

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

**EXPLORING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CENTRE OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE COORDINATION OF POLICY FORMATION
AMONG PUBLIC SECTOR MINISTRIES IN GHANA**

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that, except for references to other people’s work which have been duly acknowledged, this work presented here was done by me as a student of the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management, University of Ghana Business School, Legon.

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CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that; this thesis was supervised in accordance with the procedures laid down by the University of Ghana.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family and friends whose prayers and support have sustained me in this study.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CMA	-	Central Management Agencies
CSO	-	Civil Society Organizations
CoG	-	CoG
CRC	-	Constitutional Review Commission
DFID	-	Department for International Development
EMT	-	Economic Management Team
GCGP	-	Ghana Central Governance Project
GoG	-	Government of Ghana
HTM	-	Hierarchy-Type-Mechanism
LI	-	Legislative Instrument
M&E	-	M&E
PEMANDU	-	Malaysian Performance Management and Delivery Unit
MTM	-	Market-Type-Mechanism
MDA'S	-	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MBD	-	Ministry of Business Development
MoF	-	Ministry of Finance
MoME	-	Ministry of M&E
MoP	-	Ministry of Planning
NDPC	-	National Development Planning Commission
MSI	-	Ministry of Special Initiative
MoWH	-	Ministry of Works and Housing
MZID	-	Ministry of Zongo and Inner City Development

NPSRS	-	National Public Sector Reform Strategy
NTM	-	Network-Type-Mechanism
NGO'S	-	Non-Governmental Organizations
OHCS	-	Office of Head of Civil Service
OSM	-	Office of Senior Minister
OECD	-	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PBCMED	-	Planning, Budgeting, Coordination, Monitoring, and Evaluation Division
PMDU	-	Prime Minister's Delivery Unit
PSM	-	PSM

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ABSTRACT

Coordination is increasingly difficult in modern governments because of the shift towards specialization of functions in the public sector. This shift has placed greater emphasis on division of labour and the establishment of line ministries with specific responsibilities. Many countries have undertaken reforms to strengthen the role of the Centre of Government (CoG) to effectively coordinate policy formation and implementation among public organizations to reduce policy duplication, policy conflicts and wasteful expenditure. This study explored the effectiveness of the CoG in Ghana in the coordination of policy formation among Public Sector Ministries (PSM). The 'policy coordination scale' developed by Metcalfe (1994) was adapted as the analytical framework for the empirical analysis. Methodologically, the study used an exploratory research design and employed the interpretivist approach in ascribing meanings to the findings. Respondents were purposively selected and the data for analysis was collected through interviews of officials within and outside the CoG and a survey of public officials in all the 36 Ministries. The findings revealed that the CoG is largely effective in the coordination of policy formation among PSM in Ghana. However, the CoG has not been effective at resolving policy differences among Ministries. This could largely be due to the lack of clarity in terms of responsibilities among institutions at the CoG in resolving policy disputes. The study advocates for an effective agency within the CoG devoted to policy conflicts resolution.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background of the study

Crosscutting problems and solutions in the public sector have highlighted the increasing need for effective public sector coordination by central authorities. Coordination is the process through which a central authority uses incentives and mechanisms to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of tasks and actions of agents (individual actors and organizations) in order to ensure coherence in policy-making, policy implementation, and results (Bouckaert et al. 2010). Coordination is an old management practice employed by governments to regulate and align policies, track government outcomes and promote accountability in the public sector.

After governments have created public sector agencies for policy implementation, “the key design problem is how to combine delegation of responsibilities with effective means of monitoring, supervision, central control and accountability so as to reinforce rather than weaken the motivation to improve performance” (Metcalf 2000: 125). The problem of coordination of public agencies has given impetus to the establishment of central authorities by Governments to function as ‘coordinators’ in ensuring the attainment of ‘Whole-of-Government’ (Bouckaert et al. 2010). For the purpose of this study, Government (or the Executive) and its central authorities created for public sector coordination constitute what has been labelled in the literature as ‘Centre of Government’ (CoG) (Alessandro et al. 2013a, 2013b).

Ineffective coordination by central authorities results in the problem of policy duplication, policy disagreements, and implementation challenges among public organizations. Building the coordination capacity of central authorities within the CoG is key to ensuring that governments have the ability to coherently create and manage policies and organizations. Effective public sector coordination also enables governments to engage meaningfully with appropriate development stakeholders more fully in the governance of public authority and resources.

Most countries have established performance-monitoring units at the CoG to coordinate public sector institutions. Over the past two decades, Delivery units' approach emerged under the authority and influence of the CoG to facilitate effective Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of government priority programmes (Harrison 2016). The earliest was the Prime Minister's Delivery Unit (PMDU) in the United Kingdom in 2001. This unit was tasked with implementing the Prime Minister's priority programmes. Over the past decade, the principles and practices from PMDU'S experiences have shaped other countries to improve coordination in their public sector. Australia made robust and aggressive attempts at central coordination through the establishment of Queensland's Implementation Unit and the federal government Cabinet Implementation unit (Todd, Martin, & Brock 2014).

The most significant performance management unit established at the CoG in developing countries took place in Malaysia. The Malaysian Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU) gained attention for its transformational agenda. The PEMANDU approach and methods were exported to other African countries. The creation of M&E systems in African countries have been driven by the influence of international donor agencies (CLEAR 2012).

The Tanzanian ‘Big Results Now!’ programme was influenced by the global significance of coordination. Also, South Africa’s Delivery Unit placed greater emphasis on the use of M&E to inform the quality of service delivery (Harrison 2016). The similar structures, practices and processes of coordination have highlighted the need for understanding common modes of effective coordination across similar political, economic and cultural contexts.

According to Alessandro et al. (2013a), the structure and location of the CoG may differ across countries depending on the constitutional provisions, institutional constraints, and administrative traditions. The heterogeneity in the organization of the CoG is relevant for contextual understanding of the effectiveness of public sector coordination. Studies on the effectiveness of the CoG in public sector coordination in developed and developing countries have largely centered on the challenges and mechanisms for coordination.

According to Bardach (1998), the barriers to coordination include different professional perspectives of policy, turf battles among public sector organizations, information hoarding, and a litany of other familiar bureaucratic and political constraints. Peters (2014) identified sheer ignorance, poor institutional designs and the significant transaction cost of hierarchical approach. Peters (2018) probed the causes of coordination problems and the mechanisms to improve inter-agency coordination. Also, Christensen and Lægreid (2007b) argued that the inevitable features of contemporary organizations which includes division of labour and specialization inspired by New Public Management (NPM) reforms hinder coordination. Accordingly, Daqiq (2016) posits that the absence of coordination within the fragmented public sector results in the needless duplication of inter-agency activities and creates a

competitive rather than cooperative environment.

In Ghana, following recent reforms to improve coordination, some scholars have called for more research to explore the effectiveness of central authorities within the CoG in the coordination of public sector organizations (Appiah-Adu & Aning 2012, Appiah & Abdulai 2017). This call for research has been answered by this study to explore the effectiveness of the CoG in the policy coordination of Ministries within the public sector of Ghana.


1.1 Research Problem

Research findings on the few scholarly works on public sector coordination in Ghana suggest that Governments have struggled to create an effective CoG for coordination of public sector organizations (Appiah-Adu & Aning 2012, Appiah & Abdulai 2017). The location and focus of institutions within the CoG in Ghana have been very dynamic. Even within the same political ruling coalition, different factions have competed to coordinate policy-making, policy implementation, and policy M&E (Appiah & Abdulai 2017). This does not only result in frequent changes in the naming and location of coordination units created within the CoG, but it has weakened the CoG in coordinating the activities of Public Sector Ministries (PSM) (simply called Ministries).

Efforts to ensure effective coordination of the public sector organizations has been hindered by financial constraints, institutional dysfunction, operational challenges, uncoordinated information and inadequate technical capacity (Appiah-Adu & Aning 2012, CLEAR 2012). The National Public Sector Reform Strategy (NPSRS) 2018-2023 launched by the Office of the Senior Minister also identified resource constraints, lack of accountability and institutional

inadequacies as the weaknesses of the public sector. Appiah and Abdulai (2017) blamed the prevailing politics “competitive clientelism” for the organizational instabilities within the CoG and ineffective coordination of the public sector organizations. Political patronage and competitive democratic governance in the country has polarized political factions and undermined efforts to create effective central institutions for coordination. For instance, Figure 1 below clearly shows that from 2001 to 2019, different elected governments have created different structures within the CoG for the coordination of M&E of the activities of public sector organizations (Appiah & Abdulai 2017).

Figure 1: Coordination Units at the CoG Engaged in M&E in Ghana Since 2001



Source: Appiah and Abdulai (2017)

The diagram above shows the multiple units at the CoG created between 2001 to date to coordinate the M&E of PSM. The coordination of M&E within the CoG is characterized political and organizational instabilities blamed on “the politics of competitive-clientelism” (Appiah & Abdulai 2017). According to World Bank (2000) report on M&E capacities in Ghana, strong capacity for M&E would be strengthened if there is an effective coordination framework within the public sector, as well as identifying and setting out clear responsibilities for different actors at the CoG.

The Constitutional Review Commission (CRC), which was set up in 2010, commented on the weak legal prowess of the NDPC in ensuring strict compliance of public institutions to its authority. In 2016, the National Development Planning (System) Regulations LI 2232 was promulgated to strengthen the effectiveness of the NDPC in the coordination of policies among public sector organizations. PSM and other public organizations are required per the Legislative Instrument (LI) to submit to the NDPC medium term development plans, policy proposals, quarterly reports and annual reports to enable the NDPC ensure policy coherence among the Ministries. How effective is the NDPC in policy coordination?

There are many institutions at the CoG in Ghana created to coordinate policies among public organizations in Ghana. The institutions include the NDPC, Office of the Head of Civil Service, the Cabinet and others (Appiah-Adu & Aning 2012, Appiah & Abdulai 2017). Very little is known about the effectiveness of the CoG in coordinating policies among the Ministries. According to Peters (2015), the existence of many institutions performing undefined coordination roles can create contradictions.

The key question is how effective is the CoG in the coordination of policy formation in Ghana? This question is the key driver for this study.

1.2 Research Objectives

To achieve the research purpose, the following specific objectives underpinned the study:

1. To examine the nature of the organizational structure of public sector coordination between the CoG and PSM.
2. To investigate the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of establishment of central policy priorities for development governance.
3. To investigate the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of communication of central priorities to PSM.
4. To investigate the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of arbitration of policy differences and conflicts among PSM.
5. To make recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of PSM.

1.3 Research Questions

Based on the above objectives, the following research questions guided the study:

1. What is the nature of the organizational structure of public sector coordination between the CoG and PSM?
2. How effective is the CoG in the coordination of establishment of central policy priorities for development governance?
3. How effective is the CoG in the coordination of communication of central priorities

to PSM?

4. How effective is the CoG in the coordination of arbitration of policy differences and conflicts among PSM?
5. What measures should be adopted to improve the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of PSM?

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study would contribute to knowledge in the area of public sector coordination in Ghana. It would inform governments and policy entrepreneurs on practical measures and mechanisms in improving the CoG in the coordination of policy formation among PSM. The findings would offer government agencies, development partners and academia the opportunity to make meaningful contributions towards interagency coordination in the country.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

The study is limited by the vast nature of public sector activities that require coordination. It is extremely difficult to examine the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of all activities performed by the Ministries concerning policy formation, policy implementation, and policy M&E. Time, resources and an expansive public sector makes it near impossible for this study to entirely address all coordination issues across all public institutions in Ghana. The study is therefore limited to two main areas of public sector coordination, first, understanding the institutional framework for public sector coordination between the CoG and Ministries; and, second, the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of policies among the Ministries. The study is limited to the first 'level of coordination' of public sector organizations mainly concerned with 'policy formation'. It excludes the analysis of

the coordination of policy implementation as well as the coordination of policy M&E by the CoG. The various levels of public sector coordination are discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of relevant concepts, theoretical and empirical literature on public sector coordination. It begins with a review of literature on the key concepts of the study from various scholarly perspectives. The study also adapted Metcalfe's (1994, 2010) coordination scale as the analytical framework for exploring the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of PSM. Finally, this chapter reviewed empirical literature in the area of public sector coordination.

2.1 Definition of Concepts

The concepts underpinning the study provide relevant understanding of the study. The key concepts that define the study are appropriately clarified for better appreciation of this research. These concepts include Policy Formation, Coordination, CoG (CoG) and PSM (PSM).

2.1.1 Policy Formation

Policy formation is understood as the genesis and process through which policy takes its shape (Persson 2014). It involves the application of knowledge and experience towards the adoption of courses of action that are likely to succeed in the attainment of desired goals within a specific policy context. Howlett (2014: 281) defined Public policy as "the results or efforts made by governments to alter aspects of their own or social behavior in order to carry out some end or purpose and are comprised of complex arrangements of policy goals

and policy means”. In the public space, these ends or purposes are often multifarious and the processes aimed at attaining them are more systematic.

For the purpose of this study, policy formation is used instead of the rather similar concept of policy formulation. The aspect of policy formation discussed involves agenda setting and all other phases required for developing public policies. Policy formulation is part of the pre-decision phase of policy formation (Sidney 2007). It involves identifying and designing a set of policy alternatives to address a problem and narrow that set of solutions towards a final decision. The final adoption of policy options remains in the realm of formal government institutions at the centre (Fischer & Miller 2017). While the less informal policy formation which precedes the later phase is done by ministerial departments and other organized interest groups depending on the political system.

According to Howlett and Ramesh (2014) policy formation takes place within a larger government context involving a set of institutions, actors and practices. The formation of public policy therefore requires the contribution of several stakeholders in order to design a policy that is generally acceptable, relevant, sustainable and adequately addresses social problems. The policy cycle is cyclical hence, policy formation includes all the cumulative activities that are concerned with setting the policy agenda/ formulation of the policy and adopting the policy. Based on the rationale of the study, the coordination of Policy formation includes a series of stages consisting of (0) independent decision-making by CoG (1) Coordination of establishing central priorities (2) coordination of communication of central policy priorities to PSM and (3) Coordination of arbitration of policy differences among PSM.

The failure of the Policy formation phase to establish a common ground for resolving policy differences is one of the key reasons for subsequent implementation difficulties (Hudson, Hunter, & Peckham 2019). Policy formation requires continuous collaboration with a range of multiple stakeholders at political, technical, legislative, managerial and administrative levels as well as the engagement of local actors who usually finance implementation in developing countries. The essence is to connect all stakeholders vertically and horizontally in the policy-making process instead of making the policy design appear as a series of distinct and discrete stages.

2.1.2 Coordination

The concept of coordination is understood differently relative to context and scholarly perspective. As indicated by Bouckaert, Peters, and Verhoest (2010) cooperation, coherence and collaboration are used simultaneously in reference to coordination. These terms generally highlight the mode of streamlining public sector activities in order to achieve a collective objective. The essence and processes of coordination often play a central role in defining the term. The term coordination has been defined by Lindblom (1965:154) to mean: *“A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in it such that the adverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions in the set are to a degree and in some frequency avoided, reduced, counterbalanced, or outweighed.”* The concept of coordination surpasses negative coordination as espoused by the definition above. Aside the fact that coordination is aimed at avoiding conflicts (adverse coordination) it equally ensures the achievement of agreed goals and objectives.

Alexander (1995) also referred to coordination as processes through which government decisions are harnessed collectively to produce an expected outcome. In effect, this view

on coordination highlights the integration of policy decisions among public institutions in order to achieve intended policy outcomes. Metcalfe (1994) argued that the essence of coordination is to ensure that institutions work together without impeding, frustrating or negating the works of others. In support, Yodsampa (2013) argued that the aim of coordination is to align resources, capabilities, strategies and implement shared goals while maintaining the autonomy and independence of the agencies.

The concept of coordination central to this study and which appropriately addresses the deficiencies in other definitions of the term is given by Bouckaert et al. (2010: 16) as follows:

“Coordination refers to the instruments and mechanisms that aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of task and efforts of organizations within the public sector in order to create a greater coherence and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within and between policies, implementation and management. “

This illustrates the various aspects of coordination to ensure an integrated outcome. It highlights the authority of governments to ensure effective coordination in the public sector either through bargaining, coercion or networks. However, this definition has sacrificed precision in order to encapsulate all coordination units that have some form of role in creating greater coherence and reducing the challenges of coordination. It is also significant to note that the voluntary alignment of organizations is propelled by certain incentives for coordination. Peters and Mawson (2015) argued that coordination is more effective if there exist common goals and leadership among others.

Central authority and network mechanisms of coordination have inspired and sustained inter-agency coordination in the public sector. However, it is imperative to note that the

essence of incentives in enhancing coordination cannot be underestimated. Financial and non-financial incentives have influenced coordination of public sector organizations.

According to Hedström, Swedberg, and Hernes (1998), the effectiveness of coordination is understood through political resources available such as bargaining, co-optation and coercion. Bouckeart et al. (2010) also asserts that authority, power, information, bargaining, mutual co-optation and norms are the basic processes in coordination within the public sector. The processes of coordination between the CoG and PSM in Ghana are explored to understand the mechanisms and incentives that strengthen or undermine effectiveness

2.1.3 Centre of Government

The definition of CoG is viewed differently among scholars. Alessandro et al. (2013a: 4) defined it as “the institution or group of institutions that provide direct support to the country’s Chief Executive, generally for the political and technical coordination of government actions, strategic planning, performance monitoring, and communication of the government’s decisions and achievements.” This concept of coordination clearly highlights the role of CoG in providing support for government to coordinate the activities of PSM. Also, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) viewed CoG as “an institution, or the group of institutions, that provides direct support and advice to the highest political authority at the summit of the executive and to the council of ministers (OECD 2004: 3). These perspectives of the CoG narrowly refer to institutions or departments in the executive structure of government. Accordingly, the CoG is viewed as central agencies that supports the executive authority in the planning and delivery of central policies. The narrowed definition of CoG is more appropriate for the study of inter-agency

coordination.

The institutions and departments at the CoG perform certain key functions which includes coordinating government policies and actions across agencies and monitoring and evaluating the delivery of the government's commitment (Dumas, Lafuente & Parrado 2013, Baltija 2015). These core functions of the CoG are the focus of this study.

Metcalf (1994) sequentially highlighted the role of CoG in coordination through; establishing policy priorities and strategies, communication of these policies to PSM, resolving policy conflicts, monitoring, and evaluating the implementation of government policies. Alessandro et al. (2013b) argued that the structure and functions of the CoG differ in countries and is conveniently designed towards promoting the interest of the chief executive. However, other scholars and governments have referred to the CoG as 'Delivery Units' (DU) (Bouckaert et al. 2010, Alessandro et al. 2013a, Peters 2013). Countries that have established DU have generally done so as a means to drive performance improvements in critical service delivery areas (Todd et al. 2014).

2.1.4 Public Sector Ministries

The term public sector refers to governments and all publicly controlled or funded agencies, enterprises and other entities that deliver programmes, goods or services. This broader view of public sector includes the activities of Ministries that play specific roles in the public sector. Ministries are established by an Act of Parliament and is an extension of the Executive arm of government in charge of carrying out some specific responsibilities of government.

2.2 Analytical Framework: Public Sector Policy Coordination Scale

There seems to be some consensus among scholars that the essence of public sector coordination is to create coherence in the design, implementation and management of policies. The specific activities that should be undertaken to ensure coordination has been left unspecified by many leading scholars (Peters 2018, Bouckaert et. al. 2010). Bouckaert et al. (2010) and Peters (2018) have acknowledged useful initial attempt made by Metcalfe (1994) to specify coordination as a scale or hierarchy of activities. Metcalfe's 'policy coordination scale' is adapted as the analytical framework for this empirical research. The adapted scale covers specific areas of coordination that must be undertaken by coordinators within the CoG.

Metcalfe measuring scale for coordination shows the sequence of stages involve in coordinating ministries by a central agency. According to Metcalfe (1994), the extent of organizational interdependence is an empirical matter. Depending on the level of interdependence within organizations, the choice and process should be deliberately selected. It focuses on the management capacity of coordination than the institutions responsible for coordination. The scale illustrates different components and capacities of coordination in a hierarchical logical sequence. It highlights the possibilities for cooperation ranging from complete indifference among the actors through to the creation of a comprehensive government strategy for a policy area. This scale is useful for identifying levels of coordination among public sector actors.

Bianchi and Peters (2018) argued that the degree of coordination success at each level of the scale depends on individual judgments since there are no clear indicators of how to measure effectiveness of coordination. This scale of coordination can be classified into three levels of the Public policy cycle: policy formation, policy implementation, and policy

M&E. Level (1-3) depict the variables responsible for Policy formation in the public sector, Policy implementation level (4- 5) and level (6-7) for Policy evaluation and Accountability.

Figure 2: Levels and Scale of Public Sector Inter Organizational Policy Coordination

Levels of Coordination as an Outcome	Scale	Policy Coordination Functions
Policy Evaluation and Accountability	7	Coordination of PSM accountability for policy implementation
	6	Coordination of M&E of policies/programmes implemented by PSM towards accountability
Policy Implementation	5	Coordination of financial resource distribution to organizations for efficient policy implementation
	4	Coordination of personnel recruitment and management by public organizations for effective policy implementation
Policy Formation	3	Coordination of arbitration of policy differences and conflicts
	2	Coordination of communication of central policy priorities to public sector agencies (i.e ministers/ organizations) (PSM)
	1	Coordination of establishing central policy priorities
	0	Independent decision-making by ministers/organizations

Source: Based on Metcalfe (1994)

The process of public sector coordination depicted in Figure 2 is conceptualized to involve three main stages and eight levels. It is based on the “policy coordination scale” originally designed by Metcalfe (1994) for the study of international policy coordination among European Union (EU) member states. However, an extension of its appropriateness is applied to the vertical relationship between agencies with a central agency. At the lowest

level of the scale (level 0), there is no coordination of public sector organization and each actor maintains its autonomy and makes decisions independently. The independent decisions made by actors within the CoG will become the basis for initiating interorganizational coordination.

The first level on the coordination scale recognized the role of the CoG in coordinating the design and creation of public organizations to function as agencies of the principal Executive in Government. The essence of this is critical in ensuring uniformity and judicious use of scarce public funds on mutually agreed public programmes. The second level highlights communication of policy priorities and strategies to PSM for the purpose of keeping all actors informed and educated about the policy priorities of other actors. At the same level, there is an opportunity for PSM to provide feedback to the CoG on policy divergence or convergence through consultations among actors and central agency. However, negative approach of coordination is centered on level three where policy differences among public agencies are arbitrated in order to ensure a uniform approach towards inter-agency support in implementing an agreed policy. This level comprises of coordination actions in situations in which ministries/agencies have not been able to find an agreement on their own; a third party, normally the CoG, is thus needed. In the first instance this includes arbitration of the conflict, and in the second setting, limits to ministries/agencies' actions. This last phase is aimed at balancing the priorities of different actors. All the above phases of coordination on the scale constitute the nature of policy formation and precedes policy implementation in the public sector.

Policy implementation involves the translation of policy goals into action. Whereas level four is centered on the coordination of human resource capacity for policy implementation,

Level five is focused on the distribution of required resources to MDA's to ensure effective implementation of the policy. The concept of implementation in the public sector often synthesis both top-down and bottom-up approaches in which all actors are involved vertically and horizontally.

The crucial and zenith of the coordination scale is level six and seven which is on M&E of the policies and programmes of public agencies in a coordinated manner towards the achievement of the desired policy outcome. This level is responsible for measuring Key Performance Indicators (KPI's). Lastly, level seven is concern with accountability from PSM for policy implementation. This is critical in the public sector in order to ensure that public officials and institutions are accountable to the people. It also has the tendency of informing subsequent public policies.

Most efforts at coordination focus on the CoG in coordinating public sector activities. The multiple organizations at the centre responsible for coordination may create difficulties in coordinating the coordinators. An effective centre is necessary, but not sufficient, for the implementation of public programmes. Thus, while we emphasized vertical coordination efforts, horizontal coordination is also important (Bouckaert, Peters, & Verhoest 2016). Coordination is largely relevant in multidisciplinary issues, as horizontal problems cannot be solved with vertical approaches and ministerial 'silos' (Alessandro et al. 2013b).

2.3 Mechanisms of Public Sector Coordination

Public sector entities have a complex network of relationship with other entities and Central government often play a major role in determining the mode of relationship (IFAC 2013). Bouckaert et al. (2010) argued that most mechanisms available for coordination depend

upon structures and interactions. In as much as the structures for coordination are important, competent and committed individuals are required to operate these structures. The three dominant mechanisms of coordination include Hierarchy, Markets and Networks (Bouckaert et al. 2010, Peters 2018).

2.3.1 Hierarchy-Type-Mechanism (HTM)

Hierarchy is regarded as the default mechanism for coordinating public sector programmes and organizations. The bureaucratic theory of Weber (1947) which places emphasis on legal-rational arrangement of institutions highlights authority and power as fundamental resources and processes of coordination (Peters 2018). Bouckaert et al. (2010) argued that two aspects of hierarchical control exist; bureaucratic hierarchical control and political hierarchical control. Whereas the former refers to civil service-controlled rules and internal authority, the latter is controlled and dominated by political leaders.

In all countries, the efforts of hierarchical mechanism of coordination exist in different forms within the public sector. The merging and splitting of organizations have greater chance of internalizing and reducing the need for coordination between organizations. Restructuring government apparatus by changing the basic principle of specialization (Gulick 1937) involves shifts of competencies and task aimed at improving coordination. Peters (2018) emphasized hierarchical authority within the public sector has been the dominant mechanism of coordination in all political systems. He argues that the central government has a very large repertoire of hierarchical instruments and resources to use in confronting coordination challenges. The essence of hierarchical approach in coordination is increasingly important for political executives to regain political control and pursue consistent policies in government (Christensen & Lægreid 2007a).

Establishing and changing lines of control is another structural hierarchical way of achieving better coordination (Alexander 1995). All in all, the common feature of hierarchical approach is that, authority and coercion make coordination more or less automatic or an imposition in the public sector. The command and control mechanism of coordination is viewed as the conventional means of streamlining government activities. However, coercive elements of hierarchical coordination may contribute to problems of coordination. Bouckaert et al. (2010) underscored that the coordination challenge lies in the management difficulty face by the CoG in the rightful exercise of authority over other public organizations. The organizational capacity and technical competence of the CoG is critical in advancing the effectiveness of the hierarchical mechanism. The difficulty in steering the rightful exercise of authority makes the shift from hierarchical approach to non-hierarchical governance desirable (Bouckaert et al. 2010).

2.3.2 Market-Type-Mechanism (MTM)

Market as a coordination mechanism is more inherent in a free-market economic exchanges but it is rarely explored in public sector settings. It is equally argued that Market-Type Mechanism (MTM) is generally reserved for only matters of policy implementation. This is uncharacteristic of policy formation (Bouckaert et al. 2010). The market approach of coordination is built mainly on bargaining and information exchange or sharing as basic processes and resources.

Peters (2003) asserts that the availability of information enhances bargaining and makes negotiation more effective. According to Alexander (1995) the informal relations between partner organizations allowed in market mechanism results in the systemic mutual and partisan adjustment of decisions. There is the need for a central authority to play a neutral

role in the market in order to produce the outcomes that government desire because markets are relatively indeterminate. It seems that MTM is rarely envisaged in public sector coordination in developing countries because it overlooks the vertical arrangement in the public sector.

2.3.3 Network-Type-Mechanism (NTM)

Network is also an alternative mode for coordination in the public sector and depend more on voluntary collaborative actions and solidarity between relevant organizations. According to Bouckaert et al. (2010), networks may be referred to as resilient patterns of cooperative engagement between mutually dependent actors around specific issues of policy. Network type coordination requires more time, interactions and trust to sufficiently become reliable. The network-type arrangement recognizes instruments such as bargaining, negotiation and mutual interdependence in coordinating public institutions (Peters 2018). According to Peters (2018), the existence of networks between social actors and government could also propel coordination.

Bouckaert et al. (2010) argued that greater deal of coordination is not achieved through the coercive exercise of authority but network mechanism. This mechanism of coordination promotes bottom-up interactions among social actors with the advantage of making available essential information in other agencies. The central instruments that enhance this mechanism is the willingness of public organizations to coordinate with other agencies.

In the context of network mechanisms of coordination, the work of Peters and Mawson (2015) in Ghana clearly shows that it is difficult to create incentives between agencies to willingly coordinate their activities. Bardach (1998) argued that in order for networks to succeed as a mechanism in coordinating public institutions, organizations should be willing

to work together and bargain the definition of problems and programmes in a more acceptable model. The creation of consultation and negotiation bodies as coordination instruments acknowledges the need for representatives of these bodies to complement the impersonal system of information exchange through Information Communication Technology (ICT) (Bouckaert et al. 2010). According to Lafuente and Nguyen (2011) advisory boards strengthen control and accountability over public sector agencies. Aside the issue of sharing information, these bodies would discuss, negotiate and agree on joint strategies concerning different organizations.

Bouckaert et al. (2010) discussed chain management as a structural device used for coordination. It refers to a network of interdependent organizations involved in the delivery of different aspects of the same programme, product or service. The institutions involved in different phases of the programme are treated as equal partners, although one might play a lead role as a chain manager.

There exists a plethora of mechanisms that can be employed to enhance coordination in the public sector. Given the appropriate context and approach, every mechanism can be effective. Therefore, while attempting to provide a reasonable account of the strengths and weaknesses of each of the approaches in abstract, a more complete analysis is possible through the empirical examination of real-world cases. Many governments utilize a wide range of coordination devices. Although the search for answers for coordination challenges is gaining attention, the majority of the tools that have been developed in developing countries rely upon hierarchy as the principal instrument. Enhancing coordination will depend not only on hierarchical mechanism, but on the interplay of the three mechanisms at different levels on the hierarchy of coordination.

2.4 Challenges of Coordination

Most studies on public sector coordination have largely centered on the challenges of coordination (Bouckaert et al. 2010, Peters 2014, Appiah-Adu & Aning 2012, Appiah & Abdulai 2017). The challenges of coordination in the public sector are both political and administrative. Peters (2018) argued that policy coordination is the most difficult challenge that confronts governments and is of significant importance in recent times because of complex societal problems and the ideas of New Public Management that have created fragmentation. Four key challenges of public sector coordination are discussed below.

2.4.1 Agencification and Apecialization of Functions

Specialization and division of labour along horizontal and vertical dimensions are also basis of coordination challenges (Bouckaert et al. 2010). Other scholars such as Peters (2018) argued that specialization in the public sector which is an important value in government is the principal reason for ineffective coordination. The increasing importance of public sector coordination is occasioned by key societal problems that cut across sectors and areas of responsibility and do not correspond to the existing ministerial structures (Pelkonen, Teräväinen & Waltari 2008). Decentralization also creates an increase challenges for vertical coordination (Peters & Mawson 2016). The challenges of coordination as a result of specialization is qualitatively different and dependent on whether the structural specialization is based on purpose, process, clientele or geography. In an event of purpose-based specialization the main coordinative challenge would be to get different sectoral administrations to work together on cross-cutting problems (Christensen & Lægheid 2007b).

2.4.2 Information Asymmetry

The challenges in public sector coordination also blamed on the lack of access to relevant information within and across public institutions (Peters 2018). According to Bouckaert et al. (2010), sheer ignorance and inadequate shared information among government organizations have fettered coordination. Information in the public sector is deemed as the most powerful resource of most organizations hence the apathy towards sharing information. Peters (2018) underscored that there exist strong incentives for maintaining secrecy in the public sector. Their hostility towards information relations is to strengthen their turf and capacity to own their budgets, personnel and policies. Therefore, in the absence of legal instrument and superior incentive compelling public institutions to cooperate with a central coordination unit, the success of coordination would rely on the willingness of these institutions to provide information and resources. Voluntary cooperation among public organizations is a scarce commodity.

2.4.3. Competitive Partisan Politics

According to Bouckaert et al. (2010), the barriers to public sector coordination also include political factors. He argues that the political objectives of the executive and the deliberate political reorganization of institutions by successive governments may undermine attempts to achieve greater coherence in governance.

In Ghana, Appiah and Abdulai (2017) underscored the prevailing political settlement of “competitive clientelism” under the fourth republic as responsible for the ineffective public sector coordination in the country. They argued that the capacity of the state to have a central unit for coordination is undermined by the “competitive character of clientelist politics in Ghana”. The constitutional power provides opportunity for ruling elites to

distribute opportunities to patrons and clients of the ruling government. This results in the restructuring of coordination agencies. There is often a wholesale reorganization of coordination units at the CoG either through dismissals and transfers whenever there is transition of power in Ghana. Many newly elected governments often employ these strategies in order to reorganize the human resource of public agencies for their political interest. Hence, the competent staff and institutional memory regarding public sector coordination is sacrificed whenever there is change of government. This affects the attempts at ensuring effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of PSM. Peters (2018) also argued that coordination is deemed problematic among coalition governments and federal states where there exists power sharing between competitive political parties.

2.4.4 Weak Monitoring and Evaluation

One other noticeable barrier to coordination is weak accountability of public organizations (Bouckeaert et al. 2010). Accountability in the public sector is a virtue, but financial and legal accountability has been lacking in many developing countries. The success of coordination requires some willingness of government to think about measures that can effectively track, monitor and evaluate the exercise of responsibilities by public sector organizations. Peters (2018) highlights performance management as a challenge. The tracking of the performance of public institutions if not properly managed could propel them to jettison collective or interagency objectives. However, New Zealand employed performance management as a strategic and coordination instrument in enhancing coordination (Bouckeaert et al. 2010). In Peru, an enhanced coordination in birth registration was recorded through the use of budget for performance management (Peters 2016).

2.5 Public Sector Coordination in Ghana

Ghana is a unitary state with a central government that hierarchically coordinates the programmes and policies of public sector institutions. By virtue of an expanded public sector with numerous social policies, the Presidency more often supervise and coordinate the delivery of government programmes. The CoG in Ghana is christened the Presidency with coordination responsibilities across all public sector institutions. The only ministry with strong horizontal coordination power is the Ministry of Finance, but this power is mainly restricted to matters on budget and financial resources.

Successive governments have invested time and resources in coordinating government business. The Ghana Central Governance Project (GCGP) was initiated in 2000 in order to enhance government's policy management processes in the country's public service. It was a bilateral project between the GoG and the Government of Canada. The project enhanced policy management and coordination process at the executive level and between ministries, and between the Central Management Agencies (CMA) (Appiah-Adu & Aning 2012).

Also, the DELIVER project which started in 2014 by the GoG and Department for International Development (DFID) also made contributions towards improving the effectiveness of the CoG in policy coordination at the Office of the President. These projects propelled the establishment of Coordination units at the Presidency. However, these units are virtually replaced in terms of functions and personnel when there was a change of government in 2017. That aside Appiah- Adu and Aning (2012) argued that the CoG is unattractive to creative analyst with sharp minds. This is because of the political risk associated with serving the Executive. The job insecurity could account for the lack of interest among highly skilled personnel in working with coordinating institutions at the centre.

According to Friedman (2013) the 1992 Constitution of Ghana has empowered the central government to formulate policies, manage finances and supervise policy implementation. Article 86 and 87 of the 1992 Constitution which established the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) makes the Commission the legitimate authority in addressing issues of coordination within the public sector. In the case of PSM, the Planning, Budgeting, Coordinating, M&E Division (PBCMED) established by the Civil Service Act – 1993 (PNDCL 327) within each ministry is required by law to submit quarterly and annual reports to the NDPC.

Also, the creation of Ministry of M&E (MoME), Office of Senior Minister (OSM) and Ministry of Planning (MoP) under the Office of the President (OOP) in 2017 came as a renewed effort at strengthening the coordination of government activities at the various state ministries. That notwithstanding, Article 76(2) makes provision for Cabinet to assist the President in the determination of the general policy of government. The Cabinet in Ghana remains the highest decision making body which deliberates on policy and offers approval. A number of Central Management Agencies (CMAs) co-ordinate and provide support to Executive decision-making system and policy formation process. They include the Economic Management Team (EMT), Policy Coordination M&E Unit (PCMEU), Cabinet Secretariat (CS), Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) and Public Service Commission (PSC). These agencies work closely with the Ministries to ensure that the President receives all the information and documentation for decision making.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the main themes: Policy formation, Coordination, Centre of Government, Mechanisms of Public Sector Coordination and the challenges of coordination in the Public sector. The theoretical and methodological contribution of

literature in the area of coordination have been effectively reviewed. The use of Hierarchy-Type-Mechanism HTM, Market-Type-Mechanism MTM and Network-Type-Mechanism for policy formation and implementation have been well expanded. The challenges of public sector coordination discussed have inspired these mechanisms in the area of coordination.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter focused on the research methodology employed for the study. It highlights the research paradigm, research design and approach, study area, the population of the study, sample size and sampling techniques, sources of data, the methods used in data collection, unit of analysis, method of data analysis, ethical considerations and the limitations of the study.

3.1 Research Paradigm

According to Morgan (2007), a paradigm is regarded as a shared belief system that guides the direction of a researcher and influence data interpretation. On the same score, Kivunja and Kuyini (2017) agreed that the abstract beliefs and principles that influence the perspective and orientation of the researcher is referred to as the research paradigm. A paradigm is essentially a whole framework of philosophical disposition which appropriately guides the conduct of a research. Hence, Shannon-Baker (2016) underscored that paradigms serve as guide for researchers to ground their research.

The philosophical paradigm central to this study is the interpretivist approach. Guba (1990: 17) defined paradigm or worldview as “a basic set of beliefs that guide action”. The interpretivist approach attempts to interpret a phenomenon in terms of the meanings people ascribe to it in its natural settings (Denzin & Lincoln 2005). According to Creswell, Hanson, Clark Plano, and Morales (2007), making sense out of the meanings others have about the world makes qualitative research more interpretivist. In most qualitative studies,

the interpretivist approach is employed to further shape the study. The essence of interpretivist approach is to employ situations, languages and approaches in a manner that would acknowledge the social, historical and political context of the differences and positions of both the researcher and those being researched. The background of the researcher shapes their interpretation and it flows from their cultural, historical and personal experiences (Creswell et al. 2007). Walsham (1995) posits that interpretivist view facts as social construction by human actors which applies similarly to all researchers. Hence there do not exist any knowledge of reality. Popular proponents of the interpretivist approach Geertz (1973) argue that this approach is reductionist and condenses data in order to seek meaning throughout the research processes. The interpretivist approach unravels multiple realities as opposed to searching for one objective reality. According to Denzin (2010), the use of multiple validities and commitments to dialogue is sought in any interpretive study. The interpretivist approach is therefore much expanded in the works of Denzin and Lincoln (2011) and Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009).

3.2 Research Design

Creswell (2014) view research designs as types of enquiries that provide specific direction for procedures in research. According to Babbie and Mouton (2005) the type of research design a researcher adopts must be influence by the intended result it set to achieve. Research design is a framework which outlines how the researcher plans to conduct the proposed research. Research design is the logic that links the data to be collected to the initial questions of study.

As a result, some researchers claim that research design is a plan that guides the researcher in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations.

The study adopted an exploratory design to explore the effectiveness of the CoG in coordinating PSM. Burns and Grove (2001: 342) defined exploratory research as “research conducted to gain new insights, discover new ideas, and for increasing knowledge of the phenomenon”. The study attempts to explore the nature and mechanism of public sector coordination in Ghana. Exploratory research design was chosen because of its appropriateness in unearthing social phenomenon of which little or nothing is known about it. As noted by Kothari (2004) this design facilitates an efficient research that would provide maximal information. Also, Birkinshaw, Brannen and Tung (2011) argued that qualitative research is often done in an exploratory settings for topics that are new or hitherto under-researched. Hence, this study employed the exploratory design in order to unearth issues of public sector coordination in the country.

3.3 Unit of Analysis

Selecting the unit of analysis for a study is very crucial in shaping the research approach in collecting the appropriate data. The unit of analysis for this study is on the coordination of PSM by the CoG. It presents a macro- level of analysis, highlighting the interagency coordination in the public sector.

3.4 Research Approach

Based on the interpretivist philosophical disposition of the study in examining the effectiveness of CoG in policy coordination of PSM, the qualitative method of data collection and analysis was adopted. Qualitative research method embroils the application of qualitative data, such as interviews, documents and observation, in order to understand and explain a social phenomenon. It places emphasis on interpretation of phenomena in their natural settings to create understanding with reference to the connotations people bring to such situations (Denzin & Lincoln 1994). In essence, qualitative research allows

the researcher to have better explanations of the subjects' views, emotions, beliefs and feelings and values and dispositions, incentives and behavior including the implications and explanations assigned to happenings and effects. Bricki and Green (2007) suggest that in instances where little is known about a phenomenon, qualitative data is mostly appropriate because it allows the researcher to collect essential data that would have been impossible to place values on quantitative terms.

One of the major advantages of qualitative research is that it provides an insight into the samples' own experiences in their own words and this aids the study to provide deeper explanations to how and why certain things or situations happen (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004). It is unstructured since it commences with general problems and not hypotheses and employs unstructured research instruments (such as interviews and observations). This attribute enables the researcher to observe and fetch the right information for the analysis of phenomenon. The interview guide for this study was designed to gain more insight on coordination among Directors of PBCMED of some selected PSM and CoG. It covers all the information that could not be gathered through the questionnaires and offered more explanation in unravelling the research problem.

The study employed the qualitative approach in order to provide in-depth understanding of coordination in PSM. The mode of data collection includes semi-structured interviews which enabled the study to gain relevant insights on the mechanisms and nature of coordination between the CoG and PSM. This approach provides some flexibility for the researcher to use open-ended and probing questions. However, Coordination in the public sector showcases a vertical approach; hence any attempt to side-line the inputs of other equally important employees in PSM would be inappropriate. Thus, qualitative approach

which relies mostly on interviews is expensive and results in low response rate and as a result the conclusions drawn from the handful population may not reflect a good representation of the large population of targeted respondents at the various ministries and departments. This according Silverman (2013) results in unreliable findings. This indicates the inadequacy of the qualitative approach to investigate effectiveness of coordination of PSM by the CoG on a larger population. The demerits of the qualitative approach include the subjectivity of its findings. According to Bricki and Green (2007) It is not easy to generalize the findings from this approach since the sample size is often small; that is, it does not necessarily represent the broader population. In view of the fact that qualitative research is highly subjective, this study therefore administered questionnaire in order to minimize the persuasion and influence of individuals or institutions.

Accordingly, the study augments the shortfalls of the qualitative design through descriptive statistics. The study gathered statistical data through a survey in order to obtain broad data from a large number of respondents at PSM sufficient for a comprehensive analysis. Therefore, the study surveyed 39 employees from all the PSM, CoG and CMA's. The CMA's officials for purposes of statistical analysis were classified under CoG institutions.

3.4.1 Qualitative descriptive

Quantitative approach to research strives to describe phenomena by collecting numerical data which are analyzed using statistical presentations and interpretations (Kothari 2004; Creswell 2013). However, qualitative descriptive studies comprehensively interpret social situations with precision and accuracy. Researchers of qualitative descriptive studies are data driven and regards language as a vehicle of communication. Sandelowski (2000) argued that summarizing data numerically with descriptive statistics is a quasi-statistical

style of analysis employed by both qualitative and quantitative content analysis. However, she adds that, for qualitative studies it is a means to an end and not an end in itself. Qualitative study unlike quantitative study is further interested in interpreting additional information and not only the numerical data (Frequencies and means). Elliot and Timulak (2005) argued that distinguishing between measuring things with words and measuring a phenomenon with numbers is not a useful way of identifying different approaches to research. However, in qualitative studies emphasis is on understanding a phenomenon in its natural setting with the use of special strategies for enhancing the credibility of design and analyses.

The qualitative descriptive studies though appear quantitative on face value its more qualitative in terms of its analysis. It is employed to ascertain the degree to which a phenomenon or an issue arises or relationship amid aspects of an occurrence. It is considered qualitative descriptive studies because it relies on descriptive statistic in data analysis and does not require any rigorous quantitative analysis of the data for interpretation. The study through questionnaires provided some numerical data in order to enrich the qualitative responses. This method assists the researcher to appreciate the best predictors of results (Creswell 2012). It further makes it likely to infer, as the inferences from test of statistical hypotheses result in general inferences about the characteristics of the population (Harwell 2011).

The study conducted a survey of personnel in the various PBCMED of all PSM, CMA's and CoG to obtain information on how coordination is carried out in the public sector based on their experiences and practice. The survey questionnaires involved a number of closed-ended questions and open-ended questions to extract information from participants.

The responses of the closed-ended questions were characterized by a list of pre-empted responses while the open-ended questions provided an advantage for respondents to provide responses in their own diction.

The Statistical presentation of coded responses and an interpretation of these aggregations were used in analyzing the questionnaires from the surveyed questionnaire. The questionnaire was piloted for the first time at the Ministry of interior among a selected number of employees at the PBCMED. The responses and comments from respondents suggested that the questions were technical and difficult to understand. The questionnaire was therefore modified for easy understanding and piloted for the second time at the same ministry and among the same employees. This was done in order to ensure that the questionnaire was less technical and accurately addresses the research objectives.

3.5 Research instrument

Research instruments are the tools used to collect the data for the analysis. This study used interviews and questionnaire to collect data for the study.

3.5.1 Interviews

According to Silverman (2013) interviewing is a purposive conversation between the respondents and the researcher in a collaborative way in an attempt to gather information in the respondents' own words from which one can make insightful interpretations. The study adopted a semi-structured interview model. In this approach to data collection, the questions and the order of presentation are predetermined. Again, the questions are open-ended which affords the interviewer the opportunity to ask probing questions as the interview progresses. This gives the researcher some flexibility to be able to solicit relevant information from varied participants and yet keeping the same themes and questions.

By this approach, participants were able to elaborate their accounts and experiences and not restricted to certain pre-existing categories.

An interview guide is engaged to obtain in-depth information on the respondents especially from top management of public ministries and coordination units at the CoG. Averagely, the interview schedules lasted for 30 minutes. Participants of the interview included the Directors/Deputy Directors of PBCMED in some purposely selected PSM. The Ministries included those with coordination responsibility and more importantly Ministries who indicated instances of policy conflicts with other ministries on the questionnaire. The PSM with some form of coordination responsibility at the time of the study considered for the interview included: Ministry of Monetary and Evaluation (MoME), Ministry of Planning (MoP), Office of the Senior Minister (OSM) and NDPC under the office of the President. It was also important to gather some insightful data from MoF, PSC and OHCS whose roles in central management of PSM cannot be overemphasized. Also, Ministry of Zongo and Inner-City Development (MZCD), Ministry of Special Initiatives (MSI), Ministry of Business Development (MBD), Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Works and Housing and MoFA were the PSM that were interviewed on grounds of some identified policy disagreements.

The PBCMED are generally responsible for coordination of agencies under each ministry and are responsible for coordination in all PSM. These PBCMED have sufficient information on the nature and mechanisms of coordination of PSM. The coordination units at the CoG possess adequate information on inter-agency coordination of Ministries. The Directors of PBCMED at PSM and the heads of coordination units at the CoG were purposively sampled for the interviews. This is because of their experiences and

perspectives of coordination is of essence to understanding the study.

Mason (2006: 17) argued that qualitative research provides explicit explanations rather than “attempting to control for them or edit them out”. Following the consent of respondents, some of the interviews were recorded on tape and accurately transcribed in order to avoid any distortion of participants’ responses. However, for those participants who declined the consent to record, the researcher resorted to notes taking.

3.5.2 Questionnaire

The study also gathered primary data through the administration of questionnaire for the analysis. This tool for data collection has the advantage of obtaining much information at a very short period while offering accurate data at a lesser cost (Sekaran 2003). It further assures the confidentiality of the respondents (Moser & Kalton 1979). To assess the clarity and check the validity and reliability, a pilot test was conducted at the Ministry of the interior. The pilot test was conducted to ascertain the average length of time required to complete one questionnaire and also how well to manage the data collection process and analyses. After the pilot study, a revised version of the questionnaire was then constructed. Subsequently, the questionnaires were self-administered to all Directors of PBCMED of all PSM in Ghana and CoG institutions.

The questionnaire is made up of three sections: section A solicited data on the background of the respondent such as sex, age, level of education, designation, institution and years of experience; section B resolved the structure of coordination among PSM while the last section addressed effectiveness of the CoG in the policy coordination of PSM. In the case of section B and C, Ordinal measurement which is allocating figures to items with the aim

of grading them so as to determine the degree of coordination of PSM by CoG were also employed (Amin 2004). Likert Scale which is assigning numbers to qualitative data to facilitate statistical analysis was adopted. Each respondent was educated on the means to complete each section or item.

3.6 Study Area

The setting for the study was located at CoG and PSM in Accra, Ghana. The study area was influenced by the focus and structure of the study. Most of the institutions responsible for coordination of PSM are established under the office of the President. These units at the CoG are located in Accra as well as the PSM they coordinate. The researcher therefore collected all the relevant data for an in-depth understanding of the mechanism and nature of public sector coordination by the CoG.

3.7 Study Population

McMillan (1996) defines population as a group of elements or cases, whether individuals, objects, or events, that conform to specific criteria and to which a researcher intends to generalize the results of a research. As a result, in a research, the researcher must define the group of interest that the research is interested in studying. The study population included two sets of organizations. The first included all PSM in the country. Secondly, institutions at the CoG responsible for public sector coordination were equally a qualified population for the study. Therefore, the study population included all the PSM and institutions at the CoG.

3.8 Sampling Techniques and Sample Size

During the time of this study, there were (36) PSM of which 4 of them perform some coordination roles. These Ministries do not only assist in the formulation of public policies but also mandated to coordinate the activities of other ministries. The NDPC were equally considered appropriately for their inputs on coordination because of their constitutional mandate on national planning and coordination.

3.8.1 Sample Size

The sample size or sample is the number of items that have been selected from the population (Kothari 2004). Determining the sample size does not assist the researcher to draw inferences from the sample to make some judgment or draw conclusions about the population but also enables the researcher to explain, describe and interpret phenomena (Guetterman 2015). Therefore, the accuracy and adequacy of the sample size is very important as far as qualitative research is concern. According to Kothari (2004), the choice of sample size may be influenced greatly by budgetary constraints but the researcher must not lose sight of the parameters of interest. To resolve the difficulty in selecting the sample size, this study employed the recommendation of Creswell (2013) purposeful sampling techniques which include: deciding the participants or sites, selecting the sampling strategy, and determining the sample size (Guetterman 2015).

The total population of organizations for the study included all PSM and CoG institutions in charge of coordination. The coordination institutions at the CoG responsible for public sector coordination and sampled for the study were 4 (NDPC, MoME, MoP, OSM) and the three Central Management Agencies (MoF, PSC and OHSC). The views of officials in these 7 institutions at the Centre was very critical and included in the sample size for the

study. These institutions were cooperative and responded positively to the study. This study is driven by the hierarchical principal-agent theory and hence makes it appropriate to investigate the views of all the principals and agents of coordination. The purposive sampling of the views of these institutions are relevant for the study. The selection of only PBCMED Directors of all PSM make up the average views of the agents in coordination. These Directors of PBCMED units were selected based on their experience and level of authority in the area. On the score of qualitative data, priority was given to Ministries with some coordination responsibility and those with some policy disagreement.

3.8.2 Sampling Technique: Selecting Employees for Survey

According to Bagnasco, Ghirotto, and Sasso (2014) a research that provides significant data would require researchers to sample participants according to their knowledge and experience which is described as 'purposive'. However, because this study adopts a qualitative study to answer the research questions posed in this study, it is imperative to adopt a sampling technique that can fetch rich data and still ensure that the sample size is adequately representative. Accordingly, the study employed purposive sampling technique in selecting ministries and agencies for data collection similar to (Hancock, Calnan, & Manley 1999). Purposive sampling is the most common sampling strategy used in qualitative research (Creswell 1998). According to Teddlie and Yu (2007) it enables the researcher to produce complementary databases which comprise data that has both depth and breadth in relation to the subject under study. Also, Sandelowski (2000) noted that the essence of purposive sampling is to obtain relevant data that is material for the purposes of the study and covers all the central and decisive aspect of the study.

The ministries and institutions at the CoG were selected because of their role in public sector coordination. Purposive sampling is useful for selecting relevant institutions with adequate information that would address the questions under study (Patton 1990). The study enabled the researcher to interact with the Directors/Deputy Directors of PBCMED at PSM and the heads of units in charge of coordination at the CoG. Majority of the PBCMED in the Ministries were willing to assist with information. The relevance of purposive sampling technique was material for the richness of data and in order to avoid delays. The purposive selection of Directors or Deputy Directors of PBCMED was appropriately done in order to address the research questions with precision. The researcher administered one questionnaire each to all Director/ Deputy Director of PBCMED in all the 32 PSM and 7 officials in the 7 institutions at the CoG. The average of 5 respondents at NDPC was added to the data. This is because of the critical and constitutional imperative of NDPC on public sector coordination. In most cases, the questionnaires were administered independently by officials at the PBCMED in the ministries as well as the NDPC. Many of the respondents expressed interest in the study and assisted with information. In all, 39 questionnaires were administered to respondents. The study employed purposive sampling procedure in selecting the respondents in each ministry and for the collection of qualitative data.

3.9. Sources of Data

To answer the research questions, the study relied on primary source of data, comprising a survey of 39 officers in both PSM and CoG institutions. The data collection instrument used to solicit facts and opinions of the respondents were interview and questionnaires. Initially, a draft of the interview protocol was constructed based on the objectives formulated in the study and the literature reviewed, as well as opinions from expert in this

field. The interview protocol was made up of questions on organizational structure of the agencies under the CoG responsible for coordination, the institutional process employed to enhance effective coordination of PSM and the mechanisms adopted by CoG to propel effective coordination. The interviews were conducted on Directors and heads of Coordination units of some purposively selected PSM and institutions at the CoG.

However, the study also investigated some secondary data such as documentation, journals publications, organizational reports, Acts of Parliament and the 1992 constitution of Ghana. The essence of secondary data for the study was to offer more in-depth understanding of the concept and analytical framework of the study.

3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation

The qualitative modes of data collection were used to analyze the interviews and surveys conducted in order to examine the effectiveness of coordination in the public sector. The Metcalfe scale of coordination provided the analytical framework in understanding policy coordination among PSM. The SPSS Statistics Software was used to analyze the closed-ended responses in the survey questionnaire. The surveyed data was analyzed and presented using crosstabs and descriptive statistics including frequency distribution tables and percentages to show the proportion of respondents associated with each question.

Thematic analysis has also been used to analyze direct quotations from qualitative interviews. Thematic analysis varies from other analytic methods like narrative analysis and grounded theory analysis which aim to explain patterns across qualitative data but are theoretically bounded. Thematic analysis assesses data and summarizes the views that recur in themes. It organizes and describes data in great detail (Braun & Clarke 2006). According

to Braun and Clarke (2006) thematic analysis is an approach for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data. Thematic analysis is not inclined to some pre-existing theoretical framework; therefore, this approach is often adopted within diverse theoretical frameworks and can be used to do varied effects within them. This approach does not only organize and describe the data set in detail Braun and Clarke (2006) but also explain different facets of the research topic (Boyatzis 1998).

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Savenye and Robinson (1996) on ethical consideration make a case for all researchers to prevent their respondents from being harmed, while they protect their anonymity and privacy. Therefore, in order to address these ethical issues, an introductory letter of permission to collect data was obtained from the Department of Public Administration at the University of Ghana, Legon. The letter was sent to the management of the various agencies informing them about the research as well as to seek their cooperation. Also, the purpose and goals of the research were clearly explained to the respondents. According to Bricki and Green (2007), consent and confidentiality are two critical ethical consideration that should be given attention. Assurance was given to respondents on the confidentiality of their responses. Respondents were clearly informed that it is their right to participate and it was not targeted at job evaluation.

3.12 Variables and measurement of Variables

Based on the objectives of the study, the organizational structure of agencies responsible for public sector coordination and the various levels on the coordination scale for policy formation are the major independent variables of the study that influence the effectiveness

of the CoG in the coordination of policy formation among Ministries. The independent variables include; establishing coherent policy priorities among PSM, coordination of communication amongst PSM and the resolution of policy conflicts among Ministries. Whereas the effectiveness of the CoG in policy coordination among PSM is dependent on these independent variables.

3.13 Conclusion

This chapter covers the research design, the study and target population, sampling techniques and sample size, the variables of interest, data collection instrument, ethical considerations and data analysis approach. Based on the guidelines provided by Yin (2003), a cross-sectional, exploratory research design was used to source data needed to achieve the research objectives. An in-depth explanation, understanding and practices of how coordination of PSM is done in Ghana. The target population were the management members of PBCMED in PSM and institutions at the CoG, who are involved in the coordination of policy formation among Ministries. Other department in the ministries were excluded because they do not have direct role in the coordination of PSM.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS OF FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of data gathered on the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of PSM in Ghana. Specifically, this chapter presents the findings on the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of the organizational development of Ministries and coordination of Policy formation among Ministries. The chapter also explores measures that could be adopted towards improving the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of Ministries. The presentation of findings relies heavily on primary data collected from opinion survey of Directors mainly within coordination Divisions of all the 36 Ministries and three CMA's, as well as in-depth interviews with purposively selected officials.

4.1 Organizational Structure of Coordination between the CoG and Ministries

Under this section, the study examines the organizational structure of public sector coordination between the CoG and the Ministries. According to the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, under chapter eight, the Executive led by the President of the Republic of Ghana sits at the apex of the CoG. The President is elected through universal adult suffrage for a four-year term of office and shall not be elected to hold office for more than two terms.

Article 57(1-2) of the 1992 Constitution states that "There shall be a President of the Republic of Ghana who shall be the Head of State and Head of Government and Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ghana. The President shall take precedence over all other persons in Ghana; and in descending order, the Vice-President, the Speaker

of Parliament and the Chief Justice, shall take precedence over all other persons in Ghana.” Further, under Article 58(1) of the 1992 Constitution, “The executive authority of Ghana shall vest in the President and shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution;” and, “Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the functions conferred on the President by clause (1) of this article may be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him” (Article 58, clause 3). The President is given enormous constitutional powers of political appointments and institutional creation including the authority to constitute the members of the Cabinet, make Ministerial appointments without any limit to the number of Ministers, create Ministries, create public agencies, and appoint the heads of almost all public organizations in Ghana. The vast constitutional powers given to the President empower the occupant of the office to create agencies within the CoG to exercise delegated functions of public sector coordination.

Within the CoG is an important constitutionally created agency called the Cabinet which assist the President in the determination of the general policy of the Government. The Cabinet “shall consist of the President, the Vice-President and not less than ten and not more than nineteen Ministers of State” (Article 76(2) of 1992 Constitution). The Cabinet plays the major role in approving all decisions that require the approval of the Executive. The role of the Cabinet within the Executive branch is a colonial legacy inherited from the British parliamentary system of democratic government. The parliamentary system of government was changed to the current semi-presidential system of government after Ghana gained a Republic status in 1960. The legacy of the Cabinet in assisting the Head of Government to coordinate the development of public policies makes Ghana’s system of government a hybrid ‘Presidential-Parliamentary system’.

The 1992 Constitution envisaged the important but complex function of the Executive in the coordination of development planning, development policies, and organizational performance M&E. The designers of the 1992 Constitution therefore created the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) under the Office of the President to advise the President on development planning policy and strategy. Among the constitutionally specified functions of the NDPC under Article 87 is the function to “monitor, evaluate and co-ordinate development policies, programmes and projects.” The coordination role of the NDPC is widely regarded by public sector organizations. The membership of the NDPC, as specified in Article 86(2) of the Constitution, is politically constituted by the President; and, it shall consist of (i) a Chairman who shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Council of State; (ii) the Minister responsible for finance and such other Ministers of State as the President may appoint; (iii) the Government Statistician; (iv) the Governor of the Bank of Ghana; (v) one representative from each region of Ghana appointed by the Regional Co-ordinating Council of the region; (vi) such other persons as may be appointed by the President having regard to their knowledge and experience of the relevant areas and roles pertaining to development, economic, social, environmental and spatial planning.” Each newly elected President has reconstituted the membership of the NDPC. Efforts by the NDPC to build effective coordination capacity is undermined by frequent partisan politicization that deprives the Commission of institutional memory of competence (Appiah & Abdulai 2017).

Ghana’s 1992 Constitution also creates the Public Service Commission (PSC) to play an important coordination role in public sector personnel recruitment and management. Article 196 of the 1992 Constitution gives the PSC the power of “supervision and regulation of, entrance and promotion examinations, recruitment and appointment into or

promotions within, the public services, and the establishment of standards and guidelines on the terms and conditions of employment in the public services.” To ensure that the PSC promotes the creation of an impartial and meritocratic public service bureaucracy, the Constitution states that “Except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, or any other law not inconsistent with the Constitution, the Public Service Commission shall not be subject to the control or direction of any person or authority in the performance of its functions” (Article 198).

The Civil Service is another CMA created to facilitate policy formation and implementation in Ghana. The Head of Civil Service is appointed by the President and acting in accordance with the advice of the Public Services Commission. The Civil Service Act (PNDCL 327) states that the Civil Service is mandated to “(a) initiate and formulate policy options for the consideration of the government, (b) initiate and advise on government plans, (c) undertake the necessary research for the effective implementation of government policies, (d) implement government policies, (e) review government policies and plans (f) monitor, co-ordinate and evaluate government policies and plans.” Clearly, the Office of the Head of Civil Service (OHCS) performs the function of coordination of policy formation across the PSM. The OHCS is responsible for the recruitment and management of civil servants; and, “ensure the effective implementation of Government policies and plans for which the Service has responsibility” (PNDCL 327, Section 7).

The Civil Service in Ghana is organized into Ministries “consisting of such departments as the President may determine” (PNDCL 327, Section 13). By legal definition, under Section 13 of PNDCL 327, “A Ministry shall be the highest organization for the respective sector and is (a) constituted of the departments and divisions, and (b) responsible for the sector,

determined by the President, or as provided for by any other enactment. (3) Subject to the Constitution, the President may, by executive instrument, published in the Gazette, establish Ministries or re-designate Ministries.” The coordination functions of a Ministry is specified in Section 13 of the PNDCL 327 as follows: “(a) initiate and formulate policies taking into account the needs and aspirations of the people (b) undertake development planning in consultation with the National Development Planning Commission, and (c) co-ordinate, monitor and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the performance of the sector.” Whiles the OHCS is to coordinate policy formulation by the Ministries, each Ministry has the responsibility of coordinating the implementation of its policies and plans.

To enhance coordination of policy implementation, each Ministry is required to create among a number of organizational Divisions “a Planning, Budgeting, Co-ordination, Monitory and Evaluation Division” (PBCMED) (PNDCL 327 Section 12). In practice, some Ministries have created separate departments or units for budgeting; the analysis in this study shall refer to the coordination Division as PBCMED for the purpose of consistent and simple analysis. As noted by Metcalfe (1994), effective coordination at the higher levels depend on the effectiveness of the subordinate coordination capacity. Therefore, it can be argued that the effectiveness of the OHCS, NDPC and the Executive to effectively coordinate the tasks and actions of Ministries will greatly depend on the capacity of the PBCMED within the Ministries.


Finally, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) undertakes the public sector coordination of financial resource management in Ghana. The MoF is in charge of the preparation of the national budget after conducting programme-based budget hearings for each Ministry annually. The MoF determines the budgetary ceilings for each Ministry and approves of

the budget of the Ministries before Parliament and the President give final approval. This puts the MoF in a strategic position to ensure efficiency in budget preparation by Ministries.

In sum, under the current government of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, sworn into office in 2017, the following agencies have been created within the Presidency to perform coordination functions and report directly to the President: Office of the President, Office of the Vice-President, the Cabinet, Office of the Senior Minister (responsible for the coordination of public sector reforms), Ministry of Planning, Ministry of M&E, and National Development Planning Commission.

Outside the Presidency are the following Central Management Agencies (CMAs) whose functions are concerned with the coordination of organizational management, policy formation, and policy implementation: Office of the Head of Civil Service, Public Services Commission, and MoF. These CMAs and the agencies within the Presidency constitute what this study refer to as the CoG. Beneath the CoG, the NPP government has created 32 Ministries. For analytical purposes, because the focus of this study is on exploring the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of the Ministries, the MoF has been classified as a CoG to avoid double counting of its responses to the survey questionnaire. The structure of coordination between the CoG and the Ministries is depicted in Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Structure of Coordination between CoG and Ministries in Ghana



Source: Author

The politics of structuring organizations within the CoG suggests that there is frequent restructuring within the CoG even during the tenure of the same government (as depicted in Figure 1 previously) (Appiah and Abdulai 2017). The views of interview respondents about the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of the Ministries is more likely to have been influenced by the above organizational structure of public sector coordination.

Before analyzing the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of policies among Ministries, it is important to analyze whether the institutions within the CoG have themselves been effective in ensuring coherent co-existence following the creation of two new CoG institutions by the NPP government in 2017. It is also important to examine the effectiveness of coordination within the Ministries. The effectiveness of coordination within both the CoG and the Ministries is likely to impact on the effectiveness of the CoG to vertically coordinate the policies and programmes of the Ministries.

4.2 Examining Organizational Coherence within the CoG

The NPP government, upon assumption of rule in 2017, created the Ministry of M&E (MoME) and the Ministry of Planning (MoP) to function under the Office of the President. The decision to create these two new Ministries attracted criticisms from a section of the public who saw the two new Ministries as a move that would either undermine the capacity of the NDPC or result in duplication of functions and waste of resources. The study interviewed officials performing coordination responsibilities to seek their views on the impact of the creation of MoME and MoP in addition to the NDPC. A Director at the MoME had this to say about the principal role the ministry plays in coordination.

“Our (MoME) work is restricted to government priority programmes. We monitor and evaluate government flagship programmes. Government is interested in getting real time data and monitoring reports in order for cabinet to improve policies and programmes. In the case of NDPC they do a broader work on all MDAs. They plan and coordinate all activities of all PSM. We (MoME) also monitor the release of funds to ministries for government priority programmes. NDPC is constitutionally mandated to conduct planning and design development framework for the country. They issue guidelines to all MDAs which we are all mandated by Act 479 and the Civil Service Act to comply. We design our plans with them.”

A Director at the NDPC emphasized its constitutional establishment and responsibilities as in the following manner:

“The constitution grants NDPC the power to coordinate the policies and programmes of public sector institutions. The Legislative Instrument LI 2232 empowers NDPC to enforce this mandate. The work of NDPC involves the formulation of national development agenda. And this is done in a participatory

manner involving all Ministries and stakeholders. We hold Cross-Sectorial Planning Group Meetings which involves all ministries, civil society and private sector. The national policy includes the national development goals, strategies and objectives. Aside developing national policy, NDPC agree to which Ministry should play a lead role and which should support. NDPC also agree on targets and indicators for implementation of the National Development Agenda. Coordination requires a framework so we provide guidelines for ministries to prepare their plans.”

The constitutional mandate of the NDPC as a central institution for coordination was emphasized by most Directors in charge of the PBCMED at the Ministries and within the CoG. Within the CoG, a Director at the Ministry of Special Initiative (MSI) noted this about the functions of the NDPC and MoME:

“The NDPC largely influence our policies...NDPC does broader activities than the MoME. We involve NDPC in policy formulation through to implementation. The new Ministry of M&E is just for planning of programmes and projects especially those on government political manifestos.”

A Director at the MoF also made the following statements in reference to the constitutional powers of the NDPC: *“NDPC has been engaging almost all Ministries in one way or the other. In this Ministry, they invite us for meetings all the time and we give our input for APRs [Annual Policy Reviews].”*

One may be tempted to think that the creation of the new Ministry of Planning (MoP) will directly undermine the effectiveness of the NDPC. In contrast, a Director at NDPC had this

to say about MoP in an interview: *“This government has established the Ministry of Planning as the link between NDPC and Cabinet because we do not sit in Cabinet.”*

It seems that in spite of the apparent duplication of functions among the NDPC, MoP, and MoME, the three CoG institutions have been able to co-exist quite peacefully by ensuring that their functions are complementary rather than contradictory. The NDPC appears satisfied that it now has the MoP as its direct representative in the Cabinet.

Moreover, MoME’s focus on government’s priority programmes has been cautiously embraced by NDPC as a partial solution to the financial and technical constraints that undermined its functional effectiveness prior to the arrival of MoME (Appiah & Abdulai 2017). The question now for analysis is how effective is the CoG in the coordination of the policies and programmes of the Ministries? This question is answered next.

4.3 Effectiveness of Coordination within PSM

According to the Civil Service Act (PNDCL 327), each Ministry should establish the Planning, Budgeting, Co-ordination, M&E Division (PBCMED) for the coordination of policies and programmes. During data collection from the 32 Ministries, the study focused on the Division assumed to be responsible for coordination. On the survey questionnaire, the respondents were required to indicate the name of the Division in charge of coordination of the policies and programmes of the Ministry. Table 1 below presents categories of responses concerning divisions in charge of coordination in the Ministries.

Table 1: Name of Division within the Ministry in Charge of Coordination

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Administration	1	3.1	3.1	3.1
Personnel Management Division	1	3.1	3.1	6.3
Valid Planning, Budgeting, Coordination, Monitoring, and Evaluation Division	29	90.6	90.6	96.9
Finance	1	3.1	3.1	100.0
Total	32	100.0	100.0	

The majority of the respondents (90.6%) indicated that the PBCMED is in charge of coordination functions within their Ministries. For instance, a Director of the PBCMED at the Ministry of Water and Sanitation confirmed the relevance of the PBCMED in an interview as follows: *“We are the only department in each Ministry that coordinate the activities of the Ministry and submit reports to the relevant agencies such as NDPC among others.”* Respondents who did not mention the PBCMED were all located in the newly created Ministries where the PBCMED had not yet been created at the time of the data collection. The study then asked the respondents to rate the level of effectiveness of the division in charge of coordination. The responses are presented in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Effectiveness of the Division within the Ministry in Charge of Coordination

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Ineffective	1	3.1	3.1
	Neutral	3	9.4	12.5
	Effective	11	34.4	46.9
	Highly effective	17	53.1	100.0
	Total	32	100.0	100.0

Table 2 shows that out of the 32 respondents to the question, 87.5% rated the division in charge of coordination to be either ‘Effective’ or ‘Highly effective’. In fact, majority of the respondents rated the division to be highly effective at coordination. An interval-level analysis of the level of effectiveness of the division in charge of coordination also produces a mean score of 4.28 confirming that the coordination function within Ministries is perceived to be more than ‘Effective’ although not perfect. The effectiveness of the PBCMED is critical in order to enhance effective coordination at the CoG.

The effectiveness of the PBCMED across the Ministries will however not automatically result in effective coordination within the CoG. According to Metcalfe (1996), coordination capacity should be built from the bottom. This is because an effective coordination division at the bottom would enhance coordination by institutions at the CoG. The effectiveness of PBCMED is a positive boost for effective public sector coordination by the CoG.

4.4 Effectiveness of CoG in the Coordination of Policy Formation among Ministries

Policy formation encompasses all the processes of policy-making beginning from the recognition of a problem, the submission of proposals for policy formulation, the

formulation of the policy, and, ultimately, the adoption of the policy. Policy formation precedes the implementation stage. Elected political elites who identify a problem are also interested in pursuing appropriate solutions to the problem rather than waiting for their opponents to bring solutions. The process of policy formation is therefore a politically contested process. This section focused on analyzing the effectiveness of the CoG in coordinating the policies of the Ministries to ensure policy coherence.

The ‘policy coordination scale’ developed in chapter two suggests that the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of Policy formation among the Ministries to achieve policy coherence would involve the performance of four coordination functions: (i) the coordination of establishment of coherent policies within the CoG and among Ministries, (ii) coordination of communication of central priorities among PSM and (iii) the coordination of arbitration of policy differences and conflicts among Ministries as well as between the Ministries and the CoG. The study presents below a discussion of the extent to which the CoG has effectively performed these functions among PSM to ensure policy coherence.

4.4.1 Effectiveness of the CoG in Establishing Coherent Policies among Ministries

It is worth emphasizing that coordination in an interorganizational context “*aim to enhance the voluntary or forced alignment of task and efforts of organizations within the public sector in order to create a greater coherence and to reduce redundancy, lacunae and contradictions within and between policies*” (Bouckaert et al. 2010: 16). The effectiveness of the CoG in establishing coherent policies will require “avoiding divergences among Ministries” by “searching for agreements among ministries” and “arbitration of policy differences among Ministries” (Metcalf 1994: 281).

The institutional framework of policy coordination between the CoG and the Ministries described above suggests that the Ministries can initiate and formulate policies, they are to do so in consultation with the NDPC, and the process must be coordinated by the OHCS. Both NDPC and OHCS are expected to influence the policies of the Ministries before the policy proposals are deliberated on by the Cabinet. Meanwhile, the MoF is also expected to influence the policies and programmes of Ministries through the annual budget hearings organized by the MoF. The study asked respondents in the Ministries to rate the effectiveness of a list of CoG institutions (see list below) in coordinating the policies and programmes of Ministries. The findings are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Effectiveness of institutions within CoG in coordinating policies of Ministries

Institutions within CoG	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
National Development Planning Commission	31	2	5	4.29	.902
Cabinet Secretariat	26	2	5	4.08	.977
Office of President	23	2	5	3.91	1.041
Office of Senior Minister	21	1	5	3.62	1.244
Ministry of M&E	31	2	5	4.29	.824
Ministry of Planning	22	1	5	3.45	1.299
Office of Vice President	21	1	5	3.05	1.322
Public Service Commission	24	1	5	3.63	1.313
Office of Head of Civil Service	29	2	5	4.45	.870
Chief of Staff	24	1	5	3.58	1.283
MoF	29	2	5	4.55	.736
Valid N (listwise)	19				

From the analysis of the responses presented above, the CoG institutions that have legal mandates in the coordination of policy formation among the Ministries (namely, the National Development Planning Commission, Cabinet Secretariat, Office of Head of Civil, and the MoF) have been rated as more effective than the CoG institutions that lack such legal mandate. This finding suggests that the formal rules created to govern the relationship between the CoG and the Ministries in the coordination of policy formation is working quite effectively. The formal-legal rules that regulate the processes of public sector coordination of policy formation therefore seems to be quite strong in Ghana.

Among the CoG institutions that lack the formal-legal mandate to coordinate policy formation among the Ministries is the newly created Ministry of M&E (MoME). Interestingly, MoME is rated equally effective as the NDPC although it is the latter that has the legal mandate to coordinate policy formation. Why is this the case? A comparative analysis of the mean scores of MoME (4.29) and the Ministry of Planning (MoP) (3.45) (both Ministries were created at the same time) suggests that MoME's effectiveness is not due to free-riding on the work of the NDPC. The MoP and MoME are both performing functions that originally belonged to the NDPC. The performance of MoME therefore appears driven by its leadership. Comparing the performances of MoME and MoP, a Director at the MoFA said the following:


“The Ministry of M&E have proven that it is an effective ministry. They have done a lot with us especially on government flagship programmes and they ask for updates and progress report all the time. It is Ministry of Planning I have not seen much work. All donors I have worked with have praised the Ministry of M&E except that their focus is only on government priority programmes.”

It appears that MoME has been effective in influencing policy formation concerning government priority programmes. The effective performance of MoME requires more research to uncover the mystery surrounding its effectiveness in the coordination of policies and programmes among Ministries. Another plausible reason could be that MoME is more effective in influencing the delivery of government priority programmes among the Ministries than in coordinating policy formation. However, the clear findings is that the CoG institutions with legal mandates to coordinate policy formation have been rated by the Ministries to be more effective than the CoG institutions that lack this mandate.

4.4.1 Coordination of Communication of Central Policy Priorities to Ministries

Effective Communication between the CoG and the Ministries about central government policy priorities is an important requirement for ensuring policy coherence among Ministries. Metcalfe (1994) argued that information is a powerful resource in coordination hence the CoG and the Ministries are required to develop communication networks that ensure regular dissemination of information. This is because information asymmetry is a noted challenge in coordination studies (Bouckaert et al. 2010). Reliable and accepted channels of communication must exist between the CoG and the Ministries. Respondents at the Ministries were asked to indicate the nature of the communication channel through which Government policy priorities and strategies are made known to them. The findings are summarized and presented in Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Channels of Communication between the CoG and the Ministries



From the data provided in Figure 4, 92.1% of all the respondents indicated that the major medium through which government communicates policy priorities is the direct transmission of policy documents from the CoG to the Ministries. These policy documents include cabinet memos, correspondence, proposals and other letters from the CoG. The national budget (63.2%) and the media (print and electronic) (36.8%) were the next most used mediums through which government policy priorities are made known to the Ministries. However, the ‘State of the Nation’s Address’ and documents prepared by government to inform the public about government’s agenda (such as the ‘Agenda for Jobs’ document) revealed to be the least communication channels that inform the Ministries on government policy priorities and strategies. The responses suggest that the channel used by the CoG to communicate government’s policy priorities is mainly the direct transmission of policy documents from the CoG. What the study could not establish is whether the policy

documents that emanates from the CoG comes from a single source or different sources.

In as much as is important for the CoG to communicate central policy priorities and strategies to the Ministries, it is equally important that the CoG should allow for adequate consultations and feedback between Presidency and PSM. These consultations and feedback have a powerful influence in promoting cohesion, mutual understanding among Ministries, and an opportunity to establish consensus before making clear policy proposals and firm commitments. Feedback provides a platform for dissenting views on policy priorities to be heard and addressed by the CoG in a timely manner. The study investigated the extent to which the CoG receives feedback to address problems and concerns raised by the Ministries on central policy priorities. Using a Likert rating scale from ‘Highly ineffective’ to ‘Highly effective’, respondents were asked to respond to the question, ‘How would you assess the effectiveness of the Presidency in consulting MDAs for their feedback on government policy priorities and programmes?’

Table 4 below displays the interval-level analysis of the responses.

Table 4: Effectiveness of CoG in Consulting Ministries for feedback on policy priorities

CoG consults Ministries for feedback on Government’s policy priorities						
	N	Mean	Median	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Center of Government	7	4.29	5	0.951	3	5
PSM	32	3.91	4	0.893	2	5

The results in Table 4 show that the 7 respondents within the CoG have a higher mean rating (4.29) for the effectiveness of the CoG in consulting the Ministries for feedback than

respondents within the Ministries (3.91). In other words, while the CoG respondents within the CoG perceive that the CoG is more than 'Effective' in consulting the Ministries for feedback on central policy priorities, officials within the Ministries perceive that the CoG's performance is below 'Effective'.

Officials at the Ministries suggest that the Presidency does not consult them effectively for their feedback on government policies and programmes. Weak consultation by the CoG for feedback on central policy priorities is likely to lead to policy future disagreements among Ministries as well as between the CoG and the Ministries. If consultation and feedback between the CoG and Ministries are weak, existing policy disagreements and problems among Ministries may persist for long before receiving appropriate attention from the CoG. The theory of policy coordination scale (Metcalf 1994) suggests that the CoG will find it difficult to effectively coordinate the establishment of coherent policies within the CoG and among Ministries if prior consultation with the Ministries for feedback on government priorities is weak.

4.4.2 CoG Coordination of Arbitration of Policy differences among PSM.

The study also investigated the effectiveness of the CoG in resolving policy differences as a variable for policy formation. Against the background that there was a transition of political power from an incumbent government to an opposition party in January 2017, and 10 out of the 36 Ministries were created by the new government, the possibility of policy conflicts among the Ministries was high. The study analyzed first the extent to which the CoG has been able to create policy agreements among Ministries. Officials within the Ministries were asked the question, "Has your Ministry had any policy disagreement with another Ministry during the past five years?"

The responses are presented below in Table 5.

Table 5: Existence of Policy Conflicts among Ministries

		Has your ministry had any policy disagreement with another ministry during the past five years?		Total
		Yes	No	
Name of Ministry	Pre-2017 Ministries	1	21	22
	New Ministries	3	7	10
Total		4	28	32

The responses presented in Table 5 show that only 4 Ministries out of the 36 Ministries reported policy conflicts with some Ministries. It is reasonable to say that the CoG has been very effective in ensuring policy coherence among 87.5% of the Ministries in the course of establishing central policies and strategy for implementation. Policy conflicts among the Ministries appear to have emanated largely from the new ministries than from the old ministries. Many of the new ministries reported policy conflicts with the old Ministries than vice versa. The new Ministries that reported policy conflicts include Ministry of Business Development (MBD), Ministry of Inner-City and Zongo Development (MIZD), and Ministry of Special Initiative (MSI). Among the old Ministries only the Ministry of Works and Housing reported policy conflict with the MIZD. The MBD reported policy conflict with the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI); while the MSI reported policy conflict with the MoFA. There was no policy conflict reported between the old Ministries. This shows that the CoG had been very effective in resolving policy conflicts among the old Ministries until the arrival of the new Ministries. In other words, the CoG is able to establish policy coherence among Ministries over time.

We discuss next the nature of the policy conflicts created by the new Ministries and the effectiveness of the CoG to resolve the policy differences. Following the transition of

political power from an incumbent government to an opposition party in January 2017, and the creation of 10 new ministries by the new NPP government, the possibility of policy conflicts among the Ministries was high. We analyze next the nature of policy differences reported by Ministries and the effectiveness of the CoG in resolving the policy differences to enhance policy coherence among the Ministries.

The study sought to find out the perspective of respondents within the CoG and the Ministries about the effectiveness of the presidency in resolving policy differences among PSM. Using a 5-point Likert scale that measured effectiveness from ‘Highly ineffective’ (1) to ‘Highly effective’ (5), the respondents were asked the question, “How would you assess the effectiveness of the Presidency in resolving policy differences or conflicts among PSM?” All the 39 respondents answered the question. The results from their responses is presented in Table 6.

Table 6: Effectiveness of the Presidency in Resolving Policy Differences

INSTITUTIONS	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
CoG	7	3	5	3.71	0.951
PSM	32	1	5	3.59	1.292
All Respondents	39	1	5	3.62	1.227

From Table 6, officials within the CoG were a bit more positive (3.71) than the officials within the Ministries (3.59) in rating the performance of the Presidency in resolving policy differences among Ministries. Averagely, however, respondents within the CoG and the Ministries were in agreement that the Presidency’s performance in the arbitration of policy differences among Ministries as below effectiveness (3.62) but closer to the means scores

for effectiveness (4-5) than ineffectiveness (1-2). It seems that the ongoing policy conflicts created by the new Ministries since 2017 influenced the ratings of the respondents. A percentage breakdown of the views of the respondents about the effectiveness of the CoG in resolving policy differences and conflicts is given in Table 7 below to show the differences in opinion among respondents.

Table 7: Effectiveness of the CoG in Resolving Policy Differences

Effectiveness of the presidency in resolving policy conflicts among PSM						Total
	Highly ineffective	Ineffective	Neutral	Effective	Highly effective	
CoG	0	0	4	1	2	7
	0%	0%	57.1%	14.3%	28.6%	100%
PSM	2	5	8	6	11	32
	6.2%	15.6%	25.0%	18.8%	34.4%	100%
Total	2	5	12	7	13	39
	5.1%	12.8%	30.8%	17.9%	33.3%	100%

From Table 7, it can be seen that none of the respondents within the CoG considered the Presidency as either ‘Highly ineffective’ or ‘Ineffective’ in resolving policy conflicts among Ministries. In contrast, 21.8% of respondents in the Ministries considered the Presidency as either ‘Highly ineffective’ or ‘Ineffective’ in resolving policy conflicts at the level of the Ministries. This is not surprising because the officials at the level of the Ministries had direct experience about the existence of the policy conflicts compared to officials within the CoG. This could explain why the majority of respondents within the CoG (57.1%) were unable to tell whether or not the Presidency was effective in resolving policy conflicts among Ministries. Within the Ministries, only 25% of respondents could not tell the direction of effectiveness of the Presidency in resolving policy conflicts among

Ministries. The majority of respondents within the Ministries (53.2%) were of the opinion that the Presidency was either ‘Effective’ or ‘Highly effective’ in resolving their policy differences; and 42.9% of respondents within the CoG agreed with those in the Ministries. The overall view is that the Presidency’s performance in resolving policy differences among Ministries is slightly above average with mean score of 3.62 and percentage score of 51.2%.

The Presidency must work harder to quickly resolve the few cases of conflicts reported by the respondents within both the CoG and Ministries to create complementary or coherent policies. The nature of the few cases of conflict that were reported are described and discussed next.

4.4.3 Reported Cases of Policy Differences Among Some Ministries

Respondents reported three cases of policy difference involving six Ministries. The cases include Ministry of Zongo and Inner-City Development (MZID) Verses Ministry of Works and Housing (MoWH) policy differences on the upgrading of slums. Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) Verses Ministry of Special Initiative (MSI) policy differences on ‘One Village One Dam (1V1D)’ projects. Ministry of Trade and Industry Verses Ministry for Business Development policy differences on the development of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Summaries of the disagreements are presented below.

Policy Differences Case 1: Ministry of Zongo and Inner-City Development Verses Ministry of Works and Housing

The policy conflict between Ministry of Zongo and Inner-City Development (MZID) and Ministry of Works and Housing (MoWH) is on the slums upgrading policy. The slums

upgrading policy is a special government initiative to upgrade slums in the cities. The slums upgrading project has been placed under the newly established MZID. However, the MoWH is of the view that slums upgrading falls under their works and housing responsibilities throughout the country. Officials in the two feuding Ministries who were interviewed agreed that the policy disagreement between them is centered on which Ministry should take absolute responsibility of the slums upgrading project.

The Director at MZID noted:

“This programme is a World Bank component 3 project. We are doing a drainage system for some communities in Nima, Agbogloboshie and others. So this is actually a project financed by World Bank and is a government priority project of which we (MZID) are the agency implementing it.”

However, a Director at MOWH was of the opinion that the MoWH is the old Ministry with a pool of experience in the area of slums upgrading and that their expertise and technical knowledge would have been properly utilized if they were made the sector ministry in charge of the project. The Director at MoWH added that the Ministry does not feel threatened by the decision of the Presidency to give the project to the MZID.

Policy Differences Case 2: Ministry of Food and Agriculture Verses Ministry of Special Initiatives

The policy disagreement between the MoFA and Ministry of Special Initiative (MSI) is a struggle for ministerial responsibility over the ‘One Village One Dam (1V1D)’ project that seeks to construct dams for farmers. MoFA is implementing the government policy called ‘Planting for Food and Jobs’. This policy seeks to improve agricultural productivity and

sustenance in the country. Agricultural projects in many communities require the construction of dams to provide water for farming. The ‘Planting for Food and Jobs’ policy is therefore directly underpinned by projects including the 1V1D project. A Director at MoFA explained 1V1D policy disagreement as follows:

“This programme (1VID) is designed by Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA), an agency under MoFA with all the technical assistance. But the funds [for the 1VID project] are allocated to Ministry of Special Initiative. This brings the confusion as to who owns and is in charge of the programme. The actual work is done by GIDA but because the Ministry of Special Initiative are having the funds for it they assume it must be their project.”

The Ministry of Special Initiative (MSI), in an interview with one of its Directors, recognized MoFA as the mother Ministry that actually has all the agencies and technical knowledge on the project. The Director had this to say:

“Actually, the initiative is under the mother Ministry of Agriculture. But the President does not want to use the Ministry of Agriculture to implement the initiative because of time constraints and also because he wants results.”

Notwithstanding disagreements between the MSI and MoFA, the two Ministries are collaborating to implement the 1V1D project. A Director at the MSI emphasized the collaboration between the two Ministries.

“We have collaborated with all the agencies under Ministry of Agriculture who have some knowledge in our area of interest. The location and designs of one village one dam were virtually done by GIDA which is under Ministry of Agriculture.”

The MSI has been mandated by the Presidency to lead as the implementing Ministry for the 1V1D project while MoFA is tasked to provide technical assistance. This amounts to

inefficient duplication of institutions and unhealthy rivalry between Ministries. The Director at the MoFA speculated the reasons for the establishment of new ministries to champion government policies that cut into the responsibilities of existing ministries.

“Maybe the existing institutions are not delivering...This does not mean shutting down the existing structures. Governments do not stay in power for a long term so it is difficult to work with the existing structures if they (Governments) want results. They have a short-term mandate and the people expectations are often high. So, most governments who want to achieve results would rely on new structures. The old system can frustrate you at times.”

Some scholars have argued that the problem of political short-termism in Ghana has been a serious bane to efficient and sustainable development in the country (Appiah & Abdulai, 2017). Short-termism and ‘competitive-clientelism’ in Ghana’s politics breeds unhealthy competition and the creation of parallel Ministries to perform almost the same functions.

Policy Differences Case 3: Ministry of Trade and Industry Verses Ministry of Business Development

The Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) and the Ministry of Business Development (MBD) have policy disagreements on the government’s Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) policy. A Director at MoTI critiqued the functions and relevance of establishing the new MBD when MoTI has extensive responsibility on trade related activities in the country.

The Director made the following remarks:

“What do they mean by Business Development [referring to Ministry of Business Development]? I am sure they are in search for functions. It should be under this Ministry (MoTI). They (MBD) feel that they are in charge of entrepreneurship

meanwhile that is part of our work.”

MoTI performs responsibilities that include trade development, industrial development, private sector development and sector specific projects related to trade and industry. Accordingly, the establishment of the MBD appear to undermine some of MoTI responsibilities and operations. One may play the devil’s advocate in pointing out that MoTI is politically headed by a Minister who participated in nail-biting contests with the President during past races for the position of presidential candidate for the New Patriotic Party. A Director at the MBD gave the following reasons for the creation of the MBD:

“This ministry (MBD) has been established to make the country business friendly. Although Ministry of Trade is doing a similar thing, this ministry is expected to assist the setting up of infant businesses before transferring them to the Ministry of Trade. I see it as a collaboration between the two and not a competition.”

The Director at MoTI noted that competing and conflicting interests characterize public sector policies in Ghana. The Director rationalized the policy conflicts between the two Ministries with the following remarks:

“There is too much competing interest and conflicting policies with limited resources in our public sector in this country. The existing system is conflicting and is difficult to reconcile these ministries.”

A Director at the MoF similarly lamented the proliferation of new ministries and institutions at the CoG as follows: *“I can also say that there exist so many parallel ministries whose work could have been done by existing ministries.”*

Policy disagreements that exist among Ministries often border on competition over responsibilities and funds. Old and new Ministries struggle for responsibilities in order to stay relevant. The remote cause of policy disagreements is the ineffective policy coordination by the CoG. A Director at the National Development Planning Commission reiterated the challenges of conflict resolution in the following manner:

“Conflict resolution is one of our challenges. We have been working at the ministerial level and not the sectorial level. This is one of the areas we have not been effective because we do not have the needed resources. What we do now is that we look at the annual reports of ministries and draw their attention to it. Another means we are able to do this is through budget preparations at the budget hearings. During budget hearings at some meetings there are often some exchanges between ministries. Most of the ministries involve are often new and the law and mandate establishing them is always the problem.”

Resolving policy differences among PSM is key in ensuring policy coherence, efficient policy implementation, and unified government development strategy. Yodsampa (2013) has pointed out that collaboration between policy actors can occur while policy incoherence continues to generate inefficient and ineffective results. Metcalfe (1996) also emphasized that policy conflicts among ministries are unproductive because they result in overlapping gaps that no agency is ready to take responsibility. Policy disagreements among Ministries can be avoided or minimized if initial central policy priorities are effectively coordinated and clearly communicated to the Ministries to lay a coherent foundation for the coordination of policies among the same Ministries. However, it is important to conclude the discussion on policy conflicts by emphasizing that 87.5% of the Ministries did not report having any inter-ministerial conflicts. What measures should be adopted to improve

policy coordination in Ghana and reduce policy incoherence within the CoG, among Ministries, and between the CoG and Ministries are discussed next.

4.5 Measures to Improve the Effectiveness of Policy Coordination in Ghana

The study also had the objective to find measures that should be adopted to improve policy coordination in Ghana. The views of officials within the CoG and the Ministries were sought in that regard. The views of the respondents and relevant literature have shaped the solutions discussed below to improve the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of policies and programmes of PSM in Ghana.

4.5.1 Strengthening the Capacity of NDPC

Owing to the significant role of NDPC in coordination at the Presidency, noteworthy revelations were made that bothers on how NDPC must be allowed to operate and perform its mandate. Some respondents opined that all PSM must strictly follow the NDPC public policy guidelines to prepare their policy documents. NDPC must be strengthened as the constitutionally mandated institution for the coordination of development planning in Ghana. In that vein, it must be visible and be provided with all the resources to deliver its mandate. It is envisaged that, through the establishment of a permanent inter-ministerial policy committee at the NDPC, it will enhance the capacity of the commission to effectively coordinate public sector policies and programmes. In essence, strengthening the capacity of NDPC with both constitutional powers and operational support is critical for ensuring a uniform and sustainable coordination of PSM in Ghana. In an interview with the Director at NDPC, he noted the need to strengthen the commission whiles making reference to recommendations made by the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC).

“The Constitutional Review commission report highlighted the need to strengthen NDPC

for planning purposes. The report recommended a strong NDPC should lead the formulation of long-term National agenda which would be submitted to parliament for approval and would be binding on all governments.”

The Constitution Review Commission is a Presidential Commission of Inquiry, which was set up in January 2010 to consult Ghanaians on the operation of the 1992 Constitution and on any changes, which need to be made to the Constitution. In order to strengthen the operational capacity of the Commission, most officials recommended the Commission to harmonize the policies and programmes of ministries through periodic engagement and consultations. As recounted by the Director of PBCMED at MoTI is there is the need to collapse some ministries and synergies them in order to strengthen NDPC

“Downsize and merge some of the ministries in order to strengthen the NDPC. The NDPC is responsible for physical planning, setting targets and all that. Strengthening the NDPC would go a long way to ensuring effective coordination of ministries.”

Improving the institutional capacity requires that those institutions that competitively assume some coordination roles should be downsized or at best collapsed. This would make the NDPC more visible across all public sector institutions in the Country. The essence of establishing parallel institutions to monitor and evaluate government priority programmes would be flawed if the commission is more proactive. The Director at MoFA reportedly noted the need for NDPC to enhance its visibility and coverage. *“NDPC should be more visible and engaging in all activities of the ministry. This would give them a better cloud than they are currently doing.”* The capacity of the NDPC would be further enhanced if they consider working closely with all the major stakeholders including civil society organizations on matters of policy coordination. This would improve the outcome of their work and endear them to many within the public space.

4.5.2 Provision of Adequate Resources and Incentives

Ensuring the provision of adequate resources for coordination is also a necessary measure. All the levels of coordination require significant investment in personnel, funds, logistics and time. It is worthy of note that governments financial commitments are normally influenced by political motivations. The provision of adequate resources to all agencies which includes but not limited to the timely release of financial resources would facilitate the coordination of policies and programmes of public sector institutions. Some respondents revealed this as a strong measure, which could enhance effective coordination of the policies and programmes of the PSM. The Director at NDPC referred to resource constraints as one of its impediments and appealed for the provision of adequate resources and logistics in order to enhance the work of the commission. *“There is the need to strengthen the commission through the provision of adequate technical and financial resources.”*

The remunerations of personnel at the commission has a bearing on the performance of the commission. The condition of service at the commission should be capable of sustaining existing employees and attracting highly qualified personnel to assist in the area of coordination. Appiah-Adu and Aning (2012) noted that in Ghana the lack of highly skilled personnel interested in working on coordination matters at the presidency is because of the unattractive remuneration. This reveals that governments have not paid particular attention to the conditions of service of the personnel within the CoG to attract highly skilled personnel with appropriate knowledge in policy coordinating. Also, the issue of incentive driven coordination is normally highlighted in the MTM. Bouckaert et al. (2010) argue that coordination does not arise naturally but mostly through coercion or the use of incentives.

4.5.3 ICT Enhanced Coordination

Another noteworthy suggestion made by some respondents in the study is the design of a synchronized system to facilitate the coordination of policies and programmes through an electronic reporting system and web base publication of programmes and policies by all ministries, which is meant to encourage innovation and digitization of administrative affairs and enforce its compliance. The digitization of administrative affairs would link ministries electronically and enhance the easy flow of information. Designing a common template for all ministries to interact and share information with one principal actor would adequately address all coordination challenges.

4.5.4 De-politicization of the Coordination Institutions

Public sector coordination in Ghana has been highly compromised by excessive partisanship with little credence for a non-partisan approach in order to address the teething challenges of coordination. The capacity of the President to appoint personnel and set up parallel institutions for conducting coordination functions has an impact on the effectiveness of public sector coordination.

These ad-hoc institutions are normally political arrangements that distort the work of existing institutions. In a competitive democratic system that champion patron-client relationship, the institutional memory and experiences of existing institutions are often compromised or at worse scrapped off. The excessive politicization of coordination institutions at the center weaken the work of existing institutions. The multiplicity of institutions at the presidency rather impede the coordination of PSM. A Director at NDPC attributed the challenges of the Commission to the political interference and undue influence on the commission. He noted the following:

“Political colorization is what has affected our work over the years. All the former Chairmen of the Commission were people who had political clout. The constitution gives the power to the President to appoint the chairman of the Commission and recommend some ministers or expects to be part of the Commission.”

This account confirms the level of political impact on coordination of public institutions in the Country. The institutional independence of many of central agencies for policy coordination is compromised by the excessive powers exercised by the President over the NDPC. This affects the integrity of the Commission and heightens suspicion anytime there is change of government. In order to reverse this trend, much attention must be paid on strengthening the existing institutions responsible for public sector coordination. Depoliticizing the processes and institutions involve in coordination will repose trust and make them more effective. The de-politicization of coordination processes and institutions would require a non-partisan approach towards addressing coordination challenges.

4.8 Conclusion

The study revealed that there exist some much uncertainty and clarity on the roles and responsibilities of most PSM. The policies and programmes of PSM are expected to be coordinated by the CoG. The essence of policy coordination is because public policies are cross-cutting and involves the collaboration of more than one ministry hence there is the need for a strong CoG to coordinate the activities of Ministries. There is the need for a coherent CoG to effectively define and orient the responsibilities of lower-level organizations to avoid policy incoherence, unhealthy competition, and inefficient dissipation of funds. However, the challenge of who coordinates what and how is very imperative in the discussion of coordination.

A study by the OECD (2015) found that when newly elected governments assume office, policy conflicts usually occur between existing Ministries and new Ministries due to the zeal of multiple elected political actors at the center to deliver their electoral promises with scarce resources. Bouckaert et al. (2010) argued that any attempt by the CoG to establish policy priorities and strategies without considerable attention given to the bottom ministries and management processes would not yield the desired outcome. Metcalfe (1994) emphasized the central role that should be played by the CoG in laying down policy priorities. Coordination capacity for establishing central policy priorities requires considerable depth of analysis and collaborative preparations. The clarity of government priorities provides a certain direction of policy and clear pattern in resolving inter-ministerial differences. Bouckaert et al. (2010) observed that the failure of government to align one public policy to another often results in the duplication and contradiction of policies, programmes and projects.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

5.0 Introduction

Ensuring the effectiveness of the CoG in policy coordination among Ministries is an important condition for enhancing policy coherence. In Ghana, governments have made attempts at strengthening policy coordination at the CoG in order to develop its policy objectives. Contemporarily, this has become necessary because of the existence of social problems that require the responsibility of more than a single independent ministry to resolve. The relevance of a central authority in coordinating these independent Ministries is highly critical in resolving issues of policy duplication, policy disputes and harnessing the synergies of these ministries for an effective delivery of policy outcomes. The study explored the effectiveness of the CoG in coordinating policy formation among independent Ministries.

Metcalfé's policy coordination scale was adapted as the analytical framework in understanding the nature of policy coordination among ministries (Metcalfé 1994). The findings of the study have significantly addressed the research objectives and revealed other areas for future studies. The study examined primary data through interviews of 12 officials (largely Directors of Coordination Divisions) and a survey of 39 PBCMED officials across institutions at the CoG, CMA's and PSM. In addition, the study revised secondary data from journal articles, policy documents, books, institutional publications and legal enactments for the analysis. This final chapter of the study presents a summary of the key findings as well as some recommendations in order to improve policy coordination among ministries.

5.1 Summary of Key Findings

This section summarizes the key findings of the study on exploring the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of Policy formation among Ministries. It also provides synopsis of the findings on the objectives and makes recommendations in enhancing the effectiveness of the CoG in policy coordination.

5.1.1 Organizational structure of Public Sector Coordination in Ghana

The study identified the institutions under the Office of the President and the CMAs that coordinate the development of Policies among Ministries in Ghana. The Ministry of Monitoring and Evaluation (MoME), Ministry of Planning (MoP) and Office of the Senior Minister (OSM) are recent establishment by the current government to complement the work of existing institutions at the Centre for purposes of policy coordination.

The organizational structure of coordination between the CoG and Ministries depicts a hierarchical arrangement (as seen in figure 4). However, the study revealed numerous institutions at the CoG that create the risk of duplication and contradiction in any attempt at coordination. The principal challenge among these coordination institutions at the Centre rest on undefined responsibilities. Officials at NDPC make reference to their constitutional mandate in defense of their principal role in public sector coordination. On the other hand, the findings suggest that the newly established ministries MoME and MoP are auxiliary institutions that complement the work of NDPC in specific areas such as M&E and Cabinet respectively.

It is important to note that policy coordination which involves a logical sequence of responsibilities recognizes the specific roles each actor at the top could be attributed to.

In as much as policy coordination at the CoG comes with its challenges, the consistent multiplication of institutions at the Centre with unclear coordination responsibilities would greatly affect the coordination of policy formation. Therefore, there is the need to define the responsibilities of these institutions in order to avoid duplication and the struggle for responsibilities at the Centre.

5.1.2 Effectiveness of the CoG in the establishment of policy priorities

Developing national policy priorities and strategies among ministries is an integral part of public sector coordination. The duplication and disagreement of public policies among ministries are primarily addressed at this level. On the score of formulating independent ministerial policies, the study revealed that the following institutions: NDPC, MoME, Cabinet Secretariat and MoF have a greater influence on the formulation of policies and programmes of Ministries. The case of MoF is critical because of the role it plays in financial management of ministries. This is consistent with the position of Peters (2016) that financial incentives enhance coordination and that policy commitments are defined by budgetary resource allocation (OECD 2015). Also, the Office of the President, Ministry of M&E, NDPC, Cabinet Secretariat, Office of the Senior Minister, and Chief of Staff were averagely rated.

5.1.3 Communication of Policy Priorities

Effective communication of policy priorities between CoG and Ministries is aimed at ensuring adequate consultation among all stakeholders. The study aimed at the mode of communication between Central authorities and independent ministries. According to officials from the institutions surveyed, 92.1% indicated policy documents as the channel of communication between CoG and PSM whiles 63.2% and 36.8% highlighted the

National Budget documents from MoF and Media respectively. Effective consultation between the duo require regular interaction in a form of reports and feedback.

Feedbacks provide an opportunity for the CoG and Ministries to resolve policy disagreements. Whiles institutions at the CoG find the CoG as averagely effective in consulting PSM for feedbacks, PSM themselves rated the CoG below average (see Table 7). It is further observed from the findings that, NDPC and MoME are the only two coordination institutions that actively consult ministries for feedback in policy coordination. It is important to note that MoME has made significant improvement from 2016 to 2018 whereas NDPC has made some decline in engaging ministries. Perhaps the establishment of the new ministry MoME could occasion the decline by NDPC. Effective communication between the CoG and PSM is necessary in order to ensure that all parties are well informed and adequately consulted in policy development. Therefore, in as much as policy coordination is concerned, the CoG would have to address these gaps in communication with the PSM.

5.1.4 Coordination of Arbitration of Policy differences and Conflicts among Ministries

The overlapping functions and conflicting policies of Ministries require an impartial and central authority to resolve these disagreements amicably. The study revealed some significant policy disagreement between six Ministries in Ghana. These include: MoFA vrs MSI, MoTI vrs MSD and MoWH vrs MZID. Most of these conflicts are largely fueled by undefined responsibilities and the duplication of functions among these ministries. In all these, it is observed that the fracas is often between one of the newly established ministries and an existing ministry.

In examining the effectiveness of the CoG in resolving policy conflicts among PSM, 57.1% respondents at the CoG were neutral in assessing the effectiveness of the CoG whereas 53.2% of officials rated the CoG to be effective at resolving policy differences among ministries. Obviously, the challenge of resolving differences among ministries is eminent. Most officials suggested that, Cabinet would better address these conflicts especially that such conflicts often arise as a result of Executive decisions. This is because the usage of standing and inter-ministerial committees as a primary tool to resolve policy differences is not dynamic enough for complex strategies.

5.2 Policy Recommendations

In reference to the findings of the study, the study proposed the following policy recommendation in order to improve the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of policy formation among Ministries.

5.2.1 Enhancing the Organizational Structure of Coordination between CoG and Ministries

Government should strengthen the capacity of institutions at the centre in order to avoid the duplication of roles and the unhealthy competition among multiple principal actors at the Centre. NDPC, MoME and MoP must effectively collaborate with other agencies at the Centre such as Cabinet Secretariat in a defined and organized manner in order to identify clear distinction of roles and authority. There is the need for clarity of roles on the scale of coordination in order to ensure that the CoG is effective at coordinating policy formation among Ministries.

Also, Governments must de-politicized coordination institutions in the Country. The ritual establishment of parallel institutions at the CoG anytime there is a change of government should be discouraged and attempts must be made to legally enforce this. The mode of appointment into coordination institutions should be based on merit and not on any other consideration. There is the need to distance politics from coordination since the effectiveness of the latter is affected greatly by the former.

5.2.2 Ensuring the establishment of coherent Policy Priorities among Ministries

There is the need for CoG to effectively engage ministries in establishing public policies. The CoG should adequately consult all the relevant Ministries before developing a policy that requires multiple stakeholders. This should be done in a timeous manner in order to give room to all stakeholders to contribute effectively towards designing a coherent and cohesive policy.

5.2.3 Improve Communication between CoG and Ministries.

The study also recommends effective communication between the CoG and Ministries. This could be enhanced with the use of digital technology in order to ensure speed and ease in communication. Effective consultation in terms of feedbacks is essential in addressing issues of conflicts that could arise in the course of policy formation. The CoG should build coalition with all the key Ministries and should engage them timely and regularly.

5.2.4 Resolving Policy conflicts and disagreement

The study also recommends government to as matter of urgency resolve all policy conflicts that arise among Ministries in the course of policy formation and implementation. There is the need for government to streamline policies across PSM in order to avoid these impasses

among them. Government (Cabinet) must make attempts to ensure that all these conflicts are resolved amicably in order to avoid unnecessary delays of government policies.

5.3 Contributions of the Study to Policy and Literature

On the score of policy, the study has contributed to Public Sector Reforms in the area of policy coordination. This study provides direction in strengthening different functions and capacities of the CoG in public sector coordination. It would inform governments, politicians, civil servants, civil society and policy entrepreneurs to concentrate on matters of coordination that have not been effectively handled at the top resulting in policy failures in the public sector.

The study has also made significant contributions to literature in the area of public sector coordination. This is because little studies have been done in this area especially in Ghana. It adds to the knowledge of previous studies in coordination in the country by Appiah and Abdulai (2017), Appiah-Adu and Aning (2012) and most recently Peters and Mawson (2015). The study adapted the scale of coordination developed by Metcalfe (1994) and undertakes empirical study that adds to the literature. This appears to be the first study that empirically investigates the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of Policy formation among Ministries in Ghana.

5.4 Conclusion

Exploring the effectiveness of the CoG in the coordination of PSM is imperative for the enhanced formation of public policies. In as much as there exists a litany of challenges that hinder efforts at coordination, adequate political and administrative commitments is sufficient in improving coordination at the CoG. This would address issues of policy duplication and conflicts among Ministries. This study explored the effectiveness of the

CoG in policy coordination among Ministries. The findings suggest the CoG has made much strives towards establishing coherent policies among ministries, enhancing communication with Ministries and resolving policy disagreement amongst them. That notwithstanding, there exist great difficulty in resolving policy differences among PSM by the CoG. The challenges of Central Coordination are saddled with political interference and structural challenges. In order to address these challenges, governments must commit adequate resources and demonstrate commitments towards addressing the status-quo. The study proposed a reform of public sector coordination that would strengthen central coordination of PSM in a more uniform manner with clear definition of roles aimed at addressing policy disagreement among PSM.

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APPENDIX



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND HEALTH SERVICES

MANAGEMENT

RESEARCH TITLE: Improving the effectiveness of the Center of Government in the coordination of PSM in Ghana

This study is being carried out by **Mr. Naaeke Gregory**, a student of the University of Ghana Business School, as part of the requirement for the award of the Master of Philosophy in Public Administration degree. The study seeks to understand the nature of coordination of PSM by government. Your participation in this study is absolutely voluntary and your honest responses to the questions below would be very much appreciated. The information you provide will be treated confidentially and used for only academic purposes. I am grateful for your support.

INSTRUCTION: Please write your responses clearly or tick (✓) the appropriate box.

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Q1. Gender a. Male [] b. Female []

Q2. Please what is your age group?

- a. 20–29 []
- b. 30–39 []
- c. 40–49 []
- d. 50–60 []

Q3. What is the highest level of education that you have attained?

- a. Higher National Diploma []
- b. Bachelor's degree []
- c. Master's degree []
- d. PhD []
- e. Other: (specify).....

Q4. What is the name of your Ministry?

Q5. Which Division of the Ministry do you work with?

Q6. How long have you worked with this Ministry?

SECTION B: PUBLIC SECTOR COORDINATION IN GHANA

Q7. Which specific division within the ministry is in charge of coordinating the policies and programmes of the Ministry?
.....

Q8. How would you rate the effectiveness of the Division in charge of coordinating the policies and programmes of the Ministry?

highly ineffective 1 2 3 4 5 highly effective

Q9. To what extent does your Ministry consider the policies of all the other Ministries when formulating the 2019 policies and programmes?

Not at all 1 2 3 4 5 To a large extent

Q10. Has your Ministry had any policy disagreement with another Ministry during the past five years?

- a. Yes []
- b. No []

Q11. If yes, kindly specify the policy/policies in disagreement and specify the Ministry/Ministries involved.
.....

Q12. Please tick (√) as many as applicable the nature of your Ministry’s engagement with the presidency on your activities.

	Submission of reports
	Seminars/Workshops/Meetings
	Correspondence through letters /Cabinet memo

Q18. Do you think your ministry has been adequately resourced with funds, personnel and logistics for the implementation of government polices?

Highly Inadequate 1 2 3 4 5 Highly Adequate

Q19. What specific resource challenges do you have?

.....

Q20. How effective is the Presidency in monitoring and evaluating the policies and programmes of your Ministry?

Highly Ineffective 1 2 3 4 5 Highly Effective

Q21. How regular does the Presidency Conduct M&E on PSM?

- a. Weekly []
- b. Monthly []
- c. Quarterly []
- d. Annually []

Q22. Does the Presidency provide any incentives for personnel in your ministry in order to enhance coordination?

- a. Yes []
- b. No []
- c. Don't know []

Q22 b. If yes specify the kind of incentive

Q23. How would you assess the level or strength of cooperation and information sharing among the agencies at the Presidency?

Very Weak 1 2 3 4 5 Very Strong

Q24. Please indicate your view about the following on coordination.

	There exist so many institutions at the Presidency that monitor and evaluate
--	--

	the activities of my ministry
	There exists one central agency at the presidency that coordinates our activities at the ministry

Q25. How do you assess the effectiveness of the following institutions in coordinating the policies and programmes of PSM?

	Highly Ineffective	1	2	3	4	5	Highly Effective
NDPC		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Cabinet Secretariat		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Office of President		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Office of Senior Minister		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Ministry of Monitoring and Evaluation		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Ministry of Planning		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Office of Vice President		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Public Service Commission		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Office of Head of Civil Service		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Chief of Staff		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Ministry of finance		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	

Q26. Please indicate whether your ministry has submitted annual reports to these institutions, and whether or not you have received any feedback from them for the years indicated below.

	Submission of report to institution						Feedback from institution						
	2016		2017		2018		2016		2017		2018		
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	
National Development Planning Commission													
Cabinet Secretariat													
Office of the Vice President													
Office of the Senior Minister													
Ministry of M&E													
Ministry of Planning													

Q27. Finally, in your view what should be done to ensure effective coordination of the policies and programmes of the PSM by the Presidency?

.....