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 YUN INTERVIEW
 APRIL 22, 1990
HARLAN CLEVELAND
HARRIMAN, NEW YORK
JEAN KRASNO, INTERVIEWER

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JK: For the record, Mr. Cleveland, could you explain what your position was at the time of the Congo crisis? As I understand it you were in the State Department. About when did that begin?

Cleveland: It began three days after President Kennedy was inaugurated. It was January 23, as I remember, of 1961. I was in the Kennedy Administration the whole time that he was President and on after, also, with the Johnson Administration. My first job for almost five years was Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. And so, all UN problems as well as other international organizations and other multilateral problems (except a few that were very specialized like NATO, which was in the European Bureau) but most international organizations like World Weather, UNESCO, and World Health, were my pigeons. At that time we belonged to 53 different intergovernmental organizations. But, the centerpiece of the job was backstopping and instructing the US Mission to the United Nations in New

York. And our gladiator up there, of course, was Adlai Stevenson. At that time, both because he was so well known and because the UN was much more central to our foreign policy, there was a UN angle to everything that happened. So I got involved in whatever happened. It was exciting. It was a very interesting task. The State Department, then as now, was organized mostly by regions and countries, which, of course, is not the way the world really works. It works by multilateral diplomacy, mostly. Almost nothing involves only two countries. The UN was a big crossroads and I had to deal with that from the Washington end and administer, as it were, from below the rather complex relationships between this extremely well known ex-presidential candidate who was our Ambassador to New York, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and President Kennedy and his staff at the White House. I had the feeling I was trying to administer that triangle from below, for UN affairs only, of course.

JK: As far as the Congo operation was concerned, it began in the Eisenhower Administration in July, 1960.

Cleveland: It blew just about after Independence.

JK: So, when you came on board there had been a change in administration. From your vantage point in Washington, did you see a change in the administration's policy toward the Congo operation when the Republican Administration left and the Democratic Administration

moved in?

Cleveland:No, there was actually a lot of continuity because the posture of the Eisenhower Administration was to support the initiative of Dag Hammarskjold, and it was his initiative really to plunge in with both feet, and establish there what still ranks as the largest peace-keeping mission there has ever been. My predecessor, Fran Wilcox, and the people in the US Mission to the UN in New York, were just as supportive of that. The controversy, the political controversy inside the United States about the Congo, really didn't develop until later that year, or the following year, when some of the supporters of Moise Tshombe, who was in charge of the rich Katanga area and whom the Belgians, especially the Union Miniere, were supporting, got into a tangle with the people in Stanleyville under Lumumba who were oriented toward the Communists. There were some middle people -- the Prime Minister at the time was Adoula --who were in Leopoldville. In the United States there were some people, notably Senator Dodd, the father of the present Senator Dodd of Connecticut, was a big supporter of Tshombe. Tshombe wanted the UN out of there (it was the Belgians really) so as to give Tshombe a free hand in Katanga which they felt would be advantageous for the mining interests. The UN presence there, with Ralph Bunche commuting over there for the UN, was a force that

had sort of buffaloed the Soviets. They couldn't figure out . . . they knew how to have a confrontation with us but they didn't know how to have a confrontation with the UN. Later, of course, there came to be a controversy about the financing of it but in the early stage the UN solved for us the problem of Soviet presence and domination in the northern part of the Congo.

JK: Now, you've brought up several issues that I want to go into a little more deeply. So, maybe we'll start with this last one. As far as US policy, what were the goals of US policy in the Congo as far as the State Department was concerned?

Cleveland: I think that they were essentially the same as the UN's, as Hammarskjold's, to keep the country together so that it didn't split apart, to make it a viable country economically and politically (not very successful in the long run). Mobutu was head of the army at that time. He was our man in a way.

JK: So, the US was interested in keeping the Congo unified.

Cleveland: Keeping the Congo unified and keeping the Soviets, the Communist influence out of there. And also, there was a very important element of, I made a number of speeches on this subject at the time, of developing the UN's capacity to act. I was interested in that and so was Adlai Stevenson and so was Dean Rusk who had been a UN expert earlier in his life. He was the first Assistant

Secretary for what was then called United Nations affairs. So, we had very good support from him. The European Bureau of the State Department and to some extent the White House staff were skeptical about the UN. The African Bureau, of course, was all in favor of the Africans. And I found myself being assigned repeatedly, by Secretary Rusk, to keep those two regional bureaus out of each other's hair and sort of triangulate between those two interests and our interest in the UN. We had a very explicit, conscious, and public national interest in developing the UN so that it could solve problems that otherwise, because of the US position in the scheme of things, we felt that we would have to go in and solve. The very first meeting that we had on this subject, which must have been within the first two or three weeks of the Administration, was the first meeting that I chaired after I sat down at my desk. I found myself chairing a meeting with four ex-governors: Averell Harriman was there, and Soapy Williams was there, and Chet Bowles was there, and, of course, Adlai Stevenson. And we developed a very clear policy that we were going to support the UN in terms of money, in terms of logistics -- which was very important, we provided a lot of airlift for them -- and also politically, helping to beat the drum for what was going on with some of the other countries and helping to keep the Belgians at least neutral on the subject.

Paul Henri Spaak was pretty good about it but he had a lot of trouble internally with the fire eaters who were very militantly in favor of the Union Miniere.

JK: How did some of these dynamics that you are talking about relate to the secession of Katanga? Originally, the first UN resolution had been to stay out of the internal affairs but later that policy changed. How did that relate to the dynamics, for example, with the Soviet Union?

Cleveland: Let me finish first about our interests and our policy. Essentially our pitch was that if the UN weren't in there we would probably have to be. Then over a period of the next year or year and a half or two years the Congo would periodically blow up into a big issue either with domestic politics or international incidents and each time the President would say to me, "I remember your saying that if the UN weren't there we'd have to be there. Is that still right, Harlan?" And I'd say, "Yes, that's still right, Mr. President." Then he'd say, "Well then, let's take the flack and stay with it." We had very consistent support and a very consistent policy throughout that period up until the time of Hammarskjold's death and thereafter. We had very close relationships, of course, with Ralph Bunche. And indeed for part of the time when the UN troops were chasing the Katanga gendarmerie around the country, we were in better

touch with what was going on than Ralph was because the word got to him about 24 hours late through a general in Leopoldville, "through channels." We had an air attache at the Embassy out there with a plane chock full of communications equipment and I could just go downstairs at the State Department and talk to that person, I think he was a colonel, on a single side band radio directly. Then, by arrangement with Stevenson on emergency things, I'd occasionally call the UN directly, although we tried almost always to work through the Mission, of course. But, I would occasionally call up Ralph Bunche and say, "Ralph, do you know where your troops are today?" And he'd say, "Well, I think I know." And I'd say, "Did you know that they crossed the Kolwezi River this morning?" And he'd say, "Oh, my God, they're not supposed to do that. The Security Council has not said that's all right, yet." So, it was a very interesting time.

On the secession and on the internal politics, there isn't any such thing as staying out of internal politics, of course. Every aid program we have is involved deeply in internal politics. Even educational exchange is an intervention in internal politics. The important thing is to keep it from being party politics. But, policy politics it always is. And our purpose and the UN's purpose was to keep the country together because without the riches of Katanga the rest of the country would

really be a basket case. I went over there at one point and did an economic study leading to the beginning of a more formal aid program and it was clear that the southern part of the country would be needed as part of the mix. So, despite the fact that everyone was kidding themselves about not getting involved in the internal affairs, the United Nations operation was clearly involved in the internal politics. It was helping guide some the chief figures on their relationships with each other and in general it was very active and so were we. We had a couple of very active Ambassadors over there. Ed Gullion was there for a while and he was an activist type of ambassador.

JK: Did you deal with the Belgian or the British Ambassadors in Washington on some of these issues?

Cleveland: Yes, some, but the protocol was that if the Belgians had a problem they came to the European Bureau and the European Bureau would fuss with us. But I saw all those people all the time at parties, of course, and there was a certain amount of interaction. The same was true on the African side.

JK: The Belgians were not interested in bringing the country back together.

Cleveland: Not at all. They were heavily influenced by the mining interests and by the Belgian citizens who were still down there and owned most of the riches. And I think they felt

that they could dominate it better if it were a smaller thing and they regarded Tshombe as their man. Whereas we were trying to bet on and to build up the central government of Adoula and later other people, eventually Mobutu.

JK: How supportive were the British of the UN operation?

Cleveland: Well, they were ambivalent, I would say. They voted for it. They let it go through the Security Council. On the other hand, they were more influenced by Belgian pressure than we were. They were on the sidelines but I wouldn't say they were among the chief litigants. The chief litigants were the Belgians, the UN, the United States, and some of the other Africans who saw the UN action as helpful in developing an African state there.

JK: Did the British or the French put any pressure on the US to stay out of the secession affair?

Cleveland: I don't recall, but I think if they had been very active on it, I would recall.

JK: You mentioned Ralph Bunche and Adlai Stevenson, were there others at the UN in New York that you were in touch with?

Cleveland: Well, there were four other ambassadors under Adlai Stevenson and I saw all of them all the time. The most active on this subject were Charles Yost, who was the number three man and the top foreign service officer in the mix, and Francis Plimpton, the New York lawyer, who

was the Deputy Ambassador. But Charles Yost handled most of the high level diplomacy and was in day-to-day touch with Bunche. Brian Urquhart was there and General Rikhye was in charge of the military operation itself.

JK: Were you in touch with these people frequently, as much as everyday?

Cleveland: Not everyday because we had a mission up there for that purpose. But, I had an arrangement with Stevenson that I went up at least a day a week and had an office right next to his. I was determined that we would not get the sort of problem that had happened frequently before that time and happened after that time, for example, when Andy Young was up there in the Carter Administration. He was off the reservation about every three or four weeks. Adlai Stevenson never got off the reservation that badly and I think, at least a part of it obviously was that he was such a gentleman, but also part of it was that he and I were in very close touch on everything, no secrets and so on. He never got an instruction that he was surprised by. He would occasionally produce some rhetoric up there that would surprise us in Washington, but usually it was just going farther than he was instructed but in the same direction, like in the Cuban Missile Crisis with that famous passage at arms with Zorin, "Are there nuclear weapons in Cuba? Don't wait for the translation, answer yes or no." That wasn't exactly in our script. But, it

was the most memorable thing that was said that afternoon.

JK: So, you went up to New York frequently and you were in touch with Leopoldville by radio.

Cleveland: And also daily cables back and forth. Of course, the Embassy in Leopoldville was formally responsible to the President but in practice was responsible to the African Bureau. So, the African Bureau would be the action office for sending them things. And the European Bureau was the action office for dealing with the Belgians. I was the action office for dealing with New York. But, that meant that I often, or my staff, wrote messages to Leopoldville or Brussels or London or Paris. Because we had the operation hour-to-hour. We had to watch it. We had a very active and politically very important client in Adlai Stevenson up there. And so, (in the bureaucratic broiling and boiling on this subject) we tended to have "the power of the first draft." That is, our client needed an answer even if it should be answered by somebody else, maybe they had already gone home but we were still there, so we would write it out, clear it with them and send it off. I had a very, very good staff. Joe Sisco was my first deputy and Dick Gardiner was also a deputy working more on economic and specialized agency issues. Walter Kotschnig was an old hand on the economic side; Bill Buffum who was later an undersecretary at the

UN -- in Bunche's job, in fact -- was the head of our political section; Don McHenry who was later Ambassador to the UN was a young first year foreign service officer. So, we had an excellent staff.

JK: You mentioned that at times you had better communications with the Congo than the UN had. Did the UN have a problem with having adequate communications facilities?

Cleveland: Yes, they had to deal through their field commander who was General Prem Chand. He was in Leopoldville at headquarters. Later on I think they had a Brazilian General there. But the brigadier general who was running the outfit was actually leading the troops down in Katanga; he was the man I described in the passage in my book (*The Obligations of Power*, 1966). And he was an absolutely charming character with a very self starting personality. If he felt something needed to be done he'd go in and do it and tell headquarters about it afterwards.

JK: In your book you mentioned that you did make a trip to the Congo.

Cleveland: Yes, several.

JK: You mentioned also in your book a particular Indian officer who you said when they were planning a troop movement, he would often drive in ahead.

Cleveland: Right, and that would so astonish the Katanga gendarmerie that they'd either deal with him or they'd flee. He had

very good control of his troops.

JK: What was his name? I didn't recall that you mentioned it in your book.

Cleveland: I can't remember his name off hand. But I'm sure it's in the archives. Brian Urquhart would know.

JK: Did you have a chance to speak directly to this Brigadier General?

Cleveland: Oh yes, that's how I got these stories.

JK: How did he manage to talk them out of combat?

Cleveland: I think it was just that he was very good at bluffing. And it wasn't wholly a bluff because the UN had I think five thousand troops in there at one time. Most of them were Indians, Gurkhas and others, and they were known as good fighters. The gendarmerie was a rag tag band and they weren't going to take on these very professional soldiers if they could help it. So, they tended to avoid confrontations. There really wasn't a lot of bloodshed in all that chasing around in Katanga.

Peacekeeping troops have a very interesting and peculiar function. I call them "soldiers without enemies." Soldiers are not brought up to not have enemies. Their whole education is to defeat somebody. But the purpose of this was not to defeat anybody but to keep the various factions out of each other's hair and calm things down and keep things quiet. Even in the more orthodox peacekeeping operations on borders like the

Sinai Peninsula, for example, or in Lebanon, the UN troops carried weapons but they didn't initiate any shooting. There was an incident (I think I mentioned it in the book) where a lot of civilians especially women were beating on the Indian soldiers as they stood at attention and not one of them broke ranks, not one of them hit back or anything. This Brigadier General was one of the most genuine leaders I have met.

JK: For the UN troops to learn this new style it took retraining.

Cleveland: Yes, and it took strong and clear leadership by somebody who understood what the exercise was. There was a Malaysian also there, either a major or a colonel, who had a contingent of Malayan troops. And they were also good and tough. They had been fighting the Communists in the boondocks in Malaysia and they were very well trained. I was also impressed with the fact that he had a clear idea of the completely off-the-chart kind of mission that peacekeeping troops have, which is so different from anything in military history.

JK: In 1964 when most of the UN troops had been taken out of the Congo fighting broke out again around Stanleyville and there were various incidents where people were being brutalized. The US and the Belgians carried out a rescue mission. Were you involved in the planning of that event?

Cleveland: Yes, very much involved, all night long.

JK: What were the circumstances around that event and how were the people removed?

Cleveland: Well, they had some hostages and . . .

JK: Were these Gizenga's people who had taken hostages?

Cleveland: Yes, it was Gizenga by that time. And they were Belgians for the most part. We decided to help the Belgians. They are our allies, after all. Also, it was nice to be able to work with the Belgians and not always be adversarial with the Belgians as on the Katanga issue. So, we decided to help them; we decided that we should not engage in combat, but to supply the air transport. It was planned very carefully and was carried out with remarkable secrecy. Usually operations like that leak ahead of time. And they got in and out before getting into very much trouble. There was a little bit of a fire fight but not very much.

JK: So, it was basically Belgian troops with US transport.

Cleveland: Yes, sort of commando type troops. It was called the hostage snatch. We were able to get them out of there. It was about the most successful thing of that kind I think in modern history other than the hostage snatch at the Entebbe airport that the Israelis had carried out. I stayed up all night with that operation. Every few minutes we had reports on how things were going.

JK: When there was a change in administration from Kennedy to

Johnson was there any change in the support for the UN operation in the Congo?

Cleveland: No, because Johnson's theme was continuity. In fact, his first intention was to tell us all that we shouldn't even put in the pro forma resignation that people tend to do. And actually Dean Rusk had to talk him out of telling us not to resign. It would set a bad precedent for an incoming president to just fold in everybody automatically even if he intended to do that. We should all resign and then he should reappoint us, and just keep the resignations in his drawer. So, there was a continuity in personnel and in policy. Stevenson, in fact, thought that he was going to have a much closer relationship with the White House when Johnson came in because Johnson was his generation and he had never quite gotten used to the fact that he was working for somebody (Kennedy) who was about of an age to be his son. So, in the first two or three weeks of the Johnson Administration he was down on the ranch over the weekends and so forth, but that cooled off pretty fast. Johnson and Stevenson were really not on the same wave length on most things.

JK: You mentioned that the US supplied transport for the rescue operation. What other kind of logistic support did the US provide during the Congo operation?

Cleveland: Economic aid was the main thing.

JK: Economic aid directly to the Congo?

Cleveland: Yes, we were the biggest provider of economic assistance.

I got very much involved in that. I had been in the aid business earlier in my life, during the Truman Administration with the Marshall Plan. So, I was the natural person to send over to study the aid situation and try to figure out what they needed and what the balance of payments was, which was impossible to figure out because there weren't any numbers for us to work with.

JK: Did the US get directly involved in the training of personnel both military and civilian?

Cleveland: No, the military contingents involved were provided by countries, Canadians, Ghanaians, Indians, Malaysians and so forth. And they were trained mostly by their own countries -- on the hoof because there wasn't an international peace academy or anything. So, there wasn't really a training system. I think that's what drove Rikhye to establish the International Peace Academy because there was a big gap to be filled and he has hoped to fill it.

JK: In the beginning it was hoped that the Congolese would be able to fill in the military officers positions. I was wondering if the US had gotten involved in training the Congolese.

Cleveland: Well, yes, there was a lot of educational exchange,

people coming over and going to school. Some of the Congolese military came over to our military schools, I guess, but that was not something that I was involved in. But, I was involved very, very much in the economic part.

JK: You had mentioned that one of the US concerns in the Congo was the Soviet involvement. And you mentioned also in your book that the US was interested in keeping the Soviets out of the Congo and pretty much out of the UN operation itself. At one point when Mobutu took over the government the Soviets were kicked out of Leopoldville.

Cleveland: They mostly left much earlier than that, though, at the end of the Eisenhower Administration about the time we were coming in. The person that deserves the most credit for that was Ralph Bunche. He went over there and he was a kind of nursemaid to the new government. He stayed over there and commuted over there during that period. And the UN had a series of quite strong Secretary General representatives like UN ambassadors, as it were, resident in Leopoldville. They had the Irish poet, Conor Cruise O'Brien, over there for a while. So, the UN took a good part of the brunt of the advising and helping the new government get organized. We did quite a lot of that, too, but more under the table.

JK: As far as your recollection is concerned, the Soviets did not have any presence in Leopoldville after that point.

Cleveland: They didn't have an effective presence. They still had an Embassy there, at least for a while until the Mobutu thing. And, as usual with their embassies, they had a covert operation going. But, they were really not very effective. As I said, they were buffaloed by the UN. That was something that was not in the categories that they had learned to think with, the UN being operational that way. They thought of the UN as sort of a committee. But we thought of it quite consciously as an action body. Part of our purpose on each of the peace-keeping operations was to try to leave a situation where the UN had a greater capacity to act after the crisis than it had before. So, the crises themselves were building up the UN's capacity. That was our theory on Cyprus and the Middle East and New Guinea and so forth.

JK: You mentioned also something interesting in the book that even though there were Soviets in the UN who could be consulted on the operation that somehow their consultations were avoided on major decisions.

Cleveland: Yes, well, the US and the UN secretariat were in close cahoots, you'd have to say retrospectively; it must have looked that way to the Russians. The Russians had an Undersecretary General for Special Political Affairs which meant you didn't really report anything of importance to that office. They'd have these Military Committee meetings which weren't really terribly

significant; the Cold War was on. There wasn't very much informal conversation with the Soviets, and I think that Hammarskjold and eventually U Thant, too, were not sympathetic to them. And the Soviets were more and more offended by the UN developing its capacity to act, and they consequently made more and more trouble about the money and stopped paying their dues. That's where we got into the crisis over article 19, whether the General Assembly would lower the boom on the Soviets and exclude them from voting.

JK: You mentioned that Senator Dodd had led some criticism of the UN operation. What was the basis of that criticism and how effective was it? Was any of the criticism of the UN operation warranted?

Cleveland: Well, I thought that Senator Dodd came close to being on the payroll of the Belgian interests that were involved. He was virtually the "Senator from Katanga" the way he acted. I failed to see what US interest was engaged here. His interest was obviously engaged. He was a powerful and articulate guy and so he was able to stir a lot of mud off the bottom of the lake and imply that anyone supporting this UN operation was "pinko" and so forth, a tactic left over from the McCarthy period. But, with the President as solid as he was on it, and the Secretary of State -- (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had never really engaged himself on the subject)

-- Senator Dodd was a big annoyance but not a big problem. One of the chief interests of the President in the UN was to keep Adlai Stevenson on board in the Democratic Party because as you know Kennedy only won by a few hundred thousand votes. If on any issue Adlai Stevenson had defected, resigned in a huff or anything like that, it would have been a major body blow to the Democratic Party and to the Kennedy Administration. Whenever a President gets into the White House he's already thinking about the next election.

JK: You also mentioned in your book that both the UN and the US have been better at discouraging violence rather than resolving some of the problems that have led to the trouble.

Cleveland: They are better at peacekeeping than at peacemaking.

JK: So, taking a look at the Congo and the problems that have continued to arise there, in what way could the UN have dealt better with the underlying problems that were causing the crisis?

Cleveland: I think the UN did in the Congo what it set out to do and we set it out to do, which was to keep the country together and to make it a viable country and to develop the national leadership. The only problem was that the national leadership turned out to be a General who in the years since then has become more and more corrupt and overbearing and stealing the country blind, I think.

It's like Somoza or Pinochet or Marcos or some of the other delightful characters that the United States has supported because they were there and the US couldn't figure out what else to do. But, during the time that I dealt with the Congo, what everyone was worried about was that Mobutu wasn't strong enough. There was real doubt when he finally took over that he would make it because he wasn't a very powerful or charismatic leader at all. So, in a way it has been surprising that he has lasted so long and disappointing that power tended to corrupt so much.

JK: During the Congo crisis there were a number of tragic deaths that occurred and a certain amount of suspicion surrounding these deaths. One was Patrice Lumumba. From your point of view and from the sources of information available to you, was there any complicity on the part of the Western powers in his death?

Cleveland: Well, I don't know for a fact about that. I have always assumed that the CIA was in on the act, though probably not directly doing the assassination but at least helping to finance and support the anti-Lumumba folks up in the Stanleyville area. Lumumba looked like quite a threat to US interests at the time because he was very much oriented toward the Soviets and he had the most leadership qualities of anybody around and it looked like he was going to end up as leader of the central

government. I don't myself know and I assumed it would come out at some time like everything else the CIA seems to do. But, I've never seen any direct evidence of it.

JK: The other tragic death was that of Dag Hammarskjold.

Cleveland: Yes, it's still not clear whether it was an accident or not. It was assumed at the time, and I don't have evidence that it wasn't, that it was just an accident. It was way in the jungle, pretty remote, the place where the airplane fell down.

I happened to be in New York when that happened. I was awakened in the middle of the night. Dean Rusk was also up there because it was during the General Assembly. So, we met at an early breakfast, Stevenson and Rusk and one or two other people, Yost and/or Plimpton, and myself to discuss the implications and what we ought to do. We drew up a very short list of people that looked acceptable at the time. There was a Finn who looked like a very good bet. The Asians hadn't had it yet and U Thant had been around quite a while as the Burmese Representative at the UN. And in the end the only person who was acceptable on the US list and on the Soviet list turned out to be U Thant. U Thant was something of a disappointment for the US government to Dean Rusk and so on. He was very Third World oriented, and he was not at all sympathetic to the US on Vietnam.

JK: In the Congo operation was there any difference of

opinion?

Cleveland: No, there wasn't. There was real continuity in the policy all around in that. The Congo operation sort of tapered off after '64 and we had other crises to deal with. The Congo was long running and complex, legally, logistically, and politically. There have been a couple of books on the subject. You may have seen the one by Kalb, Marvin Kalb's wife.

JK: We've covered all the questions that I had prepared. Is there anything that you'd like to add?

Cleveland: Only to emphasize that for a thing like that, which required deciding to support the UN and then staying with that decision over three rather harrowing years, it would have been impossible if we had not had a consistency of view and of support from the Secretary of State and from the President. I think the role that I was trying to play did turn out to be quite crucial and quite central because somebody had to coordinate the White House relations, the relations with the other bureaus, the relations with Congress on the subject, and the relations and instructions to the mission in New York, and even deal with the Pentagon to some extent on the logistical support.

I remember one of the golden moments of my life was going over to meet with the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject of the UN peacekeeping in general

but with the Congo very much in everybody's mind. I was proposing that we should predesignate some forces and do some training for this new kind of mission and get set up professionally to be supportive of the UN's peacekeeping capacity. The acting Chairman of the Chiefs that day (the Chairman was sick) was General Curtis Lemay who was a fire-eating airforce officer. So, the job had many interesting aspects to it.

JK: Thank you for taking the time to do this interview.

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UNITED NATIONS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT
ORAL HISTORY AGREEMENT

I, Harlan Cleveland (Interviewee) hereby agree to participate in the United Nations Oral History Project, sponsored by the Yale University Institution for Social and Policy Studies, and consent to the recording by magnetic audio tape of (an) interview(s) with Jean Krasno (Interviewer) on April 22, 1990 (Date) at Harriman (City), NY (State).

It is my understanding that a typed transcript will be made of such tape(s) and returned to me for any necessary corrections. I hereby agree that if for any reason I have not returned the transcript with my corrections to the Institution for Social and Policy Studies within three months of the time it was sent to me, the Project Staff may edit the transcript and make it available for research and other use as provided here below.

In the understanding that the tape(s) and transcript(s) will be preserved at the United Nations and made available for historical, scholarly and (as deemed appropriate by the United Nations) public information purposes, and that copies will be placed on deposit at Yale University for research and study, I hereby grant, assign, and transfer legal titles and all literary rights in the tape(s) and transcript(s) to the United Nations. However, it is agreed that neither the United Nations nor Yale University will publish or authorize publication of the transcript(s) or any part thereof during my lifetime without my written permission.

Harlan Cleveland
(Interviewee)

April 22, 1990
(Date)

Jean Krasno
(Interviewer)

April 22, 1990
(Date)

(For the Institution of Social
and Policy Studies)

(Date)