

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

**STATE INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM:
THE CASES OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
AUTHORITY (NHIA) AND THE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AGENCY
(YEA), IN THE NORTHERN REGION FROM 2009 - 2017**

BY

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**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON
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DECLARATION

I, ABDULAI ABUBAKARI – SADIK, proclaim that this thesis is the product of my hard work and under the supervision of DR. ALIDU SEIDU and DR. ASAH - ASANTE.

Apart from the ideas, quotes and opinions from other sources that I have duly acknowledged, the author is entirely accountable for any errors that may be seen or identified in this work.

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ABSTRACT

Political Party Vigilantism (PPV) has become not only a feature but also a menace in the politics of Ghana's Fourth Republic. In Ghana, starting with the presidency of Jerry John Rawlings, PPV has expressed itself in inter-party rivalry between the two leading political parties – the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The use of propaganda to discredit rival parties and in extreme cases the forceful take-overs of state institutions (SIs) by political party vigilante groups (PPVGs) associated with the political party coming into power. A number of SIs have been particularly vulnerable to such particular take-overs, including the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) and the Youth Employment Agency (YEA). Yet others like SSNIT and SIC have not been violently attacked. Also, the region worst affected by such disconcerting phenomenon is the Northern Region (NR). This study thus set out to identify the factors predisposing the NHIA and YEA to such violent vigilante take-overs in the NR. It notes that a legion of factors including patronage and clientelism, over-ambitious campaign promises and party-based recruitment policies, etc, accounted for the vigilante takeovers of these institutions.

This study therefore recommends that a dispassionate but spirited round table discussion with the national chairpersons of the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress be organized and led by reputable nonpartisan bodies such as the National Peace Council, the National House of Chiefs, and Civil Service Organisations out a roadmap for disbanding and disowning vigilante groups that flagrantly perpetuate mayhem from the camps of the two major parties in the country. It further added that chiefs, imams, pastors, and other opinion leaders should also stop interfering in the works of the police by begging for culprits arrested by the police. This research work also recommends that laws that govern the running of existing state institutions be strengthened to insulate them from the excess attacks.

DEDICATION

To people who help others even without knowing them.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CADA	Centre for African Democratic Affairs
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CODEO	Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
CDR	Committee for the Defence Council
CSI	Contemporary State Institutions
CPP	Convention Peoples' Party
DCE	District Chief Executive
DVLA	Drivers and Vehicle License Authority
ECG	Electricity Company of Ghana
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBC	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GCB	Ghana Commercial Bank
GNPC	Ghana National Petroleum Corporation
GP	Ghana Post
GPHA	Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority
GSA	Ghana Standard Authority

GYEEDA	Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
MMT	Metro Mass Transport
NABCO	Nation Builders Corps
NCBWA	National Congress of British West Africa
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NHIA	National Health Insurance Authority
NHIS	National Health Insurance Scheme
NLA	National Lottery Authority
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NR	Northern Region
NYEP	Nation Youth Employment Authority
PHC	Population and Housing Census
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PP	Political Party
PPV	Political Party Vigilantism
RCC	Regional Coordinating Council
SFP	School Feeding Program
SI	State Institution

SIC	State Insurance Company
SSNIT	Social Security and National Insurance Trust
TOR	Tema Oil Refinery
TUC	Trade Union Congress
TTH	Tamale Teaching Hospital
UG	University of Ghana
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
VRA	Volta River Authority
WDC	Workers Defence Council
YEA	Youth Employment Agency
YEA	Youth Employment Authority

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

On 2nd June 2009, pro- National Democratic Congress (NDC) thugs forcefully seized the Tamale offices of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and the Youth Employment Agency - YEA (Modern Ghana, 2009). Again, on the 4th February 2017 the same unlawful behaviour occurred when Kandahar, a pro-New Patriotic Party (NPP) vigilante group, attacked and seized the offices of National Health Insurance Authority in Tamale and Sagnerigu, both in the Northern Region, and chased away their staff (Graphic Online, 2017; DailyGuide, 2017; Ultimatefm, 2017; YEN.COM, 2017). As if these incidents were not enough, they again, attacked the offices of Youth Employment Agency (YEA) and National Health Insurance Authority in Tamale, on Wednesday, 11th January, 2017 at 11:23am. They physically assaulted the staff and destroyed properties worth thousands of Cedis (Ghanaian Chronicle, 2017). On 26th October, 2017, another pro- NPP youth-wing locked up the office of the Youth Employment Agency coordinator in Karaga, Baba Janga, who eventually ran to Tamale (Myjoyonline, 2017a). In all of these violent attacks on State Institutions (SIs) and the numerous cases that have not been listed, it is abundantly clear that some particular SIs described for the purposes of these thesis as “Contemporary State Institutions” (CSIs), that is, SIs established after the 1992 Constitution, are selected for violent attacks, vandalism, and seizures by party youth groups.

The perpetrators of these violent attacks have always been identified in media reportage as affiliates of Political Parties (PPs) and are popularly called “foot soldiers” or “political party vigilante groups” (Bob-Milliar, 2014).

The democratization process in Africa in the early 1990s, which is part of what Huntington (1991) described as “Third Wave of Democracy”, saw Ghana hold seven successful elections

in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016, an indication that it is safeguarding the democratic tenets she embraced in 1992 (Frempong, 2017). This is an indication that Ghana has attained an advanced democratic qualification, (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Gyimah-Boadi and Yakah, 2012). This has also earned Ghana a role model status as it is now described as a beacon, bastion of democracy, peaceful and stable country relative to its neighbouring countries (Afari-Gyan, 2009; African Peer Review Mechanism Report, 2010; Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Bofo-Arthur, 2008).

In all of these elections and success stories, Political Party Vigilante Groups (PPVGs) have played vital roles as elaborated by Alidu, (2019a); Bob-Milliar (2014); Gyampo (2010); Paalo (2017); and Gyampo et al (2017). SIs like the Electoral Commission and the media, have helped in strengthening the democratic process in Ghana (Arthur, 2010).

Following the success stories, states like Ghana that adopted this new system of leadership had to also adjust to conform to the tenets of the new system. This was so because the new system (democracy) paved the way for multi-party system to replace the hitherto authoritarian regimes in Africa (Paalo, 2017). However, the recent increases in violent attacks by PPVGs on some SIs are threatening the democratic gains chalked by the country (Gyimah – Boadi, 2009, Alidu, 2019, Gyampo et al, 2017, Bob-Milliar, 2014).

As Ghana matures by making another step forward in her democratic stride (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009), corresponding matured contributions are expected from her political activists, including PPVGs (Fobih, 2008). But the noticeable increase in violent activities of these PPVGs, particularly 2009 - 2017 in the democratic process, has rather been a disturbing one (Gyimah – Boadi, 2009, Alidu, 2019; Afro Barometer, 2018). Alidu, (2019;2014), Bob-Milliar (2014), Gyampo et al (2017), Paalo, (2017) CODEO (2013; 2017) Modern Ghana, (2010; 2017), Kasapa Fm (2017), Adogla-Bessa (2017; a, b, & c), Ansah (2017), Graphic Online (2018),

Myjoyonline (2017), Olaiya (2014), Star Fm (2017), TV3 Network (2017), Ultimate Fm (2017), and Afro Barometer, (2018) have all pointed out, with examples of how PPVGs have caused destructions to the democratic gains of the country.

The mind-boggling part of the phenomenon of PPVGs or “foot soldiers” include the following questions: why are some notable SIs which are for the purposes of this thesis called “pre-Fourth Republic” SIs such as the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) and State Insurance Commission (SIC) are not violently attacked by these PPVGs? Why are “Contemporary State Institutions” (CSIs) such Youth Employment Agency (YEA) and National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) subjected to violent attacks by groups? The other puzzle that comes to the fore is what structures, aside their core mandates and ownership, these pre-Fourth Republic SIs have, and that makes them immune to violent attacks? Why are CSIs frequently targeted by PPVGs? Is it possible to curb the recurrent attacks on SIs that are prone to seizures and violent attacks by the PPVGs? The above intriguing puzzles are the purposes and motivation for this thesis.

Interestingly, literature pertaining to the theme indicate that political scientists and political theorists the world over have for a long time been interested in SIs (Leftwich, 2007).

SIs have gained the attention of several scholars because it remains a critical tool for growth and development of countries (Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; Aron, 2000; Acemoglu et al, 2000; Rodrick 2004; IMF, 2005). This is manifested in the successful progression and developmental trails of different places and time as contained in the “developmental history of Japan after 1870 and again after 1945, the Soviet Union after 1917, China after 1949 and again after 1980, Korea from 1960, Singapore and Indonesia from 1965 and Botswana and Mauritius from the 1970s” (Leftwich, 2007:6). These all reveal the pivotal roles SIs have played.

Again, political scientists with much interest in developing countries like Ghana have also hitherto been preoccupied with the manners by which stable SIs can be established and continued (Apter, 1966; Huntington, 1967; Rawls, 1971).

However, the difficulty is how politicians in power can configure a way to shape development – either economic or social – as seen elsewhere, with the SIs, either new or old (Leftwich, 2007). Leftwich’s assertion is a direct reflection in some Ghanaian SIs, as the coalition (those with power), struggle to maintain sanctity on some SIs, particularly CSIs, so as to tend them to become tools for development.

In Ghana’s political history, depending on the exigencies at the point in time, the state has always established SIs, departments, and ministries to cater and deal with new dynamics. This supports the arguments of Leftwich (2007: 4) that SIs – whether economic or social – established, vary widely “over time and space, according to the politico-economic purposes they are designed to serve at any given time”. For instance, in the 1950s, the state established a number of institutions: Volta Aluminium in 1948 was established to support the aluminium sector; and Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) was again formed in 1953 as public broadcaster to disseminate information, educate and entertain the Ghanaian public. In the same period, Tema Development Corporation was created in 1952 as a real estate developer. 1950 and 1953 saw the creation of Ghana Communication Group and Ghana Airport Company Limited respectively.

The 1960s saw the continued trend of establishing SIs. Tema Oil Refinery (TOR) was set up in 1960 to process fuel and gas for Ghanaians. It was followed by National Investment Bank in 1963 as a state development bank to provide banking services to the developing sector. The year 1965 saw the establishment of State Transport Corporation as national premier transport

company to make movement of people from one place to another easy. The Electricity Company of Ghana Limited followed in 1967 to provide electricity to Ghanaians.

The 1970s also saw the establishment of Tamale Teaching Hospital (1974), Tono Irrigation System (1975) and the Azuma Nelson Sports Complex (1974). Again, the 1980s came with its demands and necessities that saw the establishment of Cocoa Processing Company Limited (1981) as Ghana's cocoa processing company. In this period, Ghana National Petroleum Company was formed (1988) as a state agency responsible for oil exploitation, licensing, and distribution of petroleum related activities. This is not to say the aforementioned SIs were the only ones established; but they are just examples of many SIs established (Ghana.gov, 2018). From the foregoing, it is can established that SIs have always been established to respond to societal changes and demands.

It must be noted that even though the PPVGs are mostly made of youths, they covertly have the blessing and support of adults or the elders in the political parties (Adigwe, 2013; Alidu, 2019; Ahwoi, 2006).

The thesis, therefore, will examine the violent activities of PPVGs on some SIs, especially on CSIs. It will rely heavily on both primary and secondary sources of data. In doing this, the study will focus on YEA and NHIA in the Northern Region (NR). The study is focusing on the YEA and NHIA because they are the most attacked CSIs in NR, an area that has recorded many of such incidents.

1.2 Problem Statement

The different ethnic groups in this part of Africa all had their own informal structures that were used to control society and bring about equilibrium before the advent of the first Europeans in 1471. When the different ethnics groups came into contact with the Europeans who subsequently merged them to form the state called Ghana, the structures continued in addition

to the new ones that were established. This time, it was called ‘state institutions’. However, some changes were made to them. SIs were now formalized and codified. Changes and modifications to SIs have since continued to date. These changes have always been necessitated by the changing nature of society. Not only have we seen changes to SIs in Ghana, but we have also witnessed the establishment of new SIs to date. In the words of Barack Obama on 10 August 2010 when he visited Ghana, “Africa does not need strongmen, it needs strong institutions” (Modern Ghana, 2010). This was an indication that strengthening of existing SIs and establishment of new ones to deal with societal changes are among the best ways a nation can develop. Again, SIs have experts that technically produce statistics for the country (Kratke and Byier, 2014) to rely on for their developmental plans. This has partly been the logic behind creating new SIs in Ghana, whether during the pre – independence era or the post-independence era.

In recent times, destructive acts by vigilante groups where they attack state institutions has ubiquitously popped up and gained notoriety (Gyampo et al, 2017; Paalo, 2017; CODEO, 2017; Alidu, 2019a, 2019b). This has denied some SIs from effectively functioning, as a change in government effectively translates into their temporal halting. Even though the phenomenon of PPVGs causing destruction to SIs is an age-long thing (Everatt, 2000; Alidu, 2019a, 2019b; Paalo, 2017), from observation, it is on the rise now in the NR, particularly from 2008 to 2018.

The phenomenon is even more worrying because the target of the violent acts by these “foot soldiers” are on the CSIs. This is not to say that pre – Fourth Republic SIs like the Driver and Vehicle Licenses Authority (DVLA) and the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) among others have not been affected by the violent acts of ‘foot soldiers’. On the contrary, they have been occasionally affected too. But compared to the CSIs like National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), School Feeding Program (SFP), and the Youth Employment Authority (YEA) among others, pre-Fourth Republic SIs have been less affected by this canker.

Disturbingly, the problem that remains unsolved is why the CSIs are more targeted by the PPVGs. The quest to find solutions to this phenomenon has generated some scholarly works, even though few.

Generally, Aryee (2009, 2013), Borang et al, (2014, 2013, 2009), and Kopecký & Scherlis (2008) have written on inefficiency at the public services; how politicization of SIs has negatively affected the operations of SIs, Gyampo (2010), Hodgson (2006), Davis (2010), and Grief (2006) focus on traditional SIs such as the legislature, judiciary, and the executive, their challenges, and how they can promote economic development.

Gyampo, (2010, 2012), Gyampo et al, (2017), and Alidu (2019a, 2019b,) provide conceptual definition of political vigilantism and explain the link between clientelism and vigilantism; and highlight on the positive and negative roles of vigilante groups in the democratic process.

Others have looked at how party youth wings perpetuate political violence on SIs in Sub – Sahara Africa (Paalo, 2017). Bob – Milliar (2014) and Maliki (2017), Maliki and Inokoba (2011), Laakso (2007), and Olaiya (2014) have written on how party youth activists cause low-intensity electoral violence in Ghana; why they join NPP and NDC; and Youth, Electoral and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria.

However, none of the works have looked at why the PPVGs are more fixated with attacking the CSIs as conceptualized by this study. Thus, my study will focus on why YEA and NHIA in NR, which are CSIs, are the most attacked SIs.

1.3 Research Questions

The motive of this research is to answer the general question of why CSIs, particularly the NHIA and YEA, have become the main target of violent attacks by PPVGs. Specifically, the research will answer questions such as:

1. What are political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism and their nature in the Northern Region of Ghana?
2. What are the features of contemporary state institutions that have exposed them to violent attacks by political party vigilante groups and what are the features of pre-Fourth Republic state institutions that make them immune them to violent attacks by political party vigilante groups?
3. Aside the features of contemporary state institutions that exposed them to violent attacks, what are some economic, social and political causes of violent attacks by political party vigilante groups on the CSI?
4. What can be done to curb the violent attacks by political party vigilante groups on contemporary state institutions?

1.4 Research Objectives

The research has a main objective of finding out why PPVGs are more likely to violently attack CSIs than pre-Fourth Republic SIs. Specifically, the research seeks to accomplish the following objectives:

1. To explain the nature of political party vigilante groups and political vigilantism PPVGs in the Northern Region of Ghana.
2. To identify the features of contemporary state institutions that have subjected them to violent attacks from political party vigilante groups and features that have made pre-Fourth Republic state institutions immune from violent attacks by political party vigilante groups in Northern Region of Ghana.
3. Examine whether there are political, social, and economic causes of these violent attacks on the contemporary state institution by political party vigilante groups in Northern Region of Ghana.

4. To outline some mechanism of stopping the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups on contemporary state institutions in Northern Region of Ghana.

1.5 Significance of the Study

The thesis is driven by the need to address the recurrent and often violent attacks of PPVGs on some SIs, specifically the NHIS and the YEA, under the Fourth Republic in NR. This is due to the fact that violent attacks by these groups have led to wanton destruction of both state and sometimes private properties. Again, violent attacks of PPVGs have become so corrosive that reprisal attacks by the victims of their aggression can lead to a reversal of the democratic gains chalked by the country.

Even though some works have been done on Political Party Vigilantism (PPV), little is known on why CSIs are the mostly violently attacked SIs. Thus, the research will provide answers to this puzzle. Again, it will outline the features of CSIs that have subjected them to violent attacks and features of pre-Fourth Republic SIs that have made them immune from violent attacks by PPVGs in NR. The thesis will also provide evidence-based social, political and economic causes of these violent attacks, and will recommend some possible solutions to stemming them.

The study will focus on YEA and NHIA in NR, where it will provide a vivid explanation to the intriguing tendency in the modus operandi of PPVGs. These explanations that will be provided, will not only help the central government in planning a comprehensive policy that will not only help to stop the violent attacks on these CSIs, but it will also help the current and successive administrations to avoid certain pitfalls in establishing new SIs in order not to make them liable to the violent attacks by PPVGs. Again, the findings of the research will help party officials in the efficient supervision of party youth wings and ‘benches’ in order to forestall their excesses.

1.6 Scope and Limitations to the Study

This work will be positioned within the scope of PPVGs or “foot soldiers” affiliated to the NPP and NDC in the NR. In undertaking this study, the study envisioned some challenges:

First, due to the sensitivity of the matter and the stigma attached to members of PPVGs of late, it was difficult to get some of the respondents, particularly the PPVGs to be truthful to facts as to why they violently attack some selected SIs.

Secondly, some workers at YEA and NHIA stayed away from giving the full testimonies of their experience at the hands of PPVGs for fear of being victimised.

Again, issues of cost and timelines are likely to limit the study. Timelines here refers to the short period of time available for the research. In addition, traveling to gather information and engaging the PPVGs in Focus Groups Discussions (FGD) come at a cost, which in a way hampers the process of the research.

Moreover, getting a lot of foot soldiers or vigilante groups for FGD was a challenging task for the research. This was so because they have been classified as bad nuts within the realm of politics.

Finally, getting some vital information from the political leaderships of NPP and NDC was also challenging task to the conduct of this research since they are reported to be sometimes covertly encouraging the violent activities of these PPVGs.

Despite challenges, the outcome of the research was not affected.

1.7 Operational definition of Concepts/Terms

The operationalization of concepts/terms to be employed in this study is purposely to avoid uncertainty over the terms to be used since words are prone to diverse interpretation. In fact, daily usage of terms and concepts are sometimes ambiguous, and can in the case of this research

work make it problematic for empirical investigations, interpretation and analysis. Accordingly, the terms are explicitly defined below:

1.7.1 State institutions

Even though the usage of institutions or SIs date back to time immemorial, Hodgson (2002) asserts that there is no universally agreed definition for it. As such, this thesis contextualized and operationalized “state institutions” as those organisations established, either by the Constitution of Ghana or an Act of Parliament. They include all institution under Chapter 14 - 21 of the Constitution. Examples are: State Insurance Cooperation (SIC), Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB), National Petroleum Authority (NPA), Youth Employment Agency (YEA), National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), Metro-Mass Transport (MMT) Ghana National Petroleum Commission (GNPC), Tema Oil Refinery (TOR), Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority (GPHA), Ghana Post (GP), Volta River Authority (VRA), and the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) among others.

1.7.2 Pre-Fourth Republic State Institutions

The thesis conceptualised it to mean those organisations that existed before the coming into being of the Fourth Republic in 1992. They span over the period of 1940 to 1991. Some of these are State Insurance Company (SIC), Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) COCOA BOARD, Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNP), Tema Oil Refinery (TOR), Ghana Ports and Harbour Authority (GPHA), Ghana Post (GP), Volta River Authority (VRA), and National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE), and the Tamale Teaching Hospital (TTH) among others.

1.7.3 Contemporary State Institutions

They are operationalized to mean those organisations established by an Act of Parliament after the inception of the Fourth Republic. That is, they refer to that entire SIs that was established after the coming into effect of the Fourth Republican Constitution in 1992. Examples include the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), Youth Employment Agency (YEA), and Metro Mass Transport (MMT), Nation Builders Corps (NABCO), School Feeding Program and the GetFund among others.

1.7.4 Political Party Vigilante Groups (PPVGs) or foot soldiers

Alidu (2019a) defined PPVGs as “diverse set of violent actors, who are often created for a specific purpose or during a specific period for the furtherance of a political objective by violence”. This thesis operationalized it to mean those active youth groups that are affiliated to PPs – particularly the NPP and the NDC. Examples are Invincible Forces, Azorka Boys, Delta force, Alkaida, Aljazeera Boys, Kandahar boys, Boko Haram, and Young Patriots.

1.7.5 Political Party Vigilantism (PPV)

This is defined as the violent attacks of youth groups affiliated to PPs. They are the acts of either forcefully seizing state properties or private properties. It also includes the act of burning or destroying properties not belonging to them.

1.7.6 Spoils

It is another term operationalized to mean the number of administrative appointments or positions, favours, opportunities, and contracts which are shared by individuals or coalitions after their political party wins power in an election. These could be ministerial portfolios, District Chief Executive position, and board memberships of state and parastatals institutions, ambassadorial appointments. The rest are chief executive officers of state institutions, contracts and scholarships among others.

1.7.7 Winners

It is the last term operationalized in the thesis. It is defined as those coalitions or group of people with a common interest of capturing political power, that come together to form a PP, in this case either NPP or NDC folks, whose PP has won power. The coalition is made up of various interest groups – adults, youth, women, financiers, and intellectuals.

1.8 Organization of the Study

Structurally, the thesis is grouped into five chapters. Chapter one will be made up of introduction, which will contain background of the study; statement of the problem; research questions; research objectives; and significance of the study. Again, it include limitations/scope of the study; operational definition of terms; and concludes with organization of the work.

Chapter Two is made up of the theoretical framework that guides the study and the relevant literature to the work. Literature reviewed included a look at literature on general studies of SIs in the world, and the SIs under study. The concluding part of the literature review looked at the history of party youth in the politics of Africa; the positive role of PPVGs in the politics of Ghana; and the violence of PPVGs in the politics of Ghana, specifically on SIs.

Chapter Three focused on the methodological approach within which the work is carried out and the study area. It also dwells on the types of data collected for the study, methods, and procedures for data collection and the steps for data processing. Also, sources from which data are gotten from and discussed are included in this chapter.

Chapter Four presented findings, data analysis, and discussions. It ended with summary of findings and conclusions.

Finally, Chapter Five summarized the findings from the analysis of the study, conclusions and recommendations of the research.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The section here reviewed pertinent works that laid the foundation for the study. It is divided into three main sections: the first part looked at the theoretical framework guiding the studies; the second part reviewed literature on SIs in the world, Africa, and SIs under investigation; and the last part focused on literature on PPVGs and PPV in Africa and Ghana. In the first part – theoretical framework – “theory of the spoils system”, is examined. It also looked at how it relates to the thesis. The second part – literature on general studies of SIs and background of SIs under study has been looked at. The last part - vigilantism – looked at the origin and concept of PPVGs and PPV in the politics of Africa and Ghana; the positive contributions of (PPVGs) in the politics of Ghana; and the violent activities/actions of PPVGs in the politics of Ghana. The chapter concluded with summary of the thoughts elaborated.

There are some scholarly writings on the violent involvement of PPVGs in the politics of Africa beginning from the second half of the 20th century to the 21st century. Most of these works centred on West and Southern Africa, even though there are instances of their involvement in other parts of the continent (Everatt, 2000). In recent times, given the activities of the youth in the Arab spring which started in Tunisia and the spate of violent attacks by party foot soldiers on SIs in Nigeria and Ghana, for example, different scholars based on their interests and backgrounds, have given varied propositions about the desirability or otherwise of youth groups in politics (Abbink, 2005; Gyampo, 2012).

However, not many studies have been done specifically on why PPVGs more often violently attack some SIs and leave out others. The study seeks to fill the gap that exists in the existing literature. Using some selected SIs in Ghana; the study tries to find out why CSIs compared to

other SIs – Pre-Fourth Republic state institutions – are so susceptible to violent attacks by PPVGs.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The theory that served as a framework for this thesis is the “theory of the spoils system”. It has its root in the politics of United State of America (U.S.A) in the 1880s.

2.2.1 Background and Origin of Theory of the Spoils System

The term “spoils” emanated from the phrase “to the victor belong the spoils” by William L. Marcy, a New York Senator. It was specifically and exclusively used in United State of America’s (U.S.A) politics in early 1880s. The Federal government of U.S.A operated squarely on these particular tenets, where family members, kinsmen, friends, supporters of political parties (PPs) and close acquaintances that worked for the success of the PP were given government’s civil service jobs as a reward for their hard work and loyalty, instead of rewarding them on a merit basis. This system saw the removal of civil servants from offices and replaced them with party members and relatives, friends and other close associates. For instance, 919 civil servants were removed from office at the beginning of Andrew Jackson’s tenure as U.S.A president in 1829. However, this was stopped by the Pendleton Act of 1883, after demands for reforms by the civil service reform movement.

2.3 Theory of the Spoils System Explained

Spoils theory simply views politics in developing countries as a game in which a coalition – the elderly, women, the youth, intellectuals, different ethnic groups, armed strongmen, etcetera – use the logic of “spoils politics” - where the incumbent fights with opposition(s) in order to superintend over the spoils of the state (Dal Bo and Powell, 2009). It is generally axiomatic in this system (Aumann, 1985), that ‘to the winner go the spoil’. It specifies the winners as those coalitions who have won power, and the spoils as the fixed number of political schedules or

appointments available for the winning coalition. That is, “this probability depends on an obvious way on the power structure and the number of available appointments” (Gardner, 2018; 171).

In this arrangement, political power is primarily observed as conduit to appropriate the economic spoils associated with the administrative control of the state (Allen, 1995, 1999), and this emerges from what is known as “neopatrimonial” system of governance which is based on loyalty, family, religion, tribe, and where there is thin line between ruler’s private property and that of the state (Van de Walle, 1994).

Dal Bo and Powell (2008) attributed the failure of developing countries, in this case, the failure of Ghana to nip the bud of violent attacks of PPVGs on SIs, to the logic of “spoils theory”. They (people with power) siphon the spoils to themselves because they have an insight and an in-depth information about the actual and available spoils than those without power or those not holding official positions - foot soldiers (Dal Bo and Powell, 2009). This is so because the few privileged (those with appointments) by virtue of their position have knowledge about the real spoils available, and so scheme to get more of the spoils to themselves, their family, and close acquaintances at the expense of the other coalition – the foot soldiers. As a result of this unfair treatment to those who are often left with no appointments (foot soldiers), those with appointments are usually unable to bring the foot soldiers to order to conform to the laws as and when the foot soldiers violently attack SIs as a result to their neglect. Cleverly as those with positions are, they clandestinely sometimes try to buy them off or assuage the leaders of these groups or faction into conforming to laws by directing the spoils, selectively, through broad patronage networks as the cases of public employment in Zambia (Bratton, 1994) and Guinea (Ayittey, 1998) and in Ghana recently.

However, because the plans of the part of the coalition with position are temporal, the possibility of breakdown of chaos by these foot soldiers are higher, especially if times becomes harder for the youth to bear or when their economic and social condition are not changing or gets worse, and also if they become aware of the actual and real spoils available (Dal Bo and Powell, 2009).

In concluding the theory, Van de Walle (1994) and Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) maintain that lack of transparency promotes the asymmetric information between the coalitions – where those with position (rulers) have better information than those without information (foot soldiers) – hence the rulers siphoning the spoils to their associates. But those without the position (foot soldiers) resort to violent rebellion by destroying state properties if they become aware of the actual spoils.

2.3.1 Strengths of the Theory

The theory identifies the key players involved in politics and refers to them as coalition - youth, intellectuals, women wings, and the elderly. This enabled me to assign my key players such as the youth, the elderly etc., in the phenomenon of PPV to it. It spells out the roles each one of them played, and what they expect in return. Again, it underpins my context of SIs as being part of the spoils of democracy. It also explains what the elderly, the intellectuals and others with positions do when they get power. This explanation fits vividly into how those with position in this thesis behave if their party wins power. In short, the theory identifies and explains how each key player in the game of politics in developing countries acts and behaves before and after attaining power.

2.3.2 Weakness of the Theory

Even though the theory lists and identifies all key players – PPVGs, SIs, the elderly, appointments, contracts etc.; - it is unable to provide explanations to why some state

institutions, especially the contemporary ones, are regularly targeted by PPVGs. It only explains, generally, how SIs may come under violent attacks by foot soldiers if their social and economic conditions get worse and when they get to know the actual spoils available for sharing. Finally, the theory has not been able to provide explanation to why PPVGs violently attack SIs immediately their party is declared winner of general elections, and even when power has not been handed over to their party. It has also not explained why there are violent attacks when ministers and other known positions are yet to be appointed.

Nevertheless, spoils theory still explains the relationship that exists in the politics of developing countries like Ghana.

2.3.3 Contextual Application of the theory

In considering the “theory of the spoils system” vis-à-vis how PPVGs violently attack SIs in Ghana, the coalition is made up of foot soldiers, the women’s wing, the intellectuals, the elderly etc., that come together to form say NPP and NDC.

The spoils of electoral victory include the SIs attacked by party foot soldiers and those spared. The winners are the parties that have won power, and in this case in Ghana, it is usually either NPP or NDC. In expounding the foregoing, I will use the NPP because that is the current PP in government. The ministers, the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of SIs, ambassadorial appointments, District Chief Executives (DCEs), board members of SIs etc., are the privileged part of the coalition making up the government. That is, they are those who gain appointments. And because of their positions, they have better and current information about the actual spoils available (Van de Walle 1994; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). As such, they use it to unfairly appropriate the economic spoils available in their administrative offices as noted by Allen (1995, 1999) to themselves, families, and acquaintances. Appointments to these state offices are given to friends, acquaintances, and family members. The same thing applies to government

contracts, whilst ignoring the foot soldiers who equally contributed to the success of the party. It must however be noted that the few privileged always try to buy the foot soldiers with some little appointments by often recruiting them as national security operatives and sometimes awarding contracts that the foot soldiers deem incommensurate with their actual contribution to the success of the party.

PPVGs are the other part of the coalition, hence also believe in the logic of “theory of the spoils system”, that is, ‘to the winner go the spoil’. So, if they come to realise that their conditions of living and economic lives are dwindling comparative to other coalition partners who are occupying positions of spoils, then they resort to rebelling by attacking SIs, either pre-Fourth SIs or CSIs. Also, if the foot soldiers become aware of the actual spoils available, and realising that they are not being fairly treated, they again resort to the destructions of state properties as noted by Van de Walle (1994) and Jensen and Wantchekon (2004).

2.4 Literature Review on State Institutions (SIs)

The section below presents a literature review on SIs, a general review of SIs in the world and in Ghana to be specific, and then an examination of SIs for this research.

2.4.1 General Studies on State Institutions in the World

A cursory examination of governments of all shades and tints from reputable democracies in the West like the U.S.A and the United Kingdom (UK) through those of developing democracies in Africa like Ghana and Kenya to unabashedly dictatorial regimes like North Korea and Egypt is bound to reveal their establishment of SIs to provide critical services and products for their citizenry. SIs permeate all aspects of a nation’s economy, social and political structure and render services which include education, basic health care, and safe drinking water; sometimes they extend much further to “include old age pensions and support for the disabled. Governments set up a variety of SIs to provide these services, such as police forces,

public works, education ministries, public health services, water authorities, and so on. These same institutions are used by external support agencies as channels for projects intended to benefit the poor'' (Narayan-Parker & Patel, 2000; 65).

The *raison d'être* of these institutions is to provide convenient and essential services and products to the citizen at affordable prices. In furtherance of this motive, they get finance from the central government.

The review here is grouped into three sections. These are: first, reviews concerning the difficulty in defining CIs; the second concerns reviews in support of the arguments of how SIs have failed to uplift the general lives of the vulnerable or the poor and the reverse arguments of how it can and has uplifted the lives of the vulnerable and the poor elsewhere.

2.4.2 The Dilemma of Defining State Institutions

To begin with, one of the general studies pertaining to SIs has to do with the difficulty in getting a precise and a concise definition of them. Institution as a term has become universal in daily conversation. It has become common in academia and in social lives of people. It is used in disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, geography, and politics etc. And even though their history of usage dates back to Giambattista Vico in his *Scienza Nuova* of 1725, their universal definition is still inconclusive (Hodgson, 2006).

Nevertheless, March & Olsen (1986), Guy Peters (2005), and North (1990) says that institutions might not necessarily be the physical structures, but might also be a set of understandings, norms and values that guide human relations in society. Institution relay to the structure through which society organizes and executes variegated activities required in society.

Again, Institutions are explained to mean systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social interactions (Hodgson, 2006). Smith and Preston (1977) explained

institutions as a developed path of handling society's concerns. Various, institutions are explained as man-made rules which confine conceivably illogical and opportunistic behavior in society (Kasper & Streit, 1998). To North (1991; 91), “institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange”, and that “... they evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; history in consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical performance of economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story”. From the above, it can be concluded that institutions are there to organize, structure, and regulate human behavior and interactions in society. That is, it “constraints and enable behavior” as aptly opined by Hodgson (2006). Because society is made up of components with different interest, institutions are therefore created to regulate and structure it. As such, there are religious institutions, social institutions, and political/state institutions; virtually every component of society has institution to deal with its accompanying functions and demands.

In short, whereas some authors place emphasis on physical structures (formal structures) such as buildings, humans, codified laws, constitutions, etc., in defining or conceptualising state institutions, others prefer to stress on the informal constraints or non-physical structures like taboos, customs, traditions, sanctions, myths, and codes of conducts, in conceptualising it. This is clearly manifested in the definitions outlined above.

2.4.3 The Failure of State Institutions in Developing Countries

The other general aspect about the studies of SIs is an observation made by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) of how SIs have failed to uplift the status of the poor or the vulnerable in society, an assertion also made by World Bank (1989, 1992, 1994); Brautigam (1991); Hyden and Bratton (1992); Ndulu and van de Walle (1996); and Lewis (1996) in Englebert (2000), even though they pointed out the limitations of SIs to design and implement successful policies that will uplift countries from economic stagnation. Conversely, others have looked at how

state institutions have helped in developing countries, invariably uplifting the general lives of the poor and the marginalised.

Goetz (1996), Kabeer and Subramaniam (1996), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), and Narayan (1999) in Narayan-Parker and Patel (2000) posit that formal institutions overtly behaves like it is serving the general good of all irrespective of your status, but in reality, or in practice, it is producing unbalanced relations of power and authority, where women and the poor are marginalised by the elite. This supports the assertion of Narayan-Parker & Patel (2000) that SIs are in crises because only few individuals or citizens in the society benefit from the spoils, and this is against the core mandate of supporting all citizens, including the poor. Narayan-Parker & Patel (2000) paints a gloomy and horrifying picture about SIs, especially toward the vulnerable or the poor. To them, SIs has deliberately skewed away from their core mandate of protecting everyone and providing essential services for all to realise their potential devoid of your class. They argue that SIs have not only widened the gap between the rich and the poor, but it has further helped in making the vulnerable poorer. They aptly posit it in the following six ways:

“The first is that formal service provision institutions are largely ineffective and irrelevant in the lives of the poor. Where government programs of targeted assistance exist, they contribute a little in poor people’s struggles to survive, but they do not help them to move out of poverty. Second, corruption directly affects the poor, and they have widespread and intimate experience with corruption in health, education, water, forestry, government-provided relief, and social assistance where it is available. In addition, the poor have little access to the judiciary, and they fear rather than seek protection from the police. Third, poor people’s interactions with representatives of the state leave them feeling powerless, unheard, and silenced. Fourth, when functioning states collapse as in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, or go through severe disruption as in East Asia, the poor are particularly vulnerable, and the new poor feel bewildered, crushed, and angry. Fifth, the poor experience many barriers in trying to access government-provided services. These include bureaucratic hurdles, rules and regulations, the need for documents, and difficulties in accessing information. And sixth, there is often collusion or overlap between local level governance and the elite. If not outright collusion, local elite at least have direct access to and influence over local officials and resist sharing power in new decentralization and participation policies”. (Narayan-Parker and Patel, 2000: 65)

To sum it up, SIs in recent times have played a dysfunctional role in countries by aiding few to outwit the larger population (Narayan-Parker and Patel, 2000; Goetz, 1996; Kabeer and Subramaniam, 1996; Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000; and Narayan, 1999). To the arguments, SIs, in their current operations, disempower and silence the vulnerable through an outline of exclusion, humiliations, and corruption. The situation is more exacerbated by impediments such as legal, certificates, and other forms of barriers, being put on the way of the vulnerable.

The remark on this review in respect of the thesis is that the PPVGs feel those SIs affected by the violent attacks are those playing dysfunctional role by serving only the interest of few managers and party aficionados who are occupying the offices, as such the need to forcefully evict them. However, those that are not attacked violently are those they feel are serving the general interest of public; not the few political party functionaries.

2.4.4 The Positive Roles of State Institutions

In sharp contrast to the arguments above, Zysman (1994); Sokoloff and Engerman (2000); Aron (2000); North (1991); Acemoglu et al (2000); Rodrick (2004); and IMF (2005) have all argued on how SIs have uplifted and propelled developmental growth of the poor, particularly their economic lives, in developed and developing nations, even though with varying degree of state institutional arrangement over time. They buttress their arguments with the popular growth and developmental trajectory histories ‘‘of Japan after 1870 and again after 1945, the Soviet Union after 1917, China after 1949 and again after 1980, Korea from 1960, Singapore and Indonesia from 1965 and Botswana and Mauritius from the 1970s’’ (Leftwich, 2007:6), with different speed of growth.

Even though the two opposing views have advanced arguments in support of their claims, they have failed to explain why some SIs are selectively attacked, violently, by PPVGs, whilst others

are ignored. Hence, the thesis seeks to fill in that gap, by explaining or finding answer to the situation.

2.5 General Studies of State Institutions in Ghana

State institutions in Ghana are categorised into two – formal and informal (Gyampo, 2015). The formal according to Luckham (2000) is the constitution and codified laws of the land which draws the lines of sovereignty for the respective SIs as separation of powers and checks and balances on one another (Gyampo, 2015). According to Gyampo, the state of Ghana's SIs are challenged because of a system he called "Neo-presidentialism", a hybrid system of presidential and parliamentary, that it runs. To him, constitutionalism, which is supposed to, in his words, "curtail" and "bridle" the excess power the constitutions gives to the president, and lack of cooperation on the part of the people renders SIs partially effective. In this regard, PPVGs tend to attack SIs, discretionally, because the powers that be, will free them eventually. Formal laws, Acts of Parliaments, bye-laws, and precedents applications are other cases of formal institutions he outlined.

Aside the judiciary, the parliament, the executive, the public services, the police service, the prison service, the armed forces of Ghana, etc., which were directly formed as part of the Constitution of Ghana, other formal state institutions were also formed by Acts of Parliaments and Executive Instruments to provide services. Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT); State Insurance Company (SIC); National Lottery Authority (NLA); Ghana Standards Board (GSB); Tema Oil Refinery (TOR); Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG), etc., were/are some SIs established by Acts of Parliament as well.

Heads of these institutions are appointed by the president (Gyampo, 2015; Constitution of Ghana). Other supporting staffs are recruited per the Public Services Commission's requirements, which are based on meritocracy, even though it is sometimes not strictly

followed. Some of these SIs have boards, which are chaired by a person also appointed by the president. Memberships of these boards vary from board to board. Whilst the president has representatives on these boards, some are members by virtue of where they work, as a requirement to be members. Strictly, promotions in these SIs were/are expected to be based on merits, but military decrees, loyalty, religion, ethnicity, party affiliation, clientelism and patrimonialism characterised how people were recruited, appointed and promoted.

The other forms of SIs in Ghana are the informal ones. Gyampo (2015) identified “old-boys” or “old-girls” as examples of some informal SIs in Ghana. Because of the organic solidarity that exists between these institutions, they tend to influence decisions to favour one another. The office of the wives of Ghana’s presidents by constitution is not codified, yet according to Gyampo, the office in some administrations wields a lot of influence in decisions. He cited Nana Konadu Agyemang Rawlings as a former first lady who exerted influence on decisions of the government from 1980 to the year 2000 (Gyampo, 2015). The informal institutions are not backed by codified rules or laws, instead they have come into being either through convention, practices, traditions, or customs. Membership of these institutions was based on other factors other than by merit.

On the back of this and other preceding arguments, the thesis conceptualized the political/state institutions into the Pre-Fourth Republic and Post-Fourth Republic institutions. The Pre-Fourth Republic institutions, as already explained, are the institutions set up by the state, either by the powers of the Constitution, Acts of Parliament or other Executive Orders. The post-Fourth Republic institutions, encapsulate those institutions set up from 1993 to date. This informs my emphasis on SSNIT and SIC as Pre-Fourth Republic institutions, and focusing on YEA and NHIA as the Post-Fourth Republic institutions.

Generally, studies on SIs have mostly focused on their effects on economic growth (Hodgson, 2006; Davis, 2010; Grief, 2006). Consequently, studies on African SIs have also focused on how it will ensure economic development, and also promote democracy and good governance. Whereas scholars have tried to establish the pros and cons that will ensure Africa's democratic consolidation and good governance, emphasis has not been placed on how the politics of African society affect this process.

In a couple of studies such as Gyampo (2015) and Davis (2010), where they focus tacitly on challenges of SIs, they have not acknowledged the role of PPVGs in this regard. In lieu of this, the study will bring to fore, how PPVGs actions affect SIs (especially attacks on modern state institutions). Moreover, much of the literature explaining SIs in Ghana, have focused on the traditional or Pre-Fourth Republic institutions, with little attention paid to the Post-Fourth Republic institutions. Not only have they focused on the pre-Fourth Republic institutions, but have done so in shallow regard. With the inception of the resurgence of PPVGs and the heightening of their activities in the body politics of Ghana, studies on them have focused on how they influence elections and none has been done on why they violently attack some SIs and leave out others.

2.6 Background of State Institutions (NHIA/YEA and SSNIT/SIC) Under Investigation

While the bases for which Ghanaians side with political parties in Ghana range from sublime to petty factors, PPs in Ghana have over the years strived to appeal to the section of the electorate that are discerning. One way PPs win over the hearts of the discerning lot is by their often well-crafted manifestos through which they lay bare their intents to energetically pursue projects and fashion out policies aimed at improving the lot of the masses in all facets of the economy.

Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution which contains the Directive Principles of State Policy has always provided PPs in the Fourth Republic the blueprint for crafting policies towards the attainment of a just and free society.

Accordingly, some SIs have sprung up from the essence of the articles contained in Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution. Notably among these include the Youth Employment Agency and the National Health Insurance Authority. The succeeding paragraphs contain an examination of the birthing and trajectory of these institutions in the course of the Fourth Republic.

2.6.1 The Youth Employment Agency

According to The Global Economy, a World Bank report on Ghana's unemployment rate spanning the period 1991 to 2018 indicates that Ghana recorded its highest rate in the year 2000 at a staggering 10.36%, which the National Security outfit deemed a threat to the security of the nation (Theglobaleconomy, 2019). It was unsurprising therefore that the Kufour administration which won the 2000 general elections strove to create a programme that would reduce the rippling effects massive unemployment posed to our ailing economy in the early 2000s (YEA.COM, 2019; Ghanatoghana, 2012).

In 2006, the National Youth Employment Program (NYEP) was established as an agency under the Ministry of Youth and Sports with the objective of providing the unemployed youth working experience as well as employable skills in some nine modules ranging from Youth in Agribusiness through Youth in Health Extension to Youth in Waste and Sanitation (YEA.COM, 2019).

On 1st November, 2012, the National Youth Employment Programme was renamed Ghana Youth Employment and Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA) with Cabinet's approval. The aim was among other things to make the programme more effective by bringing

other employment and entrepreneurial programs under the agency. The scope of the modules of employment increased to 34 under GYEEDA (YEA.COM, 2019). The modules of YEA which are created to achieve the goals of the programs (Ghana.gov.gh, 2011) are: Youth in Security Services, Youth in Agri-Business, Youth in Immigration, Youth in Fire Prevention, Youth in Health Extension, Youth in Waste and Sanitation, Youth in Paid Internship, Youth in Community Teaching Assistants, Youth in Trades and Vocation, Youth in Eco-Brigade, and Youth in Information Communication Technology (YEA.COM, 2019; WWW.Parliament.gh).

Eventually GYEEDA morphed into the Youth Employment Agency through the Youth Employment Act 2015 (Act 887) to facilitate the creation and coordination of sustainable employment avenues for the unemployed youth in Ghana (YEA.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2011). Since its establishment, the program has received sponsorship from the World Bank (Theghanaijournal, 2011), and employs Ghanaian youth ranging the ages of 18-35 years. It employs both literate and illiterate (Parliament, 2011).

2.6.2 The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA)

Due in part to the obnoxious 'cash and carry' system which placed access to primary healthcare beyond the reach of majority of the populace, the Kufour administration caused to be established the National Health Insurance Scheme through the National Health Insurance Act 2003 (Act 650). The scheme was created to ensure that the underprivileged class of Ghanaian society had fare access to basic healthcare for some ninety-five percent of diseases in the country by contributing premiums based on their socioeconomic standing and vulnerabilities.

In October 2012, a new law, Act 852, replaced the previous law that established the scheme (Act 650). The new enactment was meant to consolidate the gains made by the previous law, and to make the scheme more effective in term of its operations, financial administration, and coverage among others.

Although the operations of the scheme has been plagued by shamefully recurrent episodes of delayed or nonpayment of claims to their agents (pharmacy shops and health posts), the subscriber base of the scheme continues to grow by leaps and bounds.

The National Health Insurance Authority envisions itself as a paradigm of a sustainable, advanced and equitable social health insurance scheme in Africa and beyond.

2.6.3 Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT)

With a vision to becoming a global model for the administration of social protection schemes, the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) is a formidable government agency whose contribution to the welfare of pensioners and the Ghanaian economy at large has proved monumental over the years.

Established in 1972 under the NRCDC 127, the Trust was charged to administer the National Social Security Scheme which was hitherto jointly managed by the then Department of Pensions and the State Insurance Corporation (SSNIT.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2011).

The Trust was converted from a provident fund scheme to a social insurance pension scheme governed by PNDC Law 247 in 1991. An Act of parliament (Act 766 of 2008) to reform the scheme was implemented in January 2010 to replace all pension schemes in Ghana.

The pension scheme run by the Social Security and National Insurance Trust had a registered membership of more than 1,471, 564 contributors (SSNIT.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2019).

SSNIT is presently the largest non-bank financial institution in Ghana and has employed over 2200 workers in all its branches across the country (SSNIT.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2019).

SSNIT's investment in domestic Ghanaian economy is evidenced by the significant stakes it holds in many enterprises including GCB Bank, HFC Bank, Africa World Airlines, and in West Hills Mall among others (SSNIT.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2019).

2.6.4 State Insurance Company Limited (SIC)

Arguably the largest and leading name in general insurance in Ghana and with a vision to dominate its industry, SIC Insurance Company Limited provides fire, motor, travel, accident, marine, aviation, and oil and gas insurance policies.

The institution has its roots steeped in the Gold Coast Insurance Company, a private insurance company which was established in 1955. After undergoing a few name changes, the company together with its subsidiary was taken over by the Nkrumah administration per an Executive Instrument in 1962 (E.I. 17) in a swoop that began with the Ghana Cooperative Insurance Company. The resulting enterprise from the takeovers was the State Insurance Corporation which commenced operations in November 1962 (SIC.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2019).

As part of the Government of Ghana's divestiture programme, the State Insurance Corporation was converted to a public limited liability company in August 1995 and assumed the name State Insurance Company of Ghana Limited. The company assumed its current name in 2007 when a special resolution passed on October 22, 2007 changed its name to SIC Insurance Company Limited (SIC.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2019).

The Government of Ghana remains the largest shareholder (with a 40% stake) in SIC Insurance Company Limited.

The company pays particular attention to its corporate social responsibility as evidenced in the significant contributions it has made to countless Ghanaian institutions and funds including the Ghana Heart Foundation, Ghana Medical Association, The Road Safety Fund, KNUST Trust Fund, and the Ghana Law School among others (SIC.COM, 2019; Ghana.gov.gh, 2019).

2.7 Literature Review on Political Party Vigilante Groups and Political Party Vigilantism in Africa, including Ghana

This part of the literature review presents a review on PPVGs. It looked at the various explanations or descriptions given to political vigilantism. It also traced the history of PPV in the politics of Africa and Ghana. Furthermore, it reviewed literature on the atmosphere of PPVGs in the Ghana and NR to specific, by identifying the number of PPVGs that have perpetrated violence on SIs since 2009 -2017. The contributions of PPVGs in the democratic processes of Ghana since the inceptions of the Fourth Republics, and the negatives it has also played.

The thesis concluded this section by presenting a summary of the review starting from review on general studies of SIs in Africa, Ghana, and on the institutions under study.

2.7.1 Explanation of Political Party Vigilantism

In the ordinary sense of the word, ‘vigilantism’ refers to the activities of voluntary community groups that strive to ensure that nothing negative and unacceptable happens to them or their sworn interests. However, in some many growing democracies, vigilantism is summed up to be "taking the law into one's own hands" (Rosenbaum and Sederberg, 1974: 542) by violently resorting to the use of brute force to guard one’s interest or a group’s interest. The definitions by Rosenbaum and Sederberg contextually fit into the case of Ghana, given what and how PPVGs behaves and where they sometimes get their instructions to act in the violent manner they do

In all, “Vigilantisms could therefore be summed up as a form of social group-controlled violence or activism, which serves the political interest of both an incumbent government and the opposition since both incumbent government and the opposition have their vigilante groups” (Gyampo et al, 2017: 115). The vigilante groups have been said to be the cause of election violence in Ghana (Bob-Milliar, 2014; Paalo, 2017; Gyampo et al, 2017; and CODEO, 2017).

2.7.2 Historical Origin of Political Party Vigilante Groups in Ghana

Historically, Everatt (2000) traces the involvement of vigilante groups in the politics of Africa, using Southern Africa as a case study, to pre-colonial era political activities when youth were recruited by the nationalists or elite to fight for self-rule or independence from the colonial masters. However, they were marginalised and neglected, a situation that is seen in almost all African countries, of which he labelled as “lost generation”, after attaining independence or achieving their goal of self-rule. The vigilante groups according to him saw themselves then as liberation movements and tools for change. Collaborating Everatt’s assertion in the context of Ghana, Alidu (2019a, 2019b), Paalo (2017), and Gyampo et al (2017) also traces it to pre-independence socio-political conditions and political struggles. Alidu (2019a, 2019b) recount some pre-independence and pre- Fourth Republic socio-political events such as 1948 riots, Nkrumah’s temperament, Togoland Youth Conference, the Ga Shifimokpee, the Anlo Youth Association, and the National Liberation Movement as conditioning situations to vigilantism. In post-Fourth Republic, Alidu (2019a) again chronicled some social and political activities such as the four successful and several aborted coups, violent bye-elections (Etiwa, Chereponi, Wulensi, Tatale, and the recently held Ayawaso West-Wagon elections held in Accra as examples), national level elections, the recently Kwame Nkrumah University Science and Technology (KNUST) students riots incident and Adenta-Madina Highway incidents, police brutalities, mob-justice, as conditioning the Ghanaian public for vigilantism. Paalo (2017) and Gyampo et al (2017) on the other hand traced the origin of PPV in Ghana to pre-independence group of the ‘Veranda Boys’ of Kwame Nkrumah’s Convention People’ Party (CPP), who were variously used to achieve independence for Ghana. Fast forward to post-independence in Ghana, Gyampo et al (2017) traced it to Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs), "Mobisquad", Workers Defence Committees (WDCs), Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), etc., all in the name of defending the revolution (Gyampo et al, 2017). The umbilical cord of

the current political party groups' violent attacks on SIs, according to them, are tied to the historical acts outlined above.

Whereas the scholars all have similarity in their positions as seen in the violent nature of their actions, those involved being youth, all taking place in Africa, and also point to the fact that violent acts of PPVGs did not start in Africa today, they equally have differences. In respect of Alidu (2019), some of the actions identified as PPV appears really not motivated by political reasons. The cases of KNUST students' incidents and that of the Adenta-Madina Highway incident were not motivated by political actions; rather different reasons aside demanding for their share of the spoils as their contributions to their various political parties' victories. Most of activities identified as the root of the PPV took place in either military periods, dictatorship or non-democratic periods, except one or two of them. However, the recent ones are taking place in a purely multi-party democracy, which makes it more intriguing to comprehend, given dictates of multi-party democracy.

2.7.3 The Atmosphere of Political Party Vigilante Groups or Youth Groups in Ghana

Table 1 give a pictorial view of vigilante groups belonging to NPP and NDC in Ghana. Table 2 on the other hand gives a more detailed list of PPVGs in Ghana including year of formation of some of them. Table 3 presents lists of only PPVGs belonging to NPP and NDC in NR that have histories of violently attacking SIs and private properties.

Table 1 List of Political Parties' Vigilante Groups in Ghana

Region	NPP	NDC
Ashanti	Delta	No special name / NDC foot soldiers
Eastern	Invisible Forces	No special name / NDC foot soldiers

Western	Western Crocodiles	No special name / NDC foot soldiers
Brong-Ahafo	No Special name /NPP foot soldiers	No special name / NDC foot soldiers
Central	No Special name /NPP foot soldiers	No special name / NDC foot soldiers
Northern	No Special name /NPP foot soldiers	No special name / NDC foot soldiers
Upper East	Bolga Bulldogs	Azorka Boys
Upper West	No Special name /NPP foot soldiers	No special name / NDC foot soldiers
Greater Accra	No Special name /NPP foot soldiers	No special name / NDC foot soldiers
Volta	No Special name /NPP foot soldiers	

Source: Gyampo et al (2017)

Table 2 List of Political Parties' Vigilante Groups since pre-independence

Name of Vigilante Group	Party allegedly associated with	Year formed
The Action Groupers	The National Liberation Movement	1954-1956
The Action Trouper	CPP	1954-1956
Azorka boys	NDC	2004
Bamba boys	NPP	2004
Action Troopers	NPP	2008
Bolga Bulldogs	NPP	2015
The Maxwell Boys	NPP	2008
Invincible Forces	NPP	2015
The Kandahar Boys	NPP	2014
Delta Forces	NPP	2014
The Burma Camp Youth	NPP	2017
The Eagle	NDC	2018

The Lions	NDC	2018
The Hawks	NDC	2018
The Rasta Boys	Not Known	Not Known
Ashanti Vigilante Group	-	-
The Pentagon	-	-
Aljazeera	-	-
Aluta Boys	-	-
Nima Boys	-	-
Salifu Eleven	-	-
Basuka Boys	-	-
Zongo Caucus	-	-
Veranda Boys	-	-
Bindiriba	-	-

Source: Alidu (2019)

Table 3 List of Political Parties' Vigilante Groups in Northern Region

NPP	NDC
Kandahar	Boko Haram
Young Elephant	Aljazeera
Invisible Forces	Gbewah Youth
Burma Camp	Aluta Boys
Kapitalist	Alkaida
Talibans	Gbana Vilbu Youth
	Azorka Boys
	Agape group
	Hawks
	66 Bench

Source: Field Compilation

Comparing table 3 to table 1 reveals some similarities and differences. To restrict the thesis to the study area – NR, whereas table 1 indicate that there are no special names attached to PPVGs in NR, the study investigation shows that there are a number of them as indicated in table 3. Also, whereas Azorka Boys, a pro-NDC vigilante group was listed as a vigilante group in Upper East region, investigation shows that the group is actually based in NR, and that it does not even have a branch in Upper East region. From my research, Azorka Boys is a group that is headed by the First National Vice Chairman of NDC, Chief Sofo Azorka, who was a former regional chairman of NDC in NR from 2012 to 2018. It must be pointed out that the lists of all vigilante groups in table 3 have a history of attacking state institutions in the NR, within the periods of 2008 – 2018. Table 3 also contains a more detailed list of vigilante groups in NR compared to table 1.

Comparing table 3 to 2, whereas table 2 contained lists of almost all vigilante groups in Ghana, including those belonging to other political parties than NPP/NDC, and those that predated self-rule, table 3 contains lists of only PPVGs in NR, and those that belong to only NPP/NDC, particularly those that came into being after the Fourth Republic. Also, table 2 provides the year of formation of some of these groups, but table 3 has not provided any because of uncertainty on the year of formation of these groups by its owners during an interaction with them. Again, whilst table 3 indicated the region of these groups, table 2 did not provide the regions from where these groups are based. Whereas some groups such as Aluta and Aljazeera could not be identified to be allegedly associated to any political party in table 2, they are identified to be allegedly belonged to NDC in NR in table 3.

2.7.4 Ambiguity on the Concept of Political Party Vigilante Groups or Youths in the Politics of Africa

This part of the literature review is motivated by the fact that all PPVGs are made of youth, though with support from some faceless adults.

Alidu (2019) acknowledges the necessity to appropriately operationalize and conceptualise PPVGs or youths as a part of dealing with their nemesis. 70% of Africa's population constitute the youth (UNECA and UNPY, 2011; Olaiya, 2014). And even though the youth have historically played a vital role for the enthronement of self-rule (Everatt, 2000; Gyampo et al, 2017; Olaiya, 2014), ambiguity still beclouds their identity, which Olaiya (2012, 2014) points out to be one of the possible reasons for recent disorder and violence acts of PPVGs in Africa, including Ghana. Olaiya (2014: 3) reaffirming an earlier position in (2012) aptly puts it:

“Such youth are also sometimes hard to pin down to any age group or status. They are at the center and the periphery; they are at the forefront and at the margins; they are mis-empowered agents, and they are hapless victims; they are everywhere and nowhere, everything and nothing. Yet not entirely so: They do overwhelmingly tend to be urban, hyper cosmopolitan in their consumer tastes and cultural repertoires, and utterly united in the vanguard of perceived socio-political disorder”

There are different perspectives and positions in the debate of youth. Whereas the age bracket school of thought (United Nation, 2006; African Union, 2006; and Resnick and Casale, 2014) places emphasis on age bracket in conceptualising youth (PPVGs), the environmental school of thought (Bucholtz, 2002), who are mostly the sociologists and anthropologists, focus on the environment.

Sociologists and anthropologists argue that fixed age bracket in conceptualising youth (PPVGs) does not really matter; rather, ideological and cultural values age base groups should be distinguishable factors in conceptualising youth (Kirkpatrick and Martini in Bucholtz, 2002). Hence Burton in Bucholtz (2002) in support of the environmentalists' view, argues that youths (PPVGs) in industrialised countries are likely to experience adolescence as a distinguishing life stage because of economic and other limitations that bequeaths on them adult responsibilities quicker relative to non-industrialised countries. Cambridge International Dictionary of English, (2002: 1213) defined Youth as “the period of your life when you are young, the state of being young, or a young person”. To them, what the environment bequeaths

on the individual determines the behaviour, responsibility, and reasoning he/she puts up. And that, the actions of an individual should be used to classify him/her into being a youth or not. Hence, functional age of the individual should be the baseline in describing him/her.

Conversely, the age bracket school of thought focuses on the age of an individual as opposed to the environment. The United Nation - UN (2006) defines youth (PPVGs) as people between the ages of 15 and 24 years. The World Bank pegs it at the ages of 15 and 25 years. Resnick and Casale (2014) recognised countries in this category, with 35 as maximum age in South Africa, Ghana, Tanzania, and Kenya, while 25 and 29 are the upper limits in Zambia and Botswana respectively. In addition, the AU Youth Charter (Banjul, 2006) defines it as between the ages of 15 to 35 years. Ghana also falls under the age category classification. Ghana's Youth Policy of 2010 defines youth as "persons who are age bracket of fifteen (15) and thirty-five (35)" (Ghana Youth Policy, 2010: 5).

The youth constitute 33% of the country's total population of 18.9 million (PHC, 2010; Youth Policy Document, 2010). According to the youth policy document, the decision of the country to peg its definition within the range provided is influenced by United Nations Organisation and the Commonwealth Secretariat. For the purposes of planning and programming, the youth policy of Ghana further categorised youth into the following in the 2010 Census: 15–19 years – 10%; 20–24 year – 8.5%; 25–29 years – 7.9%; and 30–34 years – 6.4% (PHC, 2010; Youth Policy Document, 2019).

The ambiguity in conceptualising youth reflects in several African countries, even those affected by conflicts that were dominated by youth, and in the pre-independent nationalist activities in the continent. For instance, apart from the 1992 Constitution of Cape Verde which dedicated a chapter to the youth, not even a single country in Africa has dedicated a chapter to their youth. Even countries like Sierra Leone and Liberia that experienced a greater civil war

of which the youth was mostly affected, had recognised the youth of their country by devoting a page for them in their constitution even though they constitute most of the continent's population (Olaiya, 2014).

Again, “by the time the Pan African Congress and the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) were held in Paris and Accra in 1919 and 1920, respectively, the most prominent African participants did not fall within the dominant chronological age bracket that is now regarded as “youthful” (Olaiya, 14:3-4). Again, “the organizer of the congress, W. E. B. Du Bois (1863-1963), was about 51 years of age, while key participants (including Blaise Diagne, who later became the first African Deputy in Senegal in 1927), averaged 52 years. The Gold Coast nationalist, J. E. Casely-Hayford (1866-1930), also organized the NCBWA in 1920 at the ripe age of 56” (Olaiya, 14:4). “Similarly, by the time the fourth Congress took place in 1945, the two prominent delegates of West African descent, Kwame Nkrumah (1909-1972) and Obafemi Awolowo (1909-1983), were both 46 years. In addition, James Churchill Vaughan was 56 years when he formed the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) in 1936, a formidable youth party that 2 years after, in 1938, successfully defeated the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) to claim the three tickets to the Lagos Legislative Assembly” (Olaiya, 2014:4). “The first political party in Nigeria, NNDP, was formed by Herbert Macaulay (1864-1946) in 1923 at 50, whereas Nnamdi Azikwe (1904-1996) only became the Secretary General of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in 1947 at 43” (Olaiya, 2014:4). Finally, “these men were the architects of the formation of notable political parties that fought and won political independence for their respective countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s” (Olaiya, 2014:4).

Relating it to this thesis, it was earlier stated that PPVGs are mostly made up of youth with some backing from faceless adults (Adigwe, 2013, Alidu, 2019). So, tracing the origin and how it has been conceptualized is vital for planning purposes. The nemesis of party foot soldiers

confronting Ghana today is not new per the literature. According to Olaiya (2012; 2014) and Everatt (2000), the lack of precise definition or conception of the youth (PPVGs), is a major cause of their violent acts on SIs today. And according to them, it is historical, as manifested in South Africa, Nigeria, and other parts of the continent. Failure to define a problem will make it difficult to deal with, as shown in the literature (Paalo, 2017; Gyampo et al, 2017; Alidu, 2019). Hence, Ghana's failed attempts at dealing with the accompanying negative effects of foot soldiers in the current political environment, is as result of not defining them so as to assign proper roles for them.

In attributing the possible causes of the failure of the state to deal with violent attacks of foot soldiers to marginalisation and precise conceptualisation, of which it said it date back to pre-independence, will be a major step in curtailing their negative tendencies. Aside, it also traced the origin of PPV in Ghana from pre-independence to date. However, it failed to provide concrete and specific measures to dealing with aspects of party vigilante groups attacking some SIs whilst ignoring others. Thus, the thesis seeks to empirically fill in those gaps.

2.7.5 The Positive Roles or Contributions of Political Party Vigilante Groups in Ghana's Democracy

The youth or PPVG have been actively and vigorously involved in the socio – politics of Africa and hence need to be entrusted with duty (Miller, 1936; Knebel, 1937; Rivta, 1975). “Be Seen, Be Heard: Youth Participation in Development” was the theme for United Nations Youth Day in 2007. Also, “an empowered youth contributing positively to national development” (Ghana Youth Policy, 2010: 7) is the vision of Ghana's Youth Policy.

These are wakeup calls to countries that have historically side-lined the youth (PPVGs), including Ghana, that they could fully participate and contribute positively to the development

of nations if their potentials are fully tapped. As a link, this section will look at the positive role assigned to PPVGs in the political process of Ghana.

“It is a generally acceptable fact that the youth are the indispensable and dynamic portion of the population of any nation. They are the incubators and the driving force for innovation, change and progress in all human collectivities; and no society can experience positive change and advancement if its youths are not strategically and constructively invested upon, empowered and engaged. Their immense energy and drive must be tactfully packaged and directed towards playing a constructive role in the process of governance and development of the society”. (Inokoba and Maliki, 2011: 217).

In addition, “the youth are the major source of human capital and key agents for socio-cultural, economic, and political development as well as technological innovation worldwide. Their imagination, ideals, energies and vision are essential for the continuing development of societies. Their training, development, intellectual perspectives and productive ability are key determinants of the progress and future of societies” (Ghana National Youth Policy, 2010:4). This is evident in some parts of Africa where the elite have appreciated the organizational abilities of these vigilante groups and are variously using them positively to win elections (Abbink, 2005; Roessler, 2005; Richards, 1996).

And indeed, Ghanaian politicians have also realised that foot soldiers are indispensable portion, incubators and driving forces of winning elections. Kennedy Agyapong, a vociferous NPP member of parliament for Assin Central in the Central Region, partly attributed the victory of NPP to the efforts of the PPVGs when he said “these boys” fought for the return of NPP back into power in 2017 (Daily Graphic, 2017). The elite or the politicians have invested in vigilante groups, in the past and present, and hence, they have contributed significantly to partisan

political process of Ghana (Bob-Milliar, 2013; 2012a and 2014; Van Gyampo, 2012; Asante, 2006; and Ninsin, 2006).

Given the human capital needed in Ghanaian elections and remoteness of the country, PPVGs spread the ideologies of their various respective PPs into all remote areas of the country (Van Gyampo, 2012; Bob-Milliar, 2014, Gyampo et al, 2017). This supports the assertion of Paalo (2017) that PPVGs make party machinery more popular, thereby brightening the chances of the party winning power. Even though this is true; it must be noted, however, that it not only PPVGs that spread the ideologies of their parties. Other groups in the coalition such as the women wing and the intellectual, equally spread the ideologies to all remote areas of the country since they also travel to other parts of the country to campaign on behalf of the party. Besides, the resources to travel to other parts of the country to spread the ideologies of their parties are mostly provided by others in coalition known as financiers of the political parties.

Paalo (2017) agreeing with Bob-Milliar (2014) and Gyampo (2012), maintains that PPVGs help in disseminating the content of the manifestoes of their parties to the electorates, thereby indirectly influencing the trajectory of national development and policy. The women's wings, the party executives, volunteers, and others who believe in the ideologies of the political party also help in the dissemination of the manifestoes. Aside, the formulators or people who sit to draw the ideologies of the party's manifestoes, also spread the manifestoes. In the context of Ghana, where a reasonable number of people do not read the manifestoes in order to make an informed decision out of it before voting (Field Interview), the roles of manifestoes do not really matter in elections hence their role could be insignificant. Again, where some people in Ghana vote along a certain believe rather than bread and butter, manifestoes might not influence them into voting who, as such, spreading of manifestoes by vigilante groups is not really important for them (Bob – Milliar, 2018).

Another important positive role played by PPVGs as observed by Paalo (2017), Bob – Milliar (2014), Gyampo et al (2017), and Van Gyampo (2012) is the monitoring of election related matters such as monitoring of voter registration, monitoring voting as well as serving as polling agents. This according to Gyampo (2012) has promoted fairness and transparency and has largely legitimised election results. Just like any member in the coalition, they can equally do monitoring of voting during election; serve as polling agent during registration and voting, as they have always done in Ghana. Women, financiers, and intellectuals' base of political parties in Ghana have always done monitoring of elections, served as polling agents in elections and registering.

In addition, some foot soldiers organise and raise funds for respective PPs through selling party cards and paraphernalia, even though the usage of these funds excludes the elite (Paalo, 2017; Van Gyampo, 2012), an observation also made by Alidu (2019). Kanyinga and Murimi (2002) also observed that some of these funds could be raised through personal wealth and resources. Yes, they sometimes raise funds for some of their activities. But majority of funding in the political parties are done through the financiers in the parties, who are mostly at the back stage. Aside that the political parties also solicit for fund from other sources such as selling of coupons, appeals, and etcetera.

Finally, peaceful protests and demonstrations, as noted by Gyampo (2012) and Paalo (2017), are also used as means by which PPVGs put pressure on ruling governments on real and perceived economic, political and social hardships, and this they say, definitely inures to the benefits of their respective parties. Other members in the coalition can organise peaceful demonstrations that seeks to make the ruling party unpopular.

Despite the reservations raised in all the positive roles played by PPVGs in Ghana's political environment in the past and present, they still play crucial roles in helping their various political parties (PPs).

The above highlighted positive roles of PPVGs buttresses the optimist school of thought that the involvement of youth in the political process is blissful, broadens the horizons of the youth in the democratic process, and breach the gap in political process (Imoite, 2007; Gyampo, 2012; Englert, 2008)

In all, the sections above highlighted the important roles of PPVGs in the political process of Ghana. In relation to the thesis, the above points out that if PPVGs are properly nurtured and trained, they will positively contribute to the development of Ghana, and invariably stop the attacks on these SIs. However, the authors are unable to explain why PPVs violently attack selectively, some SIs more, whilst ignoring or paying little attention to others. This thesis therefore, will fill the gap by explaining with empirical fact, why it is so.

2.7.6 Violent Activities of Political Party Vigilante Groups on State Institutions

According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), "political violence is the use of force by a group with a political purpose or motivation" (2015a:1). And that an incidence is qualified as politically violent when in an exchange, people resort to force to a political end. The situation, according to Centre for African Democratic Affairs –CADA (2012), is facilitated by patronage system; and clientelism or personal favour (Scott, 1972; Bratton and van de Walle, 1994) that has inundated the politics in Africa, including Ghana.

Similarly, Dumouchel (2012) defines it as violence caused or induced by political matters. He added that it can unite us when members in a camp fight for or against; and divide as well when enemies and targets are identified. Breen-Smith (2012) in Paolo (2017) puts it specifically as "organized violence intended to overturn or weaken the state; violence committed by

incumbents against political rivals, as well as violence not involving the state directly but against opponents in politics, e.g. confrontations between the loyalists of ZANU-PF and MDC”.

According to ACLED (2015b), political violence is also seen as assault against civilian or political foes, though not limited to the above only, and also include rioting. In Africa, the atmosphere normally amplifies and intensifies during elections, where emphasis is usually placed on elections and resultant political power (Bob-Milliar, 2014).

In Ghana, political violence by PPVGs started before self-rule with the formation of the ‘Veranda Boys’, a vigilante group of Kwame Nkrumah’s CPP, that was used to cause chaos, demonstrate, attack SIs, until Ghana eventually attained self-rule (Paalo, 2017; Gyampo et al, 2017; Alidu, 2019). It even continued in the military regimes, particularly under the “Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) era when some vigilante groups such as the "Mobisquad", Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), Workers Defence Committees (WDCs), Peoples Defence Committees (PDCs) and others were trained and armed to defend the revolution” (Gyampo, et al, 2017; 118).

In the Fourth Republic, just like how succeeding PPs have replicated youth groups in their parties to date (Gyimah-Boadi, 2007), the two major political parties – NPP and NDC – that have ruled Ghana, have covertly and informally institutionalised them in their youth wings.

On 6 April 2017, CODEO released a Communiqué raising concern about the rampant disturbances of NPP and NDC vigilante groups. The report also equated the activities of these groups to militias that have the tendency of destabilising the country. The assertion supports scholars like Burgers (2003), Durham (2000), and Diof (2003), who have advanced negative perception about youth. They see the youth threat and conduit bad politicians used to get power.

In Ghana, PPVGs are negatively used by politicians or adults to fight their rivals in politics, either internal party politics or outside party politics (Ahwoi, 2006, Asiamah, 2006).

Similarly, CODEO's Post-Election Observation Statement identified insulated cases of violent acts purportedly committed by pro-NPP vigilante groups on supporters of NDC, as well as the illegal seizures of both private and public property in the country.

Also, Bob-Milliar (2014: 126) agreeing with Weber posits "that a country with a high proportion of young men risks democratic collapse" because "male adolescents have a higher propensity to intergroup hate and political violence", and he described the above and many as actions that "violates the norms of liberal democracy". This is evident in Ghana where almost those conscripted to form these PPVGs are made of young men called in Ghana party vigilante groups.

Paalo (2017: 9) agreeing with Abbink (2005), argues that PPVGs "violence is generally triggered by the structures and actors within institutional arenas. Youth are not naturally inclined to cause violence or social destruction, but the ineffectiveness of a socio-political and moral order in the wider society together with the degree of governability of polities underpin such acts". Therefore, partisan violence does not affect countries squarely, as understood between the case study of Ghana and its compatriots in sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, political vigilante group violence can be equated to those in Kenya, Tanzania, Botswana, etc (Paalo, 2017).

Undoubtedly, the phenomenon of party footsoldierism has triggered political violence on SIs in the world, Africa, Ghana, both in the past and present times. In Africa, PPVGs have become harbingers of destabilizers, where they challenged our developing democracies by simply surpassing sanctioned politics into unconscientious party foot soldiers, political/ethnic militias groups that are establishing increased social problems (Olaiya, 2014). Cote d'voire as an

example in this case has witnessed corrosive role of vigilante groups in the bloody civil war on September 19, 2002, that resulted into the loss of lives and destruction of both individual and private properties (Olaiya, 2014).

Again, in ethically multi-coloured Nigeria, the involvement of vigilante groups in the ethnic and religious clashes has consumed a lot of lives and continue to consume, hence has raised public concern even after returning to multi-party rule May 1999 (Olaiya, 2014). The role of foot soldiers in Sudan, South Sudan, DRC, Liberia, and many more, cannot be over emphasized (Olaiya, 2014). The story is almost the same in Ghana with some degree of differences, because in the case of Ghana, we have not experienced large-scale violence relative to Cote d'voire, Sierra Leon, Liberia, and Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda, etc. In the case of Ghana, the NPP and NDC recruit these vigilante groups in the name of providing pseudo/private security (CADA, 2012), but they end up becoming agents of destruction, chaos, confusion, and rancour (Gyampo, 2012; Gyampo, et al, 2017; Paalo, 2017; Bob-Milliar, 2012; 2014). Certainly, this supports Straus' assertion that there is an increase in electoral related violence by the youth in African democracies. It must however be noted that PPVGs violence varies from country to country, even in the same country, it varies from region to region and from institution to institution (Straus, 2011).

This affirms the pessimist school of thought regarding the undesirability of the involvement of PPVGs in the politics of Africa, including Ghana (Laakso, 20017; Abbink, 2005). To the pessimist, involving party foot soldiers in politics only breeds danger, violence, and has the potential of abduction, assault, overwhelming presence of the gun, causing chaos, murder, arson, and other weapon-brandishing soldiers, either through high-level violence or low-level violence in the continent, and in this case, Ghana. Pessimist such as Abbink (2005) argues that either direct or indirect involvement of foot soldiers in politics has always been violent, and has a possible generational conflict, as young people are simply drafted by political parties

from time to time even for armed or criminal actions. Similarly, Laakso (2007) posits that PPVGs in the continent play damaging roles with their relevant political organizations and related matters, and this is with both incumbents and opposition as seen in Liberia, Sierra Leon, Cote d’voire, Angola, Rwanda, etc. Amusingly, the same scenario applies to intra-party competitions. A classic case in Ghana was what led to the death of Chairman Adams, the former Upper - East regional chairman of NPP in 2015 (Myjoyonline, 2015; Ctifmonline, 2015), and the death of an alleged member of the ‘Hawk’, a political vigilante group belonging to the NDC, in Kumasi (Myjoyonline, 2019; Citifmonline, 2019; ModernGhana, 2019).

In all, Paalo (2017), CODEO (2017), Gyampo et al (2017), Van Gyampo (2012), and Bob-Milliar (2014) have highlighted how and why these political party groups have caused harm to both private and SIs in the past and present. Laakso (20017) and Abbink (2005) also pointed out how undesirable it is to include PPVGs or youths in the political process in Africa. However, none have explored on why CSIs are more targeted than pre-Fourth Republic SIs in Ghana, specifically NR.

2.8 Summary and reflection on the literature

The literature review started with the introduction. In the introduction, it highlighted the format, structure or the outlook of how the review will be arranged. And in the outlook, it indicated the literature review will start with a review on the theoretical framework that will guide the work. Spoils theory was indicated as a theory to guide the research. It was explained to mean a situation where government gives civil service jobs to family relative or members, party functionaries, close friends, as reward for their roles in the victory of the party in an election, as opposed to qualification or meritocracy. Also, the thesis provided a brief origin and history of the theory, where it says that the theory emanated from the politics of U.S.A in the early 1980s from the phrase “to the victor belong the spoils” by William L. Marcy, a New York Senator, in 1928. However, this was stopped in the 1883 after the Pendleton Act of 1883

following demand by the civil service reform movement to reform the civil service. I also identified the strength and weaknesses of the theory, and conclude the theoretical framework with the contextual application of the theory to my work.

Next after the theoretical review is the review on general studies about SIs on the world, Africa, including Ghana. In this, the difficulty to get a concise and a precise worldwide acceptable definition of Sis has been explored. Another area explored in this part of the review is an observation made by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), World Bank (1989, 1992, 1994); Brautigam (1991); Hyden and Bratton (1992); Ndulu and van de Walle (1996); and Lewis (1996) in Englebert (2000) on how dysfunctional SIs have become. To them, it has become dysfunctional because it has failed to uplift the lives of people.

Goetz (1996), Kabeer and Subramaniam (1996), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), and Narayan (1999) in Narayan-Parker and Patel (2000) have observed how state institutions pretend to be serving the general good of all when indeed it is serving only few. Narayan-Parker & Patel (2000) summed it all positing that SIs are in crises because it has failed to serve the vulnerable like women, the poor, and all the marginalised in society. This part of the literature review concludes with convex arguments made in support of SIs on how it has helped in the development trajectories of some countries. North (1991), Leftwich (2007), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) have pointed out how economic lives of people have improved thanks to effective SIs. Leftwich in particular, has indicated that the successful development of countries like China, Korea, Singapore and other countries has been transformed due to SIs (Leftwich, 2007). The section concludes with a review on SIs in Ghana. General studies on studies on SIs in Ghana have been focusing on traditional political state institutions such as the judiciary, legislature and the executives. The informal SIs such as the chieftaincy institutions, have also received some little attention.

The last part of the literature reviews zeroes in on PPV. In this part, the review began by giving explanation to PPV in Ghana. Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) and Gyampo et al (2017: 115) has been respectively selected because of their contextual exactness for the thesis. They defined it as "taking the law into one's own hands" by violently resorting to the use of brute force to guard one's interest or a group's interest, and "Vigilantisms could therefore be summed up as a form of social group-controlled violence or activism, which serves the political interest of both an incumbent government and the opposition since both incumbent government and the opposition have their vigilante groups". The origin of PPV is traced to pre-independence in Africa (Everatt, 2000). In Ghana, whereas Paalo (2017) and Gyampo et al (2017) also traced it in Ghana to the 'Veranda Boys' of Kwame Nkrumah's C.P.P., Alidu (2019) on the other hand also traced it to pre-independence activities such as the 1948 riots, Nkrumah's temperament, Togoland Youth Conference, the Ga Shifimokpee, the Anlo Youth Association and the National Liberation Movement. The difficulty to properly conceptualise PPVGs or youth is one of the reasons identified to be the causes of its violence on state institutions has also been reviewed. A lot of positive contributions by PPVGs towards Ghana's democracy has been identified in the review. Examples are: they have helped PPs in the distribution of their ideologies; in the distribution of their paraphernalia; in mobilising funds; and in campaigning. Also, they have served as polling station agents; they have been monitoring elections; and providing security to party officials. Adversely, their actions have threatened the democratic gains of Ghana. Examples include the following: they have violently destroyed state properties; destroyed private properties; they have forcefully pushed civil servants out of offices; and beaten people.

In all the literature review point out, none has shown or provided an explanation to why some particular SIs have become the targets for violent acts by PPVGs whilst others are ignored. My

work, therefore, is seeking to fill in that gap by providing empirical explanation to why it is so for policy formation and implementation.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter dwelled essentially on the methodology that guided the study. Its focus is on techniques and strategies that were engaged in the course of the study. The specific details of it include the study area, justification for the selection of Northern Region as the study area, methodology, sampling, suitable data collection procedures and the tools employed in the data analysis of the study. It then concludes by looking at ethical issues in research.

3.2 The study area and justification – Northern Region (NR)

Northern Region (NR) is one of the sixteen regions and one of the biggest regions in terms of land size in Ghana with a population of 2,479,461 - male 1,229,887 and 1,249,574 (2010, PHC). Almost every aspect of human life can be found in NR. It is cosmopolitan in nature. NR serves as the commercial and business capital for all the regions in the north. Its capital is Tamale. NR is bordered to the North by Upper West Regions, Savannah and Volta Regions to the South, Republic of Togo to the East, and Savannah to the West. The land is mostly low lying.

NR has the highest number of PPVGs in Ghana. This was confirmed when Dr Emmanuel Kwasi Aning, a security expert and analyst at Kofi Annan Peace Keeping Centre, gave a testimony at the Emile Short Commission of enquiry into the Ayawaso West - Wagon bye-election violence Commission of Enquiry on Monday, 18 of February, 2019. He identified 24 groups in Ghana, with NR alone having 11 (Myjoyonline, 2019).

Also, 'Azorka Boys', a pro-NDC vigilante that easily comes into people's mind, is based and was founded in NR. The founder of 'Azorka Boys', Chief Sofo Azorka, was once first vice

chair of NDC in NR. He later became regional chairman of the same party from 2010 to 2018. Today, Chief Sofo Azorka, is now NDC's first National Deputy Vice Chair.

Additionally, 'Kandar', a pro-NPP PPVG that easily rings a bell whenever PPV is mentioned in Ghana, was founded and based in NR. Interestingly, just like NDC is to Sofo Azorka and 'Azorka Boys', the NPP is to Alhassan Mohammed known in his daily dealings as 'Ghana Alhassan' and 'Kandahar Boys'. He; Ghana Alhassan is the founder and leader of 'Kandahar Boys'. Today, he is elected as the leader of the northern regional youth wing. That is, he is the youth organiser of NPP in NR. This is mind blowing scenario that everyone will like to find out whether founders and promoters of violent party vigilante groups are revered in that part of the country.

3.3 Methodology

3.3.1 Research Approach and Design

Case Study as an approach is employed for this thesis. It involves techniques of investigation that allows the researcher to understand community, individual, and social phenomenon under study, over a period of time. It takes into consideration situational and peculiar differences being studied. Thus, it allowed the investigator to investigate the violent attacks of PPVGs affiliated to NPP and NDC in NR, where they seize and attack some SIs- (NHIA and YEA). Again, it enabled the researcher to zero larger phenomenon of PPV into smaller units of SSNIT and SIC on one hand and NHIA and YEA on another hand, in NR. Research design offers the fundamentals for gathering and analysis of data pursuant or relevant to social phenomenon under study. Thus, it provides the conceptual framework for a study in question (Kothari, 2004). Kothari noted the significance of a good research design below:

“Research design is needed because it facilitates the smooth sailing of the various research operations, thereby making research as efficient as possible yielding maximal information with

minimal expenditure of effort, time and money. Just as for better, economical and attractive construction of a house, we need a blueprint (or what is commonly called the map of the house) well thought out and prepared by an expert architect, similarly we need a research design or a plan in advance of data collection and analysis for our research project. Research design stands for advance planning of the methods to be adopted for collecting the relevant data and the techniques to be used in their analysis, keeping in view the objective of the research and the availability of staff, time and money. Preparation of the research design should be done with great care as any error in it may upset the entire project. Research design, in fact, has a great bearing on the reliability of the results arrived at and as such constitutes the firm foundation of the entire edifice of the research work". (Kothari, 2004: pp 32).

3.4 Research Methods

Kothari (2004:8) defines research method as a tactic to systematically solve a social phenomenon or a research problem. In others words, it is a scientific way of solving a problem in the society. Research methodology is categorized into three: qualitative, quantitative, and mixed-method (Harwell, 201; Creswell, 2013).

3.4.1 Qualitative Method

This is employed in the study as opposed to quantitative and mixed-methods. It is used because it is largely for descriptive purposes as such, fits well into answering the thesis' general question of "why are political party vigilante groups attacking some state institutions whilst ignoring others"? In answering the question of "why", the findings will be put into words and pictures, which is qualitative in manner, as opposed to numeral and statistical analysis embedded in quantitative and mixed-method. The research employs qualitative as against quantitative because the findings were based on quality, which had smaller respondents, rather than the quantity as seen quantitative and mixed-method, which normally has more respondents. In doing so, the beliefs and experiences of people which impact their behaviour

or actions (Creswell, 2013), were dependent upon. Qualitative is defined as ... phenomena relating to or involving quality or kind (Creswell, 2013). For instance, when we are interested in investigating the reasons for human behaviour (i.e., why people think or do certain things), we quite often talk of ‘Motivation Research’, an important type of qualitative research. This type of research aims at discovering the underlying motives and desires, using an in-depth interview for the purpose. Other techniques of such research are word association tests, sentence completion tests, story completion tests and similar other projective techniques. Attitude or opinion research designed to find out how people feel or what they think about a particular subject or institution is also qualitative research” (Kothari, 2004:3). Data or information in qualitative research is arguably gotten through techniques such as interviews, observations, etc (Strauss and Corbin, 1998)

3.4.2 Case Study

The type of qualitative method adopted in this research is case study as opposed to narrative, ethnography, grounded theory, and phenomenological. This provided the researcher a unique opportunity to study the multiple cases of violent attacks by PPVG on different SIs, using multiple sources and techniques to collect data. Furthermore, it granted the researcher the benefit to use the logic of replication in studying one vigilante groups to another; and one SI to another. Case study “is a qualitative approach in which the investigator explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., observations, interviews, audio-visual material, and documents and reports), and report a case *description* and case-based themes” (Creswell, 2013: 73).

The quantitative method is not used because its final analyses are grounded on statistic and numerical analysis (Creswell, 1994; Wikipedia Encyclopaedia, 2005) as opposed to the outcome which was put in a descriptive form as in words and pictures. Mixed-Methods on the

other hand, too, is not to be used because some of its findings are put in the statistical and numerical manner.

3.5 Data Collection Technique

The data collected is from both primary and secondary sources. Data collected with the primary sources was directly collected first-hand. Observation, interview, and focus groups discussion have also been adopted as techniques in collecting the primary data.

3.5.1 Observation

Observation as a technique is employed because it allowed the researcher to systematically observe people's behaviour, actions and interaction. In brief, it enables the researcher to have a detailed description of social setting or events in order to appropriately situate people's behaviour in their own socio-cultural context (Hennink et al, 2011). Hence, it enabled the thesis to appropriately situate why some SIs are attacked whilst others are ignored.

3.5.1.1 Non-participant observation

This allowed the researcher to totally keep distance while observing how a particular social phenomenon, say how PPVG violently attack SI; how SIs affected by the violent attacks behaves, etc., whilst it is going on. Non-participant observation is where a researcher observes a situation or phenomenon without participating in the activities (Creswell, 2013; Hennink et al, 2011). It must be noted that the researcher did not instigate any violent attack to enable him observe; rather, the researcher depended on previous experience observations.

3.5.1.2 Observation by visual aid.

This allowed the investigator to obtain the information from video recordings. This was done through recording and later watching and listening to review them. The other forms of observation such as participatory and walk through the space were not used. They were not used because the researcher did not directly involve himself in any of the violent activities of

PPVGs; neither did he walk through any of the violent activities of the PPVGs. It must be noted that the observation is based on previous experience that was observed on SIs being attacked.

3.5.2 Interview

Another technique used is interview. An interview or an in-depth interview “is a one-to-one method of data collection that involves an interviewer and interviewee discussing specific topics in depth” (Hennink et al, 2011: 109). Also, Kvale (1996) defines interview as a dialogue with a purpose of obtaining a descriptions or opinion of a phenomenon from an interviewee through content analysis. In other words, it is a technique used in qualitative research, and it allows the researcher to ask open-ended question to illicit opinions from respondents. This is an important technique because it allowed the researcher to reinforce the importance of gaining detailed insight into issues surrounding a phenomenon. In all the interview sections, the researcher used 30-40 minutes, except in the case of the FGDs, which lasted from for 60-80 minutes

3.5.2.1 *Semi Structured Interview*

This type of interview is used too. It allowed the researcher to have or hold a certain idea in asking for more question through probing (Alshenqeeti, 2014). It also helped, particularly, when the time was now short. Again, it enabled the researcher to arrange the questions in a manner that respondents wanted. In all, it gave a certain flexibility or room to get all what was wanted from respondents within the short period of time.

3.5.2.2 *Unstructured interview*

This was used in some parts of the interview, particularly in dealing with youth organisers of the various PPs and PPVGs. This technique allows the investigator to build a bond between himself/herself and respondents so that respondents can be more open in their responses (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002). Structured interview was not used. Answers gotten from it will

not be that detailed enough, largely because of its rigid nature (Berg, 2007), into describing why PPVGs violently attack some institutions whilst ignoring others.

3.5.3 Focus Group Discussion

The last technique employed is the focus group method (FGD). This involves an interaction in the form of discussion between 8 to 10 already selected participants (Schostak, 2005). This was led by the researcher. The interaction focused on a specific issue (Hennink et al, 2011). The discussions lasted for 60-80 minutes. It allowed the researcher to solicit more responses from the PPVGs since they all share familiar background. Again, it was also cost effective in relative to interview with each member of the groups whose memberships are over 40 in a group.

In using the FGD, the researcher went through all the formalities in organising the groups. The researcher organised them in an environment that was convenient for the groups. With the interview guide and all participants sited, discussions began with the following: welcome and thank participants for coming; introduction of researchers (myself, note-taker, and my observer); topic introduced in broad terms; outlined the processes of the discussion and guidelines; opened to them on the duration (60- 80 minutes); researcher responded to their concerns, reservations, observation raised before proceeding with actual discussion.

With the first phase done, the researcher proceeded with the second phase – actual questions and discussion. Here, the researcher began with the introduction by providing necessary information about the study. The opening questions follows, which were brief and factual. Researcher invited participants to have their comments. Introductory question then followed; just to warm participants' activeness in the discussion. Open-ended questions followed. Members or participants were probed for more answers. Transition questions follows purposely to move from introduction to key topic. Key questions followed. This generated the data expected. This came with quite a number of probes. Closing questions then followed.

Researcher ended by thanking members, after which, some snacks were provided for participants.

Secondary data on the other hand was gotten from reading materials like newspapers, journals, books, magazines, and the internet. It also included works on both published and unpublished articles and thesis. J-stor, UG space, Google Scholar, and other forms of recognised online academic portals was effectively used. Libraries such as Balme Library of University of Ghana, Legon, Political Department Library of University of Ghana, Centre for Democratic Development (CCD's) Library, and other libraries were all used.

3.6 Sampling Selection

A combination of sampling techniques was employed in selecting sampling units from the population. This helped in acquiring more information and knowledge about the population.

Target population included PPVGs belonging to NPP and NDC; some party executives of NPP and NDC; scholars that have academically written and spoken about PPV; SIs affected and those not affected by the violent attacks of PPVGs; scholars; and some civil society organisations that have over the years spoken about PPV.

3.6.1 Purposive Sampling

It is employed because it enabled researcher to purposively or deliberately pick respondents who had relevant information pertaining to the research. It is where respondents do not have an equal opportunity of being selected for a research (Yin, 2003; Taherdoost, 2016). This type of non-probability also afforded the researcher a unique opportunity to purposively select respondents who were well equipped with the technical acumen, and ready to give answers to questions pertaining to study. Purposive sampling is where participants in a particular settings or events are selected, deliberately, in order to offer relevant information that cannot be gotten from other choices (Maxwell, 2005; 2012). In other words, it is where respondents across

appropriate groups on a similar phenomenon where each group is homogenous adequate to improve the chances of engaging in a cross-group evaluation (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The other forms of non-probability sampling such as quota sampling, snowball sampling, Judgment sampling, and convenience sampling has not been considered. They have not been considered because they could not provide the luxury of chance compared to purposive sampling, in selecting respondents for the study.

Through purposive sampling, two persons were selected from each of the SIs – NHIA) and YEA in one hand and SSNIT and SIC on another hand.

The managers and staff that have worked there from 2008 to 2018 were selected. This so because the manager(s) has/have an in-depth knowledge about the institutions, and possible one of the reason they have been promoted to the position of a manager, hence can give an in-depth information about the institution.

The other staff that have worked there since 2008 to 2018 also possess enough knowledge to give as to whether the institutions has been affected by the violent activities of PPVGs or not. In all, 8 people have been selected from this category.

SSNIT and SIC are selected because they are classified among pre-Fourth Republic SIs and have not been violently attacked by PPVGs. Limited time warranted the inability to select other non-affected pre-Fourth Republic SIs.

NHIA and YEA are selected because they have always been targeted by these PPVGs. The others have not been selected because of limited time in conducting the research.

NPP and NDC are selected because they are the only two PPs to have these PPVGs that have the history of attacking SIs since the Fourth Republic began in 1992. The other political parties such Convention People's Party (CPP), People's National Convention (PNC), etc., are not selected because they do not have PPVGs currently. It must be noted that even if they have

without my knowledge, they have not been reported to have violently attacked any SI from 2008-2018, particularly in NR.

Two scholars are also considered for the study. They are selected because they have written and made academic presentations, on radio, TV, on journals, and other outlets, within my research time period, in respects to the activities of PPVGs affiliated to NPP and NDC. They are, therefore, considered as authorities in the field.

The Regional Secretaries and Regional Youth Organisers of NPP and NDC are also selected because they largely control these vigilante groups in their respective PPs. The vigilante groups fall directly under control of the youth organisers (NPP Constitution, 1992; NDC Constitution, 1992). Again, administratively, the general secretaries have direct control and knows the day-to-day activities of all agencies in the party. The other party executives are not selected because the two selected can give all the relevant information.

The PPVGs are also selected for FGD because they have a history of violently attacking SIs in NR. Kandahar, Kapitals, Burma, Aljazeera, Alkaida, and Aluta Boys are vigilante groups considered for the FGD. They are considered because they have history of not less than 3 times, in violently attacking SIs in NR. Not less than 8-10 in a group participated in all the discussion.

Two persons are also selected from Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) and Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG). The two institutions are selected because they are among civil society organisations that have for some time been advocating for an end to the phenomenon of PPV.

In all, 16 people have been interviewed. Additionally, 6 groups of not less than 10 members per group have been interacted with in the FGD.

3.7 Data Analysis and Presentation

The qualitative data in the thesis were all deduced from FGDs, observations, and the interviews. A questionnaire guide was used in both cases. The analyses were strictly based on the original opinions and views of the respondents without any input from the researcher. The interviews, observations, and FGDs were all presented in the form of direct quotes and text as opined by respondents. Doing that guaranteed the thesis unbiased description of the social phenomenon being investigated. Largely, content analysis were used in the qualitative analysis. Content analysis basically is the process of deriving meaning from respondents or participants through an interview (Patton, 2002).

Interviews were structured based on themes to let findings reflect on the main objectives and provide simple analysis. The themes were compared and contrasted to the answers gotten from my respondents.

3.8 Conclusion

The section here presents an overview of the entire chapter. It presents the methodology employed in the study. It indicated that primary data were mainly gathered from interviews, observations and FGDs. The secondary data on the other hand were gotten from magazines, seminar papers, journals, books, newspapers and the internet and other research works.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter of the research accomplished the objectives of my study by the objective interpretation of the findings made through the observations, interviews, and discussions. In all, my study discovered the reasons for the violent attacks on some SIs, specifically NHIA and YEA, and why some SIs, specifically SIC and SSNIT, are immune from the violent attacks of PPVGs in NR.

Chronologically, it was done in themes to reflect the objectives of the study. As a quick reminder, the objectives of my study are: to explain the nature of political party vigilante groups and political vigilantism PPVGs in Northern Region; to identify the features of contemporary state institutions that have subjected them to violent attacks from political party vigilante groups and features that have immune pre-Fourth Republic state institutions from violent attacks by political party vigilante groups in Northern Region; to examine whether there are political, social, and economic causes of these violent attacks on the contemporary state institution by political party vigilante groups in Northern Region; and to outline some mechanism of stopping the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups on contemporary state institutions in Northern Region.

4.2 The Nature of PPVGs and PPV in Northern Region

The phenomenon of PPVGs and PPV has been early on extensively deliberated in the chapter two - literature review. Nevertheless, an appropriate understanding of PPV is considered crucial in order to investigate the dependability and appropriateness of the data collected. Thus, I sought the expert opinions and views of some scholars from the field of political science and civil society organisations that have written and spoken about PPV, both on radio and on TV.

Also, the researcher sought the opinions of the PPVGs or youth groups perpetrating the violence on the NHIA and YEA in NR.

Finally, I have also reviewed some literature pertaining to the phenomenon of PPVGs and PPV, its nature, causes, and how to avoid it in NR.

4.2.1 What are Political Party Vigilante Groups and Political Party Vigilantism?

The views of all the experts in Political Science and some professional views from civil society groups, that is, all 15 respondents, converged with the definition of Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974: 542) that PPV is "taking the law into one's own hands" by violently resorting to the use of brute force to guard one's interest or a group's interest". Similarly, Gyampo et al (2017:81) also describes PPV as "a form of social group controlled violence or activism, which serves the political interest of both an incumbent government and the opposition since both incumbent government and the opposition have their vigilante groups". Even though a particular respondent, MR004, disagreed with the PPV tag, he still considered the acts of PPVGs as aggressive political activism largely influenced by "project politics". He said:

"...they are behaving in an environment that is not consistent with law...because they are seizing state properties that they are not supposed to; they are chasing officers that were appointed by government through a legitimate means; they are going contrary to what is legal" (MR004. 25/5/19, 2019. Field Interview, Accra).

The assertion by MR004 buttresses a communiqué issued by CODEO on April 6, 2017 that presence and survival of PPVGs is unlawful, prohibited, and government should ban these groups straightway as a matter of security concern (CODEO, 2017). Also, a different male respondent (MR007), a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG) described the act of PPV as:

"...the behaviour of these groups can best be described as a complete thuggery; indiscipline; affront to the laws of the land; an aberration to the laws of the land; a situations that should have its perpetrators languishing in jail and cited the recently

Ayawaso West-Wagon by-election electoral violence as an example” (MRO07. 22 /5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

This generally confirms the position of Adigwe (2013) that PPV have led to ‘political thuggery’. Additionally, a male respondent, MR005 and MR006, in separate interviews, described PPV as criminal acts, which violates the laws of the land.

MR005 and MR004 agreeing with Bratton and van de Walle (1994) and Lindberg (2004) attributes this to the nature of politics done in Africa – neopatrimonialism and clientelism. Bob-Milliar (2012, 2014, 2018) explains that the notions of PPVGs or party activists in Ghana is that, they will work for you, but in return, you will reward them when you win power.

Clearly, deducing from the literature, expert views and opinions expressed above, PPV as seen in NR can be summed up as a situation where a group of young guys affiliated to PPs – NPP and NDC - take the laws into their own hands in the name of demanding what is their share of the spoils of power through violent attacks, seizures and sometimes destroy both state and private properties.

In respect of spoils theory, it tells us that the PPVGs, who are part of the coalition, will resort to violence and destruction for them to be heard if they come to terms with the actual spoils available and when their economic situation worsens (Van de Walle, 1994; and Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004).

4.2.2 What are the Characteristic of Political Party Vigilante Groups and Political party Vigilantism in Northern Region?

In addressing the characteristics of PPVGs, the researcher sought experts’ opinions, literature, and combined it with past observations made.

Alidu (2019b) reaffirming Alidu (2019a) broadly grouped the characteristics into four main categories. The four categories are: Causes; Strategies; Participants; and Effects. It must be

pointed out that other expert opinions sought, past observations made, and the literature is combined or fused into the categorisation outlined by Alidu (2019a, 2019b).

4.2.2.1 Causes of Political Party Vigilantism

All 15 respondents interviewed agreed with Alidu (2019), Bob-Milliar (2014), Inokoba and Maliki (2011), and Olaiya (2014) that social factors such as exclusion, deprivation, cleavages, marginalisation, high illiteracy rate, lack of sensitisation, low education, social exclusion, stigma, and lost in social norms and values among others to be some general characteristics of PPV on CSIs in NR. For instance, in an interview, MR005 aptly puts it:

“... high poverty rates and unemployment among the youth in the NR is a bigger challenge for all governments...some serious attention must be given to it if we are really serious in controlling violent activities of vigilante groups” (MR005. 14 /5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Also, MR003, agreeing with Olaiya (2014) and Inokoba and Maliki (2011) pointed out this in an interview in Tamale:

“... almost all those involved in PPV have low level of education whilst most of them cannot read and are also marginalised; they are poor” (MR003. 15 /2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Adding to the above point, CODEO (2017) concluded that the collapse of morals, civic values, high poverty rates, and illiteracy, are some of the characteristics observed as a causal factor in all the PPV in the country. This observation was also alluded to by another respondent, MR002, in an interview when he said:

“The lost in societal values, norms and control; where chiefs and youth group leaders used to have control in the form of whipping people into line when they went astray, to me, are the general causes of PPV in the NR ... your child is your child; your child is not my child as it used to be, so how do I correct your child?” (MR002. 13/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Additionally, in the discussions with all the six (6) PPVGs, one of the common responses that resonated in their responses was that they are being marginalised or forgotten as such their

violent acts against NHIA and YEA. A member in one of the groups, G001, had this to say in the discussion:

“look, we go to attack those places because our bosses do not give us contracts; and see, when we call them for explanation, they do not pick our calls; they do not come here to tell us anything about our side of the victory” (G001. 2/2,19. Field Interview, Tamale).

The above point espoused by the respondents affirms the assertions of Alidu (2019a), Paalo (2017), Adigwe (2013), Bob-Milliar (2014), Everatt (2000), and Olaiya (2014) that marginalisation of the youth after they have played an important role in the successes of the political process is one of the commonest causes of PPV, in this case, on NHIA and YEA in NR.

Aside the social factors attributable to the causes of PPV on CSIs by respondents, all 15 respondents also pointed to political factors, too, as triggers of PPV on CSIs in NR. In summary, the views of all 15 respondents and the literature alluded to sharing of the spoils of power as being the causes of PPV. For instance, MR005 stated categorically:

“... a factor to the PPV is the kind of political investment politicians make in Ghana which is in the form of spoils system or the winner-take-all system, that is, they put in their financial contributions; the expert advice; and strength, in return occupying positions and getting positions for their personal gains; not the public gain” (MR005. 14/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

This type of political investments, which prioritises individual gain as opposed to public gain, according to the Centre for African Democratic Affairs-CADA (2012), facilitates the patronage system. Regrettably, an observation indicates that this phenomenon has inundated politics being done in NR. This also explains why African leaders, irrespective of the type – democrats or non-democrats – are heavily depending on the patrimonial system of sharing personal gains or spoils to people in reverse for unconditional political support and legitimacy (Scott, 1972; Bratton and van de Walle, 1994).

Similarly in another response, MR004, points out:

“... both patrons and clients do not care about the general good and long term benefits to the people; rather their parochial interests... and that the patronage system we run is inconsistent with the way the West run their democracy – which prioritises public good as opposed to individual good” (MR004. 25/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

In this system, PP foot soldiers tend to exhibit an awkward behaviour which is at variance with the norms of democracy (Bob-Milliar, 2014; Gyimah-Boadi 2009). That is, they work for a party with the sole aim of being rewarded if the PP wins power (Bob-Milliar, 2012, 2014, 2018 and Gyampo et al, 2017).

This clearly depicts the logic of the “theory of the spoils system” that all the members in coalition, that is, in a PP, are in for their individual interests where they use politics as a conduit to appropriate economic benefits linked with power (Allen, 1995, 1999), instead of the larger interest of the nation. So when you win power, everybody scrambles for his share of the spoils, being it ministerial appointment, contracts or anything. Hence when there is a change of power, the logic of the foot soldier is to resort to all means, particularly when there is delay in getting their share, even if it involves violence, to get what they think is due them (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; Robinson and Verdier, 2013; Kusche, 2014).

Linked to the social and economic factors identified by all 15 respondents as causal factor to PPV in NR is the economic factor. In all the discussions held with PPVGs all 15 respondents but one agreed that economic factors such as high unemployment rates, high cost of living and standards of living etc, in NR were all attributable to PPV on NHIA and YEA. This assertion supports the earlier claims of Paalo (2017), Alidu (2019a & b), Adigwe (2013), Everatt (2000), Gyampo (2010, 2012), Bob-Milliar (2014), and Gyampo et al (2017) that the lack of employment for the youth coupled with the poor show of the economy are some of the causes of PPV as a whole. For instance, a respondent, MR13, interviewed, pointed out:

“The lack of viable employment opportunities in our part of the country allows the groups to be idle, hence waiting for any opportunity to get something. So political

opportunist easily influences them with little to cause mayhem to the advantage of the politician” (MR13. 22/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Contrastingly, another respondent, MR006, rejected the economic factor as a reason for PPV on NHIA and YEA in NR. MR006 disagreed based on evidence from a survey CDD-Ghana carried out in Ashanti and NR in 2018 which proves otherwise. Nevertheless, MR006 admitted economic factors could be factor based different parameters used elsewhere.

4.2.2.2 Strategies of Political Party Vigilante Groups

An overarching characteristic of PPVGs and PPV at the macro (globally) and micro (nationally) levels, and reflective of the situation in NR is the use of violence in its operations (Alidu, 2019a, 2019b; Olaiya; 2014; Adigwe, 2013; Bob-Milliar, 2014; Van Gyampo, 2010; and Paalo, 2019).

All sixteen (15) respondents interviewed and the discussions held with the PPVGs in NR concurred to this position. Modern Ghana (2009), Graphic Online (2017) Daily Guide (2017), Ultimatefm (2017) YEN.COM (2017), Ghanaian Chronicle (2017), and Myjoy online (2017a) are just a few instances of the use of violence by PPVGs since 2009 to 2018.

MR005 collaborating Alidu (2019a, 2019), Bob-Milliar (2014), Gyampo et al (2017) indicated:

“The use of violence to register people’s plight predate back to pre-independence, and interestingly, have most of the time yielded positive results for people as such, people still resorting to it... citing the recent case in Adenta and Madina, footbridge cases, where residence had to resort to violence before the government came to their rescue by building the footbridges” (MR005. 14/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Collaborating this in my interview with members of the PPVGs, a member in one of the groups, GOO1, had this to say in response to the question:

“...see senior, we do not have radio or TV station or we cannot write letters for the president to listen to us, but we can destroy the offices and beat up workers for the president to listen to us. That is our only surest bet to be heard...” (G001. 2/1/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Also, a member of G002 said this:

“Senior, our friends in the other party were sorted out when they attacked the offices, so we also have to do that because the party chairman, regional minister and the DCE are not paying attention to our plight despite several assurances from the Member of Parliament (MP) that we will soon be sorted out” (GOO2. 15/1/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Interestingly, all the other PPVGs provided similar answers given by the members of G001 and G002 members in my interactions with them on different occasions.

Clearly, the logic of “theory of the spoils system” explains this when it explains that when the situation becomes unbearable for youth who are marginalised or when they get proper information as to the actual spoils available (Dal Bot and Powell, 2008), they resort to violence as seen in NR where they violently attack NHIA and YEA (Van de Walle, 1994 and Jensen and Wantchekan, 2004).

From the data gathered, another strategy used by PPVGs is the seizure of both state and private assets (Alidu, 2019a, 2019b; Gyampo et al, 2017, Paalo, 2017). Graphic Online (2017), DailyGuide (2017), Ultimatefm (2017), YEN.COM (2017), and Citifmonline. Com (2017) are some few cases where PPVGs seized state properties.

Agreeing with Alidu (2019a, 2019b) and Gyampo et al (2017), and Paalo (2017), a respondent, MR004, indicated this in an interview:

“...because they are seizing state properties that they are supposed to... they are going contrary to what is legal” (MR004. 25/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Additionally, a respondent (MR007) asserted:

“...these boys resort to seizing of state properties as reward for their role in election...and the politicians secretly support them when they are apprehended by police, their ‘big men’, I mean the politicians, demand for their release...” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Confirming the observation, this is what a member of G004 said:

“...see Sadik, if we do not seize the motor bikes, we would not get anything in this government. But you know we struggled for this party in our opposition days “ (MR004. 25 /2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

The other strategy used by PPVGs the data revealed is the rationalist/strategic approaches (Alidu, 2019a, 2019b). In an interview, MR005 vividly indicated:

“The PPVGs choose their target very well. They choose institutions that they think they can fit in or get results immediately. These PPVGs are strategic in choosing the PPs they join. They do not join PPs like Convention People’s Party (CPP) and People’s National Convention (PNC) because they know the chances of these PPs coming to power is slim. So they invest their energy and muscle or strength, which is what they have to contribute, into a potential power winning PP like NPP or NDC” (MR005. 14 /5/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Reiterating this argument, MR007 in an interview said:

“A major characteristic of these groups are how timely, purposeful, and strategic they are at choosing their choices of targets; PPs; and when to strike in order to get good results. So people should not think they are dunderheads or they do not reason. They are very precise and focus, and that is why they get results” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Similarly, another respondent, MR008, pointed this in an interview:

“...the guys are very intelligent. They do not come here. They know they cannot work here. They know our work is extremely difficult and demanding. They know we do not do politics here; and they also know there is no known politician working here. So, they are very strategic...” (MR008. 19 /3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

The assertions were confirmed by members of the groups in the discussion when they admitted that they do not just pick any state institution or PP; rather they pick PP that can win election. They also target SIs where their executives have direct political influence and can influence some spoils for them. They also look at where their friends used to get direct benefits when their PP was in power, so they also go there to get it. Additionally, they choose PPs whose executives can help them when they are in trouble; who can financially support them even if they are in opposition.

4.2.2.3 Participants Political Party Vigilante Groups

All 15 respondents interviewed and of discussions held with PPVGs alluded to the fact that all participants from observation and participation engage in PPV on in NR are made up of male

youth age groups, an assertion also alluded to by Alidu (2019a, 2019b) and Inokoba and Maliki (2011).

For instance, Inokoba and Maliki (2011) points out that the greatest disturbing part of this PPV is that the leaders of tomorrow – youth - are not only the key actors in this, but the sufferers of these violence at the same time. It was therefore not surprising that CODEO (2017) specifically indicated that the leadership of NPP and NDC are accused of being responsible for the emergence and backing of these groups.

Confirming this, a response from a member in of the groups, G004, had this to say in responding to a question:

“We were told by one of our bosses that if we do not go to sack the mangers of YEA, then we would not get the chance to put you into any of the modules. So we went to YEA in order to sack the old workers, so that spaces will be created for us to be fixed...our friend in the other party did; we have to do it before we can get jobs” (G004. 25/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Additionally, Olaiya (2014:) points out the same case in Nigeria where only the male youth age groups are engaged in the religious and ethnic violence, a story collaborated by Adigwe (2013) when he asserted that the male youth groups are co-opted by politicians to unleash mayhem on their political opponents, under the pretext of providing security due to failure of state security to provide equal security for all.

Additionally, Adigwe (2013) added that they mostly have the support and blessing of faceless adults. To buttress the support they get from adults, MR007 pointed out that:

“...to know how they are backed by these adult politicians, how come the police cannot arrest them? Even in few instances where they are arrested, they are quickly released. And look, even though they are committing crimes, they boldly show their faces to grant TV interviews and threatened or even after they attack state institutions. Yet, they cannot be apprehended” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Furthermore, MR006 re-enforces this position when said:

“ These boys ride on big motor bikes, and when you asked them how they got or acquired it, they said it is being bought for them by either the District Chief Executive (DCE), this minister, that minister, or this big man in the party” (MR006, 17/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

All PPVGs in my discussion indicated they do get support from known party stalwarts in their operations, even though the support comes in different forms depending on the exigencies at a particular point in time. This supports the position of CODEO (2017) that the two leading parties, NPP and NDC, and their leaderships are explicitly responsible for the advent of these groups in the 4th Republic.

However, MR0013 in an interview disagreed with this assertion that PPs, especially they the NDC, does not support the activities of PPVGs, even when I prompted him of severally instances of NDC stalwarts bailing their known members in NR from observation whenever they were caught by the police in the act, he still said no.

4.2.2.4 Effects of Political Party Vigilante Groups Violent Attacks

To realise this I spoke to experts, civil society organisations, PP executives, staff of SIs under investigation, and the PPVGs.

The last of the characteristics of PPVGs listed by Alidu (2019a) is the effects of their actions on the state. He puts these effects into socio-political, but MR004, MR006, and MR007, added the economic dimensions in an interview when they indicated that a nation does not only lose its physical infrastructure, but its economic growth also slows down and sometimes prevent investors from coming to invest into such a country. A classic examples given were Cote d’voire and Liberia.

Showing the effects of PPVGs, MR004 had this to say in an interview:

“The involvement of these vigilante groups in the politics of Ghana in the long run will have dire consequences for the country. In early 1990s and to the later 1990s, violence acts of vigilante groups on SIs were not as rampant as it is today. And observe, year after year, more and more of such violent attacks are reported

everywhere, particularly in the political season...it is very worrying² (MR004, 25/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

In re-echoing this, Alidu (2019a, 2019b) re-affirms the positions of Bob-Milliar (2014), Alidu (2014), Gyampo et al (2017), Gyampo (2012), Adigwe (2013), Paalo (2017), Olaiya (2014), and Inokoba and Maliki (2011) pointed out the debilitating effects of youth involvement in violence in the state. Political instability, “vigilante capture,” “Warlordism” , lost in social control and values, diseases, social insecurity, “cultural violence”, “structural violence” “direct violence, among others, are disclosed by Alidu (2019a) as the effects of youth involvement in politics.

Also collaborating the assertion, a respondent said:

“ the actions of these vigilante groups if not checked will always see us going 2 steps forward, 3 steps backward. This is so because the state will take number of years in building an institution, but these guys will use one or two days to destroy it without thinking of the consequences to the state. Imagine them going to burn parliament or the electoral commission office...you can imagine how it will take us back as nation...it will be terrible” (MR13. 22/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

In re-affirming the position that incidence of ballot box theft, snatching, destroying of voting materials are not only against the tenets of democracy but a threat to peace and security to the state (Alidu, 2014; Bob-Milliar, 2014), a respondent said:

“See, these guys go to polling stations with guns and machetes and snatch away voting materials such inks, ballot boxes, and many other materials you can think of. This is not a threat and a danger to the elections, but a threat to our peace and stability” (MR007, 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

It is then unsurprising when CODEO (2017) and Paalo (2017) alerted that acts such as the seizure of public and private properties by PPVGs has the tendency of sparking conflicts.

The evidence here supports the pessimists’ school of thought that the involvement of youth in the politics of Africa, either directly or indirectly, has the potential of causing conflicts, chaos or destabilize the democratic gains in the continent. They argue that youth party activists

associated with both ruling and opposition parties play a destructive role in the political processes of the continent (Laakso, 2007).

4.2.3 Exclusive Views of Political Party Vigilante Groups on Political Party Violence

This section focuses on exclusive views of PPVGs on PPV on CSIs in NR, that is, their perception, understanding and reasons. This is necessary because they are the perpetrators of the violence, even though they have the secret support of faceless adults, their exclusive views devoid of other respondents will be important in understanding the nature of PPV on CSIs in NR, Ghana. Scholars, experts, persons working in SIs affected by the violent activities of PPVGs and those not affected might present totally different views and reasons to why the PPVGs perpetuate the violence on CSIs.

All members of PPVGs in the separate discussions considered the violent destruction of SIs as bad. A particular member in G005 said:

“In fact, destroying a state property is like destroying your own property because these institutions were built with taxes collected from all of us” (G005, 25/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Arguing for the same position, another member from G004 said:

“I am a Moslem, so I know it as “unislamic”, “inhuman” to go round destroying things that do not belong to you. “Only people who take drugs and alcohol will engage in such evil acts” (G004, 25/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Some members although they condemned the violent attacks, they in a way rationalised it by describing it as “necessary-evil”. To them, interestingly the educated literate ones among them or those considered by the group members as intelligent, intimated that if the conventional way of getting your due in a struggle you contributed immensely to is not showing results, you resort to the unconventional method, if that will yield the positive results. According to them, this method overtime has proven to be effective, hence the continuation, supporting the

arguments of Alidu (2019a) that the violent acts in Ghana as a way of getting your grievances addressed has since independence been proven to be effective.

Per the explanation given to PPV on CSIs by the so-called intelligent ones, that is, PPV is a violent practice unleashed on SIs caused by political leaders, it is clear their definition of PPV on CSIs differs from others in a sense that they have blamed the causes of it on the politician. The cause, according to them is advertent – where the political leaders instructs or induce the youth with monies or promise to go and violently attack a particular SI or persons in it or where they neglect, forget, or marginalised them after power. This claim also supports the earlier position of MR0013, who stated that:

“I believed those youth who attacked the offices of NHIA in Tamale Metro were caused by people who wanted to occupy the position of managers and other senior offices” (MR0013. 22/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

4.2.3.1 Exclusive Views of Political Party Vigilante Groups on How to Stop Political Party Vigilantism

Like the previous section, this section also presents the exclusive views of PPVGs on how to avoid/stop PPV from violently attacking CSIs. Other respondents' views will come in the later sections. Again, this is necessary because they are the perpetrators of the violence and as such, can best prescribe an anti-dote to the cancer.

To start with, all members of PPVGs have suggested that political leaders who are fortunate to have gotten positions and contracts should continue to engage they the PPVGs, even if things are not turning out the way it should, a position MR007 and MR005 earlier stated that these vigilante need constant engagement irrespective of the prevailing conditions. This according to the PPVGs, gives them assurance that the leaders are still aware of them, and that they will remember them if things changed positively.

Also, they advised politicians to tone down their promises and campaign messages during campaigns. To them, campaign promises made to them to give out all their best, but in return,

they are always disappointed. So, in moving forward, they indicated that politicians should watch what they say in their quest to get power. A respondent in an interview stated:

“These politicians should not raise our hopes. They should tell us the truth so that we will not be expecting much from them when we win power. They come and tell us all good things, but they always disappoint us when we win power” (G006, 7/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

These suggestions supports the comments of MR006, MR007, MR005, and MR008 in an interview that politicians seeking to win election and govern should take into cognisance the time, resources and other challenges they may face when they win power, so they should be circumspect by watching what they say on campaign platform.

Additionally, PPVGs generally appealed to politicians not to be greedy. Politicians should try to share the little they get with people who equally contributed towards the success of the party. They said that politicians should not concentrate the spoils of power to themselves, their kinsmen, and friends. Buttressing this point, a member of G005 said this in an interview:

“Our leaders, the MP, DCE, and the party executives should be impartial in the allocations of benefits that come with power so as to reassure we members of vigilante groups that our share is on its way” (Interview. G005, 25/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Furthermore, they asserted that people should stop stigmatising them. People view them with negative perception. According to them, people including the politicians think they cannot do any meaningful job apart fighting and engaging in violence. This affects them psychologically, so some of their members due to this stigma cannot go and ask for jobs. People should begin to see them as normal people who are just trying to make ends meet, the same opinion echoed by a member of G002 when he said:

“Politicians and the Ghanaian public as a whole should change their perception toward PPVGs. Ghanaians should see us as normal human beings looking for an opportunity” (G002, 15/1/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Lastly, in agreeing with Paolo (2017), Alidu (2019a, 2019b), the members of PPVGs also pleaded with politicians to create sustainable jobs and other social intervention programs that can accommodate some of their members who are not engaged in any trade or profession.

4.3 Features of Contemporary State Institutions and Pre-Fourth Republic State Institutions

Even though the features and origin of these institutions has been extensively highlighted in my Chapter two (literature review), it is still proper to understand them properly in order to investigate the reliability of my data collected. Hence, the views of some experts in academia, senior staff working at these institutions, executives of PPs, PPVGs, and some members from some civil society groups that have been doing some works in relation to the phenomenon of PPV.

4.3.1 Features of Contemporary State Institutions Subjecting them to Violent Attacks

A key objective of my study is to ascertain, empirically, the combustible factors attracting PPVGs into violently attacking the NHIA and YEA. Whilst some respondents converged at some points, they sometimes diverged in some instances as well.

From the empirical data gathered, first, it was realised from all twelve (12) respondents interviewed and that of the PPVGs that Chiefs Executive Officers (CEO), managers, Management and Information Service (MIS) officers, accountants, Public Relations Officers (P.R.Os) of these institutions were almost made of either known political activists such as executives of constituencies or regionals or former executives of PPs. For instance, a respondent – MROO4 pointed out:

“Such positions are used to console and compensate people who could not win their parliamentary seats or who lost out in DCE positions contest as such most of these staff there does not comply with the ethics or code of conducts of their institutions. They still go on radio, TV, and mount party platforms to campaign. So a change in power exposed not only them, but the entire institution to violent attacks by PPVGs” (MROO4. 14/5/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

A critical look at this in NR typifies it as there are a number of such examples in some SIs, particularly CSIs. Stressing on this, a respondent said:

“Pronouncement by staff, mostly the heads, subjects these institutions into violent attacks, especially if there is a change of power. E.g. some of them still mount political platforms and go to radio to speak for political parties which infuriates these youth groups” (MR003, 15th February, 2019, Tamale).

Hammering on the point, another respondent - MR13 – pointed out this in an interview:

“There are known politicians who are still active working in these institutions. I am an example. This makes us vulnerable to violent attacks because, the interest of these PPVGs is just to get people not in their party out of these offices” (MR0013, 22/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Asked whether he was willing to change if that will stop the violent attacks, he was adamant...not responding. A situation I considered very bleak for the country.

In an interview, MR004 referred to these staff as ‘political exposed’ people.

Collaborating MR004’s assertion, this was what some members of GOO1 and G005 said in an interview:

GOO1 member:

“Workers like ‘RC’ (name withheld) and ‘S’ (name withheld) were making noise on radio when their party was not in power, so we needed to go and kick them out of the offices for them to know we have not forgotten of their insults on us” (G002, 2/1/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

A different, MR005, said this in an interview:

“...FG (name withheld) used to rain insults on us a lot...he spoke without reasoning. He insulted both parents and us; just because we belong to a different PP. So it was now payback time...we went there to kick him out” (MR005, 25/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

The response from MR0011, in an interview, buttresses the remarks of MR005 because he said:

“Staff of these institutions whilst their party was in power, openly hurled and heaped insults on the then opposition party and their candidates, so it is seen as payback time”(MROO1, 7/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Another feature that got all twelve (12) respondents and PPVGs unanimous approval was the assertion that people or youth who got enrolled into the modules like Youth in Security Services, Youth in Eco-Brigade, among others, were purely one - sided or were based on party affiliation, even if you have certificate. That is, before you could be picked into any of the modules, if NPP is in power, then you have to belong to NPP before you are selected. The convex situation is the same for NDC.

For instance, a respondent – MR0015 - said:

“Who gets employed, particularly the youth, into any of our models, is covertly dictated to us by the ruling party executives” (MR0015. 15 /2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Inextricably linked to the above point and also got approval from all twelve (12) respondents including the PPVGs is the fact that recruitments into these institutions are based on political party affiliation rather than merits, so change in power sends signals to these vigilante groups to come and occupy the offices. Recruitment here refers to where permanent staff are picked. So a change in power will be viewed by its uneducated youth as an avenue to get jobs, either forcefully or not.

A respondent – MR002 – asserted:

“The offices of these institutions are occupied by cronies of politicians or politicians themselves irrespective of their certificates. They are picked as permanent workers, so they take these institutions like their own since their recruitment as permanent staff were based on their political coloration” (MR002. 13 /4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Another respondent – MR009 - also added:

“Strict procedure is not followed in recruiting staff into these institutions, and the staff recruited are most of the time purely politicians; not technocrats” (MRO09. 19/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

MR005 and MR004 explaining this further in a separate interactions, indicated that mode of appointments which are based on partisan considerations; rather than merits are as a result of

the system of politics we run in Ghana and Africa as a whole – patrimonial system, which is based on patron-client relation; loyalty; identity politics or ethnicity, religion, race, language, and so on. Similarly, both respondents – MR004 and MR005 - agreed with the arguments of MR006 when he said that recruitment at YEA for instance are not competitively contested for, relative to SIC and SSNIT, because the only assurance and ticket to get yourself at this institution is your party card and activism; as opposed to ideal form – meritocracy.

Again, issues of weak law(s) establishing these institutions were discovered. All twelve (12) respondents interviewed agreed with this observation. This, according to them, allowed some initial and even later staff that were recruited into these institutions without proper qualification, hence it gave a wrong interpretation to these PPVGs that they could equally work there even without certificates. For instance, MR002 said:

“Weak laws established these institutions at their initial state. Until they started transferring and sacking staff haphazardly in these institutions and the media started talking about, people with even elementary certificate believe they could work or even head these institution because they were party members” (MR002. 13 /4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

In another interview, MR0012 also indicated:

“Weak laws establishing these institutions have allowed governments that came to power to discriminately fire employees without explanation” (MR0012. 17 /4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Throwing more light on this, MR006 explained that the background to the establishment of these institutions, particularly YEA, is the foundation of this specific problem. He intimated:

“it was established to respond to political agenda; it was strictly established on whims and caprices of politicians; it did not have a national or consensus agreement from other stake-holders like the opposition parties” (MROO6. 17/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Even though respondents agreed on most of the responses espoused, particularly those above, they also disagreed on a couple of views expressed by some respondents.

For instance, MR001 and MR0015 in separate interviews all intimated that a feature that attracts these PPVGs into attacking NHIA and YEA in NR is the fact that those institutions are not self-sufficient. They depend on government for their survival and operations; they cannot do anything unless the central government supports them financially. However, some of the respondents disagreed.

For instance, MR0013 indicated:

“From my experience, they have enough money. People pay premium in registering; pay for renewals; and lastly, every Ghanaian who goes to buy items in the market irrespective of how small it is, pays a percentage of tax of which the government subsequently releases to NHIA. However, we used to sometimes, if not most of the times, have financial problems in paying their service providers not because they do not have money but because the government delays in releasing these funds to us” (MR0013. 22/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Also, MR006 and MR007 opined that University of Ghana, Ghana Commercial Bank, among others, is all dependent on government, yet they are not violently attacked.

Again, MR004 indicated:

“Hey, these groups do not care whether institutions are self-sufficient or not; they do not care where the money is coming from; in any case, they are even ignorant of those things. All what they care about is, it was established as a reward for our contribution into the victory of their PPs” (MR004. 25/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Also, a feature some disagreed with was the fact that the inclusion of those policies into the manifesto of the PP that introduced it – NPP – made them to become subjects of political campaign; they touted themselves by citing it as some of their achievements; whilst others bragged of improving upon it. For instance, MR0015 asserted:

“...the inclusion of NHIA into the manifesto of the political party that introduced it could have somewhat allowed the vigilante groups, who are mostly ignorant as to the operation of state institutions, to give a wrong interpretation as to ownership of it ...” (MR0015. 15/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale)

However, almost every respondent afterwards disagreed. MR007 said that in any advance democracy, policies of PPs are put into their manifestos for the electorates to read and

differentiate, yet it has not resulted into any violent attacks on any SI. He added though, that majority of Ghanaians do not read manifestoes before making their choices. Besides, almost all developmental projects implemented by government in this country can be traced into their respective PPs manifestos, but they have not been attacked.

In addition, MR0012 identified lack of stability of youth recruited into the modules of these institutions programs. To him:

“Because there was no stability and security of tenure of office for these employees, a change in power quickly sends messages to these PPVGs that it is their term to go and occupy these offices. But if there is security of tenure of office, PPVGs know they cannot sack the staff or push their superiors to sack them” (MR0012. 17/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

However, some respondents disagreed, specifically MR004, MR006, MR007, and MR002. For instance, MR006, MR007, and MR007 in a separate interview all alluded to the fact that the PPVGs do not care about security of tenure of office; they do not care whether governments puts money in there or not, they will still go and attack these institutions.

Finally, another feature was the fact that these institutions are not unionised. MR008 said that these institutions do not belong to professional Trade Union Congresses (TUC). Hence, they are perceived as ordinary institutions by PPVGs.

But MR007 and MR006 again disagreed and said that these PPVGs do not care whether these institutions are unionised or not; all that they care about is where their interest will be met.

4.3.2 Features of pre-Fourth Republic State Institutions Preventing them from Violent Attacks

To empirically ascertain why some particular SIs, in this case SIC and SSNIT, are excused from the violent attacks of PPVGs in NR, data was obtained by using past observations, interviews, and FGDs in the field.

To achieve this, the researcher sought the views of experts, staff from these institutions, party executives, and PPVGs.

First, an incontrovertible feature accepted by all respondents is the fact that recruitments, appointments, promotions and anything that deals with engaging the services of people into these institutions are based on efforts, merits, as opposed to political coloration. Party executives have little or no influence as to who becomes the manager, accountants or recruited.

Arguing for this, MR007 intimated:

“These institutions have a standardised bureaucracy which has evolved over a period of time, so you cannot just use one day to change things in these institutions. These institutions are excused from violent attacks because they have well-structured and standardised rules of operations that have stood the test of time” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Linked to the above feature is the fact that known or active party executives like constituency or regional executives are not appointed to head these institutions relative to the NHIA and YEA. That is, managers, accountants, and other senior officers are not picked from PPs and made to head these institutions relative to CSIs. In the words of MR0015 in support of this point, he said:

“Heads and senior staff in these institutions excused from violent attacks of PPVGs are not known politicians and do not do partisan politics; they are purely professionals who do not do politics, even in their private life” (MR0015. 15/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Additionally, some members of the PPVGs responses reinforce this point. For instance, a member each from both G006 and G005A had this to say:

G005 member:

“...we did not attack them because we do not know the heads... he is not a politician. I do not see any of their workers going on radio to talk for his or her party. The entire workers are totally strangers to me” (G005. 25/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale);

G006 member:

“... I am told the heads of that institution has been there for long and that they do not do partisan politics” (G006, 7/5/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Even though this point and the previous one are almost the same, it differs from the above in a sense that the emphasis of respondents were directed at C.E.Os and other top management staff including board of directors; whilst the previous concentration includes the ordinary clerical workers.

Another feature which all respondents agreed to is that these institutions were not established by either NDC or NPP, whose subjects have become hostile towards one another. In support this, MR008 said:

“...these are not known to be a direct creation by the PPs competing in the Fourth Republic; hence it does not become a subject of political jargon or campaign platforms...” (MR008. 19/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Explaining this further, MR007 said that the PPs fighting over these unnecessary things have had tenures being properly served by these institutions, even when they were not leaders. It served their fathers, served them; hence none of them can use it to take credit as its achievement in order to get votes.

There were however some views opined by respondents but were rejected by some members. For instance, MR009 and MR0010 asserted in separate interactions that these institutions are self-sufficient in their operations so government cannot easily manipulate them. To them, the manipulations normally allow government to appoint its cronies who are not qualified to head them.

However, MR004, MR005, MR007, and MR006 disagreed. For instance, MR007 said this in an interview:

“That government is still the majority holder in these institution, so can still manipulate them in any way. Also, government still appoint managers and board members into these institutions...so it cannot be the reason for PPVGs not attacking SIs” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Additionally, a feature observed by MR005 is the ownership of these institutions. To him, these institutions are jointly owned by both the government and individuals or groups. As such, there is much attention on it by the other partners or owners to ensure the right thing is done. Right thing such as ensuring the right legislations are put in place to guide their operation; their code of conduct is strictly observed; the right people are recruited; allowing little or no manipulations by government for political reasons, among others. For instance, MR009 said this in an interview:

“These PPVGs believe these institutions are owned by the labourers; not government hence are scared to attack them because they know their demands are not going to be met since the government does not have final control or say” (MR009. 19/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

However, others disagreed. For instance, MR006 and MR005 all indicated that PPVGs do not care about who owns it, but where government has a share and where their interest can be met.

Another contestable feature is an observation made by MR008 that institutions not affected by PPV are unionised; they are under a recognised union like TUC. These TUC leaders at the national level fight for them and their interest. This deters PPVGs and government from interfering and manipulation. In support of this view, MR009 asserted:

“In terms of crises, their national executives intercede and sometimes even fight the government just to protect members. You cannot transfer or sack a worker without him or her committing a crime or going against the code of conducts of their organisations” (MROO9. 19/3/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

However, MR006 and MR007 disagreed, and insist that PPVGs members do not care about TUC. All they care about is where to hit and get results.

Finally, MR0013 also suggested as a feature that those interested in taking up positions in these institutions are not many. To him, unlike NHIA and YEA, which have offices in all districts and where a lot of people want to work, so incite the youth to go and attack; that of SSNIT and SIC are non-existent in all districts of the country.

But Again, MR004, MR006, and MR007 disagree because according to them, SIC and SSNIT are more profitable, more established, have more person and history, and give more incentives than both YEA and NHIA combined. So it cannot be true that people are not interested in SSNIT and SIC.

4.4 Social, Political and Economic Causes of Violent Attacks on Contemporary State Institutions

In line with achieving my third objective of ascertaining whether there are some social, political and economic background to the violent attacks on NHIA and YEA, I sought the views of experts, members of some civil society groups, PP executives, and members of the PPVGs in NR, and the staff of institutions under investigation.

I also used interviews, FGDs, and past observations.

All fifteen (15) respondents and PPVGs unanimously agreed that there are social, economic, and social causes of PPV, aside the features of NHIA and YEA.

4.4.1 Political Causes

Apart from the response from MR004 which will form the first part of this section, and which also presents a totally different angle from all responses, largely, I will use a format used by MR005, re-enforcing Alidu (2019b & b), in responding to this aspect. All other response elicited from other experts and non-experts but were used as respondents due to their connection to the topic, generally falls in this classification. It must be noted that even though some of the responses were not said by him but others, they still fall under the classification.

To start with, MR005's view is in sharp contrast to the views largely expressed by my previous respondents, even though there are converging points with them when it comes to economic and social views. To him, the better way to understanding why PPVGs violently attacks NHIA and YEA in NR is not by linking it to what the media churns out day-in-day-out, but to linking

it to the literature and facts available on the ground. And the literature according to him is linked to what is called “project politics”. Project politics according to him is where people who have the opportunity to rule, create projects that are linked to its supporters or party activists; instead of projects that are sustainable and can benefit the public.

Linking it to the Ghanaian context, the establishment of these newly SIs were viewed by its party activists as projects established for them as a patronage, an assertion also made by Bob-Milliar (2014, 2018). Because party activists “display a poster, donate money, help with fund-raising, deliver election leaflets, help at a party function, attend party meetings, undertake door-to-door campaigning...” (Bob-Milliar, 2019: 1), they also see the newly established institutions as patronage incentives or reward for supporting their PPs. This meanwhile he said, is inconsistent with the dominant idea of democracy in the West, where a party is supposed to provide a public; as opposed to an individual or private goods. But he blamed this on the way Ghanaian political leaders have run politics since 1992, where leaders have made party activists understand that their activism is for reward. He describes what is happening in Ghana as aggressive political activism covertly supported by the political leaders for their selfish interest. And this is illegal according to him.

In another remark, he says that his interaction with both PPVGs and the MPs confirms a kind of secrete Social Contracts signed between political leaders like MPs and party executives and PPVGs, where the PPVGs are promised rewards, in return they must work hard for their PPs. Hence, a change in power means they must also assume a full control of those institutions as reward for their efforts...that is the logic!

This assertion agrees with assertion of a member of G004, who intimated earlier:

“Our friends used to work in those institutions so that is why we are also trying to take over them in order to work there. We go there because that is our share of power” (G004. 25/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

The arrangement of this second section is influenced by MR005. In my interview with MR005, he largely divided the causes of this phenomenon into two, reinforcing the earlier positions of Alidu (2019a & b). The two are: Immediate/trigger events and root/remote events.

4.4.1.1 Immediate/Trigger Causes

In an interview with MR005, he said, this comes about as a result of political transitions, an assertion also observed by MR006 and MR007 in separate interviews. The transitions according to him are two: inter transition and intra transition. The intra transitions are where the same PP is handing over to itself. Examples are NDC handing over to NDC in 1996; NPP to NPP in 2004; and NDC to NDC IN 2012. These transitions according to MR005 does not bring about PPVGs' violence on CSIs, as evidence in Ghana in the years 1996, 2004, and 2012 shows. However, the inter transitions are where PP 'A' is handing over to PP 'B', say, NDC to NPP and the vice versa. Examples are in 2010; 2009; and 2017. This according to him is what results into PPV on CSIs or PPVGs' violence on CSIs as seen in NR in years of 2001, 2009, and 2017.

Relating it to the “theory of the spoils system” in Ghana, the coalition is made up of foot soldiers, the women's wing, the intellectuals, the elderly, etc., that comes together to form say NPP and NDC. The spoils include among other things and in this case the CSIs attacked by party foot soldiers and those spared. The winners are the parties that have won power, in this case again; it is either NPP or NDC in Ghana.

The ministers, the chief executive officers (CEOs) of SIs, ambassadors, district chief executives, board members of SIs, etc., are the privileged part of the coalition making up the government. That is, they are with appointments. And because of their positions, they have better and current information about the actual spoils available (Van de Walle 1994; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). As such, they use it to unfairly appropriate the economic spoils

available in their administrative offices as noted by Allen (1995) and (1999) to themselves, family members, and acquaintances.

Appointments to these state offices are given to friends, acquaintances, and family members. The same thing applies to government contracts, whilst ignoring the foot soldiers who arguably equally contributed to the success of the party.

It must however be noted that few privileged always try to buy the foot soldiers with some little appointments by recruiting them as national security operatives etc., giving them contracts that do not commensurate with their actual contribution to the success of the party.

PPVGs are the other part of the coalition, hence also believes in the logic of “theory of the spoils system”. That is, “to the winner go the spoil”. Because they have been in opposition for a while, their conditions of living and economic lives are bad or worse-off, comparative to those still occupying these institutions. And because they also know that their only share of the spoils are these newly institutions which are allegedly established for them as reward for their support and knowing that friends from the other party used to work in these institutions, they forcibly attack these institution, violently, to take over them.

This supports the arguments of Van de Walle (1994) and Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) that a member of coalitions, particularly the youth, will resort to violence if their economic lives declines or becomes unbearable for them to bear

Beneath this first cause are the root and remote causes, according to MR005, a position also observed in Alidu (2019a&b), and an opinion associated with by all respondents interviewed.

4.4.1.2 Root Causes

These root events according to MR005 are the events that have conditioned and shaped the social, political and economic behaviours of Ghanaians over time. To him, resources in Ghana

are scarce just like everywhere, but our problems or challenges are numerous. When a group complains of a problem, the government usually develops lukewarm attitude in responding to them or sometimes even ignores them, especially if it is not in what the government calls its “plans”. If the plight of the people or complainants becomes unbearable or worsens, the people will resort to violence by destroying either state or individual properties. When this happens, the government quickly comes to their aide. He cited both social and political incidents dating back to pre-independence to date. Examples of the pre-independence included the following: 1948 riots; Togoland Youth Conference; the Ga Shifimokpee; the Anlo Youth Association; the National Liberation Movement; etcetera. The post-independence and recent events also include: Four successful and several aborted coups; violent bye/national level elections; KNUST incident; Adenta-Madina Highway incident; Police brutalities; and Mob-justice; etcetera (MR005, 14/5/2019. Field Interview, Tamale).

4.4.1.3 Remote Triggers

All 15 respondents interviewed agreed to remote triggers of PPV on NHIA and YEA in NR, which are largely political, social, and economic, but in the case of economic triggers, MR006 disagreed with reason based on research carried out by CDD-Ghana in Ashanti region and NR in the year 2018.

Generally on the political causes, I describe these causes of PPV on NHIA and YEA in NR as those attributable to the style and nature of politics being run in Ghana – the patrimonial or system or clientelism neopatrimonial system (van de Walle, 1994).

According to MR005 and MR004, the type of political investment Ghanaians do is what is to be blamed largely for this PPV by PPVGs on NHAI and YEA. Intellectuals, businessmen, women, youth and different categories of people come together to contribute into a PP with the

sole aim of winning power and sharing the goodies to themselves as opposed to doing something for everyone to benefit. MR005 describes it as the winner-take-all system.

Re-echoing this, MR004 intimated:

“Party or politics is supposed to provide public goods; not individual goods. But in the Ghanaian system of politics, because of the way we have crafted our politics since 1992 to date, party activism attached their activism for a reward” (MR004. 25/5/2019. Field Interview, Accra).

The above assertion is also observed by Bob-Milliar (2019; 2018; Adigwe, 2013; Paolo, 2017) that when I work for a party to be elected into office, in return, the party must reward me. They see these things as patronage logic, where contracts and other positions are rewarded to other coalition members who equally contributed to the success of PP.

This clearly supports earlier studies of politics in Africa that were conceptualised to be "clientelism," "neo-patrimonialism," "personalism," "prebendalism," and "rentier state" (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994; Lindberg, 2004: 4). Indeed, clientelism energises the actions of PPVGs because when ones patron wins power, PPVGs think they are all automatically entitled to the spoils such as contracts and jobs that comes with power (Gyampo et al, 2017).

The “theory of the spoils system” explaining this further indicates that ministers, the chief executive officers (CEOs) of SIs, in this case NHIA and YEA, ambassadors, district chief executives, board members of SIs, etc., are the privileged part of the coalition who all got those privileges because of their loyalty and contribution into the success of that PP; but not necessarily on merits (Dal Bot and Powell, 2008). As such, they use it to unfairly appropriate the economic spoils available in their administrative offices as noted by Allen (1995) and (1999) to themselves, family members, and acquaintances.

Also, appointments to these state offices are given to friends, acquaintances, and family members. The same logic applies here where foot soldiers who equally contributed to the

success of the party are ignored, even though the political leaders try to buy the leaders of foot soldiers with some little appointments by recruiting them as national security operatives and contracts but it normally fails (Dal Bot and Powell, 2008), hence leading to violence.

Linked to the above point is observation made by MR004, MR005, MR007, and of which all other respondents concerted to, is the patrimonial or neopatrimonial system of governance in Ghana (van de Walle, 1994) of politics in Ghana, where there is virtually no line between the private life and property of the leader or the ruler and that of public or state life and property (Dal Bot and Powell, 2008). And according to Gyampo et al (2017), politicians with power ignore or prioritise individual interest or benefits to that of public interest or benefits

In an interview with MR007, he points out:

“This is why positions, appointments and all kind of benefits that comes with power are selectively given, and it is given to people considered loyal; considered as tribe mates, religious mates, language and racial mates, etc., instead of competence and the fact that all are Ghanaians” (MR007. 22/5/2019. Field Interview, Accra).

Furthermore, MR006 also espoused this in an interview:

“Because of attractiveness of politics, people go into it, within a year, they have plenty money; they build houses; buy cars, etc. Manifestation is even seen where these vigilante groups ride big motor bikes bought by the politicians...and some of these vigilante guys even build houses and buy cars within a tinkle of an eye” (MR006. 17/5/2019. Field Interview, Tamale).

Another point which all fifteen (15) respondents interviewed made was the high expectations on the part of the groups based on sweet promises that were given to them during campaign. This, according to the respondents, serves as a motivation for encouraging PPVGs into engaging in political participation activism, an assertion also observed in (Bob-Milliar, 2018).

Stressing on this, MR007 indicated this in an interview:

“Sweet promises made by politicians during campaign are used as political ruse, but it too dangerous and failure to fulfil them when you come to power makes it difficult to explain because you spoke and promised them with ease” (MR007. 22/5/2019. Field Interview, Accra).

Similarly, a member of G001, pointed out:

“We went there because of the unfulfilled campaign promises made to us by our MP and the current manager of YEA, when he was the regional secretary” (MR001. 2/1/2019, Field Interview).

In all, there was consensus by all respondents that political factor, if not the main, is one of the leading factors of the causes of PPV on CSIs in the NR.

4.4.2 Economic Causes

All fifteen (15) respondents but one agreed with the fact that part of the reasons for the increase in PPV on NHIA and YEA in NR is the economic factor. The only person who disagreed to this point is MR006. His disagreement is supported by a research conducted by CDD-Ghana. The research according to him revealed that almost 80 - 85% of respondents (groups) spoken to in Kumasi and Tamale were all employed. Some of the members spoken to, are even masters' holders, whilst some own their shops and owners of apprentice and skills jobs like mason, carpenters, welders etc. The only employment a member of these seeks to achieve, according to MR006, is to work in the National Security. But MR004 disagreed with this by saying there are always exception in every phenomenon, and cited the case of guys he has been monitoring in the political sheds of Tamale, where one or a couple of guys are always on their own but always want improvements based on success stories of one or two members.

Economic factors such as high unemployment, lack of job opportunities, high cost of living, and so on, according to all the respondents but MR006, are a domineering factor in causing PPV on NHIA and YEA in NR.

For instance, G004 said:

“Mr, we would not be sitting idle and engaging vigilantism if we were all employed. Daybreak, we do nothing; we eat and sleep. So, if we are to go and provide security in rally grounds or polling stations and earn some money, why do you think we will not accept? We will, provided we will get our money” (G004. 25 /2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Similarly, another member of PPVG, but this around G002 member, had this to say:

“I am unable to eat three times daily; when I am sick, I will not be able to buy drugs that will be prescribed for me. I cannot because things are hard of me” (G002. 15 /2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

It is there unsurprising that CODEO (2019) pointed out of how the high rate of unemployment among the youth in Ghana is primary cause of PPVGs formation. Already, earlier works of Gyampo et al (2017), Paalo (2017) Bob-Milliar (2014, 2017, 2018, and 2019), Van Gyampo (2012), Adigwe (2013), Everatt (2000), and Alidu, (2019a & b) have all stated that part of the reason for the increase in PPV is high unemployment among the youth.

4.4.3 Social Causes

Composite to the economic and political factors is the social factor, of which all fifteen respondents and PPVGs concurred to. All respondents agreed that social factors such as high level of illiteracy, poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, stigmatising the youth groups as unfit to take up responsibility of leadership or as recalcitrant, marginalisation or being neglected; forgotten, poor education or low level of education, exclusion, among others, are a major factor in PPV on CSIs in NR.

For instance, MR0013 argued that because these guys (PPVGs) have no monies, greedy politicians easily buy their conscience with just small amount of monies into causing violence on CSIs.

Stressing on this MR007 pointed out this in an interview:

“Look, these are guys who hardly make hundred Ghana Cedis a week, and for them to be five hundred Ghana Cedis to go sack or beat up people...what do you expect them to do?” (MR007. 22/5/2019. Field Interview, Accra)

MR006 argued that poor education or low level of education on the part of these PPVGs allows them to be misinformed by selfish politicians into causing troubles. From the mouth of a member of G006, he said:

“We were told to go and attack YEA or else they will not get us jobs. Being unemployed for some time now, and knowing they are bosses, we also heeded to their advice” (G006. 7/5/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Confirming this, Salam, said he believes he was beaten in his days as a manager of NHIA in Tamale Metro because people who wanted to come and take his job misinformed the PPVG.

Also, supporting the assertions of Everatt (2000), Paolo (2017) Adigwe (2013), Alidu (2019), and Olaiya (2014) that the involvements of the youth in the political successes has received a less commensurate rate in governance decisions and participation, MR007 said:

“Marginalisation appears to be the driving force behind these PPVGs, because most times, they complain that they have not been settled with anything or job. And for the PPVGs to reassert their importance and to also remind the ruling class that they have been forgotten, they resort to violence by violently attacking SIs” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

In the words of the PPVGs themselves in a discussion, a member of G003 said:

“We are being neglected. We no longer see the big men we suffered with. The party executives do not come here again. We do not get to meet them to discuss our problems” (G003. 14/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale)

Another respondent from G004 said:

“The big men are liars. See, they only know their friends, family and children after power, and only they enjoy. That was why we attacked our MP’s car” (MR004. 25/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Furthermore, a major social factor contributing to PPV in NR and accepted by all respondents was lost in social control and values. In reference to this, (CODEO, 2017) indicated that the collapse of patriotism, norms, civic values, and morals, which is manifested in the reluctance and silence of imams, chiefs, pastors, etc, in advising the youth on morals that use to keep the society in order, is one of the major causes of PPV by PPVGs in the country.

Buttressing this, MR001 added:

“Our chiefs and youth could have easily stem this if they were still active in exercising those powers that they used to. But see, today they are keeping; they do not care...and that is the problem. This informal mechanism that were used to

maintain social order, has collapsed, thereby allowing the youth to go astray” (MR001. 13/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

4.5 Mechanisms of Stopping the Violent Attacks of PPVGS on Contemporary State Institutions

This section of my research work presents views gathered from various perspectives on how to curtail the menace of PPV on CSIs, specifically on NHIA and YEA in NR, which is not only threatening the stability, but also the entire peace and stability of the country. Just as the causes of PPV were structured into sections –social, economic, and political – the various perspectives on how to stem the tide of this phenomenon will also be presented into sections.

4.5.1 Mechanisms of Stopping Violence Attacks Caused by Features of Contemporary State Institutions

The main objective of this work is to ascertain the features of CSIs, that is, NHIA and YEA, that attracts PPVGs into violently attacking them and to subsequently unearth mechanism of stopping the violent attacks. Fortunately, months of field work has unveiled some steps that can be taken as a panacea to the violent attacks.

An important step towards stopping the attacks on NHIA and YEA which had the approval of all 15 respondents and PPVGs is taking another look at the laws establishing these institutions and consequently crafting robust laws to establish new SIs in the future. In arguing for this, MR0012 asserted in separate interview:

“The arbitrary transfer and dismissal of people in these CSIs all boils down to weak laws that were used to recruit the staff. The laws were not rigid, so it allowed recruitment to be manipulated by politicians to favour their cronies” (NR0012. 17/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

In emphasising this, another respondent, MR007, indicated:

“Strong laws will perhaps, whittle down the innate and unquenched desires of political leader to manipulate and use these institutions to score a cheap political advantage by either transferring or firing people and replacing them with their stooges or functionaries who will dance to their tune” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Concluding on this, MR008 re-echoed the fact that proper legislations should be used in establishing SIs not only to check the abuse of institutions by politicians, but to check unerring staff who behave as if they are working in political offices.

The next point recommended which got approval of all 15 respondents and that of the PPVGs is the idea that appointing bodies should stop appointing active politicians to head these institutions. That is, where constituency or regional secretaries or youth organisers are appointed to become managers, deputies and accountants of these institutions, must stop.

A respondent said:

“The behaviours of such persons in their new offices are difficult to be separated from their partisan lives; they continue to speak and do politics in the offices; they go on radio, TV, and also continue to mount party platforms to do partisan politics, which is contrary to what a bureaucrat should be doing. This attracts PPVGs when there is a change of power to come violently hunt them out of the offices” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Buttressing this, MR008 also suggested that appointing authorities should stop appointing known and active politicians to head these institutions.

Furthermore, all 15 respondents and PPVGs opined that recruitments and promotions should be based on merits rather than political inclinations. To MR006, this will enhance hard work and discipline in CSIs.

Also, MR006 qualified it when he said:

“Any form of engagement into these institutions should be competitively done so as avoid biases that gives an unfair advantage to unqualified people, and added that well-structured formalities for employment, appointment, recruitment and management should be set-up” (MR006. 17/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

This according to MR005, will promote professionalism.

Finally, MR007 suggested that there should be proper orientation for staff recruited into these institutions so as to disabuse their minds from wrong thoughts. To him, even when active political activists are sent to manage these institutions, they should de-brief them off their

political lenses and let them know where they are currently working are separate from party offices. In support of this, MR005 added:

“In moving forward, an In-service training should be encouraged, regularly, to always remind members of the ethics and code of conducts of their offices. This will allow staff to be focused all the time” (MR005. 14/5/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Like the causes, the mechanism of stopping the violent on CSIs has some points being disagreed on by some respondents.

For instance, MR0014 suggested that corrupt officials in these institutions who are caught must be dealt with appropriately. This according to him, will discourage people and party activists who prioritised working in these institutions because of what they consider as ‘cheap money’.

In support of this, MR002 had this to say:

“Look, there is a general perception out there of cheap monies available at these institutions, so there is always a scramble for people to want to find themselves working in these institutions. They scramble because they believe they would be pardoned or let off the hook even if they misappropriate finances in these institution from the experiences in NR” (MR002. 13/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

However, other respondents including MR006 and MR007 disagreed. According to MR006 and MR007, corruption still persist in pre-Fourth Republic SIs, even though little or might not be seen, yet they are still excused from the violent attacks of PPVGs. Even though they disagreed, they still accepted that corrupt people in these institutions should be prosecuted and made to face the law moving forward.

4.5.2 Mechanisms of Stopping the Economic Causes of Violent Attacks on Contemporary State Institutions

An integral part of the causes of violence on CSIs is the economic fact. Whilst others tend to view it as the primary cause, others disagree. But the emphasis here is not to rank it, but to point out possible ways it can be cured. Even though a respondent disagreed with this point as

a possible cause of PPVGs violence a CSIs, he still concurred that something must be done in this regard.

An all-embracing key suggestion was that sustainable jobs should be provided to cater for the unemployed youth, who are mostly seduced into committing the violence. All respondents, including the PPVGs pointed out that the only way PPV can be reduced on CSIs to a minimum level if not stopped, is to make job opportunities available to the idle youth that are used as harbingers of violence. Re-iterating this, MR007 said:

“They (PPVGs) are unemployed; they do nothing, so they do anything that comes their way, provided it can put little money on their pockets. If they are to get jobs; if they are employed, they will not be available for anybody to use them into committing violence on CSIs” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Again, all 15 respondents agreed to the fact that PPVGs should be provided with entrepreneurial skills to go into working. When they have the skill, at least, they can get themselves involved in something that will not only keep them, but something that will give them money in the end. MR004 said:

“Most of these guys (PPVGs) who are engaged in the violent acts lack the basic technical and entrepreneurial skill and capabilities to engage into any meaning profession. As such, providing them with such skills or capacity building will help those willing to work get themselves engage into a profession that will eventually give them money and take away their time” (MR004. 25/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Also, all 15 respondents and all PPVGs agreed that financial support in the form of small scale loans should be made available to all PPVGs in NR. To all the respondents, some of the people involved in the violence cannot work or do not want to work. However, they are willing to go into business, but lack the financial muzzle to start. So a little push from the government in the form of small scale loans, will do the magic. In support of this, MR0012 said:

“With financial support, these people (PPVGs) will go into buying and selling thereby engaging themselves into profitable ventures. With this, nobody or no selfish politician can entice them with little money to go and violently attack institutions like NHIA or YEA” (MR0012. 17/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Furthermore, it is suggested that supervisory role by government should be provided to the people in whatever business ventures they engage themselves in. All respondents lauded this idea too. With this supervisory role, markets can be recommended or provided to finished goods provided by the youth engaged in the entrepreneurial or vocational/technical activities.

Finally, it is suggested that the central government should take bold steps in stabilising the economy. This according to respondents will reduce cost of living and make things for all and sundry to benefit. When this is done, employment opportunities will be created, where the unemployed youth will get themselves employed.

4.5.3 Mechanisms of Stopping Political Causes of Violent Attacks on Contemporary State Institutions.

Irrefutably, a domineering factor in the cause of PPV on CSIs is the political factor, accepted by all the respondents. As such, this section presents views of respondents as remedies to ending the menace. Respondents gave various perspectives, though related in some instances, but totally different in some as well.

To start with, all 15 respondents asserted that political leaders should stop interfering in the operations of these CSIs. All response gotten from respondents were unanimous in this regard.

For instance, MR007 indicated:

“Politicians must not dictate to us to who becomes a manager or CEO, who should be recruited or not, who should be promoted or not; rather it should be left to the laws and code of conducts dictating the trajectory of these institutions in its operations” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Also, MR003 rightly put it:

“Recruitment should follow through the right procedure. He added that PPs should stop putting pressure on institutional appointees to recruit or pick functionaries as opposed to people who are qualified. This will allow appointees to do a professional job” (MR003. 15/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Still on the interference, all 15 respondents were unanimous in advising politicians to stay away from interfering in the work of the security services. MR005 and MR007 added that it is not only the politicians who interfere in the work of the security services, but chiefs, imams, pastors as well as other opinion leaders in the region. Hence, in moving forward, these persons must also stop interfering in the works of the security personnel. This confirms the earlier findings CODEO (2017: 2) when they pointed out how ‘‘political manipulation negatively affects the professional conduct of the security agencies’’

A respondent said that Interfering in the work of the police to release culprits apprehended is a big challenge to the security services in NR. All respondents were unanimous in saying that the best way of sending a warning is for the police to arrest some perpetrators and use them as example, but the political class will always interfere to release people caught in the act.

MR007 in supporting this point, gave example of where a former Ashanti Regional Police Commander, ACP Kofi Boakye, was transferred from Kumasi to the Police Headquarters in Accra where nobody will hear of his name; just because he refused to be manipulated by the political class that were in government.

Additionally, MR005 suggested that politicians should de-politicise the recruitment into the security services so as to renew the confidence and trust in them. To MR005, MR006, and MR004, one of the biggest reasons attributed to the continuation of this menace is the unprofessional and selective behaviour of the security services, where they provide security to the functionaries of the party in power, and develop lukewarm attitude in arresting culprits from the ruling part. But quickly go to arrest alleged culprits of the opposition parties.

Buttressing this point, CODEO (CODEO, 2017) also expressed worry about the infiltrations and manipulations in the recruitment processes of the security services. This is so because the security services are flooded with political functionaries, hence their reluctance to arrest people

when they commit crimes. To respond to the security services biases and protect their members, they form these groups as stop-cock.

If the politicians de-politicise the recruitment process, MR005 indicated:

“It will bring confidence and trust back to the security services, where people will start believing in them hence disband these groups” (MRO05. 15/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

To tackle the security problem, CODEO (2017) suggested the following, an opinion also expressed by all respondents, though differently:

- “Insulation of the processes of enlistment, recruitment, promotion and appointment of security personnel at all levels from political interference;
- There should be a security of tenure for the Inspector General of Police (IGP);
- The Police Transformation Program should hasten its work on the professional development of the Ghana Police Service; and
- All criminal offences should be separated from electoral offences and prosecuted by the Police” (CODEO, 2017: 3).

Still on the political factors, all respondents said that unrealistic and over ambitious campaign promises, which are the hallmark of Ghanaian politicians, should be checked. A delay in responding to the sweet promises promised during campaigns brings anxiety and uneasiness, thereby compelling the youth to attack.

In a response from a member of G003, he said:

“We go to attack these institutions violently because their bosses have failed to deliver an agreements or promises that were agreed between us and them. Whilst they got theirs, we did not get, so we also have to go and get ours” (G003. 14/2/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Respondent there cautioned politicians to be wary of their promises, giving the fact that the resources available does not or cannot support those promise.

Furthermore, all 15 responded agreed that the security services particularly in the police in NR should be bold to deal with PPVGs caught in violent attacks. They should be professional in the discharge of their duties. Even though one of the respondents, MR006, indicated that the police cannot do anything about the situation giving the politics we run Ghana, he said that elsewhere, the police could have done something. A respondent pointed out:

“If the police are decisive in apprehending culprits; if they should refuse to release culprits even if ordered by the politicians; and if they name and shame politicians trying to intervene, this phenomenon will be stopped” (MR002. 14/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale)

Additionally, all 15 but one of the respondents, agreed that PPs should do away with PPVGs by not engaging their services, disbanding them, or disassociating themselves with their activities. Leaders of PPs are told not to intercede for any culprit caught or hire a lawyer to defend any. This according to the respondents will send a signal to members of these groups that they are on their own and if anything happens to them, no stalwart party member will come to their aid.

Furthermore, MR005 revealed that punitive voting must be used to punish PPs who are still engaging the services of PPVGs. Punitive voting according him, is where voters in the country punitively vote against a PP that goes contrary to terms agreed. In this case, Ghanaians should vote against either NPP or NDC if any of them refuse and still engage the services of PPVGs in their political activities. Even though respondents agreed with MR005 but some of them like MR004 and MR006 said it will be difficult to be implemented in Ghana, giving the embryotic stage of our democracy.

For instance, even though Whitfield (2009) has argued that majority of the voters in Africa inclines to vote on issues, Bob-Milliar (2012, 2018) shows contrary in Ghana, particularly in NR, Ashanti and Volta, where electorates votes on different issues such as tribe, religion, etc., rather mundane issues that has to with bread and butter. MR005 even admitted and stated:

“The identical politics we do in Ghana where voters vote based on religion, tribe, etc., instead of bread and butter, it will be difficult to implement punitive voting. However, this can only be successful if Ghanaians as a whole should redefine our political leadership - It should be for development and people-centred, but not for amassing wealth” (MR005. 14/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

Curtailling the power of the executive has also been put forward as solution to the phenomenon of PPV on CSIs in NR. The power to hire and fire all persons lies at the discretion of the president. MR007 inserted:

“If a police refuses to accept orders from the president to release a culprit; if managers of SIs refuse to employ unqualified persons; if heads of these institutions refuse to promote people, etc, with just a phone call from the president or a sector minister, the persons are fired” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Accra).

This is how easy it is to fire persons, and that according to the respondents, explains why even though some state officers know that what they are doing is not proper, yet they still go ahead to do it.

Continuing with the remedies of political causes, de-politicising the judiciary has been pointed out as an alternative to stopping the political vigilantism. According to MR0013, the judiciary per the explanation is expected to adjudicate cases brought before them, dispassionately. However, because politicisation of the judiciary where people appointed as judges into the chair, they often skew judgements to sweet the appointing authorities. This is seen when judges free culprits when it is obvious that those culprits were caught in the act.

Additionally, a respondent suggested that political leaders should give timely information to PPVGs as to what is expected of them. Agreeing with this, CODEO (2017: 3) stated: *“political parties should always convey decisions taken at Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) meetings and sensitize their supporters on them”*.

Stressing on this, MR0013 reiterated:

“Timely information will let the PPVGs know what to do and what not to do. Timely information is very important right after winning power. This is so because the youth often go to attack institutions because of absence of timely information. And

since they tend to hear a lot and believe in what their political masters tell, then will stop the violent attacks if they are told on time” (MR0013. 22/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Empowering security services has also been a raised point. The security is unable to quickly deal with some of these violence because they are psychologically and logically challenged. They lack vehicles, guns, protective attire, telecommunication gadgets, etc.

A respondent, MR002, speaking in support of this said:

“The security services must be given incentives in the form of life insurance, reward to any unit that apprehends and successfully prosecute culprits and some allowances as bonuses for doing a yeoman job. Also, vehicles and other military accoutrements should be made available to them for use” (MR002. 13/4/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Lastly, the government and political appointees are told to be fair in sharing opportunities. MR009 said that politicians should stop being selfish in sharing opportunities like jobs, scholar, physical developments. The governments should not base the sharing formula on sectionalism like regionalism, tribe, religion or even political party. This according to MR009 will make every Ghanaian have a sense of belongingness and will hesitate into engaging in violent acts because they see everything as theirs.

Finally, MR005, MR006, and MR0012 suggested a dialogue between all stake-holders involved in the chain – PPs, PPVGs, governments, religious leaders, and so on. All the other respondents also agreed to this suggestion.

Dialogue is important in dealing with this phenomenon in NR. Dialogue among PPs, among PPVGs, and dialogue between all stakeholders including the security services should be promoted so as to stop the spread of provocation.

4.5.4 Mechanisms of Stopping the Social Causes of Violence Attacks on Contemporary State Institutions

Like the previous sections, this section will also present views expressed by respondents and the literature as to how to stop the social causes of PPV on CSIs in NR.

Olaiya (2014) indicates that poverty is pervasive among the youth in Africa, and this is midwifed by the wide range unemployment. According to him, West Africa is most widely hit by this cancer, especially high unemployment, environmental degradation, AIDS, marginalisation, social exclusion, wars and conflicts, among others (Olaiya, 2014). It is an unsurprising fact that social factors such as those outlined by Olaiya were discovered to be among the causes of violent attacks on CSIs in NR.

All fifteen (15) respondents and PPVGs were interviewed to ascertain mechanisms of stopping the social causes of PPV in NR on NHIA and YEA in NR.

First view expressed by all 15 respondents is the fact that government and international organisations should help in creating jobs to contain the high unemployment rate among the youth in NR. This results in high poverty rates among the youth in NR. A respondent who is member of G002 said:

“We sit in this shed most of the time because we do not have jobs. So my chairman or any big man comes to tell me to help in exchange of some money, I will definitely help” (G002. 15/1/19. Field Interview, Tamale)

Another point which got all 15 respondents approval is the introduction of social facilities in NR to cater for the youth bulge. This a respondent said will engage non-busy youth. Also, MR007 asserted:

“Government and other developmental partners should introduce social intervention programs so as to cater for the very poor in society. Access to health, cloth, water, education, etc, should not be a challenge to the poor. The vulnerable including the youth should be able have access to these services at free or at a cheaper rate” (MR007. 22/5/19. Field Interview, Tamale).

Furthermore, public education by NCCE, Imams, pastors, etc., should be intensified to the youth groups. A respondent says that our society reveres such respectable people such as Imams, Chiefs, etc, so when they speak they listen. However, in recent times they have tone down in their moral preaching thereby the fall in societal norms and values that used to be an informal ways of controlling society. Respondents there called on those opinion leaders to as a matter of urgency, up their game in re-echoing the old values and norms into the ears of the youth.

In respect to resolving the high level of illiteracy and lost in social value, norms and morals, all respondents agreed that governments, parents, and partners involved in shaping the society should intensify the education of people, especially PPVGs. Civil society organisations, religious bodies, and influential personalities have a role to play in this.

The education could be in the form of sensitising the youth on what is accepted and not accepted in the society. Education could also be given on how SIs operate, etc. PPs can also join by educating their youth wings and other related party bodies on principles of democracy. Peer educations must be encouraged, especially within and between PPVGs. CODEO (2017) summarised it aptly:

“Families should take keen interest in the upbringing of their children: Public education and sensitization on morals, patriotism and civic values should be re-introduced and given prominence in schools and public discourses: Independent organizations (religious bodies, civil society organizations and influential personalities) should be apt in condemning political party vigilante activities perpetuated by all parties” (CODEO, 2017: 3)

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The phenomenon of PPV dates back to the era of our struggle for self- rule or pre - independence rule in Africa and Ghana to be specific (Everatt, 2000; Paalo, 2017; Alidu, 2019; Gyampo et al, 2017). Governments, several civil society groups, the clergy, scholars, opinion leaders and well-meaning Ghanaians in the country have called for and continue to do so for holistic steps to dealing with it since it has a potential to destabilise the peace of the country hence stagnating and stifling the democratic gains attained by the country. The central question of my study as part of the solution was: “why has Contemporary State Institutions, particularly NHIA and YEA, become the major target for violent acts of PPVGs?”. My study was conducted to examine why the PPVGs affiliated to NPP and NDC violently attack some particular SIs, particularly NHIA and YEA whilst ignoring others, specifically SSNIT and SIC in NR of Ghana.

Overall, my specific objectives used to investigate this were:

- Examine what and the nature of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in Northern Region;
- Examine the features of Contemporary State Institutions and pre-Fourth Republic state institutions that have subjected them to violent attacks and vice versa, respectively, by political party vigilante groups in Northern Region;
- To assess whether there are political, social, and economic causes of these violent attacks on the contemporary state institutions by political party vigilante groups;
- Examine some ways or mechanism of stopping the violent attacks on contemporary state institutions.

I used FGDs, interviews, observations, and relied on the literature to unearth the nature of PPVGs and PPV in NR. Also, I relied on the same tools to reveal the features of the SIs subjected to violent attacks and those not subjected to violent attacks. I again relied on focus group discussions, interviews, observations and the literature in pointing out the social, political, and economic causes of this phenomenon of PPV in NR. Finally, the same techniques and tools were relied on to give recommendations that seek to stem the tide of PPV on CSIs in NR.

This chapter therefore consists of the research objectives as specified above, summary of my findings, and recommendations based on the outcomes and the conclusion. The conclusions here on the empirical study are based on the analysis of qualitative data and its explanations.

5.2 Summary of Findings

With regards to what and nature of PPVGs and PPV, the literature and empirical data discovered four themes that explains properly the questions: what are PPVGs and PPV?; what are the characteristics of PPVGs and PPV in NR?; what are the exclusive views of PPVGs on PPV in NR?; and what are the exclusive views of PPVGs in stopping PPV in NR?.

Also, the literature and empirical data gathered also found features of institutions that make CSIs prone to violent attack, and those that excuse pre-Fourth Republic SIs from violent attacks. It also discovered social, economic, and political causes of PPV; and found solutions on how to stop PPV.

In respect of explaining or defining PPVGs and PPV, all respondents converged at the definition espoused by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974), Gyampo et al (2017), and Alidu (2019a). Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974: 542) defines it as a group "taking the law into one's own hands" by violently resorting to the use of brute force to protect one's or group's interests. Also, Gyampo et al (2017: 115) defines PPV "as a form of social group controlled violence or

activism, which serves the political interest of both an incumbent government and the opposition since both incumbent government and the opposition have their vigilante groups’.

Secondly, in respect of PPVGs, all respondents but one – MR004 – converged at the definition of Alidu (2019a). Alidu (2019a) said that ‘‘political vigilante groups are diverse set of violent actors, who are often created for a specific purpose or during a specific time period for the furtherance of a political objective by violence’’. However, MR004 describes them as a recalcitrant group that engages in aggressive politics and in lawlessness (Field Interview).

On the issue of characteristics of PPVGs and PPV, the literature and the empirical data gathered broadly discovered it into causes; strategies; participants; and effects.

Firstly, in respect of the causes, the literature and empirical data revealed social exclusion, deprivation, cleavages, marginalisation, high poverty rates, and high illiteracy rates as common characteristics of PPVGs in NR.

Also, lost in societal values and norms, the silence of chiefs, imams, opinion leaders, low level of education among other factors in NR, were also identified as being the causes PPVGs. This, the empirical data gathered revealed to be an effective informal mechanism used to control society and maintain order. It used to also complement the efforts of the formal mechanism to maintain law and order like the police and the judiciary. However, because there is a general down trend in all of these indices, NR has become so vulnerable and susceptible any new menace that erupts.

Also, the literature and empirical data also discovered that the type of politics we do – patrimonial, clientelism, winner-take-all system – are a common characteristic. This, according to the data, allows the PPVGs to think that access to the state belongs to them as their share of the successes of their PPs winning power. This system from the literature and empirical data is

at variance with the ideal form of democracy practiced in the West. Inherent in this system are corruption, failure of police to deal with culprits, etcetera.

Additionally, the final characteristic the literature and empirical data discovered as a cause is the high unemployment rate in NR, specifically the youth; high cost of living; high standards of living, etcetera. This, according to the literature and empirical data, makes life very difficult for the youth in the region, hence makes them gullible to be assuaged by little monies by some nefarious politicians into committing violence.

Secondly, and in respect of strategies, the literature and empirical data discovered PPVGs resort to the use of violence to register their displeasure and raise their grievances. This violence normally leads to destruction of both state and private properties. They choose violence because they believe it is the most effective and has since history proven to be effective mechanism of driving home your concerns. They also believe it is the only language greedy politicians who have forgotten about them and marginalised them understand.

Also, the literature and empirical data gathered discovered the seizure of both state properties private properties of politicians as a strategy to drive home their concern. This seizures of both state and private properties of politicians brings politicians into negotiating table with the PPVGs.

Finally, a strategy discovered from the empirical data gathered is the rationality of the PPVGs in their attacks. They choose their targets, PPs, and the time to strike in order to get their demands met. They do not choose PPs that cannot win power and institutions that they cannot fit into. So they are very meticulous and rational in their decisions.

Thirdly, a characteristic discovered from the empirical data gathered and the literature is the participants involved in PPV or belonging to PPVGs. The research discovered that all

participants involved in the activities of PPV are youth groups, within the ages of 15 – 40. It will also be noted that the literature and the empirical data also discovered that PPVGs have the support of some adults behind the scene, either encouraging them or funding their activities, both in opposition and in power.

Fourth and final characteristic the literature and empirical data broadly discovered are the effects of their violent attacks. The empirical data gathered revealed political instability, conflicts and civil wars, disease, high poverty rates, high unemployment, insecurity, and destruction of properties. It again revealed “Warlordism”, “vigilante capture”, slow economic growth or crippling of the economy etcetera as the negative effects of PPV in the country. These general effects kill the democratic growth of the country.

With regards to the exclusive views of PPVGs on PPV, the literature and empirical data gathered from the field discovered that PPVGs perceived PPV as something bad; something condemnable; and something that is against the laws of the land. However, some of the members, particularly those considered by the groups as leaders and the educated ones, described PPV as a “necessary evil”, and blamed the increase in PPV on political leaders when they described as greedy and selfish people who marginalised and forgot they PPVGs after power.

Finally, and with respect to the exclusive views of PPVGs on how to stop PPV, The empirical data revealed that political leaders should continue to engage PPVGs after election. This could be in the form of explaining to them how far the government has gone and the plans the government has for them.

Also, it revealed that political leaders and stakeholders should provide sustainable jobs for them.

Again, politicians should lower their promises during campaign time so as to lower the expectations of PPVGs from them after power.

Finally, it revealed that politicians, especially those privileged to have gotten positions should not be greedy and selfish by trying to satisfy themselves, their kinsmen, and their friends first.

On the issue of features that subject CSIs to violent attacks, the literature and empirical data discovered that CEOs, senior office holders like managers, accountants and PROs in these institutions were all either known party executives or known PP aficionados.

Also, it is discovered from the empirical data gathered that recruitments, promotions, and all the forms of engagements in these institutions were done on partisan bases or party lenses; instead of merit and efforts.

Again, the empirical data revealed that weak laws were used to establish these institutions, allowing them to be politically manipulated.

In addition, the background to the establishment of these did not have consensual or stakeholders' approval; rather they were established to satisfy the whims and caprices of some politicians.

Finally, the literature and empirical data discovered that heads of these institutions continue to engage in partisan politics through mounting political platforms and going on radio and TV stations to speak for their PPs.

However, respondents also disagreed on some features discovered. For instance, 90% disagreed to the feature that these institutions were not financially sufficient or independent so depended on the government for financial support.

Also, 90% disagreed to the feature that the inclusion of these policies into the manifestoes of PP that established may have affected it.

Again, 70% of respondents disagreed to the feature that the inability of members or staff of these institutions to belong to unionised bodies like Trade Union Congress (TUC), may have caused the violent acts on them.

And finally, 65% disagreed to the feature that the lack of joint ownership of these institutions by government and individuals or cooperate bodies might have caused the violent acts on them.

To the features that excused pre – Fourth Republic SIs violent attacks, the literature and empirical data gathered discovered that recruitments and promotions in these institutions were based on structured, strict lay down procedures. That is, they rely on merits and efforts of the individual.

Also, it is discovered that known and active party activists do not head these institutions. Again, even heads of these institutions like CEOs and managers who are fortunate to have gotten there, do not engage active and partisan politics like going on radio to speak for PPs or mount party platforms to speak for their PPs.

In addition, strong laws were used to establish them and back their operations. Furthermore, it is revealed that these have been existing before the creation of these PPs as such, they are not a creation of either NPP or NDC who are in constant battle.

Finally, 90% agreed to the feature that these institutions are jointly owned by both the state and individuals or corporate organisations.

In respect of the other causes aside the special features attributed to CSIs, the literature and empirical data gathered discovered immediate/trigger events; root events; and remote events.

The immediate/trigger events was attributed to transition of power, specifically external transition of power; that is, a situation where NPP was to transfer power to NDC, and the vice versa. These transitions led to violence as activists of incoming government violently and forcibly evicted people out of offices.

The root causes of PPV are attributed to both historical and current events where people had to take to violence in order to get their concerns addressed by the central government.

The remote causes the literature and empirical data gathered discovered them into social, political, and economic factors. The social are the high illiteracy rate; low level of education; lost in societal values and norms; high poverty rates; drug abuse; high alcohol consumption; silence of opinion leaders like imams and chiefs; and so on. The economic factors revealed are high level of unemployment; high costs of living and standard of living, etcetera. The political factors were largely attributed to style of politics – patronage or patrimonial - clientelism - which is based on identity politics; rather than merits.

Finally, and with regard to stopping PPV, the literature and empirical data gathered discovered that politicians and politics in Ghana must move away from the patronage system of doing politics to an ideal form of practice in the West, which is based on voluntarism and merits. It was also discovered that census building is required in establishing state institutions.

Also, stronger laws establishing SIs must be prioritised, and those SIs already established should be looked at in terms of strengthening them with laws that will serve as protective shield to them.

5.3 Conclusion

The violent and destructive activity of political activist is an age-long phenomenon which has determined the existential significance of some political activists, particularly the youth. These

violent activities have been up and down, depending on the dynamics or exigencies at a point in time. In recent times however, in NR, it is on the rise.

A noticing factor in its resurgence is the targets of these violent attacks – the newly created SIs. Whereas there are general calls by all well-meaning Ghanaians to stem the tide of this cancer, the attacks on the newly created SIs are unnoticed. Through the objectives of my study which unearthed the causes of these violence, it was discovered from the literature and empirical data gathered that the type of politics practice here – patrimonial system of politics and clientelism, which is based on identity politics such as cleavages, tribe, language, religion, loyalty, patron-client system, self – interest and personal aggrandisement, etcetera – is the primary and root cause of PPV or destructive and violent political activism.

Others factors such as loss in social control, values and norms; the silence of the imams, chiefs, and opinion leaders; weak laws that were used to establish these newly created state institutions; and lack of professionalism on the part of the security services; among other factors were also revealed as causes of PPV.

The research therefore concluded that the ideal form of democracy, which prioritises merits; as oppose to patronage should be embraced by all.

Also, the research revealed that the National Peace Council, National House of Chiefs, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), and Inter Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), should engage the antagonists, that is, the PPs, to a genuine and committed dialogue, aimed at stopping the violence.

5.4 Recommendations

In light of the findings and conclusions, my research makes the following recommendations:

Firstly, dialogue must be encouraged in order to deal with the nature of PPVGs and PPV in NR. Religious leaders, chiefs and civil societies in NR should propose and organise workshops for the two PPs – NPP and NDC – to genuinely dialogue on how to disband, disassociate and disown PPVGs that perpetuate violence in their names. If the dialogue is promoted by the non-partisan bodies outlined minus the government, the antagonist – NPP and NDC – will be genuine in proposing a way forward in doing away with the PPVGs and PPV.

Secondly, in dealing with features of SIs, laws to be used in establishing them must be strengthened and strong. The research revealed that weak laws were used in establishing these newly created SIs, hence stronger laws will immune and protect these institutions from the manipulations of politicians by deciding who the manager becomes or who is recruited as staff. The strong laws will also provide code of conducts for workers, even if they were previously active politicians but now recruited, they will be guided by the code of conducts. The new laws will bring about transparency and fairness in the operations of these institutions.

Also, one of the ways the government can strengthen these newly established SIs is to get consensus building from all stakeholders – all PPs – to agree on their establishment; so as to prevent them from being victimised whenever a new government comes to power.

To add, the media and civil service organisations should be invited to be witnesses to the consensus building process prior to the establishment of these institutions so as to promote transparency and accountability.

Thirdly, and politically, a new political investment which is people-centred, development oriented; as opposed to self – centred, must be promoted and encouraged. Patronage system of politics, which is based on identity and racial consideration, instead of merits was the major and primary cause of PPV in the region.

A national symposium must be organised by Civil Society Organisations and the National Peace Council, where PPs, chiefs, Electoral Commission, World Bank, European Union and ambassadors of developed nations like Britain, United State of America, Canada and France are invited to draw up a new political system that is in line with the ideal form of democracy practiced in the West. All PPs will be obliged to sign this agreement that will be consensually agreed upon at the end of the symposium. This ideal form will stipulate the tenets of how politics will be done in the country, and any PP, groups of persons or individuals going against it will be punished.

Also, the media will play a crucial role here by publicising and exposing people who may clandestinely try to outwit the system.

Also, campaign languages and remarks must be controlled, either directly or indirectly by the Electoral Commission with help of the media. A major cause of PPV the research revealed was the promises politicians make on campaign platforms which raise the expectations of electorates, particularly the youth. The Electoral Commission must put in place a system to check the unguarded utterances of politicians during campaigns. All aspirants that promised more than the system can support or provide, the Electoral Commission should punish such characters either by withdrawing their candidacy or fining them. Checking such reckless remarks by politicians will immensely tone down the expectations of PPVGs after victory.

Fourthly, and socially, the informal systems of maintaining law and order that were effective and was hitherto used to complement the formal system must be reawakened, promoted and encouraged. A striking feature the research revealed was the loss in societal norms and values as a result of the silence of the informal structures such as chiefs, imams, youth leaders, taboos, myths, and etcetera. Encouraging chiefs to continue adjudicating cases and enforcing law and order; imams continuing to preach to the youth; youth leaders whipping their colleagues in

line; and re-echoing taboos myths, will deter the PPVGs from engaging in not only violence, but all forms of indiscipline in the society.

Also, society should greatly change their mind-set in stereotyping the youth as bad nuts in the society. Stigmatisation was revealed as a factor that pushed PPVGs into PPV. If government takes a deliberate steps to re - engage and assimilate the youth into its fold where it provide social amenities such youth centres that provide recreation and counselling, others would follow suit, thereby encouraging the PPVGs to seek for purposive employment and skill training.

Furthermore, and economically, sustainable small scale business and entrepreneurial training must strategically be introduced, which will be aimed at targeting unemployed and unskilled youth associated with PPs. Unemployment, high cost of living and unskilled youth were revealed as a major cause of violence. Government must strategically allocate resources to provide financial support to the unemployed youth. Also, the government should provide skilled training to the groups associated with PPs.

Finally, interference in the operations of the security services, particularly the police, by politicians, chiefs, and other influential people in the country must be stopped. This will deter thugs from saying that they will be released if caught by the laws of the land.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR EXPERTS CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATION

Good morning/afternoon. Please, I want to thank you for granting me the opportunity to meet with you today. I am Abdulai Abubakari-Sadik, an M. Phil student from the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. The study is conducted in partial fulfilment of my requirement for the award of M. Phil Political Science Degree. The interview guide is purposefully designed to solicit views on the topic: why are Contemporary State Institutions more prone to violent attacks by Political Party Vigilante Groups than pre – Fourth state institution: The case of Health Insurance and Youth Employment Agency in Northern Region

Please, the interview would last from 30 – 50 minutes, and please, I will be recording the session because I cannot afford to miss anything you will say. Your responses will only be shared with me and my supervisors. This interview is purely for an academic purpose and thus confidentiality is strongly upheld.

Thank you very much and I am looking forward to your support to enable me to complete this study successfully.

.....

.....

Interviewee

Date

.....

Institution

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM

1. What is your general view of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in Ghana?
2. How will you define or explain the current state of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism?
3. What are some of the characteristics of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in the country?
4. What are the general reasons for the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
5. What are the effects of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism?
6. What can generally be done to stop the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups in the country?

FEATURES OF CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS (NHIA/YEA) AND PRE-FOURTH REPUBLIC STATE INSTITUTIONS (SSNIT/SIC)

1. What is the nature and rationale of pre-Fourth Republic state institutions (SSNIT/SIC)?
2. What is the nature and rationale of Contemporary State Institutions (NHIA/YEA)?
3. What are the features of Contemporary State institutions that have subjected them to violent attacks by political party vigilante groups?
4. What are the effects of the violent attacks on the successful operations of the institutions?
5. What are the special features of pre-Fourth Republic state institutions that have helped in excusing them from the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS VIOLENT ATTACKS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. What are some of the political causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks on contemporary state institutions?
2. What are some of the economic causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
3. What are some of the social causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?

STOPPING THE VIOLENT ATTACKS OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. What do you think should be introduced or what can be done to stop the violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
2. What measures can be put in place to stop the political causes of violent attacks on Contemporary State Institution?
3. What can be done stop the economic causes of violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
4. What can be done to stop the social causes of violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR STAFF OF PRE – FOURTH REPUBLIC STATE INSTITUTIONS (SSNIT/SIC)

Good morning/afternoon. Please, I want to thank you for granting me the opportunity to meet with you today. I am Abdulai Abubakari-Sadik, an M. Phil student from the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. The study is conducted in partial fulfilment of my requirement for the award of M. Phil Political Science Degree. The interview guide is purposefully designed to solicit views on the topic: why are Contemporary State Institutions more prone to violent attacks by Political Party Vigilante Groups than pre – Fourth state institution: The case of Health Insurance and Youth Employment Agency in Northern Region

Please, the interview would last from 30 – 50 minutes, and please, I will be recording the session because I cannot afford to miss anything you will say. Your responses will only be shared with me and my supervisors. This interview is purely for an academic purpose and thus confidentiality is strongly upheld.

Thank you very much and I am looking forward to your support to enable me to complete this study successfully.

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Interviewee

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Date

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Institution

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM

1. What is your general view of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in Ghana?
2. What are the general reasons for the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
3. What are the effects of it on the operations of your institution?

FEATURES OF PRE-FOURTH REPUBLIC STATE INSTITUTIONS (SSNIT/SIC)

1. What is the nature and rationale of your institution - pre-Fourth Republic state institutions (SSNIT/SIC)?
2. Has your institution ever been attacked?
3. What are the special features of your institution that have helped in excusing it from the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
4. What can be done to sustain the success story of your institution?

STOPPING THE VIOLENT ATTACKS OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. What do you think should be introduced or what can be done to stop the violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
2. What measures can be put in place to stop the political causes of violent attacks, if there are any, on those affected by the violent attacks?
3. What can be done to stop the economic causes of violent attacks, if there are any, on those affected by the violent attacks?
4. What can be done to stop the social causes of violent attacks, if there are any, on some state institutions affected by the violent attacks?

APPENDIX C

**INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR STAFF OF CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS
(NHAI/YEA)**

Good morning/afternoon. Please, I want to thank you for granting me the opportunity to meet with you today. I am Abdulai Abubakari-Sadik, an M. Phil student from the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. The study is conducted in partial fulfilment of my requirement for the award of M. Phil Political Science Degree. The interview guide is purposefully designed to solicit views on the topic: why are Contemporary State Institutions more prone to violent attacks by Political Party Vigilante Groups than pre – Fourth state institution: The case of Health Insurance and Youth Employment Agency in Northern Region

Please, the interview would last from 30 – 50 minutes, and please, I will be recording the session because I cannot afford to miss anything you will say. Your responses will only be shared with me and my supervisors. This interview is purely for an academic purpose and thus confidentiality is strongly upheld.

Thank you very much and I am looking forward to your support to enable me to complete this study successfully.

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Interviewee	Date
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Institution

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM

1. What is your general view of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in Ghana?
2. What are the general reasons for the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
3. What are the effects of it on the operations of your institution?

FEATURES OF CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTION (NHIA AND YEA)

1. What is the nature and rationale of your institution – Contemporary State Institution?
2. Has your institution ever been attacked?
3. What are the special features of your institution that have exposed it to violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
4. What specifically can be done to stop violent attacks on your institution?

STOPPING THE VIOLENT ATTACKS OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. What do you think should be introduced or what can be done to stop the violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
2. What measures can be put in place to stop the political causes of violent attacks, if there is any, on Contemporary State Institutions?
3. What can be done to stop the economic causes of violent attacks, if there is any, on Contemporary State Institutions?
4. What can be done to stop the social causes of violent attacks, if there is any, on Contemporary State Institutions?

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTY EXECUTIVES

Good morning/afternoon. Please, I want to thank you for granting me the opportunity to meet with you today. I am Abdulai Abubakari-Sadik, an M. Phil student from the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. The study is conducted in partial fulfilment of my requirement for the award of M. Phil Political Science Degree. The interview guide is purposefully designed to solicit views on the topic: why are Contemporary State Institutions more prone to violent attacks by Political Party Vigilante Groups than pre – Fourth state institution: The case of Health Insurance and Youth Employment Agency in Northern Region

Please, the interview would last from 30 – 50 minutes, and please, I will be recording the session because I cannot afford to miss anything you will say. Your responses will only be shared with me and my supervisors. This interview is purely for an academic purpose and thus confidentiality is strongly upheld.

Thank you very much and I am looking forward to your support to enable me to complete this study successfully.

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Interviewee

Date

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Institution

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM

1. What is your general view on political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in Ghana?
2. What are some of the characteristics of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in the country?
3. What are the general reasons for the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
4. What are the effects of it on political party activism in the country?

FEATURES OF CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS (NHIA/YEA) AND PRE-FOURTH REPUBLIC STATE INSTITUTIONS (SSNIT/SIC)

1. Are you aware some state institutions like health insurance and youth employment authority are violently by youth wings of political parties whilst others like SIC and SSNIT are ignored?
2. What the special features of these state institutions (NHAI and YEA) that have subjected them to violent attacks by political party vigilante groups?
3. What are the special features of these state institutions (SIC and SSNIT) that have helped in excusing them from the violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
4. What can be done to stop the violent attacks on NHAI and YEA?

POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS VIOLENT ATTACKS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. What are some of the political causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks on contemporary state institutions?
2. What are some of the economic causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
3. What are some of the social causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?

STOPPING THE VIOLENT ATTACKS OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. What do you think should be introduced or what can be done to stop the violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
2. What measures can be put in place to stop the political causes of violent attacks on Contemporary State Institution?
3. What can be done stop the economic causes of violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?
4. What can be done to stop the social causes of violent attacks on Contemporary State Institutions?

APPENDIX E

**INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS IN THE
FOCUS GROUPS DISCUSSION**

Good morning/afternoon. Please, I want to thank you for granting me the opportunity to meet with you today. I am Abdulai Abubakari-Sadik, an M. Phil student from the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. The study is conducted in partial fulfilment of my requirement for the award of M. Phil Political Science Degree. The interview guide is purposefully designed to solicit views on the topic: why are Contemporary State Institutions more prone to violent attacks by Political Party Vigilante Groups than pre – Fourth state institution: The case of Health Insurance and Youth Employment Agency in Northern Region

Please, the interview would last from 30 – 50 minutes, and please, I will be recording the session because I cannot afford to miss anything you will say. Your responses will only be shared with me and my supervisors. This interview is purely for an academic purpose and thus confidentiality is strongly upheld.

Thank you very much and I am looking forward to your support to enable me to complete this study successfully.

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Interviewee

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Date

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Institution

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM

1. What is your about political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism?
2. What in your view are the causes of political party vigilantism, particularly on state institutions?
3. In your view, how can it be stopped or prevented from happening?

FEATURES OF CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS (NHIA/YEA) AND PRE-FOURTH REPUBLIC STATE INSTITUTIONS (SSNIT/SIC)

1. What is your understanding of state institutions?
2. Why are some state institutions like NHIA and YEA mostly affected by violent attacks by political party vigilante groups?
3. Why are state institutions like SSNIT and SIC mostly spared or ignored from violent attacks of political party vigilante groups?
4. What do you think should done to stop the violent attacks on institutions like NHIA and YEA?

STOPPING THE VIOLENT ATTACKS OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTE GROUPS ON CONTEMPORARY STATE INSTITUTIONS

1. Generally, how can we stop the violent activities of political party vigilante groups on state institutions?
2. How can we generally stop the activities of political party vigilante groups in the country?