

**EXPLORING THE FUNDING OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING IN
GHANA'S DEMOCRACY**

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
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AWARD OF MA COMMUNICATION STUDIES DEGREE**

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DECLARATION

I declare that except for the works of other authors duly referenced, the work presented in this dissertation was done by me, under the supervision of Professor Kwasi Ansu-Kyeremeh. I further affirm that this work has not been submitted either in part or whole to any other educational institution for the award of any degree, diploma or certificate.



.....

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(Supervisor)	(Student)
Date	Date

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dear wife Felicia Asare who provided the needed support that enabled me to complete this work. I also dedicate it to my children: Zoe, Sina and Jude who provided good company while this dissertation was being written.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my sincere gratitude to God my refuge for giving me the strength to complete this research in spite of the many difficulties and setbacks I encountered.

I am highly indebted to my supervisor, Professor Kwasi Ansu-Kyeremeh for his sacrifice and guidance during the period of this research. Even during times that I personally realized that you had a lot of work on your hand, Nana, you still made time to read my work. God will always remember you, Nana. I am also grateful to Prof. Audrey Gadzekpo and Dr. Margaret Amoakohene for their motherly guidance. To other lecturers of the Department of Communication Studies, I say God bless you.

To my very good friend William Tamakloe, I say thank you. You have shown that indeed, “there’s a friend that sticks closer than a brother”. I will always remember your immense contribution to this research.

I would also like to thank my late mother and brothers and sister who ensured that I went to school.

To all who contributed to the completion of this dissertation, I say thank you. God will never forget your labour of love.



ABSTRACT

This research was undertaken to explore the sources of funding of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation to determine whether it was reflective of that of a Public Service Broadcaster or other Broadcasting Systems. Two qualitative approaches were adopted for the study, focus group discussion and in-depth interviews were used in data collection. Two groups of six persons were used for the focus group discussion and two persons for the in-depth interview. The results indicated that GBCs funding is steadily moving towards commercial activities, its TV license fee collection is not yielding much as was expected, accounting for less than 10% of GBCs internally generated funds. The results also indicated that as at 2011, 50% of GBCs funding came from government subventions.




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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the study

The advent of multiparty democracy in Ghana brought with it the liberalisation of the media. Until the 1990s, broadcasting in Ghana had been a monopoly of the public service broadcaster, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC). It was argued by Ferguson (1990), that the public service role of GBC was necessary and critical like many other African countries, to bring development, foster unity and promote national culture. According to Ferguson (1990), radio and television requires the use of a public resource, the frequency spectrum; and hence should attract licensing and regulation, both of which necessitates restricted entry. Flowing from Ferguson's argument, a restricted entry in the media space initially created broadcasting monopoly for the state while at the same time raising funding issues.

The term 'public service broadcasting' is a borrowed term from the European broadcasting corporations. Public service broadcasting corporations were set up as licence fee funded monopolies in the inter-world war period. Broadcasting institutions, therefore, attempted to bring into being, a culture of a shared life to the people (Mpofu, 1999).

They broadcast materials that portrayed a sense of oneness to the populace. In Europe, a key feature of public service broadcasting is the predominance of public funding over commercial advertising and sponsorship. Licence fees and government grants are the main form of government funding. Public funding is considered therefore as the means critical to the ability of the public broadcasting service to produce a diversity of programming, not driven by advertisers according to Mpofu (1999).

In Ghana, like other West African countries, funding for the operations of public service broadcasters came from direct government grants. After independence, this far exceeded licence fees because of the deliberate increase in government spending. In the immediate post independent Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah provided large sums of government funding to the Ghana Broadcasting Service to be used as a political and developmental tool and to transmit broadcasts by African liberation movements across the continent (Mbaine, 2003). This formed the basis of the role of the GBC over the years.

1.1 Broadcasting Systems

Over the years, there have been numerous debates on the peculiar characteristics or definition of the broadcasting systems inherited by most nationalist regimes from their colonial masters. In all these debates, four models of broadcasting was identified by Rumphorst (2003) and these are state, government, public and public service broadcasting systems.

Rumphorst (2003) defined them as indicted following. State broadcasting is controlled by the state and represents state interests. It is funded (at least in part) from the public purse and usually independent of the government of the day. Government broadcasting, however, is controlled by the government of the day and represents the viewpoint of the executive. It is at least partly funded with public money.

Public broadcasting on the one hand, is owned by the public and is thus accountable to the masses. It is also funded, at least partly, with public funds. Public service broadcasting, on the other hand, has a mandate to broadcast content that is in the public interest. A public service broadcaster need not be publicly owned – privately owned broadcasters may have such a role but a public broadcaster should always have a public service remit.

1.2 Public Service Broadcasting

The term ‘public service broadcasting’ was formulated in the United Kingdom by the Sykes Committee in 1923 during the advent of radio broadcasting. The committee, in formulating regulations for the operation of radio and broadcasting in general, decided among other things that, “broadcasting should be a ‘public utility; the airwaves were thus classified as public property’” (Born, 2004, p.27).

Born (2004) argued that, public service broadcasting’s overall contribution to society should therefore be an overtly beneficial one, providing the population with a service on a number of levels. There was a generalised understanding that, public service broadcasters were to satisfy public need or at least attempt to.

The thought of protecting the airwaves from private and governmental interests and use was derived from a suspicion of the implementation of commercial broadcasting in the United States, where commercial radio had quickly been institutionalised in society and was having detrimental effects upon the content produced as a result of the influence of advertisers. The British authorities were thus stringent in their understanding of how they wanted broadcasting to be operated amongst the British population. Burns (1977, p.34) therefore stated that, public service broadcast’s had “immense potency as a means of social, cultural and ultimately political influence and power” within the British cultural setting.

A publication by the World Radio and Television Council (2000) defines public service broadcasting as “neither commercial nor state-controlled”. Public service broadcasting’s only *raison d’être*, according to the Council, is public service. It is the public’s service broadcasting organization that speaks to everyone as a citizen. Public service broadcasters

encourage access to and participation in public life. They develop knowledge, broaden horizons and enable people to better understand themselves by better understanding the world and others.

According to UNESCO (<http://portal.unesco.org>), public service broadcasting (PSB) is broadcasting made, funded and controlled by the public, and for the public. It is neither commercial nor state-owned. It is free from political interference and pressure from commercial forces. One sees in these definitions, an encapsulation of the popular notion that public service broadcasting is characterised by programming that is broad and diverse and addresses all citizens rather than some citizens through both general programmes that are of high quality and specific programmes catering for special interest, tastes, minorities and marginalised groups.

According to Siune (1998), the idea of public service broadcasting has always embodied a commitment to balanced scheduling. This means that the public service broadcaster must be sensitive to the needs of all segments of its audience and strive to give a balanced, impartial view of issues. Siune (1998) further explains that public service broadcasting institutions are bodies which are financially independent of the government and commercial sources. Normally, there is a basic payment in the form of a license fee. The political content of programming of PSBs is also obliged to be balanced and impartial to all political interests.

These features are inextricably linked to the means of funding of any public service broadcaster. The lack of sufficient funding has great impact on the independence of the public service broadcaster. Where a public service broadcaster depends on the commercial sector as the main fund provider the public service broadcasting mandate is obviously

sacrificed for profit. In the same vein, where the government is the sole supplier of funds, it exercises tremendous control on its editorial decisions, (Siune, 1998).

1.3 Understanding public service broadcasting

World Radio and Television Council (2000) articulates that, public service broadcasting rests on certain basic principles, defined in an era of general interest media, long before the multiplication of channels and the era of specialisation. These principles remain essential today and public broadcasting authorities must give them a meaning, reinterpret them in some way, in a world characterised by media fragmentation. Universality, diversity and independence remain today, like yesterday, essential goals for public broadcasting. To these three principles must be added a fourth, particularly important when the public service broadcaster exists side by side with commercial broadcasters: distinctiveness.

Universality

Public broadcasting must be accessible to every citizen throughout the country. This is a deeply egalitarian and democratic goal to the extent that it puts all citizens on the same footing, whatever their social status or income. It forces the public broadcaster to address the entire population and seek to be “used” by the largest possible number.

This does not mean that public broadcasting should try to optimize its ratings at all times, as commercial broadcasting does, but rather that it should endeavour to make the whole of its programming accessible to the whole population. This does not merely involve technical accessibility, but ensuring that everyone can understand and follow its programming. As well as democratic, public broadcasting programming must be “popular,” not in the pejorative sense that some give this term, but in the sense that the public forum it provides should not be

restricted to a minority. Thus, public broadcasting, while it should promote culture, should not become a ghetto constantly frequented by the same group of initiates. “The ghettoisation of public service broadcasting is a non-starter”³, as the 1996 report of the European Parliament Committee of Culture, Youth, Education, Sports and the Media (Tongue Report) clearly states, opposing the notion that public networks should broadcast only the type of programming scorned by the commercial sector.

Diversity

The service offered by public broadcasting should be diversified, in at least three ways: in terms of the genres of programs offered, the audiences targeted, and the subjects discussed. Public broadcasting must reflect the diversity of public interests by offering different types of programs, from newscasts to light programs. Some programs may be aimed at only part of the public, whose expectations are varied. In the end, public broadcasting should reach everyone, not through each program, but through all programs and their diversity. Finally, through the diversity of the subjects discussed, public broadcasting can also seek to respond to the varied interests of the public and so reflect the whole range of current issues in society. Diversity and universality are complementary in that producing programs intended sometimes for youth, sometimes for older people and sometimes for other groups ultimately means that public broadcasting appeals to all.

Independence

Public broadcasting is a forum where ideas should be expressed freely, where information, opinions and criticisms circulate. This is possible only if the independence therefore, the freedom of public broadcasting is maintained against commercial pressures or political influence. Later we will examine specific means for guaranteeing respect for this principle

and ensuring the credibility of public broadcasting in the eyes of the public. Indeed, if the information provided by the public broadcaster were influenced by government, people would no longer believe in it. Likewise, if the public broadcaster's programming were designed for commercial ends, people would not understand why they are being asked to finance a service whose programs are not substantially different from the services provided by private broadcasting. This latter example, by the way, leads us to lay down another principle that is particularly important in countries where public broadcasting exists side by side with private commercial services.

Distinctiveness

Distinctiveness requires that the service offered by public broadcasting distinguish itself from that of other broadcasting services. In public-service programming—in the quality and particular character of its programs—the public must be able to identify what distinguishes this service from other services. It is not merely a matter of producing the type of programs other services are not interested in, aiming at audiences neglected by others, or dealing with subjects ignored by others. It is a matter of doing things differently, without excluding any genre. This principle must lead public broadcasters to innovate, create new slots, new genres, set the pace in the audiovisual world and pull other broadcasting networks in their wake.

1.4 History of Public Service Broadcasting in Ghana

Public service broadcasting, for that matter, radio, was introduced to the Gold Coast by Governor Sir Arnold Hodson in 1935. The first broadcast was made on July 31, 1935, via “Station ZOY”, the broadcasting service introduced for the purpose. The station was established as a public service tool with the main motive of bringing news, entertainment and music into the homes of Ghanaians (Ansah, 1985).

After 1939, the station was used for various purposes, which included educational support services as well as for the spread of British propaganda during the World War II. The station, initially under the Information Services Department, was separated from the Department in 1962 and renamed the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) to serve as the Government's mouthpiece (GBC Report, 2006).

Funding of broadcasting in the Gold Coast was done through the collection of a subscription fee of five shillings a month. When a statement was made at the Legislative Assembly to the effect that the people could not afford to pay for both broadcasting and water at exorbitant prices (Legislative Council Debates, March 23, 1938, p 74-75), Governor Hodgson replied a year later, that "nothing could be cheaper than this" (Legislative Council Debates, March 23, 1939, p. 195). Ghana took a bold step, venturing into international broadcasting by setting up the External Service of Radio Ghana in June, 1961. It broadcast in English, French, Hausa, French, Swahili, Arabic and Portuguese (Ansah, 1985). This was a major and audacious move by President Kwame Nkrumah aimed at fulfilling his foreign policy.

Then in 1965, television was introduced into Ghana with the help of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. President Nkrumah said television was introduced "for the education and edification, the enjoyment and entertainment of our people" (Speech by Osagyefo, the President on the inauguration of Ghana Television, July 31, 1965, State Public Corp., Accra-Tema, p.3). Two years later, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation embarked on a major policy shift to go into commercial broadcasting. This was against a 1953 Broadcasting Commission advice against commercial radio (Broadcasting in the Gold Coast, 1953). This happened in 1967 when the Commercial Service of the GBC was established. The government at the time explained that this was to give the "business community and

other individuals the chance of selling their goods and services through the fastest available means-radio and television” (Broadcasting in Ghana, 1978; p.14). Equally important was the need to supplement government funding.

This then marked the beginning of the commercialisation of the GBC. Subsequently, the GBC, unlike the BBC, began to engage in programming that could earn it advertisement. The GBC remained the only broadcaster in Ghana. It enjoyed the status of a monopolist until Ghana returned to multi-party democracy in 1992. The 1992 constitution made specific provisions for the liberalisation of the media in Ghana, a democratic country. Chapter five (Article 162) of the constitution states: “Freedom and independence of the media are hereby guaranteed”. Article 162(3) also states that “there shall be no impediments to the establishment of private press or media; and in particular, there shall be no law requiring any person to obtain a licence as a prerequisite to the establishment or operation of a newspaper, journal or other media for mass communication or information”. This constitution paved the way for the liberalisation of the media landscape in Ghana.

In 1968, the National Liberation Council Decree (*NLCD*) 22, 1968 redefined the purpose of GBC as that: “it shall be the duty of the Corporation to provide as a public service, independent and impartial broadcasting services (both sound and television) for general reception in Ghana”. The Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Decree, (*NLCD* 226, 1968) also made provision for the structure of the GBC. According to the Decree, the governing body of the Corporation shall be a Board, comprising a Chairman and eight other members including the Director General. Per the decree, government was responsible for the appointment of the board. The 1992 Constitution however, gives the right to appoint members of the board to the National Media Commission, NMC (Article 168, 1992 Constitution).

The corporation has a Director General who acts as the chief executive officer. He is responsible to the board for the day to day administration of the corporation. The current democratic dispensation gives the NMC the sole responsibility of appointing director generals of the GBC. Provision is made by the *NLCD decree 222* for the position of two deputy director generals. Presently, the GBC has only one deputy director general. Every division is headed by a director. The radio, television engineering and technical divisions are all headed by directors. Also, the finance, business development, corporate affairs and administration divisions are headed by directors. All ten (10) GBC regional offices are headed by directors, who report to the Deputy Director General and the Director of Human Resource. There is also a legal officer and an internal auditor who report directly to the Director General.

With the demise of short wave broadcasting, the GBC is unable to reach every corner of the country. It has therefore set up regional frequency modulation (FM) stations in all regional capitals of Ghana, except in Greater Accra where it is situated at Tema. The regional FM stations of the GBC undertake their own programming as well as marketing and sales planning. Their incomes form part of the total income of the GBC.

Part commercialisation of GBC meant that it now had to compete with the private media for ads. At the same time it produces public service programmes, no matter how boring they are. Article 63 of the constitution even places a burden on the state owned media. It states: “all state-owned media shall afford fair opportunities and facilities for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions”. This requirement must be met by the GBC and it strives to do that. The GBC has little choice not to do government or state bidding because

much of its funding comes from the state. It is a “he who pays the piper calls the tune” kind of a scenario.

The steady demise of public service broadcasting (that started with the demise of short wave broadcasting) can be attributed to the imminent onslaught of new commercial offerings via cable, satellite, digital transmission and more recently, the Internet” (Steamers, 2002). An additional reason for this “steady demise of public service broadcasting” could be the attraction that the private media have over the public electronic media.

In spite of the description of the work of the GBC as “public service” by the NLCD decree, GBC still seems to have an identity crisis such that the government is now trying to “convert” GBC into a public service broadcaster by tasking a committee reviewing the Broadcasting Bill to come out with suggestions to make the GBC a true public service broadcaster. This ambiguity of the status of GBC is a problem that this project would seek to understand.

1.5 Public Service Broadcasting Funding Models

1.5.1 Funding Models in Europe and Elsewhere

Apenteng (2007) explains the various kinds of public service broadcasting different countries practice. While NHK, the main public service broadcaster in Japan is a centralized organization like the BBC in UK, the German ARD is an association of broadcasting organizations of the individual federal states. In the Netherlands public broadcasting associations are given time and money to produce programmes for broadcast on publicly owned radio and television channels. The United States has a highly decentralized public service broadcasting system where several nonprofit associations produce programmes that are distributed through major associations like National Public Radio (NPR) and Public

Broadcasting Service (PBS). Governance and funding mechanisms also differ in the various countries (Apenteng, 2007).

The BBC makes its money primarily from license fees collected from owners of television sets in the UK. This research will explore how the GBC has managed to fund itself in a democratic and pluralised media environment. This is important because the sources of funding, as argued by Apenteng (2007), could compromise the ability of public service broadcasting from carrying out its mandate. Finance could easily be used as the leverage for control or influence on programming.

In the UK, there is a pluralised media environment, yet the BBC is able to make profit. According to the British Parliamentary Select Committee on Communications' Report (2008–09), in a period of low inflation, or possibly deflation, the BBC is financially stronger and in a more secure position than virtually any other business in the UK.

In the USA, voluntary contributions are used to fund public service broadcasting, but in Australia, the license fee is used. Like Australia, the license fee is also collected and used to fund the BBC in the UK. According to the British Parliamentary Select Committee on Communications' Report (2008–09), BBC's total income in 2008 was £4.4bn. Out of this, £3.4bn came from licence fees and £284m came from Government grants. In a period of low inflation, or possibly deflation, the BBC is financially stronger and in a more secure position than virtually any other business in the UK. There is fund for PSB activities in New Zealand and Singapore. Smith (2010) suggests that the ways of funding PSB should be left to the ingenuity of broadcasters, regulators, academics and the concerned citizens to work out what is best for them.

1.5.2 Funding Models in Africa

Different countries in Africa fund public service broadcasting using various formulae. Banda (2006) lists the different models of funding of PSBs. Direct government or state funding is the main mode of financing public service broadcasters in Africa. This however, raises the issue of autonomy from political influence. The issue of “he who pays the piper calls the tune” comes to play under this model. The government may see the public service broadcaster as its own because it is depended upon the government for the survival of the national broadcaster. The licence fee model is used in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Banda, 2006). The small numbers of people in formal employment, and the problems associated with collecting the fee have made the amounts raised insufficient to sustain PSBs (Banda, 2006). The mixed formula draws on commercial revenues and public funds. Ghana, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Mozambique all have this formula.

Nonetheless, some schools of thought are of the opinion that public service broadcasters should not compete for advertising mainly because they receive funding from the state. Debt financing from government, with an over-reliance on advertising revenue also happens in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Banda (2006) believes that such financing leaves the PSB operator too open to the vagaries of the advertising market. Sales of non-core services such as music recordings are used by South Africa and Zimbabwe. These amounts realised from these avenues are obviously insufficient to finance PSBs (Banda, 2006).

Ghana’s public service broadcasting model is similar to that of the British Broadcasting Corporation. The BBC, according to its former Director-General, Mark Thompson, was established to inform its audiences about a wide range of charities so that they can increase awareness about the work they do and raise much needed funds so that they can continue

helping those who are in need, (BBC 2013a). The British have practised this model of broadcasting for years as a democracy.

1.6 Problem Statement

According to Smith (2010), for each country, the funding system has to be something that evolves out of its own history, something that works for it. To her, public service broadcasters such as GBC are the captains of their own fate. This is important to note because the various models of funding were evolved by the respective countries themselves. For most countries running a PSB, the funding models they operate have sustained them sufficiently. A review of studies on public service broadcasting in Ghana indicates that little has been done to examine whether or not GBC has come up with its own funding sources (or model as has been done in other countries) that can sustain it as a PSB in the wake of media plurality and commercialisation. There is therefore the need to examine this issue as it would help clarify the status of GBC as a PSB or not.

1.7 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study were:

1. To explore how GBC is funded as a PSB
2. Understand whether its sources of funding influence its status as a PSB.

1.8 Research Question

The above background information gives rise to the following research question. The research this study sought to answer the following question:

R.Q1. How have the sources of funding of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation influenced the independence of GBC (from government or advertisers) as a PSB?

1.9 Purpose of this Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the various means by which public service broadcasting is funded in Ghana. It is believed that the GBC is funded through government funding and advertisements. The democratic environment Ghana is enjoying brought with it a pluralised media set up. The introduction and increase in the number of private media houses has made the media terrain more aggressive in terms of funding, especially through sound marketing principles. This study will look at the various components by which the GBC is funded. Findings from the study will help to understand whether GBCs funding is reflective of a PSB or those of other broadcasting systems such as those of State Broadcasters or Commercial Broadcasters.

1.20 Scope of Study

The research aimed at exploring the funding of public service broadcasting in Ghana's democracy and held focus group discussions with key broadcasting experts and conducted in-depth interviews with officials from GBC. The difficulty in assessing literature initially was a challenge this study faced. Coming across literature related to this study was such a herculean task.

1.21 Significance of the Study

This research is significant in that it will afford students of communication insight into how public service broadcasting is funded in Ghana. Funding of a broadcasting station determines the focus of programming of that station. The Ghanaian audiences have the impression that because GBC is a public service broadcaster, it should be able to bring to listeners and viewers all programmes they desire. This project is also significant because it would inform the Ghanaian public about the challenges the corporation encounters in securing funding

thereby enabling them to appreciate the difficulties it has. Appreciating these challenges will make it easy for the Ghanaian populace to be willing to contribute money either through tax or license fee to augment its funding sources.

1.22 Chapter Summary

The advent of multiparty democracy in Ghana brought with it the liberalisation of the media, however Ghana Broadcasting Corporation remains as the public service broadcaster. The chapter sought to identify its history in Ghana's democracy and the varied models of public service broadcasting in the world, with an emphasis on its various funding options.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter articulates the theoretical framework which guided this study. The first part presents the theoretical assumptions underlying public service broadcasting using the political economy theory of the Media and its varied funding options and defines its directly related concepts. It also examined and reviewed some studies that have been conducted that bore relation to this research. Various works were reviewed to provide various scholars' interpretations of the concept of public service broadcasting. Finally, this chapter puts the concept of public service into perspective and discusses some models in Africa and around the world. The study was conceptualised within the frameworks of the libertarian theory of the press and the political economy theory of the media.

2.1 Theoretical Considerations

2.1.1 The Political Economy Theory of the Media

The political economy theory is defined by Mosco (1995:2) as “the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations, which mutually constitute the production, distribution, and consumption of communication resources”. The theory was postulated by Herman and Chomsky (1988) in their book *Manufacturing Consent – The Political Economy of the Mass Media*, in which they introduced the propaganda model of the media. Herman and Chomsky claim that because media is firmly imbedded in the market system, it reflects the class values and concerns of its owners. They argue that money and power are able to filter out the news to fit print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public. They also maintain that the media maintains a corporate class bias through five systemic filters: concentrated private ownership;

a strict bottom-line profit orientation; over-reliance on governmental and corporate sources for news; a primary tendency to avoid offending the powerful; and an almost religious worship of the market economy, strongly opposing alternative beliefs. These filters in effect limit what will become news in society and set parameters on acceptable coverage of daily events according to Herman and Chomsky (1988).

In the propaganda model of Herman and Chomsky, maintains that owners and managers of media houses share class identity with the powerful and are motivated to please particularly those who fund them and the viewers. The independence of journalists and editors, according to the propaganda model is restricted because they are not immune to the influence of owners and managers who are also, economically motivated to please their sources of funding and viewers. According to Herman (1996) the model does suggest that the mainstream media, as elite institutions, commonly frame news and allow debate only within the parameters of elite interests. He also maintains that where the elite are concerned as against ordinary citizens, by the model, the media will uncompromisingly serve the interest of the elite. In effect therefore, public interest is subdued by the interest of the high and mighty in society due to financial considerations by the media. Corner (2003) also maintain that the propaganda model is essentially a proposition about the operation of five filters that act to shape and constrain the accounts of the political world issuing from the media. According to Corner (2003), the model presents a system within which media professionals comfortably if not numbly function and audience are just 'brainwashed'.

Klaehn (2002), on the other hand, maintains that the net result of the propaganda model is self-censorship without any significant coercion. According to Boyd-Barrett (1995) the term political economy in media research has a critical significance often associated with questions

of media ownership and control. The political economy theory locates the power of the media in the economic processes and structures of media production. Ownership and economic control of the media are seen as the key factor in determining control of media messages. For Lukin (2012), however, questions the function of the media relative to government and industry are complex and multidimensional rather than a simple one as the Propaganda Model posits. Media performance is situational and more nuanced than expected. Lukin (2012), therefore cited the example of Britain's Channel 4, a state-owned commercially funded broadcaster which in the face of 'factors such as patriotism, reliance upon official sources and ideology, was able to maintain 'a degree of autonomy and balance that is rarely expected during world war times. Lukin (2012) therefore argues that the media in certain situations can be autonomous.

In case of Ghana being a democratic state where the public broadcaster is expected to discharge its public service duties to its citizenry without fear or favour, the study is interested in finding out the extent to which the media theory of the political economy plays out in the output of GBC.

2.1.2 The evolution of public service ideals

Public service broadcasting ideals became influential during television's first decades – its era of 'scarcity' (Ellis, 2000: 2). Two important facets of the context in which they initially thrived were a relative dearth of TV channels and the need to address early concerns about the potentially negative 'effects' of a new mass medium. Adapted to television from radio, the broadly influential British public service broadcasting model was pioneered by Lord Reith, founding director-general of the BBC in the period 1927–38. Convinced that governments rather than businesses should control broadcasting and coining its 'trinity' of

values (inform, educate and entertain), Reith saw PSB as an opportunity to foster greater equality between citizens through shared experiences and, in particular, to provide ‘cultural uplift for the lumpen masses’

(Hendy, 2003: 5).

As PSB evolved in British television – with the introduction and strict regulation of the commercial ITV network in 1955, the BBC’s expansion to two channels in 1964, and the introduction of a second public network, Channel 4, in 1982 – a more progressive and ambitious set of public service broadcasting ideals emerged. By the late 1970s, the initial Reithian notion that public service broadcasting should include ‘moral leadership, enlightenment and betterment’ had given way to the view that PSB should centre on the provision of services, was best facilitated by a pluralist approach, and should work harder to meet the needs of ‘the full range of groups in society’ (Medhurst, 2003: 42). In the 1980s, the British Broadcasting Research Unit detailed eight principles for public service broadcasting which included: universality of availability; universality of appeal; provision for minorities, ‘especially those disadvantaged by physical or social circumstance’; the attempt to serve the public sphere; a commitment to the education of the public; the maintenance of a distance from all vested interests; encouraging ‘competition in good programming rather than competition for numbers’; and the use of rules which attempt to ‘liberate rather than restrict the programme-maker’ (Tracey, 1998: 26–32). With much the same combination of principles informing PSB provisions and expectations in the many countries that opted to follow the British broadcasting model, public service television has thus been characterized by a markedly more complex, ambitious set of objectives than the Reithian values under which it originated.

As the first custodians of PSB ideals in television, public networks had an interest in developing them as a distinctive set of objectives and strategies so as to demonstrate their difference from commercial networks and justify their public incomes. However, as national TV systems matured, and with the inception of new private networks accelerating in the 1980s and 1990s, public service ideals – which had presumed the continued dominance of public networks – needed to adapt to remain relevant in an environment now dominated by commercial operators and in which the public ownership of TV networks could no longer be justified by television’s scarcity relative to other media.

Graham Murdock (1997: 17–18) outlined a streamlined set of interconnecting objectives for contemporary PSB, which are summarized here as:

Autonomy – specifically broadcasting’s maintenance of an appropriate distance from both the state and commercial sector as ‘major centres of institutionalized power’;

Universal availability – to preserve broadcasting against ‘physical or material barriers to inclusion’ and maximize its ability to engage and involve the full range of citizens;

Programme diversity – which, in addition to broadening the generic, aesthetic and cultural range of programming that is offered, ensures the representation of a ‘diversity of interests, voices and perspectives’;

Innovation – to be facilitated by the active encouragement of formal, representational and other creative experimentation in programming;

Mainstreaming – the pursuit of ‘recognition and respect for difference’, to be achieved centrally through the incorporation of “‘minority” experiences and views’ in ‘the full range of primetime programming’; and

Access – the delivery of a ‘genuine diversity of representation’ through the inclusion of ‘viewers as active participants rather than as simply spectators’.

Acknowledging television's public sphere potentials and recognizing the limitations of its dominance by commercial networks, the above objectives have demonstrated their continuing relevance by delivering on two overarching PSB outcomes which (although relevant to other media) are particularly significant in television because of its very high production and transmission costs. First, PSB objectives have increased the formal and cultural diversity of programming beyond what the commercial sector alone can offer and in ways that allow for specified minority interests to be served. Second, they have helped to ensure that PSB-funded programmes can remain available to all citizens regardless of their ability to pay.

Introduced in late 2002, a notable example of the second PSB outcome above has been the BBC/Crown Castle-initiated digital platform, Free view. Offering a low-cost digital TV package as an alternative to private subscription – its broad, rapid take-up helping to secure a relatively early and unproblematic 'switchover' for British TV – Free view has provided an effective answer to the challenge of maintaining universal access in television's unfolding digital age.¹ Television's continuing convergence with the internet has introduced another imperative in preserving universal availability to PSB funded programming and services – the ability to access them on the full range of new media platforms and do so 'anywhere, anytime'.

2.1.3 Public service broadcasting and the challenges of the multi-channel era

Since the 1980s, a combination of institutional, political and cultural changes has undermined the market position of the public networks entrusted with public service obligations. These have included: the technology-fueled proliferation of TV channels and on-line TV services; the consequent fragmentation of audiences in ways that undermine the ability of any TV network to speak to, let alone for 'the nation'; the media deregulation demanded by neo-

liberal ideology; and a more general fracturing of societies into a multiplicity of identities and identifications. The fourth (and most complex) of the above changes has been shaped variously by the ‘politics of representation’, the myriad affiliations fostered by branding and lifestyle, and by commercial television’s fervent efforts to aggregate its audiences into ever more specialized niches as a way to compensate advertisers for the loss of audience size.

As their market position has weakened, public networks have found themselves struggling to reconcile public service objectives with the often conflicting imperative to compete successfully with an expanding, diversifying commercial TV sector. In the aggressively competitive markets that have characterized television since the 1990s, a greater uniformity between the schedules of leading public and commercial channels has become increasingly apparent, this itself prompting criticism that public television has ‘dumbed down’. The strategic efforts of public networks to compete effectively to retain significant audience share, despite the fragmentation of national TV markets, have been intensified, on the one hand, by their dependence on an increasingly pressurized public income and, on the other, by the need to deliver on their PSB expectations and thereby justify continued public investment. With the above changes in television involving particular challenges for its public service providers, the special case for PSB objectives to retain provision and centrality in national TV systems has come under increasing pressure.

Efforts to revive government support for PSB have prompted what Elizabeth Jacka (2003: 178) described as ‘a veritable avalanche of discourse’ in which the profiling of the public sphere, citizenship and democratic virtues of public service television have amounted to a ‘democracy as defeat’ justification.

However, even this has been open to challenge, as Jacka (2003: 180) suggested, given the impressive record and range of public interest achievements built up by private TV networks. Nevertheless, in national contexts in which a limited population size has been seen to impose undesirable constraints on the diversity of domestic TV production, a more enduring justification for the continued support of television's public service objectives has been 'market failure', an argument which centres on the public funding support of commercially vulnerable programming that meets desired cultural or social objectives. A case in point has been public service TV's provision of specified 'minority interest' programming, which (regardless of how many channels are operating) remains unviable for commercial networks. Acknowledging the resonance of market failure justifications for PSB in New Zealand, Murdock (1997: 22) argued that: 'If neither user-pays systems nor advertising based finance can guarantee a broadcasting service that meets the cultural requirements of contemporary citizenship; we must look again at the question of public funding.'

2.2 Related Works on Funding

Berry and Waldfogel (1999) studied public radio in the United States and said that, because broadcasters can capture only a part of the value of their products as revenue, there is the potential for public broadcasters to compete with commercial broadcasters over listening share and revenue. After analysing the radio stations, they concluded that due to the fear of commercialisation the stations received a lot of support for the Corporation for public service broadcasting, this according to them accounted for the vast majority of public listening. The study also found significant differences between the programming formats of the public stations and that of the commercial stations.

Tosics, Van de Ven and Riedl (2008) studied the funding of public service broadcasting and state aid rules in Belgium and Ireland after complaints from the public on the state funding of public broadcasters. According to them, private competitors argued that the definition of the public service remit was not sufficiently precise and that there were no effective control mechanisms. The complainants also claimed that the public financing received by the public service broadcasters for the fulfilment of their public service tasks was not proportionate to the net costs of carrying out these tasks. After investigating the complaints, Tosics et al., (2008) concluded that public funding and surpluses generated by commercial exploitation of public broadcasting activities may only be used for the financing of public service activities. On that basis, public service broadcasters are to report on an annual basis on the use of their public funding. They also recommended to authorities to commit themselves to ensuring that the commercial transactions (commercial activities, investments, etc.) of the public broadcasters are clearly distinguishable from public service activities and carried out on market terms, taking into account the 'arms-length principle'.

Storr (2011) studied the evolution of public sector broadcasting in the small states of English speaking Caribbean. Storr (2011) contends that a paradigm shift, characterized by competition from private broadcasters, has caused changes in public service broadcasting in the Caribbean. A highly competitive media environment culminated in the free-fall and disintegration of state-funded broadcasting. According to Storr, this caused Caribbean governments to redefine state broadcasting and establish rules to accommodate a radically changing media environment. Among these changes are:

(1) Increased commercialization (2) Closure of state-owned systems (3) Collaborations with commercial partners (4) Consolidation (5) Integration of digital technology and (6) Restructuring and reregulation.

Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) is deemed a vital element of modern democratic societies. Public service broadcasters are thus expected to play the important role of providing access to, and participation in, public life by promoting access to education and culture; developing knowledge; and fostering interactions among citizens. There is therefore no universally acceptable definition of PSB; instead, there is a plethora of definitions and descriptions of the concept. Barendt (1995) argues that PSB is a normative as well as a descriptive concept whose principal features can be identified. Barendt then identifies the following principal features as peculiar to public service broadcasters:

i) General geographic availability; ii) Concern for national identity and culture; iii) Independence from both state and commercial interests; iv) Impartiality of programmes; v) Range and variety of programmes; and vi) Substantial funding by a general charge on users.

This combination of factors, according to Barendt (1995), constitutes public service broadcasting. In this regard, the general population, irrespective of their geographical location, should have easy access to the public broadcaster. In terms of the nature and operation of the broadcaster, Barendt (1995) mentions the broadcaster's concern for maintaining and promoting the common national identity and culture of the various societies within the nation. The national broadcaster should also be independent of both state and commercial influences while producing programmes that are devoid of any leanings be it political, social, cultural influence, etc.

Chaudhry (2005) describes public service broadcasting as a broad term. According to him, if media is promoting social harmony in a society only then is it doing public service. Jabbar (2005) says PSB represents all points of view from the different segments of the society. In his book 'Citizen Media Dialogue' Jabbar gives some definitions of PSB, two of which are:

1. "The specific part of content of media which seeks to promote the public interest in any given sector of life, be it education, health basic infrastructure, social justice, freedom of expression, human rights, gender equality, political and cultural rights etc.
2. "Neither commercial nor state controlled, public service broadcasting's only *raison d'être* is to offer a public service, a public meeting place where all citizens are welcomed and considered equal. Because it is not subject to the dictates of profitability, PSB can contribute diversifying content sources, giving a voice to other cultures' points of view and promoting tolerance and culture understanding."

Public service broadcasting, according to the UNDP's Bureau for Development Policy (2004), has the potential to play a crucial role in ensuring the public's right to receive a wide range of independent and non-partisan information and ideas. PSBs also help to promote a common sense of national identity, foster democratic and other important social values, provide quality educational and informational programming, while serving the needs of minority and other specialized interest groups within the country.

According to the UN's development agency, public service broadcasting has a key role to play in strengthening democracy and democratic governance as well as poverty reduction efforts mostly in developing countries. Public service broadcasting ensures that marginalized and disempowered groups, made up of those with no political, economic influence or power, have access to information and provide a voice for the voiceless.

2.2.1 Different Broadcasting Models

The UNDP's Bureau for Development Policy (2004), identifies three main broadcasting models, namely; state, public service and commercial broadcasting. The document further distinguishes each model from the other using four parameters: description, operating rationale, audience and revenue sources.

In terms of description, the document describes public service broadcasting as a media system that is defined via a meticulously articulated legislative framework in which the media is put in the hands of the public. The model is also characterized by a greater autonomy in terms of its operations and management.

State broadcasters, on the other hand, are directly supervised by state authorities, with government exercising full control over content and or programming. Commercial broadcasters are privately owned and are usually accompanied by some degree of state regulation.

In terms of the different operating rationale for the different models, public service broadcasters usually produce content that is driven by the general public interest, while state broadcasters produce content that is driven by political interests. Commercial broadcasters, however, churn out content that is driven by commercial interest and have the potential of drawing commercials for the broadcasters to make profit.

The audience is another factor for classifying the different broadcasting models. While both public service and state broadcasters target the citizens of the country, commercial stations usually target consumers who are the main target of adverts placed on such networks.

The sources of revenue for the different models differ from one another. Public service broadcasters are usually funded through subscription fees from viewers or listeners, alongside state funding and a small percentage of advertising. State broadcasters are mostly funded through taxes, with advertisement and private investment being the main sources of funding commercial broadcasters.

2.2.2 Some Broadcasting Models in Africa

Different broadcasting models exist in Africa, fuelling the debate about how one can characterise or define the broadcasting systems inherited by most nationalist regimes from the colonial period. Banda (2006) identifies four types of broadcasting across the continent. There is the state broadcasting, which is controlled by the state and represents state interests and funded (at least in part) out of public money while government broadcasting is controlled by the government of the day and represents the viewpoint of the executive. This model is at least partly funded from the public purse.

Some African states have public broadcasters that are owned by the public and are accountable to it. Public broadcasters are funded, at least partly, out of public money. The last model of broadcasting in Africa, according to Banda, is the public service broadcasting, which has a specific remit to broadcast content that is in the public interest. A public service broadcaster need not be publicly owned – privately owned broadcasters may have such a role – but a public broadcaster should *always* have a public service remit (Article 19 2006: 37; cf. Rumphorst 2003:1-3).

In Zambia, Parliament enacted the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) (Amendment) Act in 2002 to convert the then state broadcaster to a public sector broadcaster.

That law has being partially fulfilled, as the state has blocked its full implementation through the courts of law (Banda 2006). An exception to these influences and restrictions on public broadcasting is that of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), which has seen some radical transformation from the apartheid state broadcaster to a public broadcaster.

2.2.3 Funding Public Service Broadcasters

The British House of Lords Select Committee on Communications (2009) report, recommended that an “element of contestable funding should be introduced to fill some of the gaps that might otherwise arise in public service broadcasting. This would entail the setting up of a limited fund to which broadcasters and programme makers could apply”. The committee suggests various means by which such a fund should be resourced without turning to the tax payer for extra support. First, the licence fee, part of which is already devoted to helping the elderly and disabled with the costs of digital switchover is used to fund the public service broadcasters. The committee realised that if part of the licence fee were to be made available to public service broadcasting outside the BBC, it would represent substantial additional funding. According to Ed Richards, there will be approximately £130 million per annum that could be used for something else which would have no impact whatsoever on the BBC’s programmes and services.

The committee found that in contrast to the position of advertising-funded television, the BBC is in a uniquely favoured position. The corporation’s total income in 2008 was £4.4bn, of which £3.4bn came from the licence fee and a further £284m from Government grants. Under the 2007 licence fee settlement agreed following Charter Review, the BBC has secure funding, which will rise significantly over the period of the settlement. In a period of low

inflation, or possibly deflation, the BBC is in a financially stronger and more secure position than virtually any other business in the country.

A second source of funds as found out by the British Select Committee results from the digital switchover. Currently, the public service television companies receive an implied subsidy from their use of the limited analogue spectrum. With the move to digital and the increase in access, that advantage will go. However, analogue spectrum will still have value because of demand from elsewhere. Part of the receipts which will go to the Treasury could be used for public service broadcasting—thus continuing the policy of support, according to The British House of Lords Select Committee on Communications (2009) report.

Third, the committee recommended that it may ultimately have to be considered whether a further element of the licence fee might be redirected to support public service provision outside the BBC. Redirecting an element of the licence fee has a long history. It has been used not only for the digital switchover targeted help scheme but also between 1927 and 1961, when a portion was allocated to general public funds.

The committee's recommendation for the funding of the BBC, excluded the continuous dependence on the tax payer. It suggested the following sources of funding (a) the under spend on the digital switchover programme (b) the continuance of funding from the licence fee after 2012 when the digital switchover programme ends and (c) the use of at least part of analogue spectrum revenue after 2012. Consideration may ultimately need to be given to redirecting an element of the licence fee to support public service content provision outside the BBC. It is obvious from the recommendations, that the role of the licence fee is critical for the funding of public service broadcasting in the UK.

Several funding mechanisms for public service broadcasting have been adopted in Africa. Licence fees have been the major source of funding for numerous PSBs in Africa, such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) and Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), etc. Government or state funding is also another way of sustaining PSBs. Almost all state and or public broadcasters in Africa are funding directly by government or state. This raises the question of autonomy from the political influences associated with government/state funding. Some broadcasters also practise the “mixed formula”, that provides funding via a combination of both commercial revenues and public funds. Broadcasters such as the SABC, GBC, ZNBC, Malawi Broadcasting Corporation [MBC], Radio Maputo, etc. do combine these modes of funding to see to their welfare. The over-reliance on commercial advertising by most PSB operators is also having its influence (Banda, 2006).

Some commentators argue that state ownership of PSBs does not necessarily translate into state control of PSB. The example given is that of the SABC of which the state is the only shareholder. Other commentators argue that state ownership is sometimes desirable to ensure that PSB serves the developmental interests of the nation i.e. nation-building, rural development, etc. As suggested elsewhere above, this view seems consistent with the way PSB has evolved in Africa, reflecting the varying ideological-developmental agendas of the nationalist elites.

This contrasts with the findings of the Africa Media Barometer, 2011. The Africa Media Barometer sampled at least five media practitioners and five representatives from civil society groups to assess the media situation in their own country. The sample size then

discussed the national media environment according to 45 predetermined indicators. The discussion and scoring was moderated by an independent consultant who also edited the Africa Media Barometer. The Barometer's findings indicated that the GBC was not adequately funded. It says that in fact, the GBC is "financially disabled". It says that subsidies from the government "are not even sufficient for salaries and sometimes the payment of staff is delayed". The Barometer found out that in order to survive, "the GBC sells a lot of airtime, undercutting the rates set by the private competition, and has to succumb to the wishes of potential clients". Due to this, the output of the GBC resembles that of a commercial broadcaster, rather than a public service broadcaster.

Bernie Grummell (2009 24: 267), explored the interaction between education and public Service broadcasting in the Irish context, where it has been mediated by a complex interplay of institutional, economic and cultural factors. The research was based on documentary analysis of Irish broadcasting archives, current policies and interviews with leading practitioners in the field. The Irish case study illustrates the multifaceted nature of the interaction between education and public service broadcasting, which has important implications for contemporary European broadcasting.

According to the journal, the complex funding and organizational structures of Irish broadcasting further exacerbated the position of education; with three state departments – communications, finance and education – all potentially responsible for educational broadcasting. Bell (1984: 40) cited in the European Journal of Communication argued, that 'State's traditional reluctance to provide adequate finance for broadcasting, coupled with its perpetual desire to control it' has been a consistent feature of Irish broadcasting. It stands to

reason from this literature that some states are reluctant to pay for public service broadcasting, yet their desire to have a strangle hold on it is obvious.

2.3 Chapter Summary

The chapter looked at political economy theory as the main theoretical framework for this research and reviewed some related works on funding public service broadcasting, with the view to using these to analyse the research data.



CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter outlines the method employed in gathering data for this study. It describes the study area, sample size, data collection procedure, analysis and the presentation of the data. The study was designed qualitatively where the focus was not on the numbers but the depth of issues. In-depth interviews and focus group discussions were used to help explore the issue of public service broadcasting funding in Ghana.

3.1 Overall Approach to Study

A leading scholar in the field of development communication, Servaes (2001) states that generally, qualitative approaches may be better when investigating meaningful phenomena in development communication. The research design for this study made use of qualitative research methodologies which relate to the general aim of the study, which was, to determine how the state broadcaster, GBC funded its broadcasting in Ghana.

3.1.1 Focus Group Discussions

Focus group discussions are used to understand people's attitudes and behaviour where between 6 to 12 people are interviewed concurrently, with a moderator who leads the respondents in a fairly unstructured discussion about the investigation topic. This study used FGDs as part of a multi-method approach to collect data on the topic. FGDs were used by this study because of its flexibility in question design and follow-up and the fact that it allowed for more people to be interviewed at a go.

3.1.2 In-depth Interviews

The use of in-depth face-to-face interviews and selection of interviewees were guided by purposive sampling in an attempt to reach the appropriate respondents. A purposive sample is one subjectively selected by the researcher (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003). Purposive sampling selects subjects on the basis of specific characteristics or qualities. This type of sampling starts with a purpose in mind and the sample is thus selected to include people of interest and exclude those who do not suit the purpose.

According to Boulton and Hammersley (2006:244), purposive sampling is a form of non-probability sampling in terms of which decisions concerning the individuals to be included in the sample are taken by the researcher on the basis of a variety of criteria, including specialist knowledge of the research issue, or the capacity and willingness to participate in the research. Two in-depth interviews were conducted with two management staff of GBC, including the Deputy Director-General, and the Finance Director of GBC. The interviewees were chosen according to their importance as sources based on their in-depth knowledge of the operations of GBC and according to their willingness to cooperate.

As suggested by Mercer (2006), the most useful interviewees for research projects are generally the project beneficiaries and key informants, such as organization staff and project leaders, donor staff, village or settlement leaders, local leaders from government, and business and religious institutions. It was expected that the in-depth interview would help a great deal in complementing the data collected through the FGDs.

3.2 Sampling Method

The non-probability method, specifically purposive sampling was used in this study to determine the participants for the focus group discussions. Participants of the focus group discussions were drawn from the media, post-graduate institutions and civil society groups concerned with broadcasting in Ghana. The purposive sampling technique was also used to select the two participants for the in-depth interviews, the Deputy Director-General, and the Finance Director of GBC for the study.

3.3 Data gathering methods

This study adopted two methods for collecting data: in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Focus group discussions were conducted to collect data from the participants using a structured interview guide. Two focus groups made up of six (6) media industry experts and advocates in Ghana. Each focus group lasted for about thirty (30) minutes each. The discussions were held in a school building located near GBC head office.

In-depth interviews were conducted with the Deputy Director-General and the Finance Director of GBC with each lasting not more than 30 minutes. Both focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were recorded and notes taken.

3.4 Data Analysis

The unit for analysis was GBC as the nation's public broadcaster. After the fieldwork, all taped discussions and interviews were transcribed to supplement the notes taken during the actual data collection exercise. The data was then categorized into different themes based on the research questions. The research data was thematically coded to give meaning to the study as well as to put the gathered data into perspective.

The data that were generated during the empirical study were analysed against the theoretical framework proposed in chapter two (2) and the findings compared with each of the data gathering methods as a cross referencing mechanism for validity and reliability. The research findings were also analysed descriptively and presented in a narrative form along emergent themes. Conclusions were drawn based on the data analysed.

3.5 Ethical Considerations

In respect of the ethical considerations for this study, Gorman and Clayton (2005:43-44) state that the rights of individuals involved in the research study include confidentiality and anonymity, voluntary participation and informed consent.

Approvals from the relevant authorities were also sought and acquired prior to the fieldwork being conducted. Discussions during personal interviews were confidential, and participants in the focus group discussions (FGD) were informed of the nature and purpose of the research verbally prior to the interview. This study therefore employed the above methods to ensure the requisite confidentiality and anonymity of all participating individuals.

3.6 Chapter Summary

Focus group discussions and in-depth interviews were used in gathering data for this study. The data was then categorized into different themes based on the research questions for the purposes of analysing the data for this study.

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents findings from the data gathered for the study. The study sought to explore how GBC is funded, to find out which category of broadcasting the GBC was in, and to identify the challenges GBC encounters in its funding, if any. The analyses of both qualitative and quantitative data are presented in this chapter.

4.1 Components of GBC Budget

It is paramount that we analyze GBC's annual budget to better appreciate its finance needs. In the in-depth interview with the Financial Director GBC, he said the following:

“The broad components of GBC’s expenditure, which ensure a day to day running of the corporation among other things include; Utility expenses, payment for cleaning services, printing and publications, transportation and travel, repairs and maintenance, service charges by other companies, office consumables, training and conference costs, consultancy services, programmers charges, safety, external link expenses etc. On the average, GBC requires over forty-five million Ghana Cedis (Ghc 45,000,000) annually to ensure the smooth running of the organization. Although the corporation hardly receives this target revenue figure; the corporation has seen somewhat gradual increase in the amount of funds that come into its coffers over the past ten years. Only 14% of the needed funds (GHc 45,000,000) was realized in 2002. This figure rose steadily to 30% in 2007 then to 66% in the year 2011.”

Information was not readily available regarding funds expected from the year 2002 to 2007. However, in 2008, the corporation exceeded its expectations by 2.5% although the funds that came in were nowhere near the figure needed for the smooth running of the corporation that year. In 2009, 73% of the expected funds for that year was realized; increasing to 97% in 2010 and then dropping again to 61% in 2011. This clearly gives an indication of financial instability within the organization.


Figure 1: Financial targets and proportion realized



NB: More commercial programming intensified after the fifth year

***The years under review are 2002 – 2011**

Figure 2: State's contribution to funding GBC



NB: *The year under review is 2002 - 2011

The corporation largely depends on state funds for major capital equipment and also for staff remuneration. From the year 2002 to 2008, funds provided from the state were on average only 10% of the needed funds. This figure went up to 21% and then to 46% in 2011. The rest were raised from other sources other than that of the government.

4.2 Sources of funding (Anticipated/Actual)


The Ghana Broadcasting Corporation has over the years hoped to generate its funds from its television licensing system; whilst relying on state resources to make up for any extra needed funds. However, TV license has since 2009 ceased to be a source of revenue. The fees have been suspended mainly due to the fact that the rates are so low that it is more expensive collecting them. The Deputy Director-General had this to say funding the corporation through the collection of television license fees:

TV license are still there, it's just that GBC is not collecting the fees because the rates are ridiculously low." "I mean 30 pesewas for a whole year, does not make sense collecting them.

Since the TV licensing system has not worked so well, the corporation has been forced to resort to other means of funding. The Deputy Director-General also added that:

In addition to expectations from state resources, GBC currently raises funds mainly from the production and airing of programmes, advertisements, sponsorship deals, sale of airtime, announcements, rental of its masts among others. All these sources of funding however are still inadequate to cater for the amount of funds needed for its operational expenses.

Figure 3: Internally Generated Funds



NB: Majority of internally generated funds comes from commercial receipts

*The years under review are 2002 – 2011

With a financial shortfall of up to 50% of the GBC in beefing up the funding sources is currently moving more into commercial programming as a temporal measure. This is however affecting the image of the corporation. The Finance Director had this to say:

“GBC have had to be creative in expanding our sources of funding in the face of limited funds to fund our operations. Therefore, just for the corporation to make money, GBC has moved more into commercial programming than it should as a public service broadcaster.”

Again, GBC currently relies on state funds in order to purchase medium to high cost equipment to make up for the shortfall in its finance. However, any time such grants are released the tendency for the corporation to come under some political influences is inherent.

He added:

Simply because the funding becomes a tax that is not dependent on government directly because whenever government gives you grants, they tend to try to influence you politically.

In the long term and as a more sustainable measure, GBC intends to revive the television licensing system hopefully through a digitized decoding system where the corporation can regulate who gets access to television viewing. However, until then the corporation tries to go into more commercial programming as a means of generating more funds to cover its operational costs.

4.3 Operations Management in Relation to Raising Capital

There are a number of things within the management system of the GBC that could be both direct and indirect factors responsible for the corporation's current funding system. First of all, there is some evidence that the current monitoring and supervision system is very inefficient. Superiors have a loose oversight on the workers. A leading media consultant and analyst in Ghana and a member of the FGD said this:

For instance a recent review of the corporation's programming has revealed that within a space of three months up to one thousand (1000) adverts that were scheduled to be played were never played; and there has not been any disciplinary measure taken against the individuals directly responsible for this inaction. This lack of disciplinary measures has accordingly led to a break down in discipline of its workers over the years, to a point it is almost difficult to bring things under managerial control.

(Monday, 1st October, 2013)

Another FGD participant raised a key issue in the operations of GBC as a reason for some of the funding challenges encountered by GBC. He said:

Many workers have very little skill in doing analysis, in-depth reporting, documentary and features and the corporation has not trained itself in the area of engaging the public in doing real public discourse.

Attracting good sponsorship requires excellent delivery of programmes. Thus, this lack of skill most likely has driven away more potential sponsorship. Having the needed excellent output although requires some training; also depends a lot on a sense of professional touch to achieve excellence. However, this spirit of professionalism is said to be largely missing in the staff. In-depth interviews with key informants within corporation have suggested that this reported lack of professionalism is also believed to be one main factor hampering the rich opportunities available to the corporation in attracting sponsorships.

4.4 Defining the Kind of Broadcaster GBC is, based on Funding

The Ghana Broadcasting Corporation is currently experiencing what could best be described as identity crises. Based on managerial structure, the GBC holds an identity as a public broadcaster. However the corporation's lack of financial independence seems to nullify the public broadcaster identity. Based on funding it cannot be said to still hold the identity as a public broadcaster since its funds have over the years mostly come from other sources than the public.

A FGD participant and also an Executive Member of the National Media Commission described GBC as a state owned or public broadcaster, describing the structure of the national broadcaster as similar to that of the BBC. When he was however asked how to make the national broadcaster truly independent, the executive member said:

GBC can be truly independent if it is made to run as a company to generate revenue for itself without depending on government purse. GBC can be run like the Graphic Communications Group Ltd, although it is the only state and public broadcaster. The appointment of key pleaders such as Director Generals and the Board of Directors is still by government and hence opens GBC up for political influence.

Data available also shows that between 2002 and 2011, an average of 50% of the funds received by the corporation, although woefully inadequate, has come from the state [Ref Fig. 3]. Although there seems to be some degree of autonomy in its management set up, it is still battling with some political influences as well as interruptions from Government from time to time. An FGD participant added this:

The trend I am seeing is our journalists becoming political. So it is not as if government say do this or that but we are increasingly getting politicized journalists who then go out and do things on behalf of one side or the other.

Since the year 2005 the corporation has seen some steady rise in finances [Ref Fig 3]. However, data available indicate that this rise is still partly due to an increase in government subvention as well as a diversion of the corporation's financial strategy into more commercial sources. Thus this split in the funding regime makes it difficult in classifying the corporation into any specific category of broadcasting institution. The Deputy Director-General said in the in-depth interview that,

However, in respect to management and programming GBC could be more safely categorized as a state broadcaster, but lacks a clear identity on the basis of funding. The most recent (2011) funding data available shows that up to 70% of the corporation's operational funds had been provided by the state. This one year funding alone is not enough to supports the assertion that GBC is largely a state broadcaster.

A FGD participant sees the national broadcaster as a state broadcaster that works for the state and thus represents the government. To this she said:

GBC is still a state broadcaster and there is a difference between a state broadcaster and a public broadcaster. GBC sees itself as still there for the state and the state represented by government so it is quick to respond to government and quick to do the government's bidding. So no matter who is in power, once it is government, GBC sees itself as a mouthpiece largely for the government. So its service to the public is secondary. Opening its channels to real public discourse does not happen.

4.5 Independence of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation

A FGD participant however believes GBC's independence was certain. He said:

The broadcaster is very independent to a very large extent because no government comes to power to manipulate it. As at now, it is the National Media Commission appoints the Board and the Director General and Deputy Director General of the Corporation. The 1992 constitution, through the National Media Commission has insulated it from governmental control.

Another FGD participant however believes there is more to be done to ensure this independence. In terms of ways of making GBC a more independent broadcaster, He said:

GBC financially depends on the state for subvention, but if it is made purely commercial, where the revenue generated is used to take care of its operations, financing and investment activities, the organisation will be truly and totally independent from the state.

4.6 Effects of the System of Funding on GBC

Information collected from management indicates that the funding regime in addition to managerial inefficiencies is currently having the following effects on the corporation. Firstly, there is the lack of professionalism and pro-activeness from workers, which currently costs the corporation the loss of revenue of about three hundred and fifty (350) adverts every month. Secondly, new plans to improve services are often abandoned because the expected funds for capital investments are never received. The Finance Director said:

Due to lack of needed funds, I have had to cut budget on some key expenses. This in turn affects our operations generally. We are therefore running GBC through ingenuity and with what we may have in our coffers. Remember that, if we could receive all the financial/ capital investments we really need, we can improve services and expand our impact.

Again, GBC, in its attempts to raise more funds, has ventured into commercial programming, which has currently made it lose its public service image.

Also, because GBC depends on the government for most of its funding the corporation sees itself as a government mouthpiece; as a station that is just relaying government information to the public. The Deputy Director-General said that:

This image of state ownership with legal backing for the corporation to adhere to the demands of the presidency any time they (government) call upon the corporation has created a lose system where programme schedules are often easily removed due to requests by government for specific activities to be covered and aired.

4.7 Chapter Summary

The chapter presented the findings obtained from two in-depth interviews and two focus group discussions with key media industry experts and analysts. The data that was gathered where grouped under themes that emerged from the data collected for the purpose of putting the gathered data into right perspective.



CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

To make the findings meaningful, this chapter discusses, draws inferences and relates the findings to other empirical studies. The discussion also includes implications of the findings for the theoretical frameworks based on which the research questions were formulated.

5.1 Funding of GBC

The GBC from 2009 to 2011 received an average of 10.9 Million Ghana Cedis annually from government. The corporation currently has a shortfall of about 40% in funding needed for its smooth running. There are clear indications of financial instability within the organization. This trend shows how increasingly weak and inefficient the corporation has become in being self-sufficient in its financing operations.

Banda (2006) has indicated that deficit financing from government, as the case is in South Africa and Zimbabwe often leads to over-reliance on advertising revenue. This he believes that such financing leaves the PSB operator too open to the vagaries of the advertising market. This seems to be the case with GBC where the corporation battles to survive financially. As a result beefing up the funding sources is currently moving GBC into more commercial programming.

Currently, an average of 80% of its internally generated funds come mainly from commercial proceeds, a situation which has clouded the corporation's desired status as a public service broadcaster, but does this mean GBC is on a path of no return in losing identity as a PSB or only going through a financial phase that will change and bounce back as a PSB?

Stemers (2002) points out that attracting advertisers in the face of the imminent onslaught of new commercial offerings via cable, satellite, digital transmission and more recently the internet has contributed to the steady demise of public service broadcasting. This indicates that GBC is probably never going to gain its desired identity as a PSB that currently struggles to fund major capital equipment. One of the key financing tools for PSB lies in the TV licensing system. World renowned PSBs such as the BBC and the USA's NRP have been funded via television licensing fees. This model of financing is also effective in both South Africa and Zimbabwe (Banda, 2006).

However, the TV license system of funding which was supposed to be the bedrock of GBC has not worked well for the corporation. Among other reasons for its failure in GBC are the low service rates, the crude manual system of its collection, and also the corporation's inability to sever its service from the individuals for non-payment of the fees. At the time of this research, management was hoping to revise it to reflect current economic and technological trends.

The monitoring and supervision system of activities related to income generation in GBC is poor. This makes its income generating activities to run into financial losses. The corporation lacks skilled professionals to deliver quality programmes, which drive away so much potential sponsorships.

The lack of skilled professionals has translated into the corporation's lack of marketing strategies like branding, which gives a clear identity of which sections of the public it should be targeting and how it should serve those needs. The lack of a clear target of different sectors of society makes it limited in expanding its financial capital base. This clearly shows

in GBC's inability to attract commercials and advertisers. This has serious influence on its financial engineering abilities.

Reports currently indicate no clear laid down plan within the GBC for generating funds for investment into capital equipment except relying on the government. However, the lack of capital equipment poses a major limitation to the broadcaster in delivering better and effective programming. Just a little over half of all funds received by GBC from 2009 to 2011 came from government; however this made up only 32% of the actual needed funds expected by the corporation.

These funds received mostly take care of routine expenses including: utility expenses, repairs and maintenance, service charges by other companies, office consumables, programmers' charges, safety, external link expenses etc. This result is somewhat consistent with findings made by the Africa Media Barometer, [AMB, 2011].

The Barometer's findings revealed that "the GBC is not merely adequately funded", but that the corporation is actually "financially disabled". The report also indicates that subsidies from the government "are not even sufficient for salaries and sometimes the payment of staff are delayed". The Barometer's report on GBCs survival strategies include "the sale of a lot more airtime, undercutting the rates set by the private competition, and has to succumb to the wishes of potential clients" which in many ways takes away the corporation's supposed image as a public service broadcaster.

According to Siune (1998), a PSB is one that is financially independent of the government and commercial sources. These two sources that a broadcaster ought to be independent from

according to Siune in order to be classified as a public service broadcaster is the very source of current finance for GBC. Based on this, GBC can be said to lack the financial independence that a PSB should have, thus making the corporation unqualified to be classified as a PSB.

According to Appenteng (2007), this is important because the sources of funding could easily be used as the leverage for control or influence on programming” and this “could compromise the ability of public service broadcasting from carrying out its mandate.

Furthermore, the split in the funding regime of GBC additionally makes it difficult to classify the corporation into any clear and or specific category of broadcasting institution on the basis of funding.

Similar evidence in Ireland cited in the European Journal of Communication suggests that ‘State’s traditional reluctance to provide adequate finance for broadcasting, coupled with its perpetual desire to control it’ has been a consistent feature of Irish broadcasting, (Bell, 1984).

5.2 The independence of Ghana Broadcasting Corporation

This this section seeks to answer the research question, “How have the sources of funding of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation influenced the independence of GBC (from government or advertisers) as a PSB? In 1968, the National Liberation Council Decree (NLCD) 22, 1968 defined the purpose of GBC that: “it shall be the duty of the Corporation to provide as a public service, independent and impartial broadcasting services (both sound and television) for general reception in Ghana”.

The Ghana Broadcasting Corporation Decree, (NLCD 226, 1968) also made provision for the structure of the GBC. According to the Decree, the governing body of the Corporation shall be a Board, comprising a Chairman and eight other members including the Director General. Per the decree, government was responsible for the appointment of the board. The 1992 Constitution however, gives the right to appoint members of the board to the National Media Commission, NMC (Article 168, 1992 Constitution).

The corporation has a Director General who acts as the chief executive officer. He is responsible to the board for the day to day administration of the corporation. The current democratic dispensation gives the NMC the sole responsibility of appointing director generals of the GBC. Provision is made by the NLCD decree 222 for the position of two deputy director generals. Presently, the GBC has only one deputy director general. Every division is headed by a director. The radio, television engineering and technical divisions are all headed by directors. Also, the finance, business development, corporate affairs and administration divisions are headed by directors. All ten (10) GBC regional offices are headed by directors, who report to the director general. There is also a legal officer and an internal auditor who report directly to the director general.

Currently, by using the process of appointment into leadership positions, which rests in the hands of the National Media Commission, GBC can be said to be independent, as according to research data gathered and presented in the previous chapter that is upheld.

On the basis of funding however, since over half of all funds received by GBC from 2009 to 2011 came from government it goes to buttress the point raised by Appenteng (2007), that the sources of funding could easily be used as the leverage for control or influence on

programming” and this “could compromise the ability of public service broadcasting from carrying out its mandate, thus GBC’s independence is compromised.

5.3 Theoretical framework of GBC’s funding

Smith (2010) suggested that the ways of funding PSBs should be left to the ingenuity of broadcasters, regulators, academics and the concerned citizens to work out what is best for them. Appenteng (2007) also noted that governance and funding mechanisms also differ from country to country.

To Siebert et al (1956), “in the oft-used metaphor, the press should offer a *marketplace of ideas*, pursuing profits in a natural process believed to support democracy”. These writers see the “only requirement for the press is to pursue its own economic interests” they believe that the press left on its own, will represent diverse voices and hold government accountable. Here again, staying competitive in this market place would require some serious financial injection in order to beat its competitors who are going to be mostly commercial broadcasters. Probably, GBC would need to revolutionise its TV licence funding system in order to have a more solid financial base for this market place competition of ideas.

Again, very strong leadership would be most necessary to drive this whole changing process through. According to the Marxist Media Theory of the Political Economy (Murdock & Golding 1977; Murdock 1982), the power of the media lies in the economic processes and structures of media production where ownership and economic control of the media are seen as the key factor in determining control of media messages. This certainly would require some very different leadership and organisational structure that would create this strong sense

of ownership and economic control for GBC just as Rumphorst (2003) has suggested that a public broadcaster should always have a public service remit.

5.4 Limitations

In the course of this study, certain limitations were encountered, which had some effects on the rate at which the research went. First was the bureaucratic process the researcher had to go through in getting the various respondents to grant the interview sessions, as well as accessing documents that were relevant to the research, but which were classified non-disclosable. The researcher was also limited by time and cost, which also contributed to slowing down the rate at which the research went.

5.5 Recommendations

The researcher recommends that further research be carried out, involving all media houses in Ghana, with the aim of classifying them in terms of their programme content, mode of funding and appeal to their audiences, etc. The research further recommends a content analysis of the programming of GBC to see if it promotes national harmony, culture and views of the citizenry as a PSB.

5.6 Conclusion

Although GBC is a PSB, it is not adequately independent in terms of its funding, as about 50% of its funding is from government sources. This makes GBC susceptible to influence from the state as there seems to be no clear autonomy in its operations and with a dependence on the state for its funding.

In the wake of media pluralisation, GBC as a PSB has to find source of generating funds independently to be able to stay true to the tenets of a PSB in order to serve the interests of the public.



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
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ANNEX 1: STRUCTURED INDEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION STUDIES

(DISSERTATION)

TOPIC: *EXPLORING THE FUNDING OF PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING IN GHANA'S DEMOCRACY*

I want to thank you so much for this opportunity to meet with you today, sir/madam. I am Abraham Apemenyor Asare, student of the School of Communication Studies, University of Ghana. I am undertaking research on the funding of public service broadcasting in Ghana's democracy. I will like to ask a few questions. I promise that this discussion will be treated with the uttermost confidentiality; your response will only be used for the purpose of this Academic Exercise. Thank You.

THE GHANA BROADCASTING CORPORATION

State of Current Funding

1. What is the amount of money the GBC has received annually over the past three years?

Year	Total Amount (Gh¢)
2009	
2010	
2011	

2. Could you please indicate the various sources of funding of the GBC and how much you received from each source?

Year	Source	Total Amount Expected (GhC)	Total Amount Received (GhC)
2009	1.		
	2.		
	3.		
	4.		
	5.		
	6.		
	7.		
2010	1.		
	2.		
	3.		
	4.		
	5.		
	6.		
	7.		
2011	1.		

	2.		
	3.		
	4.		
	5.		
	6.		
	7.		

Financial Engineering / Management

3. In the current democratic dispensation, is the GBC able to attract commercials and advertisers?

4. How does the GBC go about attracting commercials?

.....

.....

.....

.....

5. Is this way of attracting Adverts difficult?

- a. Very
- b. Difficult
- c. Normal
- d. Not at all

6. What are the main components of your annual budget?

Component A.....

Component B.....

Component C.....

Component D.....

Component E.....

Component F.....

Component G.....

Component H.....

7. What amount of money does the GBC require on the Average each year to run the corporation effectively? Ghc

8. Are the current funds you receive able to meet your budget requirements for the year?

9. How much shortfall in percentage terms do you have annually in terms of your budget deficit? ANS:%

10. Which aspects of the financial requirements, e.g salaries, etc, are covered by the various funding sources?

Please turn over

Please indicate how GBC manages to source for money.

Component	Covered Under Budget	% covered	Source of Extra Sourcing
A.			

B.			
C.			
D.			
E.			
F.			
G.			
H.			

11. Are you considering reintroducing broadcasting licensing fees?

Government/Private Influences

12. Does government influence the content and operations of GBC?

13. On what occasions OR Circumstances?

- Occasion A.....
- Occasion B.....
- Occasion C.....
- Occasion D.....
- Occasion E.....
- Occasion F.....
- Occasion G.....

14. How do they do this?

15. How would you rate the influence that the government has on programming and editorial content of the GBC?

16. Have there been threats from the government or its representatives or ministers to stop or restrict funding because of a particular editorial policy?

17. Does this affect the work of the GBC?



.....
.....
.....
.....

18. How about advertisers? Are your reporters able to write socio-economically disturbing stories about major corporate institutions that sponsor your programs when it comes up?

19. Are advertisers comfortable with your kind of programming?

Effects of the Funding System of GBC

20. In your opinion would you say GBC is more listened to or viewed compared to private broadcasters?

21. How does your answer in Q19 affect your advertising revenue?

- a. Brings in more funds
- b. Does not in any way affect funds influx
- c. Loses **some** funds to private broadcasters
- d. Causes the lack of funds

22. Are you able to effectively predict how much funds to expect in a given year?

23. Does your current funding regime affect your planning?

24. Please explain


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25. Have there been times when you had to abandon certain plans and programs because your expected funding did not come as expected?



ANNEX 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE

Questions to ask at GBC

<p>Introduction</p>	<p>I want to thank you so much for this opportunity to meet with you today, sir/madam. I am Abraham Asare, student of the School of Communication Studies, University of Ghana. I am undertaking research on the funding of public service broadcasting in Ghana’s democracy. I promise that this discussion will be treated with uttermost confidentiality.</p>
<p>Questions</p> <p>1. What is the amount of money the GBC has received annually over the past three years?</p>	<p>A) Could you please indicate the various sources of funding of the GBC?</p> <p>B) How much do you receive from each source in a year?</p> <p>C) Are you considering reintroducing broadcasting licensing?</p>
<p>2. What is the money that GBC receives from its “funders” able to do?</p>	<p>A) Are the funds you receive able to meet your requirements for the year?</p> <p>B) How much shortfall in percentage terms do you have annually in terms of your budget requirements?</p> <p>C) Which aspects of the financial requirements, i.e salaries, etc, are covered by the various funding sources</p>

<p>3. Does the funding guarantee the independence of GBC?</p>	<p>A) How much influence does the government have on programming and editorial content of the GBC?</p> <p>B) Have there been threats from the government or its representatives or ministers to stop or restrict funding because of a particular editorial policy?</p> <p>C) How about advertisers? Are your reporters able to write “negative” stories about major corporate institutions that sponsor your programmes?</p>
<p>4. In the current democratic dispensation, where the media is liberalized, how is the GBC able to attract commercials and advertisers?</p>	<p>A) How difficult is it for GBC to attract ads?</p> <p>B) Are advertisers comfortable with your kind of programming?</p> <p>C) Due to your status as a public service broadcaster, I perceive that you may not have the kind of listenership that the private media have. How does that affect your advertising revenue?</p>
<p>5. How predictable is the funding of GBC?</p>	<p>A) How much does your planning depend on your funding expectations?</p> <p>B) Have there been times when you had to abandon certain plans because your expected funding did not come on time?</p>

Questions to ask the National Media Commission

<p>1. Does the funding of GBC enable it to be distinct from commercial media?</p>	<p>A) What kind of a broadcaster is the GBC?</p> <p>B) Does it fit into the description of a public service broadcaster as that of the BBC?</p> <p>C) What would you propose should be done to make the GBC truly independent?</p>
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ANNEX 3: FOCUS GROUP DISSCUSSION GUIDE

1. What can you say about freedom to broadcast in Ghana?

2. What do you use to measure how free a broadcaster is?

3. Please score on a scale of 1 to 10 (With 10 being very well) how well the GBC is doing in relation to the above indicators.

Participant	Score
A	
B	
C	
D	
E	
F	
G	
H	
I	

4. What would you say from your monitoring of GBC regarding the level of independence?

.....

.....

.....

.....

5. What kind of a broadcaster would you say the GBC is, looking at their overall outlook?

- a. State
- b. Public Service
- c. Private/Commercial
- d. Government
- e. Other Specify

6. What would you propose should be done to make the GBC more independent?

.....


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ANNEX 4 INTERVIEW GUIDE WITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR-GENERAL, GBC

Government/Private Influences

1. Does government influence the content and operations of GBC?
2. How would you rate the influence that the government has on programming and editorial content of the GBC?

3. Have there been threats from the government or its representatives or ministers to stop or restrict funding because of a particular editorial policy?

4. How does this affect the work of the GBC?

.....

.....

.....

.....

5. How about advertisers? Are your reporters able to write socio-economically disturbing stories about major corporate institutions that sponsor your programs when it comes up?

6. Are advertisers comfortable with your kind of programming?

Effects of the Funding System of GBC

7. In your opinion would you say GBC is more listened to or viewed compared to private broadcasters?

8. How does your answer in Q7 affect your advertising revenue?

9. Are you able to effectively predict how much funds to expect in a given year?

10. Does your current funding regime affect your planning?

11. Please explain

12. Have there been times when you had to abandon certain plans and programs because your expected funding did not come as expected?

