

Yale UN - Oral History

Lt. Gen. John Sanderson

Interviewed by Hugh Smith

July 10, 1998

Canberra, Australia

Hugh Smith: General Sanderson, could you outline your military career, and say how you were selected as commander of the military component of UNTAC?

Lt. General John Sanderson: Well, I was a civil engineer in my initial training within the army, and a construction engineer at the beginning of my military career, and this took me on what I consider to be 'civic action' tasks, although they were strategic civic action tasks, in the Southeast Asian region during the 1960s and early 1970s. For example, during the confrontation with Indonesia over the formation of Malaysia, I was involved with an engineer operation to build a road from the Indonesian border in Sabah to direct the people back into the Malaysian Federation. At that particular time, I became very conscious of the impact of civic action as a military tool, and also of the deep intelligence infrastructure and the linkage between military operations and political objectives, as had been established by the British during the latter period of their control of Malaysia before independence.

In Vietnam, once again, as a construction engineer, I commanded a large construction organization engaged in mine-clearing operations, land clearing, and civic action tasks. Eventually, I ended up as an instructor at both the British engineer schools

and the British Staff College, where in the case of the latter I was responsible for instruction in counter-revolutionary warfare and United Nations operations. This in a sense was the beginning of my United Nations experience. I was required to extend the training package at the British Staff College in United Nations operations, which required me to become deeply involved with previous UN commanders, and commanders of contemporary missions at the time. The primary one being the UNIFIL operations in the Lebanon, which in a sense was an aberration in the UN's military endeavor up to that time, and even though it still hasn't been resolved, it still continues to exist to this day, it was an expansion of the UN's role away from simply truce-observance into a much more profound relationship with the communities they were trying to support.

On my return to Australia after that sort of existence, I became more intensely involved with the development of combat power within the Australian army, eventually ending up as a mechanized brigade commander and an airborne force commander. It wasn't until the time I moved to Canberra in 1989 with a promotion to Major General as the Assistant Chief of Defense Force - policy that I began to look again at the political dimension of military endeavor. Apart from the fact that I was heavily distracted with a reorganization of the higher defense staff, I was also engaged with a new developing relationship with Southeast Asia. In particular a new sense of cooperation between the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense in developing strategic policy. 1989 was a critical time in the development of the Paris Accords associated with the solution of the Cambodian problem, and I became linked with that particular issue through the work of some of my staff with the Department of Foreign Affairs in the

development of options for the 'red book', which was the basis of negotiations from 1989 for the solution to the Paris crisis.

Having become the Assistant Chief of Defense Force for development up until the end of 1991, I was I guess I would say moving toward an interregnum in my military career, too young to be the Chief of Staff and too experienced to be some of the other appointments at two-star level around the army, I was asked if I would like to do the job of commander of the military forces in Cambodia, should there be a resolution of the crisis there. I said 'Yes, I would,' and from about early 1991 onwards I became engaged in that issue, eventually going to Cambodia after the signing of the Paris Accords on the 23rd of October. My title was 'Military Advisor to the Secretary General on Cambodia' but it was a planning function, to develop a plan from the Paris Agreements to establish a Secretary-General's report to the Security Council as the basis for seeking a mandate for the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia.

On March 12, 1992, I was appointed as the commander of the military component of UNTAC, having sat in the Security Council for the passage of the resolution that gave the mandate. At that time there was an interesting period in the United Nations -- in fact I received my piece of paper informing me that I had been appointed as the commander of UNTAC, it actually said, in Spanish, that I had been appointed as the commander of UNPROFOR, which will give you some idea of the confusion of the times. We quickly had that changed, and I got one back in English saying that I was to command the military component in Cambodia. This, incidentally, it was only about three days before I was due to leave New York to go Bangkok on my way in.

During my time in New York as a planner, I had linked up to Yasushi Akashi, the Secretary-General's Special Representative on Cambodia, and together we prepared the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council to achieve that resolution. So, that's how I arrived at the job as UN commander of the military component of UNTAC.

HS: Now, on appointment as commander, what did you see as the principal problems facing you?

JS: Let me say, first of all by way of clarification of this issue, I consider myself most fortunate in UN terms to have actually been involved in the planning of the mission that I was to command. This is a most unusual occurrence for UN military commanders. Normally they are actually handed a plan developed by fairly immature staff within the United Nations and they are told to get on with it and do it. I actually had been involved in the development of a planning staff and in the making of the plan. So, I was fairly conscious of the sort of problems that were going to exist in Cambodia. Frankly, the principal problems were problems of time. It was clear that the climatic and social conditions in Cambodia demanded that we move towards a secure regime in the countryside as quickly as we possibly could, primarily because the rainy season is a very strong determinant of your ability to operate within Cambodia. And this meant that we had to put a military force together, get an agreement to a detailed plan, and establish ourselves on the ground with all the logistic support, before April 1992. As it turned out, my concerns about this aspect were justified because the United Nations did not have the capacity to produce the required force by that time. It doesn't work that way. As a

consequence of that, it was very clear to me that I was going to have great difficulty holding the agreement together before we were able to implement it. The problems, I think, were probably compounded by the fact that the Cambodian countryside was absolutely ravaged by war, and it required a massive engineering effort in order to contemplate what the United Nations resolution had in store for Cambodia. It was difficult to get the United Nations themselves to understand the sequence of engineering versus military operations versus civil administration in the countryside. And as it turned out, we had to work our way through a series of crises in order to bring about the solutions that we had proposed.

HS: And what was your relationship with the Special Representative for Cambodia, Mr. Akashi, with the UN Secretary-General, and the Security Council?

JS: First of all, there is no question that Akashi as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was in charge in Cambodia. He had a great deal of experience within the United Nations itself, but little or no experience of running large organizations with definitive objectives in an operational setting, and so essentially that was my role, to provide that part of the organization. I think in the end, although Akashi and I didn't see eye to eye on everything, the relationship was a successful one in the sense that his deep understandings of the inner workings of the United Nations was very important in us constructing the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, to enable us to sustain the mandate and also to gain resolutions which aided our operational purpose in Cambodia.

Let me say, there was another aspect to this which was very important, and that was the presence in Phnom Penh of the diplomatic representatives of the Permanent Five, who formed an organization called the 'extended Permanent Five' in Cambodia which enabled us to get messages through to the inner levels of the Security Council direct from the field and also enabled us to get very clear support from the principal members of the Security Council in Cambodia itself. Those people played a part as observers the Supreme National Council, as observers of the Mixed Military Working Group, and in the role of defining to their nations exactly what the situation was on the ground. This was a very important part of our relationship with the Security Council. The Secretary-General of course was a reformist Secretary-General at the time, Boutros-Ghali, with an idea, a view of the role of the United Nations which was at odds with some of the members of the Permanent Five, but there was no question that he saw Cambodia as being a critical element in the future of the United Nations and was very strongly in support of that.

One of the difficulties, of course, is that the United Nations is based on a strong idea of the sanctity of the nation-state and the importance of sovereignty. Here we were with the most intrusive operations in the history of the United Nations in terms of broaching the sovereignty of a people, even though it was a fractured state, and we needed totally different tools to those that had previously been used by the United Nations. The primary example of that is the issue of a radio station. Now, a radio station is a very intrusive item, when you think about it: bypassing the leadership of a nation, or the factions in this particular case, and going direct to the people. His Excellency Boutros-Ghali was opposed to us having that initially because it didn't comply with the

idea of the United Nations' role, but in the end, we had to be intrusive and that and many other tools had to be made available to us.

I would say that the Cambodian experience was a paradigm for the United Nations and set a whole new way of doing business, including the need to have a strong military staff within the Secretariat. That is an improvement that I hope will make an improved relationship between commanders in the field and the Security Council, and commanders in the field and the Secretariat. Without such a strong military staff, the Secretariat is in a permanent state of crisis with respect to running these major operations, full stop.

HS: And as force commander, to what extent did you have room for independent action?

JS: Well, first of all, Cambodia is a long way away from New York, and secondly it is very much out of sequence in terms of time phases, so when it was broad daylight in Cambodia it was dark in New York. It was clear that the communications that existed in New York did not facilitate detailed supervision of commanders in the field. Which meant that that commander in the field had to take the initiative on many critical issues and circumstances, and explain later, basically. That was the issue that was involved. I think this is a sort of an aberration in the issue of military command, where the operational commander in the field actually has to take strategic decisions, and develop strategic relationships, and sometimes has to develop an understanding with the individual contributing nations, through their representatives both military and civilian on

the ground, which I know made the United Nations Secretariat uncomfortable at time. But there was no alternative if we were going to work our way through this operation.

HS: And what was your assessment of the role of external actors? In particular, Australia, the Permanent Five, ASEAN, and Japan?

JS: Well, I think it was an important conjunction of the interests of all of these countries. First of all, let me say that at the end of the Cold War, Cambodia was really a serious part of the unfinished business. Continuation of the conflict in Cambodia was not in anybody's interests. And yet, everybody had some interests in ensuring that the outcome produced not simply a stable environment in Cambodia, which would contribute to the stability of Southeast Asia, but also an environment that was conducive to their particular strategic interests. So, from the point of view of Australia, it was clear that Australia was seeking a deeper and wider role in Southeast Asia as the region that it had identified as critical to its future, and the Cambodian operation was a very important part of Australia striving for that recognition.

The Permanent Five? First of all, the Soviet Union or Russia as the former sponsors of the Vietnamese, were interested in getting a lot of these problems off their plate, but sustaining their relationships with the Vietnamese and their former clients. It struck me that that wasn't necessarily for strategic purposes, but in order to maintain a favorable economic and cultural environment for the future. China, of course, more directly associated with that. It was clearly on the path of establishing a new economic

and social order within China, and was intent on making sure that there was stability around the borders of China when they went through that process.

The Americans were maturing towards a new relationship with Indo-China after the Vietnam War, and were in a strongly supportive role in establishing an environment that was more conducive to their interests in that area. The ASEAN nations, rather interesting: all of them were looking for stability and a capacity to increase the dialog and the breadth of ASEAN in that area, but at the same time were looking to maintain their own prerogatives and, I would say, the pecking order within ASEAN -- so there was some striving for dominance in the influence over the activities. But by and large [they were] strongly committed to the UNTAC mandate.

And Japan: primary player in this activity, although they weren't co-chairmen of the Paris conference -- that role was played by France as the former colonial power and by Indonesia as the predominant ASEAN power. But Japan was making very large investments in the Southeast Asian region at that time. It seemed to me they were interested in producing a climate in which Vietnam was much more acceptable as an economic partner and also where there could be a more fulsome development of infrastructure and industry in the Southeast Asian region. And they were most generous in their contributions to this operation and in lending their good offices to the resolution of the various crises that occurred. At the same time, of course, Japan, who chose to make their first military contribution outside Japan's border since the Second World War with respect to UNTAC, still found it very difficult to play any overt operational military role, which many people in Japan saw as detracting from them fulfilling their destiny as a major global economic power. They were very sensitive to the way in which the

operation was conducted and the way in which their own people were used. But without them, I suspect we would not have had the significant financial base that enabled us to conduct this complex operation.

HS: Turning now to Cambodia, what were the difficulties encountered in your working relationships with the faction leaders?

JS: Let me say first of all, one of the familiar statements that I heard, particularly from the Khmer Rouge, was “You weren’t at the Paris negotiations and therefore you don’t understand the basis of the agreement.” I had put a lot of work into understanding the basis of the negotiations and the basis of the agreement, so I had a fair idea of when we were being short-changed in that assessment. But I think it is a very important, fundamental issue, it would have been useful for a lot more of the UNTAC hierarchy to have been involved in the Paris negotiations, to understand exactly where everybody was coming from in this process. And is well known, Rafee Ahmed, who was the primary facilitator at the UN for the Paris Agreements, actually didn’t become the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for reasons which probably need some analysis, if you want to understand the nature of the UN at that time. And a lot of his staff who were involved in the negotiations, didn’t come along. So, we proceeded into this without deep relationships with the faction leaders, which would have come out of participating in the agreements, and in fact, for some time, without any records of the negotiations that had taken place. So, our interpretation of the agreements and the mandate that extended from that, was something which required a great deal of work.

But let me say that one of our big problems was the delay between the Paris Agreements and giving effect to the mandate. The sort of momentum, desirable momentum, which had been established by the Paris Agreements, had been lost by the time the United Nations got on the ground in any effective sense. And in that period of time all sorts of aberrations in people's intent, as opposed to the agreements, emerged. It was quite clear, for example, that each of the factions had a different interpretation of what the outcomes would be. The Khmer Rouge, quite frankly, thought that through the Supreme National Council and UNTAC's rather light-handed supervision of the administration, that they would be able to get into a much stronger power-sharing relationship than was clearly possible. And it was quite clear that the State of Cambodia had decided that there would be, because they dominated the countryside, that they would be able to marginalize the other factions, and sustain their particular brand of government through this process.

And it was quite clear that Silhanouk had decided that once he was back in Phnom Penh he would be able to stitch up a relationship between Ranariddh, himself, and Hun Sen, and go back to the way things had been prior to 1970. All of those factions had those ideas, the faction leaderships had those ideas, and they were able to, because of the delay in the UN arrival there and the rather light hand of the UN in the early stages, were able to give effect to some of those thoughts. Clearly, none of them could actually have those sorts of outcomes if there was going to be a successful resolution of the Cambodian crisis. I suppose the biggest problem in Cambodia was that the Supreme National Council, which was supposed to come together with the faction leaderships to hand at the table and resolve their problems at the table and provide the framework, a continuing

framework, for the United Nations to operate in, never really worked effectively because all of those differences couldn't be reconciled.

HS: One of the organizations established to bring the factions together was the Mixed Military Working Group. How useful did you find that group?

JS: I think the Mixed Military Working Group was the most useful United Nations organization in Cambodia. It's discussions, deliberations were often very prolonged, but it was clear that the Mixed Military Working Group was the only vehicle that could facilitate a secure framework in which the rest of the United Nations activities could take place. All factions, with the exceptions of the Khmer Rouge, sustained their presence in the Mixed Military Working Group right throughout the whole operation, eventually forming a sort of Joint Chiefs of Staff in the post-electoral environment. In fact, during the UNTAC experience for most of the time that the Khmer Rouge was not present at the Supreme National Council, they actually were present in the Mixed Military Working Group. What we did was form subsets of the Mixed Military Working Groups in the regions throughout the countryside, and constantly strove to make sure that all factions were represented at the right level in those places. Sometimes we had the Khmer Rouge not represented at the Mixed Military Working Group in Phnom Penh, but represented at one of the regional Mixed Military Working Groups. So, all in all, it was the continuity of the Mixed Military Working Group that was critical.

But I would like to add another dimension to this, which was the Secretariat of the Mixed Military Working Group. It was a far more effective Secretariat than that of the

Supreme National Council, which to my mind didn't have a secretariat at all. The Secretariat of the Mixed Military Working Group was made up of representatives of the four Cambodian factions, plus representatives of a wide range of the participating nations in the military component. Their presence on that was another one of these factors that enabled us to sustain a proper relationship with the contributing countries. I would like to make particular mention of the Chinese contribution to membership of the Mixed Military Working Group -- it was surprisingly effective and supportive in bringing all the factions together, particularly the Khmer Rouge, and I was deeply appreciative of that. I think the working of the Mixed Military Working Group in Cambodia is a major study in itself, and I think something well worth emulating in future United Nations operations.

HS: What was your assessment of the principal figures in Cambodia, notably Sihanouk, Ranariddh, Hun Sen, and Kiev Sampan?

JS: Well, they were certainly the major players from the Cambodian side of the house. There is no question that we could have initiated and developed this process of reconciliation without Sihanouk playing a predominant part in this. Apart from Pol Pot, he was the only Cambodian figure that had true national standing and indeed international standing. He represented a Cambodian perspective for a return to a better existence. One of the great problems with Sihanouk, of course, was his age and also the complex relationships within the royal family. He was trying to meet the needs of the Cambodian people and the demands of those remnants of the royal family that were around him. This, I think, complicated his role, which wasn't helped by the fact that because of his

health, he constantly withdrew from the Cambodian environment, either to Pyongyang or Beijing, and sent missives from there which were to my mind fairly ineffective in terms of what was going on the ground.

I have my own view, and of course I temper this view by saying that I really don't pretend to have a tremendously deep understanding of the Cambodian society and the possibilities of that. Also, I was always willing to listen to Sihanouk's views on people and Cambodian history. I think that he could have played a much more determining role as president of the Supreme National Council. I also think that he could have had a much more determining role on the development of a proper system of justice in Cambodia if he had been stronger in his determination to follow the interests of the Cambodian people. Ranariddh, as head of FUNCINPEC, the royalist faction, did not have the sort of strength of character to hold an organization that had varying levels of education. But to be fair, he showed great courage in continuing with the commitment to the electoral process, and with some support from UNTAC he was the major contributing factor to the actual conduct of an election in Cambodia. If -- and this happened from time to time -- if they had followed through on their fears and uncertainties and withdrawn from the electoral process, then the whole United Nations endeavor in Cambodia would have failed completely. So, I am on one hand of the view that Ranariddh did not have the strength of character to lead that party effectively, either before or after the election. By the same token, he showed great courage in his continued commitment to it.

Hun Sen is very much, from my perspective, the Vietnamese candidate. He was appointed by them as the foreign minister, rising to prime minister of the State of Cambodia, which in fact is a very fractured organization. There are strong divisions

within the State-of-Cambodia organization. They exist as somebody who was brought up in a fairly ruthless environment and sustains his position by ruthless but very clever manipulation of the political scene, aided of course by the fact that there is not an effective justice system in Cambodia and no effective checks and balances in the sense of a strong judiciary or anything to counter his political role. I may be being unfair to Hun Sen, but I had the sense that he never, ever intended to lose the election, and everything that we got out of him in cooperation was based on their understanding that they would win. We needed to sustain that understanding right through to the end of the Cambodian operation. The responsibility for the things that happened after and since, I think, are very much attributed to Hun Sen's desire for power in Cambodia. And there are people within his own party who are quite fearful of that.

Kiev Sampan is something of an enigma. There is no question of his intellectual ability, he is one of the finest minds that Cambodia has produced, and yet obviously was an architect, a primary architect, of the Khmer Rouge social and economic policies. He was probably one of the few true internationalists at the table in the sense that he had an understanding of where he was at and what the interests of the various international players in the game were. He nevertheless was a part of the central committee of the Khmer Rouge, probably number three -- even though he was the president he was probably number three. The first two we never saw, that was Pol Pot and Nun Chia, and it was clear that he couldn't escape from their directions and he was behaving exactly in accordance with instructions that he received from the party and primarily from the other two. I think he is a tragic figure in the sense that his intellectual prowess could have given so much more to Cambodia.

HS: And did you have any sense of the part played in all this by Pol Pot?

JS: There was much debate about the role of Pol Pot. The various documents that we managed to obtain from the Khmer Rouge's inner workings indicated that he had stepped away from the central directive roles but he was still the *éminence grise*, he was the major influence. And I had that sense all the time while I was negotiating with all the factions, and particularly the Khmer Rouge, around the countryside. Everything that I said was tape-recorded, and I had the sense that it was taken back to Pailin or wherever Pol Pot was, listened to, and further directions were issued. It was very clear to me that there were divisions in the Khmer Rouge at that time, and indeed that was the primary basis on which I recommended that we could proceed with the operation in Cambodia even after the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the process.

There were different types of characters within the Khmer Rouge. There were those who were more open and listened and showed a genuine desire for the things that UNTAC had to offer to Cambodia, and those who prattled on in the old Khmer Rouge way, meaning in a sense that they were very close to Pol Pot and very close to the center of the organization. Some of them were well educated and had remarkably good intellects but were bound by their deep background to Pol Pot. A fear, I guess, was the other sentiment that I could see, and we saw it from time to time where we got very close to people within the Khmer Rouge and they either disappeared as interlocutors, or they disappeared altogether.

HS: And how generally did you respond to the intransigence of the PDK?

JS: Clearly there had been a great deal of the debate about whether the PDK should be accepted into this agreement. There was much discussion about the genocidal history of the PDK. This had been a key ingredient in the debates of the Paris conference. The conclusion was that there couldn't be an agreement unless they were a part of it. And indeed, there were a number of international players in this process who weren't at all convinced where the fault lay with respect to the circumstances in Cambodia. So, we had to do everything we possibly could to keep the PDK in the process, to acknowledge that they were major participants in the process, and indeed that their views had to be taken seriously, debated, and where we could, generate compromises. Of course, we were subjected to a great deal of criticism from the State of Cambodia that we were compromising with the PDK to an unacceptable level, when in fact we weren't, and a great deal of criticism from the PDK that we were compromising with the State of Cambodia. That is the nature of this sort of operation. But the key message that I kept giving to the Khmer Rouge, both on the military and civilian side, was that the door was always open. There was the vision, the framework within which we all had to operate. When they were ready and willing to operate within that framework, there was always a place at the table for them. And I must say, from time to time, their commitment to the process came and went. It wasn't always "No." It was quite often "Maybe," and a whole new set of interlocutors would turn up who had clearly been trained and drilled for the process. We would get optimistic about the way ahead and then when we couldn't

comply with the demands and they disappeared, we would become quite depressed again.

But we never, ever, closed the door on them.

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HS: General Sanderson, what were the reasons for moving ahead to Phase II of UNTAC and the elections, without the compliance of the PDK? And who made these decisions?

JS: Well, clearly it is a very high-level decision to make such a transition. Let me say that the idea of moving to the conduct of an activity in a non-secure environment, as opposed to the secure environment that was envisaged in the mandate, was a very significant step. Most nations had made their commitment of troops, and bearing in mind that a lot of nations were making commitments to the United Nations for the first time in their history, most of them had made their commitments on the basis that this was going to be a pure peace-keeping activity, and that everybody would comply with the agreements that they had made in Paris. So, it was a huge step to contemplate. And let me say, it was never a sort-of clear-cut decision: one day we were going along with the mandate that was given to us on the basis of the agreements and the next day we moved to another mandate.

We gained resolutions from the Security Council that supported us in our endeavors, and the Security Council continued to exhort the Khmer Rouge to fulfill their

obligations to the process. But at a point in time, it was clear that the military either had to change its complete dispositions, to one based on an insecure environment, or leave, really. And don't forget we were actually halfway through with respect to the other factions with the implementation of the other mandate. And there was a real dilemma. On one hand we had a posture and a structure that was designed for the cantonment and disarmament process, which was supposed to be an orderly process, and on the other hand we were foreseeing the need to be able to support an electoral process in a non-secure environment. These two things demand different military outlooks and a different military posture. But at one stage, round about September 1992, it became clear that we had to contemplate a change in the disposition and indeed in the plans for the sustaining of the military force. I began planning with my staff in great depth for that outcome, and began to go through a process of convincing Akashi, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and the representatives of the Permanent Five and other players in Cambodia, that we actually could do this. That the environment would allow us to comprehend running the election in a non-secure environment if we changed our dispositions helped us gain a commitment from the various nations to this end. So I was involved continually in briefing all of those people as we made our plans, and once our plans were completed it was a massive undertaking to move the whole force. It was actually a large clock-wise movement around the countryside, so that we ended up with a very strong structure around the outside of the most insecure areas in the country.

It wasn't made as an over-night decision. The decision was made that we should proceed from our previous focus to the focus on the conduct of the elections while sustaining the original focus and sustaining the opportunities for everybody to comply

with the original focus. Also, getting ourselves into the position where in the event that we were unable to get that compliance, we could actually sustain the conduct of an election in that environment. There came a critical moment where it was go/no-go. The question was whether we were going to proceed to the election without the Khmer Rouge. That was a decision that had to be made early in 1993, and when the decision was made, of course, we were able to throw our weight more clearly and more closely behind the civil components and run the election.

HS: And what was your perspective on the confrontation between Sihanouk and UNTAC, when Sihanouk demanded that UNTAC put an end to the so-called 'climate of violence' engendered by the Khmer Rouge?

JS: Somewhere in the process, when he [Sihanouk] had been the CGDK in the early stages of the negotiations, he must have made promises to all the factions. I suppose he saw this as his role as a conciliator and the head of Cambodians' views of the future. Clearly he had made promises to the Khmer Rouge about the atmosphere and the possibilities that would be created once he was back in Phnom Penh. It was clear that Hun Sen and the State of Cambodia were not going to comply with the circumstances that would allow him to fulfill those promises. And in his frustration, he waxed and waned in his criticism of parties on all side of this process. The fact that the Khmer Rouge were not going to comply with his desires and began to actually conduct acts of terror around the countryside to frighten the international community, I think really exposed the weaknesses of Sihanouk's position in this process. When he spoke about UNTAC

putting an end to the climate of violence, he wasn't really speaking of us going out and doing away with the Khmer Rouge. He was speaking about us producing a solution which he had actually promised to everybody which we were not actually capable of producing. It is a complex issue. But you have to understand that Sihanouk was unable to meet the desires of all the Cambodian factions, and was often quite critical to the international players in this about the fractious nature of the Cambodian people. But, also he was very clear about their tendency towards violence and the fearful things that could happen if we didn't find some compromises in this process.

HS: What is your assessment of the success or failure of the cantonment of weapons and the extent to which the factions cooperated in this process?

JS: Let me say that the two smaller factions, the KPNIF and Ankie, the military arm of FUNCINPEC, complied as fully as they could. I mean, they had nothing to gain by the process not going through fully. And in fact, we actually had to let them rearm themselves again when we couldn't bring the others into the process. Now, there was duplicity in the SOC position on this: the SOC did not reveal all their weapon holdings. They revealed the weapon holdings of the armies. In fact, it was in the nature of that society that the police force was essentially paramilitary. It was a very large military wing of government and had sources of weapons that the Khmer Rouge kept talking about. However, the idea of disarming the police force was not contained in the Paris agreements. If you talk to the Khmer Rouge, you would discover the suggestion that because we didn't disarm the police and we didn't disarm the SOC military effectively,

that they could not disarm because to disarm was to destroy themselves. There is some justification for the position that they have taken in this respect. There was a flaw in the Paris agreements with respect to the control of the Cambodian police force, in particular, and it was never effectively brought under control.

On the other hand, and I pleaded this to the Khmer Rouge on many occasions, is the only way we could get control of the State of Cambodia military wings was for them to give us cooperation in various parts of the countryside. I believe elements of their leadership understood fully. But because of the nature of the Khmer Rouge they were unable to get that sort of compliance. So, while they pleaded with us to bring the SOC under control more fully, they were unable to enable us to establish the conditions where that was possible. And that was the dilemma we were confronted with. So, the SOC put 50,000 troops into the cantonments, of the 180,000 or 200,000 -- I can't remember the exact figure that they revealed to us. They certainly weren't their prime troops they put into the cantonments, and certainly the weapons systems they put into the cantonments weren't their best weapons. We were confronted with the idea that they were justified in not disarming because the Khmer Rouge stayed out in the countryside and the Khmer Rouge were justified in not disarming because the Cambodian police and elements of their own military were not compliant with the process.

Let me say that I think this is one of the most optimistic aspects of the Cambodian operation. We are talking about disengaging four military factions in an internal security environment. That's an enormous undertaking, which in the sort-of six months that was postulated for that, was unrealistic. Nevertheless, it either had to be done quickly or not

at all, and unfortunately, we were unable to get any but the two smaller factions to comply fully with this process.

HS: Did you believe that your personal safety was threatened at any stage, and what precautions did you have to take?

JS: This is an interesting issue. I never had that sense of my personal safety being threatened. Of course, I walked in the countryside and I traveled in the countryside, and the mine threat -- which was the primary threat throughout the countryside -- was always there. But I had a sense that my security was critical to the overall mission, so as the mission moved from one critical stage to a more critical stage, I raised the level of my security, not for personal reasons but for the safety of mission. And as we got close to the election, it was clear that if anything happened to me the election was not going to take place. And that was the time when I applied the greatest level of security to my movement around Cambodia.

HS: And were there any occasions on which you believed UNTAC might need to resort to the use of force?

JS: The idea of the use of force was inherent in the Paris agreements, and in the mandate. You see, what we were talking about was all the military factions going through a great act of trust and placing themselves in the hands of the United Nations military component, moving into cantonments and disarming. Now, you cannot

contemplate having responsibility for disarmed troops in cantonments if you can't protect them. Indeed, we had to write a set of standing operating procedures that were a variation on normal UN standing operation procedures to actually comprehend defending those people whom were entrusted to us. How could it be any other way?

Later on, it became necessary in order to sustain the confidence of the Cambodian people in the UN's intent and the electoral process, for us to stay in various places. There were clearly activities conducted by the Khmer Rouge, and maybe by the State of Cambodia, to move the UN presence away from certain areas, either to deter the electoral process or in order to conduct other activities in those areas. And at a particular point in time, we had to make a statement that we would stay. On a number of occasions, we fought what I would describe as 'company-level actions' in order to make that point, particularly in the more remote areas. And in some cases, the United Nations military people were killed in that activity. It was a deliberate act to say, "We are going to stay." And if we hadn't made it at those critical points, then we would not have been able to conduct the election in those areas. And indeed, the electoral components, who were required to do their thing in this insecure environment, would have quickly collapsed in their confidence if the military had not been resistant in those places.

HS: How effective were the NGOs in the peace-building process? How did they interact with the UNTAC military component?

JS: NGOs are a mixed bag. I think at some stage during our time there, we counted 185 non-governmental organizations in Cambodia. This extends from large international

organizations such as the ICRC down to small contingents of one or two people representing small religious organizations in various parts of the world. And so the contribution was mixed. In some cases, they were very vulnerable, very critical of the UN, formed a relationship with the media in their criticism, and I think detracted from the UN presence there. The larger ones, unquestionably, had a major role to play: as always, the ICRC, the Scandinavian organization Redbarna, the organizations like Care International. The larger groups made a very important contribution, and indeed were embraced quite comprehensively in the UN planning processes. All of this was part of the process of giving the Cambodians the confidence in the international community's commitment to their future, and indeed, as part of that confidence, engendering an attitude that would carry them to participate in this electoral act, which was the key issue. The creation of an electorate in Cambodia, and the actual courage of the Cambodian people to come forward and vote, was the key issue in Cambodia, without any question. So, the NGOs performed a very important part in that. But the relationship between the United Nations and the UN military component in particular, and the NGOs, was discordant. There were many NGOs who had an attitude that to have anything to do with the military would have detracted from their purpose. But we were constantly aware of their presence in the countryside, the problem of their security, and as I said their ability to actually detract from the international commitment to the military component's operation. Since the Cambodian operation, I have been a strong proponent of the idea of a strategic alliance between the military and both the United Nations humanitarian agencies and the non-government organizations, as a way to bring a resolution to these terrible problems that people suffer in these crisis-ridden countries.

HS: What is your assessment of UNTAC's record on protecting human rights, and what was the effect of establishing a branch of the human rights commission in Cambodia?

JS: Well, first of all, let me explain myself as a firm adherent to the idea of individual rights and human rights as the fundamental basis of an effective justice system. I have to tell you there are a lot of people in the United Nations who don't have that firmness of conviction. I mean, they are more willing than others to sacrifice the rights of the individual for what are sometimes termed 'individual rights' [group?] or in simple terms, stability. It is interesting being in the United Nations because you see the full spectrum of attitudes towards this, and liberal western attitudes don't prevail everywhere within the United Nations, in fact they may be in a minority. But there is no question, even though there was little chance of getting full compliance with a liberal, western idea of human rights within Cambodia, that the presence of the human rights commission, the human rights component of UNTAC, and the work that was done in establishing the rights of individuals in Cambodia, was a key element in moving the Cambodian society and the Cambodian leadership in a direction which would not have been possible otherwise. I am not saying, you know, that you turn from left to right in this process, but you change the vectors and initiate a whole range of new thoughts in Cambodian society, which of course are the key to their future.

HS: What could UNTAC do, if anything, about the mistreatment of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia?

JS: We were in the process of trying to provide, not a protective presence, but a presence throughout the countryside that deterred attacks on any minorities in Cambodia, and which deterred attack on Cambodians themselves by members of their society. But the Vietnamese minority was a particular target of the Khmer Rouge, and indeed other elements within Cambodian society, because Vietnam is seen as the eternal enemy of Cambodia. I didn't have to understand that, it is much the same thing that is going on in the Balkans today. That the Vietnamese are seen as having an encroaching, pervading, presence in Cambodian, and Cambodians have a sense that their survival depends on stemming the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia. So, when the Khmer Rouge made attacks against Vietnamese civilians in Cambodia, they were not without some support from the rest of Cambodian society. Nevertheless, it was intolerable that the United Nations should be there and not do something about those attacks. Constantly, we provided a presence wherever we could, and constantly we did everything we could to shed home the blame to where it lay. But, we could not be everywhere within Cambodia, and neither were we involved in an enforcement operation in Cambodia -- the mandate never, ever ascribed to the UNTAC military component an enforcement role, except in the sense of powers of arrest under a special prosecutor and a body of law. But one never had the enforcement role, and indeed if we were to have moved to the enforcement role I doubt if many of the contributors to UNTAC would have sustained their presence in the force.

HS: And how would you evaluate the relationship between the military and the civilian components of UNTAC?

JS: I think it varied. But I think that it was, in United Nations terms, as strong a relationship as it could be and strengthened throughout the process. It became very clear that the operation was not feasible without a full commitment of the military component to civil administration, logistic support, and the electoral activities in Cambodia. And indeed, Gérard Porcell, who was the French head of civil administration, made this point very strongly when he said that with the movement of the military component's role from cantonment and disarmament to sustaining of the administrative and electoral processes in Cambodia, it unleashed a whole range of talent, without which it would not have been possible to conceive of while doing the sorts of things that had been done. I think that realization is in fact a realization to most of the civil components of the United Nations. It was reflected, I think, probably in the civic action area where the acknowledgment of a civic action role, a civic action role, for the military component, only developed as the mission went on, despite the fact that we made the point that we really needed to do that right from the word 'go.' I think the civil administration aspect of this revelation is quite interesting. The whole idea of border controls, immigration controls, controls of the flow of goods backwards and forwards across the border, the idea of control of the ports, the undertakings which were inherent in the United Nations mandate in Cambodia, were not feasible without many more people being applied to it than was planned for. And the only group that could do this was the military. So, the military had to move into a

relationship with the civil components that enabled these things to occur. Most of the work that was done in the ports for example, and the harbors and the coastline, was done by the military. These were things that would normally be aspects of civil administration, immigration and control of the flow of goods, control of the ports, actual development of the operating safety mediums for ports and airfields: all done by the military, but within the civil framework.

HS: You mentioned the civic action role for the military component. How important was that role?

JS: Well, this was an absolutely vital role. For the last fifty years militaries all over the world have been learning this lesson, that in order to create a favorable environment in which to sustain military operations either a peacekeeping or a counter-insurgency nature, you must have a civic action program that goes hand in hand with it. Apart from the fact of creating a climate in which people are better disposed towards the military and have a greater sense of their own security, most of Cambodia was only accessible to the military. Therefore, if you wanted to conduct activities in support of Cambodian children, as UNICEF wanted to do, or conduct activities in support of infrastructure development, as UNDP wanted to do, or conduct activities to support refugees, as UNHCR wanted to do, then you had to acknowledge that the military was going to play a large civic action role in those areas. In the early stages of the planning for UNTAC I pleaded for a civic action budget for the military component and I was told that that was none of our business, that it was the business of all the other humanitarian agencies and

so on, and it wasn't feasible. Well, as it turned out, we came to a compromise with the agencies of our own accord in this, in that they provided the budgets, and we provided the planning, and the ingredients of a lot of the civic action programs. We were an agent of UNICEF, for example, in the delivery of water supplies in some of the more remote areas of Cambodia, it was well-drilling and so on. In doing that, we reinforced our own presence in the countryside and enhanced our access to the Cambodian people and indeed enhanced their commitment to the process as well. It was absolutely vital. The United Nations and the humanitarian agencies thereof have got to understand that the military is as vital to this role as they are.

HS: To what extent was the authority of UNTAC respected with regard to the directive of 17 March, 1993, which prohibited the possession and carrying of firearms?

JS: It was a nice piece of law, and the intent, I think, was praiseworthy, but the carriage of firearms in the Cambodian countryside was second nature, inherent in people's understanding of the environment in which they had to survive. However, there was a lot of indiscriminate use of weaponry by youths throughout the countryside, and this allowed the possibility of removing weapons from people who were behaving in an irresponsible manner. The idea that UNTAC could remove the weapons, I think, was a very encouraging idea for the Cambodian people, for the international community, and indeed for the civil components of UNTAC. But it wasn't a really feasible option for compliance in the time that was available without an effective police force throughout the

countryside. I don't think we ever had an effective police force throughout the Cambodian countryside.

HS: What was your assessment of the secessionist move of Prince Chakrapong just after the May 1993 election?

JS: Well, first of all let me say I think that Prince Chakrapong was a stooge in this. And let me also say that there had been a contingency plan on the part of the SOC to withdraw and run a government on the other side of the river, as a part of their fear of what might happen after the Vietnamese withdrawal. So, this was an enactment, an enactment of a contingency plan that had been established for the post-1989 environment after the Vietnamese withdrawal from the countryside. But Chakrapong really was a stooge in this; there were other major players. The Sam Dekerv autonomous zone, as it was called, in my mind was a ploy to generate an environment in Phnom Penh where the constitutional process would be compromised to allow a primary role for the losing party in the post-electoral environment. It certainly frightened a lot of people, so much so that there was a suggestion that the United Nations should withdraw from east of the Mekong, a suggestion that I resisted, and we sustained the military presence in those areas until there was a resolution of this. I actually, after a series of discussions, contemplated having to put people, a military force, east of the Mekong in order to provide for the security of our own people, including the military people, in the autonomous zone. And this was a very difficult thing to contemplate but as a commander I could not disregard the safety of the people for whom I was responsible. But it would have been a very

messy operation. The fact that we were planning such a thing I made widely known to the Cambodian factions, and I think that that was conducive in bringing about a resolution of that particular problem.

HS: What was your experience of dealings with the Thais and what was your assessment of their objectives in Cambodia?

JS: Well, quite clearly the Thais have had a number of objectives. First of all it was to rid themselves of a difficult problem with respect to the refugees along the Thai-Cambodian border. Secondly, to do so in a way which sustained their interest in their claims to parts of western Cambodia. Thirdly to provide in Phnom Penh a government that was favorable to their interests, and I think that in fact Prince Sihanouk was seen as being part of that. At the same time, of course, they were sustained by considerable economic interests along the Thai-Cambodian border, particularly in the gem trade where huge extraction of gems was taking place around the Pailin area and further south than that. And also many Thais were engaged in the business of extracting timber from inside Cambodia. So there was a lot of money involved in this. Balancing up all their strategic interests, their geostrategic interests, their commercial interests, and so on, it was quite difficult for them to comply with all of the requirements of the Cambodian operation, of the Cambodian mandate, and therefore we found ourselves in, at times, a difficult relationship with the Thais, particularly with respect to the movement of military forces through Thailand to various parts of the Thai border, I'm now talking Cambodian military forces, and on occasions, the presence of Thais inside Cambodia interfering with the

economic processes there. You know, we worked our way through those relationships, and I think at times the feelings between Thailand and UNTAC were quite difficult. There was the desire on the part of the Thais to resolve these problems at a very local level, across the borders, in regional terms, and while I was prepared to accede to the fact that a lot of problems could be solved on a local level, there was no doubt that the really serious issues had to be addressed to the United Nations and conducted at the international level. Otherwise we would have been very vulnerable.

HS: The decision not to try to disarm the Khmer Rouge, what was your thinking on this question?

JS: Well, first of all, if the Khmer Rouge... the whole idea of the Paris agreements was that the faction fully complied with the agreements, and they came into the cantonments and they were secure in the cantonments and then they disarmed. And if they didn't come into the cantonments then you couldn't disarm them. It was as simple as that. There was no question of us going around the countryside trying to drag in Khmer Rouge and take their weapons off them: there would have been a full-scale war. And it's nonsense for anybody to comprehend that it would be otherwise. So, it wasn't a question of us saying, "We're not going to disarm the Khmer Rouge." The Khmer Rouge said "We're not going to come into the process until you comply with the following things..." I recognized that if they weren't going to disarm, then there was no way we could disarm everybody else, and so I was intent on getting them to come into the process and we kept the doors open for that as far and as long as we possibly could. But at the

end of the day, when I read in some academic papers that the major failure of UNTAC was not to disarm the Khmer Rouge, this is a very simplistic and naïve assessment of the nature of the agreement and what was possible in Cambodia. We tried to encourage the Khmer Rouge to be part of the process, in other words, to canton themselves under our supervision and allow us to disarm them. Anything else was ridiculous.

HS: To what extent was Cambodia demilitarized and how did this affect UNTAC's task?

JS: This is a very important question, and was the subject of a great deal of analysis on our part, because the answer to that question determined the extent to which we could be confident about conducting the electoral process in an insecure environment. Now, it is clear to us, it was clear to us, that the Khmer Rouge began to fall apart in 1989, that they had conducted operations to lodge themselves back in Cambodia in anticipation of the Vietnamese withdrawal and to establish themselves as a major political factor inside Cambodia, and the same applied to the other resistance components, FUNCINPEC, and the KPNLF. But with the loss of the Vietnamese enemy, the Cambodian government, albeit a puppet government in Phnom Penh, a lot of the vitality of the resistance cause disappeared. Not only that, a lot of the support for the resistance cause from the west and other places started to dissipate.

We met a number of Khmer Rouge youths in the countryside who walked in and spoke constantly about when the war ended in 1989. All of the military factions were having great difficulty in holding their military components together. One reason was

they couldn't pay them. The Khmer Rouge had a much better capacity to pay their soldiers than the State of Cambodia did, and quite clearly as a vibrant military force all of them had frittered away. Nevertheless the countryside was full of unemployed soldiers who couldn't see their way forward into a future employment. And that was a great security threat. A beggar with an AK-47 is a very persuasive beggar, and they were everywhere.

To my great regret, we had quite a limited capacity to demilitarize the countryside once the Khmer Rouge decided that they were not going to comply with the Paris agreements. They saw that quite clearly. This was the tool that they employed in order to get concessions from the United Nations that were outside the Paris Agreements.

The Paris agreements, as I said, were also inconclusive about the demilitarization of the police, and there was the illusion that the police were somehow a western-style police organization which operated in the interests of the people in normal policing duties instead of being a paramilitary force armed to the teeth, in most instance better armed and better paid than the military forces, and a great threat. So there's the flaw, and it did have a profound effect on UNTAC's task, but as I've already said, we changed the focus of the military, changed the dispositions of the military, and went at the UNTAC task with a will. And the UNTAC task was essentially to allow the enfranchisement of the Cambodian population and the conduct of an election.

[end of side 2]

[tape 2, side 1]

HS: As a force commander, what were your principal problems in terms of command and control?

JS: First of all, it was a multi-national force of great complexity, in the sense that we ended up with 34 nations in the force, many of whom and I'm not sure whether it was a majority or not, but many of whom were on their first United Nations mission, and while they came at it with a clear idea that this was going to contribute to their role in the 'new world order,' they in many instances had only a very fundamental idea of what it was they were there for. And they came from different cultural bases, some of them from a cultural basis where the circumstances in their own countries were in some instances at least as bad if not worse than the Cambodian countryside. And of course we had situations where the Germans and the Japanese, engaged on their first military operation since the Second World War outside their country, were very sensitive so there was huge press interest from all in this. And at the same time there was also an explosion of UN activity with Somalia, Yugoslavia and so on, and a lot of the effort that might have been applied to Cambodia was absorbed by these other missions. So, it was stitching together a military organization from a very fundamental basis in a very short period of time.

I was well served by my personal staff in this respect. We put out some very clear directions about this to the nations in order to help them to prepare their forces, and our standing operating procedures were very prescriptive without being inflexible. And they were all put out beforehand; a great deal of effort went into that. But getting people onto the ground and getting them focused on exactly what it was they were supposed to do, when many of them had just come to survive and do their thing and go home, was quite

difficult. And then the idea that they weren't there on some sort of a jolly peace-keeping activity, that this was going to be something that was done in an insecure environment: that was a very difficult idea to get around.

The other problem was to develop a multi-national headquarters in which everybody had a sense of participation and a sense of confidence in the outcomes and a sense of contributing. That took some time to do, and I had to put in place a whole series of mechanisms which were demanding on the staff but which built up that level of confidence. So, the problems were enormous, in fact, but in the end of the day, and I've said this on many occasions, everyone actually wanted to be respected for what they were doing, their military endeavor, and for their nations to earn respect, and probably the principal tool in getting people to do what you wanted, was to say "Look, what you are doing is unprofessional and it is going to cast your nation, your military, in a bad light. This is what you should do in order to generate respect from the international community and the Cambodians themselves." And people at the end of the day were very proud about what they had achieved. On the way to that success, we had many, many disruptions and we had to send a number of people home, and in some cases major components of the various peacekeeping forces. But it was a, I suppose, military leadership endeavor of the most demanding type.

HS: You have hinted at this question already, but to what extent were standard operating procedures effectively observed in UNTAC?

JS: Let me say that a lot of the forces came from a different policy base into Cambodia. That was one of the revelations to me, coming from a country where there is a single policy base for the employment of its military forces outside the country, to find that there were military forces there that were operating on different strands of policy that came from different parts of their executive. For example, you could have a part of a military force which is responding to a strand of policy that came from the Defense, a part of it which was responding to a strand of policy which came from the Presidential palace, and a part of it which was responding to a strand of policy which came from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and it was quite difficult to determine which of these was influencing their reaction to the situations in the countryside and indeed their reaction to the standing operating procedures. This made it all the more important that I appealed to their military pride, in the uniform, and in their professionalism, to overcome those things. Some were able to overcome it more easily than others because they were a little bit more remote from their country, and the hand of their own operational commanders did not lie as heavily on them.

But I did have elements that actually were sending intelligence or information they picked up in the countryside home and not providing it to the military component headquarters, and we became very conscious of that. Fortunately, we knew what we were doing, and there was a parallel body of observers as well as the military components around the countryside, so we were able in the nicest possible way to identify where people were failing to comply with the operating procedures and to put them on a path that would bring them back onto it. And at the end of the day, that's where they had to be for their own security and for the security of everybody around them. And those that

were most vulnerable were those that didn't comply, and I think probably the history of UNTAC reveals that.

HS: Finally, a couple of questions linking Cambodia and other UN peacekeeping operations. Firstly, were there previous UN operations on which you drew as lessons going into Cambodia?

JS: I think Cambodia was a paradigm. There was nothing much from previous UN operations, except in the nature of the UN administrative processes that we could draw lessons from and try to change. I mean, the UN administration processes are very bureaucratic and cumbersome, and a number of those things had to be changed in order to conduct an operation of this complexity and magnitude. If I drew on any operations for my experience, they were things like the Malayan emergency and confrontation, and so on, and the combination of civic action, political objectives, military objectives, the fusing together of these things to achieve outcomes. Templer's role in, and conduct of, the operations in the Malayan emergency, which brought Malaya to independence and the establishment of an effective Malayan constitution and government, would be the primary operation from which I drew my understanding of what was required in Cambodia.

If you look back on the UN operations which preceded this, the only one that came anywhere near this was the Namibia operation, which was a much smaller activity. It did have some observance of borders, some control of disarming of military, and some assistance with the conduct of an election. But the idea of taking over a whole country, creating an electorate, creating political parties, creating an atmosphere in a remote

countryside which has been torn by war, on this scale, was without precedent, and I think the lessons that came from it are very vital to the future, not simply of the United Nations but of global stability.

HS: And can you say a little bit about those 'major lessons' that you drew from Cambodia for future UN operations?

JS: Well, let me say the first thing is that these are very complex military operations. They are very complex military-civil operations, and you cannot run them from a secretariat. If you are going to run operations of this complexity and magnitude, you have to have a proper headquarters organization, which is in the business of anticipating the needs of the operation, planning for it, establishing a proper link between operations in the field and policy-makers, such as the Security Council represents, and anticipating the needs of people in the field, and giving effect to those needs in order to avoid crises. Now, the UN has made a half-hearted effort to recognize that reality, but I think there is great concern that if the UN could do that it would be something other than the UN. And I think the evidence of this lies in the fact that it has been NATO that has conducted the activities in the former Yugoslavia, pushing aside, really, the United Nations, when it got down to decisive military-civic action. There are some perils in that, of course. Using NATO rather than strengthening the hand of the United Nations actually pushes us towards a regional approach to things, which is not much better than what existed before we had the United Nations.

The other aspect, I've mentioned it here, is the need for a strategic alliance between the civil agencies -- that's not simply the UN humanitarian agencies but all the civil agencies including the non-government agencies, and the military. You have to produce a planning environment and an operating environment that is conducive to that coordination of the objectives of those organizations. Otherwise the resources are frittered away, and you can find these organizations pursuing objectives that are contrary to those of each other.

The other issue, and it's a clear issue, is that you cannot conduct these operations unless you forge an alliance between the people who are the beneficiaries of these operations and the United Nations force or organization. And there's the rub: the most serious issue confronting the United Nations is that it has a Charter which is about nation-states in a liberal world where the sovereignty of the nation-state is totally respected, and yet most of the global problems can't be handled on a simple, nationally defined boundary condition. There has to be an international dynamic which enables the problems of peoples, regions, to be addressed in a total, international, economic, social, cultural and military context.

HS: General Sanderson, thank you very much indeed.

JS: Thank you.