"LA MIGRATION, C'EST UNE TRADITION, C'EST UNE MODE DE VIE": THE NIGERIEN MIGRANTS ON THE STREETS OF ACCRA.

BY

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DECLARATION

I Ishmael Boampong Osei do hereby declare that this thesis is the result of my research work, conducted at the Department of Sociology, University of Ghana, Legon, under the joint supervision of Prof. Akosua K. Darkwah and Prof. Steve Tonah. All references have been duly acknowledged and all errors found in this work are solely mine. I also declare that as far as I know, this thesis has not been published nor presented to any academic institution for an academic award.

17th December, 2021

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

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ABSTRACT

The presence of Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra confirms the idea that south-south migration is prominent on the African continent. It also presents a case of international migration for begging as a form of economic mobility outside formal labour markets yet within the framework of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. Drawing on 21 in-depth interviews and informal conversations with participants from the Accra mall area and Sabon Zongo in Accra, this study examines the distinctive form of migration for begging amongst the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra as part of intra-regional migration flows in West Africa. Data were analysed within the framework of the Push-Pull Plus model and the culture of migration with themes generated accordingly.

My findings show that following the 1970s and the 1980s drought in Niger and other parts of the Sahel region, and the various Tuareg rebellions that have happened between that time and now in Niger and Mali, racially white Tuareg migrants, in particular, have been drawn to Ghana. Over the years, these Tuareg migrants have developed a culture of migration for begging in Ghana. This is because Ghana is a politically stable country with democratic provisions that allow the Tuareg migrants some rights and freedoms. The political and economic freedoms afforded the Tuareg migrants in Ghana match their economic interests. This international migration for begging amongst the Tuaregs in Accra is engendered by the fact that begging is a common phenomenon in Ghana's Zongo communities, which are usually the first places of residence for the Tuareg migrants in Accra. These, coupled with the fact that there is a somewhat lax approach to the implementation of laws on begging in Ghana as compared to other countries in the sub-region where the Tuareg migrants report negative experiences with the law enforcement agencies, make begging a favourable means to income generation amongst the Tuareg migrants.

Furthermore, the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra, albeit foreigners in another country, are not totally cut off the Ghanaian society. Although they prefer residential segregation, there are nonetheless aspects of their living arrangements that have traces of Ghanaian societies.

DEDICATION

To my friends:

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CBD	Central Business District
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
G C H C	Gold Coast Hausa Constabulary
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GLSS	Ghana Living Standards Survey
ID	Identification
IFI	International Financial Institution
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
STC	State Transport Company
SUV	Sports Utility Vehicle
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

CHAPTER ONE

TUAREG MIGRANTS IN ACCRA: A REFLECTION OF MIGRATION IN AFRICA?

1.0 Introduction

> On the foot walk near the Accra Mall and in many other parts of the bustling city of Accra, there is the now familiar sight of little children who should be in school, instead chasing after cars and following pedestrians to importune them for money. We sometimes see the parents sitting afar of [sic] beckoning the children to continue their begging. Sometimes, we see mothers with helpless babes in arms begging in traffic. A few years back they looked amusing, speaking the little local dialect they managed to pick up. Presently, some use abusive words if you do not oblige them. Often, the children, persistent through practice, hold on to you until you give them money. You can see some of them running alongside the cars as they drive off from traffic stops. One may ask, who are these people? Where do they come from? Why are they here? (Donyina, 2019:1)

The presence of these migrants on the streets of Accra affirms the notion that the historical and contemporary experience in Africa is heavily characterized by migration (de Bruijn, van Dijk and Foeken, 2001). Across all countries on the continent, there are accounts of various forms of migration for reasons such as pastoralism, conflicts, natural disasters, trade, and labour (Arthur 1991; Tonah 2002; Adepoju 2003, Bukari and Schareika 2015). Adepoju (2019) explains that people that embark on these movements can be categorized into "temporary cross-border workers, unskilled and temporary contract workers, traders, undocumented migrants, highly skilled professionals, and refugees" (p.2).

The various sub-regions within the continent are, however, different in terms of the forms of migrations that dominate in these places. Western and Central Africa are noted for intra-regional labour migration, as are the developed countries in the global North and the Middle Eastern oil-producing nations. They are also noted for the cross-border migration of nomads seeking food and water for their livestock. The Eastern part of Africa is mostly characterized

by refugee flows. Crush, Williams, and Peberdy (2005) observe that the Southern African countries are also noted for labour migration to South Africa. The Northern parts of Africa are noted for movements of citizens to Western and Southwestern European countries. This, de Haas (2008) posits, is a result of Northern African countries' colonial ties with countries like France and Spain and also selective labour recruitment by the various receiving European countries.

Recent scholarship on migration on the continent, however, has largely focused on the international migration of Africans especially those in the sub-Saharan region to the developed world. Especially with respect to the most recent migration crisis in Europe, headlines such as "Europe is trying to cut the flow of migrants from Africa. It won't be easy" (Sieff, 2017); "Africa's media silent over the Mediterranean refugee crisis" (Africa media silent, 2015); "At least a million sub-Saharan Africans moved to Europe since 2010" (At least a million, 2018), amongst several others provide a one-sided view of migratory patterns on the African continent. de Haas (2005) and Adepoju (2019) contend that the least known fact about the migratory patterns of African populations is that most migration in Africa continues to take place on the continent rather than out of the continent. In West Africa, for instance, Adepoju (2019) reports that 80 percent of migration takes place within West Africa. The figure is slightly reduced but still relatively high in East Africa where there is a record of about 60 percent of intra-regional migration.

In Ghana, the presence of African migrants is not a new phenomenon. Adepoju (2003) explains that Ghana and Côte' d'Ivoire have long been major destination points for many migrants in the sub-region. He recounts that the "gold coast" era of Ghana for instance meant that it was the "go-to" country for thousands of people from Togo, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. As Cardinal

noted, Nigeria in particular had the largest number of migrants in the country in 1931 (Cardinall as cited in Aremu and Ajayi, 2014).

In the 1970s, however, Ghana experienced a period of political instability as a result of the various coup d'états of 1966, 1972 and 1979. The mismanagement of the nation's resources and corruption allegations attached to these regimes led to an economic decline in Ghana. The deteriorating economic situation of Ghana coincided with Nigeria's discovery of oil leading to the subsequent burgeoning oil industry. The change in fortune of Nigeria spurred growth in other sectors of its economy and therefore it started to attract many migrants across the sub-region (Adepoju, 2005). Tonah (2007) indicates that Ghanaians, both skilled and unskilled, moved to Nigeria during this period in search of greener pastures as a result of fallen living standards in Ghana. Indeed, the histories of Ghana and Nigeria in terms of migration are characterized by periods of either of the two countries being a receiving or a sending country depending on the economic situation in the other country.

Nigerians, Togolese, Burkinabe, and other labour migrants from the sub-region are not the only known types of migrants from the sub-region to have moved to Ghana. The commencement of the Liberian civil war in 1989 saw the arrival of many displaced Liberians in Ghana. As a response, the Ghanaian government established the Buduburam refugee camp to absorb these refugees (Essuman-Johnson, 2007). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) confirmed in June 2012 that Liberians' refugee status has ended worldwide (UNHCR, 2012). Many Liberians living in Ghana were forced to return home as a result of this decision. Despite this, some 7,000 Liberians stayed in Ghana and continued to live in exile under the new Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) migrants' classification (Omata, 2016).

The recent clashes on May 4, 2021 between Fulani pastoralists and indigenous Ghanaians over access to and control over land and other resources may suggest that their presence in the country is a recent phenomenon[1](Man Killed 5 injured, 2021). However, Tonah (2002) shows that since the 20th century, Fulani pastoralists in West Africa, prompted by the dry and rainy seasons, had to seasonally move from their Sahel regions to the savanna zone due to differences in environmental conditions. The number of those moving to and eventually settling in these "green" zones increased in the 1960s and 1970s due to the drought that affected the Sahelian region consequently destroying the land, soil, and environmental conditions in the area. The Northern parts of Ghana particularly became a hotspot for these Fulani pastoralists because aside from other factors like the control of diseases and the availability of veterinary professionals to meet the health needs of the animals, the Fulani migrants were able to establish relationships with the Ghanaian locals based on reciprocity (Tonah, 2000).

The answer to Donyina's (2019) questions of who the migrants described in the opening vignette are and where they come from, is quite simple to ascertain. You only have to ask them where they come from after giving them a Cedi or two on the streets, and they would willingly give you the answer. They are Tuaregs mostly from the Tillabéri region of Niger and other parts of Mali. They are neither labour migrants, refugees, nor Fulani pastoralists, which are usually the categorizations of international migrants from the sub-Saharan region in Ghana.

But why are they here? In this study, I extend the discussions on the subject of the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra by adding to the question of why they are here. The fact that it is very easy to find out who these people are but as observed by Donyina (2019), they are

[1] See also Daily Graphic (2017). https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/nine-killed-in-clash-between-fulani-herdsmen-and-farmers.html

mostly mistaken for Somalis and Chadians, affirms the fact that although physically present in Ghana, knowledge of the Tuareg migrants is close to zero.

In her work, Donyina (2019) envisaged that answers to her questions would throw more light on the legal categorization of these migrants to ensure that the right policies are enacted to regulate their activities. Sociology, however, seeks to scientifically uncover the various explanations for any given human action. Therefore, my interest lies in the social causes of this particular phenomenon. In answering the question of why they are here, I want to know the social or cultural factors in their countries of origin and Ghana that necessitated their movements. Also, I want to know how are they integrated into Ghanaian society and what informs their decisions to adopt begging as a livelihood strategy.

1.1 Problem Statement

Several calls have been made for attention to be paid to south-south migration on the African continent. Although begging as a phenomenon has received scholarly attention globally (Duneier, 1999; Asante, 2006; Kassah, 2008; Diop 2010), migration for begging as a phenomenon is a relatively unresearched area. The known studies conducted on the subject are in the context of the Roma living in Scandinavian countries (Djuve et al.,2014). In Ghana, there is a growing interest in issues relating to Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. This can be seen from short videos and documentaries on YouTube by bloggers and established Ghanaian media houses[2]. There is, however, little scholarly attention paid to this phenomenon.

[2] One Ghana TV (2019) and CitiTube (2019)

This study, therefore, seeks to contribute to the knowledge gap in the area of south-south migration by focusing on the unique form of mobilities as evident in the lives of the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra.

1.2 Research Objectives

The overall aim of this study is to explore the phenomenon of migration for begging amongst the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra.

1.2.1 Specific Research Objectives

1. To investigate the factors in the country of origin that prompt the decision to migrate.
2. To find reasons that make Ghana their preferred choice of host country.
3. To find out why begging has become a common livelihood strategy amongst these Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra.
4. To explore the extent to which these migrants are integrated into Ghanaian society.
5. To understand what imagined futures these migrants have constructed and how their presence in Ghana contributes to that.

1.2.2 Research Questions

The research questions for the study are based on the three main themes explored in this study- motivation for migration, aspiration of these migrants, and their integration into Ghanaian society.

1. What factors in the country of origin prompt the decision to migrate?
2. Why is Ghana the preferred choice destination?

3. Why has begging become a common livelihood strategy amongst the Tuareg migrant?
4. To what extent are they involved in the Ghanaian socio-cultural fabric?
5. What futures do they envisage as migrants and how does their presence in Ghana foster these ambitions?

1.3 Definition of Terms

1.3.1 Tuareg Migrants

In this study, a Tuareg migrant refers to all Tuaregs who trace their origins from Niger or other countries in the Sahel region but have moved to Ghana voluntarily or are forced to move from their countries to Ghana as a result of natural disasters, conflicts, or any other unfortunate incidence which threaten their survival in their countries of origin. It also includes all children born in Ghana to parents who fall in the category of a Tuareg migrant as employed in this study.

1.3.2 Begging

Begging as employed in this study refers to the act of imploring others with no obligation to grant a favour, often a gift of money or material things by persons who claim to be needy. The study will take both the passive and aggressive forms of begging into consideration.

1.3.2.1 Passive Begging

Passive begging is the form of begging in which a request is made gently without threat or malice, or sometimes with an outstretched container as a gesture of solicitation with no words uttered at all (Asante, 2006).

1.3.2.2 Aggressive Begging

Aggressive begging is a form of begging where the passerby is harassed with loud and persistent demands even after refusal.

1.3.3 Migration for Begging

The concept of Migration for begging is borrowed from Friberg's (2020) description of the phenomenon amongst the Roma in Scandinavian countries. In this study, however, it is employed to depict movements whether forced or voluntary into Ghana as a form of economic mobility outside formal labour markets in Ghana, and yet within the framework of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. This definition is helpful because it will bring out the differences in the various types of Tuareg migrants that are present in Ghana. For instance, skilled professionals from Niger working in Ghana's formal labour market in various capacities or as Foreign Service Officers in Niger's foreign mission in Ghana will not form part of the study.

1.4 Significance of the study

The significance of this study is that it fills the gap in the literature on the presence of Tuareg migrants in Ghana. This importance is manifested in two ways.

First, the study provides a general understanding of Tuareg migrants in Ghana. It does this by highlighting the nature of their migratory patterns and their experiences on the streets of Accra. The thesis also serves as a point of reference for future studies on Tuareg migrants in Ghana and the West African sub-region at large.

1.5 Conceptual framework

1.5.1 Introduction

This section highlights the framework of theories and concepts that help explain the phenomenon of Tuaregs migrants begging on the streets of Accra. The various theories or concepts are generally described. Their specific use in explaining the phenomenon of migration for begging as evident amongst the Tuareg migrants in Accra are also outlined. In this study, Van Hear, Bakewell and Long's (2018) "push-pull plus" framework is extensively adopted to explain the drivers for migration amongst the Tuareg migrant. An intersection of Kandel and Massey's (2002) Culture of Migration, Park's (1928) Marginal man theory and Goffman's (1963) stigma is applied to shed more light on street life amongst the Tuareg migrant and to appreciate why begging over the years is the preferred means for surviving on the streets of Accra.

1.5.2 Drivers of Migration: Push-Pull Plus Model

Originally developed in 2012, the push-pull plus model is an extension of the functionalist "gravitational" models and "migration laws" prominent from the late 19th century through to the second half of the 20th century. Popularly referred to as "push-pull" models, they stress economic, environmental, and demographic factors as reasons behind movements from one's place of origin to another place of destination (de Haas, Castles and Miller, 2020). They are simplistic because the emphasis is on all those factors that affect migration decisions. Where it is limited, however, is in its ability to explain the roles of these outlined factors and how they interact to cause population movements. Therefore, one may miss the intricacies of migration

evident across cultures when the phenomenon is viewed through the lenses of push-pull models.

Migration is a complex phenomenon. So, the various factors that cause people to move from one place to another should not be studied in isolation. There is a need to focus on the complexities of these factors in determining the inception of migration decisions and how they are perpetuated (Massey and Parrado, 1998). The push-pull plus model, therefore, fills the gaps usually associated with the push-pull models by proposing a framework that combines those structural forces that drive migration. The major thesis for the push-pull plus framework is that the various drivers of migration interact to create the structural conditions that inform people's migration decisions (Van Hear et al., 2018).

Drivers of migration are referred to as those forces external of the individuals that affect their migration decisions (Van Hear et al., 2018). At a glance, it appears the push-pull plus model places migration decision-making in the realm of the structural forces at the expense of individual motivations and aspirations. This particular viewpoint suggests that there is a dichotomous relationship between the structure and agency of individuals in determining migration decisions. This is not the case as individual aspirations and desires are usually set in contexts such as the history and culture of the society in which the individual is located, economic and political factors that affect social life and, in some cases, environmental factors that bring about social changes. The drivers for migration are thus the structural factors that facilitate or obstruct an individual's ability to exercise agency in migration decisions.

In the push-pull plus framework, four sets of drivers are identified. These are predisposing, proximate, precipitating and mediating drivers.

Predisposing drivers are explained as those external factors that create an enabling environment for migration. Taken in isolation these predisposing drivers may not influence movements. However, their interaction with other factors would increase the likelihood of migration. For instance, differences in environmental conditions in two places may cause members of the region with less favourable conditions to think of migration as a solution for improved living conditions. These environmental differences may not be the actual stimuli for migration because, with advancements in science and technology, a given society facing harsh environmental conditions may be able to turn its situation without having members of the community move from one place to another.

Proximate drivers have a greater influence on migration. In the aforementioned example, migration would be highly probable if the disparities in environmental conditions are combined with dire economic situations for instance in the place of origin as against improved economic conditions in another place. A case in point is where a lot of Ghanaians migrated to Nigeria in the 1970s due to the deteriorating economic situation coupled with political instabilities vis-a-vis Nigeria's discovery of oil leading to the subsequent burgeoning oil industry (Tonah, 2007). A combination of economic and political factors, which are in themselves predisposing factors to the extent that they had become acute, are now working as proximate drivers of migration.

Precipitating drivers are those that prompt movement. This is where individuals or households decide to move. They are usually associated with particular events. Examples are natural disasters, an outbreak of war and financial crises. Relaxed migration laws or increased demand for labour in another country can be the precipitating drivers that pull migrants to that country.

Mediating drivers are those structures available in society that can either foster or inhibit migration. In and of themselves, they are not exclusively associated with migration but they are needed to ensure that migration is possible. Quality transport systems, for instance, are provided to ensure easy commuting of people from one place to another. The end is not to promote migration but without transport services, an individual who has decided to migrate to another country may find it difficult to do so. Thus, quality transport services are mediating factors that can either facilitate or obstruct migration.

This study benefits from the push-pull plus model because it provides a framework to discuss the inception of migration, the implementation of migration decisions, and the sustenance of mobilities amongst the Tuareg migrants. Tuareg migration can be attributed to a complexity of factors. Thus, the simplistic nature of the push-pull model would not do justice to the phenomenon.

1.5.3 Towards a Culture of Migration

Societies with a long history of migration over time develop new sets of values and cultural orientations that are influenced by earlier migratory experiences (Massey et al., 1993). This is what is termed a culture of migration. Horváth (2008) argues that three major interpretations can be derived from this definition. These three interpretations or meanings are adopted in this study to understand the phenomenon of migration amongst the Tuaregs on the streets of Accra and why begging in particular has become the adopted survival strategy.

The first interpretation of the "culture of migration" identified is the fact that migration becomes a constant feature in the culture of particular sending regions. The focus here is not only on the fact that a particular society becomes characterised by constant mobilities. It also takes into consideration those tangible and intangible aspects of a society's culture that are

starkly affected by migration and therefore affects decision-making processes (Massey et al., 1994). These cultural components are observable but can also be subtle in terms of their effects on people in a given society. Kleist's (2017:327) description of a town in what used to be the Brong-Ahafo region of Ghana heavily influenced by migration is an example of a society characterized by a culture of migration.

> While many townhouses are dilapidated, with old structures and tin roofs, there are a number of big houses in bright colours as well as smart hotels, almost all built by migrant money from Europe, North America or, sometimes, Libya. Similarly, the orientation to the outside world is visible in the names given to shops and spots (small food or drinking places), such as Ben Ghazi Cold Shop, Washington Spot, Cambridge International Secondary School, Napoli Furniture, Great Jamahiriya Hardware Store, and FC Barcelona Sports Bar. Visiting or returning migrants driving fancy cars, donating huge amounts of money to churches, or generally showing wealth is also widely seen as 'proof' that migration is a potentially profitable and relatively fast way out of the destitute life that would otherwise await most people in town with little education and/or demanding family responsibilities.

In some cases, studies have shown how returnees after experiencing changes in orientation in their host countries, return with new ideas that sometimes are in contestation with the old ways of doing things in the place of origin (Horváth, 2008).

The second meaning of "culture of migration" is related to the various belief and value systems that are likely to be brought about by a society characterized by enduring migration. Over time a society where migration is common develops different interpretations of the phenomenon of migration and migrants in general. In Ghana, for instance, migration is well-liked. Literature on internal migration from the northern part of Ghana to the southern part is vast (Hashim, 2005; Van Der Geest, 2010; Pickbourn, 2011, Abdulai, 2016). The same can be said about international migration (Kabki, Mazzucato and Appiah, 2004; Mazzucato, 2008; Nieswand, 2014; Wong, 2014). Especially with international migration, some go as far as fasting for days

for a visa application (Sackey, 2006). The term "Borga[3]" has over the years become a marker for success, wealth and good living. Therefore, comments from participants, like the one immediately below, will only go a long way to ensure that the valorised status of a "borga" in society remains intact:

> As I said, I am 38 years old. I spent 2 and a half years in Libya. The rest of my years I spent in Ghana. I couldn't acquire anything in the years spent in Ghana but the two years I spent in Libya helped me to build the house that I'm in currently. I've been in Ghana for the past two years but I don't even have GHS1000 [roughly $200] to show for it. Over there I was making GHS3000 [roughly $600] every month. Therefore, I've seen that the benefit derived from my migration to Libya was good. In view of this, I look forward to enjoying more benefits when I migrate again. (Darkwah, 2019:15)

In comparison with traditional economic activities like farming and fishing, members of a society characterized by a culture of migration can experience a lack of motivation to engage in these traditional activities. This is because to the extent that migration is viewed as beneficial, immediately after individuals in such societies raise enough funds, they would move to their desired places of destination. Studies on the subject of rural-urban migration from the northern to the southern parts of Ghana have shown that even in instances where the young migrants are provided with farm implements and some form of capital to engage in some farming activities in the north, they still run away to the urban centres in Accra and Kumasi (Pickbourn, 2011; Agyei, Kumi and Yeboah, 2016; Teye et al., 2017).

The third interpretation of "culture of migration" is when migration becomes a symbol deep-seated in the culture of a particular society. Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994) argue that in some cases migration can become the prime symbol for transition into adulthood, akin to a rite of passage. Studies by Monsutti (2007), Castle and Diara (2003) and Conrad Suso (2020)

[3] "A reference to Hamburg where many Ghanaian migrants to Germany in the 1980s settled and a term now used in reference to international migrants" (Darkwah et al., 2019:14).

demonstrate how migration has become a rite of passage in Afghanistan, Mali and Gambia respectively.

In effect "the essence of the culture-of-migration argument is that non-migrants observe migrants to whom they are socially connected and seek to emulate their migratory behaviour" (Kandel and Massey, 2002: 983).

In this study, the culture of migration is adopted to help explain why begging over the years has become the adopted survival strategy amongst Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. It also throws more light on their actions and inaction in relation to their integration into Ghanaian society.

1.5.4 On the Margins of Society: The marginal man

Park's (1928) classic, *The Marginal Man* is adopted to explain the experiences of the Tuareg migrant on the streets of Accra. Although it has been refined, extended and reviewed by several scholars over the years, in this study, its application is sourced from its original interpretation. "The marginal man…is one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely different but antagonistic cultures…his mind is the crucible in which two different and refractory cultures may be said to melt and, either wholly or in part, fuse" (Park 1928:4).

The marginal man is especially useful when discussing the extent to which the Tuareg migrant is integrated into Ghanaian society.

1.5.5 Stigma

In all societies, some conform to expectations of normal behaviour. Some also fall short of these societal standards. The latter are those Goffman (1963) refers to as the stigmatised in society. The stigma attached to these individuals can either be discreditable or discredited.

Discreditable stigma is where the stigma exists, but has not yet come to the attention of the public. Discredited stigma, on the other hand, is in the full glare of the public eye. Beggars have discredited stigma. This is because their actions are generally not considered to be in harmony with societal expectations. However, the religious underpinnings of begging activities, especially amongst Muslim societies like Northern Nigeria (Usman, 2008) and the Talibés of Senegal (Diop, 2015; Zoumanigui, 2016), may suggest that beggars having discredited stigma varies from society to society.

Nonetheless, the call for the abolishment of this phenomenon by members of these Islamic societies goes a long way to support the claim that all societies frown on begging because their actions are against what is considered "normal" (Goffman 1963). The Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra have discredited stigma because their actions which are frowned upon in Ghana are conspicuous. Stigma is applied when discussing the begging activities of Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. Other strategies for survival as migrants living on the margins of Ghanaian society would also be better understood when viewed through the lens of stigma.

1.6 Summary of Thesis Chapters

The subsequent chapters comprise of the literature review, methodology, three empirical chapters, and a conclusion. Each of the three empirical chapters focuses on a part of the objectives of the study. Therefore chapter five looks at the factors in the country of origin that prompt the decision to migrate and the reasons that make Ghana their preferred choice of destination country. The fifth chapter investigates the reasons why begging has become a common livelihood strategy amongst these Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. Finally, the sixth chapter focuses on the lives of Tuareg migrants in Accra and understanding what

imagined futures these migrants have constructed and how their presence in Ghana contributes to that.

1.6.1 Chapter Two: Migration is a tradition; it is a way of life.

In this chapter, existing literature on Tuareg society in the Sahel region is reviewed. In order to put the social transformation of the Tuareg society into perspective, a historical account of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Tuareg society is provided. Furthermore, I explore the nature of migration within the West African sub-region through the lens of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement. The chapter also examines the concept of "Zongo" in Ghana and its association with Tuareg immigration to Accra in particular.

1.6.2 Chapter Three: Doing Research Amongst Tuareg Migrants In Accra

This chapter focuses on the research design that was used for the study. This includes the procedures used to collect data as well as the study sites and selection of participants. I also discuss the qualitative approaches that were used, as well as how the data was handled and analyzed using the Thematic Network Analysis method. Furthermore, the chapter looks at the ethical considerations involved in acquiring research permissions and clearances, as well as the ethics of my interactions with the participants and the challenges involved in the study.

1.6.3 Chapter Four: From The Desert To The Gold Coast: International Migration Of Tuareg Migrants To Ghana

This chapter analyses migration for begging amongst Tuareg migrants. The chapter explores the factors that inform migration decisions from their places of origin and the factors that attract Tuareg migrants to Accra. It does this by drawing on empirical data and discussing findings through the lens of the Push-pull plus model.

1.6.4 Chapter Five: Ma Me One Cedi, Me Pɛ One Cedi[4]: Migration For Begging Amongst Tuareg Migrants In Accra

This chapter explores why begging has become a livelihood strategy amongst Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. From the perspective of Kandel and Massey's (2002) culture of migration, I explore Tuareg migrants' international migration for begging. I also examine begging on the streets of Accra in general from the viewpoint of Tuareg migrants.

1.6.5 Chapter six: Tuareg integration in Ghanaian society

This chapter explores the lives of Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. It presents the extent of integration of Tuareg migrants in Ghanaian social life. It also examines the future aspirations of young Tuareg migrants in relation to their current statuses as beggars on the streets of Accra.

1.6.6 Chapter seven: Conclusions

[4] An expression in the Twi language which translates as “give me one cedi, I want one cedi” and is the usual cries of the Tuareg beggars on the streets of Accra.

The final chapter connects the main arguments to twofold conceptual frameworks for the study. Revisiting the research objectives, I summarise my key findings relating to the drivers of migration of Tuareg migrants to Ghana, the reasons why begging over the years has become the preferred means for surviving on the streets of Accra and also the big dreams of the Tuareg migrants. Finally, I provide some recommendations for future research on the subject matter.

CHAPTER TWO

" MIGRATION IS A TRADITION; IT IS A WAY OF LIFE[5]."

2.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to demonstrate why migration has become a way of life amongst Tuaregs in the Sahel region of Africa. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explores the Tuareg societies of the Saharan region. This section is further divided into three parts. The first part examines the Tuaregs before the invasion of the Europeans. Emphasis is from 1660 which is considered the period when the tribal organization started amongst the Tuaregs (Keenan, 1972), to the latter part of the 19th century. The second part focuses on Tuaregs during the era of colonialism. The third part looks at Tuareg lives after independence.

The second section places the phenomenon of Tuareg migration within the context of migration in the West African sub-region. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement is generally explored with reference to Tuareg migration in the sub-region.

The third section reviews the literature on the concept of "Zongo" in Ghana. Here, with Sabon Zongo as the point of reference, I examine the roles of Zongos in Tuareg migration to Ghana.

2.2 The Blue men of the Sahara[6]

2.2.1 The Lesser gods of the Sahara[7]

[5] La migration, c'est une tradition, c'est une mode de vie (See also Jegen, 2020).
[6] Tuaregs' moniker for the indigo dye that colors their distinctive flowing clothing.
[7] This title is borrowed from Jeremy Keenan's (2004) book with the same title

The Tuareg, also known as the Kel Tamasheq, are found on the Sahelian edges of the central Saharan region of Africa. The language of the Tuaregs is Tamasheq or Tamahaq (Tamahaq or Tamasheq for those in the North and South respectively) hence the name Kel Tamasheq which means the people of Tamasheq (Rodd, 1926). Tuaregs practice the Islamic religion (Lecocq and Klute, 2013) and are said to be ethnically connected to the Berbers of the Mediterranean coast because of their language and other cultural characteristics (Keita, 1998). Unlike the Berbers, however, whose economic arrangements were usually a sedentary form of agriculture, the Tuaregs were nomadic people who lived in the harsh environment of the Saharan desert and thus relied on their livestock for survival (Lecocq, 2010a).

Until the advent of the European colonial masters, the Tuaregs were a warlike independent group that mainly traded and controlled the caravan routes as a result of their raiding activities (Rasmussen, 1999; Kohl and Fischer, 2010; Lecocq, 2010a). In the Sahara, five mountains served as central 'meeting spots,' and smaller social groups of Tuaregs sprung up around them (Kohl and Fischer, 2010). The Ajjer in Libya, the Hoggar in Algeria, the Adagh in Mali, the Aïr in Niger, and the interior bend of the Niger River in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are these mountain ranges[8](Lecocq, 2004).

These smaller Tuareg groups were autonomous, had a well-structured but different social organization characterized by a caste system, and adapted to various economic activities in which they were involved (Keita, 1998). Lecocq (2010b) observed that at the top of the caste system were the nobles. The nobles were perceived as racially white. They were subdivided into two categories. These were the noble warriors or Immushag. As the name implies, they

[8] See Kohl and Fischer, 2010 for extensive discussions on the smaller groupings

were mostly warriors. What set them apart from the other nobles was their honour and shame culture, which was widespread among Mediterranean tribes.

The second noble group were the "Ineslemen". They were directly under the noble warriors in the hierarchy. They specialized in religious issues. With these set of features of the aforementioned noble category, the nobles are generally said to have mainly focused on fighting, raiding and controlling the caravan routes (Lecocq, 2010b).

Figure 2.1 Sketch of the Tuareg area in the Sahara and Sahel



Source: Adopted from Fischer, 2008 cited in Kohl and Fischer 2010:4

The vassals were also racially white but unlike the nobles, they mostly did not have a lineage to which they belonged. Sometimes described as similar to the notion of feudalism in medieval

Europe, the term "vassal" is derived from the notion that this group of Tuaregs relied on the nobles for security and in turn tendered to the livestock that belonged to the nobles (Keita, 1998). Lecocq (2010a) observed that this idea is regularly contested. Nonetheless, as Keita (1998) argued, there was generally an interdependent relationship between the nobles and their vassals. The vassal tribes are described as being engaged in goat-herding and to some extent in their caravan trading in cereals and dates. The vassals on their own had few camels. What they had in abundance were goats, whose products were vital to the nobles. The nobles, on the other hand, left in the care of their vassals the many camels they owned. These are what the vassals used in their caravan trading and small-scale raiding.

The harsh climatic conditions coupled with their pastoral economic activities meant the nobles and vassals from the various tribe and clans were constantly competing with one another and with other neighbouring ethnic groups for scarce water, grazing and control of the trans-Saharan routes (Rasmussen, 1998).

At the bottom of the strata were the slaves mostly from the Sudan region. They were racially black and were mostly remnants of the conquests of the noble groups over the other surrounding ethnic groups (Rouch, 1954). They provided manual labour for the nobles and vassals in the Tuareg societies.

Another category of Tuaregs, the "Inadan", was also encountered by early ethnographers. They were, however, mostly removed from the Tuareg caste system. This is because they were neither nobles and vassals nor slaves. They did not follow the set of culture expected of those at the top of the strata, neither were they slaves although they were racially black. They were free men who were mostly blacksmiths whose functions were similar to that of the griots of other West African groups (Lecocq, 2010a).

The relationship between the Tuaregs and their sedentary agricultural neighbours has been described as complex and symbiotic. As reported by Keita (1998), they have always thought of themselves as superior to their darker-skinned agricultural neighbours on the southern part of the Sahara Desert. This was because typically their livestock, trading and raiding activities made them wealthy and thus although faced with extreme environmental conditions, they were somewhat more financially secure. For instance, as already mentioned above, the Tuaregs did not engage in crop agriculture. The staple food in the region was, however, milk and millet (Rasmussen,1996). Therefore, to complement the milk from their livestock, the Tuaregs depended on the farmers for millet. Furthermore, because of their war-like dispositions and several military successes, they were able to demand 'taxes' in kind from the farmers living along the Niger River (Komlavi-Hahonou, 2009). The period before the European invasion of Tuareg societies was therefore characterized by frequent movements of the Tuareg from one region to another.

2.2.2 Tuareg societies and the Colonial Masters

During the mid-19th century, European armies invaded the Saharan regions of Africa. The consequent effect of this invasion was a changed social, political and economic structure of the Tuareg societies. The five poles described in Figure 1 above, were penetrated by the Ottoman, French, British and Italian soldiers who later enforced their respective colonial regimes. As a result, the nomadic boundaries between the various Tuareg societies were dissolved, and new colonial boundaries were created solely to advance the commercial interests of the European colonial masters (Kohl and Fischer, 2010).

Although defeated by the French colonialists in the latter part of the 19th century, the various Tuareg societies, true to their warlike tendencies, provided stiff opposition and were mostly unreceptive to efforts by the European authorities to change them (Charlick, 1991; Klein, 1998). In line with their nomadic lifestyles, the Tuaregs tended to disregard the newly established European colonial borders. They moved from colony to colony. Indeed, as argued by Keita (1998) the French were not successful in assimilating large numbers of the Tuaregs into the social milieu of their colonies. To maintain peace with the Tuaregs, French colonial officials did not contest Tuareg claims to land ownership or the power to exact tributes from sedentary farming people (Lecocq and Klute, 2013). After independence, this problem would sour relations between Tuaregs and their neighbours.

Rasmussen (1999) also noted that the Tuaregs were opposed to taxes and state schools because they perceived them as ways to change their culture. By sending the children of blacksmiths and slaves to schools, the nobles rejected secular education, preferring instead to send their children to Koranic schools. This created a gap in education amongst the nobles. The members of the lower caste had been educated in the formal western system. They, therefore, had more work options and opportunities to advance economically and politically. The nobles, on the other hand, unlike previous slaves, are reported to have despised hard labour and lacked work skills upon colonization, therefore they missed out on opportunities to advance (Clarke, 1977; Lecocq, 2005). As a result, after colonialism Tuareg nobles have become sidelined in ways that former slaves have not (Clarke, 1977; Rasmussen, 2002).

2.2.3 Lost lords of the Sahara: Tuareg Societies on the margins of the Post-independent Saharan countries

The period of the 1950s and the 1960s saw a lot of former European colonies in West Africa gain independence from their colonial masters. The colonies hitherto created by the colonial

masters were converted into nation-states with well-defined territorial borders (Kohl and Fischer, 2010). The Tuaregs of the Saharan and Sahelian regions who were one people with a common language in the past were thus divided into five different countries. These countries are Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya and Burkina Faso. Lecocq (2003) argued that not only were the Tuaregs forced to share national identities with ethnic groups different from theirs, but they were now part of countries that were characterized by different educational systems and economies that were competing against one another and also governments with different ideological orientations.

As a result of these developments, migration amongst the Tuareg was greatly inhibited. The creation of the national borders meant the Tuareg who were the lords of the caravan trade could no longer move freely from one place to another. They, therefore, developed hatred towards these new African leaders. To these Tuaregs, the new governments were structures that were no different from the previous colonial regimes. The formal governments would still deny them the freedoms they enjoyed as autonomous groups before the colonial era. The Tuaregs, therefore, presented a stiff opposition to these new administrations (Rasmussen, 2000).

The new independent administrations, largely comprised of people from tribes oppressed by the Tuaregs in pre-colonial times, for their part regarded Tuaregs as economically and socially backwards (Keita, 1998). Their economic arrangement of subsistence pastoralism was seen as a barrier to national growth. Their quest for modernization after gaining independence from France meant there was a need to educate the Tuaregs to abandon their "outmoded" lifestyle. In order to defend national interests, the new autonomous governments prohibited trade with neighbouring countries as expected by the Tuaregs (Rasmussen, 1999). As a result, the majority

of the Tuaregs, particularly the nobles remained outside the political and economic apparatus of their new countries (Lecocq, 2010a).

In Mali for instance, the new leaders were in opposition to those aspects of Tuareg economic arrangements where their agricultural neighbours paid taxes to them (Keita, 1998). The administration termed this phenomenon "extortion". Land ownership remained a contentious issue. This is because post-independent Malian governments believed that land belongs to people who worked it and not those who claimed authority due to some historical status of power and influence.

Generally, the Tuaregs became marginalized in their lands and had to take directions from people they hitherto regarded as "strangers" and inferior.

> These recent political groupings, built on the Western model of the nation-state, have produced a new type of territoriality. In each of these states, the desert zones frequented by the nomads are situated on the periphery. … This is why in the Sahara the modern states are viewed as machines for turning out minorities who are relegated to the margins of the new centralities which are settled and urban, and in other respects separated from their ancient poles of attraction (Claudot-Hawad, 2006:655).

The newly constituted state of Niger, for example, had eight main administrative regions that were geographically classified from north to south as the arid desert region, semi-arid savannah, and narrow tropical zone. These administrative regions are Agadez, Diffa, Dosso, Maradi, Niamey (including the capital of Niger, Niamey), Tahoua, Tillabéri, and Zinder (Afifi, 2011). A study by United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (2005) demonstrated how the agro-pastoral regions of Maradi and Tillabéri and the pastoral regions of Agadez, areas in the western and northern part of Niger, are the most food-insecure in the country. Reitano and Shaw (2015) reported that living very close to the largely uninhabited Sahara Desert, the social and economic development of these communities (mostly Tuareg

groups in Niger) were mostly ignored by the newly independent government. And this was because these groups constituted a political and economic minority in the newly created state.

Keita (1998), commenting on the marginalized state of the Tuaregs after the colonial regime in Mali, stated that the modernization attempts and marginalization were viewed by the Tuaregs as "re-colonization" (p.89). As a result, in 1963, the very first rebellion was staged by the Tuaregs in Mali. Many of the Tuaregs were killed in the process forcing most of the survivors to move to other places like Algeria.

The droughts that hit the Saharan and Sahelian regions in the 1970s and 1980s were another major catalyst to Tuareg migration. The Tuaregs during this period were still heavily dependent on their livestock (Keita, 1998). The drought wiped out virtually all their livestock, therefore, it rid them of food and their major source of livelihood. Coupled with mismanagement of relief items and corruption from government officials, the Tuaregs moved to other Maghreb regions and further south to other West African countries in search of work (Keita, 1998; Lecocq, 2004). Because of the oil sector and Gadhaffi's military forces, Libya was particularly appealing to the Tuaregs (Keita, 1998).

They returned to their native nations in the 1990s, armed with military tactics and ammunition, to demand autonomy. There were battles between the Nigerien army and the Tuaregs of Niger in the mid-1990s. The major Tuareg secession movements arose as a result of these confrontations. Since then, insurrections have erupted in parts of Mali and Niger regularly (Abdalla, 2009; Emerson, 2011; Guichaoua, 2012).

In a nutshell, the experiences of the Tuaregs born after the 1950s can be described as those marked by socioeconomic ruin, marginalization, and frequent movements. The emergence of colonialism consequently leading to an era of decolonization are the two evils that have redefined the Tuareg society as people who are not socially important anymore. Colonialism did not allow hegemonic systems to exist. The Tuareg societies in the pre-colonial era were hegemonic groups. Also, the post-colonial era ushered in a period of democracy and liberalization movements. These two features of post-colonial countries privileges numbers and not royalty. How then did people of such noble origins turn to begging in their West African host countries? Several studies have looked at the effects of the new social status of the Tuareg societies especially in terms of migration. What they fail to incorporate in their studies on migration amongst the Tuareg, is the begging component of their activities in their West African host countries. This study, therefore, seeks to fill that lacuna in the literature.

2.3 Ecowas Protocol on Free Movement

Although a lot of movements by Africans on the continent are to other African countries, fixed national borders created as a result of colonialism on the continent tend to impede regular flow thereby negatively affecting economic activities and denying the continent of realising the benefits of intra-regional migration (Yeboah et al., 2021). The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movements of People, Right of Residence, and Establishment (Protocol A/P.1/5/79) was established in 1979 as a response to this situation. Other rules and laws have been formed over time to serve as supporting frameworks for the flow of products, services, and labour within the Ecowas subregion (Adepoju, 2009; Adepoju, 2015).

The spirit of the protocol was to provide a "mother" framework that would create a common ground that would allow citizens from countries in the subregion to tap into the resources and the opportunities available in other countries in the subregion (Brown,1989; Yeboah et al., 2020; Okunade and Ogunnubi, 2021).

The protocol was to be rolled out in three phases. The first phase was outlined as the phase to remove visa restrictions for all citizens in the subregion. In this phase, all members in the subregion were granted 90 days of visa-free travel to another country within the subregion.

The protocol allows community members to enjoy rights to residence and establishment in the second and third phases. The protocol requires member states to allow members of the subregion the right of residency, subject to the country's established processes (Article 4 Protocol A/P/3/5/82 Relating to the Definition of Community Citizen). Member states are expected to ensure that there is equal treatment of both indigenous and migrant workers in the provision of social, cultural, and health services, as well as job security.

The literature on the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement focuses on its implementation, and the problems associated with it (Adepoju, 2002; Opanike, Aduloju and Adenipekun, 2016; Yeboah et al., 2021). Studies have also highlighted the problems that ECOWAS residents face when travelling between member states, implying that what is on paper is not actually what is on the ground (Onwunka, 1982; Adeniran, 2012; Olusegun, 2015; Yeboah et al., 2021). The gap in the literature, however, has to do with movements of members in the subregion who move to other countries in the subregion specifically to beg. These categories of migrants are unique. This is because although they are members of the Ecowas subregion, and therefore within the framework of the protocol, they operate outside the specified range of activities

allowed by the protocol. There is therefore the need to expand the literature to include these particular migrants.

2.4 Zongo: Where strangers settle

2.4.1 Understanding the "Zongo"

Several definitions have been provided for the phenomenon of Zongo. These definitions are usually dependent on the relative geographical, historical and social positioning of the one providing the definition. What is consistent, however, is that with all these definitions, Zongo is considered a place instead of a group of people. The word Zongo is derived from the Hausa language which means "stranger quarters" (Pellow, 1988:217). Historically, people who lived in Zongos were Muslims who had moved from the northern territories in sub-Saharan Africa to the southern parts either for trading purposes or as hired fighters (Pellow, 1988; Schildkrout, 1970; Ntewusu, 2011). A brief history of Ghana's association with Muslim migrants is essential in putting the phenomenon of Zongo in perspective.

Ghana's involvement with Muslim merchants in commerce dates back to the 15th century (Kobo, 2010). At the commencement of the colonial period, however, only people from the northern parts of the country had converted to Islam (Levtzion, 1968; Levtzion & Fisher, 1987; Kobo, 2010). Kobo for instance observed that:

> Dagomba, Gonja, Wala, and Mamprusi, converted to Islam as early as the sixteenth century, when they came into contact with Mande and Soninke merchants (also called Djula) from what is known today as Mali. By the nineteenth century, Hausa merchants from northern Nigeria had also extended their commercial activities to Ghana, and in the process continued the Islamic propagation that had been begun earlier by Djula traders. Through these processes, Islam became the main religion and culture of a significant portion of the urban population of the north. Intermarriage between the traders and indigenous people facilitated integration, and created a hybrid Islamic culture that bears elements of both Mande and Hausa customs (2010:70).

Although these Muslim traders had been involved in trading activities with the people in southern Ghana, they were not successful in converting them to Islam. This is because instead of integrating them into their social fabric of life, southern rulers rather provided a place of settlement known as Muslim quarters for these merchants and Islamic clerics (Pellow, 2003). This is where they engaged in trading activities, performed magic and provided healing services to the local people. As a result of this segregation, these migrant quarters become known as a place for strangers with a different culture and religion. Examples of these Zongos are Zongo Mallam now Zongo lane (Pellow, 2001), Cape Coast Zongo in the Cape Coast municipality (Williamson, 2014) and Old Zongo in Kumasi (Schildkrout, 1970).

During the era of colonization, Ghana's economy was largely based on mining and cocoa farming. These two industries were mostly in the southern part of the country. Therefore, a lot of migrants were drawn from the northern part of the country and other parts of francophone and anglophone West Africa (Adepoju, 2003). Most of these labour migrants had two things in common. These were a shared religion which in this case was Islam and a common culture due to the similar environmental conditions associated with their places of origin (Kobo, 2010). These set them apart from the local populations in the south. As a result, their isolation from the local areas by the colonial masters and traditional rulers at the time enabled them to practice their religion and culture without any influence from the indigenes (Pellow, 1985). The Zongo was thus born, influenced by the Islamic religion and the Hausa language.

The meaning of the word and the fact that it is derived from the Hausa language suggests temporality, travel and a close association with the Hausa ethnic group. Indeed, the Islamic religion and the Hausa influences in terms of language and culture still loom large in Zongos of today (Williamson, 2014). They, however, have now become a distinctive place where

migrants Muslims and non-Muslims, either from other parts of the country or in the subregion, are welcomed (Pellow, 2001; Owusu, 2010; Mensah and Teye, 2021). Some have argued that some groups have been residents of Zongos for several generations therefore, Zongos have now developed some relative permanence (Essuman and Tonah, 2004; Dauncey, 2016). Regardless of this position, Zongos are still places with origins in migration, trade, transient living, cultural hybridity, and liminality (Mensah and Teye, 2021). It is therefore the first place of call for the Abotsi[9] who has moved to Ghana in search of greener pastures (Amuzu, Nutakor and Amfo, 2019). It is also the haven for the Kayayoo[10] from the northern part of Ghana who has moved to Accra or Kumasi to work (Awumbila and Ardayfio-Schandorf, 2008; Baah-Ennumh & Adoma, 2012).

Studies on the Zongo have focused on its distinctive nature as compared to other places (Pellow, 2001; Williamson, 2014; Dauncey, 2014). Emphasis has usually been on its different social and spatial organizations. Other mostly contemporary studies have focused on the ills associated with the Zongo such as overpopulation, crime, poverty and filth (Owusu, 2010; Odunuga Afful, Oduro-Kwarteng and Awuah, 2015). Fobil and Atuguba's (2004:257) descriptions that "the city centres are mostly characterized by congestion and squalor, rapid urbanization which mostly imposes immense land and shelter demands within short time stretches have led to the development of slums popularly known as Zongos" implies that all Zongos in all places are problematic. However, as argued by Williamson (2014) depending on

[9] A Hausa word which means "my friend" and is used for young Zambrama migrants who move from house to house selling all sorts of goods like cosmetics, shoes, pieces of cloths, and electrical gadgets.

[10] Head Porters mostly from the northern parts of Ghana.

the context, Zongos differ. In places like Kumasi and Wa for instance, Zongos are among the most opulent parts.

2.4.1 Sabon Zongo: The home of migrants

Sabon Zongo[11] was built in 1912 by Mallam Bako, a migrant from Katsina in Northern Nigeria. The Muslim migrants drawn to Accra in the 19th century were mostly those drawn to the Gold Coast Hausa Constabulary (G.C.H.C.), traders who relocated to the south of the Gold Coast following the collapse of the Salaga market in Ghana's north, and Islamic clerics (Pellow, 2003). Initially based in the Old Ga section of Accra, it was not long before these Muslim migrants outgrew Zongo Mallam[12]. Political wrangling mainly between the Hausa and the Yoruba groups at the time led Mallam Bako, the elder of the Hausa group, to move his people to a new location (Pellow, 1985). Upon consultation with the traditional rulers and colonial administrators, Bako's plan for a new Zongo was accepted. A parcel of land shown in figure 2.2 was allocated for this new settlement. The 75-acre plot of land, which Owusu (2010) observed is barely 3 miles north of Accra's central business district (CBD), was initially intended as a home for Hausa migrants in Accra (Owusu, 2010). Sabon Zongo is no longer just a Hausa community (Pellow, 2001; Pellow, 2003; Owusu, 2010; Dauncey, 2016). There is a great deal of ethnic diversity. The diversity of languages spoken in the area reflects this. Hausa, Ga, and Twi are common but other languages such as "Fulani, Yoruba, Kanuri, Zabrama, Wangara, Buzu, Kotokoli, Mossi, Ewe, Dagomba, and Dagati" (Pellow 2003:63) are also present

[11] "New" stranger quarters

[12] The name of the zongo at the old Ga section.

Figure 2.2 Map of Sabon Zongo, Accra Central and Western Periphery.

Source: Dauncey (2016:41)

Sabon Zongo has received a lot of scholarly attention. This is in part due to its political history in Accra's Muslim fraternity (Pellow, 1985) and also its role in the transformation of Accra into an urban centre (Ntewusu, 2011). Generally, the subjects for studies on Sabon Zongo are similar to that of other Zongos elsewhere in the country. The socio-cultural makeup (Pellow, 2001; Dauncey, 2016), spatial arrangements (Pellow, 1991), crime (Pellow, 2002), poverty (Owusu and Afutu-Kotey, 2010) and poor sanitation (Owusu, 2010) feature heavily in studies on Sabon Zongo.

Studies on Sabon Zongo have identified several ethnic groups and categories of people found in Sabon Zongo. Pellow for instance reported that "residents speak an extraordinary range of

languages, including Fulani, Yoruba, Kanuri, Zabrama, Wangara, *Buzu*[13], Kotokoli, Mossi, Ewe, Sisala, Dagomba and Dagati" (2003:63). Buzu refers to a Tuareg slave in Hausa. In southern Niger, for instance, people use this term as a metonym or sometimes as an insult, for all Tuaregs (Rasmussen, 1999). Pellow's inclusion of Buzu in her list of languages spoken suggests the presence of Tuaregs in Sabon Zongo. Only mentioned in passing in her work, it will be a great contribution to the literature on Sabon Zongo to study its association with Tuareg migrants.

2.5 Summary of existing gaps.

The review above identifies some research gaps that will be addressed by this study. First is the introduction of migration for begging in the literature on south-south migration. While migration scholars have focused on skilled and unskilled labour migration and forced migration in the West-African sub-region, there is far less on mobilities intentionally for begging within the subregion. Much of what is known about the subject is from the studies that treat migration and begging as separate phenomena. However, the little that we do know suggests that begging has somewhat become an economic strategy for which these Tuareg migrants would move across borders to pursue. This requires scrutiny. This study sought therefore to interrogate why migration for begging is perpetuated amongst the Tuaregs of the Sahel region.

Secondly, studies abound on the impact of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movements. What these studies mostly have in common is the notion that what is written on paper does not always reflect reality. The case of the Tuareg beggars on the streets of Accra confirms this notion.

[13] Emphasis is mine

Nonetheless, this current study extends the discussions on the protocol by introducing a different category of migrants in the subregion. It also adds to the knowledge of the migratory patterns in the sub-region, thereby contributing to the scholarship on the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movements.

Finally, Accra is usually mentioned as a globalizing city. This is in the sense that increasingly Accra's urban economy is being affected by the influx of international ideas. This has caused economic transformations and changed relationships among people. Studies have focused on both the positive and negative impacts of these global penetrations. The case of the Tuareg migrants provides an avenue to explore the extent to which the Tuareg migrants navigate their precarious status as international migrants on the fringes of a globalizing city.

CHAPTER 3

DOING RESEARCH AMONGST TUAREG MIGRANTS IN ACCRA

3.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the methods, processes and design I employed in conducting the study. As outlined in Chapter One, the study focuses on Tuareg migrants begging on the streets of Accra. I adopted a qualitative approach to data collection. The adoption of a qualitative approach for this research is based on two main reasons. Firstly, the nature of the research being conducted as a relatively new subject meant a more exploratory approach was needed to provide an understanding of the phenomenon. Furthermore, as a researcher, I subscribe to the social constructivist school of knowledge production. I believe in the fact that we can understand human actions only by uncovering the interpretations people give to the experiences in their everyday lives and generally how they view their world.

There are three subsections in this chapter. The first part looks at the process of designing the research and collecting data. It describes how I developed the research questions, identified the field sites, recruited participants and conducted fieldwork activities. The second section explains how data was handled. The third section explores the issues of research ethics generally related to the subject under study and the methodological and field challenges I experienced as a researcher during the Covid-19 pandemic era.

3.1 Research Design and Data Collection

3.1.1 Research Design

Scientific research is defined as the application of systematic inquiry and procedures to improve, refine, and expand a body of knowledge, establish facts, and/or reach new conclusions (Polit & Beck, 2008). The research design is the strategy the researcher uses to answer the research questions. It is informed by the researcher's philosophical worldview which consequently informs the methods he or she employs for the study (Cresswell, 2013).

For this study, a qualitative research design was employed. This is because I subscribe to the social constructivist philosophical school of thought. Social constructivists believe that there is no such thing as objective knowledge. Rather the experiences that individuals face cause them to develop subjective meanings and interpretations of various social phenomena (Kukla, 2013). To the extent that no two Tuareg beggars on the streets of Accra have the same realities, the meanings and interpretations they give to their status as migrants begging on the streets in another country in the sub-region are diverse. Therefore, the study sought to advance knowledge on the phenomenon from the interpretations given by participants in the study.

3.1.2 Data collection Method

In terms of the research method, the qualitative research method was employed. In-depth interviews were particularly useful because the purpose of the study was to focus on the meanings these Tuareg migrants attach to the phenomenon being studied.

Overall, the researcher conducted thirty to forty-five minutes interviews with participants from three different categories of Nigerien Migrants begging on the streets of Accra. Selected adults for the study comprised of people with ages ranging from twenty-six to sixty years and those who are sixty or above. Young people were the third category of participants. Young people are defined by UNICEF and WHO as those whose ages range from ten to twenty-five years.

However, in this study, participants considered in the category of young people were those from fifteen years to twenty-five. The decision to use young people who fall in the age range aforementioned was because these young people were old enough to understand the subject being studied and thus were able to provide their versions of their stories as migrant beggars. The precarious nature of the Tuareg migrants on the streets meant that the parents were usually wary of strangers who approach their children for any form of interaction. In one instance when I engaged one of the very young migrants[14] in a friendly conversation, I saw his father at a distance gesturing to the young boy to move away from me. Given this, it would have been very difficult to seek consent from parents for their wards to participate in the study.

Furthermore, little interactions with some of the children below the age of 18 years revealed that they found it difficult to comprehend what exactly I was doing and thus could not provide any useful information on their lived experiences as migrants on the streets.

3.1.2.1 Sampling population

The study population comprised all people of Tuareg origin who moved to Ghana voluntarily or are forced to move from their country to Ghana as a result of natural disasters, conflicts, or any other unfortunate incidence which threaten their survival in their countries of origin. The Ghana Population and Housing Census acknowledges migrants as those who have lived in Ghana for six months or more (GSS, 2014). Therefore, in this study, the Tuareg migrants that qualified as participants are those who had been in Ghana for six months or more. Experience from my fieldwork revealed that most of these migrants are circular migrants. Therefore, the

[14] The young boy involved was a little above 10 years per my estimation. This happened on the streets before I went to the field to collect data. The boy asked for money and after obliging I decided to engage him in a random conversation.

study also included Tuaregs who have been living in Ghana currently for less than six months but have lived in Ghana for six months or more in the past. The focus is specifically on those who beg or engage in informal street work on the streets of Accra.

All other people of Tuareg origins who do not reflect the aforementioned category were excluded from the study. For instance, a Tuareg Foreign Service Officer or Tuareg expatriates working in the formal sector of Ghana's economy were excluded from the study.

3.1.2.2 Study Sites

The researcher selected two sites for the study. These are the Accra mall area and Sabon Zongo.

The Accra mall, since its inauguration in 2007, attracts a lot of patrons daily. In Hobdens's (2015:38) work on the essence of the Accra mall in Accra as a globalizing city, a business owner remarked "it's for everybody because everybody finds whatever they want here in this mall, and that's the beauty of it". The comment was an explanation to a question on the class category of Ghanaians who patronize the mall. It, however, sums up the importance of the mall in Accra.

The ability of the Accra mall to attract a lot of people from all walks of life and geographical location (whether local or international patrons) and the presence of the Trotro[15] station adjacent to the mall have resulted in the presence of informal vendors outside the Accra mall. These vendors sell their wares to the various passersby and mall visitors who frequent the area. This has made the perimeter between the Accra Mall, the Trotro station, and the overhead

[15] Trotros are shared informal mini-buses that are usually privately owned. In Accra, 70 percent of commuters rely on trotros (World Bank, 2015).

bridge close to the African Regent Hotel[16] a very busy area. Beggars are usually attracted to busy areas (Asante, 2006) and thus the Tuareg migrants were mostly seen at the Accra Mall area begging from passersby during the busy times of the day. It was, therefore, prudent to choose the Accra mall area as one of the sites for the study.

Figure 3.1 Settlement for Tuareg Migrants at Vulcanizer.

Source: Author's fieldwork, June 2021

Most of the Tuareg migrants at the Accra mall area were not willing to grant the interviews during the periods when they were begging, therefore the interviews granted by Tuareg

[16] The African Regent Hotel is a luxury hotel located south of the University of Ghana at Legon and just north of Kotoka International Airport.

migrants at the Accra Mall area were all conducted at their place of settlement known as Vulcanizer or Roundabout[17] which is about 1km away from the mall.

Named after a popular vulcanizer shop positioned just before you enter the settlement, Vulcanizer is a large undeveloped piece of land to the north of the Kotoka international airport and opposite the Action Chapel International[18] church. The area is characterized by shacks and other makeshift structures that mostly house migrants from other parts of Ghana. The area is also noted for makeshift structures for churches and concrete product suppliers like Monolo Plant Limited[19].

Agyei-Mensah and Owusu (2010) identify East Legon and East airport areas as high-class residential areas. The Spintex area in recent times has also become the centre for many gated communities (Asiedu and Arku, 2009). Therefore, the location of Vulcanizer is very good for the urban poor in Accra. This is because its proximity to the East Legon[20], Spintex Road and East airport areas means the urban poor who live at vulcanizer are able to provide cheap labour to the various shops and restaurants on the Spintex road, at East Legon and the East airport. They mostly work as cleaners, security men and women, and shop attendants at places like the

[17] In this study, the Accra mall area and Vulcanizer are used interchangeably to refer to the first site of the study. Where the researcher wants to refer to the mall, Accra mall is employed.

[18] Action Chapel International is a big Charismatic church founded by one of the famous Ghanaian preachers, Archbishop Nicholas Duncan Williams. See Quenin (2016) for further discussions on the church.

[19] Monolo Plant Limited is a subsidiary of the multinational construction company, De Simone Limited.

[20] The recent construction of the East Legon tunnel, popularly known as the Underbridge has improved movements from the East airport area to East Legon.

A&C mall, Palace mall, and the nearby Accra mall. Some also work as construction workers for the concrete product suppliers in the area or move to East Legon, Marteyman, East airport or further to Tseaddo. These places are affluent areas and thus have a booming real estate industry.

It is also a good location for the Tuareg migrants because it allows them to be close to these busy and affluent areas in Accra. The Accra mall, Palace mall and the American House and Kotobabi Spintex traffic lights are particularly common begging sites for the Tuareg migrants who live at Vulcanizer.

Figure 3.2 Informal settlement for urban poor Ghanaians at Vulcanizer

Source: Author's fieldwork June 2021.

The second site for the study was Sabon Zongo (already discussed in Chapter 2) at the Ablekuma West Municipal Assembly. At Sabon Zongo, the Tuareg migrants have been

provided with their own space on top of the Mallam Bako Mosque[21] where they lodge. The mosque is an uncompleted two-storey building adjacent to the Mallam Bako palace.

Although it is predominantly occupied by Tuareg migrants, occasionally, there are other migrants from other places who pass the night at the place or spend a few days at the place.

Figure 3.3 Mallam Bako's Mosque

[21] Mallam Bako's mosque or Masallaci (in Hausa) is the remnant of the original mosque built by Mallam Bako.

Source: Author's fieldwork, October 2021

3.1.2.3 Sampling Procedure and Strategies

The Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra are a hard-to-reach population. There is no information on their countries of origin, or reasons for migration registered with both the local and international agencies in Ghana recognized for keeping records of migrants in the country (Donyina, 2019). The difficulty in ascertaining the population was not a problem for me. Consistent with the general expectations of qualitative studies, emphasis was placed on the richness of the data gathered from the participants in advancing knowledge of the phenomenon (Morse, 2000). I was neither concerned with ascertaining their numbers in the country nor establishing numerical data for onwards quantitative estimations. Therefore, a non-probability sampling strategy was used to produce the sample needed for the achievements of the research objectives. A total of twenty-one participants were employed in the study. This is consistent with the observation made by Green and Thorogold (2018[2004]) that usually qualitative studies involving interviews produce little new information after the twentieth interview. To the extent that this is a small project, it also falls in line with Charmaz's (2006) assertion that not more than twenty-five participants are adequate.

The purposive sampling method was specifically used to select participants who fit the population description of the study (Lune and Berg, 2017). The benefit I derived from using this sampling technique was that it gave me the freedom to use my discretion to choose participants I thought would be beneficial to the study.

Upon entering the field, I was initially faced with the challenge of prospective participants who were unwilling to participate in the study. For two weeks, prospective participants were not

willing to participate in the study. Several reasons were given for their unwillingness to participate in the study. Chief among them, however, was the fear that I was a government official who would work to get them deported from the country.

The first young Tuareg migrant who was willing to participate in the study because according to him, he was a senior high school student back in Niger and thus appreciated what it means to do academic research, however, would not grant the interview in the open space where the begging activities were ongoing. This he explained was for fear of reprimand by his compatriots who were observing my interactions with him with keen interest. He, however, suggested we move to their place of settlement where he introduced me to another young Tuareg migrant who was schooling in Ghana and thus he argued was better placed in terms of language to grant the interview.

The snowball sampling technique from then onwards was employed to recruit participants with characteristics similar to the subject being studied. As much as possible, I strived to maintain a balance in gender and the generational make-up of participants. The decision was to help provide the gender and generational dynamics to the subject being studied.

From discussions with participants at Vulcanizer, it became imperative to recruit other participants from Sabon Zongo-another site in Accra. My interactions with participants revealed that Sabon Zongo was a popular site amongst the Tuaregs at Vulcanizer. This was in the sense that most of the participants I recruited mentioned that they initially stayed in either Ashaiman or Sabon Zongo before moving to their current place of residence at Vulcanizer. They, however, explained that recently the number of Tuareg migrants living at Ashaiman has depleted greatly. Sabon Zongo, on the other hand, was observed to host some Tuareg migrants.

I was also especially interested in those living in Sabon Zongo because participants at Vulcanizer observed that although they were also Tuaregs, there were differences for instance in terms of how they organize their begging activities, location for begging and countries of origin. Therefore, including them in the research, I envisaged, would provide other dimensions to the phenomenon which otherwise would be lost if I were to focus only on participants from Vulcanizer.

3.1.2.4 Characteristics of Sample

Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 are a summary of the demographic characteristics of the young people and adults sampled for the study respectively. I interviewed 21 individuals from both Vulcanizer and Sabon Zongo. I interviewed 17 individuals from the former community and 4 from the latter community.

At Sabon Zongo, I also had the privilege of meeting the members of the Bako royal family. They introduced me to the Tuareg migrants thereby allaying their fears of my being a government official seeking to get them deported. Key informant interviews were conducted with the Chief of Sabon Zongo and the designated head from the royal family tasked with the oversight responsibility for the Tuareg migrants in the community. My interest here was to explore the socio-historical underpinnings of this particular type of migrants in Sabon Zongo, their interactions with their host community and the day-to-day activities of these migrants in the community.

Table 3.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of adult Tuareg migrants.

*Name	Age	Religion	Sex	Marital Status	No. of Children	**Residence	***Highest Education grade attained
Abbas	60	Muslim	Male	Married	5	V	-
Faisal	40	Muslim	Male	Divorced	4	V	KS
Latif	39	Muslim	Male	Married	3	SZ	KS
Habiba	30	Muslim	Male	Single	3	V	-
Munira	28	Muslim	Female	Married	6	V	-
Rashida	50	Muslim	Female	Single	2	SZ	-
Ruqayya	32	Muslim	Female	Single	2	SZ	-

*Name: These are Pseudonyms
** Residence: V= Vulcanizer, SZ= Sabon Zongo
***Highest Education grade attained: - is for those who have never been educated. KS= Koranic School

Table 3.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of young Tuareg Migrants.

*Name	Age	Religion	Sex	Marital Status	No. of Children	**Residence	***Highest Education grade attained
Anwar	17	Muslim	Male	Single	None	V	SHS 1
Kabir	20	Muslim	Male	Single	None	V	SHS 2
Bilal	18	Muslim	Male	Single	None	V	Class 4
Ali	22	Muslim	Male	Single	None	V	Nursery

Amir	19	Muslim	Male	Single	None	V	Primary
Hassan	20	Muslim	Male	Single	None	SZ	-
Nasir	25	Muslim	Male	Single	None	V	-
Nadjat	20	Muslim	Female	Single	None	V	-
Aaliyah	15	Muslim	Female	Single	None	V	-
Zainab	19	Muslim	Female	Single	None	V	Class 6
Rabia	21	Muslim	Female	Single	None	V	-
Mariam	20	Muslim	Female	Single	None	V	-
Kadijah	18	Muslim	Female	Single	None	V	-
Sakina	25	Muslim	Female	Single	None	SZ	SHS 1

*Name: These are Pseudonyms
** Residence: V= Vulcanizer, SZ= Sabon Zongo
***Highest Education grade attained: - is for those who have never been educated.

3.1.2.5 Interview Process and Research Instruments

This study relied heavily on interviews for data collection. The interviews were tape-recorded. The richness and depth of the migration and street life stories of Tuareg migrants narrated in this thesis are the results of unstructured and semi-structured interviews conducted with adult and young Tuareg migrants and some key informants from the Sabon Zongo community. The decision to rely on these interview approaches was influenced by the fact that this study aims to explore the phenomenon of migration for begging amongst the Tuareg migrants. Specific types of in-depth interviews were informed by the category of participants being interviewed and also the particular type of information expected from them. Below is a discussion of the various interview approaches employed in the study.

3.1.2.4.1 Semi-structured interviews

Of the two interview approaches, the semi-structured interview was the form most adopted for this study. The purpose of semi-structured interviews is to arrive at a more detailed and rich understanding of the research topic (Longhurts, 2003). To this end, semi-structured interviews were employed in this study to let the Tuareg migrants reflect on their situations and construct their interpretations of them while I paid close attention to the views being shared by the participants. I designed the interview guides taking into consideration the structure and the kind of questions to deal with before commencing with the fieldwork. The questions were based on the overall aim of this study which is to explore the phenomenon of migration for begging amongst the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. Some of the interviews took the informal conversational approach. This allowed participants some space to occasionally veer off what had been stipulated in the interview guide (Dearnley, 2005).

Especially when I interviewed the young Tuareg migrants I found the semi-structured interviews useful. Some of the young people were my contemporaries with interests[22] similar to mine. Therefore, my interactions with the young migrants were more relaxed. Furthermore, most of the young ones could speak fluent English or some form of pidgin English. This improved the communication with the participants. The young Tuareg migrants were able to communicate freely allowing me to probe their experiences, behaviour, feelings, and attitudes

[22] I observed the young men especially had a passion for football. As an avid supporter of FC Barcelona, I engaged them in football banter especially on weekends when I went for data collection. Also, I have an interest in guitars. There was a young man in the camp who bought a new guitar during the data collection period. He occasionally gave me the guitar to try my hands on it while the other members at the camp looked on.

deeply for clarity and more details that otherwise would have been lost with a structured interview.

As I facilitated the process to steer clear of subjects unrelated to the phenomenon being examined, the semi-structured interview was more controlled than unstructured interviews. The unstructured interviews, on the other hand, did not always follow the order of the questions outlined in the interview guide. This interview method was chosen in light of Gray's (2009) claims that it gives the researcher the ability to vary the order of questions depending on the direction the interview takes.

Three languages were used for the interviews. These were English, Tamasheq and Hausa. Where participants could speak English and/or pidgin English, I conducted the interviews alone. I employed the help of a translator where participants could speak only Tamasheq and/or Hausa.

The somewhat universal characteristic of Hausa meant it is a fairly commonly spoken language amongst members of the Zongo and Islamic communities in Ghana. I, therefore, recruited students pursuing undergraduate programmes in the social sciences who could speak Hausa fluently to help with the translation. Their position as university students meant they could appreciate in detail the research exercise they were helping with and also understand the various themes being studied.

If the participant could speak only the Tamasheq language, I recruited a young Tuareg migrant who had enrolled in a senior High school in Ghana and therefore could speak fluent English as a translator. There were instances where some of the participants could speak a bit of the Twi or Ga languages, however, upon some form of examination it was observed that their proficiency in the Twi and Ga languages was not high enough to express themselves easily.

Therefore, I decided to use a translator in such instances to allow them to freely express themselves thereby contributing to the richness of the information provided.

Averagely, each interview lasted for 35 minutes. The length of the interviews was affected mostly by the language being used for the interview. The use of a translator due to my inability to communicate in a language the participant was fluent in meant more time was spent on that particular interview.

3.1.2.4.2 Unstructured in-depth interviews

Unstructured interviews allow participants to tell their own stories or recount a given phenomenon in their own words. Similar to the semi-structured interviews, the aim is to elicit rich, detailed information that can be used when analysing data for a qualitative study. I adopted the narrative approach of unstructured interviews for my key informant interviews. As already explained above, the decision to include key informants in the study was to explore the socio-historical underpinnings of this particular type of migrants in Sabon Zongo, their interactions with their host community and the day-to-day activities of these migrants in the community. To achieve this, I simply had a list of topics like the period when they first arrived at Sabon Zongo, the nature of work they mainly adopt while in Sabon Zongo, and the nature of their interactions with members of the Sabon Zongo community. To the extent that the interview process was largely influenced by the responses given by the key informants, the way the questions were phrased and the order in which they were asked, varied from one key informant to another.

The interview with the chief of Sabon Zongo was conducted with the help of a translator whereas that of the royal family member in charge of the Tuareg migrants in Sabon Zongo was conducted in English.

3.2. Data Handling

Data handling is a key component of every study. It entails all activities employed in converting the data gathered into useful information needed for onward analyses and interpretation and involves transcription of data, analyses and cross-checking of data. It also takes into account how data gathered is stored. This part looks at the general process of handling the data gathered for the study.

3.2.1 Data transcription

Transcription is the process of converting spoken language to the written word. Both the spoken language and the written language have different sets of rules (Kvale, 1996). Only written language can be sorted, copied, studied, assessed, and quoted. Thus, transcription is required to manage and organize data (Lapadat, 2000). Davidson (2009) identifies the naturalized and denaturalized methods of data transcription as the two main methods employed by researchers. Naturalised transcription is very detailed and less filtered. It takes into consideration breaks in speech, body language, laughter, mumbling, involuntary sounds, and gestures (Mero-Jaffe, 2011). Denaturalized transcription, on the other hand, describes the content of the interview but deemphasizes descriptions of accent and involuntary sound.

In this study, I employed the denaturalized transcription method. This is because most of the interviews were conducted with the help of a translator. My inability to speak the Tamasheq

and Hausa languages employed in most of the interviews meant I could not focus on aspects such as accents and involuntary sounds. This, however, was not a problem as the denaturalized transcription method still afforded me the chance to produce the essence of the conversations with the participants without missing out on the meaning and perceptions that were produced (Mero-Jaffe, 2011). Indeed, the denaturalized transcription method was very helpful because the itinerant lifestyles of Tuareg migrants coupled with the communal living arrangements in their place of settlement meant that in most cases the interviews were interrupted. The denaturalized transcription method thus provided flowing and coherent information that is easy to read (Oliver, Serovich, & Mason, 2005).

The transcribed data were later double-checked by listening to the audio recordings to ensure accuracy, detect any terms that may have been lost or misconstrued and clarify any areas of ambiguity.

3.2.2 Data Analyses

Analysis of data from qualitative research usually takes the form of retelling the story of participants with much emphasis on information that is parallel to the study objectives.

In this study, the data analysis process began immediately after the commencement of data gathering and lasted till the process was completed.

Data from the fieldwork was manually analyzed by the researcher. Codes were developed from the data collected and organized into themes. Thematic network analysis was employed as the qualitative tool for data analysis. Thematic network analysis is one of the many qualitative approaches to analyzing data (Attride-Stirling, 2001). In this study, it was employed for two main reasons: the size of the project and also the skillset of the researcher in qualitative

methods. This project is relatively small, and it was thus convenient to use the manual means of data analysis. Also, the researcher has developed the skill of using thematic network analysis tools to analyze qualitative data therefore it was the natural choice to make.

3.3 Ethical Consideration

The research has been conducted according to the University of Ghana's research regulations for social science research where I sought approval from the Ethics Committee for Humanities (ECH) of the University of Ghana (See Appendix III). Participants were duly informed about what was being investigated and the purpose of the study. This improved the chances of participation from participants as in some instances, it cleared the doubts they had about me. My student identification card was helpful in this regard because it authenticated my claims of being a student researcher. I, therefore, made it a point to carry it to the field on all occasions that I went for data collection.

Participants were assured of complete anonymity and confidentiality. One way of concealing the identities of participants was by not including their names in the socio-demographic aspect of the interview guides. Instead, pseudonyms were adopted. I only got to know the real names of some of them later after building rapport with them due to constant visits to their place of residence.

I sought their verbal consent before recording their interviews. Participants were told that participation was completely voluntary and that they could opt out at any moment, even if they had already accepted.

In three separate instances during their interview processes, participants decided to withdraw from the study. I willingly obliged. An amount of GHS5.00 [roughly $1] and GHS10.00[

roughly $2] was given as compensation for the time of the young people and adults respectively. In order not to compromise voluntary participation, however, information on the monetary compensations was withheld from participants until they finished granting the interviews.

The study was conducted during the period of the Covid-19 pandemic. As a social science researcher embarking on a study with humans as subjects it was imperative to conform to the general laid down protocols for the prevention and spreading of the disease. Therefore, I ensured that the various protocols outlined by the Ghana Health Service were observed during the study. Interviews were conducted in an open space with the researcher observing social distancing at all times.

It was difficult to get the participants to wear facemasks since they were in their homes and as such argued, the setting should be relaxed. I, however, wore facemasks whenever I visited the study site. Hand sanitisers were on-site for regular disinfection but it was only used by the researcher and his translators. The participants seldom asked for it.

3.4 Challenges of the study

The main limitation of conducting this study was the unwillingness of Tuareg migrants to participate. The willingness to participate was influenced largely by time availability and the fear of divulging confidential information to 'the outside world'.

They mostly begged during the daytime. This meant the only times they were available were very early in the morning before 5:00 am or later in the evening after 7:00 pm. In the afternoon, some returned to the camp to rest but were unwilling to grant interviews as they complained of tiredness.

Also, in instances where I met a few at the camps, the fear of revealing too much, which they argued, may be used against them by the Ghanaian authorities, prevented some from participating in the study. In such cases, I presented my school Identification (ID) card as evidence to the participants to remind them of my status as a student and also to reassure them that any information shared would remain confidential and anonymised.

Methodological limitations manifested in this study had to do with the lack of gender balance. I failed to attain the equal gender and generational representation that I predicted in my data sample. I attribute this to the gender inequalities in the Tuareg culture. Especially amongst the married adult female Tuareg migrants, the statement "I am only a woman" was a very common response given as a reason to opt out of the study. Although some expressed interest in participating in the study, as women, they were expected to seek the permission of their husbands or the other patriarchs at the camp. On several of those occasions, their husbands did not permit them and thus they were unable to participate in the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

FROM THE DESERT TO THE GOLD COAST: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF TUAREG MIGRANTS TO GHANA

4.0 Introduction

> First of all, what brought us to Africa here, we were at the Sahara, we didn't know town food like rice we knew only millet and milk. That's our food. The milk is not like the ones in tins and sachets, we just milk them from the animals directly and drink. We were there and we had a dry season and our animals started dying. It is over forty years. It was the dry season and our animals started to die. That is what brought us to the towns. We were in the bushes. We didn't have houses, our houses were made from goat skins that had been sewed together like a trampoline. We didn't know how to work. We only knew how to follow the animals. Even food it is just later then we learnt how to eat soup. If you buy rice unless you eat it with milk like cowbell. We weren't eating soup because we didn't know soup. We didn't know fish because we didn't like the smell of fish. After a while, the animals started increasing in numbers. In recent times, however, what causes our people to move to other places is because of terrorism. In our place they are killing a lot of people. Plenty people are dying. They will come to the village and kill all the people, children, women, men, old men, everybody.

Abbas, quoted above, is a 60-year-old Tuareg migrant who has been living in Ghana for more than ten years. He provides a lucid account of the current state of Tuareg societies in the Sahel region. As one who is advanced in years and thus has experienced first-hand the changes that have occurred in Tuareg society, he attributes the catalysts for Tuareg migration to environmental factors and conflicts. His emphasis on Tuareg culture, history, environment and conflicts suggests that international migration amongst the Tuareg migrants is a complex phenomenon that cannot be narrowed to simple causative factors. Indeed his views and that of the other Tuareg migrants interviewed in this study reiterate the idea that migration is a complex phenomenon. His use of "Africa here"[23] confirms the notion that Tuaregs generally

[23] Discussed further in the next chapter

draw distinctions between their societies and the racially black ethnic groups to the south of sub-Saharan Africa (Rasmussen, 1999; Lecocq and Hahonou, 2015), a point that reemphasises their historic dominance over these ethnic groups.

Drawing on the analysis of secondary data and interviews conducted in this study, this chapter examines Tuareg migrations from the Sahel regions of Africa to Ghana. I rely on Van Hear et al's (2018) push-pull plus model to discuss the drivers of migration, the implementation of migration decisions, and the sustenance of migration amongst the Tuareg migrants in Ghana. There are two specific questions addressed: what factors in the country of origin prompt the decision to migrate, and why is Ghana the preferred choice destination?

These two questions inform the main sections of this chapter. First of all, I contextualize Tuareg migration from the perspective of historical and contemporary political and social processes and environmental factors that have particularly rendered the Tuaregs of the Sahel region a minority group marginalized in their countries of origin. I then examine the ability of the Tuaregs to harness capital from their households and villages, and available policies to explain the implementation of migration decisions and the sustenance of migration amongst the Tuareg migrants in Ghana.

Section two examines the appeal of Ghana as a host country to the Tuareg migrants. Firstly, a brief social history of Tuareg migrants in Accra is presented. Additionally, the factors that have resulted in the Tuareg migrants becoming an ever-present feature of Accra's urban structure are examined.

4.1 Journey to the South

4.1.1 Origins of migration decision and the political economy of marginalization

The migration of Tuareg migrants to Ghana can be attributed to the interactions of predisposing, proximate and precipitating drivers of migration according to the push-pull plus model. The Tuareg societies in the Sahel and Saharan regions of West Africa are generally characterized by deep-seated structural and economic underdevelopment. Niger and Mali, source countries for Tuareg migrants recruited for the study, are ranked as the poorest countries in the world. According to the 2018 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index, Niger ranked the least developed country in the world with Mali only five places above Niger. In Niger, 74.8 percent of the country's population live in severe multidimensional poverty (UNDP, 2020). The impact of poverty in these countries is, however, more severe in the Tuareg societies. This is a result of political, economic and cultural factors in Tuareg societies that have resulted in the marginalization of these groups of people (Benjaminsen, 2008). Their marginalized state has led to their inability to provide for their basic needs and thus has become a predisposing factor for migration.

As observed in the study, participants mentioned dire economic conditions as a major reason for their movements. Remarks like "money was a problem and things are expensive over there and so it was a problem" and "our country we don't have money, we don't have anything, it doesn't rain and so we don't have food to eat that is why we come here", inter alia, were rife in the responses from participants in the study.

Poverty alone cannot explain why the Tuareg migrants move to Ghana. This is because the "poorest of poor" are usually not the ones who migrate (UNDP, 2009 cited in Van Hear et al., 2018). It is, therefore, necessary to look at other factors that prompt migration amongst the Tuaregs.

As a result of their marginalized status, Tuareg societies over the years have rebelled against successive governments in their countries (Keita, 1998; Benjaminsen, 2008). These conflicts have created insecure environments in Tuareg societies. The conflicts and insecurities in the Tuareg regions are proximate drivers that when combined with the predisposing driver of structural underdevelopment make migration more likely amongst Tuareg societies. Furthermore, dire environmental conditions in the desert regions of the Sahel also compound the difficulties faced by Tuareg citizens and thus triggers their movement to other countries.

In this sense, the aforementioned comments by Abbas provide a nuanced explanation of the drivers of migration amongst the Tuareg of Ghana. He attributes their migration to the interplay of economic difficulties which was a result of harsh environmental conditions, and the recent conflicts that have become a common feature amongst Tuareg societies. Although these drivers can be described as proximate drivers according to the push-pull plus model (Van Hear et al., 2018), from the study, the actual drivers that precipitated the migration of Tuareg migrants to the streets of Accra differed based on their countries of origin. Those from Mali migrated as a result of the Tuareg insurgencies in the 1990s which forced most of these Tuaregs to move to West African countries to the south of Mali. Munira, an adult Tuareg migrant from Mali remarked that "we run away because there was war. When we got here, we got a place to stay so we decided to stay here".

The Tuaregs from Niger, on the other hand, moved as a result of the droughts in the 1970s and the 1980s, and continue to move as a result of the harsh environmental conditions present in the arid parts of Niger. The droughts in the 1970s and 1980s forced the Tuaregs in Niger to move to other countries in the West African subregion (Lecocq, 2004). Mainly drawn to neighbouring countries such as Burkina Faso and Nigeria, some of these migrants moved

further south to Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. This parallels the observations of Chief Yahaya Bako, the current Sabon Zongo leader, who is 90 years old. When interviewed for this study he remarked that the presence of the racially white Tuareg migrants from Niger in Sabon Zongo can be traced to the reign of Mallam Lebo Bako. Daucey (2016) reported that Mallam Lebo ruled from 1961 to 1981 which is the period in which Niger as a country was faced with a severe drought that led to the mass exodus of Tuaregs in the desert region of Niger. Chief Yahaya's view corroborates that of Mallam Imurana, who is the appointed head from the Bako family with oversight responsibility for the Tuareg migrants in Sabon Zongo, and who was also interviewed for this study. According to Mallam Imurana "the black ones started coming here over 100 years ago. During Nkrumah's time the black people were here. For the white ones it was Rawlings time, during the first coup".

The environment continues to play a role in the movement of Tuaregs from Niger to Ghana. The climate of Niger is characterized by two seasons. There is a short rainy season from the period of June to September each year and a long dry season from October in a given year to May in the year after that. The impact of the nine-month-long dry season is deeply felt in the desert zone to the north of the country which is three-quarters of the country's land size (Snorek, Renaud and Kloos, 2014). During those times, life becomes unbearable and therefore these Tuaregs from Niger migrate to other places as a survival strategy. Habiba for instance stated that "during the dry season I don't want to stay in Niger because life is hard in Niger. It is difficult to get food and water but here everything is available".

Another precipitating driver that forces Tuaregs in Niger to move to Ghana is the conflicts that have plagued the northern part of Niger over the years. Abbas recounts that:

> There is a fight. Terrorists are everywhere. They are in Burkina, they are in Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria is the mother of all. Niger is the father, Mali the same thing. That is

> why we are praying so that they won't reach here in Ghana. My people that you see over here, they don't stay at a place for a long time, in a short while they will go to another place.

This has created a somewhat circular migration pattern in what I refer to as the "hi and bye" migratory strategy amongst the Tuaregs in Ghana. It is similar to de Haas and Fokkema's (2010) description of the pendulum migratory strategy amongst Morrocan migrants in Europe. They are not permanent settlers in either Ghana or Niger. The difference in the experience of these Tuareg migrants is that unlike the Morrocan migrants in Europe who are said to spend a considerable amount of time in the year in Morroco while maintaining official residence in Europe, these Tuareg migrants experience the reverse where they live for the most of the year in Ghana, their host country, and spend a short time in their countries of origin. Also unlike their Morrocan counterparts who maintain a permanent residence in their host countries, these Tuareg migrants whiles in Ghana live on the fringes of Ghanaian society as though they are ready to move to another place the next day. Therefore today it is a "hi, how are you?", tomorrow it is a "bye for now". Mallam Imurana observed that:

> those people they don't like it like it. They don't want to stay. They have one habit. They move move to other places. Today they are in Accra, tomorrow they are in Kumasi. Even Takoradi when you go there you will find some of them there. There are times those in Ashaiman they come here and then some of those here at Sabon Zongo will also go to Ashaiman.

Abbas also argued that:

> My people that you see over here, they don't stay at a place for a long time, in a short while they will go to another place. That is their character. That is our culture. When we used to stay in the bush, you couldn't stay in the bush for more than one week. If you stayed in the place for more than one week, the place will be dirty and the animals will not like to eat the grass in that area. So, they move from there to a new place to go and find food for the animals. That is how we are at our side.

This "hi and bye" approach to migration in Ghana is thus a reflection of the nomadic feature of Tuareg culture which predisposes the Tuareg societies to move. The history of the Tuareg

society is rich in accounts of constant migration (Claudot-Hawad, 2006; Kohl and Fischer, 2010; Lecocq, 2010). This is emphasised in the existence of the Tuareg diaspora in other parts of Africa (Lecocq, 2004) and the developed countries in the global North (Rasmussen, 2005; Guichaoua, 2012). Therefore, irrespective of the attempts to sedentarize the Tuareg in their countries of origin, the long history of movements across countries and regions predisposes the Tuareg society to adopt international migration to Ghana as a means of navigating their marginalized state in their countries of origin.

In effect, the international migration of Tuaregs to Ghana can be conceptualised as a result of the complex interaction of predisposing, proximate and precipitating drivers of migration. The nomadic lifestyle of the Tuareg societies coupled with the endemic structural underdevelopment predisposes the Tuareg migrants to migrate. These predisposing drivers when combined with conflicts and harsh climate conditions which can be described as proximate factors make migration across Tuareg societies more likely. The precipitating drivers that actually triggered movements amongst the Tuareg migrants differ depending on the country of origin of the Tuareg migrant. In Mali, the Tuareg insurgencies in the 1990s compelled members of the Tuareg societies to move to other countries in the West African subregion. As has been shown in this study, some of the Tuaregs moved all the way to Ghana. Although the exact date for the movements of Tuaregs into Ghana remains unclear, information from interviewees and key informants suggest the racially white Tuaregs of Niger first moved in their numbers to Ghana and other West African countries during the droughts of the 1970s and 1980s. Over the years the Tuareg conflicts in Niger have also triggered movements to Ghana. Furthermore, the climatic condition of a long dry season and a short rainy season continues to force movements from the Tuareg regions of Niger to Ghana. Together, these

predisposing, proximate and precipitating drivers cause the international migration of the Tuaregs from the Sahel and Saharan regions to Ghana.

4.1.2 Active agents or slaves of the structure?

> The term agency is often simply used to refer to an individual's freedom of choice, as it is exercised in the face of macro-level social structures that serve to both enable and constrain their action. However, this tends to reduce the discussion to one level of analysis: the micro versus the macro – say, the plucky individual working with or against the larger impersonal forces they encounter. This individualistic account of agency tends to obscure how individuals' ability to act depends on the social milieu in which their action is performed. The nineteenth-century migration of Irish smallholders to the US during the Great Famine, for instance, demonstrated not just the exercise of free choice, but also the structural framing of US migration policy, UK agrarian policy and transatlantic shipping routes, among other drivers (Van Hear et al., 2018:929).

Against this backdrop, I extend the argument of the international migration of Tuareg migrants to Ghana by looking at those available social factors that enable the Tuareg migrants in Accra to exercise their migration aspirations and desires. As has already been established, available resources or the ability to harness resources is a crucial part of the migration decision. As a result, Tapinos (1990) claims that, since the early 1990s, the poorest members of society have found it difficult to migrate due to the resources required for international migration in particular. Although the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra are poor and marginalized in their countries of origin, they are the ones who have been able to maximise the various resources and factors available that engender movement. These resources or factors are referred to as the mediating drivers; "those factors that enable, facilitate, constrain, accelerate or consolidate migration, and may diminish migration too" (Van Hear et al., 2018:932). And they are those that ensure that migration decisions of Tuareg migrants are implemented and sustained.

A collection of drivers combine to shape the nature of migration by Tuareg migrants to Ghana. They can be classified under broad terms of policy, logistics, and economics. In the aforementioned observation by Van Hear et al. (2018) the United States of America's (USA) migration policy was critical in the movement of Irish migrants to the USA. In like manner, the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement established in 1979 removes the various challenges of migration in the subregion thereby promoting migration in the subregion. Although the protocol per se cannot be said to directly facilitate Tuareg migration to Ghana, the shortfalls in the implementation of the protocol enable the Tuareg migrants to implement their migration decisions to Ghana. As argued by Yeboah et al. (2021), Article 10–12 Protocol A/SP.1/7/86 of the protocol identifies the categories of migrants from the sub-region as compromising of border residents, migrant workers and their family members, students, traders, border area workers, seasonal workers and itinerant workers. The Tuareg migrants fall within the definition of citizens of a member state in the Ecowas subregion, but they do not qualify per the provisions in the supplementary protocols for migrants (Donyina, 2019). Also section 8 of Ghana's Immigration Act, 2008 prohibits the entry of migrants who may be unable to provide for themselves and will be reliant on state resources. This particular description best describes the Tuareg migrant in Ghana. Therefore it is safe to say that per the ECOWAS Protocol and Ghana's laws the Tuareg migrant on the street of Accra is "unwanted" and not expected to move to Ghana. To navigate this precarious state, however, Tuareg migrants capitalize on the shortfalls in the implementation of national laws and the ECOWAS Protocol at the nation's border. In a study conducted to ascertain the differences in the experiences of various categories of migrants from member states, Yeboah et al. (2021) observed that the experiences of migrants vary based on gender, class, category of migrant and country of origin. Generally, West African

migrants from poor backgrounds face greater discrimination from nationals and border officials as compared to immigrants from wealthy backgrounds. The means of transportation also inform the kind of treatment migrants would be given by border officials. A male Beninois lecturer in Ghana explains that travelling by land, as well as the mode of transportation used, shapes one's experience of crossing a national border within ECOWAS and affects the likelihood of one being harassed or extorted. According to him:

> I have had no challenges so far except that at the Aflao side of the Ghana border you pay Gh15 or Gh20 to Immigration as you leave or enter Ghana. At the Togo to Benin border it's free. If you are travelling by State Transport Company (STC) or a big transport firm, you don't pay anything at the border in person. It may be that the fees are already included in the ticket price. What happens there is that, when you get to the border, the driver collects all the ID cards and passports of travellers. He visits the Immigration officials give all to them, and he soon returns with all and when we cross the border they are given back to us. After Aflao, there are other checkpoints where they collect Gh5.00 from everyone with an ID card but I don't know if same is taken from those holding passports. (Yeboah et al., 2021:237)

His remarks that "if you are travelling by State Transport Company (STC) or a big transport firm, you don't pay anything at the border in person" supports the experiences shared by Tuareg migrants in this study. A large proportion of interviewees for this study reported that they moved to Ghana with "Rainbow"[24]. None of the participants reported that they have a passport or any other official document which are usually requirements spelt out in the protocol. Nonetheless, when asked if they faced any form of challenges at the border they reported that they didn't experience any form of harassment. The fact that they travel with a "big" transport firm helps them to avoid harassment and extortion which otherwise would have been their experience at the borders due to the category of migrants to which they belong. Thus they

[24] A transport company that conveys Nigerien migrants from Niamey to Accra.

indirectly benefit from the fact that the protocol allows for ease of movement of citizens from member states.

"Rainbow" is part of the logistics available to Tuareg migrants. It serves as a mediating driver that stimulates their migration to Ghana. The fact that they are transported straight from Niamey to Accra is an incentive to migrate because other than that, they would have had to spend days hopping from one country to another before eventually landing in Accra. Access to smuggling networks can also be described as part of the logistics that mediate the migration of Tuareg migrants to Accra. At this point, it must be noted that the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on migration was heavily felt amongst migrants who travel by road. This is because since the land borders were closed as a result of Covid-19 in March 2020, Rainbow has had to transform its operations. As part of the research process, I visited the transport yard of Rainbow to see firsthand how operations were conducted. There were no buses at the transport yard at the time of visit. An informal discussion with one of the ticket sales officers revealed that the buses no longer entered Ghana. There were minibuses at the transport yard that transport the travellers to Aflao. At Aflao they help the travellers cross over to Togo where the buses would be waiting in Lome. In his own words "there is no problem at all. If you have a passport it is very easy, the only problem is crossing over. From Lome to Niamey nobody will worry you". When I asked what would happen if one does not have a passport or document he responded that "there are people there" to suggest that there is a way around that situation. He attributed the fact that from Lome to Niamey is a relatively smooth ride to the fact that there was organized transport. This information from the officer confirmed the information provided by the Tuareg migrants. During the whole period of data collection, I observed on regular basis the arrival of several Tuareg migrants from Niger at Vulcanizer. They reported that as a coping

strategy they now rely on illegal routes and smuggling networks at the Aflao borders to enter Ghana. While at the camp, knowledge of these routes and networks is passed on to other migrants thereby enabling the movements of other Tuareg migrants.

It must be said that migration from Niamey to Ghana is not cheap. The transport fare from Accra to Niamey as reported by the officer at the Rainbow office is currently GHS336 (roughly $55). Participants reported that the trip from Niger in particular ranges from GHS800 (roughly $130) to GHS1000 (roughly $163). This involves commuting from Tarbiat[25] to Niamey, and then from Niamey, they board buses that bring them straight to Kwame Nkrumah Circle in Accra. The participants reported a higher figure because as migrants without documents they needed to pay some kickbacks to officials and also pay for the services of agents needed to access the illegal routes. Thus for one to be able to embark on this journey, he or she needs to meet the financial demands involved. Either this person can pay from his or her savings or can fall on their kin and other members of the village to provide the capital needed for the trip. Habiba, an adult migrant, for instance, took a loan of GHS1000 (roughly $163) from a relative and paid it in one year. Zainab, a young Tuareg migrant, on the other hand, stated that "my mother paid for me. It was like GHS800 (roughly $130)". The Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra are thus those that have access to capital from their immediate households or relatives to support their migration.

Others also relied on friends for financial support and migration intelligence. In my findings, the collective term "my people" ran through all the interviews conducted. "My people" was used to describe other migrants of Tuareg origin who lived in both sites of study. Abbas, when

[25] A village close to Abala Filingue in the Tillaberi region of Niger where most of these migrants reported to originate from.

talking about the nomadic lifestyle of the people at Vulcanizer, for instance, stated that “My people that you see over here, they don’t stay at a place for a long time, in a short while they will go to another place”. It was used by the interviewees to differentiate themselves from other Nigerien migrants in Ghana. Habiba for instance stated that “my people were not there. There were no Tuaregs and I don’t feel comfortable living in a place where there are no Tuaregs. I don’t like that I know my people are here and I am living at a place different from where my people are”. It was also used to describe those Tuaregs left behind in the villages at Abala. Mariam when describing how she got to hear of Vulcanizer stated that “my people told me where to come right from Niger. They told me that when I get to Accra I should get down at the mall and walk to this place".

The use of “my people” suggests a sense of attachment to the ethnic group. Take for instance Rabia’s comment on what she does for a living here in Accra. She surmised that “I beg. Sometimes I get money but not everyone gives you money. Those days I don’t get money I borrow from my brothers and sisters” . When asked if every body at the camp were her family she emphatically answered “yes. Because we come from the same place I consider them my brothers and sisters”. Abbas also stated that “all the people who are here are my family. We are all the same. Those from Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and all who speak my language, when they meet one another they know they are brothers. You can’t say this one is not my brother” . Although it may be argued that it is a coping strategy to navigate their positions as migrants in a faraway country that shares little characteristics with their countries of origin, Tuareg society’s highly stratified caste system has morphed into one where gradually lines between these former categories have become blurred (Rasmussen, 1999). The shared experience of discrimination and marginalization at the hands of the French colonial masters and the post-

colonial governments of Niger and Mali has created a deep sense of attachment to the collective Tuareg group (Alesbury, 2013). In the past, there were nobles, vassals and slaves. Now there are "my people" irrespective of your clan according to the former caste system. Therefore an individual may not be a member of one's kin group, nonetheless, because of the shared culture, language and physical features, and experiences as marginalized people, there is a shared collective sensibility. That is why a Tuareg migrant in Ghana would move from a Zongo community where there are other Nigerien migrants from different ethnic origins to a camp that is solely shared by Tuareg migrants irrespective of their countries of origin. Habiba, already mentioned above, first settled at a mosque in Tema. Over time she moved to Vulcanizer.

In like manner Munira, an adult female Tuareg migrant is willing to send money home to support other members in her village to migrate to Ghana. This is because according to her "we had some of us here who sent us money, if not for them, we wouldn't have been able to come here". The case of the Tuareg migrants in Accra is proof of the point that the distinction between kinship and friendship in terms of their influence on migration decisions is eroding (Darkwah et al., 2019). Especially amongst the young Tuareg migrants who move independently to Accra, there is no difference between the impact of their family and friends on their migration decisions. For example, on my last visit to Sabon Zongo, I met Hassan, a 19-year-old Tuareg migrant from Niger. At the time, he had just returned from a short visit to his mother in Niger. He originally settled at Sabon Zongo with his step-father who lived at Sabon Zongo. But when I met him, he was in the company of Anwar, a friend of his who lived at Vulcanizer. Anwar was at Sabon Zongo to help Hassan convey his luggage to Vulcanizer. This was because after visiting Vulcanizer, Hassan had decided that he was no longer going to

live with his step-father at Sabon Zongo. Below is what ensued between Hassan, his friend Anwar and me.

Extract 1.

> Interviewer: Why are you going back to Vulcanizer?
>
> Hasaan: I came with my bag here [Sabon Zongo] but I left it and went to the Accra Mall to see my friend.
>
> Interviewer: And you are going back to the Accra Mall?
>
> Hassan: Yes.
>
> Anwar: I have registered him.
>
> Interviewer: But Anwar why don't you want him to be here [Sabon Zongo]?
>
> Anwar: I want him to be with me.
>
> Hassan: He is my friend because I didn't have any friend here [Sabon Zongo].

From the conversation above in Extract 1, we find that although Hassan was living with his step-father in Sabon Zongo, that was not enough to ensure his continuous stay in the area. He needed to be around his friends. This case of Hassan and his friend Anwar is consistent with the assertion that both kinship and friendship are two types of social relationships that influence migration decisions and the ability of people to migrate (Guichard et al., 2014).

In summary, some mediating drivers enable Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra to implement and sustain their migration decisions. The intersection of regional migration policy, available logistics and economic resources has created a driver complex (Van Hear et al., 2018) that mediates the migration process amongst the Tuareg migrants in Accra. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of persons has facilitated migration in the West-African sub-region. There have, however, been some challenges in the implementation of the policy in Ghana. The security agencies in charge of examining migrants' travel documents are not strict

in their operations. At a fee, sometimes these security officers bend the rules for illegal migrants to enter the country. These challenges are exploited by Tuareg migrants in Accra irrespective of the fact that Ghanaian laws limit their entry into Ghana. Also, recognized transport services that transport migrants from Niger to Ghana have removed the barrier that otherwise would have limited movements of Tuareg migrants to Ghana. Also, the knowledge of illegal routes into Ghana and available smuggling networks further facilitate the movements of Tuareg migrants to Ghana. Lastly, the Tuareg migrant on the streets of Accra is not the "poorest of poor" of the Tuareg societies. They are the ones who can unilaterally meet the financial demands of international migration or maximise existing support either from family or friends to facilitate their movement to Ghana.

4.2 Ghana, Africa's Land of opportunities

Inequalities in terms of political stability and economic growth between Ghana and the countries of origin of the Tuareg migrants in Accra are predisposing drivers of the international migration of Tuareg migrants to Ghana. Ghana's fourth republic has been characterized by relative political stability which can be seen in the organization of peaceful elections and the peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another (Morrison, 2004; Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). In contrast, the transfer of power from President Mahamadou Issoufou to Mohamed Bazoum in April 2021, is Niger's first democratic transition of power since it gained independence from its French colonial masters in 1960 (Gyimah-Boadi et al., 2021). About the same time in May 2021**,** Col Assimi Goïta led a coup d'etat that overthrew the democratic government of President Bah Ndaw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane in Mali.

Ghana is well ahead of Mali and Niger in terms of economic growth and human development. Generally, in terms of economic growth, Ghana is doing better than Niger and Mali. Data from figure 4.1 confirm that Ghana is experiencing significant economic growth as compared to Mali and Niger.

From the World Development Indicators, Ghana recorded 14.04 percent annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2011 which was about 23 percent higher than both Niger and Mali. In recent years, the annual GDP growth per capita of Ghana ranges from 4 percent to 6 percent. However, the highest of Niger's annual GDP growth per capita within the recent covid 19 free years is 3.2 percent and that of Mali is approximately 2.7 percent (recorded in 2018 and 2016 respectively). Indeed, except for the years 2014 to 2016, Ghana's GDP growth rate has been consistently higher than that of Niger and Mali.

Figure 4.1 Growth Rates Between Ghana, Mali And Niger From 2011-2021



Source: World Development Indicators (Accessed on the 17th November, 2021)

The differences in the area of economic growth mirror the poverty levels in these countries. This is because the 2021 UNDP Human Development report on global poverty levels, for instance, estimates that 76.3 percent of Niger's population experience severe multidimensional poverty.In Ghana it is estimated at 8.4 percent making it appear insignificant in comparison to Niger. Especially amongst the Tuareg regions poverty rates are higher than that of the other groups. A survey in Mali in 2018 for instance ranked the Tuareg area as the poorest area with a Multidimensional Poverty index of 0.522 as against the country rate of 0.376 (UNDP, 2021).

Disparities in political stability and economic growth between Ghana and the countries of origin of these Tuareg migrants are only predisposing drivers in Tuareg migration. They are not necessarily what draw them to Ghana. That is because, in the area of economic growth, for instance, countries like Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire are also economic powerhouses in the subregion (Kamoche et al., 2004; Babajide, Adegboye and Omankhanlen, 2015). Indeed Ghana was usually not the first choice for the Tuareg migrant. A large proportion of interviewees reported having lived in countries like Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali before moving to Ghana. Abbas, described in the opening vignette to this chapter, first moved to Nigeria before coming to Ghana. Hassan was born in Nigeria and lived in Côte d'Ivoire with his parents before moving to Ghana. Proximity to some of these countries and a shared common language (French) were reported as the factors that attracted them to these countries.

Opportunities available in Ghana to these Tuareg migrants can be explained as proximate drivers that draw them to Ghana. These Tuareg migrants, as we shall see in the next chapter, have over the years developed a culture of migration where they purposefully come to Ghana to beg. The movement to Ghana from other countries in the subregion is thus motivated by the

interest in their panhandling activities. In Ghana, unlike the other countries in the West African subregion, the interaction of the relative political stability, the shortfalls in the implementation of Ghanaian laws on begging and the better treatment provided by Ghanaians allow these Tuareg migrants to pursue their economic goals.

To put this in perspective, generally, the West-African Sahelian countries are politically volatile states prone to conflicts. Both Niger and Mali have been characterized by endless armed rebellions by minority groups. The recent armed rebellions in Mali started in March 2012 when rebels attacked towns in northern Mali (Kone, 2017). Since then the country has been characterized by recurrent rebellions.

Niger's case is similar but has become more profound especially if you throw in the issues surrounding the exploration of uranium and the political economy of conflict it produces (Keenan, 2008). Other countries in the Sahel region that border Niger and Mali have had their share of conflicts and political instabilities. Nigeria for example is still battling Islamist Jihadists in the north of the country (Onuoha, 2014). Burkina Faso and Chad are also plagued with the presence of non-state armed groups (Diallo, 2017) with the former experiencing a coup d'etat as recent as September 2015.

The conflict situation in Ghana is, however, different. Although the occasional conflicts in the northern part of Ghana and the recurrent Nkonya and Alavanyo conflict in the Oti region are disturbing, in comparison to other countries in the sub-region there is relative peace in Ghana. Ghana is generally more secure (Tsikata and Seini, 2004). The peace and stability enjoyed in Ghana were reported as a reason for the movement specifically to Ghana. As Bilal noted, "They

used to say there is a lot of freedom in Ghana". And in the words of Rabia, "Our people were here and we have heard how peaceful Ghana is".

Furthermore, the constitution of Ghana grants rights and freedoms to persons found within the territory of Ghana. It entitles "every person in Ghana", regardless of their race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, creed or gender to the fundamental human rights and freedoms which are enshrined in the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, Chapter 5, Article 12). The rights spelt out in the constitution are to be enjoyed by every person in Ghana whether they are natural or legal persons (legal persons include incorporated bodies or companies). The law therein makes no distinction between legal and illegal migrants, or between citizens and non-citizens, unlike other clauses which expressly reserve some privileges for Ghanaians. eg Article 4, on the right and duty to defend the Constitution, and Article 42 on the right to vote, are reserved for citizens of Ghana only. Therefore although the Tuareg migrants are illegal migrants, Ghana's law allows them some freedoms and rights[26].

The presence of Zongo communities in Ghana also ensures that these Tuareg migrants irrespective of their status as illegal migrants have a place to lodge when they first move to Ghana. Madina, Ashaiman Zongo, Nima and Sabon Zongo in the Greater Accra Region are full of migrants from all over Ghana and other countries in the West African subregion. In Sabon Zongo in particular there is a dedicated place for the Tuareg migrants. Mallam Imurana explained that:

> As I told you. This house that you see, we dey receive people. Any person who comes to Sabon Zongo will get a place a stay. Sabon Zongo is different from other places like Nima and so on. Sabon Zongo is a Muslim or Hausa village and so if you are a Muslim even if you are not a Muslim if you come to Sabon Zongo you will have a place to stay. Especially our house [Bako Family]. After our house, many big big houses have learnt

[26] Their rights and freedoms are subject to the laws of Ghana relating to the activities of illegal immigrants in the country.

> that. There is a mosque here, there are Niger people [Nigeriens from other ethnic groups], there are Nigeria people, plenty beggars wey dem dey beg. But any place wey you come from, you will get a place to sleep in the morning you go and find something to do to earn something. Therefore the people rush here.

This is different from the experience of the Tuareg migrants in other countries where they report unfavourable living conditions. Abbas explains the differences in the experiences of Tuareg migrants in other parts of the sub-region and Ghana:

> In Ghana if only you are in the country, they don't have a problem with you. But at the border they know what to do to you to get you to pass. But when you are in the country, they won't worry you. They won't even talk to you. Ghana is not like Nigeria. In Nigeria anywhere an immigration officer sees you they will collect something. Even when you have papers, they will tell you "ein no be papers I go chop". Ghanaians follow the law. Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina are all part of ECOWAS but they worry. Every day they have been arresting our people in Côte d'Ivoire. They put them in cell unless they pay a lot of money before they bail them. Even people from Chad will not have problems in Ghana although they are not part of the ECOWAS.

Zainab a young Tuareg migrant who had lived in Togo also said that "where we were sleeping, Ghana is better than that place, where we were bathing. In Lome we were bathing on the road". Additionally begging although illegal in Ghana is still widely practised. The various traffic stops and commercial areas in Accra for instance are widely littered with beggars from different backgrounds (Asante, 2006). Makafi Massalaci in Sabon Zongo, for instance, is a special area allocated for blind beggars in the community (Pellow, 2003). They have a mosque dedicated to them and a subchief who reports to the chief of Sabon Zongo (Dauncey, 2016). Indeed it is not uncommon for one to experience beggars, especially in Zongo communities. I experienced several during my time on the field. Therefore the Tuareg migrants begging on the streets of Accra is neither unusual nor distinctive to their group. The Tuareg migrants are thus drawn to Ghana because of the available opportunity for begging in Ghana which they maximize to meet their economic goals. They draw on the "benevolent" nature of Ghanaians particularly to their group as a reason why they move to Ghana. One must tread cautiously in dwelling on the case

of the Tuareg migrants in Ghana to brand Ghanaians as hospitable or benevolent. Favourable attitudes from Ghanaians towards migrants in Ghana are not universal. Darkwah (2019) for instance argues that some Nigerian migrants in Ghana as a result of othering by Ghanaians have negative experiences at their workplaces and their places of residence. The Lebanese community in Ghana, largely considered an auxiliary diaspora connected to British colonialism, also faced hostilities from indigenous Ghanaians who could not direct their frustrations to the British colonial masters (Akyeampong, 2006). Indeed even the Tuareg migrants themselves reported countless times when as beggars on the streets, Ghanaians hurled insults at them. Therefore the positive or favourable experiences as a migrant in Ghana at best can be explained as dependent on the individual's country of origin (Akyeampong, 2000; Darkwah and Ampofo, 2008; Veens, 2017) and the activity to be practised in Ghana (Akyeampong, 2006; Darkwah, 2019).

4.3 Conclusion

In effect the political and economic freedoms afforded the Tuareg migrants in Ghana match their economic interests. Over the years, Tuareg migrants have developed a culture of migration for begging. Ghana is a politically stable country with democratic provisions that allow the Tuareg migrants some rights and freedoms. Also, there are loopholes in the implementation of laws on begging which are non-existent, especially in relation to other countries in the West African subregion. Tuareg migrants have been in Ghana for decades. This enables migration intelligence and networks which result in the perpetual phenomenon of Tuareg migration to Ghana.

CHAPTER FIVE

MA ME ONE CEDI, ME Pɛ ONE CEDI[27]: MIGRATION FOR BEGGING AMONGST TUAREG MIGRANTS IN ACCRA

5.0 Introduction

> I was small when we left Niger. I don't like begging, but if you say I don't want to beg, I don't want to beg, what will you eat? What will you do?

Zainab, quoted above, is a 19-year-old Tuareg migrant from Niger. Her first experience in Ghana was when she moved with her mother and stepfather to Ghana as a child. Currently, she lives in Ghana with her mother and siblings at Vulcanizer. My first experience with Zainab was at the Accra Mall when I saw her sitting at a distance looking on as her younger siblings pestered me for money. "Ma me one cedi, me pɛ one cedi" they cried out. Holding on to my trousers, they would not let go unless I gave them money. As a young person, Zainab acknowledged the need to work. Recounting her experiences as a beggar on the streets, she surmised that "some of them (the passersby) will talk to you and say go and sell pure water (Sachet water). Yes, that is the truth, I should go and work because the money they give me they worked before they got it". Irrespective of this position, however, every day Zainab accompanies her younger siblings to beg. The position of Zainab concerning the need to make money from more dignifying avenues was shared by all the participants in this study. Nonetheless, all the participants were either currently active beggars or had a history of

[27] An expression in the Twi language which translates as "give me one cedi, I want one cedi" and is the usual cry of the Tuareg beggars on the streets of Accra.

begging. How did these Tuaregs, a people of such noble origins, turn to begging as a means to an economic end?

Begging as an economic activity practised by Tuareg migrants in Ghana is examined in this chapter. The chapter explains how these Tuareg migrants have developed a "culture of migration" for begging in Ghana over the years, ensuring the act's perpetuation. Two main questions are addressed: Why has begging become a common livelihood strategy amongst the Tuareg migrants? How are the begging activities of Tuaregs in Ghana different from other beggars on the streets of Accra?

I will explore their lived experiences as beggars on the streets of Accra highlighting how the people became involved in begging, the motivations for begging, the benefits derived from begging and those aspects of their panhandling activities that make them a unique people in Accra's urban space.

5.1 International Migration for begging amongst Tuareg Migrants in Accra

5.1.1 Towards a Culture of begging

The Tuaregs on the streets of Accra have developed a culture of migration for begging in Ghana. Migration to Ghana has been a common feature amongst these Tuareg migrants for decades and thus the young and old from the Tuareg society have developed a rather realistic understanding of this process. In Ghana, the Tuaregs mainly come to beg. In tracing the history of Tuaregs in Sabon Zongo, for instance, Chief Yahaya explained that:

> Those who first came here since time immemorial were the blacks. They are their kind (the racially white Tuaregs) but they are the blacks. They came at the very early stage. They mainly came in search of money but they were never accompanied by their wives. After they attained their goals of making money they went back. As to when they first came to this place by then I wasn't born. I am ninety years now but by then I wasn't

> born and so I cannot predict when they came here. We grew up seeing those people. They mainly slept at the chief's palace. There was a place there reserved for strangers. So, they came and slept there. It is very close to the mosque. They were very strong in religion. They had a lot of knowledge of the Quran, they didn't have to open the Quran they had it all memorized. That is why our fathers welcomed them. They gave them the love they showed them the care because of the worship. They were very strong in Islam. They adhered to the principles strictly. The time the white ones came, their parents were far gone. It was left with 2 or 3 of their parents before these white ones started coming. When they came, they joined the black ones at their quarters. These white ones, however, came with their wives and children. They were also Muslims, they prayed they recited the Quran they did a lot concerning the worship. They also came in search of money but they went back home after they got the money. They later returned after a while in their homeland.

The racially black Tuaregs, he explained, came as herbalists and magicians. This is corroborated by the views of Mallam Imurana. According to him, "they are all one people but they speak different dialect. They are all one people. It's like Ga and Krobo[28]. The black ones are mostly from Mali. All their traditions are one. The black ones they don't beg. They sell medicine. They don't even come with their wives". Thus the racially black Tuaregs healed the sick for a fee and performed magic to onlookers. When asked about the racially white Tuareg migrant, Chief Yahaya remarked emphatically that "for them they came here just to beg. It was purposely to beg". The views of Chief Yahaya is consistent with the 60-year-old Tuareg migrant who surmised that:

> In our culture in the past, we didn't know how to beg from someone. If one didn't have something like a lot of cows for milk, all you needed to do was to go to a family member who has more and explain the situation to the person. What we knew was Salaka. If you have milk and another does not have you can go and give the person milk without anyone knowing. We didn't know money, we didn't know that one can go and ask for money from another person. It was when we came to Africa here that we saw that thing. We saw the Hausa people doing it here that's when our people learnt how to beg. We didn't know how to beg.

[28] The Ga and Krobo languages are two different but closely related languages spoken by the Ga-Adangbe people in Southern Ghana.

The reference to "Africa here" does not suggest that Tuaregs started begging in Ghana. This is because Abbas reported that his first experience with international migration was to the north of Nigeria. The Hausa ethnic group he mentioned is located in the northern part of Nigeria. Cohen (1969) observed that "amongst the Hausa of Sabo, as among the Hausa elsewhere in West Africa, begging is a highly organized industry[29] which plays a crucial role in the migratory process and in the organization of the Hausa diaspora" (p.42). In Ghana, a report in 1954 for instance revealed that Hausa beggars in Ghana had moved from Sokoto through to Kano and Lagos to Ghana begging along the way for transport fare (Clarkson, 1956). Chief Yahaya of Sabon Zongo - an Islamic community dominated by Hausa culture, succinctly remarked that "for begging it is common here. The handicapped here always beg".

Begging is, however, not distinctive to the Hausa ethnic group. As has been shown elsewhere in Ghana (Fuseini and Daniel, 2018), Senegal (Diop, 2010; Bop and Truong, 2014) and Nigeria (Adebayo et al., 2014), in the West African sub-region it is a common practice among other ethnic groups. Neither is it distinctive to one particular religious group (Asante, 2006) although it is prevalent amongst ethnic groups that are Muslim dominant (Ogunkan and Fawole, 2009; Thorsen, 2012). According to Cohen (1969), begging among the Hausa, like among other Muslim people, is founded on the principle of alms-giving, which is one of the five pillars of orthodox Islam and requires a believer to contribute a modest amount of his annual income to the destitute. And so it is common to see beggars at various mosques during Jum'ah prayers or Muslim festivals begging for alms.

[29] For further discussions on the various categories of beggars in the Hausa society, see Cohen (1969)

Another form of begging popular in West African countries that can be associated with the Islamic religion is begging amongst the Talibé. Thorsen (2012:3) observed that "Talibés come from all ethnic groups, especially in countries like Mauritania, Niger, the Gambia, Senegal and Mali and Guinea", where Muslims are the majority. Begging amongst the Talibé is the phenomenon where young boys and sometimes girls under the tutelage of a Marabout (an Islamic teacher) in the traditional Koranic school system are made to beg. As explained by Diop (2010) this phenomenon is a product of poverty since the marabouts are expected to care for and provide the educational needs of the Talibés without help from anyone. In the past, the marabouts received some form of support from the community. In recent times, however, due to increased poverty in the rural areas, the marabouts and the Talibés have had to migrate to urban centres in search of money to support their educational activities. While in the urban centres the marabouts sometimes abandon the education component of their association with the Talibés and force these young boys and girls to beg. In Nigeria (Usman, 2008) and Senegal (Bop and Truong, 2014; Zoumanigui, 2016) it has been shown that begging amongst the Talibé has over the years become an activity solely motivated by the desire of these marabouts to make money at the expense of the young boys and girls who are exploited and denied of their fundamental human rights. Over time the phenomenon has morphed into active begging practices where marabouts and the Talibés move solely to beg at the urban centres. The exploitative nature of the phenomenon and the fact that it infringes on the human rights of these young boys and girls has led to several calls for its abolishment (Delap, 2009; Human Right Watch, 2019), nonetheless, it is a practice that is pervasive in the Islamic-dominant West African regions.

The form of begging practised by the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra has components that reflect other forms of begging in the Islamic world and begging amongst the Talibé. As Muslims, they are commonly found in the Zongos and at the various mosques on Fridays begging for instance. That aspect where young boys and girls are made to beg whiles an adult male supervises from afar is similar to the begging amongst the Talibé. Therefore it is not surprising for Abass to remark that "we saw the Hausa people doing it here that's when our people learnt how to beg. We didn't know how to beg". Unlike the Roma migrants in the Scandinavian countries whose acts of begging are considered a result of a development of an oppositional culture to the mainstream culture of their host countries (Friberg, 2020), Tuareg migrants in their West African host countries came into contact with cultures where begging was common. Therefore begging amongst the Tuaregs can be conceptualized as perhaps a learned practice from their interactions with other West African societies.

The dominant status of the Tuareg societies in the past meant in the pre-colonial and colonial times they could exact tributes from the other surrounding ethnic groups (Lecocq and Klute, 2013). Tuareg society now is, however, not what it used to be in the past. Lecocq (2004:89) argues that "a generation of Tuaregs born in the 1950s grew up with forced sedentarization and education, social economic destruction by drought and state agents, and social economic marginality in nation states ruling their land". Therefore the international migration for begging can be said to be a learned activity adopted by the Tuaregs to navigate their impoverished and marginalized state. Living as migrants amongst predominantly Islamic ethnic groups in the West African sub-region, Tuaregs came into contact with cultures where begging was common. As a people with little to no skills in sedentary living, the Tuaregs adopted begging as a strategy for survival. Schwartz (1992) provides an explanation for culture in his statement below:

> Culture consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves" (Schwartz, 1992 cited in Avruch, 1998:17).

Therefore although begging has not always been a part of Tuareg culture, to the extent that peoples' experiences inform the formation of certain ways of doing things, I argue that in recent times amongst the Tuaregs in Accra, international migration for begging has become an economic arrangement that has become an integral part of their society.

5.1.2 Culture of Migration amongst Tuareg Migrants

Societies with a long history of migration over time develop new sets of values and cultural orientations that are influenced by earlier migratory experiences. This is what is termed a culture of migration (Massey et al., 1993). The Tuaregs in Accra have therefore developed a "culture of migration" specifically for begging in Ghana. This is found in three ways.

First and foremost, the practice of begging in Ghana has been a feature amongst the Tuaregs for decades and therefore, especially the young Tuaregs, have developed extensive knowledge of the phenomenon. The Tuareg migrants in Accra have acquired knowledge such as the various parts of Accra that were most rewarding, the particular days in the week where these places in Accra were most rewarding, the various risks involved in entering some spaces and how to overcome the limitations in accessing these spaces. It is important at this point to note that this knowledge was basic and shared amongst the Tuareg migrants in Accra.

Interviews on Sundays had to be cut short because especially amongst the young female Tuareg migrants, late Sunday afternoon was a busy time. On my first Sunday at the Vulcanizer camp, I was intrigued by the somewhat chaotic scenes amongst the young females at the camp. No

one would talk to me. Even those who had agreed to participate in the study ignored me. Buckets were being thrown around. People were shouting at those already taking their bath to hurry up so others could have their turn. Others who had finished bathing and had dressed up were applying makeup and getting ready. Even young children below 13 years per my estimation were also busily preparing. To satisfy my curiosity I asked Anwar, my translator, what was going on. He explained that they were preparing for the trip to Labadi Beach. Later when they agreed to participate in the study, I asked what they did at Labadi beach. Aliyah commented that "we swim and beg". Nadjat, the oldest of the group explained that on Sundays fraud boys[30] visit Labadi beach from late evening to the wee hours of the night. These fraud boys give them huge monies on Sundays and so they go with the younger siblings to beg.

The young Tuareg women leave around 5 p.m. because they do not have money to pay for a ticket to enter the beach. They, therefore, use an unapproved route into the facility, swim for a while in anticipation of their benevolent donors and beg from them when they eventually arrive. Nadjat explained that: "We swim at the beach only on Sunday in the evening. We pass the bush road. I just go to swim and come back". Zainab during an interview stated that "well as we speak we are going to Labadi. We are going to beg. I go with my small sister". When asked what roles her younger sister would be playing at the beach, she affirmed that the younger sister will do the begging. Nadjat, already described above, is thus right to say that "I just swim and come back" because as the oldest of the group she only swims and supervises the very young Tuareg migrants to beg.

[30] Fraud boys, also known as Sakawa boys, are young boys known to be involved in cybercrime. (see Warner, 2011 for further discussions on the subject)

Secondly, a particular society is said to have a "culture of migration" when as a result of constant migration, it develops new beliefs and value systems associated with migration. Over time a society where migration is common develops different interpretations of the phenomenon of migration and migrants in general (Horváth, 2008). In this sense, the Tuareg migrants can be said to have developed a culture of migration for begging in Ghana. Irrespective of the negative experiences faced by the Tuareg migrants in Accra, they keep coming back after a few months' stay in their countries of origin. From their comments, the Tuareg migrants accepted the idea of being perceived and treated as outsiders by Ghanaian authorities and society at large, often at the mercy of discriminatory treatments and insults. Nevertheless, discrimination and insults appeared acceptable in light of the long-term goal of income maximization, a point shared amongst the participants in the study. The fact that they made more in Ghana meant they had more to spend when they go back to their countries or on their future aspirations. Zainab explained that "I was small when we left Niger. I don't like begging, but if you say I don't want to beg, I don't want to beg, what will you eat?" What will you do?". As a follow-up question to her comment on her state as a beggar she was asked if she gets enough from begging. Her answer was "yes if I beg I can get like Ghs40.00 (roughly $8) per day or Ghs50.00 (roughly $10). If I come I can eat Ghs10.00 (roughly $2) and save the rest". As a student in Niger, Zainab was saving towards her fees when school resumes. Habiba also opined that "I don't like it (begging) but I don't know what to do apart from that. If I know another thing to do to get money I would do it. If you don't have money, then you have to beg". Habiba owns a shop in Niger. According to her, "I have a store in Niger. I borrow money to stock the shop, I found someone to sell them for me, I came here to beg for money to be able to pay the loan". Although she claims to make profits from the shop back home when

asked if she permanently would move back to Niger she responded no. And this she explained was a result of the fact that irrespective of their plights in Ghana, she prefers to live here. Migration to Ghana purposely for begging has thus become a desirable activity amongst the Tuareg migrants. Apart from Anwar, a 17-year-old Tuareg migrant who has the aspiration of moving to Europe to play professional football, Hamza who intends to go back to Niger to work in the migrant smuggling industry, and Hassan who views being in Ghana as part of his journey to Spain, all the young migrants, for instance, viewed Ghana as the last stop. They stressed the benefits of moving to Ghana as a reason why they prefer to live here and nowhere else.

Lastly, Horváth (2008:774) explained that amongst societies that develop a culture of migration "from a possible, optional or desirable practice, migration can turn into a crucial and necessary social act, that is quasi compulsory for certain social categories". A common feature amongst the young Tuareg migrants was migration to Ghana when school was at recess in Niger. Increasingly young Tuareg migrants were coming to Ghana independent of their parents. These are usually those who have histories of begging in Ghana but had to go back to their countries for one reason or another. To the extent that migration to Ghana is conceptualized as a desirable experience, these young Tuareg migrants keep coming to Ghana every year. Kabir is a student in Niger's educational system. As a child, he came to Ghana with his parents to beg. They later moved back to Niger, this time not to Tarbiat but to Niamey, the capital of Niger. He explained that during long vacations he comes to Ghana and that is because of the educational benefits he derives from migrating. He surmised that "I chose to migrate because I want to spend my vacation here and find something to do here so that when I go back, I will do well". His decision to move to Ghana was not without contestation from his household. He later reported that:

> When I wanted to come, I asked them, some agreed some did not agree because they said I should stay at home and study even while we were on vacation. But I told them that it's no problem when I come back, I would just work hard. Later all of them said okay I can come. They decided to leave me with my own decision that is why.

According to him being in Ghana helps him improve his knowledge of the English language.

In his words:

> Because although we speak French at school, we learn the English language and so I decided to come here because they speak English here so that I will understand so that when I go, English will not be difficult for me. Now I am okay in French and so now I want to be okay in English. Because I see so many people there, my friends they don't understand English at all even if the teacher comes, they will go out. You will ask them why they don't know what you are saying whether you are speaking English or Chinese.

Kabir's case[31] presented an opportunity to advance knowledge on why Tuareg migrants move to Ghana. After probing further he recounted that his choice of Ghana particularly was because of his past as a migrant in Ghana.

> That is because I have been here before. That was when I was small so I prefer here. I have never gone to Nigeria. It was after I went back to Niger that my parents put me in school. I came with my family when I was a little boy as you see our friends here do. Later they put me in school but during vacations, I used to come back here. I wanted to see the world. I have been staying in Niger since age one so spending 2 or 3 months at another place is good for me to see how life is elsewhere. Yes, it will help me to see how life is so when I go back I would understand certain things that I wouldn't have understood if I were to be in Niger.

His valorized view of migration as one that will help him "see the world", not only affirms the nomadic lifestyles amongst Tuareg societies but also describes the culture of migration amongst Tuareg from the perspectives of a society that has developed beliefs and values around

[31] I was interested in the case of Kabir for two reasons. The first was the fact that he was the first Tuareg migrant who agreed to participate in the study. And so his views were the first I gathered in the research. His views were also different from the regular narratives of the Tuareg migrants in Accra who are usually perceived as beggars. Personally it was an eye opener although I had seen videos on Youtube where young Tuareg migrants reported that they come to Ghana when they are vacation, none had reported that it was because they wanted to learn the English language.

a particular migration pattern and the fact that migration has become a desirable practice amongst the Tuaregs and so, especially amongst the young Tuaregs, it has become a necessary endeavour to do.

5.2 Beggars on the streets of Accra

The form of begging practised by the Tuaregs in Accra is best described by Donyina (2019:1). According to her:

> On the foot walk near the Accra Mall and in many other parts of the bustling city of Accra, there is the now familiar sight of little children who should be in school, instead chasing after cars and following pedestrians to importune them for money. We sometimes see the parents sitting afar of [sic] beckoning the children to continue their begging. Sometimes, we see mothers with helpless babes in arms begging in traffic. A few years back they looked amusing, speaking the little local dialect they managed to pick up. Presently, some use abusive words if you do not oblige them. Often, the children, persistent through practice, hold on to you until you give them money. You can see some of them running alongside the cars as they drive off from traffic stops in Accra.

The Tuareg beggars described above have discredited stigma. They beg in the open and so their activities are in the full glare of the public. Anwar when commenting on the begging activities of Tuaregs in Accra stated that:

> when you go you ask people for money. Normally we go to big big places. You see Accra mall is a big place. Palace mall is a big place. 37, some also go to estate junction, some are in Ashaiman, Kasoa some go to Lapaz some big big place. There is no particular day we don't beg. It depends on our parents. We are children and so we don't have choices. For me when I was a child my senior brother woke us up at 5 O'clock in the morning. We pray and then we go to Madina. At Madina we will be there until it is 3oclock in the afternoon when we come to the Accra mall. We beg at Accra mall small when it's about six in the evening we go back to Ashaiman. We got to Madina everyday sometimes even before 6 oclock in the morning because the place will be a bit dark and people will be going to work in the morning. At 3pm the mall will be busy. So we come there .

They are also fully aware that generally, their activities are frowned on by passersby – witness the insults hurled at them - but they continue their activities.

Furthermore, their relatives back in their home countries and in Ghana know that they are beggars and so they have nothing to hide. For Zainab, although a student in Niger, her mother was the one who requested that she come to Ghana since as a new mother she could not travel with Zainab's younger siblings to beg in Ghana. Zainab described her situation as follows:

> You see my mum begged me to come here. I told her I didn't want to come but she told me to come. Right now that we are here school is on break. After three months school will resume. She begged me to come here but I said I won't and she said she has children she can't come with them. That's why I came here. When school resumes, I will go back .

According to Asante (2006), to maintain a certain level of integration in society, people with discredited stigma adopt coping strategies to deal with the situation. He described for instance how disabled beggars in Accra who do not want relatives to find out what they do, would construct narratives around their activities that are consistent with the core values of mainstream society. Other able-bodied beggars, he stressed, used their status as poor people as an excuse for their activities as though these were justifications for begging. These according to Asante (2006) were coping mechanisms to emphasize their conformity to societal norms and values.

The Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra, however, could be described as marginal men according to Park (1928). Living in two very different societies, they could only go so far in terms of their integration into Ghanaian societies. As explained by Park (1928), the process of assimilation and acculturation amongst marginal men does not happen overnight. Especially where there are differences in race, it can take a long time or may not even occur. The reason for this, he explained, was not necessarily because of differences in mentality but because of the difference in their physical features. Therefore, with all the various monikers and their associated negative stereotypes attached to their group here in Ghana, the Tuareg beggars were

aware of their condition as strangers in another country and therefore did not pay so much attention to that. An adult Tuareg beggar for instance recounted her experience of a failed job application. According to her:

> We didn't get anybody who would offer us work. Truthfully, when I came here at first, I knew a woman at Kotobabi who run a store where she sold jewelries and she said she would offer me work at her shop so that I can enroll my children in school. I said Okay. I also want to enroll my children because if they go to school, I will also benefit. I know this work (begging) we do is not good but because we don't have any decent work to do, that's why we do it. If you don't find anything to do in order to sustain yourself, how will you survive? What Allah says you will do is what you will do.What they see us doing is not something we are happy about but it has become a necessary means of survival for us. Everybody wants his child to be educated and be independent and work in future but we didn't get it that way. She said I should come very early in the morning so she can give me work. I had to leave my children behind. I got there and she said I was late I got there at 9 o'clock. She said I should get there by 7 o'clock or 6 o'clock I told her I got late because of go-slow [traffic jam]. Even if you wake up at 4 o'clock and decide to board a vehicle, you will still encounter go-slow. That was it. She refused to give me the job. Already, it seemed she never planned on giving me a job. She was only playing with my mind to see if I would be interested or not .

Being late to the appointment, one would argue that the shop owner was right in denying Munira the job. However, her comments that the shop owner never planned to give her the job indicates that she was aware of her status as a Tuareg migrant and had resigned herself to the fact that people in Ghana would not want to give jobs to her kind. Habiba, another adult migrant, is one of the few migrants who had some skills. She had skills in hair braiding. During my time on the field, I saw her plait the hair of other Tuareg migrants at the camp. Her experience with Ghanaians was, however, negative. She explains that "they don't trust me, they don't know I have the skills to plait her and so they wouldn't want me to touch their hair". When asked if she had tried to put her skills to use she said yes. Nonetheless, she reported that even amongst the indigenous Ghanaians who lived at the camp, people would not patronize her services. In her own words, "I didn't make so much from it". When I met Kabir, he told me

about his frustrations in trying to secure a job in Accra. Although finding a job in Ghana is generally very difficult even for the average Ghanaian youth[32], for the Tuareg migrants in Accra, their status as marginal men (Park, 1928) compounds the situation making it almost impossible to secure jobs.

As a result, begging according to the Tuareg migrants has become a necessary activity. This I argue is a coping mechanism by these migrants to survive in a culture that is opposed to theirs. Hence irrespective of the insults hurled at them, the Tuareg migrants will continue to be on the streets of Accra. Their status as marginal men is the reason why they would choose to ignore the insults and negative experiences on the streets. Because as migrants in another country with limited opportunities they need to persevere irrespective of the negative experiences they face from the locals. Anwar for instance explains that "when I was begging as a child we didn't have to harass people but now it is difficult for people to give them money. People don't give them money now. So they have to do that. My time by then Ghana was good. Atta-Mills' time by then Ghana was good. But now things are hard". Their status as marginal men is also the reason why they may occasionally retaliate. And that is because living on the margins of society with very limited opportunities for integration they have nothing to lose in that regard. Aaliyah surmised that "some insult me but I don't mind them. It is not nice but there is nothing I can do about it. I feel bad. Some of them I insult them back because they are insulting me. Others I let it pass. Sometimes I just feel like insulting them back. At other times I don't feel like insulting them".

5.3 Conclusion

[32] To be discussed in the next chapter

In effect, the Tuareg societies, originally a hierarchical society with nobles, free people and slaves, have in recent times due to their association with other societies adopted begging as a strategy for economic gains. In Ghana, the Tuareg migrants have developed a culture of migration to Ghana where they specifically move to Ghana to beg.

CHAPTER SIX

TUAREG INTEGRATION INTO GHANAIAN SOCIETY

6.0 Introduction

> I am used to going to a new school. Some of them call me Fulani names. He is a Fulani, he is a Lebanese. Let me say this, some of them, they don't know I speak Twi because I told them I can't speak Twi. So most of them try to speak Twi and gossip about me. But I just laugh. We laugh together. I let it go. It is not anything big. That is not my aim.

Anwar, quoted above, was a 17-year-old first-year Senior High school student at the time of the interview. As a Tuareg migrant, Anwar's first experience in Ghana was when he moved to Ghana as a 7-year-old boy with his parents and siblings. He remarked that "for me myself I don't know why I was coming I was just happy. Because I was in a village and I am going to a city and so I was happy". As a little boy, he had no clue of what he was up against. This is because immediately they first settled in Tamale[33], reality struck, Anwar and his siblings were made to beg. He claimed he detested the act begging on the streets. He surmised that "I was begging in the North. I was being stubborn. I didn't like begging and so when it was time for me to go home, I went late and my father would flog me as usual". This went on for a while until a Ghanaian woman advised his father to take him to school. His new status as a student in Ghana's educational system, however, did not change his status as a beggar on the streets. This is because he reported that he continued to beg even when a student in Tamale. Over time he relocated with his father to Ashaiman Zongo at the Ashaiman Municipality where he stopped begging and made a lot of friends with the local people. Currently, he lives at

[33] Some of the Tuareg migrants reported that before "Rainbow" started operating, they travelled through Burkina Faso and entered Ghana from the northern part of the country. At the North they settled in Tamale; the regional capital of the Northern Region before later moving to the cities like Kumasi and Accra that are in the South of Ghana.

Vulcanizer. Even though he is one of the few Tuareg migrants being educated here in Ghana, his experiences are not different from that of the others in the Tuareg community. Anwar's account above is an example of the negative experiences Tuareg migrants faced as beggars in Accra. The story is not all doom and gloom. This is because Anwar's Junior High education for instance was in a private school[34] which was paid for by a Pastor in Ghana. Indeed when I asked which ways he thinks Ghanaians accept them, he commented that "Ghanaians are very good. They are very very good, They show us love. My people complain that the system is not good. I know if Ghanaians have money, they will give it to them because way back when I was begging as a child, I got money".

In this chapter, the experiences of Tuareg migrants in Accra are discussed. Two specific questions are addressed: to what extent are the Tuareg migrants in Accra integrated into Ghanaian society; what imagined futures these migrants have constructed and how their presence in Ghana contributes to that. The chapter is divided into 2 sections. First and foremost I will examine the extent of integration of Tuareg migrants in the Ghanaian society. I will also look at the aspirations and desires of the Tuareg migrants and what they are currently doing to realize their future goals and ambitions.

6.1 On the margins of Accra, yet not left out: Integration amongst Tuareg migrants

6.1.1 Towards a Tuareg Zongo? Residential Arrangements amongst the Tuaregs in Accra

[34] Ghana's educational system is characterized by private and public or government schools from the basic to the Tertiary levels. Especially at the Basic level; which comprises of the primary and Junior High schools, the private schools which are run by individuals and usually are for profit, are more expensive and more resourced as compared to those run by the government (Okyerefo, Fiaveh and Lamptey, 2011).

A primary component of the integration of Tuareg migrants is their residential arrangements in Accra. Where they live in Accra for instance informs the particular ethnic group(s) they come into contact with and this consequently affects the language they learn, the particular Ghanaian foods they eat, and the kind of social support they get from the local people. In this sense, the study revealed that the Islamic religion plays a crucial role in the integration of Tuareg migrants in Accra. The Tuaregs are first drawn to the Muslim dominant areas in Accra. Anwar commented: "we are Muslims so when you go to a Muslim place and you don't have a place, they will get a place for you". Zongos are quite popular amongst the Tuareg migrants since they are predominantly Islam communities. Sabon Zongo and Ashaiman Zongo were reported as the first places of residence in Accra. Habiba reported that "I was living in a mosque. It was in a market. I didn't know the place and so the only place I could go to was a mosque because I was a Muslim. When I got there they didn't sack me" .

Zongos are a melting pot for Islamic migrants in Ghana therefore although the Tuareg migrants were in a new country with cultures different from theirs, the Zongos presented a place with people albeit from different ethnic backgrounds but who shared the same religious beliefs and practices. Especially at Sabon Zongo, the Tuareg migrants were presented with a space allocated solely for them. They were also granted some form of protection by the leaders of the Sabon Zongo community.

The difference between the Tuareg migrants and the other migrants who live in the Zongos, however, is that unlike the other migrant groups in Zongos who remain in the quarters for a long period sometimes several generations, the Tuareg migrants do not stay there for long periods. The Zongos can be best explained as a place of transit after which they move to other

places in Accra. This is explained as stemming from the nomadic aspect of the Tuareg culture. Abbas explained that:

> My people that you see over here, they don't stay at a place for a long time, in a short while they will go to another place. That is their character. That is our culture. When we used to stay in the bush, you couldn't stay in the bush for more than one week. If you stayed in the place for more than one week, the place will be dirty and the animals will not like to eat the grass in that area. So, they move from there to a new place to go and find food for the animals. That is how we are at our side.

The Tuaregs or the "Buzu" thus have long been associated with Sabon Zongo for instance. The association, however, is one of temporality. Many Tuaregs in Accra have "passed through" the place but few have stayed. Chief Yahaya remarked that:

> They are a lot. They come here in their numbers and they have no means for renting a room so there isn't one place that can accommodate all of them. So wherever they found themselves all they pray for is for another day so they can move. Here is therefore their stepping stone to go to other places. This place is like their centre. They come here for a while and move on to other places. They are in other regions too. They are in Kumasi and other places.

Responses from the Tuareg migrants in terms of why they move to other places suggest, however, that it is not for lack of capital to rent. This position is strengthened by the fact that their stay at the Vulcanizer is not for free. They pay a monthly rent to the caretaker of the park. They reported a desire to practice ethnic segregation. In Accra, Tuaregs practice ethnic segregation. After a brief stay in the Zongos, they relocate to other locations populated primarily by Tuareg migrants. Habiba when commenting on why she moved from the mosque in Tema for instance explained that "My people were not there. There were no Tuaregs and I don't feel comfortable living in a place where there are no Tuaregs. I don't like that I know my people are here and I am living at a place different from where my people are". Also, although some indigenous Ghanaians are living at the Vulcanizer, the Tuareg have somewhat separated themselves from the Ghanaians. Bolt, Özüekren and Philips (2010:170) argue that:

> persistent ethnic segregation may, however, be read in different ways-it may be seen as a sign of community strength and strong bonding social capital (as in the case of Jewish minorities), as a mark of social exclusion (as in the case of visible 'ghettoised' minorities), or as an indicator of 'self-segregation' and the reluctance of ethnic minorities to integrate.

Against this backdrop, the practice of ethnic segregation amongst the Tuaregs in Accra can be said to be a result of a strong sense of attachment to their ethnic group and a reluctance of the Tuareg migrant to integrate. Colonialism led to a forced national categorization of people hitherto considered strangers (Lecocq, 2003). Therefore, although in places like Sabon Zongo there are the Abotsi and other people from different parts of Niger, the Tuareg migrant would not like to stay there because they are not part of the Tuareg society. They would rather share the same space with Tuaregs from Mali and other countries from the Sahel region.

6.1.2 Forever strangers or Tuarego-Ghanaians: The Adaptation of Tuaregs into Ghanaian society

The residential segregation of Tuaregs, however, did not mean they are cut off the mainstream Ghanaian society completely. Constant interactions with Ghanaians led to the assimilation of some aspects of Ghanaian culture. This part of the chapter looks at those aspects of Ghanain culture that are practised by Tuareg migrants in Accra.

6.1.2.1 Me ti Twi nkakra nkakra[35] : Language practices amongst Tuareg migrants

The local languages spoken by the Tuareg migrants in Ghana are dependent on the particular ethnic groups they regularly interact with here in Ghana. The Tuareg migrants reported that they could speak the Hausa, Twi, Dagomba, and English languages. Twi was particularly

[35] Translated as "I understand a little Twi". This is usually the expression used by the Tuareg migrants to prove their proficiency in the Akan language.

common amongst the Tuareg migrants because they reported that they regularly interacted with Twi-speaking people. As beggars in Ghana, they depended on the benevolence of Ghanaians to survive. The form of begging practised by the Tuareg migrants involves interacting with passersby, imploring them to part with some monies. Essegbey (2009) observed that in Accra, the Akan language dominates public spaces. He reported that even in areas that are predominantly Ga, the language used by the native Ga people and the non-native Ga people alike is the Akan language. Therefore the Tuareg migrants are able to learn the Akan language with some ease. Bilal attributed his ability to speak Twi to his association with Akan-speaking friends. According to him, "I was playing with Asante children and when I was going to school too my schoolmates were speaking Twi". Zainab's response to why she learnt the Twi language was that "I heard a lot of people speak Twi". When asked why that is so, she said that "I don't even go to where Gas are. I stay with the Akan people. Gas are more aggressive than the Akans and so if we live in the areas where Gas live, our kids are very stubborn they might irritate them".

It should not be surprising that the Hausa language is not dominant amongst the Tuareg migrants. This is because the brief nature of their stay in the Zongos and the fact that they essentially seclude themselves from the Zongo community means they are unable to learn the language. Indeed the few who reported that they could speak the Hausa language were those who had lived in the Hausa speaking parts of Niger or West African countries where Hausa is common. Only one person reported to speak Dangomba and that is because he had stayed in Tamale for a while.

6.1.2.2 Eating Habits Amongst Tuareg migrants in Accra

The Tuareg migrants interviewed mainly depend on food vendors in Accra for food. This was necessitated by economic and social reasons.

> My people, they don't cook. You see you met them [other Tuareg migrants] buying food. They cook when there is a party. They all gather and then they cook. When you cook right now and your friend is on the other side, he will be looking at you so he expects you to give him some of the food. So when you are cooking you have to cook plenty. And nobody will cook that plenty. To cook and not give someone is not our style.

As a group of migrants living in the same camp, a Tuareg was expected to share his or her food with other "campmates" whenever they cook. To the extent that their income levels were low, this was impossible because one could not feed all the people at the camp. Therefore it was normal for Tuareg migrants to buy breakfast, lunch and supper from food vendors. This was cheaper than cooking and ensured that there was continuous harmony at the camp. This was because any form of chaos that could have erupted due to an individual not sharing his or her food with others was prevented. The fact that the food was usually bought in styrofoam packs also meant it was convenient to buy food from food vendors. Typical of all poor areas in Accra, there was limited access to water at the camp[36]. Water was supplied by drivers who periodically visited the camp with water tankers. A retailer - a Tuareg migrant - stored the water in large water reservoirs popularly known as Polytanks and sold the water to the Tuareg migrants and the indigenous settlers alike. The styrofoam packs for the food bought on the streets were thus handy because they were disposed of immediately after use. Water for washing dishes and cooking the food was conserved for other purposes like bathing and washing clothes.

[36] (see Ainuson, 2010)

Food was sold at the camp by the indigenous settlers and also at the trotro station near the Accra Mall. Jollof, Banku, Fufu, Kenkey, Kooko were reported as food regularly purchased by the Tuareg migrants. Fufu, a staple for the Akan ethnic group was reported as the one most liked by most of the Tuareg migrants. They explained that they regularly ate fufu because they mostly interacted with Akans.

On some occasions, some Ghanaians donated food instead of money to the Tuareg beggars. As explained by Burns (1992) people do this to guarantee that the alms offered are not misappropriated or wasted. Although this can happen on any other day[37], it is very common on Sundays to see food being distributed by members of some of the churches located in the Vulcanizer area. The food, just like the ones bought on the streets, is also usually in Styrofoam packs.

Although the Tuareg migrants reserve typical Tuareg dishes for special occasions, Ataya was very popular at the camp. Ataya is a Senegalese tea served hot in glasses. Originally not from the Tuareg regions, its popularity amongst the Tuaregs in Accra also confirms the influences of other cultures on Tuareg culture.

6.1.2.3 Social Life Amongst Tuareg migrants in Accra

Foreigners in another country, the Tuareg migrants in Accra, however, are not inactive human beings with no social life. The Tuareg migrants are actively involved in religious and social processes that ensured the continued existence of their culture as a group of people. On a typical weekday around mid-day at the Vulcanizer, you will find both the young Tuareg men and women gathered together in a shack or on the compound conversing. One of the young

[37] I personally observed on several occasions where passersby distributed food instead of money on the field.

Tuareg migrants owned a guitar at the camp and so there were times he played for the others to enjoy. The very little ones usually play football or just play around with anything they can find on the compound. On the day of the interview with Bilal, the camp was unusually quiet. So I enquired about the others. His response was that:

> they have been busy. It is only at night that we meet when we are coming to sleep. Daytime we go to work, we separate. At night we just sit and talk. We talk about our lives. We talk about enjoying the future. They don't give me any support, they are just my friends. We play and talk.

Bilal unlike the other young Tuareg migrants was a trotro conductor and so he usually left very early in the morning and came back at night. The day of the interview was the first time I saw him at the camp. He reported that he did not go to work because the trotro had developed a fault and so had been taken to the mechanic shop. His experience is different from that of the other young Tuareg migrants who mostly sell candy at night and so are less busy during the day. The Tuareg migrants also had friends amongst other Tuareg migrants outside of their camp and also amongst Ghanaians. They reported having received financial support, social and religious support from them.

The Tuareg migrants in Accra are Muslims and this religious position was very visible at the camp. The sight of young and old Tuareg migrants praying was very common at the camp. On Fridays, they performed Jum'ah prayers mostly at the Alhaji Bandah Mosque in the airport residential area. The airport residential area is an affluent area and thus the mosque usually attracts wealthy Muslims. Irrespective of that, the Tuareg migrants prayed there. Anwar attributed this to the principles of Islam. According to him:

> Islam is beautiful. They don't check your dress. That is why when we are praying, we pray in lines. We don't check your dress, your colour, we pray together. Foot to foot, shoulder to shoulder, you touch the person and you pray together. We don't check you are dirty, don't come here. I don't compare it to other religions but it is a beautiful religion .

The fact that the mosque drew the rich was an added incentive because not only did the Tuareg migrants pray at the mosque, but they also sought alms from people who usually flood the facility on Fridays.

The Tuareg migrants observed Islamic festivals. According to Mallam Imurana, the celebration of Mawlid, the observance of the birthday of the prophet Mohammed, was a happy time for the Tuaregs at Sabon Zongo. He stated that "those who remain here they celebrate Mawlid here at the Zongo. They do it separate from our people. I will tell them to invite you. They play their music, they cook food, celebrate and dance". Although the Tuaregs generally do not cook, on such festive occasions they cook and make merry. Anwar confirmed this by saying that "my people they don't cook...They cook when they party. Maybe they all gather and then they cook".

As migrants without any form of documentation, the Tuareg migrants could not register with the National Health Insurance Scheme in Ghana. Therefore when any of them fell ill, they contributed as a group to support the person. Abbas, an adult migrant at Vulcanizer observed that:

> Our people if you get food in your house and I don't have I can eat in your house till I get food. The other person can equally do same. If I am not well it is like you are not well. We go to the hospital. They ask for health insurance but we don't have and so we pay. If it's more than 2 million or sometimes it is not even up to 2 million we will contribute and pay .

The same was done for other programmes like weddings and naming ceremonies. Habiba opined that "when one is getting married they support. If you have money you can give. If you don't have money, it is not by force".

Funerals were rare. Those at Vulcanizer did not report any incidence of death at the camp. But at Sabon Zongo, there were reported cases of death amongst the Tuareg migrants. As members

of the Zongo community, the responsibility fell on the leaders of the community to perform the funeral rites for the deceased. Mallam Imurana in his comments below recounts an incident of death amongst the migrants:

> they don't have problem with the police because anything I lead them. Even if it is accident I am in charge. As beggars sometimes cars hit them. A car may fail its break. There were two girls who went to the beach one day to swim but they died. The people at the beach took the bodies to the police station. I was called to the police station and I went there to claim the bodies. The police followed me here to be sure I was saying the truth. When they came they saw that they were members of this community. They saw where they were sleeping. After that they released the bodies to me and we perfomed all the rituals for them .

From the above, we find that the Tuareg migrants in Accra albeit in the new country were not totally removed from their new environment. Although there were some aspects of their activities that ensured they maintained their identity as Tuareg, there was some form of participation in the Ghanaian culture.

6.2 The Future of the Tuareg migration in Ghana

6.2.1 "Trying to level up": Shifting Trends amongst Tuareg Youth in Accra

In recent times there is somewhat of a shift in the experiences of young Tuareg migrants in Accra. Unlike when they were young and under the care of their parents, they are moving away from begging and taking up other menial jobs in the informal sector in Accra. Take for instance Bilal, an 18-year-old Tuareg migrant who has been living in Ghana for 14 years after he moved to Ghana with his mother as a 4-year-old. As a young boy, Bilal begged with his mother on the streets of Accra. When asked what he does now, he surmised that "I am trying to level up. I am trying to make my family proud. I am hustling, I have been selling Mentos [chewing gum] on the streets, I have been doing Trotro mate and those things" . When asked about his future aspirations, he commented that "I just want to change my life. I am doing Trotro mate and so

I want to learn how to drive. So in the next five years I want to be a driver or something like that". Only time will tell if Bilal would be able to meet his future aspirations. Nonetheless, his desire to move away from begging and to work in Ghana's informal sector is reflective of the shifting trends amongst the Tuareg youth in Accra. It is therefore not uncommon to see young Tuareg men, in particular, selling toffees, chewing gum and taking up other jobs like security men, trotro conductors and janitors in Accra's urban space.

Increasingly those who shuffle between Ghana and Niger are also migrating independently of their parents. Kabir is a 20-year-old student Senior High Student in Niger. During every long vacation, he migrates to Ghana. According to him, "I chose to migrate because I want to spend my vacation here and find something to do here so that when I go back, I will do well" . Although his parents are usually not in agreement with the decision to migrate to Ghana, Kabir takes loans from his friends and makes the trip to Ghana. His first experience in Ghana was when he moved with his parents as a child to beg on the streets of Accra. As a young independent migrant, however, Kabir does not beg on the streets of Accra. Like Bilal and other friends of his at the camp, he sells sweets at Oxford street in Osu and other parts of Accra.

The changes in the aspirations of especially the young Tuareg migrants in Accra can be attributed to their continuous interaction with mainstream Ghanaian society. Kabir recounted that:

> I just wanted to change what I am doing. I decided to look for a job. I met a man who also sells mentos. He is a Ghanaian. He told me I have to do something for myself. He told me he makes a lot of money from selling Mentos, so one day I told him there is no problem I will do it. He told me I have to give him money so he buys what I need for the job. I gave him the money and he bought the things for me. I sold and sold and sold. At that time I wasn't selling in the evenings. I sold during the day at the traffic at Shiashie. After selling I gave him the money and he will buy more for me to sell. After a while, he showed me where he buys the things so now, I can go and buy my own things. And I am talking about long ago. That was the last time I came to Ghana and

> went back. But even today when he sees me he will recognize me and when I see him I will recognize him .

Bilal also asserted “that begging is not my habit already I don’t like it. I grew up in Ghana and so Ghanaians always told me that begging is not good, begging is not good so I followed their instructions”.

It is important to contextualize the experiences of the young Tuareg migrants as the reflection of youth generally in Accra’s urban space. A lot of the youth in Ghana’s urban space are “hustlers” (Amankwaa, Esson and Gough, 2021). Thieme (2018:530) uses the term "hustle" to describe “a collective condition of individual insecurity disproportionately distributed amongst young people navigating uncertainty in aspirations and irregular employment through prolonged states of waithood”[38]. Ghana's history with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank ushered in the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), and later, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). These weakened Ghana’s ability to provide employment for the youth and also provide public services like infrastructure, education, and quality healthcare (Hutchful, 1994; Konadu-Agyemang, 2000; Kamruzzaman, 2009). Economic reforms introduced in the 1980s ensured that Ghana's growth performance remained remarkably strong. Consistent growth rates followed, culminating in Ghana's achievement of lower-middle-income status, establishing Ghana as one of the economic powerhouses in Africa (Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng, 2015). The successes in the area of economic growth, however, have not reflected in job creation leading

[38] The prolonged period of suspension and contradiction that an individual faces, when he or she is biologically an adult but does not fall in the socially constructed category of an adult, is what is referred to as waithood (see Honwana, 2014)

some to question the quality of the growth in Ghana (Alagidede et al., 2013; Baah-Boateng, 2013).

To further understand the plight of the youth living in Ghana it is important to put Ghana's labour market into perspective. Table 6.1 provides an insight into employment levels in Ghana as against that of sub-Saharan Africa.

Table 6.1: Quantity and quality of employment

Economic sector	**1984**	**1992**	**1999**	**2000**	**2006**	**2010**	**2013**
Employment-to-pop. ratio, SSA	—	64.3	64.1	64.1	64.9	65.2	65.5
Employment-to-pop. ratio, Ghana	80.2	72.9	73.9	66.9	67.7	67.4	75.4
Total employment, Ghana (millions)	5.42	5.77	7.22	7.43	9.14	10.24	12.03
Economic sector							
Agriculture	61.1	62.2	55.0	53.1	54.9	41.6	44.7
Industry	13.7	10.0	14.0	15.5	14.2	15.4	14.6
Manufacturing (part of industry)	*10.9*	*8.2*	*11.7*	*10.7*	*11.4*	*10.7*	*9.1*
Service	25.2	27.8	31.0	31.5	30.9	43.0	40.9
Institutional sector							
Public	10.2	8.4	6.2	7.2	5.7	6.4	5.9
Private	6.0	6.1	7.5	8.9	7.0	7.4	6.1
Informal	83.8	85.5	86.1	83.9	87.3	86.2	88.0
Type of employment							
Paid employees	16.2	16.8	13.8	16.0	17.5	18.2	22.5
Self-employment	69.6	81.3	68.7	73.4	59.5	60.8	52.6
Contributing family worker	12.5	1.9	17.2	6.8	20.4	11.6	22.3
Other	1.7	—	0.3	3.8	2.6	9.4	2.6
Quality of employment							
Gainful/productive employment*	20.9	—	—	21.2	22.0	23.1	28.7
Vulnerable employment**	77.4	82.5	80.8	74.9	75.4	67.5	68.7
Working poverty	—	48.7	35.4	—	25.6	—	22.3

Notes: * Gainful/productive employment comprises paid employment and self-employed with employees.

** Vulnerable employment comprises own account and contribution family work.

Source: Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 3, 4, 5, and 6; Population Census 1984, 2000, and 2010 cited in Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng (2015:5)

From the table, Ghana's employment rates are slightly higher than the sub-Saharan African (SSA) average. This can be seen in the employment-to-population ratio[39] of Ghana being higher than that of SSA from 1984 to 2013. However, a closer look at employment levels in the various economic sectors provides a nuanced evaluation of Ghana's employment rates.

The agricultural sector remains the sector with the highest employment levels. In recent times it is followed by the service sector. But as argued by Aryeetey and Baah-Boateng (2015), the rising levels of employment in this service sector are down to the fact that the activities are mostly occurring in the informal sector. According to the table, the share of informal sector employment increased from 83.8 percent to 88.0 percent, compared to the country's formal sector employment's downward spiral between 1984 and 2013. As already explained above the introduction of the Structural Adjustments programmes in the 1980s saw a retrenchment in Ghana's public sector. This can be said to be the start of the depletion of Ghana's formal sector. Because the private formal sector is likewise slow with job creation, most of the personnel lost in the public sector might be said to have been absorbed by the informal sector.

Additionally, although the level of employment in Ghana is relatively higher than that of other countries in Africa, very little can be said about the quality of the available jobs. The high rates of vulnerable employment as shown in the table affirm this particular position. The International Labour Organization (ILO) (2009:37) defines vulnerable employment "as the proportion of workers who are less likely to have formal work arrangements, and are therefore more likely to lack elements associated with decent employment". Workers in this type of employment are vulnerable because in times of an economic downturn they do not have the

[39] The ratio is a measure of the ability of an economy to create employment.

"social protection" and "safety nets" to guard against the effects of these times (ILO, 2009:27). They are also often unable to generate enough savings for themselves and their families to offset the effect of these times. Therefore, on the surface, Ghana seems to be doing well in terms of unemployment rates but most of the Ghanaian workers are simply poor.

A combination of the above features of the Ghanaian labour sector accounts for a lack of opportunities for the youth in Ghana. Most of the jobs are in the informal sector.

However, a lack of employment opportunities does not imply that young people are seated with their arms folded doing nothing. As argued by Amankwaa et al (2020:363) "many young people are not stuck, rather they constantly negotiate the changing economic scenarios and find ways of managing under precarious conditions". Against this backdrop, the young Ghanaian man who introduced Kabir to the candy business is a hustler whose act of introducing Kabir to the business can be explained as helping another youth navigate his state of waithood.

The ability of the young Tuareg migrants to shift from begging to informal business is due to the waning influences of their parents vis-a-vis a strong association with friends, both Ghanaians and Tuaregs in Ghana, and the education of young Tuareg migrants. Kabir when asked the form of support he gets from friends in Ghana, stated: "when they see me selling chewing gum and mentos they encourage me to do that and not to beg. So that is the support they give me to work hard". As a young boy, Hassan lived with his father at the Koforidua Zongo. He was begging on the streets of Koforidua. Currently, he sells phones on online platforms like Tonaton and Jiji but says he wants to learn how to repair phones and laptops because the online platforms have been taken over by fraudsters. He stated that:

> I don't like begging. The time I was begging my father was controlling me. Now that I am old, my father no longer controls me and so since my time in Koforidua I have not been begging. I was selling yoghourt then my friend (Ghanaian) saw me and he showed me how to do this job.

Kabir also commented:

> As you see one by one, the guy you see over there, he came from school here in Ghana. This one he is from school. The other one is a seller of mentos. So small small. Before we didn't have those things. We were all beggars but now they are changing small small. And you see the other guy too now, he is so motivated to change it. That is why there are so many people like him and me who want to change a lot of things.

At the Vulcanizer camp, Anwar was the first to go to school here in Ghana. He is currently in a second-cycle institution. As already explained in this chapter, he benefited from the benevolence of a Christian cleric in Ghana. The man has currently extended the programme and has enrolled other Tuareg migrants at a private school in Nungua[40]. Although occasionally these young Tuareg students who are still in the control of their parents may engage in begging activities increasingly there is a sense of a need to move away from begging. As pointed out by Kabir, they are motivated to "change" the current situations.

Nasir a 25-year-old young migrant, on the other hand, had ambitions somewhat different from the others. He boldly stated that he is currently saving for a Sports Utility Vehicle (SUV) car. When I enquired about his aspirations, he explained that due to the booming industry of migrants-smuggling in the Sahel region, SUVs and pickup trucks were highly sought after. Therefore although currently selling mentos in Ghana, he wanted to go back to the north of Niger and work in that industry as an agent. As proof of this, he showed me an adult migrant at the camp who keeps his money for him.

The ability of Tuareg youth in Accra to shift from begging to other informal activities is, however, not evenly distributed across gender. From the study, I found that adult Tuareg females not only supervise the young ones to beg, but they also actively beg. This is different

[40] A town in the Krowor Municipal Assembly in the Greater Accra region.

from the adult males who only sit afar and supervise the activities of the children. The differences in gender roles suggest some form of imbalances in power distribution in the Tuareg society and this is reflected in the aspirations of the Tuareg young women. Compare for instance the aspirations of two siblings Nadjat and Anwar. When asked about their plans for the future, Anwar stated that "as in you see look at my people (points to the shacks and dilapidated structures) and so telling them my story that I want to make it in life, have a good job and take care of my people and change their lives is a good story and maybe they can help me". When asked if anything needs to change now for him to realize his goals, he stated further that :

> I don't even know what needs to change because this is how we've been living since all the years. If even something has to change, I will have to change it. I have to get a job first. Yeah. Start working. Because basically, this is what we can do. My father is not educated. He can't go and look for any big job .

Nadjat, on the other hand, stated that "I don't want to be anything. I don't go to school and so I don't want to do anything. I want to be their (pointing to her brothers) sister. When I was 15 years, I decided I will work and support them. Since I am supporting them to go higher in education, whatever they get is for me too". When asked why she decided to support her siblings instead of pursuing her ambitions, she responded by saying "because I love them". Indeed Nadjat loves her siblings, nonetheless, marriage and motherhood continue to be the ultimate markers of adulthood for women in society (Honwana, 2014). Therefore unlike Anwar who is going through the pressures of finding stable employment to be able to change the lives of his family, Nadjat's experience of liberation from her current state is dependent on men in this case her male siblings.

6.3 Conclusion

In sum, the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra albeit foreigners in another country are not cut off the Ghanaian society. Although they prefer residential segregation, there are aspects of their living arrangements that have traces of Ghanaian societies. In terms of language and food, the Tuareg migrants have imbibed the cultures of societies in Ghana. Although the particular language common amongst the Tuareg migrants is dependent on the particular ethnic group in Ghana they mostly come into contact with, the cosmopolitan nature of Accra means they eat foods from all parts of the country. Also, they actively engage in social processes that ensure their continued existence as migrants in another country. Furthermore, in recent times, there has been a shift, especially amongst the Tuareg youth in Accra. They have moved away from begging to engagement in informal activities. This shift in the economic arrangement is a reflection of youth generally in the urban space in Accra. To the Tuareg migrant, this is possible due to their increased association with other Ghanaian youth. The changes amongst the Tuareg migrant is, however, not evenly distributed across gender. And this is because of the gender inequalities in Tuareg society.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSIONS

7.0 Introduction

In response to the calls for attention to be shifted towards south-south migration, I designed my study to explore the phenomenon of international migration for begging amongst Tuaregs in Accra. I wanted to investigate the factors in the country of origin that prompt the decision to migrate and to find reasons that make Ghana their preferred choice of host country. I wanted to find out why begging has become a common livelihood strategy amongst these Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra. Also, I wanted to explore the extent to which these migrants are integrated into Ghanaian society. Lastly, I wanted to understand what imagined futures these migrants have constructed and how their presence in Ghana contributes to that. By examining Tuareg migrants in Accra, I aimed to add to the insights of south-south migration on the African continent by presenting a case study from West Africa. The study also provides a general understanding of Tuareg migrants in Ghana. It does this by highlighting the nature of their migratory patterns and their experiences on the streets of Accra.

This thesis has therefore examined the experiences of Tuareg migrants in Accra. It traces the history of Tuareg societies stressing the events that have rendered them marginalized in post-colonial Sahel countries. It also focuses on the drivers that have pushed Tuareg migrants to Ghana and why the Tuareg migrants in Accra turn to panhandling as an economic arrangement. Furthermore, it looks at the extent of integration into Ghanaian societies and the imagined futures these Tuareg migrants envisage in their lives.

7.1 Key Research findings

I have shown that following the 1970s and 1980s drought in Niger and other parts of the Sahel region, and the various Tuareg rebellions that have happened between that time and now in Niger and Mali, the racially white Tuareg migrants, in particular, have been drawn to Ghana. Although these two events can be said to be the main events that triggered Tuareg migration to Ghana, there exist some predisposing and proximate drivers that engender the international migration of Tuaregs to Ghana.

In comparison to Niger and Mali, Ghana is a politically stable country with democratic provisions that allow the Tuareg migrants some rights and freedoms. Also, Ghana fares better in the area of economic growth and development than Niger and Mali. The disparities in the political and economic freedoms afforded the Tuareg migrants in Ghana match their economic interests and thus draw them to Ghana. The migration of Tuareg migrants is further facilitated by their ability to meet the financial demands of international migration, the availability of quality transport services and the presence of Protocols that promote intra-regional migration in the ECOWAS sub-region.

As a result of the interaction of these predisposing, proximate, mediating and precipitating drivers of migration, there is the development of a culture of migration by the Tuareg migrants to Ghana specifically for begging. Many are temporal migrants to Ghana while some younger ones appear to stay longer, but always maintain the links with home. They have no established community in Accra because of the temporal nature of their stay. They appear scattered across Greater Accra. It should be emphasized though that begging is an illegal act in Ghana and child begging is a human rights abuse by national laws. However, the international migration for begging amongst the Tuaregs in Accra is engendered by the fact that begging albeit detested

by many in the city is a common phenomenon in Ghana's Zongo communities which are usually the first places of residence for the Tuareg migrants in Accra. The exploitation of the hospitality of their Muslim hosts in Accra (Sabon Zongo) coupled with the fact that there is a somewhat lax approach to the implementation of laws on begging in Ghana as compared to other countries in the sub-region where the Tuareg migrants report negative experiences with the law enforcement agencies, makes begging a favourable means to income generation amongst the Tuareg migrants.

Additionally, migration and poverty have contributed to the further weakening of the traditional hierarchical division within the Tuareg social system. Tuareg migrants in Ghana are united across racial, social and economic barriers. Ethnic identity which is manifested in the use of the phrase 'our people,' appears stronger among the Tuareg than religious (Muslim) or national identity. While in Accra, they keep together to support and protect each other as strangers.

Furthermore, although the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra remain foreigners, a status highlighted by their different physical features and their preference for residential segregation, they are not cut off completely from mainstream Ghanaian societies. They engage in social processes that ensure their continued existence as migrants in another country. There are aspects of Ghanaian culture that the Tuareg migrants on the streets of Accra adopt for their survival. They learn various Ghanaian languages to help them in their begging activities. They also eat Ghanaian foods bought from food vendors to help minimize cost. The Ghanaian languages and Ghanaian foods are a part of Ghanaian culture that these Tuareg migrants assimilate. And they go a long way to make the Tuareg migrant truly international.

In recent times, however, especially amongst the Tuareg youth in Accra, there has been a shift in the purpose of migration to Ghana. Begging is no longer what entices the Tuareg youth in

Ghana. They are increasingly being drawn to the informal labour space in Ghana's economy. In other words, they are "hustlers". To the young Tuareg migrant, selling candy along the streets of Accra and at the various pubs and nightclubs and being on call for the next available job in Ghana's informal sector is a way of changing their stories.

This shift in the economic arrangement of Tuareg youth is not however in a vacuum. It mirrors generally the experiences of Ghanaian youth in Accra's urban space. Although residents in their own countries, the lack of employment opportunities in Accra means their experience of waithood is a commonly shared state with Tuareg youth in Accra. Hustling, thus, to both categories of youth in Accra is an avenue to get out of their state of waithood. As migrants living in another country, the opportunities available to the Tuareg youth even in the informal sector are limited. Also, the changes amongst the Tuareg migrant are not evenly distributed across gender because of the gender inequalities in Tuareg society. Nonetheless, the regular interactions between Tuareg migrants and the indigenous Ghanaian youth in Accra enable the Tuareg youth to chart new territories that would otherwise have been impossible for them as foreigners begging on the streets of Accra.

7.2 Recommendations

This research has provided insights into the phenomenon of migration for begging amongst Tuareg migrants in Accra. Based on this, I provide recommendations in two areas. This first has to do with opportunities for further academic research into the lives of Tuareg migrants in Accra. The second portion discusses policy recommendations.

7.2.1 Opportunities for Research

This study provides significant information on the migration of Tuareg migrants in Ghana. It also makes contributions to the knowledge of the lived experiences of Tuareg migrants in Accra. The knowledge produced in this study should open the floodgates for further studies on Tuareg migrants in Ghana. For instance, anecdotal accounts from the study revealed that some of the migrants have married indigenous Ghanaians. Also, some of the Tuareg youth consider themselves Ghanaians because although they have Tuareg parents, they were born in Ghana and thus only know Ghana as their country. It would be interesting to look at identity formation amongst second-generation Tuareg migrants in Ghana. Furthermore, gradually albeit at a snail's pace Tuareg migrants are becoming formally educated in Ghana. It would be laudable to look at the effects of education on Tuareg households in Ghana, the various contestations likely to occur across generations and gender and how the newly educated Tuaregs navigate their state of being the educated amongst a mostly uneducated community.

A more quantitative approach to a study of Tuareg migrants in Accra would also be great. This is because then we would be able to establish relationships between various variables in Tuaregs society and identify the causality of certain actions and inactions by Tuareg migrants in Ghana, all in all, to enhance our knowledge of the Tuareg in Accra. The resources involved in these types of study, coupled with the fact that the Tuareg migrants in Accra are generally wary of formal contacts would mean that a purely quantitative approach would be too much of a task for student research at any level. Therefore I recommend a larger-scale project that is multidisciplinary and also involves multiple stakeholders from international organizations, state agencies and research scientists. In this sense, resources can be pulled from all angles to provide a comprehensive approach to understanding the Tuareg migrants in Ghana.

7.2.2 Policy Considerations

Findings from this study suggest that irregular migration amongst Tuareg migrants is likely to continue because the Tuareg migrants do not have access to passports and other travel documents. To the extent that without these documents they cannot access formal channels of entry to Ghana, the Tuareg migrants will continue to use informal routes and smuggling networks into the country. The Zongo communities in this sense would be of great help in providing some form of information on the movements and numbers of Tuareg migrants in Ghana because the Zongos are the first ports of call for Tuareg migrants in Ghana. They may not go to Ghana's Immigration Service for a residence permit or even visit embassies of their countries here in Ghana to indicate that they are in the country. But they are likely to talk to an Islamic cleric and elders of the Zongo communities that house them. Various state institutions in charge of migrant relations can thus empower Zongo community leaders to take records of migrants who report to their facilities. This would go a long way to help governments and international agencies in providing services like health screening, livelihood empowerment programmes, educational programmes and any other services that are basic for their survival in the country.

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APPENDIX I: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ADULT NIGERIEN MIGRANTS

University of Ghana

Department of Sociology

Topic: "La migration, c'est une tradition, c'est une mode de vie": The Nigerien Migrants on the Streets of Accra.

STUDY OVERVIEW:

This research is an MPhil Thesis that seeks to investigate three themes about the migration of Nigeriens to Ghana. These are their motivations for migration, the aspiration of these migrants, and the extent of their integration into Ghanaian society.

The Oxford Street in Osu and the Accra Mall area, two of the known locations for the phenomenon under study, have been selected as research sites. The results from this study will contribute scientifically to the growing body of knowledge on migration for begging as a phenomenon in the context of the Nigerien migrant on the streets of Accra.

This study would benefit greatly from your inputs, which would be garnered through your responses to this 45- minutes interview. Such inputs would be treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity.

Your consent to participate in this interview would be highly appreciated.

Section A: Socio-Demographic Features

1. Age: …….

2. Sex: ……
3. Religion: ……
4. Highest Educational Grade attained: ……. Year of graduation: ……
5. Marital status: …….
6. Number of Children (if any): ……
7. Place of Residence: …….
8. Time started: …… Time ended: …….

Section B: Thematic Areas

I. Motivations for Migration

- Why did you choose to migrate? (Probe if the decision was a unilateral decision or a collective one with other members of the family or society)
- What was your family's response to your decision to migrate if the decision was made individually?
- Are there other family members who are also migrants? (if there are probe who these family members are, their host countries and their current occupation.)
- How did you fund your migration?
- Why is Ghana your choice of host country?
- How did you arrive at the decision to move to Ghana?
- How did you migrate? (Probe for the means of transportation and whether he or she transited other countries before reaching Ghana).
- How long have you been living here in Ghana? (Probe if participant is a pendulum migrant and reasons for this particular form of migration)

II. Aspirations

- What did you seek to achieve when you decided to migrate?
- How do you think your status as a migrant will contribute to attaining your migration objectives?
- How can you describe your current situation as a migrant as contributing to your initial objectives for migrating? (if not…)
- What do you think needs to change to ensure that your current situation contributes to your future goals and objectives?
- Where do you see yourself in the next 5 years?
- Why do you think it is important to achieve those objectives you have for yourself?
- What are you currently doing to ensure that you achieve those goals and objectives you have set for yourself?

III. Extent of Integration

- How did you end up at your current place of residence?
- Which other places have you lived in since you arrived in Ghana? (if there are, probe for the relationship between the current place of residence and older places.)
- Do you speak any Ghanaian language? (if yes)
- Why did you choose to learn that particular language?

- Do you have Ghanaian friends?
- If any, what form of support do you get from these Ghanaian friends? (Probe the form of support, economic, social, religious)
- Do you have friends amongst other Nigerien Migrants? (Probe if they make friends with other Migrants from other countries)
- What form of support do you get from your Nigerien Migrant friends and/or Migrant friends in general?
- How are you able to provide for your daily meal?
- Do you eat Ghanaian foods? (Probe reasons for answer to this question)
- Why do you beg on the streets?
- What are your views on begging?
- Have you learnt any trade? (If yes…)
- Why haven't you put the skills you have acquired into use?
- Were you begging in your country of origin?
- What is the relationship between your begging activities and your future objectives?
- How can you describe your current status as a beggar as contributing to your future objectives?
- How do you feel when people hurl insults at you because you are a beggar?
- What do you do when people hurl insults at you?

IV. Wrap-up Questions

- Any further reflections on the study?

APPENDIX II: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR YOUNG NIGERIEN MIGRANTS

University of Ghana

Department of Sociology

Topic: "La migration, c'est une tradition, c'est une mode de vie": The Nigerien Migrants on the Streets of Accra.

STUDY OVERVIEW:

This research is an MPhil Thesis that seeks to investigate three themes about the migration of Nigeriens to Ghana. These are their motivations for migration, the aspiration of these migrants, and the extent of their integration into Ghanaian society.

The Oxford Street in Osu and the Accra Mall area, two of the known locations for the phenomenon under study, have been selected as research sites. The results from this study will contribute scientifically to the growing body of knowledge on migration for begging as a phenomenon in the context of the Nigerien migrant on the streets of Accra.

This study would benefit greatly from your inputs, which would be garnered through your responses to this 45- minutes interview. Such inputs would be treated with utmost confidentiality and anonymity.

Your consent to participate in this interview would be highly appreciated.

Section A: Socio-Demographic Features

9. Age: …….
10. Sex: ……

11. Religion: ……

12. Highest Educational Grade attained: ……. Year of graduation: ……

13. Marital Status: ……

14. Number of Children (if any): ……

15. Place of Residence: ……

16. Time started: …… Time ended: …….

Section B: Thematic Areas

V. Motivations for Migration

- Why did you choose to migrate? (Probe if the decision was a unilateral decision or a collective one with other members of the family or society)
- What was your family's response to your decision to migrate if decision made individually?
- Are there other family members who are also migrants? (if there are probe who these family members are, their host countries and their current occupation.)
- How did you fund your migration?
- Why is Ghana your choice of host country?
- How did you arrive at the decision to move to Ghana?
- How did you migrate? (Probe for the means of transportation and whether he or she transited other countries before reaching Ghana).
- How long have you been living here in Ghana? (Probe if participant is a pendulum migrant and reasons for this particular form of migration)

VI. Aspirations

- What did you seek to achieve when you decided to migrate?
- How do you think your status as a migrant will contribute to attaining your migration objectives?
- How can you describe your current situation as a migrant as contributing to your initial objectives for migrating? (if not…)
- What do you think needs to change to ensure that your current situation contributes to your future goals and objectives?
- Where do you see yourself in the next 5 years?
- Why do you think it is important to achieve those objectives you have for yourself?
- What are you currently doing to ensure that you achieve those goals and objectives you have set for yourself?

VII. Extent of Integration

- How did you end up at your current place of residence?
- Which other places have you lived in since you arrived in Ghana? (if there are, probe for the relationship between the current place of residence and older places.)
- Do you speak any Ghanaian language? (if yes)
- Why did you choose to learn that particular language?
- Do you go to school here in Ghana?

- Why do you go to school?
- Do you have Ghanaian friends?
- If any, what form of support do you get from these Ghanaian friends? (Probe the form of support, economic, social, religious)
- Do you have friends amongst other Nigerien Migrants? (Probe if they make friends with other migrants from other countries)
- What form of support do you get from your Nigerien Migrant friends and/or Migrant friends in general?
- How are you able to provide for your daily meal?
- Do you eat Ghanaian foods? (Probe reasons for answer to this question)
- Why do you beg on the streets? (Probe if it was part of the initial plan or became a survival strategy in Ghana)
- What are your views on begging?
- Were you begging in your country of origin?
- What is the relationship between your begging activities and your future objectives?
- How can you describe your current status as a beggar as contributing to your future objectives?
- How do you feel when people hurl insults at you because you are a beggar?
- What do you do when people hurl insults at you?

VIII. Wrap-up Questions

- Any further reflections on the study?

APPENDIX III: ETHICAL CLEARANCE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)
P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana

My Ref. No…ECH 135/ 20-21…

May 19, 2021

Ishmael Boampong Osei
Department of Sociology
University of Ghana
Legon

ETHICAL CLEARANCE
(ECH 135/ 20-21)

The protocol title below has been reviewed and approved by the ECH Committee.

TITLE OF PROTOCOL: **"LA MIGRATION, C'EST UNE TRADITION, C'EST UNE MODE DE VIE": THE NIGERIEN MIGRANTS ON THE STREETS OF ACCRA**

PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: **ISHMAEL BOAMPONG OSEI**

Please note that the final review report must be submitted to the Committee at the completion of the study. Your research records may be audited at any time during or after the implementation. Any modification of this research project must be submitted to ECH for review and approval prior to implementation.

Please report all serious adverse events related to this study to ECH within seven (7) days verbally and in writing within fourteen (14) days.

This certificate is valid till May 18, 2022. You are to submit annual reports for continuing review.

Please accept my congratulations.

Yours Sincerely,

Professor C. Charles Mate-Kole
ECH Chair

Cc: Prof. Akosua K. Darkwah, Department of Sociology, UG
Prof. Steve Tonah, Department of Sociology, UG

Tel: +233-303933866 Email: ech@ug.edu.gh

APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW DATES

Table 3.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of adult Tuareg migrants.

*Name	Age	Religion	Sex	Marital Status	Date of Interview	** Residence
Abbas	60	Muslim	Male	Married	25/06/2021	V
Faisal	40	Muslim	Male	Divorced	04/06/2021	V
Latif	39	Muslim	Male	Married	11/10/2021	SZ
Habiba	30	Muslim	Male	Single	04/06/2021	V
Munira	28	Muslim	Female	Married	04/07/2021	V
Rashida	50	Muslim	Female	Single	11/10/2021	SZ
Ruqayya	32	Muslim	Female	Single	11/10/2021	SZ

*Name: These are Pseudonyms
** Residence: V= Vulcanizer, SZ= Sabon Zongo

Table 3.2 Socio-demographic characteristics of young Tuareg Migrants.

*Name	Age	Religion	Sex	Marital Status	Date of Interview	**Residence
Anwar	17	Muslim	Male	Single	04/06/2021 and 18/10/2021	V
Kabir	20	Muslim	Male	Single	04/06/2021	V
Bilal	18	Muslim	Male	Single	25/06/2021	V
Ali	22	Muslim	Male	Single	29/08/2021	V

Amir	19	Muslim	Male	Single	29/08/2021	V
Hassan	20	Muslim	Male	Single	18/10/2021	SZ
Nasir	25	Muslim	Male	Single	05/07/2021	V
Nadjat	20	Muslim	Female	Single	05/07/2021	V
Aaliyah	15	Muslim	Female	Single	05/07/2021	V
Zainab	19	Muslim	Female	Single	04/07/2021	V
Rabia	21	Muslim	Female	Single	29/08/2021	V
Mariam	20	Muslim	Female	Single	29/08/2021	V
Kadijah	18	Muslim	Female	Single	29/08/2021	V
Sakina	25	Muslim	Female	Single	18/10/2021	SZ

*Name: These are Pseudonyms
** Residence: V= Vulcanizer, SZ= Sabon Zongo

Key Informant Interview with Chief Yahaya and Mallam Immurana were conducted on 14/10/ 2021 and 19/10/2021 and respectively.