

**THE ROLE OF THE MULTINATIONAL
JOINT TASK FORCE IN FIGHTING
AGAINST BOOK HARAM IN AFRICA**



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**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY
OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF
THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

LEGON

JULY 2017

DECLARATION


I declare that in preparing and presenting this Dissertation, I sought no assistance from anyone except as indicated in the references. I also declare that this work was carried out at the Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, (LECIAD) University of Ghana, Legon, under the supervision of Dr. Emmanuel Ken Ahorsu.

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my father, Alhaji Dauda Idriss, my mother, Hajia Mariam Dauda and my siblings. May the Almighty Allah reward and shower His blessings upon them.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest appreciation and profound gratitude goes to the great architect of the universe, the Almighty God, for guiding me through every step in the academic ladder. However, I am highly indebted to my supervisor Dr. Emmanuel Ken Ahorsu, for his tireless contribution to this work. I wish to express my gratitude to Ebenezer Anderson for his assistance and encouragement during my studies. Without him, the journey would have been lonely and almost impossible. I also thank all my lecturers, friends, and family for their valuable contributions and support.



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFISMA	-	African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AK47	-	Avtomat Kalashnikov
AMISOM	-	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQAP	-	Air Quality Analysis Branch
AQIM	-	AL Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	-	African Union
AUSC	-	African Union Security Council
BHT	-	Boko Haram Terrorist
CEN-SAD	-	Community of Sahelo-Saharan States
COAS	-	Chief of Army Staff
ECOWAS	-	Economic Community of West Africa States
EIRU	-	External Intelligence Response Unit
ETA - "Euskadi Ta Askatasuna"	-	Basque Homeland and Liberty
EU	-	European Union
FIS	-	Islamic Salvation Army
FLN	-	National Liberation Front
FLQ	-	Libération de Québec
GPMG	-	General Purpose Machine Gun
GSPC	-	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

HACM	-	Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management
IBRD	-	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IEDs	-	Improvised Explosive Devices
IMF	-	International Monetary Fund
IRA	-	Irish Republican Army
ISIS	-	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LCBC	-	Lake Chad Basin Commission
LEHI	-	Paramilitary Organization in Palestine
LMG	-	Learning Management System
Lt-Gen	-	Lieutenant- General
MNJTF	-	Multinational Joint Task Force
MoU	-	Memoranda of Understanding
MSSN	-	Muslim Students' Society of Nigeria
MUJWA	-	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MUJO	-	Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NATO	-	North Atlantic Treaty Organization (also North Atlantic Alliance)
NFPT	-	National Focal Point on Terrorism
NGOs	-	Non-Governmental Organizations
NMO	-	National Military Organization
NY	-	New York
ONSA	-	Office of National Security Adviser

PFLP	-	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	-	Palestine Liberation Organization
PSC	-	Peace and Security Council
RCI-LRA	-	Regional Corporative Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army
RPG	-	Rocket-Propelled Grenade
SJMTF	-	Special Joint Military Task Force
TPA	-	Terrorism Preventive Act
UIC	-	United Islamic Courts
UN	-	United Nations



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ABSTRACT

Boko Haram's religious militancy and terrorist activities have become a major national, regional and international concern; as its terrorist violence has spread beyond the borders of Nigeria to Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Mali. The group has survived many counter-terrorist attempts to defeat it. Nigeria has constituted the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) made up of Chad, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger in fighting Boko Haram in its attempt to end the Boko Haram menace. The study sought to find out why the Joint Task Force and how effective has the Task Force been in ending the Boko Haram menace? The study was a qualitative one that sourced data from both primary and secondary sources. The study found out that given the trends of Boko Haram terrorist activities that have spread to all the members of the Joint Task Force except Benin, the member states' knowledge of the terrains and Boko Haram's tendency for safe havens when hard pressed, the Joint Task Force is best suited for fighting the Boko Haram menace. The Joint Task Force has been very successful in rendering the group inactive. Roads, bridges, and communities that had been closed to the public have now become safe for civilians to return to and carry out their livelihood activities. The Task Force has, however, faced challenges such as inadequate resources, Nigeria's preponderance and the lack of trust among the member states, and the poor economies and common poverty of the member states that limit its effectiveness. The work concluded that given the resurgence of religious militant groups and the relative deprivation that characterizes the regions in which the group is active; it is early days yet to conclude that the Task Force has defeated Boko Haram. The study recommends that Nigeria should offer greater respect, collaboration, magnanimity towards other members of the MNJTF, since fighting religious militant and terrorist groups comes at a great cost; and solidarity among troop-contributing states is a *sine qua non* to defeating Boko Haram.



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the study

Terrorism has been one main source of insecurity. It has gained national and international attention in the world. We have seen the emergence of some or the announcement of some terrorist groups in Africa and worldwide. The Muslim World League (MWL) in 2012 defined Terrorism as “all acts of aggression committed by individuals, groups or states against human beings including attacks on their religion, life, intellect, property or honour”. The MWL further described it as “any act of violence or threat designed to terrorize people or endanger their lives or security and also, damaging the environment and public or private facilities, and endangering natural resources is an act of Terror.”¹ The United Nations in 2004 defined it as “any action, in actions already specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva Conventions Council Resolution 1566 (2004), that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”²

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; earlier cases of terrorism predate the World War years. However, it received much global attention after the September 11 attacks in the US. The September 11 attacks were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks by Islamic terrorist group al-Qaeda in the USA on Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001. The attacks wiped-out 2,996 individuals, harmed more than 6,000 others and caused approximately \$10 billion in property damage and costs totaling \$3 trillion. Four passenger aircraft worked by two U.S travellers’ air transporters were seized by 19 Al-Qaeda members. Two of the planes were crashed into the North

and South towers respectively of the World Trade Centre complex in New York City. Within an hour and 42 minutes, both 110 story towers collapsed with debris and the resulting fires causing the partial or complete collapse of all the building in the World Trade Centre Complex. The third plane was crashed into the Pentagon and the fourth was steered toward Washington, D.C., but crashed into a field in Stony Creek Township. ³

These attacks were believed to be the plan of Osama bin Laden and his co-terrorist groups to launch their global Caliph in the world. Other reasons why they attack the US were the U.S. support of Israel, the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, and sanctions against Iraq. Their attack attracted world's attention and concerns were raised bitterly. But concentrations of terrorist attacks were mainly on Western targets based in the Middle East. Africa was left, or much attention was not centered on the continent. For that matter, Africa, particularly South Sudan, Nigeria, Kenya, and Somalia, to mention a few, had its own share of terrorist acts by some militant groups. For instance, the U.S. embassy was attacked in Kenya and Tanzania in the closing days of 2012, the Al-Malahem Foundation, the media outlet of AQAP, offered \$160,000 for murdering the U.S. Ambassador in Sana'a and \$23,000 for killing any American soldiers in Yemen. ⁴

Since then terrorist groups have emerged in many parts of Africa, specifically Niger, South Sudan, Nigeria and Somalia, among others. The oldest Islamic Militant Group is the AQIM which was founded in 1998, operating in Northern Africa. Subsequently, militant groups namely: the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJO), Al-Shabaab, Maitatsine, and Boko Haram emerged in Africa. The groups are believed to be affiliated to the international terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. These Islamist Groups names vary because of geographical locations but their conducts and philosophy seem to be the same. ⁵

Terrorist attacks, their effects, and the threats they posed to the world, especially Africa, cannot be ignored. Recently there were series of attacks in Africa at large. The attack in Kenya, Cote D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso are the acts of terrorism experienced on the Continent. The most serious of all is the emerging of the militant group called Boko Haram and their abduction of the Chibok girls. Boko Haram is an Islamist militant group whose name can be translated as “western education is forbidden.”⁶

Boko Haram launched military operations in 2009 to create an Islamic State in Nigeria. In 2013 Boko Haram was officially designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State. Boko Haram has attacked Nigeria's police, army, politicians, schools, religious buildings, public institutions and civilians with increasing regularity since 2009. They have replicated the various acts of terrorism as witnessed in the Middle East and has since spread their acts to the neighbouring countries, which include Cameroon, Mali, Niger and lately Chad. This has necessitated the response of regional, national and international attempts to defeat the group. These attempts have had mixed results.⁷

A major attack perpetrated by this insurgency group, was on the Chibok school girls which were reported as:

A group of militants attacked the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Nigeria. They broke into the school, pretending to be guards telling the girls to get out and come with them. A large number of the students were taken in trucks, possibly into Konduga area of the Sambisa Forest where Boko Haram was known to have fortified camps and houses in Chibok were also burned down in the incident.⁸

This situation triggered the neighbouring countries of Nigeria to form the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). In a meeting held on 25th November 2014, the Regional Council considered the regional effort being deployed to combat the Boko Haram terrorist group and agreed on steps to be taken by the commission in support of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Benin.

The MNJTF is an offensive and stabilization military forces with the objective of combating Boko Haram and other groups labelled as terrorists operating around the Lake Chad Basin. Its establishment was determined by LCBC member states and Benin at the extraordinary summit in Niamey, Niger on 7th October 2014. On November 2014 the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) fully endorsed its activation; however, on 29th November 2015 the PSC authorized the deployment of the MNJTF for a 12 months period. This was renewed on 14th January 2016 for additional 12 months.⁹

It is an undeniable fact that Boko Haram creates fear, panic, and certainty in people that already suffer from under development and deprivation. It is against this background that the researcher would conduct a study on the Role of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Fight against Boko Haram in Africa.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria has collaborated with its neighbouring states, and with ECOWAS, UN, AU, EU, and NATO in numerous ways to combat the insurgency groups in Africa. The insurgency groups perpetrated attacks such as the December 21, 1988, mid-air explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland by a Libyan state-sponsored operation which resulted in the death of 270 passengers.¹⁰ In January (2013), Al-Qaida linked extremist and their associates in northern Mali tried to seize the country's capital Bamako, spurring a timely French military intervention that gained international support. These real and potential tragedies take on even greater concern when seen against the backdrop of the global terrorism threat of Al-Qaeda and its local associates in Africa and other regions. Three core groups are particularly significant to all these attacks; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram. There is a growing security

concern that these regional movements have expanded their reach in recruiting militants in the region. The threat and dynamics of terrorism are so pervasive that no one country, not even the super powers like the United State of America, can successfully fight terrorism alone. For this reason, there have been a lot of collaborative efforts by states or the international organization, civil society organization, and financial institutions in fighting against terrorism. Nigeria had cooperated with the United States of America and the European Union in information sharing on the Boko Haram terrorist activities. However, as stated earlier, Nigeria refused the involvement in the management by any foreign troop in fighting Boko Haram.

It was therefore very surprising that Nigeria has agreed to work in collaboration with the organization in fighting Boko Haram. For example, in terms of state power or political power, Nigeria is by far a “Super Power” in comparison with the rest of the members of the Multi-National Joint Task Force. It, therefore, beats the imagination of what the other members will bring on board in the fight against Boko Haram. The only thing they have in common is that they share common boundaries and Boko Haram has at one time or the other, used the various states as safe haven and visited its attacks on the member states but it is intriguing to know how feasible the member states can coordinate their acts in the fight against Boko Haram. It is for this reason that the research seeks to answer the research questions.

1.2 Research Questions

- What are the reasons for the membership of the group?
- How feasible has it been for the MNJTF to work together in the collaboration against Boko Haram?
- What achievement, if any, have they achieved?

- What are the challenges they face against in their common fight against Boko Haram?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

- To review Boko Haram's terrorist activities in Nigeria.
- Review Nigeria's counter terrorism activities against Boko Haram.
- Examine the role of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF).
- To find out what achievements or progress they have faced.

1.4 Scope of the Study

The study is on the role of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram in Africa. In general, the work covers Nigeria's counter terrorism against Boko Haram. It specifically covers the international fight before the Multinational Task Force.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

In International Relations or International Security studies, a statement has often been made that "African solutions to African problems". Besides, many believe the absence of contemporary terrorism is largely because of Western Foreign policies towards the Middle East and Islam in particular. It is for this reason that it was heart-warming that Central and West African countries have formed its Joint Task Force to fight terrorism and safe guard their common boundaries. The findings of this study will therefore be helpful in building upon the common strength of African countries to fight terrorism on the African continent. In other words, the findings of the study add to the emerging literature on counter terrorism by African countries.

1.6 Research Hypothesis

The study is guided by the hypothesis that the Multinational Joint Taskforce is imperative against the fight of Boko Haram in Africa.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

1.7.1 Cooperation Theory

The study employs the International Cooperation school of thought as the theoretical framework to explain the joint military intervention in the fight against Boko Haram within the sub-regions. Some of the major proponents of the theory are Ernest Haas, Charles Lipson, Steven D. Krasner and Keohane Roberts. International Cooperation has been defined as the voluntary adjustment by states of their policies so that they manage their differences and reach some mutually beneficial outcome.¹¹ International Cooperation, according to Grieco, involves a long-term engagement through the establishment and operation of an institutional regime for joint action and not cooperation based on a one-time interaction. Security cooperation activities shape the geostrategic environment every time they impact the military relations between international partners.

Security cooperation activities are organized and formally administered programmes that govern interstate interaction between partnered military units and their leaders. These programmes are therefore a unique subset of international relations. Security cooperation programmes aspire to build common expectations with partner nations so that their military assistance is available when needed. The programme support national objectives, expand policy, and eliminate potential surprises from partner nations. This theory is relevant because there is the need for collective military cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram insurgency in Africa. No one country in the

region holds the solution to the security threat of Boko Haram; not even Nigeria. There are two schools of thought under the international cooperation theory and the two schools are the realist and the idealist theory.¹²

1.7.2 *The Realist (Realism) Perspective*

The realism perspective of international cooperation theory is traced to the classical political theorist Thucydides. Since the sixteenth century, the European Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau have been its leading lights. At the topmost of this European realism is an assumption that relations between nations exist fundamentally in a “state of nature” described as “anarchy”, a condition in which war between nations is assumed to be permanent and expected, unlike how violence would arise domestically between diverse groups within a nation where it is not for the power of civil government to restrain people. The realists further argue that in international politics, states are not concerned with absolute gains but relative gains to other states. States, as major actors in the world, are preoccupied with their security and they count on their own means to achieve this. This necessitates the introduction of anarchy into the international system, which brings about competition and conflict and therefore inhibits the willingness of states to cooperate. Consequently, the states will fail if even they share common interests.¹³

Furtherance to this, Nye as international cooperation theorist, stated that anarchy is one of the three main theories in international politics; the two being a world of imperial system and the feudal system. This means one government controls the world, which it has contact with. Example includes the Roman Empire and the British Empire; whereby, human loyalties owe duties to some distant noble.¹⁴ That is a core position held by political realists, and behind it

lays the moral assumption that human nature is inherently not benevolent or kind but self-centered and competitive. If so, then nation-states must always be prepared for war, and, indeed, history reveals that increasing military strength, if not superiority, is basic to political realists. For military might alone wins wars. As Jervis points out, however, this is not to say that realists like war, for “many realists study the causes of war in the hope of reducing the chances of future conflict.”¹⁵

Under the realist school of thought, the researcher also examined core elements such as the state and sovereignty, national interest, balance of power and diplomacy.

The state and the sovereignty: Cavanaugh states that sovereign is a departure from earlier forms of governance in which people’s political loyalties were based not on territoriality, but on feudal ties, kinship, religion, or tribal affiliation. If a stranger committed a crime on someone else’s land, they found out whom he or she owed loyalty to know what law would applied.¹⁶ Argues that although political governance of some sort has been natural and ancient, it would be misleading to assume that “the sovereign state” is natural and ancient.

National Interest: the member states must look first and last to itself for its security when arranging its relations with other states, this gives primacy of importance to a state’s national interests; the interests of other nations, or of international institutions, such as the UN, or of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with transnational interests, become secondary or tertiary. National interests are central to realist theory and usually rooted in whatever a state considers necessary for maintaining its survival. A state is expected to act according to the logic of its national interests, and especially in defence of them when its survival is at stake. The regional members must consider their interest first before engaging in any joint military intervention because it is likely for the military will remain loyal to their states of origin.¹⁷

Balance of Power: According to Morgenthau, a non-negotiable principle of realism is a balance of power. It is the most relied upon arrangement for ordering relations between states to put the brakes on forms of anarchy. Typically, two or more states or groups of states will act in concert (politically, economically, or militarily) to hold in check a powerful state or a group of states from gaining predominance over them. The idea is to create a form of international stability through the balance of power arrangements, which arise and change through shifting alliances, partnerships, friendships, or even secret diplomacy and adversarial relations. Morgenthau insist that balance of power must not be thought of as merely one kind of foreign policy among many, but the only kind possible.¹⁸

Diplomacy: Morgenthau called diplomacy “The brains of national power.” Meaning, realist diplomacy “is the art of bringing the different elements of the national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern national interest most directly.”¹⁹

1.7.3 The Idealist (Idealism) Theory: Idealists are a group of philosophers who believe that reality, as we know, is fundamental and immaterial. Under the idealist school of thought, the researcher also considered these core elements such as the state and balance of power and national interest.²⁰

The state and balance of power: whereas realism tends to see balance-of-power arrangements as the broadest extent to which inter-regional relations are possible, idealism imagines much wider possibilities for cooperative arrangements among states. Although many idealists would not sacrifice the concept of state sovereignty, they tend to see the state in more

relative terms; the state is thus able to work more selflessly, such as with other states and international institutions like the UN and AU.²¹

National Interest; Idealism's more optimistic view of human nature also gives it a broader frame of reference for national interests. The saying that "states act in their national interests" is a truism even for the idealists. Realists, as Nye, 2007 points out, believe they "must define their interest in terms of the balance of power or they will not survive. So, for the realists, a state's position in the international system determines its national interests and predicts its foreign policies." Idealists, by contrast, "have a richer account of how state preferences and national interests are formed. The definition of the national interests depends in large part on the type of domestic society and culture a state has. For example, a domestic society that values economic welfare and places heavy emphasis on trade, or that views wars against other democracies as illegitimate, defines its national interests very differently from a despotic state that is similarly placed in the international system. Liberals argue that this is particularly true if the international system is moderate, that is, not purely anarchic".²²

The attacks by Boko Haram did have international dimensions and had always constituted a threat not only to neighbouring countries but to the entire Africa. This calls for a multinational military cooperation in the region because the security problems in Africa are beyond the scope and capabilities of one individual country.

1.8 Literature Review

Studies in terrorism have increased over the past years. Most of the studies sought to explain terrorism as the result of poor economic development and lack of education. However, this has been clear by many kinds of literature. Krueger and Malecková in their article "*Education, poverty,*

and terrorism: Is there a causal connection?” wrote, “Eradication of poverty and universal secondary education are unlikely to change these feelings. Indeed, those who are well-off and well-educated may even perceive such feelings more acutely.”²³ In fact, terrorists tend to be better-educated and wealthier individuals than average. Whereas some literature establishes a link between insurgency groups and MNJTF, others do not. The researcher reviewed several studies that might confirm the choice of using the International Security Cooperation Theory.

For instance, Conybeare concluded that violent Israeli reprisals convinced Egypt and Jordan to discontinue their support of terrorist operations.²⁴ According to Greener-Barcham, the Israeli commando raid of a hijacked aircraft in 1976 greatly diminished hostage situations and airline hijackings in the years following the event.²⁵ The success of these three violent reprisals supports the rational choice assumption that deterrence results when the certainty and severity of punishment increases. Eppright’s work evaluates Israel’s 1996 incursion into Lebanon, which enjoyed the immediate tactical success of significantly reducing, if not completely stopping, Hezbollah’s rocket attacks on Israel.²⁶

Richardson Clare examines the effect of unemployment and tertiary education on levels of terrorism. The multivariate regression suggest that this interaction may be somewhat significant in countries where there have been previous attacks.²⁷ Additionally, while unemployment and population size are strongly correlated with increased instances of terrorism, higher education alone has no meaningful relationship with a nation’s level of terrorism.

Prunckun and Mohr’s results were consistent with an overall deterrent effect on international terrorism.²⁸ Specifically, the authors reported that despite an immediate upsurge, the frequency of attacks against U.S. targets decreased over time. Additionally, the post raid period witnessed a decline in Libyan-associated terrorist activity.

Annan, concludes that ending violent conflicts and civil strife in the sub-region requires collaborative and collective efforts in identifying the causal indicators of conflicts; developing concrete strategies and programmes to prevent, manage and completely resolve these conflicts; documenting, managing and disseminating information on lessons learnt and best practices of conflict prevention and resolution, and peacebuilding across the sub-region; and harnessing indigenous conflict prevention mechanisms while leveraging with contemporary mechanisms to adequately address present and emerging insecurities and violent conflicts.²⁹ Although the sub-region is increasingly volatile to vicious conflicts, its rich indigenous cultural and social values such as respect, protection of human life, freedom, cooperation, and tolerance; coupled with its diverse population and numerous civil society organizations are prospective strengths and, if well harnessed, could be a driving force for ending the preponderance of violent conflicts and civil strife in West Africa.

Assanvo, Abatan & Sawadogo, in *assessing the MNJTN against the Fight of Boko Haram in West Africa* assert that the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), established by the Lake Chad Basin countries to combat Boko Haram, still struggles to demonstrate its effectiveness.³⁰ Observers also continue to question to what extent it is operational. Yet despite the numerous political, logistical, technical and financial challenges it has been facing, the MNJTF is gradually gaining ground in the fight against Boko Haram.

Agbibo writes that Nigerian government must recognise that unless issues of bad governance and systemic corruption, especially the problem of political corruption stemming from interreligious and interethnic rivalry aimed at the control of the state machinery for economic and political gains, are seriously addressed, all other measures will be nothing but cosmetic and *pro tempore*. His

emphasis is not clear whether he supports the MNJTF but rather before this prevail the government must wake up from its slumber.³¹

Thurston in his paper believes that the methodology (MNJTF) has a political drawback. It settles in dictatorship around Lake Chad.³² The pioneers of Nigeria, Benin and Niger were justly chosen, however, in Niger, the late re-decision of President Mahamadou Issoufou continued under a billow of terrorizing against the restriction. The pioneers of Chad and Cameroon, in the meantime, have been in force after 1990 and 1982, individually, and their rehashed re-decisions are not dependable. Chad's April 10 presidential race this year, for instance, happened in the midst across the board dissents and a web power outage. Western forces' excitement for provincial methodologies puts these pioneers, and especially Chad's Deby, at the focal point of the methodology is that certainly valid for France, which headquartered its West extensive hostile to jihadi power in Chad, and it is progressively the case for the United States also.³³

Adewunmi highlight the nature of Nigeria's Boko Haram War 2010-2015. The author concluded that to bring any major armed conflict to an end, it is important to understand the nature of the war.³⁴ The South African mercenaries were effective against Boko Haram because they had a better understanding of the nature of the war in northern Nigeria. Hence their adoption of the tactic known as 'relentless pursuit'. Nigeria has variously referred to the conflict with Boko Haram as a terrorist campaign, a religious war, and an insurgency. In line with this reasoning, the government had tried various strategies which did not fit the kind of warfare being fought by Boko Haram. The army's own approach had failed to quell the activities of Boko Haram, partly for lack of fighting motivation of the soldiers, partly due to the corruption and incompetence.

Considering the literature review, the researcher decided to use the International Security Cooperation to conduct a similar study specifically on the topic the role of the MNJTF in the Fight

against Boko Haram in Africa to see whether her findings and conclusions will be in conformity with the reviewed literature.

1.9 Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

The study used qualitative method of enquiry which involves an exploratory approach to unravel the understanding, practices, and challenges confronted by MNJTF in their fight against Boko Haram. The choice of qualitative approach was to gain insight into the reality of MNJTF in the African context. According to Ruyter and Scholl's, qualitative research method provides researchers with knowledge of what people think about a particular subject and what makes their thinking differ from other people's thoughts.³⁵

1.9.2 Target Population

Population, according to Zikmund, is the complete group of specific population elements relevant to the research project.³⁶ The target population were diplomats and officials from the Nigerian, Beninois and the Cameroonian embassies in Accra that were available at the time the interviews were conducted.

1.9.3 Sampling Procedure

Zikmund suggests that sampling is the process of using a small number of items or parts of a larger population to make conclusions about the entire population.³⁷ In line with the aim of the study, the respondents were selected based on Convenience Sampling Technique for an interview to account for better and even representation. Interviews were carried out at separate times and separate places

with the interviewees asked the same questions. The Convenience Sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where subjects or respondents are selected because of their convenient accessibility and proximity to the researcher.³⁸

1.9.4 Sources of Data

In this study, in-depth interview was used as the primary research instrument. The in-depth interview was conducted in the English Language. The interviews were conducted personally by the researcher. An interview guide was developed out of the literature. Respondents were encouraged to talk freely, and the confidentiality of any information provided also assured. Respondents were provided with detailed instructions as to how the interview would be conducted. The rationale behind providing clear instructions and assuring confidentiality of information is because this significantly reduces the likelihood of biased responses.³⁹

1.10 Arrangement of Chapters

This work is organized into four main chapters:

Chapter One is the introduction of the study and it covers the background to the study, statement of the problem, conceptual framework, and literature review, sources of data, methodology, and organization of the study.

Chapter Two consists of an overview of Religious Militancy in West Africa.

Chapter Three Highlights the Multinational Joint Task Force and Boko Haram.

Chapter Four, being the last chapter, looks at the summary of the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

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CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF RELIGIOUS MILITANCY IN WEST AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

The current religious militancy in West Africa, with reference to the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, is not the first of its kind to have bedeviled the sub-region and the international community at large. In this vein, this chapter is devoted to reviewing terrorism in general, paying attention to religious militancy in the West African sub-region. The chapter, therefore, presents a brief introduction to modern terrorism, an overview of religious militancy in West Africa, an overview of the Boko Haram sect, and finally an overview of MNJTF in tackling the Boko Haram militancy in West Africa.

2.1 Brief Introduction to Modern Terrorism

Terrorism involves “violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law, and appears to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping”. However, in the broadest sense, “terrorism is the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence to create terror or fear, to achieve a political, religious, or ideological aim.”¹

The phenomenon of terrorism dates to ancient times. Significant terrorist attacks could be traced to the Israeli uprising against the British in the Middle East. A significant terrorist event was recorded on 22nd July 1946, when the Israeli militant right-wing Zionist organization known as Irgun carried out a terrorist attack in British administrative headquarters for Palestine, which

was housed in the southern wing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, leading to 91 deaths and several other injured.² This was a single drastic attack during the time which also affected civilians.

However, Kapur observed that its earliest significant manifestation was felt in the international system during the era of French Revolution and the Russian revolutions from 1878 to 1881. Subsequently, terrorism was employed as means for changing a socio-economic and socio-political status quo as evident by the anarchists in France, Spain, Italy, as well as fundamental nationalist groups in, Armenia, Ireland, Macedonia and Morocco in the 1990s³

Before the First World War, terrorism featured predominantly in countries such as Turkey, Poland, India and Romania between 1923 and 1939.⁴ Also, during the World War Two, terrorism was employed in countries such as Germany and Italy to liquidate opponents and repress people.⁵ During this era, urban terrorism was later replaced by rivalry guerrilla groups in states such as China, Vietnam, and some Latin American countries.⁶

Terrorism activities have also featured predominantly in the international system due to political and liberation struggles which had historical antecedents. For instance, the current Israeli–Palestinian conflict as witnessed in the contemporary international system began with the establishment of Israel as an independent state in 1948, who usurped most territories belonging to the Arabs which erupted in large scale civil wars in 1948. Following this, in 1968, there was a hijacking of a Rome bound EL AL aircraft by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).⁷ This was subsequently followed by the hostage and torture of the athletes of the Israeli 1972 Olympic Team in Munich by Palestinian terrorists.⁸ This was referred to as “The Munich massacre,” which was an attack during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, basically on Israeli athletes. The aim of this attack was to achieve recognition for an independent Palestine state and a safe homeland for the Arab Palestinians.⁹ This political and ideological struggle between the

Palestinians and Israelis persist even to date. However, between 1960 and 1970, terrorism in the international system experienced a paradigm shift to the Middle East especially due to Israel occupation of Arab lands and the Americas.¹⁰

Contemporarily, terrorism appears *a back to the future* in the Middle East with the call by Islamic militant groups to return to the political philosophy of Islam rather than democracy, which they perceive as serving the interests of the West. This is explained by Samuel Huntington as the ‘Clash of Civilization.’ This led to the formation of Al-Qaeda and sprinter groups which spread south to Africa including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. The quest for the institution of political philosophy of Islam by Al Qaeda was instigated Osama bin Laden. Their greatest achievement was the attack on the World Trade Zone and Pentagon in the US on September 11, 2001. The attack against the US marked a new phase of global terrorism in the international system, since its strategies and mode of operation, including civilian casualties and fatalities were unprecedented.¹¹

Subsequently, the US led NATO invasion in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011, which led to the overthrow and deaths of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, created a vacuum and instigated the rise and vibrancy of terrorist organisations in the Middle East and the Maghreb. Some of these terrorist groups have extended their jurisdiction to partner with other insurgent groups in West Africa, including Maitestine, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabab. Contemporarily, however, ISIS features as the richest, powerful and most deadly terrorist group in the world.

2.2 Brief Overview of Religious Militancy in West Africa

Religion has resulted in some goal incompatibility creating conflict situations. These are usually referred to as religious conflict. Joseph Nye describes the phenomenon of incompatible goals

between or among groups leading to protests and contestations as Conflict.¹² However, Reynal-Querol & Montalvo (2000) defines religious conflicts as tensions that arise within a specific geographical area due to religious diversities and the polarization of religious groups.¹³

Religion as a source of conflict arises since it is a pivotal part of many people's identity, thus, any threat to one's belief and identity is seen as a threat to one's very being. This is a primary motivation for most ethnoreligious conflicts in today's modern and secular world of science and technology. This means there are some aspects of religion that makes it susceptible to be a source of conflict. Religious identity is often merged with ethnicity but also plays a key role in today's identity-based conflicts. Identity groups defined by religion are often targeted by political leaders for manipulation and consequently become an important feature of conflicts.

Religious Identity emphasizes the 'We' against 'Them' dichotomy. This identity formation or perception have a high tendency of attracting negative stereotypes, discrimination, racial and ethnic intolerance, and other forms of abuses.¹⁴ This is because such feelings may result in the development of either inferiority or superiority complex, which could always instigate violent acts. Members of the Boko Haram insurgent group were usually perceived as terrorists. These angered members of the group who saw themselves as being verbally abused and discriminated against. The Identity Formation or Perception also led to the common purpose of fighting the "unbelievers" for Allah and the fight against 'Western Education and Culture' which was seen by members of the group as contradictory to the principles of 'Sharia Law.'¹⁵

From a psychological perspective, religion could fester conflict since it serves as a source of mobilization, motivation, identity, shared values, beliefs, history and world civilization. In effect, an identity formed through religious affiliations make it possible to know the ease of communication, organization, shared faith, common history and identification of a territory or land

to groups in a conflict situation. For instance, the Israeli conflict with the Arab world could be largely attributed to their shared quest to possess their present-day territory promised to them by God, which was hitherto inhabited by the Arabs.

Closely related to identity, perceived threat to religious faith serves as a major source of religious conflict in today's international system. Where a religious group sees itself as being threatened by the existence and ideologies of other faiths, it may resort to violence for its survival and existence. Radical Jewish groups in Israel and Hindu Nationalist in India are examples of Fundamentalist movements driven by perceived threat to faith.

Also, all religions have their accepted dogma, or articles of belief, that followers must accept without question. This has often led to inflexibility and intolerance in the face of other beliefs in some parts of the world. After all, if it is the word of God, how can one compromise it? For instance, Egypt's Islamic Jihad consider violence to be a divine duty against infidels or non-Muslims, i.e. the perpetrators who commit such violence regard themselves as divinely directed and therefore all forms of hindrances must be removed.¹⁶

At the same time, scripture and dogma are often vague and open to ideological interpretations and applications. Therefore, conflict usually arises over whose interpretation is the correct one. This type of conflict ultimately cannot be solved because there is no arbiter. Although, almost invariably, most of any faith hold moderate views, however, extremists contribute to conflict escalation. They see radical measures as necessary to fulfil God's will and wishes. Fundamentalists usually have the notion that, "if the world is a struggle between good and evil, it is hard to justify compromising with the devil. Any sign of moderation can be described as selling out, more importantly, of abandoning God's will"¹⁷. An example of this religious conflict situation is the suppression of Christianity in some parts of China, India, and Sudan.

Without a legitimate mechanism for religious groups to express their views, it is more likely for them to resort to violence in today's secular and recent world of science and technology. For instance, Hezbollah (God's Party) in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine have engaged in violence, but often gained supporters through social service work when their governments were perceived as doing little for their populations.

Religion can cause intolerance and discrimination. Religious revivalism is an influential tool because it can provide a sense of pride and purpose, but in countries such as Sri Lanka and Sudan, religion has produced a strong form of illiberal nationalism that periodically led to intolerance and discrimination.

The last but not the least, religious radicalists are mainly motivated by their disapproval with modern ways of life to foment violence or conflicts. Motivated by the marginalization of religion in modern society, some religious groups act to restore faith to a principal place. The spread of Western materialism is often blamed for the increases in gambling, alcoholism and loose morals in general. Al-Qaeda, for instance, claims it is motivated by this neo-imperialism as well as foreign military forces in the Muslim Holy lands.

In West Africa, religious militancy has predominantly taken the form of Islamic militancy which could be classified as ancient Jihadism and Post-Cold War militancy. The militancy during ancient Jihadism was in responding or disregarding core Islamic values and principles by other religious groups. In Post-Cold War religious militancy, the focus has been a call to return to Islamic political philosophy rather than the practice of democracy which is seen by most Islamic Fundamentalists as a system of government against the will of Allah. The biggest movement arose from Hausa states in Nigeria which exist even to date, such as the Boko Haram.

West Africa has become vulnerable to Islamic religious militancy due to bad governance, social and economic inequality, extreme poverty levels, mass unemployment of the youth, and electoral violence, among others. It had led to the situation where most youth feel deprived of things they deemed valuable to have. These are privileges such as opportunities, social statuses, justice, wealth and other resources. Consequently, such youth join militant groups as the last resort to press home their demands or as a means of redressing their grievances. This has promoted Islamic militancy in West Africa by predominantly the AQIM and Boko Haram to establish a caliphate, an Islamic system of governance, which they feel will address their grievances.

2.3 Overview of the Boko Haram Militant Group

Boko Haram is the seventh richest terrorist group on the American terrorist list¹⁸. Boko Haram is funded via several ways, which comprise, robberies, abductions, donations, extortion and financing through its network of alliances with other terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (ISIS). It appears that Boko Haram receives funding and support from Al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM or AQIM).¹⁹ Mohammed Yusuf founded Boko Haram in 2002 and was based around Maiduguri in the north-eastern state of Borno which is highly dominated by Muslims. Boko Haram was touted as the Nigerian Taliban due to its philosophies and methods. Boko Haram is loosely translated in the Hausa language as “Western education is forbidden,”²⁰ In fact, “Boko” is a Hausa term which means ‘Book’ while ‘Haram’ is an Arabic term which means “forbidden but it now signifies “western education and culture is forbidden.”²¹

Officially, the name for the group is known as “Jama'atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da'awati wal-Jihad” which literally means “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad” in Arabic. The Qur’anic phrase which says: “Anyone who is not governed by what

Allah has revealed is among the transgressors,”²² Most followers of Islam are influenced by this verse. To Boko Haram, Muslims who participate or contribute to any social or political activity associated with Western society is considered "haram" or forbidden. Some of these activities include participation in elections, receiving secular education or females wearing shirts and trousers. The group is of view that, Nigeria is governed by non-believers although Nigeria is ruled by a Muslim president. The main aim of Boko-Haram is to implement and impose Sharia Law in the Northern parts of the country.²³ The group asserts that northern politics has been taken over by a group of deceitful, and fake Muslims. “It wants to wage a war against them and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by Sharia law”²⁴

Nevertheless, the name Boko Haram was a description given to the group by residents of Maiduguri due to the group’s strong inclination to reject western education which is viewed as corrupting Muslims.²⁵ The terrorist group under the leadership of the charismatic Islamic cleric known as Muhammad Yusuf was not a violent movement at its inception but later adopted militant means to drum home their demands. Mohammed Yusuf’s movement adopted a conservative theology that opposed the Nigerian secular state labelling it as corrupt and un-Islamic.²⁶ The group was seemingly quiet, remained off the radar and were not popular. The Nigerian populace and the international community at large came to know about them when they carried out deadly assaults on police stations and other government structures in Maiduguri’s street in July 2009. Consequently, Maiduguri's attacks were met with counter attacks from the Nigerian Security Forces which resulted in the death of hundreds of Boko Haram’s combatants and thousands of inhabitants fled the city for the safety of their lives. However, the Nigerian security forces also made some arrests and seized the group’s (Boko Haram) headquarters.²⁷

The above led to the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, whose corpse was displayed on television. The security forces subsequently pronounced Boko Haram finished, but the group loyalists regrouped under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau which precipitated their insurgency.²⁸ These incursions aided in expanding Boko Haram's terrorist activities from the north-eastern parts to other parts of the north such as Kaduna, Katsina, Niger, Kano, Sokoto, Zamfara, Jigawa and Abuja.²⁹ After 2009, several organized attacks were perpetrated by Boko Haram against the Nigeria security forces and later extended its violent nature to other countries such as Cameroon, Niger, Chad. Towards this end, there has been the establishment of the MNJTF to help curb and tackle the menace created by the Boko Haram militancy group in the West African sub-region.³⁰

2.4 Overview of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

“Nigeria's neighbors have worked through regional organizations including the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The LCBC created the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 1998, and its mandate was terrorism as an area of focus”.³¹ Nigeria and its neighbors have talked about creating such a force since the early days of the group's insurgency, back in 2009. To combat Boko Haram, the AU in February 2015 authorized the mobilization of a multinational force sourced from Cameroon, Chad, Benin, Niger, and Nigeria. Before this, a poorly-arranged multinational military alliance between Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger had the mandate to disrupt the doings of the group. But the most palpable shortcoming of the present multinational responses has been “a lack of mutual confidence between the participant states.”³²

A key part of United States strategy in the area is providing support to the MNJTF, which comprises of soldiers from Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin. The US provided training, intelligence, advisors, equipment, and logistical support. Again, the US supported the victims of Boko Haram by providing more than \$195 million in humanitarian aid. Nigeria signed an agreement with Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Benin to deploy 8,700- robust regional “Multinational Joint Task Force” to combat Boko Haram which had murdered several people in northeastern part of Nigeria and gradually threatened the countries in the region.³³ At a point, the Nigerian government was strongly against the inclusion of any foreign troops to help fight Boko Haram on their land. “Not only was there a lack of military coordination and mutual confidence among the nations, but at times some nations also had shown unhappiness with the actions of others - including accusations of one nation having links with the enemy - all of which led to a failure to achieve an optimal military capability.”³⁴

For instance, the disagreements before the creation of the MNJTF became evident in January of 2015, when Chad unilaterally deployed soldiers into Nigeria. Another instance is when Niger branded the Nigerian army as “cowards,” to which Nigeria retaliated by referring to Niger’s army as “serial looters.” The AU formed the MNJTF to prevent such rancorous battle of words besides its core mandate of coordinating actions. As at now, it still appears that at least a certain degree of the disagreement lingers on.

On February 3, 2015, Nigeria’s military stated that the nation’s sovereignty was not compromised although Chadian ground troops were present in northeastern Nigeria to combat Boko Haram. The armed forces of Chad carried out air and ground assault against insurgents in the Borno town of Malam Fatori. The Nigerian authorities had defended the attack, asserting that the town was under the jurisdiction covered by the MNJTF, which Chadian forces were part

of. Nevertheless, after three days of bombardment of Boko Haram locations, the troops again crisscrossed the border from northern Cameroon to the Nigerian town of Gamboru as the regional fight-back against the terrorist group continued. President Muhammadu Buhari in June 2015 instructed the immediate release of \$21 million (N4.2 billion) to the MNJTF. The president insisted that the money should be released in a matter of one week to aid the MNJTF fight the battle against Boko Haram successfully. The Nigeria government subsequently made a pledge of \$100 million to support the activities of the MNJTF.³⁵

On 30 July 2015, the Nigerian President tasked an army general to head a coalition of West African counterterrorism troops. This was a step forward for a fast-forming multinational effort against Shekau's Boko Haram. Major General Iliya Abbah received the daunting task to lead the MNJTF. The general previously served as a commander pursuing kidnappers and thieves in Nigeria's oil-rich south. The appointment offered further evidence of how quickly a West African army was coming together against Boko Haram. Collaboration across borders had long been viewed as the panacea to the insurgency of Boko Haram, which started in Nigeria but has since spread through the country's porous borders into Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nigerian and Cameroonian military officials said:

The Multinational Joint Task Force composed of troops from Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin is actively fighting Boko Haram and achieving some success. Boko Haram, however, still carried out attacks in Nigeria and its neighbors, leading some experts to question whether regional cooperation was as deep as it should be.³⁶

But to some, the Multinational Joint Task Force seemed not to be what would have been needed to neutralize the threat posed by Boko Haram. To eliminate the threat posed by Boko Haram, a formidable force like the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has been combatting al-Shabaab Islamists since 2007 would have been required. Again, the formulators

of the MNJTF could have learnt the strategy used by the AU Regional Cooperation Initiative for the elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), which was established in 2011. The MNJTF could also have been modelled after the initial configuration of the African-led international support mission to Mali (AFISMA), with the Malian army envisioned to be at the forefront of operations which was to be supported the African force.³⁷

Perhaps the most brutal attack by Boko Haram was carried out in January 2016 around Baga, a fishing settlement in Borno state, northeast Nigeria. This attack took the lives of at least 2,000 people and ransacking the military base of the MNJTF. In July 2016, the Nigerian Army reopened the Maiduguri-Dikwa-Gamboru road three years after it was closed because of Boko Haram's attacks. In 2013, at the peak of Boko Haram activities in Borno, the road was closed to motorists. On 08 July 2016, Governor Kashim Shettima of Borno State together with the Chief of Army Staff Tukur Buratai, a Lt.-Gen., inaugurated the reopening of the road. The governor, in his remark, applauded the military for containing the insurgency within the brief period, which facilitated the reopening of the road. According to the governor;

Two years ago, Borno was in a bad state and about a year and a half ago, the state almost fell completely in the hands of the insurgents. Today, the story is different and anyone who wants to be fair to the Nigerian Army and General Buratai must juxtapose these scenarios before drawing a conclusion. With the reopening of this road which is the life wire of the state, there will be a quantum leap in the economy of the state.³⁸

The efficacious condition of the MNJTF has necessitated the researcher to undertake a study on the role of the MNJTF in the fight against Boko Haram in Africa. This will help the researcher determine the status of the MNJTF currently.

2.5 Conclusion

In summary, the Chapter makes an overview of religious militancy in the West African sub-region reviewing the brief introduction to present day terrorism, overview of the religious militancy in West Africa, overview of the Boko Haram militant group in West Africa and the MNJTF in addressing the menace of Boko Haram in the West African sub-region.



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³⁵ Afp. "Nigeria not compromised by foreign troops on its soil." Daily Mail Online. Associated Newspapers, 03 Feb. 2015. Web. 31 July 2017. <<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2938328/Nigeria-not-compromised-foreign-troops-soil.html>>.

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CHAPTER THREE

THE MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE AND BOKO HARAM

3.0 Introduction

This chapter overviews the overall counter-terrorism measures taken against the cause and course of Boko Haram religious militancy and terrorism in Nigeria and the other states in the Lake Chad Basin. The focus of the chapter is on the role of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and its fight against Boko Haram. The chapter answers the ensuing questions: how has the MNJTF fared in its fight against Boko Haram? And what are the challenges it faced in the fight against Boko Haram?

3.1 Overview of Nigeria Counter Terrorism Policies against Boko Haram

Boko Haram, like other religious militant and terrorist manifestations, pose a real problem to the localities and societies in which they manifest, and to the world at large. In the same manner, religious insurgencies have been very difficult to contain, let alone eradicate. Boko Haram's main aim is Islamic governance in Nigeria, and thereafter via the imposition of a global caliphate and sharia law. There are two schools of thought on the radicalisation of Boko Haram. Some believe the Nigerian government's excessive use of force and extra-judicial fervency in the attempt to nip the group in the bud radicalised the group. Others argue that the Nigerian government underestimated the threat when the group started to be vicious in 2002.¹ The Niger Second Councillor to Ghana, Moussa Iro, believes that Boko Haram's attacks were treated with flippancy by some state officials.² In July 2009, the Federal government of Nigeria began to develop a

holistic approach to Boko Haram's insurgency after rampant violence that broke up in Borno, Yobe and Bauchi states. In the quest to defeat this insurgency several counter terrorism policies were undertaken. These strategies largely employed the use of hard (military) power via forceful operations against the militant extremist group. Among these counter terrorism policies was the formation of the joint military task force dubbed "Operation Restore Order". Established in 2009, this task force was mandated to undertake large-scale military operations in Yobe and Borno states where Boko Haram's presence was largely felt.³

Moreover, two new permanent military units in the two states were established by the government.⁴ Again, the formation of the National Focal Point on Terrorism (NFPT) in 2007, which became active in 2012 by the Federal government of Nigeria was another aspect of the present strategy.⁵ The focal point comprised of over a dozen security agencies and state departments in charge of the execution of Nigeria's national security agenda.⁶ The Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) coordinated the NFPT's activities whereas the National Security Council, headed by the President, occasionally met to assess issues concerning national security.

The government further established a committee on security in the north-east and temporarily closed the country's northern borders in early 2012 due to underdeveloped and inexplorable conditions of Borno State.⁷ The Government of Nigeria's policy also entailed the exploration of legal structures as a means of defeating the Boko Haram threat and terrorism. The Nigerian government passed the Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) in June 2011 to guide its prosecution of terrorism.⁸ It also established the Special Joint Military Task Force (SJMTF) in 2011 to confront the Boko Haram menace in the North with the city of Maiduguri in Borno State as the control centre of the task force. This military task force comprised the Nigerian Navy,

Airforce, Army, Police, Department of State Security and Defence Intelligence Agency. The Police deployed 1500 officers, 650 Airforce officers, 500 DSS operatives, and the Navy deployed 750 officers.⁹ The JSMTF was successful in killing the leader of the extremist group, Mohammed Yusuf. The Demise of Yusuf created a serious hullabaloo in the media and among human right activists.

The insurgents also gained notoriety after they abducted the Chibok school girls in 2014. This new dimension has triggered the attention of the world at large against Boko Haram. President Muhammed Buhari also took some strategic decisions by the appointment of security chiefs from areas suffering from the insurgency group. “I can emphatically state that the National Security Adviser, Maj-Gen. Babagana Mungonu (Rtd.); COAS, Lt-Gen. Tukur Buratai; Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal Sadique Abubakar, and Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Mr. Babachir Lawal, are all from the Northern-east of the country”.¹⁰ It was believed that these appointees could speak the language and communicated very well to the affected people who understood the terrain and the geopolitics of the Northern environment where they were raised.

Nigeria is my country and as am speaking to you now my family members are there, I have family members in Shafa (a suburb of Maiduguri), what do you expect me to do. Even if I am asked to voluntarily aid in the fight, I will, even if it will take me going back to the North. This canker must stop, our people are suffering.¹¹

The Nigerian government’s counter-insurgency against Boko Haran, however, hardly gathered storm as the procurement of logistics to prosecute the conflict was bogged down on corruption and the security personnel mobilised for the counter-terrorism were largely demoralised.

3.2 Regional Policies (AU and ECOWAS)

After the death of Yusuf, another Boko Haram leader emerged called Abubakar Shekau. Shekau, being one of the followers of the deceased founder, became the leader and took over the reins of leading Boko Haram and he took the terrorist war to most of the Northern half of Nigeria, reaching as far as Abuja. The Boko Haram insurgent employed new tactics which included suicide bombings and insurgent runs into neighbouring countries such as Cameroon, Niger, and Chad. To Boko Haram, the incursions into neighbouring states serves as a safe haven when being pursued in one location or country. Boko Haram has extended its activities into neighbouring countries and this has given the insurgent group global publicity and fame as a terrorist group.

On the other hand, Boko Haram extension of its terrorist activities into neighbouring states helped galvanise regional and international public opinion against it. Initially, Nigeria, given its quest for regional hegemony, had sought to fight the Boko Haram menace alone. However, given the expansion of the insurgent group's activities into neighbouring countries, Nigeria had a change of heart and sought regional and international support. Nigeria as the epicentre of Boko Haram's terrorist activities sought "first to compel its neighbours at the frontline of the war, especially Cameroon, to help in policing its porous borders and to prevent Boko Haram from attacking Nigeria from across the borders. The second most important reason was for Nigeria to garner international military and political support against Boko Haram."¹²

Accordingly, a bi-and multilateral security compact was signed by Nigeria, its neighbours, ECOWAS, select strategic partners, and the AU. For example, Nigeria had signed a security pact with Cameroon in February 2012.¹³ The compact secured, inter alia, assistance from Cameroon for Nigeria's combat against the extremist group in the frontier parts. In the same vein, Nigeria had also signed a similar pact with Niger, creating joint security patrols along the frontiers in

October 2012.¹⁴ ECOWAS and the AU held several summits in solidarity with Nigeria and promised to collaborate in the fight against Boko Haram. Such regional and sub-regional declarations of support equally imbued Nigeria's counter-terrorism measures with legitimacy.

3.3 Global Support

3.3.1 USA

As Boko Haram's attacks mounted in intensity and atrocities against local, national and international targets, the then Minister of Defence signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), in May 2012 with U.S on "military cooperation for joint military exercises and exchange of training programmes".¹⁵ The US assisted the Nigerian armed forces and police with US\$6.3 million in 2014, which was an increment from US\$6.2 million in 2013.¹⁶ The Nigerian government on May 6, 2014, agreed to an offer of help from the US with regards to the search for the Chibok girls. The US offered to assist in the rescue process of the Chibok girls, including "hostage negotiation, intelligence gathering, strategic communications, and how to mitigate the risks of future kidnappings."¹⁷ Also, apart from all these policies, the U.S further sent 16 Department of Defence staff with expertise in intelligence, counter-terrorism, medical, and communication issues which were based in Abuja, as well as two army officers with experience in supporting the mission against the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda.¹⁸ In addition, the US trained almost 650 Nigerian forces between April and August 2014 for combat operations.¹⁹ The US support for Nigeria's fight against terrorism is however not without criticisms. The US refused to sell to Nigeria surveillance planes and helicopters that are amenable to fighting terrorists in inaccessible terrains such as the Borno region with the excuse that the Nigerian government might use such military hardware to abuse human rights.

3.3.2 United Kingdom (UK)

The Nigerian government and the UK have also signed a MoU on bilateral military cooperation. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee issued a statement that the UK has taken “a very cautious response to request for military assistance and training” from Nigeria, “the UK provided judicial training, advice on counter-terrorism strategies, legal frameworks, crisis management, bomb scene management, anti-terrorist finance training, and assistance to the Office of the National Security Advisor during 2013”.²⁰ Furthermore, according to the select committee, “Nigeria signed a strategic 20-year security-training pact with Britain in 2015, providing it with counterterrorism and COIN training.”²¹

In what followed the kidnapping of the school girls in Chibok in northern Nigeria on 14 April 2014, several states across the world extended a hand of support to the Nigerian government. World leaders promised to share intelligence and develop a regional counter-terrorism strategy in order to fight the Boko Haram in three regional summits held in Paris, London and Abuja.²² The outcome of these summits necessitated the creation of an External Intelligence Response Unit (EIRU) by Nigeria, Cameroon, Benin, Chad, Niger, France, United Kingdom and the US.²³ With all these policies, Nigeria was able to expand the tactics of the war using multinational mechanism; the scope of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) included combating Boko Haram in Africa.

3.4 The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

It has been estimated that Boko Haram has killed over 10000 since 2011. Over one-third of civilians killed in conflicts in Africa was attributed to Boko Haram in 2014.²⁴ The sheer brutality of the group shocked the continent and spurred it on to intensify its counter terrorism campaign

against Boko Haram. By 2012, it became obvious the group's threat was essentially a transnational threat that requires a comprehensive collaborative effort to defeat it. In the quest to reduce the activities of terrorists on the African continent, the May 2014 Paris Summit. Participants were the leaders of Cameroon, Benin, Niger, France, Chad and Nigeria, and some representatives of the UK, US and EU. They "decided to enhance regional cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram, by means of coordinated patrols and border surveillance, pooling intelligence and exchanging relevant information."²⁵

In their bid to improve cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram, in October 2014, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) member states -Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Benin promised to contribute forces to the MNJFT, which should have become fully operational inside national borders by November 2014. It was also decided to ask the African Union (AU) and the UN to establish the appropriate legal framework for cross-border military operations.²⁶

The MNJTF, comprising Nigeria, Chad, and Niger, had existed since 1994 to combat trans-border banditry in the Lake Chad Basin but was largely inactive until 2012 when it was activated to combat Boko Haram.²⁷ At that time, Nigerian troops were based there but because of security risks, Niger and Chad had withdrawn their forces. On January 20th 2015, the need arose to resurrect the regional or multinational approach to fighting Boko Haram. Thus, heads of states from 13 West and Central African countries (Nigeria did not participate) deliberated about setting up a multinational force to fight the extremist group. Subsequently, the then president of the UN Security Council issued a statement which called for the improvement of the MNJTF's operational capacity.²⁸ The MNJTF started before the Boko Haram war but the emergence of the former extended the scope of operation of the MNJTF's to include counter-terrorism.²⁹

The MNJTF is the combination of multinational formation which mostly consists of military personnel from Benin, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria. The MNJTF was initially formed as a sole Nigerian force in 1994 during the Sani Abacha's reign to checkmate banditry and smuggling activities, as well as facilitate free movement of goods and people across its northern frontier.³⁰ However, it was expanded in 1998 to absorb forces from neighbouring Niger and Chad with the purpose of dealing with common cross-border security problems in the Lake Chad region. It had its headquarters in Baga, a town in Bono State.³¹ The group's terrorist activities led to the worsening security in the Lake Chad Basin territories. By the late 2000s and the security forces were faced with a lot of difficulties posed by Boko Haram insurgency and other terrorist groups in the Lake Chad Basin; which resulted in the re-establishment of the joint military task force of the MNJTF. According to the AU Communiqué of the 469th PSC meeting;

“The MNJTF is an offensive and stabilisation mechanism with the objective of combating Boko Haram and other groups labelled as terrorists operating around the Lake Chad Basin. Its establishment under its current structure was determined by the LCBC heads of state and government during the Extraordinary Summit of the LCBC member states and Benin in Niamey, Niger on 7 October 2014. On 25 November 2014, the African Union's (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) fully endorsed its activation.”³²

Nevertheless, the PSC did not formally authorise the deployment of the MNJTF until 29 January 2015, for a year. Subsequently, on 14 January 2016, this mandate was renewed for an extra 12 months.³³ The MNJTF is initiated from Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) which consists of Nigerian troops, Nigerien, Chadian and Benin which is not a member country. Most of the coalition countries are suffering from the canker of Boko Haram insurgency. This was formed to fight for a common cause, and the MNJTF was considered as the right coalition to contain the activities of the insurgent group.

The activation of the MNJTF came as a surprise to many international political observers. Nigeria had been adamant not to allow foreign troops on its soil to fight Boko Haram. Many wondered, therefore, why Nigeria has chosen Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Benin, which have very little to offer in terms of resources. But it is obvious that only Nigeria's neighbours who have suffered Boko Haram's attack and know the people and the terrain can help in containing the group's militant attacks.

3.5 The Mandate of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)

The MNJTF was set up to end the activities of Boko Haram menace and other terrorist groups that are causing continue series of attacks on the African continent. Their activities cut across borders with the sole aim of combating terrorism. Their activity includes:

Creation of a secure and safe atmosphere in places affected by the atrocities of Boko Haram and other extremists, the execution of the entire stabilization programmes by the LCBC Member States and Benin in the affected parts, comprising the full restoration of state authority and the return of IDPs (Internally Displaced People) and refugees; "facilitate, within the limit of its capabilities, humanitarian operations and the delivery of assistance to the affected populations."³⁴

The activities of the MNJTF also included inter alia, conducting military manoeuvres to prevent the expansion of the group's incursions; carry out patrols; averting all transfers of weapons or logistics to the group; actively searching for and freeing all abductees, including the girls kidnapped from Chibok in April 2014; and carrying out psychological actions to encourage defections within Boko Haram ranks.³⁵

Again, the MNJTF was mandated to conduct specific actions in terms of information, human rights, intelligence, and the media.³⁶ Due to the nature of the activities to be carried out, the African Union Security Council (PSC) authorised the deployment of 7500 military and non-

military staff, for the first year, which was subject to renewal.³⁷ Based on the mandate of the MNJTF, four sectors were created and the sectors were defined as:

Sector One, with the command based in Mora (Cameroon); Sector Two, located in the town of Baga-Sola (Chad); Sector Three, located in Baga (Nigeria); and Sector Four, based in the town of Diffa (southeast Niger).³⁸

3.6 Roles of the (MNJTF)

Much has been done in the fight against Boko Haram by the MNJTF as a group and individual based sectors. Among these was the significant offensive act which was carried out by the joint force, from June to November 2016 around Lake Chad and in Borno state dubbed as “Operation Gama Aiki” which literally means “Operation finish the job”. Four of the force sectors, namely, Baga-sola in Chad, Baga in Nigeria, Mora in Cameroon and Diffa in Niger were involved in a simultaneous and cooperative military action.³⁹ A sizable number of Boko Haram fighters were eliminated in the Mora sector between February and May 2016. Again, the operation facilitated the seizure of the group’s stockpile of weapons, freed captives or hostages and demolished some of the group’s training sites.⁴⁰

The MNJTF also launched military tactics called “Operation Lafiya Dole” meaning “the activities of Boko Haram must compulsory come to an end.” This operation has caused the insurgents to run away from their hideouts in Sambisa Forest toward Lake Chad in the northern part of Borno State around the Nigeria/Niger border. The MNJTF continued to pursue and dislodge the insurgents by the launch of “Operation Gama Aiki” to clear all Boko Haram insurgents.⁴¹ However, Boko Haram would not go down without a fight as the group launched many retaliatory attacks against the MNJTF and targets in neighbouring states. The insurgents responded angrily

after these reactions to stabilise their activities in the LCBC zone. This led to the unfortunate event of April 16, 2013. The insurgents planted Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) on the path of the MNJTF and shot through loopholes. Furthermore, they exhibited mastery of IED bombings, used Rocket Propelled Grenades, General Purpose Machine Guns and threw Hand Held Grenades at the troops. Since Boko Haram fighters were familiar with the movement of the troops, it enabled them to bury and remotely detonated IEDs on their way of advance which resulted in the death of one of the troops, damage to some operational vehicles and many of the troops were injured.⁴²

In a space of seven days (25 April - 2 May 2013), the Nigerian police force lost 40 of its men through a series of Boko Haram attacks in Bauchi, Borno, Adamawa, and the Kano States. Hundreds of JTF combatants have perished in battle with Boko Haram insurgents from 2011 to date.⁴³ During the “Operation Lafiya Dole”, the insurgents also countered MNJTF attacks with the IED bombs, which led to the loss of two soldiers of the MNJTF, while 12 others were wounded.⁴⁴

3.7 Resources and Logistics of MNJTF

The Nigerian Head of State Muhammadu Buhari instructed that the sum of \$21 million (N4.2 billion) be released to the MNJTF in June 2015. That sum of money was to enable the MNJTF to prosecute the war against Boko Haram effectively. Additionally, Nigeria had promised to donate \$100 million as part of the much-needed funds for the MNJTF to carry out their task. The president further requested that Nigeria should be allowed to take control of the command of the MNJTF because Nigeria was the main theatre of the war with Boko Haram and the war was very important to Nigeria.⁴⁵

The regional continent representatives from the neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Chad, Benin, and Niger) also contributed 8700 military, police and civilian troops as their quota to the

MNJTF. In February 2017, the delegation of Council of Ministers from the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and Secretary of the Commissioner for PSC of the AU which was led by the Executive Secretary of the LCBC Engineer Sanusi Imran Abdullai donated 15 tactical vehicles and 30 motor bikes to the MNJTF to aid their movement in battle against Boko Haram insurgents.⁴⁶

The United State of America, on its part, supported the creation of the MNJTF and strongly partnered with the members of the MNJTF to fight against Boko Haram. To this end, the US provided intelligence, advisers, training, logistical support and equipment.⁴⁷ In May 2014, the U.S Department of Defence sent 12 troops to Nigeria to train 650 Nigerian ranger battalions for combat operations that were presumably free of human rights violations. At the request of the Nigerian government, the U.S deployed drones and surveillance aircraft concentrated on finding the Chibok girls. They also provided information-sharing and supported programmes that provide positive alternatives to communities most at risk of radicalisation of recruitment to Boko Haram.⁴⁸ In addition to this the U.S provided approximately 71 million dollars, worth of equipment, logistics support, and training to the MNJTF signatory countries, to enable them to participate effectively in the MNJTF.⁴⁹

The Representative of the European Union (E.U) donated an amount of 21 million euros to help Nigeria and the neighbouring states that are affected by the activities of Boko Haram. According to the EU Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management (HACM) Christos Stylianides, on his visit to Nigeria (to assess the humanitarian situation) said:

More than 1.7 million people have been displaced by the terror of Boko Haram. Many of them live in precarious conditions in other parts of Nigeria and neighbouring countries where they have fled. Meeting some of them today, I saw with my own eyes the immense needs that the conflict is causing among civilians. We are stepping up our humanitarian response to call of those in immediate needs.⁵⁰

As a result, the EU commission donated an amount of 123 million euros and 107 million euros in 2014 and 2015 to respectively, to offer humanitarian assistance in Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon.⁵¹

3.8 Achievements of the MNJTF

Despite the counter attacks by Boko Haram insurgents, the MNJTF has achieved a lot in the fight against Boko Haram. One of the achievements of the MNJTF was the re-opening of the Maiduguri-Digkwa-Gamboru road in July 2016 after its closure for three years due Boko Haram's attacks. The Governor, in his remarks, commended the MNJTF and the Nigerian army for containing the insurgency. He said:

For two years, Borno was in a bad state, and about a year and a half ago the state almost fell completely into the hands of the insurgents. Today, the story is different and anyone who wants to be fair must juxtapose these scenarios before drawing any conclusions. With the reopening of this road, which is the life wire of the state, there will be a quantum of leap in the economy of the state.⁵²

The ongoing operation in northern Borno is a joint operation between the Nigerian troops and those of the Multi-National Joint Task Force which aimed at flushing out the Boko Haram terrorists at the far northern fringes of Borno state and the Lake Chad Basin. Since the MNJTF became operational, the MNJTF have fought with the Boko Haram group on three occasions. They fought each other twice in Nigeria and once in Chad. On all the three occasions, the Boko Haram terrorists suffered heavy casualties in terms of both manpower and equipment. Among the equipment captured from the Boko Haram Terrorist (BHT) were 27 AK47, three GPMG, and LMG, three hand grenades and three RPG tubes. Since the operation started, a total of 31 BHT have been killed. Unfortunately, one member of the force died while nine other soldiers were wounded. The operation is continuing with the air support of Lafiya Dole Operation.⁵³

During Operation Lafiya Dole, appreciable success was achieved. Insurgents were dislodged from Doran Nairi, Faide-Jimba, Yebi-Tasugia, Yebi-Jemi, Alli Kanori, Yebi Tumanba and Alagarno villages up to Doron Naira along Sector 3 (Nigeria) axis. The MNJTF also cleared Littri, Madayi and some villages on the Lake Chad Island along Sector 2 axis along (Chad) of Boko Haram fighters. The operation is still recording more successes. According to Colonel Dole:

MNJTF troops, during these encounters, neutralized 31 terrorists, seized and destroyed massive quantities of equipment as well as a cache of arms and ammunition. Among the equipment captured are one Hilux van mounted with Shilka gun with 97 rounds of 21mm, 14 AK 47 rifles, four rocket propelled grenade bombs, six mortar bombs, two 97 rounds of 21mm gun and eight bandoliers.⁵⁴

In the November 2016, according to Muhammed Dole, 240 Boko Haram combatants surrendered to the MNJTF in Sector 2 of Bagasola in Chad after “a fierce firepower of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) ground troops and joint Air operation during the Operation Gama Aiki”. The Commander of the MNJTF, Major-General Lamidi Adeosun, addressed the repentant terrorists and their families during his operational visit to the Second Sector. The Commander lauded the leadership of the former Boko Haram combatants for the bold decision to do away with terrorism and embracing normal lifestyles. He further promised them of their safety if they would not look back⁵⁵

According to Colonel Sanusi Usman:

the Troops of 152 and 155 Task Force Battalions at Operation Lafiya Dole in conjunction with troops of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) from Cameroon, have conducted massive joint clearance operation of suspected Boko Haram terrorists along Nigeria-Cameroon borders.

The extraordinary military operation undertaken swept over 10 suspected Boko Haram terrorists hideouts along the frontier. During the operation, 22 Boko Haram fighters were killed; while three of their soldiers (commanders) were arrested. 1275 abductees held hostage were also rescued and freed.⁵⁶

The Head of Missions of the task force, Sanusi Abdullahi, in a meeting in January 2017 with Defence Chiefs from the Lake Chad Basin Authority announced that 1300 Boko Haram terrorists have surrounded to the Multinational joint force. The meeting was attended by Defence Chiefs from Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Nigeria and Benin. They deliberated on how to improve security in the Lake Chad region through multilateral cooperation. Despite the remarkable efforts made in curtailing the activities of Boko Haram insurgents and other security threats, Nigeria's Defence Minister, Mansur Dan Ali, said the threat Boko Haram poses is still real; although the attention of the Nigerian government is being geared towards peace building and rehabilitation should be given priority.⁵⁷

3.9 Challenges of the MNJTF

The effective operation of the MNJTF has been undermined by several challenges. The fact that, members of the Joint-Task Force had plans in place in response to the dangers Boko Haram poses to them; makes their strategies in fighting the menace fragmented. Whereas Nigeria's strategy is informed by the need to annihilate Boko Haram from Nigeria, the neighbouring states' strategies are geared towards securing the borders against Boko Haram's terrorist incursions into the territories. Three of the countries; Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, had sought instead to contain Boko Haram's expansionist tendencies. These states, although challenged with the same threat had adopted some ambivalent offensive or defensive positions.⁵⁸ These different postures restrict the regional trust and cooperation needed for a successful counter-insurgency. Besides the rhetoric, there was no solidarity amongst the states of the region.⁵⁹ Each country affected by the activities of the insurgent group is only willing to protect its own zones.

Historically, Nigeria has bossed its way throughout its relations with its neighbour, given Nigeria's massive resources in comparison with those of its neighbours. The power equation and relations working in the administration of the MNJTF are no different. Nigeria has severally been accused by its neighbours of taking unilateral decisions without consultation with the other members. And as it were, Nigeria always want its position to be held, no matter how salient others' views are. A diplomat from Niger interviewed argues that there is poor chemistry of solidarity among the MNJTF members and that the only motive holding them together is the individual needs of the member states to fight Boko Haram. And that the Nigerian attitude of predominance is a stumbling block to the multinational cooperation's progress.⁶⁰

President Goodluck (2010-2015) Jonathan received a lot of public bashing for his lethargic leadership style and the absence of political will to eliminate the threat of Boko Haram.⁶¹ Under his presidency, there was next to little cooperation between Nigeria and her neighbours in combating Boko Haram insurgency.⁶² Nevertheless, upon the assumption of office in 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari made the fight against the terrorist group one of his top priorities. Buhari immediately tried to forge stronger ties and cooperation with the neighbouring states. His visits as soon as he took office after 3rd June was to Niger, 4th June to Chad, 29th July, to Cameroon, and 1st August 2016 to Benin have helped in presenting a common front against the group. Buhari's commitment towards the joint response efforts was illustrated in his contribution of 100 million dollars to the creation the MNJTF and his choice to take on the leadership mantle.⁶³

The efforts of Buhari notwithstanding, cooperation between Nigeria and the other neighbouring states still leaves much to be desired. Nigeria has been criticized for its tendency to act unilaterally in such situations. The Nigerian army was criticised for not showing its presence in occupying towns retaken from Boko Haram.⁶⁴ About the relations between Nigeria and its

external partners, the neighbours still harbour distrust when it came to collaborating directly with the Nigerian armed forces.⁶⁵

3.9.1 Corruption

According to Amnesty International, numerous eminent military sources reported that operations in the north-eastern part have been plagued with insufficient funds because of the grandiose level of corruption. The effects of the pilfering of funds include troops being poorly paid, lack of dignified facilities for personnel and poor upkeep facilities and equipment. Several field reports reviewed by Amnesty International give credence to the above-mentioned assertion. Because of insufficient troops, the 6-month rotation term that the JTF was entitled to was abandoned, constraining some soldiers to stay for two years and more. However, the six-month rotation policy ended in August 2013 when 7 Division was created, meaning the soldiers were permanently stationed in north-eastern Nigeria. Additionally, Amnesty International asserts that the fierce nature of the conflict and inadequate soldiers led to the ending of leave and training. According to internal reports, the military leadership were aware of the consequences of extending troop postings past 6-months but did nothing to change it.⁶⁶

3.9.2 Financial Constraint

Since its inception, the MNJTF has been plagued with financial constraints (especially along the front line) although the conflict continues to intensify. The armed forces received approximately 2 billion dollars in 2014 and numerous offices were captured in the budget allocated to the conflict. The military received the largest monetary allocation in 2014 which consisted of 7.5% of the fiscal budget. However, the amount that went to the north east is very hard to determine. Later in

October, the legislative body in Nigeria seconded a proposal to borrow extra 1 billion dollars to buy military equipment.⁶⁷

In fact, only the financial contributions by Nigeria, the UK and the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) have materialised. The Nigerian government pumped at least 30 million dollars to the force command headquarters.⁶⁸ Most of the costs of operations of the MNJTF are born by countries engaged in the fight against the insurgents. The support from US, EU, and ECOWAS mostly comes in the form of training, arms and other logistics but not in real cash. For instance, “for the past four months, some of the members of the task force have not been paid, even the member states sometimes depend on Nigeria for resources.”⁶⁹ This scenario has lingered on and troubled the hearts of many individuals. They have asked if the role of the MNTJF is sustainable.

3.10 Conclusion

The chapter has analysed Nigeria counter terrorism activities against Boko Haram, the role and achievements of MNJTF against Boko Haram. The persistent attacks perpetrated by the insurgents and the threats they pose to the sub-region makes the MNJTF more important and relevant. The work has found out that while the MNJTF has achieved a lot in its fight against Boko Haram, the task force's success is undermined by financial difficulties, corruption and lack of competency.

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² *ibid*

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- ⁵⁸ This state of affairs should not disguise the fact that over a number of months Boko Haram had infiltrated the south of Niger and Chad, and the north of Cameroon, which provided an ad hoc support base. In other words, the threat was always very real for neighbouring countries.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Summary of Key Findings

This chapter presents a summary of the key findings of the study. The study found out that Boko Haram's activities present critical security threats to Nigeria, the West African sub-region, and the world. Two schools of thought emerged on the radicalisation and violence of Boko Haram. One holds that the initial violence and extra judicial approaches the Nigeria government adopted in prosecuting the Boko Haram was what precipitated Boko Haram to become a violent extremist group. The other posits that the Nigerian government, originally, underestimated the seriousness of the threat posed by Boko Haram and that the government only seriously engaged the Boko Haram when Nigeria was overwhelmed.

To stem the tide of violent Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria, the Lake Chad Basin region, and Cameroon, the Nigerian government revived the dormant Lake Chad Basic Commission that was initially formed in the mid-1990s to fight cross border crimes. In addition to the hitherto Lake Chad Basin Commission members (Nigeria, Niger, and Chad), Cameroon and Benin, Nigeria's other two neighbours were added to form the Multinational Joint Task Force headquartered in N'Djamena to fight the Boko Haram menace.

The essence and membership of the Task Force were informed by the geography of Boko Haram's activism, violence, and insurgency strategy. For operational reasons, the Task Force was divided into four groups: the Baga in Nigeria, Baga-Sola in Chad, Diffa in Niger and Mora in

Cameroon. As a strategy, the Task Force was mandated to fight, deny Boko Haram fighters safe haven in the members various territories and starve them of logistic supplies and finance.

The Task Force has engaged and routed many Boko Haram fighters. But the Task Force also suffered many casualties mainly through Boko Haram ambushes and IEDs.

The inactivity of Boko Haram, even if only temporarily, is largely due to the comprehensive collaboration of the Task Force members in fighting the group. One of the major achievements of the MNJTF was the re-opening of the Maiduguri-Digkwa-Gamboru road in July 2016 after it closed for over three years due to Boko Haram violence.

The achievements of the MNJTF notwithstanding, have been fraught with many challenges that have undermined its drive for greater success against the insurgents. The challenges and difficulties include Nigeria's attitude of lording it over the rest of the MNJTF members that undermined trust and solidarity that are very vital for the success of such operations; unwillingness of Nigerian forces to occupy towns and areas that have been liberated by the MNJTF; limited resources; compounded by corruption in high places; and natural difficulty in fighting religious militancy.

4.2 Conclusions

The work concludes that despite the challenges facing the MNJTF, the Task Force holds the brightest prospect of defeating Boko Haram. Since the members' territories are the settings for Boko Haram activities and given the fact that the members' knowledge of the terrains is unquestionable; they are best positioned to fight the group if the MNJTF is well resourced and their activities are well coordinated.

And, that the arduous terrain and common poverty in the regions, where Boko Haram activities are rife, explain the longer duration the MNJTF has taken to carry out its mandate.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings, the work recommends that:

- ❖ Nigeria should offer greater respect, collaboration, magnanimity towards other members of the MNJTF. This is very essential since solidarity among the troop contributing states is a *sine qua non* to defeating Boko Haram;
- ❖ All the members of the MNJTF should shun corruption and make sure that troops are well resourced and motivated to put their lives on line in the fight against Boko Haram terrorists;
- ❖ Terrorism, whatever the form it takes, and wherever it manifests, pose real threats to international security. As such, the international community, especially the leading countries of the world and the private sector, should contribute generously to the MNJTF fight against Boko Haram. Nigerian has many natural resources and a large market whose true potential can only be realized when there is peace and stability in Nigeria and the West African sub-region;
- ❖ It will be helpful to develop the Borno region and other border regions of the MNJTF members. It appears the relative deprivation prevailing in the rural areas of the countries are feeding into the militancy.

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Interview with Moussa Iro, Niger Second Councilor on 19th July 2017

Interview with Romuald Gilbert Darko Official at the embassy of the republic of Benin on
20th July 2017

APPENDIX

Interview Guide (Unstructured Questionnaires)

1. What is your general view about religious militancy or terrorism in Africa?
2. Do you think West Africa is a fertile place for terrorism to thrive?
3. Before Boko Haram, has there been any religious militancy or terrorism movement in Nigeria?
4. What do you think about Boko Haram in Nigeria?
5. What do you think is the reason behind the emergence of Boko Haram?
6. What are the causes or strengths of Boko Haram?
- (a) What are some of the social grievances that led to the emergence of Boko Haram?
7. What is Haram
 - (a) What do you know about jihad?
8. Do you think the initial management or efforts made rather made Boko Haram stronger?
9. What are some of the national policies of Nigeria in managing Boko Haram before the MNJTF?
10. What has been ECOWAS role towards the management of Boko Haram?
11. What has been ECOWAS role that is general in managing the Boko Haram crisis?
12. Has there been some states that have been more involved in the management of Boko Haram?
13. Is there any reason why these states have been more involved than the others?
14. What has been the role of the International Community in fighting Boko Haram?

15. It has been a policy of Nigeria despite that, it has not been able to manage Boko Haram on its own and has been against any military involvement especially from the European Union and the United States of America. Why do you think Nigeria is against the involvement of the foreign intervention?
16. The US has provided technical support to Nigeria in the fight against Boko Haram through its satellites surveillance and reconnaissance flights information sharing. What forms of technical support did the US government provided?
 - (a) To what extent did the US provide shared flight information to Nigeria in their support in fighting Boko Haram?
17. Do you know anything about the Multi National Joint Task Force?
18. Why was the force allowed when others weren't permitted?
19. Is there anything significant about this force?
20. What were their roles and what have they contributed?
 - a. What were the challenges they faced?
 - b. Given their challenges, will they continue to function, or they will cease making efforts?
 - c. What are their prospects?