



**Moral Reasoning, Cost of Helping, and Human Relationships to Altruistic
Orientation.**

by

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Legon, in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of the
Masters of Philosophy Degree in Psychology.**

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March 1997.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to my mother, Madam Georgina Abena Serwaa, and all those who in one way or the other have contributed to my education to this level. Thank you all and May The Almighty God Bless You.

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12/01/23

Declaration

I, C. B. Wiafe-Akeneteng, do hereby declare that this Thesis consist entirely of my own work and that no part of it has been presented for another degree elsewhere. All materials consulted have been duly acknowledged.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'C. B. Wiafe-Akeneteng', written over a horizontal dashed line.

(C. B. Wiafe-Akeneteng)

Approval Sheet

Supervisors

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to Prof. C. E. Jusu, is written over the signature line.

Prof. C. E. Jusu

Dr A. Afrifa

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Abstract

This study examined how one's level of moral reasoning, the cost of helping, and human relationships influence one's altruistic orientation. Two hundred and fourteen subjects (123 males and 91 females) aged between 16 and 22 years with an average age of 18 years from three mixed Sixth Form secondary schools in the Greater Accra region of Ghana participated in the study. Materials were the short form of Rest James (1979) Defining Issue Test (DIT) and the Self Report Altruism Scale (SRAS). Results indicated significant main effects between each of the three independent variables and altruistic orientation. In addition, there were significant differences in the amount of help offered at each level of moral reasoning, at each level of cost, as well as the amount of help offered to the three different victims. Furthermore, there were interaction effects of any two combinations of the three independent variables on altruistic orientation. However, there was no interaction among all the three independent variables combined. These findings suggest that all three variables influence altruistic orientation in one way or the other. It is therefore recommended that measures should be taken to improve children's level of moral reasoning; and that in situations where cost of helping is high, request for assistance must be presented in piecemeal, where possible, and that education should be mounted to impress upon individuals and groups to look beyond helping only kin and/or friends so as ensure equitable treatment for all.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The term Altruism is believed to have been coined by Auguste Comte (cited in Batson 1991) who defined it as "to live for others". Before and after him, Philosophers and Social commentators such as Plato, Aristotle, Mandeville, Smith, Rousseau, J. S. Mills, and Nietzsche (all cited in Batson, 1991) have concerned themselves with the issue of why some people help those in need why others do not. While some maintained that man is by nature selfish, others argued that he is capable of attending to the needs of others in addition to his. It must be emphasized however that these initial attempts to understand altruistic behaviour were mainly speculative and was discussed under topics such as benevolence, charity, compassion, and friendship. In other words, there were no systematic attempts to study altruism (helping behaviour) as it is being done in recent times.

Current interest in helping behaviour in general, and altruism in particular by Psychologists and other Social Scientists was stimulated by the cold-blooded murder of Kitty Genovese on March 13, 1964, in the neighbourhood of Kew Gardens, New York. According to Rosenthal (1964), although the attack lasted for almost forty-five (45) minutes and was witnessed by as many as thirty-eight (38) people, none of them intervened directly or even called the police. In a related incident, a women was forced onto a pool table in Big Dans Tavern (a drinking bar in New Bedford, Massachusetts, USA) by four men on Sunday, March 6, 1983, who repeatedly raped her but in spite of her cry for help, none of the other customers nor even the bar tender went to her rescue or called the police (Baron & Byrne, 1987). Similar instances in other parts of the World where people's plea for various kinds of help have been ignored by individuals and/or groups who could have done something to help are not uncommon in everyday life.

On the other extreme, are instances of people who have risked their lives, sacrificed their time, money, and/or energy to rescue or help others in need. Typical examples of such people are Stefania Burzminski, Schindler, and many other individuals and groups who either gave refuge to, or helped Jews to flee from Nazi persecution during the Second World War (Brown, 1986). Stefania for instance sheltered thirteen Jews in an attic of her small apartment and fed them for two and a half years. The most remarkable thing about these people's behaviour according to Hellman, (cited in Myers 1993), was the fact that they knew very well that the cost (punishment) for giving refuge to, or helping any Jew to run away was death.

Another instance of altruistic act was by some residents of Oakland (in the San Francisco Bay, California, United States,) who dared after-shocks and other risks following the October 17, 1989 earthquake to search for, and rescued those who had been trapped by rubble from collapsed structures (Sabina, 1992). Mention could also be made of individuals like Madam Theresa and other voluntary organizations such as International Red Cross Society, Rotary Club International, Medicine Sans Frontiere (Doctors Without Borders), and others who in diverse ways have done, and are still doing what is within their means to attend to the needs of others in different parts of the world. Like insensitivity to the plight and plea of others, acts of altruism are also part of our everyday life. How do we reconcile acts of altruism and public generosity with stories of public apathy to the plight and plea of others?

In other words, why do some people always help in times of need (even when situational forces discourage helping)? while others do so occasionally, and yet, some do not help at all (even under the most favourable conditions)? Do some people lack the moral obligation which spurs others on to help? Is the relationship between a potential helper and a victim an important factor in the decision to help? What about the potential cost involved in helping? These are some of the questions this study intends to answer.

This study has become very relevant in Ghana not only because of the lack of research or literature on this area in the country, but more so, the increase in both natural and human activities which calls for public assistance of one form or another. For instance, on page three (3) of Saturday, March 2, 1996, issue of the *Weekly Spectator*, the parents of an eight-month baby girl, Regina Addison, made an appeal to the Ghanaian public for financial assistance to enable their baby undergo surgical operation at the Korle Bu Teaching Hospital to remove a boil at her back estimated to cost about three and a half million cedis (c3.5). Similar appeals were carried on the front pages of Saturday, May 15, and June 12 issues of the same paper (*Spectator*) in the same year (1996).

Again, on page 7 of June 21-28, 1995, edition of the *Free Press*; page 4 of the June 28-July 4, 1995, edition of *The Independent*, appeals were made by the Biochemistry Students Association of Ghana to the public for financial assistance for Dr. R. A. Acquah of the University of Ghana, to be flown to London to undergo surgery in bone Marrow Transplant estimated to cost eighty thousand pounds (\$80,000.00.) Other appeals for various kinds of help appeared in the Thursday, March 14, 1996, issue of the *Daily Graphic*; Tuesday, October 10, 1995, edition of the *Ghanaian Times*; Front Page of January 1; page 3 of March 19, June 11, and 18, 1994, editions of *The Mirror*, and also on page 3 of July 15, 1995, edition of the same paper (*The Mirror*). The list of appeals are many and varied and they are made every now and then.

In addition to the above, there have been persistent appeals by those in charge of the Blood Bank Units of The Korle-Bu and Komfo-Anokye Teaching Hospitals (September 26, 1995, edition of the *Daily Graphic*; October 9-11, 1995, issue of *The Ghanaian Chronicle*) and even the regional hospitals to the general public to volunteer to donate blood for emergency use. Furthermore, the numerous calls and appeals by victims of disasters, District

Assembly-members, Chiefs, Parliamentarians, and other government officials for public (both local & international) assistance in times of disaster as happened in the aftermath of the July 3 & 4, 1995, rains and subsequent flood in Accra, have also brought to the fore the importance of altruistic behaviour and the need to research into it.

Besides, because of the present socio-economic problems such as unemployment, gradual disintegration of our traditional systems, as well as urbanization and its numerous related problems (hustling and bustling of urban life, individualization, crime, mistrust, and competing of various stimuli for attention), helping behaviour which had been to a great extent part of our (Ghanaian) social way of life, is gradually being eroded.

The above indicates that by the activities of nature and/or of man, people will continue to depend on the altruistic acts of others to survive or come out of emergency situation(s). That is, anybody could find himself or herself in an emergency situation in which one form of assistance or another would be requested for or needed. There is therefore the need to arouse and rekindle altruistic behaviour by researching into it to find out the factors which inhibit or enhance it. The results of this study could therefore be useful to the Government of Ghana in particular, The Ministry of Social Welfare, The National Disaster Relief Organization and all other agencies which have some role to play in disaster management and relief assistance in coming out with measures which would encourage and sustain altruism in particular, and helping behaviour in general among the people of Ghana. This will not only help to sensitize and draw the attention of the public to the need to give relief to individuals and groups when the need arises, but will also go a long way to supplement official assistance to the needy especially during emergency and thus fill a social vacuum which would otherwise have been created as a result of insufficient official assistance.

It is believed that when some of the important factors which promote or inhibit altruistic behaviour are unearthed, encouraging people to behave altruistically would not be difficult. As Ethologists, Comparative Psychologists and Sociobiologists such as Shapiro & Gaddard (1994), Ellen & Wrege (1988), Taborsky (1984), Reyer (1994), Hoffman (1978), Dawkins (1976), Krebs (1975), Wilson (1975) and Armstrong (cited in Myers, 1993) have pointed out, altruistic behaviour is an inherent part of human nature. Some of these researchers have even gone further to assert that even animals exhibit altruistic behaviour.

Being a virtue and a humanitarian deed, altruism plays an important role in every society. It is therefore admired and encouraged in almost all societies. As a result, Philanthropists and person(s) or group(s) who have risked their lives or sacrificed their time, money and/or energy for others are held in higher esteem in their communities, countries, and even in other parts of the world. For example, on a hillside in Jerusalem, 800 trees form a simple line called *The Avenue of Righteous*. Beneath each tree is a plaque with the name of a person who during the Nazi Holocaust was known to have given refuge to, or helped one or more Jews to escape death from the hands of Adolf Hitler and his men (Hellman, cited in Myers, 1993). Also near the Museum of The Holocaust in Jerusalem, there are Avenues of Memorial Tablets to non-Jews who sacrificed their lives to help rescue Jews (Brown 1986). Still in Jerusalem, is a *Yad Vashem*, a memorial authority established not only to commemorate Jews who died during Nazi persecution, but also those who risked their lives to save Jews.

Bar-Tal, (cited in Myers, 1993) defined altruistic behaviour as a voluntary act which must aim to benefit others and which must be carried out without expectation of a reward. Altruism involves behaviour intended to help others; it is doing something for someone else (like trying to rescue earthquake victims) with no benefit to oneself, often with the possibility of risk to oneself (Sabina 1992). Grusec (cited in Sabina, 1992) defines altruism as an act of

concern for others - such as sharing, helping, showing concern, consideration, reassuring, and defending - that are performed independently of hope, of reward, or fear of punishment from external source and that may even be of some cost to the altruist.

Sear et al, (1991) also defined altruism as an act performed voluntarily to help someone when there is no expectation of receiving reward in any form (except perhaps a feeling of having done a good deed). According to Walster & Piliavin (cited in Myers, 1993), altruism is a very special form of helping behaviour that is voluntary, costly to the altruist, and motivated by something other than the expectation of material or social reward. To Worchel et al, (1991), altruism is an unselfish desire to help another person; its ultimate goal is to help benefit another's welfare.

Whereas Batson (1991) defines altruism as a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another's welfare which does not necessarily involve self sacrifice, other Psychologists such as Campbell, Hatfield et al, (both cited in Myers 1993), Krebs (cited in Ma, 1992) and Wispe (1978) have argued that an altruistic act should by necessity involve sacrifice. They argued further that the cost to a helper must outweigh the reward so that one's goal cannot be self-benefit. From a similar perspective, Anderson (1993) defines altruism as voluntarily helping another in need of help at the expense of personal safety, and with no expectation of external rewards. Taking a somewhat different line, Power (cited in Weiner, 1992) defines altruism as helping others not immediately related to oneself and without personal benefit. This was supported by Hoffman's (1978) assertion that many altruistic acts are directed to strangers and are made anonymously.

The above definitions seem to confirm Sharabany & Bar-Tal's (cited in Ma, 1992) contention that there is no universally acceptable definition of altruism, and that definitions vary from theorists of different orientations. Whatever angle the term altruism is looked at,



the following points stand out clearly. That,

- a. action(s) performed should be done voluntarily;
- b. action(s) undertaken should be directed at someone other than the actor;
- c. the recipient rather than the actor must benefit from whatever action is taken;
- d. there is no immediate or future material or social reward for the actor's action; a person who engages in an altruistic act treats it as an end in itself and therefore anticipates no reward (except perhaps the pleasure of contributing to the welfare of others); and
- e. action(s) undertaken may involve cost or sacrifice to the actor.

For the purpose of this study, altruism is defined as a voluntary commitment to perform an act which may involve personal cost (risk) and which is aimed at benefiting another person with no immediate or future material or social benefit to the actor. It must be stressed that the objective of the researcher is not to prove whether altruism really exists as have been done by Shapiro & Gabbard (1994), Batson (1991), Batson et al, (1989), Hoffman (1978), Krebs (1975) or what the motives of altruists are (Batson 1991; Batson et al., 1986/89). The main objective is to find out how one's level of moral reasoning, the cost of helping someone, and the relationship between a potential helper and a victim enhance or inhibit helping behaviour.

In a series of studies conducted by Rosenthal (1964), Darley & Latane (1968), Latane & Darley (1970) after the murder of Kitty Genovese (cited above), a number of variables were identified as some of the factors which determine whether one will intervene in an emergency or not. Among these are situational factors such as the presence of other people, the nature of the physical environment and the pressure of limited time. Specific personality characteristics or dispositions (Romer et al., 1986) like self esteem (Hessing et al., in Wrigtsman 1984), masculinity/femininity dimensions of the potential helper (Baumeister, cited

in Myers, 1993; McGovern, cited in Baron & Byrne, 1987), levels of individual's need for social approval (Satow, cited in Myers, 1993), individual's intrinsic/extrinsic religious values (Yinon, et al, 1982; Batson & Gray, 1981), as well as moral and ethical principles have also been found to influence certain types of altruistic behaviour.

Others are physical characteristics such as race (Sisson, cited in Myers, 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, cited in Sabina 1992; Pivialin et al, 1981), sex (Rushton et al, 1986; Eisenberg & Lenon, 1983), and age (Rushton et al., 1986) of both the potential helper and the victim. Mood of the potential helper (Pivialin et al. 1981; Cunningham et al., 1980), attribution of responsibility by the potential helper (Weiner, 1992; Kalliopuska 1982) and the relationship between the helper and the victim (Ma, 1992) also play important roles in the decision to help or not.

The above points to the fact that altruistic behaviour is influenced and determined by a multiple of factors among which are situational, personality and cognitive. This implies that any single factor analysis cannot be considered sufficient to explain a complex issue such as altruism. In spite of this however, almost all studies conducted so far have examined the effect of only a single variable - bivariate relationship - on altruistic behaviour (Anderson, 1993; Eisenberg, 1983; Batson, 1989, and Levin & Berkerman-Greenberg, 1980).

Besides, researchers have tended to ignore cognitive factors in explaining helping behaviour. Focus has mainly been on situational variables (Darley & Latane, 1968; Gergen et al., 1972; Latane & Darley, 1970). It must be pointed out however that it is not the situation *per se* which directly affects behaviour, but one's cognitive definition and interpretation [thoughts] of the situation which among others include the conflicts between one's welfare and that of others - the needy. In the words of Kalliopuska (1982), helping behaviour could largely be explained by cognitive factors. Furthermore, even when cognitive

factors such as moral reasoning are considered, researchers have generally examined whether such cognitive factor are directly related to behaviour. They tend to ignore potential mediators such as cost and human relationship.

Additionally, with the exception of a study by Nabor (1992) entitled "*Chivalry On The Road: A Study of The Helping Behaviour Of Drivers*" submitted to the Department of Psychology, University of Ghana, Legon, no other study the researcher is aware of has been conducted on this subject in the country. There is therefore the need not only to research into the area, but also to look at how different variables by themselves, and/or in combination with others, promote or inhibit helping behaviour in this country.

This study is thus intended to examine the main and interaction effects of three different variables - moral reasoning (cognitive aspects of decision-making), cost of helping, (situational factor), and human relationship (the biological or social relationship between a potential helper and the one in need of help [victim]) on altruistic behaviour. This approach (looking at two or more different independent variables at a time) is necessary because as has been pointed out already, the single variable approach is not sufficient to explain a complex issue like altruism. This approach is also in line with Jahoda's (cited in Phillips, 1989) call on researchers to consider the wider system within which social behaviour takes place.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

This chapter will concentrate on theoretical perspectives of altruistic behaviour while the next one will deal with empirical studies. Like other behavioural concepts in Psychology, various theories and models have been propounded to explain altruism. Among these is Darwinism (also known as Evolutionary Theory) and its recent version known as Sociobiology. Others are Psychoanalytic, Decision-making (also referred to as cost-reward analysis), Social Learning and Social Exchange. For the purpose of this study only three (Darwinism/Evolutionary/Sociobiology, Social learning, and Decision-making [Cost-reward analysis]) will be discussed.

Darwinism/Evolutionary/Sociobiology:

Darwinism (Charles Darwin, cited in Dawkins, 1991), also known as evolutionary theory, with its modern version of Sociobiology is one of the main theories that explains altruism. The main proponents and adherent of these theories are Darwin, Hall (cited in Wrightsman, 1984), Hamilton (1964), Trivers (1971), Wilson (1975), Dawkins (1976). Since these three concepts (Darwinism/Evolutionary and Sociobiology) explain almost the same idea as far as altruism is concerned, they have been treated under one heading.

The theory of Sociobiology began to receive attention in the 1970s when Edward Wilson, a leading proponent, published the first major text (*Sociobiology*) in the field. According to Wilson (1975), Sociobiology is the study of biological basis of all social behaviour. Sociobiologists thus explain altruism in terms of genetic make up of organisms (animals and human beings) as influenced by evolution over the ages - biological altruism. They postulate that motivation is closely linked to instincts in that behaviour such as altruism, aggression, and other human social behaviours that increase the chances of human survival are



preprogrammed into an organism.

According to Leak & Christopher (cited in Rathus, 1987), Sociobiologists view genes as the "ultimate units of life" or the "heredity units which either fails or prosper as a result of natural selection". Hoffman (1978) also asserted that to Sociobiologists, altruism is part of the basic biological nature of human beings, just as self interest is. They suggested that biological altruism has a survival value and as such it is usually directed towards those who are biologically related to us (the individual). To Sociobiologists therefore, altruism is any act which contributes favourably to the survival prospect and reproductive potential of another organism, usually at some cost to its own (the actor) prospects and potentials.

Put differently, it could be said that in the perspective of Sociobiologists, altruism is an act which increases the prospect for survival, and ultimately, the reproductive success of an organism [O] other than the one performing the act [P], at same cost to the survival prospect and productive success of P {the organism acting}. In other words, the underlying purpose of animals and for that matter human behaviour is to contribute as many genes as possible to the next generation

Natural and Kin Selection. This is one of the main components of the theory. It postulates that the essence of life is gene survival. It argues further that any genetically determined trait that has survival value will tend to be passed on to the next generation and in the case of altruism, the tendency to help others may have survival value.

It must be stated here that on this particular point (how altruistic behaviour has been maintained over generations), Sociobiologists and Darwinism differ to some extent. For instance, in Darwinism, natural and kin selection are seen as individual fitness; the capacity of the individuals to survive and reproduce in a competitive environment. According to Darwin, natural selection favours organisms that possess the inheritable variations that best equip them to survive and reproduce. He indicated further that as surviving individuals

reproduce from generation to generation, their characteristics become more common in the species. In effect, altruism for example has been maintained over the years because it has survival value.

On the other hand, Sociobiology do not view gene survival as necessarily the survival of an individual with a specific gene (in this case altruistic gene). That is, the individual does not necessarily perpetuate his/her genes by preserving himself or herself, but in most cases, by helping those genes to survive in "others" (usually younger family members and relatives with reproductive potential). According to the theory, one form of behaviour that would increase gene survival is devotion to one's children, brothers/sisters and other relatives. For instance, parents who put their children's welfare ahead of their own are more likely to pass on their genes to posterity than those who neglect them. From the point of view of this theory, a parent who loses his/her life in preserving that of two or more offspring will maximize his/her *"inclusive fitness"*. Similar maximization of inclusive fitness applies to brothers, sisters, cousins and other relatives but the difference lies in the number of people one has to help to survive in order to ensure the survival of one's genes - the more the biological distance (biological relatedness), between an actor and recipient, the greater the number of people to be helped in order to ensure the survival of one's genes. In the light of the above, individuals are more prone to help family members and relatives than non-relatives. This idea might have led to the popular phrase *"blood is thicker than water"*. Gene perpetuation in the context of this theory can therefore be understood by the basic principles of evolutionary biology - gene survival.

In the perspective of Sociobiology, the "individual" is explained in terms of set of genes rather than an autonomous organism as such the individual does not act to benefit different genes as we may be tempted to think, but its own genes in a different individual. For example, the individual derives half of its chromosomes (and for that matter genes) from one

parent and the other half from the other parent. There is therefore fifty-fifty (50/50) chance that a given gene will be shared by parents and offspring or among brothers and/or sisters. This gene sharing is referred to as "*relatedness*" [*r*]; a term is used by Sociobiologists to connote the biological relation between two or more people.

The relatedness between a parent and an offspring or among brothers and/or sisters for example is .5 [$1/2$]; that of an individual and a nephew, niece, or grandparents, is .25 ($1/4$), while that of cousins is .12 [$1/8$]. The theory thus predicts that the amount of altruism shown should increase with the level of biological relatedness [*r*]: the closer the relation, the more likely it is that an individual will be helped. Our genes thus dispose us to care for those in whom they reside (family members and relatives).

As a result of this, there is the general tendency for an individual 'A' to carry out an altruistic act to another individual 'B' if the latter 'B' is a son, daughter, parent, brother, sister or a relative than if he/she is just an acquaintance or a stranger. Helping brothers or sisters and even cousins to survive ensures the survival of one's gene even if one has to give up his/her life in the process. In most cases, a non related individual would be the recipient of aid when the cost is low, and when the non related individual is not in competition with a relative's need for aid (Bourne Jr. & Eskstrand, cited in Anderson, 1993).

To Sociobiologists therefore, the basic motivation of all organisms (humans inclusive) is the perpetuation of their own genetic pool which is accomplished by surviving offspring and others related to oneself. In the words of Barash (1977), genes help themselves by being nice to themselves even if they are "*enclosed in different bodies*". On the basis of the above, Form & Nosow (cited in Myers, 1993) also remarked that an evolutionary Psychologist will not be surprised if after a disaster people help the victims in the following order: nucleus family members, relatives, friends, neighbours, and then strangers. The point is not that the individual calculates genetic relatedness before helping, but that nature has programmed us to

care more about close kin.

The theory is even stretched further to include the fact that people whom we share genes with, and for that matter are more prone to help, are not only our family members and other relatives, but also others whose physical appearance are like us. For instance, blue-eyed people as well as people of the same tribe and race are believed to have some genes in common.

This theory does not only apply to humans, but to animals as well. For instance, Reyer (1984), Wilson (1975), Hall (cited in Wrightsman, 1984), Darwin (cited in Dawkins, 1991) have long observed similar altruistic behaviour (and for that matter, gene perpetuation acts) among animal species. Darwin for instance noted that rabbits will make noise with their hind feet to warn off predators. Wilson (1975) also observed that in termites' hive, the soldier termite will defend the nest against any intruder(s) by lying in front of others thereby exposing themselves to danger. Similar altruistic behaviours have been found in white-fronted bee-eaters (Emlen & Wrege, 1988), child fish (Taborsky, 1984), baboon, and dolphins (Hall, cited in Wrightsman, 1984).

The above theory has come under intense criticism from different quarters. Rushton (1986) has said that the idea that altruism is a genetically determined part of "human nature" is quite controversial notwithstanding the fact that how well the theory applies to human beings is still an open question. He has maintained that whatever be the case [whether applicable to humans or not], the idea is considered destructive because it leads to all kinds of favouritism (racism, nepotism, tribalism etc.). This has probably necessitated the passing of laws (e.g. *Equal Employment Opportunity Act*) in countries such as the United States of America to prevent all kinds of favouritism based on human relationships rather than on merit. According to Brown (1986), this may probably be the reason why the *Medal for Heroism* is not awarded for saving relatives.

Commenting on the theory, Gould (1970) said that although "altruistic acts are the cement of stable societies they seem to defy a Darwinian explanation". This is so because natural selection as explained by Darwin operates single-mindedly and relentlessly in favour of traits which improve the chances of survival of others, therefore, it will be impossible for any animal species to have evolved so as to have the genetic potential for consistent biological altruism. In other words, it is hard for Sociobiologists to account for the continuous existence of a behaviour which reduces the fitness of the altruist but increases the average fitness of the society; individuals constitute society therefore if the individual's fitness is affected that of the society is also affected.

A similar criticism has also been made by Wilson (1975) who is a Sociobiologist himself. According to him, altruism in terms of kin selection poses a problem for natural selection since altruistic behaviour does not only benefit the survival of others, but in most cases entails cost such as time to be expended, embarrassment, injury, sharing scarce resources, and even risking one's life. In other words, how do genes which predispose an individual to act in a way that may endanger his/her very survival pass on to others with any frequency in order to perpetuate itself?; those with altruistic genes would have died out in the course of evolution because of the possible danger of harm and death they exposed themselves to in an attempt to help others.

To Rathus (1987) it is absurd to suggest that genes can harbour anything akin to an "intent", let alone to be transmitted from one person to another. He argued that human are more complex and therefore our behaviours are less controlled by built-in response tendencies, if any. He reasoned further that as humans, learning and cultural factors enable us to resist the self-preservation of the genes.

Greenblatt (1985) has argued that in human society, social behaviour presents problems in that the enormous diversity of cultural forms, languages, and the vast technological

developments, including the ability to modify genes, becomes hard to explain by inclusive fitness. In addition, critics have argued that explaining human behaviour in terms of genes may lead some people to assume wrongly that certain human behaviours are "*natural*" and so unchangeable. This may lead to irresponsible acts.

In response to some of these criticisms, Hamilton (1964) explained that what is important in evolution is kin selection - the survival of genes which are shared by relatives (kin) rather than the survival of individuals. Thus the theory is not about the maximization of an individual fitness per se, but "*inclusive fitness*" - gene preservation. The individuals as a set of genes is properly thought of as distributed across kin therefore it is theoretically and even practically possible for an individual to preserve his/her genes by behaving altruistically with respect to kin even if that leads to death. It shows that as long as a gene leads one to bear cost in proportion to genetic relatedness, such a gene can dominate species; a gene will survive in so far as it leads organisms that have it to act in a way that maximizes the number of bearers of that particular gene in the long run.

To the question as to how one gets to know that he/she shares genes in common with 'A', 'B' or 'C', especially when they are not brothers/sisters or are relatives who have never met, Rushton, et al, (1980) suggest that physical similarities is one clue we use to detect people in whom copies of our genes are located.

The theory has further been attacked as being discriminatory and selfish because it seems to favour only those who share our genes. In addition, Rushton (1986) argues that the theory has the tendency of encouraging ethnic and racial favouritism - the root of countless historical and contemporary conflicts. He stated further that Hamilton's explanation (above) is not able to account for altruism among non-kin especially that between or among strangers. For instance, how does the theory account for kidney and blood donations and other altruistic acts to unrelated strangers who do not know each other and may never get to know one



another?.

Campbell (1975) suggests that genetic evolution may help explain a few basic prosocial behaviour such as parents caring for their young, but does not apply to more extreme instances of helping a stranger in distress; such cases are better explained by what he calls "*Social Evolution*" - the historical development of human culture or civilization. In his view, human societies have gradually and selectively evolved skills, beliefs, and technologies that promote the welfare of the group. Such altruistic behaviour generally benefits society and have therefore become part of the social rules and norms.

He states further that our ability to outwit other species (intelligence) may be a more central factor in our survival. He argues that the Sociobiological approach is faulted with abstract theorizing, naive speculation, and unjustified extrapolations from animal studies rather than on solid human evidence. Greenblat (1985) also argued that the position of Sociobiologists is mainly based on animal studies. To him, Sociobiologists appear to underestimate the contribution of culture, or nurture to human social behaviour. He stated further that the variability in human behaviour cannot be fully accounted for by any genetic theory.

Trivers (1971) in response to the issue raised by Campbell explains that help to non-kin is accounted for by another aspect of the theory called "*Reciprocal Altruism*", also known as "*Delayed Reciprocity*" or "*Contingent Reciprocity*."

Reciprocal Altruism (Group Selection). According to this aspect of the theory, one may risk his or her life or safety to help someone if he can expect help in return; help that will pay back the individual's original sacrifice and thus make both gain in the long run (Trivers, 1971). An issue which arises from this is that in the absence of any law or rule compelling people to help others who have helped them, what is the guarantee that someone who has been helped will reciprocate?

Trivers conceded in response that such a system of mutual help is threatened by potential "cheaters" who will accept help but will offer none in return. He argued however that such potential cost of altruistic acts to individuals are offset by the possibility of receiving help from others when in need hence in his view, only mutual reciprocity altruism is biologically based. In other words, it is not a matter of 'A' helping 'B' because the former was helped by the latter, but anyone being ready to help whenever the need arises. To maximize this, he speculated that natural selection has favoured a disposition to feel guilty when one refuses to help, therefore there is the general tendency for an individual to help if he can. In other words, individuals help others not only because they expect help in return, but the fact that failure to help is punishing and thus not favoured by natural selection. Thus selection over the course of evolution favours those with genes predisposing them to altruism because in the long run altruism is reciprocated to benefit the individual. There is thus a natural and social mechanism to enforce mutual helping. According to Barash (1977), reciprocity works well in villages, small communities, and towns and that is probably why rural dwellers have been found to be more helpful than those in big towns and cities (Amato, 1980; de Guzman, 1979; House & Wolf, cited in Sear, et al., 1991; Korte et al., cited in Darley & Latane, 1970; Milgram, 1970). The main criticism of this aspect of the theory is that it portrays altruism as genetic self-interest act or at best a form of exchange; we will for example donate blood with the expectation of getting blood back when we need it. According to Brown (1986), this view like its counterpart - kin selection - portrays humans as "survival mechanisms" - robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. He asserted that this is not considered altruism because it is performed with the hope of receiving help in the near future; it qualifies more for an economic exchange theory rather than that of an altruism.

In addition, Brown pointed out that biological altruism in a strict sense does not exist because evolution is not only biological, but cultural as well. He argues further that altruistic

acts fit learning concepts of kinship much more closely than it fits biological relatedness and that social factors are much more important than biological ones in determining altruistic behaviour among humans. He said for example that adopted children who have no biological relatedness at all with their adopting parents are possibly cared for at least as well as biological ones

Wilson (1975) contended that in spite of some technical problems associated with this theory, it offers a reasonable explanation for the existence of altruism among individuals who are not biologically related. In his opinion, humans are generally less selfish but more altruistic towards kin than non-kin. Like Brown and Campbell, Wilson also believes that cultural influences and learning could account for the evolution of helping behaviour. To Hoffman (1978) the main contributing factor is empathy.

In conclusion, it could be said that the above theory raises the intriguing possibility that self preservation is not always the overwhelming motive of humans as we sometimes think; biological disposition to aggression may co-exist with biological disposition to altruism. The theory is thus useful for understanding why individuals (especially relatives) cooperate with, and help one another. It is also useful in explaining why parents become attached to their infants and invest so much time and energy caring for them; and also why grandparents help with child care. It also gives us an idea as to why non-relatives are helped. The theory (Sociobiology) leads to the following testable predictions:

- [a] People would be most altruistic to those who are genetically most closely related to them; individuals would be more helpful to immediate family member than to distant relatives, acquaintance, or strangers.
- [b] The theory also predicts that parents will behave more altruistically to healthy offspring than to unhealthy ones because the former have better chance of surviving thereby perpetuating the genes of the parents.

- (c) A further prediction is that mothers will usually be more caring to their offspring than will fathers. This is so because males have the biological potential to sire a great many offspring and so can perpetuate their genes without investing much in any one infant. Females on the other hand, can produce only a relatively small number of offspring, and so must help each of these young to thrive to ensure the survival of the mother's genes (Hinde, cited in Myers 1993).

Social Learning/Norms And Modelling

The second theory which accounts for altruistic behaviour is a combination of different but similar models. Unlike Sociobiology which accounts for altruism in terms of gene survival, this model sees altruistic behaviour as a form of moral obligation resulting from reinforcement, learning, and internalization of societal norms. The first component of this model is social norms. This aspect of the model deals with the appropriate, expected, and accepted behaviour in every society, the "*oughts [dos]*" and "*oughts nots [don'ts]*" of everyday life. It suggests that we help others because we have learned and internalized societal standards of helping behaviour and are motivated to act in accordance with them.

In other words, we help others not because we have consciously calculated that such behaviour is in our interest, but simply because something within us tells us we ought to. Thus, these societal standards have become something like moral values to us and we are motivated to act in accordance with them. According to Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, (cited in Hornstein et al, 1988), as children grow older, their helping behaviours often follow the examples set by those around them and are usually supported and encouraged by the norms communicated through the child's reference groups, especially the family. In most cultures, they continued, these norms result in praise and other rewards for helping and scolding for selfishness. Eventually, just as they internalize or adopt other social norms, most children

come to believe that it is good to be helpful. If these norms are internalized, people learn to reward themselves through self-congratulation after an act of good will (Bryan & Walbet, cited in Hornstein et al., 1988). Social norms have been divided into two - social responsibility and reciprocity.

Social responsibility. This entreats us not only to help those who depend on us (e.g. parent-children, teacher-student, counsel-client, etc.) but also to help and take care of those in need, particularly, those in distress or deprived situations without regard to future exchange or reward (Schwartz, cited in Batson et al., 1986; Berkowitz, 1972; Berkowitz & Daniels, and Berkowitz et al., both cited in Berkowitz 1972). From the point of view of this model, we help others because they are our dependents and therefore obligated to.

In addition to those who depend on us, the model adds that society has made it a responsibility for us to help those in need irrespective of whether they depend on us or not. In some societies, continue the model, the obligation to offer help which is within the means or ability of the individual has been put into law. The state of Minnesota (USA) for instance has enacted a statute requiring that *"any person at a scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or suffered grave physical harm, shall to the extent that he can do so without danger or peril to himself or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person"* (Brown, 1986). The norm thus provides legal, cultural, as well as social basis for altruistic behaviour.

Norm of reciprocity. This is the second part of the theory. It enjoins us to help and not to harm those who have helped or expected to help us (Gergen et al., 1975; Greenberg & Frisch, and Regan, both in Sear et al., 1991). Gould (1970) contended that a universal component of moral code is the norm of reciprocity. He also believes that the norm is as universal as the incest taboo and the only people exempt from it are the very young, the aged, and the sick. In support of Gould's assertion, Gergen et al. (1975) also said that the norm

operates in almost all cultures. Further support for the universality of this norm have been given by Sear et al, (1991). They revealed that apart from being a generally universal norm, most religious and moral codes of many societies emphasize the duty to help others (Christianity: Luke, 10:30ff; Islam: Quoran. 2: 215; 2: 271).

Notwithstanding this universal support for the model, it has also been criticized. Piliavin et al, (1981), Latane & Darley (1970), Schwartz, cited in Batson et al, (1986) have wondered how this model reconciles its acclaim of universality with the fact that some people refuse to help even if they had previously been helped. They argued that if the norm is universal, then everyone should adhere to it by helping when the need arises. In other words, the norm does not make provision for individual differences and situational factors in behaviour. Other criticisms are that norms are very general and so may not tell us specifically what to do in a particular situation. Further, two conflicting norms may seem equally applicable in a situation. For instance, the norm of social responsibility is contradicted by the norm that says "*do not meddle in other people's affairs*". The question then is, in such a case what do we do? The proponents have also been accused of presenting altruistic acts as a form of exchange although altruism in the right sense of the word is never a form of exchange. It has been argued by Blum (1980) and Homans (cited in Sabina, 1992) that in the context of this model, altruism is a means for future reward as well as a type of social investment.

It has been said in response to some of the criticisms that although the model is universally recognized and endorsed, the extent of one's obligation to reciprocate varies according to circumstance(s) and that in practice individuals usually apply the norm selectively. Tesser et al, (cited in Myers 1993) for instance, revealed that individuals feel deeply indebted to help when someone freely and unexpectedly makes a big sacrifice. Returning a favour is also more likely when the original help is perceived to have been given voluntarily. Further, when an individual's needs are perceived to have resulted from no fault of theirs, then people

will be more willing to help Myers & Muherim (cited in Sear 1991; Gruder, 1974).

Schwartz (cited in Batson et al, 1986) in response to some of these criticisms, came out with what they call *Personal Norms* - the individual's feeling of moral obligation to act in a given way in a given situation. To them, it is this feeling of moral obligation which motivates us to help, and we are rewarded by the recognition that we have acted according to our moral standard. Schwartz's model specifies how a motivation to help in the form of a personal norm is activated in a situation and how other factors come into play to determine whether a personal norm and/or moral code is acted on or not. It recognizes that people differ not only in their normative beliefs, but also in their tendency to act consistently with their beliefs.

The third and final aspect of this model deals with Social learning. This perspective emphasizes the importance of learning in altruistic behaviour. It proposes that people learn to be helpful following the basic rules of reinforcement and modelling. In growing up children are taught to share and to be helpful. In every day life, parents, teachers, and the society as a whole are more likely to reward prosocial behaviour. Children are also encouraged to emulate people who behave prosocially. According to Rushton (1980), Midlarsky et al, (cited in Sear et al 1991), with time the combination of reinforcement and modelling develop into moral codes, habits, and learned rules about when, how, and who we should help.

The main criticism of this theory is that it seems to suggest that we engage in altruistic behaviour in anticipation of reward or to avoid punishment. Baumann et al, (cited in Anderson, 1993) argued in response that although in childhood rewards may be used to encourage prosocial behaviour, but at adolescence and/or thereabouts, the individual no longer needs any external rewards to undertake or make such behaviour worthwhile. That is, as we grow up, we internalize these norms as some form of principles or moral codes which we endeavour to adhere to.

In the words of Rosehan (1970) people engage in altruistic acts because the acts are, and of themselves rewarding to the actor; people engage in altruistic acts in order to feel good about themselves. Aronfreed & Paskal (cited in Batson et al, 1986), also in response to the above criticism have said that such speculation about helping behaviour sound somewhat circular; the critics have assumed that because helping behaviour occurred, its consequences must have been rewarding/reinforcing.

Decision-Making (Cost-Reward Analysis)

The third approach (Decision-making/cost-reward analysis) to understanding altruism focuses on the cognitive aspect of behaviour; cognitive processes which influence judgement about when and what type of help is needed. It is a form of mental processes which deals with how we perceive, mentally represent, and interpret the outside world, as well as how we go about solving problems. According to this approach, the decision to help involves complex processes of social cognition and rational decision making (Schwartz, cited in Batson et al, 1986; Latane & Darley, 1970). The model thus sees human beings as information processors - taking information, interpreting, and acting on it.

More importantly, the model focuses on the important role of cost and rewards in deciding to help. The model assumes that people are generally motivated to increase the rewards of their actions and to minimize the costs. Thus a person will act prosocially if he perceived that the profit for helping outweighs that of not helping or the cost of helping is very negligible. Sometimes it is easy to help, at other times, it involves considerable cost in time, energy and complications (Sear et al., 1991). In the case of emergency, and sometimes in non-emergency situations, the focus is on only cost as rewards are usually very minimal or non-existing

It further suggests that people consider not only the potential gains and losses that will result from a particular action, but also the consequences of failing to help (Pivalin et al.,



1981; Lynch & Cohen 1978). Potential helpers also consider the cost not only to themselves but also to the victim. The greater the perceived cost, the less likely that one will help. Among the cost for not helping are feeling of guilt about oneself, loss of self esteem, social disapproval - others may see you as having not been helping and you may feel badly because they may have poor opinions about you. Individuals may even have moral values that enjoin them to help when they can, and not helping may make them feel that they have not behaved well. In other words, cost is not only measured in monetary, or physical terms but also in psychological terms.

According to Latane & Darley (1970), there are five steps which individuals may go through before help may be given. These steps have been termed. "*Decision Tree*". The first step in this process is for the potential helper to notice that something is happening. This must be followed by interpretation of the situation as an emergency in which action is needed. If this is done, then the next step is assuming personal responsibility which in turn must be followed by the individual accepting the responsibility to help. Another step is for the individual to decide on what type of assistance is needed. The final decision in this process is embarking on an action to assist a victim. Action may be direct or indirect such as calling the police or others in a better position to help. According to Sear et al, (1991), whether a person takes direct action or seeks further assistance from someone else depends on many factors among which are the type of aid needed and the individual's ability to carry out the needed assistance.

In other words, failure to go through these steps in the decision to help may be some of the reasons why people fail to give the needed assistance; that is, they may not notice that a victim is in distress, needs help, or that a problem exists. The situation may be perceived as a trivial one which does not need any intervention. On the other hand, they may recognize a need, but will not feel personally responsible to help, or may perceive that the cost of

helping is too high. They may want to help, but they may not be able to do so because of certain constraints, or they may hesitate and be caught in a state of indecision.

Latane & Darley (1970) emphasized however that these steps may not occur one by one in a logical way. They maintain that by their nature emergencies are dangerous, unusual, unique, unforeseen, and pressing. As a result it may produce arousal which may not be present in non-emergencies. These, they said, could interfere with rational decision-making and action. Piliavin et al, (1981) asserted that as a result of the nature of emergencies, people sometimes act impulsively thereby ignoring many cues (e.g. need of a victim, cost and/or reward to the potential helper) in the situation. Such impulsive reaction to emergency situations has led some people to suggest an innate tendency to act altruistically, a position endorsed by Sociobiologists.

The foregoing theories point to the fact that by its nature altruism is a very complex issue. Whereas Sociobiologists attribute it to genetic make up of human beings, Social learning explains it in terms of moral codes, modelling, and internalization of social norms. On the other hand, the Decision-making analysis postulates that the main predictor of altruistic behaviour is the cost of helping or not helping to the potential helper and sometimes to the victim.

Although these theories look at the issue from different perspectives, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They rather complement each other and thus fill gaps left by the other. Each explains certain aspects of the concept better than the other, and together, they present a comprehensive explanation leading to the understanding of the concept. They further confirm Sear et al, (1991) assertion that helping acts are performed on the basis of various motives among which are hedonistic, compliance, empathy, norm internalization, moral obligation and presumed cost of helping.

CHAPTER THREE:

Moral Reasoning (Cognitive Aspect of Altruistic Behaviour)

Altruistic conduct by definition involves non-egoistic motives, judgements, or reasoning, therefore cognition concerning intentions, motives, principles and values are fundamental to an understanding of altruistic behaviour. For this variable (moral reasoning) emphasis will be placed on Lawrence Kohlberg's (1968, 1969, 1981, & 1984) theory and stages of moral reasoning judgement. The objective is to find out whether there are any differences in altruistic behaviour among people with different levels of moral reasoning.

Kohlberg's theory is an extension and modification of Piaget's (1965) theory of moral/cognitive development. For instance, Kohlberg expanded the number of stages from three to six, each characterized by quantitative distinctive modes of thinking. In addition, the time period over which moral development takes place was extended into adolescence and beyond. Kohlberg, like Piaget, however, believes that moral development progresses through stages in much the same way as cognitive development occurs. This developmental model rests primarily on a complex scheme of universal sequential, and invariant structural stages that was arrived at over a period of two decades of research in which individuals of different ages and cultures were asked to make moral decision judgement based on the content of stories (Kohlberg, 1984). The stages were thus derived from analysis of responses to these stories.

The six stages (sub-grouped into three levels of moral reasoning known as pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional stages), represent processes whereby an individual defines the rights and duties operating in a situation of conflicting claims and determine general parameters of moral action. According to the model, these stages of moral judgement

form an invariant sequence of thought organization. Thus an individual progresses through lower stages to more advanced ones; no jumps, no regression.

Kohlberg has argued that the higher stages of development provide better conceptual tools for decision making than the lower ones hence the higher ones are philosophically more defensible. He maintained that although some people attain the highest level of moral development during adolescence, others keep on developing their moral reasoning into their twenties and perhaps even later. Some people however never reach the highest level (Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969, Kohlberg, 1981). He also hinted that in all, only about 20% of the adult population reach stage five and six. Support for the universality of Kohlberg's stages has been provided by Snarey (1987).

In an evaluation of data obtained from 45 studies conducted in 27 diverse World cultures, Kohlberg's first four stages were confirmed. There were however no cultural diversity in the expression of moral principles beyond stage four. Thus, there was no differentiation between stages five and six. This is however not strange since those two stages are usually classified as one.

Stages of Moral Reasoning. Pre-conventional Level: This is the first stage of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning/development. It is referred to as "punishment obedience and instrumental orientation stage". At this stage individuals have no internalized personal code of morality. Rules and standards are external to the individuals; they are seen as emanating from adult care-givers. As a result the individual acts to avoid punishment or to gain reward from these adult care-givers. Later in the second phase of this stage, known as instrumental orientation stage, there is an element of fairness and reciprocity hence occasionally, they are able to attend to the

needs of others. On the whole however, they act to satisfy themselves. They are both egocentric and hedonistic and are usually referred to as "you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours".

Conventional Level: This stage is known as "Good Boy - Good Girl" and "Law and Order" Orientation stage. At this stage, good behaviour is what pleases or helps others and is approved by them. Individuals at this stage therefore try to maintain a mutual relationship with others by trying to be nice. What is right is doing one's duty, showing respect for authority and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. During the later part of this stage, there is the development of true morality and individuals are able to acknowledge the possibility of conflict between two socially acceptable standards and tries to decide between them. To a greater extent, control of conduct, standards, right, and wrong have been internalized at this stage.

Post Conventional Level: Referred to as "social contract and individual rights universal ethical principles stages", this is the last of Kohlberg's levels of moral reasoning/development. An individual at the onset of this stage is a fully fledged moral person who carefully weighs the rights of the individual against that of society's need for consensus rules. What is right is defined in terms of standards that have been agreed upon by the whole society. In the course of this stage however, an individual comes to the realization that society's rules are arbitrary and they may be broken when they conflict with universal moral principles. Thus the ultimate judgement of what is moral is a person's own conscience (even if they conflict with societal values) operating in accordance with certain universal principles. In effect, individuals do what they think is right regardless of legal restriction or the opinion of others. Standards have been internalized and refusal to act in accordance with them leads to self condemnation. Individuals become more concerned with the general welfare of others and perceive the world from an egalitarian point of view.

Empirical Studies:

Morrison et al, (cited in Baron & Byrne,1987) have pointed out that one's level of moral reasoning is a significant factor in influencing one's propensity to behave altruistically; higher level of moral reasoning result in greater amount of prosocial behaviour. They stated further that depending on the specific behaviour, there is generally at least a modest relationship between level of moral reasoning and action.

Erkut et al, (1981) in a study entitled *"Moral Judgement: Situation Interaction as a Basis for Predicting Behaviour"* concluded that the amount of help offered to the needy decreased from higher stages of moral reasoning to the lower stages. This study thus gives support to the claim that the higher one's level of moral reasoning, the more likely that one will engage in helping behaviour.

In studies by Blasi (1980), Underwood & Moore (1982), people with relatively mature moral reasoning manifested more helping and generosity than those at lower levels. In related studies by Blasi (1980), Underwood & Moore (1982) they concluded that prosocial behaviour such as helping and sharing are positively associated with levels of moral reasoning.

The above findings have been supported by studies conducted by Eisenberg & Mussen (1986) who also revealed that one's level of moral reasoning significantly influence one's propensity to behave altruistically - the higher one's level of moral reasoning the more help one offers. Malinowski (cited in Feshback & Weiner (1986) have even claimed that not only does low level of moral reasoning lead to less amount of helping, but in some cases, it leads to social vices such as delinquency and dishonesty.

The above claim by Malinowski and Smith's was earlier found by Kohlberg (1969) in a study on levels of moral reasoning and cheating in a temptation test. Kohlberg found that while

42 % (almost half) of the subjects who reasoned at lower level cheated in the test, only 11 % at the higher level cheated. In a similar study by Krebs & Kohlberg (cited in Kohlberg, 1981) involving 120 junior high school students who were given the opportunity to cheat on a test and games, 75 % of those who reasoned at the pre-conventional level cheated at least once. Of those who reasoned at the conventional level 65 % cheated, while only 20% of those who reasoned at the post-conventional level cheated. This goes further to suggest that indeed there is a relationship between moral reasoning and moral behaviour.

In another study however, higher scores on moral reasoning were related to less cheating only if the subjects responded to the moral dilemma before the temptation test. If the moral dilemmas were responded to after the test, high moral reasoning seemed to be associated less with resistance to temptation (Krebs, 1975). Hornstein et al, (1988) have suggested that this is so probably because interviewing people about their moral reasoning before a temptation test stimulates their moral reasoning and thus make them behave morally.

Rubin & Schneider (1973) administered the Peabody Picture and Vocaburally Test (PPVT) and Lee's (cited in Khanna et al, 1992) version of moral judgement stories to subjects and were provided with two measures of altruism to display altruistic behaviour. The two measures of altruism were generosity - candy donation, and helping - assisting others to complete a task. Analysis of the data showed a positive relationship between levels of moral reasoning and incidence of altruistic behaviour - helping and generosity. When age of the subjects were partialled out, higher scores on the moral reasoning was still found to correlate positively with both types of altruistic behaviour.

The positive relationship between level of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour has also been supported in a naturalistic study by Eisenberg-Berg & Haan (1979). In the said study

involving thirty-five subjects (32 Caucasians, 1 American Indian, and 2 Chicanos) from middle and upper middle class family, subjects were observed by seven research assistants over a period of six to eleven weeks in both indoor and in the fields for a specific number of minutes. The altruistic behaviour observed were sharing, comforting and helping. Results show that in all the three types of altruistic behaviour, those who reasoned at the higher level helped significantly more than those at the lower levels.

In a review of nineteen studies on the relation between moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour, Blasi (1980) found that eleven of them supported a positive relation; four gave negative result, and the remaining four were mixed or ambiguous findings. The outcome of a meta-analysis done by Underwood and Moore (1982) also indicated that although some of the relationship between moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour are weak, on the whole, there is a positive relationship between level of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour. Other studies which have related high level of moral reasoning to altruistic behaviour include those by Eisenberg-Berg (1979), Lazarowitz et al, (1976), Blotner & Bearison (1984), Rapport & Kren (1993).

Why are people whose moral reasoning is at the higher level more altruistic than those at the lower levels? According to Eisenberg (1983), people with more advanced reasoning adhere to moral criteria which focuses on the value of a moral action in itself and/or on the consequence of an act for others rather than on criteria related to personal gain. Those who reason at the lower levels on the other hand tend to think more of the consequences (such as cost to them) of their action.

The above view is also shared by Kohlberg (1969), and Eisenberg-Berg (1979). They have pointed out that people whose moral reasoning is at the higher level are more altruistic than those



at the lower levels because the former incorporate broader internalized principles into their reasoning. These internalized principles prescribe moral action for reason that have little or nothing to do with a recipient's identity.

In contrast, moral reasoning at the lower levels frequently involves considerations such as the recipient's relationship to the helper and the cost or benefit of the specific helping act. Such reasoning is usually associated with the tendency to make decisions to help based on who the potential recipient is and his/her relationship and/or past interaction with the potential benefactor. That is, high level of moral reasoning individuals make differentiation based on the characteristics of the potential recipient and cost of helping less important than do those who exhibit less mature level of moral reasoning.

Another but similar explanation has also been put forward by Joy (1983), Kohlberg (1969). According to them, the higher stage of moral reasoning offer increased understanding of the complexity of society and the validity of others point of view upon a shared social world. As a person becomes more mature in his/her moral reasoning, his/her thoughts and action correspond increasingly to egalitarianism and universality. This enables actions that take into consideration the welfare of others and encourage just interaction with his/her community and the world at large. Thus, at the higher level of moral reasoning emphasis is on fairness, justice, and equal opportunity for all.

Although the literature reviewed so far seems to conclude that altruistic behaviour decreases from higher to lower levels of moral reasoning, there have been some studies to the contrary. For example, in nineteen studies relating to moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour reviewed by Blasi (1980: [cited earlier]), four of the studies showed negative relationship between higher level of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour. Other four studies did not show any

relationship at all.

Another study conducted by Blasi (1980), Kurtines & Gewirtz (1984) has also revealed that high level of moral reasoning does not necessarily go hand in hand with altruistic behaviour or moral action in general especially if a person is under strong social pressure. Rosenhan (1970) for instance has stated that in Milgram's (1970) study, even those who scored highest on the moral reasoning scale delivered the 450 volts to learners who gave incorrect response. It has further been established by Eisenberg et al, (1984), Eisenberg-Berg & Haan (1979), Levin Berkerman - Greenberg (1980) that highest level of moral reasoning does not always lead to more altruistic behaviour or moral actions.

The above findings have been given various interpretations. Schwartz & Howard, in Bierhoff (1987) for instance have said that adherence to moral standards depend on individual difference in receptivity to situational need cues and the general feeling of obligation. They explained further that although values are relatively enduring, personal norms are situation specific, reflecting on the cognitive and affective implications of a person's values for specific actions hence a person whose moral reasoning is at higher level may not always engage in moral acts.

In support of Schwartz & Howard's assertion, Haan et al, (in Baron & Bryne, 1987) have also explained that whether or not a person will behave morally or not in a particular situation depends on how stressful the situation is, how much the person has to give up in order to act; and whether the person has effective coping strategies as well as the ability to assess the situation accurately to be able to provide the required help.

In addition, Piliavin et al.(1981), Langer et al, (cited in Wrightsman, 1984) have suggested that one of the reasons for the inconsistencies on the relationship between moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour or moral act in general is that some altruistic behaviours are automatically

performed with little or no prior conscious cognitive process. Furthermore, in crisis situations, help is almost reflexive hence such helping behaviour may not invoke moral conflict; they may be due to impulsive rather than cognitive considerations.

On the basis of the above, Blasi (1980), Lerner & Simmons (1966) have concluded that the ability to engage in higher level of moral reasoning does not necessarily lead to altruistic or moral behaviour. In support of this, Erkut et al (1981) have also argued that neither the knowledge of a person's level of moral reasoning nor the situation is sufficient to predict his/her behaviour; the two must be taken into consideration. It is on the basis of these contradictory findings that the role of moral reasoning in helping behaviour needs to be investigated further. Cost of helping has also been included in this study to ascertain how it mediates between moral reasoning and altruism

Cost of Helping

According to Bierhoff, Eisenberg & Shelly, Lynch & Cohen, Schwartz & Howard, Sobesky, and Staub, (all cited in Ma, 1992), the cost of helping to a potential helper is one of the important variables which determines whether an individual will help or not. Various studies have shown that high cost of helping in particular elicits a strong conflict between bystanders' inclination to intervene in an emergency and their desire not to cause any embarrassment or harm to themselves or the victim; approach-avoidance conflict. Sometimes it is very easy to help; at other times it involves considerable cost in time, energy, and other complications. For instance, if someone asks for directions it is easy to spend a few moments and help if one knows the directions. On the other hand however, it may be much more time consuming to stop and help someone fix his/her flat tyre. Gruder (1974) has indicated that two things which are of primary importance to a bystander deciding whether to help or not are the need of the victim and the cost

to the bystander himself/herself

Piliavin et al, (1981), Kerber (1984), Hallpike (1984) have also suggested that when bystanders encounter an emergency, they quickly weigh the positive and negative aspects of responding by using a kind of by-stander calculus and if the cost is greater than the benefit, then the bystander is likely to do one of the following: pass on the responsibility to others, escape from the unpleasant situation, or mis-represent/perceive what is going on. The above affirms Milgram & Hollander's (cited in Myers, 1993) assertion that notwithstanding the need of a victim and norms about helping a person in need, there are also rational and sometimes irrational fears about what might happen to a person who intervenes in an emergency; potential helpers are therefore cautious of what to do in such a situation.

In other words, in an emergency situation, there is conflict between the responsibility of a potential helper to assist and the influence of inhibition (cost). Among the inhibitions (cost) associated with helping are the effort to be made in order to assist someone, distasteful experience, physical harm, possible embarrassment, norms that make intervention socially inappropriate, time to be spent, and the possibility of missing an appointment. These probable inhibition costs lead to conflict between potential actor's welfare and the need to assist someone. The nature of the conflict and how it will be resolved will depend largely on the magnitude of the perceived cost and the possible threat to the individual's safety. According to Bierhoff (1987), it is the evaluation of this conflict (cost and benefit) which determines whether assistance will be offered or defense mechanisms will be employed in order to avoid helping. High cost intervention in particular induces more conflict because it involves more pain (physical, emotional, material, etc.,) which hedonistic individuals would seek to minimize.

As the cost of helping goes up, intervention (especially direct ones) becomes less likely. Direct intervention is expected to occur when the bystander is not expected to incur high cost in trying to help or when the victim will suffer great harm if the by-stander fails to act (Piliavin et al, 1981). Cost involved in helping are of two types. One, the cost of intervention to the potential helper; two, cost to the victim if the by-stander fails to help or make a mess in an attempt to help. Worchel et al, (1991) have revealed that cost of intervention to a by-stander can come from a variety of sources: first, cost as a result of an effort an individual may expend to help. Secondly, the risk one runs by helping, and finally, the lack of internal reward from helping. There are also costs of not helping which include self blame and perceived censure from others.

In the light of the inhibitory nature of cost associated with helping and the general tendency for people to avoid such cost, the question which arises is how much cost (physical, emotional, material, social and/or mental) is a potential helper prepared to bear in order to assist someone in need of help.

Empirical Studies

In a study by Batson (1989) aimed at finding out how individuals will help others in need, subjects reported that they would be more willing to give help to persons in need if the cost of doing so was low. Staub (1971) also found that many people assisted or said they would when the cost of doing so was low (Lynch & Cohen, 1978; Sobesky, 1983).

A similar finding was arrived at by Latane & Darley, (cited in Brown, 1986). In a study entitled "*Routine Courtesies*", introductory Psychology students at the University of Columbia were instructed by the researchers to go into the city of Columbia and asked from passers-by small routine courtesies such as time of the day, directions etc. Of the more than 1500 people who were approached, a substantial percentage (from 34 - 85% depending on the nature of the request)

assisted.

The higher percentage of help offered was attributed to the fact that all the requests made (time of the day and directions) involved little or no cost. For instance, neither the time spent (cost) in looking and telling the time nor to give the directions asked for involved substantial cost in terms of time or anything of the sort. In other words, the tendency for most people to help when there is little or no cost may be due to the fact that in such situations the threat to the individual's welfare is very little or non-existing hence no anxiety is aroused within the individual; there is less conflict between approach and avoidance.

Results from studies involving two or more different levels of cost have also shown a trend similar to the ones reviewed above. In one of such study, Tipton & Jenkins (1974) investigated the effect of response cost on the acquisition of instrumentally conditioned helping behaviour. Subjects consisted of sixty (60) students randomly selected and assigned to one of three groups.

Group one subjects were placed in a position in which they could help a confederate by delivering him from electric-shock and at the same time the individual risked the possibility of receiving electric shock (in an attempt to help/deliver the confederate).

Group two subjects, like those in group one, were also placed in a position in which they could help a confederate by delivering him from electric-shock. Unlike group one however, this group did not ran any risk of being shocked (cost) in an attempt to deliver the confederate. Subjects in group three served as a control group, they were neither given the opportunity to help nor received any electric shock. Results showed significant difference in the amount of help offered between groups one and two; group two (no shock [cost]) helped more than group one. This finding is in line with Magoo & Khana's (1991) assertion that when cost is introduced into a situation altruistic behaviour tend to be suppressed.



Shorthand & Stebbing (1983) also conducted two field experiments to test the effect of cost on two different requests for help. In the first study, 320 subjects with an average age of 38.5 years varied their request for a ride from one location to another. The variation in request differed from little or no cost to high cost in terms of where the driver is heading towards vis-a-vis what the lift-seeker wanted to be lifted to.

In the second study confederate subjects were asked to dial certain phone numbers which were randomly selected from a phone book. As soon as the number dialled was picked, the confederate apologized and said they had dialled the "wrong" number but his/her car had developed a fault on a Highway and had no money left on him so he wants the person answering the phone to call someone to come and help him (the stranded) to service his car or pick him home. In half of the cases, the number dialled was within the area code of the person answering the confederates call - low cost in terms of money to be paid for the call (phone bill). In the other half, the number to be called was outside the area code of the person answering the call - high cost in terms of money to be paid for the call (phone bill).

On the whole, most people who answered the confederates' calls helped by calling the number given to them when it was within their area code - low cost. On the other hand, very few people called the numbers outside their area codes. For those who requested for lift, assistance was a function of the cost to the driver - more help when cost was non-existing or low. This result goes further to indicate that high cost (monetary or otherwise) is one of the factors which inhibit altruistic behaviour.

Another study similar to the second field experiment by Shortland & Stebbing (cited above) was conducted by Colaizzi et al. (1984). Sixty-four phone calls were made by confederates who told those who answered their calls that their cars had broken down so they wanted the person

eached to call a number within (low cost) or outside (high cost) that district for assistance. Those who asked for calls within the same district had significant number of their numbers dialled for them than those whose numbers were outside the district.

The effect of cost on altruistic behaviour has further been studied by Peterson et al, (1984). In one of two experiments, the researchers examined among others the effect of situational factor (cost) on ten helping and sharing conditions, ordered from low to high costs. The results showed that more helping and sharing were offered when cost was low than when it was high. The above literature shows clearly that cost of helping of any kind (particularly high cost) tends to inhibit helping behaviour. It has however been demonstrated by Eisenberg & Shell (1987), Kohlberg & Candee (cited in Eisenberg & Shell (1984) that when moral reasoning is introduced and cost is made the mediating variable, the trend changes - high cost does not always lead to less help.

Human Relationships

According to Hamilton (1964), the tendency to help another person is selected against except when the actor and recipient are related or share genes in common. He maintained further that in a group living together, natural selection favours those who are prone to help others as a function of the recipient's relatedness to the actor, potential fecundity, or other features indicating recipient inclusive fitness, and this effect is especially strong when help is biologically significant. The above implies that the tendency for an actor 'A' to perform an altruistic act to a person 'B' depends on the relationship between 'A' and 'B' and that the probability decreases consistently from close relatives, best friends, strangers, to enemies.

In spite of the important role actor-recipient relationships plays in altruistic behaviour, little attention has been given to it since altruism became a major research topic in the mid 1960s. Even the few investigations conducted into it has yielded inconclusive results; while some

researchers such as Ma (1985/92), Eisenberg (1983), Essock - Vitale McCuire (1985) have found that the relationship between a potential helper and a victim influences altruistic behaviour, others such as Gaetner & Frey (cited in Aronson (1992) found no such influence. The inclusion of this variable (human relationships) in this study is thus the result of the inconclusive nature of the available data, its important role in altruistic behaviour, as well as lack of literature on the variable in Ghana.

Based on the researchers by Ma (1982, 1985 & 1992), Carter (cited in Ma, 1992), Freedman (1979), Barash (1977), Hardin (1977), Sawyer (1966) the hierarchy of human relationships has been constructed in the following order:

- R1: First Kin (close relations such as brothers and sisters).
- R2: Best friends or intimates
- R3: Strangers who are very weak - children, the sick, the aged etc.
- R4: Common Strangers.
- R5: Someone we dislike or an enemy.



According to these researchers, members in the R1 group are usually genetically related. A term referred to as co-efficient of relationship (r) or genetic kinship by sociobiologists (Hardin, in Ma 1992; Wilson, 1975). To Sociobiologists the r between two persons (a & b) refers to the proportion of genes in them (a and b) that are identical because of common descent.

For instance, the r between a person and one of his/her parents, son or daughter, or brother or sister is $1/2$; that of an individual and nephew or niece, grandparents, aunts, uncles is $1/4$; while that between an individual and one of his/her cousins is $1/8$. In general, the larger the r value between an actor (q) and another person (victim [p]), the greater the probability that q would carry out an altruistic act towards p .

friends and non friends - friends were helped more than non friends.

In one of four naturalistic studies in helping behaviour, Bryan & Test (1967) examined the effect of race on helping. In the study, two Salvation Army Kettles were placed approximately 75 yards from two store exits. One of the Kettles was manned by a black and the other by a Caucasian (White) both of whom were females in their early twenties. Both wore Salvation Army uniforms and were instructed not to make any verbal appeals for donations and also to avoid eye contact. The study was conducted between 10.00 a.m. and 6.00 p.m. for the period it lasted. In all 2154 females and 1549 males took part in the study. The result indicated a significant difference in donation received by the Caucasian as compared to the black; the former received more donation than the black.

Although the result of this study follows the general trend and thus confirms a similar one by Feldman it cannot be said to be conclusive. This is because no indication is given as to who the donors were. Were they all whites or blacks? If there were some black donors, then we need to know what percentage donated to each pan-handler. Thus if more blacks donated to the Caucasian than their fellow blacks, then this conclusion is questionable.

In a related study entitled "*A Laboratory On Wheel*", Piliavin & Rodin (1969) also investigated among other things the effect of race of victim vis-a-vis that of potential helper on altruistic behaviour in an Express Train in New York, - 8th Avenue Independent Subway. The study which was conducted between April 15 and June 26, 1968, between the hours of 11.00 a.m. and 3.00 p.m. had four confederates comprising 2 males and 2 females (3 whites and a black). Among the data they collected on the 103 trials were the race of an observer, race of victim, latency of helping response, number of helpers and spontaneous comments. Findings revealed a tendency for same-race help and decrease in speed of responding as group size increases.

diffusion of responsibility effect.

Gaetner & Frey (cited in Aronson, 1992) found that when a caller reached a "wrong" phone number and requested for assistance from the person who answered the call, whites helped their fellow whites more than blacks, whereas blacks subjects gave about the same amount of help to both blacks and whites. Although it is not very clear why blacks gave almost the same amount of help to both blacks and whites, it could be argued that having gone through discrimination themselves, they (blacks) had seen its adverse effect and therefore did not want others to suffer a similar fate. Another probable explanation is that because blacks were made to work for whites and thus depended on them for almost everything, they might have felt obliged to do what the white callers asked for.

A study by Ma (1992) involving Chinese and English subjects also showed that people were more altruistic towards those who were more closely related to them. In that study subjects were asked to read Kohlberg's story of *"Heinz and the Drug"* and to indicate to what extent they would steal the drug if the victim was a husband or wife, father or mother son or daughter, best friend and stranger. Both samples indicated more help for close relatives followed by best friends and then stranger.

In a related study, Freedman (cited in Ma, 1985) also used the same Kohlberg story (*"Heinz and the Drug"*) with an alternation of the relationship between Heinz and the woman from husband - wife to father/mother best friend and stranger. Subject were asked to answer on a 7-point scale ranging from definitely yes, to definitely no, whether they would do everything possible to obtain the drug. For both samples, subjects were more prepared to get the drug to help the victim in the following order; father/mother, best friend and stranger.



The tendency to help close relations have further been confirmed by Essock-Vitale & McGuire (1985). In a study to determine the pattern of helping among kin and nonkin, white middle class women with an average age of 39.6 were interviewed. Results showed more help among kin than non kin. Even among kin, helping was a function of the recipients' expected reproductive potential which goes to confirm Sociobiologists assertion that the reproductive potential of a recipient of help is one of the important factor in the decision to help. This is so because the essence of the theory is gene propagation hence only those who have the potential to reproduce matter most.

In yet another study by Ma (1985) aimed at testing the validity of the proposed hierarchy of human relationships, a cross- cultural study involving 519 Chinese and 398 English was conducted. Subjects were presented with two hypothetical dilemmas and asked to what degree they would be willing to sacrifice themselves for another individual's survival. The result of the study also confirmed previous studies; close relatives received more help followed by best friends, strangers, and than enemies.

Ma (1992) in a similar study involving a total sample of 832 subjects again found among others that people were willing to sacrifice their lives for others in the following order: close relatives, best friends, strangers and enemies. The above review points to the fact that human relationships plays an important role in altruistic behaviour and thus confirm Emlens & Wrege's (1988) findings that the relations between a potential helper and a victim is a significant predictor of helping behaviour.

Notwithstanding the above, there are few studies whose findings have been to the contrary. For instance, Piliavin & Rodin (1969) found that the race of a potential helper and that of a victim do not affect helping behaviour: In the said study both blacks and whites gave almost the same

amount of help irrespective of the race of the recipient.

Dutton (cited by Nabor, 1992), also found that blacks and American Indians solicitors for charity received significantly higher donations from whites than did white solicitors. How do we account for the differences in the above review?

According to Emlen & Wrege (1988), some of the inconsistencies in the research may be due to the fact that the importance of a helping act for benefactor-recipient relationship as well as the helping behaviour involved vary across studies. Sometimes the type of help to be rendered is of relative minor importance and could have only a small impact on the recipient. Consequently, individual may not find it difficult to help even an enemy. However, when failure to assist may seriously affect the recipient-benefactor relationship, then the existence of a relationship or link between the self and the victim should enhance the likelihood that individuals will discriminate by choosing to help close relatives than distant ones or non relatives. There is also some amount of discrimination when a non relative is in competition with a relative.

Emlen & Wrege have argued further that in life-or-death situations, people choose to aid close kin over distant ones, the younger over the aged, the healthy over the sick, and the wealthy over the poor. However, in everyday life situations, less weight is given to kinship and people help the very poor over the healthy and the very young and old over the intermediate age. In other words the seemingly inconsistencies in benefactor - recipient relationship are due to the nature of the help to be offered as well as the impact that help will have on the recipient.

Aims of the Study:

The aims of the study are to ascertain:

- 1) the moral reasoning stages of a sample of Sixth Form students in the Greater Accra region of Ghana.
- 2) the level of altruism among Sixth Formers in the Greater Accra region of Ghana.
- 3) how one's level of moral reasoning affects his/her altruistic orientation
- 4) how the cost involved in helping affects one's willingness to assist others.
- 5) how human relationships (kin, acquaintance and strangers) affect helping behaviour.
- 6) which of the three variables has the most influence in facilitating or militating against helping.
- 7) how these three variables interact to influence altruistic behaviour.
- 8) fill part of the vacuum created by lack of research in this area in the country.

Hypotheses:

On the basis of the available literature, the following hypotheses have been proposed:

- 1) there will be positive relationship between level of moral reasoning and amount of help.
That is,
 - a) those who reason at high level will help significantly more than those who reason at the middle and low levels.
 - b) those who reason at middle level will help significantly more than those who reason at low level.
- 2) There will be an inverse relationship between cost and help. Specifically; as the cost of

slipping increases, the amount of help will decrease.

- i) There will be positive relationship between altruistic orientation and human relationship.

Thus,

- a) kin will be helped significantly more than acquaintance and stranger.

- b) acquaintance will be helped significantly more than stranger.

- j) There will be two-way interaction effects between level of moral reasoning, cost of helping, human relationships, and altruistic behaviour.
- k) There will be three-way interaction effect among level of moral reasoning, cost of helping, human relationships and altruistic orientation.



CHAPTER FOUR

Methodology

Study Design:

Population: The target population was Sixth Form Students in the Greater Accra region of Ghana. This region was selected for the study not only because it was closer to the researcher and therefore was easily accessible, but also being the capital city of Ghana, as well as the administrative, and more importantly, the economic nerve centre of the country, it consists of students from all the ten regions of the country, and for that matter, people from the various ethnic groups. This made the participation of students from this region more representative of the Sixth Form population in the country and would thus go a long way to enhance generalization of the results to the rest of the target population.

The reason for selecting students for the study was to ensure higher return of questionnaires through group and on the spot administration. Sixth Formers in particular were chosen for the study because they were one of the well organized as well as easily accessible groups who satisfied the main prerequisite for the administration of the Defining Issue Test (DIT) to non native speakers of the English Language - non native speakers who have had at least twelve years of reading and spoken ability in the English Language.

Sample-size: Initial sample of two-hundred and sixty students comprising one-hundred and fifty [150] males and one-hundred and ten [110] females were selected from three mixed Sixth Form schools (Achimota, Labone and Tema) in the Greater Accra region.

Selection: Both the three schools and the two-hundred and sixty subjects were selected by means of simple random sampling method. This method was employed to give equal chance to the individual schools and students who fell within the target student and school

population to be included in the sample.

For the selection of the schools, the researcher obtained the list of all government approved and assisted Sixth Form schools in the region from both the Greater Accra regional office of the Ghana Education Service and the West Africa Examination Council office in Accra. Single-sex schools were taken out of the list to ensure that relatively equal number of both sexes were included in the study. Thus although sex was not one of the variables under investigation, it was to avoid a situation where the selection of either an all-male or all-female school could have biased the gender composition of the sample. The remaining ones (mixed schools, eight in all) were arranged in alphabetical order and numbers (1 - 8) assigned to them (Refer to appendix A for the list of Schools). These numbers were written on pieces of papers, folded, put into a hat, shaken, and three selected from them one after the other. The schools whose corresponding numbers were selected (Achimota, Labone, and Tema) were those whose students were used for the study.

For the subjects, selection was also done on the basis of simple random sampling method. In each school, random numbers were assigned to all the Sixth Formers whose names appeared on the school register made available to the researcher. On the basis of the total number of Sixth Form students in each school, ninety subjects were selected from both Achimota and Tema secondary schools and eighty from Labone school.

In order to select the required number of subjects from each school, the total number of Sixth Form students in the respective schools were divided by the number to be selected from each school. For instance, in Tema Secondary school the total number of Sixth Formers were two-hundred and eight and since that number divided by ninety is 2.3, students whose assigned random numbers fell on the second, forth, sixth, etc., to the hundred and eightieth person, were selected for the study. In each school, additional eight subjects (twenty-four in

all) were selected as stand-by to replace any of the main subjects who for any reason might not be able to turn up for the study.

Demographic Characteristics: The age range of the samples was between sixteen [16] and twenty-two [22] with an average age of nineteen [19] and a standard deviation of 1.3 years. The population was made up of Ghanaian students in the Greater Accra region of Ghana with different ethnic and varied socio-economic backgrounds. With these different socio-economic and ethnic backgrounds, the subjects could be described as heterogeneous.

Materials.

Two different types of questionnaires - Defining Issue Test (DIT) and Self Report Altruistic Scale (SRAS)- were used for the study.

Defining Issue Test (DIT) The DIT (Rest James, 1979) is a standardized form of Kohlberg's Moral Reasoning Scale referred to as Moral Judgement Inventory (MJl). The DIT is one of the widely used tests for assessing levels of moral reasoning (Rest et al., 1974). This test (DIT), instead of Kohlberg's original scale (Moral Judgement Interview - MJl) was used because it has been standardized with closed ended responses which reduce administration time, scoring ambiguity, complexity, and difficulty associated with the MJl. The DIT is a pencil and paper questionnaire designed to measure individuals level of moral reasoning, behavioural intentions, and the reasoning[s] behind actions. It consists of six moral dilemmas (the most popular being that of "Heinz and the Drug") and a sample question.

Like other moral reasoning scales such as the MJl (Kohlberg, 1969), Moral maturity scale (Kotaskova & Vajda and Karylowski, in Kataskova, 1992), the DIT consists of moral dilemmas designed to tap people's reasoning about certain situations and/or actions in which obedience to laws and authority sometimes conflict with the welfare of the actor or other person(s). Each dilemma contains a conflict between the protagonist's own needs, wants,

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of moral judgement (global score). Subjects responses thus provide indices of their levels of moral reasoning. There are separate response sheets for each DIT questionnaire so in each case responses are shaded by the subjects on the part of the answer sheet which corresponds to a particular dilemma, question, or statement.

One of the most important indices of a subject's level of moral reasoning on the DIT is the P-score which ranges from zero (0) to ninety-five (95). This (P score) is taken to be the relative importance a subject gives to the items indicative of being at stage 5 (five) or 6 (six) - the "principled" stages of Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning (Schlaefli et al., 1985). Rest et al., (1974) noted that the items in the DIT are based on prior research for a period of over ten years of subject's verbalization made in response to hypothetical but real life moral dilemmas.

The DIT has been validated in various studies. For example, Rest et al., (1974), found that the P-score and the DIT stories correlate in the .60s and .68 respectively with the scores obtained on Kohlberg's scale. According to Davison & Robbin (1978), the DIT has a test-retest correlation in the .90s, while Schlaefli et al., (1985) have found it to have a Cronbach alpha in the .70 to .80 range. A number of studies have also linked the DIT scores to a broad range of social, educational, political, and religious viewpoints (Schlaefli et al., 1985). The validity of the DIT has further been substantiated by longitudinal studies (Rest & Thomas, 1985). A major advantage of the DIT is the ability of the optical scanner (the machine used to score the questionnaires) to detect and eliminate the scores of subject who fake or just answer randomly.

For instance, some of the twelve-items in part two of the questionnaires are distractors popularly called M ("meaningless") items. These items are pretentious and lofty sounding, but are really meaningless. They are there to serve as internal reliability check as to whether

subjects followed the stories and/or understood the instructions or not. On three (3) stories (i.e. the short form of the DIT), if subject's M score is above four (4), it is recommended that the subject's scores must be discarded. This is because a high M score (above four in three stories, and above eight in all the six stories) implies that subjects paid more attention to perceived complexity and loftiness of the items than to their meaning. This consistency check enables researchers to exclude from their analysis the scores of subjects who did not understand the instructions and/or the stories, and for that matter answered the questions randomly. Apart from Rest, Hamilton & Mary (1994), Kotaskova (1992), Ma (1992), Curtis et al. (1988), Sobesky (1983), Pratt, et al. (1984), Leahey & Eiter (in Rest, 1993), Haan & Black, (1968) have also used the DIT in various studies.

Self Report Altruism Scale (SRAS). According to Sawyer (1966), an altruism scale assesses the value one places upon the welfare of another in relation to his own. He maintains that although a direct and theoretically desirable way to assess people's altruistic behaviour would be to observe people in a specific natural situation where they make choice that affect their own and another's welfare, practical difficulties of observation and methodological problems of uncontrollable and unknown biases detract from this approach. As a result, he suggested that on issues concerning altruism researchers should ask people to report what they think their behaviour would be in a given situation. In the case of this particular study, it would have been very difficult if not impossible, and even unethical to design and carry out a study of this nature in the form of field experiment hence the use of altruistic questionnaires.

Sawyer's call for self-report in altruistic studies has been supported by Rushton (1980), and Rushton et al, (1986). Following the development and administration of a Self-Report Altruistic Scale by Rushton (1980) on the basis of Sawyer's suggestion, they have also concluded that individual's altruistic behaviour could be measured through Self Report Scale.

They proposed further that it might be more useful to employ a more general and global response format by asking respondents to "*imagine*" that they were in a situation where they could engage in helping behaviour and then estimate the amount of help they would offer. Others who have used this method are Burnstein et al, (1994), Hershey et al, (1994), Khanna et al, (1992), Magoo & Khanna, (1991).

Among the advantages to be derived from the use of this method (questionnaires/scale) are that issues are made clear. For example, the type of assistance needed is made explicit, so is the person who needs assistance, the cost involved if any, as well as other issues inherent in the situation. The Altruism Orientation Scale used in this study consists of three hypothetical but everyday life occurrences (rescue of fire victims, blood donation and intervening to rescue someone who is being bullied). The scale was adapted by the researcher from existing ones by Ma (1992, 1985, & 1982), Huston et al, (cited in Wrightsman, 1984), and Eisenberg & Shell (1987) with few changes to suit the research objectives and the Ghanaian setting.

For example, in the bus accident of the original Ma (1992) scale, respondents are asked whether they will abandon an acquaintance, a stranger, or an enemy whom they are about to rescue from flames of fire and rather rescue a brother or sister who is also in danger of being burnt by the same fire. This was changed into a situation in which potential helpers had the opportunity to rescue three different categories of victims (brother/sister, an acquaintance, and a stranger) with or without sustaining any amount of injury to themselves.

Similarly, the original scales of blood donation and the rescue situation were changed into donating blood and rescuing the same three categories of people at no or some cost. Each situation consists of three parts: In part one, respondents are asked to indicate on a scale of 1—5 how they would help these three people of the same age (19 years) at no cost. The age

of the victim were pegged at nineteen to reflect the average age of the respondents.

In part two, respondents are asked to indicate on a similar five point-scale how they will assist the same three people (as in part one above) at some amount of cost (medium) to themselves. Part three is similar to part one and two with the only exception being the amount of cost (high) to be incurred by the respondents. For instance in the Bus accident, high cost mean 5% first degree body burns. Thus in each situation respondents are asked to indicate on a scale of 1 - 5 how they will assist each of these three categories of people at the various levels of cost (little or no cost, medium and high).

In all, the scale consists of twenty-seven instances in which respondents are to indicate the amount of help they will offer. On the scale, 1 (one), means "I will leave the scene or will not intervene/help", while 5 (five), means "I will definitely help". The over-all scores range from a minimum of 27 to a maximum of 135. In other words, the higher a subject's (group's) scores, the more altruistic the person (group) is. However, because the researcher was interested in the amount of help offered at each level of moral reasoning in terms of cost and victim, the total number of scores in each cell (cost x victim) for each level of moral reasoning were added separately, bringing the minimum score for each subject in each cell to three (3) and a maximum of fifteen (15). Since there were nine cells in all, the over-all total added up to the minimum of 27 and the maximum of 135 ($3 \times 9 = 27$; $15 \times 9 = 135$). Refer to appendix C for a copy of the SRAS scale.

Procedure

Pilot Study: The Self Report Altruism Scale (SRAS) was pre-tested in both Los Angeles, California, USA, and in Ghana. In Los Angeles, the subjects were from a community high school (equivalent of Sixth Form) and undergraduate students from University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), whereas in Ghana all the subjects who participated in the



pilot study were Sixth Form students from Accra Academy Secondary School. In each case twenty-subjects participated in the pilot study. The break down were: eleven (11) males and nine (9) females high school students, twelve (12) males and eight (8) females students from both UCLA and Accra Academy Secondary school. Both the United States high school subjects and particularly, those from Accra Academy secondary school, Ghana, who took part in the pilot study were equivalent in many respects to those who participated in the actual study.

The third situation (directly intervening to rescue someone being bullied) was found to be irrelevant to the two groups of subjects in Los Angeles, as most of the respondents indicated (as foot-notes on the questionnaires and also during interview after the administration of the questionnaires) that they would rather use the phone to call the police instead of them intervening directly. Calling the police in such situation was easy to do because phone booths are easily accessible - located within a distance of about every two-hundred (200) metres in residential areas. The reason they gave for non direct intervention was the rampant use of guns in their country and the possibility of endangering their lives and that of the victim.

In Ghana however, none of the pilot study subjects raised any such issue probably because most of us (Ghanaians) are used to such direct intervention and also the fact that telephones are not readily accessible as in the case of the United States. Since the Ghanaian subjects who took part in the pilot study did not raise any issue (on the scale), no changes were made. One interesting issue however came up when the Ghanaian respondents were interviewed. Two subjects who were members of the Jehovah Witness religious group did not respond to situation two (blood donation) on the scale. Their reason was that their religious doctrine forbids blood transfusion of any kind; no matter who needed it. Another issue the respondents raised had to do with the injury a potential helper will sustain in the fire rescue (Bus Accident). Most of the respondents maintained that they did not understand what is

meant by 5% first degree body burns. To overcome this during the actual study, that aspect of the questionnaire was explained to each subgroup before they were asked to begin. The explanation given was that they should assume that their whole body is 100% and out of this, 5% of the epedemis (outer skin) is burnt (first degree burnt). The average time used for the completion of the questionnaire was thirty-five (35) minutes.

The pilot study for the DIT was done in only Ghana. Those two groups of American subjects were not included because the DIT has already been tested and validated with some American subjects by Kohlberg (1969), Rest (1979) and many other researchers. Three (Heinz and the Drug, Escape Prisoner, and The Doctor's Dilemma) out of the six stories were used. The respondents were the same twenty subjects from Accra Academy who responded to the Altruism Scale. Two issues came up after the administration of the DIT and subsequent interview by the researcher.

The first was that the instructions on the DIT as a whole, and particularly the explanations on the sample question was very long and confusing. The second issue was on the two-hundred dollars (\$200.00) being the cost of the drug in the "Heinz and the Drug" dilemma. While some subjects said they tried to convert it (the \$200.00) into its cedi equivalent based on existing cedi-dollar exchange rate so as to be able to relate it better to our setting, others said they made no such attempt because they did not know the then cedi-dollar exchange rate. There were other subjects who were completely at sea as far as the dollar issue was concerned.

As a solution to the first issue, the researcher summarized the instructions by maintaining most of the terms, phrases and even sentences in the original instructions and recorded them for play during the actual study; those relating to the sample story which were not actually relevant to the stories used in the main study were eliminated. For that of the

dollar, its cedi equivalent of two-hundred and twenty thousand cedis (¢220,000.00) based on the prevailing (mid March 1995) exchange rate was quoted in place of the two-hundred dollars (\$200.00). On the average 40 minutes was spent to complete the questionnaire.

Main study: The Headmasters/Headmistresses of the three schools selected for the study were contacted by the researcher who made known to them his intention to engage some of their Sixth Form students in a proposed study whose aims and objectives were explained to them. When permission to engage the students was granted, the researcher requested for the list (register) of sixth form students in the respective schools. Random numbers from Appendix A of Keppel & Saufley (1980) were assigned to the names of the students in each school. The required number of subjects from each school was selected as described in the selection section.

Those selected for the study were informed that with the consent of their heads of Institution, they have been selected for a two-phase study which was aimed at finding out how people at their age and educational level think of certain social issues. They were told further that although their Headmasters/mistresses have agreed to their participation in the study, the final decision as to whether to take part or not rested with them - informed consent. Those who agreed to participate were randomly divided into smaller sub-groups. For example, subjects from Labone school were randomly divided into four (4) sub-groups of twenty each whereas those from Achimota and Tema were grouped into five (5) sub-groups of eighteen (18) subjects each.

These sub-groups with their small numbers (between eighteen and twenty (18 & 20) was to enable the researcher and his Assistant (a course-mate) to have maximum control over the subjects in order to focus their attention on the study so as to achieve what Aronson and Carlsmith (in Crano & Brewer 1986) called experimental realism. All members in each sub-

group were given a five-digit identification (ID) numbers. For example, 20100, 20200, - 22000; 22100, 22300 - 24000; 24100, 24200 - 2600, 26100, 26200 - 28000 were respectively assigned to sub-groups one, two, three and four from Labone school. Similar identification numbers were also assigned to the subjects from Achimota (10100 - 19000) and Tema (30100 - 39000).

A week before the study, subjects were contacted by means of reminder notes and announcements at their respective dining halls to inform them of the date, time, and location of the study. Their ID numbers were also made available to them through the reminder notes. Further, announcements were made a day before and in the morning of the study in the respective dining halls to remind them once again of when and where to report for the study.

Administration of the DIT: This was conducted in three consecutive days (a day in each school) in mid March, 1995, in the respective schools at relatively the same time (between 9:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m.). In Labone as in Tema secondary school, the study was conducted in classrooms made available to the researcher in the respective schools. In Achimota school, it was conducted in the Aggrey Chapel. Subjects from Achimota school were the first to take the study, it was followed by those from Tema and then Labone secondary. The order in which the subjects from the three schools went through the study was mainly based on the days the respective Heads of schools agreed upon with the researcher.

In each case, the study was commenced by sub-group one, followed by two, three, and in that order. Subjects in each subgroup were asked to report for the study ten minutes earlier. In other words, although the study in each school commenced at 9:00 a.m., subjects were asked to report at 8.50 a.m. The purpose of this was to ensure that even those subjects who might be late would report by the time the study was to commence. The strategy worked very well for on the whole the number of subjects who reported late was very small.

In each session, subjects were welcomed on arrival by the researcher and his assistant and were asked to take their seats behind the tables which bore their ID numbers. Thus, prior to the arrival of each sub-group, their ID numbers were written on the tables in the classroom/chapel. The ID numbers apart from ensuring the anonymity of subjects, was also to enable the researcher to match each subject's DIT scores with that of his/her Altruistic Orientation scores for analysis.

The DIT, questionnaire, answer sheets, 2B pencils and erasers were distributed to them. They were asked to write their ID numbers on the space provided for that purpose on the top right corner on the answer sheets. After that they were asked to pay attention to the instruction which was played twice on tape recorder to their hearing. The researcher then went through the sample question with them and encouraged them to ask any questions they had on the instructions or the sample question. They were told to read and respond to only dilemmas one, two and four (Heinz and the Drug, Escape Prisoner, and The Doctor's Dilemma) within forty (40) minutes.

The other three stories; *The Newspaper*, *Webeater* and *Students Take Over* were not used because they are not very relevant to the Ghanaian setting. Besides, responding to all the six stories would have been time consuming (about an hour) and even boring, in which case there was the likelihood that subjects might be compelled to respond anyhow. The minimum number of stories that can be used for a study is three so neither the validity nor the reliability of the scale was compromised by the use of only three out of the six dilemmas. At the end of the forty minutes, those who did not complete their questionnaires were given extra five minutes after which the questionnaires were collected. The subjects were informed that they would be called upon again to answer a similar questionnaire (The Self Report Altruism Scale) later. The researcher then expressed his gratitude to them for their time and patience and were



dismissed thereafter. All the subjects in the various groups went through the same procedure when it came to their turn.

A total of six subjects did not turn up for the study. There were other three who opted out because they were members of the Jehovah Witness religious denomination which does not allow blood transfusion of any kind. Thus as a result of what came up through the pilot study concerning people who belong to the Jehovah Witness religious denomination, the researcher made it known to subjects at the beginning of each session that one of the stories they were about to respond to had to do with blood donation so those who for any reason object to blood donation may opt out of the study. In all cases, some of the stand-by subjects were brought in to replace those who did not turn up or opted out. At the end of the study fourteen out of the two-hundred and sixty questionnaires were lost either through spoilage or non retrieval.

Scoring of the DIT: After the administration of the questionnaires, the two-hundred and forty-six response sheets collected/retrieved were sent to the University of Minnesota, USA, for optical scanning, scoring and classification of the subjects to the various levels (low, middle and high) of moral reasoning. The results on the DIT questionnaires were received by the researcher from the University of Minnesota, USA, ten weeks later (after they have been sent). All the two-hundred and forty questionnaires sent were scored. Thirty-two out of the lot were however invalid. These were subjects who either had an M score of more than four (4), did not pass the consistency test, or both. The scores of these thirty-two subjects were therefore excluded from the final analysis.

Categorizations of Subjects: Subjects' P scores were used to categorize them into Low, Middle, and High levels of moral reasoning for the main analysis. The P scores were used because according to Rest (1985/87/93) it is the most important score on which all analyses on DIT studies are based. In addition, whether the long (six stories) or short (three

stories) form is used, the reliability of the P scores are not affected. Rest (1979, 1986, 1987, & 1993) has maintained further that the P scores are more reliable than the stage (1/2, 3/4, & 5/6) scores and other indices of the DIT. Davison & Robbins (1978) for example, found the test re-test reliability of the P scores in the 70s & 80s, while that of the Cronbach Alpha index of internal consistency is generally in the 70s (Schaeffli et al., 1985). The P score also tells more about the importance each subject attaches to the principled moral consideration (the ultimate stage in Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning). Although most subjects could have been assigned to a specific stage of moral reasoning (e.g., stage 1/2, 3/4, & 5/6) on the basis of the most dominant stage the individual uses in responding to the dilemmas, that method has not been found to be very reliable since every subject gives at least a little attention to almost all the stages.

Furthermore, Rest (1979) has strongly recommended against using DIT data to "stage type" subjects. He stressed that in DIT research it has not been found useful to ask "what stage (1/2, 3/4, 5/6) is a subject in?" This is because subjects are attracted to a greater or lesser degree to a variety of type of moral reasoning hence subjects' scores are not represented in terms of a single stage; almost all subjects make use of each stage and that no stage is independent of each other.

As a result of the above, what is usually done is to group subjects into Low, Middle, and High levels of moral reasoning on the basis of their P scores. Thus, for the main analysis on the basis of Low, Medium, and High, the P scores are the most appropriate. The use of P scores also avoid the complications associated with subjects in transition. That is, it is usually difficult when the "stage types" are used to assign a specific stage to those subjects in transition let alone to include them in the analysis. The break down of the P scores for the two-hundred and fourteen subjects were:

$$0 - 9 = 27$$

$$10 - 19 = 62$$

$$20 - 29 = 68$$

$$30 - 39 = 34$$

$$40 - 49 = 17$$

$$50 + = 06$$

$$\text{Total} = 214$$

Cut-off Point: Below are the recommended cut off point by Rest (1979, 1987, & 1993).

Low	0 - 27
Medium	28 - 41
High	42 & above

These cut off points by Rest was based on subjects who were a combination of high school (equivalent of Sixth Formers), undergraduate and some post-graduate students whose mean P score was thirty-one (31) with some of the individual scores falling into the 70s. On the other hand, the subjects who participated in this study were all Sixth Form (equivalent of high school) students whose mean P score was nineteen (19) with the highest score falling into the 50s.

Because of the differences between the samples used to establish the cut of points by Rest and those who participated in this study, a new cut off points was necessary. New ones were therefore established on the basis of the nature of the present data. This is in line with Rest (1993) suggestion that depending of the nature of the subjects used in a study, as well as the nature of the data arrived at, new cut off points could be used. He recommended however that in such a case the new cut off points should be used alongside with the recommended ones

to determine if the two would yield similar or different results.

The new cut off points employed by this researcher based on the present data are:

Low	0 - 16
Medium	16 - 27
High	27 & above

These were based on the mean ($\bar{x}$) and standard deviation (SD) of the P scores. The mean was nineteen (19) while the SD was 13.4. The low group were those who scored $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation (SD) below the mean, while the high group were those who scored $\frac{1}{2}$ standard deviation (SD) above the mean. Those in-between the two groups were those classified into the middle categories. This cut off points apart from reflecting the nature of these data would also serve as the norm for other researchers who will in future administer the DIT to similar samples in the country.

The standard deviation was used to classify the subjects because it is an index of the spread of scores about the mean and therefore the most commonly used for describing the variability of scores in a distribution. The standard deviation also has some advantages over other measures of variability such as the percentiles. For example, whereas the range for instance focuses on only two scores, the standard deviation uses each score in the distribution in providing a measure of variation among the them. Furthermore, the standard deviation is more stable than say the percentiles. In addition, in a normal distribution, the standard deviation permits a precise interpretation of scores in the distribution and as a result most statistical tests rely on it to represent the variability of data.

Administration of the SRAS: Usually, researchers who use the DIT wait for the results from the optical scanning done by the University of Minnesota, USA, before going on with the second measure if any. In such cases follow up studies are conducted for only those

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Administration of the SRAS: Usually, researchers who use the DIT wait for the results from the optical scanning done by the University of Minnesota, USA, before going on with the second measure if any. In such cases follow up studies are conducted for only those



who "passed" the DIT scanning and the consistency test. This avoids spending time, effort, and money on subjects whose data have been rejected by the scanner and therefore cannot be used for analysis by the researcher. In this study however, the follow up study was conducted before the DIT results were received.

This was so because the report on the DIT was going to take between eight to ten weeks to be returned to the researcher. This could have led to the possibility of 'growth' (movement by subjects from one stage of moral reasoning to another) among the subjects. Such a situation could have adversely affected the result of the study because some subjects might have responded to the Altruism Scale at a moral reasoning stage different from where they were placed on the basis of their scores on the DIT some few weeks earlier. Another factor was that the upper six formers among the subjects were about to sit for their General Certificate of Education, Advanced Level Examination in May/June so any delay in administering the Altruism Scale could have led to the loss of many subjects. Thus most of them would have completed their examination and left their respective schools for their homes.

The Altruism Scale was therefore administered six weeks after that of the DIT to the same group of subjects who participated in the DIT. The only exception were the fourteen subject whose DIT questionnaires were either spoilt or not retrieved. Like the DIT, the subjects were informed of the date, place, and time for the administration of the scale. The previous ID number of each subject as well as the sub-group membership were maintained.

The procedure for the administration of Altruism Scale was the same as that of the DIT. Unlike the DIT however, subjects were asked to mark their responses on the questionnaire since no separate response sheets were provided as in the case of the DIT. The instructions were also not recorded. After subjects had taken their seats they were asked to write their ID numbers on their questionnaire. The researcher went through the instructions

with them. The part of the questionnaire that deals with the 5% body burnt was also explained. Thirty-five minutes was initially allowed for the completion of the questionnaire. Extra five minutes was given to those who did not finish at the end of the stipulated time. Five subjects did not show up for the study. Incidentally, when the report on the DIT was later received the five were among the thirty-two subjects whose data were to be excluded from the final analysis for either having an M value of more than four (4) or did not pass the consistency test. At the end of study, the researcher expressed his gratitude to the subjects.

Within two weeks after the study had been completed, the researcher arranged to meet the subjects (those who were still in school) in their respective schools to debrief them on the aims and objectives of the study as well as what each questionnaire was meant to tap. They were also asked of what they believed the study was about, what they thought about it (was it interesting, exciting, boring, very tasking etc.) and were encouraged to ask questions they had about the study. Among the questions they asked were whether their scores would be made available to them and whether low scores on the moral reasoning questionnaires means one has weak morals.

Scoring of the SRAS: An individual's scores for all the three situations at different level of cost and victim were added separately and analyzed on the basis of the individuals levels of moral reasoning. One (1) stands for no help at all, while five (5) stands for more help. In other words, the higher a subject's overall score, the more altruistic he/she is.

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CHAPTER FIVE

Results

Table 1 shows the means and standard deviations for subjects at low level of moral reasoning at three levels of cost, involving three different victims.

TABLE 1

Means & Standard Deviations for Low Level of Moral Reasoning, Involving Three Victims at Three Levels of Cost

Cost of Helping

Type of Victim	Low		Medium		High		Total	
	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD
Kin	13.66	1.47	12.31	2.10	10.83	2.81	12.27	2.47
Acquaintance	12.13	1.93	8.77	2.24	6.77	2.38	9.22	3.11
Stranger	10.39	2.63	6.23	1.75	4.55	1.63	7.06	3.20
Total	12.06	2.45	9.10	3.22	7.38	3.49	9.51	3.64

The minimum score for each cell is three (3), while the maximum is fifteen (15). In general, the means decrease as the cost of helping increases. Further, the means decrease from helping kin (K) to helping a stranger (S). This trend suggests that the amount of help decreases from helping kin to stranger, and from low to high cost. For kin (K) and acquaintance (A), the standard deviations increase from low to high cost of helping, whereas for that of a stranger it decreases from low to high cost of helping. This implies that subjects tend to differ in their responses to kin and acquaintance as the cost of helping goes up. For that of a stranger, subjects' responses rather differ when the cost is low and cluster around the mean as the cost increases. In other words, when the cost is low, subjects tend to respond differently to strangers. However, when it is high, there is little difference in their responses.

Shown below (Table 2) are the means and standard deviations for subjects at middle level of moral reasoning at three levels of cost, involving three different victims.

TABLE 2

Means & Standard Deviations for Middle Level of Moral Reasoning, Involving Three Victims at Three Levels of Cost



Type of Victim	Low		Medium		High		Total	
	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD
Kin	14.47	1.20	13.47	1.85	12.48	2.50	13.48	2.08
Acquaintance	13.30	1.56	11.00	1.72	9.55	2.05	11.28	2.76
Stranger	11.78	2.03	9.12	1.96	7.21	2.10	9.37	2.76
Total	13.18	1.96	1.20	2.56	9.75	3.10	11.38	2.9

Like Table 1, there is an inverse relation between the amount of cost and help; the means (amount of help) decrease as the cost of helping increases. Furthermore, the means decrease from helping a kin (K) to helping a stranger. Compared to table 1 however, the differences among the means from low to high cost of helping and also from helping kin to a stranger are smaller. For instance, the differences between low and medium cost, and medium and high cost for Table 1 when the victim is an acquaintance are 3.36 and 2.0 respectively. On the other hand, that for this very table for the same victim is 2.3 and 1.45; an average difference of 1.27. This suggests that irrespective of the victim and the amount of cost involved in helping, those at the middle level of moral reasoning help more than those at the low level.

Depicted below (Table 3) are the means and standard deviations for subjects at high level of moral reasoning at three levels of cost, involving three different victims.

TABLE 3

**Means & Standard Deviations for High Level of Moral Reasoning
Involving Three Victims at Three Levels of Cost**
Cost of Helping

Type of Victim	Low		Medium		High		Total	
	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD
Kin	14.85	0.48	14.46	1.02	14.19	1.62	14.50	1.17
Acquaintance	14.08	1.26	13.15	1.61	12.53	1.79	13.25	1.69
Stranger	13.05	1.47	11.42	2.23	10.42	2.54	11.63	2.41
Total	13.99	1.36	13.01	2.13	12.38	2.58	13.13	2.17

Like that of low (Table 1) and middle (table 2) levels of moral reasoning, the means decrease as the cost of helping goes up. The differences between the means of this sub-group and that of Tables 1 and 2 is that irrespective of cost and victim, this group offered more help than the previous two. In addition, the standard deviations of this group at all levels of cost and victim are more clustered around the mean than that of the low and middle levels of moral reasoning. Thus, the variability in response of this Table (subjects at the high level of moral reasoning) is smaller than those at low and middle. In other words, this group did not differ so much in the amount of help offered irrespective of the cost and victim.

Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations for all the three levels of moral reasoning at three levels of cost when the victim is kin.

TABLE 4

Means & Standard Deviations at Three Levels of Cost When the Victim is a Kin

Cost of Helping

Level of Moral Reasoning	Low		Medium		High		Total	
	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD
Low	13.66	1.47	12.31	2.10	10.83	2.81	12.27	2.47
Middle	14.47	1.20	13.47	1.85	12.48	2.50	13.48	2.08
High	14.85	0.48	14.46	1.02	14.19	1.62	14.50	1.17
Total	14.33	1.03	13.41	1.66	12.5	2.31	13.41	1.91

For each level of moral reasoning, more help was given when cost of helping was low, followed by medium and then high. On the whole however, the amount of help given at each level of cost was in descending order from high to low level of moral reasoning. The standard deviations for each level of moral reasoning also increased from low cost to high cost of helping with that of high level of moral reasoning being more clustered than those at middle and low levels. This means that although at each level of moral reasoning the amount of help offered reduces as the cost of helping goes up, the variability in subjects' responses widens from high to low level of moral reasoning.

Shown below (Table 5) are the means and standard deviations for all the three levels of moral reasoning at three levels of cost when the victim is an acquaintance.

TABLE 5

Means & Standard Deviation at Three Levels of Cost When the
Victim is an Acquaintance
Cost of Helping

Level of Moral Reasoning	Low		medium		High		Total	
	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD
Low	12.13	1.93	8.77	2.24	6.77	2.38	9.22	3.11
Middle	13.30	1.56	11.00	1.72	9.55	2.05	11.28	2.36
High	14.08	1.26	13.15	1.61	12.53	1.79	13.25	1.69
Total	13.17	1.58	11.06	1.86	9.62	2.07	11.25	2.39

Like Table 4, at each levels of moral reasoning, more help was given when cost of helping was low, followed by medium and then high. Another feature of this Table which is similar to Table 4 is the trend of the amount of help; there was an inverse relation between the amount of help offered and cost of helping. The difference however is that at each level of cost and moral reasoning, the amount of help offered was higher in Table 4 than that of 5. The standard deviations for each level of moral reasoning also increase from low to high cost of helping with that of this table being higher than that of Table 4. In other words, the standard deviations of this table are more scattered.

Shown below (Table 5) are the means and standard deviations for all the three levels of moral reasoning at three levels of cost when the victim is an acquaintance.

TABLE 5

Means & Standard Deviation at Three Levels of Cost When the
Victim is an Acquaintance
Cost of Helping

Level of Moral Reasoning	Low		medium		High		Total	
	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD	$\bar{x}$	SD
Low	12.13	1.93	8.77	2.24	6.77	2.38	9.22	3.11
Middle	13.30	1.56	11.00	1.72	9.55	2.05	11.28	2.36
High	14.08	1.26	13.15	1.61	12.53	1.79	13.25	1.69
Total	13.17	1.58	11.06	1.86	9.62	2.07	11.25	2.39

Like Table 4, at each levels of moral reasoning, more help was given when cost of helping was low, followed by medium and then high. Another feature of this Table which is similar to Table 4 is the trend of the amount of help; there was an inverse relation between the amount of help offered and cost of helping. The difference however is that at each level of cost and moral reasoning, the amount of help offered was higher in Table 4 than that of 5. The standard deviations for each level of moral reasoning also increase from low to high cost of helping with that of this table being higher than that of Table 4. In other words, the standard deviations of this table are more scattered.

The Table below (Table 6) shows the means and standard deviations for all the three levels of cost when the victim is a stranger.

TABLE 6

Means & Standard Deviation at Three Levels of Cost When the
Victim is a Stranger
Cost of Helping

Level of Moral Reasoning	Low		Medium		High		Total	
	×	SD	×	SD	×	SD	×	SD
Low	10.39	2.63	6.23	1.75	4.55	1.63	7.06	3.20
Middle	11.78	2.03	9.12	1.96	7.21	2.10	9.37	2.76
High	13.05	1.47	11.42	2.32	10.42	2.54	11.63	2.41
Total	11.74	2.04	8.92	2.01	7.39	2.09	9.35	2.79

Like table 4 and 5, at each levels of moral reasoning, more help was given when cost of helping was low, followed by medium and then high. The amount of help offered also increased from low level of moral reasoning to that of high level. Compared to Table 4 and 5 however, these means (amount of help) are low. The standard deviations also follow a different pattern. For instance, whereas for the two preceding tables, the standard deviations for all levels of moral reasoning increase from low to high cost of helping, here it is so for only those who reason at the high level. For those at the low level, they rather decrease from low to high cost of helping. At the middle level of moral reasoning, it fluctuates; 2.03 at low cost, 1.96 at medium cost, and 2.10 at high cost. These trends suggest that whereas there is a positive relation between cost of helping and the variability in responses for those who reason at the high level, there is rather a negative relation between the cost of helping and the variability in responses for those at the low level. At the middle level however, there is no relation at all.

This study tested for the effects of three main independent variables; level of moral reasoning, cost of helping and human relationships on altruistic behaviour. It also tested for the effects of three two-way and one three-way interactions effects between and among these variables. Analysis of the data showed significant main effects for all the three independent variables. The three two-way interactions were also significant. Ironically however, no significant effect was observed for the three-way interaction. Presented below (Table 7) is the summary of the statistical analysis.

TABLE 7

Summary Table of 3 X 3 X 3 Anova for Levels of Moral Reasoning
Cost of Helping and Type of Victim

Source	SS	DF	MS	F	P
Level	3616.78	2	1808.39	486.31*	
Cost	3558.10	2	1779.05	478.42*	
Victim	5387.21	2	2693.61	724.37*	
Level-Cost	449.39	4	112.35	30.21*	
Level-Victim	277.55	4	69.39	18.66*	
Cost-Victim	390.74	4	97.68	26.27*	
Level-Cost-Victim	36.81	8	4.60	1.24	
Error	7061.55	1899	3.72	--	
Total	20778.13	1925	--	--	

*P < .005.

As shown in Table 7, significant main effects were obtained for each of the three independent variables and altruistic behaviour; levels of moral reasoning $F(2, 1899) = 486.31, P < 0.05$; cost of helping $F(2, 1899) = 478.42, P < 0.05$; and type of victim $F(2, 1899) = 724.37, P < 0.05$. Additionally, the Table indicates significant interaction effects between levels of moral reasoning and cost of helping $F(4, 1899) = 30.21, P < 0.05$; levels of moral reasoning and type of victim $F(4, 1899) = 18.66, P < 0.05$; and cost of helping and victim $F(4, 1899) = 26.07, P < 0.05$. No significant interaction was however found among levels of moral reasoning, cost of helping, human relationship and altruistic behaviour $F(8, 1899) = 1.24,$

$P > 0.05$.

These results give support to the predicted relationship between each of the three independent variables and altruistic behaviour. It also gives support to the predicted interaction between any two of these variables and altruistic behaviour. Ironically however, there was no interaction effect among the three variable put together. In other words, hypothesis five was rejected. The results suggest that altruistic behaviour is separately and to a greater extent jointly, influenced by one's level of moral reasoning, cost of helping, and the type of victim to be helped.

Table 7A shows the cut-off point established and used by the researcher in addition to that of Rest James.

TABLE 7A

3 X 3 X 3 Anova for Levels of Moral Reasoning, Cost of Helping, and Type of Victim

Source	SS	DF	MS	F	P
Level	2668.72	2	1334.36	312.58*	
Cost	3558.10	2	1779.05	416.75*	
Victim	5387.21	2	2693.61	631.00*	
Level-Cost	381.82	4	95.46	22.36*	
Level-Victim	258.86	4	64.72	15.16*	
Cost-Victim	390.74	4	97.68	22.88*	
Level-Cost-Victim	26.19	8	3.27	0.77	
Error	8106.49	1899	4.29	--	
Total	20778.13	1925	--	--	

* $P < .005$.

Both the cut off points by Rest and the one established by this researcher yielded similar results. For instance significant effects were obtained for hypotheses one to four by both cut off points. The last hypothesis was also rejected by both cut off points. It could be concluded from the above that the new cut off points could be relied upon.

On the basis of the significant main effects indicated by the 3 X 3 X 3 ANOVA for the three independent variables, further analyses were conducted by means of Newman Keuls (Post-hoc analysis) for unequal samples to determine whether there were any significant differences in the amount of help offered at the various levels of moral reasoning, cost of helping, and the type of victim.

The Table below (Table 8) shows Newman-Keuls post-hoc analysis for three levels of moral reasoning and how they are related to altruistic behaviour.

TABLE 8

Post Hoc Comparison (Newman-keuls for Unequal Samples)
for Levels of Moral Reasoning

	Low	Middle	High
Low	--	13.13*	11.38*
Middle	--	--	9.51*
High	--	--	--

* $p < 0.01$

The analysis shows significant differences among the amount of help given at each level of moral reasoning; those at the high level of moral reasoning helped significantly more than those at the middle and low levels, while those at the middle level also helped significantly more than those at the low level. This goes further to confirm hypothesis one (1) which predicted that there will be significant differences among the amount of help given at each level of moral reasoning. This suggests that altruistic behaviour is a function of one's level of moral reasoning.

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Table 9 shows Neuman Keuls post-hoc analysis for cost of helping.

TABLE 9

Post Hoc Comparison (Newman-keuls) for Cost of Helping

	Low	Medium	High
Low	--	13.07*	11.07*
Medium	--	--	9.77*
High	--	--	--

* $p < 0.01$

There was an inverse relationship between cost of help and the amount of help offered; as the cost of helping increased, the amount of help offered decreased. In other words, significant differences were found among the amount of help given at the various levels of cost; more help was offered when the cost was low than when it was medium or high, and also when cost was medium than high. This gives additional support to hypothesis two (2) which predicted an inverse relationship between cost and help.

Shown below (Table) is the Newman-Keuls post-hoc analysis for type of victim in relation to the amount of help offered.

TABLE 10

Post Hoc Comparison (Newman-keuls) Type of Victim

	Kin	Acquaintance	Stranger
Kin	--	13.40*	11.21*
Acquaintance	--	--	9.30*
Stranger	--	--	--

* $P < 0.01$

There were significant differences among the amount of help given to kin, acquaintance and stranger; kin was helped significantly more than acquaintance and stranger, and acquaintance more than stranger. This goes further to confirm hypothesis three (3) which stated that the altruistic orientation of an individual will decrease from kin to stranger; kin will be helped significantly more than acquaintance and stranger and acquaintance more than stranger.

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CHAPTER SIX

Discussion

This study first examined the independent effects of levels of moral reasoning, cost of helping, and human relationships on altruistic orientation, and second, how the three variables interact to influence altruistic orientation. It was hypothesized that there would be significant relationships between each of the three variables and altruistic orientation. It was also predicted that there would be two as well as three interaction effects between and among the independent variables and altruistic orientation.

Three-way analysis of variance (3 X 3 X 3 ANOVA) confirmed the first four of the five proposed hypotheses while the fifth one was rejected. That is, there were significant main effect between each of the independent variables [moral reasoning: $F(2,1899) = 486.31$, $P < 0.05$; cost of helping: $F(2,1899) = 478.42$, $P < 0.05$; and human relationships {victim}; $F(2,1899) = 724.37$, $P < 0.05$] and altruistic orientation.

There were also significant interaction effects between any two combinations, [moral reasoning by cost: $F(4,1899) = 30.21$, $P < 0.01$; moral reasoning by victim: $F(4,1899) = 18.66$, $P < 0.01$; and cost by victim: $F(4,1899) = 26.07$, $P < 0.01$] of the three independent variables and altruistic orientation. The fifth hypothesis which predicted a three way interaction among the three independent variables and altruistic orientation was however rejected [$F(8,1899) = 1.24$, $P > 0.05$].

A post-hoc analysis revealed further that there were significant differences among the three levels of each of the independent variables. In other words, the amount of help offered at each level of moral reasoning differ significantly from each other. Likewise, the amount of help offered at the various levels of cost and those offered to the three different types of victims.

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Hypothesis 1:

Moral Reasoning and Altruistic Orientation. A significant main effect between moral reasoning and altruistic orientation was predicted. It was further hypothesized that:

- a) those who reason at the high level will help more than those at the middle and low levels, and that
- b) those who reason at the middle level will help more than those at the low level.

Analysis of the data yielded a significant main effect between moral reasoning and altruistic orientation confirming the expected relationship between the two variables. Post-hoc comparison conducted by means of Newman-Keuls for unequal samples also indicated significant differences in the amount of help offered at each level (High, Middle and Low) of moral reasoning; more help was offered by those who reason at the high level, followed by those at the middle, and then low level.

This result implies that moral reasoning is one of the factors which influence altruistic orientation and that altruistic orientation is among others a function of one's level of moral reasoning; the higher the level, the more likely that one will assist others in need. This confirms Morrison et al, (cited in Baron & Byrne, 1987) assertion that one's level of moral reasoning is a significant factor in influencing one's propensity to behave altruistically. The above result is also in line with some previous studies by Rapport & Kren (1993), Eisenberg & Mussen (1988), Blotner & Bearson (1984), Erkut et al. (1981) Lazarowitz et al, (1976), Rubin & Schneider (1973), Underwood & Moore, and Eisenberg-Berg & Haan, (both cited in Ma, 1992) which also yielded positive relationships between levels of moral reasoning and various forms of altruistic behaviour.

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This finding however contradicts other studies by Eisenberg et al, (1984), Blasi (1980), Eisenberg & Haan (1979), Kurtines & Gewirtz (1984) who found either negative or ambiguous relationships between levels of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour. Similar ambiguous and/or negative relationship have also been found by Rosenhan (1970) who concluded that high level of moral reasoning does not always lead to more altruistic behaviour. Several reasons could be adduced to account for these contradictory findings.

The first of these is probably the fact that the nature or type of assistance needed or requested for varies from one study to another. With reference to Sobesky (1983), Bryan for instance has stated that there are broad categories of altruistic behaviour. And according to Khanna et al, (1992), there are four global (caring, considerate, helpfulness and sacrificial) ratings of altruism each of which calls for among others different action(s) involving different cost (risk), effort, time and energy to be spent or used. In other words, we should not expect these different types of altruistic behaviours to have the same relationship with levels of moral reasoning.

For instance, it has been argued that being caring or considerate may not involve the same thing (e.g. cost) as being helpful or to engage in more sacrificial act which in most cases involves personal risk in the form of physical harm, emotional or psychological disturbances or even death. According to Eisenberg et al, (1984), only altruistic acts which involve conflict between the potential helper's welfare and that of another (the victim) invoke moral dilemma hence the seemingly contradictory results between levels of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour may be due to the differences in the nature of the altruistic act and not the level of moral reason per se.

The above reasoning has also been supported by Eisenberg-Berg's (1979) conclusions that moral reasoning is highly related to those altruistic behaviours which involve cost. Thus,

moral reasoning does not relate positively to any kind of altruistic behaviour; specific parameters are necessary and must therefore be present in any given altruistic situation(s) if positive relationship is to be achieved. This suggests that one should expect a positive relationship between levels of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour only in situation(s) in which at least some of these parameters are present. The parameters include anything that has the potential to evoke moral reasoning and for that matter conflict, which in turn leads to approach-avoidance conflict in the potential helper.

Another probable reason for these contradictions may be due to the type of moral reasoning or judgement measure or scale used. For instance, whereas some researchers such as Ma (1992), Curtis et al. (1988), Sobesky (1983) used the Defining Issue Test (DIT) by Rest (1979), others like Underwood and Moore (1982), Blasi (1980), used Kohlberg's Moral Judgement Scale (MJS). Other moral reasoning scales which have also been used in other studies include that of Lee (cited in Rubin & Schneider, 1977) and the Moral Development Test (Ma, 1992). Each of these moral reasoning/judgement scales may tap different aspects of morality and should therefore not be expected to yield the same or similar results when related to altruistic behaviour. This is in line with Levin & Berkerman-Greenberg's (1980) and Yarrow & Waxler (cited in Levin & Berkerman-Greenberg's, 1980) conclusion that levels of moral reasoning assessed by different dilemmas [even with the same theoretical framework such as that of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1979)] do not develop in "strictly stage-wise, synchronical way" hence they may lead to different outcomes. Thus, the variations in findings may be due to the variety of moral reasoning measures/scale adapted or used by each researcher.

Sobesky (1983) has postulated that these contradictory findings may be the result of the hypothetical nature of either the moral reasoning stories and/or sometimes the altruistic

behaviour to be measured particularly when scales are used. He argued that in studies in which either the moral reasoning and/or the altruistic behaviour have very little or nothing at all to do with real life situation, it should not be surprising to arrive at negative or ambiguous relationships. This is so because when subjects perceive that the issues being dealt with are far removed from reality, they tend not to attach any importance to them and may thus respond to them anyhow. On the other hand, subjects see issues which deal with everyday life as something which can affect them or others hence the likelihood of attaching importance to them are very high. Thus whether the issues being dealt with are real or not have significant influence on the outcome - the two approaches will logically lead to different results.

Closely related to the above is the link between moral reasoning and the altruistic behaviour to be measured. Rushton (cited in Levin & Berkerman-Greenberg, 1980) for instance found that the relationship between moral reasoning and altruism is mostly positive if the type of moral reasoning assessed is related to the type of altruistic behaviour measured. They argue for instance that if the moral reasoning deals with sacrifice or helpfulness or sharing, then the altruistic act(s) should also have something to do with sacrifice, helpfulness and sharing. In such a case, the chances of levels of moral reasoning positively relating to altruistic behaviour is high. Put differently, it could be stated that moral reasoning is not a unitary dimension but rather dilemma specific, therefore the degree of relationship between moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour depends upon the level of correspondence between the judgement and the behavioural dilemma. The implication here is that the contextual relatedness or variability in the judgement-action relationship is very crucial.

In addition to the above, Langer et al; Piliavin et al (cited in Eisenberg & Shell, 1987) have postulated that some altruistic acts are performed rather automatically with little or no prior conscious cognitive processes hence no moral conflict is aroused. In such a case, they

argued, we should not expect any positive relation between one's level of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour since moral reasoning may not be evoked. This is to say that in crisis situations such as emergencies, individuals behaviour may be influenced to a large extent by affective rather than cognitive considerations. Furthermore, in situations where expectations (social or otherwise, real or imagined), norms, or obligations for intervention are highly salient, individuals usually bow to pressure and therefore do act without recourse to moral cognition. In cases like this moral reasoning may be an irrelevant factor in influencing one's action.

The use of social scripts is another reason which could be put forward to explain the contradictory findings between moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour. According to Schank & Abelson (cited in Sabina, 1992), individuals have cognitive structures of knowledge consisting of a coherent sequence of action(s) and event(s) expected in a given situation (social scripts). These scripts which are stored in individual's memory are frequently used to guide their behaviour. In situations such as emergencies, individuals may be more likely to employ their social scripts which like reflex actions, involve little or no cognitive thoughts, anxiety or conflict hence moral thought does not come to play.

The differences in the amount of help offered at the various levels of moral reasoning could also be explained from different perspectives. It has been suggested that those who reason at the post conventional (high) level differ significantly in their moral perspectives from those at the middle and low levels; those at the high level consider multiplicities of options in their decisions. This is in sharp contrast with those at the middle and especially low levels who are mainly egocentric and therefore narrow in their perception and decisions. As a corollary to the above, it is argued further that because those at the high level are able to consider various aspects of an issue, events, and/or situation, they are able to take into

consideration the welfare of others in almost the same way as they consider that of their own hence they are in a better position to offer more assistance to those who need it. On the other hand, because those at the lower stages are not able to place the welfare of others in almost the same position as theirs, they are more concerned with their own welfare hence they find it difficult to assist others.

The above is consistent with Kohlberg's theory and stages of moral development/reasoning which state among others that the high stage of moral reasoning provide "a better conceptual tool for decision making" and that those at the high level perceive and interpret the world differently from those at the lower level. It also gives credence to Joy (1983), Eisenberg-Berg's (1979), Kohlberg's (1969) position that as people become more mature in their moral reasoning they incorporate broader internalization principles into their reasoning hence they are better able to understand the complexities of the world which in turn enable them to act in a way which takes into account the welfare of others.

In addition to the above, it could be argued that those at the higher level offered more assistance not only because of their ability to consider others welfare in almost the same way as that of their own, but more importantly, the extent to which they have internalized societal standards concerning right and wrong, "dos" and "don'ts", rights and obligations, norms and values. Thus, if stages of moral reasoning are in a form of hierarchy as have been proposed by Kohlberg, then it is logical to assume that those at the high level have imbibed, and have also better entrenched these standards more than those below, therefore, they should adhere more to these societal standards which among others call on individuals and groups to assist the needy. The foregoing implies that stages of moral reasoning reflect not only a modal manner of solving various problems but they also suggest something about an individual's range of potential kind of reasoning as well. In the words of Kohlberg (1981), the higher

stage depicts an increasing ability to balance the needs of others with one's own needs in an equitable manner.

Besides, at the higher level most individuals have carved a philosophy of life which among others aims at ensuring a community or World which offers equal opportunity for all. As a result of the above, refusal or even failure to assist others the individual could have helped, leads to self condemnation and feelings of guilt. In other words, at this stage, the norms and moral values which prescribed helping behaviour have become so internalized that they are more resistant to other inhibitory factors in the helping environment - there is a strong inner urge for those at the high level to assist others in need.

On the contrary, these moral norms and standards which urge those at the higher level to assist others in need (most of the time), have either not been fully internalized or not at all internalized at the lower levels therefore there is very little or no internal drive to assist others in need - they are easily influenced by inhibitory factors prevailing in the helping condition; help is offered only when it is convenient. This is so because those who reason at these levels are usually hedonistic and therefore act to please themselves. Even the little they do to benefit others is usually instrumental.

Erikut et al. (1987) have also argued that one of the reasons why those at the high level help more than those at the low level is the former's commitment to humanitarian values and ethical principles such as egalitarianism, equity, fairness, and justice. They reasoned that matured moral reasoning leads to growing importance of certain values one of which is preservation of human life. As a result those who reason at the high level are more likely than those at the lower levels to help others. The above lends support to Penrod (cited in Curtis, 1988) argument that those at the high level of moral reasoning define behaviour as one which satisfies their own needs and that of others.

This does not however mean that those at the high level of moral reasoning will always offer assistance to those who need or requested for it. There may be instances where they may be unwilling or incapable of helping. What the data indicate is that on the average those who reason at the high level help more than those at the low levels, hence the chances of the former assisting others at any point in time is high.

Hypothesis II:

Cost of Helping and Altruistic Orientation. A significant main effect between cost and altruistic orientation was predicted. An inverse relationship between the amount of cost and altruistic orientation was also proposed. Specifically, it was hypothesized that as the cost of helping increases the amount of help will decrease (more help would be offered when cost was low, followed by when it was medium, and then high). Analysis of the data confirmed the proposed hypotheses:

- a). significant main effect between cost and altruistic orientation, and
- b). an inverse relationship between cost and the amount of help; more help was offered in the following descending order - low, medium and high cost.

These indicate that individuals are more prepared to assist when cost is non existing or very minimal. This is in line with findings by Magoo & Khanna (1991), Sobesky (1983), Staub, (cited in Eisenberg & Shell, 1987), Lynch & Cohen (1978) that as the cost of helping goes up, intervention decreases. This in effect means that people are largely guided by considerations of cost-effect in the decision to help or not (Latane & Darley, cited in Brown 1986; Peterson et al., 1984; Colaizzi et al., 1984; Shorthand & Stebbing 1983) and thus provides support for Sobesky's (1983), Thibaut & Kelly, in Berkowitz, (1967) claim that situational factors such as severe consequence (cost) adversely affect altruistic behaviour. It also give additional support to Piliavin et al, (1981), Lynch & Cohen (1978). Schwartz (cited in Batson et al,

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1986) Latane & Darley (1970), decision-making theory of cost-effect analysis.

In other words, when individuals encounter emergencies, they weigh the positive and negative aspects of the situation and if the cost (negative aspect) is too much for them, they may employ defence mechanisms (e.g. denial and rationalization) which enable them to look on unconcerned or leave the scene so as to avoid guilt and the actual or perceived cost. According to Gerson, Damon and Learning (both cited in Sobesky, 1983), cost leads to less help because it has an inhibitory (down-ward) effect on altruistic behaviour. They suggested that this is probably so because high cost of helping induces and heightens conflict between a bystander's inclination to intervene and their desire not to get hurt or put themselves in any embarrassing situation - approach-avoidance. In other words, cost produces different problems which call for different ways of thinking and alternative action choices.

Another reason why high cost leads to low help is attributed to Bentham's (cited in Aronson 1992) proposition that man is by nature hedonistic - pleasure and happiness are his principal goals in life - so as much as possible he avoids situations and events which may bring pain. And since high cost may lead to pain which man by nature seeks to avoid, it is not surprising that the amount of help decreases as cost increases. In other words since humans are considered rational and as such wants to minimize cost of any kind, they will be dissuaded from helping when cost increases.

Low cost on the other hand, as the name implies involves little or low cost hence it induces little or no conflict between the individuals willingness to help and the genuine fear of getting hurt or something of the sort (Kohlberg & Candee (cited in Eisenberg & Shell, 1987). The above could be summed up in the words of Baumrind (cited in Anderson, 1993), Krebs & Kohlberg (cited in Kohlberg, 1984) who stated that individuals are dissuaded from acting altruistically when the "sacrifice" involved is great.

Hypothesis III:

Human relationships (victim) and altruistic orientation. Like hypotheses one and two, a significant main effect between human relationship (victim) and altruistic orientation was proposed. Significant differences in the amount of help to be offered to each of the three victims was also predicted: that

- a) kin would be helped more than acquaintance and stranger, and
- b) that acquaintance would be helped more than strangers.

The proposed hypotheses were confirmed; a significant main effect between victim (human relationship) and altruistic orientation was arrived at, and the amount of help offered decreased from kin to acquaintance and then stranger.

This result suggest that type of victim is one of the important factors that influences an individual's decision to help. In other words, the probability that a person will act altruistically towards another appears to depend on their relationship (biological or social). This is consistent with Eisenberg's (1983) conclusion that individuals make a number of distinctions among potential recipients of help and that the tendency to help another is selected against except when the actor and recipient are related (Hamilton 1964).

The above goes to support the hierarchy of human relationships proposed by Ma (1982/1985/1992), Carter (cited in Ma, 1992), Freedman (1979); Barash (1977), Hardin (1970), Staub and Sherk (1970) and discussed under human relationships in chapter two. Furthermore, this study gives additional support to previous studies by Ma (1985/1992), Easock Vitale and McGuire (1985), Sawyer (1966), Ma (1985), Freedman (1979) Duton (cited in Nabor, 1992), who also found differences in the amount of help offered to various victims including kin, close relatives, friends, spouses, acquaintances, strangers and enemies.

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Again, the data lend support to the Sociobiological theory of altruism which postulates that altruistic behaviour (which to them is biologically based) is directed towards those who are biologically related to the helper. According to the theory individuals help kin and close relatives more than others because they share genes in common hence their (victims') survival means the survival of the helper's genes. Apart from the gene sharing, kin are helped more than others because in most cases, kin live together or see and interact with each other frequently. As a result, a form of attachment or bond develops between or among them which in a subtle way places same amount of responsibility on the individual kin to help the other. Besides, in the case of parent children relationship, it is not only an attachment that is developed but actual responsibility (sometimes with social and legal consequences) to care for their wards especially when they are considered as minors. A similar responsibility is also placed on children to care for their parents particularly when the latter are old and weak.

Furthermore, because the chances of most kin interacting frequently is very high, there is the probability of one's assistance being reciprocated. This view is consistent with Gouldner (1960) theory of social exchange and reciprocity which state among others that individuals are aware of the social debt and credit established between them (in this case helper and recipient) hence the more closer the individual are, the more the chances that they will help each other and that their assistance will be returned. In other words, if an individual refuses or fails to assist a relative, he might also be denied help in future. There is also the possibility of the individual feeling guilty as a result of rebuke he will receive from other relatives for not helping a blood relation.

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seldom hence there is little or no attachment developed between them as in the case of kin. Because the interaction is less frequent the probability of reciprocity is also slim. In the case of strangers, none of the above exist: no gene sharing, first time of meeting, hence no attachment, and responsibility is less or non existing. In a nutshell, the real and imagined pressures at play when a victim is a kin is different from what pertains in the case of an acquaintance or a stranger.

It must be stated here however that it is not always that individuals assist kin more than non kin or help kin to the neglect of non kin. In some cases, potential helpers assist non kin and leave kin particularly if failure to assist a kin will not seriously affect benefactor-recipient relationship. In such a case the existence of prior relationship between helper and victim is not important. According to Staub & Sherk (1981) individuals helped non kin more than kin if the consequences(s) of refusing or failing to help a kin is insignificant or the individual believes that their relatives will understand their failure to assist. Emlen & Wrege (1988) have also found that in life-or-death situations people choose to aid close kin over distant ones or non kin, the young over the aged, the healthy over the sick, the wealthy over the poor, but in matters of everyday favour, less weight is put on kinship. Altruism is therefore not only a function of victim but also the situation and type of help involved (Sawyer 1966).

Interactions

Three two-way and one three-way interactions were predicted. All the three two-way interactions were confirmed. The one three-way interaction was however not confirmed. This in effect implies that moral reasoning and cost of helping combine to influence altruistic orientation. Similarly, the combined effect of moral reasoning and type of victim also affect altruistic orientation. And finally, the cost of helping and type of victim also influence a potential helpers's decision to assist or not to. However, when these three variable are put

together they do not show any influence on helping behaviour.

Hypothesis IV(a):

Moral reasoning and cost of helping. On the whole the amount of help offered decreased from low to high cost. However, at each level of cost, those at the high level offered more help than those at the middle and low levels, while those at the middle level in turn offered more help than those at the low level. In other words, although there is a positive relationship between level of moral reasoning and altruistic orientation (as moral reasoning goes up, altruistic orientation also goes up), at each level of moral reasoning, altruistic orientation decreases as cost increases (an inverse relationship).

The results suggest that individuals at each level of moral reasoning react differently to cost of helping others and that irrespective of cost there is ascendancy in the amount of help offered from low to high levels of moral reasoning. Although the data is consistent with studies by Eisenberg (1983), one would have expected that when cost was low, there would not be any differences in the amount of help offered, regardless of the level of moral reasoning. The fact that differences exist even in the absence of cost means that level of moral reasoning plays a significant role in helping behaviour. As has been discussed elsewhere in this presentation, those at the higher level are more altruistic because they are able to consider the welfare of others in almost the same way as that of their own.

According to Kohlberg (1964) those who reason at the lower levels live by the pleasure principles and are guided by the consequence of their action. If an action will bring them pleasure or at least no pain, then the likelihood that they would undertake it is high. On the other hand, actions which involve cost are as much as possible avoided, hence the low amount of help as cost increases. From the above, it not surprising that those at the lower level offered less help as cost went up.

Unlike the low level, those at the high level adhere to moral principles which focus on the value of an act in itself and the consequences of their refusal to help on the victim than the cost involved. According to Sobersky (1983), individuals advanced in moral reasoning would act to help others even when the consequences for that persons is severe. He postulated that high cost sometimes challenge those at the high level to do something to save lives.

Hypothesis IV(b).

Moral reasoning and human relationships: The data on moral reasoning and human relationships interaction indicated that the amount of help offered at each level of moral reasoning decreased from helping a kin to helping a stranger. On the average, the amount of help offered to each victim increased from low to high level of moral reasoning. In other words, although the amount of help offered to each victim increased as one moved from low to high level of moral reasoning, there was also a decrease in the amount of help at each level of moral reasoning as the relationship between a helper and victim widens from kin to stranger. The implication here is that at each level of moral reasoning victims are not treated equally. The differentiation between victims however decreases (refer to Tables 1,2 & 3) from low to high level of moral reasoning suggesting that discrimination among recipients of help are more pronounced at the lower than at the high level.

The above is in line with the Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning and Sociobiological theory which respectively explain that as the level of moral reasoning increases, the chances that an individual will help increases, and that individuals are more altruistic toward their closer relations than non relations. The pattern of this data is also in line with studies by Eisenberg (1983). She argued that for those at the lower stages, the identity of a recipient of assistance is very important while those at the high level are rather interested in the benefit the recipient will receive from the act than the recipients identity.

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Thus, those at the high level are more consistent in their decision regarding various recipients because of internalization of principles which prescribe moral act for reasons that have little or nothing to do with a recipients identity. Those at the lower level on the other hand, are more interested in the immediate or future benefits of their action hence they tend to assist those who are closer to them because there is a better chance of reciprocity.

Hypothesis IV(c):

Cost of helping and human relationships. As was revealed under hypothesis II the cost of an act is one of the inhibitory factors of helping behaviour. As a result, when the cost of helping goes up the amount of help also decreases. In general, and irrespective of cost, more help was offered in descending order from kin to stranger.

The above indicates that regardless of cost, individuals are more prepared to assist their kin than acquaintance and stranger. However, as the cost of helping goes up, and the gap between helper and victim widens, less help is offered confirming Sociobiologists and cost-effect analysis theories of altruism - altruism is directed towards kin and relatives and that cost of helping affects the amount of help.

As has been discussed earlier, cost of helping leads to conflict between the individual's willingness to assist because it sometimes poses a threat to his/her life. Besides, human beings, according to Bentham (cited in Aronson, 1992) are hedonistic hence they tend to avoid cost.

Hypothesis V:

Moral reasoning, cost of helping, human relationship and altruistic orientation.

No pattern of interaction among the combined effect of the three variables was observed although any two combination gives either positive and/or negative patterns of interaction. This seems to defy logic and common sense at a glance because one would have expected that

if any two combination of the three variables result in one form of interaction or another, then all the three should also lead to some form of interaction.

What then accounts for this seemingly illogical outcome among these three variables? One probable reason is the pattern of interactions between any two of the three variables. For instance, the interactions between moral reasoning and cost were both negative and positive. That is, whereas on one hand when cost goes up, help decreases (inverse relation), on the other hand as one moves up the ladder of moral reasoning the amount of help also increase (positive relation).

In the case of moral reasoning and human relationships (victim) similar inverse and positive interactions were found; amount of help goes up as one moves from low to high level of moral reasoning. For that of victim, help decreases as one moves away from kin to stranger. Lastly, for cost and victim the pattern is not different; increase in cost leads to less help, and help is decreased as one moves away from kin to stranger. The combination of these different patterns could be one of the reasons why the three variables did not yield any interaction.

In addition, the pattern of standard deviations (SD) for the various levels of moral reasoning by cost were also not regular. For example the standard deviations for those who reason at the low level decrease from low to high cost of helping. At the middle level, it fluctuates - 2.03 at low cost, 1.96 at medium, and 2.10 at high cost (refer to Table 6). These trends suggest that whereas there is a positive relation between the variability in responses and cost of help for those at the high level there is rather a negative relation between the variability in responses and cost of helping for those at the low level. At the middle level however, there is no relation. From the above it is not strange that although any two out of these three variables produced a certain form of interaction the three together do not.

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Summary and Conclusion

The study investigated the main and interaction effects of moral reasoning, cost of helping, and human relationships on altruistic orientation. It was also aimed at finding out whether:

- i) there would be differences in the amount of help that would be offered at each of the three levels of moral reasoning,
- ii) subjects would react differently to the three levels of cost, and
- iii) subjects would discriminate against or treat all other three victims equally in terms of the amount of help that would be offered to them.

Analysis of the data yielded the following results:

- a) significant main effects was found between each of the three independent variables and altruistic orientation,
- b) significant differences were found in the amount of help offered
 - i) at each level of moral reasoning
 - ii) at each level of cost
 - iii) to each of the three victims.
- c) two-way interactions were produced by any two combinations of the independent variables.
- d) no interaction was produced by all the three variables put together.

Although these findings confirm studies reported by Rapport & Kren (1993), Eisenberg & Mussen (1986), Eisenberg & Shell (1987), Sobesky (1983), Ma (1982/1985/1992), Carter (1980) they also contradict others conducted by Eisenberg et al. (1984) and Eisenberg & Haran (1979).

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reasoning, he/she becomes more altruistic. On the other hand as the cost of helping increases, individuals tend to avoid helping- the amount of help decreases. And individuals to some extent do discriminate against or in favour of certain recipients of help.

The above has a number of implications for both potential helpers, (formal or informal) victims and policy formulation as far as social welfare is concerned. For example, how best can individuals be encouraged to assist others particularly when such assistance could pose a danger to the helper? How do we get people to treat every individual equally in the face of the tendency to discriminate in favour of kin and close relatives? How do we improve upon individuals level of moral reasoning.

Recommendations and Suggestions for Future Research:

Recommendations. In the light of the positive relationship between level of moral reasoning and altruism, and also the important role altruistic behaviour plays in every society, it is recommended that measures should be taken to improve upon the level of individuals moral reasoning. This could be done through informal and formal education. According to Kohlberg (1968 1984), Durkheim (cited in Sabina, 1992), the moral atmosphere in which individuals operate is very crucial in enhancing their moral development. They have therefore suggested that moral education should not be restricted to only academic setting (only formal education) but must also involve real life situations where children especially are made to discuss, act, and settle moral problems. Kohlberg argued that this could be done without necessarily indoctrinating children with moral values of any specific religion/group.

It is the wish of this researcher that moral education will be re-introduced into our educational curriculum at least from primary to Junior Secondary School (J.S.S.) level. This is because the results of this study have shown that there is a relationship between level of moral reasoning and altruistic behaviour, and that those who reason at the higher levels are less discriminatory in their dealings with kin, acquaintances and strangers. It is therefore gratifying that in June 1996, the Ministry of education accepted the Educational Reform Review Committee's recommendation for the re-introduction of moral education at the basic level (Primary to J.S.S.).

In the light of the inhibitory nature of cost associated with helping behaviour, it is suggested that where possible, the costs associated with helping must be presented in piecemeal as was done in a study entitled "*Foot-in-the Door*" (Freedman & Fraser, cited in Myers 1993). In such a case individuals will be more willing to assist than when the whole cost is

presented at a go.

One finding (the tendency of individuals particularly those who reason at the low level to assist only their kin) which when carried over to other spheres of life will pose danger to our society is the tendency for individuals to assist kin, other relatives and friends to the detriment of others. That is, if individuals are employed, appointed or given any public position because they have some form of relationships with the appointing body or employer, then we may be calling for disaster.

This is so because apart from the high possibility of individuals being appointed to positions which they may not be capable of managing thereby leading to social and economic losses, it could also lead to disenchantment by other sections of society who perceive that they are being treated unfairly. A case in point is the civil wars in Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi and many other parts of the world where one ethnic group have had reason to believe that the other is using its power and influence to the disadvantage of the others.

Among the things that could be done to overcome this canker is educational campaign to instil into individuals and groups the sense of nationalism. In addition, Laws could also be passed to give equal opportunity to all as in the Equal Reemployment Opportunity Act in the United States of America. Not only should laws be passed but they must also be enforced and those who violate them must be punished.

Furthermore, there is the need to have a well funded and equipped organization or committee to deal with individuals and groups who have genuine needs especially during emergencies. Juvenile institution and groups such as Boy scouts, Girls Guilds and other organizations which have voluntarism and benevolence as their major aims must be encouraged to whip up a sense of "*we feeling*" in Ghanaians. Movies depicting the importance of assisting

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those in need must be shown to the general public to create the awareness on the need to help others.

Suggestion for Future Research. The types of victims involved in this study were limited in number - kin, acquaintance, and stranger. It is therefore suggested that future research should use different or include additional victims and also change victim-helper relationships.

2. There is the need to conduct field experiments to determine if subjects' behaviour will be the same or similar to what was arrived at with the Self Report Altruism Scale. This is based on the assumption that sometimes what people say they will do is different from what they actually do.
3. Future researchers should also consider samples which are different from the one used in this study. Among the samples that can be used are university graduates, Senior Secondary students, and individuals with different professions.
4. It would also be interesting to conduct a comparative studies between Ghanaian sample and that of another country or between Ghanaians with different socio-economic backgrounds.



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DIT

DEFINING ISSUES TEST
University of Minnesota
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Opinions about Social Problems

The purpose of this questionnaire is to help us understand how people think about social problems. Different people have different opinions about questions of right and wrong. There are no "right" answers to such problems in the way that math problems have right answers. We would like you to tell us what you think about several problem stories.

You will be asked to read a story from this booklet. Then you will be asked to mark your answers on a separate answer sheet. More details about how to do this will follow. But it is important that you fill in your answers on the answer sheet with a #2 pencil. Please make sure that your mark completely fills the little circle, that the mark is dark, and that any erasures that you make are completely clean.

The Identification Number at the top of the answer sheet may already be filled in when you receive your materials. If not, you will receive special instructions about how to fill in that number.

In this questionnaire you will be asked to read a story and then to place marks on the answer sheet. In order to illustrate how we would like you to do this, consider the following story:

FRANK AND THE CAR

Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. For instance, should he buy a larger used car or a smaller new car for about the same amount of money? Other questions occur to him.

We note that this is not really a social problem, but it will illustrate our instructions. After you read a story you will then turn to the answer sheet to find the section that corresponds to the story. But in this sample story, we present the questions below (along with some sample answers). Note that all your answers will be marked on the separate answer sheet.

Here is the first story for your consideration. Read the story and then turn to the separate answer sheet to mark your responses. After filling in the four most important items for the story, return to this booklet to read the next story. Please remember to fill in the circle completely, make dark marks, and completely erase all corrections.

HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what it cost to make. He paid \$200 for the radium and charged \$2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he could borrow the money, but he could only get together about \$1,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should Heinz steal the drug?

ESCAPED PRISONER

A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For eight years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day, Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison eight years before, and whom the police had been looking for. Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison?

NEWSPAPER

Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the use of the military in international disputes and to speak out against some of the school's rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal's approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred's newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred's opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred's activities were disruptive to the operation of the school. Should the principal stop the newspaper?

APPENDIX C

SEX _____

FAMILY SIZE: _____

AGE: _____

REL. DENOMINATION: _____

INSTRUCTIONS

Fill in the blank spaces above. Carefully read the instructions and the events below and indicate your responses.

Every now and then, we make decisions about issues, situations, etc., which confront us in our daily life. Imagine that you have been faced with the following situations and indicate how you will respond to each of them. In each case circle the number (1 - 5) which corresponds to the response you will make.

1 (one) stands for I will leave the scene (will not help/intervene),

2 (two) I may not intervene (help),

3 (three) I may intervene (help),

4 (four) I will intervene (help),

5 (five) I will definitely intervene (help).

SITUATION ONE (A)

[A]. A passenger Bus by which you were travelling has collided with a Petrol Tanker. As a result, both vehicles have caught fire. You were fortunate to have escaped without injury. There is one passenger in sight whom you can rescue before the fire engulfs the whole Bus, you run no risk of being burnt (hurt) if you go to his/her aid. *How will you react if the victim were:*

[AL1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
Will not help/intervene the person

[AL2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
Will not help/intervene the person

[AL3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
Will not help/intervene the person

[AM]. What about if you and the person/victim will be covered by smoke from the fire, will feel some amount of heat from the fire, and as a result of these you will be feeling a little bit dizzy, irritation of the eyes, and general body pains in the next twenty four hours? *How will you react if the person/victim were*

[AM1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
Will not help/intervene the person

APPENDIX C

SEX _____

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[AL1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 Will not help/intervene the person

[AL2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 Will not help/intervene the person

[AL3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 Will not help/intervene the person

[AM]. What about if you and the person/victim will be covered by smoke from the fire, will feel some amount of heat from the fire, and as a result of these you will be feeling a little bit dizzy, irritation of the eyes, and general body pains or the next twenty four hours? *How will you react if the person/victim were*

[AM1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 Will not help/intervene the person

[AM2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[AM3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[AH]. What about if you will sustain a five percent (5%) first degree body burns. How will you respond if the victim were:

[AH1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[AH2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[AH3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

SITUATION TWO (B)

B1. A pedestrian has been knocked down by a car. He/she has been seriously injured and needs blood transfusion. According to a Medical Doctor you have sufficient blood in your system and can therefore donate one pint with no side effect at all to you. How will you react if the victim were:

[BL1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[BL2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[BL3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

will leave the scene

Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[BM]. What about if your normal/optimal blood level will drop/fall by one-fourth (1/4) of a pint and as a result you will experience mild dizziness, uneasiness, and general body pain for the next twenty-four hours. How will you react if the person/victim were:

[BM1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[BM2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[BM3]. A stranger (someone you have never met nor known before) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[B]. What about if your normal/optimal blood level will drop/fall by one-half (1/2) of a pint and as a result you will experience severe dizziness, uneasiness, and general body pain for the next forty-eight (48) hours? Thus you will be confined to bed for these two days so there will be no classes, games/recreation etc., for you within this period. *How will you react if the person were:*

[BH1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[BH2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[BH3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

SITUATION THREE (C)

[C]. Someone who is being beaten/bullied (for no apparent reason) in a secluded place is screaming for help. You know for sure that you are physically stronger than the bully and can therefore intervene to rescue the victim at no cost at all to you. *How will you react if the victim were:*

[CL1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[CL2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5

I will leave the scene
(Will not help/intervene)

I will definitely rescue
the person

[CL3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 (Will not help/intervene) the person

[M] What about if the bully is somewhat (a little bit) stronger than you, so you are more likely to receive at least two (at most four) strong blows before you will be able to over-power him/her and rescue the victim. *How will you react if the victim were:*

[CM1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 (Will not help/intervene) the person

[CM2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 (Will not help/intervene) the person

[CM3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 (Will not help/intervene) the person

[H] What about if the bully is actually stronger than you are. That is, you will receive strong blows which will necessitate your visit to see a/your Doctor. You will also be confine to bed for forty-eight (48) hours. You will however be able to rescue the victim. *How will you react if the victim were:*

[CH1]. Your brother/sister of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 (Will not help/intervene) the person

[CH2]. An acquaintance (a friend) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 (Will not help/intervene) the person

[CH3]. A stranger (someone you have never known nor met before) of nineteen years old?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5
 I will leave the scene I will definitely rescue
 (Will not help/intervene) the person

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE AND TIME

Appendix D

Age Distributions Among the Subjects

Age	Freq	%
16	1	5
17	28	13.1
18	63	29.6
19	69	32.4
20	40	18.8
21	9	4.2
22	3	1.4

The above table (D) shows age distribution and the percentage of the samples at the various ages. The ages range from sixteen to twenty-two with sixteen being the age with the lowest frequency (1) and a percentage of .5. The age with the highest frequency (69) is nineteen with a percentage of 32.4. It is also the average age.



Appendix E

Age and Gender Distribution Among the Subjects

Age	Gender					
	Male	%	Female	%	Total	%
16	1	0.47	0	0.00	1	0.47
17	16	7.51	12	5.63	28	13.15
18	31	4.55	32	15.02	63	29.58
19	36	16.90	33	15.49	69	32.39
20	26	12.21	14	6.57	40	18.78
21	6	2.82	3	1.41	9	4.23
22	0	0.00	3	1.41	3	.41
Total	116*	54.46	97	45.54	213*	100

*Missing datum.

One male subject did not indicate his age. The above table shows gender distribution in ages and percentages within the sample. The age range is between sixteen and twenty-two years. The youngest subject (male) was sixteen years old whereas the oldest (female) was twenty-two of age. The average age for both sexes was nineteen years. In all, there were one-hundred and sixteen males and ninety-seven females.

Appendix F

Age Distribution and Level of Moral Reasoning

Level of Moral Reasoning				
Age	Low	Middle	High	Total
16	1	0	0	1
17	6	11	11	28
18	24	22	17	63
19	20	34	15	69
20	9	19	12	40
21	3	4	2	9
22	1	1	1	3
Total	64	91	58	213*

*Missing datum.

One male subject did not indicate his age. Above is the age distribution among the three levels of moral reasoning. With the exception of sixteen years, each level of moral reasoning consists of subjects in all the age range.

Appendix G

Gender and Age in Means and Standard Deviations among Levels of Moral Reasoning

Levels of Moral Reasoning

Sex	Low		Middle		High		All	
	X	SD	X	SD	X	SD	X	SD
Male	18.56	1.01	18.78	1.16	18.94	1.16	18.76	1.13
Female	18.80	1.22	18.92	0.99	18.33	1.16	18.72	1.14
All	18.67	1.12	18.85	1.09	18.66	1.20	18.74	1.13

The over-all average age for both sexes was nineteen years. The standard deviation of males was 1.13, while that of the females was 1.14. With the exception of females who reason at the high level, the average age distribution in the three levels of moral reasoning for both males and females was also nineteen.

Appendix H

Gender Distribution and Levels of Moral Reasoning

Levels of Moral Reasoning

Gender	Low		Middle		High		Total	%
Male	34	15.8	51	23.8	32	14.9	117	54.6
Female	30	14	40	18.6	27	12.6	97	45.2
Total	64	29.8	91	42.4	59	27.5	214	100

Table H shows gender distribution among the three levels of moral reasoning. For both sexes, the greater proportion of the subjects fell within the middle level of moral reasoning.

Appendix I

Religious Denomination and Level of Moral Reasoning

Level of Moral Reasoning

Religious Denomination	I	%	II	%	III	%	Total	%
Orthodox	50	23.5	77	36.2	43	20.1	170	79.8
Pentecostal	11	5.2	13	6.0	13	6.0	37	17.4
Others	2	.9	1	.5	3	1.4	6	2.8
Total	63	29	91	42.7	59	27.7	213*	100

*Missing datum.

One male subject did not indicate his age. In all, there were one-hundred and seventy (79.5%) members of the Orthodox churches, thirty-seven (17.4%) belonging to the Pentecostal churches and the remaining six (2.8) classified as others. For the Orthodox and Pentecostal, the majority fell within the middle level of moral reasoning, whereas for those who belong to other denomination, the majority fell into the low level.

