Original Article
Journal of Peacebuilding
& Development
Infrastructure for Peace and 1‐14© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
Peaceful Elections in Ghana: sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/15423166231206479
2012–2020 journals.sagepub.com/home/jpd
Samson Confidence Agbelengor
University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana
Abstract
Ghana’s democratic progress in the Fourth Republic is often linked to the management of peaceful elections,
successful political alternations, and some public trust in democratic institutions. However, pockets of violence
have also marred and derailed some progress. While the capacity to reduce political tensions and resolve elect-
oral disputes has gained significant scholarly attention, scholars still overlook the role of infrastructure for peace
(I4P) in the analysis. Focusing on the Ghanaian National Peace Council, this qualitative study examines the
extent to which I4P prevents electoral disputes, what its strengths and challenges are, and how the ongoing
challenges might be remedied. Findings on peace accords, election observation, and policy dialogue processes
were significant before, during, and after electoral manifestations. A formalized I4P was also productive through
institutional partnerships. However, institutionalization within governmental structures and its consequential
budgetary limitations necessitate prudent management of its peace fund to facilitate emergent conflict situations.
Keywords
peacebuilding, infrastructure for peace, national peace council, elections, Ghana
Introduction
Over the past three decades, the notion of infrastructure for peace (I4P) has developed as an internal approach
to long-term peacebuilding (van Tongeren et al., 2012). I4P is often characterized by a consultative platform
of multiple stakeholders who develop a problem-solving approach to country-specific conflicts (van
Tongeren, 2011), usingmodalities that include peace committees, peace secretariats, a national peacebuilding
platform, conflict analysis, early warning and response systems, and insider mediators (van Tongeren, 2012,
pp. 3–4). As early as the 1980s, Central America saw a
While the Ghanaian NPC is dominated by heavy reliance on commissions in peace negotiations
(Lederach, 2012). In Nicaragua, for example, the per-
inter-faith leadership, there are broader sonal involvement of John Paul Lederach and others
I4P modalities for resolving contentious influenced the conceptual interpretation of the internal
matters. intermediary. Hence, Wehr and Lederach (1991) for-
mulated the term “insider-partial” to describe the role
of insider mediators whose significance in conflict resolution was rooted in connectedness and trusted relation-
ships. They also predicted that such attributes would likely be helpful outside of Central America. Decades
later, following the passage of the 818th Act of the Ghanaian National Peace Council (NPC), eminent
persons with faith-based good offices have been carefully selected from different Christian denominations,
Muslim clerics from Islamic groups, African traditional religious leaders, and chiefs including other civil
society groups to tackle various forms of disputes that threatened the peace of the country. While the
Ghanaian NPC is dominated by inter-faith leadership, there are broader I4P modalities for resolving contentious
matters. This is whatmotivatesmy focus on the role of Ghana’s I4P in fostering peaceful elections in the country.
2 Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 0(0)
There are significant studies on I4P, but its role in the maintenance of peaceful elections in Ghana is
often neglected in the analysis (Alidu & Braimah, 2014). Odendaal (2010) comparatively discussed
different I4P cases as an architecture for building peace at the local level. In a cost and benefit obser-
vation, van Tongeren (2011) cited an estimation by the Ghana Investment Promotion that between
mid-2008 and mid-2009, direct foreign investment surged by 90%, in part as a result of the country’s
peaceful general election in December 2008. The NPC’s peacebuilding efforts included around 2
million U.S. dollars in financial support from the UNDP (van Tongeren, 2011). The intermediary
role of the NPC in averting expected turbulence in the 2008 election has also been documented
(Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Odendaal, 2010; van Tongeren, 2011, 2012). In Kenya, however, it
was observed that leading business associations suffered enormous economic losses from the 2008
postelection violence, amounting to around 3.6 billion U.S. dollars (van Tongeren, 2011). Yet, an esti-
mated 5 million U.S. dollars from the UNDP supported efforts to prevent violence, build consensus on
a newly drafted constitution, and establish early warning and response systems in Kenya (Kumar & De
la Haye, 2012; van Tongeren, 2011). Another related study examined the role and difficulties of peace-
building institutions such as Ghana’s NPC in promoting peaceful elections in 2012 (Alidu & Braimah,
2014). However, little is known beyond the 2012 election. Therefore, my research adds to the body of
existing knowledge on long-term peacebuilding by examining the extent to which Ghana’s I4P pre-
vented electoral disputes between 2012 and 2020, what its strengths and challenges are, and how
the ongoing challenges might be remedied.
This research used elite interviews, official documents, media reports, peer-reviewed articles and
books on the subject matter as part of qualitative research conducted between January and October
2021. A purposive sampling technique was used to gather adequate data from respondents relevant
to the study. Since the study focuses on national elections, local peace processes were excluded
from the study. The COVID-19 pandemic and other resource limitations also led to the use of
both face-to-face and virtual interviews based on the preferences and accessibility of the respon-
dents across the country.
With a total of 42 interviewees, I interviewed 13 respondents constituting eminent personalities and
administrative secretaries of the NPC. Respondents in 9 out of 12 national and regional peace councils
participated in the study, which is in part a manifestation of the NPC Act. This also supports Lederach’s
(1997) notion of lasting I4P structures at all levels of society. I also interviewed 6 public sector respon-
dents from the Electoral Commission of Ghana (ECG), the National Commission for Civic Education,
the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, the Court, the Ministry of Parliamentary
Affairs, and the Police. Their respective mandates are election management, civic education, ombuds-
man, adjudication, legislation, and law and order. These functions also contribute to the consolidation
of peace and security in the country. I further interviewed 15 respondents from two civil society orga-
nizations (CSOs), as well as academics from three academic research institutions. The respondents
were either peacebuilding practitioners or researchers in Ghana. Subsequently, 4 respondents were
interviewed based on their credentials as past or current representatives of political parties in the
country. Lastly, I interviewed 4 other respondents from two international actors working in Ghana
in order to understand the perspective of external actors.
I further took notice of the risks associated with the study on contentious electoral matters and therefore
implemented certain steps to mitigate some risks to the respondents, the investigator, and society. I
maintained the voluntary participation of the respondents; upheld the right of respondents to refuse
to answer any question they deem inappropriate; ensured their right to withdraw from the interview
at any time and respected interview confidentiality and anonymity in the data analysis process.
These ethical procedures were also applied in accordance with institutional ethical clearance for a
broader doctoral project.
Agbelengor 3
This introduction is followed by a conceptual analysis of I4P, a literature review on democratic con-
solidation and I4P in Ghana, data analysis and discussion on three mechanisms facilitated through
the I4P platform, and the conclusion of the paper.
Conceptualizing I4P
The capacity to adequately deal with ongoing and potentially violent conflict has been one of the major
challenges for many conflict-prone societies. Particularly in developing democracies, the challenges
include dysfunctional internal institutions and structures and a lack of commitment to peace by poten-
tial conflict parties (van Tongeren, 2012). I4P’s development, which adds to the theory of conflict trans-
formation, aims to further promote discussion about sustainable peacebuilding based on the use of
longer-term domestic intermediary structures rather than relying on impermanent peacebuilders from
outside (Lederach, 2012).
I4P also gained significant attention as a result of its criticism of international peacebuilding and,
particularly, the short-to-medium-term effect of external peacebuilding (Githaiga, 2020; Mac
Ginty, 2011). While resources are allocated to external organizations and other global North
experts to promote international peacebuilding (Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; Lederach, 2012;
van Tongeren, 2012), international peacebuilders are also too often characterized by top-down
engagements with national elites while neglecting local preferences (Mac Ginty, 2011).
Hence, I4P sought to localize peacebuilding within a domestic peace architecture and promote
conflict resolution through negotiation, dialogue, mediation, accords, and other indigenous
mechanisms.
I4P has significant practical applications throughout the world, but the nature of development varies
from country to country. To describe a few, in Nicaragua, peace commission development was inspired
by a regional peace initiative—the 1987 Esquipulas Peace Accords brought together Central American
Heads of States in an effort to end civil wars in Nicaragua, El-Salvador, and Guatemala (Odendaal,
2010). Subsequently, marginalized and war-affected communities and religious CSOs organized com-
missions to confront violence that bridged different sectors and levels of society. With external assist-
ance, the grassroots initiative developed into a national I4P and further evolved into sociopolitical
contexts. The immediate concerns of addressing armed conflict and mediating between warring
parties to protect civilians led to the maintenance of lasting structures against a broader range of con-
flicts (Mouly, 2013). Similarly in Nepal, a centralist civil war affected the country to a varying national
degree (1996–2006). But in this case, civil society efforts at the local level did not create local peace
committees (LPCs). I4P in Nepal was rather highly top-down in nature, through negotiations and adver-
sarial political processes, and the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2006 to end the conflict.
The establishment of a Ministry of Peace and Reconciliation in 2007 also oversaw the implementation
of the peace agreements, the formation of LPCs, a peace fund, and other transitional justice processes
(Kovács, 2019).
In Africa, a top-down approach in South Africa was formed during the troubled years of violence and
killings that preceded the elections in 1994. After the signing of a National Peace Accord in 1991 between
the primary protagonists in the Apartheid conflict, LPCs were formed in affected areas with significant input
from CSOs. While the LPCs contributed to containing the spiral of election-related violence in 1994, they
did not prevent all violent incidents (Odendaal, 2010; van Tongeren, 2011). In Kenya, a bottom-up
approach is often cited at the initial stages (van Tongeren, 2011). In 1993, a group of women in the
Wajir district of Northern Kenya embarked on a grassroots initiative that led to their engagements with dif-
ferent clans in an attempt to resolve pastoral and border disputes. Subsequently, other educated members of
the clans came on board to support the initiative (Kovács, 2019), which was replicated in other northern
4 Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 0(0)
districts of the country. Further, voluntary LPCs were then institutionalized into state administrative struc-
tures as national policy. The Kenyan I4P has also been commended for helping to prevent election-related
violence in some parts of the country (Githaiga, 2020; Kovács, 2019; Kumar & De la Haye, 2012; van
Tongeren, 2012). In February 2010, in Naivasha,
In Ghana, I4P became significant amid Kenya, African and foreign representatives agreed
on a common definition of I4P: “dynamic network
failed inter-ethnic and chieftaincy conflict
of interdependent structures, mechanisms, resources,
resolution, but progress in election values and skills which, through dialogue and con-
management within Africa. sultation, contribute to conflict prevention and peace-
building in a society” (van Tongeren et al., 2012,
p. 2). Similarly, on September 10, 2013, a continental consensus declaration in Accra, proposed I4P for-
mation in member states within three years (Verzat, 2014). The practice of I4P in Ghana, which began in
2005, appears to have preceded global attention in Africa. This confirms how some practical cases of I4P in
addressing conflict have rather influenced conceptual development. In Ghana, I4P became significant amid
failed inter-ethnic and chieftaincy conflict resolution, but progress in election management within Africa.
I review the literature on democratic consolidation and Ghana’s development of I4P in the next section.
Democratic Consolidation and I4P in Ghana
Ghana has had a tumultuous political evolution since independence on March 6, 1957. The postinde-
pendence period was rather a checkered history of different military overthrows of civilian republics,
specifically in 1966, 1972, and 1981. The current 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution is the most
enduring since independence, culminating in eight successive presidential and parliamentary elections
organized every 4 years in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020. Hence, the scope of
the review within this era also deepens the democratic focus of the study.
Elections have featured prominently in studies on democratization in Ghana. In relation to democratic consoli-
dation, a minimalist and maximalist debate is imperative (Alidu &Ame, 2012). Reference is often made to the
transition election of 1992 after 11 years of military rule between December 31st, 1981 and January 7th, 1993.
Jeffries and Thomas (1993), in their early diagnosis, revealed that although the opposition party disputed the
1992 presidential election and subsequently boycotted the parliamentary election, the procedural irregularities
did not necessarily affect the relatively free and fair outcome. Oquaye (1995), however, argued that the rec-
ognition of transitional challenges, including a defective electoral register, military incumbency, human rights
abuses, and poor election observation, and improving them were essential to safeguarding future elections.
In a millennial contribution, Gyimah-Boadi (2001) acknowledged the improvement made in Ghana’s elect-
oral system between 1992 and 2000. They include the compilation of a new voter register and the introduc-
tion of an interparty advisory committee for electoral consensus building. This subsequently improved the
credibility of the ECG in its supervision of the 2000 elections, which were concluded through a run-off.
Gyimah-Boadi (2001, 2009) and Graham et al. (2017) examined the 2000, 2008, and 2016 elections,
respectively. They emphasized the alternation of political power between the two major political parties
in Ghana, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), as a beacon of
hope for democracy in Africa. Graham et al. (2017) went further to state that, from the minimalist point
of view, Ghana appears to have also passed Samuel Huntington’s turnover test to democratic consolidation
when political power alternated three times between the NDC and the NPP in 2001, 2009, and 2017.
Arthur (2010) also conceptualized democratic consolidation in the context of free and fair elections, the
peaceful alternation of power, and some public trust in democratic institutions. Therefore, the institu-
tional progress in Ghana’s democratic consolidation includes an independent election management
role, court adjudication, the political reporting of the media, and the research and advocacy role of
Agbelengor 5
CSOs (Arthur, 2010; Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014). Arthur (2010), however, highlighted a number of
challenges that needed attention, such as funding constraints that affect democratic performance,
media bias, the rate of political tension and violence in the country, as well as perceived political inter-
ference in constitutional statutory bodies. In another discussion, Botchway (2018) revealed that CSOs
have a favorable influence on Ghana’s democratic consolidation through electoral monitoring, public
advocacy, peacebuilding, civic education, and capacity building. Adams and Asante (2020) examined
postelection disputes in Ghana and comparatively argued that although some postelection conflicts in
Africa have led to mass civil violence, Ghana’s democratic consolidation through conflict resolution is
further deepened by the persistent use of the courts by politicians to settle electoral disputes rather than
resorting to vandalism and violent protest. Graham et al. (2017) further concluded that Ghana’s uphold-
ing of democratic tenets, including the rule of law, a thriving civil society, and the preservation of indi-
vidual liberties, in addition to a free and fair election, also appears to help the country inch toward the
maximalist view on democratic consolidation.
The role of I4P in maintaining peace in Ghana’s constitutional democratic era was also driven by many
exigencies. According to van Tongeren (2011, 2012), Ghana’s I4P formation was affected by the many
intractable community-based and interethnic conflicts in the country. Such was the case with the 1994–
1995 Konkomba–Nanumba armed conflict, which led to human casualties in the 1000s. A study commis-
sioned by Ghana’s Ministry of Interior and cited by van Tongeren (2012) also identified several local con-
flict dynamics that necessitate such a body: “chieftaincy, civil and labour unrest, inter/intra-political party
conflicts, land-, religion-, ethnic/ identity conflicts, minerals and economic resources” (van Tongeren,
2012, p. 95). State judicial processes were sometimes derailed by bureaucracies and regulatory delays.
Successive governments often lacked the political will to enforce the recommendations of the official
Commissions of Inquiry they established to investigate a conflict (van Tongeren, 2011). After the
slaying of the king of Dagbon and about 40 other elders in a chieftaincy succession conflict in 2002, the
failure of state approaches led to the establishment of the Northern Regional Peace Advisory Council, as
well as the Committee of Eminent Chiefs chaired by Ghana’s subnational Ashanti king (“Asantehene”)
in mediation and peace restoration. Following the success of such initiatives, the government, in collabor-
ation with the UNDP and other CSOs, extended the eminent NPC concept to other parts of the country,
leading to the formation of an informal I4P in 2005 (Awinador-Kanyirige, 2014; van Tongeren, 2011).
Odendaal (2010) and Nganje (2021) have distinguished between informal and formal categories of I4P
structures. Informal I4Ps are noted to be less indebted to governmental structures due to their voluntary com-
position and personal interest in peace. They are also viewed as being more flexible and creative in opera-
tions. Yet, they may lack political legitimacy in their operations. The Wajir district initiative is a typical
example of informal I4P that inspired formalization in Kenya. Similarly, in Ghana, Verzat (2014) described
the institutional composition of informal I4P (2005–2011) before the passage of the NPC Act in 2011. This
included peace promotion officers appointed with a full-time role through the Interior Ministry who were
connected to 10 regional peace councils and selected district peace councils. One respondent from the NPC
stated that since the activities of the informal I4P lacked institutional legitimacy, there was no statutory obli-
gation to fund the peacebuilding institution. It was also insufficient to have a single peace promotion officer
in a region with several districts. In terms of remuneration, their paid stipends also primarily came from
outside, sources like the UNDP (Field Interview, Regional Peace Council, June 2021). A peacebuilding
researcher also stated that, without a legal framework, Ghana’s informal I4P was an unsustainable body
of eminent representatives resolving disputes (Field Interview, Academia, June 2021).
Conversely, I4P may be formalized by state recognition, national accord facilitation, legislation, or
other statutory validation. For example, the National Peace Accord in South Africa was used to
form LPCs; Under a 2002 legal framework on Local Self Government, the Committees on
Intercommunity Relations were established in Serbia; and in Sierra Leone, the Political Parties
6 Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 0(0)
Registration Commission established the District Code of Conduct Monitoring Committees (Odendaal,
2010, p. 7). Like in Kenya, the success of the initial Northern Regional Peace Advisory Council model
in Ghana inspired the formation of an informal I4P, which was gradually formalized through an Act of
Parliament (van Tongeren, 2011).
Therefore, the NPC has been given the mandate of facilitating mechanisms for conflict prevention,
management, and resolution as well as fostering enduring peace in the country (Field Interview,
NPC, 2021). The ideal structure is a three-tier architecture at the national, regional, and district levels of
the country. In other words, all 16 current regions and 261 districts in Ghana should have an established
I4P. In practice, however, the headquarters has a Governing Council; a Peacebuilding Support Unit is
within the Interior Ministry; there is an established Peace Fund; and a National Secretariat runs the
Administrative Unit of the NPC. The Governing Council has a 13-member eminent representative with
a 4-year mandate and is eligible for reappointment. Nine representatives are appointed by religious and
traditional institutions in the country, with one member appointed from the Catholic Bishop Conference,
Christian Council, Ghana Pentecostal Council, National Council for Christian and Charismatic Churches,
Ahamadiyya Muslim Mission, Al-sunnah Muslims, Tijanniya Muslim Group, Practitioners of African
Traditional Religion, and National House of Chiefs. The President of Ghana appoints two members at
the national level, with an obligatory female nomination. The remaining two are members nominated by
identifiable groups.1 Although this structure is supposed to be replicated fairly at the subnational levels,
due to budgetary and other human resource and logistical challenges, selected districts have satellite district
peace councils compared to most regions (Verzat, 2014). At the time of the study, a fully constituted
Governing Council of the NPC was assisted by 12 regional peace councils and three satellite district
centers (Field Interview, February–July 2021). A respondent from academia also stated that “another
benefit of the current formal structure is that members of the I4P have become identifiable groups in any
call for institutional accountability”. Hence, successive governments will be obliged by law to work with
the NPC and ensure that the body receives the needed budgetary support for paying remuneration, allow-
ances, and undertaking peacebuilding activities (Field Interview, Academia, June 2021).
Studies by van Tongeren (2011, 2012); Verzat (2014) noted the significance of the NPC and its peace pro-
motion officers in ensuring a peaceful electoral transition in 2008. For instance, a series of proactive meetings
were organized with the ECG, political parties, and other stakeholders. This helped to diffuse tensions, as
necessitated by the narrow margin of less than 50,000 votes between the winner and the loser after a
run-off. These accomplishments also happened when the I4P operated informally. Elsewhere, Alidu and
Braimah (2014) stated that the NPC can deepen peacebuilding and state-building measures to manage chief-
taincy, land, and other ethnic disputes at the local level in light of a formalized I4P. The benefit of formalization
also included its legitimate capacity to co-facilitate the first presidential peace accords in the 2012 election.
Despite what is known, there has been no thorough work in the area of elections since 2012, as in the 2016
and the 2020 elections. The peaceful management of elections deepens Ghana’s democratic consolida-
tion, but a focus on I4P should take cognizance of peacebuilding initiatives. It appears that the present
literature lacks a thorough assessment of peacebuild-
The peaceful management of elections ing initiatives in the context of elections. There are
other questions that remain unanswered, including
deepens Ghana’s democratic
whether the opposition parties’ petitions to Ghana’s
consolidation, but a focus on I4P should Supreme Court disputing the outcomes of the 2012
take cognizance of peacebuilding and 2020 elections damaged the efficacy of the
initiatives. peace accords that the NPC and other partners facili-
tated in both elections? How can we explain the I4P’s
attempts to foster peace in Ghana in light of election disputes? What mechanisms have been facilitated
through the I4P platform to lessen election-related disputes in the country? What are the NPC’s strengths,
limitations, and remedies? These questions are addressed in the remainder of the article.
Agbelengor 7
The I4P Platform in Preelection Peace Accords
As stated in Article 45 of Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, the ECG has a direct responsibility to oversee the
conduct of all forms of public elections in the country. Despite this, the management of peaceful elec-
tions in the country involves the contributions of different state and nonstate actors. But the extent of
such institutional roles in the case of I4P has gained little attention (Alidu & Braimah, 2014). Under a
formalized NPC, there was a proper I4P peacebuilding platform, which led to the facilitation of pre-
election peace accords before the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections. The peace accord concept was
also driven by an effort to reduce political tensions and manage disputes, which have too often led
to pockets of violence in most elections since 1992. Ijon (2020) has also acknowledged lessons on
election-related disputes in other African countries such as Kenya in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2007,
and La Côte d’Ivoire in 2010 among others. With these few examples, the rancorous nature of pol-
itical polarization, intimidation, threats, and postelection disputes resulted in mass civil violence and
democratic reversals. In Ghana, past election records also exposed the challenges of building political
communication, consultation, and dialogue across institutions, political parties, and the public in the
management of a highly polarized and tensed electoral climate that manifests before, during, and after
elections. In terms of transition, the tense atmosphere in 2001 and 2009 provided a stark reminder of
the challenges of managing the postelection situation (Second High-Level Meeting of National
Leaders, 2016,p. 3).
Therefore, the first presidential peace accord, popularly known as the “Kumasi Declaration,” went into
effect on November 27, 2012, just a few days before the sixth national election in Ghana’s Fourth
Republic, normally scheduled for December 7th. With this accord, eight contesting presidential candi-
dates publicly denounced “electoral violence, impunity, and injustice” (Alidu & Braimah, 2014,
p. 180). A respondent from UNESCO Ghana stated that since the Kumasi Declaration represented
the first presidential peace accord in the Fourth Republic: “it became a good reference point for
peace matters in the country, out of which other accords have been predicated.” (Field Interview,
March 2021). Consequently, the 2016 presidential peace accord took place few days before the
election-day, and seven political parties contesting that election signed the accord in Accra, similarly
declaring their commitment to “strengthening Ghana’s democratic stability, peace, and national unity”
(Second High-Level Meeting of National Leaders, 2016, p. 3). Another preelection peace accord orga-
nized few days before the December 7, 2020 election—this time signed by the presidential candidates
of the two leading political parties—was also held in Accra, with a formal commitment on “eradicating
electoral violence in Ghana’s democracy: the role of political leadership” (Concept Note for
Presidential Elections Peace Pact, 2020, p. 1).
Further similarities between the three peace accords can be identified, such as the secondary stake-
holders who convened or witnessed the formal commitment to peace by the primary political
parties. For instance, the 2012 peace accord was facilitated by the NPC through its Chairperson in col-
laboration with the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG), as well as the co-convening role of the
Manhyia Palace led by His Majesty Otumfuo Osei Tutu. Similarly, the NPC and the IDEG utilized the
co-convening roles of the National House of Chiefs and that of the Office of the National Chief Imam in
the 2016 and 2020 peace accords, respectively. The other statesmen who have participated in most of
the accords include former Presidents, sitting Presidents, opposition political candidates, the Chief
Justice; the Inspector-General of Police, chiefs, international observers, the media, and the general
public (Field Interview, February–July 2021). Having provided both financial and technical support to
this initiative, the UNESCO Ghana also stated that the idea of co-convenors in the 2012 accord demon-
strated “the convening power of culture and traditional authority in national development.” In all three
peace accords, the convening roles of the Asantehene, the House of Chiefs, and the Chief Imam, as
well as the presence of the heads of other democratic and security institutions and statesmen, also
8 Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 0(0)
support the argument that democratic consolidation through peaceful elections in Ghana is a shared
responsibility of different stakeholders.2
Despite the aforementioned, the outcomes of the elections in 2012 and 2020, in particular, and the
attendant postelection litigation tend to challenge the effectiveness of peace accords and the consequen-
tial nexus between I4P and democratic consolidation. For instance, although the ECG declared John
Dramani Mahama and the NDC the winners of the December 7, 2012 election with 50.70% of valid
votes cast and a victory margin of more than 300,000, the main opposition candidate Nana
Akufo-Addo and his NPP party contested the results and claimed that the process was flawed by anom-
alies and manipulation. They only formally conceded defeat after losing the case in Ghana’s Supreme
Court (Alidu & Braimah, 2014). Similar to this, in the 2020 election, the incumbent President Nana
Akufo-Addo, who won reelection with 51.30% of the vote and a margin of victory of over 500,000
votes, had his victory confirmed by the Supreme Court following an opposition election petition.
Based on this, Adams and Asante (2020), expressed a favorable response to the role of the courts in
postelection conflict resolution in Ghana. They argued that since many postelection conflicts in
Africa have had dire consequences for its citizens, a few examples being Kenya, Zimbabwe, and La
Côte d’Ivoire, the ability of the courts in Ghana to settle postelection disputes remarkably strengthens
democratic consolidation.
However, proponents of the NPC noted that the rule of lawmandate of the judiciary in dealing with electoral
disputes was vastly different from the mediation mandate of the NPC, whose rationale for co-facilitating
peace accords was based on moral suasion over leaders of political parties using their formal commitments
and the social leverage of eminent personalities and institutions (Field Interview, February–July 2021).
According to the IDEG, the eminent personalities were also carefully chosen to “inspire absolute trust
and confidence of the signatories, and deference to his/her authority” (Concept Note for Presidential
Elections Peace Pact, 2020, p. 2). The religious demographics of Ghana, a country with a total population
of 30.8 million inhabitants in 2021, also support this assertion. For example, the 2021 population and
housing census (urban/rural areas: Christianity, 70.4%/66.9%; Islam, 20.4%/19.2%; Traditional, 0.8%/
6.5%), justifies the NPC’s inter-faith approach to selecting its eminent personalities.3
A conflict management and resolution officer of the NPC also described other institutional relevance of
the peace accord:
We had actors like the Chief Justice in the signing event for strategic reasons. We wanted the head of the
judiciary to also witness the commitment to peace by candidates of competitive elections in the country.
And the judiciary in such occasions have assured of their capability to settle any eventual election disputes
through legal means. The intention was also to morally dissuade the use of vandalism and violent protests
that may destabilize the peace of the country. (Field Interview, NPC, May 2021)
On the contrary, an interview with an official from CSOs stated that although the peace accord ini-
tiative is a good moral signal among supporters of political parties to mitigate immediate political
tension in the country, the signing document has no legal binding on the actions and inactions of pol-
itical parties (Field Interview, CSO, March 2021). Commenting on the same subject, an academic
researcher noted:
...the initiative, which is normally aired on national television, makes minimal contribution to the electoral
process. It is just a funfair to let people know that it is possible for the leadership of political parties to meet,
engage one another, and hug in warm memories. But the lack of proper research assessment of the weight it
carries in shaping the behavior of citizens, makes us describe it as just a symbolic gesture. (Field Interview,
Academia, June 2021)
Agbelengor 9
Nonetheless, a peace accord in Ghana also symbolizes the desire for a peaceful environment
irrespective of pockets of violence, election outcomes, and political disputes partly attributable to
closely contested elections (Alidu & Braimah,
The ability to employ I4P as an 2014). It is also important to distinguish between
the rule of law mandate of the court in relation to
intermediary rather than an adjudicator
election-related disputes and its potential win–
enlightens its contribution to peaceful lose outcome from the underlying assumption of
elections through peace accords. I4P embedded in the NPC’s mandate that requires
the building of bridges among competing parties.
The ability to employ I4P as an intermediary rather than an adjudicator enlightens its contribution
to peaceful elections through peace accords.
The Good Offices of I4P on Election-Day
Election observation was also enhanced through the good offices of the eminent persons of the NPC. It is a
common practice for civil society groups to use this mechanism to mitigate real and potential threats of
violence during elections in Africa. In Ghana’s Fourth Republic, notable observers have been visible in
the country, the Network of Domestic Election Observers, Coalition of Domestic Election Observers,
Civil Society Forum in collaboration with the Center for Democratic Development, Commission on
Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Kofi Annan Peacekeeping and Training Center, and the
West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), including external observers from the African
Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth Observer
Group, and the European Union (EU), among others.4 Based on this, I4P’s contribution, which occurred
during the 2016 and 2020 elections, may not be considered new. However, while the conventional goal of
election observation often renders a postelection assessment, a peace-building approach could manage
peace during the polls. This initial remark is consistent with Lederach’s (2012) claim that, unlike a main-
stream postconflict project, I4P can be effective in a politically tense environment when peacebuilding
initiatives are not limited to one stage of the potential conflict cycle.
The I4P approach to election observation, also called the Election Situation Room (ESR), is part of a
broader WANEP project on building national early warning systems in the West African Subregion
undertaken in partnership with the ECOWAS and the UN Office for the West Africa and Sahel,
with funding from the EU (ESR Preliminary Declaration for Ghana’s National Election, 2020,p. 1).
A WANEP official also stated:
Although the NPC has staff in the regions, they are not enough for this initiative. They also rely on our tech-
nical expertise, funding, and other technologies in the design and operation of the project. With our effort
and other stakeholders in the electoral space, the NPC gets the right information to act. (Field Interview,
WANEP, February 2021)
In terms of operations, the 2016 ESR necessitated the deployment of 750 trained field observers across
the country in an election conducted at 28,992 polling stations. A Central Coordinated ESR was created
in Accra, with satellite ESRs in two regions, Ashanti and the Northern Region, considered key hotspot
regions.5 In the 2020 election, 350 observers were also deployed in 168 prioritized hotspots, utilizing
structured checklists across the 16 regions of the country in an election conducted at 33,367 polling
stations. The deployment was complemented by the National Commission for Civic Education, a
state agency, which deployed observers to cover 2,341 polling stations within 275 constituencies.
A Central Coordinated ESR remained in Accra, whereas the satellite ESRs were in Ho, Tamale, and
Kumasi simultaneously (ESR Preliminary Declaration for Ghana’s National Election, 2020, p. 1).
10 Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 0(0)
A former NPC member also noted that field observers were supplied with mobile phones with an SMS
system linked to coordinators in the ESRs. He summarized the checklists:
The field observers pick up information based on a set of variables we give them… what time did the ballot
papers arrive, what time did they open it, what time did people start voting, were there any skirmishes or
disagreement. (Field Interview, NPC, February 2021)
As a result, the ESRs were positioned as situational analysis platforms that obtained and reviewed data
on the development of polls through internal gathering, analysis, and decision-making, which culmi-
nated with stakeholder communication utilizing the NPC. The usefulness of the ESR through the
I4P platform and the NPC’s capacity in particular was based on the use of their good offices to
resolve identified threats and mitigate their impacts through preventive diplomacy (The ESR
Preliminary Declaration for Ghana’s National Election, 2020,p. 2).
For example, both the 2016 and 2020 elections showed incidents of violent threats, alleged voter
corruption, lack of compliance with agreed and institutionalized electoral rules and procedures,
and other human rights abuses that affected past elections. In the 2020 election, for example, after
a reported gunshot incident in Kasoa was analyzed through the Accra ESR, action was taken
through the decision room of the NPC. Eminent members of the body engaged the parliamentary
candidate to remain calm following the incident. The police commander in the area was also
engaged and assured of their resolve to find the alleged perpetrators and bring them to justice.
A similar incident in the Odododiodio constituency in Accra prompted an engagement
between the NPC and the police on the need to increase police presence in the area. Two reported
incidents regarding the tampering of presidential ballot boxes in Awutu Senya East constituency
and other areas in the Upper West Region also prompted an engagement between the NPC and the
ECG, out of which the ECG indicated an action taken to replace the official and the issuance of a
press release on the matter. Other prompt NPC actions through the ESR system included engage-
ment with the ECG to address the delay in the electoral polls in some areas, follow-up on the ver-
acity of alleged malpractices and other viral social media allegations bordering on national
security, and the deployment of members of the eminent groups to mediate in reportedly
tensed and marginalized areas (ESR Preliminary Declaration for Ghana’s National Election,
2020, pp. 3–6).
Local and foreign observers have both participated in Ghana’s elections since 1992. However,
given the dominance of Ghanaian institutions in the ESR system, it is imperative to describe the
profound nature of domestic observers in I4P conceptions. The above actions support the assertion
by Wehr and Lederach (1991) about some advantages that insiders have over outsiders due to their
in-depth knowledge of local political dynamics and established intermediary relationships with electoral
localities. However, Oquaye (1995) and Boahen (1995) argued that election observation in Ghana
cannot be a comprehensive mechanism for determining a free, fair, transparent, and peaceful election, in
part because the number of observers deployed is frequently much lower than the number of polling
places where the actual election was held. In the 2020 election, the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted
in lockdowns, physical isolation, and restrictions on public movement, also had an impact on the few obser-
vers deployed. In this context, Berger et al. (2020) indicated the negative impact of global pandemics on
electoral democracies, which partly explains the limits of election observation during pandemic times.
Another unsustainable issue is the general challenge of financial independence in election administration
in Africa, and the NPC’s reliance on the ESR of WANEP and, consequently, external funding. There
are other awful incidents that mar Ghana’s advances in democracy. For instance, the 2020 election wit-
nessed eight human casualties that were directly tied to the election, in addition to other pockets of violence
and injuries attributed to sporadic gunshots in certain constituencies.6
Agbelengor 11
In light of this, an I4P strategy for peacebuilding based on election observation is insufficient to address
the tense nature of Ghana’s elections before, during,
I4P should be seen to complement the and after the polls. Since the management of peaceful
elections includes the actions of other major stake-
management of peaceful elections rather holders like political parties, the ECG, and the secur-
than substituting the responsibility of ity agencies, these actors should be more responsive
primary electoral stakeholders. and patriotic in their activities. I4P should be seen to
complement the management of peaceful elections
rather than substituting the responsibility of primary electoral stakeholders.
I4P Policy Dialogue After Electoral Violence
A 2019 televised by-election violence linked to political vigilantism prompted a number of remedies in Ghana,
particularly a commission of inquiry, legislation, and I4P dialogue. This was not the first by-election in the
Fourth Republic to be marred by violence. In 2009, the Chereponi by-election won by the then-ruling
NDC also witnessed alleged state security violence. In 2010, the Atiwa by-election was won by the
then-opposition NPP, but the mayhem at the polling station and violence were alleged to have been caused
by national security operatives and party vigilante groups (Ijon, 2020). Following the death of a sitting
Member of Parliament (MP) in the Ayawaso-West Wuogon Constituency in the Greater Accra Region, the
ECG by law organized a by-election, which was slated for January 31, 2019. Over an hour into voting,
chaotic scenes occurred at the La Bawalashie Presbyterian School voting center, with armed men posing as
national security personnel attacking persons believed to be NDC agents, including a sitting MP for
Ningo-Prampram, Sam George. While citing the violent incident as its reason, the opposition NDC pulled
out of that election. The ECG nonetheless continued the polls, resulting in a victory for the incumbent NPP.7
To mitigate the widely condemned incident, the government established a three-member commission
popularly named after its chairman as “Emile Short Commission” to investigate and make recommen-
dations on the incident in accordance with Article 278 of the 1992 Constitution. The report of the com-
mission was delivered to the President on March 14, 2019. The government also initiated the
Vigilantism and Related Offences Law 2019 (Act 999), criminalizing acts of vigilantism in all their
forms.8 Subsequently, a government white paper was issued on the report with a Gazette notification
on September 13, 2019. The white paper rejected some recommendations of the commission’s report,
such as revising security system reporting and police recruitment, but acknowledged the presence of
political hooliganism and the need to prosecute perpetrators. 9
The NPC subsequently facilitated a formal dialogue after the by-election violence involving the NDC
and the NPP, with the support of other national and international partners. The successful dialogue gen-
erated a policy framework for disbanding political vigilante groups, prohibiting their association with
party activities, and collaborating with state agencies to eliminate their role in electoral violence.
After initial concerns and disagreements, both the NDC and the NPP accented to the implementation
of the policy (Roadmap and Code of Conduct for the Eradication of Political Vigilantism in Ghana,
2020, p. 3). For instance, interviews with NPC members indicated the active participation of some pol-
itical youth groups at the local level in the sensitization efforts of the NPC to discourage the use of pol-
itical vigilantism to cause mayhem in the 2020 election (Field Interview, NPC, February–July 2021).
Similarly, an official from the Ghana Center for Democratic Development indicated how CSOs comple-
mented the NPC’s efforts by facilitating a ball game initiative in some hotspot constituencies targeted at
the youth to explain the need to avoid political vigilantism. Participants played the game together, which
aimed to orient them on the apprehensive clauses in the law for vigilantism perpetrators and the need to
promote dialogue and mediation, and potentially prevent violence (Field Interview, CSOs, March 2021).
12 Journal of Peacebuilding & Development 0(0)
While the 2020 election was conducted peacefully across the country, a few constituencies were chal-
lenged by intimidation and harassment by national security operatives; unauthorized persons at some
polling stations; gunshots around polling and collation centers; and destruction and theft of electoral
materials, among others.10 Therefore, such direct interventions to curb political vigilantism could be
regarded as inadequate to prevent the level of tension and violence in isolated constituencies. This may
be partly attributed to the challenge of implement-
While political parties are divided by their ing the complete policy framework of the roadmap,
quest for political power, an I4P platform which requires the additional responsibility of
other governmental and nongovernmental stake-
that achieves policy consensus strengthens holders in achieving other maximalist democratic
the value of intermediary peacebuilders. issues in the context of building sustainable peace
(Graham et al., 2017). However, the role of the
NPC in this context also supports the claim that the interest in I4P evolved in Ghana in part due to
the absence of political will in conflict resolution (van Tongeren, 2011). The standard of I4P on dia-
logue and noncoercion is also fundamentally different from the state’s prioritizing of order, security,
and coercion (Mac Ginty, 2011). In a polarized political environment, the ability to assemble political
parties to mediate in order to find a solution to a contentious issue is a significant dividend for the
Ghanaian I4P. While political parties are divided by their quest for political power, an I4P platform
that achieves policy consensus strengthens the value of intermediary peacebuilders.
Concluding Remarks
The findings confirm that Ghana’s I4P is productive before, during, and after electoral manifesta-
tions (Lederach, 2012). This provides the basis to identify some strengths and contributions. First,
Ghana’s formalized I4P provides the NPC with legitimacy and sustainability, which is consistent
with a notable I4P notion on long-term internal peacebuilding structures (Lederach, 1997). Second,
the eminent good offices and inter-faith leadership within the NPC strengthen the significance of
local, customary, and traditional peacebuilding in a polarized environment. Third, though
limited, regional and satellite district peace councils can support local inclusion, while the NPC
manages national peacebuilding affairs (Mac Ginty, 2011). Fourth, the role of operational partner-
ships in the NPC’s activities bridges its human and financial capacity limitations. Overall, these
strengths add to the existing literature on conflict transformation, where mid-level leaders are
central to building sustainable peace because of their intermediary significance between top-level
actors and the grassroots (Kovács, 2019; Lederach, 1997).
Despite these strengths, concerns have been expressed about the NPC’s presence in governmental struc-
tures, including the Interior Ministry, which is headed by a political appointee of the President of Ghana. At
the subnational level, regional peace council offices could be located within governmental regional coord-
inating council buildings. The unambiguous legal provision on the independence of the NPC and the prac-
tice of I4P in Ghana partly refutes the perception of political manipulation. However, another hurdle is the
budgetary allocation to the NPC from the Interior Ministry. Significantly, in October 2021, the implemen-
tation of clause 20 in the NPC Act led to the launch of a peace fund. Since the fund legitimizes voluntary
contributions from local and international sources, I further argue that the NPC’s significance and its ability
to facilitate peacebuilding projects will be further tested by the prudent management of the funds to par-
ticularly address emergent conflict situations.
Finally, scholars and policymakers should focus on the I4P’s partnership potentials to deepen electoral
civic education and consensus building, improve professional security and journalism, curtail the pro-
liferation of small arms and light weapons, and facilitate the efforts around the distribution of economic
and social resources to conflict- and crisis-affected communities.
Agbelengor 13
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article: This work was supported by the Baden-Württemberg Stiftung, Social Science Research Council.
ORCID iD
Samson Confidence Agbelengor https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0266-7610
Notes
1. Republic of Ghana. (2011). The Ghana National Peace Council Act 818. Accra: Parliament of the Republic of
Ghana, 1–5.
2. UNESCO Supports Peace Pact on Violence-Free Elections in Ghana. (December 7, 2012) Accessed August
8th, 2023, https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/unesco-supports-peace-pact-violence-free-elections-ghana.
3. Ghana (2021) Population and Housing Census Volume 3, General Report from the Ghana Statistical Service,
published February 2022, Retrieved August 9, 2023, from https://census2021.statsghana.gov.gh/gssmain/
fileUpload/reportthemelist/Volume%203%20Highlights.pdf
4. WANEP report. (December 17, 2020). Retrieved August 17, 2021, from Electoral Violence and Monitoring,
Analysis and Mitigation, Election Situation Room December 7th, 2020, Presidential and Parliamentary
Elections in Ghana: https://www.wanep.org/wanep/files/2020/Dec/Final_Preliminary_Declaration_-_ESR_
17-12-2020.pdf
5. WANEP report, (March 2017). Retrieved August 17, 2021, from The Coordinated Election Situation Room
(ESR) for Ghana 2016 General Elections: http://www.wanep.org/wanep/files/2017/mar/rp_coordinated_ESR_
Ghana_.pdf;
6. Ghana Business News (December 19, 2020), Retrieved on August 11, 2020 at https://www.ghanabusinessnews.
com/2020/12/19/eight-people-killed-during-ghana-2020-elections-police/
7. WANEP, Situation Updates of the Ayawaso West Wuogon By-Election Violence. (January 31, 2019), https://
wanep.org/wanep/files/2019/Feb/Final_Quick_Update-Ayawaso_By-Election_01-02-20191.pdf
8. NPC (2020) Roadmap and Code of Conduct for the Eradication of Political Vigilantism in Ghana. Retrieved
August 17, 2021, from National Peace Council: https://www.peacecouncil.gov.gh/wp-content/uploads/2020/
07/Roadmap-Code-of-Conduct.pptx
9. Government white paper on the report of the Commission of inquiry in the Ayawaso-West Wuogon events. (2019)
Retrieved on August 11, 2023 on https://starrfm.com.gh/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/WHITE-PAPAER-FINAL.pdf
10. Coalition of Domestic Election Observers. (December 8, 2020). Reports. Retrieved June 7, 2022, from Coalition of
Domestic Election Observers: https://codeoghana.org/assets/downloadables/CODEO%20Preliminary%20Report%
20on%20the%202020%20General%20Elections_8%20December%202020%20FINAL%20VERSION.pdf
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