

**THE CONSTITUENCY PROJECT FUND OF
MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, AND ELECTORAL
PERFORMANCE IN SELECTED CONSTITUENCIES
IN GHANA, 2013-2016**



BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this MPhil thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, is my own work produced from an independent research under supervision. With the exception of quotations and references to other people's works, which have all been duly acknowledged and appropriately cited, this study is an original work. To the best of my knowledge it has neither in whole nor part been presented for the award of any other degree.

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ABSTRACT

The District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) was introduced in 1993 to assist the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) to perform their functions and responsibilities. Over the years, a portion of the Fund has been allocated to Members of Parliament (MPs) to be used in their various constituencies. However, there has not been any regulation or requirement on how the MPs Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF) should be used. This has led to an abuse of the Fund, as the MPs have the discretion in determining which projects are to be funded, and the individuals that benefit from it. This gives grounds to assertions that the MPsCPF has frequently been used as a campaign tool for MPs.

Against this backdrop, the study examined how the MPs Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF) was spent between January 2013 and December 2016, and its effects, if any, on the electoral performance of MPs in the 2016 parliamentary elections. It covered the 52 constituencies in the Brong Ahafo and Central Regions of Ghana. The study employed the quantitative method of research and relied on secondary data, where the expenditure records of the constituencies were collected and analyzed vis-à-vis the outcomes of the 2016 parliamentary elections.

The findings indicate that MPs spent more frequently on personal needs of their constituents even though in monetary terms, they spent more on public projects. Also, MPs who were inclined towards spending their share of the MPsCPF on personal needs of their constituents did better in the parliamentary elections. However, the highest expenditure was not recorded in the election year (2016). Rather it was recorded in 2015, and MPs who spent more in 2013 and 2014 did better in the 2016 parliamentary elections than those who had their highest expenditure in 2015 and 2016. These findings therefore raise some questions on the applicability of a 'political business cycle' in the context of the study.

In short, the findings show that even though the extent and direction of the relationships differ, the expenditure patterns of the MPsCPF actually have a relationship with MPs' performance in parliamentary elections.

DEDICATION

To God, family, and country.

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“What shall I render to the LORD For all His benefits toward me? I will take up the cup of salvation, and call upon the name of the LORD” (Ps 116:12-13, NKJV).

This journey would have been fruitless without God. I owe it all to Him. To Him alone be all the glory forever!

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List of Abbreviations

CDCF	-	Constituency Development Catalyst Fund
CDF	-	Constituency Development Fund
CPF	-	Constituency Project Fund
CSOs	-	Civil Society Organizations
DACF	-	District Assemblies Common Fund
IGF	-	Internally Generated Fund
MMDAs	-	Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies
MMDCE	-	Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executive
MP	-	Member of Parliament
MPsCF	-	Members of Parliament Common Fund
MPsCPF	-	Members of Parliament Constituency Project Fund
NDC	-	National Democratic Congress
NPP	-	New Patriotic Party
PNDC	-	Provisional National Defence Council
PWDs	-	Persons with Disabilities
SNG	-	Sub-National Government

CHAPTER 1

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1. Introduction

There has been increased interest in decentralization, and the role of decentralized units in national development. There have also been calls for central governments to delegate some of their responsibilities and resources to decentralized local governance units in ways that will ensure that central governments do not wield absolute power and exercise unfettered control over resources. Progressively, it has become obvious that central governments' efforts to meet the numerous needs and demands of citizens are inadequate. In addition, the centralized development model has failed to achieve the desired results and outcomes, leading to the call for genuine decentralization as an alternative development approach (Ayres, 1999:71; Faguet, 1997:2).

In the view of Hye (1985:2), the increased popularity of decentralization came from two converging forces: (i) the desire for participatory administration of local projects; and (ii) the need for local people to determine development planning and implementation processes. The pursuit of a decentralized approach to development requires that central governments devolve responsibilities to decentralized local government units (Ankamah, 2012). As part of efforts to curb unproductive and wasteful governance, devolve more power and resources, and ensure economic stability and local development, developing countries have designed strategies and mechanisms to improve fiscal decentralization (Bird & Vaillancourt, 1999).

Whereas decentralization has been experimented in many countries, the results have sometimes fallen below expectations because local government units are assigned more responsibilities, but inadequate resources to carry them out (SEND Ghana, 2010, p. 9).

Ghana followed the global trend of decentralization in 1988 when the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) implemented comprehensive decentralization reforms under the Local Government Law, PNDC Law 207. However, under the Fourth Republic, the policy framework of decentralized local governance in Ghana is contained in the 1992 Constitution and Local Governance Act, Act 936 of 2016.

In drafting the 1992 Constitution, it became clear that there was the need to ensure that the decentralized units had a sound financial backing if they were to perform their expected responsibilities. This realization led to the introduction of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) under Section 252 of the 1992 Constitution, which tasks Parliament to make annual provisions for the allocation of a minimum of five percent (5%) of total national revenues to the District Assemblies, in quarterly instalments.

Currently, the minimum allocation to the DACF is 7.5% of total national revenues. This was approved by Parliament during the second tenure of office of President John Kufuor of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2007.

The guidelines for the use of the DACF have provided for special allocations to different groups such as Persons with Disabilities (PWDs) and Members of Parliament (MPs). The portion allocated to MPs is the focus of this study.

Ahwoi (2010) indicates that the 1992 Constitution introduced Ghana to the practice of MPs becoming members of their Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs) – local government units. He also argues that the Fourth Republic has been experiencing endless conflicts and tensions between MPs and their Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs). The MP's presence in the MMDA seems to suggest that he/she is also a development agent, thus the numerous demands made on him/her which sometimes results in a seeming competition and rivalry between the MP and the MMDCE (Ahwoi, 2010, p. 6).

1.2. Problem Statement

Although the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) was introduced as a source of funding for the development programs of the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs), it has, since its inception, become an issue of political manipulation and contestation. In fact, Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) who were/are interested in contesting elections to parliament presented projects that were done with the DACF as personal achievements, and promised to do more if elected as MPs in the future (Nyendu, 2012, pp. 228-229). Thus, this conduct of some MMDCEs has largely led to the demand of MPs that a percentage of the DACF be directly allocated to them for their personal disbursement (Nyendu, 2012).

A former Minister of Local Government and Rural Development in the Rawlings government, Kwamena Ahwoi revealed that the decision to apportion part of the fund to MPs in 1997 was as a result of demands from MPs for financial assistance to undertake development projects which they promised the electorate in their electioneering campaigns, in order to end the incidence of MMDCEs “bluffing” them (Ahwoi, 2011), and to complement local development efforts of the MMDAs.

In a bid to separate the MPs Common Fund from the DACF, there were attempts to introduce a Constituency Development Fund for MPs. The late President John Mills first made this promise in 2009 (Mills, 2009). Akin to the Constituencies Development Fund in Kenya, established in 2003, this fund was to provide support for the various MPs in carrying out their projects. The introduction of this fund would mean that the MPs’ share of the DACF would have been abolished. However, this fund was not set up before the death of President Mills in July 2016. Therefore, the MPs still take their share of the DACF as constituency project fund.

According to Ayee (1995), the scope of the functions assigned to the MMDAs relative to their size and resources almost assured that many of the electorate would be dissatisfied. This

dissatisfaction possibly explains why the constituents rely on their MPs for support. King et al (2003) have noted the various concerns that have been raised about the MPs Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF), including the discretion of MPs to single-handedly select beneficiaries of the fund. They intimated also that this process of selecting beneficiaries is sometimes based on political considerations and therefore subject to abuse.

Since the introduction of the MPs Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF), there has been very little effort to identify possible monitoring mechanisms for its effective management and utilization (Appiah-Agyekum, Boachie Danquah, & Sakyi, 2013).

The fundamental problem results from the MPs' discretion in determining what the fund is spent on, and who benefits from it, hence the possibility of the occurrence of Mukwena's (2004), assertion that the funds have frequently been used as a campaign tool for MPs. Even though there is a monitoring mechanism for the allocation of funds from the DACF, it is difficult to show whether the MPsCPF is spent in the interest of the entire constituencies for whose sake the allocations are made.

Against this backdrop, this study examines how the MPsCPF was spent and its effect, if any, on the electoral performance of MPs in the 2016 parliamentary elections. More specifically, the study discusses the relationship between the expenditure of selected MPs from the Constituency Project Fund (CPF), and their performance in the 2016 parliamentary elections. Out of the 275 constituencies, the study will cover 52 constituencies, that is, all constituencies in two of the four 'swing' regions in Ghana, namely, Brong Ahafo and Central. Of the four 'swing regions' in Ghana's fourth republican electoral politics, the Central and Brong Ahafo Regions have been selected. The trend of electoral outcomes in these two regions presents some interesting dynamics in the previous elections. Even though they are both 'swing regions' the extent and pattern of the swings in presidential and parliamentary elections have been different.

The Brong Ahafo Region, for instance, has swung more in favour of the NPP than the NDC. Of the seven elections in the Fourth Republic, the region swung four times to the direction of the NPP. In 2008, Brong Ahafo was the only 'swing region' from which the NPP won majority of the parliamentary seats.

On the other hand, the Central Region swung more to the NDC than the NPP. However, when it swung to the NPP, the percentage of its swing was significant, 84.21% in 2004 and 82.61% in 2016 (see Table 1.1). Indeed, the highest percentage of swings for the NPP has been from the Central Region. It is therefore instructive that this study focuses on these regions and the relationship that exists between the spending of the MPsCPF and the parliamentary electoral outcomes. The swing for the NPP and NDC are indicated in blue and green respectively.

Table 1.1: Parliamentary Percentage Result of the NPP and the NDC in the Four "Swing" Regions, 1992-2016

Region	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Brong Ahafo	95.24	80.95	66.67	62.50	62.50	55.17	68.97
Central	94.12	82.35	52.94	84.21	57.89	69.57	82.61
Greater Accra	100.00	59.09	72.73	59.26	66.67	58.82	61.76
Western	84.21	63.16	52.63	50.00	50.00	69.23	61.54

(Sources: Frempong, 2017; Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2008, 2016)

This period (2013 – 2016) covers a complete term of office of an elected Member of Parliament. Moreover, apart from 1992 when the NPP boycotted the parliamentary elections, the gap between the majority in parliament and its major opposition in the Fourth Republic was greatest in the 2016 election. In 1996, the margin was 4.5%; 4% in 2000, 14.8% in 2004; 3.9% in 2008; 9.4% in 2012; and 23% in 2016 (Frempong, 2017; Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2008, 2016). This vast margin in 2016 makes research into its possible

causes relevant, and this study explores the role the spending of the MPsCPF played in this outcome.

Earlier studies on intergovernmental fiscal transfers in Ghana (such as Ayee 1995; King et al, 2003; Ankamah, 2012) have largely focused on the DACF as a whole and not the MPsCPF and its role in determining the electoral performance of the MPs in their constituencies. This study aims at filling this gap.

1.3. Objectives

The overall research objective is to examine the effect of the use of the MPsCPF on the electoral performance of MPs in selected constituencies in the 2016 parliamentary elections.

The specific objectives are three-fold:

- (i) To identify the ways and trends in the use of the MPsCPF, using the monthly expenditure record books of the 52 constituencies under study;
- (ii) To examine the relationship between the nature of disbursement of the MPsCPF, and outcomes of parliamentary elections in the various constituencies, by comparing the disbursement records and the 2016 parliamentary electoral outcomes; and
- (iii) To assess other factors (for instance, timing of the expenditure) that have influenced the parliamentary elections in the constituencies.

1.4. Significance of the Study

This study is significant in a number of ways.

First, the findings will contribute to the literature on fiscal decentralization, allocation of resources, accountability, and factors influencing voter behavior as well as conflict among functionaries of local government units in Ghana and other African countries.

Second, the findings will have policy significance, as the study examines the dynamics of the use of the MPsCPF. The recommendations at the later part of the work will help in ensuring the efficient use of the fund.

It will also inform MPs on the role their expenditure patterns play in determining outcomes of elections. This will help them in making decisions on how to spend, and what to spend on in their constituencies. Beyond this, the findings will also throw more light on areas that have been neglected in the allocation of resources, and areas that need more attention.

1.5. Limitations of the Study

The study focused on the period between 2013 and 2016 and the subsequent election in 2016, and on 52 constituencies in 2 regions. Even though generalizations of the findings may be true for all regions in Ghana and for other previously held elections, it should be done with some caution.

In addition, the study is limited by its inability to explain voter behavior in absolute terms. Conscious of the numerous factors that influence voter behavior, the study focused on one of these possible factors (MPsCPF). It sought to contribute to the debate on factors that influence electoral outcomes in Ghana, and to see whether there is any relationship between the pattern of disbursement of the MPsCPF and the 2016 elections performance of some MPs.

1.6. Organization of the Study

The study is organized into five (5) chapters. The first chapter, “Background of the Study”, comprises the introduction to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, significance of the study, limitation of the study, and organization of the study. The second chapter deals with the theoretical framework and literature review. The third chapter discusses

the methodology to be used in the research work. It includes research design, sampling technique, method of data collection, sources of data, as well as data analysis framework. The fourth chapter is devoted to the analysis and discussion of findings under appropriate headings reflecting the objectives of the research. Chapter five highlights the summary of findings, conclusion, and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1.1. Introduction

There is a large body of literature on decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and Constituency Development Funds (CDFs). Although a number of studies have been conducted in these areas in Ghana, there is little or nothing about the relationship between MPs' Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF) and parliamentary electoral outcomes. This study, therefore, seeks to fill this void, thereby contributing to the literature on fiscal decentralization, MPsCPF, and voter behavior in Ghana.

The literature review is organized under the following broad themes:

1. Global studies on decentralization
2. Ghanaian studies on decentralization
3. Global studies on fiscal decentralization
4. Ghanaian studies on fiscal decentralization
5. Global studies on the Constituency Development Fund
6. Ghanaian studies on the Constituency Development Fund

2.1.2. Global Studies on Decentralization

This section reviews global works on decentralization. Some of the works reviewed include Pranab (2002); Dickovick and Reidl (2014); Crook and Manor (2000); Wunsch (2014); Smoke (2003), among others.

Pranab (2002) assesses decentralization, and warns against the transfer of decision making to local levels in less-developed countries. He contends that subnational governments in developing countries can be even more irresponsible than their central counterparts. Emphasizing the possibility of local elite capture, and misapplication of funds Pranab (2002) states that this could make things worse than the central government failures that decentralization was meant to address.

He, however, fails to acknowledge the fact that allowing people to contribute to decisions that concern them (which is the essence of decentralization) is a way of making them committed to the success of the policies and programs decided.

Dickovick and Riedl (2014) assert that an assessment of the decentralization process in Africa produces a mixed result: substantial achievements in establishing decentralized authorities vis-a-vis unsatisfactory improvement in subnational autonomy, downward accountability, and Sub-National Government (SNG) capacity. Consequently, decentralization appears to have transformed the organization of government more than the quality of governance. The apparent success in instituting decentralization in Africa is partly because of the inherent benefits that elected officials enjoy, hence their positive disposition to its continuation. The extent of top-down control in most African countries, coupled with the overreliance on central government transfers have substantially stalled autonomy and accountability at the local level. Dickovick and Riedl (2014) have identified structural variables, historical legacies, and political institutions as some of the shapers of decentralization in Africa. The impacts of decentralization in Africa are generally remarkable in regime stability, unclear for democratization, and quite insignificant with respect to development outcomes.

By assessing the impact of decentralization on different components of governance (regime stability, democratization and development), Dickovick and Riedl (2014) have resisted the possible danger of generalizing the impact of decentralization. However, by attributing the

thriving of decentralization to the benefits that central government officials derive from it, they failed to consider other possible factors, such as the failure of the decentralized development models (Ayres, 1999; Faguet, 1997) that might have contributed to the introduction of decentralized governance.

Wunsch (2014) emphasizes the degree of transfer of authority, autonomy, accountability, and capacity to subnational governments in Africa, and its impact on the countries. Studying ten African countries, he concludes that while the legal, fiscal, and administrative authority of SNGs has improved, achievements in the other dimensions (autonomy, accountability and capacity) are insufficient, and that, an effective and responsive decentralization system is only possible with the proper combination of these qualities. He echoes the position of Dickovick and Riedl (2014) that while decentralization in many parts of Africa entrenches the influence of national level actors, it changes little in local level governance. Difficulty in raising local taxes as well as mismanagement of resources are major challenges, and although there have been forceful drives towards amending legal frameworks, their full manifestation have been limited by strong centripetal forces.

Wunsch's (2014) approach to the study is quite instructive in that, by indicating that the nature of the political economy of African countries must be directed in ways that allow for the establishment of strong and workable subnational units, he moves beyond identifying the problem to proffering a possible solution.

Crook and Manor (2000) discuss the numerous components needed for decentralization to work effectively. They argue that elected bodies at subnational levels must possess a considerable amount of power, resources and robust accountability mechanisms. The significance of local revenues in aiding effective decentralization was also discussed because local tax structures are usually unproductive and susceptible to mismanagement, especially in rural environments.

Hart and Welham (2016) argue that although decentralization is expected to advance accountability and responsiveness, these benefits will not be realized if local governments are not granted the requisite autonomy to respond to local demands. Attaining a suitable balance between central superintendence and local autonomy is crucial to an efficient decentralization system. Fundamentally, they argue that as far as decentralization is concerned there is no 'blueprint or best practice' that will apply to all countries, and that, reforms must conform to the prevailing institutional architecture. Also, the various forms of decentralization need to be seen more as a process than an event, and should be modified periodically to reflect the lessons learnt throughout the process.

The authors also stated that in a decentralized system, making information available, supervising performance, and harmonizing the decentralization process are the critical roles that central governments should be playing.

Smoke (2003) evaluates the link between fiscal, institutional and political dimensions of decentralization and argues that though they are often treated independently, they are intrinsically interconnected, and this interconnection can determine the extent of success in implementing decentralization. The multiplicity of its dimensions makes decentralization a very complex phenomenon to embark on, and to study. By itself, decentralization is neither good nor bad. Accordingly, ascertaining the suitability of a policy for a specific instance requires a critical analysis of key objectives and fundamental structures. He also discounts the truthfulness of what he terms 'popular myths and misconceptions about decentralization' that require certain conditions to be met before decentralization efforts can be successful. To maximize the potential benefits of decentralization, there is the need to clearly define the intergovernmental structures; create appropriate machinery for harmonizing activities of the various institutions; and develop a suitable policy for implementing decentralization.

Smoke (2003) provides a helpful insight into the implementation of decentralization policies by indicating that the various components are linked to each other and in order to ensure successful implementation, these components must be strengthened concurrently.

Fye (2016) indicates that, the realization of the need for decentralization can be attributed to the growing difficulty encountered by central governments in responding to the needs of all citizens. Examining the effectiveness of administrative decentralization in The Gambia, Fye (2016) mentioned that the central government dominates the interactions with the local units, hence depriving the latter the opportunity to take local initiatives that will propel development within their respective jurisdictions. This is worsened by the fact that the central government largely appoints the top officials of the Local Councils.

He recommended mutual respect, and recognition of the legitimate responsibilities of each stakeholder in the decentralization process as critical determinants of strong cooperation between government and local authorities.

White (2011) opines that regardless of the likely drawbacks to its implementation, decentralization is more capable of promoting efficiency and accountability than centralized governance. There is, however, a widening gap between theoretical expectations and practical observable outcomes of decentralization. Consequently, a great amount of scholarly works on decentralization focuses on making meaning of the failures in implementation and suggesting possible improvements to subsequent policies. Generally, evidence about the practical benefits of decentralization is vague and inconclusive. Experts, therefore, appear to be working more with guesses than concrete evidence, and policymakers are more knowledgeable about what has failed previously than on what could work in the future.

2.1.3. Ghanaian Studies on Decentralization

This section reviews works on decentralization in Ghana. Works reviewed include Ayee and Dickovick (2014); Asante and Ayee (2008); Debrah (2014); Ahwoi (2017); SEND Ghana (2010), among others.

Ayee and Dickovick (2014) state that decentralization efforts in Ghana have necessitated the formal transfer of authority to elected officials at the subnational level without necessarily dealing with the factors that constrain the holistic attainment of some crucial features of decentralization such as autonomy, accountability, and capacity. Although Ghana has instituted remarkable legal structures, there remain doubts about the extent of accountability by the officials to the MMDAs vis-a-vis to the central government. There are also significant constraints on subnational authorities largely because of the inadequacy of resources available to them, compared to the responsibilities assigned to them.

The support of the two major political parties (NDC and NPP) for decentralization may vary depending on where they stand at any given point in time – whether in government or in opposition. More challenging for the growth of decentralization are the central government employees in sectoral and line ministries, who find it difficult to handover policy authority to the local government units.

To make decentralization fully representative, Ayee and Dickovick (2014) suggest the election of District Chief Executives and all assembly members, and a restructuring of the nonpartisan nature of the elections. In contradiction to the position held by Dickovick and Riedl's (2014) that political factors help to enhance decentralization in Africa, Ayee and Dickovick (2014) indicate that these political motivations rather inhibit effective decentralization.

Assessing the role of decentralization in reducing poverty in Ghana, Asante and Ayee (2008) state that the creation of District Assemblies has led to remarkable progress in infrastructure, and this has provided development avenues in the districts. However, this improvement in

infrastructure has been concentrated at the district capitals at the expense of the rural areas where there is pervasive poverty. They noted that although more funds were allocated to deal with issues of education, health, and local governance and rural development, Ghana's decentralization system has failed to reduce poverty. Ultimately, they posit that local involvement in the formulation and execution of poverty reduction projects in particular, and decentralization at large is needed in attaining a responsive system.

However, by using four indicators namely; responsiveness to the needs of the poor; levels and quality of representation and participation of the poor; social and economic outcomes; and accountability of officials to the poor, the study ignores other possible indicators that could be used to ascertain the impact of decentralization on poverty reduction. For instance, beyond the significant improvement in infrastructure, the study did not investigate the extent of responsiveness of these projects to the needs of the poor.

Debrah (2014) notes that the creation of District Assemblies and the transfer of political, administrative, and fiscal authority to them have encouraged participation and enhanced the autonomy of officials in decision making and resource disbursement at the local levels. Nevertheless, Ghana's decentralization has been fraught with diverse challenges. These include, the fact that the central government appoints the District Chief Executives (DCEs) and 30 percent of the assembly members; entrenched conflicts between DCEs and MPs; unsatisfactory local development; delays in the transfer of funds, which is worsened by the inability of the districts to raise enough funds internally; lack of expertise of local staff; and low education level of some Assembly Members. He argues that the local election of MMDCs and an increase in funds allocated to rural districts are necessary for effective decentralization since these will reduce the central control over grassroots affairs, and increase the inclusion of local views in decision making. He also indicated that the effectiveness of subnational governments depends largely on their autonomy.

This work provides a fair assessment of decentralization in Ghana's Fourth Republic by discussing the benefits derived from its implementation and challenges faced, and also provides possible solutions to these challenges. However, even though the study sought to assess the extent of grassroots empowerment, apart from their representatives and community leaders, the grassroots themselves were not involved in the interviews.

According to Ahwoi (2017), Ghana's decentralization is fundamentally a "central government supply-driven" programme because the central government is practically in charge of every process regarding decentralization. Consequently, local level institutions have limited opportunities to contest the dictates of the central government. The nomination of the Chief Executives by the president positions them to defend central government policies rather than promote local interests. Also, the apparent exclusion of traditional authorities from local governance, coupled with the inactivity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) at the rural areas can partly be blamed for the ineffectiveness of the decentralization system in Ghana. The MPs' inclusion in the District Assemblies poses questions about whether their duties include both legislation and local development. Their effort at performing both responsibilities is what resulted in the allocation of part of the District Assemblies Common Fund to them, which has resulted in conflicts between some MPs and their MMDCEs.

This position gives credence to the need to conduct a study to ascertain the expenditure of the MPs' share of the DACF. This thesis is therefore focused on finding the pattern of expenditure of the Fund and examine the relationship that exists between the expenditure and parliamentary electoral outcomes.

SEND Ghana (2010) revealed that MMDAs did not adhere to guidelines for the utilization of the DACF; its use was not transparent, and decisions were made without meaningful community participation; information on DACF projects was not forthcoming; and MMDAs were not responsive to the local needs of the citizenry. The study also amplified the poor

relationship that exists between MPs and their respective MMDCEs over the appropriation of the MPsCPF, which has adversely affected the implementation of projects. SEND Ghana (2010) used interviews for data collection.

However, the use of this method of data collection may not be appropriate for this kind of study because, it is largely based on the subjective views of the interviewees, most of whom may be influenced by several factors. Contrariwise, this study will rely on secondary data from relevant sources. These data were gathered and organized for other purposes not connected to my study. The use of this kind of data will, therefore, eliminate the possibility of any form of bias and subjectivity. In addition, even though it mentioned the conflict between MPs and their MMDCEs over the appropriation of the MPsCPF, SEND Ghana (2010) did not indicate what the funds were actually used for. Findings from this study will, therefore, fill this lacuna in SEND Ghana's (2010) work.

2.1.4. Global Studies on Fiscal Decentralization

This section discusses works on fiscal decentralization from other parts of the world. Works reviewed include Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001); Kwan (2013) Bird and Vaillancourt (1998), among others.

Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001) opine that even though economic growth has been one of the primary reasons countries give for embarking upon fiscal decentralization, the practical evidence of the relationship between the degree of decentralization, and economic development is not conclusive. Consequently, a claim of superiority of decentralized over centralized public expenditures is not completely tenable since there are mediating factors that will attribute economic growth to decentralization, and there are others that will show otherwise. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001) argue that most fiscal decentralization procedures across countries tend to be “positively correlated with the level of economic development, generally measured

by per capita income". Thus, fiscal decentralization is more common and deep-rooted in most developed countries.

Their study provides an important insight into the understanding of fiscal decentralization policies across the world by establishing a correlation between a country's economic development and the level of fiscal decentralization practiced. Taking a clue from Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001), this thesis argues that inadequate economic opportunities for citizens is partly responsible for their reliance on the MPs for the provision of certain needs, which partly led to the introduction of the MPs' Constituency Project Fund, which is the focus of this study.

Kwan's (2013) study discovered that contrary to popular arguments that fiscal decentralization improves good governance and shrinks government budget, it rather decreases government efficiency in advanced countries. When expenditure and revenue were devolved to subnational units, budgets increased in both advanced and less-developed countries. Fiscal decentralization discouraged corruption in developed states, while greater autonomy in expenditure increased financial misconduct in the developing countries. By implication, for fiscal decentralization to work in developing countries, there is the need for a firm recognition of the rule of law and the enhancement of the capacity of local governments. He argues that strengthening the fiscal and administrative capacity of these units is crucial to the success of any fiscal decentralization effort. Beyond political autonomy, subnational governments must also be able to fulfill their assigned roles in order for fiscal decentralization to have any positive impact.

On their part, Cavusoglu and Dincer (2015), confirming the position of Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001), argue that the impacts of fiscal decentralization on income inequality depend largely on the economic status of the states. Thus, in poorer states fiscal decentralization worsens income inequality while in richer countries there is an inverse relationship. They

conclude then that, fiscal decentralization rather accounts for income inequality, and not the other way around.

Bird and Vaillancourt (1998) state that occasionally, decentralization in developing countries appears to be construed either as a universal remedy or a plague. Although locally-managed services may be less expensive than centrally provided ones, it depends on the presence of some 'rare conditions'. Beyond its possible failure in developing countries for lack of these conditions, decentralization could actually destabilize nations. This position, however, contradicts that of Smoke (2003) who calls these conditions 'popular myths'. They argue also that, decentralization takes place not as a universal occurrence, but in specific countries with diverse historical, traditional, institutional, political, and economic milieus. This then makes it implausible to do a general comparison of fiscal decentralization programmes of different countries. Policies on fiscal decentralization must, therefore, be built on the understanding of the prevailing intergovernmental structures. Accordingly, good policies must be 'tailor-made'.

They offer two approaches to looking at decentralization – the top-down and bottom-up approaches. They reiterate the position of Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001) that the extent of fiscal decentralization is greater in wealthier countries than in poorer ones. Bird and Vaillancourt (1998) stated a very important point, viz, the futility of general recommendations and comparison of fiscal decentralization in different countries.

However, upon suggesting these two approaches they did not indicate which of them will produce a more effective result. In other words, proposing two seemingly contrasting options without indicating which of them will produce a more effective result is not very useful in finding a lasting policy position for fiscal decentralization.

Jametti and Joanis (2016) found that, the distribution of seats in the legislature influences the centralization of expenditure. In other words, the more seats the ruling party has in parliament,

the higher the possibility of a decentralized expenditure. Therefore, the differences in the extent of fiscal decentralization in a country might be subject significantly to the political forces that it faces. They argue also that, reforms need to take into consideration the political realities of the country.

Studying how the strength of the ruling party influences fiscal decentralization, Jametti and Joanis (2016) focus on impacts of the electoral outcomes (political strength) on fiscal decentralization. This study, on the other hand, focuses inversely on the impact of an aspect of fiscal decentralization (MPsCPF) on electoral outcome.

2.1.5. Ghanaian Studies on Fiscal Decentralization

Ahwoi (2017) acknowledges the inadequacy of internally generated funds (IGFs) of the MMDAs. He attributes this to the unyielding nature of revenue sources and difficulty in collecting these revenues; untrained, inefficient and corrupt revenue collectors; and improper usage of the revenue gathered, which discourages taxpayers. It is this inadequacy of the IGF that necessitated the introduction of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) which has become the foremost decentralized transfer in Ghana. Ahwoi (2017), however, bemoans the central government guidelines on the use of the DACF. The prevalence of intergovernmental transfers over IGFs, restricts the SNGs and compromises their autonomy.

Amoako-Asiedu and Domfeh (2016) conclude that Ghana's experience with decentralization is one that can be praised for its good intentions on paper but whose empirical manifestations leave much to be desired due to several 'implementation bottlenecks'. Some of these challenges include central-government control, lack of composite budgeting, and anomalies in the allocation of funds. Their argument is further corroborated by Ahwoi (2017) who insists that the inability of MMDAs to function at their optimum potential can be blamed on the

inadequacy of their internally generated revenues, compelling them to rely exclusively on the DACF, hence compromising the responsiveness of the assemblies to the needs of their communities.

Amoako-Asiedu and Domfeh (2016), however, fail to acknowledge marginal gains made with the implementation of decentralization, as revealed by Debrah (2014); Asante and Ayee (2008), Inanga and Osei-Wusu (2004), among others.

Inanga and Osei-Wusu (2004) reveal that decentralized units in Ghana are more inclined to financial transfers from the central government than attaining their fiscal autonomy. They agree with Debrah (2014) that there exist three major central government transfers, namely, the DACF, Recurrent Expenditure Transfers, and Ceded Revenues, and Ghana has made some progress in fiscal decentralization. Nevertheless, there are numerous challenges to overcome in order to realize the full benefits of fiscal decentralization. Also, decentralization works better in a favorable environment with the right mechanisms in place, because the extent and quality of local services provided is a result of the amount of money raised, which, in itself is determined by the rules, standards, and practices in any particular situation.

They suggest the inclusion of loans in the list of funding options of the MMDAs. They, however, failed to acknowledge the provision already made in the Local Governance Act 936 (2016) for borrowing.

Ankamah (2012) mentioned the growing awareness by central governments of the difficulty in meeting all the needs of the people, as the reason for their willingness to involve other levels of governance in the discharge of some of their duties. However, adopting a general approach to fiscal decentralization can be detrimental particularly to less-developed countries. Therefore, he indicated that the economic, political and institutional dynamics of each country must be considered first. He argued in support of the position of other scholars (Crook & Manor, 2000;

Smoke, 2003; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998; Inanga and Osei-Wusu 2004) that, there are requisite conditions that must be met in every governance system in order for fiscal decentralization to work effectively. Ghanaian policymakers must, therefore, consider the Ghanaian context in recommending policy options to be implemented as far as fiscal decentralization is concerned. Governments, especially in the Fourth Republic have been committed to decentralization and this is visible in the provisions made in the 1992 constitution, and other legal instruments. However, even though theoretically, there are no restrictions to the use of the DACF, which is the major vehicle of fiscal decentralization in Ghana, in reality, the conditions attached to it restrict the MMDAs in their expenditure, hence weakening their autonomy.

While acknowledging the importance of the DACF, Ankamah (2012) did not assess its use in the various districts nor its impact on the lives of the local people. He, however, mentioned the other revenue-generating avenues available to the MMDAs beside the DACF and stated that the inability of the MMDAs to generate enough resources from these sources has led to their overdependence on the DACF.

Debrah (2014) also identified three basic structures of central government transfers, namely, legal authority to raise revenue internally, District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), and annual budgetary allocations including salaries of staff of the MMDAs, HIPC benefits and others. However, considering the numerous responsibilities assigned to the MMDAs, the resources available to them are insufficient and even though the local "tax effort" formula for the allocation of DACF sought to encourage the MMDAs in tax collection, its implementation has been detrimental to deprived districts. Debrah (2014) also mentioned the rural nature of some of the MMDAs as a major factor that affects their revenue base and obstructs effective fiscal decentralization. This is because these areas do not have social services and other taxable economic activities.

He, however, failed to clarify the ways in which these funds have been used over the period of his study. This study, therefore, evaluates the use of the MPs' share of the DACF between January 2013 and December 2016.

2.1.6. Global Studies on Constituency Development Funds

Various governments over the world have formulated policies to ensure equity in the distribution of public resources. One such policy is the introduction of development funds at local government or constituency levels. In most countries, this fund is referred to as the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) (Kinami, 2013).

A Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is a government fiscal strategy that allocates a specific share of the national budget to MPs to fund small-scale development projects in their constituencies (International Budget Partnership, 2010). It is a distinctive means by which MPs are engaged in responsibilities beyond legislation in that they are assigned a degree of authority in the decision and execution of projects, a role that can be regarded as a new form of public service by MPs. As such, a CDF goes beyond a mere transfer of public funds from the central government to other parts of the country, to a means by which MPs respond to the development needs of constituents. Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) are adopted in over 23 countries globally (Caritas Zambia, 2011).

According to Nograles & Lagman (2008), in the Philippines, the redistribution of national resources to politicians for use in their various constituencies can be traced back to 1930. The CDF was considered an imitation of 'pork barrel' politics in the United States of America, and this became the foundation of the design of the CDF. Pork barrel politics refers to the situation where politicians, especially elected representatives, are assumed to be spending a lot of government money on a local project in order to win the votes of the people who live in their constituency (Harcourt, 2010).

Baskin (2010) notes that apart from using the money to act in response to the development needs of their constituencies, the MPs also nurture their personal votes and improve their chances of re-election. Even though he made this assertion, Baskin (2010) failed to indicate whether, and the extent to which the use of these funds for nurturing votes actually culminate in victory at the elections. This thesis, therefore, seeks to contribute to filling this gap by finding out whether there is a relationship between the expenditure of these funds and the outcomes of the parliamentary elections in 52 constituencies in Ghana.

In sub-Saharan Africa, CDFs have gained popularity over the years essentially following Kenya's adoption of a CDF in 2003 (Oxford Analytica, 2009). According to Sasaoka (2008), the introduction of the CDF in Kenya met a wide reception and acceptance from civil society, donors and policymakers, who saw it as a critical stage in the journey towards decentralizing public funds, and ensuring local ownership of development. This position was corroborated by Kinami (2013) who intimates that the CDF was a strategic driver of socio-economic development in the constituencies in Kenya, and that it was regarded as the most efficient way to distribute resources throughout the country.

Both Kinami (2003) and Sasaoka (2008), however, have been unable to indicate the possibility of the fund's misuse for campaigns and other political purposes. By focusing on the wide acceptance of the fund, these scholars did not explore its usage and impacts. This study, therefore, assesses the expenditure of the fund and its effects on electoral outcomes.

In Zambia, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was introduced as part of a broader decentralization initiative in 1995 (Chileshe, 2011). Nevertheless, according to Mukwena (2004), since its introduction, the funds have frequently been used as a campaign tool for MPs, and its budget continues to increase. This contrasts with Auya and Oino's (2013) assertion that thanks to CDF, most people in Kenyan rural areas are now able to access healthcare and

education easily within their villages than before the CDF was introduced. However, what Mukwena (2004) failed to do is to assess whether the use of these funds for campaign actually results in electoral victory for the MPs involved. This study will fill this void by assessing the relationship between the way in which the funds were spent, and electoral outcomes. Instead of assuming that the funds were used as campaign tools, the study will first establish what the funds were spent on, and then assess their relationship with the outcomes of the elections.

By making resources available to all constituencies in all parts of the country, the CDF gives all areas of the country the opportunity to have access to funds for their developmental projects. Namano (2014) touts the CDF's ability to solve regional disparities attributable to several factors such as patronage politics. In Kenya, for instance, 75% of the funds are equally distributed among the 290 constituencies while the remaining 25% is allocated according to the constituency poverty levels (Namano, 2014). These constituencies are in the various counties. Barkan and Matiangi (2009) agree with this assessment and state that the Kenyan CDF demonstrates the strengthening of the power of the legislature in relation to the executive, as it reduces the MPs' dependence on the executive for funds.

These assertions, however, did not explain what role the fund plays in the MPs' performance of their responsibilities, neither did it indicate what specific duties the MPs are supposed to perform: are they lawmakers, local development agents, or both? Depending on what the MP's responsibilities are, an allocation of part of the nation's resources may or may not be necessary.

According to Chesang et al (2016), the fund was introduced in Tanzania in response to the call for strengthening the powers and functions of the Parliament. It was named the Constituencies Development Catalyst Fund (CDCF) as it was meant to expedite development efforts at the local level (United Republic of Tanzania, 2014, cited in Chesang et al, 2016). With the

Tanzanian CDCF, the funds are automatically distributed to all the constituencies without any requirement to seek the consent of the central government.

While the work mentioned the mode of distribution of the funds and the limited central government interference, it has not explained its impact on the socio-economic and political development of the country.

Chesang et al (2016) indicated that the CDF has contributed considerably to the distribution of resources to health and water projects. Nevertheless, it has had no substantial consequence on the distribution of resources to road infrastructure. However, by limiting the assessment of the CDF to its impact on a few policy areas (education, health and road infrastructure), the study is unable to give a holistic picture of the impact of the fund on the lives of the citizenry. It does not also assess the impact of the CDF on national policies and electoral politics in the country.

It is worth noting also that a good number of previous studies on CDF (Appiah-Agyekum et al, 2013; Kinami, 2013; Namano, 2014; among others) have adopted a similar approach to assessing CDFs. They have largely been attentive to outcomes in policy specific areas, such as education, health, water, road, community development, among others.

This thesis takes a different stance by looking at the relationship between the expenditure of these funds and the outcomes of elections in selected constituencies.

Okungu (2006) disclosed that in most cases, schools, roads, health centers, bursary funds and any form of funding from the government had been diverted to groups more loyal to the incumbent Member of Parliament, hence undermining the purpose of the CDF, and fiscal decentralization at large.

Blair (2017) reveals that, despite the fact that a political business cycle occurred between 2009 and 2014 in the annual spending of MPs contesting in the 2014 elections in India, it did not have any significant influence on outcomes of the elections. On average, incumbent MPs who

contested in 2014, used less than their annual allocations at the beginning of their term, increased the amount spent over each of the subsequent years, and spent accumulated funds in addition to the annual allocation in the election year. However, the expenses made in the election year had very minimal effect on the outcomes of the elections. This minimal effect was negative, where losers spent a little more than winners. Nevertheless, over the five-year period, MPs who won the 2014 election eventually spent slightly more than those who lost. Blair (2017) indicates that amidst all these, popularity of the political parties overshadowed the other factors in predicting outcomes of elections.

This study will therefore build on Blair (2017) by looking at the Ghanaian context; whether a clear political business cycle can be identified, and whether the expenditure patterns of the Ghanaian MPs between 2013 and 2016 had any effects on the outcomes of the 2016 parliamentary elections.

2.1.7. Ghanaian Studies on the Constituency Development Fund.

In Ghana, the main CDF started as a component of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), a formula-based system of monetary transfer from central government to District Assemblies which was introduced in 1994 (Banful, 2009). The allocation of part of the DACF to MPs was made in 1996 following insistence from the MPs. Since then, 5% of the DACF was allocated to MPs who can decide on the projects to be funded in their constituencies (Appiah-Agyekum, et al., 2013). Indeed, central to the MPs' call for their own allocation of part of the DACF is the overwhelming demands that their constituents supposedly make on them. Some of the constituents make these demands as a way of ensuring that the MPs fulfill their campaign promises. In Ghana, the allocation made to MPs from the DACF is referred to as the MPs Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF), or MPs Common Fund (MPsCF).

King et al (2003) outlined major challenges and concerns about the MPs' share of the Common Fund, including the fact that the MPs determine what the funds are used for and who benefits from them. There were also concerns about the appropriateness of MPs implementing policies and disbursing public funds since their work is specifically to enact laws. Another major challenge identified is the frequent delays in the disbursement of the DACF even though it is a constitutionally mandated allocation.

Nyendu (2012) laments that, rather than the assembly coordinating all district development efforts, MPs spend their share of the DACF in ways that will benefit them (the MPs), especially in future elections. He agrees with Mukwena (2004) that in some cases, MPs use the funds for political patronage, rewarding faithful supporters who helped them in the past, or whose help they will need in the future. The creation of the MPs' share of the Common Fund has, in most cases resulted in conflicts between the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs), and the MPs over development programme design and implementation. This disunity is heightened at places where the MPs and the MMDCEs belong to different political parties, or where the MMDCEs have future political plans, in which case they begin to see each other as competitors (Nyendu, 2012, p. 229).

Proffering a solution, he recommends the abolishment of the Constituency Project Fund or the creation of alternative sources of funding for the MPs. That notwithstanding, when the MPs' Constituency Project Funds are spent for political patronage, do they yield the desired results? Nyendu (2012) and Mukwenu (2004) have not stated this in their works. This thesis seeks to find more answers to this question and fill the gap in earlier studies.

Appiah-Agyekum et al (2013) argue that despite the significant role the MPs' Constituency Project Fund plays in supporting rural development in Ghana, not much is known about monitoring structures and procedures for the disbursement and utilization of the funds. Their

study, therefore, sought to collect data from officials of selected MMDAs and other key stakeholders on the disbursement and utilization of the Fund. They found that there was no legislative instrument on the management of the Fund. Also, monitoring of the Fund was a responsibility shared by the MMDAs and other external stakeholders. Finally, they observed that the effectiveness with which the disbursement and utilization of the Fund was monitored depends largely on the relationship between the Chief Executive of the Local Government Authority, and the MPs in the various constituencies.

However, while the study indicated that one of its objectives was to review the effectiveness with which the disbursement and utilization of the Fund was monitored, it did not indicate the criteria used in measuring these. In determining the impacts of the MPsCPF, this study seeks to identify the pattern of expenditure of the Fund, and whether or not there is a relationship between the pattern of expenditure, and outcomes of the parliamentary elections.

2.1.8. Conclusion

From the literature reviewed, one of the major things that the scholars have agreed on is the effect of central government control over the use of the DACF as a vehicle for effective fiscal decentralization (Ayee and Dickovick, 2014; Amoako-Asiedu and Domfeh, 2016; Dickovick and Riedl, 2014; Debrah, 2014; Ahwoi, 2017). This makes the MP's share of the DACF a very important component to study because it is disbursed usually at the discretion of the MPs without central government control.

Other trends that run through the works reviewed include the overreliance of subnational governments on central government financial transfers (Debrah, 2014; Amoako-Asiedu and Domfeh, 2016; Inanga and Osei-Wusu, 2004; Ankamah, 2012); the primacy of workable institutional structures and conditions for implementing decentralization (Crook & Manor, 2000; Smoke, 2003; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1998; Inanga and Osei-Wusu 2004); conflicts

between MPs and MMDCEs in Ghana over the appropriation of the MPsCPF (Ahwoi, 2017; SEND Ghana, 2010); and an inconclusive evidence about the highly touted benefits of decentralization (White, 2011; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2001).

This thesis, therefore, examines the Constituency Project Fund of Members of Parliament; its utilization, and how it relates to parliamentary electoral outcomes in the 52 constituencies in the Brong Ahafo and Central regions of Ghana in the 2016 parliamentary elections.

2.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework of the study is based on the Public Choice theory.

2.2.1. Public Choice Theory: Origins, Characteristics, Strengths and Weaknesses

The public choice theory has its philosophical underpinnings in the works of its founding fathers, Kenneth Arrow (1951), Anthony Downs (1957) James Buchanan (1979), and Duncan Black (1987), among others. As Buchanan (1979) craftily defined it, public choice is “politics without romance”. The unrealistic conventional notion it sought to displace held that participants in the political sphere aim at promoting the collective good. In this view, public officials are projected as munificent individuals who devotedly discharge the “will of the people.” In performing the public’s business, voters, politicians, and policymakers are expected to subdue their own parochial concerns.

Together with Gordon Tullock and Anthony Downs, Buchanan formed the public choice movement with which they challenged their contemporaries to reassess the most essential assumptions concerning governance and the policies and programmes that arise from political processes (Economic Insights, 2000).

Buchanan and Tullock (1991) posit that a suitable theory of human action must assume some level of rationality on the part of the decision makers. Choices must not only be focused on

some objective or goal. Rather, “the decision-making units must also be able to take such action as will assure the attainment of the goal” (Buchanan & Tullock, 1999, p. 31).

As such, the public choice theory uses the kind of analysis economists make on people's behavior at the market place to analyze people's behavior and action in group decision-making. Economists assume that the primary motivation for people's actions in the marketplace is self-interest. Although people may take actions with the intention of protecting the interests of others, the overriding motivation for their behavior in the marketplace is a concern for themselves and their personal gains. This applies to all players in the market; whether they are employers, employees or consumers.

Proponents of public choice make the same assumption—that although people in the political ‘marketplace’ may be selfless enough to be concerned about other people, their primary motivation is to maximize their personal interests. This is regardless of their position in the political ‘marketplace’ at any particular time - whether they are voters, parliamentarians, lobbyists, or bureaucrats.

The public choice theory examines human behavior at the level of the individual. A fundamental assumption is that there are individuals making rational decisions that lead to predetermined outcomes. In the words of Buchanan, “public choice theory is methodologically individualistic, in the same sense that economic theory is. The basic units are choosing, acting, behaving persons rather than organic units such as parties, provinces, or nations” (Buchanan, 1984, p. 13).

All things being equal, in the face of numerous options, a rational man will choose the option that earns him the highest benefit. In other words, he acts to maximize his own gains. Proponents of the public choice theory assume that rational people approach all circumstances with an eye on the gains, another eye on the prices, a complicated attempt to balance them, and

a strong willingness to carry-out whatever rationality suggests to them (Downs, 1957). At the crux of the public choice argument is the individual who tries to maximize his or her utility in the political 'marketplace'. This individual is depicted as a rational person whose decisions are carefully calculated therefore ensuring that the expected advantages of his actions outweigh possible disadvantages. Supporters of this theory indicate that if the assumptions of rationality are enough to clarify human behavior in the market, then they are equally able to explain voter behavior and by extension, political functioning.

In projecting the behavior of individuals as motivated by the goal of a personal sense of well-being, the theorists do not negate the fact that people care about their families, friends, and community. Downs (1957) mentioned that, it is difficult to simply attribute an act of selfishness to rationality, because acts of altruism and charity are usually a source of great joy and benefit to people who embark on them. However, public choice assumes that people are driven primarily by their own self-interests and, more essentially, people's motivations in the political process are not different from those of people in the market. They are the same human beings, after all. Therefore, "voters vote their pocketbooks, supporting candidates and ballot propositions they think will make them personally better off; bureaucrats strive to advance their own careers; and politicians seek election or reelection to office" (Shughart II, 2018).

According to basic economic principles, the way to correct "market failures" such as monopolies is to introduce government action. However, public choice economists indicate that there is also the possibility of a "government failure" where government interventions do not achieve their anticipated results for varied reasons, including, for instance, the absence of incentives for voters to monitor government effectively (Down, 1957; Shaw, 2008) and the possibility of the resources spent in ways that does not benefit the public.

Concerning the decision to vote in a rational choice context, Downs (1957) pointed out that the act of voting itself is irrational because the likelihood of a person's vote deciding an election's outcome is extremely negligible. It is possible only if the votes of all other voters are evenly divided among the candidates or issues. However, as the number of voters enlarges, the chances of that happening speedily dwindle toward zero, thus the cost of voting is likely to outweigh the benefits.

Downs (1957), indicated that the voter is mostly ill-informed about political issues and even though the results of an election may be essential to the voters, an individual's vote seldom decides an election. Accordingly, the direct benefit of casting a well-informed vote is practically zero; the voter has effectively no chance of determining the result of the election. Therefore, spending time following the issues is not personally useful for the voter unless he sees a potential benefit from doing so.

Public choice theorists point out that this justification for remaining uninformed is rare in the private sector. A consumer who buys a commodity wants to have access to all the relevant information about the commodity he or she selects. If it is a prudent choice, the buyer benefits. On the other hand, if the decision is unwise, the buyer suffers the consequences of the decision directly. However, voting lacks that kind of direct effect. Most voters are therefore oblivious of the standpoints of the people they vote for on some issues. But for a few issues that receive wide publicity, most voters are not attentive to what legislators do, and even when they pay attention, they are rarely interested in gaining the background knowledge and analytic ability needed to fully appreciate the issues. By this reasoning, therefore, the rates of voter participation will be low if voters are rational, unless there are other personal interests to pursue, which they believe the voting process can help them achieve (Shughart II, 2018).

Rational voters are also conscious of the fact that, if an opposition candidate gets elected, there will certainly be changes in policies and beneficiaries of some of those policies. This awareness

therefore influences them in deciding how to vote. They are not concerned about policies as such. Rather they are more interested in their own utility (benefit), and if they feel their current benefit is not satisfactory, they may assume that any kind of change will probably make them better off. It would therefore be rational for them not to vote for the incumbent candidate. Alternatively, those who derive personal benefits from the incumbent may object to any kind of change, since that will probably affect their interests negatively. Thus, they will vote for the incumbent to be reelected. Evidently, both actions can be said to be rational attempts to secure their personal benefits.

Practically, citizens match what their representatives are doing to what they should actually be doing, and although everyone's interest may differ, they use their own standards of what the ideal government or representative should be to rate the performance of the government or representatives (Downs, 1957).

Public choice theorists also assess the activities of members of parliament and argue that, while they are required to do that which will be in the interest of the entire public, MPs ultimately make decisions on how to use resources. These resources are provided by citizens who may as well be suffering the consequences of some of the government's policies and decisions (Shaw, 2008).

A decision by the individual legislator, no matter how efficient, does not grant him a direct benefit, that is, it does not mean that his own money will be saved, neither will he benefit from what they save for citizens. Accordingly, they see no need to fight influential groups on behalf of a public that is oblivious of the benefits or of the people who made them possible. Therefore, the motivation for prudent management that benefits the entire public is absent, or weak at best. Their primary concern is on that which brings them personal benefits (Shaw, 2008).

The supposed protection of personal interests by the legislators triggered the analysis of what public choice theorists termed 'log-rolling' or 'vote trading', where legislators tend to vote in

support of a member's bill in the expectation that their colleague legislators will return the favor when the need arises. For instance, Legislator A votes in favor of a bill that will allocate resources to Legislator B for a project in his constituency. In returning the favor, Legislator B also votes in favor of another bill that Legislator A will benefit from. Through this, they both get what they want, and even though the funds may not be appropriately utilized, voters are satisfied that their representatives have gotten something for them (Shaw, 2008, p. 3).

The advantage of public choice theory is that it has a relatively close focus (Schinkel, 2004, p. 11). The public choice theory assumes that an individual will take an action if he or she thinks, on grounds of a rational calculation, that such action will be worthwhile. It focuses on specific circumstances of the actions of an actor in the political system who ostensibly calculates the costs and benefits of his actions before taking them. It does not look for general factors.

In that sense, however, it is inconsiderate of the larger social context. The theory pays less attention to the fact that humans can be selfless in their behavior and actions. People behave in certain ways not necessarily because of the personal gains they will make, but because of the societal good. By focusing heavily on the personal gains of people, the public choice theory belittles this.

Likening voters and politicians to consumers in the market means that the theory reduces activities in the political process to an absolute economic transaction. It tends to reject the notion of general determiners and rather focuses on the particular situation of an individual acting based on a calculation of profits and losses. This neglect of the larger social context and the possibility of its influences on individual decisions is a major criticism of the public choice theory. The public choice theory cannot account for, neither does it deem necessary, possible triggering causes in situations. Its starting point and fundamental principle are the rationality of individual actors (Shughart II, 2018).

Also, by building the theory on variables such as cost-benefit analysis, it is assumed that voters are exposed to all the information they need to make a 'rational' decision. It also assumes that all voters have the capacity to comprehend the complex issues of politics and state affairs. To the contrary, some citizens are unable to sufficiently digest the issues of national politics and the messages presented to them by different candidates and parties. Their choice of a candidate, therefore, may be based on limited information; thus, their ability to make a 'rational' decision is compromised. Practically, ambiguity, and paucity of relevant information makes it difficult for even very knowledgeable and well-informed people to behave exactly as suggested by the public choice theorists.

At best, individuals can only guess and make estimations based on the information they are exposed to. Benefits that are relevant are those that voters are conscious of by election day. Only these can influence their choice of party or candidate. All others make no difference (Downs, 1957).

2.2.2. Deployment of Theory

As applied to this thesis, the public choice theory holds that one would expect the independent variable (Constituency Project Fund of Members of Parliament) to explain the dependent variable (electoral outcomes in the 2016 parliamentary elections). This is based on the theoretical assumption that voters are likely to vote in a certain way, depending on the benefits they enjoyed from the MPsCPF. In other words, they either voted for an incumbent MP during whose tenure they benefited from the MPsCPF in anticipation for more benefits if he wins, or they did not vote for an incumbent MP during whose tenure they did not enjoy directly from the fund.

To gain votes, the Member of Parliament must determine some connection between what he spends on and how citizens vote. On the other hand, the voters must establish a connection

between the benefits they enjoy and the candidate they vote for. In this study, the connection is deduced from the assumption that both constituents and MPs act rationally in politics, and that constituents cast their votes for the candidates or parties they think will provide more benefits, and MPs spend in ways that will make them maintain their seats in subsequent elections.

By using this theory, this thesis will test the validity of the public choice theory in relation to the specific variables under consideration, namely, the Constituency Project Fund of Members of Parliament and outcomes of the 2016 parliamentary elections, and the relationship that exists between them.

2.2.3. Conclusion

This section has discussed the Public choice theory, emphasizing its origin, fundamental arguments, relevance and weaknesses, as well as how it was deployed to this study. The Public Choice theory makes very cogent arguments that are related and relevant to this study. It is, therefore, a suitable theory to undergird the study.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

The research sought to ascertain the ways in which the Members of Parliament Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF) was spent over the period, 2013 to 2016, and also to examine the relationship between the disbursement of the MPsCPF and outcomes of the 2016 parliamentary elections. This chapter is therefore devoted to the methodology, and it outlines the procedures followed in the conduct of the research. Specifically, the chapter discusses the research design, sampling, methods of data collection, data analysis and presentation, and some ethical considerations that guided the collection of relevant data.

3.2. Research Design

The research design is the general strategy that a researcher selects to guide his study. It is the underlying principle that directs the conduct of the study and connects the various sections in a coherent and consistent manner. This is to ensure that the research objectives are achieved, and research problems addressed. It forms the blueprint for the collection, measurement, and analysis of data (De Vaus, 2001; Bhattacharjee, 2012). The major purpose of a research design is to ensure that the data gathered is capable of helping address the research problem adequately and as unmistakably as possible (Creswell, 2014).

The Quantitative Research Design was used in this study. It stresses the objective measurement and the statistical, or numerical analysis of data gathered through various means and from various sources (Babbie, 2010). A major goal of a researcher conducting quantitative research is to establish the connection between an independent variable and a dependent one within a population (Brians et al, 2011).

As applied to this study, the quantitative design helped the researcher to collect data that could be presented and analysed using numeric and statistical tools. This enabled the researcher to use percentages, numbers, graphs and tables to analyse the data collected and present the findings.

The use of quantitative research design makes it possible for the study to conduct an objective analysis of the data gathered, hence ensuring accurate and unbiased results. By using statistical and computational procedures, the researcher detaches himself from the data, its analysis and subsequent conclusions. In addition, the fact that quantitative research applies clear and well-established criteria to the collection and analysis of data means that the findings can easily be verified by simply following the steps and methods outlined in the study.

Nonetheless, this type of research design has intrinsic limitations. Quantitative designs are most appropriate for answering “what”, “when” and “who” questions, but not suitable for “why” and “how” questions. This is because, it provides the knowledge of quantity and not the in-depth explanation to occurrences. Also, certain complex and sensitive information cannot be gathered with a structured data collection instrument, especially if the topics require the collection of very personal information. However, because quantitative research emphasizes enumerating a given phenomenon, and not “why” or “how” it has happened, it is unable to explain the individual human experiences involved in that phenomenon.

This notwithstanding, given the nature of the study and the variables involved, quantitative method was the most appropriate method to help achieve the objectives and address the issues.

3.3. Data Collection

Data collection is an essential part of research and it is crucial to the success of any study. In every study, the researcher collects data that forms the basis of the findings, conclusions and recommendations. There are primary and secondary sources of data collection (Heaton, 2008).

This study relied on secondary sources of data collection. This was done in order to ensure that the findings and results are unbiased.

Secondary data is one that has been previously collected and can be accessed by researchers. In other words, data can be described as secondary if it was collected by someone else for some other reason but being used by the researcher for the purposes of his/her research. By implication, primary data in one situation can become secondary data in another. Secondary data may be collected from diverse sources such as published printed sources (books, journals and periodicals, magazines and newspapers) and published electronic sources (Heaton, 2008, p. 34).

In this study, the researcher collected data on the recorded expenditure of the various constituencies for the period between January 2013 and December 2016. Instead of using questionnaires and interviews, secondary data was collected because the study is about variables that cannot be adequately assessed based on individual views, perceptions and feelings.

Furthermore, the use of questionnaires, interviews and other primary data collection mechanisms was not appropriate for the collection of accurate data on the variables under consideration. For instance, an individual who received assistance from an incumbent MP within the period under study would be unable to tell whether it came from the MPsCPF or from the MP's own resources. Consequently, depending on that individual for data for this study would not help in arriving at the true relationship between the variables under consideration. The most objective way to get an accurate data is to consult the documents that contain the recorded and audited expenses made from the MPsCPF. It is for this reason that collecting data from the office of the District Assemblies Common Fund Administration (DACFA) was the most appropriate option.

In addition, since the study also focuses on the outcomes of the 2016 parliamentary elections, the researcher consulted the repository (electronic and print) of the Electoral Commission of Ghana, and other published works such as Frempong (2017) for data on the outcomes of the elections.

Given the nature of the study and the limited time and resources available for it, this method of data collection was useful without compromising quality, reliability and objectivity.

3.4. Sampling

The study employed a purposive non-probability sampling to select constituencies to be studied. Out of the 275 constituencies in Ghana, the study covered 52 constituencies (19 percent of total constituencies). Thus, all constituencies in two of the four 'swing' regions in Ghana, namely, the Brong Ahafo Region (29) and Central Region (23) were selected. The Central and Brong Ahafo Regions had been purposively chosen because the pattern of the electoral results of these two regions in the previous elections revealed some striking dynamics. Although it is a 'swing region', the Brong Ahafo Region had voted more for the NPP than the NDC. Out of the seven elections in the Fourth Republic the region swung four times to the NPP. In fact, in 2008, Brong Ahafo was the only 'swing region' from which the NPP won majority of the parliamentary seats.

In contrast, the Central Region swung more to the NDC than the NPP. However, when it swung to the NPP, the percentage of its swing was significant: 84.21% in 2004 and 82.61% in 2016 (Table 3.1). Actually, the highest percentage of swings for the NPP was from the Central Region. It is therefore instructive that the study focused on these regions and the relationship that exists between the spending of the MPsCPF and the parliamentary electoral outcomes.

Table 3.1: Parliamentary Results (Percentage) of the NPP and the NDC in the Four "Swing" Regions, 1992-2016

Region	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Brong Ahafo	95.24	80.95	66.67	62.50	62.50	55.17	68.97
Central	94.12	82.35	52.94	84.21	57.89	69.57	82.61
Greater Accra	100.00	59.09	72.73	59.26	66.67	58.82	61.76
Western	84.21	63.16	52.63	50.00	50.00	69.23	61.54

NDC

NPP

(Sources: Frempong, 2017; Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2008, 2016)

3.5. Data Analysis and Presentation

The analysis of the data was done at different levels according to the variables involved.

First, data from the expenditure records was categorized under different subjects to reflect the expense details. This data was analyzed using descriptive statistics to ascertain the trend of the expenses in the various constituencies. It helped to achieve the first objective of the study.

Second, data on the 2016 parliamentary electoral outcomes was presented according to whether the incumbent MPs in the various constituencies stood for reelection, and whether they won.

Data analysis was done using statistical packages such as Microsoft Excel and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The researcher compared both sets of data (expenditure records and the electoral outcomes) using cross-tabulations, correlation analyses and regression analyses. These helped establish the relationship between the expenditure and the electoral outcomes, thus realizing the second objective of the study.

Also, the four-year period under study was divided into three – the beginning of the four-year tenure of an MP (2013); towards the end of the tenure, and leading to the next election (2016); and the two middle years (2014 and 2015). This helped the researcher to determine the levels

of expenditure in each of these periods; whether more money was spent in a particular period than the others and whether that has any influence on the outcomes of the elections.

3.6. Scope of the Study


The study focused on the expenditure of the MPsCPF and the outcome of the 2016 parliamentary elections in all constituencies of two swing regions (Central and Brong Ahafo Regions).

The swing regions were selected because of their role in Ghanaian electoral politics. Comparatively, they are known for not having an absolute loyalty and support for any particular political party. Their support for parties had shifted during the previous seven elections as depicted by Table 3.1 above, unlike the other regions that have been consistent with their support for particular parties, albeit, to different extents. Progressively, it has become apparent that, the ability of a party to win a particular national election depends on how well the party is able to sway the ‘swing regions’ to its side.

It is for this reason that the 52 constituencies from the two swing regions were selected for this study, since their voter behavior may be seen as influenced by other factors beyond absolute loyalty to political parties. The two regions selected for this study are particularly important due to their unique features in the electoral politics of Ghana’s Fourth Republic, which features were discussed in chapter one, and the sampling section (3.4) of this chapter.

Table 3.2: Parliamentary Percentage Result of the NPP and the NDC in the "non-swing" Regions, 1992-2016

Region	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	2016
Ashanti	100.00	84.85	93.94	92.31	87.18	91.49	93.62
Eastern	84.62	57.69	69.23	78.57	71.43	78.79	81.82
Volta	94.74	100.00	89.47	95.45	95.45	96.15	96.15
Northern	100.00	78.26	78.26	65.38	80.77	64.52	58.06
Upper East	91.67	100.00	66.67	69.23	69.23	80.00	80.00
Upper West	100.00	100.00	87.50	70.00	60.00	90.91	54.55



(Sources: Frempong, 2017; Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2008, 2016)

The study also focused on the expenditure of the MPsCPF because its mode of disbursement afforded the researcher the ability to establish some level of measurability. One is able to consult documented records to find out expenditure on items at a particular time. This level of analysis cannot be done with, for instance, the MPs personal funds spent in supporting the constituency in various ways, since one does not have records of those expenditures. The MPsCPF therefore is a more appropriate fund to assess.

The concentration on the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) was because of their dominance of the outcomes of both presidential and parliamentary elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic. They have been in and out of government. Over the years both political parties have won an overwhelming majority of the seats in parliament. The sum of seats they have won ranges from 94.5% (1992) to 100% (2016). Interestingly, apart from the NDC and NPP, no other party nor individual won a seat in parliament in 2016. Also, the 2016 election is the only election in the fourth republic in which there was an alternation of power from one party to the other without a run-off. Unlike 2000 and 2008 where electoral run-offs led to changes in power, it was different for 2016. These developments provided a

compelling reason to investigate the factors that might have influenced the 2016 parliamentary elections.

3.7. Ethical Issues

Integrity and ethical issues play a key role throughout all phases of research (Knottnerus & Tugwell, 2018). While researchers embark on their studies with the aim of gathering data that helps achieve their objectives, they must always adhere to certain ethical concerns.

According to Neuman (2014), ethics “defines what is or is not legitimate to do or what moral research procedure involves. The ethical issues are the concerns, dilemmas, and conflicts that arise over the proper way to conduct research” (Neuman, 2014, p. 145). Irrespective of what approach one uses in conducting a research, the ethical dimensions of research are recognized by all the approaches. Nevertheless, specific ethical concerns are determined by the research question and the data collection technique (Neuman, 2014, p. 125).

Accordingly, an approval was sought from the authorities at the District Assemblies Common Fund Administrator’s office for the collection of data on the MPsCPF. Also, after recording the data, the researcher engaged the services of a colleague, who is a research assistant at the Legon Center for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), to review the entries in order to ensure that the data entered into the researcher’s system was exactly what was gathered from the records at the DACF Administrator’s office. This person was a neutral individual who had no direct interest in the findings of the study.

In addition, data collected was treated with a high level of confidentiality. The researcher made sure that apart from the individual who helped in reviewing the data entry, no other person had access to the data collected. The data was used solely for the purpose of this research, and not for any other activity.

3.8. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to understand the trend in the use of the MPsCPF; to examine the relationship between the nature of disbursement of the MPsCPF and outcomes of parliamentary elections; and to assess the influence of timing of the expenditure on the parliamentary elections.

This chapter outlined how the research was conducted, clarifying the process used to select the sample, the method used to collect data as well as the approach that was used in analyzing the data.

This chapter is very important to the study because, it helped in organizing various activities according to the objectives of the study, and by so doing ensured that the researcher focused his attention, energy and resources on the materials and data that were relevant to achieving the stated objectives. Another significance of the chapter is that it informs readers on how the study was undertaken, how the findings were made and what led to the conclusions.

The chapter has provided the foundation upon which the subsequent two chapters were built. It set the parameters for the collection of data and outlined the guidelines for analyzing the data collected.

The next chapter is devoted to the analysis and discussion of findings under appropriate headings to reflect the objectives of the research.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I presented and analyzed the data that was gathered from various secondary sources. Data from MPs Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF) expenditure records were collected on 52 constituencies in the Central and Brong Ahafo Regions of Ghana over a period of four years (2013-2016). Also, the results of the 2016 parliamentary elections of these constituencies were collected and analyzed.

At the latter sections of this chapter, the results of the data analysis were discussed. Data analysis was done in accordance with the objectives of the study. The objectives of the study are to: (i) identify the ways and trends in the use of the MPsCPF; (ii) examine the relationship between the nature of disbursement of the fund and outcomes of parliamentary elections; and (iii) assess the effect of timing of the expenditure on outcomes of the parliamentary elections in the constituencies. Generally, the data analysis was done using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis.

4.2. Analysis and Presentation of Results

4.2.1. *Expenditure of the MPsCPF*

The data from the expenditure records gathered from the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) office were grouped into various categories. They include Personal Assistance–Education; Personal Assistance–Health; Personal Assistance–Business; Personal Assistance–Needy/Disaster; Public Goods–roads, bridges and community projects; Public Goods–

Education; Public Goods–Health; Public Goods–Safety/security; Donation-Religious/Traditional bodies; Monitoring; Donation–Youth Events, and Unclear Expenses (expenses whose details are not clear or not stated). The classifications and total amounts spent on items that fall under these categories are presented in Table 4.1 below. Although the DACF specifies that these funds should be allocated to the MPs for constituency projects, the determination of the specific items to spend the funds on is largely left to the MPs.

The information in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 show that generally, there were 8,516 recorded disbursements from the MPsCPF in the 52 constituencies within the period under study. In other words, expenses were made 8516 times from the MPsCPF. Out of this, 4975 (representing 58%) were spent on personal assistance towards education; 1010 (about 12%) on roads, bridges and other community projects; 6.4% on personal assistance towards business; 6.1% was on public expenditure on education; 5.8% on expenses that are not clear; and 3.5% on donations to religious and traditional bodies. The remainder ranges between 1.6 % (public expenditure on health, and public expenditure on safety and security) and 0.7 (for monitoring).

Table 4.1: Classification of MPs' Spending of the Constituency Project Funds

Type of Expenditure	Categories	Activities	Total Amt (GH¢million)
Personal	Education	Payment of fees and scholarship packages for students, payment of hostel fees for students, and support toward apprenticeship	6.48
	Health	Medical bills for individuals, purchase of drugs for sick constituents.	
	Business	Purchase of hairdryers for hairdressers, sewing machines for seamstresses, support for farmers, and financial support for constituents to start their own businesses.	
	Needy and Disaster Victims	Shelter and relief items for disaster victims, and monetary and other forms of support for the needy.	
Public	Education	Building or refurbishment of school blocks and dormitories, extra classes for schools, mock exams and mathematical sets for JHS and SHS students, and donation of textbooks, tables, chairs and computers to schools.	15.98
	Health	Building or renovation of local clinics and health centers, supply of items to health centers, vaccination exercises, and health awareness and public education activities.	
	Roads, bridges and community projects	Construction or refurbishment of roads and bridges, drilling or repair of boreholes, construction of information centers, extension of electricity to communities, and support for locally initiated projects.	
	Safety and Security	Support for police operations during community events, support for security agencies to forestall peace, and provision or replacement of street lights	
Groups	Religious/traditional authorities	Donations at church fundraising activities, donation to Muslim communities, support for Muslim communities during festivals, donation during traditional festivals and funerals, and construction/renovation of chiefs' palaces.	2.18
	Youth organizations	Sponsorship for football teams, youth cultural groups, and other youth clubs.	
Others	Monitoring of MPs' project	Fuel and other expenses for MPs to inspect projects in the constituencies.	3.12
	Unclear Expenses (Beneficiary or purpose of payment is unclear)	Expenses for which details are not clearly given, for instance, purchase of TV sets, motorbikes and building materials with no stated beneficiary or purpose; and amounts given to individuals or organizations without a clear indication of its purpose.	

Table 4.2: Summary of Frequency of Expenditure of constituencies

Expenditure Details		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	TOT	RANK
Constituency	Region														
Asunafo North	B.A	49			1	6	12	1	4	1			8	82	34 th
Asunafo South	B.A	74	2	20		77	26	6	2	3		1	13	224	11 th
Asutifi North	B.A	17				20	10	2	2	1			7	59	39 th
Asutifi South	B.A	19		2	2	96	46	4	4	4			7	184	16 th
Atebubu Amantin	B.A	31			2	22	5	6	4	2		1	5	78	36 th
Banda	B.A	23		3		11	7	1	3	5		1	13	67	37 th
Berekum East	B.A			3		5		1	3			4	4	20	49 th
Berekum West	B.A			1		2		2	7				9	21	48 th
Dorma Central	B.A	302		33	1	4	12			9			3	364	4 th
Dorma East	B.A	44				13	7	3		2	6	2	6	83	33 rd
Dorma West	B.A	125	8	33	2	37	17	11	2	4	8	3	23	273	8 th
Jaman North	B.A	30	4	5	4	15	4	1	1	15	1	1	8	89	32 nd
Jaman South	B.A	130	4		1	26	4	2	3	14	3	1	4	192	15 th
Kintampo North	B.A	89			1	12	13		1	1				117	23 rd
Kintampo South	B.A	312			1	28	63	4	3	9			3	423	3 rd
Nkoranza North	B.A	50	25	1	11	20	13	1	12	28		1	5	167	18 th
Nkoranza South	B.A	29		2	4	24	13	1		1			20	94	29 th
Pru East	B.A	2				3	23	13	1				1	43	41 st
Pru West	B.A	50	2	9	1	11	12	4	2	20	1	6	14	132	21 st
Sene East	B.A	8	2	7	3	11	4	2	6	7	3	4	10	67	37 th
Sene West	B.A	4		1	1	3	1				1		1	12	51 st
Sunyani East	B.A	1433	5	2	1	23	9	2	2	18	6	5	23	1529	1 st
Sunyani West	B.A	246	4	29	1	18	7	3	9	11		3	10	341	6 th
Tain	B.A	35		5	6	21	17	6	8	10	1	3	5	117	23 rd
Tano North	B.A	46	4			19	7		3	3	1	3	8	94	29 th
Tano South	B.A	107	2	4		29	13	9	1	1	1	8	25	200	13 th
Techiman North	B.A	34		15		25	6	1		3		1	140	225	10 th

Expenditure Details		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	TOT	RANK
Constituency	Region														
Techiman South	B.A		2	5	1	23	6	4	2	1		9	5	58	40 th
Wenchi	B.A	119	6	2	9	16	3	2	12	3		2	61	235	9 th
Abura Asebu Kwamankese	C/R	139	1	2	1	8	1		2		3		1	158	19 th
Agona East	C/R	82			1	16	3		3	1		1	4	111	25 th
Agona West	C/R	132	4	56		7	2	2	2	10		1	2	218	12 th
Ajumako Enyan Essiam	C/R	284	5	156	4	16	5		1	5		1		477	2 nd
Asikuma Odoben Brakwa	C/R	148	10	65	5	28	10	3	4	14	5	4	5	301	7 th
Assin Central	C/R		1		1	11	7		1				1	22	46 th
Assin North	C/R	4		4	5	47	7	5	3	5				80	35 th
Assin South	C/R						1	1					3	5	52 nd
Awutu Senya East	C/R	78				5	2			2	1	1	4	93	31 st
Awutu Senya West	C/R	70	2	1		59	20	6	9	8	2		6	183	17 th
Cape Coast North	C/R	254	9	7	7	15	21	6	6	6		8	7	346	5 th
Cape Coast South	C/R	48	9	3	1	10	11	2	3	6		1	2	96	28 th
Effutu	C/R	3		17		2	1	1			1		6	31	44 th
Ekumfi	C/R	49		36	6	41	13	9	1	21	15	3	2	196	14 th
Gomoa Central	C/R	1		5	2	8	1			3	1	1		22	46 th
Gomoa East	C/R	78	1	2	1	12			1	4	1		1	101	27 th
Gomoa West	C/R	11	8			9	1		1	2				32	43 rd
Komenda Edina Eguafo Abirem	C/R	81		2	34	10	1	3	2	8		1	8	150	20 th
Mfatseman	C/R	50			2	20	25	2		18		1		118	22 nd
Twifo Atti-Morkwa	C/R	6			1	26	2	4	1		1			41	42 nd
Twifo Hemang Lower Denkyira	C/R	28	2	4	2	32	17	1	2	10			4	102	26 th
Upper Denkyira East	C/R	8			3	7				1				19	50 th
Upper Denkyira West	C/R	13				1	10							24	45 th

Key to Table 4.2 (Expenditure detail)

Indicator in Table 4.1	Expenditure
1	Personal Assistance-Education
2	Personal Assistance-Health
3	Personal Assistance-Business
4	Personal Assistance-Needy/Disaster
5	Public Goods-roads, bridges, community projects
6	Public Goods-Education
7	Public Goods-Health
8	Public Goods-Safety/security
9	Donation-Religious/Traditional bodies
10	Monitoring
11	Donation-Youth Events
12	Unclear Expenses

The differences in the numbers recorded for the various constituencies show the differences in the expenditure patterns of these constituencies. As shown by Table 4.2, the highest frequency of expenditure (1529) was recorded in the Sunyani East Constituency (Brong Ahafo), while the least frequency (5) was recorded in the Assin South constituency in the Central Region. It is also worth noting that, in the Central Region, there were no recorded data for 3 constituencies (Awutu Senya West, Cape Coast North and Gomoa Central) for 2013. Similarly, 6 constituencies in the Brong Ahafo Region (Asunafo South, Asutifi North, Banda, Brekum East, Brekum West and Techiman North,) did not have any recorded data on their expenditure for 2013. For some of these constituencies, the expenditure books were not found, while for the others, there were no recorded expenditure in the books for 2013. Gomoa East also had no recorded expenditure for 2014.

An analysis of the data also revealed that a greater part (66%) of the expenses can be classified under 'personal expenses'. These are expenses that were meant to benefit individuals, rather than the entire constituency. These include personal expenses on education, health, business, and for the poor and needy. Twenty two percent (22%) was spent on projects and activities that

can be termed ‘public’ including expenses on roads, bridges and other community projects; schools, health, and security. Five percent (5%) was spent on selected groups including traditional and religious bodies and toward youth activities. The final type of expenses was classified under ‘others’, and this includes monitoring and unclear expenses (7%). The unclear expenses are made up of expenses for which details were not clearly stated. For some of these expenses, the amounts spent were stated without indicating what they were used for. In other cases where payments were made for items purchased, there were no specifications on what the items were used for. These are presented in Figure 4.1 below.

The high percentage of the frequency of expenditure on personal needs may be attributed to the general perception about the MPs responsibilities to constituents. Equally important is the inability of the constituents to take care of some of these basic expenses such as health care, education, among others This is corroborated by the fact that the amount of money spent on some of these expenses were quite small (as little as GH¢70). Alternatively, it could be a way by which the MPs’ sought to influence the electorate to vote for them.

On the other hand, the distribution of the actual value of the expenditure among the various categories gave a different result. As shown in Figure 4.2 below, 33% of the total amount spent was on public goods – roads, bridges and community projects, 16% each was on personal assistance towards education, and public goods – education; unclear expenses, 10%; donation to religious and traditional bodies, 5%; and the least amount was spent on personal assistance towards health, and monitoring (1% each).

Table 4.3 compares the frequency of expenditure, and actual amount of the various categories in terms of ranks.




Figure 4.1: Type of Expenditure and Percentage of Total Frequency




Figure 4.2: Total Monetary Value of Expenditure

Table 4.3: Comparison of Ranks of Categories in Frequency and Actual Values

Rank	Frequency	Actual Monetary Value
1 st	Personal assistance – education	Public goods – roads, bridges and community projects
2 nd	Public goods – roads, bridges and community projects	Public Goods – education
3 rd	Personal Assistance – business	Personal assistance – education
4 th	Public Goods – education	Unclear Expenses
5 th	Unclear Expenses	Donation – Religious/Traditional bodies
6 th	Donation – Religious/Traditional bodies	Public goods – health
7 th	Public goods – safety/security	Personal Assistance – business
8 th	Public goods – health	Public goods – safety/security
9 th	Personal assistance – needy/disaster	Donation – youth events
10 th	Personal assistance – health	Personal assistance – needy/disaster
11 th	Donation – youth events	Personal assistance – health
12 th	Monitoring	Monitoring

4.2.2. Annual Expenditure of the Constituencies, 2013 – 2016

This section presents the data on the expenditure of the MPsCPF for the years 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. Figure 4.3 shows that the largest frequency of expenditure was in 2015 (37%), while the least was in 2013 (10%). 2014 and 2016 had 22% and 31% respectively.




Figure 4.3: Distribution of the Frequency Expenditure of the MPsCPF based on Years

4.2.3. Constituencies, their most-frequent Expenditure Years and Electoral Performance

Specifically, in 2 constituencies (3.8%), their most frequent expenditure was in 2013 (both constituencies were in the Central Region). In 2014, 8 out of the 52 constituencies (15.4%) spent more compared to the other years; 4 of them were from the Brong Ahafo Region and the other 4 from the Central Region. Twenty six (50%) constituencies spent more in 2015, out of which 14 were from the Brong Ahafo Region and 12 from the Central Region. Finally, in 2016, 16 (30.8%) constituencies spent more compared to the other years of which 11 were from the Brong Ahafo Region and the remaining 5 from the Central Region.

Besides, out of the 2 constituencies from the Central Region whose highest expenditure was in 2013, one of the MPs won the election and the other (Assin South) did not seek re-election. With regards to constituencies which had their highest expenditure in 2014, all 4 candidates from Brong Ahafo won, 3 out of the 4 from Central Region won and the remaining 1 (Abura Asebu Kwamankese) lost the primary elections. In 2015, 8 out of the 14 from the Brong Ahafo Region won, 3 lost and the other 3 did not contest (one lost the primary elections while the other two did not seek re-election). 2 out of the 12 from Central Region won, 4 did not contest and 6 lost. Among the non-contesting incumbent MPs, 2 (Asikuma Odoben Brakwa and Upper Denkyira West) lost the primary elections while the others (Gomoa East and Gomoa West) did not seek re-election. Lastly, for 2016, 7 out of the 11 from the Brong Ahafo Region won, while the other 4 lost. From the Central Region, 1 won, 2 lost and 2 (Cape Coast North and Twifo Hemang Lower Denkyira) did not seek re-election (Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6).

It is worth noting that, other factors might have contributed to the outcomes recorded in the elections. For instance, factors such as popularity of the candidates, party in power, presidential candidates, among others can influence electoral outcomes. That notwithstanding, this study focuses on the expenditure of the MPsCPF, and the analysis implies that, all incumbent candidates (100%) who had their highest expenditure in 2013 and 2014 won the election. Ten

(10) out of 19 (52.6%) who spent more in 2015 won, while 8 out of 14 (57.1%) who recorded their highest frequency of expenditure in 2016 won.

4.2.4. Incumbent MPs' Participation in the 2016 Parliamentary Election

As shown in Table 4.5 below, 33 incumbent MPs (representing 63.5%) belonged to the NDC, while 19 (36.5%) belonged to the NPP. Out of this 25 (75.8%) from the NDC contested the 2016 parliamentary elections, while 16 (84.2%) of the NPP incumbent MPs contested. Eight (8) NDC and 3 NPP incumbent MPs, however, did not contest, either because they lost the primary elections, or they did not stand for the primaries at all. This data is necessary for determining the performance of incumbent MPs in the parliamentary elections.

In all, 78.85% of the incumbent MPs from the Brong Ahafo and the Central Regions contested in the 2016 parliamentary elections.

Table 4.4: Constituencies and their Year of Highest Expenditure Frequency

CONSTITUENCIES AND THEIR YEARS OF HIGHEST EXPENDITURE				
	2013	2014	2015	2016
	1. Agona East 2. Assin South	1. Asunafo South 2. Atebubu Amantin 3. Berekum West 4. Sene West 5. Abura Asebu Kwamankese 6. Assin Central 7. Cape Coast South 8. Effutu	1. Asunafo North 2. Asutifi South 3. Dorma East 4. Dorma West 5. Jaman North 6. Jaman South 7. Kintampo North 8. Kintampo South 9. Nkoranza North 10. Nkoranza South 11. Pru West 12. Sunyani East 13. Tain 14. Wenchi 15. Agona West 16. Ajumako Enyan Essiam 17. Asikuma Odoben Brakwa 18. Assin North 19. Awutu Senya East 20. Awutu Senya West 21. Ekumfi 22. Gomoa East 23. Gomoa West 24. Komenda Edina Eguafo Abirem 25. Twifo Atti-Morkwa 26. Upper Denkyira West	1. Asutifi North 2. Banda 3. Berekum East 4. Dorma Central 5. Pru East 6. Sene East 7. Sunyani West 8. Tano North 9. Tano South 10. Techiman North 11. Techiman South 12. Cape Coast North 13. Gomoa Central 14. Mfatseman 15. Twifo Hemang Lower Denkyira 16. Upper Denkyira East
TOT	2 (3.8%)	8 (15.4%)	26 (50.0%)	16 (30.8%)
BA	0 (0%)	4 (50%)	14 (53.8%)	11 (68.8%)
CR	2 (100%)	4 (50%)	12 (46.2%)	5 (31.2%)
SEATS WON IN THE 2016 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION				
BA	0	4	8	7
CR	1	3	2	1

Table 4.5: Incumbent MPs, their Parties and whether they contested in the 2016 parliamentary elections

		Party of Incumbent MP		Total
		NDC	NPP	
Did the incumbent MP contest in the 2016 parliamentary elections	Yes	25	16	41
	No	8	3	11
Total		33	19	52

Table 4.6: Non-contesting Incumbent MPs

Reason for not contesting * Region * Political Party of Incumbent MP Crosstabulation					
Political Party of Incumbent MP			Region		Total
			BA	CR	
NDC	Reason for not contesting	Lost the primary elections	0	3	3
		Did not seek re-election	2	3	5
	Total		2	6	8
NPP	Reason for not contesting	Lost the primary elections	1	1	2
		Did not seek re-election	0	1	1
	Total		1	2	3
Total	Reason for not contesting	Lost the primary elections	1	4	5
		Did not seek re-election	2	4	6
	Total		3	8	11

4.2.5. How Incumbent MPs Fared in the Elections

An analysis of the data also revealed that about 63% of incumbent MPs who contested the election won, while the remaining 37% lost.




Figure 4.4: Did the Incumbent MPs win the 2016 Election in their Constituencies?

Table 4.7 shows the distribution of incumbent MPs according to their parties and whether they won the 2016 parliamentary elections. It was observed that out of the 25 incumbent NDC contestants, 11 won the election, and 14 lost. For the NPP, 15 won, while 1 lost. By implication, 42% and 58% of the winning candidates belong to the NDC, and NPP respectively. On the other hand, 93% of the losing candidates belonged to NDC while the remaining 7% was from the NPP. Beyond the expenditure of the MPsCPF, it is important to note that other factors might have contributed to the results recorded from the elections. This study, however, is concerned mainly with the expenditure of the MPsCPF.

Table 4.7: How the Parties fared in the 2016 Parliamentary Elections

Party of Incumbent MP* Did the incumbent MP win the election? Crosstabulation				
		Did the incumbent MP win the election?		Total
		Yes	No	
Party of Incumbent MP	NDC	11	14	25
	NPP	15	1	16
Total		26	15	41

4.2.6. Regional Performance of the Incumbent MPs.

This section analyzes the performance of the incumbent MPs according to their parties, and the performance of the parties according to the regions. As shown by Table 4.8 below, 26 out of the 41 incumbent MPs who contested were from the Brong Ahafo Region, while 15 were from the Central Region. The data also shows that 8 out of 15 NDC contestants (53%) in the Brong Ahafo Region won, while 7 (47%) lost. On the other hand, all the NPP's 11 incumbent candidates (100%) in that region won. However, as far as the total incumbent seats in the region are concerned, the NPP and NDC won 58% and 42% respectively.

In the Central Region, 4 out of the 5 NPP incumbent MPs (80%) won while 1 (20%) lost. On the other hand, the NDC lost 7 out of 10 incumbent seats (70%).

Generally, the NPP incumbent candidates won 15 out of the 26 incumbent-won seats from both regions (58%) and the NDC won 11(42%). Out of the 15 incumbent seats lost in both regions, the NDC lost 14 (93%) seats while the NPP lost 1 (7%).

Table 4.8: Performance of Incumbent MPs according to their Parties and Regions in the 2016 Elections

Name of Region			Did the incumbent MP win the election?		Total
			Yes	No	
Brong Ahafo	Party of Incumbent MP	NDC	8	7	15
		NPP	11	0	11
	Total		19	7	26
Central	Party of Incumbent MP	NDC	3	7	10
		NPP	4	1	5
	Total		7	8	15
Total	Party of Incumbent MP	NDC	11	14	25
		NPP	15	1	16
	Total		26	15	41

4.2.7. Relationship between Expenditure with Highest Frequency and Electoral Outcome

The analysis also revealed that 17 out of the 25 incumbent MPs (68%) whose highest frequency of expenditure was on personal assistance toward education and contested the 2016 parliamentary elections won, while the remaining 8 representing 32% lost. For those who spent more on public goods – roads, bridges/community projects, 50% won and the other 50% lost.

All MPs who spent more on personal assistance towards business (1), public goods – safety and security (1) and public goods – education (2) won (that is, 100% for each category). One MP each spent more on donation towards youth events, and ‘unclear expenses’, and they both lost. This is presented in Table 4.9 below.

However, for the other categories, (Personal Assistance – Health, Personal Assistance – Needy and Disaster Victims, Public Goods – Health, Donation – Religious and Traditional Bodies,

and MPs' Monitoring), none of the MPs had them as their category of highest frequency of expenditure.

Clearly, the results indicate that incumbent MPs who spent more on expenses that were personal (education, business) won more seats (18) than those who made more expenses on public goods (8). In fact, the former group of MPs won seats more than twice as much as the latter.

Table 4.9: Crosstabulation: Highest Frequency of Expenditure and Performance in the 2016 Parliamentary Elections

Highest frequency category * Did the incumbent MP win the election? Crosstabulation				
		Did the incumbent MP win the election?		Total
		No	Yes	
Highest Frequency category	Personal Assistance-Education	8 (32%)	17 (68%)	25
	Personal Assistance-Business	0	1 (100%)	1
	Public Goods-Roads, Bridges/Community Projects	5 (50)	5 (50)	10
	Public Goods-Education	0	2 (100%)	2
	Public Goods-Safety & Security	0	1 (100%)	1
	Donation-Youth Events	1 (100%)	0	1
	Unclear Expense	1 (100%)	0	1
Total		15 (37%)	26 (63%)	41

Table 4.10 is an arrangement of the various categories of expenditure and their ranks, from the most-frequent (first) to the least-frequent (twelfth) category for incumbent MPs who won the 2016 election. For the 26 incumbent MPs who won, Personal Assistance – Education has the highest frequency (first) for 17 of them. Six (6) of the constituencies had Public Goods-Roads, Bridges/Community Projects as the highest category of expenditure. It was also the category with the second highest frequency for 9 incumbent MPS who won the elections. Additionally, Unclear Expenses has the third highest frequency for 6 constituencies; the fourth was donations to religious and traditional bodies; the fifth was public goods – education; sixth was public goods – safety and security. The least frequent expenditures of MPs who won the 2016

elections were donations toward youth activities, personal assistance towards health, personal assistance to the needy and disaster victims, and monitoring. In summary, the analysis suggests that most of the incumbent MPs who won the 2016 parliamentary elections had relatively high expenditure frequencies for Personal Assistance – Education, and Public Goods – Roads, Bridges/Community Projects.

Table 4.11 presents the frequencies of the various categories of expenditure for incumbent MPs who lost the 2016 elections. It also showed that 9 MPs had Personal Assistance – Education, as the expenditure with the highest frequency, while 6 had Public Goods – Roads, Bridges/Community Projects as the category with the second highest frequency. On the other hand, 4 MPs had Public Goods – Education as the third most frequent category. The least frequent category of expenditure for incumbent MPs who lost the 2016 parliamentary election is Personal Assistance – Needy and Disaster.

A comparison of the frequencies of the categories of expenditure for MPs who won and those who lost revealed that both groups had a similar trend of expenditure. For the category with highest frequency, they both had personal assistance – education, while public goods – roads, bridges/community projects was the category with the second highest frequency. Also, both groups of MPs had personal assistance-needy and disaster as the expenditure with the least frequency. Table 4.12 shows these similarities.

Table 4.10: Arrangement of Expenditure Categories (from Highest to Least Frequency) for MPs who won the 2016 Election

Category of Expenditure	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th
Personal Assistance-Education	17	1	4	2								
Public Goods-Roads, Bridges/Community Projects	6	9	4	3	3							
Personal Assistance-Business	1	3	1	1	4	2			4			
Public Goods-Education	1	3	4	4	5		2	2				
Unclear Expenses	1	2	6	3	4	4	1	1	1			
Donation-Religious and Traditional Bodies		2	2	5	3	2	4	2				
Donation-Youth Events		2					4	3	3	2	3	1
Personal Assistance-Health		1		3	2	2	1		2			1
Personal Assistance-Needy & Disaster		1	1	1	2		5	2	1	2	1	1
Public Goods-Health		1	3			5	1	3	2	3	2	
Public Goods-Safety & Security		1	1	3	2	6	2	2		2	2	
Monitoring				1		3	1			1	1	1

Table 4.11: Arrangement of Expenditure Categories (from Highest to Least Frequency) for MPs who lost the Election

Category of Expenditure	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th	7th	8th	9th	10th	11th	12th
Personal Assistance-Education	9	3			1	1						
Public Goods-Roads, Bridges/Community Projects	3	6	3	1								
Personal Assistance-Business	1	2	1	1	2	1	3	2		1		
Donation-Religious and Traditional Bodies	1		3	4	2	1		1	1	2		
Unclear Expenses	1	1	2	2	1	2	1		1	1		
Personal Assistance-Needy & Disaster		1		1	3		1	1	2			1
Public Goods-Education		1	4	4	2	2	1		1			
Donation-Youth Events		1	1			1		1	1	4		
Public Goods-Health			1	1	1	5	2	1	1	1		
Public Goods-Safety & Security				1	1	2	4	2	1		2	
Personal Assistance-Health					1		1	3	1			
Monitoring					1		2	2	1		1	

Table 4.12: Comparison of the Frequencies of the Categories of Expenditure for MPs who won and those who lost

	Won	Lost
1 st	Personal Assistance-Education	Personal Assistance-Education
2 nd	Public Goods-Roads, Bridges/Community Projects	Public Goods-Roads, Bridges/Community Projects
3 rd	Unclear Expenses	Public Goods-Education
4 th	Donation-Religious and Traditional Bodies	Donation-Religious and Traditional Bodies Public Goods-Education
5 th	Public Goods-Education	Personal Assistance-Needy & Disaster
6 th	Public Goods-Safety & Security	Public Goods-Health
7 th	Personal Assistance-Needy & Disaster	Public Goods-Safety & Security
8 th	Donation-Youth Events Public Goods-Health	Personal Assistance-Health
9 th	Personal Assistance-Business	Personal Assistance-Needy & Disaster
10 th	Public Goods-Health	Donation-Youth Events
11 th	Donation-Youth Events	Public Goods-Safety & Security
12 th	Personal Assistance-Needy & Disaster Monitoring Donation-Youth Events Personal Assistance-Health	Personal Assistance-Needy & Disaster

4.2.8. Correlation Analysis

The seeming similarity shown in Table 4.11 with regards to the general expenditure patterns of MPs who won, and those who lost suggests the need for a more rigorous analysis of the relationship between the variables under consideration. The next section assesses the statistical association between the dependent variable (parliamentary electoral outcomes) and the independent variables (expenditure of the MPsCPF).

Two levels of analysis were done to ascertain the relationship between the variables. For each of the levels of analysis in this section, the test was done on both the frequencies, in terms of the number of times an expenditure was made, and the actual amounts in terms of Ghana Cedis (GH¢). At the first level, a correlation analysis was done using the Pearson Product Moment

Correlation $r = \frac{n(\sum xy) - (\sum x)(\sum y)}{\sqrt{[n(\sum x^2) - (\sum x)^2][n(\sum y^2) - (\sum y)^2]}}$. The Pearson correlation was used because it is helpful in measuring the direction and strength of a linear association between two variables. At the second level, a regression analysis was done to ascertain the extent of the impact of the expenditure patterns on the parliamentary electoral outcomes.

Correlation between Frequency of Expenditure, and Electoral Outcomes

Table 4.13 and Figure 4.5 below show the results of the correlation analyses for the frequency of expenditure, and electoral outcomes.

The relationships between the various categories of expenditure and the outcome of the 2016 parliamentary elections differ in direction and strength. Among all the categories of expenditure, personal assistance towards health exhibits the strongest positive correlation (0.20). Similarly, personal assistance towards education has a correlation of 0.17, safety and security has 0.16, donation to religious and traditional bodies has 0.098, personal assistance towards business has 0.096 and public goods-education has the weakest positive association (0.01). This means that the frequency of expenditure on public education has an almost insignificant correlation with the electoral outcomes.

On the other hand, the frequency of expenditure on the needy and disaster victims exhibits the strongest negative correlation (-0.27) with electoral outcomes. By implication, each time MPs spent on this category of needs their chances of winning the election gets affected negatively. Likewise, an expenditure on items that fall under “unclear expenditure” has a correlation of -0.23, monitoring has -0.23 and donations toward youth activities has -0.19. Intriguingly, public health expenses, and public expenses on roads, bridges and other community projects have negative correlations of 0.22 and 0.21 respectively.

Correlation between Actual Values (amounts in GH¢) and Electoral Outcomes

The results of the correlation analysis on the actual amounts spent show that similar to the results on the frequencies, expenses on the personal health of individual constituents have the strongest positive correlation (0.23). This is followed by expenses on public safety and security (0.19). Personal assistance towards education and business recorded a correlation of 0.08 and 0.03 respectively while expenses on public health has a correlation of 0.04.

However, the other categories of expenditure have a negative correlation with the electoral outcomes. Expenses on roads, bridges and other community projects had the highest negative correlation of about -0.39. The same can be said for monitoring -0.38; personal assistance to the needy and disaster victims - 0.20; unclear expenses -0.17; donations to religious and traditional bodies -0.17; donations towards youth events -0.14 and public expenses on education -0.01. These are presented in Table 4.14 and Figure 4.6 below.

In summary, for the actual values, expenditure on roads, bridges and other community projects had the strongest correlation with electoral outcomes while expenses on public education had the weakest correlation. For the frequencies, support for the needy and disaster victims had the strongest correlation while expenses on public education had the weakest.

Table 4.13: Correlation between Frequency of Expenditure and Electoral Outcomes

Electoral outcome_Dummy	p.a_edu	p.a_health	p.a_bus	p.a_n/d	p.g_rds/brdg/commpro	p.g_edu	p.g_health	p.g_safety/secu	don_rel/trad	mp_monitoring	don_youth_act	Unclear_exp	
1.000	0.1733	0.2048	0.0968	-0.2670	-0.2127	0.0104	-0.2153	0.1635	0.0983	-0.2343	-0.1913	-0.2375	Electoral outcome_Dummy
	1.0000	-0.0269	0.1102	-0.1045	-0.0223	-0.0378	-0.0987	-0.0685	0.2937	0.2250	0.3043	0.0574	p.a_edu
		1.0000	-0.0570	0.7227	-0.1421	0.0507	-0.2037	0.5162	0.5601	0.8095	-0.3751	-0.0031	p.a_health
			1.0000	-0.0928	-0.0674	-0.1334	0.3159	-0.2715	-0.0395	0.8000	-0.2308	-0.0264	p.a_bus
				1.0000	-0.0881	-0.1474	-0.0762	0.1460	0.1118	0.3974	-0.2702	0.1177	p.a_n/d
					1.0000	0.7581	0.2780	0.0079	-0.0446	0.4477	0.0605	0.0694	p.g_rds/brdg/commpro
						1.0000	0.4055	0.0441	0.0375	0.3485	0.2137	-0.0918	p.g_edu
							1.0000	-0.2597	-0.1221	0.4600	0.3278	-0.1479	p.g_health
								1.0000	0.2018	-0.2698	-0.1708	0.3492	p.g_safety/secu
									1.0000	0.3791	0.0049	-0.1891	don_rel/trad
										1.0000	-0.0221	0.0458	mp_monitoring
											1.0000	-0.0622	don_youth_act
												1.0000	Unclear_exp

Table 4.14: Correlation between Actual Amount Spent and Electoral Outcomes

Electoral outcome_Dummy	p.a_edu	p.a_health	p.a_bus	p.a_n/d	p.g_rds/brdg/commpro	p.g_edu	p.g_health	p.g_safety/secu	don_rel/trad	mp_monitoring	don_youth_act	Unclear_exp	
1.000	0.0817	0.2279	0.0300	-0.1966	-0.3914	-0.0137	0.0417	0.1850	-0.1656	-0.3763	-0.1405	-0.1665	Electoral outcome_Dummy
	1.000	0.1808	-0.2007	0.0731	0.0633	-0.0953	-0.2668	0.3060	0.1780	-0.1194	0.0015	0.3081	p.a_edu
		1.0000	-0.0239	0.2501	-0.2269	-0.0864	-0.2794	0.6000	-0.0122	-0.0314	-0.0516	-0.0548	p.a_health
			1.0000	0.0250	-0.2872	-0.0798	-0.1193	-0.0906	0.0681	-0.0412	0.0300	0.0479	p.a_bus
				1.0000	0.1536	-0.1171	-0.0907	0.5345	0.0742	-0.1124	0.2744	0.5400	p.a_n/d
					1.0000	0.2831	-0.1104	-0.2613	-0.1149	-0.0489	0.1223	0.0054	p.g_rds/brdg/commpro
						1.0000	0.5431	-0.0891	0.1054	0.3111	-0.1031	-0.1203	p.g_edu
							1.0000	0.0651	-0.1242	0.3468	-0.0959	-0.1214	p.g_health
								1.0000	0.3271	-0.1645	0.2753	0.4631	p.g_safety/secu
									1.0000	0.3566	0.1917	0.0238	don_rel/trad
										1.0000	-0.0089	0.0234	mp_monitoring
											1.0000	0.2734	don_youth_act
												1.0000	Unclear_exp




Figure 4.5: Correlation between Frequency of Expenditure and Electoral Outcome




Figure 4.6: Correlation between Actual Amount Spent and Electoral Outcomes

Comparison of Correlation of Frequencies and Actual Values

A comparison of the correlation coefficients points out that, the directions of the correlations for both frequencies and actual values are the same for all categories, except three.

While the frequency of expenditure on public education and donations to religious and traditional bodies have positive correlations, the actual values have a negative correlation with electoral outcomes. Therefore, the number of times that these expenses were made had a positive impact even though the amounts spent on these items had a negative impact on electoral outcomes. On the other hand, while the frequency of public health expenses had a negative impact on the electoral outcomes, the actual values had a positive impact on them.

Table 4.15: Comparison of Correlation of Frequencies and Actual Values

<i>Category</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Actual</i>
Personal assistance towards education	0.1733	0.0817
Personal assistance towards health	0.2048	0.2279
Personal assistance towards business	0.0968	0.0300
Personal assistance to needy and disaster victims	-0.2670	-0.1966
Public goods – roads, bridges and community projects	-0.2127	-0.3914
Public goods – education	0.0104	-0.0137
Public goods – health	-0.2153	0.0417
Public goods – safety and security	0.1635	0.1850
Donation to religious and traditional bodies	0.0983	-0.1656
MPs’ monitoring	-0.2343	-0.3763
Donation toward youth activities	-0.1913	-0.1405
Unclear expenses	-0.2375	-0.1665

4.2.9. Regression Analysis

The second level of analysis in this section is the regression analysis. Beyond indicating the direction of the association, regression specifies the influence of a unit change in the independent variable on the dependent variable. In other words, the regression analysis helped to show how much impact the independent variables have on the dependent variable.

Similar to the correlation analysis, the regression was done on both the frequency, measured in terms of the number of times an expenditure was made, and actual values, measured in terms of Ghana Cedis (GH¢). Selected categories of expenditure which fit the models were used in running the regression analyses.

In interpreting the regression results, if the p-value for a variable is less than the significance level (0.05), then the data provides sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, meaning that there exists a significant relationship between the variables.

Alternatively, a p-value that is greater than the significance level indicates that we do not have sufficient evidence to show that the independent variables have any effect on the dependent variable. The significance levels are indicated by the stars (*), thus the more stars, the stronger the effect.

Regression Analysis for Frequency of Expenditure

The regression equation used for the analysis of the frequency of expenditure is:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 p.a_edu_i + \alpha_2 p.a_health_i + \alpha_3 p.a_n/d_i + \alpha_4 p.g_rds/brdg/commpro_i + \alpha_5 p.g_edu_i + U_i$$

Where Y_i =dummy variable $\begin{bmatrix} Yes = 1 \\ No = 0 \end{bmatrix}$ = dependent variable,

p.a_edu = personal assistance towards education measured in terms of number of times

p.a_health = Personal assistance towards health measured in terms of number of times

p.a_n/d = Personal assistance to needy and disaster victims measured in terms of number of times

p.g_rds/brdg/compr = public goods – roads, bridges and community projects measured in terms of number of times

p.g_edu_i = Public goods – education measured in terms of number of times

U_i = error term

The results are presented below.

Table 4.16: Regression Results for Frequency of Expenditure and Electoral Outcomes

OLS estimates Dependent variable: Electoral Outcome__Dummy__

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t-statistic</i>	<i>p-value</i>
constant	1.60978	0.110861	14.5207	<0.00001***
p.a_edu	0.0001934	0.0001015	1.9056	0.10535
p.a_health	0.0316180	0.0101483	3.1156	0.02070**
p.a_n/d	-0.0313628	0.0188075	-1.6676	0.14645
p.g_rds/brdg/compro	-0.0260003	0.0054610	-4.7611	0.00312***
p.g_edu	-0.0457473	0.0107111	-4.2710	0.00526

Mean of dependent variable = 0.833333

Standard deviation of dep. var. = 0.389249

Sum of squared residuals = 0.0904598

Standard error of residuals = 0.122787

Unadjusted R² = 0.945724

Adjusted R² = 0.900494

F-statistic (5, 6) = 20.9093 (p-value = 0.000986)

Log-likelihood = 12.2993

Akaike information criterion = -12.5986

Schwarz Bayesian criterion = -9.68912

Hannan-Quinn criterion = -13.6757

The result in Table 4.16 shows the extent of the impact of the various expenditure categories on the parliamentary elections. Specifically, there exists a statistically significant relationship between electoral outcomes and frequency of expenditure on personal assistance towards health, public goods- roads, bridges and other community projects, and public education.

This can be seen from the p-values of these variables (less than 0.05). As the frequency of expenditure on personal assistance towards health increases, the impact on the electoral outcomes also increases by 0.03. This means that for an additional expenditure made on the personal health needs of the constituents, the chances of getting a positive outcome in the elections increased by 3%. On the other hand, the negative coefficient recorded for roads, bridges and other community projects, and public education suggests an inverse relationship, where an increase in the frequency leads to a decrease in the chances of winning the election. Consequently, an increase in the frequency of expenditure on public education results in a 4.5% reduction in the MPs chances of winning the election. Likewise, an additional expenditure on roads, bridges and other community projects has a 2.6% negative effect on the MPs' chances of winning the parliamentary election.

It is worth noting that the p-values suggest that, the variables with negative coefficients have stronger effects on the electoral outcomes than the one with a positive coefficient (the smaller the p-value, the stronger the relationship).

However, the p-values of personal assistance towards education and personal assistance to the needy and disaster victims, (greater than 0.05) implies that there is not enough evidence to suggest a statistically significant correlation between these independent variables and the dependent variable.

Regression Analysis for Actual Values of Expenditure

The regression equation used for the analysis of the actual expenditure values is:

$$Y_i = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 l_{p.a_edu_i} + \alpha_2 l_{p.g_rds/commpro_i} + \alpha_3 l_{unclear_exp_i} + \alpha_4 l_{mp_monitoring_i} + U_i$$

Where Y_i =dummy variable $\begin{bmatrix} Yes = 1 \\ No = 0 \end{bmatrix}$ = dependent variable

$l_{p.a_edu}$ = log of personal assistance towards education measured in terms of GH¢

$l_{p.g_rd/brdg/compro}$ = log of public goods – roads, bridges and community projects measured in terms GH¢

$l_{unclear_exp}$ = log of unclear expenses measured in terms of GH¢

$l_{mp_monitoring}$ = log of MPs' monitoring measured in terms of GH¢

U_i =error term.

The results presented in Table 4.17 reveal that a unit increase (GH¢1) in the expenditure on personal educational needs of constituents leads to a 0.5% increase in the chances of winning the elections. On the other hand, each additional Ghana Cedi the MP spent on roads, bridges and community projects increased his chances of losing the election by 0.36%. Similarly, unclear expenses and money spent on monitoring also reduce the chances of getting a positive outcome by 0.1% each.

Table 4.17: Regression Results for Actual Values of Expenditure and Electoral Outcomes

Linear-log Heteroscedasticity-corrected estimates Dependent variable: Electoral Outcome__Dummy_

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Std. Error</i>	<i>t-statistic</i>	<i>p-value</i>
Constant	1.58611	0.896845	1.7685	0.10741
l_p.a_edu	0.505221	0.0687429	7.3494	0.00002 ***
l_p.g_rd/brdg/compro	-0.355629	0.0252197	-14.1013	<0.00001 ***
l_unclear_exp	-0.135197	0.0473774	-2.8536	0.01714 **
l_mp_monitoring	-0.100343	0.0360546	-2.7831	0.01935 **

Statistics based on the weighted data:

Sum of squared residuals = 26.872
 Standard error of residuals = 1.63927
 Unadjusted R² = 0.969127
 Adjusted R² = 0.956778
 F-statistic (4, 10) = 78.4782 (p-value < 0.00001)
 Akaike information criterion = 61.3137
 Schwarz Bayesian criterion = 64.8539
 Hannan-Quinn criterion = 61.2759

Statistics based on the original data:

Mean of dependent variable = 0.666667
 Standard deviation of dep. var. = 0.48795
 Sum of squared residuals = 1.02111
 Standard error of residuals = 0.319548

4.3. Discussion of Results

This section is devoted to discussing the results of the data analysis. The results show the apparent proclivity of MPs to focus more on meeting the personal needs of constituents probably because of the possibility of those expenses helping them win more votes in subsequent elections. This partially reinforces the position of the public choice theorists who insist that human beings are rational actors and that primarily, they pursue their individual interests. By attending to the personal needs of individual constituents, the MP seems to appeal

to the rationality in the voters, that is, he expects them to make a decision at the polls based on the benefits they have enjoyed, and the benefits they are likely to enjoy if they vote for the incumbent MP. Even though it appears the MP is concerned about the wellbeing of his constituents, he may be doing that not merely out of benevolence and his humanitarian instincts, but as a rational person, he might as well be preparing the grounds for seeking re-election.

This rationality argument, however, should not be overstretched and overly generalized. This is because the preferences of constituents may differ. Their perception of ‘personal interest’ or ‘personal benefit’ may not be the same. For instance, a voter may regard the construction of a community center as an item of personal benefit to him, while another may consider support for wards’ education more personal than a community center. Therefore, absolute rationality holds only when we have a clear definition of what constitutes ‘personal interest’ to the electorate. This also corroborates the views of Ferejohn (1986) that the pure rationality argument of elections is, an incomplete explanation of electoral phenomena. As much as they respond to the benefits they derive from incumbent candidates, voters may also consider other factors in deciding how they vote in an election.

In addition, the result shows that even though expenses on personal needs have a higher frequency, more money was spent on public projects and programs. This can be attributed to the capital intensiveness of the public goods. A lot more money is needed for the provision of public goods than for meeting personal needs. For instance, a single expenditure on refurbishing a health facility may be worth (monetarily) more than the fees of 100 senior high school students. This explains the use of both frequency and actual values of the expenditures in the analysis.

The results of the analysis of the annual expenditure of the various MPs over the four-year period is quite intriguing. The results show that more expenditure was made in 2015 than in 2016 (the election year). This contradicts the initial expectations of the researcher that more will be spent in the election year (2016). It questions the applicability of Mukwena's (2004) assertion of the use of CDFs as campaign tools in the Ghanaian context. It is the belief of the researcher that, if indeed they are used as campaign tools, there should be an increase in expenditure in the election year since the electorate can easily remember benefits they have enjoyed a few months to the election, and the MP can conveniently refer to these expenses during his campaigns. These results are also contrary to the national expenditure pattern, where the government budget in the election year (2016) was the highest within the four-year period (MOFEP, 2012; 2013; 2014 and 2015).

Additionally, it calls to question the usefulness of Nordhaus's (1975) 'political business cycle' which primarily suggests an increase in government expenditure just before elections with the expectation of retaining the seat. Indeed Blair (2017) confirms the existence of a political business cycle in India in the form of the annual spending of the Constituency Development Funds as incumbent MPs spent a lot more in the election year with regards to the 2014 parliamentary (Lok Sabha) elections. The findings of this study however show that same cannot be said in the Ghanaian context for the 2016 parliamentary elections and the MPsCPF expenses preceding it.

Another interesting point from the results is the years of highest expenditure and the corresponding electoral outcomes. Even though the majority (50%) of the MPs spent more in 2015, only 53% of these MPs who contested won. This sharply contrasts with 2013 and 2014 where few MPs spent more in these years, but all MPs in this category who contested won their

parliamentary seats. This suggests, therefore, that largely, the years in which incumbent MPs make the highest expenditure did not really matter in determining the outcomes of the parliamentary elections.

Another critical issue this raises is the role that awareness plays in determining how electorates vote in an election. KAS (2019) suggests that only few Ghanaians are aware that their MPs are given a share of the DACF. In fact, as at June 2019, only 37.7% of respondents from the Central Region know that their MPs have access to part of the DACF. On the other hand, only 43.6% from the Brong Ahafo Region were aware of this (KAS, 2019).

As mentioned earlier, other factors can also contribute to the direction of voter preferences. For instance, the nature of Ghana's Fourth Republican Electoral Politics could be a contributing factor. The two major political parties (the NDC and NPP) have successfully dominated elections since 1992. None of the political parties has been able to succeed itself after the compulsory two-term limit, creating what can be conveniently referred to as the "two-term cycle". In 2016, the NDC had two terms, and as the order has been, the toll fell on the NDC, thus affecting both the presidential and parliamentary elections.

Also, Gyampo and Appah (2018) indicate that, against popular notions, political party identification, rather than ethnicity is the foremost determinant of voter behavior in Ghana. They also indicate that increasingly, voter decision is being influenced by citizens' evaluation of the government, and candidates for that matter.

The results also raise issues with the relevance of 'incumbency advantage' in determining electoral outcomes. Out of the 8 constituencies in the Central Region where the incumbent MPs did not contest, 6 of these MPs belong to the NDC and in the 2016 elections, the NDC lost all 6 seats to the NPP. On the other hand, the NPP won the two seats even though they contested

with new candidates. In effect, the NDC did not win any of the seats where the NPP introduced new candidates but the NPP won all the seats at places in the Central Region where the NDC introduced new candidates.

This is however different in the Brong Ahafo Region where both parties retained their seats with new candidates. This leads us to safely argue that incumbency may have some influence on electoral outcomes. Nevertheless, this influence is not absolute.

Furthermore, the results also reveal a significant positive correlation between expenditure on personal health needs of constituents and electoral outcomes. This is true for both frequency and actual values, and is further corroborated by the results of the regression analysis, where it was observed that an additional expenditure on personal health contributes about 3% to positive electoral outcomes. It suggests therefore that the electorate in these constituencies consider attention to their personal health needs as a very important determinant of their choice of a parliamentarian. After all, for all the other items and projects provided through the MPsCPF, the constituents' ability to enjoy them depends on good health. Thus, an MP who pays attention to their personal health needs is worthy of their votes. This position is further strengthened by the fact that expenses on individual health needs constituted only 1% of total money spent and 2% of the total frequency of expenditure, yet it has the strongest positive influence on the outcome of the elections.

The negative impact of expenses on roads, bridges and community projects is rather startling. Given the level of capital investment that has gone into these projects and the fact that this category had the biggest share of the total amount of money spent from the MPsCPF, one would have expected a positive correlation with the electoral outcomes. In addition, although the correlation analysis shows a positive association between expenses on personal education

and electoral outcomes, the regression shows that while the association is not significant when considering the frequency of expenditure, it is quite strong when considering the actual values.

Arguably, constituents are more concerned about how much money is spent than how often the money is spent on meeting their educational needs. However, these arguments should also be placed in the right context of political party popularity, personality of the candidates and the nature of the national electoral politics, since all these contribute significantly to determine outcomes of elections.

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I analyzed the data gathered from the various sources regarding this study and presented the results according to the objectives of the study. The results were also discussed. The results show that between 2013 and 2016, even though MPs spent on a wide variety of items, majority of the expenses from the MPs' Constituency Project Fund was on the personal expenses of the constituents, and a lot more was spent in 2015 than in the other years under consideration.

The results also show that, for some of the categories of expenditure, the impact of the frequency on electoral outcomes is different from that of the actual amount spent, and that, even though the link between the independent variable (expenditure pattern) and the dependent variable (electoral outcomes) is quite weak, the former has some influence on the latter.

The subsequent chapter presents a summary of research findings, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.1. Introduction

The relevance of decentralized governance cannot be underestimated. While it is very important, its successful implementation depends on several factors including availability of resources. The need to make resources accessible to the decentralized units of government is crucial to achieving an effective decentralization policy. However, it is also critical that the use of these funds is thoroughly assessed, particularly when they are allocated to political officials. Indeed, authors like Mukwena (2004) argue that the Constituency Development Funds (CDFs) risk being misused, especially for political purposes, such as Members of Parliament using them as campaign tools. IMANI Africa (2018) have also questioned the relevance of these funds to MPs who are supposed to be legislators.

Primarily, this study sought to assess the use of the Members of Parliament Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF), also called MPs Common Fund (MPsCF), and its relationship with outcomes of parliamentary elections in Ghana.

This chapter contains a summary of the research findings, recommendations based on the findings, and conclusion.

5.2. Summary of Research Findings

The findings made from the analysis of the data for this study are outlined in this section. They are presented according to the specific objectives of the study.

5.2.1. Findings on Objective 1.

The first objective of the study is to identify the ways and possible trends in the use of the MPsCPF. The results from the descriptive statistics of the data revealed that, even though the MPs spent the funds on a variety of items, for the greater number of times (58%) they were spent on items that fall within the category of personal education while about 6% was on public education. By implication, between 2013 and 2016 about 64% of the total number of expenses from the MPsCPF in the Brong Ahafo and Central Regions was on education-related expenses.

However, with regards to actual amounts spent over the period, the highest percentage (33%) was on public goods – roads, bridges and other community projects, followed by expenses on public education, and personal educational needs (16% each). Personal assistance towards health, and MPs' monitoring activities had the least percentage (1% each) of the total amount spent from the MPsCPF.

In summary, 66% of the number of expenses was on items that benefited individuals directly while 58% of the actual amount spent was on items that had more public benefits. Therefore, while the records show that expenses on private benefits were more frequent, more money was spent on items that were meant to benefit the public.

5.2.2. Findings on Objective 2.

The second objective of the study is to examine the relationship between the nature of disbursement of the MPsCPF, and outcomes of parliamentary elections. Analyzing the disbursement records and the 2016 parliamentary electoral outcomes, the study found that, though different in direction and intensity, there exist some relation between the various categories of expenditure and electoral outcomes in the 2016 parliamentary elections. It was

also found that among the categories, expenses on personal assistance towards health had the strongest positive impact on the 2016 parliamentary elections (both frequency and actual values). Conversely, personal assistance to the needy and disaster victims had the strongest negative impact for the frequencies, while public goods – roads, bridges and community projects surprisingly had the strongest negative effect for the actual values.

It is worth noting also that the results show that incumbent MPs who spent more on personal items won more seats than those who spent on public items.

5.2.3. Findings on Objective 3.

The third objective is to assess the timing of the expenditure and whether it has any influence on the outcome of the parliamentary elections in the constituencies. The results show that, the MPs spent more in 2015 (37%) than all the other years under study. The least expenses were in 2013 (10%). The percentage of the expenditure increased by the years (that is, 10% in 2013; 22% in 2014; and 37% in 2015). Interestingly, it declined to 31% in 2016 (the election year). In addition, even though collectively, a lot more was spent in 2015, the individual cases show that those who spent more in 2013 and 2014 did better in the 2016 parliamentary elections than those who had their highest expenditure in 2015 and 2016.

5.3. Recommendations

Indisputably, there are aspects of the management and use of the MPsCPF that need improvement in order to ensure judicious use of these national resources. In the ensuing section the researcher makes some recommendations on the basis of the findings of this study. The recommendations made in this section are divided into two: recommendations on the

management and use of the MPsCPF, and recommendations on the fund and electoral performance.

5.3.1. Recommendations on the Management and use of the MPsCPF

To start with, there should be a legal system that will guide the use and the management of the MPsCPF. The current situation where the use of the funds is highly dependent on the discretion of the MPs does not provide adequate avenue to measure efficiency of its use. It rather encourages corruption, favoritism, partisanship, and ethnic and other forms of discrimination - the same issues that USAID (2009) argued it was meant to address. A binding law that regulates the use of this fund should stipulate items that the fund can be spent on, who (individual or group) qualifies to benefit from the fund and ways of ensuring that the funds are actually used for what the records indicate they were used for.

It is worthy of note that even though in most of the cases in this study, the District Finance Officer and the Internal Auditor signed the expenditure records, this mechanism is not elaborate enough and may not be an adequate deterrent to the misuse of the funds. Indeed, in some cases, these officials did not sign the expenditure sheets. In other cases, only one of them signed some of the expenditure sheets, leaving the others unsigned. A binding legal system that makes it mandatory for an independent external auditor to audit the use of the fund will provide a more sustainable and robust means of checking irregularities.

Secondly, the MPs' Constituency Project Fund should be separated from the District Assemblies Common Fund. The 1992 Constitution and the District Assemblies Common Fund Act, 1993 (Act 455) did not stipulate the allocation of part of the DACF to MPs. To avoid the conflicts that exist between many MPs and their Metropolitan, Municipal or District Chief

Executives (MMDCES), usually over the Common Fund, a separate fund should be created for the MPs.

Furthermore, there is the need to include in the 1992 constitution, a section on the specific roles of Members of Parliament. Do their responsibilities go beyond legislation and representation? Are they local development agents? All these should be clearly stipulated in the Constitution. The 1992 Constitution of Ghana has a chapter on the legislature - composition, procedure, privileges among others. However, it does not precisely stipulate the exact responsibilities of the MPs. This makes it difficult to assess their output; after all, there is no point of reference or standards with which to measure their performance. Specifying their roles will also make it easier for us to determine whether they deserve an allocation of national resources for their personal disbursement or not. Indeed, scholars such as Ahwoi (2010), institutions like IMANI Africa (2018), and individuals like Quaitoo (2019) – an MP – have suggested that the MPs share of the District Assemblies Common Fund be scrapped. However, these suggestions can only hold if there are no ambiguities concerning the responsibilities of the MPs.

Moreover, local governance units should be strengthened to fulfill their constitutional mandates. Article 245 of the 1992 constitution, and the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) specify the functions of the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies. Building the capacity of the Assemblies to perform these functions effectively is essential because it will relieve the MPs of some of the demands placed on them by their constituents; demands which ideally should be handled by the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs).

5.3.2. Recommendations on the use of the Fund and Electoral Performance

From the analysis of the influence of the MPsCPF expenditure on electoral outcomes, it is clear that expenses on personal assistance towards health have the greatest positive influence on parliamentary electoral outcomes. This is true for both frequency of expenditure and actual values of the expenditure. Incumbent MPs seeking reelection should pay more attention to the health needs of their constituents. In addition, attention should be paid to public expenses on safety and security since analysis of both frequency and actual monetary value show a positive effect on the electoral outcomes. In summary, holding other things constant, an increased expenditure on personal health and educational needs of constituents, as well as public security will increase the MPs chances of winning a parliamentary seat.

However, it is further recommended that, in order to extend the impact of the Common Fund to all constituents and to ensure its effective use, MPs should equally increase their expenditure on items that benefit the entire constituencies and communities rather than individuals, some of whom may be selected based on some discriminatory bases. Apart from seeking to win the next elections and spending the Common Fund in ways that will help them achieve this goal, MPs should also consider the need to improve the general wellbeing of their constituents. As much as they pursue their political goals, they should also attend to the overall development of the constituencies they represent. This recommendation emanates from the realization that expenses on roads, bridges, community projects, public education, among others, that seem relevant and beneficial to entire communities and constituencies rather have negative effects on the electoral outcomes. An incumbent MP who desperately wants to win the elections will therefore not spend much on these very important items and projects.

5.4. Conclusion

There is no doubt that public funds allocated to institutions or individuals for any purpose must be adequately accounted for. In order to ensure the practice of good governance and effective implementation of the tenets of democracy, there should be adequate mechanisms for financial accountability at all levels of governance. Consequently, financial transfer systems that do not have metrics for measuring effective utilization inhibit the attainment of transparent governance and effective fiscal decentralization. As long as there are no clear guidelines to evaluate the expenditure of the MPs' Constituency Project Fund (MPsCPF), which depends on the directives of the MPs, determining its effectiveness remains problematic.

This study focused on 52 constituencies from the Brong Ahafo and Central Regions of Ghana whose expenditure records were studied over a period of 4 years (2013 to 2016). It has identified the various category of items that the MPsCPF had been spent on between 2013 and 2016, and found that MPs spent more frequently on personal needs of their constituents. However, they spent more money on public projects and items.

The study found that, MPs who were inclined towards spending their share of the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) on personal needs of their constituents did better in the subsequent elections, hence, all other things being equal, MPs who spend more on these items will perform well in the elections.

Furthermore, the apparent similarity in the expenditure patterns of MPs who won and those who lost is not an indication of an absence of correlation between expenditure pattern and electoral outcomes.

The study also leads to the conclusion that, the frequency does not necessarily correlate with amount of money spent on a particular category of expenditure. Some categories had very high

frequencies but not a correspondingly high amount of money spent on them compared to other categories that had lower frequencies.

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Appendix 2: Sample of an Expenditure Sheet with Several Recorded Expenditure Details

REGIO RECEIPTS		PAYMENTS										CONSTITUENCY: BANDA 28019			
Date	Particulars of Receipt	Receipt No.	Bank	Date	Payee	Particulars of Payments	Folio	P.V. No.	Chq. No.	Bank	Health	Education	Local Government	Bank charges	Codes
April, 2015	Balance b/f		75,242.36												
20th April, 2015	Transfer	LF 60	75,172.19	23/4/15	Bandaman Senior High Sch.	Being amount released as financial Assistance to Bandaman Senior High School.		01/4/15	184305	7,000.00		7,000.00			2821008 3122216
				23/4/15	Anane James.	Being amount released for the payment of School fees from Damango Health Assistant Training school.		02/4/15	184306	1,932.00		1,932.00			3122216
				23/4/15	Edith Boatman	Edi Being amount released for the payment of school fees from Serkwa Health Asst. Training Sch.		03/4/15	184306	1,170.00		1,170.00			3122216
				23/4/15	Bongase Women Association	Being amount released as financial Support to Bongase Women Association		04/4/15	184306	3,000.00			3,000.00		3122216
				23/4/15	Eliah Mensah	Being amount released as school fees from University of Ghana.		05/4/15	184306	1,774.00		1,774.00			3122216
				23/4/15	District Health Directorate	Being amount released as financial Support to the Mkwini Health Centre for the purchase of Medical Equipments		06/4/15	184306	7,176.30	7,176.30				2821008 3122216
				30/4/15	NIB	Being Bank charges by NIB Ltd.		07/4/15		50.50				50.50	
						Total Expenditure				22,102.80	7,176.30	11,876.00	3,000.00	50.50	
						Balance c/d				128,311.75					

PRE-APPROVED BY
 FULL NAME: *Simon Osei*
 DESIGNATION: *Asst. Acc.*
 DATE: *7/15/15*

DIST. FINANCE OFFICER
 BANDA DISTRICT ASSEMBLY
 BANDA AHEMMAK