

range themselves in three rows behind him. The megaphonist shouts out the phrases after him and the congregation repeat. The body is then placed in the grave and each throws a handful of earth into it.

The grave is always very shallow, never more than three feet deep. This, they usually explain, is to enable the body to get out at the Resurrection. It has a narrower trench at the bottom which will just take the body lying on its side, and provides ledges to support sticks and straw so that the earth does not touch the body. It is orientated north-south and the body placed on the right side with its face turned towards the *qibla*. This practice has been adopted by many pagans. Clergy differ as to whether the grave should be marked or not, and the general opinion is opposed to this, but sometimes in the Sahil sticks or stones will be seen at the head and foot of the mound. After a short time nothing indicates the place of the graves in the compound or village burial ground. Even with newly-islamized the remnants of the ancestor cult have no connexion with graves. Contrary to Muslims in other parts of the world there is no visiting of graves:

They wash their hands thus and their feet, they salute one another.

They scatter in silence, and leave thee in the grave.¹

After the interment it is the Sudanese rule as in Morocco that participants return to the village in silence by a different route from that by which they came, as after the *'id* prayers. In parts of the Sahil (Kayes, Jenne, Songhay) the mourners return to the house of the deceased for further ablutions, prayers, and readings. All insist that ablutions are necessary after the funeral for all participants in order to remove the contamination of death.

After-death ceremonial consists of the offering of *ṣadaqa* to God on specified days. Fulfilment of the prescribed rites and other obligations of the survivors, such as almsgiving and payment of debts, is regarded as obligatory, not merely in order to eliminate the contamination of death, but for the repose of the soul of the deceased.² Muslims have every confidence in the efficacy of their rites and once completed on'

¹ From a poem by 'Uthmān dan Fodio in C. H. Robinson, *Specimens of Hausa Literature* 1896, pp. 80-81.

² H. Gaden writes (*Proverbes et maximes peuls et toucouleurs*, p. 61): 'It is believed that he who has left debts is not at peace in the grave as long as they remain unsettled. If the creditor dies unpaid the *m̄bēlu*, or shadow soul, of the debtor follows the *m̄bēlu* of the creditor beseeching it to accept payment of his debt, the burden of which oppresses him. But the *m̄bēlu* of the creditor refuses because it can only be settled on the day of Resurrection. The *m̄bēlu* of the debtor, therefore, knows no repose, but had the son paid his father's debt before the death of the creditor, the *m̄bēlu* of his father would have peacefully awaited the Resurrection and Last Judgement.'

the fortieth day there are no offerings of such a nature as would constitute a cult of ancestors.

With Soninke¹ the *imām* on returning to the house calls in a loud voice for the dinner of the dead. A calabash of unpounded millet is placed before him, the others group themselves around, he prays and hands the calabash to the family cleric who washed the body. On the third day the white cloth which covered the body is removed from the roof where it has been displayed since the funeral and washed. They prepare an alms of millet which, after being blessed by the cleric, is ground and mixed with milk to make *sōssē*. In the afternoon the *imām* arrives and puts the *sōssē* into five calabashes. The grave-cloth and clothes of the deceased are brought. He blesses all with prayer, shares the *sōssē* with the other clergy, and gives the family cleric the clothes. All the family remain within the compound for eight days, and during this time the whole village observes mourning; no festivals, drumming, and dancing are allowed.

Susu, Temne, Mende, and other peoples of western Guinea offer ceremonial rice 'sacrifice' on the first, third, seventh, and fortieth days after death, the last being the day the spirit departs, after which the widow is free to marry. Mende practice is as follows. Rice-sacrifice (*safandajaa*) is offered after returning from the funeral. Three chickens are killed, three calabashes of white rice,² with three kolas in each, are prepared. Other rice is prepared for eating, together with a bowl of uncooked rice into which each one puts money. The *fodie* is asked to 'offer the sacrifice'. He and the others place a hand on the three bowls, those unable to reach place a hand on those in front. The *fodie* recites a prayer in Arabic asking Muḥammad and other prophets to intercede with God on behalf of the new arrival; no direct prayer to God being offered. Then the maternal uncle prays in Mende asking the prophets and *ndebla woveisia* (ancestors) to look after the deceased and the family. The money collected is given to the *fodie* as 'passport money' and he divides the rice according to custom. The sacrifices on the third, seventh, and fortieth days are similar but on a larger scale, including if possible the offering of a sheep or goat. Seven bowls are offered on the seventh day, and after the ceremony a relative pours a libation of water on the ground. Susu and Temne practices are similar.³ Temne have one general bowl for ancestors (*afam afi*), but special bowls are

¹ See J. H. Saint-Père, op. cit., pp. 159-62.

² *Mba lewie*, rice dough mixed with honey or sugar. Red rice (*m̄ba b̄r̄i*) is abhorred as associated with pagan practice.

³ Susu *thamdog*, Temne *tam̄r kabo*, 'to set bread'.

prepared for recently departed persons. These are kept until morning and then, their virtue having departed, given to children. The cleric is always called in to pray in Arabic, whilst the family head talks to the ancestors.

A sacrificial *ṣadaqa* of the staple food is offered nearly everywhere on these days (this apart from the slaughtering of a sheep and preparation of food necessary for the visiting mourners) when clerics offer prayer. Islam is against the heavy feasting and drinking which characterizes the mourning feast of pagans. The Dagomba *ṣadaqa* consists of *gumba*, 'sacrificial grain'.¹ Nupe after the burial return to the house to eat *ṣadaqa*. They say this is the first food the deceased (*kuchi*) eats in *èku*. Relatives give money and kola to the cleric. On the third, eighth, and fortieth day *ṣadaqa* is offered, the last being the day his *rđyi* goes to *èku* to remain until the Day of Judgement. Most Songhay observe only the seventh-day feast when they provide a bull, if they can afford it, for the whole village as *ṣadaqa*, but only the affluent make an offering on the fortieth day when they collect the village clerics for a Qur'ān recital and give them a feast at its conclusion.

Widow's Ritual Mourning. According to Islamic law the widow should observe 'idda for three periods of legal purity (*qur'*), or four months ten days, during which she may not remarry. A slave-wife observes half this period. If the widow is pregnant the period extends until her delivery. In the Sudan the 'idda of widowhood is far more strictly observed than that of divorce because of the persistence of old ideas of the soul. Custom varies the period slightly. In some places it is four moons; in Hausaland some said five months, others 130 days, and others 122 days. Nupe said 115 days. In the Timbuktu region it lasts five months fifteen days.² South of the Sudan, especially in western Guinea and even among Fulbe of Futa Jalon, the widow is free to remarry after the fortieth-day sacrifice. The heir cannot turn widows out of the house during the 'idda but owes them neither food nor raiment, custom overriding the *shari'a* in this respect. At the expiration of the 'idda the wives are free and can claim the payment of the bride-price if entitled

¹ The word *gumba* has been adopted from Hausa. Among the Māguzāwa it consists of a preparation of bulrush millet mixed with water. In their rite it is 'hung up overnight in a calabash. In the morning it is taken down, milk added to some of it, and this portion is drunk by members of the household and distributed to the neighbours as *sadaka*. The remaining part, without milk, is scattered on the floor of all the huts, in the corn storehouses and on the *jigō* of *dāfi* wood sacred to Kure and the model hut sacred to 'Inna'; J. Greenberg, *The Influence of Islam on a Sudanese Religion*, 1946, p. 45.

² Songhay call the 'idda period *handu gu serti*, 'five-months stipulation'. In Gao it is the normal four months ten days.

to it. The Songhay woman, however, returns to her own family for the 'idda, but the heir is supposed to maintain her during this period.

The death of her husband involves the woman in a state of taboo.¹ She is divested of all her clothes and ornaments, bathed and dressed in old or poor garments, black or white according to custom, her hair is let down, disordered, and bound in a kerchief. No jewellery may be worn, nor cosmetics applied. She may wash neither herself nor her clothes. She is provided with Qur'anic charms to protect her against her husband's spirit, as well as local counterparts (knife, cowries) against attacks of witches. She may not leave her home for a prescribed period (Tokolor: fifteen days) or attend feasts. Among many (e.g. Songhay) she may not leave the house during the whole 'idda, unless at night when no one is about the village. With some she may not speak to anyone except near relations, and above all not to any man.

The ritual for ending the mourning period varies. The procedure with the recently islamized Mende is as follows. For three days before the seventh-day sacrifice the widows who were virgins when the deceased married them are secluded in a screened part of the veranda. They are looked after by old women and not allowed to go out unaccompanied for fear of the husband's spirit which is around and jealous. They can only eat plantain and no rice. Their heads are shaved and remain so from the seventh to the fortieth day. On the thirty-ninth day they are returned to the screened veranda. Then comes the fortieth day sacrifice after which they are taken out into the fields and washed. On their return each is asked to choose a husband among the right degrees of the family. Similarly with other peoples of Sierra Leone. The Susu widow cooks food for her husband on the fortieth day (*labirañ*) and relatives eat it: 'She is washed like a corpse and then his *bari* (spirit) leaves.'

With Hausa of Zaria the widow's mourning period (*takaba* = 'idda) begins on the Friday following the death. She must wear 'white charms' wrapped up in white material, not leather, and worn around the neck. If circumstances allow she remains secluded the whole period. The freeing ceremony at the end (*fitar takaba*) is a great festival when all women relatives and friends (*kāwāyē*) bring food after nightfall. A small calabash, placed upside down inside a large one which contains water, is beaten all through the night (*kidān ruwa*, 'beating water'). Special songs are sung by hired women, all the mourning clothes are given away, and she is washed. In the morning she appears in new clothes, the clergy recite prayers, and the feast is held.

¹ On the taboos Hausa women must observe, see Mary Smith, *Baba of Karo*, p. 212.

Influence of Islam in the Economic Sphere and upon Material Culture

I. ISLAM AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

A GLANCE at Islamic economic theory will show in what way a religious culture might be expected to influence economic life. Islamic law never formulated any system of economics, for such ideas belong to the modern Western way of thinking. It was not interested in abstractions like economic theory, but about the conduct of persons. Thus it was less concerned about the way or means by which a man earns his living or acquires his wealth, than with the way he dealt with his gains. It has its rules governing the conduct of traders, but not of markets. It is concerned with the welfare of the community, hence self-interest such as would endanger that is condemned. Since God has decreed one's status in the world, resignation to one's lot is a virtue, whilst avarice, usury, and gambling are vices. Islam recognizes private property, but disapproves of hoarding; consequently it not merely urges one to be charitable (*sadaqa*), but has made charitableness a matter of legislation (*zakāt*), whilst Qur'ānic injunctions lay special stress upon the duty of caring for orphans, widows, and destitute. Trade occupies an important place in Islamic tradition, and it has built up a large body of regulations governing contracts, exchange, and loans. Its system of taxation and religious obligations make it necessary to budget for an economic surplus. Its social and labour ethics and legislation influence economic life. Regulations regarding the *jihād* and slavery justified both slave-raiding and the system of economic inequality. The husband's obligation to provide for his wife affects the sex division of labour; its regulations regarding ownership and inheritance could, if adopted, revolutionize traditional economic life by the fragmentation of landholdings and individualization of real property, and disrupt the family as an economic unit.

The converse aspect needs noticing in what is primarily a religious study. This is the way each occupational sphere affects understanding and practice of Islam and the extent to which old religious attitudes are bound up with economic activities; for example, ritual magic with animal productivity, the agricultural cycle and craftsmanship.

West African societies had already achieved fully developed techniques and economic organization before Islam made its appearance. Its influence is most evident in the commercial sphere which in the Sudan belt was wholly taken over by Muslims. Its direct influence in other spheres has been weak. Changes are due primarily to other factors, but once set in motion, Islam, with its body of legal institutions, governs the direction of change in accordance with its own pattern. The main forms of Sudanese economy fall into the groups of pastoralism, agriculture, hunting and fishing, industry and craftsmanship, trade, and clerical occupations. These categories are to a great extent interdependent. There is no closed system of economic differentiation except in regard to certain crafts. Pastoralists, craftsmen, and traders practise agriculture; agriculturalists keep livestock, hunt and fish, whilst their wives and daughters engage in home crafts and petty trading; all village clergy supplement their income from performing clerical duties, teaching, and amulet-making, by cultivating or trading.

2. NOMADS

Nomads have filled an important economic role in the Sudan primarily in breeding camels, cattle, and sheep, but also in organizing or disrupting trade-routes, and in encroaching upon or co-operating with cultivators. They need not, however, occupy us long for Islam scarcely influences their economic life, though it may help to rationalize changes due to other factors. Nigerian Tuareg and southern Arab Kunta lead a semi-sedentary life resembling that of riverain Negroes in many respects. In this case, change of habitat and mode of life provided the conditions by which Islam could gain greater influence. The arabized Berbers whom we call Moors have been considerably modified in their social institutions and this has affected aspects of economic life. In the Sudan belt the only nomads encamped in the midst of Negro agriculturalists, other than southern Tuareg, are the Fulbe, scattered over the whole region, and the Baqqāra, cattle-breeding Arab tribes in Lake Chad region. Fulbe nomads fill an important function in the economy of the Sudan, but Islam has exercised little influence upon them. On the other hand, many have been modified by their Negro environment which has led to settlement and intermarriage, but it is the act of settling which has enabled Islam to change their institutions. With nomadic Fulbe cattle-keeping is a way of life, for cattle are not a commercial but a social asset, representing wealth and capital rather than a source of income. Mixed Fulbe groups, however, have found in

settlement the practical utilization of their cattle as a means of exchange.¹ Upon many Baqqāra of Chad region the same Negro influences have been working as upon Fulbe.

Islam suits nomads, but being an urban religion does not revolutionize their social and economic life. The prosperity of herds is dependent upon natural conditions and that involves the continuation of non-Islamic magical ritual. Their social institutions are closely adapted to their needs, consequently they react against any attempt to enforce Islamic law upon them. *Qādī's* courts are unacceptable in a society where customary law rules and justice is decided by tribal elders. A feature of nomadic Islam referred to frequently has been the formation of clerical sections to perform religious duties on behalf of warrior clans.

The nomad is more concerned with rights in animals than in land. Pasture-grounds and watering-places remain the concern of the social unit, but Islam, by allowing for individual ownership and through its inheritance regulations, may bring about changes in animal ownership. As with Negro peoples both tribal and individual property rights are recognized. Islam has no influence upon the first but affects the second, though only rarely do women appear to accumulate animal wealth, chiefly through bride-price and inheritance. Islamic contractual law has gained little ground. It has not had any effect upon such aspects as livestock-lease, the agreement by which an owner confides animals to the care of a lessee who receives as recompense milk and a proportion of the increase.

The most successful attempt to regulate nomads before the European era was made by Shaikh Ḥamadu of Masina. He amassed large herds scattered all over the country as property of the state, and appointed an *amīru māgal* as state herd-chief who nominated subordinates to the provinces. These officials also exercised authority over Fulbe tribes in such a way that the state could regulate the use of pasturages, cycles of transhumance, prices of animals and their products, and take precautions against diseases.² Western control has had a more profound influence than Islam mainly through the suppression of raiding, the regulariza-

¹ The nomadic Fulbe who emigrated into Futa Jalon became completely sedentarized, chiefly through exploitation of slave labour, and having acquired a taste for the products of the land are forced to some extent to occupy themselves with cultivation. But cattle still ally with Islam as symbols of superiority, a sign of nobility, which they refuse to exploit. Both are the first things to which the new-born child is introduced since it is made to drink milk and the magical water called *naši*.

² See Ch. Monteil, *Djénne*, p. 221.

tion of migrations and caravan traffic, and in fostering the change from nomadism to transhumance.

3. AGRICULTURALISTS

Islam has taken little interest in agriculture which has no essential place in legal texts, and the effect of Muslims upon agricultural economy cannot be compared with that of the Portuguese, who, through their introductions from the new world, revolutionized the economic life of many peoples. Indigenous to the Sudan were *dura* (small millet or Pennisetum) and *dukhū* (sorghum), the basic cereals, rice, fonio, and yam; all except yam being referred to frequently by the Arabic writers. Trade relations after the rise of Islam do not appear to have introduced new basic cultures or methods of cultivation. Traffic across the Sahara, so influential in many spheres, was relatively unproductive in the agricultural sphere, though previous traffic, mainly from the Nilotic region, had brought new cultures.¹ It is true that names for wheat, melon, turnip, cloves, dates, sugar-cane, fig, pomegranate, onion, and the like, in Sudanese languages are derived from Arabic but their cultivation did not spread widely. They were grown in various parts of the north, but primarily as luxuries for foreigners in sahilian ports. Rice, propagated in the Mediterranean world since the eighth century A.D. and spreading into the Sudan, may be an exception, but if so it spread rapidly for it is mentioned by many Arab geographers. No doubt the imported replaced an indigenous variety. The clothing requirements of Islam, however, encouraged the cultivation of cotton.²

The economically-exploited system of slavery probably derives from the Saharan system. The freeing of masters from manual labour had led to economic differentiation and the growth of a social hierarchy long before the introduction of Islam. It enabled an Islamic clerical class to be supported, but this was simply a substitution for the priestly class. Workers on the land were scarcely islamized. A kind of anti-nomy prevailed over vast areas, especially in Fulbe states, between agriculturalists, slaves of the land, who remained practically pagan, and

¹ Trade relations influenced the economy of farmers in so far as they led them to work for an economic surplus to buy things they could not produce.

² Al-Bakrī mentions that in Toronka on the Senegal whose people weave the cotton strips called *shakkiyyāt*, 'though there is not a great deal of cotton in their country yet you can scarcely find a single compound which does not have a cotton shrub' (al-Bakrī, p. 173; cf. Ibn Sa'īd for Barīsa, in Abū' l-Fidā, *Taqwīm*, p. 157). Al-'Umarī (*Masālik*, p. 66) reports that it was cultivated in Māli. Ad-Dimishqī (p. 240) mentions the (silk?) cotton tree in the Kawkaw region. The word for cotton in the majority of Sudan languages is a corruption of *qutun*.

Fulbe, slaves of God, who were fervent Muslims. It is obvious, therefore, that the economic revolution caused by the abolition of slavery would affect Fulbe religious life, since it compelled many to abandon their leisured life lounging around mosques and work for their daily bread.

Islam influences traditional economy in so far as its regulations regarding ownership and inheritance gain ground. It has been shown that in general these have not been adopted in regard to land tenure and real property. Change in this sphere came about, in the last century, through the influence of theocratic governments and their successors; and, in the present century, less from Islamic pressure (except where supported by European governments as in Northern Nigeria) than from such factors as scarcity and pressure on land and a heightened individualism encouraged by the conditions of a new age. Nadel has shown that the size of the collective farming groups among Nupe is declining. Formerly they consisted of from ten to fifteen members, today they have often declined to two or three, for sons after marriage tend to claim their personal plots.¹

Since the family normally forms a working unit Islamic contractual law has not led to the formation of agricultural associations. Labour is still based either on clientship² or the collective work of family and neighbours. A notable exception is found in the collective farm settlements formed by the *muridin* of Senegal.³ Under the inspiration of Ahmad Bamba an Islamic saint cult has given an impulse for the exploitation of uncultivated land, the greater productivity of land owned by members, and price-control of products. Upon joining the *ṭarīqa* the neophyte agrees to surrender himself body and soul to the shaikh. If he possesses land it is for the service of the community; if landless he is allotted a plot, provided with seed and loaned implements and animals. The shaikh's deputies take control of the harvest, which being a cash crop (especially ground-nuts) is assured a more remunerative sale than would be obtained by the isolated cultivator. The system also embraces craftsmen and traders. Revenues are distributed among members either in kind or goods. It is, therefore, a system of collective security in which the shaikh, as trustee of the land and controller of capital and labour, is responsible for the welfare of all affiliated. The system has widened the idea of agricultural co-operation from the traditional one between

¹ S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium*, pp. 242-3.

² The *métayage* system of land tenure, under which the proprietor receives a proportion of the crops or cash or labour, is widespread, especially since the abolition of slavery, but is not the direct effect of Islam.

³ See P. Marty, 'Les Mourides d'Amadou Bamba', *R.M.M.* xxv (1913), 106-12.

members of natural groups to members of the new Murid society, and, in contrast to the traditional Islamic attitude, sanctified labour under the aegis of Islam.¹

The adoption of Islamic regulations concerning women may affect agricultural economy. The husband's obligations, women's right to own capital resources, and the tendency towards their seclusion, has in some parts led to new divisions of labour and their economic independence. Hausa have been strongly influenced in this respect. Whilst pagan Hausa women work on the land, among Muslims farm work is the exclusive province of men, the wife's obligations being confined to domestic work. These changes are due to the former system of slave labour rather than to Islam, the attitude of the privileged class spreading to free and serf Hausa.² In other regions where women's share in the work of the farm is important Islam has had little effect.

The economic demands that religion makes upon farming communities include offerings to clerics as formerly to cult priests, in addition to other forms of *ṣadaqa* to propitiate the spirits governing fertility and increase. These offerings involve providing for a surplus above mere subsistence requirements. Since the farmer's need to achieve harmony with the spiritual world is as vital as physical labour, the religion of the agricultural cycle follows the old pattern. Cultivation rites vary,³ but the general outline is much the same and only one or two illustrations need be provided so that our estimate of the relative demands of Islam and of the spirit world may be balanced. The following are the principal rites among islamized Temne. Before clearing the ground they consult the seer, ask permission of the *kārifi*, prepare rice flour dough and make *sadika* at the entrance to the plot. Before burning they make another *sadika*. Before hoeing they build a small hut on piles, place stones in it, chew kola, and spit on them. When the rice is almost ready for harvesting a little is cut, sieved, and placed on a pole at the

¹ More recently the leaders have realized that mechanized agriculture could multiply their production. In 1949 a beginning was made on lands originally sanctified by the manual labour of the founder, on a system of triennial rotation: millet, ground-nuts, and fallow (see P. Pelissier, 'L'Archide au Sénégal', *Les Cahiers d'Outre-Mer*, iv (1951), 222-5). It will be interesting to see what effect this will have upon the original sanctification of land and labour.

² Cf. the Hausa saying: 'Farm work is not becoming for a wife. She is free, you may not put her to hoe grass (like a slave).'

³ Cultivation rites are almost non-existent among Nupe, whether pagan or Muslim. When rains are late the Islamic rain-prayer (*istisqā'*) is performed in the bush (but no fasting), the village head calls upon the *zigi* (priest) to do his part, but there are no rainmakers as with their Yoruba neighbours. If danger threatens the farmer asks a cleric to sacrifice a ram on the farm, but these are individual and not communal rites. See also S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium*, p. 237.

entrance of the farm as protection against the *ɔ-ser* (witch). This serves to show that the spirits have been paid to protect. The first cutting is beaten, cooked, and eaten on the farm, a little being offered at the spirit-hut as thankoffering to the spirits. The Temne, islamized during the last 200 years, have been too recently influenced for Islam to have changed farm ritual, but there is a gradual addition of Islamic magic ritual. Thus some Temne and Mende, at stage three, after burning but before hoeing, make a *šadaqa* of a white kola and remnant of white cloth. These are placed on the earth and hands are laid on them whilst a cleric recites a passage from the Qur'ān. The kola nut is buried and the cloth tied to a pole in the centre of the cultivation.

Similarly with long-islamized cultivators Islam has little influence upon practices vital to the fertility of land and the protection of crops. Marty writes of agricultural rituals among the people of Futa Jalon: 'They are undoubtedly anterior [to Islam], and it is certain that it is by the compliance of the *karamoko* who, being powerless to suppress these popular customs or maybe little desirous of so doing, have set themselves to eliminate all that was too obviously pagan and render them orthodox by islamizing them.'¹ The direct influence of Islam is seen in the addition and then substitution of Islamic magic ritual in place of sacrifice to spirits. Some islamized Hausa have discontinued sacrifice to the *uwar gwōna* (farm-mother), or Magiro or other *iskōki*. Instead they seek the protection of God by making in His name offerings to poor and clergy, and call in the cleric to protect their fields and crops against spirits, witches, thieves, monkeys, and other marauders. He reads the Qur'ān, recites prayers, spits on the earth, and provides an amulet to be tied on a pole or tree. In this way Islam sanctifies the felt need to propitiate the forces which govern fertility.

4. URBAN LIFE AND TRADING

A subsistence economy characterizes the major proportion of men's activities, but this was inadequate for the needs of the inhabitants of the Sudan states who had to pay taxes in one form or another to their rulers, as well as satisfy the economic requirements of religion. In addition, the trading economy introduced villagers to a wide variety of articles they could not grow (such as kola) or make for themselves (clothes and trinkets). Farmers, therefore, had to produce an economic surplus which tax-collectors and traders transported to the markets and trading towns.

¹ P. Marty, *Guinée*, p. 493.

The consequent exchange economy took two forms: one internal, embracing both small-scale trading within the local community and a wider commerce, carried on mainly by individual traders; and an external exchange with North Africa through the sahilian 'ports', whose organization involved large-scale operations and organized caravans. The Saharan routes have been likened to sea-routes in that they are defined tracks between two lines of ports in North Africa and the southern borderland, with along them various oasis ports-of-call. The southern ports were founded by Berbers and other northern organizers of Saharan transport, not by Negroes. In them slaves, gold, ivory, pepper, and other local products were exchanged for Saharan salt and North African goods. Through the trans-Saharan routes Islam was introduced into the Sahil and Sudan, a native Muslim trading element was soon formed and took over the whole internal commercial sphere.

South of the Sahil ports few large towns developed in western Sudan.¹ Towns were mainly residences of rulers and had the characteristics of agglomerations of villages. A considerable proportion of their population engaged in agriculture. They were organized in villages in which members of the same ethnic group congregated, with their own organization, chiefs, councils of elders, and mosques, and following their distinctive customs. Consequently they lacked all municipal feeling and disappeared without leaving a trace. As market centres foreign traders operated in them, but they also were segregated into their own suburb. Ruler towns were unstable, the continual changes in their sites showing that they were centres of village civilization. The various capitals of Māli, though they had a large trading community, were simply collections of villages. Timbuktu and Jenne had different characteristics, since they were founded by members of the Mediterranean civilization for the purpose of trade, and remained stable throughout the centuries. Other trading centres, like Nyamina, Sansanding, and Bamako, were not normally ruling towns. Kano and Jenne were unusual in that they were both capitals and centres of internal trade. None of the founded capitals of the theocrasies of the nineteenth century, such as Sokoto and Hamdallāhi, became commercial centres. But the true markets of the Sudan region were traditional centres on trade-routes or outside a village, held on fixed days of the week. Markets were, therefore, not tied to towns whose instability did not upset economic life.

Islam as an urban religion cannot exist in its distinctive form without

¹ The peculiarities of towns in central Sudan are dealt with in the writer's forthcoming *History of Islam in West Africa*.

towns and only townspeople can conscientiously follow its principles. The farmer instinctively resists it as a disintegrative factor. On the other hand, in the town, where life and personal relationships are more secularized, Islam is an integrative factor. Town life and trading involve abandoning local religion, Islamic law can operate over a wider field of social relations, *qāḍī's* courts can function, and teachers attract pupils from a wide area. In the townsman class there are three occupational groups; clergy living on offerings and fees; men of business such as merchants and traders, craftsmen, shopkeepers, and street vendors, for if profit is meagre so is the expense of setting up; and, finally, artisans and manual labourers. The heterogeneity characteristic of towns, however, derives from differences of ethnic origins rather than from divisions of labour. Islam, with its power to call to the one *jāmi'* for Friday prayer, is the only integrative factor.

Islam and contacts with North Africa had little direct influence upon means of exchange. Coinage was not adopted in the Sudan states,¹ though shells were in use before they imported cowries. Exchange was the normal practice and in transactions the price was stipulated in mediums of exchange: rings, nuggets or *mithqāl's* of gold, strings of cowries (an unconsumable means of exchange), strips or bolts of cloth, bars of salt, measures of grain, slaves or animals. Al-Bakrī says that 'the means of exchange of the inhabitants of Silla are millet, salt, brass rings, and fine cotton strips called *shakkiyyāt*'.² Al-'Umarī wrote that in Kanem cotton material was the monetary standard: 'they use as money a cloth called *dendi* which is woven in their country. Each piece of material is 10 cubits or more in length. . . . They also use shells (*wada'*), beads, pieces of copper, and coined money (imported?), but the standard upon which value is based is cloth.'³ In western Sudan cloth formed the standard (*tamma* = 10 cubits), though for large-scale operations merchants used the *mithqāl* of gold, a term employed later as a fictitious measure. Strings of cowries were used throughout the Niger region, but were less widespread in central Sudan.⁴

Internal commerce was carried on by individual itinerant traders.

¹ Imported coinage was used by merchants but regarded as pieces of precious metal. The *douro espagnol* (Arab. *abū madfa'*) was used for a short time in Bornu but was supplanted by the Maria Theresa dollar.

² Al-Bakrī, p. 173.

³ *Masālik*, p. 44; *Ṣubḥ*, v. 280.

⁴ Cowries first appeared in Kano in the reign of Muḥammad Sharaf (1703-31); cf. Palmer, *Sud. Mem.* iii. 123. They were imported chiefly through the port of Badagari, spread but slowly, and appeared in Bornu only in Barth's time. They were not strung as in western Sudan and counting was quite a problem.

Few caravans went south of the sahilian ports, but individuals or small groups of traders could traverse the country without difficulty because their function was an economic necessity. In central Sudan the Hausa made trading their speciality, their activities extending throughout what is now Nigeria, across Dahomey and Togo into the Gold Coast where they met the Mande Dyula, the dominant traders of the Voltaic region. Throughout the west the word *dyula* has become synonymous with 'trader'. The traders of western Guinea are Mandinka, Soninke, and Susu. These traders acted as agents for Islamic culture, establishing themselves in villages along the routes, where they remained sometimes for years before returning home. Some settled permanently and thus created new Islamic nuclei. Villages along trade-routes tended to acquire Islamic characteristics, whilst the people of the bush remained pagan. Even where least effective they created favourable milieux for the ultimate spread of Islam.

The chief influences of Islam upon economic life derive from its universalism. In this Arabic helped. Its utility as a written language and its value as a link between scattered traders need not be stressed, and the schools which flourished in trading towns perhaps owed something to the commercial as well as to the religious value of Arabic. Traders introduced large numbers of Arabic commercial terms, such as weights and measures, into Sudanese languages.¹ But although the Islamic element took over the commercial field it brought little that was new. The same exports and the same methods continued when Berbers became Muslims. In the exploitation of Saharan salt-mines and Sudanese gold extraction (a pagan monopoly) there was no improvement. Handicrafts like leather work benefited from northern influences, but owed little to the direct influence of Islamic civilization.

In practice the action of Islamic law is not very effective. In towns trading practices, being based upon economic expediency, are little influenced. In village life the ethic of the individual only partially displaces the collective ethic of the cultivator. Islamic regulations affect the trader most in the sphere of personal and social relations. He regards the duty of almsgiving as important both for the welfare of his soul and the prosperity of his business. Contracts follow customary procedure but have been influenced by Islam and it is difficult to tell in the Sudan

¹ For example, the Arabic *mudd* was adopted throughout the Sudan for a measure of millet. It was an important exchange standard since millet formed the basis of economic life. In some villages the chief kept a standard measure mainly for the convenience of itinerant traders. Similarly with measures of length: Arab. *shibr*, 'span', Mande *sibira*, Songhay *silbi*, Fulfulde *sibre*.

zone which elements are indigenous and which due to Islam. The *qāḍī* will normally allow customary law except in the negative sense that he would not recognize a contract which was directly opposed to Islamic law, such as one concerning the sharing of the profits of a brothel or a self-pawning contract. Though the written contract has been introduced contracts are normally verbal, sealed by a handclasp and the recitation of the *Fātiḥa*.¹ Estimation of the correct day and even hour is important in drawing up a contract, and a plea before a *qāḍī* that one had been enacted on an unlucky day would have a reasonable chance of being accepted as evidence of its invalidity.

Traders are well acquainted with the devices by which the prohibition of usury may be circumvented. In the modern Islamic world these have ceased to be of interest, but in West Africa they are still prevalent. The prohibition is interpreted as applying only to interest on loans of money.² Consequently the legally-minded get around it by loaning goods, the debtor promising to repay double after a year; in other words, he acknowledges that he has received more than the actual amount of the loan. *Qāḍīs* recognize this type of transaction for it has received the sanction of the schools and the creditor can apply to the court to enforce restoration or the equivalent in money,³ but claims for interest on money lent would not be recognized. The normal small trader needs to borrow very little, but those who wish to make bulk purchases operate with a sleeping partner who receives a proportion of the profit by way of interest. Farmers frequently borrow grain or mortgage their harvest to tide over the 'hungry season' before the harvest, agreeing to repay $1\frac{1}{2}$ measures for each measure borrowed, but these are generally short-term loans. The Islamic prohibition has been beneficial to the farmer and small-scale trader for, in spite of the devices adopted to circumvent the letter of the law, a borrower cannot get heavily into debt since the

¹ Mande: *fatiha dō*, 'to conclude a contract'.

² A successful Hausa business man, al-ḥājj al-Ḥasan, who died in 1955, 'used to find an outlet for surplus capital by advancing money to any promising young men who put up to him a likely sounding trading scheme, asking them to repay half their profits (in some cases less; in some cases none) if they made any. The size of his bank balance can be judged from the fact that he was one of those gilded men of Kano who stipulate for religious reasons that their deposit accounts shall be non-interest-bearing, but who receive instead a substantial "dash" each year' (*West Africa*, 29 Oct. 1955, p. 1020).

³ Professor Daryll Forde writes: 'In Zaria province, for example, the judges who administer the Koranic law, admit as a valid transaction the sale on credit by a money lender of an article such as a gown, actually obtainable for say 7s. cash, for 10s. This the buyer proceeds to sell for 7s. in order to secure that amount of cash and eventually repays the "seller" the agreed price of 10s.' (*The Native Economics of Nigeria*, 1946, p. 165). H. Minor (*The Primitive City of Timbuktu*, 1953, pp. 69-70) reports the same practice in Timbuktu.

interest remains fixed, however many years elapse before repayment, and the creditor has no legal means of enforcing repayment of illegal loans.

Islam exercised little influence upon the industrial sphere, primarily because of the hierarchization of society into craft classes and castes. In central Sudan craftsmen were organized into guilds or trade corporations, bound together by common professional interests, mutual help, and recognition of the authority of the guild-head. The latter, equivalent to the *amīn* of the Arab *sūq*, acted as intermediary between members and central authority, fixed prices for their commodities, and regulated differences. Craftsmen in towns are invariably Muslims, but the Islam of members of the professional castes is superficial. The technique of crafts and the organization of markets involve ritual, therefore Muslim craftsmen cannot abandon old practices. In North Africa craftsmen have a patron saint, but those of West Africa are under the protection of a patron spirit, considered as inventor of the craft. No Hausa smith would neglect to offer sacrifice to Maḳērā, their chief spirit, nor a hunter to Gajērē and other hunter or forest spirits. Similarly with markets. M. G. Smith remarks: 'Despite the long centuries of Islamic proselytization in Hausaland, the market derives its mystical charter and its economic vitality from the traditional pre-Islamic spirits.'¹

5. INFLUENCE OF ISLAM UPON MATERIAL CULTURE

Sudanese peoples had attained stable forms of cultural organization long before a specifically Islamic culture began to penetrate. Influences from the Mediterranean and Nilotic regions had been so absorbed as to seem wholly indigenous. When Berber traders introduced Islam into the southern Sahil they forged a much closer link than had existed before between the North African and Sudan civilizations and it was naturally this belt, the zone of transition between Sahara and Sudan, Berbers and Negroes, which was most influenced. Islam penetrates most deeply where a strong urban culture is already in existence, but in West Africa, a sphere of village civilizations, it had to create its own urban milieu and cultural characteristics.

The native religious assembly is characterized not by a building but by the sacred grove such as is mentioned in the first account of Gāna.

¹ Mary Smith, *Baba of Karo*, p. 281.

Urban Islam required the large building for worship. For this purpose the type of architecture associated with the Sahil lent itself, and this style became associated with Islamic culture simply because Islam first gained the people of the Sahil. It is not characteristic of Mandinka village civilization, in spite of the inclusion of Jenne and Timbuktu within the sphere of the state of Māli, but is found in the urban civilization of the Sahil and Sudan from Futa Toro to Lake Chad. It is rarely found outside this region with the exception of the Dyula dispersion. The Dyula, deriving from the urban civilization of Jenne, have taken this style wherever they have founded settlements, not only at Bobo Dioulasso in the savanna, but even in the forest country of the Ivory Coast where they continue to maintain it in spite of the different, and seemingly unsuitable, climatical conditions. Their villages have the characteristic Sudanese aspect of straight alleys, running between flat-roofed mud houses, with their pinnacles and water spouts, surrounding an inner courtyard upon which the rooms open. Pylons stand on each side of the heavily-worked entrance door with its carved lock, identical with those of North Africa. But this style of architecture remains exotic since it has not been adopted by the natives of the region.

Islamic contacts modified the economic life of West Africans chiefly in so far as Muslims became agents of economic exchange; consequently they played a pivotal role in the diffusion of Islamic material culture. This is most evident in regard to personal habits and clothing. Islam enjoins personal taboos, forms of hygiene and manners which have inculcated habits of cleanliness, courtesy, and propriety. Here the effect of Islamic legal morality is more evident than in economic life. Though its effect in this sphere varies among different peoples certain elements always go along with islamization and are evident in the village as well as in the town. A Muslim village, even though but superficially islamized, is never quite the same as a pagan village, and the first stage is the adoption of elements of material culture, many of which, though not in themselves specifically Islamic, are associated with its civilization in the eyes of pagans. Material culture is closely allied with religious differentiation. If a man is naked or semi-naked he is a Pagan, if he wears a robe or gown he is a Muslim, if he puts on shorts or trousers he is a Christian. If he urinates squatting he is a Muslim, if standing a Pagan or a Christian. Some cultural elements are adopted in dissociation from Islam as a religious culture, whilst under different circumstances they are adopted because people want to be thought of as Muslims. In this category of material traits actual religious elements

must be included. A Pagan in a Muslim environment imitates the external postures of ritual prayer as part of his attempt to assimilate himself, even though temporarily, into his new environment. In the sphere of village civilization the different traits coexist on a basis of religious differentiation,¹ and many elements of material culture will not be assimilated until people have crossed the dividing line.

Traders' importations were naturally governed by demand. New material goods which fit in with established cultural patterns are easily adopted, any which might upset the pattern of life are rejected. But Islam, by modifying habits of mind, opens the way for new acquisitions. In any case they are africanized and become part of African Islamic culture. The stress Islam places upon clothing encourages the art of weaving, but styles of the turban or gown are not the same as those of North Africa. The most important cultural introduction of Islam was the alphabet, but even here, though it has no relation to anything in former life and is wholly associated with Islam, a Sudanese style distinctive from that of North Africa made its appearance.

The distinction between things directly due to Islam and those associated with Islamic culture by no logical process is seen more clearly in the sphere of personal habits. Islamic culture carries with it a deep sensitivity to nakedness and has led to the adoption of clothing and to a general uniformity of type and style, though with local variations and with the usual differences in style and quality between rulers, clergy, peasant, and nomad. The universal type of Sudan Muslim dress consists of short pants and a little smock with short sleeves for men and a wrapper round the waist for women. A long full gown is worn over this on special occasions and by men of rank, together with a cotton cap and a turban; and women add a blouse or voluminous wrapper. Chiefs wear varied types of head-dress; in the west a round or conical head-gear, in the centre an adaptation of the Tuareg mouth-veil.² These

¹ This may be illustrated by the Mande higher numeral *keme*, which is apparently an ancient assimilation: ancient Egyptian *khemen* (value 80), Berber *temed*, Fulfulde *himere*, pl. *keme*. In Māli and among Mandinka pagans today its value is 60, with Bambara it is 80, but wherever Islam has been adopted its value is 100. Three systems of enumeration, therefore, exist in the same language group based on the same word. Traders have had to distinguish them: *mali-nkeme*, *bāmāna-nkeme*, and *silāmi-ya-keme* (or *faradye-la-keme*), the Islamic *keme* (see M. Delafosse, *La Langue Mandingue*, i. 274-5; S. de Ganay, 'Graphie bambara des nombres', *J. Soc. Afr.* xx (1950), 296 n. 1).

² The peoples of north-central Sudan have adopted many Tuareg characteristics. The visage muffler (but not the mouth taboo with which it is associated) has been adopted in a simpler form, merely hiding the lower part of the face, by northern Songhay, Zerma, Hausa, and settled Fulani chiefs. Many have also adopted the Tuareg sword, arm dagger, and bracelet. Hausa and Zerma chiefs use the Arab saddle, mount from the right, and do not use adjustable

head-dresses are worn by the commons only on special occasions. In general, neither blacks nor whites of the Sudan mind praying with the head bare, contrary to the attitude prevailing in most parts of the Islamic world. Muslims have maintained the custom, universal among pagans, of shaving the head when in mourning. Henna usage¹ is a characteristic of Islamic civilization which has spread widely because of a prophetic recommendation. It purifies, it is known to mollify *jinn* and neutralize their urge to harm. Its application characterizes all Islamic festivities and transitional rites. The night of the great henna (*lailat al-ḥinnā' al-kabīra*), a feature of marriage ceremonial in Morocco and the eastern Sudan, has been adopted by Songhay and Hausa.

Islam inculcates habits of personal cleanliness and refinement of manners, the first being due to its ritual regulations, and its adoption leads to demands for soap and perfumes. The effect of Islamic taboos such as drinking intoxicants and eating carrion has been mentioned elsewhere. The slaughtering of animals according to the Islamic rite is an early acquisition, important in that it makes flesh licit. Islam prohibits mutilations, tattooing, and incisions, except circumcision and excision, and the disappearance of deformation customs is an index to depth of islamization. Tattooed Muslims are generally those, like Dyula, living among pagans whose wives conform to custom in having their children done. Taboos form a common element linking Muslims. Those that run counter to more important things will not be accepted. The taboo on contact with a dog is effective where people have no use for it, but ineffective with people who engage in hunting. Islamization normally leads to the abandonment of the practice, common among many pagans, of eating dogs.

Fermented drink is closely linked with the sacred and plays a great role in religious and social life. Islam naturally seeks to break this link and the prohibition of alcohol is closely associated with the ban on offerings to communal cult deities. This prohibition has had considerable effect even though everywhere Muslims will be found who ignore it. Public opinion can be mobilized against fermented drinks on account of the role they play in pagan life. Here an Islamic taboo has been beneficial and Western influence harmful. Beer, of course, is part of the natural diet of many Africans, and it is not this which is the problem today, but stirrups. Al-'Umarī says (*Masālik*, pp. 68–69) that the people of Māli used the Arab saddle and method of riding except that they mounted from the left.

¹ Its diffusion in the Sahil is no doubt pre-Islamic. Al-Bakrī says that henna was cultivated at Awdagha (pp. 157, 168). The Arabic word has been adopted by the Songhay (*alhinna*). Hausa *lalle* may come from Tamahaqq *anella* which itself is probably derived from *ḥinnā'*.

imported or local factory stuff. Clergy do not find this question easy to deal with and almost everywhere one finds controversy. In general, they argue that the prohibition mentioned in their law books only applies to palm wine and spirits but not to beer which has but a small percentage of alcohol. Nupe clergy asserted that God had prohibited *muge* (palm wine), but not *ege* (beer made from guinea corn), nor, surprisingly, *barasa* (trade gin). A few said that beer is prohibited, probably because of its local association with libations, but not palm wine. A great role is played by the kola nut in supplying the place of beer in Islamic rituals. It is an essential element in all ritual surrounding the great events of social life, and consecrates contracts and oaths. Since the law books do not mention it, chewing could be retained, but with an essential change from red to white kolas in Islamic ceremonial in western Guinea, parallel to the change from red to white rice offerings.

Another prohibition concerns representational art. Islam affects symbolic art associated with house decoration largely through the dissociation of idea and symbol. It has a withering effect upon other aspects of the imaginative life. It destroys representational art, less as a result of the actual prohibition, as through its rooting out of pagan symbols, like masks of mystery cults and representations of ancestors.¹ This is the same process as operated in early Islam, for the prohibition is not due to the Prophet's express legislation. We have to remember that under the old régime art was a vehicle of religion, decorative arts were not related to aesthetic appreciation but to the old spiritual world of associated ideas; hence when the symbols are displaced there is no aesthetic need to be satisfied which might be diverted to other channels of art. Islam, however, has not had a negative effect upon music² and dancing, the African's natural means of expressing his feelings. Whilst music is the speciality of the griot caste, the dance is the pastime of all classes, young and old, men and women, Muslims and pagans; only clergy and chiefs do not take part out of concern for their dignity.

¹ Lebeuf and Masson Detourbet (*La Civilisation du Tchad*, p. 141), after describing the art of the So peoples, write: 'L'islamisme a tué cet art des représentations et, partant, la technique de la céramique qui, depuis lors, n'a cessé de régresser jusqu'à ne plus pouvoir produire que les grossiers ustensiles contemporains.'

² The folk-music of the Sudan was little influenced by borrowings after the rise of Islam, but rulers who adopted aspects of the ceremonial of eastern courts certainly imported some musical instruments; see H. G. Farmer, 'Early References to Music in the Western Sūdān', *J.R.A.S.*, 1939, pp. 569-79.

The Influence of Westernism

I. THE IMPACT OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

IN considering the impact of Western civilization some comparison will be necessary between its influence upon pagan as well as Muslim regions. Nor can modern administrative divisions any longer be ignored since there are differences, not only on broad lines between the colonial policies adopted by British and French, but also by each power at different times, in different regions, and towards Muslim and pagan populations. Also, although boundaries cut across climatical bands and bring most diverse peoples into one political unit, their present political and economic organization is important for assessing the contemporary situation for it has given each division a definite individuality and has governed the direction and speed of the infiltration of Western ideas, the intensity of the resultant changes, the forms of economic and social evolution, and posed problems peculiar to each political region. Thus different forms of political evolution are in progress in French and British Africa. At the same time, Western ideas, working through the new institutions, are causing ethnic groups to differentiate themselves in a quite new form of consciousness from any in earlier African life.

We may recall the scheme of culture contact presented in the second chapter, in which Western civilization is given its place in the contemporary scene of contact, reaction, and adaptation. The culture fields with which we are confronted are:

Local African Cultures: that is, the regional cultures, the inherited traditions and customs of the local folk culture;

West African Islamic Culture: the main theme of this book has been an analysis of the impact of Islam upon African culture and the resulting socio-cultural organization. But further, as a result of the European occupation, has come the challenge of

Western Culture, and it is necessary to see what has been the response of Muslims to its disruptive tendencies leading towards the secularization of life.

This impact, leading to the adoption of elements of material culture (such as technology and cash-crop cultivation) and of its secular ideology,

has been unequal in its effect upon different types of societies, such as those of town and village, and upon pagan and Muslim communities, but we may generalize in broad lines as to the contemporary results.

In the sphere of Sudanese village culture the local culture field remains the dominant element, modified in varied degrees, according to region, people, or class, by the Islamic culture, and to a much lesser degree by the infiltration of Western elements. In the sphere of Sudanese urban life the three patterns operate with quite different emphases from those within that of village culture. The Islamic is the dominant culture pattern, Western influence affects certain spheres of life, and the old culture, originally the village civilization, is weakest, for it consists of disparate elements of old social patterns together with remnants of cults and practitioners, which, divorced from their natural setting, become non-functional in the life of society. When we turn to the coastal urban centres once again the emphases are different. In this sphere the Western is the dominant element, the local culture (in Senegalese towns this is the local-Islamic amalgam) comes second, and the Islamic is a semi-integrated intrusion, even in Lagos where the population is 50 per cent. Muslim.¹

The various cultural agents and forces which lead to the modification of traditional life by the West are:

1. *Political forces*: colonial officials and the policies of the governments they represent.
2. *Economic forces*: European officials of agricultural departments, merchants and the like, acting as agents of world economic forces.
3. *Educational, welfare, and religious forces*: educationists, missionaries, health and sanitary authorities, and the policies lying behind their activities.

It will be noted that these agents are all Westerners and that their personal impact is limited, only the missionaries being closely in touch with African life. It is rather through the *impersonal* action of these Western agents that changes are effected. The really effective agents of transmission are Africans, so we get:

¹ Coastal towns divide into three groups corresponding to the main littoral climates: the sub-Canarian (towns like St. Louis and Bathurst which have a long European history); Guinean (Bissao, Conakry, Freetown, and Monrovia, to name only capitals); and the Beninian (towns of the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, and Nigeria). In this last group the quantitative penetration of Islam varies considerably, but it is represented mainly by immigrants from the interior who are distinct and recognizable in dress and deportment, professions, customs and religion, and remain relatively untouched by the Western ferment in which they are living.

4. *Social forces*: Western-influenced Africans of various types: Creoles in their role as intermediary communities, teachers, government officials, trade unionists, the politically conscious, and the advanced and *évolués* who have studied in Western schools or in Europe. The lead in modification comes from the urban centres which influence the countryside through the links that exist between town and country, urban relatives, villagers working in towns, on agricultural schemes, in mines, and the like.

The forces set in motion as a result of the impact are unparalleled in any previous phase of African history. Formerly outside influences, including Islam, came unhurriedly and naturally, and were assimilated by Negro peoples into their own cultural heritage without radical displacement or resulting in an essentially new point of departure. This was true even of European influence until the present century, for since the Portuguese first landed it has been continuous in a narrow coastal strip and many aspects were absorbed naturally. But the present century has been characterized by the abrupt nature of the impact and the revolutionary type and rate of change that has been set in motion, especially in littoral regions. For example, in the economic sphere stress is placed on industrial crops like cocoa and ground-nuts whose cultivation brings about changes in traditional agriculture which in turn modify social and cultural patterns. People can no longer live in a closed economy in which each social group produces purely for its own needs, but their economy is geared to world needs. Similarly in other spheres, new forms of political and social consciousness and organization are being forged in the process of readjustment. No village remains completely untouched by some aspect of Western influence. So revolutionary are the changes that are taking place that African cultures in their traditional form are unable to cope with the forces and are succumbing to them, for they could not assimilate Western civilization in the same way they assimilated fugitive radiations from earlier civilizations.

At the same time, owing to the impossibility of acquiring a true historical perspective, we need to be cautious in trying to estimate what is actually happening. Anyone viewing the changing scene of Africa today is more likely to over-emphasize the shock of the impact and the rate and depth of change than the reverse. This is because the outward signs of change are so predominantly before our eyes, whereas often they are being assimilated more naturally than we suppose and village people's inner life remains substantially what it was before. This is

especially true of those West Africans who were islamized before the impact made itself felt.

The difference between the reaction of pagan and Muslim societies derives primarily from the nature of their socio-religious systems. Islam protected Muslims against the main impact through having provided them with a universalist religion, a social and cultural pattern common to diverse groups, and an attitude of cultural and religious superiority. Other insulating factors derived from the situation of the main Muslim communities in the interior far removed from the main impact, the unsuitability of much of their region for rapid economic development, and the difference in policy adopted by colonial governments towards Muslims and pagans.

Muslims, confronting local African cultures, had been imbued with an attitude of cultural and religious superiority. When faced with conquest by European powers demonstrating a technical superiority they responded by a self-protective withdrawal. The fact that Islam came to Negroes as a civilization gave them greater resistance to Western civilization. No statement could be wider of the mark than that of Dr. C. K. Meek who, after mentioning that Islam has raised 'barbaric tribes to a higher level of civilization and welded them together into one homogeneous whole', goes on, 'thus Muhammadanism, or Semitic culture, has made the way easy for the reception of Western civilization'.¹ In fact, the exact opposite would be nearer the mark; the new order, based on the secularization of the theory behind these influences, is a direct challenge to the fundamental principles upon which Islamic civilization is based.

The powers of resistance inherent in Islamic societies have ensured that the process of change has been gradual, restricted in operation, and allowed to influence only limited spheres of life. Gradually they are giving way, for no people in Africa can completely immunize themselves against the penetration of these forces, especially now that they are finding themselves lagging behind the more open societies of the coastal regions in material, economic, educational, and political development. Youth are realizing that it is necessary to understand the new world into which they are being drawn and therefore coming into opposition to the traditionalists and privileged who seek to retard. All the same, though the impact of the West has created many problems its effect upon Muslims contrasts strikingly with its effect upon pagan societies. This helps us to understand the change Islam has wrought in the lives of Africans who assimilated its culture.

¹ Meek, Macmillan, and Hussey, *Europe and West Africa*, 1940, p. 13.

On the other hand, there is a great difference between the attitude adopted towards Western civilization by long-established Muslims and that displayed by those who have entered the Islamic fold during the last hundred years and have not acquired the conservative mentality characteristic of the first. These have shown themselves ready to come to terms with present realities, have proved more adaptable, and have acquired a more secular attitude towards religion.

One further aspect should be mentioned. Since culture contact has a reciprocal character the other face, the conditioning of the European, should not be ignored. They are just as much in the triple culture situation as African new men. The Islamic environment modifies colonial policy and the administrator, missionary policy and the missionary, economic planning and the expert. This aspect is important since it explains regional differences and the vacillations and modifications of official policy. Similarly the missionary, when allowed to work in Muslim regions, had to adopt a different policy in regions of consolidated Islam from that he adopted in pagan regions. This is one of the factors to be taken into account in explaining, for example, why Christianity in Hausaland is a foreign religion, represented mainly by Yoruba and Ibo but not by Hausa Christians.

2. POLITICAL CHANGE

The contrast between British and French policy towards Muslims is marked. We will look first at British policy in Northern Nigeria. The British entered upon the conquest of the Fulani-Hausa states in the spirit of slave-liberators of the nineteenth century. But once in control they perpetuated the system of rule whose tyranny they had ostensibly set out to end. Their aim was little more than one of expediency, the maintenance of public security as cheaply and as effectively as possible. They accordingly bolstered up the disintegrating states, interfered as little as possible with established institutions, and kept out all 'progressive' influences. They promised the emirs that there would be no interference in religious matters and interpreted this to mean that Islam would be upheld as the religion of any state whose ruler called himself a Muslim and its people insulated against other religious influences.

In adopting his policy of indirect rule Lugard thought that he was following the normal principles of the Sudan state, the virtue of which lay in the way it allowed traditional forms of rule to operate within the general framework. There was, however, this primary difference. The

British conquest followed upon a relatively recent Fulani conquest, in full dissolution when they took over, and they confirmed and stabilized this alien authority which proved unadaptable to changing conditions. The French, on the contrary, by changing the superstructure were building upon sounder principles for this interfered less with primary institutions.

This policy, besides assisting the spread of Islam, enabled Islamic law to gain greater influence. In fact, before they came under British administration rulers and their courts accorded greater recognition to custom than today. Nadel shows how in the Nupe state under British rule Islamic law has been gradually overriding customary law. Through the operation of the principle that a stronger law drives out the weaker, Muslim law becomes predominant. *Qādis* are ignorant of the unwritten code, they make pagans swear on the Qur'ān, and they in consequence feel themselves free from the obligation to tell the truth.¹ Clerics in Northern Nigeria tried to push the application of the *shari'a* as far as they could. Generally Muslims take the line of least resistance and allow an award to follow Islamic rather than customary law, but open clashes were not infrequent.²

The policy of indirect rule as interpreted in Nigeria shackled its peoples with the existing ruling class, tied down both Muslims and pagans to the *status quo*, and isolated them from the rest of the world; and although this policy failed since it did not take into account the inevitable encroachments of new forces, it succeeded in so retarding the northern emirates that they remained stagnant and undeveloped until recent years.

Yet in spite of this policy political change was unavoidable from the very outset of British rule. Although the administration reinforced the political apparatus, real power was taken away from the chiefs, political boundaries were rearranged, and chiefs' powers were limited since they

¹ See S. F. Nadel, *A Black Byzantium*, pp. 165-74.

² See Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, 1951, part iii, p. 95. As we have seen, colonial powers were confronted by customary law among Muslims as well as pagans. The extent to which Islamic law was applied depended upon custom (in Northern Nigeria Islamic law came under the provisions of 'native law and custom') and varied considerably in different localities. Colonial powers therefore recognized the application of Islamic law in certain spheres, but had to add to their ordinances the clause, 'excepting those points where customary law applies'. Only in the Gambia is there a definite enactment recognizing Islamic law (Mohammedan Law Recognition Ordinance of 1905). This grants to *shari'a* courts jurisdiction in cases between Muslims relating to status, marriage, succession, donations, testaments, and guardianship; but not to civil contracts and criminal matters. In predominantly pagan areas in all territories Islamic law was applied, as exceptional to the prevailing customary law, to Muslims who cared to invoke it.

were subject to the legislative and administrative control of the Protectorate government. The law was that of the colonial authority, for even though Islamic law was recognized the spheres in which it could operate were determined and a western criminal code imposed.¹ Through the secularization of political theory a breach was opened between religious tradition and political life and the former could not have its full effect.

Eventually the government realized the limitations of its policy,² mainly through the rise of nationalist movements in the south. Yet long before the policy of isolation had failed, for it had proved impossible to insulate the inhabitants of the north completely. Then the necessity of transforming an artificial creation like Nigeria into a freely-associated self-governing state forced the government to realize that their northern policy must inevitably lead to the formation of another Pakistan, and a belated attempt was made to develop the northern regions. Once they introduced innovations to improve conditions of living, dispensaries and hospitals, schools and agricultural schemes, the influx of new ideas was accelerated.

British policy in Nigeria cannot be compared with that in their other West African territories for in these there were no comparable Islamic states, but rather with French policy in the Muslim regions of the A.O.F. The French, with their twin aims of direct rule and assimilation, showed indecisiveness in their policy towards Islam. Two parallel strands run through it, one pro-Muslim and the other, not so much pro-animist, as an attempt to hold the balance. Certain governors (Faidherbe, Grodet, and de Coppet) adopted a policy of fostering Islam. Like the British they regarded it as a stage towards civilization, and considered as Muslim any village which had a mosque. By reason of their experience in North Africa they felt themselves on familiar ground when confronted by Muslims, whereas the Negro world was strange and unaccountable. In the early days when there was a shortage of administrators Muslims were a useful resource and former N.C.O.s or interpreters were made local chiefs. Similarly they seized upon Islamic law to govern the personal and social life of anyone who could possibly be called Muslim. As elsewhere there was the usual legal dualism

¹ In Northern Nigeria the Muslim courts were given wide powers of criminal jurisdiction, but nowhere else. In the A.O.F. a decree of 17 Feb. 1941 provided a Native Penal Code modelled on the French code.

² Sir Donald Cameron was the first governor to criticize the extreme way in which the policy of indirect rule was conceived and operated in Northern Nigeria in a speech to the Legislative Council in March 1933.

between the Code Français as the penal code and Qur'ānic law as the civil code. To smooth their path the French at first recognized Islamic education, although they realized that it was no help towards the civilizing ends they had in view. In the earlier period they tried to regulate it, but afterwards concentrated upon education in French and limited recognition of Islamic education to the maintenance of a few establishments for special purposes such as training of *qādis*.¹

But the French, as a result of their experience in conquering the Muslim adventurers and dealing with outbreaks of *soi-disant* Mahdīs, also regarded Islam as a menace and this thread runs through their attitude. Islam appeared to them, first as the strongest force opposed to their penetration² and then to internal security. The wars of al-ḥājj 'Umar, Samōri, Rābiḥ, and a host of smaller chiefs had led to political disintegration and anarchy. As in Northern Nigeria their conquests had fragmented and no powerful states remained. Hence the French encountered no great opposition in their conquest. But once in control, the administrators, however favourable they were to Islam, followed a different policy from that of the British. They had no use for the system of indirect rule and proceeded to eliminate the important Muslim chiefs.³ A few were retained, though without real authority, in order to smooth the path of transition to a new political order. But whenever expedient, generally immediately they showed signs of disaffection, they were dispossessed. The *almāmi* of Futa Jalon was kept

¹ The British administration also made some provision for the teaching of Islamic law. In 1934 the Kano Native Administration founded a law school with three teachers from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. This was taken over by the government in 1947 as the School of Arabic Studies. Although it has produced graduates with an advanced knowledge of Arabic and *fiqh*, they do not compare with those of the past for many of the existing *qādis* trained under the old system of seeking-masters display a most impressive knowledge of the *shari'a*. The inclusion of a more liberal range of subjects has, on the other hand, given graduates of the Kano school a wider outlook.

² All Muslims were by no means opposed, certainly not the non-privileged and dispossessed who aided the French to eliminate tyrants like the Tokolor and Samōri and heaved a sigh of relief when they were destroyed, yet after a generation or two of peace many of the younger generation tend to look upon these conquerors as champions of Sudanese independence. Islam nourished their opposition to alien rulers and was the strongest obstacle towards the policy of assimilation.

R. Delavignette (*Freedom and Authority in French West Africa*, English transl. 1950, p. 75) shows that French policy 'did not encroach on custom as much as has been supposed. For most of the great chiefs who were displaced by our nominees were themselves feudatories who held their fiefs from the slave-trader for whom they rounded up the game, or they were the soldiers of a Moslem war lord who handed over the pagan cultivators to them as serfs. They did not oppress, they rather oppressed the old Africa of the land and the villages. And in replacing them by our chiefs of cantons, we have most often merely substituted for a usurper a sort of functionary.'

on for a time but his rule was finally abolished in 1912. After conquering Masina in 1893 they appointed 'Ajīb, *almāmi* of Dingiray and brother of Amadu Seku, as ruler, but in 1902 he was put on pension and the region brought under direct administration. In Futa Toro the authority of the chiefs of the old régime declined considerably to the advantage of the *chefs de canton* appointed by the administration. Minor chiefs were replaced by men of the same stock as the people they administered or by nominees from the army. Where a great indigenous chief such as the Moro Nāba of the Mossi accepted French control peacefully he was allowed to retain his symbolical, moral, social, and religious authority, but his political authority was reduced almost to nothing. Chiefs in general became subordinate officials of the administration.

Shortly before the First World War many administrators, realizing that Islam was in opposition to their civilizing ideals, felt that its spread, accelerated under the conditions provided by their rule, might endanger French hegemony. The result was a number of books with the title theme of L. G. Binger's *Le Péril de l'Islam* (Paris, 1906), culminating in J. Brévié's *L'Islamisme contre 'Naturisme' au Soudan Français* (1923) which set out to show that Islam, on the wane when they took over, had been given new life and unprecedented opportunities for expansion under the occupation; that it was disruptive of the religio-social order of Africans; and that pagan communities which had resisted its encroachments were in danger of social disintegration. A circular drafted in 1911 explained the new slant in policy and affirmed that every effort was to be made to arrest the decline of African religion and consequent disruption of the old society. Restrictions were to be placed on the movements of itinerant alms-collecting and proselytizing clerics, whilst permits to perform the pilgrimage and open new mosques and schools were to be granted only by provincial governors.¹

Two things strike one immediately regarding the territories formed by Western powers: the artificiality of the frontiers hastily drawn during the closing years of the nineteenth century and the disunities, political, economic, and religious, which exist within these artificial boundaries. The organizations set up by Western administrators could override natural loyalties, but once transition towards a new political order brings out new aspirations the disunities begin to show themselves.

¹ It was this policy which led to official encouragement of the work of P. Marty on regional Islam, an important feature of which from the point of view of the administration was the listing of Islamic clerics and estimates of their influence.

An inevitable result of the occupation has been the awakening of nationalism. There are enormous variations in the degree and extent in which different regions have been affected by Western influence. It has been strongest in coastal areas, including predominantly Muslim Senegal, but away from these areas it has been relatively slow and has had a milder impact. Political activity has been most intense in the areas where Western penetration has gone deepest. The ever-changing political scene is outside the sphere of this inquiry and we are only concerned to point out the influence Islamic allegiance can play in the political scene. This is most evident in Northern Nigeria where religion continually made its appearance in discussions with the Muslim *évolué* class about their political aspirations. Muslims, unlike pagans, had never expected a millennium from the West, but a form of nationalism has appeared which in varying degrees is animated and reinforced by Islam. When pressure from southern politicians forced the British to make progressive moves towards granting self-government a deep cleavage in political ideals showed itself between north and south. Islam as the established religion gave an appearance of solidarity to the north although only two-thirds of the people are Muslim. Southerners had been evolving rapidly whilst northerners had not been affected in any radical way. The ruling authorities desired no change and viewed the aspirations of the southerners with suspicion. Regionalism was inevitable. Nationalist ideas brought out these deep-rooted prejudices and led to the formation of three regions with a central legislature.

A number of groups may be distinguished in Northern Nigeria from the political point of view. There are the ruling classes whose primary concern is the maintenance of the *status quo*. Political parties in the south, as in Ghana, realize that a modern party must have its roots in the rural population as well as the new men, but the authorities in the north sought to preserve politics as the prerogative of an aristocracy. This group finds its political organ in the Northern Peoples Congress. The leaders of the masses, the clergy class, whose ideal is that of a Muslim church-state, perhaps need distinguishing although they do not exert any obvious political influence. Then there are those who favour a modern state based on Islamic constitutional principles but adapted to modern conditions. Relatively small in numbers and confused in aim they favour a democratic pattern of political authority with Islam as religion of the state, and were keen to discuss the character of modern Islamic states. Among them is a minority more deeply secularized by Western education. They react strongly against medieval Islam and

the superstitions of everyday life. Islam is scarcely vital to their thought and in the social and political fields they recognize its implications only in so far as allegiance tends to demarcate. Next come non-Muslims who are most self-conscious in the pagan 'middle belt'. Finally, there are southerners born in the north who draw their political biases from their southern brethren. These last two groups find their political organ in the Northern Elements' Progressive Union,¹ which seeks reform of the present autocratic system. The last four, who stand to benefit by change, are critical of local administrations controlled by the old ruling authorities. The formation of new legislatures has not satisfied their political aspirations since only nominees of the emirs can secure election. They feel that local government reform is impossible under the present system and that the emirs cannot provide a foundation upon which to build a modern state.

Except in Northern Nigeria and the Senegal the influence of Islamic allegiance upon political life is negligible. The secularist outlook of administrators of colonial territories led them to maintain an impartial attitude with regard to the various religions practised by the peoples they administered. This attitude has been acquired by politicians of Southern Nigeria and Ghana. Hence they have no patience with Islamic political theory. The formation of the Muslim Association Party in Ghana provoked a strong reaction from Dr. Nkrumah and the radical Convention Peoples Party as bringing religion into politics.² Similarly the South Nigerian politicians have no use for the Islamic bias of the northerners.

French policy with regard to the political development of her colonial territories has followed quite different lines from that of the British.

¹ For some time they could not secure representation in the Northern House of Assembly, but have now (1957) seven members.

² The Muslim Association was founded in 1932 as a cultural organization to foster Muslim unity and seek for reforms giving greater recognition to Islam in the legal and educational system. It made its first entry into politics in 1939 when it sponsored candidates for the Accra municipal elections. At the 1954 general election the M.A.P. claimed the support of Muslims in the Colony and Ashanti, and of its sixteen candidates only one was elected. Following this the C.P.P. made efforts to secure the support of the M.A.P. members by setting up a Muslim Council, sympathetically considering proposals for establishing Qur'ān schools or introducing the Qur'ān into government schools for Muslim pupils, and by sponsoring a C.P.P. *imām* in Accra. At the 1956 election the M.A.P. put forward only three candidates and won one seat.

In the Northern Territories Muslims are not organized as a separate party but support the Northern Peoples Party which contested each of the twenty-six northern seats. Of the 104 members of the 1954 Assembly fifteen were Muslims (including two *Aḥmadīs*), that is 7 per cent., which is roughly representative of the strength of Muslims throughout Ghana as a whole (see *West Africa*, 26 May 1956, pp. 324-5).

Direct administration was the rule with the tendency towards closer integration with the metropolitan government. In 1944 a conference at Brazzaville drew up recommendations for the political, economic, and social development of these territories. The preamble to the recommendations states that, 'The goals of the work of civilization being accomplished by France in her colonies does away with any idea of autonomy and all possibility of evolution outside the unit of the French Empire; the constitution of self-government, even in the distant future, is not to be considered.' The colonies were, therefore, to be regarded as parts of greater France and the policy contemplated the assimilation of peoples of different cultures into French civilization. French is the official language, whence vernacular schools were not encouraged and vernaculars not taught in official schools.

The 1946 Constitution abolished the *indigénat* (a special régime applying to all French subjects who were not citizens), formed elective assemblies, and granted manhood suffrage in the sense that those qualified had the right to send representatives to the National Assembly. The proportion of voters to representatives was very high. The Soudan with 900,000 voters elected four deputies and Senegal with 600,000 voters elected two. Their number was increased in 1955 but this did not satisfy the hopes of Africans, for the A.O.F. like other territories had formed its political parties. An important change from the point of view of Muslims introduced under the 1946 constitution was that citizenship was obtainable without the acceptance of French personal law.¹ Formerly the adoption of French citizenship had been practically impossible unless they discarded their Islamic heritage.² Since the abolition of the *indigénat* the hereditary chiefs of the religious orders in Senegal have become of increasing political importance for by their support of candidates they can sway the votes of all their adherents.

In March 1956 the National Assembly carried the aims of the Brazzaville Conference a stage farther when it passed an enabling bill giving authority to introduce a wide range of reforms. The general aim was to associate overseas peoples more closely with the management of their own affairs. Apart from the introduction of universal adult suffrage and a single electoral college it makes provision for enlarging the powers

¹ The only exceptions had been the *communes* of St. Louis, Rufisque, and Dakar, the old colonial towns, which were regarded as part of France and organized like French municipalities. Those born in these *communes* have had the right to vote since 1848, but with this unique distinction, that they were the only Africans who could do so and retain their *statut personnel*.

² Similarly in Portuguese Guinea the legal status of the *assimilados* was that of *não indígenas* (non-natives).

of Territorial Assemblies by the transfer of powers hitherto reserved to the French Parliament, the setting up of Executive Councils (part elected, part official) alongside these Territorial Assemblies, and of organs of local government, and, on the long-term view, the africanization of the local administrations. It is clear that the closing stages of colonial relationship will be more protracted in French than in British territories.

3. THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC CHANGE UPON SOCIETY

Economic change will be discussed only in so far as it is bound up with social change. The first great revolution was effected through the abolition of slavery. A society not based upon slavery was scarcely conceivable to West Africans and its abolition, however graduated in accomplishment, could not help modifying both economic and social life. At first only traffic in slaves and slave status were abolished. Slaves could remain in a state of servitude but the occupying authorities would not recognize the existence of the slave when individual cases came before them. Some slaves freed themselves but others retained their ties with their masters. Thus harsh treatment was lightened and other abuses prevented but the economy was not radically upset. The serf system was allowed to continue for some time. In French territory measures were taken to abolish the system of *captifs de case* in 1901 for the Soudan and extended to the whole of the A.O.F. in 1909. Resistance came chiefly from Fulbe ruling classes and clergy since it affected both their economic life and prestige, but as a result 'captivity' disappeared more quickly in the A.O.F. than in Northern Nigeria.¹ In Futa Jalon abolition caused an inner *malaise* and was at the root of the troubles experienced in that region during the early decades of the present century. But after a time the people adjusted themselves. Ex-slaves and serfs who retained their link with their masters became tenant-clients (Fulfulde *wallobē*, sing. *wallo*). In general, the master remained owner of the land and received a proportion of the harvest; or, alternatively, the *wallo* was allotted a plot to cultivate on his own account whilst continuing to work his patron's land. Much the same happened in British territories and former slaves became independent farmers.² Serfdom still shows

¹ The British abolished the legal status of slavery in Nigeria in 1916. In the Protectorate of Sierra Leone it was not abolished until 1 Jan. 1928.

² 'In Northern Nigeria the estate system has, for the most part, disappeared, but some royal estates are still largely worked by ex-slaves, whose position has become assimilated to that of "clients", paying an annual tithe'; C. K. Meek, *Land Law and Custom in the Colonies*, 1946, p. 22.

itself in social and even legal discrimination. Former serfs cannot normally marry outside their own grade and the masters draw upon them for slave-wives. Yet the social set-up is changing, in many areas rapidly, and the descendant of a slave betters himself by acquiring cows and marrying into his patron's family or going to school and emerging among the ranks of the *évolués*. The Western impact has not led to any fusion of classes, but the very possibility of individual changes means a breach in the rigidity of custom. The social effect of slavery survives, not only in the prestige accorded to the former master class, but also in their attitude towards manual work. Settled Fulbe still despise work formerly done by slaves, and this has hindered them from acquiring a new economic outlook. In many parts, notably in Northern Nigeria, they established a monopoly over offices in the native administration.

The reorientation of trade brought about the second immediate revolution. In the past Sudanese looked northwards towards the countries of the Mediterranean for trade and communications with the outside world. The occupation changed the economic outlook from the desert to the sea, from sahilian ports to maritime ports through which flowed the products of the West. A network of roads and railways directed themselves towards the coast. The old Saharan routes became almost lifeless so far as traditional traffic was concerned, whilst at the same time the significance of the Sahara and the role of nomads was transformed through motor and air transport and the radio. This reorientation of trade led to the decay of old towns and the foundation of new ones. River-borne traffic on the Niger was diverted to new ports and old emporiums like Timbuktu were left high and dry. The annual *azalay* or salt-caravan of 6,000 camels which still sets out from this city only serves to point the contrast between its former activity and present decay. Jenne has been deserted for Mopti, and commerce between Tripolitania and Zinder withered when Kano was linked by railway to the coast. But Kano was not killed because it was not wholly dependent upon desert-routes but a meeting-place of traffic from many directions. It changed its commercial outlook, gained a place in the new economy, became a centre for the ground-nut industry, and grew into a great metropolis.

Social and economic factors are closely linked. The difficulty Islam encounters in gaining recognition for its legal regulations has been stressed. Unaided it is not strong enough to change deeply-rooted social habits. This is the reason why such great changes in the way of

displacement of custom by Islamic institutions (inheritance regulations, personal property, and wife-seclusion) have been proceeding since the European occupation.

The main influence of the West upon Muslim regions has been in material progress. European demand for export commodities stimulated new economic developments. Although the most important demands have been for the products of the Guinean lands, such as palm oil and cocoa, the demand for ground-nuts in particular (Senegal, Gambia, and Northern Nigeria), for cotton, rubber, and rice (West Guinea), have increased the prosperity of Muslim regions. Schemes undertaken by agricultural departments have transformed the economy of many regions, mixed farming has been encouraged, and the area of arable land enlarged and cultivated on new lines on a basis of individual holdings. Naturally these economic changes have influenced social life, more particularly in parts where Western influence and Islam penetrated at the same time. New economic crops bring in ready money and the effects can be seen in a higher standard of living, increasing cost of funeral expenses, marriage-payments, and wedding celebrations among *évolués*. Among cultivators these payments have not in general risen in terms of real values, for if the traditional marriage-payment is four oxen, it remains four oxen even if paid in cash. Conversely, economic factors explain why some Muslim regions have been so little changed by the impact of the West. Regions like the Chad Territory of the A.E.F. have proved unsuitable for development projects because of the problem of communications. In essentials the economic life of many parts of the Sahil and Sudan is not greatly affected by the European occupation.

Changes have taken place in the character of Sudanese towns.¹ Formerly they did not contrast strongly with the countryside. Now they are turning from collections of villages into urban aggregates,

¹ Among changes in material life are styles of mosque architecture. Mosque building, even in the Sudanese zone, tends to adopt European or pseudo-oriental styles, taking the form of halls of bricks, stones, or concrete, and provided with eastern-type minarets. Since the only examples of large buildings for worship in new materials upon which local or European builders could derive inspiration were Christian churches, the exteriors of many new mosques resemble churches and the minaret a church tower, although the interior gives a dominant Islamic note. These mosques are of every conceivable style. The *jāmi'* in Porto Novo which shows Portuguese influence may be contrasted with the mosque built (1943-9) in Kano in an imitation oriental style, incongruous in the sun-baked mud city and replacing a mosque (built originally by 'Abd Allāh dan Fodio) in the Sudanese style such as exists at Zaria in natural harmony with its environment. With the encouragement of the administrations these imitations are replacing natural mosque architecture.

changes are in progress in their constitution and some forms of municipal organization are emerging. Even in conservative Muslim regions urban society contrasts with the countryside. In Northern Nigeria reaction against the West put Muslims at an economic as well as educational disadvantage and there was an influx of southerners to fill posts as accountants, clerks, foremen, and mechanics. Traditional authority segregated them into suburbs (*sābon garīs*), but their influx posed problems because they were extraneous to the traditional structure.

The effects of new means of communication upon social life have taken vast numbers out of their former isolation. Others periodically leave village life behind to live in towns. This leads to some loosening of old ties, and disintegration of the patriarchal family, already begun by Islam, is accelerated. Industries, commerce, and the increase in possibilities for money-making make the individual more independent of his community. New professions have been created and the administrator, teacher, doctor, and engineer, in this aspect of their life, are outside the old order. They gain increasing influence in the community and consequently reduce that of the old authorities. A real change comes when they assume positive functions.

But the tenacious social structure survives all change. Islamic migrants retain their local and family ties, yet at the same time are socially and spiritually at home in any Muslim group. When Muslims, therefore, come under such disintegrative influences as life in mining centres they are not detribalized. It is noteworthy that settlement in the new towns scarcely changes long-established Muslims. On the contrary, they are the most traditional and conservative of all their inhabitants. Life in towns often accentuates tribal differences. Hausa communities settled in special quarters form ethnic and cultural colonies. Most are geared to the traditional type of trading economy and none of the new openings to youth are open to their sons because of their opposition to modern education. The new urban milieux hardly touch such colonies, and the atmosphere in which their children grow up is little removed from that of a village. They do not tolerate marriage outside their own ethnic group, their youth do not frequent cinemas, bars, and dance halls. In a new town like Cotonou (Dahomey) it is the Muslims (numbering 6 per cent. out of a population of 35,000) 'who represent the traditional element, little touched by Western civilization' and 'refractory to scholastic education'.¹

¹ J. Lombard, 'Cotonou, ville africaine', *Bull. I.F.A.N.* xvi (1954), 352-3.

4. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Education is the gateway to the benefits of the Western world. But Muslims had a different scale of values and both political and religious authorities in regions of consolidated Islam set themselves against Western education. So strong was the opposition in Northern Nigeria that they succeeded in insulating themselves for the first fifty years of British rule.¹ Recently changes have taken place in their attitude for the demand for modern educational facilities is increasing.² Girls' education has begun but it will be long before the effects will be seen.³ 'Fundamental education' schemes have been started and are increasing the demand for reading material, but, as Mahatma Gandhi stressed, literacy as such is not education.

As Islam in its penetration into Africa produced a new clerical class so Westernism led to the formation of a class of 'new men', those the French call *évolués*, who have assimilated aspects of Western culture and act as culture-agents between it and the masses. It is largely through them that change in native institutions takes place. The depth and degree of this cultural assimilation demonstrate the difference in the former background of pure African or Islamic culture.

Among Muslims the most profound social and cultural revolution is taking place in those societies upon which currents of both the Islamic and Western civilizations converged simultaneously, that is communities islamized during the last 150 years. Thus in Senegal alongside peoples like Tokolor and Soninke, resistant to cultural currents from the West, are the Wolof who adopted Islam during the second half of the nineteenth century at a time when French influence was penetrating. N. Leca shows that a social revolution is proceeding among the Wolof of Get N'dar (St. Louis) so strong that the former absolute character of caste prohibitions is being relaxed. He ascribes this to

¹ At one time it was hoped to use the Qur'ān schools as a basis for educational development (see the *Nigerian Handbook*, 1933, pp. 177-8), but the scheme was not well received by the clerics and the Director of Education had to report, 'Religious prejudices have, up to the present, prevented any considerable expansion of this scheme' (*Report of the Education Department*, 1932, p. 6).

² In 1956 applications for admission to schools in Northern Nigeria were greater than the places available since the administration had not hurried to found schools for which there were insufficient pupils.

³ The French established a federal *école normale* (teacher training college) for girls at Rufisque in 1939, but it drew most of its trainees from non-Muslim areas, especially Dahomey. Even in 1948 the Senegal, although it has had boys' schools for over a century, was unable to provide its complement of pupils for the Rufisque school (see J. Capelle, 'Education in French West Africa', *Oversea Education*, xxi (1949), 960-1).

The aggregation of the old social framework consequent upon the abolition of native political authorities, the birth and growth of a local *petite bourgeoisie*, with as immediate corollary the enhancement of material values to the detriment of the old customary primacies; and, finally, the diffusion of democratic ideas. . . . These factors work together to create an individualism which is further strengthened by the possibilities for action contained in the receipt of a regular salary.¹

M. Leca adds that in this society in transformation many traits of the former structure, such as the high position accorded to women in Wolof society, pierce through the Islamic façade. The attitude of such people to girls' education is entirely different from that of people embedded in the old Islamic civilization. Whenever we hear that a West African Muslim woman has become a medical doctor or barrister or is the first to go to Europe to study agriculture we find that she is not from traditional society but is a Creole or Yoruba or Wolof.²

Traditional Muslims are being drawn, primarily by material interests, into a new world and are beginning the withdrawal from isolation, but this new outlook is strictly limited in its range. Economic and political change rather increased the domination of Islam over their lives than aided the penetration of Western attitudes. They are little influenced by those aspects of Western culture which reflect new social and cultural attitudes. All the same the old unity is being breached through the appearance of the new men. The French policy of cultural assimilation has not succeeded. It has simply made the *assimilés* men of two worlds. French has made great progress as a code language, far greater than English in British territories, and this has tended to create a wider gulf between the *évolué* and tribal life than has education upon similar people in British territories where the vernacular is encouraged.

In their search for a wider outlook the new men are beginning to look towards other Islamic lands to see how they are faring in the new

¹ N. Leca, 'Les pêcheurs de Guet N'dar', *Bull. Com. Ét. A.O.F.* xvii (1934), 315-16.

² The wider cultural associations that have been formed are by neo-Muslims. A Muslim Congress of Nigeria was formed in 1948 'to unite solidly the Muslims of Nigeria, to cooperate in spreading Islam, to accelerate its progress as the religion of humanity, and to maintain close relations with related societies in Mecca, Cairo, Khartoum and England'. In spite of its name it is limited to the western region and does not, so far as I know, operate in the northern provinces. At the third congress held in Benin City in December 1951, attended by delegates from similar congresses in Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Gambia, it was decided to form a West African Muslim League embracing the four countries. At this congress arrangements were made for an assembly of chief *imāms* to meet at Oyo to fix the dates for the two 'ids which had been a source of conflict. This is symptomatic of the difference in mentality between Muslims of the south and north.

world, and what they learn increases their resentment against the old order of Islamic society and against Western powers. They have little first-hand knowledge of these countries. For those in French territories it is Paris to which the *évolué* looks for the means to reaffirm and renovate his Islamic heritage. There students and parliamentarians meet fellow-students or colleagues from other Islamic lands.¹ Similarly with Northern Nigeria. The British have tried to prevent Nigerian Muslims, especially the few educated, from having contacts with Egypt and other Muslim lands. These have been dissuaded from accepting offers of bursaries to study at the Azhar or modern Egyptian universities. All the same they have not been able to prevent a minority from gaining wider contacts in ever-increasing ways. These factors are operating to draw West African Muslims out of their isolation—an isolation, however, which is still very real.

Since traditional education proved unadaptable to modern standards all government schools treat Qur'ānic teaching simply as a subject, included to satisfy Islamic prejudice. This is the Western attitude towards religion and inevitably leads pupils to adopt a more secularist outlook. They remain uncompromising Muslims in their social-political outlook, but for some Islam as a religious law comes to stand for what retards and its influence on life is weakened. They are assuming greater importance and are often brought into opposition to traditional authority and all it stands for. Some learn to see aspects of the traditional life and outlook through the eyes of westerners and come to regard the religious practices of their family and village as superstitions, yet cannot free themselves from them.

5. RELIGIOUS CHANGE

Although religion is inseparable from the previous discussion of change, certain points need bringing out. The events of the nineteenth century upset the historical equilibrium established between Islam and African religions, and loaded the scales against the latter more effectively than at any previous stage of history. Village religion is serviceable only within the circumscribed bounds of village life. When horizons were widened its limitations were felt, and this led many to adopt either Islam or Christianity parallel to those aspects of the old religion

¹ Certain events closer to Africa now have wider repercussions than just upon *évolués*. African deputies in the Assembly have been attacked in the A.O.F. for supporting French policy in Algeria. West African soldiers in the French army are influenced. The Army of Liberation in Algeria has gained much sympathy, but has had more effect in Mauritania, so closely linked culturally with Morocco.

which are still serviceable. Mystery cults, the equivalent in some respects to the universal religions, lay no claim to exclusiveness, but Islam and Christianity both claim to be exclusive and conflict with the old appeared inevitable. But, as we have shown, Muslims circumvented the problem of any acute clash, and the animist in his Islamic garb can make the best of both worlds and find a place within the new society. Western control has not only aided the consolidation of Islam over regions where its hold was precarious but has also aided its spread over the whole of West Africa. It follows from this that in any study of religious change account must be taken of the fact that we have in many areas the conditions of an Islam engaged in proselytization.

Whilst the coastal regions have been a zone of contact between the Western and animist cultures, with Islam well behind as a third factor except in Senegal, western Guinea, and Western Nigeria, the north Sudan regions tried to insulate themselves against Western culture. The south Sudanese regions resisted both Western and Islamic influences, though not uniformly, for in some parts the one, in others the other, are disrupting religious life. Wherever a spiritual vacuum is created the way opens for new religions, including new African cults. Under the new conditions the most important distinction to bear in mind is that already referred to between Muslims islamized before the occupation and those islamized after it.

Given the unity which characterized society before the European occupation, such changes as lead towards the secularization of political, economic, and social life cannot but have repercussions upon religious understanding and outlook. Westerners pride themselves upon mastering life without reference to anyone beyond man, the very opposite of the old view of life. This attitude also challenges the principles of Islam, hence the instinctive, half-comprehending, reaction of the clergy and authorities against Western cultural offerings such as education. But whereas its impact upon many pagan societies has been such as to breach the old bases of life and cause them to search for a new centre, established Muslim communities erected a wall which is only now being breached as youth is being won to adopt western attitudes.

The established Islam of both the black and white world of West Africa is not the Islam of the twentieth-century Near East, influenced in so many ways by the currents of Western civilization, which is adapting itself to the demands of the modern world, but the Islam of the Middle Ages. The isolationism of Muslim clergy is a very real one. Their contact with the Muslim world of North Africa and the Near

East is very tenuous.¹ The majority of those who travel for study live and work in the restricted mental environment of mosque and *madrassa*, insulated against any revivifying currents. The people affected by travel are the *évolués* who come to disdain the clergy and traditional Islam as out of gear with the spirit of the age. Their interests are not in religion as such, their Islam shows itself in relation to such issues as Muslim solidarity, and of late Muslims in the A.O.F. have been taking a much greater interest in what is happening in North Africa. But, in general, it is true to say that very few signs of the destructive changes evident in the pagan regions can be seen operating, not only on the superstructure of legalistic Islam, but even in the underlayer of popular religion. In fact Islam has acted as a cement for this underlayer and very few have adopted the Western attitude towards it as superstitious practices. Thus clerics are equally opposed to any undermining of the sphere covered by the *shari'a* and to the introduction of modern methods of treatment and prevention of disease, both of which menaced their double function as clergy and medicine-men. There are signs that their conservatism is being undermined. Although their attitude to the offerings of the West is negative, it proved impossible to exclude everything, and those elements which had to be accommodated were as far as possible segregated as contaminating. When segregation failed they were adopted without ousting the old but running parallel with it. This is what has happened with the treatment of disease. Everywhere the dissimilar and incompatible methods of modern medicine and old magical-religious methods are juxtaposed. The new is being accepted without displacing the old, for thereby an alternative or double safeguard is gained.

As long as worship of the law continues Islamic institutions will adhere to the values of the past, yet religious change of some sort is inevitable through the gradual secularization of life by the appearance of the new men. Of the longer-established Muslims those of Senegal, in

¹ Clergy with a thorough knowledge of the Arabic of their law books when confronted with an Egyptian newspaper or journal were quite unable to understand modern Arabic and showed no inclination to undertake a new discipline. Attempts to reform religious education have had little success. Notice the fate of the *École Coranique Supérieure* founded at Bamako in 1950 by a group of four radical Azhar graduates. They emphasized understanding the Qur'ān as opposed to mere memorization, and included some modern subjects. Numbers quickly rose to 400. But their activities fell under the censure of both secular and religious authority and the administration closed down the school in December 1951, for in French Africa as well as British the administration tends to support conservatives against reformers. A milder attempt in French Scudan is being undertaken by a group called *Jam'iyyat al-Murshidin* who have opened a number of schools marked by a more liberal use of the vernacular. Similarly a school (*Makar-antar Umin Musulmachi*) in Zaria, whilst stressing a sound knowledge of Arabic, gives religious instruction in Hausa.

close touch with French culture, are being influenced by currents from modern Islam. Young Hausa, interested in the question of translating the Qur'ān into their language and encountering the opposition of the clergy, were outspoken in branding them as obscurantist. Upon these Islam is losing its power as a spiritual force, whilst retaining its social domination over their life in society. But though new currents weaken its spiritual dominion over the lives of the few, they have not and are not likely to influence much the religious outlook of the masses.

The appearance of Christianity has complicated the religious scene even in areas of consolidated Islam, for although the administrations co-operated with Islamic authority to keep Christian missions out of Muslim areas yet they drew on southerners, a large number of whom were Christians, to fill those posts their activities had created which were boycotted by Muslims. And, though they were segregated, all the same the balance of the old Muslim-pagan equilibrium was upset. Hence the formation of southern element parties and the disturbances in Kano in May 1953. Nominal Ibo Christians make use of Christianity as part of their nationalism over against Hausa-Muslim nationalism. Pagans in the border regions, such as the Middle Belt of Nigeria, where missions were allowed, are adopting Christianity, and these have to be allowed for in political calculations for a unified north.

The reaction of established Islamic societies to the secular civilization of the West has been shown to be largely negative. When, however, we turn to areas of recent islamization we find much greater religious change taking place in consequence of the penetration of currents from two civilizations at the same time. Neo-Muslims involved in two universalist systems are influenced by the individualistic secular attitudes of the West and a different attitude to religion has made its appearance, the most striking aspect being religion as personal religious allegiance. Many have adopted Islam as a personal religion rather than as a civilization. They are absorbing the specifically religious elements of Islam first and the civilization, which seems to some to be backward and retarding, only to a limited degree. In regions of consolidated Islam religion is a question permanently closed by birth, but to neo-Muslims it is an open question about which the individual may hold any opinion and form any allegiance he pleases. Where Western secular influences are strong, as among Yoruba, individual changes of allegiance can take place without causing any outcry from the community, for it is not thought to menace family solidarity or undermine the fabric of society. Many Yoruba families have Muslim, Christian, and pagan members

and all join happily in each other's religious festivals, for they are merely acts of social custom like the observance of Christmas in the Western world. Since customary law rules family life, membership of three religions has so far caused few problems in regard to inheritance and the like, though it may do so in the future. Similarly in wider community life religious allegiance does not determine the way men vote at elections or choose representatives. Among the Yoruba religion has been secularized. Their old religion has been so breached that it can never again be the foundation of life (at least in its organized form though one cannot rule out the possibility of the development of a new type of national Christianity or Islam). Both Islam and Christianity have gained large numbers of adherents, especially Islam, yet neither of these religions hold together the social edifice, they are simply the religious department of life. Thus the act of joining the one or the other does not undermine the social structure, and the family remains the real cement of Yoruba society. Although the majority of Muslim Yoruba belong to the poorer class of society, the influence of the new men is determining the direction and values of religion, and the sphere in which religious leaders can operate is circumscribed. Hence, on the one hand, the strength of custom over against Islamic law, and, on the other, the tendency to form Islamic 'societies'.

This attitude towards religious allegiance is also characteristic of neo-Muslims elsewhere, especially in towns. It exists among urban Wolof influenced by French liberalism though to a lesser degree than with the Yoruba because most of the Wolof are Muslim and Roman Catholics are numerous only in towns (Dakar, Gorée, and St. Louis). Similarly with Creole families in coastal settlements (Dakar, Bathurst, Conakry, Sierra Leone Colony, Porto Novo), among whom the difference of attitude was showing itself at the end of the last century as may be seen from the work and writings of the Sierra Leonian Muslim, Edward Blyden, author of *Christianity, Islam and the Negro Race* (1888). Marty writes of the Creoles of Dahomey, that 'Within the same family we find Catholic and Muslim branches; and within the same family we observe that, without any apparent reason, the children change sometimes to the one, sometimes to the other of these religions'.¹ Yet this attitude is not confined to urban communities. Even among newly Islamized cultivators (for example, in Sierra Leone) religion is often regarded more as a family affair and change of allegiance does not excite community feeling as in the Sudan zone. At most, unless stimu-

¹ R.M.M. lx (1925), 126.

lated by immigrant clerics, there will only be family opposition. In such a state of flux with Islam and Christianity contending for people's allegiance, religion is ancillary to other claims of life—politics, money-making, and above all the family. A riot over a religious issue would be surprising; people riot over more serious communal matters.

All these neo-Muslims are considerably more influenced by Western ideas than long-established Muslims. In contrast to the Sudanese they are more self-reliant in face of modern conditions, more insistent upon material and intellectual progress. They display great enthusiasm for education and have formed a number of societies for the purpose of opening and maintaining schools.¹ This is the reason why the Ahmadiyya, a maritime-introduced Indian Islamic sect, has gained a foothold in coastal regions of British territories, but has had little success, and, indeed, has been strongly opposed, in regions of consolidated Islam, for the Ahmadiyya is itself a Western-influenced Islam.²

But though Islam is not allowed to restrict individualistic attitudes and other new gains acquired through the impact of the West, many secularized Africans find it congenial, and it is often joined by those who react against Christianity. Frequently one hears it being advocated as 'the religion of the Blacks' as opposed to Christianity, 'the religion of the Whites'. We have shown that the change from village religion to Islam has been primarily a social phenomenon. Individual villagers did not become Muslims, only immigrants to towns, traders and slaves who had lost tribal ties. But in the new West Africa conversions of individual pagans to Islam are quite common, even in the sphere of the agricultural civilization, though not so common as in towns. The result is that the Islam of these neo-Muslims, even after it consolidates itself, is not the same as in the Sudan. This does not necessarily mean that it will not have an anti-Western tendency, but it is only partial and not wholehearted, for the material aspects of Western civilization are fully appreciated.

¹ The Ahmadiyya has promoted the setting up of Western-type schools, where the Qur'ān is taught as a subject, and various Islamic societies like the Anṣār ad-Dīn and Nawair ad-Dīn in Yorubaland. These societies have begun to operate in the northern region and may in time influence some of the younger generation. Among neo-Muslims elsewhere all kinds of new societies have made their appearance. Mende have formed *Malodi* (Ar. *marolid*), mutual-help clubs, which have become widespread. They have a great feast on the birthday of the Prophet, they help the family with funeral expenses, as much as £10 being provided, and wear small black badges with an Arabic inscription. Each member has to pay regular subscriptions, and if a member dies in default they will not help at funeral rites—the kind of discrimination characteristic of Creole Christians. Insurance societies of this kind are characteristic of the whole of the Guinean region from Sierra Leone to the Yoruba.

² On the Ahmadiyya see Appendix IV.

These considerations have a bearing upon the future. The proportions of religious allegiance in West Africa are roughly: Christians 4.4 per cent., Muslims 36.3 per cent., and pagans 59.3 per cent. The number of people who are not yet attached to one or other of the universal religions is still very large, but the ethnic religions are doomed in their old organized forms. It seems unlikely that any of them could develop into universal religions. Undoubtedly new cults will arise, as they are doing today, but they stagnate and decay quickly. Old cults will now and again develop new tendencies and temporary vigour, but there seems little chance of their spreading widely. Those which have appeared are the preserve of initiated and, though they attract many to make use of their powers, they are not religions. Nationalistic cults with racist tendencies may also make their appearance. But the majority will have the choice between Islam or Christianity or secularism forced upon them through the decay of their old religions and their manifest incompatibility for life in modern Africa.

Islam is likely to gain far more of the uncommitted than Christianity and this study has shown the reason for this forecast. Islam has had centuries to africanize and implant itself. Islam is part of the African scene, whilst Christianity still suffers from the handicap of being a Western religion, and there is even some reaction against it on this account. In many parts it is stagnant and turned in upon itself, and African Christians have shown little missionary impulse. Islam presents itself to the inhabitants of a disintegrating world as less alien, even familiar and known in the sense that it has its place in the African set-up. Although Islam is also stagnant it has the field to itself over vast areas where it spreads by natural diffusion, though it remains possible (bearing in mind the spread of the Harris movement in the Ivory Coast) for an African Christianity to awaken and spread rapidly.

Islam will progress numerically but one fact must be borne in mind which makes the situation particularly intriguing. This is the simultaneous spread of Western secularism. This means that Western civilization will have, as it is already having, a greater influence upon such neo-Muslims than Islamic culture. Africans will be gaining new modes of thought, new ideas of the function of the state, and also new ideas of religion in a secularized world. Neo-Muslims today tend to manifest a Western attitude towards religion. African governments will have to remain neutral in matters of religion. This means that the absorption of secular ideas will limit the advance of Islam primarily to its religious aspects and neo-Muslims will have more in common

with their Christian neighbours than they will have with north Sudanese Muslims. As in other parts of the world Christians and Muslims in West Africa have to adjust themselves to living and letting live side by side, and allowing their encounter to be one, not of competition for adherents, but an encounter of the things that pertain to the spirit.

Ceremony of Joining Islam

THE ceremonial act of allegiance to Islam is not of great importance for there is little sense of an abrupt break with the past. Many pagans in towns just slip into Islam by calling themselves Muḥammad and imitating their fellows without any special ceremony. A rite is performed where public recognition is sought as in the case of chiefs and important men, but there is little feeling of a transitional rite. When carried out it does not differ from normal Islamic practice. The Prophet is said to have ordered those who wished to embrace Islam to perform the *ghusl* (washing of the whole body), and submit to the shaving of the head and circumcision. The Hausa term is *wankā*, 'washing', *an yi masa wankā*, 'he has been baptized', he has become a Muslim. This word has spread among Yoruba, Nupe (*wanka lisilenchi*, *lislāmi* = Islam), Dagomba, and others influenced by Hausa. The recognized elements are: teaching, washing away the past, sacrifice with naming, and confession of faith before witnesses. Where performed the *mālam* teaches the convert the *shahāda*, ritual ablutions and prayer motions. The ceremony takes place either at the entrance hut or the mosque. The *mālam* washes him (so they said) in a rite something similar to that for the dead, the *shahāda* is recited before the assembly, and a ram is sacrificed (*yanka sadaqa*) in the courtyard or vestibule with the 'intention' of naming (say) Abū Bakr, similar to the naming of the new-born. After which all repeat the *ṣalāt 'alā 'n-nabī* ten times and the elders give the convert their blessing.

This ceremony is performed wherever Islam is established, but newly islamized areas have local ceremonies. Among Mende of Sierra Leone the cleric places a writing tablet (*walei*), on which the *basmallah* has been written, on the knees of the convert (*tubimoi*), then writes the phrase on his hands and tells him to lick it off. Next, at the cleric's house they make 'sacrifice' (dough of rice flour with which honey or sugar is mixed, topped by a kola). All place a hand upon the rice or one touching it, the cleric says an Arabic prayer and all recite the confession together. (This is the sacrifice offered at naming and death ceremonials in regions islamized through the Fulbe of Futa Jalon where it is called *tyobbal*.) After hands are removed from the rice prayer is offered in Mende asking God to accept the sacrifice and bless the convert.

Circumcision is not regarded as having anything special to do with Islam. Most Sudanese performed it before Islam came. Uncircumcised generally have it done, though clergy assert, on good textual authority, that it is not obligatory for adults. Little teaching is done since participation in the life of the community is trusted to develop in the convert the external characteristics and inward consciousness of being a Muslim.

Gunṇun and Sòkó in Nupe Religion

It is impossible to gain any understanding today, not only of the displaced religion of Muslims, but also of the religion of those in process of adopting Islam. Religion in the Sudan zone was especially fluid, for a characteristic was the incorporation, but not full integration, of small groups into a dominant society. Every village had its variations. What unity religion had was largely subjective. Cosmological knowledge was the preserve of a priestly caste or circle of initiates. Consequently when Islam displaced priesthood and initiation such knowledge faded away. African religion in all regions subjected to the pressure of Islam is at an advanced stage of degeneration and fissuring into isolated cults. The difficulties may be illustrated with reference to the Nupe. Professor S. F. Nadel provides an excellent study in his *Nupe Religion* (1954). The writer worked in the region for only three weeks and was studying Nupe religion primarily with respect to the influence of Islam. The observations on Nupe religion scattered about this book are based on these restricted studies and no attempt has been made to reconcile them with those of Nadel.

The Nupe have been instanced (p. 51 above) as a people whose former earth-god has given way completely before the sky-god whose name has become a synonym for Allah. Nupe said their former creator-spirit was Gunṇun, ruler of all spirits. He was in everything and could be worshipped everywhere, though special places in the bush were reserved for his worship where seven-day ceremonies were observed. Today Gunṇun, as chief spirit, has died and Gunṇun worship degenerated into an unrecognizable fertility cult. Pagans recognize Sòkó as chief god. Sòkó is the 'sky'.¹ Pagans when performing ritual communication (*kútiẓi*) include a prayer to Sòkó, but do not offer him *làba*, prayer with libation. They said: 'He is too far, we must use more accessible helpers to protect us and our crops.' Nor does it help when Muslims say that Sòkó hears prayers but only in Arabic. Pagans call Muslims *Sòkóbachi*, 'worshippers of Sòkó', whilst Muslims call pagans *kútibachi*, 'performers of *kúti*'. With the decline of Gunṇun, therefore, Sòkó has become supreme God and

¹ Everyone had a different account of the position of Sòkó under the old régime. One old Nupe denied that he was sky-god at all. He said pagans called the sky *sàmiko*, 'the great filter', which was modified to Sòkó. Muslims adopted Sòkó, 'sky', for God. The word used today for sky is *sámà* (Ar. *samā*). Clouds (*nanko sòkó*), he said, meant simply 'cattle of the sky', now interpreted as 'God's cattle'. Another Nupe from a different region said Sòkó was only one of the gods under Gunṇun. Gunṇun sent other *kútiẓi* to punish, but Sòkó was not one of them (though Sòkómaji, a lesser god, was). Sòkó was, on the contrary, the beneficent god who sent rain. They did not *làba* to Sòkó unlike Gunṇun who sent good and bad and needed propitiating.

Muslims could employ the name as a synonym for Allah because no cult was associated with him. These changes had been going on for some time before the Fulbe conquest and it is impossible to know what GunnuŃ cult really was. GunnuŃ came to mean little more than 'cult', for fusion between spirit-agency and ritual is characteristic. Earth had a power of its own known as GunnuŃ, hence all ritual was, and still is, GunnuŃ.

Present-day Mahdī Expectations

BELIEF in the coming of the Mahdī is stronger in western than in central Sudan. The writer first came across it when travelling by the Fuladu on the river Gambia. This steamer was so packed with humanity that it provided a cross-section of every aspect of west Sudan Islam. There a Mandinka trader spoke of the belief of Tokolor, Fula, Soninke, and some Mandinka that al-ḥājj 'Umar was a descendant of the khalīfa 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. Some regarded him as the khalīfa himself for they have no historical sense. Accounts were given of how he was revealed as the Mahdī in Mecca and Madina. They also asserted that the Qur'ān foretells that an 'Umar would come to restore the true religion, but since they could not read the Qur'ān they could not show me the passage. In Sierra Leone the Mahdī idea is spread by Mandinka, Susu, and Fula immigrants and traders, and in parts there was an air of expectancy. When he comes all machines will stop working and Western civilization will come to an end. The rising under Haidara in 1931 was connected with these beliefs.

Since the Mahdī myth is based on oral tradition strange ideas appear. Tokolor came nearest to Islamic tradition. They say he must be a descendant of the Prophet, and therefore white. All black mahdis are impostors. Four cycles will bring history to an end. The first is the Nasariyanu, the dominance of Christians; the second that of the Mahdī, the third that of Masi Dajālī (al-Masiḥ ad-Dajjāl), and the last the reign of 'Isā. Other Tokolor mentioned Jūjū and Majūjū (Gog and Magog) rampant on earth, the splitting of the moon, the sun rising in the west and setting in the east, and the ascent of the Qur'ān into the sky. Elsewhere, though the Mahdī was known, there was no expectancy. In Northern Nigeria he was formerly linked with a prophecy concerning a Fulani migration to the east, and there is still some interest in the year A.H. 1400 (A.D. 1979) associated with the second coming of the prophet 'Isā. In general, West Africans are very apathetic about the coming of the Mahdī.

The Ahmadiyya: a Modern Islamic Missionary Movement

THE history, teaching, and propaganda methods of the sect known as the Ahmadiyya is inextricably interwoven with Western influence and this movement has developed missionary activities which have carried it into British East and West Africa. The sect was founded at Qādiyān in the Punjab by Mīrzā Ghulām Aḥmad (1839-1908) who claimed to be the promised Messiah and Mahdī, and was branded as a heretic and impostor by orthodox Muslims. After the death of his successor in 1914 a group associated with Lahore broke away, asserting that Ghulām Aḥmad was only a *mujaddid* or 'reformer' and not, as he claimed, a prophet after Muḥammad, 'the Seal of the Prophets'. This dissident group, which called itself the Ahmadiyya Anjuman-i-Ishā'at-i-Islām, or 'Society for the Propagation of Islam', claims to be orthodox and has kept out of politics. But since the formation of Pakistan the Qādiyānis have become of considerable importance in political life. This led to a new orthodox reaction and the denial that they are Muslims. Muḥammad Iqbāl wrote: 'Qādiyāniyyat is the name of an organized effort seeking to establish a separate religious community built on a prophethood parallel to that of Muḥammad' (quoted in *Al-Furqān*, Lahore, October 1953, p. 48).

A notable feature of the Ahmadiyya has been its missionary activity in which it has imitated Christian missionary methods, institutions, and terminology. It established itself among Indian Muslims on the east coast of Africa and was first introduced into Nigeria in 1916. The arrival in 1921 of al-ḥājj 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Nayyār, who made the Gold Coast port of Saltpond his headquarters, initiated a phase of vigorous propaganda. By 1927 the movement had formed forty branches with approximately 3,000 adherents in the Colony and Ashanti. 'Abd ar-Raḥmān also preached in the Yoruba region, where he gained followers, and even in Kano and Sokoto, where he was not well received by the 'ulamā. In 1927 a missionary society was constituted and the movement expanded rapidly amongst Yoruba Muslims, in Gold Coast Colony and Sierra Leone.

The Ahmadi missionaries were welcomed when they first appeared in Lagos, but after they refused to worship behind a non-Ahmadi *imām* and clerics realized that they were regarded as heretics by orthodox Muslims, a reaction took place and bitter disputes broke out. At the same time the split in the movement in India led to divisions in West Africa. In 1939 the Khalīfat al-Masīḥ of Qādiyān announced that he disowned the Nigerian movement for its rejection of the prophethood of Ghulām Aḥmad, whereupon it altered its constitution to sever all links with Qādiyān. A section, however, refused to join this

separatist movement and called themselves the Sadri Anjuman-i-Aḥmadiyya Qādiyān, and after a long litigation in the courts concerning the ownership of Aḥmadiyya mosques this party gained the suit. The split was more connected with personalities than with doctrine, and since 1947 the leaders of the two movements have been trying to reach agreement, though in fact a third group calling itself the Muslim Mission Community has split off from the dissident party. The majority seem prepared to recognize the Khalifat al-Masīḥ of Rabwah (the headquarters since the 1947 partition) as their spiritual head, though many, and in particular the third group, do not recognize Ghulām Aḥmad as the Messiah. A new mosque was opened in 1951 by Muḥammad Zafrullah Khan, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who is an Aḥmadī. The effect of these sectarian movements has been to make Lagos, now the headquarters, a picture of Islamic confusion with three chief *imāms* and three Friday mosques. Branches have been established in all the important towns of south-western Nigeria, but they have had little success in the north where the *mālamai* are strongly opposed to them, and the small groups which exist in northern towns are mainly composed of southerners. The Aḥmadiyya levy the *zakāt* on their followers who include a number of wealthy merchants and in consequence have considerable funds at their disposal. They take an active part in education, maintaining primary schools in many important centres and the Tinubu High School at Lagos. Plans are being made to open schools for girls. From Nigeria Aḥmadī influence has spread into Dahomey.

The Aḥmadiyya progressed more rapidly in the Gold Coast, now Ghana (where they claimed a membership of 22,572, including children, in 1948), than in Nigeria. It is strongest in Saltpond region where a number of Fanti have been converted and individuals of the *évolué* class in the Colony have joined. In Ashanti only a few individuals and one small village claim to be Aḥmadī, but they maintain a secondary school at Kumasi with Pakistani teachers on the staff. Other schools are maintained at Saltpond, Ekrawfo, and other places. In the Northern Territories there is a centre at Wa where the chief is an Aḥmadī (see J. N. D. Anderson, *Islamic Law in Africa*, pp. 264–6). In Sierra Leone, where they are gradually gaining adherents, they maintain schools in Freetown and in the Protectorate at Bo (their headquarters), Magburaka, Rokofo, and a few smaller villages. One Sierra Leonean is at Rabwah on a six-year course of training. There are a few Aḥmadis in the Gambia, but no missionaries since the *‘ulamā*, fearing their divisive influence, prevailed upon the administration to refuse applications for their entry (1956).

The Aḥmadiyya differs from all previous Islamic action on Africa in that it was a maritime importation into the forest region, and that meant an entirely different non-African Islamic tradition. By its very nature it brought a sectarian conflict into the West African Islamic world because its whole attitude is so different from the basic assumptions and patterns of established Islamic society. One effect has been to stimulate interest in liberal Islam, particularly among

the educated in British territories, and to cause controversy in Muslim circles. Many of the old school react against the liberals as strongly as against the main group holding the heresy concerning the prophetship of Aḥmad, because of practices such as permitting women to enter mosques and pray behind men and allowing the bride to be present at her wedding to give her consent. The founder and his successors have always claimed power to inaugurate new legislation, and though the Pakistani leaders who control the movement tend to follow the Ḥanafī *madhhab*, minor differences in prayer ritual and the like all cause controversy with Mālikis. Aḥmadis tend to form a special community, clearly differentiated from other Muslims, fully open for the reception of new members, but opposed to their daughters marrying non-Aḥmadī Muslims. Orthodox Muslims also react against its Western methods, for its African leaders are imbued with the same spirit, social welfare and educational programmes, method of propaganda and arguments as the Pakistani missionaries. Consequently the Aḥmadiyya attracts individuals of the *évolué* class, but leaves the orthodox cold. They work mainly in the British territories, as much because of language, for their medium of propaganda is English, as because the French authorities are suspicious and restrictive. Politically the Aḥmadiyya have a tradition of supporting the established authority upon whose neutrality their very existence has at times depended. In West Africa they have not allied themselves with the aims of any party and leave their members to follow their own inclinations.

APPENDIX V

Statistics of Religious Allegiance

	<i>Animists</i>	<i>Muslims</i>	<i>Per cent.</i>	<i>Christians</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>French West Africa:</i>					
Sudan	1,509,000	1,810,000	55	17,000	3,336,000
Haute Volta	2,488,000	555,000	17	70,000	3,113,000
Guinea	728,000	1,381,000	65	22,000	2,131,000
Ivory Coast	1,642,000	324,000	15	163,000	2,129,000
Niger	320,000	1,800,000	85	4,000	2,124,000
Dahomey	1,158,000	279,000	17	143,000	1,580,000
Senegal and Mauritania .	450,000	1,960,000	78	90,000	2,500,000
Total: French West Africa	8,295,000	8,109,000	48	509,000	16,913,000
<i>French Equatorial Africa:</i>					
Chad Territory only . .	630,500	1,621,500	72	..	2,252,000
Togo: French Mandate .	804,000	50,000	5	166,000	1,020,000
British Mandate . . .	330,000	30,000	7.5	40,000	400,000
Cameroons: British Mandate)	2,729,300	750,000	19.5	113,000	1,033,000
French Mandate)				513,000	3,072,300
<i>British West Africa:</i>					
Gambia	19,700	246,500	90	6,550	272,750
Sierra Leone	1,692,000	588,000	25	70,000	2,350,000
Ghana	3,498,000	300,000	6.5	750,000	4,548,000
Nigeria: Northern . .	4,616,000	11,661,000	69	558,000	16,835,000
Western	..	..	..	..	6,144,000
Eastern	..	..	..	..	7,229,000
Portuguese Guinea . .	323,230	181,280	35.6	4,410	508,920
Liberia	1,200,000	100,000	6.6	200,000	1,500,000

GLOSSARY-INDEX OF ARABIC AND AFRICAN TERMS

Abbreviations

Ar	Arabic	N	Nupe
Berb	Berber	S	Soninke
Dy	Dyula	Song	Songhay
Fr	French	Tam	Tamahaqq
Ful	Fulfulde (and Tokolor)	Te	Temne
H	Hausa	Teda	Teda
K	Kanuri	Tok	Tokolor
M	Mande (Mandinka, Bambara, and Dyula)	Y	Yoruba
Me	Mende	W	Wolof

abbāla (Ar). Camel-rearing nomadic Arab tribes, 17.

'abd mamlūka (Ar). Purchased slave, 134.

'abd qinn (Ar). Slave born in the house, 134.

Abore. Hausa term for nomadic Fulbe, 12 n.

a-boro mōsar (Te). Ancestor house, 35, 104.

'āda (Ar). Customary law, 147, 148 n.

ādhān (Ar). The call to prayer, 71, 157.

afām afi (Te). Ancestors, 181.

a-gbōki (Te). A women's dancing society, partially secret, 109 n.

Aḥmadiyya. An Islamic messianic sect, 172 n., 210 n., 223, 230-2.

Aijene (Me). Heaven. (Ar *al-janna*), 35 n., 58.

aiki (H). Deed; *aikin mālam*, a spell to harm, 116.

'ajami, *'ajamiyya* (Ar). Outlandish, the term employed for vernacular texts written in Arabic characters, 84.

Ajanāsi (Y). Qur'ān reciter, co-interpreter, 72.

Ajurrūmiyya, *al-*. A popular manual of Arabic grammar, 82.

a-kuntha (Te). Witch's bag, 118.

alafāshe (Y). The cleric (*alfa*) in his function as diviner, 120.

alfa (W. Sudan). A cleric, 68, 72, 73, 82, 122, 157, 163.

alifa (Ar *khalifa*). Title of the chief of Kanem, representative of the *mai* of Bornu, 152.

Alijena (N). Heaven, 57.

alkālī (H, Song). Judge, Ar. *al-qāḍī*, 73, 148 n., 175.

alkurdu (H). Pen-case, 70.

alkyabba (H). A voluminous gown, 173.

Allāh (Ar). God, 37, 38, 51, 52, 53 n., 60, 74, 100, 227-8.

Allāh manyo (Khasonke). God's bride, marriage to a cleric by gifting the bride, 170 n.

allo (H), *alwa* (W), *walci* (Me), *walāra* (M), *wālā* (Y). Writing tablet, from Ar. *al-lawḥ*, 81 n.

allowa (H, from Ar. *al-wuḍū*). Ablution, 84.

allua (W. Guinea). Writing tablet, 161 n.

almāgiri (H, Ar *al-muhājir*). An itinerant Qur'ān student, 160 n.

almāmi (Ar *al-imām*): west Sudan, (1) leader in prayer; (2) politico-religious head of a Muslim community, 69, 71, 73, 79, 121, 145, 146, 150, 156, 165 n., 207, 208.

almania (Te). A dancing society, 109 n.

amariya (H). Bride, 172.

amariyan boko (H). Mock bride, 173.

amenokāl (Tam). Chief of a Tuareg federation, 11.

amīr al-mu'minīn (Ar). Leader of the believers, 143.

amīru māgal (Ful). State herd-chief, 186.

an bese (Te). Prayer-enclosure, 35.

andi (H). Priest of a *bōri* cult, 111.

anella (Tam). Henna, 198 n.

anganchi (H). The state of being a bridegroom, 173.

ango (H). Bridegroom, 173.

anjōnū (Y). Evil spirits (Ar *al-jinn*), 36.

anjāntha (Te). Locker; *a-kantha kor*, 'to lock the farm' against marauders, 114.

ayyesem (Te). Life, 58 n.

'āqila (Ar). The range of kinship of those responsible for the *diya* or blood-wit, 152.

'aqīqa (Ar). Eighth-day naming ceremony characterized by the sacrifice of an expiatory offering, 154-7.

ara (Y). The physical body, 57 n.

A'rāf, *al-* (Ar). The partition between heaven and hell, 59.

aramat (Tam). The Great Feast, 80 n.

arbi (Teda). Clan, 130 n.

Arma (Song). Name by which the descendants of the Andalusian and Moroccan musketeers (Ar *rāmin*, pl. *rumāt*,

sharpshooter) who conquered Songhay in 1591 are called, 15-16, 136, 163 n.

arna, asna, anna, azna (H). Pagans = Lat. *paganus*; *chinikin azne noma*, 'farming is the pagans' occupation', 16, 39, 51.

arowūsi (Y). Megaphonist at Qur'ān interpretations, 72.

aryana (Susu and Te). Heaven; Ar *al-janna*, 58.

aserkam (Tam). Class groupings among Tuareg, 11.

'Ashūrā (Ar). The tenth day of Muḥarram, 74, 76-77, 80, 159.

askiya. Dynastic title of rulers of Songhay from 1493 to 1591, 24, 26, 28, 74 n., 116 n., 137 n., 140, 144, 151 n.

aslama (Ar). To submit to, become a Muslim, 48, (50 n.).

auran fālo (H). Veranda marriage, 169 n.

auran jin dāḍi (H). A fixed-term marriage, 168.

auran kisan wuta (H), 175 n., see *tahlil*.

auran kōme (H). Remarriage to a former wife after the triple divorce, 175 n.

auran kulle (H). Marriage with complete wife seclusion, 169.

auran matafi (H). Traveller's marriage, 169.

auran sadaka (H). Gift marriage to a cleric, 170 n.

auran sunna (H). Muslim consort marriage, 167.

auran zaure (H). A fixed-term marriage, 169 n.

auran zumunta (H). Kinship marriage, 165 n.

ausa, hausa. Left bank of Niger and country on the left bank, 16.

āwē (Y). Fast; *irun āwē* 'prayer of the fast', 79.

azalay. Saharan salt caravan. The Bilma-Air-Hausa caravan is called *taghālam*, 213.

Azawād (Fr *Azaouad*). Eastern part of the Sudanese Sahara, north of the Niger buckle, 2, 10 n., 94.

'Azrā'il (Ar). The angel of death, 55 n., 59.

azumi (H). Fast (Ar *aṣ-ṣawm*), 78; *watan azumi*, 'the moon of the fast', Ramaḍān, 78 n.

dzun (N). Fast (Ar *aṣ-ṣawm*), *etswa dzun*, fast month, 78.

babalāwo (Y). 'the father who has the secret', a priest of Ifa, the Yoruba oracular deity, 120.

badolo (W). Agriculturalist class, 136 n.

bait al-māl (Ar). In Islamic states the public treasury, 175.

Bakkā'iyya Tariqa, deriving from Aḥmad al-Bakkā'i (d. 1504), 94, 97.

bākōmba (N). Twin spirit, 104; *gba bākōmba*, twin cult, 104 n., 105.

balēpe (Ful). 'Black', negroid Fulbe, 12.

bandiri (H). A basin-shaped hide drum, 96.

banya (Song). Male trade-slave, 134 n.

baggu (Song). Pool; *hirow baggu*, 'entering the pool' = circumcision; *baggu sola*, the collective (hut) circumcision, 163.

baqqāra (Ar). Cattle-rearing Arab tribes, 17, 185, 186.

Barābra (sing. *Barbari*). Name applied to Nubians in Egypt, 85 n.

baraka (Ar). (1) Blessing, (2) divine power, 66, 82 n., 89, 111-12; *i-bār'ka* (M), 'thank you', 112; *omo dyogi barke* (Tok), he possesses power, 112; *o barkini* (Tok), he emanates power, 112.

bārāsa (N). Trade gin, 199.

bari (Song). Horse, mount, used of a person possessed by a spirit (hole), 111 n.

bari (Susu). Spirit, 183.

barzakh (Ar and Persian). In Islamic eschatology 'an intervening state (*ḥā'il*, 'barrier') between death and the Day of Judgement' (Baidāwī on xiii. 100), Hades, 60.

basmalla (Ar). Saying 'In the name of God' (*bismillāhi*), 226.

bāwa, pl. *bāyi* (H). Trade slaves, 133-4.

bāwa gandu (H). Tribute paid in the form of slaves, 134.

mbēlu (Ful, Tok). The shadow-soul, 60-61, 118 n., 180 n.

bid'a (Ar). Innovation, new ideas and practices contrary to the *sunna* of the Prophet, 83, 90 n.

bīdān, sing. *bīdānt* (Ar). The Whites; in Mauritania: the Moors, 1, 10, 31.

bīki (H). The forty (hundred) days' seclusion of a woman after childbirth, 158.

Bilād al-Bīdān (Ar). Land of the Whites, 1.

Bilād as-Sūdān (Ar). Land of the Blacks, 1.

biledyo, pl. *vilēpe* (Tok, Ful). Magician, counter-witch practitioner, 119; *vin'dōpe ko vilēpe*, 'those who write are magicians', 113.

Bismillāhi (Ar). 'In the name of God', uttered by Muslims before any undertaking; by pagans as an exclamation, 34.

bōchi (N). Medicine-man, 112, 115.

bōka, pl. *bōkāyē* (H). Medicine-men, 38, 59, 115.

bōli, bōri (M). Material abode of a spirit, object consecrated to a spirit, symbol, altar, 37, 104, 107, 108, 112; *bōli-sōni*, 'fetish sacrifice', 75; *bōli-tigi*, guardian of a *bōli*, 107; *bōli-din*, one allowed to sacrifice at a *bōli*, 107.

bolo-ku (M). 'Washing the hand' = circumcision, 162.

bondo 'or *sande* (W. Guinea). Women's mystery society, 109 and n.

- bongo kyebo* (Song). 'Shaving the head', name for the eighth-day naming, 157.
- bōntyē* (Dy), *bōndyu* (M). Amulet buried in the foundations of a house, 114.
- bōri*. Hausa possessive spirit cult; *ya hau bōri*, 'the spirit has mounted', *ya sauka*, 'it has dismounted', 25, 43-44, 59, 63, 92, 103, 107, 109-11, 178; *bōri jamā'a*, the *bōri* community, 111; *dan-* (m.), *'yar-* (f.), *'yan bōri* (pl.) initiates into the cult, 38, 39 n., 111, 115.
- Bororo'en*, s. *wororbe* (Ful). Nomadic cattle Fulbe of central Sudan, 12 n.
- buḍar kai* (H). The bride's unveiling, 173.
- būḍēji* or *ba-buḍē* (H). A cleric who practises magic, 117.
- būta* (H). Ablution jug, 70.
- būzū* (H). Undressed goatskin prayer rug, 69.
- byia* (Song). Soul, shadow, double, of a paternal ancestor, the 'personality' which enters the body at the seventh-day naming ceremony, 51 n., 60, 154.
- chasbi*, *chazbi*, pl. *chazbuna* (H from Ar *ṭasbīḥ*). Rosary, *jā chazbi*, to tell beads; 93 n.
- chigbè* (N). Medicine, 112; *chigbè jinchī*, medicine-man, 115; *chigbè dēdē*, chief medicine-man, 115; *mājīn chigbè*, bad medicine, 115.
- chiyāwa* (H). Grass, 59 n.
- chuchenāwa*, sing. *ba-chūcheni* (H). Domestic slaves (Ful *dimājo*), 133.
- ḍa*, pl. *ḍiya* (H). (1) Son, (2) a freeborn person, 133.
- dabare* (Ful, Tok). All the techniques of magic to harm, 113.
- dabbāra* (Ar). Magic-making, spell-binding, 113.
- dagga ndangara* (S). Revocable repudiation, 174.
- ḍahīya* (Ar), *layya*, *lāhiya* (H), *laiha* (Ful). Sacrifice, the Great Feast, 80 n.
- ḍāki* (H). A hut, house; *ḍākin tsāfi*, fetish hut, 39 n.
- da-la* (M). Addressing s.o.; *da-la sōni*, addressing the ancestors with libation, 75 n.
- Dalā'il al-Khairāt* (Ar). 'The Proofs of the Excellences', a well-known poem in honour of the Prophet written by Abū 'Abdallāh M. b. Sulaimān al-Jazūlī (d. A.D. 1464), 53, 78.
- damel*. Title of the ruler of the Wolof state of Kajoor, 130 n.
- dan mai-ganyē*, *dan māgani* (H). Seller of the materials for making medicines, 45.
- Dār al-ḥarb* (Ar). Land of warfare, a country where the edicts of Islam have not yet been promulgated, 33.
- Dār al-Islām* (Ar). Land of Islam, a country where the edicts of Islam are promulgated, 33.
- dare* (H). Night, 76.
- da siri* (M). See *siri*.
- ḍauri* (H). 'A tying-up', employed in names for protective charms, 115.
- ḍaurin aure* (H). The Islamic marriage-contract ceremony, 172.
- da'wa* (Ar). 'Invocation', employed generally for the lawful system of spell-binding and incantation, as opposed to *sihr* (sorcery) and *kahāna* (divination), but in the Sudanese Sahil it is often equivalent to *da'a* 'ala, e.g. Song *addawa*, 'a curse', 116 n.
- deftere fīṭore koidi* (Ful). Books of dream interpretation, 122 n.
- derde*. Teda chief (Tibesti); *maina* among western Teda, 11.
- dhikr* (Ar). Remembering, technical term for the ritual 'mentioning' of the fraternities (*ṭuruq*), 92 n., 93-94, 96, 99-100, 101 n., 123.
- dhikr al-awqāt* (Ar). The daily office of a *ṭarīqa*, 96, 99-100.
- dimājo*, pl. *rimaybe* (Ful, Tok). Household slave, inalienable serf, 133 n., 134.
- ḍiya* (Ar). Blood wit, 152.
- dōki*, pl. *darwāki* (H). Horse, the term used for one 'mounted' by an *iska*, 111 n.
- dō-mba* (M). 'The Great Day', an earth festival = *anabī dō*, the Prophet's birthday, 76 n., 78 n.
- domi-būr* (W). Noble class by the masculine filiation, 136 n.
- du'a* (Ar). Invocation, prayer, 71; *ḍdūwa* (N), 105, 116 n.
- dūba* (H). Divination; *mai-dūba*, diviner, 120.
- dugu* (M). Land, esp. that of a village, 106.
- dugu da siri* (M). Territorial spirits, 102, 103, 106.
- dukhn* (Ar). Sorghum, 187.
- dungahi muriē* (S). Divorce by mutual consent, 174.
- dura* (Ar). Small millet or Pennisetum, 187.
- d'ya* (M.). Physical life, spirit, double, 58-59.
- dyabu* (Song). Striking the ground with a stick on the thirteenth day of the circumcision retreat, 163.
- dyāka* = Ar *zakāt*, 146.
- dyam-būr* (W). Freeman, 136 n.
- dyamgal* (Ful, Tok). A head tax paid by serfs to their master, 133 n.
- dyami-būr* (W). Serfs, 136 n.
- dyamu* (M). Clan name, 130.
- dyangugol* (Ful). Reading, 81, 161.
- dyara* (M). A Mande cult, 107.

- dyēgom* or *dyagobere* (Ful, Tok). Tax paid by serfs to their master, 133 n.
- dyidē* (M). Child (*dē*) of the water (*dyē*), a spirit, 110 n.
- dyidē kuntigi* (M). Chief of the cult of the water spirit, 110 n.
- dyinger* (Song). To pray, prayer, religious festival, *dyingerēy*, mosque; *dedow dyinger*, the 'Ashūrā, 76 n.; *almudu dyinger*, Prophet's birthday, 78 n.; *koteme dyinger*, twenty-seventh night of Ramaḍān (descent of the Qur'ān), 78; *ferme dyinger*, 'festival of the open mouth', 79 n.; *tyibsi dyinger*, 'ram festival', i.e. the Great Festival, 80 n.
- dyi-tigi* (B), *dyi-tū* (Bozo). Master of the water, the intermediary between people and the water-spirit (*fāro*), 106.
- dyo*, *gyo*, *dyu* (M). Spirit of an initiatory cult, mask, altar, or other object consecrated to the spirit, 104.
- dyō*, *gyō* (M). A trade slave, 134 n.; *dyō lādā*, law regulating slaves, 147; *dyō-mbēnde*, 'mustered slaves', the first month of the year, 76 n.
- dyongolo* (Song). See 178-9.
- dyula* (M). Trader, 14, 193.
- eba* (N). Strings of shells used in divining; *ebabōchi*, *ebasachi*, diviner; *sa 'bā*, to divine with shells (*sa*, to divine), 120.
- ēbalā* (N). Prayer with libation (ancestral spirit cult), 105.
- efo* (N). Day.
- efo-gō nyā yāwō*. 'Day of the bride's reception', the first part of the marriage ceremony, 172 n.
- efo kiṇna*. Day of Resurrection, 57 n.
- efo kiyōma*. Day of Resurrection, 57 n.
- efo misun*. Day of the Brink or Brim, 57 n.
- efo shiriya*. Day of Judgement, 57 n.
- efo yāwō ōwa dzūn*. Day of the bride's appearance, 172 n.
- efo xunmago*. The Last Day, 57 n.
- ēfū* (N). Offering, sacrifice (yam, corn, &c.) to spirits, 105 n.
- egā* (N). A witch-spirit; *nya'ga*, witchcraft; *gāchi*, a witch (fem.); 56 n., 118 n.
- ēgbangi* (N). A cord used for divining, 120.
- ege* (N). Beer made from guinea corn, 199.
- egi nuwōn* (N). Spirit of the watering-place, 104.
- ēku* (N). The next world, 56 n., 57, 182.
- ekūn* (N). Corpse, 57.
- ēmi* (Y). Life, spirit, 57 n.
- ēmilo* (N). 'Entering the compound', the taking of the bride to her husband's house, 172 n.
- ēmīna* (N). Hell, 57.
- enyawō* (N). Blood sacrifice to *kūtizi*; *enyawōbā*, place of offering, altar, 105.
- ēshē* (N). (1) The soul, personality, of a man, 56-57, 61, 117 n., 118 n.; (2) a witch spirit, 56 n., 117 n.; *ēshēchi*, one possessed of an *ēshē*, 117, 118.
- etsu* (N). Title of the head of the Nupe state, 73 n., 77, 90.
- ewo balā* (N). Calabash dedicated to the pouring of libations for ancestors, 105.
- ewō dāngizi* (N). Kinship money, one of the marriage payments, 167 n.
- ewō ejindā* (N). Greeting gift, sealing the betrothal, 167 n.
- ewō gwada* (N). Help money, a marriage payment to the bride's mother, 167 n.
- ewō yāwō* (N). The bride-price, 167 n.
- fāda* (H). Chief's compound or assembly-hut, 69.
- Fādiliyya*. A *ḥarīqa* in the Qādirī tradition, founded by Muḥammad al-Fāḍil (d. 1869), 90, 93, 94-95.
- fajrari* (K). Presents made by the bride's family to the bridegroom, 168.
- fāgol* or *pāgol* (Serer). Ancestral and nature spirits, 54 n.; *yā fāgol*, human intermediaries with spirits, 54 n.
- falanga* (Song). The elected chief of a circumcision school, 163.
- fannu* (Ful). Legal studies, 81-82.
- faqih*, pl. *fuqahā* (Ar). Jurisconsult, 68 n., 69, 135, 143, 148 n.
- Fāro* (Bamb). Self-created high-God, God of the water, organizer of the world, 58, 106, 108 n.
- faskh* (Ar). Annulment of a marriage or other contract, 175.
- fatawa* (H). Apparition which manifests itself from the blood of one who has been killed, 59, 60.
- fatauchi* (H). Bull-roarer, 39.
- Fātiḥa* (Ar). Opening chapter of the Qur'ān, 47, 116 n., 157, 161, 172, 194.
- Fātiḥa dō* (M). To conclude a contract by the repetition of the Fātiḥa, 194 n.
- fatwā* (Ar). The formal opinion of a *mufti*, 148.
- ffingē* (N). The 'shadow' soul of all living things, 56-57, 118.
- fneditugol* (Ful). The joining of letters, 81, 161.
- frugol* (Ful). Qur'anic exegesis, 81-82.
- fia tyitāb* (Song). Book of divination, 122 n.
- fiitāndu* (Tok). Vital force, 60-61.
- fodyo* (Ful, Tok). A trained *faqih*; *fode* (M), *foḍe* (Te), 69, 70, 121 n., 181.
- Fulānin gida* (H). House (settled) Fulani,

- now Hausa in culture; *Fulānin zaure* (H). Fulani ruling class, 132.
- furu, futu* (M). Marriage, 166; *furu-ba dō*, 'day of the great marriage', the annual festival of marriages, 171; *furu-fz*, 'marriage thing', the dowry provided by the fiancé, 166; *furu sara*, the Islamic marriage payment within the *furu sōngo*, 'marriage price', 166; *furu lo'o la*, to conclude the marriage contract, 166.
- ga-bibi* (Song). 'Black body', descendant of slaves, esp. from fourth generation, 134 n., 136.
- ga-korē* (Song). 'White body', descendants of white Saharans and Moroccans, 136.
- gāchi* (N). Witch, 118 n.
- gafaka* (H). Cleric's book bag, 70.
- Gajērē-mai-bakā* (H). 'Dwarf of the bow', a spirit of the bush, also called Kauji, Maharbin-dare, Gajērē-mai-dawa, and Sabara, 195.
- gallē* (Ful). Compound, 165 n.
- gāmi nyā kin* (N). Lit. 'The law of the land', i.e. customary law, 148 n.
- gāmi nyā momodu* (N). Islamic law, 148 n.
- Gāna*. South-Saharan Soninke state, c. 750–1215, 3, 14, 32, 195.
- gandu* (H). Capitation tax (Ar *jizya*), 134, 147.
- gāni* (Tam, K, Teda), *ganē* (H), *gamu* (W). The Prophet's birthday, 78.
- ganqama-e* (Susu). Men's mystery society, 109.
- gāra* (H). A bride's dowry, 167.
- garasa* (Song). Smith and shoemaker caste among the Zerma, 136.
- gargassahe* (Ful, Tok). Leather-workers, 137.
- garmi* (W). Ruling class by pure uterine filiation, 136 n.
- gaskiya* (H). Truth (Ar *haqīqa*), 84.
- gawlo*, pl. *awulhe* (Tok). Caste group of griots, 136 n.
- gba* (N). To submit; *wun āgba*, he has submitted, been converted; *lāgba*, a convert, 48.
- gba bākōmba* (N). Twin-cult, 104.
- gbako* (N). A cord used in divining, 120.
- gbangbani* (Te). A men's society, 109 n.
- gbā-sa* (M). 'Horn' containing an amulet, 114.
- gevel* (W). Caste groups of bards, 136.
- girka* (H). To put a pot on the fire for cooking, to initiate into the *bōri* cult, 111.
- ghafar* (Maur. Ar). Tribute levied for according protection (*khufāra* is also used), 135.
- Ghudfiyya*. A small Moorish *ṭarīqa* deriving from Muḥammad al-Aghḍaf (d. 1860), 94–95.
- ghusl* (Ar). The complete ablution, 226.
- gida* (H). Compound; *gidan tsāfi*, a pagan sanctuary, 39.
- godirwagi* (N from H). 'Small thanks'; *godirwako*, 'great thanks', part of the marriage payments, 167 n.
- gōdiya* (H). 'Mare', woman whom the spirit has 'mounted' during the *bōri* rites (*kūdiya* in Nilotic Sudan), 111 n.
- goga* (N). Interpreter, megaphonist (Ar *muballigh*), 72, 77.
- griot* (Fr. For conjectural derivation see p. 136, n. 1). Praise-singer-genealogist of caste status, 32, 102 n., 136, 137, 155, 199.
- gumba* (H). A porridge made of pounded millet, used at namings, funerals, and expiatory offerings, 157 n., 182.
- gunki* (H). Fetish, sacred tree or place; place where *bōri* performances are held, 39 n.
- Gunṇun* (N). A Nupe ritual and cult, 51, 105, 119, 227–8.
- gurma* (Song). Right bank of the Niger, interior of the Niger buckle, 10.
- gyeērē* (Song). Caste of griots, 136.
- hābe*, sing. *kāḍo* (Ful). Name applied by Fulbe to indigenous inhabitants.
- haḍāna* (Ar). The custody of children after divorce or death, 176.
- haddād* (Ar). Smith-caste, 137 n.
- hadith* (Ar). Tradition about the Prophet, 79, 82, 161.
- hadra* (Ar). A congregational *dhiḥr* gathering, 93.
- Hāfiẓiyya*. A branch of the Tijāniyya *ṭarīqa*, 90, 97.
- hailala* (Ar). Repetition of the phrase, 'there is no god but God', 100.
- halāl* (Ar). Lit. 'that which is loosed', lawful (as opp. to *ḥarām*), 50, 66–67, 113.
- halei*, to- (Me). Medicine; *halemsi*, medicine-man, 35, 112.
- hal-puldren* (Tok). Pulār-speakers, 13 n.
- Hamāliyya*. *Ṭarīqa* founded by Hamāhu 'llāh b. Muḥammad (1886–1943), 94, 99.
- Hanafīyya madhhab*. The school of law deriving from Abū Hanīfa, 82, 232.
- ḥarām* (Ar). That which is sacred, that which is prohibited, 50, 66–67, 113, 174.
- harbin allura* (H). Invocation shooting with needles, 117.
- harbin kasko* (H). A form of invocation shooting, 117.
- harrāṭīn*, sing. *harṭānī* (Moorish Arabic); *ikawaren* (Tam). Free men of inferior status; in the oases it means black cultivator, 10 n., 136.
- hāti* (N, from Ar *khātim*). Geomancy, divination in sand (Ar *ḍarb ar-raml*), 120.

- haume, hamme* (Song). Fast month, 75 n.
- Hausa* (Song). Left bank of the Niger, 16 n.
- Hausāwa*, sing. *ba-haushe* (H). Hausa, 16.
- Harūd* (Fr Hodh). The western part of the Sudanese Sahara from Tagant to Timbuktu, 2, 10 n., 90, 136.
- hendu*, pl. *keni* (Ful). Wind, used by settled central Sudan Fulani for spirit possession, 110 n.
- hew* (Song). Wind, employed as synonym for the 'doubles' of possessive spirits (*hole*), 54 n.
- hijāb* (Ar). Amulet, 115.
- hindē* or *indē* (Ful). The personal Islamic name, 156 n.
- hinna* (Ar). Henna, 198 n.
- hinni* (Song). To have mercy on (Ar *hanna*), 85.
- hirw* (Ar). An amulet, 115.
- hiwāb*, pl. *ahwāb* (Ar). (1) One of the 60 sections into which the Qur'ān is divided for recitation purposes, (2) a prayer or litany of a religious order, 79, 80 n., 159, 160.
- holē* (Song). Invisible personalized corporeal spirits, 54 n., 55, 110 n.
- honamzi* (Me). Witch, 118.
- honei* (Me). Witch-spirit, 118.
- horso* (Song). Slave of first generation, 134 n.
- hubus* (Ar). North African term for religious endowments and family trusts (elsewhere *waqf*), 74.
- hukm* (Ar). A judgement given by a *qādī*, 148 n.
- hundi* (Song). Vital force, 60.
- hurma* (Ar). Dues paid by tributaries to Moorish warrior tribes, 136.
- id, ida* (Berb). Grandfather. Employed in tribal names, e.g. *Ida-w-'Alī*, 97, 98.
- 'Id* (Ar). Festival day, 79, 80, 124, 180, 217 n.
- 'Id al-aḥḥā* or *al-'Id al-kabīr* (Ar). The festival of the sacrifice, 10th Dhū 'l-ḥijja, 71, 80.
- 'Id al-ḥīr* or *al-'Id aṣ-ṣaghīr* (Ar). The festival following the fast of Ramaḍān, 71, 72 n., 79, 146.
- 'idda* (Ar). The period of probation incumbent upon a woman after divorce or the death of her husband during which she may not remarry, 41, 168, 174, 175, 182-3.
- idyey alman* (Song). Marriage (*idyey*) wealth, 168.
- igīu*, pl. *igīwēn*. Caste group of bards among the Moors, 136.
- ijmā'* (Ar). The consensus of the Islamic community, in practice the agreement of the leading jurists, 148 n.
- ijtihād* (Ar). Independent elucidation of some point of law based on the recognized *uṣūl al-fiqh*, 148 n.
- ikhwān* (Ar). 'Brethren' of a religious order, 97.
- iklān*, sing. *akli* (Tam). Negro serfs, former slaves of the Tuareg, 11.
- 'ilm* (Ar). Knowledge, (a) occult, 113 n.; (b) legal, 81.
- 'ilm al-kalām* (Ar). Scholastic theology, 49.
- 'ilm al-ta'bīr* (Ar). Divination through dreams, 122-3.
- imām* (Ar). Leader of ritual prayer, political head of an Islamic community, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74 n., 77, 79, 80, 81, 121, 134, 139, 141, 143, 145, 150, 155, 179, 181, 210 n., 231.
- imghad*, sing. *amghid* (Tam). Vassals of a noble Tuareg tribe, 11, 168.
- imoshar* (Tam). Nobles, 11.
- inislimen* (s. *aneslem*). Clerical clans, clerics, among Tuareg, 11, 69.
- Inna* (H). 'Mother' of all the *iskōki* who appears as a Fulani woman, 182 n.
- inurwa* (H). Shadow, 59.
- iska*, pl. *iskōki* (H). Wind, esp. the harmattan, used for spirit influences, 54, 55, 59, 60, 63, 111, 190.
- isō-yigī* (Y). The Islamic legal marriage; *isō*, state of being tied; *yigī*, the Islamic *ṣadāq* (bride-price = *owō-idano*), 120, 168.
- Isrāfīl* (Ar). The angel who sounds the resurrection trumpet, 56 n.
- istighfār* (Ar). Repetition (*dhikr*) of the phrase *astaghfiru 'llāha*, 'I ask pardon of God', 96, 100.
- istikhāra* (Ar). 'Asking favour' of heaven, divination by the use of the rosary, cowries, bits of wood; divination through dreams, 123.
- istisqā'* (Ar). Ritual prayer for rain. It involves communal prayer on the 'Id ground with recital of *sūras* ad-Duhā and ash-Shams. The chief offers a sheep for sacrifice and processions of children are associated, 189 n.
- itu yigi* (Y). Untying the *yiji* contract, i.e. divorce, 168.
- jā* (Song). Title of rulers of Songhay until replaced by the *īr* in 1275, 139.
- Yabarta*. Ethiopian Muslims, 85 n.
- jabr* (Ar). The right of matrimonial restraint accorded to the father or his executor, 164-5, 171 n.
- jahannam* (Ar). Hell, 35 n., 58.
- jāhilchi* (H). The pagan way of life, 154.
- jallāba* (Ar cent. and east. Sudan). Merchant class, 18.

- jama'a* (Ar). Council of elders, village assembly, 139.
- ama'a alkādirāwa*, sing. *ba-kādiri* (H). The Qādiriyya congregation, 92, 96.
- jāmi'* (Ar). The great mosque where the Friday prayer is celebrated, 71, 74 n., 98, 141, 143, 192, 214 n.
- Jan Gari* (H). 'The Red City', the abode of the spirits in *Jan Kasa*, 'the Red Country', 60.
- jangali* (Ful, H). Tax on cattle, 147.
- jarirdu* (Ful). Women's prayer enclosure, 74.
- jāriya* (Ar). Female slave, 168.
- jawharat al-kamāl* (Ar). 'The essence of perfection', a Tijāni prayer, 94, 99, 100.
- Jibrīl, Jabra'il* (Ar). Gabriel, the angel of revelation, 55 n., 59.
- jigō* (H). 'Pole', forked stick at entrance or sacred tree in a compound particularly associated with *kure*, 'male hyena', son of Inna, 'Mother' of all the *bōri* spirits, 39, 182 n.
- jihād* (Ar). Religious war to spread domain of Islam, 12, 15, 25, 26, 29, 47, 86, 92, 94, 122, 132, 141, 142, 143, 147 n., 184.
- jikānā* (N). Geomancy, 120.
- jinn* (Ar). Terrestrial spirits formed of air and fire, 35, 51, 54-55, 78, 113, 114, 115, 123 n., 155, 159, 198; Yoruba *anjunu*, *alijano*, 36; Dyula *gyina*, 54 n.; Songhay *djin*, 55; Nupe *ālijēnu*, 55 n., 104.
- jizya* (Ar). Poll-tax, 39, 147.
- jūldō*, pl. *jūlbe* (Ful). A Muslim; *jūlirde*, mosque, from *jūlde*, to perform ritual prayer, 50, 72; *jūldō sumaye*, the Lesser Festival, 79 n., 121 n.; *jūldō laiha*, the Festival of Sacrifice, 80 n.; *jūldō donkiri*, the Festival of Sacrifice, 80 n., 121 n.
- jumbui* (Me). Sin; *jumbumoi*, sinner (Ar *dhanb*), 35 n.
- jūya bai* (H). 'Turning the back', last feast of the old year, 76.
- kachela* (K). A class of officials of servile status in the state of Bornu, 135.
- kaḍaita* (H). To acknowledge the divine unity, 85.
- kaṣā'a* (Ar). Marriage equality regulations, 165.
- kafē, kafi* (H). Charms buried in ground to protect compound or village, 39.
- kaffāra* (Ar). Expiatory sacrifice or work, 75.
- kāfir* (Ar). Unbeliever, infidel, 64, 142, 165 n.
- kambun baka* or *kandun ido* (H). Evil eye, 117.
- kan gida* (H). Lit. 'head of the house', the family totem, 67, 131, 132 n.
- karamoko, karamofo* (M). A cleric. Compound of *kara* (Ar *qara'a*, read) and *M mofo*, 'person', 68, 78, 82, 105, 122, 156, 161, 190.
- karātunjinchi* (N). Qur'ān reciter (H *karātu*, reading, Ar *qirā'a*), 72.
- kātimei* (Me). A category of amulets, 114.
- karwa*, pl. *kāwāyē* (H). A woman's bond friend, 173, 183.
- keme* (M). A higher numeral, 197 n.; *mali-nkeme* = 60; *bāmana n keme* = 80; *silāmiya-keme* or *faradye-la-keme* = 100.
- karifi* (Te). Generic term for 'spirits', 106, 189; *ro-karifi*, 'place of spirits', next world, 58; *a-bempa karifi*, sacrifice to spirits, 106 n.
- khalifa* (Ar). Successor, the initiating leader of a *ṭarīqa*, 93, 97, 98, 229.
- khalifat al-masīh* (Ar). Successor of the Messiah, 230, 231.
- kharāj* (Ar). Land-tax, 146-7.
- khaṭīb* (Ar). Preacher, 72.
- khātim* (Ar). Seal, signet-ring, an amulet in the form of squares; *hātumēre* (Tok, Ful), a written amulet; *hātumēre mankataba*, a writer of amulets, 114, 120.
- khifād* (Ar). Excision, 162.
- khiṭba* (Ar). Solicitation, betrothal, 171.
- khul'* (Ar). Divorce by means of a compensation or indemnity paid by the wife to the husband, 175.
- khutba* (Ar). The formal homily delivered at the Friday and festival prayers, 72, 73, 77, 79, 80.
- kiḍan ruwa* (H). 'Beating water', performed at the time when a widow is freed from the 'idda, 183.
- kira* (H). To call (to prayer); *mai-kiran-ṣalla*, muezzin, 71 n.
- kirgi* (H). Untanned ox-hide; *mālamīn kirgi*, wandering friar, 69.
- koḥi* (H). Supernatural power, weaker than *kūwāri*, 117.
- kɔfɔ* (Te, Loko, Limba, &c.). A men's mystery cult, 190 n.
- kōlak*. Title of the rulers of Waday, 100.
- komo* (M). Mystery cult among Mande, 29, 35, 36 n., 103, 107-8, 109; *komo-deu*, initiates of the cult, 108; *komo-tigi*, master, priest of the cult, 108.
- kongo* (Song). Female trade-slave, 134 n.
- kono* (M). A Mande cult, 107.
- kōrami* (H). Pen-case, 70.
- kōrāna, kōrāni* (H). Forked stick at entrance to compound for protection, 39.
- kororam* (K). Asking money, the betrothal present, 167.
- kpākogi* (N). A board used in divining, 120.
- kpakpei* (Me). An amulet, 114.

- kpànká* (N). Lit. 'truant', water-spirits who carry away the spirits of children dying before the naming ceremony, a household cult, 104.
- kpàta tsózi* (N). Spirits of the watering-place, not worshipped, 104.
- kpaya* (Me). Power; *halei gbaya*, the power in 'medicine' (*halei*), 79.
- kpiákpíá* (N). Charm on a cord for divining, 120.
- kuchi* or *ezàtsuchi* (N). The departed spirit, disembodied soul, a new-born child before naming, 57 and n., 182; *kuchi-gangan* (N). Talking to departed spirits, 106 n.
- kudin ada'a* (H). Thanks-money, part of the bride-price, 167.
- kudin aure* (H). Marriage price, 167.
- kudin baiwa* (H). The gift signifying betrothal, 167.
- kudin ðaure* (H). Cleric's marriage fee, 173.
- kudin galsurwa* (H). 'Greeting money', paid by bridegroom, 167.
- kudin kasa* (H). Land tax = *Ar kharāj*, 147.
- kudin sadāki* (H). The Islamic *ṣadāq*, 167.
- kudin sallama* (H). Money for calling, the first marriage payment, 167.
- kudin sa rana* (H). Money for fixing the marriage day, 167.
- kudin sunna* (H). The Islamic *ṣadāq*, 167.
- kuhl* (Ar), *kwalli* (H). Antimony, 80.
- kulle* (H). Wife-seclusion, 169, 176-7.
- kurwā* (H). Soul, double, 59-60, 112, 117, 118, 119 n.
- kúti*, pl. *-zi* (N). A channel of communication with divinity, a utilized divine emanation, a ritual, 53 n., 105 and n., 227.
- kútigba* (N). Spirit-worship, 53 n.
- kútigbachi* (N). Spirit-worshippers, 227.
- kwanakin anganchi* or *buḡin anganchi* (H). The marriage rites, 172-3.
- kwanan tsíwa* (H). 'Night of licence', preceding the consummation of a marriage, 173.
- kwanche* (H). To untie, cast off; *k. māguzanche*, he has discarded pagan rites, 39.
- kwankwamai* (H). Spirits associated with haunted places and the transmission of supernatural contagion, 112.
- kwaraya* (H). A pagan contest, 39.
- kwāri* (H). Supernatural power; *yā zuba masa kwāri*, he has put on him power, 112, 117.
- kworé* (M). A Mande cult, 107.
- lāba* (N). To pray to ancestors with the pouring of beer libations, 105, 115, 227.
- lādan* (H). Muezzin, 71.
- lāhira* (general usage, from *Ar al-ākhirā*). The next world, future life, 58, 59, 60.
- lahma* (Ar). Tributaries of Arab tribes of Berber origin, 136.
- lailat al-hinna' al-kabīr* (Ar). The night of the great henna, a feature of the Islamic marriage, 198.
- Lailat al-Qadr* (Ar). 'The Night of Power', 78.
- lalle* (H). Henna, 198 n.
- lāsmi* (Me). Small written charms, 114.
- lauhe*, sing. *labbo* (Tok). Woodworker caste, 137.
- lawh* (Ar). Writing tablet, 81 n., 161 n.
- lāya* (H from *Ar al-āya*, verse, sign), employed in names of written amulets, 115.
- lechini* (Me). Ceremony for ancestors performed only by Muslim Mende, 105.
- lelu* (N). Chief of the witches, 118.
- Lesidiyya* (Ar). A branch of the Qādiriyya-Bakkā'iyya *ṭarīqa* founded by Sh. Sīdya 'l-Kabīr (1780-1868), 94 n.
- limān* (Ar *al-imām*). Central Sudan: leader of prayer, 69, 70, 141, 157.
- lisimoi* (Me). A type of written charm, 114.
- lislami* (N). Islam, 226.
- lo-ba dō* (M). Day of final resurrection, 59.
- lontha* (Te). Spirit of interpretation, whose permission has to be sought before calling up other spirits, 106 n., 122 n.
- lū, dū* (M). Family; *lū-tigi*, family head, 127, 156.
- lugali* (K). The bride or bridegroom's representative (*Ar walī*), 167.
- lugaliram* (K). Payment for fixing the date of marriage, 167.
- lukstobla* (Me). Muslim clergy who write charms, 114.
- ma'aiki* (H). Messenger; *ma'aikin Allā*, the Prophet, 53.
- mābubē*, sing. *mābo* (Ful, Tok). Weavers, 137.
- masoi* (Te). Holy water (pagan), 115 n.
- magāji* (H). Official at the court of a Hausa chief, 73.
- māgani* (H). Medicine, supernatural power, 112, 115; *mai-māgani*, herbalist, 115.
- Maghāriba*, sing. *Maghribi*. North African, 85 n.
- magūri* (H). Seller of material for charms, 115.
- Māguzáwa*, s. *Ba-māguje* (H), der. from *Ar majūs*, pagan, 16, 38-39, 60, 109, 182 n.
- māguzanche* (H). Paganism, following local cults, 39, 154.
- Mahalichehi* (H). The Creator, 52 n.
- al-Mahdi* (Ar). 'The rightly-guided one', whose advent heralds the End, 62, 207, 229, 230.
- mai*. Title of the rulers of Bornu, 139, 140, 145 n.
- mājir dōdō* (N). Chief of the *ndakó gboyd* cult, 119.

Majūs, sing. *majūst* (Ar). Magians, Zoroastrians, 39.
Makaḍaichi (H). The One (God), 52 n., 85.
makaranta (H). School, 220 n.; *makarantar allo*, Qur'ān school, 81; *makarantar ilmi*, law school, 81.
Maḳṣā (H). Spirit of the smiths, 195.
malāk, pl. *malā'ika* (Ar). Angel, 55.
mālam, *māلامي*, pl. *mālamai* (H) from Ar *mu'allim*. Cleric, lettered man, 43, 44, 68, 69, 70, 79, 111, 112, 117, 121, 133, 172, 226, 231.
Mālik (Ar). Guardian of the fires of hell, 56 n.
Mālikiyya madhhab (Ar). The school of law deriving from Mālik ibn Anas, 53, 82, 126, 134, 148, 152, 164, 168, 175, 177 n., 232.
Mālikiyya ṭarīqa. Order founded by Mālik Si (d. 1929), 90, 97.
mān, pl. *ṣi* (N). Cleric, 70, 72, 77; *mānko*, chief imām, 70, 77; *ēnā mānṣi*, order of clergy, 70.
ma-nasi (Te). Charmed water, 114 n., 115 n.
manche (Te). A men's mystery society (o-gbengle, master of the society), 109 and n.
mānsa, *māsa* (M). King, 139.
marbi (K). The Islamic legal marriage payment, 167-8.
masallachi (H). (1) Mosque (Ar *muṣallā*), 71 n.; *masallachin idī*, the 'Id prayer ground, 79; (2) One who performs *salla*; *kai masallachine?* are you a Muslim?, 50.
al-Masīḥ ad-dajjāl (Ar). Anti-Christ, 229.
masihirchi (H). One who practises sorcery (*sihr*), 117.
masjid (Ar). 'Place of prostration', mosque, 71 n., 72.
marulid an-nabl (Ar), *mālūd* (west Sahil region). The Prophet's birthday, 78, 223 n.
māye, f. *mayya*, pl. *māyu* (H). Wizard, witch, 59 n., 118, 119.
mayta (H). Witchcraft, 118.
māba (N). Pagan mourning feast held on the eighth day after death, 105.
māba gboli (Me). Pagan (red) rice offering, 39, 181 n.
māba jaa (Me). Muslim (white) rice offering, 39.
māba lewie (Me). Rice offering at mourning feasts, 181 n.
mārei (Te). Dream; *ro-mārei*, dream-world, 58 n.
mihrāb (Ar). Niche in mosque indicating direction of prayer, 73.
minbar (Ar), *mumari* or *misiri gye kòtò* (Dy). Wooden block (in the Sudan) on right of the *mihrāb* on which the preacher (*khaṭīb*)

stands to read the homily (*khuṭba*) at Friday prayer, 71, 73, 74 n.
misidi, *misiro*, *misiri* (M, S, Bozo, &c.), Mosque, parish, 70, 71 n., 150.
mithqāl (Ar), in W. Sudan *metikale*, *mutukale*, *minkale*. Measure of weight utilized for gold-dust, representing $\frac{1}{4}$ th ounce or 4 to 5 grammes, 192.
modibbo (Ful, Tok). Cleric, 69.
moi. Title of the chief of the Bolewa, 145 n.
mōri, *mōru*, *mōdi*, *mōdu* (M). Muslim, sometimes 'cleric', 69; Temne o more, pl. a more, 35; *Mōriya* (M), Islam.
mōriba (M). Cleric, 68.
mu'adhdhin (Ar), *almudiyin* (Song). The announcer of the hours of prayer, 71 n.
mu'allim (Ar). Teacher, 68.
mu'allimin (Ar). An occupational caste of 'skilled' workers among Moors, 136.
mubāra'a (Ar). Divorce by mutual consent, 174-5.
mudāra (Ar). Dues paid by tributaries to Arab suzerain tribes, 136.
mudd (Ar), *mūde*, *mūre*, *mule* (M). Measure of capacity, varying according to locality, 146, 147, 193.
mufit (Ar). A canon lawyer authorized to give a *fatwā* or formal legal opinion. Hausa *mufuti* is a judicial assessor appointed by the ruling authority, 148 n.
muge (N). Palm wine, 199.
Muḥarrām (Ar). The first month of the Islamic year, *Herran*, *Harom* (Tok, S), 41, 76, 77, 90.
muhtasib (Ar). Guardian of morality, 153 n.
mujaddid (Ar). A reformer, 230.
mulaththamūn. Arab term for the Saharan Berbers who wear the muffler (*liṭhām*), 10 n.
Munkar and Nakir (Ar). Two angels who visit the dead after the funeral, 55-56 n., 57 (Walakiri).
muḡaddam (Ar). A leader in a *ṭarīqa*, generally non-initiating, 93, 97, 98, 100.
murābiṭ (Ar 'member of a *ribāṭ*), Fr *marabout*, 'cleric' in general, 'devotee'; in Ḥawḍ 'link' with divinity (Lat. *re-ligare*) 69 n.
Murābiṭūn (Almoravids). Islamic movement inspired by 'Abd Allāh b. Yāsīn (d. 451/1059) among the west Saharan Ṣanhāja Berbers which led to the destruction of the town of the Gāna in 1076, though his state survived, 24.
murgu (H). Tax paid by serfs to their master, 133.
murīd (Ar). Aspirant on the Sūfī path, disciple of a Sūfī shāikh, 53, 93, 95.
Muridiyya (Ar). *Ṭarīqa* founded by Aḥmad Bamba (d. 1927), 53, 95, 97, 188-9.

- muṣallā* (Ar). (1) Oratory. Small open-air plots for ritual prayer, the normal African mosque, 71 n.; (2) the praying ground for the 'id festivals, 72 n.
- musulmachi* (H). The Muslim way of life, 154, 220 n.
- mut'a* (Ar). Gift, pleasure. (a) A consolatory gift given to a wife who is repudiated or at the conclusion of a fixed-term marriage, 169, 175. (b) A marriage concluded for a fixed term at the conclusion of which divorce is automatic, 168-9.
- na, naba* (Gur language group). The political chief, 144 n.
- nabī* (Ar), *nabiyu* (M). Prophet, 53, 78 n.; *anabī dō* (M), the Prophet's birthday, 78 n.
- naṣṣore* (Tok). The whole of the marriage payments whose restitution is involved if the husband is granted a divorce, 166 n.
- nafs* (Ar). Soul, 61 n.
- nagban* (N). The soul of an animal, 56-57, 117 n.
- nago* (M). A Mande cult, 107.
- nā'ib* (Ar). Deputy, lieutenant, 69, 70.
- na'ibi* (H). An assistant *imām*, 157.
- nakà* (N). Body, 56.
- nāma* (M). Cult of a spirit represented by a hyaena mask, 29, 107, 108.
- nankò Sòkò* (N). 'Cattle of the sky', used of moving white clouds, 227 n.
- ṇare* (Song). To pray, beg, 116 n.
- nasi, nesi* (W. Guinea). Holy water, 115, 186 n.
- ṇbà* (n.), *yinbà* (vb.). Worship of spirits of ancestors (Nupe), 104-5.
- ndakò* (N). Spirits of the ancestors (see *ṇbà*), 104.
- ndakò gbòyá* (N). An anti-witchcraft cult, 107 n., 119.
- ndāwò* (N). A chief priest of the communal *kútiṣi* cults, 105.
- ndebba woveiisa* (Me). Ancestors, 181.
- ndevui* (Me). Breath, life, 58 and n.
- ngafei* (Me). Spirits of ancestors, 105.
- Ngala, nala* (M). God, sky, rain. (Ar *Allāh*), 34 and n., 52, 59.
- ngauwanda* (Me). Blessing, 79.
- nikla* (Ar). Dowry, 166 n.
- nikāh mut'a* (Ar). Marriage for pleasure or a gift, marriage for a previously stipulated period, 168-9.
- noddandu feho* (Ful). Invocation-shooting = H. *harbin kasko*, 117.
- noyandi* (Song). Dowry, 168.
- nunḡbere* (N). Gunḡn stick, placed on property as a protective charm, violation afflicts with sleeping sickness, 105.
- n'ya, ni* (M). Personal spirit, as contrasted with *d'ya*, impersonal vitality, 58-59; *mina-māsa*, chief catcher of souls, 'Azrā'il, 59; *n'ya-kò*, cult of spirits, animism, 104; *n'ya-kò-de*, animist, 104; *n'ya-ma*, divinized spirit, a dangerous force liberated at death, 58, 112; *n'ya-tigi*, head of a spirit cult, 50; *mā-n'ya*, spirit of an ancestor; *mā-n'ya-kò*, cult of ancestors, 54 n.
- nyamakhala* (S). Woman of the griot caste, 155.
- nyamnēdyo*, pl. *nyamnēḡbe* (Ful). Witch. *nyāmde*, to eat, 118 n.
- nyēnybe*, sing. *nyenyo* (Ful, Tok). General term for caste groups, 137.
- nyiga durbe* (K). Kinship, first cousin, marriage, 165 n.
- nyiga malāmla* (K). Gift marriage to a cleric, 170 n.
- oba* (Y). Chief, 109.
- ɔfem* (Te). Person (the ordinary word is *ɔwini*, pl. *anfam*, people), 58 n.
- Ogboni* (Y). The *òshugbò* mystery cult, 109.
- òḡun* (Y). Medicine, the power in the *tira* (amulet); *òlòḡun*, medicine-man, applied to Muslim *alfa* when functioning as such. Pagan medicine-man = *eleḡbòḡe*, 112.
- ojiji* (Y). Shadow soul, 57 n.
- ɔkàn, ɔkà* (Y). Corporeal 'soul', normally 'heart', 57 n.
- ɔmen* (Te). Medicine-man, destroys witches, heals and administers swear-medicine, 106 n., 115 n.
- onirwāsi* (Y). The preacher (*khaṣṣib*) of the Friday homily; interpreter, commentator, 72.
- ɔser* (Te). Witch; *raser*, witchcraft, 118, 190.
- ɔ-thupɔs* (Te). Diviner (pagan); *ɔ-thupas*, divination, 122 n.
- orwo-idano* (Y). Bride-wealth, 168.
- ɔrɔrɔ* (W. Guinea). A widespread mystery cult, 109 and n., 140.
- Pulɔ*, pl. *Fulḡe*. See 11 n. and Index under Fulbe.
- qāḡī* (Ar). Judge, 69, 137, 143, 148-53, 174, 186, 192, 194, 205, 207.
- Qāḡiriyya*. Ṣūfī order associated with the name of 'Abd al-Qāḡir al-Jilānī, 90 n., 91, 92, 93, 94-96, 98, 99, 124.
- qibla* (Ar). The 'direction' in which prayer should be performed, 178, 179, 180.
- qubba* (Ar). Tomb, 90.
- ra-gbenle* (Te). A mystery society, 109 n.
- raḡ'a* (Ar). A revocable repudiation, 175 n.
- Rajab* (Ar). Seventh month of the Islamic year, 76 n., 78, 159.

rak'a (Ar). 'A bowing', the various ritual actions and recitations constituting one act of worship, 73, 79, 123.

rakihar wata (H). 'Escorting the moon', the ceremony for bidding the spirits good-bye before their departure into the bowels of the earth during Ramaḍān, 111 n.

Ramaḍān (Ar). The ninth month of the Islamic year, 31, 72, 74, 76, 78-79, 97, 110 n., 169, 171.

ran kiyāma (H). Day of Resurrection, 60.

ran suna (H). The eighth-day naming, 157.

rāy (H). Life, 59-60.

rdyī, lāyī (N). Life, the spirit of man, 56-57, 61, 182.

ribūt (Ar). Frontier post manned by pious men, later equivalent to *zāwiya*, 100.

ridda (Ar). Apostasy, 48.

rijiyan rāy (H). 'The Well of Life', place of the departed spirits, 60.

riki (H). 'Support', charms to protect compound, 39.

rikiḍaddu (H). Men who are metamorphosed into certain animals; *ya rikida kura*, he changed into a hyena, 117.

rindingol (Ful). Reading, 81, 161.

riwāq (Ar). A portico in a mosque set aside for groups of students, 85.

Rog (Serer). God; 54 n.

rógngà (N). A cleric who uses a stone called *rógngi* for harmful magic, 117.

ruh (Ar). Vitalizing spiritual principle, 61.

ruqya (Ar). Legitimate magic, 116.

saa or *saci* (Me from Ar *ṣadaqa*). Offering, sacrifice, 105; *mba bci*, red rice sacrifice; *mba jaa*, rice sacrifice; *ṣafanda jaa*, first sacrifice for the dead after the funeral.

sabhāla (Ar). Repetition of the phrase *subhān Allāh*, 'Praise is due to God alone', 96.

sābon garī (H). 'New town', outside the old walled *birnis*, esp. quarters inhabited by southerners, 45, 215.

sadaka (H). Voluntary alms (Ar *ṣadaqa*), 77, 182 n.

sāḍaka (H). Slave wife (*sa*, place in, *ḍaka*, house), 168.

sadāki (H). Marriage-money, 167, 169, 175 (Ar *ṣadāq*).

ṣadāq (Ar). The Islamic marriage payment by the husband to the wife which becomes her legal property, and, in Africa, is part of the bride-price, 165-8, 170-5 *passim*.

ṣadaqa (Ar). Voluntary alms, offering, 34, 39, 44 n., 74-75, 171, 172 n., 180, 182, 184, 189, 190.

sa-d'-ya (M). 'Vivification of the dead (*sa*)', name given to one conceived or born at the time of the death of a member of the family; name given as synonym of 'Alī

because of the belief in the resurrection of 'Alī, son-in-law of the Prophet, 157.

ṣafanda jaa (Me). Rice-sacrifice, 181.

sāhil (Ar). Shore, borderland between desert and sown, 2.

sa'ir (Ar). One of the seven hells, 58.

sakkē, sing. *sakke* (Ful, Tok). Leather-workers, 137.

salanke (H). The *imām* who officiates at the 'id prayers in the Hausa state of Abuja, 141.

ṣalāt (Ar). Ritual prayer, 71, 72, 81, 100.

ṣalāt 'alā 'n-nabī (Ar), 172, 226; see *taṣliya*.

ṣalāt al-'id (Ar). The festival prayer, 79.

ṣalāt al-jum'a (Ar). The prayer of assembly, the Friday prayer, 73.

sali, sēli (M), *syēri* (Dy), fr. Ar *ṣallā*. Ritual prayer, religious festival, 72; *sali-bolō*, *syēri-bolō*, open-air prayer square, 71, 72; *sali-gyimina*, perform the ritual ablutions; *sali-ba*, 'great prayer', 10 dhū 'l-ḥijja, 80 n.; *sali-ba'a*, 'pray-er', i.e. Muslim, 14 n.; *sali-gyi*, ablutions; *sali-de*, 'child of prayer', i.e. newly circumcised, 162 n.

ṣallā (Ar). To accomplish the ritual prayer (*ṣallān*), 71, 72.

salla (H). Ritual prayer, often the festival prayer, 50, 71, 79 n., 111 n.; *mai-kiran-salla*, caller-to-prayer, muezzin, 71 n.; *karamar salla*, the lesser festival, 79 n.; *salla azumi*, the festival of the fast, 79 n.; *salla layya* or *lāhiya*, the Great Feast, 80 n.; *babbar salla*, the Great Feast, 80 n.

sama' (Ar). The sky, 227 n.

sāmi-ko (N). The great filter, the sky, 227 n.

sammu (H). Poison (Ar *simm*), magic to harm, 117.

sa-nan (M), a variety of tamarind tree, 49.

Ṣanhāja, Arab corruption of Berb. *azenūg*, pl. *idzāgen* (cf. *Ibn Khaldūn*, ed. de Slane, i. 194). General term for a great group of west Sahara Berbers, 10 n.

Sanūsiyya Tārlqa, 91, 100-1.

saraka (M), *sarakhe* (Susu), *sathka* (Te), *saa* (Me), der. from Ar *ṣadaqa*. Protective medicine placed on houses or compounds, offering, sacrifice, 105, 106 n., 156.

sarauni, *sarauniya* (H). Priestess of a *bōri* cult (also *sarāki* and *uwar girka*), 111.

sarki, pl. *sarakuna* (H). Chief, headman, 73, 144 n.; *sarkin tsāfi*, *sarkin arna*, priest of the pagan rites, 38; *sarkin musulmi* = Ar *amir al-mu'minīn*, 98; *sarkin māyū*, chief of the witches, 119; *sarkin bōri*, chief of the cult, 144 n.

sauka (H). To dismount (of a *bōri* spirit), 111.

ṣawm (Ar). Fast, 78.

sebe, serwe, sefe (M). The general term in western Sudan and Guinea for a written charm, 114, 115.

- sebe-tu-la* (M). Cleric who ingurgitates holy water and spits on the patient, 115.
- seli* (Me). To pray (Ar *sallā*), 35 n.
- səm* (Te). Sacred; *ra-səm*, holiness, *ma-səm*, taboo; *der-ɔ-məsəm*, sacred place; *ɲlasər ma-səm*, to violate ceremonial law, 67.
- seriñ* (W). Cleric; *seriñ-dāra*, schoolmaster, 70, 130 n., 136 n.
- Sha'bān* (Ar). Eighth month of the Islamic year, 76 n., 78.
- shābūr, shābīr* (N. Afr. Ar). Spur, 84.
- Shādhiliyya ʔariʔa*, 91, 96-97, 98.
- shahāda* (Ar). The confession of faith, 42, 49, 53, 146, 178, 226.
- shaikh* (Ar). Elder, head of tribe, religious leader, &c. In Sudanese languages *shīhu, sēku, sēhu*. In Mauritania (with pl. *ash-yākh*) 'religious leader', whilst *shikh*, pl. *shyākh*, 'political leader', 84, 93, 98, 188.
- Shēhu* (Ar *shaikh*). Title of the ruler of Bornu, Masina, &c., 145 n.
- Shaijān*. Chief of the evil spirits, 53 n.
- shanchi* (H). A contest of the Māguzāwa, 39 n.
- shan kabēwa* (H). 'Pumpkin festival', a rite of *bōri* devotees before the pumpkin harvest (*sha*, to partake of fruit), 111.
- shari'a* (Ar). The canon law of Islam, 125, 146, 147 n., 148-9, 182, 205, 207, 220. In African languages it generally means 'judgement', Hausa *ya yanke shari'a*, 'he passed sentence'.
- sharif*, pl. *shurafā'* (Ar). One who claims descent from the Prophet, 131 n., 136.
- shibr* (Ar). Span, 193 n.
- shika* (H). Annul (a marriage), 175; *shikan batta*, the triple repudiation, 175 n.; *shikan sunna* or *s. raja'i*, revocable repudiation, 175 n.
- Shinqīt*, Fr. *Chinguetti*, Azer *Si-n-gede*. A *zāwiya* centre (founded A.D. 1262) in the Sāqiyat al-Ḥamrā' region of Mauritania. The name was extended by the Arab world to the whole of western Moorish Sahara, 85 n., 97.
- Shinqīfī*, pl. *Shanāqītā*, an inhabitant of Shinqīt, a Moor of Mauritania, 85 n.
- st* (*sonni* in *T. as-Sūdān* and Leo Africanus). Dynastic title of rulers of Songhay from 1275 to 1493; 139.
- sibha* (Ar). Rosary, 121 n.
- sigi* (Ful). Pronunciation and spelling, 81.
- sihr* (Ar). Sorcery, 116.
- silāmi* (M). Islam; *silāmi ya kó*, the Islamic cult, 104; *silāmi ya kó de*, a Muslim, 104; *silāmi ya keme*, a hundred, 197 n.; *silāmi ya lāda*, Islamic law, 147.
- si-ra-lāda* (M). 'Custom of the family', customary law as regulating free men, 147.
- širāt* (Ar). In Islamic tradition a bridge across the eternal fire, 57, 80.
- siri* (M). Tie, link, 53 n., 114; *lā siri, da siri*, link with spirits, ritual, cult, offering, 53 n.; *lā (da) siri dugu*, genii loci, 102, 103, 106; *lā siri folo*, fourth month of solar year, Rabi' II of Islamic year, 76 n.; *lā siri lā ba*, sixth month of solar year; Jumādā II of Islamic year, 76 n.; *lā siri tigi*, religious chief of a village, master of the land.
- sirruyanke*, pl. *sirruyanke* (Tok). Magician-diviner, versed in occult sciences who writes *hātumēre sirru*, secret amulets, 121.
- siyāsa* (Ar). Policy. Justice rendered at his own discretion by a Muslim ruler, parallel to customary and Islamic law, a recognized restriction of the competence of the *qāḍī* by those who appoint them to their office, 147.
- So*. Mythical name for the former inhabitants of the Chad region, 16, 190 n., 145 n., 199 n.
- so, su* (M). Family (total); *so-tigi*, family-head, 127, 130.
- sodādo*, pl. *sodābe* (Ful). Trade-slaves, 134 n.
- soggē* (Ful). Dowry, 166 n.
- Sōkó* (N). Sky, undifferentiated spirit, God, 51, 227-8.
- Sōkóbachi* (N). Worshipers of *Sōkó*, 227.
- so-ni* (M). Sacrifice, libation, 75; *sononke*, sacrificer, a Muslim by name only, which in the Gambia has been confused with *Sōniŋke*, the Sarakole.
- soro, sōgo* (M). Sacrifice (bloody), 74-75.
- sōsē* (S). A porridge of ground millet and milk prepared for the mourning feast as alms, 181.
- sū* or *sō* (M). Offering, sacrifice, libation, 74-75; *sū-ni-ke-baḡa*, *sōro-nge*, *sōno-nke*, a sacrificer, 75.
- sū-baḡa* (M). Witch, 118.
- subalhe*, sing. *tyubballo* (Ful). A free group of fishers assimilated among the Fulbe as members of the upper class (*rimhe*) but inferior to Fulbe proper, 15.
- sūdān*, s. *sūdāni* (Ar). Blacks, 1, 10, 31, 85 n.
- sukunya*, pl. *-ābe* (S, Tok). Witch, 61, 118.
- sule* (Song). Slave of second generation, 134 n.
- sule-hule* (Song). Slave of third generation, 134 n.
- sulmiya* (H). To fall off, apostatize, 85.
- sumburuku* (Song), Ar *baraka*, pronouncing formula of blessing with spitting, 157.
- sūna* (H). A name; *sūnan fito*, the real name of a person, 157 n.; *sūnan wōdsā*, the known or nick-name, 157 n.; *ran sūna*, naming day, 157.

- suñkalo* (M). 'Moon of deprivation', ninth month of the solar year = Ramaḍān, 75, 76 n., 78 n.
- sunna* (Ar). The model behaviour of the Prophet, one of the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence, hence employed for 'the custom of Muslims', 154, 162.
- sunna hindē* (Ful). The animal sacrifice ('*aqlīqa*') at the naming ceremony, 156 n.
- sunniḡol* or *sugol* (Ful). Circumcision, 162.
- sūq* (Ar). Market, 195.
- sūra* (Ar). Chapter of the Qur'ān, 81, 123, 151, 158, 161.
- surkulle* (H). Spell-casting by means of incantation, 55.
- tabaske, tafaske, afisko* (W. Sudan), *aid-n-tfaska* (south Moroccan Berber); Muslim Great Festival (*al-'id al-kabir*); *Tifeski* (Mauritania) 'spring' (*μάροχα*), 76, 80 n., 110 n.
- tafsir* (Ar). Explanation, commentary, 70, 81-82.
- Tafsir al-Jalālain* (Ar). The commentary of the two Jalāls, al-Maḥallī and as-Suyūṭī, 78, 79 n.
- tāggalt* (Tam). Bride-price, 168.
- taghilmūzt* (Tam). Mouth-muffler, 69.
- tahllil* (Ar). 'Legalization', the arranged temporary marriage of a woman triply-divorced to enable her to remarry her former husband, 175 n.
- tahlil* (Ar). Repetition (*dhikr*) of the phrase, *lā ilāha illā 'llāh*, 'there is no god but God', 96, 100.
- takaba* (H). Widow's mourning period, 183.
- takarda* (H), *takāda* (N). Paper; *būde takarda* (H), opening of the book (of the year), 77 n.; *takāda eyaze* (N), 'the Book of the Years', 77; *maga takarda* (H), a chief's scribe, 77 n., 141.
- takbir* (Ar). The expression *Allāhu akbar*, 'God is most great', 179.
- takhmis* (Ar). An expansion of a poem by adding three couplets to the original two, 78.
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- Takrūrī*, pl. *Takārīr* (Ar). West Sudan Negro, 13 n., 85 n.
- talaka*, pl. *talakāwa* (H), *latqa, taleqqi* (Tam.). Poor, the free peasant class, 110, 132-3, 168.
- talāq* (Ar). Repudiation of the wife by the husband, 174.
- ṭālīb*, pl. *ṭalaba* (Ar). Student, disciple, 93.
- Tamāhaqq*. Language spoken by the Tuareg, 10.
- tamma, tām̄ba* (Sudan region). A standard length of cloth = 10 cubits, 192.
- tamstr* (Wo, Ful). One learned in Islamic law; Ar *tafsir* = *mufassir*, commentator, 70, 148 n.
- tana, ntana, tne* (M). Taboo, sacred thing, 53 n., 130, 131 n.
- tarancis* (Te). A dancing society, 109 n.
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- ṭarīqa* (Ar). A mystical path, Sūfī brotherhood, 45, 46, 53, 82, 88-101, 188.
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- tāsābi, tasba* (N). Rosary, divination by the rosary, 120.
- tasbīh, tasbiha* (Ar). Rosary, 93 n., 120.
- tashi* (H). Courting, betrothal, 167.
- taṣliya* (Ar). Calling down blessing on the Prophet with the phrase *ṣallā 'llāh 'alaihi wa sallam*, 96, 100.
- taṭliq* (Ar). Judicial divorce, 175.
- tarwa* (Ar). Repentance, 48.
- tarwīd* (Ar). Doctrine of the divine unity, 81, 82.
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- tam̄r kabo* (Te). Ceremony of rice flour bread on the fortieth day after a death, 181 n.
- temezsid* (Tam). Mosque, 71 n.
- ten'dana* or *teḡatu* (N.T. of Ghana). The indigenous priest-chief authority, 144 n.
- tenga naba* (Mole). Village chief, 144 n.
- tenga soba* (Mole). Master of the land, 144 n.
- teṇe* (Ful, Tok). Bride-price, 166 n.
- tere* (M). The nature or character of a person, 58.
- terwenjamci* (M). 'Crossing the water-place', pagan ceremonies on the third or fourth days after death, 57.
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- tiku* (Ful). Assembly of elders, 150.
- tim̄rwo* (Tok), diviner, pl. *tim̄p̄e*; *tim̄gal*, divination, 120.
- tira* (Song, Y). Writing, amulet (*oni tira*, a charm-writing cleric); *tira ferey* (Song). 'Opening the book' (Berb *terē*); Islamic

- marriage contract ceremony, so called because characterized by the recitation of the *Fātiha*, 165-8.
- tirāhu* (Song). Place of reciting (Ar *talā*, read, recite); *tirāhu tyitāb*, law school, 81 n.; *tirāhu Korān*, Qur'ān school, 81 n.
- tiwoanin* (Berb). Compensation paid to the chief in addition to the blood-wit, 152 n.
- tō* (M). Association, 138 n.; *fla-ntō*, age-group association, 138 n.; *tō-nde*, member of an association, 138 n.; *tō-nde-mi ma yelena*, mounted members of a possessive spirit association, 110 n.; *tō-n tigi*, head of an association, 138 n.
- tōrōdo*, pl. *tōrōdhe* (Ful of Futa Toro). A cleric; *tōrade*, to beg alms or to pray, 135 n.
- tsāfi* (H). Traditional religious rites, 38-39, 65; *matsāfa*, place of worship, 39 n., 67.
- tsarki* (H). Ceremonial cleanliness; *mai-tsarki*, a holy man (pl. *tsarkākā*); *tsarkākā*, to become ritually clean, 67.
- tsubbu*, or *ḍabu* (H from Ar *ṭibb*). Magic; *mai-tsubbu*, a cleric who makes charms, 115.
- tú* (N). To name; *tú suna* or *tú kaye*, the naming ceremony on the eighth day after birth, 157 n.
- tūbi* (M, Me, &c.). Repentance (Ar *tawba*), submission; *i tūbi ta-ba* (M), 'art thou converted to Islam?', 48.
- tūbimci* (Me). A convert, 226.
- tukuri* (H). A recitation of the Qur'ān in sections by different clerics on special occasions, 79.
- tur* or *ḥap* (Wolof). Possessive spirit; *tur hat*, possessed woman, 110 n.
- turabi* (N), *toabei* (Me), *tiri* and *turu* (M), divination by sand (Ar *turāb*); *toabemci* (Me), *tiri ke baṭa* (M), divination, 120.
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- Twāreg*, sing. *tārgī*, *twārgī*. Tuareg. See Index.
- tyērno*, pl. *sērñāḥē* (Tok, Ful). Cleric who has received some training in law, 69, 82.
- tyibsi* (Song). The month of Dhū 'l ḥijja, from Ar. *kabsh*, ram, 75 n.
- tyitāb* (Ar *kitāb*), a book of law (Song), 81 n.
- tyobbal* and *kodde* (Ful). A specially prepared millet meal, 156 n., 226.
- tyukunyāgo* (Tok). Witchcraft, 118.
- ubañ giji* (H). 'Lord', God, 51.
- 'ulamā'*, sing. *'ālim* (Ar). Those who are trained in legal studies ('ilm), 81, 85 n., 230, 231.
- umm al walad* (Ar). A slave woman who has borne a child to her master and is generally regarded as free at his death, 168.
- umma* (Ar). Religious community, 40, 64, 139.
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- 'urs* (Ar). The wedding celebration, 172.
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- wada'* (Ar). Shells, 192.
- wakil* (Ar). A representative, warden of a mosque, &c., 69, 97, 98.
- wailuḥē*, sing. *bailo* (Ful, Tok). Caste group of smiths, 137.
- walā'* (Ar). Patronage, affiliation, the relationship of a master towards his freed slave, 133.
- walakha* (S), *walaṛa* (M). Writing tablet, 161 n.
- walei* (Me), Ar *lawḥ* (writing tablet). Amulet written on a wooden board, 114, 226.
- wali* (Ar). A guardian, 172.
- wallimat al-'urs* (Ar). Nuptial party, recommended according to Islamic law one day after the marriage is consummated (called *yange* in Fulfulde), 172, 173.
- wallo*, pl. *wallowē* (Ful). Tenant-clients, freed serfs holding land from their former masters (from Ar *walā'*, clientship), 212.
- wallu-al* (Ful). Writing tablet, 161 n.
- wambāḥē*, sing. *bambādo* (Ful, Tok). Caste of musicians, 137.
- wankā* (H). Washing, employed for the ceremony of joining Islam; *an yi masa wankā*, he has become a Muslim, 226.
- wanka liilenchi* (N). To join Islam, 226.
- wanzo* (M). Original impurity expelled by the rites of circumcision and excision, 58.
- waqf*, pl. *awqāf* (Ar). Religious or family endowments, 74.
- warande* (S). Wife repudiation, 174.
- wāsi* (Ar *wa'z*), Yor. Friday sermon, Qur'an interpretation; *shewāsi*, to interpret, 72.
- wata* (M). Call to prayer; *wata-ri-baṭa*, muezzin, 71 n.
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- wird*, pl. *awrād* (Ar). A litany task, generally recited at the end of certain ritual prayers, 92 n., 93, 95.
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- wodēḥē*, sing. *boḍādo* (Ful). Red. Designation of the unmodified nomadic Fulbe, 12.

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