


**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

**CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN**

**AFRICA**

**(THE CASES OF UNMISS AND AMISON/ATMIS)**




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**POLITICAL SCIENCE DEGREE**

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
## DECLARATION

I, Lydia Yamoah Hagan, hereby declare that this research, except for acknowledged quotations and references, is the result of my endeavour and a representation of my views and research findings. No part of this project has either been presented wholly or partially to any other institution(s) for any award.




LYDIA YAMOAH HAGAN

(STUDENT)




PROF. ABEEKU ESSUMAN-JOHNSON

(PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR)



DR. SEIDU ALIDU

(SECOND SUPERVISOR)



DR. CHARLES AMO-AGYEMANG

(THIRD SUPERVISOR)



## **DEDICATION**

To my son Nana Yaw Yamoah Hagan, my family and friends.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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## ABSTRACT

Conflict is one major challenge confronting mankind and since 1960, the UN has carried the burden of force deployment to save humankind, restore peace and bring development through peacekeeping a typical military approach. Research and experience over the years have shown changing nature of conflict and therefore requiring a different response. Newer strategies employed are a multidimensional approach to peace operations. This phenomenon is an evolved peacekeeping that now combines efforts of the military, police, and civilian experts in conflict management, transforming from military-led to civilian-led multidimensional missions with their qualitative role exponentially increasing. The actual relevance of civilian actors in multidimensional peace operations, the agency notwithstanding, seems disregarded to systematically record and document civilian achievements. A scholarly search for literature shows a lot more works on uniformed actors. Even liberal authors and contemporary works lump civilian and military contributions together, creating a yawning gap in the literature on the civilian component in peace operations. The burden of this thesis is to explore and establish civilian contribution and influence on peacekeeping operations in Africa, focusing specifically on UNMISS and AMISOM now ATMIS at the global and continental levels. The study is underpinned by Kant's liberal peace theory which is the bane of peace operations and the functional theory which encourages the strength of different parts in making the whole successful. A desk review, a designed survey questionnaire and an interview guide with the UN/AU mission success indicators informed the methodology used to gather data which resulted in the fact that the majority of the mission milestone was made possible by the civilians, especially through the leadership, civil affairs, political affairs, coordination unit, human rights, and protection units as well as the integrated training cell. Major impact-driven projects and interventions through

humanitarian, health, education, judiciary, and capacity enhancement in Somalia and South Sudan cannot be over-emphasized. This study has succeeded in contributing to the existing literature on peace operations by accounting for the contributions of the civilians which is the ultimate study objective, as restoring calm to the communities through monitoring and reporting human rights violations, crime control through police and judiciary capacitation, improved health through building and equipping medical Centers, reducing youth vandalism through increased education, improving the socio-economic situation and boosting investor confidence through effective economic measures, in the case of Somalia returning the administration from Nairobi to Mogadishu, improving elections, and building the capacities of State institutions and relevant officials to take over the country governance when the mission exits. The afore civilian achievements prove that the civilian component provides the social vehicle and ingredients for peace operations in Africa and their absence will render the missions unsuccessful. The use of liberal peace theory is challenged as absolute peace is not gained neither in Somalia or South Sudan. Part of the reasons coming from the inherent weakness of the liberal pace theory which favors external interventions to local intervention challenges the holistic achievement of the Functionalist theory due to coordination issues among the actors. The study provides an opportunity for the peace UN, AU, and RECs/RMs to justify the cost of including civilians in the theatre and suggests alternative research areas to academia while suggesting international job opportunities as an alternative to the unemployed graduates. Further research could consider (i) Specific civilian achievements in a mission (ii) the importance of having the civilian component in multidimensional peace operations (iii) Civil-military joint achievements in multidimensional peace operations (iv) multidimensional peace operations make the needed impact. And (v) Is the cost of having a civilian component in multidimensional peace operations worth it?

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAII	Amani Africa 2
ACCORD	Africa Centre for the Reconstructive Resolution of dispute
AFISMA	African-led international support mission to Mali
AMIB	African Mission in Burundi
AMIS	Africa Union mission in Sudan
AMISOM	Africa Union Mission in Somalia
APF	Africa Peace Fund
APSA	Africa peace and security architecture
ASC	Africa Standby Capacity
ASF	African Standby Force
ATMIS	Africa union transition mission in Somalia
ATMISHQ	Africa Union Transition Mission in Somalia Headquarters
AU	Africa Union
AUBP	Africa Union Boarder Programme
AUCFC	Africa a Union Civilian Foundation Course
AUPSOD	Africa union peace and security operations division
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CAR	the Central African Republic
CCTSAMM	Ceasefire Transition Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEWS	Continental Early Warning Systems

CPO	Contemporary Peace Operations
DDR	Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
DDRR	Disarmament Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DPPA	Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
ECOMIB	ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
EU	European Union
EUTM	European Union Training Mission
FG	Force generation
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HDC	Humanitarian and Development Consortium
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Country
HIV/AIDS	Human Immune Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HOCC	Head of Civilian Component
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displace Persons
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHRL	International Human Rights Law

ILO	International Labour Organisation
ITC	Integrated Training Cell
KAIPTC	Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre
LPT	Liberal Peace Theory
MDPSO	Multidimensional peace operations
MINURSO	United nation mission for the organization of a referendum
MINUSCAR	Multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in central Africa republic
MINUSMA	Multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali
MONUSCO	United Nation Organisation Stabilization Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAU	Organization of Africa Union
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
P/CVE	Preventing Countering Violent Extremism
PKO	Peacekeeping operations
PO	Peace Operations
POC	Protection of Civilians
PSC	Peace and security council
PSO	Peace support operations
PSOD	Peace security operations division
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RDC	Rapid deployment capability
REC/RM	Regional Economic Community/Regional Mechanism

ROL	Rule of Law
RRP	Relief Reintegration and Protection
SFG	Somalia Force Generation
SNA	Somalia National Army
SOFA	Status of Force Agreement
SOP	Standard Operation Procedure
SPF	Somalia Police Force
STC	Special Technical Committee
SRCC	Special Representative of Chair of the Commission
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
TCEs	Training Centre of Excellent
UKMST	United Kingdom Mission Team
UN	United Nations
UNAVEM	United Nation Angola Verification Mission
UNDPKO	United nations department of peacekeeping operations
UNHB	United Nations Handbook
UNISFA	United nation interim security force in Abyei
UNMID	united nation mission in Darfur
UNMIL	United Nation Mission in Lebanon
UNMISS	United Nation Mission in South Sudan
UNMOGIP	United Nation Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan
UNOC	United Nation Operations in Congo
UNOCI	United Nation Operation in Cote D'ivoir

UNPFA	United Nation Population Fund
UNPOL	United Nation Police
UNSC	United nation security council
UNSCR	United Nation Security Council Resolution
UNTAG	united nation transition assistance group
UNTSO	United nation truce supervision organization
US	United States
VCCT	Voluntary Confidential Counselling and Testing
WTO	World Trade Organisaion





## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

#### 1.0 Introduction

Humanity is confronted with the burden of law and order, peace and security ushered by the eminence of conflict and its effects. Defined as the disagreement between two parties, conflict is as old as Adam and could manifest in violent and non-violent forms (Achleitner & Greindl, 2013). The end of cold war in the early 1990s witnessed a dramatic surge in violent international power struggles leading to state implosion across Africa. Obviously connected with internal conflicts arising from bad governance, identity crisis, poverty, unemployment among others (Aning et al 2010). Liberia and Sierra-Leone had their bite at civil wars in the 1989 and 1991 respectively.

The concept of state creation has been one of the political ways of managing peace and security and the maintenance of law order for neighbourly co-existence of humankind in the so-called states gave rise to notion of peacekeeping which is linked to international law and order. It evolved over the years and is now known as multidimensional peace operations as its nature has now assumed a more complex and integrated nomenclature. The United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) are the two organisations responsible for peace operations in Africa.

UN peacekeeping begun in 1960 with the first mission in Congo, deploying 20,000 military personnel. This mission saw 250 deaths including the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold. Its peace operations then were basically meant to maintain ceasefires and stabilize situations on the ground and provide crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflict by peaceful means.

The mission was usually made up of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with their main function being monitor, report and build confidence (UN, 2021).

Beyond the Cold War was a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. With a new consensus and a common sense of purpose, the Security Council authorized a total of 20 new operations between 1989 and 1994, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000.

Over 50 peace operations have been deployed in Africa since 2000, most of which are African-led or hybrid African Union/United Nations initiatives (Williams, 2013).

According to the UN, peacekeeping has always been highly dynamic and has evolved in the face of new challenges. In October 2014, the UN Secretary-General established a 17-member High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations to make a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations and the emerging needs of the future. The HIPPO report, as it is known, was issued in June 2015, with key recommendations for the way forward for peace operations. In September 2015, the Secretary-General's issued his own report on the implementation of these recommendations and the future of peace operations.

### **1.1 Background: The Evolution of Peacekeeping**

Conflict as a social issue is as old as man and cuts across continents, regions, and nations (Ezeibe and Oguonu, 2014). As a feature of human interaction, conflicts have occurred in different forms, between groups or states, between communities and across boundaries. It has evolved over time, posing a challenge to law and order since the discovery of states. The efforts deployed in managing conflicts as well as maintaining peace and security have become important features of peace and security. In their book, *Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa*, Achleitner and Greindl, (2013), described peacekeeping as a most enduring framework of collective security based on one for all.

The challenge of maintaining law and order as well as how peace and security have been managed in Africa since the 1960s to date is an important subject matter for this work. Many civil conflicts and wars such as Sudan 1995-1990; Chad 1965-1985; Angola since 1974, Liberia 1980-2003, Nigeria 1967-1970, Somalia 1999-1993, Burundi, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone 1991-2001, is the story of African and portrays the volatility of the continent, making it a base for most of the world's peace operations hub. African countries have hence been struck since the late 20<sup>th</sup> century with the problems of civil wars and inter-state conflicts affecting development hindering the process of integration and cohesion in Africa. Thugery, looting and arson have become part and parcel of Africa's political culture (IMDJ, 2010).

In addressing the challenge, peacekeeping begun as a conflict management tool and evolved over time. In the 1980s, a number of UN operations became multidimensional in outlook (Guehenno, 2003) comprising the military, police, civilians all working together for a peaceful continent. Its new integrated nature departed from the solely uniformed men to also comprise expert civilian roles such as political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarians, reconstruction, public information and gender for the effective and efficient management of issues arising from the civil unrests. Otto (2019) emphasized this new form of peace operations. According to him, the United Nations (UN) entered an era of multidimensional peacekeeping operations three decades ago, insisting that civilians and uniformed personnel worked together. A peacekeeping operation is referred to as multidimensional when its scope of operations goes beyond the military to include police and civilians, working together but each having specific functions (Tshiband, 2010).

In the 1992 Agenda for Peace, former United Nations' (UN) Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali recognized the central role of civilian personnel and he laid the foundation for human rights

integration in UN peacekeeping operations. Since then, the UN was deemed to have entered an era of multidimensional peacekeeping operations (Otoo, 2019).

Aside the above, Dr. Paul Williams of the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies on 18th September 2015, gave a presentation on policy and operational issues that determined the shift from the traditional peacekeeping to multidimensional peace operations in Africa. According to him, peace operations have always developed as an adhoc response to changing patterns of war fare; the trends of violence have changed from traditional wars such as inter-state conflict to new ones such as asymmetric wars such as Boko Haram, al-Qaida, Alsha Bhab, (ACSS, 2015). Evolinnng from the traditional military model of observing buffer zones, monitoring cease-fire agreements and supporting disarmament to a multifaceted paradigm with civilians and military working together to store peace in the war torn areas (Durch, Holt, Earle & Shanahan, 2003; Mohamed, 2005).

Another very cardinal development was the famous Brahimi report of 2000, which observed that peacekeeping operations creates demand for other experts outside the domain of uniform personnel. And recommended that the UN system must commit to peace operations carefully, to reflect honestly on past performance, adjust accordingly, fine-tune its analytical capacities to respond to realities and summon creativity required to implement new and alternative solutions to peace operations situations (Brahimi, 2000).

Overriding concerns of the Report were that UN was unable to identify, recruit and deploy suitably qualified civilian personnel required at the right time or in the numbers to fill shortfalls in key administrative areas (procurement, finance, budget) and in logistics support areas (contracts managers, engineers, information systems analysts, logistics planners) that plagued peace

operations throughout the 1990s and that some peacekeepers find themselves in positions that do not match their previous experience (ibid, 2000).

A reminder that the United Nations was created to save “succeeding generations from the scourge of war” in October 1945 and has since been called upon to prevent disputes from escalating into war and contained a lot of conflicts for decades through peacekeeping operations (UN, 2003). The UN peacekeeping is based on impartial presence at the conflict area with the objective of ceasing hostilities, bridging the gap between warring factions, and ensuring durable peace. Peacekeeping had been initiated to tackle inter-state conflict but has been used in intra-state and civil conflicts (UN Handbook, 2003).

Moving on, multidimensional peace operations this time, is assuming a more integrated approach where military, police and civilian all together combine efforts of expertise to end conflict in Africa (Belamy and Williams, 2010; Birikorang, Okyere & Aning, 2017). Since peace operations is also a conflict management tool, which primarily entails diplomacy and management, most operations have a range of staff dedicated to the political aspects of the mission (Edu-Afful, 2018) as well as to civil demands.

The political and civil affairs components of multidimensional peacekeeping operations originated with the recognition that political advice needed to be internally available to Heads of Mission. Political affairs unit is a substantive civilian component. Its size and structure vary from mission to mission and to the tasks officers are expected to undertake. While an academic grounding in political science or international relations, as well as knowledge of the country is often preferred,

political affairs officers include lawyers, diplomats, journalists, humanitarian aid workers, human rights activists, teachers, and anthropologists, to name a few which are core competences of civilians. The main requirements are versatility and ability to analyze and communicate clearly (UN Handbook, 2003).

Civil affairs officers are the civilian face of the mission to the local population and understand local culture, customs, institutions and laws. Their role engages them with local civilian authorities and communities in efforts to consolidate peace by restoring the political, legal, economic, and social infrastructures that support democratic governance and economic development. They are responsible for directly managing all aspects of civilian life. The broad range of specialized expertise and professional backgrounds among civil affairs officers include political science, law, international relations, business administration, engineering, economics, or a specific area pertinent to the needs of a mission, such as education, health, and finance. Besides, they also conduct independent analysis; identify strategic issues, opportunities, and risks; exercise good judgment; negotiate; develop operational plans; establish and maintain productive partnerships and communicate and operate effectively in a multicultural and multi-ethnic environment (UN Handbook, 2003).

The transformation from military to civilian-led Multidimensional peace operations (MDPO) is indeed one of the most significant developments in UN peacekeeping. The qualitative role of civilians in peace operations (PO) has changed exponentially and, as a result, the number of civilian functions has also increased considerably. That is 16,791 of the 106,245 mission staff (Coning, 2017).

There has been a great advancement in African peace operations capacity over the past decade. Member states contributed only 10,000 troops to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in the year 2000, when the African Union (AU) was established (Lotze, 2013). The early days of 2017 saw Member state's contributions rise to approximately 48,000 peacekeepers to the UN, which amounts to about 50% of all UN peacekeepers (United Nations, 2016). The AU has deployed eight peace support operations of its own, including to Burundi (African Mission in Burundi (AMIB), the Central African Republic (CAR) (MISCA), the Comoros (AMISEC & MAES), Mali (AFISMA), Somalia (AMISOM), and Sudan (AMIS I & II). In early 2017, the AU was responsible for the African mission in Somalia (AMISOM), currently the largest mission of its kind in the world with a strength of 22,126 personnel (African Union, 2017).

Peacekeeping in Africa is a crucial form of conflict resolution and a feature of international relations. While the UN has traditionally been the main peacekeeping actor in Africa, the African Union (AU) has been playing an increasingly important role in sustaining and fostering peace and security in the continent. Since the early 2000s, the AU has mandated and deployed many peacekeeping missions and Peace Support Operations (PSOs). Building upon its early experiences in Burundi, Sudan and Comoros, nowadays the AU is de facto a key PSO actor in Africa, having developed a comprehensive peace and security architecture to address conflicts on the continent.

The AU is currently developing a new PSO doctrine, which builds upon previous operational experiences and concepts from the African Standby Force (ASF), also informed by the UN. Ultimately, this doctrine aims to bring together the AU experiences and international PSO norms into a codified text, which will provide guidance for all AU PSO policies and deployments.



Studies have theorized about the effect of civilian components of peacekeeping operations on peace and democratization (Fortna 2008; Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Civilian personnel are heralded as central to UN missions and promoting human rights is a core pillar of the UN peacekeeping operations (Otoo, 2000). Despite the vital roles of civilians in peacekeeping operations, the literature points to their recruitment challenges (Eckhard, 2018). A critical search of the literature displays lack of account on the significant contributions of civilians during such missions and therefore, limited data and knowledge of their contributions.

## **1.2. Problem Statement**

The gradual shift and transformation of the orthodox peacekeeping framework, fundamentally, has been the introduction of civilians to improve effectiveness in contemporary peace processes. Civilian admission changed the name from peacekeeping to multidimensional peace operations leading to their deeper engagement with a notable example of civilian contribution in 2009 in Afghanistan to signal the indispensable role of civilians and the mutual complementarity between non-uniformed and the uniformed personnel in the improvement of peacekeeping delivery.

The proposal by the Brahimi report for an overhaul of peace operations highlighted the centrality of civilian contribution to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. To the extent that missions are now led by civilians and how the civilian component has become a prominent feature of modern peace operations is the backdrop of this study. Notwithstanding the proposed and actual relevance of civilian actors in multidimensional peace operations, there is a seeming disregard of the agency to systematically record and document civilian achievements. A scholarly search for literature shows a lot more works on the uniformed actors. Even liberal authors and contemporary works



lump civilian and military contributions together, creating a yawning gap in literature for the appreciation of the civilian component in peace operations.

The burden of this thesis, therefore, is to explore and establish the civilian contribution and influence on peacekeeping operations in Africa, focusing specifically on two missions both at the global level of the United Nations (UN) and the Regional level of the African Union (AU) namely United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) now Africa Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). (Hough, Du Plessis & Kruys, 2006) (UNDPKO, 2003) (Coning et al, 2017). In addition to the contributions and influence on peacekeeping operations, the work will also look at challenges that confront the civilian contributions and make recommendations.

### **1.3. Definition of Terms**

There several common terminologies used in this study and this section defines the following key terminologies which are widely used in the study.

#### **1.3.1 Peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping is a deployment of an armed force with the consent of the warring factions in order to build confidence and monitor the peace agreement signed by both parties. It unusually involves a set of actions/activities undertaken by the military, police and civilians in a war-torn environment to restore peace. It reduces deaths and protects vulnerable groups especially civilian, women and children. Many people use the terms peacekeeping and peace operations interchangeably. However, according to the United Nations defines **Peacekeeping operations** as “activities that

consist of military, police, and/or civilian personnel deployed in a country torn by conflict. These personnel aim to provide security, early peacebuilding, and political support” (United Nations, 2017b). Achletner & Greindl, 2013 also defined peacekeeping as “a most enduring framework of collective security, operating on the principle of ‘all for one’.”

There are different types of peacekeeping, and the UN enumerates the four major ones as the observer, inter-positional, multidimensional and peace enforcement missions. This study however is concerned with the multidimensional mission which is currently referred to as Multidimensional Peace Operations (MDPSO).

“Peacekeeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the possibilities of both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace” (Hough et al., 2006:21).

### **1.3.2 Peace (Support) Operations**

The term Peace Support Operation (PSO) describes organised international assistance initiatives to support the maintenance, monitoring and building of peace and prevention of resurgent violent conflict. Some people refer to them as peace support operations. There are two categories of PSOs: peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The CEO of German Centre for Peace Operations training Centre (Zif) Almut Wieland-Karimi, defines peace operations as “an important tool for international crisis prevention and conflict management. They help prevent violence, secure a ceasefire and build peace in a sustainable way.” (ZiF web, 2021). They further explain that there are major differences in practice but features are always permanent and these are:

- i. The authorizing body: the fact that it must be deployed by an international organization such as the UN, AU, ECOWAS, etc.
- ii. Legitimization: the peace operation deployment must be done with the host country
- iii. Aims of the peace operations; PSOs are mandated in order to defuse crisis situation, end violent conflicts and secure peace in the long term.

### **1.3.3 Multidimensional Peace Operations**

This is also referred to as integrated peace operations mission is a modern framework that allows different components, experts, and organisations to work together with the common aim of bringing peace and security to the host country. Emily J. Munro in his works multidimensional and integrated peace operations: trends and challenges, defines MDPSO as “The divergent mandates of peace forces, whose missions are to bring security to war-torn areas, and humanitarian relief entities, whose focus is on the protection of civilians and the unfettered delivery of relief, must be reconciled” (Munro, 2021:18).

### **1.3.4 Civilian component**

The civilian component refers to the non-uniformed mission officers commonly found in peace operations mission and according to Cedric et al 2017, are made up of Political Affairs, Human Rights and Protection, Public Information, Humanitarian Liaison, Safety and Security, Civil Affairs, Gender and Mission Support (Coning, Limo, Machakaire & Okeke, 2017).

### **1.3.5 Who is a civilian?**

The term civilian refers to a “non-uniformed personnel working in multilateral peace operations, but excludes humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the international Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

### **1.3.6 African Peace and security architecture**

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) embodies the structures, objectives, principles, values and the decision-making processes for the prevention and management of conflicts in Africa. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol adopted in July 2002, outlines the various components of the APSA and corresponding responsibilities. It is the main pillar of APSA and supported by following structures in discharging its duties:

- i. The Commission,
- ii. The Panel of the Wise
- iii. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
- iv. The African Standby Force (ASF) and
- v. The Peace Fund.

The APSA embraces a comprehensive agenda for peace and security in Africa that includes:

- i. Early warning and conflict prevention;
- ii. Peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction and development;
- iii. Promotion of democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights; and
- iv. Humanitarian action and disaster management

#### **1.4. Objectives of The Study**

The general objective of the study is to examine and make known civilian contributions to UN and AU peace operations in Africa. Specifically, the study seeks to:

- i. Assess the context that informs the deployment of UN and AU multidimensional peace operations in Africa.
- ii. Examine the mission structure, and composition of UN and AU multidimensional peace operations in Africa.
- iii. Examine the contributions of the civilian component to the overall UN and AU multidimensional peace operations mandates implementation in Africa;
- iv. Evaluate the collaboration between the civilian component and the other mission components in UN and AU multidimensional peace operations mandate implementation.
- v. Discuss the conditions for mission success and exit in UN and AU multidimensional peace operations in Africa.

#### **1.5. Scope of The Study**

This study will consider civilian peacekeepers in a UN and AU missions in Africa namely:

- i. The United Nations Mission in the South Sudan (UNMISS)
- ii. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

These two missions present a good representation at the global and continental levels. According to CIPRI 2020, these are the largest two multi-lateral peace operations as of 31<sup>st</sup> December 2019.

Referenced below on the ranking table. They have all the dimensions of a modern peace operations

and functions needed to be interrogated by this study. It therefore forms a good representation of all the components especially the civilian component under discussion.

## LARGEST MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS AS OF 31 DEC. 2019



AMISOM = African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia; UNMISS = United Nations Mission in South Sudan; RSM = Resolute Support Mission; MONUSCO = UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; MINUSMA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; UNIFIL = UN Interim Force in Lebanon; UNAMID = UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNISFA = UN Interim Security Force for Abyei; KFOR = Kosovo Force

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, 27 May 2020.

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
### **1.6. Significance of The Study**

This study is a contribution to knowledge generation and addresses the seeming gap in literature at the empirical, policy and pragmatic/administrative levels. Empirically, the study establishes the bases for the actual contributions of the civilian peacekeeper in bringing peace to the continent and highlights some important achievements of civilian peacekeepers.

At the policy level, it influences peace operation policy at the global and continental levels and provides deploying authorities with justification for funding civilian components in peace operations.

Administratively, the study provides UN and AU with insightful inputs and exposes the difficult dynamics associated with civilian roster, rapid deployment, quantification and their continuous inclusion in integrated peace operations as a process to expand civilian expertise. This brings meaning to the multidimensionality we tout today and will hopefully influence the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) /Regional Mechanisms (RMs) deployment policy of civilian's inclusion in missions.

Furthermore, this research work offers recommendations for the young graduates of Ghana and beyond in considering alternative job opportunities in peace operations, and highlights Ghana's contribution to peace and security in Africa.



### **1.7. Chapter Organisation of the Study**

The study is organized in seven chapters. Chapter one comprises the introduction, definitions and justification for the study. Chapter Two covers literature review. Chapter three discusses the theoretical framework with chapter four focusing on the methodology, data collection and processing. Chapter five presents and analyses the data gathered. Chapter six discusses findings and Chapter seven covers the summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations.





## CHAPTER TWO

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.0 Introduction

This chapter is a desk review of the evolution of multidimensional peace operations, legal framework of the United Nations (UN) and Africa Union (AU) mandating mission processes, the UN Charter, and the AU constitutive Act. The chapter will be specifically considering: (i) The evolution of peacekeeping (ii) Contemporary multidimensional peace operations (iii) Peace operations in Africa (iv) The legal framework of the UN and AU(v) The mandating processes of both organisations (vi) Mission components and narrow down to (vii) The role of civilian components; UNMIS & AMISOM.

#### 2.1.1 The evolution of peacekeeping

In most of the peacekeeping literature, as observed by Weinlich, in 2014, ‘peace operation’ has replaced ‘peacekeeping operation’ in modern times. This section traces the evolution of peacekeeping by critically examining papers and scholarly works of experts and practitioners in the field. The study will make references to books, articles, and materials on basic facts about the United Nations. Works by both modern and classical scholars such as Sanderson, 2002; Beardsley, 2013; Séverine, 2011; Moxon-Browne, 1998; Abiola, Seun, and Otte, 2014; Abiola and Otte, 2014; Nau, 2015; and Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017 are examined to show the transition from peacekeeping to peace operations.

Peacekeeping has a long history in the creation of the United Nations. As a global organ, it has always been in the midst of change, critically assessing its performance, with a periodic monitoring

and evaluation measures that seek to expand and strengthen its central role in meeting the many demands of world in transition (Kofi Annan, 1998), since its creation. Crucial to its existence, the UN Charter captures the determination of the international community to confront the devastation of the 20th century's two world wars. The advent of weapons of mass destruction heightened the determination and indeed, necessity, to place human relations on a footing that allowed conflict to be moderated by the conciliatory processes of mediation and negotiation (Sanderson, 2002).

One of the primary reasons for establishing the United Nations as central part of its mandate is the maintenance of international peace and security (UNHB, 1998). This task takes different forms and terminologies such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace building and enforcement. The term peacekeeping has however become a conceptual subject and main tool in mission operations, but it is not mentioned in the UN Charter (Langholtz, 2010). The idea of peacekeeping emerged out of the commitment of the United Nations to encourage and help nations resolve their differences through peaceful means (Sanderson, 2002). Peacekeeping operations are crucial instruments for international community through the Security Council to advance international peace and security. The role of peacekeeping, in the history of the United Nations, was recognized by the world in 1988, when the United Nations peacekeeping forces received the Noble Peace Prize (UN Basic Facts, 1998: 67).

Tharoor envisioned that if peacekeeping is to serve as a useful instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security, it needs conceptual clarity, political support and financial resources. For peacekeeping to remain effective in a changing world, its credibility must not be jeopardized by applying it peacekeeping to inappropriate situations, or by the issuance of mandate unsupported by doctrinal consistency or military means, and or by the undermining of its authority to reconcile peacekeeping with war-making under the rubric of peace enforcement (Tharoor,

1995). Indeed, the promises of peacekeeping as effective instrument of conflict reduction, to some extent, explains the evolution towards multidimensional missions or operations; the main subject of this thesis work which seeks to reflect upon the unprecedented number of peacekeepers who are not of the traditional military identity.

Since its creation, the UN has been called upon many times to prevent the threat and conflict escalating into war. From 1946 till date, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has issued over 2580 resolutions, the bulk of which directly address threats to international peace and security. While many of these resolutions relate to renewals of peacekeeping mandates in post-conflict environments, others pertain to the UN's role as a conflict manager during hostilities (Beardsley, 2013). It has, however, since 1948, been able to establish 73 peace operations with 13 ongoing ones and has substantially evolved, adopting novel approaches (Di Salvatore and Ruggeri, 2017) such gender, civilian component, and other experts.

The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in May 1948, when the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a small number of UN military observers to the Middle East to form the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours (UN Fact Sheets). Sanderson argued that the observers included unarmed military observers to aid and advance the armistice between Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Egypt. This is an historical operation that heralded the importance of multidimensionality in peacekeeping which is under the interrogation of this study. Another old peace operation is the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) established in Kashmir in 1949 to observe the truce on the Indian and Pakistani border. The two

missions still exist and could be called the source of traditional global peacekeeping culture (Sanderson, 2002).

Today, peacekeeping is multidimensional and continue to stimulate academic and policy debates. The debate on multidimensionality of peace operations drives this research with a focus on the contribution of civilian component of POs. Besides the maintenance of peace and security, UN also facilitates political processes, protect civilians, assist in disarmaments, demobilization, and integration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights among others. Indeed, Abiola and Otte visualize this movement of UN as having worked towards a systematic way of conducting peacekeeping operations (Abiola, 2014).

Abiola and Otte argue that after 45 years of UN, the Agenda for Peace emerged as the document that contains the foundation of modern peacekeeping. According to the two scholars, the Agenda for Peace is seen as a holistic approach to the maintenance of international peace and security, building sustainable peace through preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building strategies (Abiola and Otte, 2014).

UN peacekeeping has undergone profound transformations. In the post-cold war era and in the years that followed, the UN shifted in focus from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. This is because the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations remained contested, and it was used occasionally to provide space for political solutions of interstate conflicts and to avoid the escalation of regional conflicts into superpower conflicts (Weinlick, 2014). In addition, Leonardsson and Rudd observed that the international community was also faced with new security challenges of internal violence and state failure. To address these challenges, particularly the UN launched a number of peace

interventions. Here, the promotion of peace was based on liberal ideals of democracy and market economies, which was reflected in framing documents such as the UN's Agenda for Peace (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015).

The UN, therefore, embraced the consideration that security extends beyond the security of nations to a people-centered concept of human security that focuses primarily on protecting people while promoting peace (Human Security Initiative, 2014). In the years that followed, its legitimacy, contemporary peace operations are billion-dollar enterprises and involve hundreds of thousands of military, police and civilian personnel, (multidimensional approach), to assist in rebuilding war-ridden states and societies worldwide (Weinlich, 2014).

An important milestone in the evolution of peacekeeping that openly gave prominence to multidimensional approach was the conference held at the University of Limerick in June 1995 entitled 'Peacekeeping in the 1990s'. It brought together academic, military, police and civilian experts in the field of UN peacekeeping which focused on need to train and prepare of both civilian and military peacekeepers in the late 1990s (Moxon-Browne, 1998). The debate centers on a number of distinct but related themes such as: the extent to which the traditional concept of 'peacekeeping' has been replaced by the newer concepts of peace enforcement and peacebuilding; the increase in civilian participation in peacekeeping tasks; the increasingly multidimensional and complex character of contemporary peacekeeping operations; and fundamentally, perhaps, the well-worn question of whether soldiers make the best peacekeepers or are the only people who can do the job (Moxon-Browne, 1998).

Broadly speaking, peacemaking refers to the process of bringing parties in conflict to cease hostilities and negotiate an agreement through peaceful means. Peacekeeping denotes the

deployment of armed personnel to prevent the resumption of large-scale violence after a peace agreement. Peace-building includes actions to strengthen and solidify peace (Séverine, 2011). There are also enforcement measures; an approach which generally requires military force than peacekeeping (Nau, 2015) to maintain and restore peace and security. Such measures range from economic sanctions (embargoes) to international military action and are resorted to when peace was threatened and diplomatic efforts failed (UNHB, 1998).

In recent times, the United Nations system is focusing as never before on peace-building which gives greater expression and agency to the multidimensional aspect of it, hence this study. This reflects the action to support structures and to strengthen and consolidate peace. Experience has shown that keeping peace, in the sense of avoiding military conflict, is not sufficient for establishing a secure and lasting peace. Such security can only be achieved by helping countries to foster economic development, social justice, and protection of human rights, good governance and democratic process (UN Basic Facts, 1998).

Peacekeeping, haven evolved, both in focus and goal, more fundamentally places importance on civilian component of mission operations. Heje and Ryan (1998) advocate a more flexible approach to the management of conflict: soldiers have a role to play at certain junctures, but civilians, police units, election supervisors and health workers exemplify the multifaceted approach to maintaining peace.

Peacekeeping has been quite successful but saddled with some challenges as well. In Adam Twardowski's summary of the future of peacekeeping in Africa, a number of successes and challenges were discussion. Since the end of the Cold War, UN peacekeepers have recorded two-thirds success rate in completing complex mandates for instance (11 out of 16 complex missions

with 5 in Africa). He corroborates this with the observation that many studies suggest a 60% success rate of all 57 completed UN missions in Africa since 1960 (Twardowski, 2021). Yet, challenges of human right abuses have occurred.

## **2.2 Contemporary Peace Operations (CPO)**

### **2.2.1 Introduction CPO**

This section discusses the patterns and the historical processes of peacekeeping work, the dynamics, and how it assumed its current multidimensional nature. It will address issues through the lenses of scholars, analysts and practitioners in the field of peace-keeping by reviewing published documents (reports, resolution papers, handbooks, etc.) by the UN and scholarly articles by: Sanderson, 2002; Uesugi, 2004; Goncharova, 2018; Norvanto and Dumue-Laanila, 2017; Munro, 2008; Tshiband, 2010; Lijn, 2010; Abiola, Otte, 2014; among others.

### **2.2.2 Brief Background CPO**

Whereas the section is attentive to contemporary multidimensional peacekeeping operations, it is importance taking a snapshot of some significant facts of peacekeeping in general. It is generally described as a UN invention and is often associated with two names: Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester B. Pearson. These two eminent figures set forth principles that defined what is referred to as peacekeeping (Woodhouse and Duffey, 2000; cited Tshiband, 2010). The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation document for all the United Nations' basic mission work (UN-DPKO, 2008).

Peace operations are mainly established by the UN Security Council with the charter as a guiding principle and under the “primary responsibility for international peace and security” (UNHB,



2003). It is usually based on four main principles which are to operate with the consent of all parties, impartiality, and minimum use of force; while other principles include legitimacy, credibility and local ownership. Boutros-Gali said in 1992 that the deployment of a UN [AU/REC] presence in the field must meet the consent of all parties concerned.

Cedric de Coning (2010) argues that when most people think of peace operations, they think of soldiers. Since the late 1980s, the realities of UN peacekeeping have changed but still maintain the traditional model of military operation to support of a political activity. Today, a growing number of UN peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional, made up of a range of components including military, civilian police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. Some of these operations do not have a military component but carry out their mandates alongside a regional or multinational peacekeeping force (UNHB, 2003).

The former stereotypical view of peace operations through military spectacle got people to misunderstand the central thrust of peace operations which uses conflict management tool, and thus primarily entails diplomacy within a political process (Coning & Kasumba, 2010). This misconception of seeing peacekeeping in the eye of the traditional military model is the driving force behind this study with the distinct object to delineate its multidimensional aspect, discuss and document its contribution thus far.

Peacekeeping has become crucial but not mentioned in the UN Charter (Sanderson, 2002), but emerged out of necessity during the cold war as an ad hoc improvisation (Uesugi, 2004). Goncharova has argued that peacekeeping came into the United Nations' vocabulary in the 1950 (Goncharova, 2018). However, Sanderson (2002) held that the idea of peacekeeping emerged out



of the commitment of the United Nations to encourage and help nations resolve their differences through peaceful means.

The Security Council adopts a range of measures, approaches and mechanisms to fulfill its responsibility (UN-DPKO, 2008). They are subject to constant change because the operations and the environment in which they are conducted have evolved significantly since the first deployment (Norvanto & Dumue-Laanila, 2017). Subject to change, peacekeeping operations are regarded flexible and over the decades has been deployed in many configurations (UN-DPKO, 2001). The conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been guided by a largely unwritten body of principles and informed by the experiences of the many thousands of men and women who have served in various operations launched since 1948. Those operations had evolved to multidimensional missions (UNSC, 2013).

In a research analysis, Lijn identified nine factors for success and failure of a peacekeeping operation during a study on the cases of Rwanda, Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia. According to him these nine factors are the probability that a peacekeeping operation makes a positive contribution to durable peace increases if: 1) the parties are sincere and willing to cooperate with the implementation of the operation; 2) the operation is able to provide a sufficient sense of security to the parties; 3) the operation has sufficient attention to the causes of the conflict both in depth and in breadth; 4) the operation receives co-operation from important outside actors and parties; 5) the operation is deployed timely and at the right time; 6) the operation is implemented by competent personnel under competent leadership, and with clear command structures; 7) the operation is part of a long term approach; 8) the 'policy tools' implemented in the operation are coordinated within the operation, as well as externally; and 9) the operation provides ownership (Lijn, 2010).

### 2.2.3 Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations

In recent times, the nature of conflicts has changed assuming a more complex and dynamic approach, this warrants that the strategies for responding to and managing conflicts must also change to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to for-store peace. As a result, contemporary peace operations have assumed a multidimensional nature and hence the new terminologies: contemporary peace operations or multidimensional operations (UNHB, 2003).




Figure 2. 1: Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations

The qualitative role of civilians in peace operations has changed exponentially and, as a result, the number of civilian functions has also increased considerably. Civilians now represent approximately 20% of all UN peacekeepers. As of 28 February 2010, the UN had deployed almost 22000 civilians, including approximately 8000 international staff (Coning & Kasumba, 2010). The increase in civilian numbers according to the UN are firstly; the fact that mission mandates have grown increasingly complex, the requirement for qualified civilian expertise has grown apace and secondly; More multidimensional characteristic integrating the political, humanitarian, development and military dimensions in peace operations.

The UN peace operations encompasses three major features namely; conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building (Brahimi report, 2000). According to the Brahimi report, peacekeeping implores diplomacy and mediation to address conflicts in progress with the aim of stopping them. This 50-year-old effort has evolved over time, shifting from the traditional primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separation after inter-state wars to a complex model of integrated elements of military and civilian working together to build peace after civil wars.

Peace operations involve the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (police and/or military), with a mandate to (i) Assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process (ii) Serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements (iii) Enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace. This encompasses UN, UN-authorized, and non-UN operations, which may range in size from small observation and security sector reform missions involving less than 50 personnel to multidimensional operations involving tens of thousands of soldiers, police, and civilians. (Williams, 2013)

#### **2.2.4 The Multidimensional Approach**

Since the late 1980s, previous military observer missions included non-military tasks, a growing number of UN peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional, made up of the military, civilian, police, political, civil affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. Some of these operations do not have a military component but carry out their mandates alongside a regional or multinational peacekeeping force (UNHB, 2003).

Peace operations took a multidimensional nature in the 1980s to include different functional areas (Coning, 2010). A peacekeeping operation is referred to as multidimensional when its scope of operations goes beyond the military to include police and civilians, working together but each having specific functions (Tshiband, 2010). Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmaments, demobilization and reintegration of former

combatants, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the law and order (UN-  
DPKO, 2001). These multi-functions have failed to become prominent in the literature.

The UN first employed civilians and military in the United Nations Operations in the Congo (UNOC), is also known in French as Opération des Nations Unies AUCongo (ONUC) (Liu, 1999). Apart from being the most controversial UN peacekeeping mission, due to its use of force and being the largest ever deployed, ONUC set a precedent for multidimensional peacekeeping operations, combining traditional peacekeeping tasks with political and humanitarian activities handled by civilians (Liu, 1999; Findlay, 2002).

In addition, multidimensional peace operations cover such areas as mission support, safety and security (UNHB, 2003). The implementation experiences with these activities showed that they rarely occur in a linear way, but are mutually reinforcing, providing a holistic approach to addressing conflict. It was also realized that the increased complexity of post-conflict environments needed novel reactions in responding to these exigencies with coherent multilateral responses (Munro, 2008).

Abiola and Otte have expressed the concern that within the UN system, practice has always preceded conceptualization and that UN peacekeeping is an evolving concept, developed after repeated trial and error in the field (Abiola & Otte, 2014). In this light, Ban Ki-Moon proposed that periodic reviews of the missions would be conducted to ensure that they had the right mix of skills and capabilities to respond to evolving mandates and changing conditions on the ground (Ban Ki-Moon, 2013). On multidimensional and integrated peace operations, the Norwegian defence Minister said 'We continue to press for progress in the face of challenges, noting that the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and of Field Support were working to further improve

the planning, managing and supporting of missions' (Munro, 2008). In other words, the journey of peace operations to the multidimensional phase had been a long process of learning experience and multidisciplinary enquiry.

Again, in 2013, Ban Ki-Moon asserted that peacekeeping, after 65 years, had kept pace with the times. In that, the operations today are more varied and more complex than ever. And whatever form it takes, multidimensional peacekeeping remains a highly cost-effective investment in progress towards lasting stability (UNSC, 2013). Abiola and Otte observed that multidimensional approaches usually rebuilds national structures and elements of civil society while maintaining the peace and conducting security sector reform (SSR) (Abiola & Otte, 2014) and playing a critical role in easing the interface between peacekeeping, peace building, and restoring national capacities (Munro, 2008).

As mentioned earlier, the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Brahimi Report, was a comprehensive peacekeeping that stressed the pressing need to establish more effective strategies for conflict prevention, in both the long and short terms. The unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2086 in January 2013 further recognized multidimensional peacekeeping as a tool for peacebuilding and longer-term development (Brahimi, 2000). UN Security Council adopted the Resolution (UNSCR) 2086 (2013) on the Importance of a Multidimensional Approach to Peacekeeping (UN, 2013). With the aim of facilitating peace-building and preventing a relapse into conflict. Multidimensional peace operations thus have the mandates to:

Over the last 20 years, UN multidimensional peacekeeping has become an important international peacebuilding instrument, usually playing a more prominent role at the early stages of a post-

conflict peacebuilding effort (UN DPKO, 2010) to (i) provide support to basic safety and security by assisting national SSR programmes of military, police and other law enforcement institutions; (ii) enable Disarmament Demobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR); (iii) support the strengthening of rule of law institutions of the host country, such as the police, judicial institutions and correctional system; (iv) provide for rapid response in mine action; (v) support peace consolidation and inclusive political processes, including the local population and civil society; (vi) facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance; (vii) contribute towards protecting human rights; (viii) protect civilians, particularly those under imminent threat of physical violence; (ix) cooperate and coordinate with UN agencies, funds and programmes, as well as all relevant partners, to support the host government in poverty reduction and economic development; (x) support the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building.

### **2.2.5 The three components of Multidimensional peace operations**

It is worth noting that the most important part of any peace operation is how it manages the political aspects of the peace process, as a result most peace operations have a range of staff dedicated to the different political aspects of the mission. One recent most significant development in UN peacekeeping is the transformation from military to civilian-led Multi-Dimensional Peace Operations (MDPO). A typical multidimensional peace operations structure is made up of the three components as shown in figure 2.1. However, with the complexity of a typical modern peace operations missions and the growing roles of civilians, the structure has come to be the one below;




Figure 2. 2 : A modern mission structure

### 2.2.6 The military component

The military component refers to the three army wings of the mission made up mainly of the military. They are led by the force commander at the strategic level and made up of the formed units at the tactical level, military observers, staff officers and liaison officers all in the operational level. The main functions of the military component in a mission include observation, humanitarian escort, and cooperation with the other components on mission objectives.



Figure 2. 3 : A glance of the military component in a typical MDPO



### **2.2.7 The police component**

The police component refers to the police officers of the mission made up mainly of the individual police officer, the specialized police teams, and the formed police unit. They are led by the police commission at the strategic level, the deputy commissioner at the operational level and made up of the formed units headed by sector commanders at the tactical level. The main or traditional functions of the police include Protection of civilians, Monitoring, Observation, Reporting, Law enforcement, mentoring and Capacity building/Training. However, they also perform other functions such as reform, restructuring and rebuilding of broken-down institutions in the mission as well as electoral assistance, executive law enforcement, advising of the local police, public education, demobilisation disarmament and reintegration among others.

### **2.2.8 The civilian component**

The civilian component refers to the various civilian experts who are employed into the different civilian function. They are deployed into the mission's substantive roles as well as mission support roles. The mission support roles are the administrative and logistics such as human resources, finance, procurements and so on. And the substantive roles are political adviser, legal advice, planning and coordination, public information, human rights gender among others (Cedric de Coning, 2017).

### **2.2.9 The civilian component (Civilian Peacekeeping)**

Civilian Peacekeeping refers to as unarmed peacekeeping (Schirch, 2006). It is a new term, and involves unarmed individuals placing themselves in conflict situations in an attempt to reduce inter-group violence (Schirch, 2006). Carriere has argued that it is not new in the field of peace



support operations. It has been widely used to describe civilians working in UN peacekeeping missions (Carrière, 2010). Advocates of the civilian component argue that the first observers' missions deployed by the UN involved unarmed military observers (Wallis, 2010). Civilian peacekeeping works at the grassroots level, offering the possibility of reducing conflict and preventing violence through engagements with communities (Wallis, 2010). The work is undertaken by communities themselves rather than by international peacekeepers, self-proclaimed leaders or government authorities. The aim is to provide open space for local civil society to act (Schirch, 2006). One of the key principles is the 'primacy of those involved'. This principle relegates the role of the international civilian peacekeeper to a supportive one while the lead is taken by communities. It also opens the door to empowerment and building capability of local communities and civil society activists, to enable them to take their destiny in their own hands.

Civilian peacekeeping involves a range of tasks, including:

- Proactive presence (accompaniment and protection);
- Monitoring the compliance to human rights/IHL standards in conflict-affected or vulnerable areas and supporting local human rights groups (civilian protection);
- Monitoring the security situation through community-based early warning mechanisms and conflict prevention; and
- Cross-community dialogue.

The primary objective of civilian peacekeeping is to reduce the incidence and effects of violence on civilians. Using relationships implies that civilian peacekeepers use the influence of some individuals and networks to secure and enhance acceptance of their mission. Once their mission is

accepted, their safety and that of the communities they intend to protect is enhanced as well. They are also expected to use diplomacy to persuade and convince all parties concerned to adopt non-violent means of settling disputes and, most of all, to protect civilians in case of escalation of violence. It is believed that the mere fact of international presence, visible and actively engaging actors encourages compliance by the abusive parties (Mahony, 2006). Other tasks carried out in civilian peacekeeping are: 1) election monitoring; 2) ceasefire monitoring; 3) establishment and monitoring of peace zones; 4) humanitarian and relief assistance; and 5) the re-establishment of the rule of law. All these activities have been undertaken by UN and regional peacekeepers, both civilian and uniformed.

The qualitative role of civilians in peace operations has changed exponentially and, as a result, the number of civilian functions has also increased considerably. Civilians now represent approximately 20% of all UN peacekeepers. As of 28 February 2010, the UN had deployed almost 22 000 civilians, including approximately 8 000 international staff (Coning & Kasumba, 2010).

#### **2.2.10 Gender in Multidimensional Peacekeeping**

Since the Beijing Conference in 1995, mainstreaming a gender perspective in the entire work of the United Nations has been a priority. Contemporary situation concerning the mainstreaming of a gender perspective in multidimensional peacekeeping operations has become prominent. The main focus concerns female participation in the field which, historically, has been very low. Olsson (2007) points out that human rights and humanitarian assistance are two examples of areas of multidimensional peacekeeping operations where it is vital to consider the different needs of men and women.

With the increasing importance of civilian and humanitarian components in the mission, the number of local women affected directly by it has increased. The expansion of the peacekeeping mandate has also made possible more open gender integration to these missions with the intention of making them include the gender-specific needs of both women and men. Moreover, the issue of gender mainstreaming has become closely interconnected with the question of women's representation in general, and with their participation in decision-making procedures in particular (Olsson, 2007). Since 1993, about one-third of all civilian staff hired has been female while the number of women in military units has been almost non-existent. Consequently, the degree of female participation in a mission is affected by its composition (UN Statistical Division, 1995).

The contemporary missions have evolved to be multidimensional. Issues of gender mainstreaming have also brought new perspective when the UN endorsed certain policy to bring balance on gender perspective. Having established low women representation in peace operations, the UN and AU have put resolutions and measures in place to shore up the numbers. These include the Security Council adopting resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325) on women and peace and security on 31 October 2000. This resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of their equal participation and full Resolution 1325 (2000). More resolutions include Resolution 1820 (2008), Resolution 1888 (2009) and Resolution 1889 (2009). These mandates require peacekeeping missions to boost women's participation in post-conflict decision-making processes, prevent sexual violence, protect individuals, including women and girls, increase the presence of female peacekeeping personnel, and systematically train all peacekeepers to address gender issues in their work.

At the continental level, the AU's commitment to gender equality is rooted in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. Some of the landmark decisions which highlight AU's leadership in Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment include (i) The Declaration on promotion of gender equality as a major goal of the AU- Article 4(L) of the Constitutive Act specifically provides that the African Union 'shall function in accordance with the promotion of gender equality', thereby making the promotion of gender equality one of the goals of the AU. To achieve the goals of involving females in PSO, females must be present to take care of the peculiar needs of males and females in PSOs.

In recent times, most peace operations mandates include gender specific policies; for instance, UNOCI, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNMIL, UNMISS and AMISOM have specific gender references in their mandates to prevent violence against women and to create awareness about combatting violence against women (ACCORD, 2013)

## **2.3 Peace Operations in Africa**

There are different types of peace operations, the UN deploys on the bases of mandates from the peace and security council whereas the AU categorises them in four different ways name; mandated, authorised, endorsed, and recognised.

### **2.3.1 Introduction**

Peacekeeping activities are mainly conducted by the United Nations (Kertcher, 2012) and represent a key tool used by the international community to maintain security in countries plagued by violence (Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2016). Of the 51 original signatories to the United Nations Charter, 4 were from Africa, these being *Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, and South Africa* (UN Data, 2000). Worthy of note is the African presence in the original UN Charter. This portrays

the fact that the continent must wake up to the reality of maturity and taking responsibility of her peace and security related problems.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (Zaire), also known by its French abbreviation ONUC, ran from July 1960 to June 1964 and was the first UN operation in Africa. ONUC was initially created at the request of the Congo's current government to facilitate a smooth transition to independence and the withdrawal of Belgian forces. In 1989, as the council's relations started to improve, the subsequent round of UN operations in Africa got underway. Long-standing irregularities in the Southern African sub-region were corrected by the implementation of Resolutions 626 and 629, which respectively covered Angola and Namibia. Cuban troops were removed from Angola by the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I), as opposed to the United Nations Transition Assistance Group.

### **2.3.2 Current UN Operations**


The United Nations' (UN) efforts to establish and maintain peace have mostly been focused on Africa since the early 1990s. These initiatives first served as a representation of the rest of the world helping Africa (Conning, 2015). With more than 100,000 military, police, and civilian troops, 14 peacekeeping operations are being carried out by the UN Department of Peace Operations as of August 2019. These operations include seven that are in Africa: The United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (UNMISS) which was established in 2011; the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) which was established in 2011; the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) which was established in 2011; and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in

the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), which was established by the Security Council in 2014. (UN Data, 2015-2019).

### **2.3.3 The African Movement**

With time, the move to see African solutions to African problems (Malan, 1998) gained attention. In fact, the concept of an African Renaissance invoked in some African experts and peacekeepers the challenge to confront issues facing the continent on daily basis from an African point of view. Dissatisfaction with how international peacekeeping operations were implemented through militaristic peace enforcement or neglect made the UN suffered severe blow to its image and credibility as an instrument of peacekeeping in Africa (Nkiwane, 2001).

It is believed that the former Secretary-General of the Organisation of African Union played a key role in the move for Africa to handle her own problems, though obviously unintentional role in the prostitution of peacekeeping, through the publication of his An Agenda for Peace in 1992, when he said that OAU Member States can no longer afford to stand aloof and expect the International Community to care more for our problems than we do, or indeed to find solutions to those problems which in many instances, have been of our own making. The simple truth that we must confront, today, is that the world does not owe us a living and we must remain in the forefront of efforts to act and act speedily, to prevent conflicts from getting out of control (Dr Salim, OAU Address, 1997).



### **2.3.4 Peace Operations with Africa**

The former continental body, the Organisation of African Union (OAU) left a mark in the history of peace operations in Africa. There is still much to learn from its early activities (Berman, 2002). The African Union's (AU) predecessor, OAU dabbled in conflict management, supporting peacekeeping operations in Chad in the early 1980s and conducted small observer missions, was ill-fitted to conducting peace operations. Not only was it difficult to generate consensus within OAU, on specific courses of action, but its members did not endow the organization with substantial budget or relevant resources. OAU was forced to operate without suitable bureaucracy and effective management structure of standing forces (Williams, 2009). The African Union (AU), which replaced the OAU in July 2002, took to designing new machinery and promising to build on the accomplishments of the OAU. The difficulties experienced by the OAU in its initial effort at peacekeeping in Chad in the early 1980s explains why it did not undertake another mission in Africa for almost ten years (Berman, 2002).

### **2.3.5 Building Africa's Capacity**

Over the last 20 years, however, Africa has developed significant capacity of its own, and today Africans make up the largest proportion of the UN's civilian, police, and military peace operation officers. As of March 2015, approximately 60% of the UN's 5200 international civilian peace operations staff and about 80% of its 11 600 local staff are Africans. In addition, Africa has now become the largest regional contributor of police and soldiers to UN peace operations and contributes approximately 48% of the UN's 106 000 uniformed peacekeepers (Conning, 2015). In addition, the Administration has stated a preference for providing U.S. support to African-led



stabilization operations (e.g., training, equipment, and logistical support) through bilateral channels rather than U.N. mechanisms.

In January 2015, the African Union Assembly endorsed Agenda 2063 which aims at achieving an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena. The Department of Political and Peace-building Affairs (DPPA) therefore, works closely with the AU Peace and Security Department and the AU Department of Political Affairs to coordinate and support each other's efforts in conflict prevention, mediation and peace-building in line with 2030 Agenda.

On 19 April 2017, during the first United Nations-African Union Annual Conference, the UN Secretary-General and Chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission signed the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. This builds on an increasingly close cooperation since the two Organizations signed the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union in 2006 (A/61/630) (AU, 2018). For 14 years the EU has channelled its peace and security support finances through the African Peace Fund (APF) to help pay for African-led peace support operations, capacity building for AU institutions and AU-led conflict prevention initiatives (Fabricius, 2021).

### **2.3.6 First AU Peace Operations**

Between 2003 and 2008 the African Union deployed peace operations involving approximately 15,000 soldiers to four states: Burundi, Sudan, the Comoros, and Somalia. This represented a huge change of tempo from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity. It also raises important



questions about how successful these operations have been, what challenges they raise for the union's peacekeepers, and whether this tempo of operations is sustainable (Williams, 2009). The Africa peace operations illustrate how U.N. peacekeeping has significantly evolved since the first mission was established in the Middle East in 1948 (UN Truce Supervision Org.).

### **2.3.7 Special Technical Committee (STC)**

In addition to the functions provided for in the AU Constitutive Act, the STC's role includes: enhancement of the Continental Early Warning System; implementation of the Common African Defence and Security Policy; implementation of the AU Policy on Post-Conflict Stabilisation; implementation of the AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform; continuous enhancement of the African Standby Force's (ASF's) Planning Elements, the ASF's civilian, military and police components, and its Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC); facilitation and coordination, through AU policy organs, of AU Member States' police, intelligence and other security institutions in the fight against transnational crime, illicit arms proliferation, cybercrime and terrorism; implementation of the AU Border Programme (AUBP); and any other functions and tasks as may be assigned to it by the Executive Council or the Assembly.

### **2.3.8 Africa Peace Operations and Funding**

Some experts have expressed concern regarding possible funding shortages for U.N. peacekeeping operations, particularly those in Africa, and the impact it could have on their effectiveness. In a March 2019 report to the General Assembly (A/73/809), U.N. Secretary General (SG) António Guterres noted an increase in the number of peacekeeping missions that are frequently cash constrained due to member state payment patterns and arrears, and "structural weaknesses" in

peacekeeping budget methodologies, including inefficient payment schedules and borrowing and funding restrictions (Rettig, 2015).

### **2.3.9 African Union Funding Proposal**

In 2016, the AU backed a proposal under which AU member states would cover an increased share of the cost of African-led stabilization operations, in exchange for the potential to receive U.N. assessed funding for the remainder of the cost on a case-by-case basis. AU financing is to be raised primarily through a continent-wide tariff on imports and member state assessments.

In 2018, the three African members of the Security Council introduced a draft resolution that could have paved the way for the financing future AU-led operations through U.N. assessed contributions, under specific conditions. U.S. diplomats signalled concerns, including with regard to securing congressional support, and the draft resolution did not advance to a vote.

### **2.3.10 United States Funding Support**

Over the years, US has demonstrated an interest in the mandates, effectiveness, and funding status of U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa as an integral component of U.S. policy toward Africa and a key tool for fostering greater stability and security on the continent. The Obama Administration backed new operations in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali but both times at the urging of France. The Trump Administration has expressed broad support for the AU's efforts to self-finance 25% of its "Peace Fund" by 2025, while criticizing the import tariff as likely to incur violations of World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations.

### **2.3.11 European Union Funding Support**

European Union, Brussels, has, on the other hand, steadily become more disenchanted with the way the AU has used EU money for peacekeeping. For example, in 2018, a European Court of Auditors investigation concluded that the EU's support for the development of the AU's African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 'has had a poor effect' and needed refocusing. The European Union (EU) this year 2021 change the way it funds African peace and security. The changes are likely to have big implications, especially for the African Union (AU) Commission, but it's not clear whether everyone affected is taking sufficient note (Fabricius, 2021).

In 2021, the European Union has hinted the introduction of new ways of financing African peace and security. It will replace the dedicated fund that supported the African Union's (AU) efforts to prevent and resolve conflict with successor instruments that give the EU more flexibility in choosing who and what to support. The new instruments will allow the EU to directly finance both a broader range of African-led peace support operations and coalitions and direct training and equipment for national armies. EU peace and security funds can now bypass the African Union. Brussels can in future directly finance regional and national military initiatives rather than funnelling money through the AU (Fabricius, 2021).

The EU believes this greater flexibility will generate better results for the continent. 'Brussels will be able to provide direct funding to African-led peace support operations and military coalitions, even when they are not operating under an AU Peace and Security Council mandate, and to provide bilateral financial support for military training and equipment to African armies. The new strategy seems to result from both push and pull factors. On the push side, the EU has steadily become

more disenchanted with the way the AU has used the money it's been ploughing into peacekeeping over the years (Fabricius, 2021).

Paul-Simon Handy, Senior Regional Adviser at the Institute for Security Studies largely agrees in his 'In some instances the AU has become extremely dependent on EU funding, especially for [the AU Mission to Somalia],' he says. Brussels has lost patience with pouring money into a mission that has not shown enough improvements on the ground. Handy then says. Withdrawing the money from the AU's control and allowing it to be spent on regional or national military missions enables the EU to better pursue its own strategic advantages in Africa

AU Commission chair Moussa Faki Mahamat said, 'AU is a long way short of being able to finance its peace efforts entirely through member state contributions'. Efforts to persuade the UN Security Council to fund the rest have so far failed. The EU shift comes at a time when the AU has vowed to self-fund 25% of its peace operations. The Peace Fund established to that end has so far collected about US\$200 million (Fabricius, 2021).

### **2.3.12 Issues with Peace Operations in Africa**

Besides the idea of fiscal challenges, several overarching issues and debates continue to arise regarding peace operations in Africa. These fall into several categories as discussed below:

#### **a. Civilian Protection Mandate Fulfilment**

Records indicate that armed groups have repeatedly massacred civilians at close proximity to U.N. operating sites. Policymakers have debated what changes, if any, can or should be made to enable peacekeeping operations in Africa to fulfil mandates to protect civilians. This issue has been

particularly salient with regard to MONUSCO (in DRC) and MINUSCA (in CAR). Both missions' mandates place a high emphasis on civilian protection amid on-going conflicts and severe logistics and personnel protection challenges. Restrictions imposed by troop-contributing countries on their forces' deployments, often attributable to force protection concerns, may impede civilian protection efforts in some cases. What will Africa-led operations do that is differently?

**b. Mass Atrocities**

Some experts and observers have asked whether U.N. peacekeeping operations are an effective tool for preventing or addressing mass atrocities. U.S. support for MINUSCA's creation was nested within a high-level effort to prevent further mass atrocities in CAR; fulfilling this goal has proved challenging. In Mali, militias have engaged in a spate of civilian massacres in the center of the country, a region that was largely outside the purview of MINUSMA until the 2019 mandate renewal.

**c. Role of Host Governments**

A key challenge over the years has been how and to what extent U.N. peacekeeping operations are able to pursue positive working relationships with host governments whose interests may not align with international stabilization efforts. In practice, peacekeeping personnel may require approvals from host governments to acquire entry visas or access certain parts of the country. It is believed that Africa-led operations will have more leverage since host countries automatically would belong to the African Union.

**d. Counterterrorism**

Some policymakers have questioned what role, if any, U.N. peacekeeping operations should play in addressing transnational terrorism in Africa. This debate has repeatedly arisen in the context of

Mali and may become relevant in other places (such as DRC, where the Islamic State has claimed ties to a local militia group). What would AU do differently to in such situation?

**e. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by U.N. Peacekeepers**

The United Nations has been confronted with how to better address sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeepers. Some previous operations have high rates of substantiated allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation (UN Data, 2019). Solving African problem using African approach might work. For example, in CAR, in a single year (2016), peacekeepers from the Republic of Congo and DRC, among others, were implicated in the abuse of minors, while Burundi's police contingent was repatriated due to abuses by its police services at home.

**f. African Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCS)**

Experts and policymakers have debated the advantages and drawbacks of relying on African countries to contribute the bulk of military and police personnel to U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa. 15 African troop contributors may be willing, but they often display capacity shortfalls and/or poor adherence to human rights standards.

In Mali, which has been the deadliest environment for UN peacekeepers since MINUSMA's establishment, top troop contributors include Burkina Faso, Chad, Senegal, and Togo, which are among the world's poorest countries. Moreover, troop contributors that border the host country may have bilateral political interests that complicate their participation in peacekeeping operations. Some countries may also wield their contributions to such missions to deflect international criticism of their domestic political conditions.

**g. African-led Operations**

How and whether to fund and sustain African-led regional stabilization operations in lieu of, or as a complement to, U.N. peacekeeping operations has been debated in U.N. fora, in Africa, and

among U.S. policymakers. Stabilization operations initiated by the African Union (AU) or sub-regional organizations are often superseded by U.N. peacekeeping missions. While African regional organizations can authorize rapid military interventions, they are generally unable to finance or sustain them, and donor governments may be reluctant to fund them over long periods. AMISOM, established in 2007 and mandated to take offensive action in support of Somalia's federal government and against Islamist insurgents, has remained the sole African-led military intervention to benefit from a U.N. support operation funded through assessed contributions.

#### **h. Call for Partnership**

Highly complex and dynamic conflict systems are placing significant demands on African peace and security institutions. In response, new practices and cooperative models are emerging to try to shape a more peaceful and stable continent (Coning et al., 2017). To ensure reliable funding for peace operations, capacity-building and needed support, a partnership between United Nations is being fostered. This partnership is a strategic measure to bolster the effectiveness of Africa-led operations.

The partnership between the African Union and the United Nations continues to grow from strength-to-strength. Hanna Tetteh, Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union, introducing the Secretary-General's annual report on the partnership (document S/2019/759) via videoconference, described a host of mechanisms based on the 2018 Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. She also highlighted joint field visits and frequent consultation between the Security Council and the Union's Peace and Security Council, most recently the annual meeting between the two bodies (SC Meeting, 2019).



Fatima Kyari Mohammed, Permanent Observer for the African Union, briefing via videoconference, also described a burgeoning of cooperation between the two organizations. One key achievement could be seen in the many joint field visits, most recently spearheaded by the United Nations Deputy Secretary-General and the African Union Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security to the Horn of Africa (document S/2019/759).

### **Conclusion**

Peace operations in Africa inspite of its many challenges have made progress. The AU through the APSA, APTSA, ASF, RECs and RMs support and partnership with the UN. EU, US, etc. promises to get even better. The UN has come to trust the AU and hence the rebating of missions like UNAMID.

## **2.4 The Legal Framework of The UN and AU**

### **2.4.1 Introduction**

War, in any form, is the cruelest reality of mankind in society. Efforts are always being made to use negotiations instead of arms to address issues that have the potential to trigger wars. Though the toll of human suffering, death and destruction continue to grow, the prevention of armed conflict remains the first most important agenda and purpose of international cooperation. The need to preserve humanity in the face of the reality of war has become prominent and for this reason, an impressive body of international humanitarian legal frameworks has been established.

The starting point for any discussion of the legal framework of UN peace operations is that the power to undertake or create such operations is not written anywhere in the UN Charter (Rose,



2009). However, the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) enjoy acceptance by the generality of the world where their activities and operations offer the unique advantage as a means of addressing conflicts globally and continentally. Their actions are, therefore, to conform to reason, law and must satisfy the ends desired by the international community. They are ‘to ensure compliance and must do so informed by established legal instruments’ (UNSG, 2010) whenever they deal with conflict.

In order to meet the challenges posed by today’s peacekeeping missions, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have embarked on a major reform effort, *Peace Operations 2010*, aimed at strengthening and professionalizing the planning, management and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations (Langholtz, 2010).

In the world today, it is called into question the law's ability to adapt itself to regulate human conduct, especially in the most dramatic circumstances of war. On one hand, the UN principles of peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, and a ‘minimum’ use of force, play an integral role in ensuring the legality of any peace operation that is not established under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Cambridge University Press, 2017). The UN and AU have *human rights* obligations to every action undertaken. In international law, human rights obligations are those that States have undertaken by signing treaties, which are then ratified by national parliaments and enacted through changing the state’s practice.

#### **2.4.2 Legal Framework**

Legal framework can simply be described as all the rules, responsibilities and institutions governing the behavior of actors in a sector: peacekeeping, economic, health, education, mining,

etc. The rules, rights and obligations of companies, organizations, governments, and citizens are set forth in a system of legal documents called legal framework (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2015). Legal framework could include a country's constitution, legislation, policy, regulations, charters among others. The Charter of the United Nations, signed, in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, is the principal legal framework of the UN.

The human rights frameworks are designed to be a legally, politically and morally binding set of principles for governments. It is important to mention here that whereas there are so many legally binding treaties, covenants, statutes, protocols and conventions, there are also nonbinding political statements, declarations and principles that are expected to guide certain activities of UN and AU. For example, the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights which encompasses civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights share the principles of universality and indivisibility. Its principles have been developed in a range of human rights instruments, some of which have been accepted by most states, others not. These instruments define specific standards for women, children, disabled persons, migrant workers and other vulnerable groups for minorities and indigenous groups.

### **2.4.3 Why Legal Frameworks**

The importance of the legal frameworks primarily is to gain legitimacy for actions. They direct actions or tasks of peacekeeping operations of UN and AU as well as guiding peacekeeping personnel in official functions and personal conduct in terms of use of force, type of weapon to use and others.

Regarding this study, the focus is on the legal basis for peacekeeping operations by the United Nations and the African Union. The legal basis for the UN peacekeeping is enshrined in the UN Charter in specific chapters. The UN provides various means through which conflict may be contained and resolved. The Security Council may also prescribe ways to resolve dispute and request the Secretary General's mediation. General Assembly has been analyzing and developing ways to strengthen UN actions for peace (Basic Facts, 1998).

#### **2.4.4 Obligations to Peacekeeping Operations**

In order that the actions of the UN and AU meet the requirements and satisfaction of the international community, human rights principles are applied to whatever they do. International Law protecting fundamental human rights of every individual at all times apply both in war and peace times, to all human beings. Legal sources include UN Charter Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (also referred to as International Bill of Human Rights) and others.

#### **2.4.5 What are human rights?**

Human rights are a set of universal minimum standards aimed at protecting human life, well-being and dignity of everyone without distinction and guaranteed by international law (OHCHR, 2021). These rights according to OHCHR are inalienable, interrelated, and independent. That is to say they cannot be taken away or trampled upon by any other. They are inherent to all human beings, whatever the nationality, place of residence, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity, national, colour, religion, language or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. They include civil and political rights include the right life, freedom from

torture, protection from discrimination, freedom of expression, a fair trial, not be held in slavery. Economic, social and cultural rights also include the right to join a trade union, education, food, housing and medical care social security and work, equal pay for equal work (Basic Facts, 1998).

#### **2.4.6 International Humanitarian Law (IHL)**

International humanitarian law has a brief but eventful history (Fact Sheets: 13, 2000). It was not until the second half of the nineteenth century that nations agreed on international rules to avoid needless suffering in wars. They are rules they bound themselves to observe in a Convention. IHL is body of law defined as the principles and rules which limit the use of violence in times of armed conflict. It aims to protect persons who are not, or are no longer, directly engaged in hostilities: the wounded, prisoners of war and civilians; and to limit the effects of violence in fighting to the attainment of the objectives of the conflict (UN Fact Sheets: 13, 2000).

IHL is also popularly referred to as Law of War or Law of Armed Conflict. It is applied in times of armed conflict to limit negative impact of armed conflict and reduce suffering during war where individuals not part of war again. Its legal sources include Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, Secretary-General's Bulletin on International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

There are three main currents that have contributed to the making of international humanitarian law. They are the "law of Geneva", represented by the international Conventions and Protocols established under the aegis of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) with the protection of the victims of conflict as their central concern; the "law of The Hague", based on the results of the Peace Conferences in the capital of the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907, which dealt principally with the permissible means and methods of war; and the efforts of the United Nations

to ensure that human rights are respected in armed conflicts and limit the use of certain weapons (UN Fact Sheets: 13, 2000).

The following are some of the essential rules of IHL, (a) Civilian targets cannot be attacked, (b) Attacks only against military objectives, (c) Civilians and anyone no longer taking part in hostilities must be respected and treated humanely, (d) Anyone who surrenders or stops fighting (e.g., wounded) cannot be killed, (e) Torture is prohibited at all times and in all Circumstances, (f) Captured combatants and civilians must be respected and protected, (g) It is forbidden to use weapons or methods of warfare that are likely to cause excessive injury or unnecessary suffering, (h) Wounded and sick must be collected and cared for, (i) Medical personnel and medical establishments, transport and equipment must be respected and protected, (j) The Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal emblems are signs of protection and must be respected, (k) Prevention and prosecution of war crimes covers attacking civilians, recruiting children as soldiers, torturing prisoners and sexual violence.

Notwithstanding the positive intentions of IHL, it is being debated and challenged on many levels as new means and methods pose new legal and practical questions in terms of the challenges of new technologies that have entered the modern battlefield. At the factual level, the features of contemporary armed conflicts present a challenge. These features include: an increase in asymmetric conflicts, the involvement of one or more third States' armed forces in local conflicts crossing national borders, and the proliferation and fragmentation of armed parties (Nil, 2016).

Another challenge lies in the growing complexity of the interplay between IHL and other bodies of law, such as human rights law or international criminal law, which, despite all similarities, are

built on different rationales. The lack of clarity deriving from the overlap between those bodies of law, combined with the resulting jurisprudential and doctrinal interpretations, are at times used as pretext to lower the level of legal protection during armed conflict (Nil, 2016).

#### **2.4.7 Strengthening Future Peacekeeping**

Over the years, as certain prerequisites for the success of peacekeeping become clear, new instruments are designed to enhance the quality of activities. At the same time, the unacceptability of certain actions and inactions of personnel also became obvious for the review and alteration of instruments to guide activities of peace operations in the field (UN Basic Facts, 1998). Some of the frameworks being provided to facilitate the timely planning and deployment of an operation may include:

**Enhancing capacity for rapid deployment:** After an operation has been created, its credibility and effectiveness are affected by the promptness with which it is deployed. Rapid deployment can prevent enormous suffering and can spare a country for the legacy of bitterness that can make the political reconciliation impossible for years. Several initiatives have been take to address this need.

**Enhancing ability to function in diversity:** Once deployed many operations face difficulty of hostile environment. In some situations, an impressive show of force is the best way to avoid having to actually use it. This was successful by United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia.

**Acting Comprehensively:** In assisting states in the aftermath of conflict, peacekeeping confronts problems of economic collapse and traditions of abusive use of the instrument of state to advance political power. The institution-building role of peacekeeping operations has thus increased in

importance, with mandates including such tasks as ensuring human rights observance, promoting means to end impunity of human right violators, and creating the institutions through which legitimate political differences can be expressed.

**Mustering Political Will:** Ultimately, the success of peacekeeping operation depends on the political will of the warring parties to resolve their differences. It also depends on the political will of member states to support such operations, and ensure they are provided with human, financial and material resources necessary for them to come out of the damage of war.

Furthermore, operations can take many forms, and are constantly evolving in the light of changing circumstances. Among the task discharged by peacekeeping operations are:

- **Maintenance of Ceasefires and Separation of Forces:** By providing breathing space, an operation based on limited agreement between parties can foster an atmosphere conducive to negotiations,
- **Preventive Deployment:** When deployed before conflict breaks out, an operation can provide a reassuring presence and a degree of transparency which favour political processes.
- **Implementation of Comprehensive Settlement:** Complex, multidimensional operations, deployed based on comprehensive peace agreements, can assist in such diverse tasks as monitoring human rights, observing elections, furnishing Humanitarian assistance and coordinating support of economic reconstructions.
- **Protection of Humanitarian Operations during Conflict:** In many conflicts, civilian operations have been deliberately targeted as a means to gain political ends. In such



situations, peacekeepers have been asked to provide protection and support for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

#### **2.4.8 List of UN International Legal Frameworks of PSOs**

- The UN Charter
- General Security Council Resolutions of relevance
- Significant Treaties
- General Principles of Law, International Customary Law and Justice Norms
- Agreements & Guidelines
- Judicial Precedents
- The 1994 Convention on the safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and its 2005 Optional Protocol
- Administrative Issuances from the Secretariat

#### **2.4.9 International Human Rights Instruments, Treaties and Monitoring Bodies**

Human rights are defined in the many treaties generated by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) since its creation in 1919. Here, a selection of core human rights treaties or instruments generated within the United Nations will be discussed.

The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its two Optional Protocols.



In addition to the Declaration of Human Rights, there are nine core human rights treaties which lay out in more detail what these rights mean. These include the ICESCR and ICCPR, and the following seven conventions. The conventions vary in status, as some have been ratified by many more countries than others.

- International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 1965)
- Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 1979)
- Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT, 1984)
- Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC, 1989)
- International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers & Members of their Families (ICRMW, 1990)
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 2006)
- International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED, 2006)

#### **2.4.10 Other Human Rights Instruments**

- There are hundreds of more legal instruments and political declarations on a wide range of issues that are relevant to international development. The website of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provides links to the full text and ratification status of many of these instruments (OHCHR Fact sheets).

- ILO Labour Standards. Since its creation in 1919, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has generated almost 200 treaties that lay down basic standards on labour-related issues ranging from child labour to indigenous rights, (OHCHR Fact sheets).

### **AU Human Rights Instruments**

- AU Constitutive Act
- The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects related to Problems of Refugees in Africa, 1969
- African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981
- African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 1990
- The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1998
- Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 2003
- The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1998
- Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 2003

### **International Treaty Monitoring Bodies**

International human rights are protected by core international structures and organisations developed to promote and protect human rights in all situations as in peace operations. This includes the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the ILO's systems for enforcing labour rights. OHCHR is part of the UN Secretariat. It works to raise

awareness of human rights and to promote them through dialogue, advice and technical assistance with member states and other organisations.

### **Treaty-Based Bodies**

Treaty-based human rights bodies are committees of independent experts elected by governments. They work in specific areas laid out by the particular treaty and monitor its implementation by the states that have ratified it and they are required to periodically submit reports on progress to the relevant treaty committee. In addition, the HRC, CERD, CAT and CEDAW committees examine and decide on complaints (OHCHR Fact sheets).

Some regional organisations have also developed their own human rights systems, although these systems vary considerably. Further information on regional approaches to enshrining human rights at regional level: (a) African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, (b) African Union, (c) Inter-American Court of Human Rights, (d) European Court of Human Rights, and (e) European Committee of Social Rights.

#### **2.4.11 The African Union**

The African Union (AU) approach to peacebuilding is an outcome of African experience with peace missions and lessons from the global environment, especially the United Nations (Zondi, 2017). Murithi indicates how discussions about peace efforts in Africa have focused on actions, successes and failures since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and sees them as part of the institutionalisation of Pan-African ideals of prosperity for all, peace, development, self-reliance, liberation, etc. (Murithi 2008, p.17, cited, Zondi, 2017). The AU has

innovated in useful ways in peacebuilding. Given the ubiquity of imported approaches to the subject of peace in Africa, it is to consider the AU's approach to peacebuilding and its efficacy in fulfilling the African dream of peace (Zondi, 2017).

The continental peace architecture provides an institutional framework for implementing the concept of a comprehensive peace that encompasses conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. At the pinnacle of this architecture is the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established in 2004 with ten members elected for two-year terms and five for three-year terms in order to provide some stability and continuity to the Council's leadership. The focus of the PSC is similar to that of the OAU Central Organ, i.e. to prevent and resolve conflicts by monitoring potential security threats throughout the continent (Baregu, 2011, cited: Zondi, 2017).

It operates by sending fact-finding missions in the form of peace envoys, observer missions, mediators, technical support teams, and armed forces to keep peace after agreements. Article 7€ of the Protocol Relating to Establishment of the Peace and Security Council operationalizes the AU Constitutive Act's principle of non-indifference by empowering the Council to recommend military interventions for authorization by the AU Assembly in cases of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes (African Union, 2002). This is a new dynamic in Africa's peace agenda, a continental decision-making platform for peacebuilding plus the principle of non-indifference towards violence within states (Zondi, 2017).

#### **2.4.12 Legal Justification of AU Intervention in Domestic Affairs**

The AU approaches to peacebuilding is in the legal framework. In its article 3 the AU Constitutive Act, the Union states as part of objectives 1) promote peace, security, and stability on the continent and 2) promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments. Article 4 specifies the Union's principles of peace operations, it clearly states 1) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity and 2) respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities (Constitutive Act, 2000).

This permits intervention in member states in cases of crimes against humanity and genocide and removes the old problem where the Pan-Africanist ideal of peace and prosperity is hampered by the Westphalian principle of non-intervention in national affairs. In fact, when the AU acted on the dictum of non-interference in the affairs of member states, it allowed ethnic and religious wars and political upheavals ravage the continent unchecked from Rwanda, Burundi, Congo Democratic Republic (DRC), to Sierra Leone, Liberia, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Guinea, Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Libya, Comoros, Chad and Mali (Cocodia, 2020). Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Africa is the first region to provide the legal framework for setting aside the principle of non-intervention in specific circumstances, before the international community adopted the principle of Responsibility to Protect. Therefore, the AU Constitutive Act, the Protocol establishing the PSC and other decisions of the AU on peace provide a conducive legal-political environment for comprehensive AU peace missions (Zondi, 2017).

#### **2.4.13 AU-UN Cooperation**

In order to promote effectiveness in peace operations, the need to build cooperation between the UN and the AU in peacebuilding in Africa has become crucial in strengthening African capacity as well as boosting the UN interface with regional organisations in keeping with the principle of subsidiarity. According to Zondi, the AU approach is to lay the ground for such cooperation through comprehensive peace missions of its own, focused on anticipating conflict hotspots, confidence building and peacekeeping. This is essential for African ownership of hybrid missions as well as for building African capacity for peacebuilding. The challenge is to develop a shared conceptual framework for the AU and UN (Zondi, 2017).

#### **2.4.14 Challenges of African Peacebuilding Operations**

Experts in the field of AU peacekeeping operations agree on the inadequate resources of the AU to enable her go it alone and which necessitates her dependence on better resourced organisations such as the UN and the EU. (de Coning et al., 2007; Murithi, 2008; Coleman, 2011; Lotze, 2016; Cocodia, 2020). The reliance on external forces for financial and technical resources seriously undermine the AU's peacebuilding. The failure of the AU to finance its programmes generally and the inability of many of its member states to finance their regular budgets is a major threat to peace operations. As Zondi (2017) said, 'this resource problem points to a fundamental weakness in the post-colonial African condition and is a serious contributor to the post-colonial realities of deferred dreams, shattered expectations and illusions of change'. However, the AU is said to be obsessed with saving the inherited neo-colonial state and trapped in state-centric approaches to peace rather than on transforming society as a whole by re-orienting citizenry or boosting indigenous civil society structures that form part of social capital for peace and development (Zondi, 2017).

#### **2.4.15 Conclusion**

From past terrible experiences of OAU, the AU approach to peacebuilding has evolved to improved interventions in the later years. The AU inherited the lessons learned under the OAU, but benefitted also from UN-driven ideas of holistic and comprehensive pursuit of peace and development. It uses a peacebuilding framework anchored on balance between continental leadership and regional responsibility for peace that is based on a holistic concept of peace that embraces all the elements of the UN Agenda for Peace. It also innovated the need to incorporate and benefit from the participation of non-state actors in supporting state-driven peace processes.

### **2.5 The Mandating Processes of The UN and The AU**

#### **2.5.1 Introduction**

Mandate is a fluid concept and term with different meanings and can refer to the purpose, vision, mission, goal and/or duty of an individual, ad hoc group or organisation. It could, as well, refer to the period of time set to accomplish or end a course of action as assigned. The effort of peace operations in Africa, usually begins with the mandating process. This is the legal bases on which the UN or AU set their troops to an identified area of conflict requiring intervention. Peace Support Operations staff are deployed to implement the tasks set in a given mandate thereof. The Security Council, in the case of UN, and the Peace and Security Council in the case of AU are the main organs that give the mandate for an operation, setting tasks which are specific to each mission. The range of mandated tasks differ from mission to mission and this is due to the nature of the conflict, the challenges presented and the prevailing circumstances on the ground (AU-CFC, 2020).

In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a UN peace operation. UN peace operations traditionally have traditionally been



associated with Chapter VI deals with Pacific Settlement of Disputes. However, the Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution and has never invoked Chapter VI. Chapter VII contains provisions related to Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment into volatile post-conflict settings. Chapter VIII of the Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of peace and security provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles in Chapter I of the Charter.

Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act broke new ground by empowering AU member states to intervene in situations involving crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide

“(h) the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”;

“(j) the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security” (AU Constitutive Act, 2000). However, when it comes to the UN, it is (i) Chapter 6 - Pacific Settlement of Disputes, (ii) Chapter 7 - Use of Force and (iii) Chapter 8 - Regional Arrangements.

### **2.5.2 The mission mandate**

A United Nation Security Council (UNSC)/Africa Union Peace and Security Council (AU PSC) mandates give international legitimacy to the presence of a peace operation in a country. The mandate is the legal basis for all actions or tasks the operation undertakes and this includes the use of force. A mandating process is a rigorous exercise conducted by many actors concerned about the conflict. It determines the tasks specific to a peace operation and the total number of staff



needed for completing the tasks. Mandates may change from time to time depending on the conflict dynamics of the conflict and response (AU-CFC, 2020).

### **Peacekeeping/Peace Operations Mandates**

Over the years, the range of tasks assigned to UN peace operations has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict and to best address threats to international peace and security. Although each UN peace operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council. Depending on their mandate, peace operations may be required to (a) deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders, (b) stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement, (c) assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements, (d) lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.

Mandates also reflect a number of cross-cutting, thematic tasks that are regularly assigned to UN peace operations on the basis of the following landmark Security Council resolutions (a) UNSC resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, (b) UNSC resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict, (c) UNSC resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

#### **2.5.3 Mission mandating process**

UNSC and AU PSC mandating processes are basically similar because the mandates are determined by the type of mission to be established. The UNSC mandating process starts from the strategic level when the Council deems it necessary to respond to a given conflict situation. This is followed by a strategic assessment of the situation and thereafter a technical assessment team is

sent on the ground to carry out a thorough analysis and verify the findings. The UNSC, based on the findings, decides to deploy a peace mission through an adoption of a resolution (AU-CFC, 2020).

For example, when a dispute is brought to the Council's attention, the first action is usually to recommend to the parties to reach agreement by peaceful means. In some cases, the Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. It may set forth principles for peaceful settlement. It may appoint special representatives or ask the Secretary-General to use his good office. When the disputes lead to fighting, its first concern is to bring it to an end as quickly as possible. The Council issues ceasefire directives that can be instrumental in preventing wider hostilities. In support of a peace process, the Council may deploy military observers or a peacekeeping force to the area of conflict (Department of Public Information, 1998).

The AU mandating process is based on the six deployment scenarios. The process is informed by a strategic direction at which point a Conflict Management Task Force (CMTF) is established to undertake a strategic assessment. The assessment once completed informs the strategic planning which culminates in the Draft Initial Mission Plan. Thereafter, a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) is sent on the ground to verify the situation and the requirements for the establishment of a peace operation. A Draft Mission Plan and the Mandate are then drawn. Once the mandate is approved by the PSC, a Communiqué is released to authorize activation and deployment of a PSO Mission. It is a rigorous, time consuming process that requires input of different actors at the various levels. The process aids decision making on tasks, resources required, time frame and exit strategy. The table below shows the AU deployment scenarios which determine the mandate and the decision making process (AU PSC protocol 2002; AU Constitutive Act, 2000).

### 2.5.4 Some mandated missions and deployments

Table 2. 1 : Some mandated missions and deployments

	AU Mandated PSOs	AU Authorised PSOs
1.	<b>AMIB</b> (Burundi ) 2003 – 2004 [3,500 personnel]	<b>MAES</b> (Comoros) 2007 [1,300 personnel]
2.	<b>AMIS I &amp; II</b> (Darfur ) 2004 – 2007 [7,700 personnel]	<b>Operation Democracy</b> (Comoros) 2008 [750 troops]
3.	<b>AMISEC</b> (Comoros) 2006 [700 troops, 63 Military Observers, 30 Civilian police]	<b>RTF-LRA: 2012 onwards</b> [5000 uniformed personnel]
4.	<b>AMISOM</b> (Somalia) 2007 onwards [22,126 uniformed personnel]	<b>MNJTF-BH: 2015</b> [7500 military and other personnel]
5.	<b>AFISMA</b> (Mali) 2013 [7,197 uniformed personnel]	<b>G5 Sahel: 2017</b> [5 000 military personnel]
6.	<b>MISCA 2013 – 2014 –</b> [6080 uniformed personnel]	<b>SAPMIL: (Lesotho) 2017</b> [258 military, police, intelligence and civilian personnel]
7.	<b>AU Observer Mission in Burundi: 2015</b> [100 each of Military & Human Rights Observers]	

Source: The Civilian Dimension of the African Standby Force, AU (2010)

### 2.5.5 Prospects of mission mandates

When PSOs are mandated, there comes the opportunity to be more supportive of locally led solutions. PSOs contribute to the strategic political coherence of larger national and international effort. Scope of PSO mandates may be trimmed down to focus on political stability and politics.

### **2.5.6 Some Challenges of PSO**

Peace operations have a number of challenges which include;

- i. Counter-terrorism operations
- ii. Dilemma of neighbours deploying in PSOs
- iii. Prioritizing political processes
- iv. Engagement with actors that constitute the primary threat to peace and security
- v. Sustained peace without making political progress
- vi. Countering violent extremism and PSOs
- vii. AU PSO Principles
- viii. Fundamentalist non state actors.
- ix. Demands from State actors for greater emphasis on human security.
- x. Resources, capabilities to fulfil Mandates
- xi. Lack of guidance especially when host government proves to be major perpetrator.
- xii. People centered approaches over State centered approaches
- xiii. Effect of Social Media

### **2.6 Mission Components in Contemporary PSO**

Peace operations missions are made up of clusters of functionalities working together for the effective mandate implementation of the operation. They are usually the military component, the police component and the civilian component.

### **2.6.1 The military component**

The military component refers to the three army wings of the mission made up mainly of the military with observation, humanitarian escort, and cooperation with the other components on mission objectives (AU-CFC, 2020) as main functions. They are led by the force commander at the strategic level and made up of the formed units at the tactical level, military observers, staff officers and liaison officers all in the operational level.

### **2.6.2 The police component**

The police component refers to the police officers of the mission made up mainly of the individual police officer, the specialized police teams and the formed police unit. They are led by the police commission at the strategic level, the deputy commissioner at the operational level and made up of the formed units headed by sector commanders at the tactical level. Their main functions include: Protection of civilians, Monitoring, Observation, Reporting, Law enforcement, mentoring and Capacity building/Training. However, they also perform other functions such as reform, restructuring and rebuilding of broken state institutions as well as electoral assistance, advising of the local police, public education, demobilisation disarmament and reintegration among others (AU-CFC, 2020).

### **2.6.3 The civilian component**

The civilian component refers to the various civilian experts who are employed into the different civilian function. They are deployed into the mission's substantive roles as well as mission support roles in the administrative and logistics such as human resources, finance, and procurements. The

substantive roles are political and legal advice, planning coordination, public information, human rights, gender and others (Cedric de Coning, 2017).

## **2.7 The Role of Civilian Components; Unmis & Amisom**

### **2.7.0 Introduction**

The concept of enhancing civilian dimension in peace operations is the expeditious deployment of the right experts in the right numbers. It does not only provide a comprehensive approach to peace and security but also necessitates critical analysis of the purpose and objectives of each civilian function in order to avoid duplication of tasks within the mission (SIPRI, 2010). This section discusses the roles of the civilian component in peace operations with a specific attention to the United Nation Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON) which are the focus of this study. Worthy of note is the sturdy rise in civilian in peace operations which exceeds 6500: see figure 2.4.





Figure 2. 4 : Civilian deployed to peace operations 2000-2009



Source: SPRI, 2010

### 2.7.1 The role of civilian components in mission

Every peace operation has a mandate and each component has a role for its effective implementation. Usually the civilian roles are for political processes and protection. Coning et.al iterates the functions of civilians (De Coning, Karlsrud & Breidlid, 2013). Whereas the UNDPKO looks at protection in general, the AU categorizes its civilian functions into two major functional areas namely substantive and support functions (Coning, 2010).

### 2.7.2 United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS)

The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was established in March 2005 and currently has the second largest civilian component of a UN multidimensional peace operation. It is made up of 827 civilian staff deployed under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 1590 (Wiharta & Blair, 2010). The mission's mandate includes the support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement' (CPA) implementation. Entailed in the CPA are a comprehensive set of tasks and responsibilities for monitoring the ceasefire, establishing a DDR programme to promote political

inclusiveness, promoting the rule of law, monitoring and promoting human rights, offering electoral assistance and facilitating the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (SIPRI, 2010). In addition, the Resolution authorized the mission with Chapter VII powers to use force in the protection of civilians considered to be under imminent threat in the areas of deployment and as it deems within its capabilities (Wiharta & Blair, 2010).

More recent research by SIPRI reveals UNMISS is the largest mission in Africa (SIPRI, 2020) and is made up of about 20,000 military, police, and civilian peacekeepers from 73 countries. With the objective to consolidate peace and security, and help establish conditions for development in the Republic of South Sudan, with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of South Sudan to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours through: Protection of civilians, Creation of a conducive conditions for delivering humanitarian assistance; Support implementation of the revitalised agreement as well as monitoring and investigating human rights (Mold, 2020).

The mission's mandate hasn't changed much; it still calls for the protection of civilians in its capacity and deployment areas who are at risk of physical harm, especially women and children. In order to prevent violence against civilians, especially against those who are displaced, it must also proactively deploy troops and conduct patrols. The deterrent and prevention of sexual and gender-based violence must be prioritized, and safety and security must be maintained at the locations for the protection of civilians during the peacekeeping deployment. In addition, the mission must promote a secure environment for the repatriation, relocation, resettlement, or integration of refugees and internally displaced families into host communities. Monitoring, examining, confirming, and reporting on abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are some of the other responsibilities (SIPRI, 2020). Currently, approximately



2,676 civilian employees work for UNMISS besides the 1,888 police and 14,911 military personnel (UNMISS, 2021).

### **2.7.3 UNMIS MANDATE (QUOTED; UNMISS.ORG)**

1. To support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by performing the following tasks:
  - i. To monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and to investigate violations;
  - ii. To liaise with bilateral donors on the formation of Joint Integrated Units;
  - iii. To observe and monitor movement of armed groups and redeployment of forces in the areas of UNMIS deployment in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement;
  - iv. To assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction;
  - v. To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting understanding of the peace process and the role of UNMIS by means of an effective public information campaign, targeted at all sectors of society, in coordination with the African Union;

- vi. To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in addressing the need for a national inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peace-building;
  - vii. To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of police;
  - viii. To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework;
  - ix. To ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity, and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;
  - x. To provide guidance and technical assistance to the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation with other international actors, to support the preparations for and conduct of elections and referenda provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
2. To facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions;

3. To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination;
4. To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to co-ordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS's capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

#### **2.7.4 Change from UNMIS to UNMISS**

The UN recounts that the UNMIS operations was wound up 9<sup>th</sup> July 2011 with the completion of an interim agreed by the Government of Sudan in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed on 9<sup>th</sup> January 2005. The mission however ended its 6 years operations on the independence of South Sudan following a CPA of 9<sup>th</sup> January 2011. The Security Council then established a successor mission United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 9<sup>th</sup> July for an initial period of 9 years to be renewed further when needs be.

##### **2.7.4.1 Current UNMISS Mandate update (Quoted)**

In accordance with UN Resolution 2625(2022), the situation in South Sudan is a continuous threat to international peace and security in the region and therefore extends the mandate to 15<sup>th</sup> March 2023. In addition, it also encourages that the mission continues its three-year strategic vision

defined in resolution 2627 (2021) so as to prevent a return to civil war, build durable peace and support inclusive, accountable governance and free fair and peaceful election.

**(a) Protection of civilians (POC)**

- Protect civilians under threat of physical violence, within its capacity and areas of deployment, including in the context of elections, with specific protection for women and children.
- Deter violence against civilians through proactive deployment and active patrolling with particular attention to internally displaced people, refugees, humanitarians, and human rights defenders, and identify potential threats or attacks through a mission-wide early warning strategy
- Maintain public safety and security of and within existing UNMISS protection of civilians sites and retain the ability to protect re-designated camps under the sovereign responsibility of the Government of if the security situation deteriorates.
- Deter, prevent, and respond to sexual and gender-based violence within its capacity and areas of deployment.
- Exercise good offices, confidence-building, and facilitation in support of UNMISS's protection strategy to prevent, mitigate, and resolve intercommunal violence by supporting community-led peace dialogue processes.
- Support development and implementation of gender-responsive community violence reduction programmes, to help reduce intercommunal violence and collaborate with partners to complement community disarmament initiatives, with a particular focus on

members of armed groups ineligible or unwilling to be integrated into the Necessary Unified Forces, women and youth.

- Provide technical assistance and build capacities to help the Government of South Sudan expand and reform the rule of law and justice sector.
- Foster a secure environment for the safe, informed, voluntary, and dignified return, relocation, resettlement or integration into host communities for IDPs and refugees.
- Promptly and effectively engage any actor credibly found to be preparing or engaging in attacks against civilians, IDP camps, UNMISS protection of civilians sites, other United Nations premises and personnel, or international and national humanitarian actors.

**(b) Creating conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance:**

- Coordinate with humanitarian actors to create secure conditions for the delivery of assistance and ensure full, safe and unhindered access to all those in need in South Sudan.
- Ensure the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel, installations, and equipment.

**(c) Supporting the Implementation of the Revitalised Agreement and the Peace Process:**

- Use good offices to support the peace process and implementation of the Revitalised Agreement, including through advice, technical assistance, and coordination with regional actors.
- Assist all parties in the full, effective, and meaningful participation of women, youth, faith groups, and civil society in the peace process and transitional governance structures.

- Participate in and support the work of CTSAMVM, RJMEC, and other implementation mechanisms.
- Use technical assistance to support mechanisms of the Revitalised Agreement.

**(d) Monitoring, investigating, and reporting on violations of humanitarian and human rights law:**

- Monitor, investigate, verify, and report on abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including possible war crimes or crimes against humanity.
- Report specifically on violations and abuses committed against women and children, including sexual and gender-based violence, and accelerate implementation of new mechanisms to monitor, analyze and report on conflict-related sexual violence and abuses against children.
- Monitor, investigate, and report on incidents of hate speech and incitement to violence.
- Work with international, regional, and national mechanisms engaged in monitoring, investigating, and reporting on violations of humanitarian and human rights law.

The total number of personnel in unmiss is 17982 with 2268 being civilians and current budget of 1,201,887,500 US Dollars (unmiss, 2022).

### **2.7.5 Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)**

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which is headquartered in Mogadishu started in February 2007 by the Africa Union with approval from the United Nations. This mission was mandated to protect the Somalia's against the Al-Shabaab warriors. It is the second largest mission in Africa (SIPRI, 2020). AMISOM is described as the AU's longest running, largest, most costly and most deadly operations (Williams, 2018).

Like any peace operations mission, the AMISOM is multidimensional; made up of the military, police and civilian components. However here the civilian component has mission support, political affairs, stabilization and early recovery, protection, human rights and gender as well as security sector reform (amisom-au.org, 2021).

As per the UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) AMISOM is mandated to pursue the following strategic objectives:

- i. Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia;
- ii. Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
- iii. Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia;

Specifically, the following tasks were authorized: maintain presence in the sectors set out in AMISOM, assist the appropriate Somali security forces to protect Somalia, protect personnel, secure key routes, conduct targeted offensive operations, mentor the Somali security forces and reconfigure the security forces.

### **2.7.6 Background of AMISOM**

AMISOM had replaced the IGAD peace support mission in Somalia (IGASOM) which had been an intergovernmental authority on development protection and training mission to Somalia approved by the AU on 14<sup>th</sup> September 2006 and approved by the UN on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2006 IGASOM was hence issued on 6<sup>th</sup> December 2006 and mandated for 6 months (UNSCR-1725,

2006). The UN Security Council authorized the AU to deploy a PO with a mandate of six months however on 20<sup>th</sup> August 2007, the UNSC extended AMISOM deployment for six months. On 31<sup>st</sup> May 2019 the UNSC unanimously approved resolution 2472, authorizing member states of the AU to maintain personnel until 31<sup>st</sup> May 2020 with reduction of the number of troops to 19626 by 28<sup>th</sup> February 2020 (UNSCR1772, 2007).

### **2.7.7 The civilian component of AMISOM**

The Civilian Component of AMISOM was initially located at Mogadishu in May 2011 and supervised by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Africa Union Commission (SRCC) and his deputy. The component is made up of five clusters namely; (1) Mission Support, (2) Political Processes, (3) Stabilisation and Early Recovery, (4) Protection, Human Rights and Gender, and (5) Security Sector Reform. The civilian component tasks included: Effective management of the mission for the implementation of the AMISOM mandate;

- i. Working with all stakeholders to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia;
- ii. Coordinating the efforts of the military and police components in the implementation of the country's National Security and Stabilization Plan;
- iii. Facilitating efforts aimed at overall development and the re-establishment of governance structures, rule of law institutions and the restoration of both physical and social infrastructure in Somalia;
- iv. Providing support to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups as well as security sector reform processes;



- v. Coordinating with partners, including donors and other international actors, humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and services to the Somali people;
- vi. Logistical support to the other Mission components and contracted resources including procurement and budgeting. (amisom, 2021)

### **2.7.8 AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)**

AMISOM on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2022 changed to a transition mission named the Africa Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). It was authorised by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) at the **1068th meeting** on 8 March 2022 and mandated by the United Nations Security Council on 31 March 2022 under Resolution 2628 (2022), with an initial mandate for 12 months. ATMIS as a mission evolved after an exhaustive consultative process between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the African Union (AU), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and other international partners (ATMIS, 2022).

ATMIS has a clear mandate to fully implement the Somali Transition Plan (STP), a strategic plan that details the handover of security responsibilities from the African Union to the Federal Government of Somalia.

Following the 1068<sup>th</sup> Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 8<sup>th</sup> March 2022. At this meeting, the Peace and Security Council, Recalling its previous decisions on the situation in Somalia and on AMISOM post-2021, particularly Communiqués [PSC/PR/COMM.1053(2021)], adopted at its 1053rd meeting held on 7 December, 2021; [PSC/PR/COMM.1042 (2021)] adopted at its 1042nd meeting held on 28 October, 2021 ;

[PSC/PR/COMM. 1037(2021)] adopted at its 1037th meeting held on 7th October, 2021, and Communique [PSC/PR/COMM.2 (CMXCIV)], adopted at its 994th meeting held on 11 May 2021, as well as the Summary Records of its meetings held on 30 August, 2021 and on 30 July 2021, as well as United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2568 (2021).

The PSC decided that ATMIS shall have the following mandate: a. degrade Al Shabaab and other terrorist groups; b. provide security to population centres and open the main supply routes; c. develop the capacity of the Somali Security Forces to enable them to take over security responsibilities by the end of the transition period, that is, December 2024; d. support peace and reconciliation efforts of the FGS; and e. help develop the capacity of the security, justice and local authority institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States. Further details from the communique can be found at

<https://atmis-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/communique-for-the-1068th-meeting-on-atmis-mandate-8-march-2022.pdf> and the UN security council resolution 2628 (2022)

<https://atmis-au.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/atmis-adopted-res-e.pdf>



## CHAPTER THREE

### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

#### 3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the two theories as the theoretical framework underpinning the work. They are the Liberal Peace Theory and the Theory of Functionalism. The chapter traces the proponents, origin, assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of these theories as well as the development of the two theories. Also it draws the relevance of each the liberal peace theory to the study and complementing it with the functional theory due to the criticisms and shortcomings of the former while ensuring the proper grounding of this work.

#### 3.2 The Liberal Peace Theory

The 'Liberal peace' theories postulates that there is a high tendency for domestic and international peace to happen when the highest majority of individuals in a society have control over political and economic decisions. This theory is a paradigm closely linked to liberal democratic peace theory which focuses on peace within states and argues that democracies do not go to war with each other (Miklian, 2014). It is appropriate to first discuss Kant's democratic peace theory within which the foundation for the Liberal Peace theory is set.

##### 3.2.1 The origin and proponents of the Liberal Peace Theory

The basic principles of the Liberal Peace concept originated from the works of the German Philosopher and Political Theorist Immanuel Kant and, Thomas Paine as early as 1700 and adapted by the 1832 Manroe Doctrine (Longley, 2019). The theory has since been subjected to rigorous studies in recent times. Kant had a penchant for civil liberties and rule of law as domestic solutions

for peace and believed that if no meaningful peace can ever be achieved, then hostilities eventually could become a war of extermination, resulting in a perpetual peace in the “graveyard of humanity as a whole. Such a war must absolutely be prevented and all the means that lead to it (Doyle, 2005). Kant developed a political philosophy of republic that holds a condition for peace that rests on three essential ideas: the protection of individual freedoms (liberalism), the rule of law and legal equality (constitutionalism), and representative rule (as embodied, for example, in modern democracy). A closer look into Kant’s major political works reveals that peaceful relations are expected from states with the protection of individual freedoms (liberalism), the rule of law and legal equality (constitutionalism), and representative government (democracy). Only when all three constitutive elements are jointly considered can we uncover the multifaceted nature of Kant’s approach to the domestic sources of international peace (Danilovic & Clare, 2007). His attempt was to devise a political system that would protect human freedom at every level of interaction (Ellis, 2005, p.13). This noble notion has received increased attention among political theorists in recent times (Ellis, 2005; Riley, 1983; Rosen, 1993; Williams, 1983).

Kant’s democratic peace theory had many variations and it was a foundational philosophy behind the creation of the League of Nations (LN), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU); and it continues today under the guise of the ‘liberal peace’ debate. Much recent scholarship has focused on the apparent absence of war among liberal democratic states - the liberal peace. To help explain the phenomenon, many refer to the political writings of Immanuel Kant, and the central role he envisioned for the liberal republic as the foundation for perpetual peace which happens to be the ultimate aim of peace operations by the UN and AU.

The 'liberal peace', on the other hand, was coined by Michael Doyle in 1983. Doyle was one of the first scholars to put the truism of the democratic peace theory to an empirical test, analyzing all interstate wars back to 1816 (Miklian, 2014). He found that no two liberal democracies had ever gone to war against each other. The finding became a lightning rod for both scholars and Western policymakers who fought for the promotion of democracy over authoritarian rule, arguing that a more peaceful world would result (Oliver, 2009). Doyle (1983) initially studied and later emphasized that the liberal aspects in Kant's theory and provided a more detailed theoretical analysis of the link between liberal republicanism and peace. Doyle (2005) correctly observed that the liberal elements of Kant's republican idea as a prerequisite for peace.

### **3.2.2 Arguments and assumptions of the liberal peace theory**

In the interest of the twin theories, I will discuss the four main strands of thought within the liberal peace framework, influenced by the key antecedents of, and debates in, international theory which provide understanding for contemporary thinking about peace. These four strands are the Victor's Peace, the Institutional Peace, the Constitutional Peace, and the Civil Peace (Oliver, 2009).

#### **a. Strand one**

The victor's peace has evolved from the age-old realist argument that a peace that rests on a military victory and upon the hegemony or domination of a victor. The perspective of the victor's peace is that peace is more likely to survive when it is established this way. In its extreme forms, this can be seen as a Carthaginian peace and the only way of containing both Hobbesian anarchy and the profligacy of human nature. The victor's peace framework has been subjected to the hamartia of territorial and strategic over-extension, greed, and an inability to control unruly subjects despite its imposition qualities (Oliver, 2009).

**b. strand two**

The institutional peace rests upon idealist, liberal-internationalist view. They attempt to anchor states within a normative and legal context in which states multilaterally agree how to behave and how to enforce or determine their behavior. It can be traced from the Treaty of Westphalia through to the founding of the UN and beyond. The institutional peace discourse is subject to many discordant voices and issues, and the enormity of its systemic project, which requires the consent of a broad range of actors. Its development and implementation has drawn the UN system, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), and agencies into the quagmire of multilateral governance in an international milieu where states jealously protect their priori sovereignty. It has struggled to create consensus or to communicate with those involved at the civil level, or to receive and respond to feedback on its overall systemic project (Oliver, 2009).

**c. Strand three**

The constitutional peace rests upon the liberal Kantian argument that peace rests upon democracy, free trade, and a set of cosmopolitan values that stem from the notion that individuals are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end. This became a common refrain spanning many European Peace projects of the medieval period, through to Versailles in 1919, and on into the post-Cold War period. All of these three strands have been influential across the scope of the first and second ‘Great Debates’ of IR. The constitutional peace is a challenge to those who do not want to share power in domestic constitutional situations, and who do not want the certainty of domestic legal structures that might outlaw their activities. It struggles to overcome the simple binaries. It depends upon the territorial inside/outside, and the identity of friend or enemy (Oliver, 2009).

**d. Strand four**

The final strand identifiable is that of the civil peace. This is something of an anomaly in thinking about peace because it requires individual agency, rather than state, multilateral. The civil peace is derived from the phenomena of direct action of citizen advocacy and mobilization from the attainment or defence of basic human rights and values, spanning the ending of the slave trade to the inclusion of civil society in IR today. It is derived from liberal thinking on individualism and rights, and has been taken up by more recent constructivist, critical and post-structural thinking on the problem of hegemony and domination, identity, particularism and pluralism, as well as the need for human security and justice beyond the states-system (Oliver, 2009).

### **3.2.3 Criticisms, strengths and weaknesses of the liberal peace theory**

These aspects of the liberal peace are both contradictory and complimentary, and each brings with it a certain intellectual and empirical baggage. Some important questions arising from these different components of the liberal peace and the problems they raise. How does one emancipate without dominating, without ignoring difference, without knowing the mind of the other? How do these different discourses interweave, play themselves out, and communicate with each other, without competing, dominating or negating each other? How can those who 'know' peace talks to those who do not? So arise the question of the nature of peace, and of how it is to be achieved. The fact that peace is so rarely openly conceptualized and explicitly defined in much international discourse other than in negative terms is, in the light of the above, the problem of peace.

The liberal peace theory is a theory of democratic peace theory proposed by Kant. It seeks to address the constituent elements of democracy as necessary tools and guide for the solution to 'perpetual peace' in the world. It forcefully rests on liberalism, constitutionalism and the tenets of democracy. The appropriateness of this theory to the study is grounded in the fact that the liberal



peace theory perfectly aligns with the adopted approach of peace brokers in the international system. The undertone of all peacekeeping exploit by UN has explicitly expressed goal of achieving democracy in the world since democracies do not go to war against one another.

The 'liberal peace' theory does not go uncriticized. According to Oliver (2007) liberal peace is undergoing a crisis of legitimacy at the level of the everyday in post-conflict environments. In many such environments; different groups often locally constituted, perceive it to be ethically bankrupt, subject to double standards, coercive and conditional, acultural, unconcerned with social welfare, and unfeeling and insensitive towards its subjects. He also believes that the liberal peace theory is tied to Western and liberal conceptions of the state, to institutions, and not to the local. Its post-Cold War moral capital, based upon its more emancipatory rather than conservative claims, has been squandered as a result, and its basic goal of a liberal social contract undermined (Oliver, 2009).

### **3.3 Justification for a Second Theory**

The weaknesses of the liberal peace theory, makes it difficult to use only this for the entire study, especially for the fact that the UN gleans to a different approach for PSO which is generally peacekeeping whereas the AU and ECOWAS gleans to peace enforcement. Both approaches in themselves not addressing the component functions of the civilians.

The functionalism theory fills the gab by the very assumption of it addressing conflict as a social instability but also seeing society as a system structurally consisting of various integrated parts; with each part fulfilling a specific role and contributing to the whole (Widdison & Delany, 2000).



This directly speaks to peacekeeping in a multidimensional nature with the civilian component as a social structure within the solution of peacekeeping.

### **3.4 The Theory of Functionalism**

The study deploys the theory of functionalism to complement the Liberal Peace theory and strengthen the conceptualized base of the work.

#### **3.4.1 Origin and proponents of the Functionalism theory**

The functionalist perspective or functionalism has its origins in the works of Emile Durkheim, who was especially interested in how social order is possible or how society remains relatively stable. As such, it is a theory that focuses on the macro-level of social structure, rather than the micro-level of everyday life. Notable theorists include Herbert Spencer, Talcott Parsons, and Robert K. Merton (Crossman, 2020). Functionalism posits that society is more than the sum of its parts; rather, each aspect of it works for the stability of the whole.

Durkheim envisioned society as an organism since each component plays a necessary role but can't function alone (Crossman, 2020). Functionalism looks at groups and the values and norms that govern them as the driving force behind every society working the way it does. Like in peacekeeping, the multidimensional approach is found to be an effective driving force in peace operations for it embraces the underlying concept of functionalism as a paradigm for peace operations as you have the different components and functionalities working together for peace.

The concept of functionalism is one of the major theories that sociologists apply in the study of social problems such as conflict, peacekeeping and social instability. The central perspective of functionalism is that society is a social system structurally consisting of various integrated parts: tangible and intangible. It is to say that, as a system, it tends to have interacting, interlocking and intersecting parts. In the opinion of the functionalists, each of the parts that compose the system fulfils a specific role contributing to the overall health and functioning of a given society, system or body. This way, in a well-integrated system, each part is undoubtedly contributing to the stability of the whole (Widdison & Delaney, 2000). In other words, any time a part becomes non-functional, the society is bound to suffer and that social cohesion and stability are disrupted.

### **3.4.2 Assumptions of Functionalism**

Pope defines a functionalist as one who (1) views society as a whole composed of interrelated parts, (2) assumes a tendency toward system equilibrium, (3) considers how society or the social order is possible and, hence, (4) views structures in terms of their contributions to the perpetuation or evolutionary development of society, and finally, (5) sees pervasive commonalities or consensus as the ultimate basis of social order (Pope, 1975, p. 361). In other words, like the body of a human being, made up of many organs and parts, playing different roles for general function and health of the entire body. It is this that provides the functionality of society.

Durkheim gave a meaning to the term function. According to Pope, the meaning Durkheim ascribed to function is restricted or circumscribed in meaning. In the opinion of Pope, the term function should at least connote such variables as 'results' or 'effects'. In contrast, Durkheim declined on the grounds that terms like results and effects imply no idea of correspondence and

the needs of society. Rather, he preferred to argue that parts, as they constitute the whole must act in merit, that is, join with other parts in maintaining general life of the society, system, or body (Pope, 1975). It is to be explained, therefore, that function in its true sense must meet social needs wherever it occurs.

Pope recapped Durkheim as saying that society as a whole composed of interrelated parts. The whole and a part (or parts), a part and the whole, and one part and another part have to be seen as interdependent. However, the whole must be given priority, because its influence is greater than that of a single part. Parts vary according to the nature of the whole in which they are located. To view them apart from their context is to 'fail to discern their natures, for they will seem to be distinct realities, each with its independent existence, whereas they are actually parts of a whole' (Pope, 1975, p. 362). This is juxtaposed against multidimensional or contemporary peace operations which has the military, the police and the civilian components working together to achieve a mission mandate together. With each component depending on each other as their functions interlace though each component is in itself independent, having its own command and control as well as SOPs.

Pope discusses Durkheim's propensity to view social institutions in terms of positive functions that may be traced to basic conceptualizations that embody fundamental assumptions. He cites Durkheim as saying, 'Social life is above all a harmonious community of endeavours, when minds and will come together to work for the same aim' (Durkheim, 1960, p.338, cited: Pope, 1975, p. 363).

In the writing of Pope, functionalism ‘is more pervasive in the Division of Labour’ and that function of a social fact consists of the production of socially useful effects. For example, ‘the military, industry, the family and the public have social functions, since they have for their respective objects the defence, nurture, and the assurance of renewal and continuity of society’ (Pope, 1975, p. 364).

Functionalism interprets each part of society in terms of how it contributes to the stability of the whole society. For example, the government, or state, provides education for the children of the family, which in turn pays taxes on which the state depends to keep itself running. The family is dependent upon the school to help children grow up to have good jobs so that they can raise and support their own families. In the process, the children become law-abiding, taxpaying citizens, who in turn support the state. If all goes well, the parts of society produce order, stability, and productivity. If all does not go well, the parts of society then must adapt to recapture a new order, stability, and productivity. Functionalism emphasizes the consensus and order that exist in society, focusing on social stability and shared public value.

### **3.4.3 Criticism of Functionalism**

Functionalism has been criticized for downplaying the role of individual action, and for being unable to account for social change. In the functionalist perspective, society and its institutions are the primary units of analysis. Individuals are significant only in terms of their places within social systems (i.e., social status and position in patterns of social relations). Some critics also take issue with functionalism’s tendency to attribute needs to society. They point out that, unlike human beings, society does not have needs; society is only alive in the sense that it is made up of living

individuals. By downplaying the role of individuals, functionalism is less likely to recognize how individual actions may alter social institutions.

Critics also argue that functionalism is unable to explain social change because it focuses so intently on social order and equilibrium in society. Following functionalist logic, if a social institution exists, it must serve a function. Institutions, however, change over time; some disappear and others come into being. The focus of functionalism on elements of social life in relation to their present function, and not their past functions, makes it difficult to use functionalism to explain why a function of some element of society might change, or how such change occurs.

***What are the critiques discussed for the Structural-Functional theory?***

- “Social stratification systems function to limit the possibility of discovery of the full range of talent available in a society. This results from the fact of unequal access to appropriate motivation, channels of recruitment and centers of training.
- In foreshortening the range of available talent, social stratification systems function to set limits upon the possibility of expanding the productive resources of the society, at least relative to what might be the case under conditions of greater equality of opportunity.
- Social stratification systems function to provide the elite with the political power necessary to procure acceptance and dominance of an ideology which rationalizes the status quo, whatever it may be as “logical”, “natural”, and “morally right”.

In this manner social stratification systems function as essentially conservative influences in the societies in which they are found.

- Social stratification systems function to distribute favorable self-image unequally throughout a population. To the extent that such favorable self- images are requisite to the

development of the creative potential inherent in men, to that extent stratification systems function to limit the development of this creative potential.

- To the extent that inequalities in social reward cannot be made fully acceptable to the less privileged in a society, social stratification systems function to encourage hostility, suspicion and distrust among the various segments of a society and thus to limit the possibilities of extensive social integration.

### ***How social Stratification can be dysfunctional***

- Ralf Dahrendorf was also one of the major critics of functional theory. Ralf Dahrendorf observes that stratification originates from the closely related trinity of norms, sanction and power.
- Similarly, rigidity of caste system cannot be explained through functional theories of Davis and Moore and others.
- Further, elite recruitment theory proves that elite gobble up all the rewards and perpetuate the elite rule.
- Beck and Baudrillard also visualise that such functional stratification is no longer valid as inequalities are now individualised and no clear strata exists today.
- According to Alvin Gouldner, stratification is not inevitable as Davis and Moore predicted and he criticises them for providing a justification for social inequalities.

***Why Structure-functionalist theories suffer from illegitimate teleologies as a big logical problem?***

- According to Jonathan Turner – ‘Structure-functionalist theories suffer from illegitimate teleologies as a big logical problem’. They often take cause for effects and vice-versa, for example, if you ask them which positions are more important? They will say the one which are rewarded the most. When you ask them why are they rewarded the most? They will say that because they are functionally more important.

### **3.5 Research Questions**

Based on our theory the following questions will guide the research:

- i. In which context are UN and AU PSOs deployed in Africa?
- ii. How are the UN and AU peace operations missions in Africa structured and composed?
- iii. How does the roles of the civilian component contribute to the achievement of the mission mandate in the UN and AU multidimensional peace operations?
- iv. How does the civilian component collaborate with the other mission components in the implementation of UN and AU multidimensional peace operations mandate?
- v. Under what conditions can UN and AU multidimensional mission be described as successful and ready for exit?

### **3.6 Indicators of Mission Success**


According to the UN Charter (1945) and the AU constitutive Act, (2000), the contemporary peace operations also known as multidimensional peace operations are based on the principles of legitimacy, credibility, impartiality, use of force and international humanitarian law (IHL) / international human rights law (IHRL) compliance consider the following as critical mission success factors according to the AU i. Understanding the Context of the conflict ii. Matching

Resources to Mandate iii. Financing iv. Force/Capabilities v. Training. Vi. Flexibility and Adaptability vii. Coordination, Collaboration, and Unity of effort viii. Transition and Exit Strategy, all together determine how successfully the mission mandate can be executed.

Therefore, if any mission's needs to these factors they will succeed. Based on these factors the study will use five of them as indicators against which the civilian component contribution to PSO success in Africa will be measures.

- i. Understanding the context of conflict and matching available resources for mandate achievement,
- ii. Financing the various components especially civilian
- iii. Component Capability,
- iii. Coordination and collaboration.
- iv. unity of efforts and
- v. Transition and exit strategy.

To aid this research, questions emanating from the theoretical framework as well as the indicators for a successful mission will be used as measuring models for mission success and the role played by civilians in peace operations.





## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **4.0 Introduction**

A methodology is a systematic way of solving research problem whereas a method is a set of procedures and techniques for gathering and analysing data (Straus & Corbin, 1998). It is the logic of how a scholar arrives at a valid and reliable knowledge. In other words, it is the strategy employed in the collection of data or evidence for analyses to uncover new information or arrive at a better understanding of a particular topic (Jeff, 2021). This chapter encompasses the research methodology, research instruments and methods of data analyses. This research will adopt the exploratory approach.

#### **4.1 Philosophical Assumptions**

This session is a detailed discussion of the philosophical assumptions underpinning this study. It covers definitions and explanations of philosophies and paradigms used by social science researchers and how this thesis is philosophically contextualised. Every research is backed by philosophical assumptions or paradigms and different researchers use different ones. (Wambugu, 2021) defines philosophy as the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence whereas Sanders (2015) sees it as a system of beliefs and assumptions about the development of knowledge. Therefore, research philosophy is the development of knowledge in answering the research problem, it is that which guides the researcher in answering the research problem. There are different research philosophies used by different researchers, however, social science researchers use four main ones namely: ontology (the nature of reality), epistemology (the nature of knowledge), and axiology (the nature of values) and methodology (knowledge-data gathering)

according to Wambugu (2021). These philosophical assumptions culminate into what we call paradigms which guide the researcher in answering the research problems (Creswell, 1998). According to Guba & Lincoln (1994), there are four main paradigms in social science research, and these are positivism, post-positivism, constructivism and pragmatism. This study uses Pragmatism as according to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. 713) pragmatism is “a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ and instead focuses on ‘what works’ as the truth” regarding a phenomenon under investigation. Pragmatism arises out of situations, actions and consequences rather than mere antecedent conditions (Creswell, 2014). Pragmatism rejects the strictly qualitative or quantitative methods associated with the paradigm wars and instead calls for the use of mixed methods in research (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). This paradigm is rooted in the pluralistic view of things to enable the researcher to draw liberally from both quantitative and qualitative methods and their associated procedures (Creswell, 2014).

#### **4.2 Research Design**

A research design generally refers to the plan, structure and execution of a study. Durrheim (2006) describes research design as a framework for action serving as a bridge between research questions and the execution of the research. According to him they are plans that guide the arrangement of conditions for collecting and analyzing data (Durrheim, 2006). This research will adopt a mixed method in order to use diverse approaches for data collection and analyses aimed at substantiating the civilian function in PSO (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Combining qualitative (describes and infers) and quantitative (using figures for analyses) from data gathered. It will also help reject incompatibility of the study. Both quantitative and qualitative analyses will be used and it will employ a comparative study approach by comparing the functions/roles of the civilian component

both at the UN and AU levels. Data on two major missions, one each from the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU Africa Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Comparing the individual civilian substantive functions /roles in the mission's bench marked against mission success indicators.

#### **4.3 Research Method**

A research method is a set of procedures and techniques for gathering and analysing data (Straus & Corbin 1998). It is the logic of how a scholar arrives at a valid and reliable knowledge. In other words, it is the strategy employed in the collection of data or evidence for analyses to uncover new information or arrive at a better understanding of a particular topic (Jeff, 2021). According to him, a research method is the tool used in carrying out the research. This study will use survey method where a questionnaire will be used as data collection instrument.

#### **4.4 Study Population**

Pritha Bhandari defined population as the entire group that you want to draw your conclusion about (Bhandari, 2020). According to her, 'population can also mean a group containing elements of anything you want to study such as objects, events, organisations, countries, species, organisms, etc.' The population for this study is two major peace operations missions in Africa. Specifically, civilian component from the UN mission is South Sudan (UNMISS) and the AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Aside the civilian staff of these missions, the Military and Police personnel; researchers, academics and the deploying authorities of UN/AU will also be part of the study population. Then the deploying authorities will also be interviewed. At least all the substantive and support functions of the civilian component will be given questionnaire to complete, whereas

their military and police counterpart will also be respondents for purposes of confirmation of facts and figures.

#### **4.5 Sampling Method**

A sample is the specific group that you will collect data from. Here the size is always smaller than the population (Bhandari, 2020). This study uses both probability and non-probability sampling techniques due to the mixed method employed. These include simple random sampling, stratified sampling, purposive sampling techniques due to the different (strategic, operational and tactical) levels of civilian staff in the selected missions. The contact building strategy was done through existing alumni of the KAIPTC and ASC-Roster network. As a former course director who had trained a lot of mission staffs across the continent and a member of the African Standby Capacity-Roster team and a member/civilian representative of the African Standby Force (ASF) I used my contacts in the two organizations to reach out to the identified civilian contacts in the selected missions and appropriate officers will be given questionnaire to complete while their supervisors were interviewed for more information and confirmation where necessary. The Chief of mission staff were contacted and permission was sorted to access respondents. Approval procedures were rather long and rigorous.

#### **4.6 Data Collection Instruments**

Primary data was collected with the use of a questionnaire and an interview guide while secondary data was gathered from existing documents. The interview guide was useful as it helped the researcher ask follow up questions that were not catered for by the questionnaire (Harvey, 2011).

Section A of the questionnaire covered the demographic profile of the respondents. There were five questions seeking information on age, gender, marital status, Nationality, academic qualifications, mission components, function (substantive or support), and length of stay in the mission.

Section B of the questionnaire examined respondents' knowledge of the context of the conflict and mission resourcing. Here, the questions sort information on respondents' knowledge of the courses of conflict, operation environment, how the mission was resourced, reasons for mandating these missions, and their specific roles in the mission here, the study sort to determine how the individual expertise contributed to the mission success and how these roles impact the community/country of operation. Section C concentrated on exit strategy and sustainability of peace after the mission exits. Here the questions covered exit teams and strategy as well as some challenges encountered.

#### **4.7 Data Collection Procedure**

Initial contacts were made through the KAIPTC alumni and the ASF network to the two missions. Discussions on phone and emails were used to get appointments with the people suggested by my contacts and then a visit was made to the ECOWAS Commission in April 2022 for discussions with the Head, Peace, and Security Operations Department (PSOD), Head of Civilian Component and the Africa Standby Capacity-Rostering officer as well as the acting head of AU PSOD, a UN advisor and a former staff of AMISOM/ATMIS who happened to be in Abuja too. These and initial discussions clarified that I could only get data from the global-UN, and continental-AU but not the Regional ECOWAS because only the UN and AU had deployed civilian components in a multidimensional operation. Further referrals were made to the global and continental bodies for approval and subsequent data collection from the determined civilians.

The twenty-five questions were computed into a monkey survey software for quick and easy data gathering as well as timely analyses. These questionnaires were to be completed by at least forty-four from each mission. Where the distribution was mainly to civilian components but also to a few police and military components for triangulation purposes. Two each from all the twenty civilian substantive and support functions, two each of military and police components were targeted to complete the survey as well as three mandating authorities from global, continental and, regional levels.

Due to visa challenges the trip to UNMISS could not happen so only the survey link was shared for them to complete questionnaires electronically. However, a trip was made to ATMIS in Mogadishu-Somalia where data was collected from all targeted staff over a period of one week and link shared with those out on vacation.

#### **4.8 Data Analysis**


The data collected was analysed with the monkey survey software. A tri-section questionnaire was designed and personally administered in each of these 2 missions electronically and physically. Descriptive statistics including frequency counts, percentages, cross tabulations and multiple responses were used to analyse, describe and interpret the gathered data. Frequency counts and the percentages were employed to present the age, marital status, academic qualifications of the respondents. Simple bar charts, pie charts, and line graphs will be used to illustrate the kinds of substantive and support functions of the civilians. Descriptive percentages were used to illustrate their responses.

#### **4.9 Ethical Considerations**

First of all, ethical clearance was sort from the University of Ghana Ethical Committee. Secondly, clearance was also sorted from the UNMISS and ATMIS before access was granted to their mission staff, and then informed consent was sort from all respondents. Confidentiality was assured and strictly adhered to while anonymity guided the use of information gathered.


##### **4.9.1 Justification for the two choice of missions selected**

This aspect of the study uses case study approach. Greene (2003) perceives a case study as an intensive study of a single group, incident, or community. They provide a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data and analysing information and reporting the results. This study sets out to collate the various contributions made by the civilians from the global to the regional level of missions in theatre by the UN, AU and ECOWAS. Incidentally the ECOWAS has not got a civilian component mission currently and so only the UN and the AU missions which happen to be the largest on the continent will be used. The latest mission ratings by SIPRI below shows that AMISOM and UNMISS are the largest UN and AU ones there are (SIPRI, 2020).





## LARGEST MULTILATERAL PEACE OPERATIONS AS OF 31 DEC. 2019



AMISOM = African Union (AU) Mission in Somalia; UNMISS = United Nations Mission in South Sudan; RSM = Resolute Support Mission; MONUSCO = UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; MINUSMA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINUSCA = UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; UNIFIL = UN Interim Force in Lebanon; UNAMID = UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNISFA = UN Interim Security Force for Abyei; KFOR = Kosovo Force

Source: SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, 27 May 2020.

[www.sipri.org](http://www.sipri.org)  
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## CHAPTER FIVE

### PRESENTATION OF DATA AND ANALYSES

#### 5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and analyses the interviews and data collected from the field. A total of one hundred and twenty-eight (128) mission staff completed the questionnaires from the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMIS) and Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) now Africa Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) as well as four (4) mandating authorities from the AU and ECOWAS and five (5) supervisors from ATMIS were interviewed. The data from the survey and interview are presented in this chapter based on the three broad thematic areas of the questionnaire and interview guide designed. They included section one which covered demographic and background information, section two for conflict context and mission resourcing, whereas section three covered exit strategy as well as state restoration measures or what is commonly known as sustainability strategy. Whiles the interview guide covered the actual contributions made in the host countries and some major challenges encountered.

The chapter specifically follows the chronology used in building the questionnaire, thus the research objectives of the study, the theoretical background of the study, research questions and the indicators of mission success defined by the United Nation and the Africa Union and discussed in chapter four. (i) Demographic and background of the study respondents, (ii) conflict context, civilian roles and mission resourcing (iii) reasons for authorizing these missions and (iv) exist strategy as well as major achievements and challenges gathered from the interviews.


## 5.1 Demographic And Background Information Of Study Respondents

This section presents the demographic information of the respondents, covering age, gender, marital status, nationality, educational qualification, staff function/role and their mission component (military/police/civilian).

### 5.1.1 Age distribution

This section presents the ages of respondents, all 128 answered, representing (100%) response rate.

Figure 5. 1 : Age distribution of respondents



**Source: Field data, 2022**


The figure above presents the age distribution of the 128 respondents, showing the following age distribution: None of the respondents fell within the age group 18-30, representing 0 (0%). In age group 31-40, there were 33 respondents representing (25.78%). Then in age group 41-50 there were 59 respondents representing (46.09%). Those in age group 51-60 were 35 representing

(27.34%) and respondents above 60 was 1 representing (0.78%). From the table above and the figure below, mission staff fell between the ages 30 and 60.

### 5.1.2 Gender Distribution

This section looks at the gender variation of the respondents. Here 127 out of the 128 respondents answered this question and one person did not answer, representing 99.22% response rate.

Figure 5. 2 : Gender Distribution




**Source: field data, 2022**

The figure above (5.2) shows the male gender dominance of the peace and security industry. Out of the 127 respondents who answered this question. There were 84 male respondents, representing (65.63%). Followed by 43 respondents who were females, representing (33.59%). There was no respondent for other gender, representing (0.00%) and one none respondent, representing (0.78%).

### 5.1.3 Marital status of respondents

This section presents the social status of the respondents. Here there were 127 answers out the 128 respondents representing (99.22%) of response rate and one non response representing (0.78%).

Figure 5. 3 : Marital Status of Respondents




**Source: Field data, 2022**

This section the marital status of the respondents. As shown by figure 5.3, 19 respondents representing (14.96%) are single, 101 representing (79.53%) are married, 6 respondents representing (4.72%) are divorced and 1 (0.79%) is widowed.

### 5.1.4 Educational qualification of respondents

This presents the highest educational level attained by the respondents. Here all 128 respondents answered, representing 100% response rate.

Figure 5.4 : Educational Backgrounds of Respondents



Source: Field data, 2022


Figure 5.4 shows that in terms of education, everyone working in the mission has a formal education and were of different levels. There was no one without formal education, representing (0.00%). For the educated, there was only one (1) person with Basic education, representing (0.78%), followed by 21 who had Secondary education, representing (16.41%) and 106 had tertiary education, representing (82.81%). This implies that majority of the respondents were educated.

### 5.1.5 Component representation of respondents

As mentioned in the literature review that contemporary peace operations is now multidimensional where military, police and civilians work together for a common goal, the questionnaire though meant mainly for the civilian components also added some military and police for purposes of

triangulation and also show component perception as far PSO is concerned. This section therefore shows the percentage of the various component participation in the survey. All 128 responded representing 100% response rate for this question.

Figure 5. 5 : Component distribution of respondents




**Source: field data, 2022**

This section depicts the component of the respondents. Here figure 5.5 shows that the highest respondents were civilian component with 72 responses, representing (56.25%), followed by police components with 41 responses, representing (32.03%) and the military with 15 responses, representing (11.72%)

### 5.1.6 Peace operations mission representation of respondents

There were two missions and 4 authorising officials to respond to this question and all 128 respondents answered representing 100% of response rate.

Figure 5. 6 : Mission/Organisation representation



**Source: Field data, 2022**

This section represents the missions which respondents belong to. Here the United Nations Mission in South Sudan had the highest response rate with 76 representing (59.38%), followed by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia with 50 responses, representing (39.06%), then, one mandating authority and one Training Centre of Excellence (TCE) with each representing 0.78% respectively.

### 5.1.7 Mission function or roles of the respondents

This section presents the substantive or support functions performed by the individual respondents, depicting the actual role played in the mission and by extension the effect on the host nation. Here some mission staff plays more than one role, especially with the ATMIS where they are understaffed due to the current peculiar situation of changing from a regular to a transition team. Here out of the 128 respondents, 116 answered this question representing (87.50%) and 12 non-responses, representing (12.50%). The table below shows the various responses provided.

Table 5. 1 : Functions/Roles of respondents

ANSWER CHOICES	PERCENTAGE	NUMBER OF RESPONSES
Political affairs	18.97%	22
Legal affairs	9.48%	11
Planning and coordination	37.93%	44
Public information	12.07%	14
Humanitarian liaison	18.10%	21
Human rights	27.59%	32
Gender	21.55%	25
Child protection	24.14%	28
Conduct and discipline	16.38%	19
Rule of law	25.00%	29
Electorate affairs	7.76%	9
DDR/SSR/Civil affairs	8.62%	10
Human resources	7.76%	9
Financial	5.17%	6
Procurement	6.90%	8
Logistics	12.07%	14




Engineering		4.31%	5
Geographic Information Service (GIS)		5.17%	6
Integrated training service		14.66%	17
Contingency owned equipment security		9.48%	11
TOTAL			340

**Source: Field data, 2022**

Table 5.1 shows the twenty substantive and support functions typically played by the civilian component in the two missions. Here some civilians play multiple roles therefore some responded for more than one thereby resulting in 340 responses for this question, showing the following: there were 22 responses for political affairs, representing (18.97%). Legal affairs with 11 responses, representing (9.48%). Planning and coordination 44, representing (37.93%). Public information 14 responses, representing (12.07%). Humanitarian liaison with 21 responses, representing (18.10%). Human rights with 32 responses representing (27.59%). Gender with 25 responses, representing (21.55%). For child protection there were 28 responses, representing (24.14%). For conduct and discipline there were 19 responses, representing (16.38%). For rule of law there were 29 responses, representing (25.00%). For electorate affairs there were 9 responses, representing (7.76%). For the DDR/SSR/Civil affairs there were 10 responses representing (8.62%) for human resources there were 9 responses, representing (7.76%). For financial there were 6 responses, representing (5.17%). For procurement there were 8 responses, representing

(6.90%). For logistics there were 14 responses, representing (12.07%). For the engineering role there were 5 responses, representing (4.31%). For geographic information services (GIS) there were 6 responses, representing (5.17%). For training there were 17 responses, representing (14.66%). For contingency owned equipment and security, there were 11 responses representing (9.48%).

Figure 5. 7 : Civilian Component Function distribution



### 5.1.8 Nationalities of respondents

This section is the nationalities of the respondents. There were thirty-two nationalities responding.




Table 5. 2 : Nationalities of respondents

<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Numbers</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
1. Bangladesh	1	
2. Brazil	1	
3. Burundi	2	
4. Canada	1	
5. Congo	1	
6. Eswatini	1	
7. Gambia	2	
8. Ghana	23	
9. Guatemala	1	
10. India	1	
11. Ireland	1	
12. Ivorian	4	
13. Kenya	12	
14. Lesotho	4	
15. Liberia	3	
16. Malawi	2	
17. Nepal	1	
18. Nigeria	10	
19. Romanian	1	
20. Russia	4	
21. Rwanda	3	

22. Sierra Leone	6	
23. South Sudan	9	
24. Sri Lanka	1	
25. Sudan	1	
26. Sweden	1	
27. Switzerland	2	
28. Tanzania	2	
29. Togo	1	
30. Uganda	6	
31. Zambia	3	
32. Zimbabwe	9	
33. No response	9	5.65%
<b>34. Total response</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>94.35%</b>


Source: Field data, 2022

The 128 respondents who answered survey came from 32 different countries across the world. 119 of them responded to this question representing 94.35% of response rate and 5.65% non-response. The 32 different countries nationals depict the diverse nature of peace operations another aspect of multidimensionality.

### 5.1.9 Length of service in the mission of respondents

This section presents how long the respondents had been working in the mission as this influences their knowledge and appreciation of the issues in the conflict or mission area.

Figure 5. 8 : Length of service in the mission area



**Source: Field data, 2022**

All 128 responded to this question giving 100% response rate. The highest number of 51 respondents, representing (39.84%) had been in the mission for over five years. 24 respondents, representing (18.75%) had been in the mission 4-5 years. Followed by 19 respondents representing (14.84%) had been there 1 to 2 years and 0 to 6 months respectively. With the lowest number 15 respondents representing (11.72%) being in the mission 3 to 4 years.


## **5.2 Conflict Context, Civilian Roles, And Mission Resourcing**

This section presents the context of the conflict situation and how the mission is financed, the hostility level and actual civilians' roles which helps restoration in South Sudan and Somalia. Here people could choose more than one opinion and had the opportunity to add what was not provided.

### 5.2.1 Source of conflict in the mission area

Out of the 128 attempted responses received, 116 representing (90.63%) answered this question, and 12 representing 9.37% non-response. However, this session allowed more than one response and opportunity to add what was not added. As a result, a total of responses given were 235

Figure 5. 9 : Source of conflict



Source: field data, 2022

Figure 5.9 shows that highest source was given to be ethnic marginalization with 86 representing 74.14% followed by scarce resources with 41 responses representing 35.34% and the least being election-related with 23 responses representing 19.83%. however, aside from the options provided, 47 respondents representing 40.52% of the respondents added their own sources of conflict, stating insurgency and terrorism as sources of conflict.

### 5.2.2 Respondent understanding of conflict context


Respondents were asked how well they understood the context of the conflict in their mission area and 117 out of 128 responded, representing (91.41%) response rate and shown by the stars.

Figure 5. 10. : Conflict context



Source: Field data, 2022

Figure 5. 11 : Conflict context




Source: Field data, 2022

Figure 5.11 shows that 22 responses representing 18.80% had an excellent understanding of the conflict situation in the mission, 55 responses representing 47.01% had a very good understanding, 32 responses representing 27.35% with a good understanding, 7 responses representing 5.98% had a fair understanding one response representing 0.85% had a poor understanding of the context.

### 5.2.3 Nature of mission environment

There was also a question to find out the nature of the environment respondents operated in, as to whether it was hostile, semi-hostile, normal, or don't know. environment. 116 out of the 128 responded to this question representing 90.63% response rate.

Figure 5. 12 : Nature of mission environment



Source: field data, 2022


Figure 5.12 shows 52 respondents representing 44.83% described the environment as hostile, 40 respondents representing 34.48% described the environment as semi-hostile whereas 3 respondents representing 2.59% found the environment normal with the remaining 3 respondents representing 2.59% not knowing how to describe the environment. On the whole the largest respondents found the environment hostile or semi hostile.



### 5.2.4 Mission resourcing

According to the UN and AU, part of mission success indicators is the availability of resources. The questionnaire enquired who resourced the mission. Here 168 responses were given as there was the opportunity to choose more than one option. A total of 106 out of 128 answered this question, representing 82.81% response rate. The UN is the highest funder of both missions.

Figure 5. 13 : Source of mission resources




**Source: field data, 2022**

Figure 5.13 shows that out of the responses given, the highest being 91 respondents and representing 85.85% said that the UN provided resources for the mission. 42 respondents representing 39.62% said the mission was resourced by partners, 30 respondents representing 28.30% said the AU resourced the mission where-as 5 respondents representing 4.72% said host nation resourced the mission. This implies that both missions are resourced and the resources were provided by more than one organization especially in the case of AMISOM/ATMIS.

### 5.2.5 Availability of resources to the mission staff

This section tries to assess the availability of resources for the mission staff to effectively play their roles in the mission. When asked how available resources were to the mission staff. 116 out of the 128 responded, representing (90.62%) response rate.

Figure 5. 14 : Availability of resources in the mission for work




Source: Field data, 2022

Figure 5.14 shows there was resources available for the staff of missions to performed their responsibilities. 6 people representing (5.17%) said the availability of resources was excellent, 30 respondents representing (25.86%) sad very good, 56 respondents being the highest and representing 48.28% said good and 19 respondents representing 16.38 said. On the other hand, 5 people representing 4.31% said poor. Therefore 95.69% agreed that there were resources available for their function in the mission.

### 5.3 Reasons for Authorizing This PSO Mission

This section presents the reasons why the missions were mandated. Multiple options were allowed bringing total responses 435 of 116 out of 128 responses representing 90.61% response rate.

Figure 5. 15 : Reason for authorizing the mission



Source: field data, 2022

Figure 5.15 displays the reasons for authorizing a mission, 100 responses representing 86.21% said the mission was mandated for the protection of civilians, followed by 80 responses representing 68.97% said the mission was mandated for the promotion of human rights, then 79 responses representing 68.10% said the mission was mandated for the restoration of rule of law, 68 responses representing 58.62% said it was for the prevention of conflict, 48 responses representing 41.38% said it was for women empowerment and 42 representing 36.21% said it was for humanitarian assistance or field support. However, 18 responses representing 15.52% gave

other reasons including: training, political stability, infrastructure, governance and eliminate insurgency and restore peace.

#### 5.4 Substantive or Support Function/Role Of Respondent

In every mission there are substantive and support function especially when it comes to the civilian component. This part of the study presents the individual function or role played by the respondents.

Table 5. 3 : Function or role of respondents

ANSWER CHOICES	PERCENTAGE	RESPONSES
Political affairs	18.97%	22
Legal affairs	9.48%	11
Planning and coordination	37.93%	44
Public information	12.07%	14
Humanitarian liaison	18.10%	21
Human rights	27.59%	32
Gender	21.55%	25
Child protection	24.14%	28
Conduct and discipline	16.38%	19
Rule of law	25.00%	29

Electorate affairs	7.76%	9
DDR/SSR/Civil affairs	8.62%	10
Human resources	7.76%	9
Financial	5.17%	6
Procurement	6.90%	8
Logistics	12.07%	14
Engineering	4.31%	5
Geographic Information Service (GIS)	5.17%	6
Integrated training service	14.66%	17
Contingency-owned equipment security	9.48%	11
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>340</b>

**Source: field data, 2022**

There were responses from all 20 substantive and support functions of the mission. 340 responses were received as some staff played more than one role due to understaffing especially at ATMIS. 116 of the 128 responded representing 90.63% whereas 12 representing 9.37% gave no response.

## 5.5 Exit Strategy


This section presents the real contribution made to the country and sustainability strategies put in place to ensure the country does not relapse after the mission is closed. This is what also determines the success of the mission, as this is one of the success indicators of a mission by the UN and AU. Here questions on exit strategies, composition of exit team, and sustainability plans were asked.

This section specifically presents the existence of an exit strategy, team and sustainability plan by percentages according to respondents' responses.

### 5.5.1 Exit strategy

This section asked whether there was an exit plan, 99 out of 128 responded representing 77.34% response rate as displayed by figure 5.1.16 below.

Figure 5. 16 : Exit strategy



Source: Field Data, 2022

Figure 5.16 shows the highest responses with 69 respondents being 69.70% said yes and 30 being 30.30% said no. this was because the whole of ATMIS is an exit strategy in itself, however UNMISS is still in full swing but has an exit plan which is not known by all its staff members.

### 5.5.2 Composition of transition (exit strategic) team

This section presents responses for the existence of an exit team to ensure smooth handover and takeover of state affairs when the mission has come to an end. 99 out of 128 responded representing 77.34% response rate as shown by figure 5.5.2 below.

Figure 5. 17 : Availability of an exit team





Figure 5.17 shows that the highest responses of 61 representing 61.62 said yes there was an exit team in place and the 38 representing 38.38 said no there was no exit team in place. As mentioned earlier AMISOM was at the exit with the ATMIS established as the team to see to this where as UNMISS is not exiting yet but has an exit plan which sits with the strategic level of the mission. For ATMIS they also had the UN, EU and the Host nation being part of the exit team.

### 5.5.3 Possibility of new mission or possible extension

When asked whether there was going to be a new mission 99 out of 128 responded representing 77.34% response rate and is displayed by figure 5.5.3 below

Figure 5. 18 : Possible extension



**Source: field data, 2022**


Figure 5.18 shows that the highest responses of 80 representing 80.81% were not sure whether the mission will be extended after its mandated period. 14 respondents representing 14.14 said no there will be no extension and 5 responses representing 5.05% said yes there will be an extension.

### 5.5.4 Mission success

When asked if they considered the mission a success, 99 being out of the 128 respondents answered representing 77.4% response rate.



Figure 5. 19 : Mission success



Source: field data, 2022

Figure 5.19 shows that all respondents agreed that the mission have been successful even though in various degrees of success.

### 5.6 How Would the State Be Sustained?

99 out of 128 responded with the following comments:

- i. Inclusion of Somalia Government and reconciliation
- ii. Federalism
- iii. Resource Sharing
- iv. Improved economy so as to provide jobs for the youth
- v. Preventing and countering violent extremism
- vi. Education of the locals
- vii. Dialogue with the rank and file of the community
- viii. Sensitization and peacebuilding initiative

- ix. Implement all the peace agreements by all parties
- x. Through countrywide massive disarmament, establishment of Trauma healing and truth commission, building strong government institutions, Empowering rule of Law (public order must be maintained), permanent constitution, and conducting free and fair elections countrywide.
- xi. Encouraging all partners in the peace process to promote peace in the area
- xii. Collective efforts from the people of South Sudan
- xiii. Electoral reforms to ensure participation of everyone in the governance of the country
- xiv. Disarming rebel groups and reintegrating them into the security forces
- xv. By educating the people of South Sudan to desist from using weapons and the government should play a major role in making sure that no civilians own guns
- xvi. Need for political will from the government of South Sudan as well as Somaila
- xvii. Capacity development and training for law enforcement
- xviii. The peace will be sustained with the will of the politicians. Indeed, until now, they are the ones who fueled the tensions between civilians from both ethnic groups
- xix. DDR, Election, united security force with no fraction
- xx. Institutionalization of peace building strategies in the government structures with the support of the International community.
- xxi. Complete implementation of the agreement and participation of stakeholders, including ordinary citizens in the making process of permanent Constitution.
- xxii. Political will and involvement of all stake holders including women.
- xxiii. When the leaders of South Sudan in political arena signs the revitalized peace agreement
- xxiv. Support of the peace agreement, capacity building and elections

- xxv. Peaceful election and peaceful coexistence between all the Ethnic groups.
- xxvi. The security apparatus would have been trained to take care of security. Building Nations staff capacity through coaching, mentoring and empowerment
- xxvii. Through ownership and political engagement of local communities and authorities.
- xxviii. Promoting peace
- xxix. By overseeing the peace process between Government of South Sudan and Opposition forces
- xxx. Support to maintenance of the Ceasefire Agreement Continued political engagement with leadership to sustain the peace Effective function on of parliament and judiciary Professionalization of the armed forces
- xxxi. Building and strengthening the state institutions
- xxxii. Local government empowerment
- xxxiii. Empowerment of South Sudan People
- xxxiv. Peace guarantors and other international bodies like AU, EGAD, CTSAMM, and UN agencies funds and program are likely to design programs to ensure sustainability of the peace
- xxxv. Empowerment of local authority
- xxxvi. Capacity building of the rule of law institutions
- xxxvii. Another UN Mission and sustain the peace
- xxxviii. To enable Somalia to be at peace with itself and ensure an enabling environment for Somalis to live in peace among themselves, through the building and enhancement of Somali institutions and governance processes that will guarantee effective rule of law, civil authority and an effective social contract between the government and its people.

- xxxix. Partners
- xl. Mutual agreement between all partners
  - xli. Host country
  - xlii. Dialogue between conflicting parties
  - xliii. Host security architecture
  - xliv. It is expected that the FGS will have been sufficiently enhanced to take over security responsibilities from ATMIS.
  - xlv. Taking away a total or cutoff of arm conflict, state protection, and recurring humanitarian crisis and having one sovereignty
  - xlvi. This will depend on the progress of FGS's national priorities as outlined in its NDP9.
  - xlvii. By ensuring that the institutions responsible for keeping and maintaining peace are enabled to lead the process by themselves.
  - xlviii. By building the capacity and capability of the Somali Security Forces to ensure progressive implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) and the Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) for a sustainable security environment in the country.
  - xlix. Somalia security force should be capacitated to take over by 2024
    - 1. It is anticipated that the Somalia security forces will take over the security responsibilities of ATMIS. A security framework has been designed for them to follow. Besides all stakeholders has agreed to: Inclusive government and reconciliation, Democratisation, Federalism, Resource sharing, Improved economy to provide jobs for the youth and 6. Preventing and Countering Terrorism
    - li. 1. Improvement in the criminal justice system. 2. DDR programme. 3. Poverty alleviation programmes by the government. 4. Employment opportunities for the youth. 5. Logistic

support to state security institutions such as the police and military to effectively carry out their internal security responsibilities.

- lii. Strong international enforcement. Extended the transitional arrangement. Revise the constitution and bar all the current leaders from standing for future elected positions. Truth and reconciliation and transitional justice
- liii. Understand goals and process with activities at the prevention of conflict, people-center approach, and have a political will
- liv. Currently the mission with all stakeholders are now working on force generation; whereby Host country is expected to have by this time the capacity to secure their country.

## 5.7 Challenges

The various functions had their peculiar challenges, and the following were some of the challenges given by the respondents:

1. Effective implementation of the peace accords - no political will, human rights violations, and abuses, justice system not accessible to all civilians in remote areas
2. Lack of strong government support in mandate implementation
3. Logistics challenges, force generation by Somalia Security Force (SSF) to take over key security installation in Somali when the mission exits
4. Capacity of the SSF to take over from ATMIS in 2024. To meet the 2024 deadline, the federal armies and regional armies must be integrated into one Somali National Army. This has not been easy to achieve over the last 6 years and unless those forces are integrated under a common command and control, the schisms which currently exist may continue. If it does, the 2024 date may not be realised.

5. Commitment to genuinely implement the agreements listed above.
6. Funding constraints. The EU provides financial supports to ATMIS whilst the UN provides logistics support. The annual budget for ATMIS will be around \$800m, all coming from the EU and UN. There is no guarantee that the funding, especially from the EU, will continue. This concern is even more pertinent now that the EU is a major player in the Ukrainian conflict.
7. Insecurity in the country generally
8. No career progression with the mission, the feeling of stagnation
9. Ongoing conflict
10. Funding challenges
11. Separation from family, work overload due to understaffing in ATMIS, uncertainty of the future in the mission
12. Weather challenges, non-motorable roads, flight cancellation frustrations, poor infrastructure, denial of access for smooth operations
13. Political stalemate and logistics challenges
14. Reconfiguration of the mission structure to meet the current security council mandate
15. Tribalism
16. Gender imbalance, women empowerment challenges due to cultural practices and strong tripartite
17. Understaffing
18. Food insecurity, flooding, intercommunal conflicts
19. Leadership based on clan system instead of competence
20. Capacity-building challenges

21. Non-cooperation from the citizens
22. Lack of motorable roads to send support to remote and needy areas, lack of basic infrastructure like health and education in some areas
23. Large numbers of displaced persons and refugees
24. Host country not showing seriousness in projects meant to support the communities by way of preparing to take over but are only interested in money through the submission of ghost military names for payments
25. Lack of predictable and sustainable funding, inadequate staffing, inability to expand offensive operations due to insufficient number of troops
26. Lack of funds for the payment of military ex-Gracia so they cannot go on pension in Somalia
27. General mission stress
28. Lack of trust among the conflict parties
29. Threat from violent extremist
30. Intelligence gathering and lack of adequate resources
31. Lack of common understanding of the National security architecture by Federal Government Security (FGS) key actors.
32. There are multiple challenges which include: 1. Limited SSF force generation which undermines the implementation of ATMIS Mandate in support of the STP. 2. Unpredictable funding for the implementation of ATMIS mandate. 3. Limited human and financial resources. 4. Issues related to Command and Control 5. Discrepancies between ATMIS operational requirements and available logistical support. 6.

- Insecurity and at times unavailable/unwilling local partners. 7. Limited coordination amongst partners supporting Somalia's peace, stabilization and development processes.
33. Lack of commitment from the government and partners to implement the peace agreement lack of funding for the government's lack of political will to implement some of the key benchmarks to sustain the peace agreement slow pace of implementation of key element of the peace agreement
34. Arms in the hands of civilians
35. Language barrier
36. 1. The federal army and the regional armies are not working together and this is a challenge for the 2024 exit planned. 2. No commitment to the agreements listed above and 3. Funding constraints, it is not certain that the EU Funding will continue. ATMIS budget of 800 million usd is provided by the EU while the UN provides logistics support. Now EU is heavily supporting Ukraine so funds diversion
37. Tribalism and lack of trust among the citizens of Somalia
38. First, there is a need for the Somali elites to agree to reach a compromise and be willing to seek an agreement of what a Somali State is and should be. Second, there is a notion by many that the challenge in Somalia is Security, which is why there seem to be a lot more focus on degrading Al Shabaab and generating more Somali Security Forces to fight terrorism. Third, a security notion does not enable more focus to be placed on more support and engagement with Somalia and the political and other elites to seek required compromises and agreement on the governance model that best suits Somalia and takes into account a good balance between secular and religious/social norms and values. Fourth, and critical also is the fact that Al Shabaab functions like a shadow state



and competes with the government. Fifth, the resource challenge that affects funding for ATMIS and support to Somali Security Forces and Government institutions to function effectively does not enable achievement of all the objectives set by the AU and the international community in support of Somalia. Sixth, unwavering commitment, continuity and reliability of the Somalis in working with the AU and the international community in maintaining the momentum and vision of ongoing actions towards enabling Somalia to move from conflict to peace

39. Violation of force agreement

40. Lack of Consensus Among the Warring Parties leading to disrespect of ceasefire.

Secondly, Increase of Intercommunal Wars.

41. Weak government institutions and high level of illiteracy from Government officials and civil populations well.

42. Killing of people

43. Proliferations of arms and multiple cattle raiding and increased Rebel attacks based on ethnicity.

44. Lack of Resources security challenges

45. Acute shortage of civilian staff Communication challenges between FGS and FMS.

46. Issues of access to the community Issues of project implantation due to security and access. Clan dynamics.

47. Proper plan of the implementation of the transition period, particularly administrative management of the staff (contract renewal, recruitment of additional staff to deploy in the sectors etc...)

48. Lack of cooperation from some Government officials and locals

49. Unpredictable funding from Partners Volatile security environment lack of resources to implement mandate
50. Violation of SOFA agreement
51. Missed implementation benchmarks including formation of unified forces at the operational level. Continued and emerging intercommunal conflicts Limited and selective political will
52. Wide spread violence fueled by proliferations of arms among the communities. Poor infrastructure to reach out to cut off communities during violence. Lack of political will from the parties to the agreement.

### **5.8 Further Comments**

The last question asked respondents to add any further comments there maybe, and 99 out of the 128 respondents representing 77.34% gave the following comments:

1. There is still unrest in the country
2. Need for continuation of the mission
3. I applaud the un for the efforts they have made to ensure peace is restored in South Sudan and other nations which are facing conflicts.
4. There should be Disarmament Demobilization Reintegration and Reinsertion (DDRR) conducted here in South Sudan as was done in other countries
5. There is still unrest in the country
6. Need for a continuation of the mission
7. I applaud the un for the efforts they have made to ensure peace is restored in South Sudan and other nations which are facing conflicts.

8. There should be ddr conducted here in south Sudan as was done in other countries
9. We are hoping that by 2024 the Somalia Government and officials will be able to provide security when ATMIS exits
10. The Mission is doing a lot and have achieved a lot but the Warring Parties continuously disrespected ceasefire Agreements. Secondly, Interparty Conflicts brought division and creation of more Rebel Groups with new Agendas making it difficult to accommodate all in the existing Peace Agreements.
11. There is a need to include all the opposition parties and rebel groups within South Sudan and outside.
12. The mission is going on well though there are some challenges people are facing on ground.
13. Need to deploy more peacekeepers
14. so far the mission providing the required assistance in order to achieve the mandate of the mission
15. There are no sufficient changes toward in the place
16. There are no sufficient changes toward in the place
17. - The mission needs additional resources in terms of TCC (military), uniformed police and military observers. The resources will enable the mission to deploy them in some hotspots in order to deter any source of tensions and ensure the protection of civilians
18. Peace and Tranquility forever in South Sudan and the world at large
19. To realize inclusive and durable peace, South Sudanese have to create for themselves permanent peace instead of 'imported' peace by external partners.

20. The mission should exert more efforts to pressure the parties to the agreement to uphold the rule of law, implement the agreement, protect civilians and work toward making a permanent constitution and conducting internationally recognized elections.
21. Mission should engage the parties to agreement to implement the agreement to letter and spirit that will lead to permanent constitutional making and conduct free and fair elections
22. The mission has done its best to stable the security situation
23. South Sudan needs all the support from the Powers that be in order to attain peace and security.
24. The mission strives to deliver on its mandate but the parties to the conflict are not sincere thereby derailing the fragile peace process.
25. Government Security Sector must seek cooperation from the opposition forces
26. National level conflict has largely reduced and power sharing at the national level completed whilst political governance structure largely now in place at the national and state levels. Nevertheless, local and intercommunal conflicts continue to fester and emerge whilst rule of law, development and financial aspects of the peace agreement have been largely unimplemented
27. There is a slow implementation of the peace agreement due to the absence of political will
28. There is a slow implementation of the peace agreement due to the absence of political will
29. Managed to help some POC camp to return people to normal life

30. Progress appears to be slow and based on individual contributions. Big changes and improvements are bureaucratic and take time
31. The ethnic differences/disrespect is the most important issue to be solved in UN Missions, including UNMISS.
32. The mission should ensure that the timetable for transition is adhered to.
33. The mission should ensure that the timetable for transition is adhered to.
34. The mission should ensure that the timetable for transition is adhered to.

## **5.9 Interviews at ECOWAS and ATMIS**

An interview guide was designed for interacting with the deploying authorities, and selected supervisors of the various functional areas to find out about the exact contributions and achievements of the civilian components to the mission success in the respective missions selected for this study. An initial list made from the desk review identified one mission each from the Regional level, continental and global levels so as to present an all-encompassing picture of the subject matter. For the Regional level was ECOMIB, continental level AMISON.ATMIS and global level UNMISS. Information gathered from these interviews is presented as follows: For the ECOWAS Commission, the AU Commission, and AMISOM/ATMIS (political affairs, legal affairs. Human rights/gender and protection as well as coordination cell).

### **5.9.1 Interview with heads of AUPSOD, ECOWAS-PSOD, HOCC, and Roster Officer at the ECOWAS Commission**

The first set of interviews was held at the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, Nigeria where the head of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) Col. Olu Allain Pale revealed that the

ECOWAS Peace Operations in the Region is largely military received from Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and that there was no civilian component deployed even though there are a few civilians in ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB). This is, however, an arrangement by the host nation. Subsequent discussions with the Head of Civilian Component (HOCC) Mr. Bekaye Coulibaly and the Civilian Rostering/Training Officer Mr. Danjuma Sunday Aku confirmed the same. As a result, the study excluded ECOWAS from the study population as the civilian component functions needed to complete the survey were not available. This led to the decision of limited surveys to the global and continental levels only.

The UN staff were not available for the interview as I could not travel to South Sudan due to visa challenges and staff uncertain availabilities.

### **5.9.2 Interview with head AUPSOD at the AU Commission**

1. ATMIS exit strategy is centred on generation of additional Somali Security Forces to degrade the capabilities of Al Shabaab, including through integration of regional forces to takeover security responsibilities from ATMIS; finalisation of the Somali Provisional Constitution which will clarify the governance and elections model for Somalia and ensure enhancement of governance and rule of law institutions to enable Somalia and its people to leave in peace
2. The mission is a transition mission with a reconfiguration plan and benchmarks that are monitored by the AU Peace Support Operations Division, working jointly with the UN, EU and the Federal Government of Somalia. This transition team is referred to as the Quartet and operates at Principals as well as technical level to direct, monitor, facilitate

and report on all transitions processes to the AU Peace and Security Council as well as the UN Security Council.

3. To enable Somalia to be at peace with itself and ensure an enabling environment for Somalis to leave in peace among themselves, through the building and enhancement of Somali institutions and governance processes that will guarantee effective rule of law, civil authority and an effective social contract between the government and its people.
4. First, there is a need for the Somali elites to agree to reach a compromise and be willing to seek an agreement of what a Somali State is and should be. Second, there is a notion by many that the challenge in Somalia is Security, which is why there seem to be a lot more focus on degrading Al Shabaab and generating more Somali Security Forces to fight terrorism. Third, a security notion does not enable more focus to be placed on more support and engagement with Somalia and the political and other elites to seek required compromises and agreement on the governance model that best suits Somalia and takes into account a good balance between secular and religious/social norms and values. Fourth, and critically also is the fact that Al Shabaab functions like a shadow state and competes with the government. Fifth, the resource challenge that affects funding for ATMIS and support to Somali Security Forces and Government institutions to function effectively does not enable achievement of all the objectives set by the AU and the international community in support of Somalia. Sixth, unwavering commitment, continuity and reliability of the Somalis in working with the AU and the international community in maintaining the momentum and vision of ongoing actions towards enabling Somalia to move from conflict to peace

5. First, there is a need for the Somali elites to agree to reach a compromise and be willing to seek an agreement of what a Somali State is and should be. Second, there is a notion by many that the challenge in Somalia is Security, which is why there seem to be a lot more focus on degrading Al Shabaab and generating more Somali Security Forces to fight terrorism. Third, a security notion does not enable more focus to be placed on more support and engagement with Somalia and the political and other elites to seek required compromises and agreement on the governance model that best suits Somalia and takes into account a good balance between secular and religious/social norms and values. Fourth, and critically also is the fact that Al Shabaab functions like a shadow state and competes with the government. Fifth, the resource challenge that affects funding for ATMIS and support to Somali Security Forces and Government institutions to function effectively does not enable achievement of all the objectives set by the AU and the international community in support of Somalia. Sixth, unwavering commitment, continuity and reliability of the Somalis in working with the AU and the international community in maintaining the momentum and vision of ongoing actions towards enabling Somalia to move from conflict to peace
6. AMISOM achieved its set objectives within its means, and ATMIS will achieve same, depending on the commitment of Somalia and its people, as well as the support of the international community to enable both ATMIS and the Government in our efforts. Within this context, reconfiguration of AMISOM to ATMIS and transfer of security responsibilities from ATMIS to Somali Security Forces is dependent on force generation and integration by the Federal Government, working jointly with the Federal Member States within the National Security Architecture and with agreement on the devolution of



authority as well as resources allocation and sharing between the Federal Government and the Federal States.

### **5.9.3 Interview with selected supervisors in ATMISHQ**

This section presents the summaries of interviews with functional supervisors at the ATMIS Headquarters. They include security, political affairs, civil affairs, planning and coordination, human rights/gender/protection as follows:

#### **5.9.3.1 Interview with head of political affairs ATMIS**

A few selected senior civilian staff were interviewed about the mission's major achievements and how they have impacted the Somali land. Interviews with the political affairs, civil affairs, legal affairs, human rights protection, and gender as well as the planning and coordination cell of the SRCC revealed that:

- ❖ Some major achievements by the political affairs division is the ability to create a secure environment so as to return the Somalia government official back to into the community to rule their people in country and not from Nairobi like was happening before the mission. The restoration of peace, state formation, and the attendant boost to the economy, securing population centers and key government installations, Supporting and securing electoral processes in 2012, 2016 and 2021, Rebuilding the Somali police force and restoring rule of law is gaining good grounds as SSR has expanded and regular in M and E, OJT trainings provided regularly and Capacity-building support for human rights and gender.
- ❖ Change of election from security-led to civilian led. Brought election experts from the AU for the first time in the 2021 elections. This by far has been the best election held in the

history of Somalia, recording 30% women participation in the elections. Capacity building through training and equipment supply for the election management body to the tune of 250,000 USD for a free and fair elections. The acceptance of external election experts was an indication of an improved security situation in Somalia. Also remarkable was the general acceptance of the election results especially when power changed from one party to another. ATMIS has since supported the new Government to gain state control.

- ❖ Strong partnership with the European Union, Somalia Government, United States of America, the United Kingdom, the United Nations and the Africa Union for peace and security in Somalia.

### **5.9.3.2 Interview with coordination and planning at SRCC office in ATMIS**

This is the office that leads the mission and directs policy and decision. It is the command and control of the mission. Planning and coordination officer was interviewed and the following were his views:

The office of the SRCC aligned the AU policies to the Somalia context to allow for mission mandate implementation, this has improved the working relationship and interactions with the Somalia officials. Built the capacity of the local level authorities, embarked on quick impact projects that would improve their circumstances. The resolution, budgeting, accounting and resource mobilization is all coordinated from the SRCC office. The entire mission is administered from this office.

### 5.9.3.3 Interview with head of civil affairs ATMIS

The civil affairs division also recounted the following achievements in Somalia:

A number of quick impacts projects (QIPS) for the Somalia community and these included:

- ❖ The building of a basic school complex in 2013. This led to an increased number of children going to school. They run two streams so as to contain the new numbers.
- ❖ The building of a police station and equipping it with biometric equipment while training Somalia officials to operate it. This has led to a reduced crime rate and boosted confidence in the citizens, it has improved law enforcement as the police
- ❖ has received lots of training too.
- ❖ Another equally important project was the water rehabilitation project which provided potable water for the people of Somalis.
- ❖ The building of a women and health Centre, equipped with beds and mattresses. This has improved health delivery and access to medical care as well big relief to pregnant women as they could now access healthcare with ease.
- ❖ Last but not the least is the humanitarian support activities such as providing relief items to victims in Somalia.
- ❖ All these projects have been duly handed over to the Government and people of Somalia as a way of empowering them and getting them ready for the mission exit.
- ❖ Another major achievement has been a series of training organized for the Somalia people in order to get them ready for taking over their own governance when the AU exits, these trainings are as follows:

- Training of the Somalia Parliamentarians in June 2018

- Training of ministry of finance-south west state of Somalia on taxation, procurements and revenue collection in December 2018
- Training of the Somalia interim regional administration-IRA in June 2015
- Training of the Somalia youth on entrepreneurial skills for small scale economic activities and leadership
- There was a workshop to review the QIPS and decide the way forward for the exit strategy

#### **5.9.3.4 Interview with head of procurement/ITS at affairs ATMIS**

When the head of procurements/integrated training section was interviewed, he expressed the following views:

On the 31 March 2022, AMISOM made way for a new Mission- the African Union Transition Mission for Somalia (ATMIS). The plan is for the ATMIS forces to gradually hand over security responsibilities to the SSF so that by December 2024, ATMIS will be liquidated. ATMIS is the transition mission. Its mandating authority is the African Union Peace & Security Council (AUPSC) whilst the UN Security Council (UNSC) provides the authorization for the Mission. The two Councils have oversight of the Mission and will monitor its performance to ensure it meets its roadmaps. The AMISOM PHRG unit has over the years ensured that the Mission's troops have discharged their duties in compliance with all applicable AU and international legal instruments.

The procurement unit has also been involved in providing supports on Human Rights, IHL, Women & Child Protection, governance, and Rule of Law to the Somali Government. The unit has supported the Government in drafting several statutes, policies, and other guidance documents for the Somali armed forces. The building and professionalization of the Somalia Security Forces

has led to the improved capacity of the SSF to gradually take over security responsibilities from AMISOM.

AMISOM has been a success. It was formed in 2007 to stabilize Somalia and it has done that successfully. At its inception, the whole of Somalia was under the Islamic Court Union (the precursor of Al-Shabaab) and even the Somali Government was based in Kenya. AMISOM involvement has led to the pacification of Somalia and the recovery of all the major towns and cities from the belligerents. Since 2008, Government and its apparatus have returned to Mogadishu and three cycles of elections have taken place. It is anticipated that the SSF will take over the security responsibilities of ATMIS. Beyond that, there is in place in Somalia a Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS) framework which is a Somali-led framework where all stakeholders agree that military force alone will not eradicate the conflict in Somalia. Towards this end, Somali political leadership have all agreed and committed to:

- A. Inclusive government and reconciliation.
- B. Democratisation.
- C. Federalism.
- D. Resource sharing.
- E. Improved economy to provide jobs for the youths.
- F. Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) etc.

#### **5.9.3.5 Interview with gender/human rights/protection at ATMIS**

According to the gender and human rights officer, AMISOM/ATMIS has chalked a lot of success in Somalia with regards to human rights protections and gender mainstreaming. She says one of

the greatest achievements have been the deployment of field officers for monitoring human rights violations as well as the creation of a gender desk and protection structures in the Somalia community where vulnerable groups could make a report and data compilation of the various violations could be done.

The field officers' ability to finally access the Somalia cities in order to monitor and report violations led to the creation of cluster groups to sensitize and educate especially women and children. This in turn helped with the provision of support through advocacy and training on international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to these groups thereby reducing the number of violations through these support groups.

ATMIS has been sure to be part of these clusters namely: the national human rights/GBV cluster/national protection cluster and children in armed conflict cluster is an indication of good progress as these platforms creates the opportunity for discussing violations and solutions. As a result, there is an appreciable improvement in the situation especially when it comes to the ATMIS support troops, though she couldn't give a specific percentage of improvements seen in violation reduction. According her the general security situation at the grass-root level has improved.

### **5.10 Conclusion**

This chapter has shown the major achievements of the civilian component in the two missions from the data captured from the questionnaire as well as the interviews with key senior mission staff. The fact that the mission leadership is civilian, the major and key decision positions are held by the civilians and all the vital functions are performed by the civilians through the functions they play. The findings are discussed in detail in chapter six.

## CHAPTER SIX

### DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

#### 6.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the research findings which set out to make known the civilian contribution to UN and AU multidimensional peace operations (MDPSO) in Africa. The discussion of findings is anchored on the Kant liberal peace theory and the Durkheim functionalism theory, and the UN/AU mission success indicators as the theoretical frameworks used by the study, while utilizing the desk review, and field data gathered in responding to the research questions. The liberal peace theory which is the main frame of study holds that peaceful relations are expected from states with the protection of individual freedoms (liberalism), the rule of law and legal equality (constitutionalism), and representative government (democracy) and that it is only when all three constitutive elements are jointly considered that we uncover the multifaceted nature of international peace (Danilovic & Clare, 2007). Knowing that the burden of the United Nations and the African Union mission mandating is all about achieving international peace by ensuring that the individual countries are at peace. Protecting human rights and restoring rule of law and democracy to war-torn countries such as Somalia and South Sudan where AMISOM and UNMISS are respectively deployed. And the functionalism which sociologists apply in the study of social problems such as conflict, peacekeeping, and social instability with the central perspective of functionalism holding that society is a social system structurally consisting of various integrated parts: tangible and intangible. It is to say that, as a system, it tends to have interacting, interlocking, and intersecting parts. In the opinion of the functionalists, each of the parts that compose the system fulfills a specific role, contributing to the overall health and functioning of a given society, system, or body (Widdison & Delaney, 2000). This is directly related to the civilian component as



an independent part of the whole MDPSO yet without which the entire mission cannot function to achieve its mandate.

Having given that theoretical background, the five major themes from the research questions shall guide the chronological presentation of the research finding and discussion for a holistic appreciation. The presentation, therefore, covers: (i) context for the deployment of UN and AU MDPSO in Africa; (ii) the structure and composition of UN/AU MPSO mission (iii) contribution of the civilian component in UN/AU MDPSO (iv) the collaboration of mission components in implementing mission mandate; and (v) UN and AU mission success indicators.

## **6.1 Context For The Deployment Of UN And AU MPSO In Africa**

This section analyses the contextual conditions that warrant the multidimensional peace operations by the deployment in the first place by the UN and AU. Considering the AU does peace enforcement whereas the UN comes in to keep the peace.

### **6.1.1 Context for UN and AU deployment**

The United Nations Security Council mandates peace operations deployment in order to confront threats to global peace and security in line with the UN Charter as primary responsibility for maintaining global peace and security. In general terms, the UN deploys when there is peace to keep. Using its general peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force in its deployment so as to preserve peace where fighting has ended, and to assist in implementing the peace agreement. In this case, it deploys the military to observe ceasefires. However, the AU deploys in order to enforce peace by embarking on coercive measures including military force used to restore international peace and security. The AU usually deploys without consent of



conflicting parties once there is a threat to international peace or humanitarian and protection purposes.

Given what the liberal peace theory states, there is a high tendency for domestic and international peace to happen when the highest majority of individuals in a society have control over political and economic decisions and focuses on peace within states, this is seen in the UN deployment of multidimensional peace operations within South Sudan to forestall the conflict which is largely due to ethnic unrest and leadership clashes among others. The UN has put mechanisms in place to capacitate the people to regain their peaceful existence and take charge of the economy and get back to democratic rule touted by democratic peace theory. The deployed staff with the understanding of the mandate to protect valuable lives and in fulfillment of the functional theory embark on this mandate implementation with an appreciation of the conditions in South Sudan.

Similarly, in Somalia, where the conflict is largely a counter-terrorism effort, the liberal peace theory is still very much at play as the AU strives to degrade the Al-Shabab and restore democratic rule to the people of Somalia. AMISOM was deployed as per the UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) and mandated to pursue such strategic objectives as enabling the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on the abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia; Reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; and assisting the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation, and peacebuilding in Somalia. Specifically, the following tasks were authorized: maintain a presence in the sectors set out in AMISOM, assist the appropriate Somali security forces to protect Somalia, protect personnel, secure key routes, conduct targeted offensive operations, mentor the Somali security forces, and reconfigure the security forces. These goals for Somalia resonate with the

assumptions of liberal peace theory which holds that a condition for peace rests on three essential ideas: the protection of individual freedoms, the rule of law and legal equality, and representative rule. However, the shortcoming of the theory here is the fact that Somalia is not at war with another democracy.

## **6.2 The Structure and Composition of UN/AU MPSO Mission**


Within the paradigm of the functional theory, this section analyses and discusses the structure which is mainly about the command and control measures in the mission and the composition which implies the various components/experts coming together to work for a common goal. The functionalist is defined as one who (1) views society as a whole composed of interrelated parts, (2) assumes a tendency toward system equilibrium, (3) considers how society or the social order is possible and, hence, (4) views structures in terms of their contributions to the perpetuation or evolutionary development of society, and finally, (5) sees their commonalities or consensus as the ultimate basis of social order (Pope, 1975, p. 361). For the peace operations to succeed in its mandate implementation, the military, police, and civilians must work hand in hand with each one of them effectively playing their role to ensure a concerted effort at achieving the equilibrium in this case peace. The civilian leadership breaks down the mission mandate into strategic objectives where all three components deduce their concepts of operations. Civilian experts conduct a needs assessment of the conditions on the ground based on which the military and police make relevant interventions for the host nation's benefit. The independent effects of each component defining the holistic success of the entire mission. An interview with the human rights and protection expert in Somalia indicated that the constant monitoring and reporting of the violations in the Somalia communities gave them hotspots of violations against especially women and children, this formed

the bases for creating the GBV cluster, as well as the children in armed conflicts cluster where victim support is provided through tailor-made solutions and interventions. Police going on community patrols and military supporting the humanitarian officers supply much-needed support. These by extension led to a reduced number of cases recorded late. In addition, the quick impact project on school buildings has made most of the youth go back to school.

### **6.2.1 Structure and composition of UN mission**

Recalling from the literature review in chapter two, modern peace operations missions which is dimensional in nature, is typically led by civilians. There are three typical levels of modern peace operations, whereby the United nations headquarters or the African union commission/Peace and security divisions are responsible for deploying the mission first of all. Followed by the mission headquarters which is usually in the mission area and in this case Juba and Mogadishu for UNMISS and AMISOM/ATMIS respectively. And then the sectorial or operational areas where security forces and individual civilian experts are located to do the day-to-day activities in realizing the missions' objectives. Figure 6.1 depicts that the mission headquarters is headed by the Special Representative of the AU Commission Chair (SRCC) and the United Nations by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). These are the commanding and controlling officers who are then followed by the heads of the military component called the Force Commander, the head of the police component called the Police Commissioner, and the head of the civilian component called the Head of Mission assisted by the Chief of Staff. The UN mission structure and composition is depicted in the figure below.

Figure 6. 1 : UN mission structure




Source: UNPKO, 2021

### 6.2.2 Structure and composition of AU mission

The structure and composition is discussed against the functional theory. The mission component section looks at the exact roles played by the three different components and expatiates on the civilian roles and how these roles contribute to the mission’s success. First of the three components work together for the overall mission success under the leadership of the mission management as depicted in figure 6.2 where the senior management team is made up of the Head of Mission / SRCC; Deputy Head of Mission; Mission Chief of Staff; Chief Political; Force Commander; Police Commissioner; Head of Mission Support; and others as directed by the Head of Mission / SRCC.

Figure 6. 2 : AU mission structure



Source: AU Diaries (Amani Africa II, 2015)

The mission composition looks at the exact roles played by the three different components and expatiates on the civilian roles and how these roles contribute to the mission’s success. First of the three components work together for the overall mission success under the leadership of the mission management as depicted in figure 6.1 where the senior management team is made up of the Head of Mission/SRCC; Deputy Head of Mission; Mission Chief of Staff; Chief Political; Force Commander; Police Commissioner; Head of Mission Support; and others as directed by the Head of Mission / SRCC.

Table 6. 1 : Mission component response

<b>Mission component</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Civilian	72	56.25%
Military	15	11.72%
Police	41	32.03%
Total	128	100%

**Source: Field data, 2022**

Table 6.1 shows the components categorisation of all the respondents who were largely from the strategic and operations levels of the missions’ headquarters; 72 out of the 128 which represents 56.25% were from the civilian component, while 15 (11.72%) were military and 41 (32.03%) were police component also referred to as civil police. This is a demonstration that the civilians occupy the most relevant positions in the mission and are the once proving leadership in the implementation of the mandate. This supports the research objective of the study that multidimensional peace operations are no longer the bane of the military.

### **6.2.2.1 The military component**

The military component operates in support of the political objectives as set by the mandate and directed by the Head of Mission; To establish the conditions that support the achievement of the above; To enhance mission credibility by acting robustly while remaining impartial. Whereas the force commander at the operational level Leads the military component; Provides military advice to the Head of Mission; Implements the military concept of operations; Liaises with and provides advice to local military authorities.

### **6.2.2.2 The police component**

The police component led by the police Commissioner who heads the police component at the operational level and provides advice on Rule of Law issues to the Head of Mission; Implements the police concept. Whereas the component Ensures compliance with international criminal justice and human rights norms, assists in establishing and maintaining public safety and law and order, Achieve the long-term viability of local law enforcement institutions through monitoring, mentoring, advice, and training in best practices, and undertake other rule of law duties, including assistance to electoral processes that contribute to sustainable peace and security. Capacity-building programs for the local police in such aspects as: Assessment, selection and recruitment; Assistance in the reform, restructuring, training and development of the local police and; Advising and mentoring; Supports refurbishment of critical infrastructure of the local police.

### **6.2.2.3 The civilian component and Function in relation to overall mission success**

This section discusses the makeup of the civilian component, their functions, and how these function contributes to the realization of the strategic objective of the mission mandate.


**The Head of mission** particularly operates in a complex environment; Provides vision and direction; Manage change and plan ahead; Integrate the many components of the Mission; Communicate widely within and outside the Mission; and Develop Consensus. **The Chief of staff** provides day-to-day direction on behalf of the Head of Mission ; Coordinates the implementation of mission policies on behalf of the Head of Mission ; Ensure that the mission develops procedures that support effective operation, consistent with AU policies. **Chief of political affairs** Provides analysis and political advice to the Head of Mission and mission staff; Liaises with local



government, international agencies and other actors; Advises on activities of civilian components to ensure that they are synchronised with mission objectives.

**The Substantive function of the civilian component** Support to political processes, elections, promoting dialogue and reconciliation; Support to basic safety and security – including mine action; protection of civilians; disarmament demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), strengthening the Rule of Law; and security sector reform (SSR); Development of conflict-management capacity at national and subnational levels; Support to the provision of basic services; Support to the safe and sustainable return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and refugees; Support to restoration of core government functions and Support to economic revitalisation.

Fig. 6. 1 : Civilian contribution to mission success



Source: AU Diaries (Amani Africa II, 2015)



Apart from providing leadership and direction for the mission implementation, the civilians are the ones who hold the mission every time whereas the police and military rotate annually or biannually, table 6.1 in chapter five shows the longest serving mission officers were civilians who had been in the mission for over three years while the military and police had been around between six and twelve months. In addition, as the three components work together, figure 6.3 above depicts the synergy with which work is done where each component depends on the other for playing their role and the civilians serve as the main defendants for the realization of the mission goals. For instance, the establishment of gender desk and creation of human rights violation reporting system provides data for the military to aid civilian humanitarian officers to bring relief items to the citizens in need.

### **6.3 Contribution Of The Civilian Component In UN/AU MDPSO**

This section is the crux of the study and it analyses and discusses the major contributions made by the civilians to multidimensional peace operations in Africa through their twenty functional areas, and this is the crux of the study. These functions are (i) Political affairs (ii) Legal affairs (iii) planning and coordination (iv) public information (v) humanitarian liaison (vi) human rights (vii) Gender (viii) Child protection (ix) conduct and discipline (x) rule of law (xi) Election affairs (xii) DDR/SSR/Civil affairs (xiii) human resources (xiv) finance (xv) procurements (xvi) logistics (xvii) engineering (xviii) geographic information service (GIS) (xix) integrated training services and (xx) contingency owned equipment and security.

The civilian component personnel give peace operations a human and empathetic face beyond the uniform. They foster a relationship of trust and strengthen engagement with local communities (CFC, 2021) for instance interview with the gender and human rights officers at ATMIS revealed

interacting with the victims of various violations and bringing them some support through counselling, humanitarian assistance and other relief aid and building schools for the communities sent a lot of children to school gave them hope and they are very happy now.

Aside the above and more critically, the component plays a key role in support of Political processes such as the signing of peace agreement. The Protection of Human Rights, Protection of Civilians, Gender, Stabilization programmes and Humanitarian Support just to mention a few. Other key tasks they perform include management of the mission to ensure successful, implementation of the mandate, working with all stakeholders to support dialogue and reconciliation; Compliment the efforts of the military and police components in the implementation of the Security and Stabilization programmes; Supporting development and the re-establishment of governance structures, rule of law institutions and the restoration of both physical and social infrastructures. Interview with the civil affairs revealed that the AU mission through their Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) built a hospital and women centre for the Somali people as well a bore hole and a police station which have improved the access to health and drastically reduced crime rate in Somalia.

Providing support to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups as well as security sector reform processes; Coordinating with partners, including donors and other international actors, humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and services to the local population; Logistical and Admin support to the other Mission components and contracted resources including procurement and budgeting.

From the literature and the field data, the substantive functions are those civilians whose roles of activities directly influence the communities whereas the support functions are those who provide the needed administrative support for the substantive to play their roles effectively. For instance,

the political affairs unit, follow and support political processes in country/regionally (national dialogue & reconciliation), and drafts Special Representative reports to Chairperson. The civil affairs unit, Support restoration and extension of state authority, and Support engagement between Gov. & civil society. The humanitarian liaison officers, Liaise/coordinate/support humanitarian actors. The human rights unit, Monitor human rights situation, Work with national human rights commissions, CSOs& others, and Supports capacity building, the protection unit, Identify, monitor protection risks, vulnerabilities & concerns, Coordinate to ensure protection concerns are addressed. The gender unit, provides policy & technical advice to inform operational activities and ensure delivery of training for all personnel.

The public information unit, implement effective PI strategy in support of mandate through communication, stakeholder engagement, Speaks and writes clearly, concisely, logically. Encourages colleagues to provide information and views, keeps them informed, Adjusts language, tone to match audience and circumstances.

Another important function is stakeholder Engagement, establishes and maintains productive partnerships with stakeholders by gaining their trust and respect, identifies stakeholders' needs and matches them to appropriate solutions, monitors ongoing developments inside and outside the stakeholders' environment to keep informed and anticipate problems, meets timeline for delivery of product or service to stakeholders and keeps them informed of progress or setbacks in projects.

Furthermore, they do planning and organising, developing clear goals that are consistent with agreed strategies. Identifies priority activities and assignments; adjusts priorities as required and uses time efficiently. Allocates appropriate amount of time and resources for completing work and delivers outputs for which one has responsibility within prescribed time, cost and quality standards,

they Foresee risks and allows for contingencies when planning, monitors and adjusts plans and actions as necessary.

#### **6.4 The Specific Functions/Roles Played by The Civilian Component And Contribution To Multidimensional Peace Operations In Africa (With Examples From Somalia And South Sudan)**

This section recounts the various achievements made in Somalia and South Sudan under the leadership and experts of the civilian component, they will include actions and quick-impact projects in Somalia and in South Sudan respectively.

##### **6.4.1 AMISOM/ATMIS contribution in Somalia**

This section shows the various projects and activities done in Somalia major contributions achieved through by the civilians in peace operations in Somalia. From 2007 to date, AMISOM.ATMIS has made tremendous developmental contributions to the Somalia in spite of the challenges faced. The political affairs, civil affairs and gender/human rights/protection units especially in the areas of (i) peace restoration, state formation and socio-economic achievements (ii) securing population Centers, and key government installations (iii) supporting electoral processes in 2012, 2016 and 2021 (iv) rebuilding the Somali police force and restoring rule of law (v) capacity building for human rights and gender and quick impact projects (QIPs).

##### **6.4.1.1 Peace restoration, state formation and socio-economic achievements**

An interview with the head of political affairs at ATMIS in July 2022 revealed that hitherto AMISOM coming to Somalia, the country was being governed administratively from Nairobi

Kenya because the al-Shabaab had made Somalia ungovernable. AMISOM through its civilian leadership and political affairs unit, several expansions, consolidation operations leading to the liberation Mogadishu city in 2011 and subsequent liberation of other cities and towns in South Central Somalia. This enabled the protection of successive authorities and later the interim regional administrations, degrading Al-Shabab and other opposition armed groups, provision of security for two election processes in 2012 and 2016 as well as the completion of state formation processes.

Secondly AMISOM's presence under the civilian leadership ushered in a period of stability on political, security, and socio-economic fronts. This is evident in the increased mobility and trade, and expansion in the international airlines for both private and public flights (AMISOM through the eye, 2021). The return of major financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the world bank after 25 years break away. In terms of economic growth, the mission helped Somalia build resilience, a strong commitment to reforms and created an enabling environment, the IMF, in 2018, acknowledged a boost in the areas of construction, communication, commerce, and service sectors and promised to sustain its support. This was reported during the first review of the staff-monitored program for Somalia, and obviously, increased security and economic confidence.

Similarly, in March 2020, under the Somalia Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, the IMF and world bank decided to write off the country's over \$5 billion debt because of the mission support in taking all the required steps under the programme. Another major economic achievement. Now, there is a conducive business environment and enhanced confidence for investment making the estate and financial sector record significant and steady growth. Moreover, large numbers of the diaspora population have returned and are investing in millions of dollars in various businesses, thereby spurring economic growth. Also, the rebuilding of state institutions

such as education and health sectors under the leadership of AMISOM, there is relative peace in the country.

#### **6.4.1.2 Securing population Centers, and key government installations**

The civilian component in collaboration with the other components and other partners has succeeded in liberating vast swathes of the country from militants/al-shabab control. In addition, the humanitarian and protection units have secured main supply routes to ensure the free movement of goods and services. These liberated areas have been factored into the quick-impact projects designed by the civil affairs unit and continuous collaboration with humanitarian actors to ensure effective and structured interaction for the facilitation of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. That aside, the civilian component ensures through capacity building, training, and effective coordination of the local security forces securing of key installations in the country.

#### **6.4.1.3 Supporting electoral processes in 2012, 2016 and 2021**

Since 2007, the civilian function of election unit has supported the Somalia electoral processes by creating space for dialogue, reconciliation and negotiation, and most importantly facilitating state formation process across the entire country. They ensured the proper planning and coordination for the 2012, 2016 and 2021 elections, ensuring that these elections were inclusive, peaceful, transparent, free and fair. And also support the handover of power successfully. This is a great achievement of the mission mandate in the area of restoring the rule of law and good governance.

#### **6.4.1.4 Rebuilding the Somali police force and restoring rule of law**

The rule of law unit which is another substantive civilian component function in collaboration with the police component, trains, mentors, and advises the Somalia police forces on the maintenance of law and order. This helps with modernization of their police force and improving policing standards in Somalia for a sustainable rule of law system when the mission is over. The unit ensured implementation of various programmes for the Somalia police force, targeting new recruits and all levels of officers in Mogadishu, Kenya and Djibouti training Centres. The ROL unit has also support the police with biometric data base for a credible salary payment system as well as refurbished a police station and equipped it with computers, furniture, and vehicles.

#### **6.4.1.5 Capacity building support for human rights and gender**

The civilian function called integrated training unit, the gender, human rights and the protection units all of which are substantive civilian functions in AMISOM/ATMIS, supported various capacity building initiatives of the Somali security forces, government officials, civil society groups as well as women and girls in preparation of taking full control of their country affairs at the exit of the mission. These capacity building efforts are an advancement of international humanitarian/human rights law and bring an end to human rights violations as well as stop all forms of discrimination against women/girls and sensitization of all communities on the elimination of conflict related gender based violence.

Aside the above, AMISOM through the civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Reporting Cell (CCTARC) is able to track the actual cases of civilian casualties by the various players in Somalia. This has particularly helped with tailor made interventions to reduce these violations considerably.



Furthermore, the AMISOM protection, human rights and gender unit has been providing guidance to the various sections of the Somalia security forces to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (HRL) through training and sensitization workshops. These were escalated to the government official, civil society organisations and regional/federal government for an enhanced capacity and awareness which will help in sustaining the peace scores once the mission exits.

An interview with the head of political affairs gave me an insight into the particular types of training conducted for the different strata of the Somalia community in order to equip them with sustainability skills once the mission is over and some of them were in the pictures he shared as an appendix at the end of the work.

These trainings were conducted for the members of Somalia parliament, the youth wing, the women groups and revenue officials on proper taxation measures for a sustainable government upon mission exit. All pictures have individual training title and periods of implementation.

#### **6.4.2 Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)**

Quick impact projects (QIPs) are small scale, low cost programmes that are planned and implemented within short periods of time to and have a rapid positive impact on targeted communities. The AMISOM Civil Affairs Unit is the civilian substantive function responsible for QIPs. They have implemented several of these projects from 2007 to date. Some of these are construction of schools, hospitals, water wells, free medical care Centers, police station, just to mention a few. When I asked the head of civil affairs in an interview if these made any impact in the community, he smiled broadly and said yes, telling me some of the impacts which included: reduction in crime, many children going to school, women and girls having the confidence to report



rape cases and police being able to track and deal with crimes thereby reducing general crime rate in Somalia. These are many other benefits inspired by the civilian component in AMISOM cannot be over emphasised, hence the essence of this research work.

### **6.4.3 UNMISS civilian contribution to South Sudan**

This section shows the various projects and activities done in South Sudan as major contributions achieved through peace operations. Since 2012, the peacekeeping mission has implemented 17 projects in the Eastern Equatoria region. Past contributions include the construction of water sanitation facilities, courts, medical centres, police posts, and prison facilities.

#### **6.4.3.1 Four classroom block handed over on 4 July 2016**

UNMISS as part of its quick impact projects(QIPs) and social intervention programs, built a 500-dollar four-classroom block in a community school at Naagori in Yambio under the funding of Mission Relief Reintegration and Protection section. This project happened at the Sunrise Nursery and Primary School with a population of 100 (UNMISS, 2022).

#### **6.4.3.2 Rehabilitation of an old historic building into a court and a water rehabilitation project handed over 24 January 2018**

In the middle of Torit town, in the eastern Equatorial region of South Sudan, there stood a building that had been constructed in 1946 as a crucial meeting spot for resolving local problems. Over the course of its 72 years, it has had a difficult history, with its straw roof burning down twice before being replaced with iron sheets. Upon request, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan

intervened to save the historical site so that the local community could continue to host significant meetings, including discussions intended to advance the peace process in the region.

The UNMISS peace operations completed the B'Court restoration, which included furnishing the entire structure, installing latrines and seats, and providing furniture and office supplies. Their goal was to improve the atmosphere for the mandate's execution. (UNMISS,2022)

"The court's reopening helps reduce crime and reduced violence since it provides a meeting space for the community to settle disputes amicably and according to custom. According to the chief of Troit municipal, it will aid in enhancing ties within the neighborhood.

In order to offer women detainees with secure facilities to utilize, UNMISS has started a second Quick Impact Project in Torit to build a Water and Sanitation Facility in the Special Protection Unit at the Central Police station. Both initiatives are being carried out in collaboration with the Moonlight Development Organization and should be finished in three months. Between 2012 and 2017, UNMISS sponsored and finished more than a dozen QIPs in the Eastern Equatoria region, and it will continue to employ these initiatives to support the establishment of a lasting peace in the area.

#### **6.4.3.3 Improvement in law and order handed over in July 2017**

In the Upper Nile region of South Sudan, UNMISS supported three projects to renovate new police, judicial, and police conference facilities. These improvements helped the local populations by preserving law and order. Offices received new furniture, window and door replacements, and wall crack repairs. Additionally, solar energy has been installed to power computers, fans, and security lights. Police holding cells now have functional toilets to give suspects better hygiene and

dignity while they wait for trial. The South Sudanese people benefited significantly from the renovation of these existing facilities.



**UNMISS Civilians handing over to the police a renovated station and offices 5<sup>th</sup> July 2017**

**Source: (UNMISS.org, 2022)**

#### **6.4.3.4 Renovation of court building & police station in Malakal launched 17<sup>th</sup> March 2017**

A Quick Impact Project (QIP) has been started by UNMISS, its implementing partners, the South Sudan Development Agency SSUDA, and the Humanitarian and Development Consortium (HDC), to repair the police station and courthouse in Malakal. The UNMISS-funded project, which will cost 47,000 USD, will increase access to legal services for more than 100,000 residents by empowering and prioritizing government agencies that uphold the rule of law. In five weeks, the project should be finished. The renovations included the refurbishment of the buildings of the court and the police station, and also of the interior offices to bring them up to habitable standards. Both

buildings were fully destroyed by the conflict-related violence that has been plaguing the city. In his remarks at the project launch, the governor of Central Upper Nile State, James Tor Monybuony, expressed his appreciation of the financial role of UNMISS and emphasized that his government is doing all it can to reinstate the rule of law and sustain the relative peace which has been achieved.

#### **6.4.3.5 Women resource center**

UNMISS supported a resource center initiative for women in Northern Bahr el Ghazal region, valued USD 47,000, in an effort to empower women in the area. On March 23, 2018, they presented two fast impact initiatives to the locals of Aweil East and Aweil Town. The main objective of this project is to empower and uplift the women in this region. It is meant to improve the household income, to improve the status of vulnerable women and strengthen their resilience. Today, we hand it over to the community, with the expectation that it will benefit thousands of women in Aweil and in the greater Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal region.



**UNMISS handing over Women Resource Centre on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018 at Aweil town**

**Source: (UNMISS.org, 2022)**



In addition, UNMISS handed over a solar powered water yard to the community of War-Akech in the Aweil East area. The project, worth approximately USD 43,000, was implemented by the Pan Aweil Development Agency.

#### **6.4.3.6 Launch of QIPs 26<sup>th</sup> January 2021 to promote rule of law in Western Equatoria**

According to the head of UNMISS Christopher Muchiri Murenga, building durable peace across South Sudan is a primary objective in Yambio, Western Equatoria. Construction of six different buildings, including a police station, a prison, a bridge, a primary healthcare unit, a peace hall, and an office building for interfaith organizations working on religious reconciliation, is being done to promote harmony and stabilize communities, he says. He added that these initiatives affect Yambio as well as nearby communities like larger Mundri, Maridi, and Tambura. Mary Raphael, a Sakure-based advocate against gender-based violence, thinks that women in particular stand to gain a lot from the development of the police station (Salifu, 2021). Many women who have endured either sexual assaults or domestic violence might find hope at the police station, says Mary. “Underage girls are frequently raped by older men in Western Equatoria, and increased law enforcement presence will most definitely assist curb high rates of such gender-based crimes,” Community residents in Mundri, meanwhile, hope that the new prison’s completion will provide the rule of law the much-needed boost it needs.

Women’s advocate Juliana Mabruk said, “In Mundri, the shortage of prison facilities had brought about a situation where women, men, and juvenile offenders were detained together; this was disturbing.” Juliana is supported by James Enoka, the police commissioner for Western Equatoria State. In addition to supporting the rule of law, having adequate detention facilities helps law enforcement officials safeguard human rights. Additionally, according to Commissioner Enoka,

the future prison facilities will assist neighborhood police officers in lessening the effects of seasonal cattle movement, land conflicts, and other domestic concerns that commonly result in confrontation. With the use of QIPs, UNMISS meets critical societal demands that will eventually ensure peace and prosperity for all South Sudanese communities. Most crucially, they strive to strengthen local authorities' capacities and boost community members' faith in the capacity of government institutions to advance their day-to-day interests, according to Mr. Murenga. The UNMISS Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) program, which establishes partnerships with regional implementing partners throughout South Sudan; the funding for each project is USD 50,000, facilitates the creation of this kind of infrastructure.

#### **6.4.4 UNMISS Political affairs unit**

UNMISS political affairs unit established coordination mechanism among international partners and provided support to the National Constitutional Amendment Committee constitutional processes. Contributed to a peaceful and inclusive transition as well as the expansion of political and civic space by fostering discourse through forums with political leaders and members of civil society as well as by increasing the participation of women and young people in politics. The UNMISS political affairs examined and reported on the effects of political changes in the nation and the region for the mission's strategic engagement. The mission also offers a direct support to mediation procedures, example is the most recently the Sant'Egidio procedure to entice non-signatories to affix their names to the R-ARCSS structures in South Sudan.

#### **6.4.4.1 Civil affairs unit**

The Civil Affairs Division carries out its responsibilities with three strategic priorities in mind, in accordance with the current UNMISS mandate and SRSG David Shearer's mission to protect civilians and establish lasting peace through:

The goal of conflict management is to help local stakeholders avoid, lessen, and resolve interpersonal disputes. Initiatives include assisting states in the Lakes, Central, and Western Equatorial regions in setting up a joint border committee to regulate pastoral migration across their individual borders, as well as the Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Warrap states. Support for the management of certain intercommunal disputes is also included in this body of work, particularly in larger Jonglei, Lakes, and Warrap.

In order to solve concerns with social cohesion, Civil Affairs collaborates with regional communities. This activity aids in mending the social fabric and fostering trust between communities that are at odds with one another. Improvement of civil-military relations, sports, peace initiatives, aiding schools' peace groups, and conducting activities identified in the communities just to mention a few. This support is aimed at bringing tensed communities together. Civil affairs, help local stakeholders carry out reconciliation actions to support the maintenance of peace agreements. Supporting programs for inter-communal reconciliation in Boma and Torit is one. In support of the peace process's implementation at the subnational level, civil affairs organize forums to raise awareness of important community leaders and facilitates dialogue forums at the Juba level to create a nexus between subnational and national stakeholders in the implementation of the peace process to encourage ownership.

#### **6.4.4.2 Human rights division**

Since the beginning of the current conflict, the UNMISS Human Rights Division has given priority to human rights monitoring and investigations. After determining that there were good reasons to suspect that both sides in the conflict had perpetrated war crimes and crimes against humanity, UNMISS made a number of recommendations. Since then, the public has had access to the two reports on the situation of South Sudan's human rights. In order to support attempts at accountability, the study emphasized the necessity for the African Union Commission of Inquiry to both acquire more data and provide suggestions on systems for accountability that would encourage national healing and reconciliation.

In the event that the government proves unwilling or incapable to seek true responsibility, the report also recommended for consideration of a hybrid or special court with international participation. There will be other reports. Meanwhile, the Human Rights Division continues to monitor and document accountability measures taken by the government. Human rights officers continue to conduct field missions to monitor and evaluate human rights throughout South Sudan, particularly in areas housing IDPs from conflict-affected states. They also take up protection interventions in cases involving human rights advocates and specific victims, such as those who have experienced sexual and gender-based abuse.

The UN family has worked to ensure that human rights awareness permeates all aspect of its work in South Sudan, in keeping with the "Rights Up Front" policy established by the UN in late December 2013. Every effort has been taken by UNMISS and the UN agencies to take decisive and effective measures to stop abuses and violations of human rights. None was more dramatic than when UNMISS began to offer protection to civilians who were immediately in danger of being physically harmed during the ongoing conflict by opening its compounds all over the nation.



#### **6.4.4.3 Relief reintegration and protection**

UNMISS had a relief, reintegration, and protection unit (RRP) which liaised with humanitarian workers to support IDPs with the main aim of creating a secure environment for safe voluntary, and dignified return of (Internally Displaced Persons) IDPs and Refugees and gaining permanent peace. Here they had four major activities performed under the themes: protection of civilians, coordination, return, and reintegration alongside quick impact projects. When it comes to protection, the RRP identifies protection sites, and concerns and proposes maintenance methods, conducts analyses of requirements and recommends the most appropriate measures for creating safe environments for these returnees. In addition, RRP advocates the interests of the identified development nationwide and dialogues with relevant stakeholders for increased participation and successful delivery of activities so recommended to ensure resilient support and early recovery. Furthermore, the Unit collaborates with UN country teams to identify and ensure the realization of their main four activities so as to ensure safe and dignified return of the refugees and IDPs (UNMISS, 2022).

#### **6.4.5 Major achievements in South Sudan**

Since the start of the civil war in December 2013, RRP has collaborated closely with UNMISS security components (UNPOL and Force), partners in PoC camp management, IDP leaders, and a wide range of other partners to help create the right conditions for the safe delivery of humanitarian aid to 182,030 IDPs in five PoC sites in Juba, Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau. Additionally, RRP has led, and taken part in integrated UNMISS patrols to remote and difficult areas to conduct basic protection needs assessments that have assisted partners in conducting more in-depth expert evaluations to help guide their actions.

RRP engaged Implementing Partners to carry out a series of activities in Western Bahr El Ghazal state to help rebuild trust between IDPs, state security actors, and host communities in order to support the Mission to "foster a secure environment for the safe, informed, voluntary, and dignified return, relocation, and resettlement or reintegration into host communities for IDPs and refugees." Through these activities, a large number of South Sudanese individuals were able to express their ideas, worries, and suggestions for how to establish an atmosphere that would be conducive to the voluntary return of displaced people and their reintegration.

RRP's programming initiatives in Upper Nile state have assisted IDP youth and their peers in the mainstream community in learning new vocational skills, empowering them to engage in peaceful livelihood activities, which would make their return and reintegration more sustainable. Youth (both male and female) who had been separated due to ethnic hostilities and conflicts were also reunited thanks to the vocational training.

24 Quick Impact Projects worth about \$1,200,000 were established by RRP during the 2018–2019 fiscal year. For instance, RRP coordinated the construction of water points to reduce conflicts over water resources, supported the installation of solar power systems in two radio stations, and assisted management of court renovations and construction to promote the rule of law. The creation of community peace centers was encouraged by RRP in order to aid the Mission's efforts to create enduring peace. A 77% increase in enrolment was the result of the construction or rehabilitation of five schools.

#### **6.4.6 UNMISS Child protection unit**

Child recruitment and use, sexual violence against children, killing and maiming children, kidnapping children, attacks on schools and hospitals, and denying humanitarian access to children in

violation of international law are six grave violations that the UNMISS Child Protection Unit monitors, reports on, and advocates with the parties to the conflict to end and prevent. The unit is responsible for monitoring and reporting on all grave violations committed against children by parties to conflict in South Sudan; Establishing referral pathways for children in need by coordinating with government organs, UNICEF and UN agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other child protection actors; Supporting UN Country Task Force with Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on grave violations against children; Following up on recommendations made in UN Secretary-General's reports on children and armed conflict in South Sudan; Supporting creation, adoption, and implementation of action plans by parties to conflict in South Sudan; Promoting institutionalization of child protection within SSPDF through SSPDF training curriculum on child protection as well as establishment of SSPDF Child Protection Units and appointment of SSPDF Child Protection Officers serving as liaison Officers; Advocating best practices in handling children in conflict with law as per South Sudan Child Act (2009) and other applicable national and international legal standards; Delivering training and sensitization sessions to the parties to the conflict (Government Security Forces including SSPDF, NPSSS, SSNPS, NSS and Wildlife services as well as to pro-Machar SPLA IO and SSOA forces), Mainstreaming child protection concerns across UNMISS in conjunction with various mission components (civilians, military, UN Police and corrections).

#### **6.4.7 Major achievements by the child protection unit**

The UNMISS protection unit, in collaboration with UNICEF and other partners, has supported more than 3,148 children (2,802 boys, 346 girls) whose release and reintegration with their families were supported between January 2015 and July. Aside from that, more than 19,000 officers from

the conflicting parties, locals, and protection partners received training and awareness-raising seminars on national and international legislation on child protection and military command directives between January 2018 and July 2019. Also, more than 4,900 UN employees received training and activities for mainstreaming the mandate on child protection between January 2018 and July 2019; assistance with creating preventative and accountability measures for the South Sudan People's Defence Force (SSPDF) (UNMISS,202)

#### **6.4.8 UNMISS Gender unit**

The gender unit was established to support the implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) on Women, Peace and Security, namely 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), and 2122 (2013) within the scope of mission mandates and in alignment with the Department of Peace Operations' Gender Equality Policy (2010) and the Gender Forward-Looking Strategy 2014.

The Section is led by the Senior Gender Advisor and reports directly to senior mission leadership who are all civilians. The unit was created to: Develop capacity in order to ensure peacekeeping activities are gender sensitive and responsive to the different needs of women and men. Ensure accountability in order to ensure resources are allocated to address women, peace, and security agendas, and build partnerships in order to ensure effectiveness of advocacy support provided to national partners.



#### **6.4.9 Major achievements/contribution of the unit in South Sudan**

The UNMISS gender unit's achievements can be categorized under four thematic areas namely: global open day, technical and operations support, capacity development as well as research and analyses. And they are discussed below:

##### **a. Global Open Days**

In order to discuss women's experiences in conflict and peace and their concerns in light of the four action points of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and their action plans, the Gender Section has facilitated dialogue processes between the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, David Shearer, and women leaders from civil society organizations. 20 female delegates delivered the report Peace and Justice for Women in South Sudan to SRSG Shearer in 2016. Women Peace Forums were used to apply bottom-up, inclusive, participatory, and interactive techniques and methods to conversation processes. In order to increase the participation of women in peace and security, partnerships with UN Agencies, Funds, and Programmes, in particular UN Women, have been a key component and are being scaled up.

##### **b. Technical and Operational Support**

According to the DPO Gender Equality Policy, the DPO/DFS Forward-Looking Strategy, and the mission's own planning cycle, the Gender Section applies systematic approaches and methods while providing technical and operational support to mission components with regard to gender mainstreaming, gender equality, and gender parity.

##### **c. Capacity Development**

In order to improve the knowledge, skills, and preparedness of Force Gender Focal Points, Advisors, and Enablers on gender and Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), including

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), the Gender Section has provided the UNMISS Military component with training inputs. To develop and administer gender and SGBV training to new deployments to the operation, the Section conducts weekly introduction trainings under the direction of the Military component and the Integrated Mission Training Centre (IMTC). The CRSV modules fall under this. Key institutions involved in the implementation of the Peace Agreement have received training assistance from the Section. Together with the UN Population Fund, it taught 47 members of the Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) and gender focal points from the Government of the Republic of South Sudan in 2016. (UNFPA). The UNMISS Gender Task Force, an institutional body that promotes and facilitates gender mainstreaming throughout the mission, has a secretariat within the Section. It meets every three months to discuss updates, share skills, and plan and execute cooperative advocacy campaigns.

#### **d. Research and Analysis**

One of the main responsibilities of the Gender Section is to incorporate gender views into conflict analysis, mission planning, implementation, and reporting. The four pillars of UNSCR 1325 - increasing women's participation in public decision-making and peace processes; preventing sexual and gender-based violence; protecting women and girls from such violence; maintaining the humanitarian nature of refugee camps, including those for internally displaced people; and accounting for the various needs of women, men, girls, and boys in humanitarian settings—are all covered by data and information.

#### **6.4.10 UNMISS HIV/AIDS Unit**

The UNMISS HIV/AIDS unit has Since 11 July 2011, trained hundreds of Change Agents for outreach campaigns across states and maintained 94 per cent HIV&AIDS awareness among all staff. It has Sensitized thousands of persons to HIV and AIDS, ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, returnees, women and youth associations, students and teachers, Mobile Risk Populations and larger communities. Furthermore, the unit has provided voluntary confidential counselling to about 20,000 people across the country and conducted weekly induction of new staff on the subject matter. Furthermore, the unit in partnership with other stakeholders commemorates HIV/AIDS day, raises funds and creates awareness so as to promote safe sex, prevent more infections and provide care support to the infected through creative activities and condom distribution. They also produced information communication materials for extensive distribution and conducts monitoring and evaluation of the trends.

#### **6.5 The Collaboration of Mission Components In Implementing Mission Mandate**

This section discusses and analyses the collaboration that exists between and among the mission components. The existing command and control mechanism (mission structure), the leadership, communication, coordination, motivation, and joint actions. The mission usually has joint project planning, information sharing, mutual assistance, joint project planning, negotiation, and coordination of efforts towards mandate achievement. Here we see the functionalism theory at play. For instance, it is the monitoring and evaluation team that produces reports to inform the planning of community-based development projects led by the civil affairs unit in collaboration with the military engineering team to build schools, hospitals, and police stations while the police provide training and mentoring for the Somali police force.



## **6.6 UN and AU Mission Success Indicators**

This section considers how the civilian component contribution has been in line with the UN Charter (1945) and the AU constitutive Act, (2000) contemporary multidimensional peace operation mission success indicators on the principles of legitimacy, credibility, impartiality, use of force and international humanitarian law (IHL) / international human rights law (IHRL) compliance. These indicators include i. Understanding the Context of the conflict ii. Matching Resources to Mandate iii. Financing iv. Force/Capabilities v. Training. Vi. Flexibility and Adaptability vii. Coordination, Collaboration and Unity of effort viii. Transition and Exit Strategy, all together determine how successfully the mission mandate is executed.

## **6.7 Source of Conflict and Nature of Environment**

This section sets out to establish the demonstrated understating and appreciation of the context of the mission by the civilians in UNMISS and AMISON/ATMIS. According to the UN and AU criteria for mission success, understanding the nature of conflict and the context of operation is very important. When asked if they understood the source of conflict, 91% of the respondents demonstrated various degrees of understanding of the conflict and described the environment as hostile. They also gave sources such as ethnic marginalization, terrorism, insurgency, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, scarce, resources, and election-related challenges (Figure 5.9: field data, 2022).

In Somalia, the major source of conflict is terrorism and ethnic marginalization as the Al-Shabab is a faceless and dangerous enemy still militating against the people whereas in South Sudan, its mainly largely conflict-related sexual violence and gross human rights violation (UNMISS, 2022) among the listed causes.



The civilians in the demonstration of their understanding of the mission context made known the major reasons for mission authorisation and these included the protection of civilians, the prevention of further conflict, the restoration of the rule of law and good governance, human rights protection, women empowerment as well the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia and South Sudan.

### **6.8 How the Mission Resourced/Source and Resource Sufficiency Of Resource**

This section shows the resource availability to the mission. For every mission to succeed, it needs resources (AU, 2022) and (un.org, 2022). Here resources refer to money, logistics, personnel, and other required materials. Information from the field data and interviews with selected senior mission staff, the United Nations is the biggest funder of peace operations in Africa especially in UNMISS and AMISOM/ATMIS with 85% of the total resources in the mission, followed by the European Union with 39.62% support, 28% in the case of ATMIS by the Africa Union and the least contribution from the host nation. For the fact that some of these resources have been in the form of pledges, they may not always be available for immediate use as and when needed. Figure 5.14 in chapter five depicts the availability of resources and obviously, 80% rate of availability make this mission highly successful.

### **6.9 Summary of the Civilian Contribution to MDPSO in Somalia and South Sudan**

Summarily, the various achievements made in by the civilians in Somalia and South Sudan are the provision of mission leadership through proper planning and coordination, provision of concepts of operations that breaks down mission mandate into pragmatic activities and interventions in the communities, availing the various civilian who cooperate and collaborate with the military and

police for planned interventions in Somalia and South Sudan, monitoring and evaluation of progress made while reviewing activities periodically, and using the lessons learnt to review the mandates in Somalia and in South Sudan respectively hence the respective new exit timelines for 2023 and 2024 for the two missions. This is an excellent display of the Functional theory which depends on the competence of each independent part for the effective functioning of the whole system for a successful mission implementation. However, the liberal peace theory was not fully supported as it cannot be confidently concluded that absolute peace has been achieved through democracy in both Somalia and South Sudan even though lots of progress and development have been made.

#### **6.10 Exit Plans/Transition Team in Place/Sustainability Plans**

This section discusses the plans which have been put in place for peace sustainability after the mission is over, and how the Somalis and South Sudanese will be able to sustain the achievements made by the mission. In figure 5.16 where respondents' answer to exit strategy was presented, 69.70% agreed that there was an exit strategy whereas 30.30% said no. this was because the largest percentage saying yes were from ATMIS and the few from UNMISS, and rightly so. The Africa Union Mission in Somalia has drawn an exit plan which is effective from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2022 and hence the new mission name Africa Union Transition Mission in Somalia. Whereas UNMISS is still in existence but has renewed mandate, therefore majority of the UNMISS respondents are not sure what the exit strategy is.

### **6.11 Composition of Transition (Exit Strategic) Exit Team and Plan**

The AU organized a four day conference, which was attended by representatives from the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), military commanders from Somalia National Army (SNA) and AMISOM, representatives from Somali Police Force and AMISOM Police, as well as officials from the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the UK Mission Support Team (UKMST), European Union Training Mission (EUTM), and several of Somalia's international partners so as to plan the transition of AMISOM into ATMIS and its eventual exit. These representatives hence formed the technical team to oversee the transition.

### **6.12 Transition/Exit Strategy and Sustainability**

In chapter five is a presentation of the various exit strategies iterated by the respondents and the sustainability benchmarks in place for the Host Nations. According to the head of AUPSOD, ATMIS exit strategy is centred on generation of additional Somali Security Forces to degrade the capabilities of Al Shabaab, including through integration of regional forces to takeover security responsibilities from ATMIS; finalisation of the Somali Provisional Constitution which will clarify the governance and elections model for Somalia and ensure enhancement of governance and rule of law institutions to enable Somalia and its people to leave in peace

The mission is a transition mission with a reconfiguration plan and benchmarks that are monitored by the AU Peace Support Operations Division, working jointly with the UN, EU, and the Federal Government of Somalia. This transition team is referred to as the Quartet and operates at the Principal as well as technical level to direct, monitor, facilitate and report on all transitions processes to the AU Peace and Security Council as well as the UN Security Council.

In terms of sustainability, which have been differently reported in the interviews, they sum u to the following:

- i. Capacity building for the governance systems and state institutions such as the police, parliament, judiciary, electoral system/processes, medical centers, etc
- ii. Training of officials to keep on doing what will keep the peace, for instance the government officials, state armed forces, state police, the legal fraternity and civil society organisations
- iii. The various programmes include thematic areas such as taxation, elections, gender mainstreaming, the youth and security among others
- iv. Equipment like biometric systems, computers, hospital equipment, relief items, etc have been sufficiently provided to sustain the capacitated institutions
- v. Last but the least are the quick impact projects which have brought a lot of relief and community satisfaction are also there.

### **6.13 Challenges Faced by Civilians in Mandate Implementation**

In spite of all the successes chalked by the two missions, they obviously have challenges in their mandate implementation. The number one is the lack of political will largely on the part of the host nations, especially with the peace agreements. Another major one is the financial and easy resources available for the implementation. Even though the missions have pledges from funders they are either not sufficient for the elaborate plans of the mission or not fully available when needed due to bureaucracy and other administrative barriers, for instance in the case of ATMIS, the AU peace fund does not have sufficient funds for the huge budget of the mission in Somalia. That aside, the ATMIS mission has a faceless terrorist group as an opponent in their quest for

peace search, and this appears to be the most fruitless venture to embark on, and this is the lot of the AU mission in Somalia. Conflict parties never giving up the fight is another challenge and logistics, and the environment in which the missions operate is hostile in nature, just to mention a few.

Apart from the above larger challenges faced by civilians in the mission, they equally have challenges within the mission and these include some collaborative hick-ups. The civilians are perceived by the military as being indisciplined whereas the civilians think flexibility is important to them and the military thinks they are not serious since they stick to time strictly. As a result, this poses a challenge to their collaboration. The civilians are thought to be paid far too much forgetting very little, but the uniformed personnel forget that what they get from a mission only complements their salaries back home. Broadly, this study is challenged in the use of liberal peace theory as absolute peace has still not been achieved in neither Somalia or South Sudan as the missions have not been able to build peace. Part of the reasons coming from the inherent weakness of the liberal peace theory which favors external interventions to local intervention and indirectly causing fragmentation for the holistic achievement of the Functionalist theory due to issues of coordination among the actors.

#### **6.14 Conclusion**

The afore discussions have a presentation of the research findings in accordance to the research questions in line with the reviewed literature, the liberal peace theory and Functionalist theory as well as the UN/AU mission indicators. Where questions one and two providing a background and laying the building blocks for findings presented; research question three being grounded in the

liberal peace theory, research question four in the functional theory and the research question five the UN and AU mission success indicators.



## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 7.0 Introduction

This final chapter concludes the study by summarizing the research findings in relation to the research objectives/research questions as well as the contribution to the body of knowledge. In addition, it will review the limitations of the study and propose further research opportunities and makes recommendations for the peace and security sector.

#### 7.1 Summary of Findings

The findings of this study are summarised according to the research objectives, the themes in the research questions and the mission success indicator outline by the UN and AU in peace operations. The summary points center around: (i) mission structure and contextual understanding (ii) mission resourcing (iii) civilian functions/role in peace operations (iv) civilian components and their relationship with other components and (v) exit strategy and sustainability issues (vi) contribution of the study (vii) limitations (viii) further research opportunities (ix) conclusion and (x) recommendations.

##### 7.1.1 mission structure and contextual understanding

The civilians demonstrate an excellent understanding of the conflict situation by recounting the sources of conflict as ethnic, electoral, arms proliferation, terrorism, etc, and how their function helps solve the problem in the community according to the UN and AU this is one of the ways of being successful. The mission structure has civilians in the leadership and other very vital position where they steer the affairs of the mission to achieve their mandate.

### **7.1.2 Mission resourcing**

The mission leadership which is civilian, has been excellent with efficient resource mobilization and management for appropriate interventions in the missions and these are manifest in all the quick impact project, the life span of the mission and even the mission staff, all leading to the major mission successes we see today.

### **7.1.3 Civilian function in MDPSO**

They play a substantive role such as human rights monitoring and reporting, disarmament demobilization and reintegration, restoration of rule of law, free and fair electoral processes, capacity building and training, gender mainstreaming civil activities, and political processes to hopefully end conflict.

### **7.1.4 Civilian roles in relation to other components**

Social glue for the mission both at the administrative and operational levels. They give the mission stability as they are more stable and work longer years than the military and police whose turn around averagely one year. Data from the field indicated that over 50% of the civilian mission staff had been there between 2 and 15 years (ref table 5.1.6). they are the ones that the citizens are more comfortable relating with when mission staffs have to get into the communities for monitoring and impact assessment. They break the mission mandate down into concepts of operations, give direction to the mandate implementation, and help bring meaning to peace operations.



### 7.1.5 Exit strategy and sustainability

Through the civilian component wings of civil affairs, gender, protection, and training cell, the mission has been able to capacitate the Forces, State institutions, and judiciary system for possible takeover and sustainability when the mission is over. These capacities have been in the area of health, education, rule of law, human rights protection, and general crime reduction.

Somalia though has not had Al-Shabab completely degraded has managed to bring its administration from Nairobi to Mogadishu and ensured successful three elections and a smooth handover of power from one group to the other smoothly, a great leap in the democratic direction.

Table 7. 1 : Summary table

### Summary table - Connecting theoretical frameworks and research questions to meet research objectives

Research question	Corresponding theory	Remarks
Questions 1 and 2 Context of deployment and structure and composition of MDPSO	Foundation grounded in the UN charter and AU constitutive	Lays the building blocks for MDPSO (Structure and composition) Command and control/expertise and mission roles
Question 3 Contribution of civilians to MDPSO	Liberal peace theory	Contribution of the civilians to PSO in Africa Restoration of ROL/Gd governance/ world peace
Question 4 Collaboration among the three components	Functional theory	Existing collaboration between mil/pol/civ for mandate implementation Achievement of peace-end goal
Question 5 UN/AU Indicators and mission success	Indicators of the UN/AU mission success	Capacitation/sustainability/exit

In summary, apart from the table above, the findings of this study also include:

- ✓ Existing collaboration and coordination mechanisms among the three mission components (composition and expertise)
- ✓ The independent functions and interdependent roles by the components and how their concerted efforts are directed by mission leadership toward the mission mandate achievement
- ✓ How the UN and AU multidimensional peace operations are supportive of the liberal peace theory as well as the functional theory in peace operations at play
- ✓ Protection of civilians (core mandate)
- ✓ Restoration of democratic rule (the essence of MPSO/LPT supported)
- ✓ Peace agreements and their implementation through constant Monitoring and Evaluation
- ✓ The major contributions and achievements as discussed/analysed in the tables
- ✓ How multidimensional peace support operations support the liberal peace and functional theories.

## **7.2. Study Contribution (Value Addition)**

This study brings great value addition to the peace and security, peace operations, and academic sectors in that this study will contribute to knowledge generation and address the seeming gap in the literature at the empirical, policy, and pragmatic/administrative levels. Empirically, the study establishes the bases for the actual contributions that the civilian peacekeeper brings to peace operations, and peace on the continent, having highlighted some important achievements

especially, in Somalia and South Sudan. At the policy level, it will influence peace operations deployments and resourcing decisions, as the study provides deploying authorities with justification for funding civilian components inclusion.

Administratively, the study provides the UN, and the AU with insightful inputs, and exposes the difficult dynamics associated with the civilian roster, rapid deployment, quantification, and their continuous inclusion in integrated peace operations as a process to expand civilian expertise. This will bring meaning to the multidimensionality we tout today and influence the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) /Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to begin doing the same. Furthermore, this research offers recommendations for the researchers and students more research opportunities and provides Ghanaian graduates with alternative international job openings beyond Ghana and indirectly reducing chances of terrorist recruitment.

### **7.3 Gaps and Limitations and Future Research/Building on the Study**

This study did not focus so much on separating the individual civilian achievements of the missions separately as the focus was more on the civilian component, it also did not cluster specific civilian roles per the individual mission or community impact per country even though in a few instances they were clarified.

Future research could therefore focus on (i) Specific civilian achievements in a mission (ii) the importance of having the civilian component in multidimensional peace operations (iii) Civil-military joint achievements in multidimensional peace operations (iv) multidimensional peace operations make the needed impact. And (v) Is the cost of having a civilian component in multidimensional peace operations worth it?

#### 7.4 Conclusion

The broad scope of this study was to explore and establish civilian contribution to, and influence on peacekeeping operations in Africa, with a focus on two missions both at the global level of the UN and the Regional level of the AU (UNMISS and AMISOM now ATMIS). It also sorts to look at challenges that confront civil contributions. As had been highlighted by the Brahimi report, the centrality of civilian contribution to the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. The extent to which missions are now led by civilians and how the civilian component has become a prominent feature of modern peace operations formed the basis of this study. The study also sorts to close the yawning gap in the literature and the seeming disregard for the agency.

This research hinged on two theories, Kant's democratic peace theory within which the liberal peace theory sits, and the theory of functionalism. Many refer to the political writings of Immanuel Kant, and the central role he envisioned for the liberal republic as the foundation for perpetual peace which happens to be the ultimate aim of peace operations by the UN and AU. Durkheim's functionalism posits that society is more than the sum of its parts; rather, each aspect of it works for the stability of the whole. Just as the civilian component works for the whole of the peace operation mission through its major roles and contribution to the peace being sort in Somalia and South Sudan.

The study also showed that the majority of the mission milestone was made possible by the civilians, especially through the civil affairs, political affairs, coordination unit, human rights, and protection unit as well as the integrated training cell. Major impact-driven projects and interventions through humanitarian, health, education, judiciary, and capacity enhancement in Somalia and South Sudan cannot be over-emphasized. This study has succeeded in contributing to the existing literature on peace operations by accounting for the contributions of the civilians

which is the ultimate study objective. The afore discussions show that the civilian component provides the social glue for peace operations in Africa and their absence will imply a major struggle for any mission success.

## **7.5 Recommendations**

This study makes the following recommendations to the peace and security sector and academia about the subject matter.

### **i. To the deploying and funding authorities**

The study provides an opportunity for the peace UN, AU, and RECs/RMs to justify the cost of including civilians in the theatre of peace operations. Having demonstrated the invaluable contributions made by the civilians and proving that the mission cannot succeed without them, the United Nations, The Africa Union Commission, and ECOWAS are encouraged to utilize them and continue to make provision for their inclusion.

In addition, as part of the induction and orientation for new mission joiners and as a refresher for the old mission staff, reiterate the importance of all three components and how symbiotic their works are so that the respect for each other is deepened and the collaboration improved. Member states should be encouraged to contribute towards the peace fund so that there will be sufficient funds for operationalising the missions as required. And find more innovative ways of raising needed resources for the mission.

Some personnel complained about language barrier, it is recommended to get interpreters especially when the activities assigned are not confidential. In the case of political will, have meetings with the relevant stakeholders and have them understand the peace agreement signed,

highlighting its importance in the development of their community and they will hopefully be supportive.

**ii. To the Africa Union**

For the very reason that civilian experts are expected to perform as soon as they are deployed, this study recommends that the screened experts on the ASC-Roster are deployed in the mission to for the right fit and timely functioning to support a successful mission mandate implementation. A visit to the ATMIS headquarters showed a staff shortage, this study will recommend that the AU takes timely steps in filling the gaps in the mission so as to help achieve the transition mandate of 2024. As recommended, utilise the civilian standby capacity roster as it has trained experts with relevant skills required for the mission.

Some of the ATMIS mentioned the language barrier as one of their challenges when they go into the communities, it is recommended that provision is made for some language assistants to be employed in order to help with interpretation on the go. The financial challenge was mentioned by about 90% of all interviewees and this study will like to recommend that resource mobilization sources should be expanded and be more targeted innovatively by earmarking and approaching different stakeholders with specific aspects of the mission needs instead of the blanket search for bulk money. Once stakeholders can relate to specific aspects of the mission needs, resource support will be more meaningful direct, and timely. For example, some stakeholders are not comfortable funding military activities so expand the resource base by targeting specific partners for different and specific civilian actions for the Somali communities such as specific women and children-focused plans, health-focused action plans, and education-focused action plans with specified budgets and timelines.

The facelessness of the enemy being fought is another challenge mentioned, the study recommends that some members are identified and motivated to offer information about these criminals who form part of the community. That way they could be picked up individually and hopefully over time are reoriented to convert or are then separated from the community so that they do not have any multiplying effects thereby reducing their attacking effects and eventually making Somalia peaceful as desired.

The missions have equally been deviled with coordination and communication challenges and here the study recommends that the individual components are made to see the importance of each arm and coordination mechanisms are streamlined to improve on task allocation and supervision of work delivery on daily, weekly, monthly bases in addition to the quarterly and annual measures. That way lapses are detected early and controlled in good time for effective and efficient mandate implementation.

**iii. To the Peace and security think tanks, academia, and graduates of political science**

It is recommended that researchers in this sector should publish more on the achievements of civilians in peace operations and provide alternative job opportunities to be explored outside the country. To the Training Centers of Excellence and Training Institutions, multidimensional peace operations and especially the civilian component should form part of our peace and security or political science subjects for study.

**iv. To the civilian peacekeeper**

The missions present the challenge of staying away from family to work in a hostile environment, but this study recommends frequent leave to be with family for rejuvenation, for, mental health improvement and psycho-social support.

In additions it is encouraged that civilian experts take pride in the job they do and consider themselves equally important to the major achievement of the set mandate and allow themselves to be hound out by their counterparts in the other components.





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  6. <https://www.zif-berlin.org/en/what-peace-operation> (assessed 21/1/21)

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1-Field Pictures



**The Africa union authorized ATMIS travel cell to arrange a UN flight from Nairobi to Mogadishu in support of my trip. This is the flight I used. Grateful for this support.**

**Source: Field pictures, 2022**




**Mogadishu airport shuttle bus**



**The airport shuttle bus at the Mogadishu airport**



**Picture taken on arrival at the ATMS Headquarters, rebranding from AMISOM**








**Tour of the headquarters included a bunker, where staff hide from Al-Shabab attacks**







**The bunker has bed for staff to hide for days till rescue**





**The ATMIS Meeting room, where I was given security brief on arrival**








**Going to the offices for interviews at the ATMIS headquarters**





**The public information officer Opioh handing over a book of AMISOM achievements in Somalia on behalf of the civilian head (Gifty Bingley) who was on leave.**








**These protective jackets are sure so heavy but needed for safety**





The heroes square, where memories of officers who died in battle in Somalia are kept





**ATMIS Civil affairs unit**




**Interview with Christian, head of AMIS civil affairs unit**

INTEGRAI PROCEDAMUS






**Interview with the head of security**





**Weekly update meeting led by the Deputy SRCC**








**Interview with Fadyl, the DDR expert I Civil affairs unit**





**Mathias, the travel officer who took care of my trip, arranged my visa, UN flight, and accommodation and picked me up from and to the Mogadishu airport.**





**The headquarters is a heavy security zone**






**Training of Somalia parliamentarians, youth, administrators, and revenue officials**



Source: ATMIS HQ, 2022



Source: ATMIS HQ, 2022







Source: ATMIS HQ, 2022



Source: ATMIS HQ, 2022



**Appendix 2 - Letters**

P. O. BOX LG 1093  
LEGON ACCRA  
GHANA  
25<sup>TH</sup> APRIL 2022

THE DIRECTOR  
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE  
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PEACE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT  
AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION  
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Dear Sir,

**PERMISSION TO ACCESS THE AMISOM/ATMIS FOR RESEARCH**

I am Lydia Yamoah HAGAN, a Course Director at the KAIPTC and focal person for the ASC-Roster/Civilian component activities and a final year PhD student with the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon.

I have been the ASC-Roster focal person since 2014 and attended various civilian dimension activities since then. I have also been the Civilian Foundation Course Director from 2015 and trained many mission staff from across the continent including AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) now referred to as AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

In furtherance of my education I decided to write on a topic which I find relevant to the AU. In my engagements with partners, they usually request justification to fund civilian related activities, as many still misconstrue peace operations as a pure military venture.

Realising challenges in the inclusion of civilian aspects in multidimensional peace operations, I decided to undertake a PhD Degree to ascertain civilian contributions to peace operations on the continent, within this context, I'll use a case study approach, focusing on the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

I am at the data collection stage and kindly requests assistance to engage with relevant ATMIS civilian staff to administer my questionnaire if possible. In this regard, I will appreciate assistance to enable my visit to Mogadishu, including support to obtain a visa to Somalia. As a self-funded student, I will also appreciate if assistance with accommodation in the ATMIS compound is possible for three (3) nights to enable my interaction with ATMIS staff and prevent safety concerns as well as transportation challenges for my engagements.


If possible, and with your permission, I will like to schedule my visit anytime between 2 and 10 June 2022.

Attached to this letter is a letter from my university, with a copy of my questionnaire for your consideration. I will appreciate your assistance and support to enable me in undertaking a successful data collection and research process.

Yours sincerely,



Lydia Yamoah Hagan



P. O. BOX LG 1093

LEGON ACCRA

GHANA

1<sup>ST</sup> AUGUST 2022

THE DIRECTOR  
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DIRECTORATE  
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, PEACE AND SECURITY DEPARTMENT  
AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION  
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

Dear Sir,

**LETTER OF APPRECIATION**

**FOR A SUCCESSFUL RESEARCH DATA COLLECTION IN AMISOM/ATMIS**

I wish to express my uttermost appreciation to you and the Africa Union Commission (AUC) for granting me the opportunity to conduct research at the Africa Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

The ATMIS colleagues were excellent with my travel arrangements and very responsive in the completion of the questionnaire. And I know all of these were as a result of the request from the Commission.

I am truly grateful and promise to share the outcome of this research in due time, it may be of relevance to you. God bless you, the Commission, and the Mission.

Yours sincerely,



Lydia Yamoah Hagan

P. O. BOX LG 1093

LEGON ACCRA

GHANA

4<sup>TH</sup> MAY 2022

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

UN MISSION IN SOUTH SUDAN

JUBA

Dear Sir,

**PERMISSION TO ACCESS THE UNMISS STAFF FOR RESEARCH**

I wish to introduce to you Mrs. Lydia Yamoah HAGAN who is a Course Director at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) responsible for the Human Rights, Civilian Foundation and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) courses. She doubles as a focal person for Civilian Component activities.

Mrs. Hagan is a final year Ph.D. student with the Department of Political Science at the University of Ghana, Legon. She is writing her thesis on the topic **“Civilian contribution to multidimensional Peace Operations in Africa-the cases of UNMISS and AMISO/ATMIS”**

This thesis proposes to consider a sample from the biggest UN mission (UNMISS) and the biggest AU mission (AMISOM now ATMIS) from which deductions could be made. She, therefore, needs your kind support to the mission personnel (civilian component) for data collection.

Attached to this letter are letters from the university and a copy of the questionnaire for your perusal. Counting on your cooperation and support for Mrs. Hagan successful research completion.

Yours sincerely,

CY Dagadu

Col

For Commandant

Department of Political  
Science

University of Ghana

Legon, Accra

24<sup>th</sup> January 2022

The Chairperson

Ethics Committee for Humanities

ISSER,

University of Ghana

Legon, Accra

Dear Chairperson,

**APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL FOR DATA COLLECTION**

I am a fourth year PhD student with the Department of Political Science. Index number 10064993.

In line with the requirement of the University of Ghana data collection regulations, I wish to request ethical approval for data collection from the field for my thesis titled: **Civilian contribution to multidimensional peace operations in Africa: a review of AMISOM and UNMISS.**

Yours sincerely,

Lydia Yamoah Hagan

Enclosed:

1. Cover letter
2. Letter from the Head of Department
3. New Protocol submission form
4. Protocol consent form
5. Research proposal
6. Work plan
7. Budget
8. Questionnaire
9. Curriculum vitae

AFRICAN UNION

الاتحاد الأفريقي




UNION AFRICAINE

UNIÃO AFRICANA

**INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM**

To: Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS REF: CPAPS/CMD/244/A/36926-22

Through:  Date: 7 June 2022

From: Director, Conflict Management Directorate Ext: 2927

Subject: **REQUEST FOR PROVISION OF SUPPORT TO A KAIPTC COURSE DIRECTOR/PHD STUDENT AT THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON RESERACHING ON ATMIS**

Reference is made to attached letter received from the University of Ghana, Legon to Conflict Management Directorate of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department on behalf of Ms. Lydia Yamoah Hagan. Ms. Hagan is a Course Director at the KAIPTC—Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre and a Focal Point for the African Standby Capacity (ASC) Roster and Civilian Component activities. Currently she is a PhD student with the Department of Political Affairs at the University of Ghana, Legon. Ms. Hagan is interested in civilian and multidimensional aspects Peace Support Operations (PSOs), with a case study on the UN Mission on South Sudan (UNMISS) and AMISOM/ATMIS.

Ms. Hagan is currently at the data collection stage and intends to obtain assistance from the relevant Civilian Staff to conduct her questionnaire. In this regard, she wishes to undertake her research physically in Mogadishu during the 3<sup>rd</sup> week of June 2023 and requests ATMIS' assistance to obtain a visa to Somalia as well as accommodation for three (3) days within ATMIS premises – since she is a self-sponsored student.

As a staff of one of AU's key African partner institutions, it is requested that ATMIS assist in providing the requested support. It is requested that an ATMIS Focal Person is selected to facilitate this assistance through Rinass Abdella – Political Officer, PSOD on the contact details below: [RinassA@africa-union.org](mailto:RinassA@africa-union.org); Mob: +251911-51-16-26.

Thank you



**Appendix 3 - Questionnaire**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE MISSION STAFF**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

**PHD THESIS**

This questionnaire is to collect data for a Ph.D. thesis titled: civilian contribution to multidimensional peace operations in Africa, the case of AMISOM and UNMISS. The data collection and thesis are purely an academic exercise. Therefore, any information provided will be treated as confidential. I therefore, count on your cooperation in answering these questions.

**SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION**

*(Tick the appropriate answer)*

1. Age

(1) 18- 30  (2) 31-40  (3) 41-50  (4) 51-60 (5) 61 and above

2. Gender

(1) male  (2) female  (3) others

3. Marital status

(1) single  (2) married  (3) divorced  (4) widow/widower

4. Highest level of education

1. no formal education  2. basic (primary, middle, and JSS)  3. secondary (SSS, training college and vocational)  4. tertiary

5. Component?

(1) Civilian  (2) Military  (3) Police  (4) others

6. Mission

(1) UNMISS  (2) AMISOM  (3) Deploying authority  (4) Others

7. Function

(1) Public Affairs  (2) Civil Affairs  (3) Gender Affairs  (4) ICT

8. Nationality? .....

9. how long have you been in this mission

(1) 0 – 6 Months  (2) 6-12 Months  (3) 01-2 Years  (4) 03-04 Years (5) 5 Years and above



**SECTION B: CONFLICT CONTEXT AND MISSION RESOURCING**

*(Tick the appropriate box)*

10. What caused the conflict here?

- (1) Rebel attack (2) tribal issues (3) scarce resources (4) Election-related (5) others.....

11. Do you understand the context of the conflict? (1) Yes (2) No

12. How would you describe the nature of the environment?

- (1) Hostile (2) semi-hostile (3) normal (4) not hostile (5) don't know

13. How is this mission resourced? (1) UN (2) AU (3) host nation (4) partners (5) others .....

14. What resources are available to you? .....

15. Reason for authorizing this mission (1) stop the rebels (2) peace restoration (3) stop hostilities (4) protect civilians (5) others.....

16. Your function in the mission

<i>Substantive civilian function</i>	<i>Tick box</i>	<i>Mission support function</i>	<i>Tick box</i>
1. Political affairs		1. Human resources	
2. Legal affairs		2. Financial	
3. Planning & coordination		3. Procurements	
4. Public information		4. Logistics	
5. Humanitarian liaison		5. Engineering	
6. Human rights		6. Graphic information service(GIS)	
7. Gender		7. Integrated training service	
8. Child protection		8. Contingency owned equipment security	
9. Conduct and discipline			
10. Rule of law			
11. Electorate affairs			
12. DDR/SSR/Civil affairs			

13. Exactly what do you do on a daily basis

14. Can the mission function without you? 1. (Yes) 2. (No)

15. Explain further.....

16. How related is your role to the problem at hand?.....

**SECTION C: EXIT STRATEGY AND STATE RESTORATION**

*(Tick the appropriate answer)*

17. Is there any exit strategy in place? 1. Yes 2. No
18. If yes, what is the strategy? .....
19. Is there a transition team to ensure the smooth mission exit? 1. Yes 2. No
20. Who is part of the transition team? Mention them.....
21. Will there be a new mission?
22. How will the peace be sustained? .....
23. What challenges are you facing now?
24. Would you say the mission has been a success?
25. Any comments? .....

Thank you

### **UNMISS APPROVAL TO ADMINISTER QUESTIONNAIRE**

Dear Lydia

On behalf of the Office of Chief of Staff, we would like to inform you that your request to conduct your research with UNMISS has been approved. This permission has been given on the below conditions:

#### **Dates of the research:**

1. Adjustment of dates on data collection. Currently, our Mission is overwhelmed with a lot of activities, therefore, conducting this research as per your proposed time would be difficult. However, we suggest that we discuss the research dates in July so that we assist you in getting the research data.



**Questionnaire and the future use of PHD outcome:**

1. Concerning the survey, responses to questions about age, nationality and marital status shall be made optional, as they have an impact on privacy and the participants should not be obliged to answer for in order to allow them to take part in the survey.
2. Some of the questionnaire questions (e.g. nr.10, 11 and 15), as presented, oversimplify the root causes of the conflict and the context of the establishment and operations of UNMISS. Reference made therein to “stop the rebels” may be problematic, as this language is not aligned with the language used by the mission to refer to non-government/non-signatory elements. These questions should be reformulated.
3. The use of UN/UNMISS open-source information for academic research is permitted, as long as the source is properly quoted, and credits are correctly mentioned.
4. The Mission requires you to include the following disclaimer in your academic paper/thesis or project ***“The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of the United Nations or UNMISS as one of its organs.”***

To enable the research to go, smoothly, the Mission will on your behalf request the 20 UNMISS Sections concerned to identify (on a voluntary basis) two members (one male and one female). Legal Affairs Unit will be on standby to assist any participants for any clarifications that may be needed. LAU’s contact numbers must be included in the message transmitting the link to the survey in case any clarifications are required by Mission members taking the questionnaire.

Suggestion on the participants:

- The mission suggests only 2 participants as highlighted by the table below.
- Participants should be identified by each respective sections mentioned.
- There should be a gender balance of 1 male and 1 female participants from section mentioned below.

<b>Substantive civilian function</b>	<b>Suggested Participants</b>	<b>Mission support function</b>	<b>Suggested Participants</b>
1. Political affairs	2	1. Human resources	2
2. Legal affairs	2	2. Financial	2
3. Planning & coordination	2	3. Procurements	2
4. Public information	2	4. Logistics	2
5. Humanitarian liaison	2	5. Engineering	2
6. Human rights	2	6. Graphic information service(GIS)	2
7. Gender	2	7. Integrated training service	2
8. Child protection	2	8. Contingency owned equipment security	2

9. Conduct and discipline	2		
10. Rule of law	2		
11. Electorate affairs	2		
12. DDR/SSR/Civil affairs	2		

Regards

**Witness Mudzamatira**

Information Management Assistant

Office of the Chief of Staff

|UNMISS HQ |Juba RSS

Tetra: 11012226 |Ext: 2328 |Mobile: +211917166971

Email: [witness.mudzamatira@un.org](mailto:witness.mudzamatira@un.org)



#### Appendix 4 - Ethical Clearance

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)

P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana

Tel: +233-303933866 Email: [ech@ug.edu.gh](mailto:ech@ug.edu.gh)

My Ref. No... ECH 290/ 21-22...

March 30, 2022.

Lydia Yamoah Hagan Department of Political Science University of Ghana Legon

Dear Ms. Hagan,

ECH 290/ 21-22:

CIVILIAN CONTRIBUTION TO MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA (THE CASES OF AMISOM AND UNMISS) This is to inform you that your request for review of your protocol for ethical clearance by the Ethics Committee for the Humanities has been completed. The study design, informed consent and benefits and risks have been adequately addressed. The committee has approved your protocol subject to addressing the comments below.

Selection of Participants • Indicate specifically the number of males versus females. Other Comments • Given that you have been a director of training; familiarity may result in bias responses. Please respond to the points raised and highlight the corrections/changes (for ease of reference) in your protocol and submit a soft copy ONLY of the revised documents for the attention of the ECH Administrator by Friday, April 01, 2022.

Yours sincerely,

ECH Coordinator

Final approval in pdf below



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA



Ethics Committee for Humanities (ECH)

Official Use only  
Protocol number

PROTOCOL CONSENT FORM

Section A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Title of Study:	Civilian contribution to multidimensional peace operations in Africa
Principal Investigator:	Lydia Yamoah Hagan
Certified Protocol Number:	

Section B: CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

**General Information about Research**

This study titled "civilian contribution to multidimensional peace operations in Africa" is a thesis being undertaken in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of a PhD in Political Science at the Department of Political Science, University of Legon. This thesis aims at examining the actual contribution of the civilian component to modern-day peace operations in Africa using AMISOM and UNMISS as the global and continental models. The specific objectives first, are to examine the mission structure and composition of the civilian component in UN and AU peace operations in Africa; secondly, to describe the role of the civilian component in UN and AU peace operations in Africa; thirdly, to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of civilians in UN and AU peace operations in Africa; and finally, to discuss the challenges faced by civilians in mandate implementation in UN and AU peace operations.

The study will use a questionnaire to collect data from relevant respondents in the field and headquarters. The questions will be largely close-ended, a Likert, and a few open-ended questions to help get additional information where necessary.

Consent of the respondent will be sought first and assurance is given to them that this is purely for academic exercise and letting them know they could skip any question they are not comfortable responding to. Each participant will be required to spend a maximum of ten minutes completing the questionnaire attached. Participation is solely voluntary.

**Benefits/Risks of the study**

This study will, first of all, provide empirical bases for the actual contributions of the civilian peacekeeper in bringing peace to the continent and address the seeming gap in the literature. It will

Revised – August 2020

INTEGRI PROCEDAMUS



contributes to policy, knowledge, and practice. In addition, it will highlight the important civilian contribution to peace in Africa and give the United Nations and African Union some inputs for difficult decisions regarding the civilian roster, rapid deployment, quantification, continuous inclusion in integrated peace operations and bring meaning to the multidimensionality we tout today and influence the RBCS deployment policy of civilian's inclusion in missions.

Furthermore, this research will offer recommendations for the young graduates of Ghana and beyond in considering alternative job opportunities in the area of peace operations, highlight Ghana's contribution to peace and security in Africa, And assess the civilian factor in contemporary peace operations and generally improve the contribution of civilian experts in peace operations for a better Africa.

#### **Confidentiality**

The study is strictly for academic purposes and therefore, any information gathered from respondents will be strictly private, confidential, and used solely for academic purposes. Under no circumstance will the investigator reveal the identity of the respondents who have consented to participate in the study to any third party.

#### **Compensation**

The study is purely for an academic purpose and as a result, has no compensation packages for the respondents who will participate. The researcher will ensure that the participants respond to the questionnaire or interview at their location so as to ensure that they do not incur any cost as far their participation in this exercise is concerned. However, the researcher where necessary may provide drinking water.

#### **Withdrawal from Study**

Even though the full participation of the respondents is very important to the achievement of the study objectives, participation is purely voluntary and respondents reserve the rights discontinue or decline participation at any given point of the and or skip any question they are not comfortable answering. There will be no restrictions or penalties should any participants decline or withdraw their participation.

#### **Contact for Additional Information**

In case of further information, clarification on the study, or in the case of research related injury, please contact the under listed:

1. Prof. Abeeku Essuman-Johnson; Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon; 0208135834; [aessuman-johnson@ug.edu.gh](mailto:aessuman-johnson@ug.edu.gh)
2. Dr. Alida Seidu; Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon; 0260578079; [amalidu@ug.edu.gh](mailto:amalidu@ug.edu.gh)
3. Dr. Charles Anu-Agyeman; Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon; 0558202042; [cano-agyemang@ug.edu.gh](mailto:cano-agyemang@ug.edu.gh)

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If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant in this study you may contact the Administrator of the Ethics Committee for Humanities, ISSER, University of Ghana at [ech@ug.edu.gh](mailto:ech@ug.edu.gh) or 00233- 303-933-866.

**Section C: PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT**

**"I have read or have had someone read all of the above, asked questions, received answers regarding participation in this study, and am willing to give consent for me, my child/ward to participate in this study. I will not have waived any of my rights by signing this consent form. Upon signing this consent form, I will receive a copy for my personal records."**

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature or mark of Participant

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

**If participant cannot read and/or understand the form themselves, a witness must sign here:**

I was present while the benefits, risks and procedures were read to the volunteer. All questions were answered and the volunteer has agreed to take part in the research.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of witness

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of witness / Mark

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

I certify that the nature and purpose, the potential benefits, and possible risks associated with participating in this research have been explained to the above individual.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Person who Obtained Consent

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Person Who Obtained Consent

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

INTEGRI PROCEDAMUS

Revised - August 2000



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE MISSION STAFF  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON  
PHD THESIS

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**SECTION B: CONFLICT CONTEXT AND MISSION RESOURCING**

*(Tick the appropriate box)*

- 10. What caused the conflict here?  
(1) Rebel attack (2) tribal issues (3) scarce resources (4) Election-related (5) others.....
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8. Child protection		8. Contingency owned equipment security	
9. Conduct and discipline			
10. Rule of law			
11. Electorate affairs			
12. DDR/SSR/Civil affairs			

- 13. Exactly what do you do on a daily basis
- 14. Can the mission function without you? 1. (Yes) 2. (No)
- 15. Explain further.....
- 16. How related is your role to the problem at hand?.....

**SECTION C: EXIT STRATEGY AND STATE RESTORATION**

*(Tick the appropriate answer)*

- 17. Is there any exit strategy in place? 1. Yes 2. No
- 18. If yes, what is the strategy? .....
- 19. Is there a transition team to ensure the smooth mission exit? 1. Yes 2. No
- 20. Who is part of the transition team? Mention them.....
- 21. Will there be a new mission?
- 22. How will the peace be sustained? .....

- 23. What challenges are you facing now?
- 24. Would you say the mission has been a success?
- 25. Any comments? .....

Thank you

