


**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS
OF TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL REGION OF WEST
AFRICA**

BY

RICHMOND DEBRAH




**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF
GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS
DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

LEGON

JULY 2021

DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research under the supervision of Dr Boni Yao Gebe. No part of this work has been presented to any university or an institution of the award of any degree.



DEDICATION


I dedicate this work to everybody that is striving to make it in life against all odds.



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My sincere and deepest gratitude goes to Dr Boni Yao Gebe, my supervisor, who has been a tremendous mentor for his motivating advice, assistance and kind words since the first day I set foot in LECIAD, University of Ghana, Legon; Dr Boni Yao Gebe, whose expertise was invaluable in guiding me through the research with his insightful feedback motivated me to bring out the best. I would also like to acknowledge the enormous contributions made to this work by Dr. Festus Aubyn, Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso and Mr Richard Apau. These people deserve mentioned of the support they gave me when they took time out of their busy schedules to assist me with an interview. I am really grateful.

I will also like to thank my lecturers for their valuable guidance throughout my study. You provided me with the requisite knowledge and information I needed to complete my course work and dissertation successfully. God bless you all.



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACSRT	African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
ADC	Democratic Alliance for Change (Alliance Démocratique pour le Cangement)
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CNRDRE	National Committee for the Re-establishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State (Comité national pour le redressement de la démocratie et la restauration de l'État)
CRDRE	Committee for the Re-establishment of Democracy and the Restoration of the State
CVE	Countering Violent Extremist
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FLM	Macina Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSPC	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISGS	Islamic State of Greater Sahara
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISWA	Islamic State of West Africa
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JNIM	Jama'at Nasr al-Islam Muslimin
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNJ	<i>Mouvement Des Nigériens pour La justice</i>
MNJ	Nigerien's Movement for Justice (in French Mouvement des Nigériens pour la justice)
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MNLA	National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest
MUJAO	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
MUJWA	Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
US	United States

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ABSTRACT

Researchers and scholars have defined terrorism differently in their own terms. This is due to the fact, one cannot be specific about the motives, targets and methods of terrorism since these categories differ from case-to-case and also, the complication of unravelling the overlaps within each of these categories in effect makes its definition difficult. However, in general, terrorism can be defined as the use of violence or threat of violence to a deliberately to cause fear. The intention behind the causing of this fear among their targets mostly done to pressure or to intimidate societies, a group of people or governments to give in to something, usually in the quest of pursuing goals which are mostly religious, ideological or political in nature. The issue of terrorism has been a major concern in the Sahel Region West African lately, due to the emergence of numerous terrorist group in the region. Terrorist activities have drastically changed the situation in the area, though not much of it has been documented. This study therefore aimed to determine the socio-economic effects of terrorism in Sahel region of West Africa. The study was conducted using Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger in the Sahel Region of West Africa as a case study due to the constant terrorist attacks these three countries have suffered during the past decade which still persist with no sign of ending soon. The 2012 Tuareg uprising in Northern Mali which led to the influx of terrorist groups and organisations coming in to assist the fighters against the state later gave rise to extremism. These extremist groups eventually spread across the Sahel Region with their activities causing devastating consequences on the socio-economic lives of citizens and governments in the region. The study employed the use secondary and primary data. The secondary data used were books, journal articles, internet sources and primary data was gathered using semi-structured interviews to collect relevant data from experts in the field of terrorism. The study found that terrorism activities have had major effects on the economic and social activities in these countries in the Sahel Region of West Africa with education, health, food security, human life, businesses, industries, the sector and the economies of these countries affected. Most citizens have left their communities for other areas closing and leaving their businesses and economic activities. A number of trained workers who offer essentials services have fled the area, leaving some of the basic activities almost deserted. The education and health sector have been the most affected as teachers and medical practitioners fled the region and left public schools and hospitals without professionals in the fields. This study recommends that the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and also ECOWAS take measures to address the already existing socio-economic problems facing their countries and, also that of the grievances of their citizens. It also recommended that the various counter terrorism initiatives must be revived and provided with the necessary logistics to fight these extremists.



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the Research Problem

The world today is facing many challenges of conflict and organised crime issues which have devastated many countries and have caused many socio-economic development problems. Terrorism is of such major security concern of the international community that have caused dramatic threat to world peace and security with devastating socio-economic and developmental consequences in countries and regions where terrorism exists.

Universally, there have not been an agreed for the word terrorism. It has been defined most countries, departments and agencies in different ways. For example, the United States of America Federal Bureau of Investigation of defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives".¹ The United States of America's Department of Defence also defines terrorism as "the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological objectives."² Michael Walzer, defined terrorism as "the deliberate killing of innocent people, at random, to spread fear through a whole population and force the hand of its political leaders".³ Terrorists or extremist usually aim at the general unarmed population using violence or the threat of violence to achieve their objective. Through the use of this means, they are able to "create a psychological effect of fear on the people in the community where their attacks are carried out, therefore causing unrest among people." In effect, terrorism does not have to do with the immediate victims it claims, but about the horror

effect it creates on the rest of the people⁴. According to Kegley, “terrorism is not directed at the victims of its activities, but the people who eventually get information about their effects, and those who see the results.⁵ The major terrorist groups that operate internationally are divided into three categories with not clearly defined boundaries: religious extremists financed by governments, radicals or separatists Palestinian and leftist groups; domestic, state-sponsored and international-sponsored terrorism; and also, Cyber terrorism which transcends national boundaries.”⁶

The Sahel region is not new to terrorist activities and these countries of the Sahel Region in West Africa – Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – have had pockets of terrorist activities in the past before the current Islamist-attributed terrorist. Some activities of terrorism dates back to when various forms of rebellions were launched by the Tuarges of Northern Mali against the Malian government that started in the 1960s and reached its height in the 1990s.⁷ In their attempts to the challenge state authority through the use of violence, communities of the Tuaregs and Arab nomads living in the north of Mali were marginalised. In effect, the Tuareg rebel movements launched series of coordinated attacks against Malian government forces throughout the 1960s to the 1990s. Successive Malian governments dealt differently with these rebels with the aim of putting an end to the rebellion.⁸ A number of strategies were used to deal with the movement which includes: the use of repression; the recognition of the movements; signing of peace treaties; reducing military presence in Tuareg and Arab areas in the north; decentralization of power; and reconciliation. The military was also used as one of the most important elements in solving the Tuareg rebellion issue. Most combatants of the Tuareg militant groups were integrated into the army.⁹ The GSPC—which recently changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Maghreb— has in the past maintained pockets of terrorist unrest in the countries of the Sahel, particularly in Algeria and around the borders of Mali, Mauritania and

Niger for a number of years. Although the activities of GSPC was on a small-scale at the initial stages, they have added to the host of problems and security failures that is facing the region.¹⁰

The initial Tuareg rebellion that was led by the MNLA elements that moved from Libya to Mali in January 2012 was eventually kidnapped by Jihadist Salafist elements who fought alongside Colonel Ghaddafi's troops during the Libyan uprising which saw Ghaddafi's regime coming to an end.¹¹ With the weapons acquired from the fighting in Lybia, they were able to overpower government forces. At the height of this uprising, an enormous portion of the Sahelian region fell into the hands of a countless number of terrorist groups in the first months of 2012 overwhelming and eventually overpowering forces the Malian state.¹² The remobilization and accumulation of weapons and fighters from Libya since 2011 after the fall of Ghaddafi fed the contradictions in northern Mali and transformed the situation into a strategic threat for the Sahel Region, West Africa and Western countries as well.¹³ It was an unprecedented achievement for the terrorists – the emergence of a nucleic Al Qaida Jihadist state – requiring urgent and immediately countermeasures from the International Community, mainly from the West. The three main terrorist actors at that time in northern Mali were AQIM, MUJAO and Ansar Eddine until other terrorist groups emerged.¹⁴ The spill over of these terrorist activities later spread into neighbouring countries Niger and Burkina with different terrorist groups operating in different parts of these countries with different ideologies and under different names.

From 2019 into early 2020, the G5 Sahel Group which is made up of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, has suffered significant losses socio-economically due to the activities of these terrorist organizations.¹⁵ The consistent attacks launched by these terrorist groups in these countries have had many socio-economic impacts in countries and on the region making socio-economic life difficult for citizens and others alike who live in areas where these terrorist attacks have been rampant.¹⁶ Most professionals – including teachers, nurses, doctors,

engineers, traders, businessmen and others alike – in fear of being attacked or killed by the activities of these terrorist, have fled these areas leaving their jobs.¹⁷ Educational institutions and education in these areas has been greatly paralysed as students, teachers, educationist and other professionals in the sector have fled these areas in the Sahel region en-mass, leaving no replacements in the education system.¹⁸ In other sectors such as the health sector, consistent terrorist activities has led to most institutions to close down as professionals such as nurses and NGOs working in the sector have fled for the fear of their lives creating a vacuum in the health sector that have left unfilled.¹⁹ In a similar fashion, many companies, traders and businesses – that is both local, national and multinational corporations – have closed their businesses and left these areas, greatly affecting the economy of these countries and the region as a whole.²⁰ The risks of a possible spill over of instability from the Sahel to the neighbouring countries and regions further complicate the situation. While these are the general problems facing the Sahel, this study sought to access and document the socio-economic impacts of terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa.²¹

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Since 2012, the increase in insurgency and terrorism activities in countries of the Sahel Region in West Africa – Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – has greatly affected the social and economic activities of citizens and governments in this region and the West African sub region in general. Although these terrorist groups are all over the Sahel and have been targeting towns and cities in other countries in the Sahel including Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania, these three countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – in West Africa have had the highest number of attacks, with families, citizens, churches, government agencies and military and police posts, tourists and tourist centres, businesses and international aid workers being targeted constantly. These acts of terrorist activities have greatly affected the socio-economic activities of these

countries and the spill over is being felt in the region and neighbouring countries. This has resulted in the destruction of life and properties and infrastructure, reduction in productivity and increase in the cost of clean-up and repair cost of damages caused by these terrorists with a number of citizens and inhabitants of these place closing their businesses and moving to other areas of these countries following attacks of these terrorist which results in deaths and injuries of some of their relatives, employees and associates.²² There have also been losses in foreign direct investments, security cost, reduced economic growth, output losses, reduced tourism and losses in trading in these countries due the activities of these terrorist. Foreign investors are being dissuaded in investing in these countries because of the potential terrorist activities. A number of professionals who provide essential services in the education, health and other sectors have either have fled their work places in fear of the consistent attacks on the various institutions they work and their lives and, thus creating major vacuums left unfilled in these sectors.

These happenings have created devastating effects on families as well. The effects of these terrorist attacks on the population are numerous and breadwinners are mostly the direct victims.²³ Women, children and the working-class have been the primary victims of these attacks. Adding to the impact caused by the destruction of business centres has been financial problem created by the loss of family income after a victim's death especially when the he or she is the breadwinner.²⁴ Children's academic performance have been affected due to these socioeconomic changes and state support to families affected have been inadequate.²⁵ Due to this, there is an urgent need for effective state intervention to support and to a large extent, absolve these families to aid their socioeconomic revival.²⁶

The surge in terrorism has extremely affected the economic and social development of the region badly. It is significant to note that these terrorists have been changing their modes of operation, with an increased in the use of various tactics which includes the use of IEDs, gun

attacks, suicide bombing and hostage taking that are now commonly used. Even though there have been some effective attempts at engaging these terrorist groups in this region, these interventions have yet to have any significant effect on turnout. The aim of this research, therefore, was to assess the socio-economic effects of terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa specifically in these countries – Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso to enable governments of this region, regional organisations, and multi-national organisations get a greater understanding of these socio-economic damages caused by terrorism activities to better direct resources to help to fight and mitigate terrorism-related costs.

1.3 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions:

1. What is the nature of terrorism in the Sahel region of West Africa?
2. How has terrorism affected socio-economic development in the Sahel region of West Africa?
3. What are the counter terrorism strategies applied to overcome the challenges in the Sahel region of West Africa and with what success?
4. How can terrorism be countered in the Sahel region of West Africa?

1.4 Research Objectives

The objective of the study was to assess the socio-economic effects of terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa. To address this the research was guided by these specific objectives:

1. To explore the nature of terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa.
2. To assess how terrorism has affected socio-economic development in the Sahel Region of West Africa.

3. To examine the counter terrorism strategies applied to overcome the challenges in the Sahel Region and their success.
4. To identify the best strategies that can be put in place to counter terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study focused on the socio-economic effects of terrorism in these countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – since the rise of the insurgency in Mali and its spill over to Burkina Faso and Niger. The research was carried out in the Sahel Regions of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and it covered the timeframe from 2012 to 2020. The reason is that, the period 2012 to 2020 will give enough time to assess the long-term effects of terrorism on the socio-economic development of the above countries. These areas are prone to terrorist attacks, which has resulted in devastating effects as many citizens, families, aid workers, businesses, government workers and other professionals have deserted these areas that have been subjected to consistent terrorist attacks in these countries in fear of their lives. The terrorists target citizens, investors, tourists, government workers including health and education workers, aid workers, security personnel and other professionals who offer essential services to citizens in the affected areas. Since they have been the direct targets of these terrorists, most of these professionals have fled their work places and left the places with major shortages hitting professional services such as education, health, other essential public services. This vacuum created due to the absence of these professionals and attacks on other areas of the economies in the region have had effects on the socio-economic development of these areas negatively which is already known to be the poorest part of the West African sub region, and the focus of this study was to find out these effects.

1.6 Rationale of the Study

Terrorism and terrorist activities affect the socio-economic development of states. The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of terrorism activities on the socio-economic development in these countries –Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso – in the Sahel Region of West Africa and add existing literature on the subject. The study also looked at the counter terrorism measures and strategies that have been implemented in the fight against terrorism in this Region and how successful it has been in the quest of eliminating extremists and terrorist activities in the Region. The study aimed at helping to identify some of the best counter terrorism strategies and measures that can be implemented to counter terrorism activities in the region.

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The concepts of Human Security and National Security constituted the framework for the study.

The concept of human security varies depending on the type of approach. According to the minimalist approach, human security is considered to be "a perception of the absence of risks, dangers and threats to existence, values and interests of human individuals and the formation processes and management of this perception".¹³ According to the UNDP, which is representative for the maximalist approach, "human security "can be said to have two main aspects: "it means, first, safety from chronic threats as famine, disease and repression. And secondly, it means protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. The human security concept is based on four fundamental characteristics: 1. Human security is universal; being relevant for the entire global population which is affected by different types of threats; 2. These components of human security are interdependent; phenomena such as famine, disease, pollution, social exclusion are interconnected; 3. Human security can be achieved more easily through early prevention than late interventions; 4. Human security is

focused on people's lives.”²⁷ According to Haq, “Human security is not about states and nations, but about individuals and people”. Thus, Haq argues that, “the world is entering a new era of human security” in which “the entire concept of security will change – and change dramatically”.²⁸ Lloyd Axworthy, argues that, human security “includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights.”²⁹

In the Human Development Report, published by the UN, seven dimensions of human security are outlined which are: personal, food, economic, health, environmental, community and political.

The importance of this concept to the study is that, “this concept can be usefully employed to the fight against terrorism and organized crime in post-conflict and conflict situations. The individual and his security needs is the main focus of this concept since he is the primary victim of terrorism and organized crime, even though terrorism also endangers the security of the state as well. In tackling these threats, therefore, not only that of the state is given a paramount attention but also the security of citizens in particular.”³⁰ People matter and that the focus has to be on their vulnerabilities. Thus, being basic message of the human security approach, it is important that state structures like the police and the judiciary, need to be strengthened — albeit with a view to securing and protecting human rights and ensuring democratic governance. Even though the state has the primary function of protection, the protection needs should be provided in such a way that the security of the citizens and the individual is in the foreground.”³¹

The criticism of this concept is that, “even though the concept of human security has been gradually accepted in international relations, its usefulness as a policy tool and its functioning has been questioned. Human Security has been, first of all, questioned because there is no common agreed definition of it. The concept has been generally questioned because of its

limited utility, broadness and vagueness for policy analysis. To some human security is attractive, but analytically weak since it introduces too many variables that are not necessarily linked together. To others human security has become a neat device to appropriate development aid for the purposes of foreign policy. In relation to the war on terrorism the human security agenda has been transformed into a northern political and security agenda. Human security has also been denounced as a relation of governance, since instead of the well-being of people living in ineffective states it prioritizes the security of homeland populations and citizens. It has also been criticized because it has had paid too little attention on empowerment of women in particular. Finally, human security's operationalization has been broken up into various forms and its objectives diffused".³²

National security, on the other hand, is "the protection and safekeeping of the nation as a whole. Its highest priority is the protection of the nation and its people or citizens from external attacks attack and dangers by maintaining armed forces and shielding state secrets". Walter Lippmann, describes National Security as, "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war."³³ Harold Lasswell, also describes National Security as, "The distinctive meaning of national security means freedom from foreign dictation."³⁴ Arnold Wolfers, defined National Security as, "National security objectively means the absence of threats to acquired values and subjectively, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked."³⁵ "National security is also the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to preserve its nature, institution, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders", (Harold Brown, U.S. Secretary of Defence, (1977-1981)).³⁶ Robert E. Osgood Jr has said that national security "necessarily denotes a nation's determination to preserve certain interests at all costs. Foremost among these

national interests are: nation's integrity, political independence and fundamental political institutions. It embraces not only the survival of nation, but its ability to survive."³⁷

The importance of this concept to the study is that, "National security does not only embrace external security contours, but also, one of its core priorities is internal security, which is equally very paramount. It is here that the impact of terrorism is felt prominently."³⁸ Low intensity conflict is another name given to terrorism. It is a misnomer; for it's a conflict of low intensity only from the viewpoint of the perpetrators of conflict but also, it brings about maximum destruction and death to the victim-nations.³⁹ One of the primary focus of National security is associated with managing physical threats and with the military capabilities used for doing so. This means that, national security is often understood as the capacity of a nation to mobilise and organise military forces to guarantee its borders and to prevent or successfully defend against physical threats including military aggression and attacks by non-state actors, such as terrorism.⁴⁰ Terrorism creates an enemy within. That is why when acts of terrorism is detected, the state must be put resources to counter it ruthlessly, and if necessary, with a massive application of force rather than allow it to exist. The drain acts of terrorism are plunders on an economy is very devastating, forcing the states to divert scarce resources to fighting terrorism. It is against this backdrop that it is very important that every nation needs to tackle and counter the issue of terrorism effectively so as to preserve and protect its national integrity".⁴¹

The criticism of the above concept is that, National security is premised on the proposition that "security policy is a matter of ensuring national survival". "The beginning and end of security is the ensuring of national survival and other national security issues can only be raised if national existence is ensured. It is also premised on the fact that foreign affairs and security policy must be formulated first and foremost to ensure national security before other forms of security issues such as sustainable peace, national prosperity, stability and other related

concerns then follow.⁴² The main focus of national security is on potential and actual threats to a nation's territorial integrity therefore, the primary aim is to protect the nation's sovereign frontiers against any form of external aggression. This being the logical basis or foundation of the National Security, non-military aspects of security are relegated to the background."⁴³ It is not surprising given the fact that international relations have been more "state-centric" than "people-centric thus far."⁴⁴

1.9 Literature Review

1.9.1 Definition of terrorism

Many Scholars have attempted to give the definition of terrorism, but none of these definitions has been accepted generally as accepted universally as the meaning of terrorism. Gianola in his book, "Il volto del terrorismo" defined, terrorism as "the strategic activity, be it of an individual or an organized group, of a bearer of collective interests not, or insufficiently, safeguarded by a national or the international order. It is exercised by means of acts of extreme violence against people and property." He further added that the targets of the acts of terrorism are not necessarily part of the people that is to be influenced by such violence but rather its influence is effectuated by "attracting the attention of the media or of the general populace."⁴⁵

Hardman, also in his work, "Terrorism" defined terrorism as "a term used to describe the method or the theory behind the method whereby an organized group or party seeks to achieve its avowed aims chiefly through the systematic use of violence. Terroristic acts are directed against persons who as individuals, agents or representatives of authority interfere with the consumption of the objectives of such a group. The terrorist does not threaten; death or destruction is part of his program of action, and if he is caught his behaviour during trials is generally directed primarily not toward winning his freedom but toward spreading a knowledge of his doctrines. .Terrorism is a method of combat in the struggle between social groups and

forces rather than individuals, and it may take place in any social order.”⁴⁶ Further arguing, he posits that “terrorism is not intended to draw the attention of the ruling government or the country but also to draw the attention of the majority of people by creating a sense of insecurity making them to believe that their safety is no longer safe in the hands of the authorities in power. “The publicity value of the terroristic act is a cardinal point in the strategy of terrorism”, he adds.⁴⁷

Silverman and Jackson, also in their work, “Terror in Insurgency Warfare” argued that, “terrorism as element in this process of violent change can be defined as the use of physical violence, however indirect, to cause political-psychological fear in a person. They add that terrorism is not a distinct stage in revolutionary development, but a present time tactics to both guerrilla and conventional warfare. To them terrorism differs from guerrilla warfare in as much as its purpose is to influence the opponent and any third parties rather than to annihilate him”.⁴⁸ “The intention of the act, not the nature of the act, not the nature of the act itself, they added is the crucial characteristics which distinct terrorism. The target, therefore, is often someone other than the victim of a terrorism act. In consequence, the psychological results of the act are more important than the act itself. How an act is seen as torture, arson or murder as terrorism will depend how this act is perceived by the international community. For an act to be seen as terrorism, the victim must be identified by its intended audience, be related with what the victim stands for and experience feelings of fear and insecurity for their own well-being. The intended audience must be aware that it is the target at which the influence or intimidation is directed, they added.”⁴⁹

To quote English, in his work “Terrorism: How to Respond”, “Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a political aim; which involve a diversity of acts, of targets, and of actors; it possesses an important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in the hope

of maximizing political communication and achievement; it embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted redressing of power relations; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and as such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent attempts at political leverage.”⁵⁰

Laqueur, outlining the genesis of terrorism notes, “Terrorism has been there for ages dating back to the time of the Jewish Zealots (sicari), who were active during Rome's occupation of Palestine.⁵¹ This Zealot sect, according to Chalian et al, was one of the very first groups to practice systematic terror of which we possess a written account. This knowledge of the Zealots’ struggle account is contained in the reporting of Flavius Josephus in his Jewish Antiquities, that was published in 93–94c.e., and in another account of his of the Jewish War, a brief work published between 75 and 79, to the greater glory of Vespasian and Titus, for whom he worked as an advisor on Jewish affairs. Josephus uses the word sicarii — a generic Latin term derived from sicarius, “dagger-man” — to denote the Zealots.”⁵² The methods and operations they used is similar to the methods of suicide and sacrifice that are used by terrorists in contemporary times. According to Hopman, as quoted in William’s work, “An Analytical History of Terrorism, 1945-2000”, he posits that “in contemporary times, it was given momentum by Robespierre's regime de la terreur (June 1793-July 1794) and, Edmund Burke has been credited with adding the word terrorist to the English lexicon in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, which railed against the "thousands of those Hell hounds called Terrorists ... let loose on the people" by the Jacobins, regularly aided by Dr. Guillotin's famous invention.”⁵³

According to Chalian et al, “the French Revolution marked a turning point in the history of terrorism”. It gave birth to the term “terror”—or what might equally be called “state terrorism”— “prefiguring a practice that was to evolve considerably in the twentieth century with the advent of totalitarianism and large-scale violence. The term “terrorism,” of course,

they posit, derives from the experience of the French revolutionary Terror that occurred in 1793 and 1794.”⁵⁴

Terrorism is also linked to “the authoritarian regimes of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia and the Fascist regime of Italy between the 1920s and 1930. Also, in the Middle East, it can be linked to the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood, in Palestine during British rule where various acts of terror were orchestrated against the British and the wars waged against colonialism in Algeria the French and Cyprus against the British”.⁵⁵

In the events that followed World War Two (2) era (post world war 2), terrorism changed its revolutionary nature. “In the wars of independence fought between the 1940s and 1950s by nationalist seeking to attain independence from colonial rule from European Imperialist in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, the various acts which were violent in nature committed in this process were also considered as acts of terrorism. Some of these wars that were fought in Kenya, Israel, Algeria and Cyprus in the quest to gain independence utilise to some extent, forms of terrorism. In 1946, a bomb explosion that hit the King David Hotel in Jerusalem by a Jewish underground group is seen as one of the most momentous terrorist acts. However, the current radical nature of terrorism came into existence after the Second World War.”⁵⁶

According to the Britannica online encyclopaedia, “the 20th century saw great leap in the use and practice of terror. It became the character of a number of political groups stretching from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political divide.” “The improvement in technology and the development of explosives, automatic weapons and IEDs provided terrorist a new mobility and lethality and the advancement of the aviation industry gave rise to new opportunities and methods for terrorist and changed their modus operandi. During the regimes of Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin, both of Germany and the Soviet Union respectively, terrorism was seen as an official policy which was used against opposition and voices of

descent. The use of execution, torture and imprisonment of opposition members were carried out with legal guidance to instil fear and panic and also to enhance compliance to national ideology and the economic, political and social objectives of the state.”⁵⁷

The Britannica encyclopaedia also mentioned that “terror was employed by one or both parties in anticolonial conflicts”: one, war of independence between Algeria and France, the Irish war for independence between “Ireland and the United Kingdom, and between Vietnam and France and the United States; secondly in conflicts between different national factions over a land such as between Palestinians and Israelites; thirdly, in conflicts between religious sects such as the one that occurred between Roman Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; and, in internal conflicts between revolutionary forces and established governments.” It adds, “In the latter part of 20th and beginning 21st centuries, some of the most extreme and destructive groups that engaged in terrorism held a fundamentalist religious ideology such as Hamas and al-Qaeda.”⁵⁸ Some groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Hamas, employed the tactic of suicide bombing, in which executioners of such acts would attempt to destroy a prominent economic, military, political, or symbolic target by detonating a bomb on their person. In the latter half of the 20th century the most known groups using terrorist means were the Red Army Faction, the Japanese Red Army, the Red Brigades, the Puerto Rican FALN, Fatah and other groups related to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Shining Path, and the Liberation Tigers. The most known groups in the early 21st century was al-Qaeda, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and ISIL.”⁵⁹

The world woke up to four coordinated terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which was initiated by Osama bin Laden’s Islamic terrorist group Al-Qaeda on the United States. These attacks were very destructive causing the lives of about 6,000 persons and 9,000 injuries and was the most destructive attack causing several millions of dollars in material loss compared

to the earlier attacks. This attack led to the creation of international coalition of countries with the aim of fighting terrorism in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and other East Countries that were seen as the haven of terrorist groups by the international community.⁶⁰

According to Rulaca, in his work, “Terrorism Proliferation and Radicalisation in Europe” due to the European Union countries' taking part in the military and international coalition campaigns against terrorist above, there series of coordinated terrorist attacks on some European cities.⁶¹ Their targets were the civilian population in these cities.⁶² For example, the Madrid train bombings carried out on 11 March, 2004 claiming the lives 192 people and injuring around 2,000; in London similar bombings on the underground rail lines and another on bus were carried on the 7 July, 2005 which claimed the lives 56 people and injured than 700 people; and the London bombings of 21st July, 2005 which claimed no life. Other attacks by terrorist were also carried out between 2005 and 2015: first being the Oslo attacks on 22 July 2011 with 77 victims; the second, Charlie Hebdo, the French satirical paper, attacks in Paris on 2nd November 2011 and 7-9 January 2015, which also claimed the lives of 14 people were, of which 2 were police officers; other similar attacks like the Toulouse and Montauban attacks on March 11 to 19 2012, London attacks on 22 May 2013, Brussels attacks on 24 May 2014, and the Copenhagen attacks on 14 February 2015.⁶³ Rulaca also states that the spate of attacks increased when some European states joined in the bombing of ISIS targets in Iraq and Syria. The year 2016 witnessed similar attacks such as: in Brussels on 22nd March, Nice 14th July, and Berlin 19th December. In 2017, the most devastating terrorist attacks in Europe were in the United Kingdom on 22nd March, 22nd May and 3rd June: also, in France on 20th April; in Sweden the attack that happened in Stockholm on 7th April; and Barcelona on 16th August and Cambrils 18th August all in Spain. The use of vehicles ploughing into crowds were employed in some of these attacks. ISIS has repeatedly threatened some European states”.⁶⁴

Since the September 11 attacks on the U.S. many smaller terrorist groups, aside Al-Qaeda have emerged with different methods of operations and how they carry out their activities. Most terrorist groups come together to create affiliates in countries such as Syria, Mali, Niger, Somalia, Yemen, and Egypt, and al-Qaeda for example, having taken advantage of weak and failing countries, has turned ungoverned spaces into governed spaces, providing governance and assistance to franchise groups working at a grassroots level to generate political legitimacy and trust among local populations in areas they operate.⁶⁵ In Syria, Yemen, and throughout West Africa have Al-Qaeda-linked groups have integrated themselves with local militants, parroting provincial grievances as a means of gaining entree.⁶⁶

Bloomberg et al, in their work, “Terrorist Group survival: ideology, tactics and base of operations”, argue that “terrorist groups perform better if they are larger in size, expand their attack modes, are animated by religiosity rather than non-religious political goals, and base their activities in Africa or the Middle East. Groups’ lastingness is bolstered by democratic institutions and an in-between level of ethnic breakup at home”.⁶⁷

Most terrorist groups nowadays have advanced in their operations and are using innovative means in their attacks and activities wherever they are causing major blows in areas and countries where they operate. “The style of battle and nature conflict since the cold war ended has changed drastically. Through unbalanced warfare, weaker fighters are using creative tools to cause devastating consequences to more powerful rivals.⁶⁸ The means recruitment, fundraising, and communication by religious extremism has been very easy making difficult for their activities to be monitored effectively by governments. Some terrorist groups are characterised by religion since most of these terrorists’ groups recruit followers by invoking religion and under the guise of fighting on behalf of the religion. This is one of the reasons why

terrorism has become more and more deadly as groups easily recruit followers confessing to the same religion.”⁶⁹

In a nutshell, it can be confirmed that “terrorism has been with of humans since time immemorial but the activities of terrorists these days has given it a new facet. This incident should always be seen in historical point of view to be able to understand it.”⁷⁰

1.9.2 Terrorism Motivation

To ascertain the motive for which people engage in terrorist acts is not an easy task. For one thing, “terrorists aren't likely to show up willingly as experimental subjects, and closely looking their activities from afar can lead to wrong conclusions. Someone’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter, as most Arabs who are behind Palestinian suicide bombers and attackers often will attest”.⁴¹ Osama bin Laden described “good and bad terrorism”.¹ “Terrorism can be commendable and it can be reprehensible. Terrifying an innocent person is objectionable and unjust, also unjustly terrorizing people is not right. Whereas terrorizing oppressors and criminals and thieves and robbers is necessary for the safety of people and protection of their property. The terrorism we practise is of the commendable kind for it is directed at the tyrants and the aggressors and the enemies of Allah, the tyrants, the traitors who commit acts of treason against their own countries and their own faith and their own prophet and their own nation. Terrorising those and punishing them are necessary measures to straighten things and to make them right.”⁷¹

In DeAngelis work “Understanding Terrorism” he posits that, “for years, psychologists examined terrorists' individual traits, searching for clues that could explain their readiness to involve themselves in violence”. He adds that “while researchers have to terms that most terrorists are not "pathological" in any traditional sense, most important insights have been obtained through interviews with some 60 former terrorists conducted by psychologist John

Horgan, PhD, at the Pennsylvania State University's International Centre for the Study of Terrorism".⁷²

According to Crenshaw, "a direct cause of terrorism is an existing of identifiable grievances by subgroup of a larger population, such as when a minority ethnic group discriminated against by the majority. In so doing, a social movement develops with the aim of addressing these grievances and to settle for either equal rights or a separate state; acts of terrorism is then the resort of an extremist group of this broader movement".⁷³ She again adds that, "the very existence of a group that is dissatisfied within a majority is a catalyst for the cause of terrorism. She adds the use of terrorism is not always what those are discriminated against resort to channel their grievances".⁷⁴

In Miller's work, "The Literature of Terrorism", Juergensmeyer argues, "most terrorist attacks are carried out using religion as pretext but it cannot be nailed down to a specific country of origin. Given the examples of the Jewish assassins of Israel, radical Hindus and Sikhs in India, the Buddhist terrorist sect in Japan and the Christian militants in the United States. He adds that researchers have long time held the view that certain religious groups give incentives to those ready to give up their lives for the sake of their religion."⁷⁵ Ghorayeb for instance as Dawson accounts, inferred that "the elimination of discrimination and degradation led to the vital of sacrificial victim in Shi'a Islam. To demonstrate high esteem and prominence the idea of martyrdom is used within society at large. And people who are ready to lose their lives for religious purposes are seen as iconic inside their culture". Ghorayeb argues that "they are revered by family and friends for opting to continue the fight for religious views and complete self-sacrificing their personal life."⁷⁶

Religious terrorism, as suggested by some researchers is by far greater threat than political terrorism. Religiously motivated terrorist as argued by Caleb Carr hold the view that "they are

fighting in an extraterritorial battle that outlines the battle of good versus evil. The end result of this type of war is greater than the individual and therefore substantiates the sacrifice of lives. Individuals that carry out terrorism acts affiliating religiously are more prepared to kill themselves and those around them as against political terrorists who want their message to be known but without causing injuries”. The politically motivated terrorist as argued by Hoffman carryout their message to be heard and they view killing as a sad necessity unlike the religiously motivated terrorist. The dangerous motivator for conflict when compared to just acquiring land.⁷⁷

The goals of Religious fighters move beyond the world we live in today and look to life after death. They develop a "will to win" mind set because the end results for giving up in a battle is falling out of good graces with God and therefore endless damnation. With this mind set of damnation, “religious fighters past the point of care of their lives and this allows them to repress the fear of death”. Muslim countries are likely to host ten times the number of suicide bombers where the US military is present, or, where an active Israeli occupation remains as in the case of Palestine.⁷⁸

1.9.3 Social Effects of Terrorism

The impacts of terrorism reach many aspects. Terrorism has devastating effects on the social lives of people. The main goal of terrorism is to “disrupt ordinary life, instilling fear and creating sense of helplessness in the population. The end results of terrorism can indeed be wide-ranging and far-reaching. It has endless effects on groups, the individuals, and the society in general. The social success and developmental well-being of the majority are in jeopardy and in the situation of constant strain and stress. Citizens find it difficult to live their lives properly and calmly. The use of violent means to perpetuate their acts among the people causes devastating effects leading to socio-economic decline and the destruction of human and social

acquaintances.”⁷⁹ According to Ganor in Simon-Tov et al, “terrorism’s aim is discourage public faith in authorities and the state, to disrupt ordinary life, to create fear and helplessness in the population, and in the end, change government’s policy.”⁸⁰ Ganor also states that terrorism works to create a sense of security and to disrupt the everyday life of people, making people to live in constant fear and uncertainty in the target community”.⁸¹

In the work, “Terrorism, a socio-economic and political phenomenon with special reference to Pakistan”, Sabir argues that, “the terrorism creates sense of insecurity in the minds of the people which leads to sense of dissatisfaction and terror among the population. The sense of helplessness and uncertainty prevails in the minds of people where terrorism exists. This then leads to hopelessness among the people with regards to their personal development and social well-being”.⁸² These violent acts of terrorism, Samir further posits, badly affects “the mental development of the human beings placing them situation that is stressful. These attacks especially, leave harmful and far-reaching effects on the minds of children with the sight of dead bodies and horrible scenes of terrorism on the media”. Terrorism “damages human and familial relationships which ultimately affects the performance of the individuals in their work places”.⁸³

Terrorism causes devastating impacts on whole social system and not just the individual. Terrorism often causes or leads social split among people belonging to different schools of thought or backgrounds especially when one side is perceived of associating itself with terror acts. This division becomes the cause of major social division which jeopardises the social fabric, cohesion and unity of a country negatively.⁸⁴

Sabir again argues here that, terrorism causes people to run or escape from their social and professional responsibilities due to the fear of terrorist attacks. A soldier, a nurse, a teacher and any other professional offering essential services cannot perform their duties if they witness

the deaths of their colleagues constantly due to deadly terrorist attacks in their course of operations. Even though one will perform his or duty, to constant fear of losing his or her life to terrorist attacks deter one from performing his or her duty to the state. “Terrorism promotes social division and isolation among the different groups of the society. It creates division between the supporters and sufferers of the accused terrorist attacks. This means that terrorism leads social disturbance and people feel divided in the society”, he argues. It also affects the social development and well-being of citizens. Businesses and economy of a country suffer the most due to terrorist activities which directly decrease job opportunities. Poverty level increases which damages the society very much in the long run.⁸⁵

According to Langer and Godefroidt, due to terrorist attacks, people who lose faith in other people for the fear that they could be attacked since terrorist by their nature are not easily identifiable. The fear that terrorism creates destroys social trust, they argued. They add that “this threat of terrorism does not even have to be real, as perceptions of such threats seem to be enough to decrease people’s societal trust. Where trust is low, economic advancement may slow down, political institutions may remain weak, and well-being may be lost”.⁸⁶

According to Waxman in his work, “Living with Terror, Not Living with Terror: The Impact of chronic Terrorism on Israeli Society”, “the threat of terrorism leads to a group resort to stereotypes, leading to more negative stereotyping by members of the targeted society”. In the US for instance, there have been several cases of this such stereotypes as the rise of “Islamophobia” in the US after the 9/11 attacks, and the rise in anti-Arab sentiments in Spain after 2004 Madrid train bombings. In similar instance in Israel during the second Intifada, Israelis held negative stereotypes of Palestinians, “seeing them as dishonest, violent, and having no regard for human life.”⁸⁷

Waxman also posits that; one social effect of terrorism is “the increase in ethnocentrism and xenophobia as a group raises its solidarity in the face of violence attacks. With this, identification with, and support for, the in-group rises as a result of terrorism, while identification with, and support for, any out-group decreases”. “It was evident in Russia during the course of terrorist attacks carried out by Chechen militants, when ethnic Russian identity became more important, while xenophobia rose. In the United States in the aftermath of 9/11, a similar incident occurred when there was a rise in patriotic sentiment and flags were raised across the country”.⁸⁸

1.9.4 Economic Effects of Terrorism

The correlation between terrorism and economic growth impediment appears very complex. Terrorism impairs economic activity. In its negative repercussions, terrorism is damaging and leads to a devastating effect on the economy that calls for measures to curtail acts of terrorism. Karagöz, 2006, in Mehmet, 2017, outlining the economic effects of terrorism asserts that, “terror and terrorism can lead to a considerable loss for the economy of a nation. These losses, he adds, are mainly due to uncertainties that comes about by the confidence lost with terrorism and transferring a major part of a country’s scarce resources on military expenditure. Also, terrorist can also target directly the essential sectors of economics of countries.”⁸⁹ These outcomes, he adds, confirms that “the goal of terrorism, which aims to achieve political and economic demands through an unlawful means, is a clear sign to intimidate the government and create fear and horror and panic in the society. In other words, the objectives of terrorism are to reach a political goal by mounting pressure on political authority and breaking down public interest through the use of violence”.⁹⁰

Frey et al. and Uysal et al., in Mehmet, in relation to the above posit that, terrorism “instils fear and destruction in society and the destruction of a country’s economy. Due to the deep impact

of terrorism on the social and political spheres of a country, it also affects economic development negatively”.⁹¹ “One major reason for targeting the economy, the state of economic development, by terrorist is that, it is the most important indicator of success. And as a matter of fact, terrorist activities, despite its objective to disrupt the macroeconomic stability in a country, include the economy. The success of these activities is the creation of effective violence in society”, adds in Yalcinkaya as documented by Mehmet.⁹² Mehmet also states that, “when there is a weak economic structure in a country, the terrorist organization that facilitates the society and the state manipulate it one direction, which will cause panic and fear leading to anarchy that dominates the economy”. “It is a fact that there is a direct and indirect relationship between terrorism and the economy. However, the direction of this relationship may be double-sided to show the interaction. Therefore, in formulating counter-terrorism strategies, the economy of a country should be included”, he added.⁹³

Mehmet, again states that one of the important areas among the objectives of country’s basic economic policy is “economic growth and development”. Simply “a country in a given period, the rise in the amount of goods and services manufactured by expressing economic growth is set to increase in the percentage in GDP”.⁹⁴ “Considering the spending on final goods and services, GDP is calculated with regards to the expenditure method using the economic indicators in a given time”. Without doubt, Mehmet further adds, “attacks from terrorists affects the determinants of national GDP and thus show clear evidence that show the negative impacts on economic growth. For example, distrust that emanates from terrorism leads to a switch in consumption and investment behaviours”.⁹⁵

Gupta et al. investigating the impacts of armed conflicts and terrorism middle and low income countries came out that, the economy growth is lower and inflation is often higher if there is an armed conflict in a country which leads negative effects on tax revenues and investment in that country.⁹⁶ Conducting “a systematic investigation of the incidence and economic impacts

of terrorist attacks at the country level”, Tavares came out with the results that, “rich countries are the most prone to suffer from terrorist attacks while their democracies become, if anything, less vulnerable than other countries”.⁹⁷ In a study by World Bank, it was estimated that “a 4 % GDP decline in the Israeli economy while that of the Palestinian territories suffered a 50 % decline in between 1994 and 2002 due to conflicts and acts of terror.”⁹⁸

Meierrieks and Gries, highlighting on the causality between terrorism and economic growth posited that, terrorism destructs economic activity by directly causing physical and human capital stock destruction through the loss of life, property damage and others.⁹⁹ Sloboda, argues that since tourism is one of the biggest industries, and many open economies, especially small countries, count on it as their major of internal generated revenue source, it is largely affected when there are acts of terrorism especially in areas where these tourist centres are located. There is often decline in the patronage of such places too. He adds that terrorism can cause a major blow to the tourist sector by keeping tourists away especially after major terrorist attack especially close to or in a major tourist centre. The long term the indirect costs of terrorism on the tourist sector is that, a substantial number of expenditures is directed into the rebuilding of tourist facilities, to provide security measures to reduce the threat terrorist activities and also, on advertisement to re-attract tourists to these destinations again. This is in the long run damages the travel and tourism sectors of a country causing the country to lose financially.¹⁰⁰

According to Blomberg et al, terrorism distorts national levels of consumption, investment, government spending and savings on an aggregate level. Since terrorism creates uncertainty due to fear and panic which often leads to “postponement of long-term investment or increased government spending on security at the expense of other areas such as education, health and infrastructure, which reduces growth in the end”.¹⁰¹

According to Abadie and Gardeazabal, internationally, terrorism can lead to capital and trade flows diversion since it poses a costly risk and causes reduction to foreign investment.¹⁰² When there are terrorist attacks on a leading to withdrawal of international investment, it hurts economic development, “especially when foreign finance and investment are essential engines of growth of an economy”. Studies carried out indeed, have shown that “terrorism has negative impacts on macroeconomic variables such as consumption, investment, and public spending and on the international flow of goods and capital”, added, Abadie and Gardeazabal.¹⁰³ They again added that these effects “help to explain and confirm why several studies came out that terrorism is impedes economic growth on national, sub national and global levels”.¹⁰⁴

Khan and Estrada evaluating the “terrorism effects of on economic performance” highlights the following: activities of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq caused economic growth to decline by -2.58 % and in Syria, -3.20 % in 2013 in a study conducted. These results is evident of how much economies are badly affected by the activities of terrorism.¹⁰⁵

In a study by conducted by Gaibulloev and Sandler in Mehmet, 2017, it came out that the “impact of terrorism is felt greatly in developing countries than in developed countries since developed countries have greater flexibility to adapt to terrorism due to their strong economies.”¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the study also found out that “internal terrorist activities have double negative impacts of slowing economic growth than international terrorism. With the reason that, higher negative effect on the economy is due to piled of “government expenses and a loss of capital outlay” due to the rise in terrorism related activities”.¹⁰⁷

1.9.5 Terrorism Activities in the Sahel

According to Harmon, Terrorism in the Sahel part dates back to the first Tuareg insurgency against the newly independent Malian government, the so-called Alfellaga, which lasted from May 1962 to August 1964 and was led by members of the Ifoghas confederacy and was limited

to Adrar des Ifoghas (Adagh). The main cause of the Alfellaga was a Tuareg nationalism that was growing in the face of what they saw as a rival Malian nationalism, in which the Tuareg did not want to participate. In the early 1960s, the Malian government tried to reduce or end the political power of the Tuareg and Bidan chiefs in the northern regions of Mali, which they saw as a relic of colonial era privilege.¹⁰⁸ The government also tried to free the bellah-iklan and to regulate the movement of herds of livestock, especially cattle, across borders. The Tuareg perceived all of these government initiatives as detrimental to their political agenda and to their culture and livelihood. He again posits that they were against the Keita regime because they felt they should never have been made part of Mali.¹⁰⁹ According to Sidibé, these led to consistent revolt against the Malian state by the Tuareg which were met with harsh rebuttals from the Malian state over the years and these attempts to rise up against state authority is due to the marginalisation and discrimination of Tuareg and Arab nomadic communities residing in the northern part of Mali. In their attempts to express their grievances, they formed movements which launched coordinated attacks against government security agents. To address this, successive Malian governments dealt differently with rebel movements in the north of the country in order to contain this. A number of strategies were used to deal with the movement: there have been the use of repression; the recognition of the movements; signing of peace treaties; reducing military presence in the north; decentralization of power; and reconciliation. The Tuareg perceived all of these government initiatives as detrimental to their political agenda and to their culture and livelihood.¹¹⁰

According to Harmon, years of marginalisation and drought conditions forced many Kel Adagh and other Tuareg to flee their homelands leave in exile. They took refuge in Algeria, Libya, Niger, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. While in exile in neighbouring countries such as Algeria and Libya, most of them were recruited into the armies of these countries to help fight insurgent

and terrorist that confronted their host countries. In Libya, the Malian exiles played an important part in Muammar Qaddafi's regime with most of them serving in the military.¹¹¹

The coup in Mali in 2012 provided a perfect opportunity for these exiled Tuareg and other Arab minorities to rise again. The exiles decided to apply the political and military skills they had learned in exile to a war of liberation.¹¹² According to Danjibo, "with the availability of arms from Libya, with which the fighters who fought side by side with Gaddafi in the hands of these Tuareg fighters who escaped following the death of Gaddafi, provided grounds for renewed armed insurrection against Malian state in the north of the country which then spread to other states in the Sahel". "It is believed that other states in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to have deposits of large catchments of arms and ammunitions circulating in the region, making these countries potential areas of conflicts and instability", notes, Danjibo.¹¹³

According to Cherbib, when these armed rebels, mostly made up of "Malian Tuareg and Arab fighters returning back to Mali after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya, launched insurrection in January 2012 against the Malian state and won control of the north of Mali, the AQIM – a terrorist organization in the Sahel that has been fighting the Algerian state and terrorizing other states over the years – and its local offshoots back the Malian insurgents briefly. They later chase them out of the three main cities in the north – Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao – which they governed from April 2012 to January 2013. Seizing the opportunity to carry out its terrorist activities, they implemented Sharia law and trained more locals in jihadist warfare while administering the north and parts of central Mali (Mopti region)".¹¹⁴

According Pillepe, in the context of the Sahel these factors – "erosion of state institutions, collusion with corrupted officials, involvement of security officials and business persons in contraband trafficking are among the factors" – "provided a perfect impetus and conducive theatre of operations for the AQIM to perpetrate a crime terror nexus. The Malian conflict in

2012 further made the AQIM to capitalise on expanding their activities within and beyond the Sahel”.¹¹⁵

According to Renard, originally beginning in Algeria GSPC, the AQIM changed its name and strategy to reflect the ideas reflect that al-Qaida’s model. Despite a steady decline in the number of recruits due to pressures and counter measures from Algerian security forces, AQIM has shown some form of remarkable resilience these past decades. It has used al-Qaida’s influence to recruit new members; it has shifted from the use of guerrilla tactics to terrorism by engaging criminal activities as well; and lastly, moving southward and east across borders to escape the counter pressures mounted on it by Algerian security forces.¹¹⁶

According to Niang, although most of the terrorist groups in the Sahel, including AQIM, have a rather distant link to AI Qaeda, they have been able to use the veneer of Islamic ideology to embed themselves into local religious networks, some of which have recently gone through a radicalization phase. They are often structured around qatiba or battalions and they operate across the Sahel using guerilla strategies that allow them to escape state control quite successfully. AQIM's form of ransoming is often seen as a scheme, a one-off opportunity that allows them to extract maximum resources; this precludes the possibility of mutually beneficial relationship and future transfer while allowing them to bankroll their operations. Incidents of kidnapping thus tend to be violent, often leading to executions where payments.¹¹⁷

Ndiaye also posits that, the Sahel faces widespread violence and the number of terrorist attacks has increased in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali, killing more civilians and soldiers. However, Islamist groups including MUJAO, AQIM, and Ansar al-Dine thrive and gain strength over “ungoverned spaces” across the Sahel region. Militant Islamist groups control the northern territory of Mali and threaten the security of populations in neighbouring countries. Most of their activities involve attacks on civilians, ambushes on military troops, bombings of popular

markets, hotels, cities and restaurants across the region.¹¹⁸ The people struggle of extraordinary levels from forced displacement due to terrorist attacks. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) observes thousands of people fleeing across the region causing large scale population displacements. AQIM has expanded its reach beyond the borders Sahel, by engaging in kidnappings of foreign citizens in Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. The group have murdered foreign citizens and assassinated military officials as well as innocent citizens. In response to the assassination, a Malian military was subsequently defeated and humiliated. In August 2020, AQIM launched a suicide bomb attack which was unsuccessful in the vicinity of the French embassy in Mauritania.¹¹⁹

According to Apau and Banunle, in Burkina Faso, “the threat of terrorism and the activities of terrorism is not different from other countries in the Sahel. Insecurity is on the rise on daily basis in the country with an increasing report of terrorism and conflict related violence in the western regions of the country”. In Boucle du Mouhoun, a region that borders conflict affected Mali, Apau adds, “there have seven security-related incidents recorded since October 2018. An estimated people of about 1.4 million live in conflict-affected zones of Burkina Faso. Due forced internally displaced people, the population of Djibo, a Sahel town continues to rise by 50% due to displacement of people from surrounding towns.¹²⁰ It evident that effects of the insecurity and rising violence are aggravating the vulnerability of refugees, displaced populations and host towns who need humanitarian assistance”.¹²¹

According to a report by the United States Department of State Publication Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism that was released in August 2010, “the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) demonstrated a greater interest in Niger in 2009, making attempts to and expand and extend its influence into Nigerien territory from the ungoverned spaces that borders Mali and Algeria. The porous borders and ungoverned spaces provide terrorist groups such as AQIM a haven for recruiting, people and smuggling of contraband, undetected transit,

and facilitation of logistics among others. Niger's severe resource constraints which emanates from its current status as one of the poorest countries in the world coupled with an ongoing political crisis, have hampered the Nigerien government's efforts to counter the activities of the AQIM and other terrorists group intrusion".¹²²

According to Danjibo, "the Sahel and other areas of sub-Sahara are the centres sectarian crises in Africa, culminating in terrorist activities". He argues, "Inter and intrastate wars are common in the region. These conflicts have contributed to aggravating a situation of gross insecurity of lives and livelihood. It is currently estimated that there are more than 10 million small arms and light weapons circulating in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa, which create a situation of instability in the region." "The region is having been devastated by a number of challenges, which includes the lack of transparency and accountability, state fragility, weak institutions, the lack of development, non-participatory political processes, weak bureaucratic structures, youth unemployment, rural-urban migration, the lack of social justice, environmental hazards and poverty".¹²³

He again posits that, "the Sahel remains one of the most complex regions in the world in terms of ethnic configuration, religion, colonial experiences, the environment and geography. Countries in the region have been beset with age-old complex problems ranging from ethnicity, to religion and the environment".¹²⁴

The sudden end of "authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, which renewed hopes of democratisation in the region, has on the other hand expanded the activities of terrorist groups that have taken advantage of the porous borders fragility of states and ungoverned spaces in the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Africa". Due to the "porous boundaries and borders among countries of the Sahel and the fragile nature of states have terrorists groups have been coordinate with a network of other terrorist groups such as the MUJAO, Ansar Eddine, while

giving Boko Haram the chance to constantly transit from Nigeria to the Sahel region Niger to Mali, and to link up with the AQIM and other groups for financial and logistic support to carry out its operations.¹²⁵ The proliferation of weapons and arms after the fall of regimes is a major factor have led to the development of local and transnational extremist groups. These arms that are either bought at very low prices from illegal organisations or criminal terrorist networks in the North and West Africa, have landed in the hands of terrorist groups such as AQIM and others to aid their activities. This is particularly true of Boko Haram's connection with AQIM and other terrorist organisations in West Africa".¹²⁶

From all the above reviewed literature, it is evident that, the literature has clearly defined the concept terrorism and its activities, highlighting on terrorism, its social and economic effects and terrorist activities in the Sahel. It was also evident from the literature above that, terrorism and its changing nature as well as the security dynamics requires that pragmatic measures should be implemented in response to the many challenges confronting the Sahel Region. It was however clear that, there are literature lapses of specifically assessing the socioeconomic effects of terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa, which has not been filled by the available literature. The literature gap that is left unfilled from the above literature is what this study seeks to fill.

1.9 Research Methodology

1.9.1 Research Design

The research methodology is a case study of these three countries of the Sahel, which are, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso in the Sahel Region of West. The study employed the use of qualitative and purposive approach.

Due to the risk involved in engaging terrorists and geographical restriction; how covert terrorist operations are; and also, the risk involved in engaging terrorist for real life interviews, the

research made use of mainly qualitative data and employed the use of qualitative method of data analysis. The researcher interviewed experts and academics in the field terrorism.

1.9.2 Sources of Data

The use of both primary and secondary sources of data were employed by the research. Primary sources of data were obtained from interviews conducted with experts and resource persons who have expertise in terrorist activities through the use of face-to-face semi-structured interviews to collect primary data from academics and experts in Ghana. Semi-structured interview guides were conducted in this study and this gave free room for the respondents to answer questions freely in their own opinions without restraint. Permission of the respondents were sought before the interviews were recorded and later transcribed to letter.

Secondary sources of data were obtained from books and journal articles.

1.9.3 Sampling and Sampling Technique

Focused and purposive methods of sampling used were used for this research. Purposive sampling known “as subject sampling makes use of non-probability technique allowing the researcher to select members within a large population to participate in the study. This form of sampling is time saving and cost effective because of the limited number of people interviewed for the study”.

1.9.4 Data Analyses

Data analysis was based on content analysis which gives a “detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular material for identifying patterns or themes.” The study analysed and reviewed published journal articles, books, internet sources and research papers related to the research data collected to find out its relevance to the statement problem.


1.9.5 Ethical consideration

Relating to ethical consideration, the researcher obtained letters from LECIAD and gave them to the respondents. The interviews for the study for the study were scheduled and conducted on agreed dates and the respondents were given an informed consent to assist the researcher in the study and to record the interview.

1.10 Arrangement of Chapters

Chapter One constitutes the introduction of the research.

Chapter Two gives an overview of terrorism in the Sahel Regions of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Chapter Three assesses the implications of terrorism activities on the socio-economic development of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the counter terrorism strategies applied to overcome the challenges in the Sahel Region and their success and implementation challenges faced and the way forward for the UN. Chapter Four discusses the summary of research findings, conclusion and recommendations.



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CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE SAHEL REGION OF WEST AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of terrorism and insurgency in the Sahel Region of West Africa specifically the countries Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. This covers the history of Terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa, the nature and dynamics of terrorism in contemporary times, the terrorist organization carrying these acts in the Sahel Region of West Africa, and also, the causes and implications of terrorism and insurgency in the Sahel Region of West Africa.

2.1 History of Terrorism and Insurgency in the Sahel Region of West Africa (Central Sahel – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger).

Acts of terrorism and insurgency has become one of the most dangerous threats to citizens and countries of the Sahel Region and the whole of the West African sub region in general in contemporary times. It is the most discussed topic among the various organisations and unions within the sub region and has also received attention of every state in the sub region and the international community as a whole. Even though acts of terrorism and insurgency has become consistent in recent years, terrorism and acts of insurgency is not a new phenomenon. Throughout the course of human history, acts of terrorism and insurgency has been perpetuated and carried out in so many ways motivated by different incentives. The first acts, manifestations, roots and practices of terrorism dates back to the 1st-century AD Sicarii Zealots who opposed the Roman occupation of Judea with a massive revolt.¹ In the 19th Century, the French revolution and its aftermath activities has also been identified as one the earliest acts of

terrorism in human history and historians regard it as a point of blowout in the conceptual history of terror.² The formation of the Ku Klux Klan and its perpetrating of acts of terror to torment former slaves and torment reconstruction supporters after the American Civil War also marked an era of terrorism in human history.³ In the latter part of the 19th Century, a lot of terrorist acts were committed across Europe by people who wanted social change and they believed that the only way for them to get this was to commit acts of terror on authorities and assassinate them⁴ Within the period 1865 down to 1905 a number dignitaries such as “kings, prime ministers presidents and other government officials were murdered by anarchists’ guns or bombs.”⁵

The twentieth century also witnessed an unprecedented number of terrorist attacks and activities. Terrorism and acts of terror were committed by Nazis in Germany and also the Soviet Union against their opponents.⁶ Terror has also been used in several ways: terror was also used by colonialist and anti-colonialist in several states that were under colonization across Africa and other areas of the world; between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland; local conflicts such as “Indonesia, the Philippines, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Peru and the former start of Yugoslavian” conflict.⁷ Subsequent acts of terror have been committed by the Arabs and Israel and several other states and groups across the world.

The Sahel, as being referred to by the US military is "the new front in the war on terrorism", is a “vast region which includes the countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, and borders the Sahara Desert”.⁸ Terrorism and acts of insurgency in the Sahel Region dates back to pre-colonial era. According to Sidibe, Terrorism activities can be traced to when the Tuareg launched armed rebellions against the Mali government demanding an autonomy that started in the 1960s and developed again during the 1990s.⁹ When Mali gained independence from France in September 1960, Tuareg nationalists began a militant movement for independence led by Zeyd Ag Attaher which led to several revolts and clashes from September

1963 to August 1964 when the government defeated them declared the end of the rebellion after their leader captured.¹⁰ These rebellions and attempt made by these rebels against the state was due to the marginalisation and discrimination of “Tuareg and Arab nomadic communities living in northern of Mali”.¹¹ During these rebellions and clashes with the government, several Tuareg militants were killed, captured and several others fled their homes to neighbouring countries like Algeria, Libya and Morocco.¹²

During the 1990s, beginning on June 28-29, 1990, militant members of the Tuareg rebel group known as the MPA which was led by “Iyad Ag Ghali, attacked the towns of Ménaka, Tidarmène, and Ikadewan in northern Mali on, leading to the deaths of four individuals in Tidarmène” marking the start of another phase of the conflict.¹³ Also in Niger around this period, Tuaregs in Niger started a similar rebellion against the Nigerien government in Tchintabaraden, Niger, and when local gendarmes arrested a large number of these rebels, other Tuaregs attacked the police station in the town to free those arrested.¹⁴ In response to this, the army killed several hundreds of Tuaregs.¹⁵ During this period of conflict between the Tuareg rebels and the governments of Niger and Mali, several attacks were carried out by both sides against each other resulting in a number of civilian and military casualties and also the displacement of people: the Tuareg rebellion during this period at its end was “marked by the destruction of about 3,000 weapons in Timbuktu” in northern Mali on March 26, 1996; also, it was estimated that about 2,500 civilians were killed in the course of the conflict; and also, about 150,000 Tuaregs fled to neighbouring countries such as Algeria, Libya and Morocco as refugees during the conflict.¹⁶

In the 2000s beginning from May 23, 2006, Tuareg militants of the group ADC, which was “led by Ibrahim ag Bahanga attacked military barracks in Kidal and Ménaka” in Northern Mali leading to the death of two government soldiers begun another phase of the conflict.¹⁷ During this phase of the conflicts between 2006 and 2009, the governments of Algeria and Libya

hosted the two factions for peace negotiations which proved futile at the end with the rebels carrying out attacks on government troops and installations between this period until Government troops responded by attacking the main “Tuareg base in Tinsalak on January 21-22, 2009, resulting in the deaths of 31 individuals which followed up with the capturing of the rebel group’s last remaining base in Mali on February 6, 2009.”¹⁸ The Tuareg militant leader, Ibrahim ag Bahanga, fled to Algeria during this period and about 700 Tuareg militants surrendered to the Malian government on February 17, 2009”.¹⁹

According to Sidibe, the above rebellions have had serious “socioeconomic consequences on nomadic communities living in the north of the country” and its neighbours.²⁰ He again posits that, “the mass movement of young people to other countries, decreasing cattle numbers, the lack of rainfall and spread of the desert, illiteracy, the degradation of the water table, the lack of civil values, fragile democratic achievements, coupled with the political exploitation of intra-community tensions, are all issues confronting regions of Northern Mali”.²¹ All these factors, he argues, have “led some actors to engage in illegal activities and to challenge state authority which the state has been struggling to impose on this large area of its territory”.²²

2.2 Contemporary Terrorism and Insurgency in the Sahel Region of West Africa (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger)

2.2.1 Mali

The Arab spring which started in December 2010 ignited by the Jasmine Revolution that was initially ignited after the self-immolation of the Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi sparked public outrage that shook some “countries in North Africa and the Middle East”. Its aftermath is the deposing of some authoritarian leaders such as: the “Tunisian president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali; the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak”;²³ and the deposing and assassination of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi who has ruled Libya through a coup since 1969. In the course of the fight against Gaddafi’s government, Tuareg rebels fought on

the side of Gaddafi's forces and in the aftermath of the conflict when Gaddafi was assassinated, they fled the country and headed south towards Mali and other areas in the Sahel.²⁴ Boosted by Tuaregs with the return of their well-armed and well trained brothers who fought for Col Muammar Gaddafi in Libya presenting a tougher stance, The National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad a rebel group", mostly comprising of Mali's Tuaregs launched an operation of independence for northern Mali's desert region complaining of being marginalised by the southern government for decades as it has been their reason for the past insurgencies.²⁵ According to Cherbib, when these armed groups, mostly made up of "Malian Tuareg and some Arab fighters coming back to Mali after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi's regime, they launched the armed insurgency in January 2012 and took control of the northern part of Mali".²⁶ Soldiers were deployed by the government to repel these attacks and take back the control of the north from the insurgents but they were ill-equipped to tackle and stop the advances that were being made by the rebels. Some soldiers were ambushed and killed by the rebels and their bodies were posted on social media. This led to an uproar among citizens of Mali and they called on the government to provide the military with the resources needed to quell the rebellion. Amidst this, a group of low ranking military officers overthrew Mali's democratically elected government of Amadou Toumani Touré led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, proclaimed the creation of the CNRDRE justifying the take-over over the government's inability to deal with the crisis in the North and to provide the army with the manpower and equipment necessary to defend the national territory.²⁷ In the aftermath of this coup, the country was plunged into a downward spiral of violence across the country particularly the north, and led to a de facto division of the country with different political groups and armed factions fighting against each other has continued unabated till date.

According to Cherbib, these arm rebellions started by the Tuaregs was eventually taken over the AQIM – a terrorist organization in the Sahel that has been fighting the Algerian state and

terrorizing other states over the years – and its local “offshoots when they briefly backed the Malian insurgents before chasing them out of the three main northern cities of Kidal, Timbuktu and Gao, which they ruled from April 2012 to January 2013”. Seizing the opportunity to carry out its terrorist activities, “they administered the north and parts of central Mali (Mopti region) based on Sharia law and trained more locals in jihadist warfare”.²⁸ Following the seizure of the movement by the “AQIM, other terrorist groups such as JNIM, ISWA, ISGS, Al Murabitoun, Ansar Dine, Katiba Macina and Boko Haram” have been active in the region carrying various forms of terrorist attacks on government, civilians, foreigners, schools, churches, hospitals, government buildings and military installations²⁹. Other areas of attacks have also been “religious centres, kidnappings, shopping areas, hotels, bars, nightclubs, restaurants and transport hubs”. Together, the above terrorist groups collaborating mostly in their activities, their presence has heightened tensions among different ethnic groups and communities, as demonstrated by a serious upsurge of violence and ethnically targeted killings and inter-communal violence, particularly in central Mali, with insecurity, scarce resources and a lack of accountability or effective governance.³⁰ The above events have led to protracted consequences with serious “humanitarian crisis and socio-economic effects on the lives and citizens throughout the Sahel region which was already affected by structural factors of fragility such as climatic, economic and development challenges”.³¹

In the aftermath of the violence that started in Mali, the spill over of the violence and terrorist activities “has spread downward from Northern Mali to the regions of Ségou and Mopti and to neighbouring countries Burkina Faso and Niger. The terrorists mainly directed their hostilities towards civilian populations and security forces which has affected local communities in peripheral regions fuelling already existing inter-communal tensions”.³²

2.2.2 Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso, a neighbouring country to the south of Mali has since the Malian crisis have its fair share of terrorist activities. Until the start of the Malian crisis, Burkina Faso has been a relative peaceful country with no incident of recorded terrorist activities. After the fall of the regime of Blaise Compaore in 2014 and his failed attempt to extend his almost three decade-long reigns after he deposed Thomas Sankara in a coup in 1985, there was popular unrest in response to pushed him out of power. He was subsequently removed from power and a transitional government was formed. The highly trained presidential guard, who were loyal to Compaore, staged a failed coup which aimed to oust the transitional government in 2015. After “the failed coup attempt, the presidential guard was dissolved”. This “dissolution of the presidential guards” created a vacuum in the security services of the nation providing an impetus grounds for terrorist groups to penetrate the country to carry out their activities.³³ According to the John Campbell of the Council for Foreign Relations, “some people in Burkina Faso believe that the recent spate of terrorist attacks have been supported by former soldiers of the dissolved presidential guard, who saw affiliating themselves with these Islamist terrorist groups will provide them the grounds of gaining their way back into power, even though no direct evidence to support this is available” Campbell adds.³⁴

Before the first terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso in 2015, terrorist “affiliated with the Tuareg rebels in northern Mali and al-Qaeda operated along the border with Mali. Since 2016, the situation has escalated as the spate of attacks led by these terrorists began targeting southern Burkina Faso, including the capital Ouagadougou” that has become rampant extending and spreading to the country’s east border with Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Niger.³⁵ These Islamist terrorist groups have carried out several attacks against the state and civilians. In the country’s north and eastern areas, “years of negligence by the central government and its failure to extend the state security apparatus over these regions and invest in these areas of the local economy

has allowed terrorism and organized crime to thrive in the east and north making these areas ripe for the expansion of jihadist and extremist groups' activities there". In the east, the dense forests of the area has provided a perfect landscape for militant groups making it possible to evade the government.³⁶

Since the abduction of a foreign security agent at a mine on 4th April, 2015 in the north of the country, Burkina Faso has consistently suffered attacks from armed terrorist groups and these hostilities and crimes perpetrated by these terrorist are mainly directed towards civilian populations and the country's security forces and this has affected local communities in the exterior regions of the country fuelling pre-existing inter-communal tensions.³⁷ Even though Burkina Faso's geographical proximity to Mali is one of the main factors for the violence that has engulfed the country, other domestic factors have facilitated attacks from non-state actors and the establishment of armed groups.³⁸ In an interview with the SIPRI, Dieudonné Ouedraogo, a research and a programme assistant at the Centre for Democratic Governance in Burkina Faso on his perceptions of security in the Sahel in Burkina Faso in November 2019, he asserted that due to this rise of insurgency in the country's Sahel, Burkina Faso is now deeply affected by insecurity and human rights violations perpetrated against civilians, leading to massive displacement.³⁹ According to the Human Rights Watch as it reports, "these terrorist groups have concentrated recruitment efforts on the nomadic Peuhl, or Fulani, by exploiting community grievances over poverty and public sector corruption. This has inflamed tensions with other largely agrarian communities, notably the Foulse, Mossi, Songhai, and Gourmantche, who have been the victims of most attacks."⁴⁰ "The attacks carried out by these armed groups since the rise of their activities in 2015 have been carried in many ways which includes: victims being gunned down in market centres and villages, as they worshipped in churches and mosques, and as they transported aid to displacement camps; attacks on schools and health centres; other victims have been killed during ambushes, including 39 mine workers

in November 2011; summary executions, torture and other ill-treatment which includes sexual violence against mostly women, and looting of farms and animal products from villagers; attacks on military convoys and government officials; and the attacks on mining towns and miners.”⁴¹ These armed Islamist groups, according to the Human Rights Watch, have rarely claimed responsibility for attacks. A surge in these attacks in the years of this decade and in recent months have caused hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee their homes with an estimated 33,007 people forced to flee their homes and 16,000 Burkinabe citizens who have to neighbouring countries in search for safety.⁴²

2.2.3 Niger

Before the first terrorist attacks associated with the Malian crisis in Niger began in 2012, the country was a fragile state. During the 1990s, Niger, just like its neighbour Mali, experienced some form of insecurity, principally in the Agadez region of the north of the country. The Tuaregs, who are the inhabitants of this region for centuries, just like in Mali were the opponents in this uprising “when various groups of peeved Tuaregs formed the MNJ and launched an insurgency against the government”. The Tuaregs in Niger just like in Mali Justified their attacks in the region by claiming that there have social and political inequities between them and other ethnic groups in Niger.⁴³ These rebellion in 1990 and 2009 started by the Tuareg marked the beginning of a cycle of insecurity that will confront the country till date. The spill over of the violence and terrorist activities that has spread in the Sahel Region of West Africa from Northern Mali as a result of the Tuareg insurgency did not spared Niger, a country bordering Mali to the north-east. According to Guido, Niger’s “high unemployment rates, low literacy levels, and young population seem to provide fertile ground for extremism to take root. He adds that the rise of terrorist activities has retarded and disrupted the country’s development, especially public finances, and destabilised the south east, the main scene of armed clashes”.⁴⁴

In Niger, the Tuareg insurgency and its aftermath terrorist crisis in Mali has had “a strong impact and has affected the border region of Tillabéri which has increased inter-communal tensions already existing between the Zarma and Fulani communities as recounts by the Human Rights Watch. These terrorist attacks and conflicts are a direct effect of the conflict and terrorist activities in neighbouring Mali. The armed groups target security agents of the Nigerien state and also by abducting and killing of traditional leaders suspected state collaborators. The aim of this strategy is to deter local populations from cooperating with the state authorities while at the same time coercing them to sympathize with armed groups”. In 2012, Niger refocused its attention on Boko Haram, AQMI, Al-Qaeda, and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.⁴⁵

In Niger, the battle against Boko Haram and other Islamist terrorist groups has stoked up local inter-communal tensions and exacerbated violence over access to resources. These Islamist militants have been waging an insurgency in Niger for more than a decade now and security officials fear an expansion of their operations might further degenerate into years of chaos in a Region already in distress over long period of conflict. The attacks by these terrorist groups have been on attacks on a military bases, schools, churches, market centres and other areas mostly close to Niger's border with Mali where terrorist cross in and out of the country from Mali due to the porous nature of the border and also in Nigeria around the Lake Chad basin. According to Guido, these attacks carried by these terrorists are “characterized by combined arms operations, complex tactics and operational planning. He added that the ambush of American Special Forces in Niger and the later attack on UN forces at the Timbuktu Super Camp are indicators of a dangerous new alliance and cooperation between rebels, smugglers, and terrorists and these can only be achieved by terrorist due to the level of sophistication of weapons received from mutually supporting alliances as they are normally in competition with one another for local support and resources”.⁴⁶

AQMI, Al-Qaida, and the MUJWA destabilize western Niger along the vast border it shares with Mali. South-eastern Niger is plagued with attacks from various terrorist groups, especially Boko Haram. Increased attacks in the south-eastern region of Niger are attributed to the “country’s participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force” that seeks to end Boko Haram’s insurgency. Despite Niger’s effort to fight terrorism through strategic engagements, the country continues to suffer from terrorist threats.⁴⁷

According to the African Report in an article they published, the report notes, “data collated by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project showed that the activities of insurgent have increased in Niger in the past few years. The article again pointed out that, in 2018, a total number of 167 conflict-related events resulting in 506 fatalities were recorded and the numbers grew to 476 conflict-related events resulting in 1046 fatalities in 2020. These events the articulated mentioned, happened around the borders of the country and reveal the impact of insecurity on the stability of Niger.”⁴⁸

2.3 The Nature of terrorism in the Sahel

The use of violence as a means of achieving political, social and religious objectives in the Sahel Region of West Africa is not new to the Region. As I have already outlined, the Tuareg rebellions in the past in Mali and Niger in particular was carried out by the use of violence and acts of terrorism to achieve their aims. Since the fall of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi and the subsequent uprisings in Northern Mali by the Tuareg rebels, the Sahel Region of West Africa has become a new hub of violence and major terrorist activities over the past decade. Majority of Terrorist acts carried out in the world is concentrated in this region. These events – the Arab Spring and its aftermath effects and the Malian crisis – have led to the nature of terrorism in this new region to take a new form. Most of the terrorist groups operating in this

region have links and affiliations with other major terrorist organization around the globe particularly the Middle East like al Qaeda for financial and logistical support.

Reports suggest that, most fighters of these terrorist organisations in the Sahel are of foreign origin motivated by the quest to create an Islamic Caliphate in the Sahel following the examples of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. There is a “small cadre of foreign fighters linked to al-Qaeda or Islamic State that are present in the Sahel fighting alongside local terrorist and it is believed that in the wake of Islamic State’s losses in Syria”, these numbers in the Sahel will grow as foreign fighters will pour in.⁴⁹ The UN has warned that “mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libya have been crossing into the Sahel, threatening to undermine gains in fighting terrorism by West African nations and plunge the region into violence that will be difficult to control and also, this could lead to a worsening situation in the Sahel would be harmful to Africa as a whole and could turn the continent into a battlefield and base for international terrorism.”⁵⁰

Another nature of these terrorist acts and violence in the Sahel is its transnational nature. Threats of violence transcends the borders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. According to Kamara, “these terrorist groups in Sahel are affiliated to al Qaeda and ISIS and exploit the protection received from ungoverned spaces as a shield to attack Mali, and its neighbours Burkina Faso and Niger. The porous borders between these states allow these Islamist terrorists to operate freely because it is chronically under policed and porous”. The UN, which shares these concerns and has commented that, “the Sahelian borders are porous, harsh, and extremely hard to control and can be easily accessed by terrorists and indeed, the porosity of the Sahelian borders envelops terrorists and transcends borders of Sahelian states”. Kamara adds that, “Mali’s corrupt state officials exploit the porosity of the border to participate in trafficking of contraband items, mainly cigarettes, narcotics, and arms, which Islamist extremists use in attacks against the state”.⁵¹

2.4 Strategies, Methods and Tactics of Terrorist Groups in the Sahel Region of West Africa

Terrorist groups in the Sahel Region of West Africa employ several methods and tactics in carrying out the attacks they perpetrate on their victims. In their quest to invoke havoc on the targets, these methods and tactics they resort to have caused devastating effects on the lives and properties of citizens and governments in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Some of these methods they employ in perpetrating their acts of terror include: the use of explosives in large gatherings; the bombing of government buildings, security installations, churches and schools; kidnappings of foreigners and aid workers; and mass shootings. Others have been in the form, vehicle ambushes, small arms fire and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) just to mention a few.

Mass shootings is one the main methods employed by these terrorists in perpetrating their acts of terror in the region. Indiscriminate mass shooting attacks without warning have carried out in several places including in places visited and frequented by foreigners, diplomatic premises, hotels, restaurants, bars, nightclubs, shopping areas, markets, public areas such as tourist attractions, airports and other transport hubs, places of worship including mosques and churches, schools, and businesses with western interests”.⁵² These attacks have been very devastating leading to the loss of thousands of human lives and properties within the past decade.

Attacks on the military bases, outpost and other security installations including ambushes, assassinations and attacks on security forces, and the use of IEDs is another method employed by these terrorists in carrying out their activities.⁵³ There have attacks on attack on a police units and members of the security forces across the region. In Mali for instance, the army has consistently suffered heavy casualties leading to death many “soldiers from terrorist groups active in the area with links to al-Qaeda and ISIL or ISIS”.⁵⁴ In Niger and Burkina Faso, similar

attacks have been carried out against the army and military bases across these countries over the years. There have various reports of attacks of the continued casualties suffered by the troops facing the various armed groups in the region on their military bases. The United Nations force in the area, the MINUSMA, has also suffered the same fate.⁵⁵

The use of explosives is one of the methods employed. “Improvised explosive devices are some of the techniques used by jihadist groups in the Sahel to assassinate security forces and civilians. Within this decade, terrorist groups have carried out a lot of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, injuring and killing soldiers belonging to international missions and security forces of the states in the region”. The Artarlaya News Agency that reports that, “these IEDs which includes landmines, used by these terrorists are made up of a military explosive charge, an electrical source with a detonator, a container and an activation/initiation system and In Mali, most of the explosive and detonator charges come from mining activities, although about 25 per cent come from military charges, especially in the north of Malian territory”.⁵⁶ The Report again adds, “*When cars drive over the mine, the mine explodes automatically. Finally, the mine is usually activated by a system of plates, which the victims of the attack pass in front of and activate. In central Mali, however, we find that several of the attacks have been carried out with a radio activation system, which is much more sophisticated. Suicide attacks, involving a vehicle with an explosive charge or a bomber with a waistcoat full of explosives, tend to be used mainly at military bases and camps.*”⁵⁷ Attacks targeting the military and the civilians have been carried through the use of these explosive devices with most of these attacks carried out against Malian and international forces including forces of neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.⁵⁸ There have also been attacks that mix the use of explosives which are mostly detonated by radio frequency, in order to stop the vehicle and then ambush the victims. These explosives and the use of hybrid method of devices pose

a real security problem for national and international law enforcement agencies and also civilians the civilian population in these three countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.⁵⁹

Islamist militants who target villages in the three countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – often use motorbikes and pick-up trucks during their attacks. They are able to move about swiftly in the swathes of territories they control carry out abductions and attacks, including gunning down people in a village, towns and cities along the borders of the three countries with the aid of these motorbikes.

Suicide bombings is one of the tactics used by these terrorists, and over the past decade, these groups have launched cautiously planned suicide missions against the states of the central Sahel at different places including military bases, government buildings, government officials, as well as civilians.

The use of women and children to perpetrate acts of terror is one of the strategies also adopted by these terrorist groups. These terrorist groups see the role of women and as important and strategic to them in so many ways in their quest to create a caliphate in the Sahel. According to Ella Jeannine Abatan of the Institute for Security Studies, there are specific reasons for which terrorist groups involve women in their operations. She posits that unlike the Boko Haram, terrorist group who involve women actively in their activities, especially to carry out suicide missions and other deadly acts of terror around the Lake Chad basin and other parts of Niger, however, the terrorist groups in the Sahel, especially the JNIM, doesn't involve women directly or let women play any direct role in the execution of their activities. Rather, women play various active supporting roles such as cooks, laundresses and being informants for the various violent extremist groups in Mali. Other acts of espionage and services such as the supplying of fertiliser to make explosives and other deadly explosives are roles played by women.⁶⁰ The AQIM for instance, has encouraged its fighters to marry local women for them to provide

various supportive roles for them and in view of this, one of its leaders, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, has married about four women from different well known tribes of the Tuareg and Arab Berabiche families in order to expand his role and influence in the region.⁶¹ Some of the armed attacks by these Islamist militants and other terrorist groups that have become rampant across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are conducted by children. These children, mostly forced to commit these crimes through indoctrination and forced to commit these violent acts, are mostly teenagers.⁶² In an attack that occurred in June 2021, in the village of Solhan in the Sahel region, the attackers were mostly children who murdered their age mates.⁶³ Reports suggest that many of these young recruits are extremely young and some are even pre-adolescent. During the terrorist groups 2012 campaign of conquest and control of northern Mali, a lot of child soldiers were recruited. Since they were in control and still are in control as governing authorities of these areas in the Sahel, the terrorists recruit and force children into their activities without any hindrance.⁶⁴ Many of these children, just like the women, serve as spies and commit other deadly acts of terror.

Kidnapping for ransom is one of the modus operandi employed by these terrorists in the region. Foreign nationals are viewed as legitimate targets, including those engaged in tourism, humanitarian aid work, journalism or business sectors. The terrorist groups operating in the Sahel are capable of and have been carrying out attacks and kidnaps over long distances across the Sahel. Kidnapping for ransom is the primary source of finance for JNIM. Criminal gangs also carry out kidnapping for terrorist groups in return for financial rewards.⁶⁵ These terrorists also use kidnappings in negotiating for the release of their members captured by security forces across the Sahel.⁶⁶

2.5 How Terrorism is funded in the Sahel Region of West Africa

Due to the operational cost involved in carrying out terrorism activities and operations, terrorist groups look for a lot of avenues for fund to be able to execute their operations effectively. The use of modern machinery, including cars, motorbikes and other means of transport and communication require huge sums of money for them to be able to purchase these items. Funds are needed for their personal upkeep, day to day administration and also payment of fighters and other collaborators which includes informants. To be able to do all these, the terrorist groups in the Sahel look for funds from a lot of sources. Ana Núñez Cifuentes, in an opinion paper, “*The Sahel and terrorist financing: diversity and financial system opportunities*”, he asserts that, in a report carried out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), it was estimated that more than €40.5 billion are lost annually in illicit flows for terrorist financing in West Africa.⁶⁷

Kidnapping for ransom, as mentioned earlier, is one of the primary sources of finance for terrorist groups operating in the West African Sahel. They target foreign aid workers, foreign nationals, and other important people within these countries that they operate and the victims who are viewed as legitimate targets are only released after large sums of monies have been paid to these terrorists. Reports suggest that, criminal gangs in cooperation with these terrorists also carry out kidnapping for terrorist groups in return for financial rewards.⁶⁸ It is estimated that, between 2008 and 2013, AQIM alone made about \$100,000,000 from kidnappings through the kidnapping of employees of multinationals, tourists, aid workers and diplomats of Western origin who are worth millions of euros for these terrorists.⁶⁹

Some of these terrorists also engage in acts of robbery and looting to finance their activities. They raid, loot and rob villages and towns in the central Sahel including farms, military bases

and police stations. These stolen goods out the robberies and looting perpetrated is then resold re-sold in an inflationary manner.⁷⁰ They also attack villages and towns during market days to get cash and food items. Terrorist groups such as BH, AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun and Ansar Dine all participate in these robberies.⁷¹

Extortion of money from officials and civilians is another means by which these terrorists are able to sustain and maintain their operations across the Sahel. This is common means of getting fund are mainly used by the AQIM and its affiliate BH. They do this through tax collection or protection fees from traders for them to operate within places where these terrorists operate. There are occasions where for officials or politicians to able get information from these terrorists, they are coerced or intimidated to pay for the information. Cifuentes accounts that, a BH member that was arrested in 2012 confessed that, some members of government were making "personal" donations to the terrorist group. Further investigation conducted on his bank account proved that, indeed, payments were made for such protection.⁷² Donations and Zakat collected from mosques is another exploitable form of making money to finance terrorism. In Mali and Niger as accounted by Cifuentes, the terrorist groups raise funds from merchants and sympathizers and act as intermediaries between families raising funds in the form of Zakat to finance their activities.⁷³

The extraction and sale of natural resources is also another means through which these terrorists fund their activities. The Sahel region of these countries are rich in minerals and other natural resources and due to how the sector is affected by weak regulation and supervision of illegal artisanal mining, the terrorist operating in these areas have taken advantage of the situation to mine and trade in tons of illicit gold that they use to fund their activities. It is estimated that more than 30 tons of illicit gold are exported annually for €832,000,000 between Burkina Faso and Mali. Since the mining areas are unprotected from these terrorist groups, they attack the mining centres and take control of these sites. They are also hired by locals to protect these

mining centres. The funds acquired through the illicit sale of gold and other minerals are used by these Jihadist Jihadists use to spread their ideologies and recruit sympathizers from towns and communities near mines, and use the explosives used at the mine to commit attacks. Through the exploitation of minerals resources such as phosphate, phosphorus, oil and sulphur, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are able finance their activities.⁷⁴

These terrorist groups also take advantage of the fisheries, agriculture and livestock sectors in the Sahel to finance their activities. The fisheries, agricultural and livestock sector provides a vital agricultural importance to the economies of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and it is the main source of income for the majority of the population in this region. The terrorist in this region however have resorted to livestock and other agricultural products theft and sell these products in local markets to finance their activities.⁷⁵ It has been reported that this livestock that is stolen from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger within the region are sent to be sold below market prices in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. The money accumulated from the sale of these livestock and other agricultural products is used to purchase more weapons, fuel, food, and motorbikes, which are much preferred due to ample supply and easy mobility across the Sahel, the report says.⁷⁶

Illicit activities such as migrant trafficking and drug trafficking is another means through which these terrorist organisations finance their activities. The Sahel, which is one of the most used routes in trafficking drugs to Europe from Latin American, the terrorist groups operating in the Sahel has got involved in this drug trafficking to beef up their finances and activities.⁷⁷ Due to its porous borders and the lack of control of the remote areas by governments in the region, the trafficking of drugs to Europe through this route with the aid of the terrorist who make large sums of money through this trade has become rampant with terrorist groups such as AQIM and others engaging in this trade.⁷⁸ Human trafficking is one the sources of income for terrorist groups in the Region. Migrants en route to Europe from the Western and Eastern coast of Africa

use the Sahel as their route to Europe and in both routes human trafficking and smuggling are an important source of income for criminal organizations, terrorist groups, militias and for some tribes who capture some of these migrants and sell them off to other parts of Europe and the Middle East and some, their vital organs harvested and sold on the black market.⁷⁹

2.6 Terrorist Groups in the Sahel Region of West Africa

All the terrorist organizations that operating in the Sahel region of these countries – Burkina Faso, Niger and have common ideologies and are motivated by the same incentives. Just like Al Qaeda and ISIS, they operate on the same ideologies with the aim of establishing an Islamic Caliphate and to enforce strict shariah laws in the Sahel. Merging and coming together with already existing groups that have been fighting governments and countries in the Sahel for decades, since the Malian uprising, these groups, using the Sahel as their dwelling place have attacked states (Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger) and neighbouring states of the Sahel. There are about 6 main terror organisations that operate in this region — the ISGS, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), the Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, the local al-Qaeda branch which is Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Boko Haram.

2.6.1 Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

According to Arieff (in Kfir, 2018), the AQIM came into existence and started operating in the 1990s, when it operated as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, a branch of the Algerian-based Groupe Islamique Armé later embracing the al-Qaeda brand in 2006 with the objective of expanding its existing network in North Africa and the Sahel region. Embracing the brand of al-Qaeda emanated mainly because of how effective (brutal) counteroffensive measures adopted by the Algerian government forces were making it irrelevant as it begun losing most its recruits and the ability to carry out effective operations against its targets. Kfir

also posits that the group consist of two main branches – the Katibas – which are further divided into subgroups called the facilas. Each of these facillas are further made up of two sariyas (platoons) with membership from 12 to 18 and this may be further organized into smaller cells as this provides the katibas and the fassilas with some form of autonomy allows them to coordinate their day-today interactions and activities within the local community in which they operate that is synonymous with that of al-Qaeda. By embedding itself into the local community and tribes as Kfir, the group spreads its wealth by “paying above the market price for some goods and services, distributing money, treating the sick with medicine, buying SIM cards and airtime for people, and marrying “not into powerful families but poor local lineages, deliberately taking the side of the impoverished” Kfir, argues.⁸⁰

The GSPC later AQIM pursued an agenda of extending its activities beyond Algeria to the Sahel and North Africa in general. In 2007, its merger between Al Qaeda solidified this vision of extending its reach beyond the borders of Algeria when it changed its name Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Like, Al Qaeda, AQIM support and champion the Salafi-jihadism ideology that detest the West with the aim of establishing an Islamic caliphate across the Sahara and Sahel ruled and governed by a caliph with sharia law. In the initial stages of its operation, AQIM started using Al Qaeda’s tactics of suicide bombings and other explosive devices to carry out its attacks against government forces and also targeting foreign institutions. These tactics and methods were abandoned in the end due to the decline in the support of their activities and the unavailability of recruits.⁸¹ As the pressure from the Algerian government on the group became intense and unbearable, they moved out and extended their operations outside of Algeria to the other parts of North Africa and the Sahel in general.

In the events leading up after its merger with Al Qaeda, the group have carried out series of terror campaigns across North Africa and the Sahel. These attacks carried out have been in the form of synchronised bombings, suicide attacks and kidnappings aimed at various police

stations, civilians, government buildings and officials and foreigners across Algeria and the North Africa including Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

In the aftermath of the uprising events in Northern Mali in 2012, the group capitalised on the security vacuum created by the insurgency and moved its operation into Northern Mali and the Sahel Region providing a safe haven for the group and its fighters. Forming alliance with local groups and Ansar Dine, the terror group was able to control large area of the Sahel by opening training camps and implementing Sharia laws.⁸² By gaining the trust of the people through the alliances they formed when the people lost trust in the government and their local leaders coupled with decline legitimacy of the state, it began implementing its own governance system confined within the territory it controlled by employing the locals, embarking on income generating activities, and also recruiting aids such as guides, drivers, informers and paramedical staff. The group also supplied of foodstuffs and other essential commodities such as fuel, tyres, spare parts, and weapons. It also gave subcontracting hostage taking and hostage keeping in the area it controlled. Solidifying its presence and control of the Sahel away from Algeria, AQIM began to recruit its members from other parts of Africa such as Niger, Tunisia, Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania, and other areas with some recruits coming from the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to wage jihad and create a caliphate in the Sahel. AQIM has coordinated series of attacks against government forces and military installations across Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Their attacks have also included the UN forces, civilians, government officials and foreigners. With the improvised explosive device (IED), shootings, suicide bombings against its targets, their attacks have claimed several lives across the Sahel Region.⁸³

The group also focuses on engaging in criminal activities for financial gain such as kidnapping for ransom which is its main source of income of financing its activities across the Sahel, drug trafficking and illegal smuggling of illegal contraband through routes in the Sahel to Europe.

These drugs are mostly brought inland from the shores of Benin, Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Togo from South America. Benin, and Ghana in West Africa. ⁸⁴

2.6.2 Ansar Dine

Ansar Dine, one of the terrorist groups operating the Sahel is translated as “Defenders of the Faith,” and also known as Ansar al-Din is a Tuareg militant Islamist group led by Iyad Ag Ghaly. Just like the AQIM, it also begun the quest of establishing a Shariah state with its main target being westerners and peacekeepers. The group is also known for involving itself in the 2012 Malian coup that created a security vacuum in the north of Mali. When the Malian military staged a coup and ousted the Malian president in 2012 and the Tuareg rebels, mainly arriving from Libya led by the MNLA launched an uprising to take over northern Mali, Ansar Dine and other groups such as the MNLA, AQIM and the MUJAO took advantage of the security vacuum created by the uprising and invaded northern Mali, defeating the security forces of Mali and occupying the area in the process. In the aftermath of these events, Ansar Dine took control of seized new territory and took over from MNLA with the aim of installing Shariah law. These terrorist groups - Ansar Dine, AQIM and MUJAO – ended their alliance MNLA and kicked it out mainly because of the MNLA’s objective of establishing a secular state not meeting their objective of establishing a caliphate ruled by sharia law. ⁸⁵

After expelling the MNLA, Ansar Dine then established Shariah law in the territory it controlled in northern Mali, the group propagated its anti-western agenda by banning a lot of activities such as alcohol drinking, smoking, the visiting of cemetery on Friday and the playing of football. The wearing of veils (hijab) by all women was also enforced in the territory. It embarked on series of attacks on the Malian, French and UN peacekeepers including civilians and foreigners.⁸⁶ Some of these attacks have been in the form of suicide bombing which detonate cars, ambushing of forces with the use of explosives, attacking army and military

bases and installations and shooting of civilians using rockets, mortars and IED. Even though the French intervention in 2013 brought Ansa Dine's activities to a halt and also led the group to remain dormant, the group resurfaced again in 2015 and carried out several terrorist attacks.⁸⁷

Ansar Dine merged with FLM – a group that initially broke away from it – Al Mourabitoun, and the Sahara branch of AQIM to form Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) in March 2017. These groups reiterated their wish to fulfill Al Qaeda's (AQ) ideological agenda of creating a caliphate in the Sahel. The group – JNIM – pledged their allegiance to Al Qaeda and conducted several attacks in Mali and in Burkina Faso afterwards.⁸⁸

2.6.3 Movement for Divine Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA)

Movement for Divine Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) is a jihadist group made up of mostly of southern Saharans who broke away from the AQIM in December 2011. Because its leader, Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, is Mauritanian, MUJWA is generally seen as a foreign organization even though several of its most prominent members are Malian nationals, mainly Lamhar Arabs. Asfura-Heim notes, "The MUJWA have developed a reputation for using car bombs and have stated that they intend to conduct suicide attacks in Mali's capital as well as the capitals of other African nations whose troops are fighting in Mali." It is believed to be heavily funded by drug and ransom money, and some observers speculate that the group may in essence be little more than a front for criminal activities.⁸⁹

2.6.4 Boko Haram

Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a "pure" Islamic state ruled by sharia law. Walker, highlighting

on Boko Haram's deadly activities notes, "Since August 2011 Boko Haram has planted bombs almost weekly in public or in churches in Nigeria's northeast. The group has also broadened its targets to include setting fire to schools. In March 2012, some twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, and as many as 10,000 pupils were forced out of education".⁹⁰ Whereas the emergence of Boko Haram has often been associated with Mohammed Yusuf, the group traces its early beginnings in 1995 as a religious study group called the Muslim Youth Organization led by Abubakar Lawan at the University of Maiduguri in Borno state, northern Nigeria. However, it was in the early 2000s that Boko Haram emerged as an extremist religious organization advocating for the strict implementation of Sharia law according to the group's own radical interpretations.⁹¹

Since 2009, Boko Haram's reign of terror has been the biggest security challenge especially to Nigeria where the group is dominant and in the larger Sahel region. The group has evolved from their previous demands for strict adherence to Sharia laws to the pursuing the establishment of an Islamic State in West Africa. This shift has also seen the group transform how it conducts its terror campaigns. Notably, Boko Haram has become a more organised terrorist organization with defined chain of command, ideology, military organization, intelligence gathering capabilities, recruitment drives, access to financing, ownership of high-power military hardware and training of members. In the Sahel, the large part of the region is ungoverned and has provided grounds for violent groups such as Boko Haram to flourish, engage in conflict with local communities, train, recruit new members, and generate new support from other similar ideologically driven terror groups internationally. Since 2009, the clash between Boko Haram and the civilian central government of Nigeria has been most felt by civilians in the Muslim-dominated north-eastern Nigeria and the neighbouring states in the Lake Chad Basin such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad.⁹²

The Crisis Group reports, *“Boko Haram’s activities have significantly expanded beyond the geographical confines of Nigeria. After causing waves of displacements from Nigeria since 2013, Boko Haram started leading violent operations in Niger in 2015, mainly in the border region of Diffa. While the situation normalised between 2017 and 2018, an upsurge of violence has been observed since the end of 2018.”*⁹³ In Niger, Boko Haram has continued to attack government forces, government installations and civilians. The conflict has disrupted this poor country’s development, especially public finances, and destabilised the south east, the main scene of armed clashes. The Diffa region has been suffering from consistent Boko Haram attacks. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally displaced people only survive thanks to foreign aid. Recourse to local vigilante committees and reprisals by Boko Haram against anyone who collaborates with the army have created a difficult atmosphere in which local score-settling, collective fear and informants are all ingredients of a dangerously toxic brew. On the shores of Lake Chad, in the extreme east of Diffa region, Boko Haram’s presence has aggravated intercommunal tensions, which have degenerated into deadly conflicts.” Boko Haram also formed alliance with other terrorist groups in the Sahel, and together, they have been able to coordinated and carry out several attacks in Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.⁹⁴

2.7 Causes of Terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa

2.7.1 Religion

In the Sahel, “religiously motivated terrorists often follow a political objective: establishing a regime based on Islam, defined in religious terms”. “It is a bilateral relationship between fervent religious believers and God, in which there is no possibility of dialogue or understanding with others, only the establishment of the demand for righteous combat.” This “concept explains why religious terrorism has an international scope, because even if it starts at a regional or national level”, the group of “enemies” “encompasses all those who are distinct

from the terrorist group. Messianism is the engine of this activity, and martyrdom, its most potent weapon. Death from fighting is presented as a sacred act and reflects the certainty of the members of these groups of the truth to their ideology”.⁹⁵ These groups – ISWAP, AQIM, Ansar Dine, Movement for MOJWA and Boko Haram – use religion as the basis for which they carry out their attacks. Islamic religious terrorism in the Sahel “arises as a response to colonialism and the practice of soft power by Western countries in Arab and Islamic cultures, which has been reinforced through the current of Islamic fundamentalism”.

“Jihadism” is the principal term used for the violent ideologies that these violent extremist organisations in the Sahel such as AQIM, Ansa Dine, “under the banner of their narrow interpretation” of the word “Jihad.” Most Jihadist ideologies follow an ultra-orthodox Sunni interpretation of Islam that can be described as “radical” or “extremist” in nature and implementation. The “Jihadist movements base their actions” on what they view as a “Just War” paradigm according to “their respective interpretations and frustrations pertaining to foreign and domestic policies of governments that they deem hostile to (Salafist) Islam and its principles”. The vast majority of al-Qaeda-type Jihadist organizations have been Sunni, and, in fact, embrace Salafism. The concept of Salafism, which means “antecedent,” is based on the belief that the “true” and “ideal” interpretation of Islam is found in the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the 7th century AD. Thus, Salafists promote the idea of replicating Islamic society of the Prophet’s 7th century prototype of the “Islamic State” in today’s world. That requires applying “not just the ‘spirit’ but [the] ‘letter’ of the law, “which is what sets them apart from their mainstream counterparts.” Some Salafists “embrace violent Jihadism. Salafism was at odds with the concept of jihadism –itself a violent offshoot of Salafism– as practiced by groups such as al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Ansa Dine, AQIM and other terrorist groups in the Sahel that sought to use force to manifest their Islamist ideology”.⁹⁶

2.7.2 Socio-Economic Causes

Socio-Economic factors is the main factor behind the rise of extremists in the Sahel. The socio-economic dimensions are fed by structural and continuing dissatisfaction of marginalized and vulnerable populations in the Sahel.

Extreme poverty throughout the region is a key factor in the rise of terrorism in the Sahel. In a draft report, Conkar, highlighting on the socio-economic problems of the Sahel argues, “The states of the Sahel exist in a state of fragility and generally occupy the lower end of international indexes ranking stability and development. 40% of the population live below the poverty line and the region's level of development is among the world’s lowest. The Sahel states are also amongst those countries with the highest employment rates in the agricultural sector, with Chad at the highest level (87%). Climate change in this arid region poses a particularly acute set of economic and humanitarian challenges. More than 90% of the workforce is employed in the informal sector and this leaves these workers and their families highly vulnerable to climatic or man-made shocks.” Terrorist groups have capitalised on this to lure people into their organisations which provides some livelihood for these people.⁹⁷

In a report by the Foundation for European Progressive Studies, it reports that, “although young people represent the largest segment of the population in all Sahel countries, their social status and economic opportunities are limited. Precarious living conditions and social marginalisation mean that young unemployed men are effectively prevented from marrying and acquiring a modicum of social status. Due to some of these precarious conditions the youth are particularly vulnerable and violent extremist groups often use the bait of easy money to entice a deprived and alienated younger generation by recruiting them to join their activities”.⁹⁸

In a report published by the UN, it notes, “populations living in remote, marginalised areas in the Sahel have suffered from notably harsh social and economic inequalities and this stoke a

pervasive sense of grievance. Tens of millions of pastoral farmers and nomads of the Sahel are particularly affected by the inequalities in access to basic services. In most countries in the Sahel, populations suffer from economic and social disparities that contribute to the people's grievances against the central authorities. For example, underdevelopment in Burkina Faso's Northern provinces, where insurgents are most active is due to 50 years behind the rest of lags behind the rest of the country. Burkina Faso's north has been relatively marginalized, with far fewer services, state facilities and development projects than elsewhere. As a result, many people feel abandoned and distrust the government's security forces. That distrust is deepened by the fact that few officials come from the Peulh or Fulani ethnic group that predominates in the north".⁹⁹ In Mali, the lack of economic development in the north and the resentment of local populations against the state, which created a security vacuum in the north presented terrorist groups with an opportunity to settle.¹⁰⁰

2.7.3 Political Instability

Several explanations of ongoing instability dynamics have been identified and labelled, ranging from poor governance (e.g., the rapacity of ruling elites) to ethnic and kinship-based rivalry as well as the rise of religious extremism (local jihadist groups more or less affiliated to global terror constellations). Rampant organised crime is often cited in this context as a key destabilising factor. The "standard narrative has long been one whereby the immense Sahara space and the semi-arid regions along its shores" are depicted as "ungoverned spaces" – i.e., areas where no authorities are exercised and that, accordingly, have become home of terrorists, bandits and criminals argued, Rabasa et al.¹⁰¹

In Mali, according to the Relief web in a statement, "rebellion in the north by heavily armed, primarily Tuareg rebel groups, together with weak governance in Bamako, corruption, and an ineffectual counterterrorism response, culminated in a March 2012 coup d'état. Terrorist and

extremist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), exploited the resulting political vacuum and seized control of the northern two-thirds of Mali. Terrorists enjoyed greater freedom of movement and, temporarily, access to a larger pool of potential recruits and training opportunities.” Relief Web further states that, at the same time, transnational networks of criminal activities are well-established used as smuggling routes to traffic weapons, drugs and people which is on the increase.¹⁰²

In Burkina Faso, as the Conversation News Agency reports, “the rise in attacks by terrorist is largely attributable to the weakening of the state over the last ten years. This has been driven by political instability. For instance, 2011 saw clashes between police and students and a military mutiny, during which several soldiers committed acts of theft and pillage against the populace. With some difficulty, the then-president Blaise Compaoré eventually re-established control. He dissolved the government to appease critics. But hostilities flared up again when he proposed a change to the constitution to run in the 2015 presidential election. As parliamentarians prepared to vote on the constitutional amendment, he was overthrown in a popular uprising in 2014. In September 2015, after a period of uncertainty during which the army temporarily took power, the Regiment of Presidential Security attempted a coup.” It added that, in the aftermath of this, the transitional government set up organised a presidential election that brought former prime minister and president of the National Assembly, Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, to the nation’s highest office. Since he was elected, he has had some resistance from groups who have questioned his capabilities of handling the country’s complex issues.¹⁰³

A weakened central power makes it easier for violent groups – like highway bandits, local militias and armed bands of jihadists – to emerge and thrive. These groups carry out various forms of violence, from pillaging to religiously motivated attacks. Jihadi groups flourish in this growing atmosphere of insecurity.¹⁰⁴

2.7.4 Climate Change and Resource Scarcity

Foundation for European Progressive Studies in a paper accounts that, “the management and use of natural resources in the Sahel are closely linked to matters related to intra-regional mobility. The overwhelming majority of those living in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso subsist through agriculture and pastoralism. These activities are obviously highly dependent on climatic and seasonal factors: in the rainy season, flooding makes it essential to herd livestock to dry areas, while rice growing takes place in flooded areas. In the dry season, once farmers have harvested their rice crops, the livestock is returned from northern deserts to the grass fields of the south. Climate change and conflict, however, have begun to alter the traditional movement of people and livestock, and this has injected enormous uncertainty into the lives of those dependent on these traditional patterns”.¹⁰⁵


The Foundation for European Progressive Studies again argues that, “the lack of access to sufficient amount of water for irrigation, poor soil, drought and irregular rainfall as well as limited employment in the rural areas have undermined pastoral and farming economies and have instead become catalysts for mass migration”¹⁰⁶. They also note, “Competition for access to water and land has also long fomented tensions between vulnerable communities in the region. In recent years, desertification and resource scarcity engendered by climate change as well as demographic pressure and poor governance have exacerbated these tensions and undermined the fragile links between communities and their environment. This increasingly results in violent clashes that undermine regional security and stability. These conflicts, in turn, serve the interest of violent extremist groups that fit these events into their nefarious narratives, thereby generating new opportunities to exploit dissatisfaction and economic hardship in order to recruit new members and to justify violence”.¹⁰⁷

2.8 Conclusion

The three countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – have been at the hotbed of a dynamic mix of violence that has confronted the region ever since the insurgency that was launched by the Tuareg rebels who subsequent pushed out by the extremists Islamist groups that captured northern Mali in 2012 and turned the north of the country and other parts of the Sahel in a Sharia state. France intervened military to crush the insurgency in 2013 but is now overhauling its Operation Barkhane and planning to leave the country. The UN and Ecowas also intervened to help prevent the spread of terrorism to bring stability to the region but all these have not yielded the needed results.

The main terrorist groups operating in the Sahel are the al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin, which is a coalition of armed groups widespread across the Sahel and North Africa and has engaged in negotiations with leaders in Mali and Burkina Faso; secondly, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, which is ISIS/ISIL branch that is more brutal in its activities and unwilling to negotiate with the Sahel states governments. These terrorist groups have exploited pre-existing communal tensions between tribes in the region and forming alliances with ethnic armed groups (militias).

The next Chapter will look at the socio-economic effects of the terrorist activities in the Sahel and the counter terrorism measures put in place to help curb the menace, and also, how effective it has been in the fight against terrorist activities in the Region.



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CHAPTER THREE

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL REGION OF WEST AFRICA – BURKINA FASO, MALI AND NIGER

3.0 Introduction

This chapter forms the core matter of the thesis. It will discuss the socio-economic effects of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the Sahel – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. The chapter first gives a brief history of terrorist insurgency in the Sahel region of West Africa. It also discusses the socio-economic effects of terrorism in the Sahel. The chapter also looks at the various counterterrorism measures taken to address and tackle terrorist activities and also, how effective their implementation have been in dealing with terrorism in the Sahel.

3.1 Terrorist insurgency in the Sahel Region of West Africa

As indicated in Chapter Two, terrorism and acts of insurgency in the Sahel Region of West Africa is not new to the region. Even though the Sahel region has been experiencing pockets of terrorist activities post-independence era, that's from the early 1960s throughout the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s to the 2000s, the beginning of the Tuareg insurgency against the government of Mali in Northern Mali in 2012 and the subsequent coup that followed suit saw major regional problem of insecurity that manifested into militancy and terrorism which spread across the region into neighbouring countries Burkina Faso and Niger. This Region, which has already been ravaged with a long history of instability due to civil wars, religious conflicts, ethnic and political conflicts have been faced with its greatest threat – terrorism and its related activities – since the emergence of terrorist groups and their activities after the 2012 uprising by the Tuareg rebels in Northern Mali. The activities of these terrorist groups have threatened national and human security, socio-economic and sustainable development of the region. The Sahel region of West Africa, which covers Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger is one the least developed

and poorest region in Africa and the world as a whole. These already existing factors – famine, marginalisation of minority groups, bad governance, corruption, unemployment and the exclusion of minority groups in governance – which has been the cause of insurgency and uprising in the past decades has been the main cause of the recent rise of radicalisation and terrorist activities, emergence of violence and insecurity that have plagued this region.

The 2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali and its aftermath marked the beginning of the current terrorists and extremist insurgency characterised with violence and terror in the Sahel region of West Africa. Beginning in Mali, these acts of terror eventually spread across the region to neighbouring countries ¹Burkina Faso and Niger. According to Giuseppe, taking advantage of the region's porous borders, these transnational extremists took control of the political vacuums existing in the Sahel and capitalised on the deep resentment of locals and ethnicities such as the Tuareg, Arab tribes, Moors, Peul, Songhai and Fulani communities in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso who have been marginalised towards central authorities.² “Motivated by racial, religious, ethnic, tribal, and national ideologies, these militants and groups include groups as AQIM, Boko Haram, Ansaru, Ansar Dine, Ansar al-Sharia, MJUAO, MLNA, other militant recruits, and displaced persons”.³ These groups presented themselves as “defenders of the local population and the redeemers from the alleged abuses perpetrated against them by the states Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.” The Jihadist-Salafist leaders of these groups – especially of AQIM – in order to gain trust, influence in local dynamics and reinforce the local communities' confidence in them have entered marriages and kinship affiliations in the local communities where they operate in these countries.⁴ Adding to this, Giuseppe posits that, “the marginalisation of neglected communities from the key formal economic sectors that has been persistent over the years also led to the emergence of an informal economy in arms and drug smuggling, as well as contraband in basic necessities, thus indirectly contributing to the growth of Islamist extremism”.⁵

Since the rise of the insurgency in 2012 by Islamist militants in the Sahel – groups affiliated to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI) – occupied the north of the country, there have soaring number of attacks which has persisted till recent years against the states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and their citizens.⁶ According to Hassane Koné, Senior Research Associate, Institute of Security Studies (ISS) Office for West Africa, strengthening armed rebellions and rebel movements, weapons acquired and transferred from Lybia during the uprising fast tracked and aided the activities of terror groups such as Movement for Jihad in West Africa, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb and other non-state groups operating in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin. Since September 2013 however, as Hassan further notes, the supply of weapons decreased for a number of reasons: the first has to do with the onset of the Libyan civil war which made it impossible for weapons to be transferred since the rebels or warring factions needed these weapons to fight; and secondly, the increased military and international coalition forces presence along the borders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger made it impossible for these rebels to get access to these weapons supplied from Libya since these forces intercepted and confiscated weapons meant or destined for armed and terror groups operating in the Sahel.⁷

According Hassan Koene, the weapons from Libya is just one source of the supplies. He posits that other sources of “supply comes from weapons diverted from poorly controlled national stockpiles, as well as arms trafficking from the various crises that have shaken West Africa – in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Niger. Some West African ports, identified by the Small Arms Survey as illicit trafficking routes, are also allegedly used for the transport of arms. He again adds that recent attacks by these groups on isolated military barracks – during which equipment was stolen – shows that violent extremists are getting their weapons from looted military barracks”. “Terror groups in the Sahel now launch large-scale attacks on military garrisons or positions, exploiting their vulnerabilities. Using the element of surprise, attackers

arrive in large numbers, on motorcycles or in pick-up trucks. They surround the camp and pound it with mortar shells or rockets to disrupt its defences. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices are used to clear the way for the assault on multiple fronts. Soldiers are overwhelmed and the attackers gain control of the outposts and seize weapons, ammunition and other materials”, he added.⁸ Video footages of fighters theatrically displaying quantities of arms and ammunition stolen during attacks on military camps of Inates in Niger, Indelimane in Mali and Koutougou in Burkina Faso were shown in 2019, Koene adds.⁹ These weapons have aided these terrorist groups to carry out their scale of attacks over the years in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger which have had devastating consequences on the socio-economic development of these countries.

Since these extremist groups started their violent terror attacks that begun in 2012 in Mali spreading to neighbouring countries Niger and Burkina Faso and this has led to the death toll of civilians and security agents rising on daily basis. Informing the UN Security Council on the situation in the central Sahel in 2019, Mohammed Ibn Chambas, the UN envoy for the region, notes, “the attacks have increased five-fold in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger since 2016 with more than 4,000 deaths reported in 2019 compared with an estimated 770 deaths three years before. He added that, in Burkina Faso, the death toll rose from about 80 in 2016 to more than 1,800 in 2019”.¹⁰ In a report published by the International Rescue Committee, it stated that, “civilian deaths in the region rose by a staggering 1870% in 2019 compared to 2016, with civilian deaths linked to militias increasing by 8,500% in just four years from 2015 to 2019”. It continued to state that “civilians in the Central Sahel are worse off in 2020 by nearly every measure – more likely to need humanitarian aid, be displaced, face food insecurity, or die from conflict – than at any other point in the previous decade. More than 7 million people are acutely food insecure – a tripling since last year – and this number is expected to grow to almost 13 million by the end of the year 2020”.¹¹

Blockading villages and also “isolating some areas under their control by enforcing repressive policies based upon their interpretation of Islam, these Islamist armed groups have abducted or killed at least, 300 community and religious leaders, state officials and their family members in the tri-border area since 2018. It has also been reported that between 2012-2018 these Islamist armed groups have committed crimes various forms of crimes – murder, torture, recruitment of children, maiming, rape and sexual violence – against humanity as well as attacks against humanitarian workers and MINUSMA.” They have routinely attacked and looted civilian infrastructure which includes places of worship, schools and health centres. These extremist groups have also targeted secular state education across these central Sahelian states in the region, burning schools and threatening, abducting or killing teachers.¹² In 2020, almost “7,000 people were being killed in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso and sexual violence was on the rise against women and children and more than 13 million people were in need of humanitarian support”.¹³

The POLITICO again in a news report notes, “these Armed groups have also used landmines and improvised explosive devices, indiscriminately killing and maiming more than 450 civilians in Burkina Faso and Mali during 2020. One hundred and forty-five MINUSMA peacekeepers have been killed since July 2013, including 12 this year.¹⁴ In November 2020, the terrorist group ISGS launched attacks on military bases in Mali, at Tabankort and Indelimane, which claimed the lives of 92 soldiers and in December the same year, the group said it had killed 42 people – 35 of them civilians – in Arbinda in Burkina Faso. More than 170 soldiers have died in two recent ISGS attacks in Niger”. Several other terrorist groups have carried out various forms of attacks on military bases across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger since the onset of the insurgency in the region. These attacks have claimed the lives of thousands of security agents and civilians and the death toll keeps increasing daily.¹⁵

As the figure below reported by the Vision for Humanity Organisation taken from the Global Terrorism Index 2022 produced by Institute for Economics & Peace indicates, across every country other than Chad and Mauritania in the region, and every country in the Sahel other than these two countries recorded deaths from terrorism of at least 40 in the year 2021. In these countries – Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali – in 2021, the total deaths recorded were 734, 588 and 574, respectively, reports, the Vision for Humanity.¹⁶

Incidents and deaths from terrorism in the Sahel, 2007–2021




Figure 1. Trends in Terrorist incidents and deaths from terrorism. Vision for Humanity, 2022.¹⁷

These terrorist groups have exploited the already “existing ethnic tensions in the Sahel, where competition between communities has been exacerbated by climate change and demographic pressure on scant resources by recruiting fighters from pastoralist Fulani communities, leading others to form self-defence groups”. Due to the weapons availability in the region which are easily obtained due criminal networks, these groups are able to carry out various forms of attacks against each other. Attempts by Malian authorities to disarm these militias have not

yielded any positive results.¹⁸ The POLITICO reports in article published on its website that, “attacks by Islamist armed groups against civilians in the Central Sahel have become more frequent during 2021. In the volatile Tillabéri and Tahoua regions of western Niger, more than 600 civilians have been killed this year, over five times more than in 2020”. In November 69 people from a community “self-defence group” were killed by a suspected Islamist armed group in Tillabéri region. “In northern Burkina Faso, alleged child soldiers affiliated with the so-called Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims perpetrated the deadliest attack in the country since 2015, killing over 130 people in Solhan, Yagha Province, on 5 June.¹⁹ These attacks have led to a devastating humanitarian crisis that have confronted the region with over 2.1 million people being internally displaced with about 1.4 million in Burkina Faso alone since the beginning of the insurgency”.²⁰


In Mali since the rise of the insurgency, there have been numerous attacks against civilians and the Military with some notable ones as reported by the UK government being: “2 April 2021, terrorists attack on MINUSMA camp in Aguelhok, which resulted in the death of four peacekeepers; On 15 March 2021, terrorists attacks a Malian Army security post in Tessit, killing 33 soldiers; 14 June 2020, terrorists attacked a Malian military convey approximately 160km north of Segou town, killing 24 soldiers; On 6 June 2020, terrorists conducted an attack in the area of Sarakala, Segou region, resulting in Malian Army vehicles and weapons being stolen; On 6 April 2020, terrorists attacked a Malian military base in Bamba, Gao region, killing 25 soldiers; On 26 January 2020, terrorists attacked a Malian military camp in Sokolo, Segou region, killing 20 soldiers; On 24 February 2019, insurgents attacked the Koulikoro Training Centre, the main training base in Mali for the European Union Training Mission, approximately 55km northeast of Bamako. Four Malian military personnel were injured; In June 2017, terrorists attacked Le Campement resort in Kangaba, on the outskirts of Bamako, which resulted in a number of deaths; In March 2016, gunmen attacked the headquarters of the

European Union Training Mission in the centre of Bamako; In November 2015, terrorists attacked the Radisson Hotel in Bamako, killing a number of hostages including foreign nationals.”²¹ Also in Niger, as reported by the UK government:

“There have been multiple recent attacks in Niger, particularly in the Diffa and Tillabéri regions. Notable recent attacks include: On 21 March 2021 over 137 people were killed in attacks in the Tahoua region; On 16 March 2021 over 58 people were killed in attacks in Banibangou in the Tillabéri region; On 2 January 2021 over 100 people were killed in attacks on two vilages (Tchoma Bangou and Zaroumadareye) in the Tillabéri region; On 21 December 2020, terrorists killed 7 Nigerien soldiers in an encounter in the village of Taroum, in the region of Tillabéri; On 12 December 2020, terrorists killed 35 people in the village of Toumour in the region of Diffa, close to the border with Nigeria; On 9 August 2020, gunmen killed 8 people, including 6 French nationals, at a giraffe reserve in Kouré; on 9 January 2020, terrorists killed 89 Nigerien soldiers at their base in Chinegodrar, Tillabéri; on 10 December 2019, terrorists killed 71 Nigerien soldiers at their base in Inates.”²²


In Burkina Faso, since the insurgency began, there have been deadly attacks security forces in and civilians with these Jihadist killing several civilians and security personnel. “JNIM has carried out attacks in the north and northwest, while the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is mainly active in the east and in the border region of neighboring Niger. These numerous attacks have led to the death of more than 2,000 people have died since 2016.”²³

From the figure below, it is evident that terrorist attacks and activities have increased with the past decade with terrorist activities concentrated along the border regions of the Sahel where government control is generally low giving room for the terrorists to operate.



Terrorist attacks in the Sahel, 2007–2021

Most terrorist attacks occur away from major urban centers.



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

Figure 2. Distribution of terrorist attacks in the Sahel 2007 – 2021. Vision for Humanity, 2022.²⁴

According to Mr Richard Apau who was with the African Centre for Counter Terrorism Research, recently and especially during the Covid era, there have been an increase in the attacks in the Central Sahel countries by these extremist groups operating in the region. He adds the threat is still real especially in Northern Mali, Burkina Faso and the Selibeli region in Niger. According to Mr Apau, one would have expected that the advent of COVID-19 which came with its own devastating effects would have reduced the scale of attacks but rather, these terrorist groups are still launching their attacks on civilians and military personnel at large of these central Sahel States.²⁵ According to Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso, the situation in the Sahel is one that is scary and very unpredictable which needs urgent measures of the countries concerned – Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and the International Community – precisely because the causes of terrorism has not been precisely focused. He adds that the situation is very volatile since acts of terrorism are consistently perpetrated by these terrorists' groups and currently on the African continent, 75 percent of terrorists' activities is located in the Sahel Region of West Africa.²⁶ Speaking on the current situation in the Sahel, Dr Festus Aubyn also notes that, looking at West Africa currently, the Sahel is the epicentre of terrorism in West Africa especially the confluence

between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. He adds that although there have been some isolated cases of attacks in the region, comparing pre COVID era to now, the intensity of attacks have been minimal but in terms of geographical expansion, these terrorists are still expanding especially to the coastal areas.²⁷ According to the GTI, the three of the ten most impacted countries due to terrorism in 2021 are in the Sahel region which are Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. These three countries according to the GTI recorded substantial rise in terrorism related deaths of 81, 174 and 74 respectively in 2021.²⁸


3.2 Social Effects of Terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa

The social effects of terrorism on countries in the Sahel region of West Africa has been very devastating during these past years of terrorist activities. Terrorists' activities in the Sahel has destroyed the social structure and order, governance of society, destruction of social networks and support, functional impairment, conduct disorder, destruction of social capitals, social and the social institutions of citizens in these countries. It has destructed the social lives of people particularly on Security and Safety, Women and Children, Health, Education, Religion and Food Security.

3.2.1 Security and Safety

The security situation in the Sahel has been very disturbing and continue to deteriorate. For citizens to be able to carry out their daily activities effectively without any hindrance, there is the need for sound atmosphere of security and safety. Security and Safety are very paramount for the success of every country. However, due to the activities of terrorist organisations in the Sahel, citizens leaving in the countries of the Sahel, are always leaving in fear for their lives.

Incidents and deaths from terrorism in the Sahel, 2007-2021



Source: Dragonfly TerrorismTracker, IEP calculations

IEP

Figure 3. Sahel has become the new epicentre of terrorism. Source: Vision for Humanity, 2022.²⁹

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, violence from extremist activities that started from Northern Mali in 2012 from the regions of Ségou and Mopti has spread to neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. Civilians populations and security forces of the nations in the region have been the direct recipients of the hostilities and atrocities carried out by these terrorists which has affected and influenced already existing local conflicts and tensions between ethnic groups and communities in the region. In this region, since 2016 due to the rise in attacks, deaths reported has increased with over 4000 deaths being reported in 2019 as compared to an estimated figure of about 770 deaths recorded in 2016. Burkina Faso has regularly suffered attacks from “non-state armed groups mainly in the north of the country and due to these attacks, the country is now deeply affected by insecurity and human rights violations perpetrated against civilians that have led to massive displacement since the rise of the insurgency”.³⁰ This had led to the deterioration of the security that has led to increase in insecurity mainly in the border areas in the north and the Sahel regions. Burkina Faso’s porous border with Mali has facilitated the “spill over of insecurity from Mali to Burkina Faso and

since then, the situation has continued to deteriorate in the Liptako–Gourma region an area in the border region between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Armed Islamist groups have committed targeted attacks and summary executions since April 2019, in Burkina Faso and this have led to death of over 250 civilians”.³¹ In a July 2021 Monthly Forecast by the UN Security Council, the Council noted that “the security situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate, with terrorist groups operating in the Sahel expanding their presence southward, increasingly threatening coastal West African states”.³² The killing of at least 132 civilians with several others being injured as reported by local authorities in the town of Solhan during the nights of 4th – 5th June 2021 in the Sahel Region of Burkina Faso shows how this region continues to be ravaged by violence. The attack as reported has been the deadliest ever to be recorded in Burkina Faso since the emergence of violent extremism and insurgency in the country. In Niger, there have been records of similar deadly attacks where at least, 137 civilians were killed in an attack in Western Tahoua region of the country on 21st March. In similar circumstances on Niger’s border region with Mali in the Tillaberi Region, there have been deadly clashes and conflicts between Zarma and Fulani groups. These have increased inter-communal tensions between these two communities often resulting in the death and loss of innocent lives. These feuds and conflicts between these communities are as a direct result of the conflicts in Mali. Attacking the Nigerien state, they abduct and kill traditional and local leaders they suspect of cooperating with the state and at the same time, coercing them to sympathise with them with the claim by these terrorists of providing better services including jobs, money and goodies to them.³³

According to Cline, with their already existing problems with includes insecurity, these countries of the Sahel region have continued to face security challenges adding up to their pile of challenges and difficulties already confronting these governments..³⁴ Dieng also notes that the terrorist threat in Africa recent years, especially around the Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel

regions have worsened considerably due to multiple terrorist attacks.³⁵ Due to these repeated attacks targeting security forces, civilians as well as private and other state actors, a sense of insecurity has been created among citizens of these countries and the region in general. The deadly and the spate of attacks being carried out by these terrorists have made citizens to constantly live in fear for their lives.

According to an index carried out by the GTI highlighting global terrorism deaths, it indicated that the threat of terrorism has been serious in the region with these countries namely – Niger, Mali, the DRC and Burkina Faso – in Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for about 48% of the total global deaths from terrorism.³⁶ This is highlighted in the figure below.




Figure 4. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 48% of global terrorism deaths. Source: Vision for Humanity, 2022.³⁷

The sharp increase in armed attacks on communities, schools, health centres and other public institutions and infrastructure has reached unprecedented levels, with violence disrupting livelihoods and access to social services. Growing insecurity has also exacerbated already

chronic vulnerabilities in the region, including high levels of malnutrition, poor access to clean water and sanitation facilities.³⁸

3.2.2 Education

Terrorist attacks lead to the close down of schools since mostly, teachers and educators in areas where there are constant terrorists attacks mostly run for their lives leaving their students. The activities of terrorists in the Sahel Region continue to be one of the most serious threats to security and peacefulness in the educational environment in this region. This situation adversely affects security and stability in the region and has deep repercussions on education.

According to Dr Festus Aubyn of WANEP, in most areas of the Central Sahel states where there are a lot of terrorist attacks, schools have consistently become specific targets of violent attacks whereby students and their educators are killed, thus leading to the closure of hundreds of schools and an increase in the number of school dropouts. He added that since most people get displaced in these areas of terrorist attacks, school enrolment has totally dropped.³⁹

According to Education International, in 2019, more than 900 schools were closed and more than 150,000 students were forcibly displaced in Mali due to terrorist attacks on schools. In Burkina Faso, about 2,000 schools were closed in the same year affecting the enrolment of more than 326,152 students.⁴⁰ According to Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso of GAFSCS, due to the disbelief in Western education by most of these terrorists groups, schools in the Sahel countries of West Africa are directly targeted by Islamist militants, who are against Western education.⁴¹ Dr Festus Aubyn also adds that because these terrorist see the schools in these countries as a representation of the West, schools' infrastructure – including buildings, furniture, text books and other logistics – are burnt down by these terrorist mostly when they raid these schools. The education sector in Burkina Faso is suffering and “about 2.6 million children and youth are out of school in Burkina Faso, with another 1.7 million students at risk

of dropping out of school due to the negative effects of both the ongoing security and COVID-19 crises.”⁴² The terrorist insurgency in the country has resulted in the closure of more than 2,300 schools and a massive displacement of more than one million people. A number of schools are open but empty because parents are scared their children will be attacked on their way to class.⁴³ The advent of COVID-19 pandemic further resulted in the closure of all schools in Burkina Faso for several months.⁴⁴ Threats to teachers, ambushes on schools and the use of schools for military purposes have forced 4,505 schools in the country to close, disrupting education for more than 626,693 children.⁴⁵ In Mali, of the approximately 3.8 million girls and boys that are enrolled in primary, lower secondary and upper secondary schools across the country, as many as 50 per cent of children are out of school due to the persistent terrorist attacks on schools and school children.⁴⁶ According to Mr Richard Apau, who was with the African Centre for the Study and Research in Terrorism, in Burkina Faso and Mali, schools are occasionally closed down due to threat posed by these terrorist organisations and also, to protect the students.⁴⁷ This he adds, has affected the ability of these young students to read and write and become major players of the economic activities of their countries in the future.

Dr Festus Aubyn also posits that, young girls of school going age are forcibly conscripted on daily basis into these armed groups when they attack villages and towns. These young girls he mentioned, mostly end up by dropping out of schools which has affected their educational enrolment.⁴⁸ The Human Rights Report also notes that, “Female students and educators are specifically affected by attacks of these terrorist and pregnancy from rape, the health consequences and stigma of sexual violence, the risk of early marriage, and the privileging of boys’ education over girls’ all make it particularly difficult for girls to return to school affecting their academic life”.⁴⁹ Due to the already low literacy rate existing in this region, according to Dr Festus Aubyn, these attacks on schools and educational facilities have aggravated and worsened the illiteracy rate.

These terrorists groups have targeted state education across the Central Sahel, most commonly by burning and looting schools and threatening, abducting, or killing teachers.⁵⁰ Because of this, teachers and students don't show up for school and also, parents scared of their children being attacked on their way to class stop them from going.⁵¹ Most of the security agencies of these states and non-state armed groups have also used dozens of schools for military purposes, including as camps and temporary bases. These actions by the terrorist which have led to teachers and other educators alike to leave these schools, have denied students from going to school which has greatly affected the educational sector of these countries in the central Sahel – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.⁵²

3.2.3 Health

The health sector in the Region has been hit badly since the rise of insurgency in the Region. The escalating violence, record displacement of civilians and rising insecurity and the killing of innocent civilians that have engulfed these countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – have had devastating consequences on the health sector of these countries. Many lives are lost daily due to terrorist attacks, millions of people are displaced, and primary health care remains inaccessible.

According to Dr Festus Aubyn, when there is insecurity in any area, no health professional is willing to travel to and work in such areas. He adds that the advent of terrorism in the Sahelian countries have led to a massive exodus of health professionals from these areas. Terrorism related violence have affected the public health and the health care services in the region.

In Mali, terrorism and insecurity in that have faced the country since 2012 have had health implications for the country's people, many of whom experience food insecurity. The country continues to face serious challenges in the health sector, with some of the world's worst health indicators. Under terrorist occupation, nearly all health facilities in northern Mali were

ransacked in 2012, and internally displaced people overtaxed the health system in the south.⁵³ According to the WHO, “the country’s health infrastructure is weak and there are significant gaps in staffing and health service delivery. There have been reports of both destruction and looting of health care facilities in the north, which has significantly reduced access to basic health services. Nearly 90% of community health centres in the regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu are not functional due to the departure of health personnel and the lack of medicines and other medical supplies and 23% have been looted or damaged” since the rise of the insurgency.⁵⁴ In another report by the WHO, the report indicated that there have been: “limited access to health care due to the destruction and/or looting of facilities, and the interruption of health services (with the departure of staff and non-governmental organizations (NGOs): 94% of community health centres were no longer functional. Most of the health facilities that remained open did not have the qualified staff and medicines required to meet the needs of the population; shortages of medicines and medical supplies including blood products; overwhelmed health services in the southern regions, which were not prepared to deal with a large influx of people; a significant number of dead and war-wounded people brought to health facilities; outbreaks of measles, cholera, malaria and anthrax due to overcrowding, deterioration in hygiene and sanitation conditions and poor access to safe drinking water; human rights violations and acts of violence, including sexual and gender-based violence; and lastly, many deaths and injuries caused by landmines, explosive devices and bombings, which continue to pose a threat”.⁵⁵ Even though the Malian State has implemented some measures to curtail the challenges that face its health sector, “notably in decentralizing healthcare and developing community health centres, Mali’s healthcare system remains poor. Even the national hospitals, the best facilities in the country, reportedly suffer from overcrowding, lack of up-to-date equipment, and insufficient medical supplies. Regional hospitals also lack equipment, supplies, medicine and staff”.⁵⁶ In conflict-affected areas and

remote parts of Mali, the reports notes, the access to the quality of services and services are very limited. Way below the World Health Organization's (WHO) recommended minimum threshold of 23, there are only 3.14 health professionals per 10,000 people in Mali. Of particular interest is the lack of health personnel in the remote and poor areas of the country. 17 percent of the health centres and structures in the northern part of the country are no longer functioning. About 80 percent of the qualified health workers are also paid by international aid agencies. Areas controlled by armed groups have been worst facing limited access to health care and health centres. The outbreak of diseases and the risk of contracting diseases such as malaria, respiratory diseases and infections, meningitis and dengue fever has been very high due to the armed conflict and access to healthcare that have been limited with the unavailability of health centres and health workers, reports the International Peace Institute.⁵⁷ There is a particular need for neonatal and obstetric services, mental health and trauma services, and primary healthcare for women and girls, as well as medical care for victims of sexual violence.⁵⁸

In Burkina Faso, negative impact on numerous health indicators has been demonstrated in the numerous armed conflicts and terrorist attacks that have befall the country. Growing violence and insecurity due to mounting insurgent armed groups have caused the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians. As populations flee conflict-affected areas, the demand for health services continues to grow while attacks further decrease the number of functioning health facilities. The provision of quality health services is hindered by a weakening health system and a lack of epidemiological data to guide evidence- based interventions.⁵⁹ According to Druetz et al, Terrorist attacks have presented a new barrier to access of maternal healthcare services in Burkina Faso. These attacks according to them have contributed to changes in delivery practices by reducing the number of ANC visits, assisted deliveries and caesarean sections in primary healthcare centres and district hospitals. They add that the exponential increase in the number of terrorist activities in West Africa is therefore expected to have

deleterious effects on maternal health in multiple countries and through different mechanisms. This problem could be compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, which threatens to further strain the region's already weakened health infrastructure making access to health services in Burkina Faso to decline.⁶⁰ Due to the escalation of violence and lack of financial means, roughly 1.5 million people have seen a significant reduction in their access to healthcare since 2019.⁶¹

According to Mr Richard Apau, in Niger, the attacks by these terrorists have led to multiple injuries and casualties. Injured individuals or citizens who will require medical care are always on the increase. An increase in these attacks in Niger have caused an imbalance in the availability of medical care as there may be fewer well-equipped healthcare centres that can cater for the victims of these terrorist attacks. The number of casualties has placed burden on the already fewer hospitals and health centres across the country. This according to him has affected the delivery of health care in the country badly.⁶² Already in Niger, medical facilities are "limited in both supplies and staff, with a small government healthcare system supplemented by private, charitable, religious, and Non-government organisation operated clinics and public health programs".⁶³

3.2.4 Food Security

Across the Sahel, farming, animal husbandry and cross-community and cross-border trade are the main economic activities and sources of livelihood and survival of the citizens living in the region. However, due to the onset of terrorism and armed conflicts which has created insecurity in the region, most communities have over the past decade being unable to go about their agricultural related activities and cross-border trade which have had negatively impact on agriculture, trade and food security in general. Across communities where terrorist activities have intensified with their lands bombed, farms attacked, farm produce looted and farmers

harassed, there have been cases of worsening food insecurity and malnutrition. Armed conflicts in the Sahel has reduced agricultural and trading activities by 25% to 30%.

According to the European Union, “for the fourth consecutive year, vulnerable people living in conflict-hit areas are facing a food crisis due to Sahel’s ongoing challenges. Some 23.4 million people are facing severe food insecurity for the 2021 lean season (when food reserves run low). Up to 2.5 million children are at risk of severe acute malnutrition. The situation could quickly worsen in conflict-affected areas already grappling with food shortages and access to nutrition facilities.”⁶⁴ According to Mr Richard Apau, the ongoing terrorist attacks and fighting in the Sahel have led to the destruction of several farms which has affected farm yields or farm produce. He posited that the terrorist groups in the Sahel attack the farms of villagers and loot their farm produce. Sometimes they end up taking everything away from the farmers which includes livestock. By so doing this contributes to food insecurity. Mr Apau also added that as most citizens of the Sahel faces food shortages and crisis, they have become vulnerable to terrorist groups who come to their aid by providing them with food and other social services. In the end, through the provision of these basic commodities, they end up by luring most citizens into their activities.⁶⁵ According to Dr Festus Aubyn, the Sahel region which is one of the areas devastated by climate change with less amount of rainfall recorded throughout the year and because of this, the already has already been battling with hunger issues due to food shortages. The activities of these terrorist which prevented people from going to their farms due to the fear of being attacked or killed coupled with the onset of the COVID-19 virus with its lock down measures worsened the famine situation of the region.⁶⁶ A projection that was made during the 2020 lean season (June-August) suggested more than 4.8 million people could be food insecure (Phase 3 -Phase 5) representing a 50 per cent increase compared to 2019 predictions.⁶⁷ According to the World Food Programme (WFP), growing insecurity is threatening gains made in various sectors including food security and nutrition, disrupting food

and trade flows. Having barely recovered from the acute food crisis that hit the Sahel in 2018, many vulnerable families are now affected by violence.⁶⁸ Caritas Internationalis, a humanitarian organisation reports that the worrying increase of food and nutritional insecurity among the peoples of the Sahel is both a consequence and a cause of persistent civil unrest in the region. In the first half of 2020 at least 7.2 million people required immediate help. The most affected are mainly displaced persons, forced to abandon their fields, livestock, and means of subsistence.⁶⁹ Conflicts and violence in the Sahel create the conditions for the worsening of food insecurity. “Conflict situations have a direct impact on the transport of goods and commercial exchanges that ensure food availability in the region while guaranteeing food supplies to border communities, which rely on trans-frontier trading and are often with no other means of securing the basic necessities of their lives. These dynamics also impact crops, forcing farmer communities to flee, leaving their land and endangering their livelihoods, as well as on pastoral activities, with direct consequences on the food security of semi-nomad herders, having to redefine transhumance routes due to the inaccessibility of grazing lands in conflict-riven areas”, reports the ISPI.⁷⁰ It adds that the number of people in need of urgent food assistance or food-insecure people in Burkina Faso’s Sahel and Centre-Nord provinces, Mali’s Gao and Timbuktu regions and Tahoua and Tillaberi regions in Niger is expected to increase to around 4.8 million. That is 1.8 in Burkina Faso, 1.1 in Mali and 1.9 in Niger respectively for the 2020 peak season between June to August.⁷¹

Looking at the broader West-African picture, conflict and COVID-19 emergencies taken together could bring some 51 million people, currently in a “stressed” situation, into a food and nutrition insecurity condition. A worrisome scenario, unfortunately not that far from reality.⁷²

3.2.5 Women and Children

Women and children, who are the worst affected in times like this haven't been spared by the wrath of terrorist activities in the region. According to Dr Festus Aidyn of WANEP, "when conflict happens, the rule of law breaks down, freedom of movement is restricted, institutions and services are weakened, creating a lack of access to social services and information, and to food and livelihoods. This situation affects the entire population, but it disproportionately affects women and children the most".⁷³ Adding to this Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso of GAFSCS also notes that, the first to suffer most in every terrorist attack are the vulnerable – women and children. Mr Richard Apau formerly of ACSRT also posits that incidents of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence, violence against children, exploitation, trafficking, forced recruitment and early marriage are on sharp rise.⁷⁴

The surge in armed violence across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger is having a devastating impact on children's survival, education, protection and development. According to the UNICEF, "attacks on children and violence across the Central Sahel continue to surge and more than 4.3 million children are now in need of humanitarian assistance. This advocacy brief highlights the impact of the insecurity on children and their families, advocating for attacks and threats to stop, and for critical human and financial resources needed to respond to the massive and acute needs."⁷⁵ When displaced women and children, and host communities do not have access to basic health services, or clean water and sanitation, it increases their risk of infectious diseases including acute respiratory infections, diarrhoea, malaria and measles – all leading causes of child mortality."⁷⁶ Across the region, more than 670,000 children since the start of 2019 according to UNICEF, due to this armed conflict and instability in the region have been forced to flee their homes in search of security and safe havens. At the risk of "violence, exploitation and recruitment" by these armed groups and terrorists, families and children are prone to child marriages and other negative coping mechanisms. In addition to this, children


have come under attack, killed, maimed due to the crossfire between terrorist groups and forcibly evicted from their homes and separated from their families.⁷⁷ Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso accounts that, some of the children in areas of these conflicts often end up being forcibly conscripted into these terrorist groups as children soldiers. The young girls among them are forced to marry these terrorists. Their childhood ends up being destroyed.⁷⁸ The crisis has left approximately one million children suffering from severe acute malnutrition and more than 40 percent without birth registration, leaving hundreds of thousands at risk of statelessness⁷⁹ and about 650,000 children in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have been out of school due to closure of schools which has increased in six-fold due to violence.⁸⁰

According to Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso, the conflict in the Sahel have increased women's exposure and vulnerability to sexual and gender-based violence. He further adds that Islamist organisations and militias deliberately target women in the children. In the Central Sahel where terrorist activities is on the increase, women have been victims of systemic attacks and kidnappings, and are forced into slavery as sex slaves, informants and even fighters, he posits.⁸¹ Additionally, Dr Festus Aubyn also notes that women in areas affected by the activities of these terrorists in the Sahel have been victims of rape and forced prostitution, pregnancy and early marriage, as well as many other forms of sexual violence.⁸² They are also forcibly conscripted to be wives of the terrorist, made as spies of the groups and most at times, they are sold to other terrorist groups as slaves when captured. In a research conducted by Plan International in June 2020, it revealed that girls' lives have been turned upside down by violence and instability in the Sahel and most girls disclosed that restrictive norms and attitudes of their families and communities have left them feeling trapped and powerless. Plan international also noted that a vicious cycle of gender-based violence (GBV) driven by conflict and displacement across three central Sahel countries: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, is creating a protection crisis for girls and young women. In addition, the report stated that "violence and the fear of violence are facts

of daily life for adolescent girls in the most insecure regions of the Central Sahel. Not only are girls scared to leave the house, they are also having to contend with their vulnerability to ‘everyday GBV’ in the home, including forced marriage, physical and sexual violence or sexual exploitation”.⁸³

3.3 Economic effects of Terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa

Since the rise of terrorism and its related activities in the Sahel, economic activities have been badly affected and its effects very devastating to the region. The years between 2007 and 2016 as reported by the UNDP saw the cost of terrorism cost on the African continent on the low while in reality, the figure is much once estimating for “GDP losses, lost informal economic activity, extra security spending, and refugee/IDP costs are accounted for”. Identifying 18 focus countries in which terrorism and its related consequences which includes economic consequences, the UNDP notes that the number of terrorists’ attacks and fatalities from the activities of terrorists in Africa between the years 2007 and 2016 had a major impact on the economies of the countries in focus which includes that of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger as is shown in the figure below.⁸⁴



	Number of Fatalities	Number of Terrorist Attacks	Economic Cost of Terrorism (constant 2017, USD Million)
Nigeria	18952	3058	US\$97,966
Libya	1413	1595	US\$5,201
Sudan	2664	717	US\$3,807
Kenya	1426	447	US\$1,268
Cameroon	1326	190	US\$879
Somalia	4472	2152	US\$770
Tunisia	158	44	US\$498
Uganda	1242	184	US\$410
Chad	629	53	US\$342
Ethiopia	505	66	US\$281
Mali	486	271	US\$226
CAR	1136	204	US\$197
Niger	838	78	US\$172
Morocco	75	13	US\$99
Tanzania	61	45	US\$45
Senegal	92	32	US\$27
Mauritania	27	11	US\$23
Burkina Faso	57	15	US\$20

Figure 5. Total economic cost of terrorism and intensity of terrorist activity in focus countries, 2007-2016.

Source: UNDP, 2019.⁸⁵

Of these 3 countries in focus, Mali has suffered by far the highest economic impacts of terrorism. The economic impact of terrorism for Mali, at US\$ \$22.4, for Niger, US\$170.9 million and that for Burkina Faso, US\$19.7 million which has suffered the lowest total absolute economic impact according to a report released by the UNDP in 2019.⁸⁶ According to this report, to fight their internal extremist challenges, these countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – spent US \$1.583 billion, US\$1.867 and US\$ 614 million respectively on their security expenditure between the years 2013 to 2016. Most citizens living in extreme poverty in these countries could have been affected positively and their lives changed if these monies were channelled into their economies and other sectors.⁸⁷

The figure below shows the amount spent on countering terrorism by the 18 countries in focus on the study carried out by the UNDP in 2019 with the Sahel countries affected by terrorism included.




Figure 6. Securitization Spending and Levels of Terrorism, 2007-2016. Source, UNDP, 2019.⁸⁸

3.3.1 Businesses

Business – both small and large scale – haven’t been spared by the wrath of these terrorists activities. Violent extremism is challenging West Africa’s Sahel — especially Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — with local implications for individuals, communities, governments, and businesses. According to Dr Vladimir the terrorist in the Sahel direct their attacks against businesses – both small and large scale – by looting their products or destroying them. As result of being the target of these terrorist, most businesses are afraid to operate. They have closed down their shops and have moved out places where there has been consistent terrorist attack, he added.⁸⁹

According to Dr Festus Aubyn, terrorism in the Sahel has led to a lot of businesses to close down because of the fear of these business being attacked. The fear that these attacks may happen continuously deter businesses from operating normal.⁹⁰ Mr Richard Apau also posits that terrorism have had massive effects on the economic and business activities of countries of the central Sahel. Their activities have been a major threat for businesses Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. He added that in their attempt to cause harm to the economy, these terrorist groups attack business premises or they may seek to attack specific businesses to advance their political agendas. Most of these businesses they mostly target are businesses of foreign nationals or countries.⁹¹ Businesses in these Sahel states belonging to foreign nationals and locals are particularly affected by these terrorist acts which has disrupted the supply chain and disturbed their business activities in addition to interrupting information flows. Due to suspension of supply chain all businesses struggled and also decrease in efficiency of organizations. These terrorist groups have attacked businesses with extremely harmful weapons, results in businesses losing confidence and increased costs to the businesses and economy.

Since most market places are frequently attacked by these terrorist as Dr Antwi-Danso argues, most sellers and buyers afraid of being attacked are deterred from going there to conduct their normal businesses which to buy and sell.⁹² According to Mr Richard Apau, “markets, where agricultural products often constitute a key component of trade, are often the hub of economic activity for towns and villages in countries and the disruption of a market can take a long time to recover. These attacks on marketplaces have serious economic effects, as well as emotional, social, structural, impacts on the countries of the Sahel”, he added.⁹³ Dr Festus Aubyn also notes that the attacks on these markets have serious impact on women. Since these goods and products sold in marketplaces are mainly done by women, they have been at the forefront of the attacks. The disruption of markets by terrorist in this area makes women who engage in

mainly agricultural products unable to sell their perishable products thereby losing a valuable source of income, he added. Dr Festus Aubyn also adds that, due to the consistent terrorist attacks in these areas, some financial institutions have ceased to operate in these areas for the fear of being attacked and robbed by these terrorists.⁹⁴

Herders who due to their livestock move from one place to the other have been unable to do so due to the fear of being attack by these terrorists and their livestock taken from them. Farmers are also unable to visit their farms due to the fear of being attacked by these terrorists. Due to the activities of these terrorists, over 50 million people in the Sahel who rely on livestock and agricultural products for their income, have lost significant amount of money. Between 2012 to 2021, unemployment rose between 6.5% to 7.78 percent in the region.⁹⁵

3.3.2 Industries

Most industries in the region have also been affected by the activities of these terrorist. According to Mr Richard Apau, the frequent terrorist attacks by these groups have affected industrial production as well as demand. This in effect, may have different outcomes which leads loss of customers' contracts, customer trust, reduced share of the market and a significant decline in sales, all of which have led to a lot of business failure in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. Dr Antwi-Danso also adds that the activities of these terrorists have had direct effect on industries operating in these countries since there have been decline in buyer demand which has created unpredictable shifts, interruption in supply chain, disruption in the flow of policies, regulation and also has a wide impact on the macroeconomic factors of the country. Dr Festus Aubyn also notes that the activities of these terrorist have led to discontinuity in supply of essential goods, services and resources that are essential for the citizens of these countries. These problems, he said, have caused serious impact on the operation of these industries operating in areas where there are persisting terrorist attacks. Because of these terrorist attacks

as Mr Richard Apau noted, there have been short-term shortage of services, goods, raw materials and other commodities needed by most industries in these countries. Since these countries are landlocked countries and most industries import their raw materials from the coastal countries in the south, transporting these essential materials have been very dangerous due to the activities of these terrorist. Sometimes these industries run short of materials and commodities for their operations and it takes certain time to recover from this kind of shortage.

In Burkina Faso for instance, Islamist fighters have occupied at least 15 mines in the east of the country, giving them direct control over production and sales which has been a major blow to the mining industry in the country. This untaxed and unregulated economic activity generates massive amounts of capital, which is channelled to parties engaged in armed conflict, completing a vicious economic circle that sustains several stakeholders: miners, refiners, weapons manufacturers, and political leaders.⁹⁶ “While Western Mali largely remains off the radar for stabilisation efforts, emerging trends suggest that violent extremist groups have identified this region’s strategic value. With an estimated 77% of Mali’s gold production, the Kayes region could be a windfall for them. The industry is central to Mali’s economy as it provides 75% of export revenues, 25% of the country’s budget, and 8% of the country’s gross domestic product”.⁹⁷ The tri-border Liptako-Gourma region, straddling northern Burkina, southern Mali and western Niger, shows that groups operating in the Sahel are already tapping into gold mining. This helps them obtain the financial, logistical and operational resources needed to carry out attacks and sustain themselves.⁹⁸

Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso posits that, most business have lost revenue, decreased growth points and increased transaction costs in the Sahel due to the activities of these terrorist. He added that the destruction of industrial infrastructure has led to a considerable economic and human cost and the protection of industrial sites and vital infrastructure from terrorist attacks

has therefore become a priority for the public authorities, generating additional military and security expenditures.⁹⁹

3.3.3 Trade and Investment

Trade and investment have also been badly hit by terrorist activities in the Sahel region. Dr Vladimir Antwi-Danso posits that, investment in the economies of these countries have been directly affected because no foreign or local investor is ready to invest or trade in an economy where there is chaos. He adds that Foreign Direct Investments in these countries has dried up these countries because: one, there have been an efflux since people have invested in these countries, especially areas where there are terrorist attacks have taken their monies and investment out; and two, potential investors who have planned or want to invest in these countries have been deterred by the activities of these terrorist. Dr Festus Aubyn also notes that, due to the activities of these terrorist, those who have invested – especially private investors who are profit oriented – into the economies have recorded lost in investment due to these attacks in areas where they have invested. This he adds, have led to loss of investors' confidence and therefore, most investors are packing out of these countries. For traders who sell in areas where there are terrorist activities according Dr Festus Aubyn, they will have to move miles from their original areas – most at times crossing borders – before they can trade in their goods and services.

Dr Festus Aubyn argues that due to the ban on motor cycles by the governments of the Sahel, traders and investors who trade in motor bikes have recorded low sales since riders are not buying the bikes to use for their commercial purpose. He adds that these actions taken by the governments have deterred investors and trading from importing and trading in motor bikes causing a lot of economic and financial problem for those who trade and invest in motor bikes across the Sahel.

Also, according to Diop, due to the frequent attacks by terrorist on tourist centres across the region, the tourism sector in these areas has been greatly affected.¹⁰⁰ Diop adds that these attacks carried out have had two major effects on the sector. Attacks that have targeted tourist sites frequented by tourists have had strong international media impact.¹⁰¹ These attacks, according to Diop, are highly publicized because of the arrival of tourists from several nationalities. Initially, the multiplication of terrorist acts results in a decrease in bookings, or even cancellations, leading to the fall in tourism receipts (Income effect). Secondly, the climate of insecurity created by the terrorist threat prevents modernization of the sector, thus reducing investment. The consequence is that the other actors of the economy cannot profit from it (quality effect).¹⁰² Telecommunications, which according to Diop forms a major contributor to GDP among these Sahel countries have not been spared the wrath of these attacks. Reducing in growth and investment as Diop notes by -0.498% and -0.319%, respectively, the activities of these terrorists have affected the telecom sector significantly. Tourist sites which are also the homes of tourists have also had a decrease in investment rate by -0.752% which can lower the investment rate due to the activities of these terrorists. The transport sector as Diop again argues, has been engendered due to the attacks leading to desertion of urban transport with has lowered its growth of about 0.574% and investment in the sector lowered by 0.418%.¹⁰³

3.3.4 Human Capital

Due to the activities of terrorists, there have been a direct loss of human resources which have led to concomitant loss of production and output. The activities of these terrorist have led disruptions to normal labour market functioning including potentially higher rates of unemployment, underemployment or informal employment.

According to Dr Antwi-Danso, due to the activities of these extremists, there is a lost productivity of people who join violent extremist groups. These are often young and

economically productive males who could have worked for the economic benefits of their communities and countries. He adds that the dependents and relatives of fighters often lose the opportunity to engage in formal employment due to their association with fighters. This includes the wife or wives of fighters who may become destitute when a fighter dies or is unable to provide ongoing financial support. And finally, the presence of violent extremist groups or response of security services means that many people are unable to engage in any economic activity. This in a nutshell have led to unemployment among the youth.

Mali for instance has a severe human capital deficit. It is among the African countries with the lowest score on the human capital index published in 2018. The human capital deficit per the report could worsen in the future due to uncertainty with regard to the country’s security and in particular, due to population growth.¹⁰⁴

For the fear of their lives, Dr Festus Aubyn notes that, citizens of the Central Sahel States have migrated to other countries – mostly south of the Sahel – in search for greener pastures.

The figure below highlights the number of internally displaced people and refugees that have migrated to other countries as at the year 2014 due to the terrorist situation in the Sahel Region of West Africa.


Figure 7. Refugees from first set of Sahelian countries (as at 2014). Source: UNECA, 2017.¹⁰⁵

Name	Refugees from	Refugees in
Burkina Faso	1,857	31,894
Mali	139,267	15,195
Mauritania	34,114	75,635
Niger	738	77,830
Nigeria	90,921	1,239

The Vision for Humanity also notes that as at the end of 2020 as the figure below highlights, persistent insecurity in the region due to the conflict led increasing number of displacement of

people with about 10,000 civilians killed. Adding, the organisation argues that the growing humanitarian crises led to the number of internally displaced persons within the Sahel amounting to over 2.5 million people with the majority of them being women and children and the over 75% remaining lacking or without adequate shelter.¹⁰⁶ These movements of the large number of displaced people to other areas in the Sahel and Coastal regions of West Africa have put a lot of pressure on the already scarce resources of the region threatening intercommunal conflicts and rivalries. Among these 2.5 million people that have displaced, most of them – the youth – used to be gainfully employed or engaged in various forms of economic activities but due to the activities of their terrorists, they have deserted their work places to other areas in such of shelter and security leaving close to about 2 million people unemployed.

Figure 8. Number of Displaced People in the Sahel. Source: Vision for Humanity, 2022.¹⁰⁷



3.4 Measures Implemented in the Sahel to Address Terrorism Issues

To curb the activities of these terrorist in the Sahel, several measures have been put in place to address the challenges posed by these terrorists to the countries in the central Sahel and the

region in general. The 2013 international military intervention set off a series of major regional security initiatives in the Sahel including the G5 Sahel, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), and French Operation Barkhane.¹⁰⁸ There others are the Accra Initiative and MINUSMA.

The first of these strategies is Operation Barkhane. France's Sahelian strategy aims for partner states to acquire the capacity to ensure their security independently. It is based on a global approach (political, security and development) whose military component is carried by Operation Barkhane, led by the French armies.¹⁰⁹ Taking over earlier French mission in Mali – Operation Serval – Operation Barkhane came into force on 1st August, 2014 with a counterterrorism strong force of 3000 men deployed to countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. These countries – Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger – together, form the “G5 Sahel”. With its main purpose of countering terrorism and bolster “cross-border and region-wide securitization efforts”, its objectives were two-fold: one was arm and assist the G5 Sahel nations security services in fighting terrorists and their networks in the Sahel-Sahara region; and secondly, to create an unsafe haven for terrorists to operate in the region.¹¹⁰

The Accra Initiative is also a counter terrorism measure that was launched in September 2017 by “Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Togo in response to growing insecurity linked to violent extremism in the region.¹¹¹ To prevent the spread of terrorism and it from spilling over from the Sahel to other States as its main aim, it also aims to address organised transnational crime in the region’s border areas. This is grounded on three main pillars: this includes training of security and intelligence personnel; conducting joint cross-border military operations to sustain border security; and lastly, intelligence and information sharing.¹¹² Two levels of meetings are held: one is between intelligence services and heads of security of countries across the sub-region; and ministers of states of countries in the sub-region who are

in charge of security.¹¹³ On quarterly basis, meetings are held between heads of states within the region to address the security concerns in the region which is followed by that of the ministers of states and heads of the security agencies in the sub-region. Given their proximity to coastal states in their experience in fighting terrorism, Mali and Niger were later admitted as observers.¹¹⁴ Even though the International community's interest in preventing regional instability has been growing, the Accra Initiative, two years after it was launched, has little to show for its prospects for success.¹¹⁵

Another one is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in that country and carry out a number of security-related tasks.¹¹⁶ The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap. By unanimously adopting resolution 2164 of 25 June 2014, the Council further decided that the Mission should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians; supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation; and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in that country.¹¹⁷

The G5 Sahel Joint Force, created in 2017 by the 5 States of the region – Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad – is a Cross-Border Joint Force in Bamako, pooling their resources to fight security threats in the Sahel region. The United Nations Security Council welcomed the creation of this Joint Force in Resolution 2359 of 21 June 2017, which was sponsored by France. The Joint Force has been endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Committee and fights terrorism, cross-border organized crime and human trafficking in the G5 Sahel zone. It carried out its first operation in November 2017 with the armies of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.¹¹⁸

Apart from these regional security forces, each of the three countries of the Sahel, has its own counter terrorism strategy. In Mali, the pivot of the insurgency, the Counter Extremism Project reports that, implementing its first national strategy to prevent the spread of violent extremism, terrorism and radicalisation in June 2017, Mali, through its Ministry of Religious Affairs in cooperation with other Islamic organisations came up with this strategy aimed at promoting moderate Islam among its citizens. Adding to this, the Ministry in February 2019 launched another Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy which did not only focus on working with other organisation and religious bodies in maintaining a secular state but also to improve “governance, reinforcing security, promoting development, and increasing communication” in the country’s hotspot area with the aim of providing transparency regarding government’s actions in these areas among citizens. Due to the lack of resources and effective interagency, the Ministry of Religious Affairs, however, has not been able to implement these measures which were aimed at stabilising these areas.¹¹⁹ In 2017, Burkina Faso’s Army-Gendarmerie-Police counterterrorism task force Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT), was formed and tasked with bolstering the effort to counter terrorist activities along its northern border. The GFAT more than tripled the amount of task force members from 500 troops in 2016 to 1,600 troops in 2017.¹²⁰ In January 2017, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali agreed to set up a joint counterterrorism force to address the transnational terrorist threat in the Liptako region.¹²¹ The group expanded the following month to include representatives from the entire G5 Sahel, including Chad and Mauritania. In addition, Niger also counterterrorism investigations are primarily the responsibility of the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime (SCLCT-CTO), an interagency body comprising representatives from Niger’s National Police, National Guard, and Gendarmerie. Niger continued to use rudimentary terrorism watch lists that it shares with the

security services and at border checkpoints. Since 2017, it moved more than 700 of about 1,400 BH-related detainees fully through its criminal justice system.¹²²

However, despite these efforts and initiatives taken by regional and international agencies to combat the threat from international terrorism and also efforts by these three countries – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – to mitigate the ongoing insurgent violence as these strategies appear to be well suited for responding to the contemporary dynamics of instability in the Sahel, jihadist attacks have escalated in recent months and the insurgency still persist. Efforts to curtail these extremist groups are challenged by small defence forces, strained coordination between security services, budget shortfalls, and continuing instability in the Sahel. Militants regularly attack the security agencies of these countries and other regional military units deployed in the area which are mostly poorly equipped and underfunded to adequately repel attacks by these terrorists. These issues are becoming worse and more complicated with consistent number of attacks that have stretched southwards with recent ones along the borders of countries that border Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger threatening their peace and security.

3.5 Measures to Take in Addressing the Terrorist Insurgency

Notwithstanding the efforts of the Regional Forces and governments initiatives in bringing into force several counter terrorism measures and programmes, the reality of life for the population in the Sahel will require a more comprehensive approach. The multidimensional tactics employed by Islamic extremists—military operations, subversion of state authority, intimidation, infiltration civil society and local community councils, and propaganda—also necessitate an approach that can help curb this menace. These approaches must provide lasting solution to the problems posed by these extremist groups and their activities in the Sahel. In view of these challenges and problems posed by these extremist groups, this study will propose some measures to address the terrorism menace” argues, Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso.

First of all, by addressing the root causes of terrorism in the region through good governance. This should be done by: reducing corruption to its barest minimum which will include measures to undertake this; secondly by provision of socio-economic amenities and opportunities for marginalised groups, poor communities and places under developed in the region; three, by providing good education, the relevant skills needed in the economy and opportunities for the youth that will enable to gain the requisite skills needed for their personal development and also for their communities which will help in preventing them from being lured to join terrorist groups.

Secondly, countries of the central Sahel, must incorporate negotiations, diplomacy, and cultural work in the broader sense in dealing with terrorist. This means that a combination of community development, consciousness-raising, and economic development is needed. A national consciousness about terrorism must be implemented in the Sahel. The government must cooperate with citizens in the areas where there these terrorist attacks are consistent to help on intelligence gathering on these terrorists. They must be given incentives and protected when they give information out as informant. People must know about security and consciousness in their communities. The actors involved in the various counter terrorism efforts must coordinate to reduce duplication of efforts in the various areas they operate. Actors in the fight against terrorism in these states must come together as one and fight these terrorists devoid of their political affiliations. Adopting mechanisms that will create community resilience by embracing the whole of society approach whereby youth leaders, women and children, tribal and clan leaders, local leaders and politicians, religious leaders, influencers and opinion leaders will be involved in the decision-making process towards the prevention of terrorism. These people should be asked about their problems and opinions on how best they think these issues can be resolved.

Thirdly, artificial intelligence. The governments of the Sahel must encourage the use of artificial intelligence such CCTV cameras, taking of Biometric information of citizens, provision of proper identification systems to help identify and sort out terrorists who attack various government institutions, schools, hospitals, businesses and barracks within the various communities. Acts of terror and various forms of crimes committed against the states are able to be detected and individuals involved quickly apprehended whenever they commit a crime or execute various forms of terrorist attacks. The countries involved must also come together and share data on citizens' biometric data to be able to arrest and punish those who engage themselves in cross-border terrorism within these countries.

The militaries of these countries must be equipped well with the needed logistics to fight against the insurgents. There must be consistent and regularly training of security agencies to be able to adapt to the changes in the modus operandi of these terrorists. Special Forces must be trained and equipped well with the aim of fighting these terrorists and deployed to where they are. There must be also be an integrated border management to check the influx of citizens in and out of these countries. The resources provided by the international community must look at the long-term run. Most of the support in terms of financial aid and logistics support from the international community with aim of countering terrorism are in the short term which make difficult for these countries since the issue of terrorism still persist.

Most of the counter terrorism measures that have been implemented in the Sahel has been too much military centred. The measures fixation on the military aspect alone has been very retrogressing making it difficult for the issues to be addressed since the military dimension of the issue has taken a chunk of the responses. Much have not been done in terms of the development and socio-economic aspect of it. The governments of this area must make every conscious effort to put in measures that will address the socio-economic problems in the

Region. Since there is lack of coordination among the actors, there have duplication of efforts which have helped in terms of using the limited resources within the Sahel to solve the problem.

The regional bodies and other security agencies must be well equipped to fight the terrorist.

Also, religious organisations, aid organisations and NGOs work in these countries must be regulated, scrutinised and checked in the Sahel countries. Most of these organisations and NGOs disguised themselves as humanitarian workers carrying out various forms of humanitarian assistance in communities in the Sahel countries that lack some development and social amenities but on the blind side, supporting extremists and propagating extremist ideas among the various communities. Proper measures must be put in place to scrutinise and regulate their activities – especially their source of finance and intentions – to avert the possibility of indoctrinating most of these communities that are extremely poor and would accept every message and carry out any direction once they are given basic socio-economic needs by these groups who disguised themselves as humanitarian and religious bodies but with ill extremists' intentions.

Also, the Sahel countries must put measures in place to check the illicit trading of drugs and arms that are used to finance terrorism in the Sahel. Security agencies – especially those between the border areas of these countries – must be trained to have the necessary technical knowledge and equipment to be able to address the situation that is facing their countries.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of terrorism in the Sahel. It also discussed the socio-economic effects of the terrorist insurgency that have plunged the region into chaos since the Tuareg uprising in the north of the country that paved the way for the terrorist groups in the Sahel to come in and destabilise a region that had a history of an already existing conflict. To conclude, the rise of the insurgency in the Sahel have had devastating impacts on the socio-

economic development of the region. Even though several counterterrorism measures have been put in place to curtail this insurgency, pockets of attacks by these terrorists are carried out against the states and their citizens which have made life very unbearable for them in the region.



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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter entails the summary of the findings of the research which relates to the objectives of the study that was established at the beginning, the conclusions drawn from the findings and some recommendations. The chapter is made of three sections where each section deals with above issues outlined.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The rise of the Sahel insurgency by these terrorists and their quest to create an Islamic Caliphate in the Sahel region of West Africa since 2012 from Mali spread that spread to other states such as Burkina Faso and Niger with their activities threatening the entire region. The impacts of their activities have been very disturbing and devastating. It has created a psychological trauma among the people in areas where they operate living them in constant fear and panic. Their activities have led to the exodus of civilians moving from areas where these terrorists operate to other areas of their respective countries and other countries within the sub-region. This has created one of the greatest numbers of internally displaced persons with serious challenges currently confronting the region and the world in general with the need of various forms of humanitarian assistance to cater for the displaced persons. Peoples businesses and means of livelihood have been abandoned, hospitals, clinics, schools, private and public institutions/enterprises and industrial activities have come to halt and disrupted. To curb the devastating effects of these terrorist the various governments supported by international bodies and institution undertook some measure. These measures, however, despite the resources,

money and time spent executing them, have not been able to curtail the challenges posed by these terrorists whose recent spate of attacks have been numerous and deadlier. In view of these challenges, the research quested to assess the socioeconomic effects of the terrorists' activities in these countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – which in the Sahel region of West Africa and known geographically as the Central Sahel.

The study found out that those affected most by the activities of these terrorists across the three countries of the Sahel understudied were women, children and the aged. Women and children have been the worst affected by the terrorist attacks. Its implications on women and children have been devastating to the extent that, their socio-economic activities have been deprived. Women, children and the aged have faced various forms of post-traumatic stress in the aftermath of a terrorist attacks. This in effect, have led to the aged, women and children especially, experiencing low mood, low self-esteem, difficulties with learning, and problems of trust and relationships in these countries of the Sahel. They are unable to find an inner sense of safety in the aftermath of a terrorist attacks since they often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and major depression. Additionally, women and children have been used as human bombs where they carry bombs on them for suicide attacks. Most of them end losing their lives or parts of their bodies due to the nature of IEDs they use to carry out the attacks.

The study also found out that the consistent attacks on educational facilities across the three countries of the Sahel. Education is paramount for the development of an area given the role it plays in an individual by giving him/her the requisite skills needed for his/her personal development and his community in general. Because of most of these jihadists who carry out attacks on these schools brand the western type of education these students receive as Haram, most of these schools in the areas where they operate have been consistently become the targets of their attacks. This have led to the closure of schools in these areas where these terrorists operate. Students for the fear of being attacked and killed have stopped going to school with

the support of their parents who don't want to risk the lives of their children. Schools and other educational infrastructure and materials have been destroyed by these terrorists. Teachers and other educationist alike, have stopped going to schools vacating these areas to safe places. New ones have also refused postings to these areas.

Also, the study established that for those living in these countries affected by terrorism, everyday life is coloured by the uncertainty that comes with not being able to know if you are safe. The violence means used by these terrorist cause fear and panic with freedom to life, security and personal safety jeopardised. Citizens living in these countries consistently witness the mindless destruction of government properties, attacks on security agencies and civilians, shooting at public places, bombing of schools, churches and sporadically killing innocent citizens have created fear and panic in them. Because their lives are being threatened by these terrorist attacks, most of them are always afraid to go about their daily activities. The restrictions placed on the citizens due to curfews and the instability of public security have impeded the growth of business and normal commercial activities with the greatest affected being agriculture which the main job of citizens living in these areas. These happenings has further entrenched the already existing poverty in these areas.

Due to the devastating effects of these terrorist attacks, food security in this area, which has been consistently facing challenging with famine and food shortages, has also been badly affected. Terrorists have attacked and destroyed farms of citizens which has affected production and yield. Farms attacked by these terrorists are again looted and sometimes burn. They steal livestock of these farmers leaving them behind nothing. Farmers and traders are also not able to transport food within the affected areas to sell or buy. They have also capitalised on the age-long feud between herders and farmers by fuelling conflicts among them that have led to the massive destruction of farms and animals. Aid and humanitarian agencies are not able transport aid and relief items to these areas to the fear of being attacked and kidnapped for

ransoms. These destructions of agriculture and the production of food in these countries in the Sahel region which already an impoverished area have led to a massive food shortage and it is estimated that about 18 million people in the region are currently affected by hunger.

Again, the study found out that due to the consistent attacks carried out by these terrorists, most businesses, such as shops, banks and market places mostly close down and do not open regularly due to fear of being attacked. Some banks, shops and business owners have closed down and move to other places for security and safety reasons.

The activities of these terrorist have led to loss in investor confidence especially in the various operating in the country. The loss of foreign investor confidence due to the various acts of terrorism perpetrated by these terrorist groups have led large outflows of capital in these countries. Since the area has been branded as a terrorist target, it has attracted reduced levels of FDI.

The economy of these countries has been affected by the terrorist attacks. The impact due to loss of property and funds used to repair building and infrastructure damage have cost these countries so much. These countries have also suffered from some long-term effects of these attacks as financial markets slowly recover from the shock of the attack. The largest effect that this insurgency have had on the economy of these countries, the study found out however, is the rise in spending on security and defence, and the impact on supply chains of enhanced security at land and border crossings. Spending on defence and national security of these countries have increased by a large amount in recent months following the recent spate of terrorist attacks that have been deadly and destructive. As these countries take steps to make their borders more secure, they have spent more on logistics and personnel training. This has also led to increased border and checkpoint security among these countries that have made it

expensive to move products and goods into and out of the country. Some trucks and buses transporting people, goods and services spend more hours and days due to these measures.

Another finding of this research is that, terrorism has also affected the tourism sector of these countries badly. Most tourist destinations have been deserted due to spate of recent attacks. Since most tourist destinations have been the target of these terrorists who target mostly foreign tourists to kidnap them for ransom, most foreigners who use to troop to some of the amazing tourist destinations have stopped patronising such destinations, especially in areas where these terrorists carried out their attacks. This reduction in number of tourists coming into the country due to the fear of being attacked or killed. Most of these terrorist target tourist destinations where foreign nationals of countries taking part in the counterterrorism measures as a way retaliating attacks by foreign forces. This have led to a lost in revenue generated by this sector for the countries. These actions and measures have had economic effects significant on Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

4.2 Conclusions

The study concludes that the activities of the terrorist in the Sahel have been devastating and damaging to the socio-economic development of the countries in the Sahel. The loss of human lives and properties due to the barbaric acts committed by these terrorists will have a devastating and lasting effects to the socio-economic development of these countries and the region in general. The region which is already suffering from ethnic, tribal, farmer and herder conflicts and extreme climatic conditions coupled with extreme poverty can be plunged into chaos if drastic measures are not taken it will spread to other areas where there already pockets of existing conflicts and poverty. The continue loss of human lives, the abuse of human rights and the break in the governance and democratic structure due to the activities of these terrorist undermines the territorial integrities of these countries and the West African sub-region in

general. These terrorists will continue to pose serious threats to other countries in the sub-region as long as they get the room and resources to operate. It is therefore essentially that regional and global bodies such as ECOWAS, UN, AU and other bodies come out with drastic measures to support the already existing ones undertaken to help curb the menace being created by these insurgents.

4.3 Recommendations

This study recommends that the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and also ECOWAS take measures to address the already existing socio-economic problems facing their countries' grievances of their citizens. Marginalised groups such as the Tuareg, Fulanis and other minority groups who have been discriminated against for centuries must be given the freedom peacefully voice or express their grievances.

The concerns raised by these marginalised and minority groups must be considered and must be involved in the mainstream economic, political, cultural and social activities of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Their concerns must be addressed to prevent new sparks of civil unrest and violence that could devastate these countries. Since years of marginalisation of ethnic and minority groups been the main catalyst for this insurgency as the literature said, conscious efforts must be taken to address this.

The study also recommends that the issues of climate- and weather-related disasters has led arid and semi-arid conditions and changing desert boundaries which have often led to deadly clashes between agricultural farmers and pastoralists must be addressed through peace and mediation efforts by the government. In addition, the government must come out with policies that will favour both agricultural expansion to farmers and pastoralists. The restrictions that are placed on the access to natural resources on farmers and both farmers with the use of repressive force by the government must be addressed by engaging the various communities through a

dialogue to find a lasting solution. Humanitarian must be provided for victims of drought to address the issues of hunger and food scarcity. The governments of these countries must make sure such these are distributed fairly among all groups facing various kinds of humanitarian problems. The governments of these countries must improve agriculture in their countries through mechanised farming and also by providing subsidies and creating food preservation and inter marketing mechanisms across their countries. Food scarcity in these countries should be addressed at the level of the community development organization through researching and then educating local population on food production for their area and circumstance.

Negligence and long periods of absence in the ungoverned places of these countries must be addressed by bringing government presence by providing these areas with the necessary socio-economic activities such as good roads, water, electricity, schools, clinics and other poverty alleviation programmes that will address their challenges. There should be equal access to education, employment, housing and affordable healthcare services and political offices among all citizens of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. When these places are provided with the necessary social interventions and not neglected, it will reduce the rate at which they are indoctrinated by these Islamists to pick up arms against the state.

Rapid economic development across various areas of these countries must be provided through industrialisation of the region so that the over reliance of on farming and other primary produce will be reduced. Development programmes that strengthened the capacities of local areas, citizens and the countries in general must be pursued.

Making the ordinary people part of the fight through awareness creation. The governments if these countries must involve their citizens in the counterterrorism measures. Citizens must be educated on the long-term effects of terrorism on their immediate environments and the countries as whole. Fighting or opposing groups that are fighting must be involved in planning

a campaign that will educate people on the effects of terrorism. The governments of the Sahel must create many opportunities for the groups to socialize on each other's territory and in neutral places. Further along in the conflict resolution process, competing groups can try to understand one another's history to help prevent ethnic, farmer and pastoralist conflicts that have allowed room for these terrorists to operate. They must also be educated on peaceful religious co-existence and tolerance for one another.

Enhancement of democracy to ensure peace and development. Democracy facilitates legitimacy of sovereign states, effective, participation, inclusion, protection of rights, the common good and therefore advancement of any nation. Democracy will help address ethnic conflicts by resolving grievances and enabling developed and resilient countries.

The study will also recommend the building of a strong and well-equipped community shield to defeat these terrorists. Existing regional and community organisations such as G5 Sahel, ECOWAS, MINUSMA and other groups such as the European Union and AFRICOM must come together to bring a strong force to counter these terrorists by sharing information and conducting joint exercises against the terrorist. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger must also cooperate with these international groups by sharing information on the terrorist locations and also by implementing international protocol strategies geared towards the prevention of terrorism. Also, the process of integration in West Africa must be sped up to enhance collective information sharing and data on citizens that will help to identify bandits and terrorist who commit various forms of crimes and escape to other countries to hide or conceal their identities. Fighting terrorism is a collective effort and for it to succeed, all stakeholders from various field of work and background must be involved.

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APPENDIX

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

TOPIC OF DISSERTATION: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORISM IN THE SAHEL REGION OF WEST AFRICA

1. What is the current situation with respect to terrorism in the Sahel Region of West Africa – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger?
2. How has the activities of terrorism affected the socio-economic development in these countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger?
 - a. Social effects
 - i. Women and children
 - ii. Education
 - iii. Health
 - iv. Security and safety
 - v. Food security
 - vi. Religion
 - b. Economic Effects
 - i. Businesses
 - ii. Trade and investment
 - iii. Human capital
 - iv. Small scale businesses
 - v. Industries
3. What are the counter terrorism strategies that have been applied or implemented to overcome the challenges of terrorism in these countries – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger?
4. What have been the successes of the implementation of these strategies?
5. What challenges are the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger facing in terms of the implementation of these counter terrorism strategies?
6. What are some of the programmes the governments of Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Niger have implemented to resolve the root causes of terrorism in their countries? For examples, marginalization, unemployment, poverty among others?
7. How can terrorism be countered in these countries
 - a. Burkina Faso
 - b. Mali
 - c. Niger
8. What recommendations will you make to help find a lasting solution to the current terrorism and insurgency crisis in the Sahel Region of West Africa?