterns also makes the need for energy to control domestic temperatures high. This is in the form of air-conditioning of human user-facilities such as cars, conference centres and living accommodation. A higher consumption rate also means a higher cost borne by consumers. In many rural areas, inhabitants still rely on the use of fuel wood and organic

material for heating and cooking. With the climate change and dwindling forest resources, the very basic aspects of human survival thus get threatened. Peasant farmers rely on the use of fire for clearing their fields. They use it to ensure a speedy sprouting of fresh grass for their animals to graze and they use it for both heating and cooking meals. The use of fossil and hydro based electricity covers a small part of rural areas. The deployment of solar systems has also not gained much penetration in much of the Sahel though it can be a very viable source of energy.

Possible mitigating measures include the investment of resources and efforts in promoting reconciliation, improvement of the livelihood options of the vulnerable in society, and sincerity in the conduct of dialogue to complement military efforts. The political classes should avoid the manipulation of ethnic and communal conflicts for political gains, the passage of discriminatory legislation, and the deployment of vigilante and militia groups to consolidate power and influence. They should improve the provision of public goods and equity in society.

Conclusion

The impact of the water-energy-food nexus on security, survival of both states and inhabitants of the Sahel cannot therefore be underestimated. This has an indirect impact on the security and defence fortunes of the rest of the African continent especially on West African states because they have a lot in common with countries in the Sahel. Ghana is thus at risk of the adverse effects of the challenges posed by climate change including its rippling effects on food security, water security, and energy management. It is equally faced with threats of insecurity, conflict, and instability that can result from the water-food-energy mix. For these to be contained, a pragmatic and dynamic approach needs to be fashioned for the design, launch and pursuit of security and defence directives.

6.7.8 *The National Defence Policy and the Ghanaian Threat Landscape*

The National Defence Policy classifies the threats faced by Ghana into internal and external threats. These are not unique to the country but similar to those confronting other sub-regional countries including Ghana's neighbours and allies. The threats have a potential of creating uncertain and volatile security situations necessitating periodic calls for MACA. Though internal threats are in-exhaustive, key ones include "military *coup d'états*, ethnic conflicts, illiteracy, corruption, proliferation of arms and ammunition, mass unemployment, political intolerance, greed, poor economic growth, and poverty". Also listed as threats in the NDP are violent crime, armed robbery, chieftaincy disputes, religious fanaticism/intolerance, drug trafficking, money laundering, cyber-crime, illegal migration, and smuggling. Political vigilantism, breeding of terrorists' cells, inactivity of the youth, contract killings, state-sponsored violence, abuse of state institutions, as well as subjugation of national interest to partisan interests are all current threats to Ghana. Emerging threats rooted in weak political leadership, indecisive and timid state security institutions, a deep misunderstanding of the ethos of a democratic state, bad governance, and the nonchalant attitude of a good percentage of Ghanaians have the potential of negatively impacting the survival of the Ghanaian state.

These threats show the fragile nature of the security of the ordinary Ghanaian that needs not be matched with a complacent and less resolved security architecture. Consequently, the NDP advocates for a professional, well trained and resourced military institution, which will remain subordinated to the Civil Authority and which will promote democratic practices as well as military – civil relations. The NDP thus added that the "Armed Forces shall continue to be adequately funded, trained and equipped to discharge" its constitutional responsibilities (NDP,

2012). The NDP equally called for an improvement in the capacity of the Ghana Police Service for an effective discharge of their primary responsibility in the security and Defence space.

The peaceful relations with Ghana's neighbours have been attributed, by the NDP, mainly to the Foreign Policy of the country. However external threats still abound especially due to poorly demarcated borders and other geo-political issues including trans-border crime. With about 2300 km highly porous international boundaries, border violations are possible. This favours the perennial movement of herdsmen into Ghana in search of pastures for cattle leading to tensions with Ghanaian farmers. External threats also include the waves of terrorism in the West African sub-region, the complexities of radicalization and violent extremism, drug trafficking, money laundering, production and trade in fake medicines, illicit trafficking of both humans and drugs as well as the dumping of toxic waste. Thus, damages to the physical environment could be externally caused. The NDP further identified threats posed by Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on the global stage and possible attacks on national infrastructure using ICT as potent threats. The growing arms production on the African continent without adequate measures of control is yet another threat. The possible spillover of conflicts and civil disturbances in neighbouring states, subversive acts of agents of hostile states, and the activities of fanatical religious institutions in the sub-region are some other external threats outlined in the policy (NDP, 2012).

The presence of foreign military interests, assets and bases constitute a threat that could expose Ghana to attacks by enemies of the foreign military powers. The country's vital and strategic installations as well as resource bases could be subject to attacks (NDP, 2012). These notwithstanding, the NDP in 2012 downplayed the imminence of Ghana being a victim of

direct military attack. It however advocated a state of permanent vigilance and readiness of the Defence and security institutions.

6.7.9 *The Employment of Forces*

Following the diagnosis of the threat landscape, the NDP specified the possible scenarios under which the country might deploy its Defence forces. It is certain that no amount of predictions and forecasting can exactly capture the future of all threats to life and property that will require the services of Defence forces. The NDP however attempts to list some of these instances. These include the following:

- a. Attacks on Territory.
- b. Blockades.
- c. Internal Security and Low Intensity Conflicts.
- d. Peace Support Operations.
- e. Attacks on Embassies, Ships and Aircrafts.
- f. Disaster Relief.
- g. Search and Rescue.
- h. National Development.

To fulfil its constitutional role in times of emergency and normal disturbance to the peace, the GAF will be used to secure the nation. The foremost role is the insulations or response to land, sea and air threats to the territorial integrity of Ghana. Overt attacks on key installations and resources such as its mineral and oil fields will require immediate and swift response from the GAF. Keeping land, sea and air trade routes free of blockades and interference of any nature may require the use of assets of the GAF. Anti-piracy activities at sea, protection of Ghanaian

registered ships and aircrafts as well as the safety and security of her embassies and staff may all require the deployment of GAF.

Ghana remains prone to avoidable man-made and natural disasters and these occur on an annual basis. The provision or restoration of relief services in collaboration with other Defence sector actors such as National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) and other Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) has been maintained by the NDP. The conduct of search and rescues operations is yet another capability the NDP expects the GAF to be trained and equipped to perform. The GAF has over the years earned respect and won hearts and minds by coming out to help inhabitants in times of disasters.

In discharging her responsibilities as a member of the comity of nations, Ghana has been involved in peace support operations since the 1960s. she has deployed troops in support of peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations across the world in pursuit of Foreign Policy objectives as well as world peace. The NDP maintains the continuous involvement of GAF in such outings. It requires the nation to contribute its quota to ECOWAS, AU and UN peace efforts as well as obligations of the ECOWAS Standby Force. Apart from the external peace support operations, the NDP maintains the vision of deploying the GAF in support of the Ghana Police Service in Internal Security operations up to fighting low intensity conflicts and counter insurgency. This is yet another example of inter-institutional success in operations such as OP CALM and OP PEACE ANGEL.

In conformity with Article 120 (3) of the 1992 Constitution, the NDP which is the product of the Ministry of Defence, engaged to put at the disposal of the nation all human and material resources of the Armed Forces for an accelerated socio-economic development of the country

as appropriate. In this regard, the NDP hinted at restructuring and equipping as well as development of the skills base of the Armed Forces for effective delivery on that score.

GAF thus needs to develop, plan, and maintain forces with the capacity to conduct sustained surveillance and respond decisively to all natures of threats. The NDP therefore requires of the GAF a design of schemes and strategies for an effective delivery of its roles, effective contribution to politico-socio-economic development, whilst dealing with the ever-evolving threat landscape of the country. The Armed Forces should thus not be associated with the conduct of operations akin to those of oppression anywhere in the world let alone in Ghana but should be seen to be contributing to the advancement of world peace, the lot of the black race and the total well-being of the Ghanaian state and citizen.

6.8 Strategic Response

Setting the strategic objectives basically requires the determination by the NDP of which threat faced by the world and Ghana currently really deserves the use of the Armed Forces. These threats could include terrorism, global warming, climate change, and WMD proliferation among others. Key to the Defence policy is how best can the GAF be developed to meet all threats identified by the NDP? What do Ghanaians want the GAF to be able to do against threats which are different from and greater in magnitude than those that seem currently credible threats? How to identify strategic objectives in the face of newer threats and position GAF to be able to achieve them. These call for proactiveness, pragmatism, and innovation in designing and running structures to satisfactorily contain such threats.

The country's land mass, its entire ecosystem and population constitute critical assets and all available tools including the use of the Armed Forces for their protection is accepted by the

NDP. The Security and Intelligence Agencies Act – Act 526 of 1996 establishes a National Security Council, states its composition, functions, and powers. The Regional Security Councils as well as the District Security Councils are also covered. It is worth noting that a key function of the DISEC is the provision of early warning of all issues of security concern. This therefore requires Unit Committees to be effective in triggering the early warning mechanism needed for the taking of swift preventive action (Quantson K. B., 2005). For Quantson, civil population needs to own and be involved in National Security. This is because the information required to be distilled into intelligence comes from the population and a well oriented population on the objectives, purposes, and benefits of National Security is an asset.

6.8.1 Ghana's Strategic Objectives

The NDP of 2012 has outlined strategic objectives that the armed services must strive to achieve. These objectives are not very different from the set strategic goals that previous governments have sought to achieve. The setting of clear objectives for a policy is the beginning of getting a better policy especially if the drafters get clearly understood objective statements. To decide on the capabilities, resources, doctrine and spending patterns required for the Ghana Armed Forces, the role of a clear statement of strategic objectives cannot be over-emphasised. From the literature, defining strategic objectives is one of the most challenging stages in defence policy formulation. Strategic objectives seek to convey what the Armed Forces is expected to be able to do. This may be difficult in the case of Ghana because of its geographical location, its varied history, and lead role in African affairs, its active role in various sub-regional, continental, and international organisations, as well as its incessant quest for world peace. Systemic changes at both the regional and global levels affect the defence options of Ghana since such changes weigh heavily on the listed variables above. In the face of all these, the search for long-term strategic interests of Ghana was done and included in the

NDP. They are those factors in the international order that significantly affect the likelihood or otherwise of an armed attack on Ghana. The use of strategic objectives in this study will mean those policy goals that the NDP wants to be able to achieve through the use of the resources of the Ghana Armed Forces. It makes sense to say that if policy formulators are able to very clearly define strategic objectives then it will be easier for operational personnel to be able to build the needed forces that can achieve such objective in efficient and cost-effective ways. In this regard attempting to answer the question of what is expected of the Ghana Armed Forces in all circumstances defines the strategic objectives. This certainly presents both the policy maker and the implementer great challenges.

Ghana's historical antecedents and standing among the comity of nations makes her strategic options quite peculiar. Whilst remaining wary of a possible conventional attack from neighbours over natural resources, she seems more exposed to asymmetric attacks because of her age-old policies relating to migration and touted unofficial "Ghanaian hospitality". Thus, despite the amount of attention given to the Armed Forces in the 2012 Defence Policy, the primary pre-occupation of the NDP is the insulation of the Ghanaian territorial space from armed attacks. This is buttressed by the fact that conventional conflicts, even in the face of present-day threat changes, still determine the reasons for which countries maintain, organize, train, equip, and deploy armed forces – the case of Ghana not being any different.

It is obvious that the NDP faced that challenge of classifying the conventional threats Ghana is exposed to. Whilst on one hand planning for a conventional military threat, it appears that it is not very evident and likely. It can be argued that Ghana is not faced with a clear, certain, and present conventional military attack from any of her neighbours in the sub-region over any issue but that does not mean that she is inevitably and immutably secure. Consequently, the

strategic objectives as contained in the NDP do not present a case of a country face with obvious and immediate threats of military attacks. This could be fallouts from the existing order which seems to suggest that given the global, continental and sub-regional context in which Ghana finds herself, as well as the distribution of military capabilities, patterns of national intentions, and alliances, no country may be too willing to launch an armed attack on Ghana in the foreseeable future. Attacks from terrorist groups and other non-state actors appear more likely than attacks from other sovereign states.

Ghana is not a country whose physical security is determined by the stability of the international order such as the European countries. Whilst they may not be threatened by physical invasions anymore, they concentrate their strategic objectives on wider security, diplomatic, political or humanitarian purposes (White, 2008). This highest risk to them may be that of terrorism - both home-grown and external. For Ghana the strategic objectives are still bent on ensuring that armed attacks are averted even in the absence of credible scenarios. This therefore makes the formulation of such policies quite challenging. Ghana's claims to security from armed military attack cannot be said to be well grounded in any case. It will depend to a large extent on the continuous stability of the current sub-regional power balance, the progressive solving of conflicts and hotspots in the sub-region and the managing of inequalities. These can easily change and being conscious of that led the framers of the NDP to maintain an aspect of the possibility of an armed attack.

6.8.2 National Defence Mission

The NDP states the mission of the NDP and the *raison d'être* of its formulation. "The National Defence Mission is to provide a reliable security guarantee for the maintenance of peace and stability and sustainable socio-economic development" (NDP, 2012). What this mission means

is that the role as assigned by the 1992 Constitution has been buttressed by the NDP. This is because of all the four constitutions; it is only the 1992 Constitution that specifically orders the GAF to play developmental roles at the behest of the President. The mission gave birth to some policy objectives and they include:

- i. The improvement of the equipment state of the GAF to maintain her in a high state of human and material resource preparedness.
- ii. To improve logistics and morale of all security services and get the GAF ready for rapid response to any threat.
- iii. Improve the human capital and institutional capacity for national Defence.
- iv. Improve civil-military relations through good, proactive public relations and decentralized civic action programmes.
- v. To ensure Ghana meets her international obligations to the UN, AU, Commonwealth, NAM, and ECOWAS (NDP, 2012).

To achieve these policy objectives, there is the need for the performance of some key tasks.

Though not exhaustive the NDP listed a few. These include:

- i. Resistance to foreign aggression, containing internal destabilization activities, safeguarding Ghana's democratic system, and creating a secure and enabling environment of the sustainable socio-economic development.
- ii. Defence and protection of Ghana's strategic resources and legitimate rights and interests including maritime rights and interests.
- iii. Safeguarding the dignities, rights, safety and security of all Ghanaians, protecting the diverse national values and cultures, whilst promoting ethnic, religious and political justice and harmony for the attainment of peaceful co-existence, national cohesion and unity.

- iv. Support the state in the quest for a fair, transparent, and acceptable resolution of disputes of colonial and historical legacy and current socio-ethno-political and religious contradictions.
- v. Support to civil authority to combat crime and thereby promote peace and security.
- vi. The provision of intelligence and advice to government on matters of Defence and Security in order to curb and or contain breaches of security and thus safeguard the interest of Ghana's security.
- vii. Support Ghana's commitments to the UN, AU and ECOWAS on the basis of equality and mutual benefits as well as the preservation of national sovereignty and dignity.

Since the NDP is expected to be a living document, some of these tasks are expected to keep evolving with the prime aim of meeting the overall interest of Ghana. It is quite evident from the tasks that no one institution can effectively discharge all of them without the collaboration of other institutions. Therefore, the Defence establishment will require more stakeholders for effective and comprehensive task delivery. These give the Defence sector the assets to adopt the best posture necessary to achieve its aim.

6.8.3 Strategic Posture

The NDP in discussing the strategic posture of the country assigns to GAF the role of deterring and containing both external and internal aggression. Concepts available for this include Prevention, Protection, Deterrence, Rapid Mobilisation, Force Projection, International Cooperation and Diplomacy. These self-explanatory concepts are the first set of options preferred by the NDP. However, their use is not in any specific order and the times of their use cannot also be predetermined. So, the use of force and the choice of going to war is the last

resort. The purpose of the use of any of them or in using a group of them is to guarantee national security, attain national interest and ensure national prosperity.

6.9 National Defence Establishment

Ghana's Defence architecture is provided by the NDP. In elaborating the Defence establishment, a Higher Management of Defence was identified. This basically encompassed the constitutional power driven from the 1992 Constitution for the creation and sustenance of Defence structures. For instance, the Constitution provides for the establishment of the Armed Forces, the Armed Forces Council as well as Boards and above all, it outlines the role for which the Armed Forces is trained, equipped, and maintained. With the designation of the elected President as the Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces, the civil control of the Armed Forces is clearly set by both the 1992 Constitution and the National Defence Policy. Parliament is equally given and coffered with the monopoly for the establishment of any arms bearing institution in the country. Parliament in the exercise of its wide-ranging legislative, and oversight responsibilities, plays critical roles in controlling the Defence sector not only through budgetary means but also through monitoring of Defence activities.

The MoD itself is organized to ensure the direct execution of political control of the GAF. The MoD has both the military and civilian components with the Minister as the political head. The Minister is responsible for the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of the implementation as well as review of the Defence Policy with the advice of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Defence Staff Committee. The Minister provides the political direction to guide the GAF. The Civil component is headed by the Chief Director who, apart from being a principal advisor to the Minister, also ensures the initiation of policies. The Military component on the other hand is composed of the General Headquarters and the three

services. The CDS exercises the operational command and control as well as the administrative control of the Armed Forces. However, the authority for the conduct of military operations originate from the National Security Council and comes to the CDS through the Minister of Defence.

The mission of the GAF is to “*protect by land, sea, and air, the territorial integrity of and sovereignty of Ghana against internal and external aggression, thereby contributing to the transformation of the economy to achieve growth and accelerating poverty reduction, especially among the vulnerable and excluded*” (NDP, 2012). Thus, the *raison d’etre* of the Defence policy is to “generate, employ, and sustain combat-ready, integrated and rapidly deployable Armed Forces, capable of quick assembling to meet varying contingencies both at home and abroad” (NDP, 2012). To achieve this, the underlisted specific tasks have been assigned by the NDP:

- a. The provision of intelligence and advice on Defence issues affecting Ghana’s security to the government.
- b. The protection of Ghana’s territorial integrity and sovereignty through surveillance and control of the country’s land, maritime and air spaces.
- c. Protection of the country’s onshore and offshore strategic assets and resources.
- d. Coordination of national Search and Rescue operations.
- e. Provision of MACA on demand.
- f. In collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducting evacuation of Ghanaians from crisis-ridden countries.

6.9.1 Joint Task Force

To execute the above listed tasks, a Rapid Deployment Force of a Battle Group size is maintained in conformity with the NDP and equipped for a short notice to move. The configuration of the force to be used may at times require the inclusion of the countries allies and several competences. The configuration will impact on the chain of command and the leadership in the field. However, the NDP expects the CDS to exercise overall control as appropriate. The NDP notes that the objectives of both the Foreign and Security Policies will be bolstered with the setting up of a command structure for the deployment of forces.

6.9.2 Tri-Service Institutions

The NDP maintains the existing institutions. The services provided by tri-service institutions such as the centres of learning and health centres will continue to provide opportunity for career development of servicemen and civilians. The institutions shall be funded to incorporate peace support training and higher standards set for each.

6.9.3 Strategic Intelligence

The gathering, collation, analyzing, and dissemination of intelligence to help decision making and to meet Defence requirements has been inserted by the NDP. It also outlines the reporting lines and related institutions. This also gets executed through the deployment of Defence Advisors as integral parts of the Foreign Missions of Ghana.

6.9.4 The Ghana Army

One of the key Defence Sector institutions is the Ghana Army. Its primary mission is the Defence of the sovereignty of the territorial integrity of Ghana in conjunction with other

security services. The NDP wants a highly mobile army, well equipped for action both locally and abroad.

It emphasises a deterrent posture but with sufficient aggressive capability to defeat threats of any nature to national security related to land operations. The policy makes for an army with a flexible character with well-motivated troops that are trained and equipped to take advantage of technology to contribute meaningfully to national development. The Armed Forces keeps expanding to meet increasing obligations but realistically.

6.9.5 The Ghana Navy

The NDP wants an expanded Navy with special units to meet the demand of Ghana's increasing maritime interests and oil finds. The navy is thus required to act alone or with the Air Force and Army to stem aggression from the sea by defending the territorial waters, safeguarding the state's maritime resources and ensuring state sovereignty. The doctrine affecting its posture shall stem from the National Security and Defence policies with the ultimate aim of achieving national policy objectives. The performance of SAR, goodwill missions, enforcement of fisheries regulations, conduct of evacuation operations, and protection of sea lines of communication are also contained in the NDP. These ultimately contribute to the economic development of the country.

6.9.6 The Ghana Air Force

The Air Force is mandated to defend the territorial airspace, deter and contain external aggression by air and help secure key facilities. The NDP aims at achieving air superiority at all times against aggressors. The Air Force for its conduct of surveillance over the country's borders and EEZ shall be well equipped despite cost. The conduct of evacuations, medical

evacuations, and search and rescue operations have been highlighted by the NDP in furtherance of national development. The running of an effective intelligence warning and command and control system to ensure effective cooperation with land and maritime forces is also a policy objective.

6.9.7 Other Institutions for National Defence

The Defence Sector of Ghana, like many Commonwealth countries, is not the preserve of only the military. In Ghana other institutions with Defence related roles include the Ghana Police Service, the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Service, the Ghana National Fire Service, and the Ghana Immigration Service. Others are the National Disaster Management Organisation, and the Narcotics Control Board. The Ghana Health Service and Meteorological Services are also partners of the Defence Sector. The NDP directs a sharing of training sessions to strengthen links and increase interoperability during emergencies.

6.9.8 National Reserve Forces

The Ghana National Defence Policy makes room for reserve forces. A National Reserve Force of retired security services personnel on an active reserve role as well as volunteers between 18 and 30 years constitute the reserve of the Defence forces. The responsibility for training them in their regions of residence is that of the GHQ. Their eventual deployment will see them integrated into all services for the purposes of national Defence as appropriate.

6.9.9 Voluntary Military Training and School Cadet Corps

The National Service policy of Ghana requires young graduates to undergo military training. The NDP expects a budget to be set aside for such training as well as school cadet training. These could be part of the Civil Defence Force. The responsibility is that of the MoD. Every citizen has a responsibility to contribute to the safety and security of Ghana. The state also has

the right to employ any able-bodied citizens for national Defence. The NDP therefore directs the establishment of a civil Defence structure with procedures for sensitization, training and equipping of citizens for national Defence as required.

6.9.10 Crisis Management

Another National Defence Establishment aspect of importance and frequent activation is crisis management. The NDP in conformity with the 1992 Constitution identifies the role of the National Security Council (NSC) in the institution of measures to cater for the internal and external security of Ghana. In doing so, the NSC uses GAF and other security services as its tools. Whilst the NSC sets the criteria, the CDS plans and executes the assigned military tasks. Crisis management includes disaster situations, internal security breaches, war situations, and external crisis. For the disasters NADMO will benefit from the services of the other security services including the 48 Engineer Regiment of GAF. The air assets of the Ghana Air Force are also used to bring relief to inhabitants in distress. Internal Security situations will see the military supporting the Civil Police if called to help. In times of counter-insurgency and war the MoD will be the lead agency with the aid of others as the political leadership decides. For external crisis the lead agency will be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but working on the directives of the NSC. Thus, from the foregoing it can be seen that the structure of the Defence sector, as set out by the NDP, has many stakeholders who traditionally were not deemed or expected to be Defence sector players. The complexity of the sector however is easy to surmount with a proactive Ministry and staff.

6.10 Defence Capability Requirements

The NDP acknowledges the Defence Sector as a lead guarantor of security needed for the political, social and economic advancement of Ghana. The human, infrastructural and logistics

requirements will however compete with other needs of other sectors over the limited resources available to the state. Consequently, the NDP believes in the fashioning of a cost-effective model of resourcing the GAF for effective delivery of its numerous mandated roles.

For the human resource requirements, the policy recommends the putting in place of a Sustainable Human Resource Strategy that will staff GAF with high quality officers and men as well as civilian employees. It identifies the staff as the most critical asset of the Defence sector and the most decisive component responsible for the outcomes of military and related operations (NDP, 2012). It should be noted that the NDP places emphasis of regional representation in enlistment and recruitment into both the military and the civilian employee's establishment of the GAF. This could be a move to ensure an Armed Forces with a true national representation and character. The policy also gives prominence to specialist training, career advancement, motivation and retirement packages for servicemen.

The National Defence Infrastructure runs on the available infrastructure of the nation. As such the need for the MoD to collaborate with other stakeholders to ensure the maintenance and expansion of the road, rail and port infrastructure. The holding of strategic reserves for use in times of need is also supported by the NDP consequently, a Strategic Reserve Policy for the Defence Sector is recommended by the NDP. To keep the heartbeat of the country stable, the NDP directs the prioritization of the protection of all critical national key installations such as the seat of government, strategic economic assets, and energy sources.

The policy believes in a self-sufficiency plan in logistics matters of the Defence sector. It thus envisions the establishment of light industries to produce some requirements of the sector. The technical employment of resources relative to interoperability and compatibility will not be

overlooked during acquisition. Related to that, the development of technology through partnership with local industries and tertiary institutions is encouraged. In this regard the Research and Development departments of the Service need to be proactive and to benefit from government funding and to position GAF for self-sufficiency in technological matters in due course. The NDP advocates the transfer of technology from Defence industries from which military hardware is purchased.

Other Defence Sector requirements identified in the NDP include medical services/facilities and recreational and housing facilities. The medical facilities of the Armed Forces, according to the policy, shall be expanded and continue to be national emergency health facilities. The training schools of the medical service shall also be upgraded to include post-graduate and specialists training whilst the existing Medical Reception Stations are upgraded to the status of District hospitals. Closely related to health matters is that of recreation. The development of recreational facilities for use of staff and families in all Defence establishment is a policy directive meant to ensure the physical and mental well-being of personnel. All these also go to promote civil-military relations as they are opened for civilian use. To ensure efficiency and easy mobilization, office and residential accommodation facilities shall continue to be provided for all ranks and some civilians.

All the listed requirements of the Defence sector cannot be obtained without the needed funding. In fact, to obtain the required support for budgetary approval and to make a case for the release of budgeted funds, it might be impossible for the Defence Ministry to go at it alone. Consequently, Inter-Ministerial support and multi-sectorial agency advocacy may be required. The policy recognises the need for coordination as well as the creation of synergy and the use of common resources so as to avoid duplication and waste. The NDP underlines the importance

of equipping the GAF to perform its mandated and constitutional roles despite financial constraints. It believes the world standard of 1.5 to 3 percent of GDP as Defence budget should be met to serve national security and Defence needs.

The needs of the Armed Forces are numerous and expensive. Those of other Defence and security sectors players are not less expensive. Defence equipment for instance hardly enjoy subsidized prices. Since Ghana imports a higher percentage of its requirements, it should be expected that huge sums of money will be used for purchases. However, the requirements are necessities that cannot be shelved. The MoD is thus expected not just to stop at making policy statements but got forward in soliciting for the needed funds both from public and private sources to keep the Defence sector well-resourced.

6.11 Civil-Military Relations

The military exists for, and all that it does is for the benefit of the state and its citizens. However, the co-existence of the two camps can at times be conflictual. Consequently, the NDP in trying to deconflict roles and reduce tensions, has been categorical about the subordinate position of the military to civil authority. Whilst advocating a cordial relationship between the military and civil sectors, it acknowledges the special and constitutional responsibility of the GAF for the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ghana as well as defending her against external aggression. For optimum performance, enormous powers are required by the military but both the military and civil authority need to know their respective roles in a democracy. There should be well defined areas of cooperation and collaboration since the domains are extensive. The NDP directs the pursuit of existing policies regarding secondment of military officers to civil institutions, media relations, outreach programmes, joint training, humanitarian assistance, contribution to democratic imperatives and MACA.

The human resource base of the MoD is diverse and widely needed by other sectors of the Ghanaian economy. The policy of having representatives of the Armed Forces contribute their expertise to the National Security Council, Regional Security Councils, and District Security Councils is upheld by the NDP. It further advocates the strengthening of the practice of permanent secondment of qualified personnel to serve in other public institutions. This will not only serve the interest of military-civil relations but also answer, in part, the call by Article 210(3) for an active contribution to national development.

Regarding media relations, the NDP as part of promoting good governance envisages an accountable Armed Forces which will not only meet best practices but also one that takes responsibility for its actions. Act 256 of the Parliament of Ghana requires the Minister of National Security to, annually submit to Parliament a record of activities of the security services. This is a major accountability issue and needs to be sustained coupled with the opening for aggrieved persons to seek redress against the security services. To aid the practice and make it an acceptable culture, the NDP called for the development and implementation of a Media Policy to guide the Ghana Armed Forces with emphasis on the pre-eminence of national interest and national security in the dissemination of information. The conduct of various types of outreach programmes to remote parts of the country to promote a sense of belonging, national cohesion and development are encouraged by the NDP. It thus maintains that budgetary allocations and resources should be made available for these. The policy makers also believe that joint training at senior executive levels will contribute to the military and civil society appreciating the importance of each other. As such it advocates the attendance of representatives at seminars nationwide including but not limited to the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC) and Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping and

Training Centre (KA IPTC). For the promotion of democratic practices and culture the NDP is emphatic that the GAF and its members will continue to be sensitized through training, codes of ethics, international exposure, and professional development to continue to abstain from political interventions of all natures. Finally, on the civil-military relations front, the NDP expects the governments of Ghana to give priority to equipping the GAF to be able to accomplish its constitutional roles and that of the development of the nation. In doing so, the GAF should have what it takes to assist the civil authority in times of emergencies and natural and man-made disasters among others.

As such the National Defence Policy does not just seek harmonious relations between the Ghana Armed Forces and Civil society but also wants the GAF to be well equipped to do what will be appreciated by the society. For this to be possible policy measures already spelt out need to be fulfilled by all concerned stakeholders. Government happens to be the major stakeholder in all these.

6.12 Identified Weaknesses

The provision of a National Defence Policy to guide the Defence Sector is in conformity with good governance and best practices. The policy covers all the domains required for the protection, preservation and survival of the nation-state Ghana. It equally answers the call for a more involving role of the Ghana Armed Forces in the development of the country. These notwithstanding, there are weaknesses that require addressing if the NDP must retain its relevance and be fit for purpose. Some of them are discussed below.

The NDP makes no provision for a situation where all the troops of the Ghana Armed Forces will be in the country with no participation in international peace operations. The challenges

that will be faced by the institution in such a case are enormous and the NDP should have made room for that. To assume that there will always be a requirement of Ghanaian troops for peacekeeping outside the country is to lose sight of the evolving measures for peace making and the fact that threats to world peace are also changing thereby requiring newer responses.

The NDP is ambitious enough in opting for light-industrialisation in a bid to produce some of the logistics requirements of the Defence sector. However, it will be realized that the choice should have been informed by comparative advantage considerations. Consequently, a re-visit of the concept of self-sufficiency taking advantage of the agricultural prospects of the country would have been expected.

The NDP, in a quest to promote national cohesion and unity, states that recruitment into both the military and civilian employee components of the Defence Ministry should be guided by regional balance. Much as this may seem to promote representation, it fails to jettison the idea of viewing people along parochial ethnic lines. Unemployment should not cloud merit and interest. The NDP should be seen to be safeguarding the dignities, rights, safety and security of all Ghanaians, protecting the diverse national values and cultures, whilst promoting ethnic, religious and political justice and harmony for the attainment of peaceful co-existence, national cohesion and unity. As Vice Admiral Mathew Quashie observed, a “people-centric approach” is what is needed for the Defence sector of Ghana today (ADF, 2015). This cannot be achieved when regional and ethnic divisions are being emphasized instead of being discouraged. A Defence Policy should uphold the tenets of professionalism with emphasis on impersonal criteria for recruitment and promotion. The dangers of ethnic profiling include the deepening of prejudices and existing mistrusts that entrench fault lines in society resulting in polarization and lack of cohesion among a people.

The NDP has also failed to outline its relationship with the ever-increasing operators of the security sector that are in the private sector. These include private physical security providers, private investigative security companies and private bullion service security operators among others. These private companies contribute significantly to the stability, security, and Defence of the nation and merit attention from policy makers in the Defence sector.

The world has seen an increase in the mainstreaming of gender issues in all domains and the Defence and Security sectors are no exceptions. However, the NDP has not given any special mention nor attention to explicitly give direction to Defence authorities on the way forward relative to gender. Granted that the research has uncovered a steady progress of females in the GAF, percentages especially at levels of responsibility are still diminutive. Equally requiring attention and direction is the level of risk all service persons should be exposed to considering cultural and traditional Ghanaian concepts of gender. The NDP needed to give guidance with the realistic contribution of stakeholders and lady-beneficiaries on equanimity in both benefits and responsibilities.

The tendency for military forces and Defence Sector resources to be misused by incumbent governments is a common threat in Africa. The NDP fails to insulate the GAF against such issues despite the associated risks. Additionally, it does not in anyway deal with the issue of security of tenure of office holders which is a requirement for unbridled professionalism.

Consensus building has been identified as a key enabler for effective delivery of the goals in the public sector. It is however not a norm in military practice. That notwithstanding its benefits to the existing *esprit de corps*, cohesion, and harmony within the ranks of GAF cannot be over-emphasised. The NDP was thus expected to give an orientation for consensus building not just within GAF but to include all other Defence Sector stakeholders on matters of national security.

Finally, the NDP fails to outline all the stakeholders of the Defence sector. Much as the competences of various institutions will be required to respond to spontaneous events affecting the sector, the possibility of abuse and inaction might still arise. Though the membership may be indeterminate, a list of stakeholders will limit turf battles, duplicate, waste, and competition.

Conclusion

The Ghana National Defence Policy is a prime product of the Defence Ministry meant to guide the Armed Forces in their preparations and discharge of constitutionally mandated duties. It covers both peace and wartime expectations and gives adequate guidance required by a professional armed force. That notwithstanding, the policy in its current state can only remain useful if it is reviewed frequently to meet the fast-evolving threat landscape of the country and the increasing security needs of the Ghanaian citizen.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE INVOLVEMENT OF GHANA ARMED FORCES IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

7.0 Introduction

The Ghana Armed Forces is one of the relics of the colonial era in the public sector. Its formation, training regime, structures, equipment, deployment, control, financing, and psyche have all been tailor-made to satisfy the traditional roles of national defence. The first is the primary role – thus the territorial defence of the country – and then the secondary role – the assisting of the civil authorities for the maintenance of law and order in times of internal emergencies. For Colton, an armed forces involvement in public life can be classified into four instances: (1) “Official prerogative” – where the institution has recognized, accepted, and assigned responsibility. (2) “Expert advice” – where experts within the military are permitted to offer their specialist opinions to government on specific issues. (3) “Political bargaining” – where the institution is directly placed in the public domain with its resources being used to achieve set goals. Finally (4) “by Force” – where members of the institution use violence to usurp and arrogate to themselves governance powers contrary to their traditional mandates. In all these instances, the political, international, social, economic, and cultural development of the country and its citizens are positively or adversely affected. Military professionalism is the bridge required to link the military and development if the relationship must be harmonious, fruitful, productive, and without contentions (Welch. C, 1984). This chapter discusses the possibilities and potentials for the of GAF participation in national agenda and in the social life of the citizens with the aim of contributing to national development.

7.1 Ghana Armed Forces in National Development before 1992

The involvement of the Ghana Armed Forces in national development has, over the years preceding the coming into being of the 1992 Constitution, been classified as indirect or passive in nature. This is because all the three Constitutions and their accompanying defence directives situated the main focus of the Ghana Armed Forces on the containment of external threats and justifiably so because the primary call of the traditional military is to go to war against external adversaries. The institution's secondary responsibilities are mostly domestic in nature (Janowitz, 1964). However, in carrying out these core functions, the rippling effects ensured a serene, secure, and peaceful local atmosphere that inured to the benefit of developmental agencies and sectors. The passive contribution of the Ghana Armed to development was therefore in the domains of political, social, economic, and cultural development.

Whilst carrying out the traditional mandate of defending the territorial integrity of the country, the GAF contributed to the defence of the Constitution, protected regimes, provided defence advice to Foreign Missions through the Offices of the Defence Advisors in Ghana's Missions abroad, and the physical protection of highly placed members of the political class such as the President and the facilities of the Executive. These constitute political developmental roles that the GAF played before 1992 and continuous to play today.

7.2 GAF's Involvement in Development beyond 1992

The 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana in Article 210(3) expressly states that the GAF would be involved in development as deemed necessary by the President. This formed a critical aspect of this study. The available literature confirms that in 1972 when a similar decision was taken by the Prime Minister to deploy the GAF on disaster management related duties, it brought some disquiet and was among the reasons listed for the overthrow of the then elected

government of Busia (Ocquaye, 1998). It could thus be a cardinal reason why the framers of the 1992 Constitution decided to craft the role of the GAF to include participation in national development without really defining what that meant. The drafting history of the Constitution however shows some interesting insights into the conceptualization and thinking that the framers of the constitution had at the time. Apart from the indirect contribution to national development in a rather passive manner, they visualized a more active participation in the political, economic, social, infrastructural, agricultural, and human capital development of the country.

7.2.1 Political Advancement

The *travaux preparatoires* of the 1992 Constitution have it that the framers acknowledged the huge potential of the Ghana Armed Forces to positively defend the constitution and advance the political fortunes of the country both domestically and internationally. They were encouraged by Samuel Huntington's observation that the involvement of the military in "extraneous" activities such as partisan politics could adversely affect professionalism. The Constituent Assembly therefore knew that deviant elements within the military could be potential threats to the democratic system being introduced by the 1992 Constitution. To forestall such threats to democracy, the internal security structures incorporated the leadership of GAF at various levels. These included the National Security Council, the Regional Security Councils, and the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Security Councils.

The members and Units of the GAF also play active roles in the internal security set-ups. A majority of military establishments in Ghana are infantry in nature and therefore are deployed in urban, peri-urban, and rural areas across the country. This deployment options give the GAF a maximum potential of getting involved in local governance. These hierarchy of Security

Councils therefore have members of the GAF as active members at all levels. These councils provide the needed advice to the Local Authorities to ensure not just security and safety but that the developmental needs of communities are ensured. In so doing the GAF plays minimum political and governance functions essential for development at both the local and national levels.

Since the coming into being of the 1992 Constitution, the GAF has been involved in the building, protection, and strengthening of some national political institutions and structures. The GAF is a member of the National Election Taskforce meant to ensure the provision of a safe and secure environment for the conduct of political activities and the development of internal democratic activities. Apart from being involved in the decision-making levels, the elements of the military also get involved in direct electoral support duties such as the transport of sensitive electoral material to areas inaccessible by road. Electoral officers are equally transported and protected to such areas. This is done using the air assets of the Air Force and the boats and maritime crafts of the Ghana Navy.

In the performance of these varied political duties, the GAF is expected, and duty bound to remain apolitical in both deed and perception. Contribution to political development has been thus not limited to the defence of the Constitution but also includes the contribution to the growth and maturity of political institutions of the country.

7.2.2 Secondment to Public Institutions

The GAF over the years has been called upon to second experts to other institutions of state. These have mainly been public institutions and the posts have also mainly been at the managerial levels. Examples of these in recent times include commanding the Customs, Excise

and Preventive Services, Prison and Fire Services, the Narcotics Control Board, Security Management at the ports of entry of Ghana and other state institutions, among others. GAF has also seconded officers to sensitive appointments in the aviation and maritime sectors. By their presence and output, the GAF gets to contribute to the advancement of developments in their areas of expertise. Other areas where secondment has taken place is the Local Government sector. Regional and District Secretaries have been appointed from the GAF to administer local government structures. Both retired and serving members of GAF have served the nation in these capacities. Appointing authorities may be counting on the culture of near puritanism of the military. This is because the typical military culture abhors corruption and decadence as emphasis is placed on modesty, frugality, and self-restraint in private life.

7.2.3 Economic Security

The economy of each modern state is the backbone to development. The military in Ghana has been identified as having a role in the economic development of the country. For both local and foreign investors to choose to invest, there is the urgent need for sanity, safety, and security in the communities that make up the country. In addition to the provision of security for economic development, the GAF through its participation in peace support operations bring in substantial sums of money to the government from the United Nations. The UN pays reimbursement to the country for the presence of Ghanaian troops and their equipment in operation theatres.

The Ghana Armed Forces has over the years provided direct protection for sensitive economic activities. The movement of bullions and other valued minerals such as gold requires reliable security. This contribution to development continues to be necessary since transactions are still

largely based on the use of cash in the society. The GAF also provides anti-hijacking services to commercial aircrafts operating from Ghana.

7.2.4 Industrial Development

There are latent potentials in both the set-up and human resource base for the GAF to be active in the manufacturing and industrial sector. The establishment of the Defence Industries Department has set the stage for the optimization of the industrial prospects of the Armed Forces. With initial prospects in shoe making, the sewing of uniforms for security services, and the manufacture of some home appliances the potential of GAF in the sector is very huge. GAF has the potential to refit aircrafts and ships. This capability can be enhanced to cover larger crafts and for commercial purposes too. The local fishing community can also benefit from the services as well as technological transfer. This potential thus, did not escape the notice of the framers of the 1992 Constitution.

7.2.5 Infrastructural Development

Road and bridge constructions are some of the specialities of the engineers of GAF. These have been done over the years but can be better planned to cover all parts of rural Ghana. The potential of the GAF Engineers has never been exhausted in these important fields that can result in a rapid development of road infrastructure especially for the rural areas. The bridge construction capability of the GAF is equally huge. This can be well exploited for both the urban and rural areas relying on both local materials and expertise.

The development of housing using appropriate local technology is yet an area that can be developed. Ghana continues to grapple with housing deficits nationwide. This affects the deployment of public and civil servants to areas where their services are needed. The GAF can

effectively help reverse this situation when given the needed resources, policy direction and support.

Ghana suffers annual floods each year. The main challenge identified has always been said to be poor drainage systems big enough to contain flood waters. Given the capacity of the engineers of GAF they can be engaged to help develop the needed infrastructure to stem the perennial flood related disasters. Natural disasters such as floods, wildfire outbreaks and torrential storms do lead to the displacements of inhabitants and the destruction of houses. The GAF has the potential to construct temporary shelters for such displaced person.

Closely related to the housing sector are sanitation issues and waste management. The GAF can both help in the management and disposal of industrial and domestic waste. This requires partnering with other private institutions with the expertise for the creation of the needed synergy to meet the sanitation needs of the country. The potential of construction and maintenance of bio-gas installations also exist in the GAF. With the right policy direction and investment, this potential could be harnessed and made available to both public and private institutions. In such a case, the generated waste could rather be raw material for the generation of energy for safe use.

Communication infrastructure and technological transfer is yet another area where the potential of GAF can advance the fortunes of the country. With the growing cyber requirements of the country for both domestic and industrial use the security of the cyberspace becomes Paramount. The expertise of GAF communication outfits can be harnessed to fill gaps and design locally suitable programmes at affordable costs. Thus, engagement in public works, engineering

projects, and road construction in rural areas are among the essential developmental activities that the GAF can contribute to national development.

7.2.6 *Crime*

The threat of economic saboteurs has always been present in the country. The fight against normal and organized crime is essentially the duty of the interior Ministry and its actors. However, the GAF as part of its secondary role assists the civil authorities in the fight against crime when need be. The GAF has competence at tracking and sharing of information with the internal security services for the needed arrests and prosecution of suspects engaged in devious activities potent enough to derail developmental gains of the country. These include the activities of drug dealers, smugglers of goods and other essential and subsidized items across the borders whilst evading the payment of taxes. To contribute its quota in the economic domain, the GAF conducts frontier protection duties such as Op Sit-down Look to help curb the activities of economic saboteurs.

7.2.7 *Institutional Exchanges*

Developmental goals can also be achieved by sharing of expertise. In the field of security, the GAF continues to share its expertise with sister security services with the aim of ensuring that there is harmony in practices and cohesion amongst the country's security services. The conduct of joint training sessions often leads to the conduct of joint exercises. These create the needed synergy for the conduct of joint operations to solidify internal security measures and provide congenial atmospheres for national development whilst enhancing peace, safety, and security of citizens.

7.2.8 Social Development

The development of the social sector entails a lot and the GAF can promote the advancement of sport infrastructure and sportsmen to continuously win laurels for the country. The staff levels for numerous disciplines of sports within the GAF have always been quite high. With the right policy and funding, these could be engaged to train, develop, and sustain budding talents for the Sports Ministry.

The continuous participation of GAF in the School Cadet corps system as contained in the National Defence Policy needs to be expanded and the participation of the students encouraged. This offers an opportunity for the instilling of Public Service ethics, societal discipline, and laying the foundation for a generally disciplined youth. This can also contribute to the instilling of nationalistic and patriotic values in the youth. The policy of ensuring that graduates do national service in the military needs to be revisited and enforced.

Instructors drawn from the GAF also get deployed to second cycle schools to handle the Schools Cadet Corps. All these activities are aimed at building and inculcating ethical values and discipline amongst the students thereby making them more patriotic and responsible citizens. By so doing the GAF contributes to the civic education of the youth.

7.2.9 Education

The schools of the Ghana Armed Forces have long been assessed to be among the best in the country due to the discipline exhibited by the teaching staff, non-teaching staff, and students. The schools are open to the general public and a high percentage of students are wards of the civil populace. The Ghana Armed Forces can contribute to the development of life skills, vocational and other handiwork training for the youth. There is a plethora of technical and

artisanal training institutions such as the Catering Training School, the Engineers Training School, the EMMETTS, the Nursing Training College, the School of Trade Training, the Ordnance Training school, the Mechanical Transport Training school, and the Music school among others. These can be strategically coordinated to ensure the youth gets avenues to learn skills that will make them self-employed instead of seeking white collar jobs after training.

7.2.10 Sports and Entertainment

The GAF also contributes to the development of amusement facilities and programmes. The music institutions and bands of Units of the GAF continue to contribute to the entertainment industry of the country. Other amusement activities include the horse-riding facilities, periodic sea trips by the Navy and flights by the Ghana Air Force. These can however be enhanced if the needed vision and resources are provided for a more significant impact.

7.2.11 Health

The GAF has always made available to the general public its medical facilities and personnel. Consequently, Units of the GAF have engaged in vaccination exercises in their local areas of responsibility. The inhabitants close to military health facilities have used these facilities in times of ill-health and need. The 37 Military Hospital itself has been declared the National Disaster Hospital (NDP 2012).

The opening of the doors of GAF's health facilities nationwide to the general public thus constitute a significant contribution to national development. The network of Medical Reception Centres of the GAF which have the status of poly clinics, the sick bays, field hospitals and tertiary hospital facilities complement the health infrastructure of the Ghana Health Service. Additionally, the various units of the Armed Forces in their Areas of

Responsibility are very suited to conduct vaccination exercises in the rural areas. The air-ambulance system is also equally better suited to evacuate accident victims and seriously sick persons from inaccessible areas of the country.

7.2.12 Social Cohesion

Generally, as professionalism deepens in militaries, and as they become more representative of local social structures, the military ethical codes work to suppress ethnic, tribal, parochial, and separatist tendencies (Janowitz, 1964). Professionalism does not only concern standardization and coherence of doctrinal issues, it also covers the application of modern scientific techniques to military training as well as an impersonal approach to recruitment and promotion of personnel. The Ghana Armed Forces by its composition and with a strong sense of nationalism, can be a trusted vehicle for the promotion of national cohesion. With the representation of all groupings and diversity of the nation within the rank and file of the GAF and with a doctrine that abhors highlighting divisions and discrimination, the possibility of ensuring firm commitments to patriotism and nationalism are high. Show casing these values by the GAF could go a long way in promoting cohesion in the society and cementing existing fault-lines between groups. The sustenance by leadership of fights against discrimination of all natures and the fostering of genuine *esprit de corps* among members have rippling effects on the society and need to be encouraged.

7.2.13 Agricultural Development

The Ghana Armed Forces has had stints with agriculture in the country over the decades. Its formations, units and individuals have produced various crops and raised animals both for domestic use and for commercial purposes. This sector can be very vibrant and has great potentials for expansion. The defunct Ghana Armed Forces Farms raised animals and

cultivated crops for commercial purposes for quite some time. The 1992 Constitution's Article 210(3) therefore gives an opening for a further revisit and development of this concept. The GAF has the potential to contribute significantly to the food security of the country. A concerted policy on it needs to be developed for a full realization.

The choice for mechanized and modern methods of farming can be enhanced with the involvement of the mechanical units of GAF which have the potential to develop and deploy implements that meet local conditions. The employment of engineer resources of the GAF can also further develop the access to fields and borehole systems for irrigation of farms for an all-year round farming. The bio-chemical outfits could also assist with seed development and post-harvest management.

Pisciculture or fish farming is yet another area that has been attracted the membership of the Armed Forces. Farming activities have continued to appeal to the units and individuals of the GAF who even compete with established farmers for local awards. Through this the GAF does not only contribute to the food needs of the country but also adds to the developmental strives of the sector.

7.2.14 Environmental

The GAF has been involved in efforts at preserving the forest, flora and fauna of the country over the years from wanton plunder. Consequently, the deployment of teams to assist the Forestry Commission to check the illegal logging and destruction of rare tree species has been a regular exercise. The GAF has also participated in the deliberate planting of trees not only in the units and farmlands, but also in degraded forests such as in Begoro under the supervision of the Forestry Commission (Daily Graphic, 2003).

Closely related to the preservation of the forest is the fight against illegal mining popularly known as “galamsey”. The frequent deployment of soldiers and defence sector assets to monitor, hunt for and prosecute persons engaged in illegal mining activities serves a developmental purpose. This also contributes to the preservation of water bodies both for human and animal consumption, and industrial purposes. Protection of water bodies through the conduct of Operation Vanguard contributes to the preservation of the eco-system as life of creatures in the rivers is also preserved.

7.2.15 National Disasters

Disasters whether natural or caused by the negligence of man happen each year the world over. Unfortunately, they often catch the Ghanaian authorities unprepared. The current organization, structures, locations, psyche, and human/material resource base puts the GAF in a better position to handle disasters. The GAF continues to contribute to mitigating their effects. This however is not sufficient. The involvement in the pre-emptive and preventives measures could prove more useful. They remain domains that have not seen the involvement of GAF despite the existing capacity to achieve results. Reactive measures basically use up resources but with temporary mitigation impacts that bring fleeting relief to victims.

For GAF to fully realise its potential in that domain and for the nation to equally benefit from its capacity, the policy direction, resourcing and institutional set-up must be reviewed to internalize disaster management structures at all levels of governance. The need to get a firm grip on disaster management capacity cannot be overemphasized. Disasters exacerbate pre-existing conflicts and security threat drivers. These have grave implications for peace and security nationwide and can adversely affect national development.

7.3 Human Capital Development

The development of every modern state is based more on its human capital than on the natural resources that it might have. Consequently, the addition of value to the skills of the citizenry should constitute a very important aspect of governance. Both domestic and international institutions need to be used in prosecuting this agenda. In the case of Ghana, the Armed Forces is one of the public institutions that can be relied upon to partner civil authorities to provide this essential need for national development. It serves as a credible training ground for technical and administrative skills which when optimized, will significantly improve the developmental options of the country.

The GAF has a high potential to train pilots for all sorts of aircrafts and other aviation specialists for the local aviation industry as well as for the sub-region. This aspect has been proven over the period as a good number of the staff of the GAF have worked with local and sub-regional aviation industries. The same applies to the maritime industry. Maritime specialists such as ship captains, other senior maritime senior officers, and deck hands can all be trained by the Ghana Navy given the needed retooling and orientation. The GAF has well established veterinary services that can provide both training and direct services as a contribution to the animal husbandry development of the country. Building the capacity of persons in the training and management of dogs in all domains such as guard, narcotics control, and recreational duties can also be carried out by GAF.

Another sphere of study that the GAF can help develop is that of survey and meteorological services. Survey is almost synonymous to the military. The training of professional surveyors, their staff, and assistants can be well done by the military given the needed policy direction.

The GAF can thus partner with schools of learning at all levels to produce a critical mass in areas where it has latent and an explored potential that can contribute significantly to the building of human capital and workforce for national development.

7.3.1 International Image of Ghana

On the International Relations front, the GAF continues to provide Defence Advisory services as a key and integral part of Ghana's Foreign Missions. This role also sees to the safety and security of the Ghanaian diaspora. Recommendations and execution of evacuation of Ghanaian nationals back home in times of emergencies among other functions, are made and piloted by that outfit. The Ghana Armed Forces in promoting good neighbourliness and strengthening ties with African nations, continues to train the future leaders of African armies at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College as well as at the KAIPTC. Ghana's Navy carries out its Show of Flag and Goodwill visits to foreign ports in furtherance of Foreign Policy objectives. The participation of sports teams in international tournaments also deepens the friendly relations with other countries – an ingredient required for development.

The deployment of troops on international peace operation of all natures requires the prior approval of the Foreign Ministry. The Defence Ministry only provides the military actors and the Ministry of Interior provides the civil Police or Prison Service actors as the case may be. Consequently, participation in peace support operations by the military is on the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Benefits and credits for performance thereof as well as contributions to the image of the country on the international stage are therefore due the MFA.

7.3.2 Resistance to GAF involvement in National Development

There is no common position on the exploitation of the potentials of militaries in Africa for national development (Diop, B.2011). Some critics could be of the view that the GAF should concentrate on its core mandate of addressing traditional security challenges to Ghana's sovereignty since an involvement in developmental sectors may water down its potency or detract it from its prime calling. Others may see it as a militarisation of the society and an opportunity for the Executive to call the bluff of equally competent public work force that may periodically demand improved conditions from government. The fear that the civil authority may lose control of the military, which has natural tendencies for being domineering, may become a problem. It is thus understandable if the direct involvement of the military in physical development attracts some amount of dissenting views. However, with an increasingly multi-disciplinary approach to training and doctrinal approach, with a highly enlightened populace, Ghana is mature enough to engage its military in direct development and still ensure her survival.

Conclusion

The Ghana Armed Forces since its creation has contributed its quota to the development of the country in various domains. The lack of a specific policy implicating it in national development and defining its developmental role in explicit terms has however been a challenge over the years. As such its contribution was largely seen as passive and indirect. However, the framers of the 1992 constitution, realizing the huge potential available to the nation within the GAF, added in the Article 210(3) a need for the GAF to be involved in direct developmental roles. It also failed to define the exact roles expected of the GAF in national development. The 2012 National Defence Policy thus went a step further by outlining some of the domains that the GAF can significantly contribute to national development without relegating its core mandate

that also play a passive role in the development of the nation. What remains to be done is how to harness the resource base of the GAF in an attempt to optimize its potentials in support of the developmental aspirations of Ghana. In sum, the Ghana Armed Forces should not only symbolize the pride, sovereignty, and independence of the country but must contribute to the development of the country in all feasible domains so as to remain beneficial and relevant to the citizen for whom the state and its institutions exist. Contribution to national development should thus not end at the strategic level but must transcend all levels and be felt and seen by the ordinary citizen. Key to the success of this concept is a good communication strategy that will address the concerns of the authorities, the beneficiaries, and the actors.

CHAPTER EIGHT

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS

8.0 Introduction

Defence as a product has the basic features of any commodity or service which is not only designed for exchange to meet needs but also to preserve territorial integrity of the country and improving its National Security. Ghana's Defence Policy serves as a blueprint for the Ghana Armed Forces in the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ghana, contribution to Internal Security, as well as taking part in regional and international peace operations (Aboagye, 1999). However, technological, transformational and dynamic nature of issues of security, both at the national and international levels, cannot be overemphasised. The critical question now is *"how relevant will Ghana's Defence Policy be on matters of security?"* This chapter therefore seeks to (i) assess the viability of Ghana's Defence policy in safeguarding National Security, (ii) ascertain the extent to which the Defence Policy framework adapts to transformations within the global context and the expanded mandate of the Ghana Armed Forces and (iii) the implications of the policy and related matters to national development.

Based on this background of information, this chapter discusses the relevance of Ghana Armed Forces Defence Policy. Views from experts within the field of security, various stakeholders in the Defence sector as well as retired and experienced military officers were sought. These views were put together into networks of themes with the global theme, organising themes and basic themes, details are shown in Figure 7.1. Relating to the theme on the relevance of Ghana's Defence Policy, four organising themes were mentioned during the conduct of the key informant interview and these are 'safeguards of national security' ensures 'formalised structures and operations', 'logistics and resource supplies' and 'accountable financial management and resource use'.

8.1 Assessing the viability of Ghana's Defence Policy

The assessment of the viability of Ghana's Defence policy can be seen through the identification of threats; hostility and aggression based on intelligence analysis, the definition of the scope of national security, defence alliances, combat readiness and military organization of national forces. The complexity and nature of the information infrastructure within the Defence policy can have serious repercussions for Ghana's National Security. The security environment is full of uncertainties, very dynamic, facing a lot of threats and challenges that have the tendency of affecting state survival. Therefore, the relevance of the policy to the changes in the security environment has implications for safeguarding National Security. Ghana's Defence policy is therefore expected to adequately contribute to the long-term requirements of national security. This section assesses the views and perspectives of key stakeholders in the Defence sector on how viable Ghana's Defence policy is in safeguarding her national security and the aspirations of her inhabitants. The views from security experts in the study reveal that Ghana's Defence policy should be frequently modified to suite the ever-changing threat landscape to cater for asymmetric warfare, inter-ethnic conflicts, cybercrimes, civil unrest, and terrorism among others. The effective collaboration between the Ghana Armed Forces and other security agencies is clearly stated in the Defence Policy in fighting crimes, civil unrest and other activities that pose threat to security and law and order in the country. For Ghana to boast of a viable Defence Policy, the state's survival and the interests of its citizens must be guaranteed by such a robust policy document.

8.1.1 Safeguarding National Security

The viability of Ghana's Defence policy depends on how it safeguards the national security of the country. Through the direction of this policy, effective threat analysis can be done, terrorism can be detected and the effective collaboration with other security agencies to ensure peace and

security. The contemporary security environment is full of uncertainties, very dynamic, bedecked with a whole lot of traditional and emerging threats and challenges that have the tendency to become more deadly, but the policy provides unique opportunities to avert these threats as well as advance the nation's interests. The policy also provides guidelines to the Ghana Armed Forces in engaging in conventional warfare, rapid deployment, countering a wide spectrum of threats both at home and abroad as well as embarking on joint security operations to meet the security needs of Ghana. The policy again critically assesses and provides specific guidelines and measures to contain imaginary and real threats against Ghana's National Interests.

In this prevailing security environment, no nation is secluded from terrorist and other threats. The transnational nature of most threats makes them global security concerns of which no nation, including Ghana, can handle alone. Therefore, the Defence policy assists in this regard by providing mechanisms for sound threat analysis and early detection of terrorism as well as related threats to safeguard national security. Furthermore, due to the porous, permeable, and not well demarcated nature of Ghana's border, the possibility of any external threat cannot be taken for granted. The policy therefore helps in this regard to completely and satisfactorily combat these border threats that directly affect Ghana's territorial integrity.

Furthermore, other challenges faced by the country such as environmental degradation, water pollution, illegal logging, deforestation, sand winning, indiscriminate plastic waste disposal, unemployment, and illegal mining (*galamsey*) have all become serious threats to national security. The Defence policy therefore seeks to address these challenges by ensuring effective collaboration between the military and other relevant stakeholders such as the Forestry Commission, Lands Commission as well as the Environmental Protection Agency. A recent

action by government to fight illegal mining and prevent the pollution of water bodies resulted in a collaboration among five government ministries (Ministry of Interior, Defence, Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation, Land and Natural Resources Ministry and Local Government and Rural Development Ministry). This led to the formation of a Military – Civil Police Joint Task Force dubbed ‘*Operation Vanguard*’ with a mandate to combat the operations of illegal miners who have depleted Ghana’s forest cover and polluted her water bodies. Here are some of the quotes from the experts during the key informant interview:

“...the face of threats keeps changing, now it is all about asymmetric warfare, terrorism, piracy with the ISIS coming to the front so we will need to have a Defence policy that is going to guide us in confronting our threats and probably from that time, I suppose, to evolving situation we can make modification to them, I think we should have a Defence policy” (Head of operations, GAF, 25 years of experience).

“What they did in this Defence policy was very comprehensive threat analysis, that is the external factors and internal factors and even when you go through it, you will realise that as if the policy was prepared today because most of the issues considered are still happening” (Senior Colonel-Legal Service, GAF, 25 years of experience).

“One thing I can remember very well is the effective collaboration amongst the services of the Ghana Armed Forces that this policy seeks to achieve” (Senior Colonel-Legal Service, GAF, 25 years of experience).

“...seeing the collaboration that existed especially between the military and the police in fighting some crimes or most of the major crimes, I think they are in order just that I feel they react instead of being proactive in dealing with some of these issues” (Research Fellow-GAF).

“...a Defence policy is needed out of which you can draw our National Security strategy based on the security horizon of our time...” (International Relation Expert, 20 years of experience).

“...the most significant threats, particularly internal threats have been noted through this policy” (Infantry Officer-Intelligence Corps, GAF)

These quotes above from security experts reiterate the fact that a country's Defence Sector must be policy driven in order to safeguard her national security and promote internal and international peace. A critical review of other country's Defence policies also highlighted similar importance of a Defence policy to their nation. For instance, a review of the Canadian Defence Policy underlines the importance of their policy which is grounded in a thorough assessment of global security environment, terrorism and cybercrime. Their policy sought to address the threat stemming from terrorism and actions of violent extremist organisations. It also sought to provide assistance to civil authorities and law enforcement agencies, including counter-terrorism, in support of national security and the security of Canadians abroad. Their policy is also designed to detect, deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Canada through intelligence support operations and capacity building. The Defence Policy of Nigeria was designed as a result of the numerous security challenges she has faced. Security issues like human trafficking, kidnapping, drug trafficking, ethno-religious, communal, socio-economic and political conflicts, proliferation of small arms as well as an increasing insurgency of extremist military groups such as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lida'awati wal Jihad, popularly known as Boko Haram have influenced the formulation of the Nigeria Defence Policy. Their policy seeks to combat these security threats through the mobilisation of resources that will guarantee its territorial integrity, protect its citizens and other foreign nationals living in Nigeria from danger, promote her values and legitimate interests as well as enhance the well-being of its people. Their policy also provides clear guidelines that will ensure effective collaboration with both internal and international security agencies to minimise the threats posed to her survival.

The Turkish Defence Policy has adopted anti-terrorism strategies that will be used to fight and combat terrorism. The police, special operations units and village guards were the main security apparatus used in fighting terrorism. Their policy called for a close collaboration among

various stakeholders such as the legislature, academics, think-tanks, media and the general public to safeguard the country's national security.

8.1.2 Formalised Structure and Operations

An important reason for formulating a Defence policy in a country is to streamline and clearly define the structure and operations of the country's Defence agencies. Ghana's Defence policy is a formal written document that guides and gives directives on how the Ghana Armed Forces is structured and should operate. During the expert interview, the participants mentioned some essential responsibilities given by the policy to the structure and operations of the Ghana Armed Forces. They said that Ghana's Defence policy provides direction, it sets out goals and principles, spells out good strategic and tactical options both at internal and international levels. The more dominant view from the experts was the policy spelling out good strategic and tactical operations of the Ghana Armed Forces on both national and international assignments. The Defence policy of Ghana directs the Ghana Armed Forces to develop the capability to achieve robust surveillance and design schemes and strategies in order to counter threats like attacks, raids and strikes staged from hostile countries. The policy further vividly shows the hierarchical structure of the Defence sector in the country which comprises the Minister for Defence as the political head of the Ministry, his two principal advisers, the Chief Director who is a civil servant and the Chief of Defence Staff. With the aid of these two key advisors, the Minister formulates policies and gives policy direction to the Armed Forces. The Chief of Defence Staff is responsible for the operational command and control as well as the administration of the Ghana Armed Forces. Again, the chain of command for the initiation and conduct of military operations flows from the National Security Council through the Minister for Defence to the Chief of Defence Staff and from him to the Service Chiefs. To have a viable policy, orderliness is required. Evidence of the policy formalising the structure and operation

of the Ghana Armed Forces is captured by the following quotes from the key informant interviews:

“The Defence policy has a bearing on your force structure, your doctrine – how you operate and, on the doctrine,, you have operational, strategic and tactical doctrines” **(Retired Diplomat/Army Commander, 42 years of working experience).**

“As for that one it is very relevant because that policy, I think will shape the strategy that the Ghana Armed Forces will have to adopt and once that one is done, it is cast down to the services, the formations and to the various units. So, it is very critical because that will define the line that the country should take as far as Defence issues are concerned” **(General Staff Officer, 27 years of experience).**

“Policies need to set out principles, goals and objectives and empower institutions to discharge various duties” **(Chief Superintendent, Ghana Police Service).**

“... so it is very important to have a policy that governs how the Armed Forces should operate” **(Artillery officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).**

“...If we are setting about to develop it, we are going to patiently pick each of the roles, extract the broad objectives, get a clearance and guidance from the top, and ensure that these are in sync with a strategic level thinking and then condense or break them down into activities, military activities, cost these activities and then when the proposal of the set of military tasks and errr rules of engagement relating to all these acts, set of practice, techniques and procedures associated with all these activities will all be drafted and they will all accompany such documents that will now be imputed item by item...” **(Armour officer-GAF, 21 years of experience)**

The Defence policy of Canada for instance has set up various special units assigned for special operations. Thus, the policy set up the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) mandated to expand its operational capacity as well as invest in capabilities that enable rapidly deployable and agile Special Operations Forces (SOF) to provide unique skills both at home and abroad. Their policy further tasks the Canadian Armed Forces to operate across a wide spectrum of operations and leverage new technologies to maintain Canadian Armed Forces interoperability with allies and an operational advantage over potential

adversaries. The Canadian Defence policy also designed strategies to improve cryptographic capabilities, information operations capabilities, cyber capabilities to include cyber security and situational awareness projects, cyber threat identification and response and the development of military-specific information operations and offensive cyber operations capabilities able to target, exploit, influence and attack in support of military operations (Wu and Fetterly, 1990).

Moreover, the Common African Defence and Security Policy has streamlined some structures within the African Union and have assigned them some responsibilities. The Council for Peace and Security has an oversight responsibility of early warning mechanisms, meant for responding in time to African conflict and crisis situations. The Council together with other bodies within the Union facilitates peace, security, and stability in Africa through the use of early warning and preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, peace-making operations and interventions, peace building and post-conflict, humanitarian campaigns and crisis management (Touray, 2005). Similar operational structures can be located in the Nigerian Defence policy which through their Constitution provides for an advisory body on Defence, the National Defence Council, made up of the President, the Vice President, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff and the Service Chiefs with powers to advise the President on matters relating to the Defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Nigeria. This security advisory body created by the Defence policy of Nigeria is seen as a key component of the nation's security architecture involving all security agencies and ministries dealing with security issues (National Defence Policy, 2006).

8.1.3 Logistics and Resources

The Defence policy of Ghana has been crucial to the existence of the Ghana Armed Forces and other security agencies as a result of the provision it has made for the supply of logistics and resources (material and human) to ensure a formidable security force in Ghana. The policy asserted that quality military personnel remain the most critical asset of the Defence establishment. The quality of officers and soldiers continues to be a deciding factor in all future military and security operations both at the national and international level. The policy further stated that high priority should be given to initiatives and programmes that will support recruitment and enlistment of personnel based on regional balance, ethnic neutrality, quality of life, and the training and education of men and women in the rank and file of the Armed Forces. It also called for professional training at all levels of advancement in the force to safeguard competence and institutional integrity. Adequate personnel motivation and well-developed career progression plans that will ensure and guarantee job satisfaction is also vividly spelt out in the policy. The policy was also loud in trumpeting adequate Defence logistical supplies for the security forces in terms of arms, ammunitions, armour cars, adequate uniforms and protective gears that will ensure self-sufficiency in Defence logistics. Within the concept of Defence logistics as stipulated in the policy, issues of compatibility and inter-operability with respect to equipment procurement and maintenance are addressed. The policy is also not silent on budgetary issues, where it stated that the state should make adequate budgetary allocations commensurate with National Security and Defence requirements to the Ministry of Defence. Similar comments made by the experts during the key informant interviews are as follows:

“I will be forced to say training and equipment, because they are the fundamental basis on which Armed Forces strive, having the right equipment and the right training will be the best way errr to make a force that is efficient and capable of serving the nation”
(Armour officer, GAF, 21 years of experience).

“Budgeting, procurement, and resource management should be done with the active participation of the sectors concerned. Additionally, internally generated funds should

also be subjected to public financial laws/procedures. All these require policies to be effective” (Principal Analyst, Narcotics Control Board, 15 years of experience).

“Policies are the determinants of what we do and are thus very necessary to justify why resources should be allocated to institutions” (Chief Supt. Regional Fire Service HQ, Tamale, 20 years of experience).

“...itself is going to change troop contributing country policy, because I have seen a draft policy and implementation date where in the future troops must be on standby, so let’s say if Ghana is supposed to provide an infantry battalion, the entire infantry battalion must be there with all its equipment on stand-by and depending on the level of stand-by the country is paid a certain amount of money...” (Infantry Officer, GAF, 20 years of experience).

Issues concerning Defence logistical support and resource provision for security forces are not unique to Ghana, in other words, other Defence policies of different nations have also similar provisions. For instance, the Turkey Defence policy has tasked the Ministry of Defence to carry out financial and budgetary services of the national defence functions and see to the procurement of weapons, vehicles, equipment, logistics, materiel, and supplies. Furthermore, financial and inventory accounting/auditing within the framework of the principles, priorities, and main programmes are determined by the Turkish General Staff. In accordance with the Defence policy of the Armed Forces such decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers (Wiśniewski, 2015). Additionally, the provision of logistics and resources for the Nigeria Army is one important component of the Defence Policy of Nigeria. The policy thus states that the success and effectiveness of the Nigeria security forces largely depend on the commitment and political will of its members as well as the resources provided by Nigeria. Similarly, for the Ghana Armed Forces to implement a viable Defence Policy, the accompanying resources are very essential.

8.1.4 Accountable Financial Management and Resource Use

One effective way to sustain Defence structures in order to meet desired objectives is to ensure prudent financial management and resource use. For instance, funding and good budgetary allocation are necessary for peace support operations and all other national assignments. Transparent financial management as well as Defence budgeting are essential to ensuring the integrity of all defence activities and reducing the potential for corruption in the Defence sector. The allocation of funds and other resources to defence activities clearly supports the attainment of security, defence objectives and the implementation of military strategy by the Ghana Armed Forces. The policy demands cost definition criteria that can be used in the determination of the content of programs and activities that comprise the Defence budget. The basic reasons for these distinctions are to allow for more informed resource allocation decisions and to establish criteria for determining which costs are appropriate to the various Defence allocations of GAF.

Perspectives on accountable financial management and resource use from the interview include recycling resources, auditing use of resources as well as ensuring effective budgetary and resource allocation. Here are some of the quotes from the interview confirming these assertions:

“Whilst expecting the institutions to be frugal and judicious in the use of their allocated resources, government should equally be interested in meeting her part of the bargain. That is providing the resources and budgetary allocation on a timely basis” (Deputy Director, Ghana National Ambulance Service, 13 years of experience).


“We can certainly demand that the institutions be prudent, accountable and more forward looking in their financial management...” (Chief Superintendent, Ghana Police Service, 22 years of experience).

“Budgeting, procurement and accounting must be done properly at all times and corrupt officials dealt with. Best practices should also be assessed for lessons” (Lt Col/Deputy Director-GAF, 32 years of experience).

“Auditing and judicious use of resources should also be actively practised” (Deputy Director, NADMO Tamale, 17 years of experience).

In Ethiopia, the military budgetary process is a major part of the annual national budgeting system of the country. Their military budget begins at zero every year; in other words, the sector undertakes only annual budgeting. There is no medium-term perspective to military budgeting. The Ministry of National Defence (Budget Department) prepares a consolidated military budget, which includes collection of revenues from the sale of surplus property, medical services, aviation services and equipment from welfare stores or canteens (Omitoogun and Hutchful, 2006). For Kenya, the most immediate potential security threats to her are from the neighbouring countries; therefore, based on the external threat analysis, a substantial amount of military expenditure has been related to these threats. The level of military spending over the period 1990-2003 was an average of 1.9 per cent of GDP.

Figure 8. 1: Thematic Network on Viability of Ghana Armed Forces Defence Policy



Source: Researcher - Field work, 2018

8.2 Ghana's Defence Policy adaptation to transformation within the global context and expanded mandate of GAF

8.2.1 International Defence Arrangements

The contribution of the Ghana Armed Forces to maintaining international peace through regional and international bodies like the Economic Community of West African States, African Union, and the United Nations cannot be underestimated. However, the efficiency of the Ghana Armed Forces on foreign assignments may be better appreciated when guided by a well-documented, robust, and operational Defence Policy.

On the basis of the above assertions, this section discusses the relevance of Ghana's Defence Policy to the changing landscape of international politics and diplomacy. It also examines the views of experts solicited during key informant interviews on the subject matter understudied. This section also discusses how Defence policies of other jurisdictions relate to International Relations. The Policy directs the full participation of Ghana in Peace Support Operations under the auspices of the UN, AU and ECOWAS.

“Even when we leave here to conduct security operations in other countries under UN or under other international bodies like ECOMOG, it becomes more relevant to have a policy” (Operations Officer-GAF, 25 years of experience).

“...it is also relevant for the immediate regional groupings like ECOWAS, why, because again globalization is creating its own negatives and part of it is cross border and transnational organized crime including insurgencies and terrorism. If terrorism has no boundaries, the whole globe is a territory and a launch pad for them. It stands to reason that adjoining countries and/or countries close to each other need to learn something from each other and in a coordinated effort also protect their territorial integrities. So, a Defence Policy is needed” (International Relations Expert, 23 years of experience).

“Defence and Diplomacy issues such as bi-lateral relations, multi-lateral relations, relations with sub-regional and regional bodies and relations with international institutions. The effective collaboration of several Ministries is there for required” (Infantry officer, 13 years of experience).

8.2.2 Developing Formal Relationship with Other Countries

The Defence Policy recognises the ever-changing international landscape, maritime environment and airspace. It therefore considered international cooperation essential for ensuring security because many of the threats (terrorism) cannot be addressed single handedly. The policy advocates for close coordination of policies with other countries in advancing broader national security and foreign policy objectives. It stresses commitment to collective and collaborative arrangements with allies in addressing security challenges and this view was dominant among the experts interviewed. This highlights the importance of the Ghana Armed Forces developing a good working relationship with the security agencies in other countries and international bodies. Furthermore, Ghana's Defence Policy acknowledges diplomacy as a important tool for shaping her relationships with neighbours and the international environment. This serves, to a large extent, the national interest and economic growth of the country as well as countering external threats to Ghana's national security. Thus, as far as Ghana's Defence Policy is concerned, the importance of preventive diplomacy in dealing with conflict, promotion of regional security, forceful articulation of Ghana's national interest and peaceful resolution of disputes cannot be overemphasized. Similar comments were shared during the expert interviews in which the importance of international politics and diplomacy in shaping Ghana's Defence Policy was duly acknowledged.

“Again, concerning our relationship with other countries and good neighbourliness, you can only be relevant to someone outside if you yourself are safe at home” (Artillery Officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).

In 2018, Canada and the Ghana Armed Forces announced the establishment of a bilateral training and technical assistance partnership through the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operation in order to increase the Ghana Armed Forces' deployment of women to UN peace operations. Ghana has collaborated with numerous African military forces over the years.

8.2.3 *Joint Military Training*

The Defence Policy laid emphasis on joint military training serving as a good interface in fostering not only international relations between the militaries of countries but also civil-military relations. It directs that the Ministry of Defence shall continue with the policy of promoting avenues for regular interaction through training at designated military institutions within and outside the country. The Ministry of Defence therefore continues to pursue the policy of joint leadership training for senior military officers in and outside the country at Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre and the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, the Ghana Military Academy, the Army Combat Training School and the Jungle Warfare School. These facts were also duly acknowledged by experts during the key informant interview.

“If joint training is conducted frequently between the militaries of the sub-region, then all difficulties will be surmounted. There is the need for coordination of all available efforts. Resources should also be harnessed from all member states for the benefit of all else. Then alone can the required synergy be generated.” (Retired Diplomat/Army Commander-GAF, 42 years of experience).

“Thankfully, quite a number of the countries train their officers together. By so doing they get to know each other’s doctrines and procedures. This is a sure way of getting the various sub regional armed forces to overcome their inter-operability challenges” (General – Brigade Commander, 33 years of experience).

“We have to ensure we do joint training, joint exercises... It shouldn’t be said “ this is Ghana and this is what we should use”. Equipment should be procured from one source and then people who are going to operate them be trained on those equipment, whether the person is from Burkina Faso or he is from Guinea Bissau, they have the same equipment and they are trained to use them” (Artillery Officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).

“I started asking myself why even other African countries bring their personnel for training in Ghana and that goes to show the quality of the training Ghanaian military gives to its own and for this reason other African countries will want their military trained here in Ghana” (Research Fellow-GAF).

Ghana and Canada have adopted a joint security training program that has enhanced the bilateral relationship between these two countries. For instance, Canada provides training to the Ghana Armed Forces through the Department of National Defence's Military Training and Cooperation Program, which aimed at enhancing the interoperability of peace support operations among Canada's partners, and expands and reinforces bilateral Defence relations. Internally, there are joint training/exercise modules that are periodically held with other Security and Defence Sector stakeholders.

8.2.4 Guides in Signing Military Pacts

Signing military pacts between nations requires some amount of bureaucratic functions and procedures. Therefore, having a Defence policy to provide specific and detailed guidelines to undergo these bi-lateral agreements and cooperation is therefore necessary. During the interview, experts expressed their divergent views on how Ghana's Defence policy will guide the Ministry of Defence in advising the Executive in signing of military pacts and other international treaties with Defence implications.

"...it is necessary that the sub-region sets up an inter-dependent security structure that will ensure the safety and security of all member states of ECOWAS. I think ECOMOG did well and ways must be found to retain its competence and experience" (**Deputy Director-Ghana Health Service - 13 years of experience**).

"...the current Defence policy touched on the establishments of foreign military bases in Ghana and their implications" (**Infantry officer-Intelligence Corps, GAF, 13 years of experience**).

"...we know that there are only two strong military forces when it comes to those things. It is Ghana and Nigeria. They have the troops when it comes to the West African sub region" (**Acting Director of Logistics GAF, 23 years of experience**).

"I think that the Defence policy should indicate which support that Ghana will be in a position to give in this case to the ECOWAS Stand-by Force if purely engineer support and the UN peacekeeping is just a battalion. It should also indicate the instances that Ghana is authorised or Ghana will take part in an intervention forces or intervention"

operations within the sub-region” (Operations Officer-GAF, 25 years of experience).

From the above quotes, it is clear that there is a need for Defence policies of various nations to be clear on the procedures to be followed when it comes to signing of treaties and military partnerships in favour of the Defence sector of nations. Furthermore, it is clear that military alliances/pacts among countries certainly involve some cost, which must be offset by some benefits either via trade or war. Without having any relationship, countries are not able to coordinate either in attacking or defending. In other words, signing of military pacts among countries guided by their respective Defence policy can be fairly expensive, but still serve a purpose of making clear who could defend who in various situations (Jackson and Nei, 2015).

8.2.5 *International Conflict Management*

As Ghana continues to enjoy relative peace with her neighbours, there are also potentials of threats arising basically from unresolved geo-political issues relating mainly to un-demarcated borders. The recent maritime dispute between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire over oil exploration is a typical example. Further, the permeable and not well demarcated international borders are a potential source of conflict in terms of border violation and external aggression. The other sources of threat are terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, attacks on national information infrastructure via ICT, environmental degradation, dumping of toxic waste, weapons of mass destruction, local conflicts, and unrest in neighbouring countries that could have spillover effects. Others include illegal migration, gun running, cyber-crimes, violent extremism, and poverty. On the basis of the above realities, Ghana’s Defence policy should provide guidelines and protocols to ensure that Ghana manages these issues of international conflicts with some sense of diplomacy and professionalism.

“There is a need, I started by saying that some countries in the sub-region are conflict minded and ECOWAS arrangements are all based on conflict resolution. The same zeal with which we want to tackle conflict or deal with it requires collaboration in order to be effective.” (Senior Colonel-Legal Service, GAF).

8.2.6 Managing Cross-Border Threats

The management of cross-border threats involves a well-defined national and international border agency control and surveillance system which involves substantial risk analysis and relevant crime related intelligence. For this to be effective, a well-documented policy needs to provide clear protocols and guidelines to regulate the movement of people and goods across the borders. Some of the issues implicated in border threat management in Ghana include, but are not limited to, money laundering, human, drug and weapon trafficking, terrorism, refugee influx and animal movement. However, Ghana’s Defence policy is silent on procedures to ensure good cross-border management. Additionally, the implementation of ECOWAS protocol on free movement of goods and services is problematic and runs contrary to the dictates of the conduct of OP COW LEG by GAF against the presence of nomadic herdsmen. Some views were expressed by experts during the key informant interview and they are as follows:

“A Defence Policy will set the environment in a holistic and unbiased manner. The Ghana Armed Forces for instance will be required to hold itself in readiness to support all that is required for the effectiveness e.g the ECOWAS security architecture to contain threats to stability and security” (General Staff – Command Operations Officer, 25 years of experience).

“Errr, one critical thing the policy should also focus on is the rising asymmetric nature of warfare, terrorism and counter terrorism” (Chief Instructor-GAF, 25 years of experience).

Sosuh (2011), in his paper titled “Border Security in Ghana: Challenges and Prospects” discussed some international best practices, which serve as a guide to inform and help border security practitioners and other key stakeholders to develop policies, programs and processes

for various strategies for mitigating cross-border threats in Ghana. These best practices enhance cooperation between subordinate units within a border agency. They describe the effective and efficient internal cooperation and management of workflow processes, information exchange, as well as resource management within an agency responsible for specific tasks. Another best practice is developing and establishing comprehensive remote border area surveillance programs. Effective surveillance of remote border areas and border zones adjacent to official ports of entry is required to prevent persons from bypassing official border controls in order to avoid checks, smuggle commodities and persons, infiltrate to conduct possible terrorist attacks and attempting to enter or leave a state's territory illegally. For example, in fulfilling effective border surveillance duties, border guards could be used for both stationary and mobile roles. There could also be the development of a National Border Monitoring Programme.

8.2.7 Keeping International Peace

Ghana, as a member of the community of nations, is obliged to support international and regional activities towards international peace and security. In this case, the Ghana Armed Forces has been actively involved in both past and on-going international peace keeping operations. As a matter of facts and figures, the personnel of the Ghana Armed Forces and Ghana Police Service have served as UN peacekeepers since the early 1960s. Since their first participation in the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), over 80,000 Ghanaian military, police and civilian personnel have served in various capacities in more than 30 UN missions (Aning and Aubyn, 2015). In demonstrating Ghana's commitments to the objectives of the United Nations, African Union and Economic Community of West African States, the policy stipulates that the Armed Forces shall be well trained and adequately equipped to effectively participate in such international activities and also contribute its forces to the AU/ECOWAS Standby Forces. In order to achieve this, there is a need for close coordination of policies with

ECOWAS and AU member states. Other suggestions were articulated by the experts during the key informant interview.

“...I know keeping international peace is part of it and so how we relate in the international peace or peace support operation is also very key” (Artillery Officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).

It is also important to note that the decision-making process that governs the deployment of peacekeepers occurs at two stages: strategic and operational. It is governed by an institutional procedure adopted by the military as a guide. The key actors involved at the strategic stage comprise the President, Cabinet, Parliament, Minister of Defence, Minister of Interior, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ghana Armed Forces Council and Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The decision on the supply of troops remains the sole prerogative of the President, who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Ghana Armed Forces according to the Articles 57(1) of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana. However, the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is paramount. Again, before any decision is taken, an internal threat assessment will be conducted to ensure that the absence of personnel will not have any adverse impact on the country in terms of the government's ability to deal with any potential national security crises. This threat assessment will be carried out by the CDS, Ghana Armed Forces Council with the support of the GAF's International Peace Support Operation (IPSO) dept and the International Relations Department of the Ghana Police Service (Aning and Aubyn, 2015).

8.2.8 Effective Inter-Regional Conflict Resolution

There are some strategies that are often used in resolving conflicts among states and even regions. These strategies include mediation, negotiation, diplomacy, arbitration, reconciliation, pre-emptive deployment of troops and imposition of sanctions. For all these strategies to be effective, a Defence Policy must appropriately provide clear guidelines to effectively deal with

conflicts that bedevil the African continent. Here are some comments by experts on the role of Ghana's Defence Policy in ensuring effective inter-regional conflict resolution worth citing:

"...because of the role it plays also on the international scene beyond ECOWAS, you know the world is now faced with this kind of warfare, a kind of cyber warfare, a kind of low intensity conflict all over the place therefore interventions are very much needed, we cannot say that something is far off from us and therefore we are not part of it" **(International Relations Expert, 20 years of experience).**

"All based on conflict resolution then if the same zeal with which we want to tackle that or deal with it, that network collaboration must come to play" **(Senior Colonel, Legal Service-GAF, 25 years of experience).**

Clearly, Ghana's Defence policy lacks detailed procedures and processes that should be followed to resolve conflicts either through violent and non-violent means. This notwithstanding, it gives a general guide that allows the use of controlled initiative on the part of actors who may develop the fine details. However, ECOWAS protocols on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance on Defence have been designed basically to solve inter-regional conflicts and other issues of security. For instance, the ECOWAS protocol on modalities of intervention and assistance (Article 13) states that all member states must agree to place at the disposal of the Community, earmarked units from the existing National Armed Forces in case of any armed intervention. Furthermore, the protocol entreats members to desist from pledging, inspiring or overlooking acts of rebellion, aggression and violence against the territorial integrity of other States in the community (Article 2, ECOWAS Protocol). The protocol entreats all member States to adopt peaceful means of solving disagreements and battles (Article 5, ECOWAS Protocol).

8.2.9 Nation Building

On the contribution of the Defence Policy to ensuring nation building, the participants mentioned that the Defence Policy stipulates some responsibilities of the Ghana Armed Forces.

These responsibilities ensure that the military takes part in activities other than Defence that ensures that they contribute to the infrastructure, economic, human capital development, agricultural, political, and social development of the country. These include, but are not limited to, building of schools, hospitals, assisting during times of disasters and other social responsibilities. The Defence Policy therefore provides clear guidelines that will ensure that the military plays this secondary role without losing focus of its traditional role of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country. The policy further requires the Ghana Armed Forces to provide relief and restoration of essential services during natural and man-made disasters by closely collaborating with the NADMO, the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and other relevant agencies and organisations. The policy also states that the Ghana Armed Forces shall conduct search operations both at home and abroad depending on the exigency of the situation by well trained and equipped personnel within the force. The policy also directed the Ministry of Defence to put its resources either human or material at the disposal of the nation for socio-economic development to be accelerated. The Defence policy further directs the establishment and development of adequate Defence infrastructure and provision of strategic reserves that are commensurate with national Defence requirements. The Ghana Armed Forces has an essential role to play in the rehabilitation of road and railway networks, airfields/ airstrips, ports and harbours and inland waterways and telecommunications. These are considered important for national Defence and Security as well as socio-economic development. This was also clearly outlined during the key informant interviews by some relevant stakeholders in the Defence Sector:

“To be seen to be useful we must be seen to be involved in contributing to the development of society in any way possible. The construction of urinals for schools, little bridges for kids to cross to school etc. A bit of self-help projects such as leading clean-up exercises” (Retired Diplomat/Army Commander –GAF, 42 years of experience).

“The GAF needs to contribute meaningfully to development of the country. For instance, the health facilities should be made more available to the public. Engineers should be building bridges in the rural areas etc. If the military uses its staff and machinery for the direct benefit of the general public, the civil populace will certainly consider it to be relevant” (Retired Diplomat/Brigade Commander/UN Special Representative of the Secretary – General, 43 years of experience).

“We are still relevant, and I think errr, our resources are available so that when we are required to operate as a force, we will provide the necessary support required of us” (Acting Director of Logistics at the Army HQ, 23 years of experience).

In this fast changing and globalised world, the changing dynamics of the role that the military plays in performing its duties cannot be underestimated. The role of the military providing some developmental assistance in other sectors of the economy is not unique to Ghana but can be found in other jurisdictions across the globe. For instance, a critical review of Canada’s Defence Policy revealed that the policy has an aim to contribute to social, economic and geo-political developments by offering support and funding for scholarship programs for Masters and Post-Doctoral students.

8.2.10 Internally Generated Funds

A search for alternative and innovative ways of generating funds (fund raising) to support the Defence sector is another means through which prudent financial management and resources control can be effectively handled. The Defence Sector is full of activities and programmes hence it requires adequate funds and resources to effectively implement them. Generation of funds by GAF will serve as a supplement to the Defence budget received from central government. Some of the suggestions obtained from the expert interview regarding generating funds internally are as follows:


“Leaders must find innovative ways of raising funds from both public and private sources to support budgetary allocations” (Chief Staff Officer -Commodore, 30 years of experience).

“Institutions need to be encouraged to raise internally generated funds to supplement that which comes from central coffers” (Ghana Health Service - Hospital Administrator, Tamale Regional Hosp. 18 years of experience).

“...the possibilities of generating funds internally to cater for some minor expenses must be exploited” (Principal Staff Officer-GAF, 26 years of experience).

“Departments need to be encouraged to raise funds internally to cater for some costs” (Deputy Director-GAF, 17 yrs of experience).

Figure 8. 2: Thematic Framework Relevance of GAF Defence Policy to Changing International Relations



Source: Researcher -Field work, 2018

8.3 Implications of Ghana's Defence Policy for National Development

Ghana's Defence policy came into being in July 2012, drawing its authority from the 1992 Constitution which vividly stipulates the roles of the Ghana Armed Forces at national and international levels. The policy also sets out to ensure peace, security and national cohesion and thus generates a friendly environment where national objectives and development would be achieved. The National Defence Policy does not only provide guidelines on issues of security but also vividly stipulates the role of the military and other security agencies in providing developmental roles that contributes to national development. The policy states that the Ghana Armed Forces should be trained and equipped to provide relief and assistance in collaboration with other agencies like NADMO, during natural and man-made disasters. The policy further directs the Ghana Armed Forces to be trained and equipped to conduct search and rescue operations both at home and abroad depending on the exigency of the situation. This therefore requires the establishment of specialized units for such tasks. Again, the Defence Policy directs that the Ministry of Defence to put its resources, both human and material at the disposal of the nation to accelerate socio-economic development. It called for the restructuring and re-equipping of specialized units within the forces to achieve this national objective.


The Defence policy further directs the establishment and development of adequate Defence infrastructure and provision of strategic reserves that are commensurate with national Defence requirements. The Ghana Armed Forces has an essential role to play in the rehabilitation of road and railway networks, airfields/airstrips, ports and harbours and inland waterways and telecommunications which are vital for national Defence and Security as well as socio-economic development. This section therefore considers and analyses the views of experts in the Defence

sector and also senior and experienced military officers on the developmental roles played by the Ghana Armed Forces. This point is considered as an important policy framework that has a possibility of making the Ghana Armed Forces a more effective national institution.

As Ghana's Defence policy has a mandate of safeguarding the country's national security, this in turn has implications on national development. Al-Marshat (1985) suggested that national security is more than territorial defence and should focus on the "physical, social and psychological quality of life of a society and its members both in the domestic setting and within the large regional and global system" (Awosusi and Ogbuleke, 2019). According to Mathew (1989), global development now suggests the need for another analogous broader definition of national security to include resources, environmental and demographic issues (Ebeh, 2015). National security practically touches on all spheres of human existence. The best way to approach it is from the system theory perspective where a dislocation in any particular area of the system is bound to have an overlapping effect on other areas. It ranges from food security to issues of environmental degradation and health. It also encompasses psychological security as well as armed security.

From the above we can see that national development can be anchored on security. For instance, incidents of violence like ethnic crises, vandalism, vigilantism, armed robberies, kidnapping, murders and other social vices can create insecurity and therefore hinder development of some infrastructures and foreign investments.

Figure 8. 3: Thematic Presentation of Impact of NDP on National Development



Source: Researcher’s Construct, 2018.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Ghana’s Defence policy over the years of its existence has undergone various stages of effective implementation vis-à-vis the changing global Defence systems, dynamic international security systems and national security. This dynamism has implications for development not only in the Defence Sector but also other sectors such as health, economy, agriculture, education, religion, and social development. Consequently, ensuring that policy remains robust and has the buy-in of Sector stakeholders and affiliates is very essential to confirm its usefulness in the public space.

CHAPTER NINE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the study and conclusions drawn from the data presented in Chapter Six. It also discusses the implications of the study for actions taken on Defence matters especially how they impact on national development. It thus seeks to answer the questions raised pursuant to the set objectives of the study. The chapter ends with recommendations for policy makers, stakeholder practice, and for future researchers.

9.1 Summary of Findings

The objective of the study is to assess the viability of Ghana's Defence Policy in safeguarding national security, to understand the adaptation of the Policy to global transformation with the nature of security threats confronting states and the implications of these dynamics on the country's development.

The study used an exploratory research design to conduct an in-depth exploration of available data as well as other sources in order to gain more insight into the relevance of Ghana's Defence Policy to the core mandate of the Ghana Armed Forces for protecting state sovereignty from external threats and internal aggression. More specifically, the study interviewed key stakeholders in the Defence and Security sector comprising retired Army Commanders, retired diplomats, senior officers, legal practitioners in security matters and International Relations experts.

Appointees at the Defence ministry, and serving officers were also involved. This chapter summarises the major findings from the study, the study limitations and some recommendations for the scientific and policy communities.

9.1.1 Assessing the viability of Ghana's Defence Policy in safeguarding National Security

Ghana's Defence Policy has aided in safeguarding the country's national security. This was possible through the guides it provides in conducting threat analysis by mapping security zones, and deployment of troops to volatile areas. The policy is viable and potent for the detection of conventional, asymmetric, and terrorist related threats through early security warning arrangements/systems by ensuring surveillance and effective border security.

Furthermore, the policy provides clear guidelines on effective collaborations between the Ghana Armed Forces and other security agencies. Joint operations by the military and police to fight major crimes and joint security training among agencies are encouraged by the NDP. However, safeguarding the national security of the country requires adequate provision of resources and logistics. The policy therefore directs the provision and distribution of adequate human and material resources and other logistics like specialist equipment for the Ghana Armed Forces to effectively carry out its mandate.

Closely related to this is the adequacy of budgetary allocations, accountable financial management and provision of other logistic resources. In the quest to safeguard the country's national security, the Defence Policy gives a place of importance to budgetary issues and financial

management of resources for GAF to achieve its mandate with the spirit of probity and accountability.

9.1.2 Adaptation of Ghana's Defence Policy to transformations within the global context and expanded mandate of GAF

Ghana's Defence Policy has been adapted appreciably to the fluid global transformation of security threats. This is evident in the active involvement of GAF in international Defence arrangements of international organisation such as UN, AU and ECOWAS. This partnership has resulted in Ghana's participation in peace support operations worldwide. The policy also made room for international cooperation with other countries having recognised the ever-changing international security landscape, maritime, and airspace. To achieve this, the policy provides specific guidelines to guide the signing of bilateral and multilateral agreements, signing of military pacts and other international treaties.

The Defence Policy recognises the possibility of threats arising basically from unresolved geo-political issues, border violations, drug and human trafficking, illicit arms trafficking between her and the neighbouring countries. These possibilities have necessitated the need for the Defence Policy to provide clear guidelines and protocols in resolving these issues with diplomacy and professionalism. However, Ghana's Defence Policy, in its current state, does not provide much details on these aspects. The general direction is given but the operational details are muted and left to the field actors.

Additionally, the Defence policy was explicit in providing clear guidelines that will ensure that the Ghana Armed Forces plays its secondary role effectively without losing focus of the traditional role of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the nation. The policy directs the Ghana Armed Forces to provide relief and response services during natural and man-made disasters by closely collaborating with other institutions such as NADMO, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and other relevant agencies and organisations. The policy also directed the Ministry of Defence to put its resources either human or material at the disposal of the nation for socio-economic development to be accelerated. In this regard, the National Defence Policy was found to have mainstreamed a people-centred approach in the use of Defence Sector resources.

9.1.3 Implications of Ghana's Defence Policy for National Development

Ghana's Defence Policy provides guidelines on issues of Defence and Security as well as stipulates the role of the Ghana Armed Forces in the national developmental agenda. In other words, as the Defence Policy has a mandate of safeguarding national security and this has implications on national development, development is anchored on security, thus the absence or minimisation of violence as expressed in incidents such as ethnic conflicts, terrorism, kidnapping, armed robbery, murders and other social vices creates a secure environment and peaceful atmosphere for development in all sectors to thrive. The nexus between development and the absence of societal tensions related to crime and violence cannot be overemphasised.

Other Findings

Other significant findings of the study include the following:

- The country's Defence Sector has always had a Defence Policy contrary to the perception that no Defence policies were in use in the country.
- The awareness of the existence of the policy and what it contains was however not widespread not because it is not available but because stakeholders believed they could work without consulting it daily thereby relying on routine response to Defence and security issues.
- Though the Defence Policy makes room for periodic review the current Defence Policy has not been reviewed since 2012. That is to say that Ministers of Defence have not been proactive enough since 2012 to review what was formulated even in minor details.
- The logic of subordination of the Armed Forces to civilian control has not only been reinforced in the Defence Policy but it has been internalized by the institution and its members.
- The Defence Policy has built-in mechanisms to have the sector stakeholders come out with subsidiary policies such as an anti-terrorism policy, maritime and water resources Defence Policy, flexible/need-based training policy, and media policy to help guide and regulate the Defence Sector governance.
- By being people-centered and tacitly supporting Article 120(3) of the 1992 Constitution, the NDP in its organization and content enhances Ghana's National Security significantly by mainstreaming the place of the citizen in all Defence matters.
- The NDP chooses good neighborliness and the promotion of peaceful co-existence over violent means of solving disputes with others. This is further reinforced by a flexible approach to adapting to the ever-evolving threat landscape of the ECOWAS

sub-region. A major finding of the study therefore is that the NDP is very responsive to traditional, current, and emerging threats not only within the boundaries of Ghana but of the sub-region and beyond.

- It was found that for the Defence Sector to operate in a sustainable and cost-effective way, the stakeholders need to be constantly guided by the avoidance of duplication of roles, de-conflicting of points of tension and disputes, and the reduction of waste. These can only be attained if interest is generated and sustained by the leadership of the stakeholders. The study revealed that the involvement of stakeholders in decision making relative to policy making could satisfy this requirement.
- It was discovered that the Defence Sector remains very relevant not just to the survival of Ghana but is also intrinsically linked to the well-being of all inhabitants of the land. To make this an enduring status, a proactive conduct of monitoring and evaluation devoid of biases should be done on a frequent basis. Additionally, it was found that there is the critical need for the security and Defence sectors to be demystified that civil society could better appreciate them, know their role in helping sector stakeholders and feel the relevance of the sectors.
- Other significant observations worth mentioning include the lack of depth in the conduct of consultation with stakeholders, including CSOs, during the drafting/review of Defence Policies. There are apparent disparities and contradictions between aspects of the NDP and some provisions of ECOWAS protocols to which Ghana is a signatory. The practice of restructuring of GAF without taking into cognizance institutional memory leading to avoidable inconsistencies and distortions was observed. Additionally, some national public policies, with impact on Defence, lack harmony,

coherence, and unity of purpose. Furthermore, there is the failure to conduct prior consultations with sector actors when entering into MOUs/Alliances. Though essential, consensus building is not practised as a norm. Most importantly, apart from the insufficiency of budgetary allocations, the GAF potentials have not been adequately tapped for the benefit of the country. Venturing into industrialisation has not also been anchored on comparative advantage.

- Finally, it was found that there is a wide gap between Defence Policy formulators and its implementers. As such, the interpretation and internalization suffer an amount of avoidable resistance. It was realized from the study that the involvement of the implementing class in the review and re-formulation of policies will make them more successful. It was equally realized that the opinions of beneficiaries were also key. This is because beneficiaries best know their own needs and even how such needs could be solved. Making key decisions for their benefit without involving them may result in disparities in priority areas.

9.1.4 Findings Related to Realism

With the epistemic context of realism, important distinction is made between low and high politics, the basis of interaction between the two realms and the implications this has for the state's quest to acquire power which in the specific context of this study is national development.

It can be argued that the National Defence Policy document as structured sets up a contradictory relation between the GAF and the Constitution of the Fourth Republic. While the policy document makes a latent or inexplicit distinction between low and high politics and implicates the GAF in it, the Constitution's Article 210(3) explicitly implicates the GAF in the state's quest for

development. This is what defines the said contradiction. The impression of the National Defence Policy when it comes to the state's conceptualization of low and high politics has left undefined the specific channels and role play of the GAF in the quest for development. This is manifested in the lack of a clearly articulated GAF doctrine spelling out how it will institutionally [re]calibrate to meet its role as an agent of development even if from the perspective of the National Defence Policy. To make the issues murkier, the Provision of the 1992 Constitution (Article 210:3) which, among others, mandates the GAF to be agent of development is not referenced in the National Defence Policy. This, I contend, is the result of the lack of an explicit epistemological distinction that had not been made between low and high politics. Were it not so, the place of Article 210(3) in the National Defence Policy would have revealed itself and the likely institutional and doctrinal adjustments required of the GAF would have been defined. Given this, it comes as no surprise in the findings when some duty bearers had no knowledge of the existence of the National Defence Policy document.

9.1.5 Findings Related to the Literature

The literature used for the study was both rich and revealing. The following are some of the findings that the study unveiled through the exploitation of the literature:

- The history of the country and the Ghana Armed Forces highly determine the direction of the Defence Policy being implemented at all times and in all circumstances. For instance, Ghana's long participation in international peacekeeping operations, peace support and peace enforcement operations in the ECOWAS sub-region, as well as the conduct of numerous Internal Security operations have all contributed to the experience of the Armed Forces and the policies that are fashioned out for guidance.

- An inexistent myth of secrecy hangs around Defence policy formulation, implementation, and review. Meanwhile the Defence Policy comes under a ‘*Restricted*’ security classification which is the lowest of all security classifications of the Defence Ministry and the Ghana Armed Forces.
- The Defence Policy has always been sensitive to the changing threat landscape but with national security dominating the internal security needs.
- The analysis of the literature and data confirms the place of the citizen as the central figure in Defence Policy matters.
- The Armed Forces has had an enviable history and remains very relevant to the survival of the nation-state as well as the well-being of the inhabitants of the territory.

9.1.6 Surprises

In conducting the research, a few surprises were discovered. These include the following:

- Some respondents, both serving and retired servicemen, do not have any knowledge about the NDP. They assume the Defence Sector runs only on ad hoc basis. This was found to be out of ignorance and lack of interest than due to the fact that access to the document was cumbersome.
- Another surprise found after digesting the NDP was the apparent lack of depth about the financial support for the implementation of Defence sector policies. The NDP might be an excellent document with the keys to ensuring the survival of the nation and the national security needs of its citizens. However, these laudable ideas cannot be fulfilled without the needed resources. Funds are also required for the operationalization of many of such policies. It is therefore surprising that the NDP is

silent on the sources and guidelines for the accessing of funds for the Defence sector. This therefore confirms the recurring identification of funds as one of the key challenges of the sector by respondents to the survey that was conducted during the study.

- It was also discovered that the already little budget allocation hardly ever gets fully disbursed leading to a situation whereby the GAF exists on a boot-string budgetary support with the knowledge of the political class. In such a case, the security and survival of the country hits the borders of being compromised needlessly.
- It was found that certain protocols that Ghana has entered into that have defence Sector implications are not well understood by actors and therefore their effective implementation becomes a problem. For instance the ECOWAS protocol of Free Movement of Goods and Persons goes contrary to the annual conduct of Op COW LEG by GAF to get Fulani herdsmen and their cattle not only to stay away from cultivated farms, but to eventually get them out of the borders of the country. Such inconsistencies could be attributed to the country being a dualist state. This calls for a synchronisation of Ghana's Defence Policy with protocols of international bodies such as ECOWAS, AU and UN for the elimination of possible conflicts, contradictions, and ambiguities in implementation.

9.2 Conclusions

Ghana's Defence and Security Sectors have undergone significant transformations over the six decades of her existence as a sovereign state. The Defence sector, though dominated by the Ghana Armed Forces, is not the preserve of the military alone. The military remains the lead agency but

with the indispensable support of other stakeholders. The Sector's core responsibility is to ensure the survival and security of the nation but with the citizens as the final beneficiaries in all its activities.

The Defence Policy of Ghana has shown resilience and adequate flexibility in meeting the challenges of an ever evolving local and international threat landscape. It has therefore continued to exhibit signs of being a living document with in-built mechanisms to ensure that the current level of relevance associated with the Defence Sector is not only sustained but also enhanced to fully meet the transformation of global security and its associated challenges. Ghana's Defence Policy makes room for the military to also perform its non-traditional roles of providing social and economic interventions which contribute to national development.

9.2.1 Contribution to Knowledge

- The study adds to the existing knowledge base on Defence matters in Ghana in the domain of the history of Defence Policy making. It generates interest in the conduct of research into defence policy issues that have hitherto not received much illumination.
- The study has uncovered that so much literature and information on the Ghana Armed Forces and the entire Defence Sector exists. However due to the lack of interest on the part of many stakeholders, research is often not conducted. This can be attributed to the suspected myths surrounding defence issues. The traditional regimental structure of the Ghana Armed Forces, the need for confidentiality of some defence issues concerning strategy, and the apparent seclusion of defence locations from the general public have all

contributed in discouraging researchers from choosing the Defence Sector for their work. This study, having been conducted by an insider, should help convince others to take up research on Defence Studies. This could thus breach the gap in conducting research between academic researchers and by serving officers.

- Secondly, the need for a dynamic Defence Sector requiring the support of the citizenry has been unraveled. The study has brought to the fore the requirement for an effective inter-ministerial network for a viable Defence Sector Policy. It has revealed the nexus between the Defence Sector stakeholders and the developmental aspirations of the country. It has illuminated the departure of the GAF from the colonial legacy that it was bequeathed with and putting into the public domain the dictates of the 1992 Constitution relative to the Defence Sector.
- Thirdly, the study also adds to the knowledge of the stakeholders in the sector that they need to lead research into Defence matters to be able to convince others to follow. Additionally, the study has highlighted reasons for a seemingly lack of public sympathy for the GAF. It has made the contribution that the GAF needs to lend itself to further scrutiny by researchers in order to remain relevant, win and sustain public sympathy, and thereby continuously benefit sufficiently from the public goods and support. The study has thus brought to the public, a field often thought off as being impermeable to investigations.

- Furthermore, the seemingly lack of access to Defence structures for the purposes of conducting research due to an aura of confidentiality has been further breached. The successful conduct of the research has brought to the fore that research can be safely conducted within the Defence set up without jeopardizing the survival, stability, and interests of the state.
- Finally, the study has also reinforced the requirement for a continuous control of the Defence Sector by civilian authorities. The benefits of the civil control of GAF to the institution and its image are highlighted. As an institution that traditionally does not avail itself for internal and external criticisms, the study offers a better understanding of the Ghana Armed Forces and its role to society, the West African sub-region, and the International Community.

9.3 Recommendations

9.3.1 Policy Recommendations and Practice Implications

The Defence policy of Ghana is viable in safeguarding the national security of the nation through the guidelines it provides for the Ghana Armed Forces and other security agencies. These guidelines include threat analysis, detecting threats and effective collaboration between the military and other security agencies. Based on this, the study recommends that the policy should be reviewed through broader consultation with relevant stakeholders to provide a more detailed approach in averting potential security threats. From the review of the policy, it provides scanty details on the activities of the Ghana Armed Forces in Internal Security matters. Emphasis is still on external Defence matters when there seem to be an apparent shift on the international stage.

This suggestion was also mentioned during the key informant interview where respondents recommended detailed and unambiguous guidelines and procedures in the policy when it comes to the matters of national security.

Again, the Defence Policy is not too clear on Defence budgeting and accountable financial management of resources. For the national security of Ghana's territory to be safeguarded, there must be effective allocation of financial, human and material resources. The study therefore recommends that the policy should be reviewed to provide clear instructions on Defence budgeting and effective allocation of resources as well as mechanisms that make the release of allocated funds mandatory.

Even though the Defence policy recognises and has been adapted to the global security transformation, the policy does not fully incorporate the dynamics in international security threats, cyber-crimes, internet fraud and border and maritime security surveillance system. The study therefore recommends that the policy be reviewed to include how to deal with these dynamics in security, both for the national and international commitments.

In addition, the study recommends that Ghana's Defence Policy be synchronised with protocols of international bodies such as ECOWAS, AU and UN. This is necessary because some protocols of these international bodies are in sharp contrast with what are clearly stipulated in the Defence policy. An example being the implementation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement *vis a vis* the conduct of OP COWLEG duties by the GAF.

Other Recommendations

Other important recommendations worthy of consideration include the following:

For the State

- That appointing authorities should keep in mind the essence of institutional memory in determining office holders, institutional restructuring, and selection of Defence options.
- The drafting, approval, implementation and review of key national policies such as National Development Policy, Foreign, Domestic and Defence policies must be harmonised done to avoid waste, reduce duplication, and ensure coherence.
- There is an urgent requirement for clarity at all times about the entering into Defence pacts, alliances and the signing of MOUs that will require the commitment of Defence resources.

For the Ministry of Defence

- That the Defence Policy be kept a truly living document to sustain its relevance to the rapidly changing threat landscape. This requires a constant review.
- The GAF being a technologically sensitive institution should be resourced to not only use technological advancement in operations but most importantly, develop innovations for the benefit of the developmental sector of the country.

For the Armed Forces

- Should actively involve the rank and file in consensus building on non-operational issues to promote cohesion and harmony.
- Engage CSOs on collective issues relating to Defence of the state.

- Proactively determine the developmental options that its capacity, deployment obligations and general set-up can meaningfully contribute to without adversely affecting core mandate duties.
- The GAF should develop culturally acceptable modalities of promoting gender mainstreaming in all domains including direct combat functions.

The GAF must position itself to satisfy its constitutional mandate for the survival of the nation and the physical development, social, economic, political, and moral development of the country and its citizens. The orientation of the GAF *vis-a-vis* development should thus not be geared towards physical development alone but also a contribution to the total development of the individual especially the youth.

9.3.2 Recommendations for Future Research

- With regards to future research, the West African sub-region through ECOWAS has placed a high premium on Defence matters even though it is an economic bloc with an integration agenda. Future studies could look into the possibilities of harmonizing the Defence policies of the 15-member countries and getting them to be in tandem with the dictates of the Common African and Defence and Security Policy of the African Union.
- Again, the industrial prospects of the Ghana Armed Forces need to be closely reviewed. This therefore constitutes a domain requiring further research. The relationship between the developmental requirements of the country and the technological capacity of the GAF provide domains for research.

- The respect and adherence of the GAF to its subordinate position to the political class should be matched with the political class's commitment to making available all budgeted funds meant for the Defence sector. How can the GAF ensure this? This also requires further study.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. Books

- 1960 Constitution of Ghana (1960). *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*. Accra: Assembly Press.
- 1969 Constitution of Ghana (1969). *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*. Accra: Assembly Press.
- 1979 Constitution of Ghana (1979). *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*. Accra: Assembly Press.
- 1992 Constitution of Ghana, (1992). *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*. Accra: Assembly Press.
- Aboagye, F. B. (1999). *The Ghana Army: A Concise Contemporary Guide to Its Centennial Regimental History, 1897-1999*. Accra: Sedco Pub Limited.
- Addae, S. (2005). *A Short History of Ghana Armed Forces*. Accra: Ministry of Defence - Ghana Armed Forces.
- Addae, S. K. (2012). *History of Ghana Armed Forces: Military Organizations and Regiments*, Accra: Eureka Foundation.
- Asante, S. (2007). *Ghana and the Promotion of Pan-Africanism and Regionalism*. Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Baylis, J. &. (1992). *Dilemmas of World Politics: International issue in a changing world*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Birkland, T. (2001). *An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and Models of the Public Policy Making*. New York: Routledge.
- Booth, K. (1998). *Security and Emancipation*, Oxford: Loho Hut.
- Brodie, B. (1950). *National Security Policy and Economic Stability*. New Haven: Yale: Yale Institute of International Studies.
- Brown, C. (2001). *Understanding International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Brown, H. (1983). *Thinking About National Security: Defence and Foreign Policy in a Dangerous World*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

- Buzan, B. (2011). *People, States*. Reading: McGrawhill.
- Chitor, B. (2017). *Contemporary Approach to Military Law in Ghana*. Accra: Optimum Design & Publishing Services.
- Chuter, D. (2006). *Policy Formulation and Implementation: Managing Defence in a Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Chrisman, L. (2018). *Postcolonial contraventions: Cultural readings of race, imperialism and transnationalism*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Cleary, L. R., & McConville, T. (Eds.). (2006). *Managing Defence in a Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2008). International edition: business research methods. *New Delhi: MacGraw-Hill*.
- Crokatt, R. (2003). *America Embattled: september 11, Anti-Americanism, and the Gobla Order*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Deutsch, K. (1988). *The Analysis of International Relations*. Englewood Cliffs: Prince-Hall.
- Dobson, A., Dobson, A. P., & Marsh, S. (2007). *US foreign policy since 1945*. London: Routledge.
- Dougherty, E. & Pfaltgraffz, J. (2001). *Contending Theories of International Relations - A Comprehensive survey*. London: Longman.
- Dougherty, E. & Pfaltgraff, J. (1990). *Theories of International Relations*. London: Harper and Row.
- Dye, T. (2017). *Understanding Public Policy*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Friedman, M., & Schwartz, A. J. (2008). *A monetary history of the United States, 1867-1960*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Graham, A. A. (1992). *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Hansenclever, A. M. (2002). *Theories of International Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobbes, T. (1957). *The Leviathan or The Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hobbes, Thomas. (1651) *Leviathan*. Ed. Richard Tuck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Howe, H. M. (2001). *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Huntington, S. P. (1981). *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- James, P. (1992). *International Relations and Scientific Progress: Structural Realism Reconsidered*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
- Kapstein, B. E. (1992). *The Political Economy of National Security*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Kauppi, P. R. (1993). *International Relations Theory - Realism, Pluralism, Globalism*. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company.
- Kennedy, P. (1987). *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. New York: Random House.
- Keohane, R. (1986). *Neorealism and its Critics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kissinger, H. (1994). *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Lidell Hart, B. H. (1954). *Strategy: The Indirect Approach*, London: Faber & Faber
- Miles, M. B., Huberman, A. M., Huberman, M. A., & Huberman, M. (1994). *Qualitative data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Morgenthau, H. (1951). *In Defense of National Interest*. New York: Macmillan.
- Morgenthau, H. (1960). *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace*. New York: Alfred Knopff.
- Nwaubani, C. A. (2001). *The United States and Decolonization in West Africa, 1950-1960*. Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press.
- Omitoogun, W., & Hutchful, E. (Eds.). (2006). *Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: the Process and Mechanisms of Control*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Quincy, W. (1998). *A Study of War* Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Rosenau, J. (2000). *Thinking Theory Thoroughly: Coherent Approaches to an Incoherent World*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Rosenberg, E., & Foner, E. (1982). *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945*. New York: Macmillan.
- Schraeder, P. J. (1994). *United States Foreign Policy Towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. New York: McGrawhill.

- Sloan, E. C. (2012). *Modern Military Strategy: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.
- Trager, F. N., & Kronenberg, P. S. (Eds.). (1973). *National Security and American Society*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
- Volgy, T. J., Corbetta, R., Grant, K. A., & Baird, R. G. (2011). Major Power Status in International Politics. In *Major powers and the quest for status in international politics* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Von Clausewitz, C. (1956). *On War* (Vol. 2). New York: Barnes & Noble.
- Waltz, K. (1986). *Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing.

B. Chapters in Book

- Adu-Amanfoh, F. (2002). Ghana's Foreign Policy and the Strategic and Security Concerns in the West African Sub-Region. Paper presented at a Workshop on "Ghana's Foreign Policy Options" Organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana.
- Atuguba, A. R. (2005). The Rule of Law and National Security: Challenges for the Judiciary in Bluwey, G. K. & Kumado, K. (eds) *Ghana in Search of National Security Policy*, Accra: LECIA
- Boafo-Arthur, K. (2005). Parliament and National Security in Ghana in Bluwey, G. K. & Kumado, K. (eds) *Ghana in Search of National Security Policy*, Accra: LECIA.
- Bluwey, K. G. (2002). *Foreign Policy and Decision-Making in Ghana: Issues, Ground Rules and Actors*. Paper presented at a Workshop on "Ghana's Foreign Policy Options" Organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana.
- Cato, A. A. (2002). Ghana's Role and Place in International Organisations. Paper presented at a Workshop on "Ghana's Foreign Policy Options" Organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana.
- Chuter, D. (2006). Policy Formulation and Execution. In *Managing Defence in a Democracy*. London: Routledge.
- Coleman, N. C. (2002). *Defence Policy in Ghana: The Past, Present and the Wayforward*. Paper presented at a Workshop on "Ghana's Foreign Policy Options" Organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana.

- Debrah, E. M. (2002). *Lessons from Ghana's Foreign Policy since Independence*. Paper presented at a Workshop on “Ghana’s Foreign Policy Options” Organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana.
- Hackman, O. A. (2002). *Ghana's Foreign Policy Under the Kufour Administration*. Paper presented at a Workshop on “Ghana’s Foreign Policy Options” Organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs, University of Ghana.
- Hutchful, E. (2005). African States and the Challenge of National Security in the Post-Cold War Era in Bluwey, G. K. & Kumado, K. (eds) *Ghana in Search of National Security Policy*, Accra: LECIA
- Johnson, C. N. (1990). Aristotle’s Theory of the State: The Nature of the Problem. In C. N. Johnson, *Aristotle’s Theory of the State* London: Palgrave.
- Naidoo, J. P. (2005). Educational Decentralization and School Governance in South Africa: From Policy to Practice. *International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP) UNESCO*.
- Oppenheim, F. E. (1975), “The Language of Political Inquiry: Problems of Clarification”, in Greenstein, F. I. and Polsby, N. W. (eds.), *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. I: Political Science: Scope and Theory, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Quantson, K. B. (2005). The Policy and Practice of National Security in Ghana in Bluwey, G. K. & Kumado, K. (eds) *Ghana in Search of National Security Policy*, Accra: LECIA
- Sebenius, J. K., & Peterson, P. G. (1992). Rethinking America's Security: The Primacy of the Domestic Agenda.
- Taylor, T. (2006). The Functions of a Defence Ministry. In R. L. Cleary, *Managing Defence in a Democracy* London: Routledge.

C. Journal Articles

- Acharya, A. (2007). State Sovereignty After 9/11: Disorganised Hypocrisy. *Political Studies* Vol. 55, 274–296.
- Agyepong, S. (2011). Indigenous African Warfare: Its Concept and Art in the Gold Coast, Asante, and the Northern Territories up to the Early 1900s. *Africa Today*, 58(1), 137-140.

- Aning, K., & Aubyn, F. K. (2015). From Research to Practice: Linking the Training for Peace Programme's Research to Policy Development and Training in Peace Operations. *Conflict Trends*, 2015(2), 19-27.
- Attride-Stirling, J. (2001). Thematic Networks: An Analytic Tool for Qualitative Research. *Qualitative Research*, 1(3), 385-405.
- Awosusi, O. E., & Ogbuleke, L. E. (2019). Critical Thinking in Information Technology and Management for National Security in Nigeria. *Asian Journal of Applied Science and Technology (AJAST) (Peer Reviewed Quarterly International Journal)* 3, 41-52.
- Azam, J. (1995). How to Pay for the Peace: A Theoretical Framework with Reference to African Countries. *Public Choice*, 38(1/2), 173-184.
- Baldwin, D. A. (1995). Security Studies and the End of the Cold War. *World Politics*, 48(1).
- Baldwin, D. A. (1997). The Concept of Security. *Review of International Studies*, 23(1), 5-26.
- Björn, H. (1980). Soldiers and Politics: The Case of Ghana. *Journal of Peace Research*, 17(2), 173-193.
- Brodie, B. (1949). Strategy as a Science. *World Politics*, 1(4), 477.
- Buhaug, H. (2016). Climate Change and Conflict: Taking Stock, *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, 22(4), 331-338. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1515/peps-2016-0034>
- Bull, H. (1968). Strategic Studies and Its Critics. *World Politics*, 20(4), 599-600.
- Bunyavejchewin, P. (2012). Theories of International Politics after the Incident of 9/11: The Richness and Weakness of Realist Tradition in the Twenty - First Century. *Kasetsart Journal - Social Sciences*, 33(1), 162.
- Dandeker, C. a. (2002). The British Armed Services. *The Political Quarterly*, 73(4): 465-75.
- Diop, B. (2011). Sub-Saharan African military and development activities. *Prism*, 3(1), 87-98.
- Ebeh, J. I. (2015). National Security and National Development: A critique. *AFRREV IJAH: An International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 4(2), 1-14.
- Ekoko, A. E. (1983). The Theory and Practice of Imperial Garrisons: the British Experiment in the South Atlantic 1881-1914. *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 12(1/2), 133-148.

- Firsing, S. (2014). Thinking through the role of Africa's militaries in peacekeeping: the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia and Rwanda. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 21(1), 45-67.
- Galadima, A., Garba, Z. N., Ibrahim, B. M., Almustapha, M. N., Leke, L., & Adam, I. K. (2011). Biofuels Production in Nigeria: The Policy and Public Opinions. *Journal of Sustainable Development*, 4(4), 22.
- Gutelius, D. (2007). Islam in Northern Mali and the War on Terror. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 25(1), 59-76.
- Hakimi, M. (2014). Toward a Legal Theory on the Responsibility to Protect. *Yale Journal of International Law* 39(2), 247-80.
- Hansen, L. (1997). A Case for Seduction? Evaluating the Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Security. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32(4), 369-397.
- Herbst, J. (1990). War and the State in Africa. *International Security*, 14(4), 117-139.
- Huntington, P. S. (1954). Radicalism and Conservatism in National Defense Policy. *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 8. No. 2., 206-222.
- Ince, O. U. (2016). Friedrich List and the Imperial Origins of the National Economy. *New Political Economy*, 21(4), 380-400.
- Jahn, B. (2017). Theorizing the Political Relevance of International Relations Theory. *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(1), 64-77.
- Kaldor, M. (2005). Old Wars, Cold Wars, New Wars, and the War on Terror. *International Politics*, 42(4), 491-498.
- Kolodziej, A. E. (1992). What is Security and Security Studies? Lessons from the Cold War. *Arms Control* 13(2).
- Kramer, R., Michalowski, R., & Rothe, D. (2005). "The Supreme International Crime": How the US War in Iraq Threatens the Rule of Law. *Social Justice*, 32(2), 52.
- Krasner, S. D. (1995). Compromising Westphalia. *International Security*, 20(3), 115-151.
- Lawal, T. A. (2011). National Development in Nigeria, Issues, Challenges, and Prospects. *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research*, 3(9), 237-241.
- Lebrow, R. (1996). Thomas Schelling and Strategic Bargaining. *International Journal*, 51(3), 555-576.

- Melvyn, P. L. (1990). National Security. *Journal of American History*, 77(1), 143 -152.
- Mohan. (1966). Ghana, the Congo, and The United Nations. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7(3).
- Naomi, O. (1995). Towards an Integrated View of Human Rights. *Hunger Teach Net* Vol 6(3), 6-7.
- Nwaubani, E. (2001). Eisenhower, Nkrumah and the Congo Crisis. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 36(4), 601.
- Nwolise, O. (2014). Oracles on Excessive Use of Force. *Ibadan Journal of Peace and Development*, 36.
- Olsen, G. (2011). Civil-Military Cooperation in Crisis Management in Africa: American and European Union Policies Compared. *Journal of International Relations and Development.*, 14(3).
- Patterson, E. (2013). What They Say and Do: Religious Freedom as a National Security Lens. *The Review of Faith & International Affairs*, 11(1), 22-30.
- Philpott, D. (2002). The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations. *World Politics*, 55(1), 69-95.
- Quénivet, N. (2005). The World after September 11: Has It Really Changed? . *The European Journal of International Law* 16(3), 561–577.
- Ratti, L. (2014). Stepping up to Reintegration: French Security Policy between Transatlantic and European Defence During and After the Cold War. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 12(4).
- Rocco, T. S., & Plakhotnik, M. S. (2009). Literature Reviews, Conceptual Frameworks, and Theoretical Frameworks: Terms, Functions, and Distinctions. *Human Resource Development Review*, 8(1)
- Rogerson, C. (1996). Defence Economic Restructuring and Conversion in South Africa. *Geo Journal No. 39(3)*, 231 - 234.
- Rothschild, E. (1997). What is Security? *Daedalus*, Vol. 124(3), 53- 98.
- Sicurelli, D., & Fabbrini, S. (2014). An Institutional Approach to Foreign Policy-Making: The EU, the USA and Crisis Management in Africa. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 12(1), 41-61.

- Shultz, R., Godson, R., Hanlon, Q., & Ravich, S. (2011). The Sources of Instability in the Twenty-First Century: Weak States, Armed Groups, and Irregular Conflict. *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 5(2), 73-94.
- Spykman, N. J. (1942). Frontiers, Security, and International Organization. *Geographical Review*, 32(3), 436-447.
- Taliaferro, J. W. (2000/01). Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited. *International Security*, 25(3), 128–161.
- Touray, O. A. (2005) The Common African Defence and Security Policy. *African Affairs*, 104(417) 635-656
- Ullman, R. H. (1983). Redefining Security. *International Security*. 8(1), 129-153.
- Welch, C. (1984). African Military and Political Development: Reflections on a Score of Years, and Several Score of Studies. *Issue (Waltham, Mass.)*, 13, 41-44. doi:10.1017/S0047160700008611
- White, H. (2008). Strategic Interests in Australian Defence Policy. *Security Challenges*, 4(2), 63-79.
- William, T. R. (1949). Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience. *World Politics* Vol. 2, Issue 1.
- Wiśniewski, R. (2015). Military-Industrial Aspects of Turkish Defence Policy. *Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej*, (9), 215-228.
- Wohlforth, W. C. (1995). Realism and the End of the Cold War. *International Security*, 19(3), (Winter 1994-1995), 91-129.
- Wolfers, A. (1952). National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol. *Political Science Quarterly*, 64(4).
- Wu, T., & Fetterly, R. (1990). Canadian Defence Policy: An Analysis. *Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de Politiques*, 161-173.
- Yoroms, G. (2010). Nigeria and the Challenges of Transnational Security in West Africa. *Governance and Border Security in Africa*, 271-93.
- Zachary, S. (2018). Demography, Defence Budgets, and the Transatlantic Alliance. *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, Vol. 16 (1), 59-80.

D. Documents/Reports/Papers

1962 The Armed Forces Act, Act 105.

2012 Ghana National Defence Policy.

Alli, W. O. (2012). The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy.

Bamalli, N., & Akinterinwa, B. O. (2007). Redefining Nigeria's Interest and Commitments in Peace Support Operations. Nigeria's National Interests in a Globalising World: Further Reflections on Constructive and Beneficial Concentrics. Volume Three—Nigeria's Interests beyond Nigeria. Ibadan: Bolytag International Publishers, 68-109.

Burgess, J. P. (2008). Non-Military Security Challenges. *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, 60-78.

Digester, P. (1994, September). The Concept of Security. In *Paper Delivered at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association* (Vol. 14).

Gallie, W. B. (1956). Essentially Contested Concepts. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. N.S.

Gboyega, A. (2003). Democracy and Development: The Imperative of Local Governance. *Inaugural Lecture*.

Ghana National Defence Policy. 2012. Accra: GoG.

Hicks, S. (2017). the Grand Ethipioian Renaissance Dam: Power Dynamics in the Nile River Basin. *American Security Project*.

Hillen, J. (1998). *Future Visions for US Defense Policy: Four Alternatives Presented as Presidential Speeches* (Vol. 1). Council on Foreign Relations.

Lin, L. (2011). State-Centric Security and its Limitations: The Case of Transnational Organized Crime. Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS).

Mensa-Bonsu, H. J. (2014, Sept 14). The African Union's Peace and Security Architecture: A guarantor of Peace and Security on the Continent? *2014 Alumni Legon Lecture*. Accra, Legon, Greater Accra: Legon Press.

Nduom, K. P. (2002). *Ghana's Relations with Her Neighbours and Role in the ECOWAS*. Paper presented at a Workshop on "Ghana's Foreign Policy Options" Organised by the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana.

Robert, R. (1959). A Short History of Ghana Army.

State Security in Marines, (2001) *Ghana: A Country Study*

Sosuh, M. M. (2011). *Border Security in Ghana: Challenges and Prospects*

U.S. Embassy, U. (1959). *Telegram from the US Embassy, Accra*. Accra: 745J.5MDSP/10-2059, 20 October 59.

E. Internet Sources

ACLED (2019). *Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project*.

ADF (2015, Jan 13). Retrieved from ADF: <http://adf-magazine.com/ghana-takes-a-people-centric-approach>

Biddle, S. D. (2005, April). *American Grand Strategy After 9/11: An Assessment*. Retrieved from American War College : <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub603.pdf>

Chitty, A. (2006). *University of Sussex*. Retrieved from University of Sussex: <http://www.users.sussex.ac.uk>

Croxton, D. (1999, December 1). *The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty*. Retrieved from Tandfonline: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.1999.9640869>

Hagberg, S. (2019, July 4). *The Legacy of Revolution and Resistance in Burkina Faso*. Retrieved from SIPRI: <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2016/legacy-revolution-and-resistance-burkina-faso>

Handley, A. &. (2001, November 11). *SAIIA*. Retrieved from South African Institute of International Affairs : https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20011100_cru_working_paper_2pdf

Khalidzad, Z. (2018, February 19). *National Interest*. Retrieved from The National Interest: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/realist-national-security-strategy-24555>

Marines. (2019, Jan 27). *Country Study*. Retrieved from www.state.us.gov: www.state.us.gov

Toth, N. (2019, July 4). Retrieved from http://www.publikon.hu/application/essay/496_1.pdf

US Marines. (n.d.). *Ghana: A Country Study (National Security)*. Retrieved from The Marines: http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Ghana%20Study_5.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-163242-423

F. Unpublished Works

Appiah, J. A. (2014). *The African Union and the Quest for Peace and Security in Africa: 2002-2012* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Ghana).

Demir, İ. (2005). *Hegemonic Intervention in the form of Coercive Diplomacy* (Doctoral Dissertation, Middle East Technical University).

Ba-Taa-Banah, T.T. (2010). *Climate Change as a Threat to Peace and Security: The Case of the West African Sub-Region* (Masters Dissertation, University of Ghana).

G. News/Online News

BBC. (2018, Oct 18). News Item. London, London, The United Kingdom.

Gaouette, N. (2018, Oct 20 Oct). *CNN*. Retrieved from www.cnn.com:
<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/19/politics/trump-saudi-arabia-options/index.html>

Lazarus, S. (2018, Oct 20). *www.cnn.com*. Retrieved from www.cnn.com: <http://www.cnn.com>

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

MAIN INTERVIEW GUIDE

Name: Timothy Tifucro Ba-Taa-Banah

Institutional Affiliation: PhD Candidate of Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy [LECIAD], University of Ghana.

Purpose: *I am conducting a study aimed at putting into perspective the issue of policy making in the Defence Sector and the contributions of various stakeholders. It is also aimed at generating a re-thinking of policy alternatives in the face of contemporary changes to warfare and threat landscapes. The study is expected to unravel the continuous relevance of the Defence Sector to a nation's existence. The Research is STRICTLY for Academic purposes and all information received will be treated confidentially.*

1. Do you know of the existence of the Defence Policy of Ghana?
2. If Yes, what has been your association with it?
3. What in your opinion are the strengths of the current Defence Policy?
4. What are its drawbacks (if any)?
5. What can you say of its future vis a vis the changing landscape of external threats?
6. How do you see it in the face of internal threats?
7. If no, do you think there is a need for a Defence Policy?
8. What do you think should be its focus?
9. What do you think should be contained in it?
10. In your opinion, which threats are the commonest and potent in the West African sub-region?
11. In the case of Ghana and in your opinion what are some of the major threats to National Security?
12. Do you find the Defence arrangements of the ECOWAS sub-region satisfactory in meeting these threats?
13. a. How do you assess the inter-operability of the Defence resources of the Sub-region?
b. How can they be harmonised for mutual benefit?
14. What apparent challenges do you foresee?
15. What is your view of the ECOWAS Standby Force?
16. What do you think should be contained in the Defence Policy of Ghana to make the role of Ghana Armed Forces relevant to the ECOWAS Standby Force?

17. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana adds a developmental role to the traditional role of the Armed Forces. What can you say of the future of Ghana's current Defence Policy in relation to this new constitutional mandate?
18. Do you think by adding a developmental role the GAF will lose focus of its core mandate?
19. Are there other roles for national development?
20. How do you rate the development of civil Defence structures in Ghana?
21. Any further reflections?

APPENDIX II

SUPPLEMENTARY INTERVIEW GUIDE

Name: Timothy Tifucro Ba-Taa-Banah

Institutional Affiliation: PhD Candidate LECIAD

Purpose: Research for STRICTLY Academic purposes and all information received will be handled confidentially.

1. Please tick the option that best suits you.
 - a. Civil servant.
 - b. Public servant/Serving Officer/Retired Officer/Soldier
 - c. Academic staff/Researcher.
 - d. Any other (please specify) ...
2. What is your field of specialization?
3. What doctrinal values underpin the Defence Policy of Ghana?
4. What factors have historically influenced Ghana's Defence strategy?
5. What are the strengths of the current doctrine (if any)?
6. What are its drawbacks (if any)?
7. What can you say of its future vis a vis the changing landscape of external threats?
8. How do you find the Defence arrangements of the ECOWAS sub-region in relation to that of Ghana?
9. In your opinion what threat profile is easily discernible in the West African sub-region?
10. How do you assess the inter-operability of the Defence resources of the Sub-region?
11. How can they be harmonized for the mutual benefit of countries in the region?
12. What apparent challenges do you foresee?
13. What can you say of the future of Ghana's current Defence Policy vis a vis the new constitutional mandate which cites the GAF as a partner in national developmental aspirations?
14. How satisfactory have been the Defence arrangements for Ghana since 1992?
15. Are there any civil structures worthy enough to support the armed structures of the GAF?
16. Further reflections, if any?
17. What is your view of the ECOWAS Standby Force?
18. What do you think should be contained in the Defence Policy of Ghana to make the role of Ghana Armed Forces indispensable to the Force?
19. What recommendations can you contribute for the establishment and sustainment of Logistics Pools for the African Union Standby Forces?

For Retired Officers – In addition to the above.

1. Do you think the Defence Policies that have directed the Armed Forces all these years have been comprehensive and robust enough?
2. Where do you think leadership has faltered in making the Defence Policies more effective and reliable?
3. What do you think should be done in producing Defence policies for the country?
4. From your experience how will you rate Ghana's Defence arrangements vis-à-vis her francophone neighbours?
A. poor. B. Satisfactory C. Good.
5. How will you rate Ghana's Defence arrangements vis-à-vis the Anglophone countries in the West African sub-region?
A. Poor. Satisfactory. C. Good.
6. What recommendations can you make to contribute in maintaining the relevance of the Ghana Armed Forces to the Ghanaian, the ECOWAS citizen, and the International Community?

For Civilian Respondents ONLY

1. Do you have any idea of the role of the Defence sub-sector of the country?
2. If yes what is your opinion about the arrangements in place to fulfill that role?
3. What is the level of confidence you have in the security of the country? A.Low. B. Average. C. Satisfactory. D. Good. E. Unsure.
4. Any comment on your answer?
5. What do you think should be the ideal framework and focus of the policies underpinning the conduct of the Defence Sector?
6. What should be the role of the Ghana Armed Forces in sub-regional and Continental Defence matters?
7. Do you think the contributions of Ghana to world peace are worth the cost to the country? Please explain ascribe reasons for your answer.

Thank you very much for your cooperation.

APPENDIX III

SAMPLE RESPONSE – TRANSCRIPT

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW ON DEFENCE POLICY OF GHANA

Interview Date: 7/05/2018

Interviewer's Name: **Timothy Tifucro Ba-Taa-Banah**

ID Number: Ken (004)

Venue of Interview: Burma Camp

Time of Interview: 8 am

Start time: **08:00 am** End time: **08:28 am**

Duration of interview: **28 mins**

Years of working experience: 25 years.

Current Portfolio/Rank: Ken is a senior Colonel of the Legal Service of the Armed Forces. He was a member of the committee that met and drafted the 2012 National Defence Policy of the Ghana. He is a lawyer of over 25 years at the Bar and he has had a varied military career. He has served in numerous theatres of operation both as a Legal Adviser and as Officer Commanding combat troops. He has advised over 4 Chiefs of Army Staff and has several publications to his name.

Meanings of symbols and abbreviations used in the transcription

1.,- incomplete sentence
2. **xxxxx**- inaudible
3. **Int**-Interviewer
4. **Res**-Respondent
5. []- Parentheses used to capture on verbal cues and meaning to actions and inactions
6. ++ - Short pause
7. ++++ - Long pause

Key Informant Interview

Int:

Good Morning Sir,

Res:

Morning

Int:

Please how are you doing?

Res:

I am ok

Int:

So, I am Timothy Ba-Taa-Banah. I have been trying to study to see what contribution I can also make in terms of the field of err policy making as far as Defence Studies is concerned not just for Ghana but for the West Africa sub-region and the International Community if the need arises. You never know when you are invited to be a part of a committee. Please do you know about the existence of the National Defence Policy?

Res:

Yes.

Int:

Ok, what is your association with the policy, were you part of the drafting?

Res:

Yes, I was actually the Secretary to the Board that worked on the current Defence policy.

Int:

Thank you very much. Do you remember some of the strengths of the current Defence policy?

Res:

One thing I can remember very well is about the effective collaboration amongst the services of the Ghana Armed Forces this policy seeks to achieve.

Int:

Sir, what is your opinion on the Defence Sector, because at times I think, we think is military heavy?

Res:

Well, I think that it is military heavy, under normal circumstances that is how it should be. Now what must be clearly delineated is the civilian ownership of the military, in this case the huge role that should be played by the Ministry of Defence and I think for the past few years that is coming out very well and effectively. It has its negatives but I think that err the military as at now has accepted subordinate position to the civilians.

Int:

Sir, do you think there are any drawbacks on the current document we have?

Res:

Yes, there is and one key drawback is the fact that it has not gone through all the processes to become the national Defence Policy and then another drawback is that I think we are supposed to have the National Security Policy from which the Defence Policy is drawn. Now, because it has not gone through the full processes, there is a current impasse when it comes to Ghana's relationship with the US on this military pact. If the Defence Policy had gone through all the processes, things would have been easily allocated. Let me add this, there is a problem with regards to our territory, that is with regards to the interests that the system places emphasis on. The Defence Policy has been there and yet I have not seen successive leadership of the Ghana Armed Forces pay particular attention to it. I can say for sure that the current Minister of Defence and the previous one were not well informed about this Policy.

Int:

Errm, I want us to talk about the threat landscape, errm this Defence policy made mention about the issue of the importance of the environment. We have a changing environment as far as the Defence landscape is concerned in the West African sub-region. In fact, even things like indiscipline on the part of individuals are sufficient to destabilise nations in the West African sub-region. The current changing landscape, I mean the threat landscape, how do you see us functioning with a Defence Policy that will be quite comprehensive depending on the dynamic of the people. For now we know of galamsey, we know of money laundering but there are other threats that may not appear to be too popular.

Res:

What they did in this Defence Policy was very comprehensive threat analysis, that is the external factors and internal factors and even when you go through it, you will realise that as if the policy was prepared today because most of the threats considered are still prevalent today. Now with regards to the unforeseen future, the dynamics haven't changed much externally, because it took a lot from the situation that happen in Nigeria particular *vis-a-vis* the oil find but internally what is unfolding is about political violence and youth agitation. The fact that now people are not afraid to use harm or force to register grievances and that is where the arrangements under the policy call for effective collaboration with stakeholders. Despite this, we did not look at it as an Armed Forces that is waiting behind the scenes for the Police to do the work and when they are overwhelmed, then the military comes in. It has become the norm that we cooperate with them right from the onset, so all those arrangements have been made erm provision of joint task force, headquarters and all those things. But I think that where the dynamics are changing has to do with the nature of crime, hijacking and cyber, those are the things that as at the time they were working on the policy were not too pronounced. Now that is something that we need to look at if there are any attempts to review or push through the Defence policy to its logical conclusion with regards to the processes.

Int:

Your general view on the North. When I got to the North on duty, I realised that our Police garrison wouldn't put their best foot forward. A good number of security agents are frustrated, disenchanted, ill-motivated persons who feel they are posted there because they are not in the good books of superiors etc. Some are even deviants such as drunkards. So how can they be first line respondents without quality? This explains why all the time, they are getting angry with GAF that we are getting too close to the populace which should be their preserve. We are almost like first line respondents because you visit a rural Police Station Commander's office and you at times get discouraged with what you see there xxxx, So they see posting to rural Ghana as a punishment. So, if you say you punished me then I won't work. I will switch off. No respect for the villagers, so they don't get respect back from the villagers. That is the secret of the soldiers. Soldier's theory is to respect the locals, so the locals also give us [soldiers] some amount of respect. So if the Police don't respect them [the locals], that means *obia nye obia* [meaning no nobody is nobody], so that is the reality of the situation up there.

Res:

The problem we are really having is serious. I will make reference to the SOP for joint operation where at any point in time we try to make sure that our personnel are trained, you were part of the training we organised recently [referring to the interviewer]. But the police don't do that. Meanwhile it is a requirement of all security services to train for efficiency. So, you see that while

we [soldiers] are operating effectively and efficiently, they [police] are not. So we have this dilemma, either to sit and wait for them to mess up before we go in (in order not to take over), Let's assume that they do not exist and we go and operate. But I hope that with time, things will be better. Once upon a time in our system when a soldier was seen as naughty, they will post him to the North too. I don't think it is right.

Int:

So, Sir let's talk about the West Africa sub-region small. How do you see our Defence arrangements in this country? Sir you will realise that in the Northern part of Nigeria, we have the multi-national force, we have the ECOWAS stand-by force, we have the previously practised ECOMOG who ensured that our West Africa sub region is safe. So, I want you to tell me about the relevance of the security arrangements. What do you see in the effort of political leaders to ensure that our West African region is safe?

Res:

Well, I think they invest in talking, but the will is not there. What I see in them is let's wait until there is a conflict or crisis then we will work towards responding to it. But erm in relation to the ECOWAS Stand-by Force, when we had the problem in the Gambia, you saw how we struggled before putting resources together before we went. Even though as a party we were supposed to have a ready force standing by. Even Ghana, that is a key player to that, look at what we went through not to talk about other nations. You have mentioned right. With regards to the Defence partnerships that they have with their colonial masters, mostly with France.... and because of that Defence pact that they have with their colonial masters, the francophone countries within the sub-region are not willing to pay particular attention with regards to the Defence issues within the sub-region. They know that any time there is an uprising or conflict in the sub-region France will intervene on their side. Those who are fighting for the ECOWAS Standby Force are the Anglophone countries, so the idea is good but for now I don't think we are ready enough to ensure that preventive measures are put in place, we can confirm this with the state of terrorist attacks in our neighbouring countries. If we were to have effective collaboration and road maps towards security in the sub-region, I don't think err those conflicts will be so rampant.

Int:

What challenges do you foresee regarding the arrangement?

Res:

Obviously resources, the resource constrains and then getting a standard operating efficiency, a standard, so that we know that soldiers are being deployed on almost the same standard when it comes to efficiency or capability. Of course, the political will, most are interested in the talk

shows. However, when it comes to seeing through what is spoken and decided, then the problem arises.

Int:

What is your view on Ghana's Defence Policy relative to the West African sub-region? When we look at our issues, we use the Ghana Armed Forces as an example, for instance we have the 'Operation COW LEG'. We have this ECOWAS Protocol for freedom of movement, but that doesn't mean that we should...., I mean in state survival, the state must first survive, but do you think the Defence Policy should go further to talk about such relationships where national interests is seen to be going against sub-regional interests?

Res:

That is what must happen in the national interest, now the policy will have been stronger if it had an existing arrangement, an effective arrangement within the sub region, I am saying this because if you have arrangement for the prevention of terrorist attacks and all that, when Ghana is planning for preventing measures, it has one eye on the other measures being put in place by the neighbouring countries. So you are very sure that terrorists could come from neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso or La Cote d'Ivoire , but because La Cote d'Ivoire have very effective measures the rate is reduced, so we are making sure that people don't go from here to Togo or Burkina or Cote d'Ivoire, and because there is no effective preventive measures by countries within the sub- region, we are looking within and outside at the same time and that leads to over stretching of resources. So, if we can get the sub regional plan that is working effectively it can help a lot, so then the Defence Policy will be drawn but as at now there is nothing to look up to.

Int:

Do you think it is possible to have the idea that will harmonise the sub-regional xxxx of our Defence policy?

Res:

There is a need, I started by saying that some countries in the sub-region are conflict minded and ECOWAS arrangements are all based on conflict resolution then if the same zeal with which we want to tackle that or deal with it, that network collaboration must come to play.

Int:

Errm, Sir now we talk about the 1992 Constitution, you know, it gives us an additional developmental role, that expects us not just to perform our traditional role but to also perform the

developmental role. They expected us to be specialists in provision of Defence. Sir how do you see the future of our Defence Policy vis-a vis this issue of our traditional role as stated in the 1992 constitution?

Res:

Errm, I am a proponent of the military doing something else besides its primary responsibility. Fortunately we have a Defence industry that was registered about six seven years ago, but if you look at what has been put in place, if you look at countries such as Brazil, South Africa and Egypt who are making so much progress then a lot needs to be done. Ideally, people sit and see us walking about and they assume that we have nothing within, when there is no issue, when there are no conflicts for us to address, what else? We stay in the barracks and train and others. But these days we have public and private partnership with people/organisations with the resources prepared to invest in the country and Defence or the Armed Forces promised to have the credible partners they always look up to. So, I believe that the provision in the constitution was there for a purpose, we can do a lot, we can do a whole lot. So, let's primarily focus on the protection and defence of the country but let's bear in mind the fact that we can use the skills we have for the benefit of the general society. So, I believe that we can do that not to the detriment of the primary responsibility.

Int:

Sir, do you think for instance we used to have the workers brigade, even the Ghana Armed Forces farms so people were earmarked for some particular activities. Do you think it is an option that we can look at, that a unit is created to cater for some of these things and then those for combat roles and special forces, stay and concentrate to specialise on how to give us that combat role effectiveness and the article 210(3) of the 1992 Constitution also concentrate on how to make the military much more relevant to Ghanaian citizens.

Res:

If you look at the proposal, the business development that GIHOC has, for instance, it has division such as affordable housing, dairy farming, solar farming, computer assembling plant and all that, so it can tap into. If you look at the specialisation within the system, ok, we now have a commercial bank, the Armed Forces bank, so it can really work. GIHOC has leverage when it comes into going into arrangement with other partners, so we have everything. I don't see why we should just be sitting there doing the primary thing without generating income. The government when it comes to funds is very small. We at the headquarters here, if I tell you what the system here is meant for us for maintenance for a year and what actually comes you will marvel but whatever be the case we want to be effective and efficient in whatever we are doing. We need resources, what is coming from the government is inadequate, so let's think about how we can also generate some income to supplement what government is providing for us.

Int:

Errm, so you don't think we will lose focus of our core mandate?

Res:

Not at all, not at all, let me explain this, you know we have...., the company has been registered, it is a limited liability company, so what we are doing is that we have experts, people with the required skills being appointed to run it as a business, so you don't have a situation where I sit here, instead of me performing my work as a legal advisor to the chief going to be on that board, you understand. What it will do is that, it will rather go and enhance our capabilities because we will be getting resources.

Int:

Ok Sir, your concluding reflections on my work?

Res:

I believe that in a nutshell what you are working on is timely because of current issues and the fact that we have not been proactive in pushing through the policy to get the required regulatory approval. Maybe this work will prompt the authorities to act on it. We have the presidential endorsement but it didn't go through all the processes to get there, what we did was to forward it to the President and he signed and we just assumed that, that is the end but it is not, so in principle it is there as a draft and I believe that it is about six years now and I believe that we have a second look at it and revise it entirely most especially if we take a clue from the constitutional provision that talks about our developmental responsibilities and we get to a point like other developed countries relying heavily on their Defence institution and to complement the support they get from government.

Int:

Sir, thank you very much for all that you have said. It will contribute immensely to my work.

APPENDIX IV

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW ON DEFENCE POLICY OF GHANA

Interview Date: 9/05/2018

Interviewer's Name: **Timothy Tifucro Ba-Taa-Banah**

ID Number: Abu (001)

Venue of Interview: **Burma Camp**

Time of Interview: **10:05 am**

Start time: **10:05 am** End time: **10:41 am**

Duration of interview: **36 mins**

Years of working experience: **22 years.**

Current Portfolio/Rank: An Armour officer who has spent several years working with politicians and the National Security outfit. He holds a Masters Degree. He currently teaches at the highest staff training school of Ghana and handles both Ghanaian and foreign senior officers. He has served continuously for 22 years and has also been in several operation theatres. He has a lot of interest in legal and security matters.

Meanings of symbols and abbreviations used in the transcription

8.,- incomplete sentence
9. **xxxxx**- inaudible
10. **Int**-Interviewer
11. **Res**-Respondent
12. []- Parentheses used to capture on verbal cues and meaning to actions and inactions
13. ++ - Short pause
14. ++++ - Long pause

Key Informant Interview

Int:

Good Morning Sir,

Res:

Morning

Int:

Please how are you doing?

Res:

I am fine

Int:

Ok, thank you for your acceptance to participate in this short interview, I am going to ask you some few questions and err you will give me responses the best way you can.

Res:

Ok, alright

Int:

So, errm the issue about this Defence Policy of our country, I want to know whether you have come into contact with our national Defence Policy.

Res:

I think err, it's been err an issue that has been debated for some time about the existence of national Defence policy. Errrm I have always held the view that we do not really have a fully-fledged national Defence policy, we have got a well thought out err doctrine based on the role carved out for us [referring to Defence sector] in the 1992 constitution. But we have not been able to codify the functions of the Armed Forces. But much of what we have traded as a Defence policy is just an elaboration of those roles and this has not be captured and properly ratified or passed down as policy. Why I my saying this? The policy much, more or less will go through some little bit of err, steps, ok, right from the extraction of the roles of the Ghana Armed Forces from the constitution and they are very broad roles which have been stated. So these roles were derived from broad objectives err, strategic and operational objectives from those roles, having extracted those broad objectives, you look at the series of activities that will lead to the

achievement of these roles. If you have come out with a series of activities, these activities will cost money and resources. You will need to evaluate or at best estimate how much it will cost you to carry out these activities and at that stage, with consultation with the leaders of the country - that is the Executive and Parliament, you will be able to tell whether these activities can be approved within the available budgetary allocation for the Ghana Armed Forces. The Executive and Parliament must agree with the military leadership that these activities which will cost so much have been authorized, and are in sync with our broad national objectives and we have approved and are willing to fund those activities towards the achievement of those broad objectives. It is at this stage that the approved document will accompany the series of activities which have been carved out by the military leadership and then passed back to them as the policy that I think they can work with. But if we are just looking at extrapolation of the roles and then err, you know stating them out in the document without necessarily looking at the import of those roles and how much it will cost the state and whether the state is indeed ready and prepared to fund those activities that will lead to the achievement of those roles, then we don't have a policy. And that is why as we speak, err we don't have a working budget in the Armed Forces, to the extent that every time they put up a budget, they tend to give what they have that is always a fraction, very, very, very, very minute fraction of what our [referring to Ghana Armed Forces] budget is. Yea that we eventually get allocated for err recurrent expenditure, so every year we, we come out with you know a strategy, we come out with plans, and projections but they remain on the shelves because we hardly get any resources for completion of these roles.

Int:

Ok, so basically, if I got your errm, you right, the issue about the policy making itself has been err, for the records we have one that was signed by xxxx July, 2012 calling it the National Defence Policy but at this point of the study has confirm that it didn't go through all the needed processes before the C-in-C appended his signature to it, that notwithstanding once it was assented to by the C-in-C himself, we still recognized it as a policy. Now how satisfactory its production has been is the issue you have raised here because, was it done whilst sitting in an air-condition room somewhere and signature appended to it just to satisfy that there is the existence of a policy, or did it go through the mill very well to get to the policy stage? But in your opinion, apart from what you have elaborated now, the issues about broad roles and activities, what do you think are the key issues that the Defence policy of our country should concern itself with, keeping in mind that in fact we have a changing landscape as far as threat is concerned, both external and internal threats?

Res:

Yes, if I have to just mention two things, I will be forced to say training and equipment, because they are the fundamental basis on which an Armed Forces strives, having the right equipment and

the right training will be the best way err to make an Armed Forces efficient and capable of serving the nation.

Int:

Ok, are there any other emerging or possible threats that we don't seem to be laying emphasis on, apart from those ones we confront here and there? Any that we are overlooking in terms of threats that affect the stability of the West African sub region and the well-being of the West African citizens.

Res:

Yes, erm, I think I have virtually mentioned all the contemporary threats and err the one that err, internally +++ I think is critical is the issue of err indiscipline, yea it is a major err, issue that is seriously regenerating and making the country more vulnerable to all xxxx, I am saying indiscipline in a sense that we as a nation, err because of love for freedom, freedom of expression, and our unique understanding of the application of democracy, it has become very difficult to instill discipline in the society. So the right to do whatever you like, whether right or wrong is an essential ingredient of democracy. Rules and regulations that are made to make roads safe, rules and ethics that are made to make our workplace safe, and productive, rules and traditional values that are made to keep our society stable are being blatantly violated without any hope of recovery. This is because fundamentally our society is one that has xxx to rely on punishment as a basis for good conduct. Ok, so in our society, the only reason why most people behave well is the fear of punishment and owing to this national indiscipline, punishment is no longer guaranteed. So, people can do what they like and get away with it. If our perception about democracy is such that when people do wrong and they are made to face the law things will be different. We have our own "democratic attitude" which is used to flip the issues and so a lot of the time our systems, judicial system, the policing system are not effective. Everything is totally broken down and almost beyond recovery. There is even no hope because we don't have any means of enforcing punishment for wrongdoing, so I think that, err I see this as a serious vulnerability that is exposing us to all the external issues. So, we look at terrorism, we will be more vulnerable to terrorism because of our indiscipline and lack of compliance with basic rules and regulations.

Int:

Ok, now let's talk about the ECOWAS sub region, erm there is this cliches that are settling in and I mean they are not only present here in Ghana. – ESF, Right 2 Protect etc. How do you see the Defence arrangements? Do you think they are adequate to cater for the current threat landscape?

Res:

I will say no. I will say no because these arrangements are weakened by our external relationships. We have the francophone countries. You know, the French/francophone armies get direction sometimes contrary to sub regional arrangements and that is considered superior because of the European powers like France. The rest of the other West African countries seem to have multi and bilateral relationships, which erm, do not all coincide with the same objectives, erm this is because of varied interests that the developed world has in each of these countries. So they are also driven by Western interests and the rest of the sub region Britain, U.S and lately some of the Eastern European countries carving out...., and China carving out their own relationships with each of these states based on their interest in their natural resources and so on. So the regional arrangements, one does not have the right funding and there is no hope of getting the right funding for, Then the integration is also erm, is not going on well because of the old factors in terms of our alliances with other multiple partners, so we do not have a concerted effort. So, I see regional bodies as an effort have not errr, have no bright future for the regional arrangements.

Int:

Ok, so now let's talk about the ECOWAS Stand-by Force. The Stand-by Forces simply talk about our formal arrangements of errr assembling troops from various countries and sending them out to help out err countries that are in distress. Errm the concept is simply a departure from where, you say country "A" should give you troops, and country "A" may be provides an infantry battalion and comes with a bit of engineers and health services and the like. Now with ESF propositions, for instance, Ghana is supposed to be providing engineer services. So, when the ECOWAS Stand-by Force is really in place and we have to deliver our services, we will be forced to send our engineers. How do you see it, with this ECOWAS Stand-by Force concept *vis a vis* the earlier concept? When nations pledge say ooh we are going to Liberia and they sent a little bit of their armour, their little bit of troops, much as we have adopted the ESF, like what happen when we went to Gambia. Countries still have to pledge and send troops. Do you think we have been wasting our time thinking about the ECOWAS Stand-by Force?

Res:

Yes, I think largely, the ECOWAS Stand-by Force, you know, arrangements are good concepts, in terms of err, approaching the security issues from a holistic perspective. But then, for too long, it has remained like a tabletop exercise/concept and erm this is largely because of the earlier issue that we mentioned that the military, training arrangements, training partnership of member countries are too varied and wide. This err, makes it very difficult to get that full commitment. The other challenge is the resources, because err training, bringing a large force, and sustaining them to be available at short notice requires huge capital injections and sufficient contributions from member countries. However, they end up relying on donor support and donor support comes

in during emergencies. On routine basis we hardly get any support and routine support from partners is based on those colonial linkages. Errr, you know, and err Western alliances that we have individually. So erm the arrangement is not effective thus prolonging a tabletop kind of exercise structure that has not been able to respond fully to crisis situations since its creation. So maybe we should look at... ECOWAS should look at how best to get better commitment from err the contributing countries err, and get better funding, otherwise it will not be effective.

Int:

Ok, so erm, the 1992 Constitution says that GAF should play that developmental role you spoke about [Respondent: yes] and err, the fact that we have..., we don't want to lose focus. Looking at it critically meaning that if we have to remain relevant and perform the true tasks, we may be losing focus. This requires, like you mentioned much earlier, we sustaining our training to remain relevant to ourselves and to remain professional at any particular point in time. What else do you think the 1992 Constitution wants transmitted? Which information should be sent through the various statutory directives and then the Defence policy? Ok, and what else do you think we should have contained in them, apart from the training and equipment you spoke about in the Defence Policy to help us maintain that focus and still satisfy the developmental aspect.

Res:

I got your point. What I will say is err, a complete, err to suggest a complete realignment of our doctrinal approach to err our military operations. Errrm I will rather want to recommend that we don't depart from our traditional role of maintaining an Armed Forces capable of defending the country's territorial integrity and that is a requirement for statehood and that cannot be substituted in any way for any reason. It is the first basic thing that makes us a state and err Ghana's stability largely has been because of the perception of our neighbouring countries that Ghana has a very professional standing Armed Forces. That in itself has given us stability over so many years. So, we must not focus on that. In order that these new roles assigned by the 1992 Constitution in relation to development, err supporting the message, you know erm, developmental effort, I will rather think or suggest that err, it is incorporated in our organizational arrangement. This should have a task force as part of the Ghana Armed Forces arrangement that is focused on that. Hence recruitment and training will essentially be directed towards internal support. So you have a Command which is - I will want to say - the equivalent of what we have in other countries like the *gendarmarie*, now in all the Francophone countries, they have *gendarmarie*, who are a sort of stronger policing and external Defence unit. Now it is not to say that we have to create a *gendarmarie*, but we should have an outfit and task force designated for internal Defence, internal issues, supporting the police and supporting those developmental issues and it will be similar to the arrangement in the US where you have the National Guard. It is similar to the *gendarmarie*. We will continue to have floods, and when there are floods, we want soldiers, so do you want to train a fighting soldier, a soldier capable of facing an enemy, direct threats of terrorisms, direct

attack of terrorists groups , you will want to train such a soldier with so much money and send him to go and rescue people in floods? I hope you understand that. So you will want to train such a soldier which is so expensive to train. It costs so much to train somebody suitable for employment during emergencies, for terrorism, err counter terrorism setting, and to go make him, prevent cutting of timber, Operation Halt', or mineral.... anti-'galamsey' duties – Op Vanguard. I mean that is not commensurate. So one will expect that it will be cheaper to train people specifically for internal...., we know the internal challenges, every year we have floods, every year we have galamsey, so let's have this task force, whose training is more oriented to internal Defence.

Int:

Ok, currently, how do you rate the Defence structures we have?

Res:

Yes, they are there. They are there and have largely been They have been very useful, very useful but what I am saying is that every time these err national disasters and national security challenges emerge, they are asking for soldiers. So what I am saying is, why would you train a soldier with so much money to go and fight terrorism and then send him to go and fight galamsey menace? You understand that. So, our core mandate of combat and territorial Defence, those soldiers and men meant for these operations, should actually be maintained and trained to continue to focus on that. Because you and I will agree that if a soldier who is trained for combat is put in this internal security operations, he will find it difficult adjusting immediately to a more burning...., switching suddenly from anti-galamsey, Op VANGUARD, OPERATION HALT, you take him from there and send him to real combat situations. The transition will be difficult, you see his orientation and training and everything will be completely off. As such I think, this thing is really segregating the Armed Forces, so I think we must have a unit, just like we have an Engineer unit, we have Recce and Armour, we have Supply Unit, we have Air Force. So let's create, let's designate this development Units. Then people will be recruited into the positions and that I believe will solve our problems. These people, such as the teaming youth groups who are giving pressure to politicians, when you examine them, they are not suitable for the main military duties. They have flat feet etc. All these challenges, some of them have you know all the forbidden things that we are not supposed to do, you pick them and you will know that this guy we will classify him and put him in such a unit.

Int:

Ok, so any final reflections on how you see the Armed Forces erm, contributing to future defence policies?

Res:

Yea, just to re-emphasise my line of thinking about the Defence Policy. We should stop fighting issues about whether we have a Defence Policy or not. Let's accept that we don't have a comprehensive policy and then set about to develop it. So, if we are setting about to develop it, we are going to patiently pick each of the roles, extract the broad objectives, get a clearance and guidance from the top, and ensure that these are in sync with a strategic level thinking. Then condense or break them down into activities, military activities, cost these activities and then when the proposal of the set of military tasks and err rules of engagement relating to all these acts, sets of practice, techniques and procedures associated with all these activities will all be drafted. They will all accompany such documents that will now be imputed item by item, so when eventually they are approved the legal aspects are catered for because they are debated in parliament as to what a soldier can do and what a soldier cannot do in all these circumstances. Then the cost, the equipment that the soldier needs to do all these things and the budget that the commanders require to be able to carry out those activities also accompanies it. All these are debated and once they are approved then there will be no basis to now be spoon feeding the Armed Forces with little left over of the budget. Once this is something that is mandatory and we have approved it and so we must provide it to the Armed Forces. So that document cannot be a small page like this [Respondent show interviewer a small page of document], that one we are talking about is like some small document outlining the roles and the intentions and visions of the Armed Forces and national Defence vision and goals and objectives and so on. But this one each one of those goals, you have a set of activities and you have accompanied tactics, techniques and procedures related to those activities and then rules of engagement associated with them. So it will go and the legal people will look at their own and err military and Defence, security and Defence Committee will look at their own, the finance people will look at their own and all these committees will have some kind of review to refine and come out with what we have agreed that our military people should do or our Armed Forces should be doing and then once it comes out then you can say that you have a document that you can call your policy.

Int:

Thank you very much, I appreciate your thoughts that I have learnt a lot from them. It will greatly help to arrange and complete my work. I find your thoughts on issues of training and equipment policy interesting. I equally appreciate your arguments about indiscipline being one of the threats to our stability as a nation.

Res:

Yes, you are always welcome and I wish you well.

APPENDIX V

Qualitative Analysis (Thematic Network Analysis)

Global theme	Organizing theme	Basic theme	No. of responses	Some Quotes
Relevance of Ghana Armed Forces Defence Policy	Safeguards National Security	Helps in threat analysis	35	<p><i>“...the face of threats keeps changing. Now it is all about asymmetric warfare, terrorism, piracy, with the ISIS coming to the fore. So we will need to have a Defence policy that is going to guide us in confronting our threats and probably from that time, as opposed to evolving situations, we can make modification to the policy. I think we should have a robust Defence policy” (Chief Operations Officer, GAF, 25 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...the most significant threats, particularly internal threats have been noted through this Policy” (Infantry officer-Intelligence Corps, GAF)</i></p> <p><i>“so a Defence policy needs to be drawn out of a national security policy/strategy based on the security horizon of our time - that is national and international security, needs to be based on the security horizons of our time. So basically, we really need the Ghana Armed Forces to be guided by a Defence Policy.” (Dean of Academic Studies at GAFCSC).</i></p>

				<p><i>“...it is a policy, so your national security strategy will be a really homeland security oreinted, full homeland security...” (International Relations Expert, over 20 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Well laid out such that the successive leaders should be able to speak to the policy and anticipated threats” (Legal Adviser to the Ghana Armed Forces, 17 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“What they did in this Defence policy was very comprehensive threat analysis. That is the external factors and internal factors and even when you go through it, you will think that the policy was prepared today because most of the threats considered are still prevalent” (Colonel-Legal Services, GAF, 25 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...a Defence policy is needed out of which you can draw the mission of GAF and its strategy based on the security horizon of our time...” (International Relations Expert, 20 years of experience).</i></p>
--	--	--	--	--

		<p>Effective collaboration with other security agencies</p>	<p>25</p>	<p><i>“It should also state how the military should relate to local authorities and other agencies in the discharge of duties” (Retired Diplomat /Army Commander, 43 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“One thing I can remember very well is about the effective collaboration the services of the Ghana Armed Forces this policy seeks to achieve” (Senior Colonel-Legal Service, GAF, 25 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“It has become the norm that we cooperate with them right from the onset. As such all those arrangements have been made erm provision for joint task force, joint headquarters, and all those things. However, I think that where the dynamics are changing has to do with the nature of crime such as hijacking and cyber. Those are the things that as at the time they were working on the policy were not too pronounced. Now that is something that we need to look at if there are any attempts to review or push through the Defence policy to its logical conclusion with regards to the processes” (Senior Colonel-Legal Service, GAF).</i></p>
--	--	---	-----------	--

				<p><i>“...the cooperation and sharing of intelligence with the various security agencies...” (Directing Staff-GAF, 23 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...seeing the collaboration that existed especially between the military and the police in fighting some crimes or most of the major crimes I think they are in order just that I feel they react instead of being proactive in dealing with some of this issues” (Research Fellow-GAF).</i></p>
Formalised Structure and operations	Gives good strategic, tactical operations directions	18	<p><i>“The Defence policy has a bearing on your force structure, your doctrine – how you operate is based on the doctrine. You have operational, strategic, and tactical doctrines” (Retired Diplomat/Army Commander, 42 years of working experience).</i></p> <p><i>“It provides guidance, directions and without it there will be complete chaos” (Career officer, GAF, 35 years of working experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...they also ensure continuity of cardinal decisions and guidelines” (Director, GNFS, 21 years of experience).</i></p>	

				<p><i>“Without policies, we will hardly progress since knee-jerk solutions will dominate and preparations for contingencies will end up being ineffective and wasteful of resources” (Naval Commodore, 30 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Policy gives the direction and instructions that a government wants a particular Sector Ministry to follow” (Command Operations Officer, 35 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“We need to be guided in all that is done not relying on the discretion of others. We need it for future guidance” (Director Discipline GAF, 26 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“I think the Defence policy is very very important. That is the document that should provide policy direction for the Ghana Armed Forces to operate. So it is important that we have a Defence policy” (Chief Instructor of the Army Faculty, 25 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“As for that one it is very relevant because that policy I think will shape the strategy that the Ghana Armed Forces will have to adopt and once that one is done, it is cast down to the Services, the Formation and to the various Units. So, it very critical because that will define the</i></p>
--	--	--	--	---

				<p><i>line that the country should take as far as Defence issues are concerned” (General Staff Officer, 27 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Policies need to set out principles, goals and objectives and empower institutions to discharge various duties” (Chief Superintendent, Ghana Police Service).</i></p> <p><i>“... so it is very important to have a policy that governs how the Armed Forces should operate” (Artillery officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“.... Additionally, there is the need for consistency in policy direction and that can only be guaranteed when there is a documented policy for the guidance of office holders” (Principal Staff Officer-GAF, 26 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“So they are needed to direct the conduct of operations in this case and to justify why funds should be released” (Deputy Director, NADMO, Tamale, 17 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“It also ensures that the Sector is run with guiding principles irrespective of the political party or government in power” (Logistics Corps Col, , 32 years of experience).</i></p>
--	--	--	--	--

			<p><i>“I think a policy is necessary because it gives us the basis around which to operate. Then from time to time depending on the particular situation...” (Directing Staff, GAFSC, 23 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Yes. I think it is necessary because it guides you into the future. What you are doing and what you are not doing, and you have to do. So, I think it is very necessary for us to have a policy that will guide us” (Military Police officer, 20 years).</i></p> <p><i>“...If we are setting about to develop it, we are going patiently to pick each of the roles, extract the broad objectives, get a clearance and guidance from the top, and ensure that these are in sync with a strategic level thinking and then condense or break them down into activities - military activities. Cost these activities and make proposals of the set of military tasks and err rules of engagement relating to all these acts, set of practices, techniques and procedures associated with all these activities will all be drafted. They will all accompany such documents that will now be imputed item by item...” (Armour officer-GAF, 21 years of experience)</i></p> <p><i>“...then your national security strategy will incorporate that kind of err...., and your training, your</i></p>
--	--	--	--

				<p><i>equipment, whatever, you know will all emanate from your National Defence Policy” (International Relation Expert, 20 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“But this one each one of those goals. You have a set of activities and you have accompanying tactics, techniques and procedures related to those activities and then rules of engagement associated with them” (Engineer officer-GAF, 23 years of experience).</i></p>
Nation building	Guides in providing development	9	<p><i>“It has piloted initiatives such as Operation Feed Yourself, Cocoa evacuation, road construction, and relief operations. So having a Defence policy will make it better” (Commander of Army Combat School, 28 years of working experience).</i></p> <p><i>“The Defence policy needs to be reviewed periodically to harmonise Defence requirements and developmental issues the GAF can get involved in” (Director Discipline-GAF, 26 years of experience)</i></p>	
Logistics and Resources	Ensures adequate logistical use and support	16	<p><i>“I will be forced to say training and equipment, because they are the fundamental basis on which Armed Forces strive. Having the right equipment and the right training will be the best way err to make an Armed Forces efficient and capable</i></p>	

			<p><i>of serving the Defence needs of the nation” (Armour officer, GAF, 21 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...itself is going to change troop contributing country policy because I have seen a draft policy and implementation date where, in the future, troops must be on standby. So let’s say if Ghana is supposed to provide an infantry battalion, all the battalion must be there with all their equipment on stand-by and depending on the level of stand-by you are paid a certain amount of money...” (Infantry officer, GAF, 20 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...the Armed Forces must be supported with logistics and equipment that will make the it respond effectively to its core mandate...” (Artillery Officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Policies are the determinants of what we do and are thus very necessary to justify why resources should be allocated to institutions”. (Chief Supt. Regional Fire Service HQ, Tamale, 20 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Additionally, the existing policy states clearly channels of sourcing resources and how they should be judiciously used” (Assistant</i></p>
--	--	--	--

				<p><i>Commissioner of Police, 24 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Budgeting, procurement, and resource management should be done with the active participation of the sectors concerned. Additionally, internally generated funds should also be subjected to public financial laws/procedures. All these require policies to be effective” (Principal Analyst, Narcotics Control Board, 15 years of experience).</i></p>
--	--	--	--	---

APPENDIX VI

Thematic Framework-Ghana Defence Policy

Global theme	Organizing theme	Basic theme	No. of responses	Some Quotes
Adaptation of Ghana's Defence Policy to changing international politics	International Defence Partnerships	Helping in developing formal relationship with other countries	37	<p><i>"...quite a number of the countries of ECOWAS train their officers together. By so doing, they get to know each other's doctrines and procedures. This is a sure way of getting the various sub regional Armed Forces to overcome their inter-operability challenges"</i> (Career officer-GAF, 35 years of experience).</p> <p><i>"Even when we leave here to conduct security operations in other countries under UN or under other international bodies like ECOWAS, AU, - it becomes more relevant to have a policy"</i> (Operations Officer-GAF, 25 years of experience).</p> <p><i>"I also think so because the Defence policy can't be isolated from Foreign Affairs"</i> (Operations Officer- GAF, 25 years of working experience)</p> <p><i>"...it is also relevant for the immediate regional groupings like ECOWAS. Why, because again globalization is creating its own negatives and part of it is cross border and transnational organized crime including</i></p>

				<p><i>insurgencies and terrorism. If terrorism has no boundaries, the whole globe is a territory and a launch pad for them. It stands to reason that adjoining countries and/or countries close to each other need to learn something from each other and in a coordinated effort also protect their territorial integrities. So, the policy is needed” (International Relations Expert, 20 years’ experience)</i></p> <p><i>“I think that it should be comprehensive that will cover our relationship with our neighbours” (Chief Instructor-GAF, 25 years’ experience)</i></p> <p><i>“Again, our relationship with other countries, good neighbourliness etc. You can only be relevant to someone outside if you yourself are safe and stable at home.” (Artillery Officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Defence and Diplomacy issues such as Bi-lateral relations, Multi-lateral relations, Relations with sub-regional and regional bodies and Relations with international institutions” (Infantry officer, 13 years of experience).</i></p>
		Guides in signing military pacts	18	<p><i>“...it is necessary that the sub-region sets up an inter-dependent security structure that will ensure the safety and security of all member states of ECOWAS. I think ECOMOG did well and ways must</i></p>

				<p><i>be found to retain its competence and experience” (Deputy Director-Ghana Health Service, 13 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...the current Defence policy touched on the establishments of foreign military bases in Ghana and their implications” (Infantry Officer-Intelligence Corps, GAF, 13 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“I think that the Defence policy should indicate which support Ghana will be in a position to give. In the case of the ECOWAS Stand-by Force it is purely engineer resources. For the UN peacekeeping operations, it is mostly infantry battalions. The policy should also indicate the instances that Ghana is authorised to act on its own, or Ghana will take part in intervention operations within the sub-region” (Operations Officer-GAF, 25 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...we know that there are only two strong military forces when it comes to those things - it is Ghana and Nigeria. They have the troops when it comes to the West African sub region” (Acting Director of Logistics GAF, 25 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“The Francophone and Anglophone divide exists but a cross-fertilization of the expertise should be encouraged. This should</i></p>
--	--	--	--	---

				<p><i>put forces in a position to respond to countries in distress”. (Legal Advisor-GAF, 17 years of experience).</i></p>
		<p>Joint military training and exercises.</p>	<p>15</p>	<p><i>“If joint training is conducted frequently, all difficulties will be surmounted. Coordinate all efforts and harness resources of all member states for the benefit of all else” (Retired Diplomat/Army Commander-GAF, 42 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Thankfully, quite a number of the countries train their officers together. By so doing the officers get to know each other, understand the doctrines of allies, and their way of doing things. This contribute immensely to integration and inter-operability of military forces in the sub-region” (General – Brigade Commander, 33 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Though training for conventional warfare should continue, the Armed Forces should diversify training to include present day asymmetric approach to warfare” (Retired Diplomat/Army Commander, GAF, 43 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“We have to ensure we do joint training, joint exercises... It shouldn’t be “this is Ghana, and this is what we should use”. The equipment should be procured from one source and then people</i></p>

				<p><i>who are going to operate them be trained on those equipment, whether they are from Burkina Faso or from Guinea Bissau. They have the same equipment and they are trained to use them competently” (Artillery Officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“I started asking myself why other African countries bring their personnel for training in Ghana. That goes to show the quality of the training Ghanaian military gives to its own and for this reason other African countries will want their military trained here in Ghana” (Research Fellow-GAF).</i></p>
	International conflict management	Effective inter-regional conflict resolution	22	<p><i>“There is a need, I started by saying that some countries in the sub-region are conflict minded and ECOWAS arrangements are all based on conflict resolution. If the same zeal with which we want to tackle conflicts is exhibited in our commitments, then that needed network and collaboration must be seen” (senior Colonel-Legal Service, GAF).</i></p> <p><i>“...because of the role it plays also in the international scene beyond the ECOWAS, you know the world is now faced with this kind of warfare, a kind of cyber warfare, kind of low intensity conflicts all over the place. Therefore, interventions are very much needed. We cannot say that</i></p>

				<i>something is far off from us and therefore we are not part of it” (International Relation Expert, 20 years of experience).</i>
		Manage cross-border threats	14	<p><i>“A Defence Policy will set the environment in a holistic and unbiased manner. The Ghana Armed Forces for instance will be required to hold itself in readiness to support all that is required for the effectiveness of cross-border security management e.g. the ECOWAS security architecture to contain threats to stability and security” (Command Operations Officer, 25 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Errr, one critical thing the policy should also focus on is the rising asymmetric nature of warfare, terrorism, and counter terrorism” (Chief Instructor-GAF, 25 years of experience).</i></p>
		Keeping international peace	34	<i>“...I know keeping international peace is part of it and so how we relate in the international peace or peace support operation is also very key” (Artillery Officer-GAF, 24 years of experience).</i>

APPENDIX VII

Thematic Framework

Global theme	Organizing theme	Basic theme	No. of responses	Some Quotes
Sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the Defence policy/structures	Accountable Financial Management and resource use	Effective budgetary and resource allocation	40	<p><i>“Whilst expecting the institutions to be frugal and judicious in the use of their allocated resources, government should equally be interested in meeting her part of the bargain. That is providing the resources and budgetary allocation on a timely basis.”</i> (Deputy Director, Ghana Health Service - National Ambulance Service, 15 years of experience)</p> <p><i>“Therefore, to be seen to be cost effective, we need to be prudent and use resources judiciously”</i> (Director, Fire Service, Tamale, 21 years of experience).</p> <p><i>“The use of resources must be prudent and transparent and above all leaders must show frugality and a display of a high sense of integrity”</i> (Commodore, 30 years of experience).</p> <p><i>“Accountability, checking corruption”</i> (Principal Analyst, Narcotic Control Board, 21 years of experience).</p> <p><i>“We can certainly demand that the institutions be prudent, accountable and more forward</i></p>

				<p><i>looking in their financial management...” (Chief Superintendent, GPS, 22 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Released funds must also be judiciously used and accounted for...” (Principal Staff Officer-GAF, 27 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Auditing and judicious use of resources should also be actively practised” (Deputy Director, NADMO Tamale, 17 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Apart from that let us see the budgeting process, the internal auditing and the implementation of best practices in procurement, tendering and disposal of contracts” (Chief Supt, GNFS, Tamale, 20 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Budgeting, procurement and accounting must be done properly at all times and corrupt officials dealt with. Best practices should also be assessed for lessons” (Lt Col/Deputy Director-GAF, 32 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Probity and accountability must be ingrained in office holders” (Assistant Commissioner of Police, 24 years of experience).</i></p>
	Internally Generated Funds	Raising funds	14	<p><i>“Leaders must find innovative ways of raising funds from both public and private sources to support budgetary allocations”</i></p>

				<p><i>(Naval Commodore, 30 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Institutions need to be encouraged to raise internally generated funds to supplement that which comes from central coffers” (Ghana Health Service - Hospital Administrator, Tamale Regional Hosp. 18 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“...the possibilities of generating funds internally to cater for some minor expenses must be exploited” (Principal Staff Officer-GAF, 26 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Government Departments need to be encouraged to raise funds internally to cater for some costs” (Deputy Director-GAF, 17 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Additionally, internally generated funds should also be subjected to public financial laws/procedures” (Principal Analyst-NACOB, 15 years of experience)</i></p>
	Human Resource Development	Skills training	12	<p><i>“...training of personnel” (Principal Analyst, Narcotic Control Board, 21 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Public servants need to be trained in financial management skills to help run institutions in</i></p>

				<i>cost-effective ways” (Chief Supt-GNFS, 20 years).</i>
	Proper Regulation of Resource Use	Audited resources	13	<p><i>“Additionally, released resources should be strictly controlled and audited” (Ghana Health Service - Hospital Administrator, Tamale Regional Hosp. 18 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Procurement through to disposal of unserviceable equipment must all respect the laid down regulations” (Retired Diplomat/Army Commander, 43 years old experience).</i></p>
	Effective Leadership	Leadership style	42	<p><i>“Civil Defence institutions can be more effective depending on the policy direction, leadership and resources” (Intelligence Officer – Colonel. 28 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“Creative and transformative ways of running the Armed Forces need to be arrived at by leaders” (Deputy Director-GAF, 17 years of experience).</i></p>
		Goal setting	31	<i>“Goals need to be met but not without the use of resources” (Principal Officer-NADMO, 19 years of experience).</i>
	Effective allocation of resources	Recycling resources	43	<i>“Waste must be reduced as much as possible and recycling of material should be encouraged” (Retired Diplomat/Army Commander-GAF, 43 years of experience).</i>

				<p><i>“Waste needs to be reduced and frugality needs to be encouraged” (Deputy Director-GAF, 17 years of experience).</i></p> <p><i>“No institution should be starved of resources and none should be allowed to waste them unchecked” (Assistant Commissioner of Police, 24 years of experience).</i></p>
				<p><i>“...it is rather sad that the GAF, has over the years failed to optimize its resourcefulness for its own benefit and that of the larger Ghanaian society. A lot more can be drawn from its latent potential” (Former Chief of Army Staff – General – 42 years of experience).</i></p>

APPENDIX VIII



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)

P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana

My Ref. No.....

1st November, 2017

Mr. Timothy Ba-Taa Banah
Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)
University of Ghana
Legon

Dear Mr. Ba-Taa Banah,

ECH 056/17-18: THE GHANA ARMED FORCES AND THE NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY: MEETING CONTEMPORARY THREATS AND CHALLENGES FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

This is to advise you that the above reference study has been presented to the Ethics Committee for the Humanities for a full board review and the following actions taken subject to the conditions and explanation provided below:

Expiry Date:	31/10/18
On Agenda for:	Initial Submission
Date of Submission:	18/09/17
ECH Action:	Approved
Reporting:	Bi-Annually



Please accept my congratulations.

Yours Sincerely,

Rev. Prof. J. O. Y. Mante
ECH Chair

CC: Prof. Henrietta Mensah-Bonsu, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana.

P. O. Box CT 4315

Accra

20 Sep 2017

The Chairperson
Ethics Committee for Humanities
ISSER, University of Ghana
Legon

Dear Chairperson

Application for Ethical Approval


Protocol Name: **The Ghana Armed Forces and the National Defence Policy: Meeting Contemporary Threats and Challenges for National Development.**

I wish to submit to you the above-named protocol and essential documents for approval by your committee.

I look forward to receiving any comments that you may have in relation to the above.

Thank you for your co-operation.

Yours sincerely



TT BA-TAA-BANAH

(Principal Investigator's Name & Signature)

Enclosed:

1. Letter from Head of Department
2. New Protocol Submission Form
3. Protocol Consent Form
4. Research Proposal
5. Work Plan
6. Budget
7. Questionnaire/Instrument
8. CVs of PIs and Co-PIs

LEGON CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DIPLOMACY (LECIAD)

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, P. O. BOX LG 25, LEGON GHANA



19th September, 2017

Date:.....

Our Ref No... LEC.ST/PHD

Ref No.....

Tel.: +233-0302-501025

Fax.: +233-0302-501311

Email: Leciad@ug.edu.gh

The Chairperson
Ethics Committee
College of Humanities
University of Ghana
Legon

Dear Sir,

**REQUEST FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL
TIMOTHY BA TAA BANAH**

This is to introduce to you Mr. Timothy Ba Taa Banah, a third year Ph.D International Affairs student at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD)

Mr. Ba Taa Banah is conducting research on the topic "**The Ghana Armed Forces and the National Defence Policy: Meeting Contemporary Threats and challenges for National Development**".

I should be grateful if you would grant him Ethical Clearance to enable him undertake the Study.

Counting on your usual co-operation.

Yours sincerely,



Dr. Philip Attuquayefio
For: Director



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA



Official Use only

Protocol number

OFFICE OF RESEARCH, INNOVATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Ethics Committee for Humanities (ECH)

NEW PROTOCOL SUBMISSION FORM

Requirements:

- i. A new protocol must be submitted to the ECH at least five weeks before the proposed commencement date of the research.
- ii. All sections of the form must be completed before protocol can be considered for review.
- iii. 11 hard copies of proposal must be submitted to the ECH in addition to other documentations as spelt out in the SOP. A soft copy of proposal and other documentations should also be emailed to ech@isser.edu.gh / dopai-tetteh@ug.edu.gh

Section A – Background Information

1. Project Title:

The Ghana Armed Forces and the National Defence Policy: Meeting Contemporary Threats and Challenges for National Development

2. Proposed Date of Commencement:
October 2017

3. Principal Investigator (Name, Title, Qualifications, Postal Address, Institution/Department, Phone number, Email address)

4. Co-Investigator(s) (Name; Title; Qualifications; Postal Address; Institution/Department; Phone number; Email address)

5. Student Investigator(s) (Name; Title; Qualifications; Postal Address; Institution/Department; Phone number; Email address; Supervisors name, Title and Contact) **Timothy Tifucro BA-TAA-BANAH, Lt Colonel, BSc Admin, MA(Int Affairs), MPhil(Def/Geo-Strategy),PGCPA,DELF, P.O.Box CT 4315, Accra, LECIAD, 0548332544, timbat1@yahoo.fr.**

**Supervisor – Boni Yao Gebe, Dr, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD).
Ansah Kumi-Koi, Dr, Department of Political Science – Legon.**

5a. Indicate status

Undergraduate

Masters Level

Doctoral Level

5b. Thesis Approval Letter and Introductory Letter from Head of Department

Section B – Project Information

1. Proposed Project Duration - From: (dd/mm/yy)_20/10/17__ To: _31/07/2018_____
2. Collaborating Institution (if applicable)
3. Funding Status of Project? Funding pending <input type="checkbox"/> Funded <input type="checkbox"/> Not funded <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Source of funding (Name and Address)
5. Research Location(s) ACCRA – MINISTRIES AND CDD, NDPC, WANEP, KAIPCT, National Archives, and PARLIAMENT.
6. Data Collection Instruments (ie. Interview, questionnaire, observation et cetera) Interview Guide
7. Consent Process (Circle all that applies): (i) Written (ii) Oral (iii) English language (iv) Local language (v) Other
9. Work Plan (Attach Work Plan)

Section C – Ethical Survey

1. Will the study involve participants who are particularly vulnerable or unable to give informed consent? (eg people under the age of 18, people with learning disabilities, students you teach or assess, etc.)

Yes No

If Yes, state the category of persons?

2. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge and consent at the time?

Yes No

If Yes, state why?

3. Will the study involve any audio or visual recording of people in public places?

Yes No

If Yes, State which type?

4. Will the study involve the discussion of sensitive topics? (e.g. sexual activity, illegal drug use, illegal activities, death, whistleblowing)

Yes No

If Yes, state the topic type? - National Security/Defence Issues .

5. Will the study involve invasive, intrusive or potentially harmful procedures of any kind?

Yes No

If Yes, State procedures?

6. Is physical pain or psychological stress from the proposed project likely to cause harm or negative consequences beyond the risks in normal life?

Yes No

If Yes, State how?

7. Will financial inducements (other than expenses) be offered to any of the participants?

Yes No

Section D - Signature

Name of person completing the form: _____ TIMOTHY TIFUCRO BA-TAA-BANAH _____

Role on the study: _____ STUDENT RESEARCHER _____

Signature: _____ *Timothy* _____

Date: _____ 20 Sep 17 _____

For all student projects:

<i>Timothy</i>	20/09/17	<i>J. Asante</i>	20/09/2017
Student Investigator	Date	Supervisors Signature	Date

For Thesis Supervisor(s)

I the undersigned supervisor have read through the proposal thoroughly (Scientific Review of the proposal) and reviewed the research instrument(s).

<i>J. Asante</i>	20/09/2017	<i>K. L.</i>	20/09/17
Super visors Signaturor	Date	Supervisors Signate	Date

Note:

As the **Principal Investigator/Student Investigator** on this project, my signature confirms that:

- (i) I will ensure that all procedures performed under the study will be conducted in accordance with UG - wide policy statement on ethical conduct of research involving human subjects as well as the Standard Operating Procedure of ECH.
- (ii) I understand that if there is any change from the project as originally approved, I must submit an amendment to the ECH for review and approval prior to its implementation. Where I fail to do so, the amended aspect of the study is invalid.
- (iii) I understand that I will report all serious adverse events associated with the study within seven days verbally and fourteen days in writing.
- (iv) I understand that I will submit progress reports each year for review and renewal. Where I fail to do so, the ECH is mandated to terminate the study upon expiry.
- (v) I agree that I will submit a final report to the ECH at the end of the study.

APPENDIX IX



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA



Official Use only
Protocol number

Ethics Committee for Humanities (ECH)

PROTOCOL CONSENT FORM

Section A- BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Title of Study:	The Ghana Armed Forces and the National Defence Policy: Meeting Contemporary Threats and Challenges for National Development
Principal Investigator:	TIMOTHY TIFUCRO BA-TAA-BANAH
Certified Protocol Number	10054192

Section B- CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

General Information about Research

The purpose of the study is to contribute to the review of the Defence policy making process of Ghana. The study is expected to unearth how Defence policy making can be more effective at maintaining the relevance of the Armed Forces as a Public Sector institution. I will require a maximum of 3 hours of each participant's time.

I will pose questions and the participant will answer them whilst I take notes. Answers may draw follow-up questions. A synopsis of all responses I consider relevant to my research work will be documented.

Benefits/Risks of the study

The prime benefit is that the study will add to the existing knowledge of Defence Policy reviews. In the Ghanaian context the policies have not been reviewed by previous researchers who have mainly concentrated on the history of the Armed Forces.

The obvious risk an adversary of Ghana getting to know the strengths and weaknesses of the Defence policy of Ghana. However this is already possible without the conduct of this study by any potential adversary using his intelligence wings. Additionally, Defence Policies are not sensitive documents. Their classification are low and they may even be accessed on-line.

There are hardly any hazards associated with the study. Participants will not be required to engage in any physical activity beyond oral responses to questions. However, if during the interaction I notice a physical discomfort of a participant I will immediately discontinue and seek the necessary medical assistance for the individual involved.

Confidentiality

No reference whatsoever will be made to any individual who participates in the research unless he/she specifically requests to be mentioned by name. even if such a request is made I will go a step further to seek the opinion of my lead supervisor. All notes taken during interviews will also not bear the names of the respondents. Additionally my research such not be made public at any point in time.

Only my supervisors may have access to my notes and records. Not even the participants will have access to my hand written notes. I do the typing myself and as such no clerk/typist will have acces to my work.

Compensation

No compensation will be paid any respondent. However because of the envisaged 3-hour interaction, I will provide water, a drink and a snack during to the interviews.

Withdrawal from Study

Participation in this study is solely on voluntary basis. No one will be compelled to take part in it whatsoever. Consequently, at any point in time a participant may withdraw without fear of any sanction. He/she will suffer not be adversely affected by the withdrawal or refusal to take part.

Any participant who feels strongly that some questions should not be answered will be allowed his/her way without any fear of being quoted or sanctioned. No legal action can be conceived against any participant for either his participation, withdrawal, OR his refusal to participate in the study.

Contact for Additional Information

I am the sole student researcher involved with this study. I can be contacted on 0548332544 or timbati1@yahoo.fr. My lead Supervisor, Dr Boni Yao Gebe (0244 538 416) can be contacted at LECIAD

whilst Dr Ansah Kumi –Koi (0208128875) can be contacted at the Department of Political Science – Legon.

If you have questions about your rights as a research participant in this study you may contact the Administrator of the Ethics Committee for Humanities, ISSER, University of Ghana at ech@isser.edu.gh / ech@ug.edu.gh or 00233- 303-933-866.

Section C- PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT

"I have read or have had someone read all of the above, asked questions, received answers regarding participation in this study, and am willing to give consent for me, my child/ward to participate in this study. I will not have waived any of my rights by signing this consent form. Upon signing this consent form, I will receive a copy for my personal records."

Name of Participant

Signature or mark of Participant

Date

If participant cannot read and or understand the form themselves, a witness must sign here:

I was present while the benefits, risks and procedures were read to the volunteer. All questions were answered and the volunteer has agreed to take part in the research.

Name of witness

Signature of witness / Mark

Date

I certify that the nature and purpose, the potential benefits, and possible risks associated with participating in this research have been explained to the above individual.

Name of Person who Obtained Consent

Signature of Person Who Obtained Consent

Date