


UNIVERSITY OF GHANA



**GHANA'S NATIONAL BORDER SECURITY STRATEGY AND
COUNTER TERRORISM**



**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF
GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEGREE**



JULY, 2021

DECLARATION


I, Ibrahim Imam Haafiz, hereby declare that this dissertation is the result of original and independent research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr. Amanda Coffie and that this work has never been submitted in part or whole for any degree or any other purpose, with the exception of references and quotations, which have been duly acknowledged.



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DEDICATION

This work would not have materialised without the strength and guide of Allah Almighty. I dedicate this work to Faizah, Jawad, Najat and Nuwaira- Noella for their support throughout this period.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The contribution of many institutions and persons towards the completion of this research cannot be overlooked. Acknowledging such wonderful people is the least I can do.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States Security Governance Initiative (SGI)

JCAP - Joint Country Action Plan

NBSTGW - National Border Security Technical Working Group

NBSS - National Border Security Strategy

FIC - Financial Intelligence Centre

ML/TF&P - Money Laundering/ Terrorist Financing and Proliferation Financing

DNFBPs - Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions

DI - Defense Intelligence

FXDF - Foreign Exchange Declaration Form




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ABSTRACT

The main objective of this study is to analyse Ghana's National Border Security and the prevention of Terrorism. Specifically, the study examines Ghana's exposition to terrorism threats, the efficacy of the National Border Security Strategy (NBSS) in Countering Terrorism and the challenges faced by state agencies in border management. The study employed qualitative methodology and relied on primary and secondary data for the analysis. The study focused specifically on the land borders of Ghana. The data was analysed using thematically based on the study's objectives. The study revealed that the NBSS contributes significantly to the efforts in countering terrorism in Ghana. Therefore the study recommends easy accessibility to all agencies/personnel engaged in border security and protection. This can be achieved through the inclusion in the curricula of all national security services training schools and training courses.

Additionally, the study found that security personnel face some challenges that directly affect their duties at countering terrorism. These include threats associated with the movement of animals across borders, overcrowding, attacks from citizens and nationals, smuggling of goods, human and drug trafficking, armed robbery. The study recommends personnel protection, constant engagement with leaders and citizens of border communities to facilitate countering terrorism at the borders and inland. Finally, the study recommends that the government of Ghana adequately funds the National Border Security Fusion Centre to ensure sustainability and the achievement of the goals of the NBSS



CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Background of Study

Historically, events that influence humanity have generated diverse reactions to prevent a return or minimize its ramifications. Incidences of violence produce unilateral, bilateral or multilateral actions for dealing with them (Quartey, 2014). The phenomenon of Terrorism is not new to the human experience. Violent actions have been deployed in the course of human history by different actors for diverse purposes. Terrorism is generally agreed to mean acts of violence aimed at the public in pursuance of political or religious ideologies. Terrorism, however, is characterized by the use of violence against civilians, with the express intention of causing harm, death or panic in the population (United States Institute of Peace, 2001).

A key element of Terrorism is that there is violence or a threat of violence that is deliberate, arbitrary, intentional, and a predetermined strategy undertaken primarily for political reasons. According to Rourke (2010), the targets of terrorist violence are not necessarily the victims of the violence but rather the audiences of the violence. From this perspective, Terrorism is a form of political communication rather than direct military action. In his view, political violence must have an identifiable organization for it to be classified as Terrorism (Mensah, 2017).

As a result of globalization, it has become easier for terrorist organizations operating across national borders to share information, cooperate internally and with other organizations, secure geographic access, and acquire weapons. International migration of people lies at the core of the ongoing process of globalization. People migrate to improve their economic prospects, ensure a more secure living environment, reunite with their family members, or avoid persecution in their country of origin (Kahanec & Zimmermann, 2008). International Terrorism is, because of its cross-border dimensions, a migration issue. It touches on a range of matters directly affecting

migration policy, including border integrity (entry and residence with illicit intent), national security, integration, ethnic/ multicultural affairs and citizenship (IOM, 2003).

Africa has experienced terrorism before and after the September 11, 2001 attacks (Bamba, 2014). Kenya and Tanzania experienced concurrent violent terrorist attacks in 1983 when US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam were targeted and attacked. The attacks led to the death of 80 individuals, with more than 1600 injured. After September 11, Kenya, notably, experienced other terrorist attacks, including a major attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi in 2013. Al-Shabaab, a Somali militant group, claimed responsibility for the attacks, which killed 67 persons and injured 175. These terrorist attacks in different parts of the globe and in Africa seemed not to have triggered the requisite reaction from most West African states.

The occurrence of terrorism in West Africa has taken the dangers of terrorism to the attention of states and other stakeholders. Nevertheless, recent actions on the part of terrorists have radically altered the situation. Within West Africa, terrorist activities are diffusing rapidly from north to south. The influence of Jihadists in Burkina Faso is a developing concern for the coastal countries in West Africa. Although these countries have experienced very few attacks, the governments fear that activists will use Burkina as a springboard for activities in the south (International Crisis Group, 2019).

The comparatively weak systems within Africa in general and the West African sub-region, exacerbated by weak economies, make matters of security of grave concern. The security sector of many states in the sub-region is characterized by ill-equipped security agencies, insufficient collaboration among the different actors, and poor communication (Azumah et al., 2020). Borders in West Africa are undeniably porous. This is an issue of concern for West African governments, individuals, civil society groups and the international community. This porosity has contributed to

the easy movement and crossing of borders by terrorists in attacking innocent people and targets across West Africa. Boko Haram (a terrorist group), which has its headquarters in the Borno State in Nigeria, readily crosses the Nigerian border as it attacks targets in Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (another terrorist group) from Algeria has a base in the northern part of Mali and easily crosses the Malian border and attacks targets in Burkina Faso, Niger and Cote D'Ivoire (Mensah, 2017).

The growing threats of terrorism have been a subject of open discussion in Ghana by state actors and citizens of Ghana. This has created a need for serious action by the Government of Ghana to tackle the current terrorist attacks in some states within the ECOWAS sub-region to control the spread of such violence (Azumah et al., 2020). Within the challenges associated with Globalization, migration, free movement of people and goods, the porosity of borders, instability in West Africa, and the attendant increase in transnational border crimes including numerous terrorist attacks in neighbouring countries, Ghana is not immune to terror attacks. Thus it is essential to study Ghana's National Border Security Strategy towards countering Terrorism.

1.1 Problem Statement

In West Africa, terrorist activities are spreading. The spectre of Islamists getting to the Gulf of Guinea troubles West African leaders. Jihadists' militancy expansion within Burkina Faso has significantly deepened this apprehension. Burkina occupies a crucial location, linking the Sahel to coastal countries and neighbouring four of them, namely Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. Terrorists attacked Côte d'Ivoire in March 2016 and could be strengthened by the coastal state's fragility to launch future attacks. On that basis, the Gulf of Guinea states exhibits the weaknesses that a lot of the time reflect the condition of their northern neighbours, which are more disturbing.

The flow of the Sahelian crisis into Burkina Faso may well initiate violence on a regional scale, as it encourages the advancement of armed groups towards the coastal south (International Crisis Group, 2019).

According to Foucher & Jézéquel (2017), an additional cause for West Africa's fragility is the elusive regional response found in countries' inability to cooperate. These states have tried to cultivate a joint response to the Islamists activities. The establishment of numerous dissimilar arrangements with intersecting security and development obligations has meant that their struggles have been unfocused. There is also the challenge of an elusive regional response. The G5 Sahel Joint Force, comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad, fails to consist of all West African states and gives the impression of an insufficient reaction to the regional problem of terrorists. The G5 Sahel is premised upon the concept that the Islamists threat will spread horizontally, crossing the western Sahel from east to west; the response's originators overlooked the likelihood of vertical extension. Moreover, there are also concerns over inadequacies in the G5 Sahel's security processes and the fact that the G5 Sahel Joint Force and other West African states have under no circumstances appropriately combined forces. West Africa similarly lacks control and the financial resources which joint operations need.

From the start of 2019, many events taking place by the frontiers of coastal states, and relating to Islamists armed groups either directly or secondarily, have been connected with Burkina Faso. Two French holidaymakers abducted in Benin on 1st May, 2019, likely by brigands that supposedly attempted to sell them to Islamist gangs, were set free a couple of days subsequently in northern Burkina Faso. In late April 2019, Togo's President, Faure Gnassingbé, noted the apprehension of suspected associates of armed groups coming from Burkina Faso. In the same

month, Burkinabé intelligence agencies cautioned their counterparts in neighbouring countries that several armed Islamists had departed Burkina Faso to hide in Benin and Ghana (Tisseron, 2019).

The International Crisis Group (2019) has observed that Burkina Faso does not constitute the sole conceivable entrance for groups desirous of extending their sway into West Africa. Numerous events have occurred on the frontier between Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, comprising the kidnapping of a Colombian Reverend Sister in the Sikasso region in February 2017. The Islamist group, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), is working to open a passage from northern Mali to north-western Nigeria and north of Benin, transiting through the Nigerian settlement of Dogondoutchi.

Terrorist activities appear to be moving towards the south and east of Burkina Faso, getting close to the Gulf of Guinea countries. On 7 November 2019, an assault on a group of workers from the Bougou gold mine slew about thirty-eight individuals, attested to their existence in the east of Burkina Faso, neighbouring Benin and Togo. This attack occurred despite the Otapuanu military operation, which was launched on 7 March 2019. The authorities had hailed it as a success. Moreover, Burkinabe security operatives intervened in the province of Pô, a settlement adjoining Ghana in the southeast of the nation, slaying 6 persons believed to be terrorists (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Detained in April 2019 in Burkina Faso, Oumarou Diallo, the leader of a domestic Islamists group called the Diawo Group, possessed a list of associates in Benin, Togo as well as Ghana, signifying associations with these states. This partnership has been understood as a signal of a combined scheme that intends to cause the fall of Burkina Faso in an attempt to make a way into Togo, Benin, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire (International Crisis Group, 2019).

Many countries in the sub-region are seeking to fashion a border management strategy to safeguard against these crimes. Ghana is one such country with this strategy. In this light, this study aims to examine Ghana's border security strategy as a significant measure for countering Terrorism on Ghanaian soil.

1.2 Research Questions

The research questions of the study are as follows:

- i. What is the state of border management as a counter-terrorism tool in West Africa?
- ii. What is the National Border Security Strategy's (NBSS) contribution/role in countering terrorism in Ghana?
- iii. What are the challenges of the NBSS countering terrorism terror along the inland borders and within Ghana?

1.3 Objectives of Study

The main objective of this study is to analyze Ghana's National Border Security and the prevention of Terrorism. Specifically, the objectives of the study are:

- i. To analyse the state of border management as a counter-terrorism tool in West Africa;
- ii. To examine the role of the National Border Security Strategy in Countering Terrorism in Ghana;
- iii. To discuss challenges of the NBSS countering terrorism terror along the inland borders and within Ghana

1.4 Scope of the Study

The main focus of this study is to examine how Ghana's National Border Security Strategy contributes to countering Terrorism at the inland borders and within the country. The study covers the general overview of terrorist activities in West Africa and West African border management systems. Specifically, it will examine the case of Ghana's adoption and implementation of the NBSS towards countering terrorism. The NBSS was adopted because it is the main guiding framework for counter-terrorism in Ghana. The timeline for the study is January 2021 to July 2021. The adoption of this period enables the analysis to examine the implementation of the strategy and its efficacy to address the ever-changing nature of terrorist activities in West Africa.

1.5 Rationale of the Study

Although Ghana has not experienced terror attacks in the 21st century, there has been terror scares in Ghana since 2016. The arrest of some men by the police with a bomb (grenade) in January 2018 at Odokor, a suburb of Accra, made Ghanaians feel unsafe. There have also been attacks on churches in Burkina Faso by terrorists with the recent attack experienced on the 27th of May 2019. These acts have forced some residents of violent areas to cross over into Ghana. On the 3rd of June, a Burkinabe was also arrested with a loaded gun in a church at Hamile, a town in the Upper West region. A few days later, Canada and the United Kingdom issued terror alerts to their nationals. These events have heightened the notion that a terrorist attack could hit Ghana.

Thus, the study sought to examine Ghana's preparedness to counter these possible attacks by focusing on inland border management since the borders are the main entry point for terrorists across the sub-region. Documented evidence abound on Boko Haram and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Magrib use of border crossings to attacking their targets.

There are studies on border management and counter-terrorism but few have focused on the strategies of individual countries border management as tool for countering terrorism in general and the specific case of Ghana. The current study, therefore, has scholarly and practical implications. The study will contribute to the national security strategies of Ghana to protect the country from terror threats and protect the borders from terrorist infiltration. Also, the study will be contributing to the growing scholarship on this issue.

1.6 Thesis Statement

The study is qualitative and is guided by the following thesis argument. That Ghana's national border security strategy has significantly contributed to countering terrorism in Ghana.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

1.7.1 The Concept of International Security

International security broadly refers to the measures adopted by countries and international organizations to promote collective survival and well-being. The measures often comprise military action and diplomatic arrangements like pacts and conventions. It has also been observed that international and national security are practically related, as international security is national security or state security in the global space (Sheehan, 2005). International security began as a new area of academic study with the end of the Second World War. It started as an area of study independently but has become part of a sub-discipline of international relations (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

Some of the proponents of the concept of international security include Edward A. Kolodziej and Roland Paris (2004). In terms of content, international security has extended over the period.

Presently it includes a diversity of interrelated matters at the global stage, which affects human existence. The domain of international security covers the old or orthodox approaches of military clout, the origins and consequences of war among nations, economic clout, tribal, religious and political conflicts, trade and commercial wars, energy provision, science and technology, food, along with threats to human security and the stability of nations posed by ecological destruction, contagious infections, climate change and the activities of non-state actors (Sheehan, 2005). Even though the extensive view of international security considers everything as a security issue, the conventional view concentrates primarily on military issues (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

In terms of security in the international arena, Walter Lippmann (1944) perceives security as the ability of a state to safeguard its basic values, both in terms that a country needs not give up its essential values in staying away from war and can uphold the values by winning war but David Baldwin (1997) contends that ensuring security occasionally needs sacrificing certain values, which may include marginal values and exceptional values (Baldwin, 1997).

Arnold Wolfers (1952) contends that just as individuals show differences in recognizing and detecting danger and threats, various states also exhibit differences in security expectations. Arnold Wolfers (1952) argued that not only is there a variance between accommodation of threats, but different countries also encounter varying levels of threats due to their exclusive geographical, economic, environmental, and political setting. Related to the above, Buzan (2000) perceives international security as more than dealing with threats, but also in terms which threats can be endured and the ones that call for instant action. The concept of an international security actor has extended in all directions from the 1990s, with the range including countries, groups, persons, international organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations as well as local governments (Buzan, 2000).

Bertel & Kristian (2006) have noted that international security has assumed new forms in the 21st century and that threats are no longer mainly emanating from nations. Threats are emerging from ethnic groups preoccupied by hyper-nationalism, criminal rings, *Mafiosi* control, infectious diseases, HIV/AIDS, radicalism, poverty, economic mismanagement, over-population, failed states, in-flows of migrants, pollution and its attendant impacts, the irrigation and destruction as well as environmental degradation. The casualties of the new threats are mainly individuals, society as well as the entire world. The physical and economic existence of people is under threat and so is the existence of societies and eventually the globe.

Nayef (2007) has indicated that conventional methods to international security typically concentrate on national actors and their military capabilities to safeguard national security. Nevertheless, for some years now, the characterization of security has been stretched to deal with the twenty-first century globalized international system, its fast technological advancements as well as the international threats which emerged from this process. According to Nayef (2007), within a globalized system security can no longer be viewed as a zero-sum game involving nations only. International security, instead, assumes five dimensions which comprise human, ecological, national, multinational, and transcultural security, and as a result, international security and the security of any country or culture would not be attained without good governance at all stages which ensures security through justice for all persons, countries as well as cultures (Nayef, 2007). Weaknesses of the concept of international security is its failure to discuss the roles or the part played by and the limits of international organizations in ensuring international security (Kolodziej, 2005). The relevance of the concept of international security to this study is that the complex nature of present-day terrorism in West Africa threatens the existence of all the states in the sub-region and beyond. To address these threats requires the adoption of a comprehensive international

security approach. International security more than deals with threats, and has assumed new forms and that threats are no longer mainly emanating from nations. Threats are emerging from ethnic groups preoccupied by hyper-nationalism, criminal rings, extremism, and in-flows of migrants. The international security framework helps to contextualize the study by assisting in understanding how national actors and their capabilities are deployed to safeguard national security by responding to the threat of terrorism.

1.8 Literature Review

1.8.1 Terrorism in Africa

The establishment of a separated Africa Command by the United States is the strongest signal that the United States Government views Africa as an increasing Islamic terrorist threat. The establishment of Africa Command was significantly motivated by the realization that the disjointed approach of the US government's military intelligence work, as well as regional security training activities, were not able to meet the rising threat presented by growing Islamists connections around East and Southern Africa, the robust existence of extremist Islamic bands within Somalia together with the increasing existence of organizations connected to Hezbollah and Iran which, on occasion, cooperate with al Qaeda, in West Africa (Carson, 2014).

A key terrorist attack in Africa involves the one on the Westgate Shopping Mall which happened in the Kenyan city of Nairobi. This shopping center is famous because it is a major attraction for Kenyan citizens as well as foreigners from different parts of the world. This violence was ascribed to actions of the Somalian refugee network. Consequently, 175 individuals died and 68 nationals of other countries sustained injuries (Bolaji, 2010). The attackers isolated Moslems from non-Moslem colleagues and set them free but at the same time held the others hostage leading to the

killing of a lot of shoppers, mainly non-Moslems. As a result of the attacks by the Islamists, the Kenyan security organizations reinforced resilience against terrorism by strengthening its stand against illegal refugees particularly persons of Somali origin as they were perceived to be the originators of the attack (Azumah, et al., 2020).

Clarke & Ireland (2012) have also emphasized the attack on Nairobi's transport terminal, particularly the Machakos Station. Several transport stations in Nairobi are known for their impenetrable human traffic every day for it connects the Eastern and Central African countries. Al-Shabaab operatives' violence, which was understood to have been undertaken, caused nine deaths and several commuters injured. The assault was therefore considered to be retaliatory after KDF had arbitrated in Southern Somalia for about five months. The attack had the backing of East Africa Al-Qaeda operatives and agents. These attacks compelled law enforcement, counter-terrorism together with domestic security agencies to set up extra measures aimed at safeguarding susceptible public spaces as well as structures to supplement the security of human beings and assets (Clarke & Ireland, 2012).

In West Africa, there was a similar attack connected with Islamist West Province, and Boko Haram was found around the Nigeria-Cameroon frontier in Gamboru. The assault was a bomb attack focusing on military and non-military operative locations within a crowded market in the Gamboru city and neighbouring zones. It was discovered that the bomb ripped through a crowded marketplace situated between Gamboru and Fotokol in Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively, leading to the death of 30 people, with 35 people sustaining various injuries (Bolaji, 2010). Within Cameroon, there was an attack in the town of Waza that is generally viewed as the first and sanctioned assault by Boko Haram on July 12, 2014. This violence was motivated by the Government of Cameroon joining the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership in 2014. With

almost 37 suicide assaults largely around Northern Cameroon and the Lake Chad Basin area, 1,300 people died, resulting dire consequences for the social and economic wellbeing of the state and its inhabitants (Opoku et al., 2017). These attacks were followed by shop plundering, embezzled livestock, as well as stealing to fund their operations. Due to these attacks, the security of areas such as schools, public gatherings, markets, and transport stations was revamped (Opoku et al., 2017).

Due to established causes and associated negative effects of terrorism on lives and national development, various counter-terrorism techniques have been developed and used. It has been noted by Azumah et al. (2020) combating terrorism in Africa is a daunting task. Confounding the strategic situation further in Africa is the massive cultural and ethnic variances across diverse geographical borders, making the collecting and analyzing intelligence problematic. It also observed that strategies developed to truncate networks by eliminating prominent personalities within the movement are not likely to cause actual changes, especially as regards Islamic extremism as the ideology of the movement has been dispersed and assimilated to the degree that there is little reliance on personalities to lead and guide it (Azumah et al., 2020).

1.8.2 The Spread of International Terrorism

According to Gruici (2011), international terrorism is used when there is a large number of national backgrounds concerning the terrorists themselves as well as the victims of the assaults; and the space where the attack really took place. Terrorism has a long history and did not begin on September 11, 2001, with the al Qaeda violent attack on the United States. Weinberg & Eubank (2006) have pointed out that even the vilest singular deed of terrorism on American land prior to September 11, happened on April 19, 1995, when anti-government campaigners, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols exploded a truck-bomb at the frontage of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal

Building in Oklahoma City, which led to the demise of 166 people. Roskin & Berry (2010) have noted that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), established in 1893, can be traced back in time to over a century; implying that terrorism is not a new occurrence.

Broadly speaking, Weinberg & Eubank (2006) have outlined the motives behind terrorists' actions. They contend that terroristic approach and its instantaneous gains are spreading fear, advertising their concerns, frustrating authorities into reacting excessively as well as raising the determination of the "victim" people.

According to Weinberg & Eubank (2006) terrorists groups take advantage of weak regimes which are not able to uphold law and order, and often lack legitimacy and effectiveness. There terrorists groups exploit the fragile state structures to organise easily as well as plan assaults and create training sites. In the view of Weinberg & Eubank (2006) this does not happen for the reason that their activities are sanctioned by government but principally for the reason that the state lacks the capacity to halt their operations. A case in point is Al Qaeda which took advantage of the poor economic and leadership conditions of Afghanistan and Sudan. With this al Qaeda was able to establish their own infrastructure such as religious institutes, developing terrorist maneuvers, as well as to lift the confidence of victim people.

The September 11, 2001 or 9/11 terrorists' attacks definitively shaped global politics by the transformation of the global security system as well as the expansion of immigration system. On September 11, 2001, two hijacked airlines full of inflammable aircraft fuel crashed into World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York City, and another aircraft crashing The Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia-Washington D.C. Reportedly, a fourth aircraft targeting the White House in Washington D.C., crashed earlier in an area south of Pennsylvania, Shanksville (Gruici, 2011).

Gruici (2011) further indicates that the violent attack led to the death of 3,025 persons. On the basis of this attack the United States declared war on the prime suspect, Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Lansford & Tashey (2005) have noted that after the September 11 assault, America established the Global Coalition against Terrorism. Suddenly, the emergence of a new security threat was universally acknowledged, a threat that was not limited to a particular country, with no defined space and is essentially multinational in character. Many countries intensely condemned the Islamists' operations and embraced the idea of becoming part of the broadest coalition ever witnessed in history, a grouping led by the United States against international terrorism and its state-backers. In response to the attacks, a raft of measures and arrangements were put in place, even in the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as the Central Barcelona Process.

Following the September 11 terrorist violence, the influential governments of the West mainly had, in the final analysis, appreciated the fact that failed countries constituted an existent, crucial danger to international peace and security. The tragedy of September 11 generated an important influence over countries' approaches and concerns over immigrants, resulting in novel and higher levels of control and monitoring at national borders. Essentially, the horrors of 9/11 influenced most countries to deploy armed forces to topple terroristic regimes. The United States and their allies used force against states known for sponsoring terrorists. Citizens of India pressed for war against Pakistan after the Mumbai carnage (Roskin & Berry, 2010). According to Chomsky (2007), terrorists, like raiders, have been competent at crossing borders and killing people without authorization. Nonetheless, a terrorist can be born everywhere globally, making it difficult to see a logical relationship between border security and counter-terrorism.

1.8.3 Implications of Transnational Security Threats for Border Control

There is already a well-established connection between cross-border crimes and economic integration worldwide (Quartey, 2019). Quartey (2019) has noted that the situation is not different within the ECOWAS sub-region, which makes the task of agencies involved in border management herculean. It is to be noted that controlling and regulating cross-border crime is not just to ensure nonviolent co-existence with neighbours as well as stability in the regional bloc, but it must be viewed as necessary in encouraging relevant political and social-economic activities essential for integrating the countries. The ECOWAS free movement protocols constitute the main principles facilitating cross-border operations of citizens. The population of Africa is the most mobile globally, with the ECOWAS sub-region being the part of Africa with the maximum degree of movement of people (Jørgen, 2016). Furthermore, Addo (2006) notes that the porous nature of national frontiers in West Africa makes it easy for crime to be committed across borders and creates uncertainties resulting from weak interventions and measures designed for identifying criminal engagements. The criminal movements on the whole upset trading and other operations, people's rights, and other forms of human endeavour in regional blocs. Onuoha (2011) observes that criminal activity linked to border activities comprises illicit trade in small arms and weapons and trafficking of people as the dominant crimes. Marketing of narcotics and armed robbery form part of trans-border crimes that mercenaries and other actors commonly manage.

According to Ukeje & Ela (2013), controlling national frontiers is challenging because of the lack of an all-inclusive approach in addressing cross-border issues in West Africa, and there is, therefore, the necessity for clear and strong strategies merged with universally recognized principles as directed by ECOWAS, UN as well as the European Union. A weak security sector,

high rates of youth unemployment, marginalization, and coupled large refugees comprise some of the foremost challenges national frontiers within ECOWAS.

Adesina (2014) contends that the continuous existence of terrorist groups in neighbouring states of West Africa is extensive as a result of the porosity along with the largely uncontrolled frontiers. The situation is not different from other African states south of the Sahara. Cross-border crime is rising in Africa, especially dealing in narcotics, making it a major transshipment route of drug substances that are intentionally concealed to escape detection at the border.

Protecting African borders is a challenging task, making penetration by adversaries into conflict zones easy. According to Quartey (2014), the movement of persons from one part of sub-Saharan Africa to another by reason of armed conflicts generates serious security repercussions. It is to be noted that people who run away from conflicts have the right and protection under international humanitarian laws to be accommodated in nearby states. The internal law provisions notwithstanding, many a time, armed fighters travel along with people with refugee status and then threaten the security of the local host communities and refugees within the boundaries of the camps upon crossing the borders. Vignal (2017), writing on changing borders in the Syrian conflict, observed occasions where cross-border attacks or attacks on neighbouring nations were launched by fighters that at the outset make use of refugees as a cover to be able to get into the country. Actions of this nature on the part of armed fighters raise serious concerns over the shared nature of trans-border crime and the security of these borders. Emerson & Solomon (2018) view that fragile state capacity in dealing pragmatically with issues around its frontiers has resulted in the emergence of criminal organizations that facilitate illegal smuggling of contraband commodities and easing the easy movement of foreign nationals lacking correct documents. Even though only a few violent conflicts have occurred over borders, national frontiers have witnessed conflicts that

reflect the operations of multinational criminal groups across the border. Once the population along the border is abandoned and isolated from the central government development agenda, they become unhelpful and exceedingly collaborative of criminals' activities and scarcely make available information state actors in respect of the illegal operations undertaken by criminal gangs (Lan & Xiao, 2014).

1.8.4 Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) in West Africa

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Transnational crime by definition involves individuals in more than one nation maintaining a system of operation and communication which is sufficiently effective to carry out criminal transactions, on occasion recurrently (UNODC Report, 2005). The efficient manner in which transnational crimes are sometimes executed presupposes the participation of some states' officials and/or establishments. In the case of West Africa, transnational organized crime could include criminals in the region work together with each other as well as with other groups outside the region such as the rest of Africa, South America, Europe and Asia. Whereas it could be factual that the fragile nature of countries in West Africa and the weaknesses of national organizations authorized to fight the transnational crime has led to the upsurge of transnational organized crime in recent times, the involvement, active or inactive, of national officers in the region and outside, cannot be ignored. Organized crime can infiltrate political parties mainly because the lack of regulations on election campaign financing and the absence of state support for parties (Aning, 2009).

Globally, organized crime is regarded a significant threat to human security. Organized transnational criminal groups pose threats to West Africa's fragile states and to democratic governance development and establishments. Organized crime obstructs social, economic, cultural


and democratic developments at the global level, with uneven impacts on third world and weak countries. The threat and challenges of organized crime generally in Africa and particularly in West Africa is huge due to the high presence of weak countries that serve as possible breeding grounds for such activities (Commission of the European Communities 2007). The pervasive power of the corruption of criminal organizations, coupled with a general crisis by state actors in the administration of justice and enforcement of the rule of law play a part in contributing towards the flourishing of such activities (Mazzitelli, 2007). According to Aning (2008), in Africa, as in other parts of the world, organized criminal activities take the form of drug trafficking, advanced fee and cyber-crime, human trafficking, forgery, cigarette smuggling, illicit manufacturing and trading in firearms, armed robbery, the theft and smuggling of oil and stolen vehicles.

All the above activities are undertaken together with laundering of money and corruption, the two most important means criminal networks must master so that they can gain from their illegally obtained proceeds and broaden their scope of activities and power. Through corruption, criminal groups are able to obtain protection from state officials, influence political decisions and gain access to genuine business activities. West Africa in its entirety, and individual West African states, presents at the present time the ideal conditions for the establishment of structured criminal networks because of its competitive advantages in reducing risks and consequently maximizing profits (Mazzitelli, 2007).

West Africa's coastlines and harbours have become the center of transatlantic cocaine trade. Cocaine is not the only narcotic traded through and in West Africa. Heroin comes into the region generally by air courier to be subsequently exported to Europe and, to a lesser degree, the United States (US Department of State, 2005).

Fragile security and economic hardships create the ideal conditions for criminal groups to traffic humans and smuggle migrants. Children and women from all over West Africa are trafficked for labour and sexual exploitation both within the region and in Europe, the Middle East as well as the Arabian Peninsula (Mazzitelli, 2007). As for the final destination of trafficked persons, according to Mazzitelli (2007), two main patterns could be observed within West Africa. The first comprises intraregional trafficking flows, whereby children are trafficked for exploitation in the agricultural, fishing and private informal economy, or for begging. The second includes the trafficking and exploitation of young women to be used as either domestic work or forced prostitution in destinations in Europe, the Middle East and the United States (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006).

West Africa presently lacks the capacity to produce its own weapons, so most of the guns in circulation originated from outside the sub-region.⁶⁹ In sum, despite the decline in active conflicts, many countries in West Africa are still affected by the presence of militant groups, irregular changes of government, or the aftermath of civil war. Though the location of demand shifts over time, there is no shortage of potential buyers for firearms in the sub-region. Since most flows are intra-regional, almost all of the trafficking takes place by land, although air shipments have been detected. These seizures indicate that there are essentially five main sources of illicit firearms in West Africa: legacy weapons from past conflicts in the region; weapons from recent conflicts in neighbouring regions; weapons sold by or rented from corrupt security officials; weapons transferred from sympathetic governments; a relatively small number of weapons imported from outside Africa.



1.8.5 Religious Fundamentalism in Africa

From the time when the events of September 2001 occurred and the start of the global war against terrorism, the prevailing literature on terrorism has tended to focus on studying extremist and violent movements associated with Islam (Hassan, 2021). Nevertheless, the phenomenon of religious radicalism is experienced by all religions and beliefs (Siradag, 2016). Fundamentalism and violence based on faith exist in different parts of the African continent where the interpretation of religious texts is used as the main motive to justify the clashes with the existing society. This is applied to all major religions in Africa, including Christianity (Siradag, 2016).

Perhaps the most serious problem posed by radical religious movements, this study argues, is the ongoing conflict between Christians and adherents of other faiths, particularly Islam and traditional religions in many African countries. Despite the goodwill and calls for tolerance from many religious leaders, all indications are that conflicts along religious lines of communication will be the most pressing issue in the next decade (Hassan, 2021).

According to Hassan (2021), in general, there has been a changing face to religious violence over time in modern African reality, a region that has been fairly stable in terms of peaceful faith coexistence. Africa has not historically experienced religious wars since traditional religions were like isolated islands and had no missionary function. Despite small religious conflicts, there have been no major wars or conflicts based on religion in the last decade. Political religious movements were not a concern for the postcolonial secular state in Africa. However, things took a different turn as signs of religious violence began to increase on the continent. This may become one of the main sources of instability and human insecurity in the future. If this potential threat is not taken seriously it could alter the long-term dynamics of Christian–Muslim relations in Africa (Hassan, 2021).

Most of the countries threatened by religious violence are concentrated in the Sahel region and beyond, with a strong Islamic presence in its northern regions and a Christian concentration in the south (Hassan 2020). An additional factor is the influence from North Africa. There is also a general feeling of political and economic marginalization as a result of hegemony over the political and administrative apparatus of the state by either party. It is noteworthy that the past decade has witnessed an escalation of religious or interfaith tensions and sometimes violence in West, Central, and East Africa. While some of these tensions have been contained, others have escalated. For example, the Ivorian conflict is often portrayed as a confrontation between a Muslim north and a Christian south. With regard to the current religious demographic composition, this is only partially true. It is correct that the vast majority of northerners are Muslims (56 percent). However, there are a large number of Muslims in the south (35 percent as a result of internal migration movements between north and south, as well as waves of migration from the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso and Mali (Miran-Guyon 2006).


It is no secret that the main influence on interfaith relations is due to the fact that extremism from one religious group tends to encourage extremism from other religious groups. This occurred in Nigeria during the Biafra War, and the reaction of Christian organizations to the imposition of Islamic Sharia laws in the north. The case of armed Christian organizations directed against Muslims in the CAR provides another example. These conflicts can correspond to the lines of sectarian and ethnic divisions, which can lead to the violent targeting of some groups (Kagwanja 2014). Extremist religious movements appear in the context of a state crisis. The public sometimes welcome them as an alternative to the state in its attempts to achieve security and stability because it is believed these movements will be able to provide enforcement of the rule of law and establish

stability. In Africa religion is closely related to people's daily lives, and thus religious affiliation is shaped and becomes a decisive factor in building social identity. This affiliation may create sharp differences between religious groups (Hassan, 2021).

The review of literature discussed the spread of international terrorism, terrorism in Africa, transnational organized crime in West Africa as well as religious fundamentalism in Africa. The study focuses on Ghana's national security strategy and counter terrorism and using the concept of international security will help to give context to the study to understanding how national actors and their capabilities are deployed to safeguard national security by responding to the threat of terrorism.

1.9 Research Methodology

According to Creswell (2013), a research design is the plan for conducting the research study. It is a blueprint that points out how, when and where data is to be gathered and assessed. A qualitative approach will be adopted for this study. According to Moore et al. (2015) the focus of qualitative research is on people's reflections and emphasizing the uniqueness of the person. Researchers adopt a qualitative approach to examine the activities, perspectives, practices as well as emotions of people at the same time emphasizing their understanding appreciation of these considerations involved (Creswell, 2013). Qualitative research is a social investigation system that emphasizes how entities understand and apply their thoughts of real-life situations. The justification for employing the qualitative method in this study is because it is easy to probe, capture and define the views of persons.



1.10 Data Sources, Sampling and Data Analysis

The study used both primary and secondary data sources. The primary data was collected using a semi-structured interview guide. The study interviewed key persons from security agencies, organizations and some selected community leaders in two border communities and inland border posts. This study set out to interview 20 respondents, 4 each from the following organizations: the Ghana Immigration Service, Customs Excise and Preventive Service, Military, Ghana Police Service, community leaders. Using the principle of saturation, the study in the end used 12 responses from the field because further analysis of the data did not yield new themes or ideas. The use of 12 respondents is in line with Hennink and Kaiser (2022) who observed that saturation is usually reached between the 9th and 17th interview. Without doubt, the best extensively utilized principle for the determination of sample size and evaluation of its adequacy is that of saturation (Vasileiou et al., 2018). The study adopted the purposive sampling technique and obtaining rich information for the study was possible because of the purposeful selection of experienced respondents who have a good knowledge of their operations.

These agencies and actors are noted as key actors/agencies for the deployment of the NBSS. The study focused on the two border posts of Paga in the northern part of Ghana and Aflao in the southern part. The justification for this is that the two border posts constitute the biggest in their respective locations.

The secondary data sources included reports, journals, articles related to the study. After transcribing the interviews, the study used themes drawn from the interview guide and the study's research objectives for content analyses. The emerging themes from both primary and secondary data formed the framework for the analyses, findings, and conclusion presented in chapters three and four.

1.11 Ethical Considerations of the Study

Creswell (2013) defines ethical considerations as the moral standards that the researcher should consider in all research methods in all stages of the research design. After obtaining permission from the supervisor to conduct the interviews, the investigator assured the respondents that information provided to the researcher would not be used to go against them. To ensure anonymity, the researcher did not reference respondents' names and personal details in the analysis.

Furthermore, the researcher ensured that would-be participants were not compelled to participate in the research. Participants were provided the option of participating or not at any point during the interview and post-interviews. The researcher approached each participant, sought their permission, explained the purpose of the study, outlined the data collection procedures and eventually asked for oral consent to proceed with the interview. Each participant included in this study consented to their participation which is significant for achieving a high level of credibility and reliability of the data presented. Again, this also ensured that no participant was exploited or harmed during and after the study.


1.12 Limitations of the Study

The study mainly focused on Ghana's border security and counter-terrorism. To the extent that the study will not cover all borders in Ghana and all borders, there may be aspects of local border strategies that this study may not capture. Notwithstanding this limitation, the findings of this study

remain relevant towards examining the case of Ghana's border strategy and its contribution towards countering terrorism at those specific entry points and the nation as a whole.

1.13 Organisation of the Study

In terms of structure, this study is divided into four chapters. Chapter one, which is the introductory chapter, sets out the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the research objective, research questions. It also presents the methodology, literature review the significance of the study, and the scope and organization of the study. Chapter Two discusses key concepts and discusses relevant literature. This chapter presents an overview of the approaches to border management and counter-terrorism. It covers multi-agency working and counter-terrorism, coordinated border management, community-oriented approach to counter-terrorism, Ghana integrated migration management, Ghana national border security strategy, measures for terrorism prevention in Ghana as well as challenges associated with border management. The third chapter research analysis. The chapter deals with the state of border management, contribution and challenges of national border security strategy in countering terrorism in Ghana. This chapter presents the results obtained from the field as well as the discussions of the study. Chapter four concentrates on the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.



CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF BORDER MANAGEMENT APPROACHES TOWARDS COUNTERING-TERRORISM

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the approaches to border management and counter-terrorism. It covers multi-agency working and counter-terrorism, coordinated border management, community-oriented approach to counter-terrorism, Ghana integrated migration management, Ghana national border security strategy, measures for terrorism prevention in Ghana as well as challenges associated with border management.

2.1 Counter-Terrorism

Even though different countries adopt an array of means to interrupt the activities of terrorists in the preparation and implementation stages, the term counter-terrorism is usually used to mean the actions developed for countering the ideas, narratives, activities or messages sent out by extremist groups along with complementary operational pre-emptive efforts. Essentially, counter-terrorism is targeted at preventing non-radicalised persons from getting radicalized and stopping the operations of the already radicalised. Counter-terrorism is also targeted at creating resilience against violent radical activities which threaten the state and individuals via several means (Neumann, 2011). Effective counter-terrorism approaches are ones that dynamically involve and include several agents and allies in different parts of the world. This also includes leveraging the tools together with the capacities of nations all over the globe against a common enemy.

Counter-terrorism also includes persuading persons with extremists thinking and discouraging them from actualizing them. It deals with actions which are taken by appropriate agencies to thwart terrorist activities. This implies that the target population for counter-terrorism programmes is

actually enormous, particularly if the actions and processes are directed at people locally or overseas deemed to be in a position to offer assistance to facilitate the operations of terrorists groups. On this basis, it has been suggested by Lorenzo (2010) that the array of non-coercive methods which can consist counter terrorism measures remain extensive. As a result, governments together with international agencies have undertaken a comprehensive set of actions towards countering violent terrorism. It is further stated that most of the measures adopted are built upon existing initiatives as well as strategies such as engaging communities, delivering development, conflict prevention, etc. According to Neumann (2011), the set of actions adopted to fight terrorist operations is potentially infinite. Neumann (2011) developed a typology of indicative actions, embracing: messaging; engagement and outreach; developing the capacity of agencies in the fight against terrorism, community security along with protection programmes, education and training of community leaders, public employees, law enforcement, etc.

Romaniuk & Naureen (2012) have stated that the broad nature of counter terrorism measures means counter-terrorism operatives come into contact with a spectrum of actors which were possibly beyond the range of their immediate tasks. Generally, counter terrorism mobilises new implementing actors from diverse government agencies, engaging non-traditional actors outside the regular system of government's operations, as well as extending antiterrorism operations to a range of policy spheres which were hitherto not impacted by issues of national security. Counter methods and their goals, funding as well as efforts to incorporate prevention with other antiterrorism techniques remain varied from country to country.

Furthermore, Jason (2010) has stated that the growing emphasis on counter terrorism measures has given rise to more appreciation of an understanding that counter terrorism constitutes is a method of communication to susceptible groups as well as the larger populace. Accordingly, public views

regarding government's performance in tackling threats along with safeguarding the citizenry can offer one measure of efficiency of counter terrorism actions. It is to be noted that the development of counter terrorism strategies has given has led to the emergence of several difficulties in the field of policymaking and practice including, for instance, the identification of community-level pro government agents together with the designing of interventions in a manner aimed at avoiding the stigmatisation of target population, that may consist of minority as well as faith-based groupings (Romaniuk & Naureen, 2012).

2.2 Multi-Agency Working and Counter-Terrorism

According to Kiran (2018), multi-agency working refers to a situation where personnel from several agencies operate an organized unit cooperatively, share goals, information, schedules, and roles to interfere promptly to stop problems from arising. McInnes (2007) states that Multi-agency working deals with ensuring that people are frequently interacting about their duties and tasks, appreciating one another's functions, and sharing with other organizations and users of services. It involves operating in concert in the direction of generally established objects and goals. Atkinson et al. (2005) conceptualize multi-agency working as operating in partnership across organizations to improve services to address multifaceted situations. Atkinson et al. (2005) further identify several models of multi-agency operation, with each being able to perform diverse functions such as decision making, coordination of efforts, to undertake a broad service, among others (Atkinson et al., 2005).

According to Atkinson et al. (2005) decision-making becomes useful when professionals from diverse organizations need to be brought together so as to make decisions on specific needed operations. Within the framework of counter-terrorism, for instance, this may comprise scheduling

meetings of policing professionals, immigration, customs, military and other state agencies to consider the appropriate means of offering help to communities from which several persons are known to have taken part in terrorism. The emphasis of decision-making of such groups tends to be strategic, for example, policy-based instead of operational.

In the view of Abbott, Townsley & Watson (2005) service delivery would occur, for instance, when policing as well as other professionals perpetually go along with a multi-agency team, where knowledge is shared, and the team can organize the services in an integrated manner to service delivery, for example, situations of community-based techniques for developing resilience to violent radicalization or terrorism. A technique of that kind can include either co-location of the personnel or their remote networking and can also encompass both strategic and operational actions.

Charman (2014) notes that an operational team delivering multi-agency working includes drawing organizations together to provide services to a particular clientele base and is often operational. Charman (2014) further states that this model is identical with the multidisciplinary team working, usually deployed within the health service sector.

The significance of these distinctions for multi-agency working in countering terrorism is that they demonstrate that any thought of multi-agency partnership includes specifying the exact kind of cooperation. This also encompasses recognizing that groups that work together to prepare policies are very dissimilar from those co-located and undertake their operations with persons signifying a tendency to take part in terrorism, that is, focus on practice.

In terms of the value of multi-agency working, it is generally acknowledged that multi-agency working delivers numerous benefits whenever intricate public challenges occur across different agencies' domains of operation (Cairns, 2015). Multi-agency working has been acknowledged as

a means for dealing with the disintegration of services in and across jurisdictions, as well as the propensity for services to work in silos without optimally tying together the knowledge, capability as well as practices of other organisations.

With the occurrence of multi-agency working, team members and relevant agencies have an opportunity to tap into the experience and the resource base available in partaking agencies and emerging as related professionals adopt a trans-disciplinary viewpoint on challenges. Multi-agency working can likewise generate a common dialect and a standard method towards valuation and formulation of risks, and lead to an agreement regarding the all-encompassing goal, thereby improving the efficacy and efficiency of services and making room for a multi-agency working group to request additional resources (Greenhouse, 2013). Moreover, multi-agency working is considered a valuable technique for tackling multifaceted challenges like public safety, crime prevention as well as preparation and response to emergencies. It has been noted by Charman (2014) that even though the value of multi-agency working is well established, practically, it is usually rather challenging to execute. There is also the difficulty of inter-operability of structures, policies as well as procedures as regards dealing with undertaking operations across organizations. For Kiran (2018), the duty for the multi-agency service constitutes the identification and remedial of the risk elements linked to the particular phase being targeted during the intervention stage. The author noted that, for instance, three approaches cover a significant volume of the multi-agency work being undertaken in the prevention of violent extremism, which remains valuable. The prevention approach prevents violent radicalization at its initial phases through community-based resilience-building interventions such as critical thinking, inter-group contact, social modelling, etc. Such approaches could be described as dealing with the risk of violent radicalisation preemptively through a public health- or community-based approach.

Another level is redirection which involves supporting persons that are presently perceived to be going through the midst of being violently radicalized and may be in danger of participating in terrorism. Multi-agency services established to deal with such persons can be characterized as providing a targeted method to violent radicalization. There is also supported exit, which deals with persons desirous of disengaging from terrorism. The preceding approach could include practical, psychological as well as policing.

2.3 Coordinated Border Management

The Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade (2005) defines Coordinated Border Management as the organisation and control of border agency operations to address the collective task of enabling the flow of lawful persons and merchandise and at the same time maintain secure borders in a manner that meets lawful national requirements. According to Aniszewski (2009), Coordinated Border Management can be used to mean a harmonized methodology deployed by border control organizations, both national as well as transnational, within the framework of looking for better efficiency as regards the management of goods and travel movements, while ensuring equilibrium with compliance requirements.

Polner (2015) describes Coordinated Border Management as representing a method for managing borders, including public service organizations operating across portfolio frontiers in a harmonised way to accomplish the common aim of ensuring a unified governmental reaction to the problems of national frontier control. The term can mean a rational means of managing national frontier activities towards ensuring well-organized and operative practices deployed by all supervisory bodies tasked with safeguarding borders and monitoring requirements that apply to persons, merchandise, and deliveries going across national frontiers. In terms of the object, the coordinated

border management structure is for trade facilitation and the approval of travellers and simultaneously securing national frontiers (Polner, 2015).

According to the Commission of the European Communities (2007), coordinated border management has generally been presented to be of two diverse aspects, namely, domestic border management system that comprises internal management in and between state agencies or in some cases, a single economic bloc; while the second, international border management, consists of a partnership among neighbouring states and trading partners. The essential facets of the internal border management setup are coordination and collaboration at the intra-service level plus the inter-service level. Intra-service collaboration refers to a partnership among agencies in a government that comprises two distinct phases. There is the vertical dimension of intra-service collaboration, which implies the coordination and collaboration amongst diverse managerial stages from a government institution to entities operating at the border level. In contrast, the horizontal dimension deals with the working collaboration among several entities at the different stages of the entity. Inter-agency cooperation also takes place at the local, regional and central levels. It is based on horizontal cooperation and coordination between different border agencies (Aniszewski, 2009).

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2008) has observed that cross-border agency collaboration constitutes the other important prop of harmonized border management. This is contingent upon a robust legal structure among states. Cooperation of this nature can be put forward by using a policy statement or a joint compact between states. Genuine collaboration and coordination between various border entities take place at three phases: local partnership amongst personnel on either side of the national frontier, a joint cooperation between neighbouring countries, and transnational partnerships. In the view of Aniszewski (2009), the ideal kind of cross-

border collaboration at the local level deals with the idea of a one-stop border post, which deals with a border post managed by two adjoining states. This involves the day-to-day control of borders, the coordination of requisite documentation, formulating a legal structure dealing with shared acknowledgement of regulations, and sharing of information, mutually maintaining infrastructure.

The bilateral kind of cross-border collaboration comprises consultations among neighbouring states at the provincial level as well as the main level to deliberate on issues like harmonization of border patrols on either side of the national frontier, establishing mutual patrols, the establishment of offices to help with communication as well as sharing of data along with the possible formation of end-to-end mechanisms for control (World Customs Organization, 2011).

Polner (2015) has noted that multinational collaboration in terms of border management matters is concerned with matters like data sharing among states and entities of regular training services. Multilateral border control collaboration will also take account of collaboration with pertinent transnational agencies in establishing, approving and executing several global standards and best practices harmonising and building effectiveness in coordinated control of national frontiers. Also, according to Polner (2015), several gains result in states and specific border agencies from coordinated border management. Developing and executing a coordinated border management system will lead to the elimination of ambiguities among various policy positions, and on this basis, delivering policies becomes more operative. The implementation of the coordinated border management enables states to tackle strategic concerns effectively throughout the border agency division that may not be taken into account by individual state entities, bringing a system perspective to border management.

Bowman (2006) has indicated that the effective implementation of a coordinated border management system can strengthen the state's capacity to tackle strategic border agency issues in an all-inclusive manner, which approach will greatly profit all border agency duties together with other tasks. In terms of resource usage, coordinated border management can generate significant savings by means of economies of scale taking place from sharing Information, Communication Technology structures, improvement, cross-training, and bringing together resources from different units. Generally, the joint use of data and intelligence information will yield benefits for all border entities while supporting them to undertake more effective risk controls. Improved and better ways of managing risks will empower individual entities to deliver their facilitation together with their intervention programmes in an effective manner.

As regards the challenges, it has been observed that various entities may deploy different organisational ethos that could impact harmonization and collaboration at various stages. Also, numerous outlines of accountability and many performance measurements may generate significant complexities. There is also the cost component such as transitional costs of introducing a mutual approach which may also be fairly high from the onset, and the availability of funds would be a question that would need to be addressed. Nevertheless, the gains from implementing a coordinated border management system would ultimately prevail over cost considerations (Aniszewski, 2009).

2.4 Community-Oriented Approach to Counter-Terrorism

According to Durodié (2005), a community could largely be considered as comprising individual persons, a group of persons, as well as organizations confined within a specific zone area and/or

possessing collective interests. From the above description, it can be said that a community is a stakeholder group expressing interest in specific concerns, processes or plans. In this sense, people or a group of people could be part of several communities. It is to be expected that people play a part in more than one community, including across national frontiers, with their attachments to certain groups expected to transform over a period. Moreover, the expectations of individuals within a community vary dependent upon several background factors such as sex, age, education and income levels.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014) notes further that the term community remains multifaceted and extensively deliberated, generating diverse understandings which capture several overlapping views. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe also distinguishes communities of interest that draw together people, diverse groupings, and organizations that express one or other joint interests such as a common geographical zone, preservation of certain beliefs and principles. On the other hand, geographical communities comprise persons, identifiable groupings, and establishments in particular territorial spaces, like neighbourhoods, towns, regions, societies, or the total population of a state. There can be communities of interest that express universal and international aspects within a certain sense of borderless communities that go beyond indigenous or native zones or national frontiers. Of late, due to the emergence of information technology and new media, people, groups, and organizations located in diverse spaces are capable of linking and engaging on topics of shared interest.

Innes (2006) contends that the state plays a significant part in the creation, encouragement, and sustenance of cohesion amongst the communities within a society. The state does this through the promotion of a sense of identity which is reliable and lasting, along with being adequately fluid to easily cover several communities, premised upon the equal and complete enjoyment of human

rights as well as fundamental freedoms by persons within the national space. It is generally known that terrorist groups work to stimulate fear among citizens with the intention of drawing attention to their group, the concerns they advocate as well as the imposition of their demands on the people together with the state. Terrorists communicate using the attacks they launch; besides the propaganda accompanying them, together with their particular understanding of reality, they present and what ought to be done. The attacks, together with the narrative they deliver, produce disruptive impacts within societies. An essential aspect of resilience to terrorism, especially in the immediate aftermath of attacks, is for state officials and political leaders to encourage cohesion and solidarity in society in the face of terrorism, to reaffirm their commitment to democracy and the rule of law and to reject violence and divisive ideas and stereotypes (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2012).

According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014), community-oriented methods depend on the idea that the safety of a community is comprehensively linked with the extent of cohesion in addition to the resilience of the community. State-level terrorism prevention plans and programmes, as a result, occasionally target the building of resilience in communities that do not want to have anything to do with extremists or their perspectives on issues, along with mobilizing the national population, people and identifiable groupings within society to embrace counter-terrorism objectives.

It has been indicated by Spalek (2012) that terrorists pose a danger generally to society and for, therefore, an entire state. Activities of terrorists are not limited to only negatively impacting communities, but they need and search for assistance, adherents, and recruit from the public to implement their ideas. Therefore, the state has a duty to prevent, combat, and manage the effects of the actions of terrorists together with the responsibility of respecting and protecting human

rights. In the course of these functions' performance, the state needs to look for assistance from civil society organizations, media, traditional and religious leaders to counter terrorists' activities effectively. According to Topping (2008), preventing terrorism remains a collective duty that involves the combined participation and collaboration of the immigration service, customs, police, and other state agencies and individuals in communities. Getting the community to participate in the prevention of terrorism could be herculean. Within that community, there could, for instance, be a record of misunderstandings and tension among state intelligence organizations and the general public or with specific communities specifically, which may be resulting from instances of recurrent state agency offensive conduct. In the view of Friedmann & Cannon (2007), conventionally, policies and practices that aim to counter-terrorism have mainly targeted the community, such as aiming at a community in order intelligence and undertake operations undertaken by the key security concerns of the state. In pursuit of this, the state deploys such strategies as police stop-and-search powers, clandestine maneuvers as well as intelligence collection technics to identify suspects that may be terrorists and foil their operations, mainly operative strategies for attacking the community of state at large. These approaches remain an essential aspect of any adequate plan for countering terrorism. It has been observed that these techniques sometimes adopt engagements with communities or does not engage in consultation or co-operation with individuals along with identifiable groupings within the communities and that basis may end up running the risk of sidelining or in certain situations, stigmatize particular communities as well as persons (Friedmann & Cannon, 2007).

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014) has noted that the community-oriented approach is the method by which national counter terrorism goals, plans along with mechanisms are undertaken by means locally motivated, collaborative interventions, designed for

local situations, for enhancing and ensuring effective outcomes. The adoption of the above signals that there is a rising acknowledgement of the fact that societies along with communities constitute stakeholders and collaborators for countering terrorism instead of just remaining as passive objective of state law enforcement operations. According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014), the community-oriented approach for counter terrorism is targeted at bringing people in the community on board, and raising their support for policy formulation and implementation, bearing in mind the variances as well as intricacies regarding, for instance, ethnicity, culture, political ideology, sentiments, concerns, setting as well as history. Community-oriented approaches have the potential of contributing to improved accountability of decision making bodies to the public. Establishing supportive partnerships among policymaking entities, security agencies as well as other community agents is essential to the community-oriented approach to counter terrorism. Developing and sustaining trust remains vital to the effectiveness of such approaches.

2.5 Ghana Integrated Migration Management

Stimulated by efforts to ensure effective response to the intricate migration problems, the International Organization for Migration together with the Ghana Immigration Service are collaborating to implement the Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach Project sponsored by European Development Fund of the European Union (EU). This project was launched in 2014 with the aim of contributing towards the Government of Ghana's attempts to ensure the effective management of migratory issues. This would be accomplished by establishing an integrated migration management approach (Ghana Migration Management, 2016). According to Jørgen (2016), migration remains a serious concern which requires a multi-faceted method.

Even though capacity development remains a key strategy in the management of migration, it fails to deal with all subsequent concerns. On this basis the Ghana Immigration Service adopted the integrated management method as an all-inclusive, transparent and rational way of addressing migratory as well as national frontier management practices.

According to the Ghana Migration Management (2016) the Ghana Integrated Migration Management system's strategic focus is on three areas: developing the capabilities of personnel leading migration management, sharing information on secure and legitimate movement, as well as creating of a nationwide databank for actual policy making operations in respect of migration.

The first component was designed to address migratory issues in West Africa since the area remains one of the regions globally known for high migratory activity. With the rise in the movement of persons and merchandise across national frontiers comes the need to improve immigration and border control arrangements to ease movements across those frontiers. To accomplish this, the Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach seeks to develop the capacity of personnel to be able to understand and put into effect applicable regulations. This also includes supporting the improvement of physical structures, equipments as well as capabilities of Border Patrol Units to check unapproved cross-border movements like the movement terrorist as well as narcotics and human trafficking.

The second component of the Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach is the promotion of secure and authorized movements of people. Due to the fact that it remains necessary for migrants to ensure that efforts are made to take decisions in a way makes movement legitimate, non-coercive and safeguarded by domestic and transnational regulations, the Ghana Integrated Migration Management system offers assistance through the strengthening of the Migration Information Bureau situated within Accra as well as the Migration Consultation Centre located at

Sunyani to serve migrants' needs. The Ghana Integrated Migration Management project also supports livelihood improvement operations within localities susceptible to illegal migratory activity within Ghana (Ghana Migration Management, 2016).

There is also the third focal area of the project dealing with the reinforcement of migratory information management to make policies that are informed by evidence. The Ghana Migration Management (2016) has noted that it is anticipated that with the implementation of the Ghana Integrated Migration Management Approach comes a more harmonized method for managing migratory related information to strengthen Ghana's capability for mapping its migration issues and for designing the right migration policies. The Ghana Integrated Migration Management project is collaborating with several stakeholders to ensure creation and operation of the national migration data sharing structure, data gathering and analysis on migratory activities as well as regularly providing updates on Ghana's migration profile.

2.6 Ghana National Border Security Strategy


Countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) including Ghana are faced with the difficult task of successfully controlling national borders in a manner which helps to secure their territories, promote regional integration as well as fighting illegal cross-border activities. The rising prospect for terrorism, problems linked to transnational usage of technologies by criminals to perpetrate crime, dealing in counterfeit merchandise, prohibited trading in humans, weapons and drug, piracy and growing e-commerce require that Ghana develops the capacity to tackle them.

Managing and securing borders remains an intricate endeavour because the practices overlap the expertise and scope of diverse institutions which are mandated to address emotional issues and

threats that affect the security of the state, economy, communities situated along the border, as well as international relations. On the basis of the foregoing, universally, the cooperative method in border management has been regarded as the ideal method. The idea of a cooperative approach has progressively been recognized and adopted as constituting best practice in counter-terrorism as well as the promotion of efficiency in the flow of goods and persons that eventually leads to progressive changes in society where individuals and their livelihoods are secured. The Republic of Ghana has taken steps that are consistent with the cooperative approach (Government of Ghana, 2020). According to the United States Department of State (2019), the Republic of Ghana in February 2016 signed the Security Governance Initiative (SGI) Joint Country Action Plan (JCAP) with the United States of America. This is a joint agreement purposely targeting the consolidation of Ghana's security sector control. This joint pact comprises a border security element, one of the aims of that is the development and implementation a national border security plan. From the time when the JCAP was approved, Ghana implemented a cooperative method towards the supervision, control as well as securing its national borders. Consistent with the above method, the border control institutions in Ghana are acting in cooperation towards the development of a National Border Security Strategy which will institutionalize collaboration and harmonization amongst important border security managers, which includes traditional rulers within the communities along borders; with the country's neighbours; as well as with strategic border security partners. Through the coordination efforts of the National Security Coordinator as well as heads of security institutions, the National Border Security Committee developed the Ghana National Border Security Strategy, which outlined four aims. The first aim is ensuring the sustenance of the cooperative approach to managing borders to ultimately ensure a harmonized supervision and enforcement of Ghana's borders. Secondly, the National Border Security Strategy is designed to

achieve efficiency regarding approved cross-border movements of people and goods so as to enhance procedures and ability, modernize infrastructure, and encourage competence, reliability as well as personnel wellbeing. Thirdly, the aim is also to fight cross-border threats to secure national frontiers to reduce cross-border crime. Ultimately, the goal is to develop collaborations, economic and national interests to champion border security collaborations, operate with stakeholders together with communities along borders, and transnational associates to manage security at national frontiers effectively encourage economic integration (Government of Ghana, 2020).

According to the Government of Ghana (2020), among other things, the National Border Security Strategy outlines the following strategic undertakings which have to be achieved.

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- i. Ensure the sustainability of the National Border Security Fusion Center with requisite financing, together with the National Border Management Secretariat which administers the Center;
 - ii. Establish a Land Border Development Authority;
 - iii. Increase the deployment of technology for the process at the ports and borders, surveillance, and data gathering as well as analysis;
 - iv. Employ the use of Advanced Electronic Cargo Tracking and Monitoring System, and enforce the usage of sealed containers for carrying high-risk commodities from the ports to the destinations;

- v. Develop clear policy and standard operating procedures for transhumance (cattle herdsman);
- vi. Develop the capacities and enable the Border Patrol Unit as well as the Customs Preventive Unit to sustain lead as the primary force for the security of national frontiers;
- vii. Deliver constant training for personnel and staff of border agencies;
- viii. Maintain interactions with communities along the borders together with other relevant stakeholders in border security;
- ix. Enhance the wellbeing of personnel, and strongly maintain the rules which protect staff from coercion throughout the period of executing their responsibilities; and
- x. Provide training of personnel in foreign languages which are central to effective communication and harmonization with regional as well as transnational partners.

According to United States Department of State (2019), the Government of Ghana has also already set up the structure for the implementation of its border security goals, that are captured within a Memorandum of Agreement with the United States which sets up a Ghana National Border Secretariat for supporting and sustaining efforts towards an integrated border management. Under the mandate of the Ghana National Security Coordinator, the Secretariat also created a National Border Security Technical Working Group (NBSTGW) which is tasked with heading the process of developing the integration and the execution of Security Governance Initiative (SGI) Joint

Country Action Plan goals. The NBSGW is in charge of establishing a National Border Security Strategy but also needs funding in order to accomplish their assigned task. The Ghana National Border Security Strategy focuses on Ghana's air, land, and sea frontiers. It is to be noted that the strategy is concentrated on the national, strategic level. The National Border Security Strategy is said to be sensitive to Ghana's protocols and agreements regarding Ghana's transnational frontiers, including those of ECOWAS (United States Department of State, 2019).

2.7 Measures for Counter-Terrorism in Ghana

That notwithstanding, to expedite the execution of the legal framework toward countering terrorism in Ghana, two principal organizations are tasked directly with the burden of addressing terrorism related issues in Ghana. Several organizations such as the Ghana Immigration Service, Ghana Armed Forces, Ghana Police Service, Bureau National Investigations, Economic and Organized Crime Office are involved in Ghana's counter-terrorism effort. These institutions are the Financial Intelligence Centre, and the National Crisis Response Centre set up purposely to tackle terrorism funding and prevent terrorism in Ghana. Bamba (2014) has argued that addressing issues related to sources of financing for terrorists remains central to the fight against terrorism. Through the preclusion of funding from getting to terrorist organizations, their capacity to undertake any operation is significantly abated and, in some cases, removed.

Ghana has developed many laws to support terrorism prevention in Ghana. The Anti-Money Laundry Act 2008 (Act 749) was ratified proscribing money laundering in all forms. The Financial Intelligence Centre is the institution responsible for anti-money laundering as well as combating the funding of terrorism. The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) was set up by section 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749) as amended. In the execution of its responsibilities,

the FIC remains the national centre for the receiving and analysing doubtful transaction information as well as other evidence pertinent to predicate offences of Money Laundering/ Terrorist Financing and Proliferation Financing (ML/TF&P) and to distribute actionable intelligence to capable authorities (Financial Intelligence Centre, 2021).

The Financial Intelligence Centre is also mandated to call for supplementary material from Accountable Institutions and Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs) in Ghana, which includes legal practitioners, auditors, solicitors, cultural organizations, non-governmental organizations, real estate owners or agents, gaming sector, traders in precious metals as well as precious stones and dealers in automobiles. Ghana designed the Financial Intelligence Centre to function as a part of an international network and can access appropriate evidence on criminal activity taking place across transnational frontiers. The Financial Intelligence Centre's global networks are linked and include GIABA, EGMONT GROUP, ARIN-WA, and FFIUs, among other bodies. The Financial Intelligence Centre in addition, takes part in several global forums where emerging developments regarding money laundering and terrorism funding arrangements are shared to deepen awareness and serve the purpose of monitoring (Financial Intelligence Centre, 2021). Bamba (2014) has observed that intelligence thrives on collaborative efforts. The Financial Intelligence Centre has worked together with other related institutions in Ghana such as the Bank of Ghana, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Gaming Commission as others agencies situated outside Ghana.

The National Crisis Response Centre remains the main institution responsible for the prevention of terrorism in Ghana. This organization was set up in 2001 under the National Security Council in partnership with the United States of America. The National Crisis Response Centre has liaison personnel taken from the Bureau of National Investigations, the Research Department of Ghana's

Foreign Ministry, as well as the Department of Defense Intelligence (DI) of the Ghana Armed Forces. Others working with the National Crisis Response Centre are the Customs Division of the Ghana Revenue Authority, Ghana Police Service, and the Ghana Immigration Service (Bamba, 2014). Besides these domestic collaborative arrangements, state institutions charged with terrorism prevention also liaise with governmental agencies in and outside the ECOWAS sub-region in their endeavour to prevent terrorism (Bolaji, 2010). In line with this and guaranteeing that the emerging threats of terrorism in the West African sub-region do not overwhelm Ghana, the National Crisis Response Centre has also implemented extra measures towards countering terrorism.

Through the constant upgrading of information sharing by counter-terrorism agencies in West Africa and its outside collaborators, there is better tracking of recognized and terrorists under suspicion. This kind of crucial intelligence regarding movements of potential terrorists has significantly assisted ECOWAS countries, including Ghana, to arrest and deport certain people suspected of terrorism-related activities (Obi, 2006). According to Bamba (2014), Ghana's National Crisis Response Centre has a databank on terrorists and their associates through the cooperative effort of national and international counter-terrorism bodies, enabling the detection and tracking of people with terrorist backgrounds. In addition to the preceding, Ghana has introduced other terrorism prevention mechanisms, such as the institution of the tactical level financial rules aimed at monitoring funding movements within Ghana's financial establishments. Consistent with the Foreign Exchange Act 2006 (Act 723), the Financial Intelligence Centre and the Central Bank have capped the quantity of cash which an individual can withdraw or transfer into Ghana ten thousand United States Dollars or its equivalent in travellers' cheque or any other monetary instrument (Ghana Revenue Authority, 2011). The Ghana Revenue Authority (2011) also indicated that amounts in excess of ten thousand United States Dollars the limit shall be

transferred by a bank or other accredited agencies. In addition, there exists a condition for the declaration to Customs officers at the point of exit or entry into Ghana cash foreign currencies taken into or outside Ghana even though the amount is less than the specified limitation. Travelers are formerly obligated to complete the Bank of Ghana Foreign Exchange Declaration Form (FXDF) and when the amount surpasses the limit value ten thousand United States Dollars the Customs personnel shall confiscate the full sum whether or not it has been disclosed. The guidelines as regards the import and export of cash introduced by Ghana help in ensuring that terrorists cannot move money through the largely porous borders within West Africa. This makes the measures taken by terrorists ineffective and makes it difficult for them to operate with ease (Bamba, 2014).

The Bank of Ghana together with the Financial Intelligence Centre (2011) have rules and procedures for financial and accounting institutions that have compelled financial establishments to implement anti-money laundering and counter terrorism methods so as to preclude those establishments from being used for money laundering and terrorism financing. Furthermore, there is an obligation on the part of financial establishments to assign an officer of senior rank to serve in the capacity of an Anti-Money Laundering Reporting Officer in line with the Bank of Ghana and Financial Intelligence Centre Guidelines. The foregoing is part of several mechanisms for the prevention of terrorism in Ghana, all of which contributed immensely towards the counter terrorism in the country.

2.8 Challenges Associated with Border Management


Generally, border management personnel all over the world face several difficulties as regards the control as well as administering activities the border particularly, in less developed states. It is

important to note that many of these problems are not new but are rather long standing issues which have lingered for many years. Lamptey (2013) has observed that border controls in essence entail supervising and managing movements of individuals, merchandise as well as services across national frontiers in the national interest and normally to maintain the peace and security of the country. This task is characteristically carried out by state organizations such as Customs, Excise and Preventive Service, Ghana Immigration and Police services as well several other organizations in accordance with state laws.

It has been indicated that within West Africa alone, there are thirty-five transnational frontiers which are very porous. This situation renders the borders susceptible to threats of terrorism and trading in humans, weapons and drugs. Even with this state of affairs, border security concerns in many West African states are not always incorporated into national security or economic policies, and border therefore organizations charged with border control typically lack equipment, lack proper training as well as other resources (Lamptey, 2013). Complicating these issues is the problem of understaffing for many organizations as well as ill-motivated personnel who do not efficiently cooperate and harmonize their operations at the national and regional levels. Related to the foregoing, Okumu (2011) indicated that border agencies responsible for managing national frontiers could not execute their responsibilities successfully. In Niger and Mali, for example, officers at the borders are poorly equipped and ill-motivated. The lack of office space for agencies responsible for patrolling and controlling the borders and insufficient means of communication have negatively impacted the capacities of the agencies to execute their responsibilities efficiently (Okumu, 2011).

Nkoroï (2016) has stated that the disregard for border management structures has mostly led to a rise in border crimes, several of the problems arising from inadequate realistic methods in tackling

border issues. It has further been indicated that weak organizations operating border controls show how poor states respond to the challenges of crossing borders. It is clear from the commitment of governments in relation to border controls, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries, they lack well-equipped agencies to control national frontiers. Furthermore, weak collaboration at various stages presents a challenge in terms of border management. This problem has been noted to arise mainly from the absence of teamwork at several levels, for instance, the local level, where many border security and management activities may not include communities along national frontiers. It has been stressed by Titeca & De Herdt (2010) that the weak interface between the local population and government agencies in terms of the deployment of security staff impact border management because the bulk of the local population has a profound understanding of the border landscape. There is also the challenge of poor incorporation and harmonization amongst units at the state level, for example, immigration, police, customs as well as several security personnel, which contribute significantly towards the difficulties faced by border control agencies. According to Quartey (2019), globalization affects African countries partly as regards controlling border-related crime because the deployment of modern equipment and changes in international relations has weakened the purpose of traditional boundaries. Quartey (2019) adds that this has made crimes to be executed without physically crossing the border and trading colossal volumes of goods without physical borders, but rather through the Internet.



CHAPTER THREE

STATE OF BORDER MANAGEMENT, CONTRIBUTION AND CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL BORDER SECURITY STRATEGY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN GHANA

3.0 Overview

This chapter presents the results obtained from the field as well as the discussions of the study. The study made use of primary data, which were obtained through interviews coupled with secondary data. The analysis of both the primary and secondary data was done using thematic analysis based on the objectives and research questions of the study.

3.1 The State of Border Management as a Counter-Terrorism Tool in West Africa

Within the broader sense of national security, there exist a number of institutions that are tasked with the management of border security in any country, including Ghana. For this reason, respondents were asked to indicate the specific institutions they belong. As expected, respondents involved in border security management belonged to five key state security institutions namely the Ghana Immigration Service, the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Armed Forces (Defense Intelligence) and the National Intelligence Bureau.

This result is in line with the assertion by Kiran (2018), who noted that several government security institutions work in an organized way to provide adequate security at the borders as they share not only goals and information but also they schedule their roles in order each institution can interfere a timely manner to stop problems from arising.

In support of the Kiran (2018), McInnes (2007) also argued that, when multiple institutions are involved in providing border security, they are able to interact on issues related to their duties and tasks, and they appreciate the functions played by each other. McInnes (2007) further observed

that multiple agencies working together generally operate within a specific direction established by the state.

Finally, in support of the finding, Atkinson et al. (2005) conceptualized that when two or more agencies are operating in partnership across different organizations, they help to provide an improved multifaceted border situation. Atkinson et al. (2005) further identify several models of multi-agency operation, with each being able to perform diverse functions such as decision making, coordination of efforts, to undertake a comprehensive service, among others (Atkinson et al., 2005). The number of years an institution has existed demonstrates its level of experience and expertise in dealing with a particular issue under the institution. For this reason, respondents were asked to indicate the number of years that their institutions have existed. The responses given by respondents were not definite as to the exact time and date that their institutions were created. For this reason, different dates and times were given by respondents as to the date or time their institutions were created. The following are some of the responses provided by respondents when they were asked to indicate the date their institutions were created.

“I really don’t know the exact date the Ghana Police was established but am told it’s been in existent even before independence. I but I do not know when we were deployed here” I can therefore not give you a definite data for which the Ghana Police have been here” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

‘Well, I can’t really tell the exact date the Ghana Immigration Service was created but I strongly believe that, it was created in 1989. I am however sure that; the Ghana Immigration Service have been in operations at the border since then)”. (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“Well, I have no knowledge of the exact date or time that the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) was created but am told by my senior colleagues that, it has existed even before Ghana attained independence in 1957” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

From the above responses, it is clear that, most of the respondents have no clear or definite date or time that their institutions were created and the border except the Ghana immigration service

officer. This is strange because it is expected that for such government institutions, they should have some form of institutional memory like a book or documents that contains the history of the organization.

Border security personnel are deployed to particular borders for special assignments or circumstances, while some are deployed to the border as their traditional responsibility. Based on this, respondents were asked to indicate the responsibilities or roles played by border security officers. On this score, the following are the responses provided by respondents.

“We are at the border because it is our responsibility as an institution to provide border security for the country and that is the only reason we provide security at the border” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“Our institution is stationed at the border because we are tasked to provide border security to the country by law and for that matter we will continue to do this together with other security agencies” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“Our traditional role is to provide internal security for the whole country and it includes providing adequate security at all borders of the country. I will therefore say that; it is our traditional role to be providing security at the border”. (A Respondent from the Ghana Police Service)

The responses above demonstrate that most of the personnel deployed to the borders from the various security agencies played different roles, and while some of them were stationed there for particular purposes, some were stationed at the borders because of special circumstances. According to Bowman (2006), when different border security institutions play different roles, it ensures the effective implementation of a coordinated border management system which has the potential of strengthening the state’s capacity to tackle strategic border agency issues in an all-inclusive manner. This approach will greatly profit all border agency duties together with other tasks.

Border security personnel have different job requirements at the border, and for this reason, respondents were asked to indicate their specific job requirements for which they were deployed to the border. The responses suggest that, a number of job requirement including facilitation of entry and exit of travellers, preventing illegal entry into the country and the facilitation of traders into Ghana. This suggests that, personnel at border post are required to play a number of roles in their work to protect the country's borders. The responses provided by respondents on their job requirement at the border posts are presented below.

“We are stationed here to beef up security and protect travellers from theft, armed robbery and other related border security issues. In addition, my task at the post is to ensure that the border is safe and secured and for that reason, I also engage in patrols at the exit and entry points of the border” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

“We are mainly interested in trade issues at the borders of Ghana and we are required to facilitate traders who are coming to Ghana through borders and traders who are sending their goods and services outside Ghana through the borders” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“We have a number of tasks we perform at the border as an institution and these tasks include the protection of the border from intruders, illegal immigrants and facilitate travellers to enter and exit the country through the borders” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

The responses have shown that different institutions play different roles in providing security at the border. These requirements include ensuring safety and secured border, protection of the border from intruders, illegal immigrants, facilitation of travellers, beefing up security and the prevention of cross border armed robbery. This is true because all the institutions involved in border security issues play different roles but work in a coordinated manner to ensure effective border security for the country. This is confirmed by Polner (2015) who indicated that several gains result to specific border agencies from coordinated border management.

Border security institutions encounter several threats in their efforts to provide adequate security at the borders. Based on this, respondents were asked to indicate the types of threats they encounter when providing security at the borders. The responses suggest that several threats including threats from border residents who try to cross the border, smuggling of goods, attacks from citizens, attacks from foreign nationals, animal movements, human and drug trafficking and overcrowding.

“Well at my post, we face the threat of illegal migration, human trafficking and some animals trying to move from neighboring countries into Ghana. In fact, in some instances, the animals are so much that, it becomes difficult controlling the situation and return the animals to where they are coming from”. (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“We are mostly threatened by the smuggling of goods through the border into the country and in addition, overcrowding at the borders is also a major threat we encounter in the course of carrying out our task of providing security at the borders. I must add that, we are sometimes attacked by foreign nations from neighbouring countries” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“As an institution we encounter a number of threats, ranging from drug trafficking, human trafficking, cross border armed robbery and large movement of cattle at the border post at the border areas. In fact, people even try to find alternative route to escape been caught by us” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

The result above has clearly demonstrated that, border security personnel in Ghana are faced with the threats of animal movement, overcrowding, attacks from citizen, attacks from foreign nationals, smuggling of goods, human and drug trafficking, armed robbery and drug trafficking. This is confirmed by the GNA (2010) who noted that, on human trafficking Women and children of poor social status are often the victims.

The human trafficking business is estimated to accrue \$7-12 billion a year and is fast catching up with the profits made from drugs trafficking. According to the GTNA (2010), Smuggling is the main and lasting survivor forms of cross border crimes since the beginning of the definition and

demarcation of boundaries. Despite the fact that, security personnel deployed to the borders face different threats, some of the threats are more linked or associated with terrorism, hence respondents were asked to indicate the specific threats they face in the course of providing security at the borders. The responses show that, they don't face any specific threats related to terrorism but that, they are threatened by the activities of terrorist in neighbouring countries where terrorism is on the rise in recent times. In responding to the question, respondents made the following assertions.

“Hmmm, for specific, I would say no because we have not experienced any major terrorist activities during the course of our work. However, we are concerned about the spread of terrorist activities spreading in the West Africa Region. In addition, the porous nature of our borders increases our fear of terrorism activities spreading to our borders” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

“I cannot mention any specific terrorism threat on or border but we continue to be threatened by the increasing activities of terrorist in neighbouring border countries especially in Burkina Faso” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“I cannot say that; we have a specific terrorism threat as a country because we have not experienced any terrorism activity in Ghana. But let me add that, it doesn't mean that we don't face any threat of terrorism, especially looking at the rise of terrorism activities in the West Africa Region” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

The responses on the threats of terrorism suggests that, even though we don't have a specific terrorism threat as a country, we continue to live in fear because of the spread of terrorism activities in our neighbouring countries. This point is noted by Tisseron (2019) who observed that, in 2019, the Burkinabé intelligence agencies cautioned their counterparts in neighbouring countries that a number of armed Islamists had departed Burkina Faso to hide in Benin and Ghana. As to whether Ghana is exposed to the threats of terrorism in the face of the identified threat we experience at our borders including threats from border residents who try to cross the border, smuggling of

goods, animal movements, human and drug trafficking and overcrowding, respondents indicated that, yes Ghana is exposed to the threats of terrorism despite the efforts put in place to check terrorism in the country. The responses by respondents are presented as follows.

“I think we are exposed to terrorism because, we lack the technological expertise to help us protect the country from terrorists and the activities of terrorism. For this reason, I think Ghana is heavily exposed to terrorists’ threats and authorities have to do something about it” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“There is no doubt that we are exposed to the threats of terrorism as every country within the West African Sub-region is threatened by the continuous spread of terrorism within the West African Sub-region. I for me, I believe that we are exposed to the dangers of terrorism due to the lack of logistics to deter terrorists at our borders” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“Our exposure to the threat of terrorism stems from the fact that border security personnel lack the necessary tools and equipment’s as well as right technologies to deter terrorist or potential terrorist” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

The responses have clearly indicated that, Ghana is very much exposed to the threats of terrorism partly because the country lacks the technical expertise and the continuous spread of terrorism in the West African sub-region. This is confirmed by Foucher & Jézéquel (2017) who noted that, an additional cause for the West Africa’s fragility is the elusive regional response found in countries’ not being able to cooperate to tackle the issue of terrorism within the West African sub-region. The finding is further supported by Jørgen (2016) who noted that, migration remains a serious concern which requires a multi-faceted method.

3.2 The Contribution/Role of the National Border Security Strategy (NBSS) in Countering Terrorism in Ghana

When the Joint Country Action Plan (JCAP) was approved in 2016, Ghana implemented a cooperative method towards the supervision, control and securing its national borders. Consistent

with the above method, the border control institutions in Ghana are acting in cooperation. This study, among other things, sought information from various agencies as to their awareness on Ghana having a National Border Security Strategy. It sought to explore such issues as whether prior to deployment, personnel received training introducing them to the NBSS or any counter-terrorism strategy or issues about NBSS were brought to the fore at training.

The Ghana National Border Security Strategy focuses on Ghana's air, land, and sea frontiers. It is to be noted that the strategy is concentrated on the national, strategic level. The National Border Security Strategy is said to be sensitive to Ghana's protocols and agreements regarding Ghana's transnational frontiers, including those of ECOWAS (United States Department of State, 2019). Moreover, the idea of a cooperative approach has progressively been recognized and adopted as constituting best practice in counter-terrorism and the promotion of efficiency in the flow of goods and persons that eventually leads to progressive changes in society where individuals and their livelihoods are secured. The Republic of Ghana has taken steps consistent with the cooperative approach (Government of Ghana, 2020).

In order to deal effectively with the border security issue, security personnel should have adequate knowledge about the country's policy and strategy used to counter-terrorism. For this reason, respondents were asked to indicate if they are aware of the fact that Ghana has a National Border Security strategy, all respondents answered in the affirmative and indicated that they were aware that Ghana has a National Border Security strategy that seeks to counter-terrorism in Ghana especially along the borders. The responses of respondents are shown below.

“We are aware that Ghana as a country has a National Border Security strategy with the sole aim of ensuring a formidable border security and prevent the occurrence of terrorist activities in Ghana” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

“Yes I have heard about the National Border Security strategy of Ghana and understand that, the strategy core objective is to manage and secure our borders in the face of rising terrorism in the West African sub-region” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“Yes I am aware that, Ghana has a border security strategy called the National Border Security strategy and I also know that, the main aim of the strategy is to prevent terrorism in Ghana by providing adequate security at our borders and deter potential terrorists’ activities in Ghana” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

The responses of respondent clearly suggest that, respondents are aware of the fact that Ghana has a national border security strategy and the aims and objective is also known by respondents as indicated in their responses.

These responses are in line with Ghana’s goal to have a border security strategy. This ultimate goal is to develop collaborations, economic and national interest to champion border security collaborations. A goal to ensure collaboration between stakeholders, together with communities along borders and transnational associates to manage security at national frontiers effectively so as to encourage economic integration (Government of Ghana, 2020).

In order to use any strategy like the NBSS, it is important that border personnel undergo training to understand the in and out of the policy to position them to implement the strategy better. For this reason, respondents were asked to indicate if they had any training on Ghana has border security strategy before they were deployed to their border post. The responses show that at least all border security personnel involved in this study underwent some form of training before they were deployed to the stations. Samples of their responses are provided as follows.

“Yes. I had training on general counter security strategy as wells as training on the National Border Security strategy before I was deployed to my station. For this reason, I think have enough knowledge about the National Border Security

strategy and the best way to implement it to prevent the occurrence of terrorist activities in Ghana” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“Yes, I underwent training on border security and counter-terrorism, and as part of my training, I was made to understand the National Border Security strategy and its goals as well as the best way to implement it to get the desired result of preventing the occurrence of terrorist activities in the shores of Ghana” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“For me, I got to know of the National Border Security strategy during my training and I understand the goals of the strategy as a police officer” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

“Apart from the training, I have also participated in a number of seminars where the National Border Security strategy was the main theme of the programme. These trainings and seminars have therefore broadened my knowledge in border security issues in general and the National Border Security strategy in particular” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

From the above response, it is obvious that, border security personnel received some form of training on border security and terrorism and most importantly, they received training on the National Border Security strategy before they were deployed to their various stations on the border. This is confirmed by the United States Department of State (2019), which noted that the Government of Ghana has also already set up the structure for the implementation of its border security goals, that are captured within a Memorandum of Agreement with the United States which sets up a Ghana National Border Secretariat for supporting and sustaining efforts towards an integrated border management.

In order to achieve the aims and objectives of the NBSS, there is the need to roll out some actionable measures to make it more effective in managing border security and deter terrorism within our borders. For this reason, the study went ahead and asked respondents to indicate the measures they think can be put in place to make the NBSS more effective and achieve its aims.

All respondents suggested that NBSS should be taught at all national security services training schools to give personnel the needed understanding of the aims and objectives of the NBSS even

before they are deployed to the borders. Others added that personnel of the border security services should be made to undergo compulsory refresher courses on NBSS to help them acquire the necessary tools better to implement the aims and objectives of the NBSS. The following are some of the responses provided by respondents.

“I think the best way to fully understand the aims of the NBSS and better implement it is to teach it as a course in our training schools. This is because, even though I received training on NBSS during my training, the training was very short and as a result, it was difficult for me to fully understand the NBSS strategy” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“For me I think including NBSS as course in our training will significantly help in better understanding what the NBSS stand for as far as its objectives and goals are concern. I also think go for refresher courses on the NBSS will go a long way to help officers in fully understanding the NBSS” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“I am of the view that, the NBSS can better be understood if it is thoroughly thought during our training. I therefore believe that, including it in the training courses is the best measure to help understand the NBSS” (A respondent from the Ghana Armed Forces).

The responses from the respondents attest to the fact that including NBSS as a course on its own within the training syllabus of the border security institutions is a viable measure to understand the NBSS better to implement it to achieve its aims and objectives effectively. The responses are in line with the Government of Ghana (2020), who noted that constant training would be delivered for personnel and staff of border agencies as part of the National Border Security Strategy. In addition, training will be provided for personnel in foreign languages that are central to effective communication and harmonization with regional and transnational partners.

For terrorism to be curtailed, it is important to have effective counter-terrorism measures to meet the emerging threats of terrorism on our borders. Respondents were therefore asked to indicate if the counter-terrorism measures in Ghana are adequate. The responses suggest that border security officers believe that the measures to combat terrorism in Ghana are not enough, as respondents

believe a lot can be done to improve the measures to combat terrorism within our borders. The following are the responses provided by respondents.

“I think the current measures we have is not adequate and without improving on the measures and adopting modern ways of deterring terrorist, we will continue to face the threats of terrorist within the country and at our borders” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

“Well, I think we are doing a lot to combat the threat of terrorism, but I strongly believe that the current measures put in place by authorities are not enough considering how terrorist are changing their techniques and the new ways they have adopted. I strongly believe that modern ways of combating terrorism should be adopted if we want to deter terrorist from entering our shores” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“I believe the issue of terrorism is very complicated and requires effective measures to deal with it. I would say that, our current measures put in place to counter terrorism is good but not enough to deal with the issue of terrorism especially considering the rapid spread of terrorism in the West African Sub-region” (A respondent from the National Investigation Bureau).

The above responses suggest that the measures put in place to combat terrorism is not enough and not up-to-date with the current spate of terrorism within the West African sub-region. To effectively counter terrorism, new measures with high efficacy that consider the changing ways of modern terrorism would have to be adopted. The finding is supported by Azumah et al., (2020), who contend that the security sector of many states in the sub-region is characterized by ill-equipped security agencies, insufficient collaboration among the different actors, and poor communication (Azumah et al., 2020).

In order to improve border management, there is the need to put in place measures to help counter terrorism at the borders. For this reason, respondents were asked to suggest ways to improve border management and counter-terrorism within our borders.

Several measures were suggested by respondents, including the up-to-date training, identifying the sources of finance for terrorist groups, intelligence gathering, supply of the needed resources,

boosting the morale of border security personnel, clear definition of roles and employing trained personnel at the borders. The following are the responses provided by respondents.

“I will suggest that, border security personnel’s’ deployed to the borders should be given adequate training that is up-to-date on current trends of terrorism. I also suggest that, the roles of border security personnel should also be specified to make their work more effective” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“I will recommend that, adequate logistics and other accoutrements should be provided to border security officers to make their work easier and effective. I would also recommend that, the morale of border security personnel should be boosted through rewards, promotions and other benefits. I also suggest that, we do more of intelligence building and identifying the sources financing for terrorist groups” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“I recommend that, the training for border security personnel should be intensified and improved by training border security personnel on modern ways of combatting terrorism. I would also recommend that, authorities should only employ trained personnel to man our borders and not just anybody who did not go through proper training on border security and anti-terrorism” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

The suggestions made by respondents indicate that there are several ways of improving border management. However, most importantly, border security personnel require better training, intelligence gathering, adequate logistics and resources, morale-boosting and the employment of qualified border security personnel. This finding is supported by Bamba (2014), who observed that intelligence thrives on collaborative efforts, and the Financial Intelligence Centre is known to have worked together with other related institutions in Ghana such as the Bank of Ghana, Securities and Exchange Commission, the Gaming Commission as well as others agencies situated outside Ghana.

3.3 Challenges of National Border Security Management in counterterrorism activities in Ghana

This study also looked at the challenges affecting border management mainly in terms of personnel, equipment, training and co-operation between personnel of other services. Several challenges have been identified:

“There are inadequate operational accoutrements such as ballistic helmets, body armours” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“Most of the personnel deployed at the borders do not have the required skills and knowledge to manage the border effectively. They lack logistics to perform their duties and no periodic training to keep them up to date. There is no better coordination between personnel of other services because they lack the rationale behind due to poor education at the training school” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

“Coordination among various state agencies and bodies charged with counter-terrorism in Ghana is not very developed as links between agencies remain weak in most cases” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“Border management matters are concerned with matters like intelligence sharing among agencies as well as entities of regular training services. A lot of the time what is witnessed in Ghana is a lack of effective intelligence gathering and sharing. In cases where the intelligence exist, there are usually gaps that do not help proper planning” (A respondent from the National Intelligence Bureau).

Issues like harmonization of border patrols along national borders, establishing mutual patrols, the establishment of offices to help with communication, and sharing of data along with the possible formation of end-to-end mechanisms for control remain a challenge for border management in Ghana.

When viewed from the perspective of international counter-terrorism efforts, it is clear Ghana, in its internal border management to counter-terrorism, undertakes coordination and collaboration at the intra-service and inter-service levels. Intra-service collaboration refers to a partnership among

agencies in a government that comprises two distinct aspects. There is the vertical dimension of intra-service collaboration, which implies the coordination and collaboration amongst diverse managerial stages from a government institution to entities operating at the border level. Inter-agency cooperation also takes place at the local, regional and central levels. It is based on horizontal cooperation and coordination between different border agencies (Aniszewski, 2009). This approach comes with a lot of benefits for countries. According to Polner (2015) several gains accrue to states and specific border agencies from adopting a coordinated border management approach. The author notes that developing and executing a coordinated border management system will lead to the elimination of ambiguities among various policy positions, and on this basis, delivering policies becomes more operative. The implementation of the coordinated border management enables states to tackle strategic concerns effectively throughout the border agency division that may not be taken into account by individual state entities, bringing a system perspective to border management (Polner, 2015). There is also the problem of weak collaboration at the international level and stated as follows:

“Poor collaboration and cooperation at various stages of the international level presents a challenge in terms of border management. This problem has been noted to arise mainly from the absence of teamwork at several levels, for instance, where many border security as well as management activities may not properly integrate with border agencies of other countries” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

“The lack of office space for agencies responsible for patrolling and controlling the borders together with insufficient means of communication has negatively impacted the capacities of the agencies to execute their responsibilities efficiently. This is also coupled with the lack of equipment for tackling crime and terrorist operations” (A respondent from the Customs Excise and Preventive Service).

“The porous nature of borders of Ghana and the current security situation in its neighbouring states presents a real threat to agencies involved in the fight against terrorism. This is very complicated by the lack of cooperation on the part of communities along the borders especially in terms of giving information

on the movements and activities of suspected terrorist or collaborators” (A respondent from the Ghana Police Service).

These observations are consistent with the view of Nkoroi (2016) who has stated that the disregard for border management structures at the international level has mostly led to a rise in border crimes. Several of the problems at borders arise from inadequate realistic methods in tackling border issues at the international level. Okumu (2011) has noted that within West Africa alone, there are thirty-five transnational frontiers which are very porous. This situation renders the borders susceptible to threats of terrorism and trading in humans, weapons and drugs. Even with this state of affairs, border security concerns in many West African states are not always incorporated into national security or economic policies, and therefore border organizations charged with border control typically lack equipment, lack proper training as well as other resources.

The porous borders pose a real challenge to Ghana’s efforts in counter terrorism. The specter of Islamists getting to the Gulf of Guinea is a serious concern. Jihadists’ militancy expansion within Burkina Faso has significantly deepened this apprehension. Burkina occupies a crucial location, linking the Sahel to coastal countries and neighboring four of them, namely Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana as well as Togo (International Crisis Group, 2019). Related to the foregoing, Okumu (2011) indicated that border agencies responsible for managing national frontiers lack the ability to execute their responsibilities successfully because officers at the borders are poorly equipped and ill-motivated.

Another problem complicating these issues is the problem of understaffing for many organizations as well as ill-motivated personnel who do not efficiently cooperate and harmonize their operations at the national and regional levels. The problem was expressed in the following terms:

“The problem of lack of well-trained and qualified staff performing specialised functions together with the absence of modern equipment for agencies involved in counter-terrorism activities in Ghana as well as border agencies of

neighbouring countries complicates counter-terrorism operations for the local personnel” (A respondent from the Ghana Immigration Service).

This is confirmed by Quartey (2019) who noted that the development of modern equipment and changes in international relations has weakened the purpose of traditional boundaries. This has made crime to be executed without physically crossing the border as well as trading colossal volumes of goods without physical borders, but rather through Internet (Quartey, 2019). In general, border management all over the world is not without difficulties as regards the control as well as administering activities at the border. This is more particular in less developed countries including Ghana.

It is important to note that many of these problems are not new but are rather long standing issues which have lingered for many years. However in Ghana, the effective implementation of the National Border Security Strategy may help overcome many of these challenges.



CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study and specifically deals with the summary, conclusions, and recommendations of the study. The purpose of this study is to examine Ghana's border security strategy as a significant measure for countering terrorism on Ghanaian soil. The study focused on the state of border management as a counter-terrorism tool in West Africa; the contribution of the Ghana National Border Security Strategy (NBSS) in countering terrorism in Ghana, and the challenges of the NBSS in responding to threats of terror activities along borders and within Ghana. To further achieve the study's objectives, the study data were analysed using thematic data analysis and strongly relates to the objectives and research questions of the project.

4.1 Summary of Study Findings

On the first objective of examining the state of border management as a counter-terrorism tool, several issues were established by the study. The study found that, security personnel involved in border security management belonged to three key state security institutions namely the Ghana Police Service, the Ghana Immigration Service and the Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), however the Ghana Armed Forces (Defense Intelligence) and the National Investigation Bureau (NIB) also play supportive roles. The study also found that the number of years the border security institution has existed is not known by the majority of border security personnel. They gave conflicting dates as to how long their institutions have existed. The study also found that most of the border security personnel deployed to the borders from the various security agencies played

different roles. While some of them were stationed there for particular purposes, others were stationed at the borders because of special circumstances. This includes facilitation of entry and exit of travellers, preventing illegal entry into the country and the facilitation of traders into Ghana. On the threats faced by border security personnel at the borders, the study found that border security personnel are faced with the threats of animal movement attacks from the citizens. There are also foreign nationals that engage in smuggling of goods, human and drug trafficking, armed robbery and drug trafficking. The study found that there were no any specific threats related to terrorism but that Ghana is threatened by the activities of terrorists in neighbouring countries where terrorism is on the rise in recent times. In other words, even though we do not have a specific terrorism threat as a country, we continue to live in fear because of the spread of terrorism activities in our neighbouring countries.

Whether Ghana is exposed to the threats of terrorism in the face of the identified threat, the study found that border security personnel face several threats in the course of carrying out their task at the border. These threats include the nefarious activities of smugglers, illegal animal rustling/movements, human and drug trafficking. Ultimately, border security personnel agree that Ghana is very much exposed to the threats of terrorism.

On the second objective of identifying the contribution/role of the National Border Security Strategy (NBSS) in countering terrorism in Ghana, the study made several revelations.

The study found that border security personnel deployed to the borders are aware of the fact that Ghana has a national border security strategy that aims at managing our borders and combating terrorism in Ghana. The study also revealed that, the NBSS contributes significantly to the efforts in countering terrorism in Ghana and for that reason, it should be taught at all national security services training schools to give personnel the needed understanding of the aims and objectives of

the NBSS even before they are deployed to the borders. The study also revealed that, if the compulsory refresher courses on NBSS will help border security personnel acquire the necessary tools to better implement the aims and objectives of the NBSS.

The study also revealed that, border security officers believe that, the measures put in place to combat terrorism in Ghana is not enough and something can be done to improve the measures to combat anti-terrorism within our borders. The study also revealed that, border security personnel are of the view that, several measures can be put in place to better combat terrorism within our borders. The suggested measures as outlined by border security personnel include up-to-date training, identifying the sources of finance for terrorist groups, intelligence gathering, supply of the needed resources, boost the morale of border security personnel, clear definition of roles and employing trained personnel at the borders.

On the challenges of the NBSS in responding to threats of terror activities along borders and within Ghana, the study identified several challenges including inadequate operational accoutrement, lack of skills and knowledge to manage the borders effectively, lack of logistics, poor coordination between border security personnel and institutions, In addition, the study revealed that, issues like harmonization of border patrols along national borders, establishing mutual patrols, establishment of offices to help with communication as well as sharing of data along with the possible formation of end-to-end mechanisms for control remains some of the identified challenges of border management in Ghana.

The study also revealed that, there is weak collaboration at the international level as there is insufficient partnership and cooperation at various stages of the international level presents a challenge in terms of border management. This problem arises primarily from the absence of

teamwork at several levels, for instance, where many border security and management activities may not properly integrate with border agencies of other countries.

Another challenge identified by the study has to do with the lack of equipment for tackling crime and terrorist operations. In a related view, another respondent noted that and in addition, the borders of Ghana are porous and pose a real challenge to Ghana's efforts in countering terrorism. The study revealed that, under staffing remains a major problem for most of the border security institutions. The study further found that most of the border security officers are ill-motivated and as a result they do not efficiently cooperate and harmonize their operations at the national and regional levels.

4.2 Conclusions

Based on the findings, the study concludes that most of the border security personnel deployed to the borders from the various security agencies played different roles in the facilitation of entry and exit of travellers, preventing illegal entry into the country and the facilitation of traders into Ghana. The study also concludes that, the threats faced by border security personnel at the borders include the threats of human trafficking, drug trafficking, armed robbery, animal rustling/movement, overcrowding, attacks from citizen, attacks from foreign nationals and smuggling of goods. Finally, the study concludes that even though we do not have a specific terrorism threat as a country, we continue to live in fear because of the spread of terrorism activities in our neighbouring countries. The study further concludes that activities such as smuggling of goods, animal movements, human and drug trafficking remain a serious challenge at Ghana's biggest border posts making the country very much exposed to the threats of terrorism.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions, the study makes the following recommendations to improve the border security situation and counter-terrorism in Ghana.

Firstly, the study recommends that the government of Ghana through the border security institutions should ensure the sustainability of the National Border Security Fusion Centre by adequately providing the required financing in order to make their work more effective and achieve the goals of the NBSS. The Government of Ghana could work collaboratively with ECOWAS and other Sahelian states to help counter terrorism through information sharing and pooling of logistics to monitor the cyber space. In the long term the countries in the West African sub-region could consider implementing measures to address the factors that make the region ideal for terrorist activities.

Secondly, the study recommends that border security institutions should adopt modern border security technologies and increase the deployment of technology for all the processes at the ports and borders, including surveillance, data gathering and data analysis. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the US, Department of State, ECOWAS as well as the Government of Ghana can cooperate to monitor the movement and activities of possible terror groups.

Furthermore, the study recommends that, the border security institutions should develop the capacities of their personnel and enable the Border Patrol Unit as well as the Customs Preventive Unit to sustain lead as the primary force for the security of national frontiers.

Also, the study further recommends that the government should enhance the well-being of border security personnel and strongly maintain the rules which protect staff from coercion throughout the period of executing their responsibilities; and

Lastly, the study finally recommends that the border security institutions should provide adequate training for their personnel in foreign languages, which are central to effective communication and harmonization with regional as well as transnational partners. The Government of Ghana, the Sahelian states and all ECOWAS member states could consider incorporating foreign language studies as core requirements of their training programmes.



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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire seeks information on **Ghana's Border Security Strategy and Counter-Terrorism**. The information provided will be used for academic purposes only. Your responses will be very much appreciated.

- i. Which security agency do you work for?

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- ii. How long has that agency been deployed at the border?

.....

- iii. Is the presence of your security agency as a result of a particular circumstance or are they traditionally there?


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.....

- iv. What is your job requirement at this post?

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- v. In doing your job, what are some of the threats you have encountered?

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.....



vi. Mention specific terrorist threats; have you personally encountered any?

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.....

vii. Knowing all these threats, do you think Ghana is exposed to terrorist threats? (Make a grading: low, medium or high).

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.....
.....

viii. Are you aware of Ghana having a National Border Security Strategy?

- Prior to your deployment did you have a Training introducing you to the NBSS or any counter terrorism strategy?
- Did you talk about the NBSS at Training?
- Did you receive any counter terrorism training?

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.....

ix. Specifically in your opinion what are the challenges affecting border management

x. In terms of personnel, equipment, training, co-operation between personnel of other services?

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
xi. What do you think should be done to achieve the aim of the NBSS?

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v. Generally, do you think our counter terrorism measures are adequate?



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xii. What will you suggest should be done to improve border management to help counter terrorism at the country's borders?



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