

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES



**AN ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL PARTY VIGILANTISM IN
GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC**

BY

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DECLARATION

I, **AMPONSAH TAWIAH**, declare that this thesis is the result of hard work and dedication on the part of the student, and under the supervision of **DR. SEIDU M. ALIDU** and **DR. CHARLES AMO-AGYEMANG**. I am of absolute certainty that this work does not contain any material that has been published or submitted by any individual to any institution for the award of any degree. All materials used for this study have been duly referenced by the student.


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ABSTRACT

Political Party Vigilante Groups (PPVGs) have become a visible feature in Ghanaian politics since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1992. PPVGs are mostly associated with the two leading political parties in Ghana – the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), the current government and opposition respectively. The activities of PPVGs come into prominence during election when they are used by their respective political parties to intimidate voters, protect ballot boxes and police polling stations. In performing these duties, PPVGs tend to take the law into their hands knowing that a ruling party to which they are affiliated will protect them. In serving the interest of their patron parties, however, PPVGs pose a threat to Ghana’s fragile democracy. Not only does the intimidation of voters by political party vigilantism (PPV) inspire fear and prevent electorates from exercising their democratic franchise, it also undermines peace and security through the use of violence.

The threat posed to democratic stability compelled the Ghanaian Parliament to enact an anti-vigilante legislation in 2019 (Act 999) which criminalised such activities. However, in spite of promulgation of the anti-vigilante legislation, and in spite of the commitment by political parties to adhere to the dictates of the legislation, PPV continued unabated. There is high level of bad faith or mistrust among the political actors in working closely to disband PPVGs affiliated to their parties. Therefore this study is conducted to unravel the factors accounting for the bad faith posture among the political actors in disbanding their vigilante groups.

Using a purely qualitative research methodology, the study sought to explain the poor compliance of political leaders to the call to combat PPV. The study found, among other things, that anti-vigilante legislation was not enough to combat vigilantism. Moreover, widespread mutual suspicion among NPP and NDC along with lack of trust for the electoral management body in Ghana, the Electoral Commission (EC), to conduct free, fair and transparent elections, were part of the reasons for the show of bad faith among political parties. Accordingly,

recommendations were made aimed at enhancing the state's ability to effectively stem the activities of PPVGs in the country.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my beautiful and lovely wife, Mrs Dora Amponsah; and my three wonderful children: Edith Ama Kyewa Amponsah, Raymond Kwabena Amponsah and Benedicta Abena Gyamfua Amponsah.

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Table 2 - Some known PPVGs purported to have links with the NDC 43

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

ADA	Avoidance of Discrimination Act
ARPS	Aborigines Rights Protection Society
AWW	Ayawaso West Wuogon
BNI	Bureau of National Investigations
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CODEO	Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
CPP	Convention Peoples' Party
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DCE	District Chief Executive
DPP	Democratic People's Party
DSP	Deputy Superintendent of Police
EC	Electoral Commission
Flt. Lt.	Flight Lieutenant
GCPP	Great Consolidated People's Party
GNA	Ghana News Agency
GSS	Ghana Statistical Service
IDEG	Institute for Democratic Governance
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
IGP	Inspector General of Police
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IPAC	Inter-Party Advisory Committee
ISD	Information Services Department
KNUST	Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology

MMT	Metro Mass Transport
MP	Member of Parliament
NCBWA	National Congress of British West Africa
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NCP	National Convention Party
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NHIA	National Health Insurance Authority
NHIS	National Health Insurance Scheme
NIP	National Independence Party
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NPC	National Peace Council
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NYEP	Nation Youth Employment Programme
PCP	People's Convention Party
PDA	Preventive Detention Act
PHP	People's Heritage Party
PNC	People's National Convention
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	People's National Party
PP	Progress Party
PPs	Political Parties
PPV	Political Party Vigilantism
PPVGs	Political Party Vigilante Groups
PPVGR	Political Party Vigilante Group Respondent
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics

RCT	Rational Choice Theory
UG	University of Ghana
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UK	United Kingdom
UP	United Party
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WTA	Winner-Takes-All

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

In early 1990s, there was a paradigm shift in the configuration of government and its operations in almost every country on the African continent; where many authoritarian regimes had to reform and adopt democracy (Huntington, 1991). According to Huntington (1991), this ‘third wave’ of democratization of the continent, however, did not in any way guarantee its consolidation. Scholars still remain divided as to what account(s) for democratic consolidation in most countries. In an attempt to answer the question of democratic consolidation, some scholars have plausibly argued that,

“a country achieves democratic consolidation when no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state, the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas even ... when all actors ... become subjected to, ..., the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process” (Abdulai & Crawford, 2010:28).

Ghana after going through multiple political transitions of colonialism, independence and military regimes finally returned to a multi-party democracy and constitutional rule in 1993 (Ayee, 2017). This happened after eleven turbulent years of authoritarian-cum-civilian Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) chaired by Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings who was elected and subsequently became the first President under Ghana’s Fourth Republic (Frempong, 2007). The Fourth Republic is so far the longest serving constitutional regime. It has already experienced seven successive general elections; and even gearing up for the eighth general elections in 2020.

In the words of Frempong (2016), from a not-too-inclusive constitution-making process through acrimonious transitional elections held in 1992, the Fourth Republic has indeed made several accelerative strides. This is due to the fact that almost all the previous elections could generally

be described as peaceful, transparent, free and fair. This incredible achievement according to Akuamoah (2017) can be attributed to the remarkable roles played by state institutions like the Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana, the National Peace Council (NPC), National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE), etc. Also, it is equally important to accentuate the pivotal roles performed by some political parties in Ghana. In fact, some civil society organisations (CSOs) like the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), IMANI Ghana, West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO), etc. have also made a significant contribution in the electoral politics of Ghana. The IEA for instance has indubitably played significant roles as it has for more than a decade hosted the Ghana Political Parties programme that brought together the leadership of the political parties with representation in parliament to discuss issues of national importance in an a-political manner. Again, the IEA has been hosting Presidential Debates, Town Hall Meetings and Evening Encounters for Presidential Hopefuls before elections; the preparation of the Code of Conduct to regulate the activities of political party actors before, during and after elections. The aforementioned state institutions and CSOs have indeed contributed in diverse ways to finding or proposing solutions to our political problems; and to a very large extent helped to shape the conduct of Ghana's electoral politics.

Amanquandor (2019) emphasizes that all previous and current administrations under the Fourth Republic as well as the general citizens of Ghana have witnessed a stable democratic government characterised by a relatively peaceful political atmosphere. This according to Gyimah-Boadi and Prempeh (2012) has resulted in an increase in political participation in the form of foot soldier groups mainly created by the various political parties; in an effort to capture political power so as to enable them implement their policies and programmes. The establishment of party foot soldiers has been conventionally recognised and associated with the two leading political parties in Ghana; namely the New Patriotic Party [NPP] and the National Democratic Congress [NDC] (Asamoah, 2019; NCCE Report, 2019; Bob-Milliar,

2014). Scholars such as Gyampo, Graham and Asare (2017), Alidu (2019a; 2019b; 2020) and Paalo (2017) have argued that these foot soldiers are mainly unemployed youths; who are deployed by their political parties to perform such functions as: provision of security for campaigns; organising people who support the political parties; serving as the polling agents when there is registration of voters. The political party foot soldiers also assist their parties on the day of election by protecting polling centres and electoral materials, and collation of voting outcomes or tabulation of election results.

Notwithstanding the services rendered by the political parties and their foot soldiers, the country has recorded many instances where these groups have exceeded their limit as espoused under the laws of Ghana (Bob-Milliar, 2014; Asekere, 2020). The Political Parties Act, 2000, (Act 574) empowers each adult citizen of Ghana who is of sound mind to openly participate in partisan activities that have the tendency to impact on the configuration, policies, structure as well as the organization of government (Act 574, Article 2[1]) at any given time. In spite of this, the clandestine acts of these political youth groups have made them gain both local and international notoriety; and are collectively termed as Political Party Vigilante Groups (PPVGs); who engage in acts of “taking the law into their own hands” (Rosenbaum and Sederberg, 1974:542). The clandestine acts by these political parties and their PPVGs have also contributed in stifling the democratic consolidation process of Ghana. Noticeably, inter-party feuds have contributed immensely and been worsened by the recent proliferation of PPVGs. Gyampo et al (2017) succinctly argued that,

“Vigilante groups, particularly those belonging to the party that won elections have over the years, taken the laws of the country into their own hands, forcibly ejected officials of previous administration from their apartments and physically assaulted them, as well as engaged in seizures of public property and assets in the custody of public officials in an uncoordinated manner” (Gyampo, Graham & Asare, 2017:112).

This according to CODEO (2017) remains an aberration to Ghana’s politics due to the increased electoral related violence and transitional problems. In fact, since the inception of Ghana’s Fourth Republic in 1992, the NPP and the NDC have gained notoriety in the formation of such groups. References can be made to groups like the Eastern Mambas, Hawks, Azorka Boys, etc. alleged

to be affiliates of the NDC whereas the Invincible Forces, Delta Forces, Khandahar Boys, Bolga Bulldogs are allegedly affiliated to the NPP. The ramifications of such operations has heightened the call by state institutions like the Judiciary, NCCE, etc., and civil society groups like the IEA, CDD, IDEG, etc. on the need to disband these PPVGs. Nonetheless, all attempts have proven futile. The incessant attacks by these groups recently claimed a life at the Ashanti Regional NDC office when some party functionaries met to deliberate over their national delegates' congress. In recent times, the activities of political party vigilantes also marred the bye-election that was held at the Ayawaso West Wuogon (AWW) constituency on 31st January, 2019; which has been probed by the Justice Emile Short Commission.

1.2 Problem Statement

Ghana has made tremendous strides in her quest to adopt representative governance over the past two decades; that is the Fourth Republic (WANEP, 2019). There is a plethora of evidence such as the periodic conduct of free and fair elections, freedom of expression, respect for fundamental human rights of citizens, peaceful alternation of political power between the two dominant political parties: NPP and NDC, and the respect for the rule of law; to aver the display of democratic dividends in Ghana. Also, through a referendum held in December 2018, Ghana moved a step further in strengthening and empowering grass root democracy by creating six new administrative regions. These six new administrative regions include Ahafo, Bono East, North East, Oti, Savannah, and Western North Regions; with their administrative regional capitals at Goaso, Techiman, Nalerigu, Dambai, Damongo and Sefwi Wiaso respectively. Notwithstanding these improvements in consolidating democracy and the enhancement of relative political stability in Ghana, there is an emerging security challenge created by political party vigilantism (PPV) that threatens national peace and human security (WANEP, 2019; ArmahAttoh, 2017; Aning & Danso, 2012; Asante, 2002).

Articles 43-54 of the 1992 constitution, and other laws of Ghana like the Political Parties Act, 2000, (Act 574) as shown above, are in place to ensure transparency, accountability, equity and sanity in Ghana's body politics. For instance, the Presidential Transition Act according to Gyampo, Ofori-Mensah and Owusu-Mensah (2013), "remains integral to smoothen transition process as well as the conduct of elections and succession" (p.8). Article 210 (2) of Ghana's 1992 constitution prohibits formation of an armed force except by or under the authority of an Act of Parliament. Section 200A of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 30), amended by section 5 of Criminal Offences (Amendment) Act, 2012 (Act 849) is explicitly clear and lucid on how to deal with an organised group that commits an offence.

Several elections have been organised under the Fourth Republican constitution, that is, presidential, parliamentary, local government and even bye-elections (Frempong, 2016; Agyemang-Duah, 2000, 2005; Jonah, 2001). Frempong (2016), for example, argues that the Electoral Commission (EC) has played its role to a large extent creditably as the body responsible for the management of elections in Ghana; with support from other bodies like CSOs, National Peace Council, etc. Mention can be made of the various electoral reforms like the establishment of Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) in order to achieve an inordinate pellucidity in all facets of the voting procedure (Ayee, 1997; IDEG, 2014; Frempong, 2016).

Notwithstanding the praise Ghana has received over the years for the conduct of various elections, some of these elections have come with their own challenges. Some of the elections, especially bye-elections are fraught with violence and impunity. According to scholars like Edu-Afful and Allotey-Pappoe (2016); Ibrahim (2020); Alidu (2020); and Asekere (2020), bye-elections that were characterised with violence that are worthy of note encapsulate Akwatia in the Eastern Region (August, 2009), Chereponi in the Northern Region (September, 2009), Atiwa in the Eastern Region (August, 2010), Talensi in the Upper East Region (July, 2015) and in most recent time, Ayawaso West Wuogon (January, 2019) in the Greater Accra Region; in which there was a shooting incident and about a dozen persons were injured in clashes between

supporters of the opposition and national security operatives. Bye-elections have proven to portray a tensed political atmosphere that is plagued with more violence largely because virtually the entire machinery of political party functionaries and droves of party foot soldiers descend to a single constituency to campaign and monitor elections (CDD-GH Report, 2019).

Again, there are various documented patches of violence during general elections in Ghana in some parts of the country (Bob-Milliar, 2012; Frempong, 2007b). Commenting on the kind of violence perpetuated by the members of the PPVGs, Lartey and Danso (2016) argue plausibly that:

“Political vigilante groups with affiliation to the two leading political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have been at the forefront of unleashing torrents of violence during elections with the aim of undermining opponents, in either inter-party or intra-party contests and events, and safeguarding the electoral fortunes of their parties” (Lartey & Danso, 2016:55).

These patches of violence are normally instigated by groups formed by individuals with subtle acceptance by the political parties they belong to (Tankebe, 2019). For example, Azorka Boys (NDC) and the Bamba Boys (NPP) are allegedly formed by those individuals who are named after such vigilante groups. The modus operandi of these groups is either to put fear in people to vote in certain direction; and prevent legitimate people who want to vote. Some of them even steal ballot boxes and cause mayhem at polling station(s). The members of these violent vigilante groups affiliated to the political parties operate on the basis of protecting the ballot boxes during elections (Bob-Milliar, 2014).

It is of significant interest to note that the activities of these PPVGs in recent times have been on the rise and has undermined some elections held (AWW Bye-Election: Emile Short Commission of Enquiry Report, 2019). Sadly, upsurge in these political vigilante activities have distorted governance process and threatened state security in Ghana (myjoyonline.com, 2017; Daily Graphic, 2017; CODEO Report, 2017). Until recently, State institutions and other actors

had not shown enough commitment in dealing with the menace of political party vigilantism (Silva, 2013; Candy, 2012).

The phenomenon of political party vigilantism (PPV) which is grounded on a vindictive and revengeful instantaneous justice seriously affects the ethical and communal relations of our societies (Asekere, 2020; Maunga, Mugari & Tundu, 2015). Its pervasive nature moves beyond the immediate local communities; and often involves varied approaches and multifarious agents. According to Prattern (2008), the activities of political party vigilantes with their culture of violence is susceptible to dethrone a properly elected government which has the legitimacy to rule a state. The practice whereby some people take the laws of the country into their own hands and resort to mob justice is not a new phenomenon to someone who often reads local newspapers.

In fact, a close examination of the Fourth Republic reveals acts of political vigilantism perpetuated by political party foot soldiers which largely commenced in 2000 after the NDC lost power to the NPP (Bob-Milliar, 2014). The transitional period since 2000 saw the seizure of state assets ranging from office complexes, toll booths, and public toilets from those who lost power.

This act of impunity has conventionally been entrenched in Ghana's body politics since same acts of impunity manifested in the 2008 and 2016 transitional periods. The acts of political party vigilantism has degenerated into members of these groups attacking some members of their own party (Bob-Milliar, 2014). Reference can be made to the attack on Member of Parliament for Tafo-Pankrono (myjoyonline.com, 2018); and the recent shootings at the NDC Ashanti Regional office which claimed a life (adomonline.com, 2019).

Though studies on the activities of political party vigilantism across the globe and Ghana abounds (Adinkrah, 2005; Bob-Milliar, 2012; 2014; Armah-Attoh, 2017; Gyampo, et.al, 2017; Johnston, 1996, Tankebe, 2019; Alidu, 2020; Asekere, 2020; Ibrahim, 2020; Adzimah-Alade et.al, 2020),

not much of such studies have specifically paid attention to why political parties have failed to disband these groups after several campaigns on its threat to democracy. The resistance of both state and non-state actors in dealing with it remains questionable.

The ramifications of such operations has indeed heightened the call to disband these vigilante groups in Ghana. For instance, in the quest to curtail the act of political party vigilantism, the President's 2019 State of Nation Address (SONA) on 21st February requested for dialogue between the two main actors namely, the NPP and the NDC in Ghana or face legislation received some backlash from both ends of the political divide. In view of this, Ghana has adopted several measures including the passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019 (Act 999) to disband the PPVGs. Nevertheless, the political actors have shown some level of bad faith in working closely to disband these PPVGs.

So, the question begging for an answer is; why have political actors not shown enough commitment towards disbanding these political party vigilante groups despite their suppose confession of being committed to the political processes in Ghana? It is the quest in trying to find some answers to this question that this study is being undertaken. Thus, the study seeks to fill this important gap in the literature by establishing the factors accounting for the bad faith posture in working closely to disband PPVGs affiliated to these political parties; and proffer ways to address them.

1.3 Research Objectives

The overarching objective that the study seeks to achieve is to account for the mistrust or bad faith posture among political actors towards disbanding political party vigilante groups affiliated to the parties; and proffer ways by which they can be addressed. Therefore the study seeks to achieve the following specific objectives:

- i. To identify the factors that account for bad faith among political actors in disbanding political party vigilantism in Ghana; and how they can be addressed.
- ii. To examine the reasons for the formation of political party vigilante groups in Ghana.
- iii. To analyse how the continuous existence of these political party vigilante groups controls Ghana's democratic development.
- iv. To explore the existing provisions in the 1992 constitution and other laws of Ghana that provide mechanisms for addressing this menace on consensus from the actors involved.

1.4 Research Questions

The general research question posed for investigation in this study is the bad faith shown by political actors in the quest to proscribe political party vigilante groups in Ghana. Specifically, my research will answer questions such as:

- a. What account for the bad faith attitude of political actors towards disbanding political party vigilante groups in Ghana; and how can this be resolved?
- b. What account for the formation of political party vigilante groups in Ghana?
- c. What are the ramifications of political party vigilantism to Ghana's democratic development?
- d. Are there provisions in the 1992 constitution and other laws of Ghana that provide mechanisms for dealing with political party vigilantism?

1.5 Significance of the study

This research is relevant for several reasons. Theoretically, the study will contribute to scholarship by providing other perspectives to the already conceived concepts of vigilantism; complements the existing literature on political vigilantism; as well as expands the debates on the dynamics of party politics in Ghana. Specifically, this study will help to decipher why political actors are unwilling to co-operate with the State in disbanding vigilantism. Probing into

this will add to the invaluable store of knowledge on party politics in Ghana as well as serve as a reference material to students of vigilante politics. As Ghana is approaching the December 2020 general elections, the findings of the study would guide the behaviour of political actors on the need to disband vigilantism in our body politics.

1.6 Research Design and Methodology

The main objective of a research design provides the study with the blueprint to answering research questions as well as elaborates on the type of study being conducted, the population and sampling technique and data analysis.

The study will adopt the qualitative research model of research design, data collection and analysis. The qualitative approach according to Creswell (2003) is where the researcher produces knowledge-based propositions primarily founded on constructivist standpoints with an aim of creating a knowledge pattern or developing a theory or both; within a certain discourse.

With regards to gathering of data for analysis, the study will make extensive use of both primary and secondary sources of data collection. The primary sources of data will mainly be acquired from the use of interview guides prepared to obtain relevant information on the subject matter in elite interviews involving party technocrats, civil society organisations, security services, academics and journalists. The secondary data will be obtained from books, journals, articles and official documents such as the 1992 constitution and Committee reports. These will provide a rich source of data and some historical information on the spectacular issue of political party vigilantism that has found its deep root in the political discourse of Ghana.

On sampling technique, the study will adopt a purposive non-probability technique to select participants for interview owing to the sensitive and delicate nature of the topic. Purposive sampling even though criticised for researcher's biases, Mugenda (1999) argues that it rather

allows a researcher to extensively make use of study sites that have relevant sources of information to answer stated research objectives. Targeted respondents to be interviewed would include: political party leadership, especially those in NPP and NDC; the security apparatus that are engaged to deal with these groups, especially the Ghana Police and the Military; Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) like CODEO, IDEG, CDD-Ghana; State institutions that deal with the activities of these groups, especially NPC, NCCE, Parliamentary Select Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs; and Vigilante groups, especially Azorka Boys, Invincible Forces, Delta Forces, the Hawks, etc.

The data will be qualitatively analysed through the use of content data analysis method. Qualitative content analysis basically focuses on specific method of adopting first-hand operational information and meticulous analysis of manuscript within its framework of communication (Mayring, 2010). This is thoroughly executed by following content analytical procedures and step by step simulations deprived of hasty quantification. Content analysis, however, is not only about the obvious content of the material. One advantage of this method is to keep out the researcher's personal thoughts about the subject (Anderson, 2007:1). In this disposition, this method of interpretation will help the study by allowing the researcher to give expression to the salient arguments and thoughts that have emerged on the subject matter under investigation.

1.7 Organisation of the study

The study will be divided into six chapters, with each chapter focusing on specific relevant theme. Chapter one will be the introduction which will encompass background to the study, problem statement, objectives, research questions, and significance of the study. Chapter two will concentrate on literature review on the key concepts underpinning the study. Chapter three will be the theoretical framework within which this study is situated. Chapter four will focus on the Methodology and Methods of Data collection. Chapter five will focus on data analysis and

discussions. Lastly, chapter six will capture the summary of research findings, conclusion and recommendations.

1.8 Summary of Chapter

Generally, the scourge of political party vigilantism in Ghana remains an affront to the democratic development in Ghana's Fourth Republic and if not properly dealt with, could spell doom for the nation, especially when we approach the 2020 general elections. The recent calls to disband these vigilante groups and the apathetic behavior of actors involved in dealing with it has necessitated this research to ascertain reasons accounting for the delays and as well proffer some solutions. This study would be relevant in broadening the scope of vigilantism in Ghana. By using a qualitative method to this study, it will assist the researcher by providing expertise knowledge; and also help to decipher the rationale behind the posture of the main political parties who have gained notoriety in the formation these groups. The elite interviews as a form of purposive sampling would be adopted to unravel some hidden truths on the phenomenon due to the sensitive nature of the study. Finally, content analysis will be done to interpret transcribed responses from respondents.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter of the study predominantly concentrates on the review of relevant literature on political party vigilantism. According to Fink (2014), literature review is designed to provide an overview of relevant sources of reference materials like books, published journals, scholarly articles, etc. It involves an acceptable exploration of a piece of published body of knowledge through summary, classification, synthesis, and comparison of previous research studies. This section contains the review of scholarly works relevant to the discourse of vigilantism, its root causes and impacts on Ghana's democracy. Some scholars including Biggam (2008) and Cooper (1984) argue that the essence of vigorously reviewing pertinent literature is to relate the study to the bigger on-going debate and filling gaps within the literature as well as extending earlier study. Creswell (2014) also maintains that it also helps to pitch results of previous research works related to the current research area under study. Therefore, this section of the study is to assess and appreciate prevailing knowledge on political party vigilantism.

In order to expedite the comprehensible and methodical accomplishment of the overarching objective of this chapter, pertinent literatures are divided along five (5) major thematic areas: origin of vigilantism; conceptualising vigilantism; vigilantism in Ghana; root cause of political vigilantism in Ghana; and dealing with political vigilantism in Ghana.

2.1.1 The origin of vigilantism

This sub-thematic area of the study seeks to indispensably profile the foundation and historical perspectives of the term vigilantism. The word “vigilante” or the term vigilantism is of Spanish origin which means “watchman” or “guardian” (Brian, 2012; p.1). Nonetheless, Johnston (1996:222) associates the word vigilantism to mean “vigil” in which a person or a group of persons must be awake or observant; and alertly watchful so as to avoid danger (Vander, 2014;

Nel, 2016). From a layman's perspective therefore, vigilantism means to be in a constant state of alert. It basically symbolises a phenomenon where groups unify in order to detect dangers. Ordinarily, the term vigilantism, as shown above comes from the word vigilant. Thus, just trying to use it by its literal interpretation. It therefore connotes something good or positive. Hence, in using the term vigilantism by its strictest context, it ought to or must portray something like watch-dogs for the political parties.

Originally, vigilantism or vigilante groups were not a bad idea at all. It used to refer to a certain group of people living in a community who came together and defended the community against criminals. Accordingly, almost everybody initially had a very positive idea of a vigilante group. That is, a group of people who voluntarily came together to defend the security of a particular community. Example is the community policing. It was not a bad idea at all. Even today in Nigeria, the Federal Government and some State Governments train, arm and pay some vigilante groups. So, there are some communities having vigilante groups that are armed, trained and paid allowances by the state. As the subsequent segments of the study will indicate, this positive connotation of the term political party vigilantism is being mutated and degenerated into a kind of security threat; and now regarded as "taking the law into one's own hands" (Rosenbaum & Sederberg 1974:542).

2.1.2 Vigilantism in Global Context

Historically, vigilantism was incorporated into the American English in the 19th century. In actual fact, it is perceived that vigilantism is as old as the United States itself (Culberson, 1990; Abrahams, 1998). History has it that the United States began with vigilantism; as there was gross injustice and cruelty on 4th July, 1776; which is celebrated as the declaration of independence by the Americans. In the early 1830s for example, the 'vigilance committees' were formed in the southern part of the United States. This group was specifically formed to protect, guard and guide the people who specialised in captivity of slaves against intrusion by

opponents. Nel (2016) proclaims that such abolitionists were repeatedly coerced, attacked, intimidated, assaulted and also terrorized by the members of these vigilance committees with the consent and backing of indigenous law enforcement officers. Later in the 1830s, the local government system established in the western part of the United States was characterised by a weak transfer of devolved powers which was insecurely controlled at best. Therefore a significant feature that was associated with this kind of weak political order was that, some people took it upon themselves to provide instant justice for alleged perpetrators of felonious activities. Certain individuals indicted for transgression and subsequently plumped up by this kind of makeshift system of justice, were undoubtedly not exultant with the hasty mode or alacrity with which justice was dispensed to them. Again, 'The Bald Knobbers' was another vigilante group that was formed in the United States of America around this same epoch whose members apparently became interested in the practice of taking the law into one's own hands. Consequentially, such individuals were more widely accepted than Vigilante movements from the other periods.

Abrahams (2002) gives accounts on what Dinsdale transcribed about the 1860s Vigilantes of Montana, a gang of fretful people who organised themselves against a fraudulent native sheriff and other "undesirables" who traversed their route. According to Nel (2016) the word "vigilante" and other associated forms "vigilance committee" and "vigilant society" appear to portray some kind of constructive connotations. Abrahams (2002, pp. 4-5) argues further that, individuals who were antagonistic to the actions of such gangs disparagingly described them as "stranglers". Buur (2003) also postulates that those vigilante group members were trademarked as "regulators" and "moderators" or had a more specific title called *Witdoeke* (which literally means white cloths) and the notorious Ku Klux Klan. Throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, African-American vigilantes promiscuously demolished emblems of white authority and properties allied to white society in vengeance for the damages and humiliations triggered by racial and ethnic discrimination, solitude and segregation. Abrahams (2002) claims that it is

only more recently that there has been a swelling proclivity in North America to construe the term “vigilantism” – with its connotations of violence more contemptuously.

In fact, some traits of the phenomenon of vigilantism is realized in the scriptural story espoused in Genesis chapter 34 of the kidnapping and the subsequent raping of the daughter of Jacob called Dinah. This clandestine act which took place in the Canaanite town of Shechem was orchestrated by the son of the monarch. Simeon and Lewi, who were brothers of Dinah, took the law into their own hands; and violently reacted by killing all the males of the town in retaliation. Similarly, in 2nd Samuel chapter 13, when King David woefully failed to chastise Ammon for raping Tamar, this compelled Absalom to take the law into his own hands; and killed his brother Ammon for raping their sister, Tamar. To this end, vigilantism could possibly be comprehended as a retaliatory bustle in response to crime committed by individuals (Buur, 2008; Tankebe, 2009; Mireanu, 2014; Minaar, 2001).

It is also instructive to note that acts of people taking the law into their hands was already in existence before the word vigilante was accepted into the British phraseology. In the early British context, the term “vigilante” seems not to have been used to mean something negative. Nevertheless, in all likelihood, owing to the violent actions associated with some vigilante group members like the Ku Klux Klan and other individuals such as Simeon, Lewi and Absalom as indicated supra, vigilantism has had deleterious inferences in the minds of people long ago. In the British parlance, the pool of words that take account of “vigil”, “vigilance” and “vigilante” imply with another set of words that have partly interconnecting denotations, including “wake” “watch” and “watchful”. These words, according to Abrahams (2002) take their origins from Germany. They also seem to share the similar meanings with prehistoric Indo-European origins (Abrahams, 2002). Curiously, however, in modern-day English practise, the notion of “neighbourhood watch”, which mostly involves nonaggression and cooperation with the state security enforcement agencies like the police, is frequently used in loud difference to vigilantism (Johnston, 2001; pp. 5-6; Nel, 2016; pp.27-28).

2.1.3 Vigilantism in Africa

Issues relating to vigilantes have vigorously emerged at different periods within the African history. The term vigilantism was derived from collective self-protection entities that were created in the 19th century. In contemporary times, Africa has indeed observed an outstanding number of countries moving away from dictatorial government machinery to democracy. However, there is somewhat disconcertingly sarcastic about this point that must be asserted. Whereas some countries in Africa like Ghana, Botswana, Benin, Mauritius, Cape Verde and Namibia have experienced stable transitional period to democracy (Freedom House Report, 2020), many countries on the African continental region have experienced various forms of violent skirmishes. Although the upsurge in vigilantism in several democracies in Africa is rarely a new occurrence, the activities of vigilantes actually form part of these democratic expansions. Vigilante group activities are part and parcel of those indigenous party-political inducements that give rise to what Mireanu (2014) and Tankebe (2009) describe as multi-choice policing. Many scholars including Abrahams (1998), Adinkrah (2005), Minaar (2001), Mireanu (2014), Nel (2016) and Tankebe (2019) incline to blame the proliferation of PPVGs to an over-all miscarriage and total failure of most past and present African governments to ensure order and security which they believe weakens the legitimacy of the state. Others such as Hoekman (2014), Hass, Keijser and Bruinsma (2014) have advanced a very different justifications concerning vigilante violence to be a result of multi-centred power figurations, legal pluralism as well as multiple means of political orders and exploits from above in some contemporary African countries.

2.2 CONCEPTUALISING VIGILANTISM

Having traced the origin and history of vigilantism, it is worthy to make an attempt to conceptualise vigilantism; which is the foremost object of this sub-section of the study. In an attempt to conceptualise vigilantism, it is imperative to first of all advance a wide-ranging comprehension of what actually constitute vigilantism in order to appreciate the term under

study. Stone (2016) succinctly agrees with other scholars like McIntyre (2005) and Seale (2012) that before embarking on any empirical study on any chosen topic, researchers primarily attempt to form a comprehensive conceptual definition of the construct they aspire to scrutinise. The essence of such approach is to assist researchers in developing a valid and reliable operational definition (McIntyre, 2005); embracing all salient elements that can withstand the test of time.

With regards to vigilantism, however, there is long standing disagreement within the literature, among scholars as to how the term vigilantism should be construed and subsequently defined. Many scholars including Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974); Brown (1975); Burrows (1976); Bowden (1978); Abrahams (1987); Culberson (1990); Johnston (1996); Haas (2010); Haas, Keijser and Bruinsma (2014); Kucera and Mares, (2015); Moncada (2017); Mares and Tore (2019) and, Alidu (2020) postulate that vigilantism is indeed an enigmatic concept. Moncada (2017, p. 403), for example, shares similar view with Haas (2010; p.30) that in the literature, there are indeed variances with a number of apparently fundamental components of vigilantism, such as “who, what, why, when, how and against whom”. The paucity in conceptual lucidity within an existing body of knowledge therefore poses some problems to research and accumulation of information (Moncada, 2017). From my personal observation, such discrepancies in trying to define vigilantism create problems of validity when comparing the results of other studies that focus on the conceptualisation of vigilantism.

Notwithstanding the complexities surrounding the disagreements among scholars in providing a widely accepted definition of vigilantism, Johnston (1996) offers some kind of leverage and hope on the conceptualisation of vigilantism. It is equally important to espouse in a clear and lucid terms, however, that the definition of vigilantism provided by Johnston (1996) is not exhaustive. To get a far-reaching gaze into the convolutions of vigilantism, it is central at this point to principally describe what vigilantism entails. Johnston provides a rather more concrete definition of the term under consideration where he posits that:

“Vigilantism is a social movement giving rise to premeditated acts of force—or threatened force—by autonomous citizens. It arises as a reaction to the transgression of institutionalised norms by individuals or groups—or to their potential or imputed transgression. Such acts are focused upon crime control and/or social control and aim to offer assurances (or ‘guarantees’) of security both to participants and to other members of a given established order” (Johnston, 1996, p. 232).

Taking some clue from Johnston (1996) in his definition of vigilantism above, Haas (2010:31) and Haas et al (2014:227) also conceive that “vigilantism is a planned criminal act carried out by one or more private citizens in response to (the perceived threat of) a crime committed by one or more private citizens, targeting the (alleged) perpetrators of that crime”. From my perspective, this definition seems to suggest that the phenomenon of vigilantism is a concerted effort carried out by a group. According to Roche (1996) and Nel (2016), although individual vigilantes are certainly not disregarded entirely, the existence of such groups, further succumb to the notion that vigilantism remains more or less frequently conceded as a joint inventiveness. The expression “mob justice” that is often associated with vigilantism strengthens the very widespread acuity that vigilante activities are carried out jointly.

Flowing from the above definitions, it could be deduced that Johnston (1996); Haas, Keijser and Bruinsma (2014); and Haas (2010) share certain salient elements of commonality; which can be identified to further enunciate what vigilantism entails, which are: vigilantism as involving some level of planning, premeditation and organisation by those who engage in such acts ; vigilantism as largely involving private or voluntary citizens as participants (arguably, such members are mostly males); vigilantism involves a certain level of autonomous citizenship; vigilantism as involving the usage of or susceptible usage of force; vigilantism as action towards criminality and societal nonconformity or rebelliousness; and vigilantism as a form of providing personal and collective security.

According to Johnston (1996); Haas et al (2014) and Haas (2010), vigilante groups’ actions often involve some minimal level of planning, premeditation and organisation. Thus, the eccentricities of vigilante violence are not a ‘spontaneous’ act like a reflex action that requires

an instant response or acts of individual self-protection movement. This therefore provides an unblemished indication to the effect that vigilante activities undeniably necessitate a definite amount of contemplations beforehand. This introspection stage, however, does not demand an extensive period of time. This is because vigilantism is not a mere ruthless and instantaneous reaction in a flash. Johnston (1996) for example argues plausibly that in order for “vigilantism to occur, the participating agent must engage in some form of preparatory activity such as the surveillance of an intended victim or the observation of a particular location” (p. 222). As noted in the etymology of vigilantism as aforementioned, it still remains significant that the Latin origin of vigilantism, 'vigil', literally refers to the state of being conscious and on the alert.

With the above reflections, it is also symptomatic that a distinctive trait of vigilantism is the advances that time and again ensue behind the scenes. Vigilantes seek in the direction of addressing certain trepidations that they consider to be criminal or unwarranted; and that are not resolved by the state or any other actor. These involve matters which they have keen interest in; and where they consequently craft their peculiar systems within which they execute justice. Dumsday (2009) succinctly argues that the planning and premeditation stage is “an angry over reaction” (p.51). This, however, does not qualify a person to be tagged as a vigilante.

Even though retaliation and vigilantism could move in tandem, it does not necessarily mean that the former implies the latter. According to Amanquandor (2019), very few scholars have disputed this element of Johnston's classic definition of vigilantism. He cites scholars like Huggins et al. (1991) and Adinkrah (2005) who strongly argue that, even though most vigilante groups are well organised and plan before they act, “some of them are relatively spontaneous and clandestine” (Amanquandor, 2019; p.6).

Private voluntary agency and autonomous citizenship on the other hand, emerged from the viewpoint of Johnston (1996) to the effect that a person cannot remain an agent of the state in order for such an actor to be a vigilante. He argues further that, it remains intolerable for a person to be ‘under’ state command and still work ‘outside’ of the government as a vigilante at

the same time. Although I agree with Johnston (1996) on the score that a state actor cannot prioritise both intentions; it does not inescapably rule out the fact that a person who operates for the state may possibly have a hidden 'agenda' to pursue; and thus could prioritise being a vigilante. Dumsday (2009) posits that a state actor may be a vigilante if such an agent has his personal plans as a vigilante; and places premium on his parochial intentions beyond his work as a government official. This does not include describing state security officers like the police personnel or other employees of the government who are performing their duties within the remit of the laws of the state as vigilantes.

In furtherance of this, Dumsday (2009) avers that, a public security officer could be a vigilante when such officer has an initial unanimity with the state. This is particularly so if that unanimity is approved through coercion. Harnischfeger (2003) for example, claims that once upon a time in Nigeria, there existed a dominant vigilante group called the Bakassi Boys who openly executed robbers on the boulevards without any legal battle or probe. At the initial stage, the Federal Government to some extent tolerated the instant and mob justice of the Bakassi Boys until later when the Nigerian government realised that it had degenerated into serious man slaughtering. When the state eventually made an attempt to intervene and control the Bakassi Boys, they adopted the use of "black magic" to frighten the state officials; and the state has certainly not tried to stop them again (Harnischfeger, 2003). Although the Bakassi Boys were to some extent permitted by the state at the beginning, it must be stated that they are not state security *officials*. Rather, in this instance, they are vigilantes who have taken the law into their own hands. By and large, vigilantism in this respect is understood as a voluntary activity carried out by 'active citizens' (private voluntary agents) without the support or the authority of the state (Johnston, 1996; p.226).

The application or vulnerable usage of force is a very important component of vigilantism. It is repeatedly acknowledged that vigilantes continually adopt violence to accomplish their

ambitions. This assumption has, conversely, been refuted as not essentially the case. Certain vigilantes purely frighten to make use of violence, perhaps without ever (or hardly ever) using it. Johnston (1996) postulates that it is imperative to establish this discrepancy. This is particularly so because the violence that is adopted by the vigilantes varies greatly as well. Some scholars including Harnischfeger (2003) and Sen (2012) argue that the vigilantes actually start from 'mere' warnings to floggings and gory open brutalities.

Similarly, Johnston (1996) claims that vigilantism is indeed a response to crime and public deviancy. This particular component of vigilantism remains a central part of the attempt to conceptualise vigilantism. This is because it introduces another dimension of vigilantism in relation to legal pluralism and responses from the state. Johnston (1996) posits that a distinction must be categorically made among dualistic ways of vigilantism: firstly, having a single mindedness on 'crime control'; and secondly, being apprehensive by way of 'social control' or, more unambiguously dealing with the 'maintenance of communal, ethnic or sectarian order and values' (p.228).

Johnston (1996) affirms that the paramount possibility remains that vigilantism is unequivocally, a rejoinder to delinquency. Thus, vigilantism in this sense is regarded as a crime control mechanism. This means that state laws are actually violated; but the "reprobates" are not appropriately held liable. There is therefore no shred of doubt that vigilantes resolve to take the laws into their own hands (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974) and administer justice by themselves. The other alternative control system available to or adopted by vigilantes is the social control mechanism (Johnston, 1996). This is especially when vigilantes uphold a discrete value sets that are different from that of the state. According to Dumsday (2009), through the adoption of vigilante group activities, these actors involved apply a different recognised legitimate scheme other than those upheld by the state.

It must be accentuated at this juncture that Johnston (1996) gives an indication of instances where vigilante group actions could involve both crime control and social control mechanisms described above. In the opinion of Nagtzaam and Lentini (2007), a typical illustration of this situation involving both crime and social control mechanisms could be the Marine Marshals who attentively pursue their goal of guarding aquatic creatures through intermittent targeting of pirate whale fishers. Although the state desires to safeguard the lives of the whales in the ocean to the extent that laws are promulgated on the subject; the state, however, blatantly refuse to guarantee such laws guarding the oceanic creatures (Nagtzaam & Lentini, 2007). This therefore gives an indication of state failure in two dimensions. One of such circumstances of state failure is the inability of the state to enforce its own laws or bye-laws on marine fishing; and two is the inability of the state to protect the lives of sea animals.

This aspect of state let-down would be observed within the ambiance of the Marine Marshals. There is another cog of the Marine Marshals that is inextricably linked to legal plurality. In the dogma of the Marine Marshals, these aquatic animals' lives are equally central to the survival of individual human beings (Nagtzaam & Lentini, 2007). In fact it is the state that has a social contract with its citizens but not the sea animals. Though some people might perceive the ferry seizures by the Marine Marshals as a vigilante-like action, the Marine Marshals are, however, in their moderation zone to protect the lives of the oceanic animals. Consequently one can argue plausibly that it would be the same situation for the Marine Marshals if there were human beings living in the seawater; and these buccaneers were killing such people. This is indeed a diverse clarification of standards and principles that likens human lives to different forms of lives. Kucera and Mares (2013) also argue that there are some legal structures that consider a particular group as being 'lower' than other groups. This legal classification of groups is exceptionally factual compared to definite tribal or culturally sectional groups.

The expression ‘social deviant’ remains a mystifying concept to use to describe a vigilante group. It symbolizes persons or groups who perceive other persons who digress from their thoughts on justice, law and order as deviants. To make an assertion that such groups are borne out of this perceived ‘social deviance’ is very arguable. In view of this, I refer to them as quasi-vigilante group in the study. ‘*Quasi*’ is a Latin word which literally means ‘other’. Hence it refers to these groups that have a diverse (other) set of standards and principles than those upheld by the state.

The challenge associated with this description is that it practically assumes an outright delineation of, conceivably, state failure or let-down. In a Western state, for example, a vigilante group member who attempts to sustain a law passed by a religious sect in society might be seen to be a quasi-vigilante. Conversely, if the laws of the state are centered on religious reflections, then vigilante groups which challenge the enforcement of such a ‘Western’ law could be regarded as a *quasi*-vigilante. In view of this, it is always expedient that one considers the state as the yardstick in any attempt to conceptualise vigilantism from the legal perspective. Thus, whether or not such vigilante group members are opposing or promoting the enforcement of state laws. This therefore suggests that whether a vigilante group is a *quasi*-vigilante group or a crime rebellious vigilante group is contingent on the reliefs associated with state laws. Regardless, whether vigilante group members are implementing the laws of the state or they are not applying a legal system of the state still remains problematic; because it is very difficult to differentiate the two.

The ultimate element of vigilantism raised by Johnston (1996) centers on the individual and the joint security of the vigilante group members. This is extremely treasured by vigilante group members as they prepare for their daily repetitive activities. This may perhaps take several methods since diverse vigilante groups conceive security in a different way. Whereas some groups consider security as the absence of violence, others perceive it as the perpetuation of

anything vigilantes ponder as the accurate and ‘just’ standards and principles. The uniqueness of almost every vigilante group is that they struggle to achieve a greater objective which they consider as the ‘common good’. Vigilantism in this instance is, however, not circumscribed as an ordinary self-preservation or private displeasures. Instead, it largely epitomizes the trepidation aimed at the greater representation. According to Johnston (1996), the groups that habitually counter as a reaction to crime committed by people is regarded as the defense of other persons against law breakers. He further argues that the *quasi-vigilante* group members make an attempt to extend their unique valued structures to other persons. They do this because such quasi-vigilante groups have a contradictory justice scheme to that of the state which they consider to be unprejudiced and equally fair to expand to cover other people.

Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) have also identified three forms of vigilantism. They comprise regime control vigilantism, crime control vigilantism, and social control vigilantism. Regime Control vigilantism occurs when a regime takes steps to protect its citizens as a result of insurmountable frustrations about its state of affairs (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974). As will be captured later in the study, President Hilla Limann for example, adopted the regime control vigilantism strategy to prevent people from committing crime under the Third Republic of Ghana. With respect to crime control vigilantism, they share similar element of commonality with Johnston (1996) to the effect that it deals basically with vigilantism against suspected criminals who are seen to have escaped punishment. This could be due to several factors including inefficiency, ineptitude, dishonesty, corruption or kind-heartedness on the part of the regime in power. Crime control vigilantism is normally linked to specific uncertainties surrounding a particular crime committed by an individual as postulated by Hil and Dawes (2000). In fact, this type of vigilantism is often connected to and shown within a particular culture, such as the Death Wish movies starring Charles Bronson (Grayson, 1992). The crime control vigilantism in the words of Ayyildiz (1995) can be perceived as enchanting a two-fold character, embodying both a “law-abiding hero and a law-breaking villain” (p.147). The social

control vigilantism on the other hand lays emphasis on violence activity perpetrated against a particular group that is greatly perceived as a threat or danger to certain cherished societal practices, values, standards and principles (Pedahzur & Perliger, 2003; Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974). The distinction between crime control vigilantism and social control vigilantism is that, the target group or victims of the latter need not to have involved themselves in a crime. A typical example is the mob injustice by the people of Denkyira-Obuasi that led to the brutalities and untimely demise of Major Adams Mahama on May 29, 2017. The target groups under social control vigilantism could be communal which is characterised by such factors like race and religion, economic or political.

Flowing from the above, scholars including Abrahams (1998, p.9), Asamoah (2019, p.11) and Kucera and Mares (2015, p.172), adopt a modest three-part equation. The components of this equation encapsulate good citizens, criminals and the state. Therefore the equation represents: good citizens + criminals + state = Anticipated Peace. All things being equal, citizens naturally have a social contract with the state to protect them against transgressions that may be committed against them by the criminals. If, on the contrary, trust in the state is absent, the equation drops one part; and the tussle would now be between good citizens versus criminals (Abrahams 1998, p. 9; Asamoah, 2019, p.11). Thus good citizens + criminals - state = Disaster. This means that any time the state fails to protect its citizens, the equation features only good citizens and criminals; and the outcome of such encounter, could be disastrous. People will now begin to find different ways of protection. As a way of seeking for protection, I totally agree with Brown (1963) and Abrahams (1998, p. 7) that vigilantism is an “organised extra-legal movements the members of which take the law into their own hands or associations in which citizens have joined together for self-protection under conditions of disorder”.

It is apparent to espouse that vigilantism in its broad usage refers to the act of taking the law into one’s own hands (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974). Vigilantism thus presumes that there

is the manifestation of a definite order, which the vigilante group members aspire to wholly safeguard; or whose paucities it desires to get rid of, or against which it describes themselves. I can therefore argue plausibly on this note that, vigilantism arises mainly due to injustice in the state. Hence Abrahams (1998) is right to have conceptualised that:

“Vigilantism presumes the existence of the state, and of formal legal and other procedures involving the use of force over which the state normally claims a monopoly... Vigilantism typically emerges in ‘frontier’ zones where the state is viewed as ineffective or corrupt, and it often constitutes a criticism of the failure of state machinery to meet the felt needs of those who resort to it. It is a form of self-help, with varying degrees of violence, which is activated instead of such machinery, against criminals and others whom the actors perceive as undesirables, deviants and public enemies” (Abrahams 1998, p. 9).

In line with conceptualising vigilantism as a social or crime control and its associated legal ramifications by scholars like Johnston (1996), Haas (2010), Abrahams(1998), Kucera and Mares (2015); Moncada (2017; p.408) also conceptualises and defines “vigilantism as the collective use or threat of extra-legal violence in response to an alleged criminal act.” I am of the view that his point of view on how vigilantism should be conceptualised is a trade-off between socio-legal dimensions. He further identifies five core definitional magnitudes which constitute vigilantism. They encompass “*social organisation, target, repertoire, justification and motivation*” (Moncada, 2017; p.407).

Moncada (2017) explains that *social organisation* dimension of vigilantism revolves around communal bonds which profile the organisation and accomplishment of vigilantism and its related activities. The basic traits of such societal relationships actually vary from discrete to combined efforts. The joint societal organisation of vigilantism can have a pathway ranging from approved to unapproved systems. A classic instance could be a spontaneous vigilante mob or a moderately institutionalised self-preservation gang in a community.

According to Moncada (2017), the *targets* of vigilantism are the set of goals or objectives that individuals who allegedly involve themselves in behaviours that violate a certain directive want

to achieve. The targets of vigilantism include acts such as flouting or disobeying a set of guidelines that are used in governing a particular community. Such guidelines can differ from official to unofficial engagements. Amongst the regularly beseeched guidelines in lessons of vigilantism is the prescribed legal instruction that catalogues a variety of behaviours as felonious and accordingly punishable by the Courts. There are other many guidelines that are not lawfully enshrined; but they are recognised and implemented by an array of non-state groups. These unconventional guidelines could bring into line with a separate order that differs from the official permissible order. Examples of such unceremonious guidelines are repeatedly not established in situations where the authority of the state is challenged, such as inner-city neighbourhoods which are controlled by gangs. Standards, values, norms and principles surrounded by unofficial guidelines are manoeuvrable; but they are often times not codified; and are therefore perceptibly apparent to persons residing within such territorial confines that are not well-ordered by the state. Notwithstanding the degree to which the directive is rationalized and its core reasoning, the target remains a person who is indicted for having violated the norms that are concomitant with the directive.

Moncada (2017) further explains that *repertoires of violence* are the catalogues of appropriate punishing technique that persons involved in vigilantism or gangs adopt to deal with or intimidate their adversaries. This ranges from lethal to non-lethal methods. Instances of well-known dangerous (lethal) practices related to vigilantism include hanging and necklacing (the extrajudicial exercise of cruelty, torture, vindictiveness and killing carried out by imposing a rubber tire filled with petrol or kerosene around a victim's neck, chest and arms; and setting it on fire to burn the victim). Non-lethal practices encompass sexual assault, beating, battery, whipping, and physical or corporal as well as psychosomatic pain.

In his view, Moncada (2017) explicates *justification* as the exact manner in which culprits of vigilantism explicitly defend their actions as being acceptable. By this the vigilante group

members sometimes name some people, the media and even state officials as their eyewitnesses to justify their actions. Defences or *justification* vary from personal to joint in character.

Personal justifications take the form of affirming the action as the ‘right thing to do’ in the eye of the beholder; whereas a collective or joint justification includes an assertion to have been acting for the safety and protection of the majority people living in the larger community. It must be emphasised that people who engage vigilantism often rely on the second method to defend themselves regardless of the fact that societies exist as separate entities.

The *motivational* aspect is linked to the reason(s) for carrying out vigilantism by an actor.

By decoupling motivation and justification, Moncada (2017) easily aligns with contemporary struggles on the ontology of party-political violence that regard motivations as a lubricant, vibrant and not essentially decipherable tainted acts that demand for any defence. Also, whatever the motive behind that clandestine act of vigilantism can never be expected to bring into line with the defence presented by its perpetrators.

Therefore linking the five core definitional dimensions to how he conceptualises vigilantism, Moncada (2017) argues that:

“The social organisation aligns with much extant research that views vigilantism primarily as a group activity. The target is an individual(s) who has allegedly committed a criminal act as defined by the state, defined as ‘an illegal act for which someone can be punished by the government’. The repertoire of violence is the extra-legal use or threat of violence, which can be lethal or non-lethal in nature. The justification is the alleged violation of the rule of law. Motivation in this root concept is conceptually aligned with the justification – punishment of the violation of the rule of law – but may diverge to other motivating factors depending on the conceptual strategy used by the researcher” (Moncada 2017; p. 408).

From the ensuing debate on how scholars have attempted to conceptualise the phenomenon of vigilantism, I strongly agree with Johnston (1996). This is because vigilantism cannot be conceptualised merely in terms of both crime control and social control spectrums. Rather, I conceive vigilantism as a ‘nebulous’ and the same time ‘normative’ concept; and to even apply the concept in collocation with those components enumerated above, the meaning of vigilantism

may capture a possibly inexhaustible array of political as well as legal accomplishments. As a result, conceptualising vigilantism in relation to “planned actions which are undertaken voluntarily by private citizens without the state's authority and which use or threaten to use force for purposes of social control” (Johnston, 1996, p. 229); may include several actions ranging from say ‘beating’ a defiant teenager in areas where such retribution is prohibited, to perhaps, murdering or assassination of a radical statesman so as to stabilise the communal command within a specific territory.

From my personal perspective, the resolution to this problem of conceptualising vigilantism connects to the normative (concerning the practice of forcing people to accept and obey societal rules and regulations) facet of the concept. This offers the preliminary account for considering vigilantism as a criminological concept, relative to a political instance. Vigilantism rises once a particular conventional directive is regarded as a threat emanating from the misdemeanour or potential misdemeanour of institutionalised standards and principles. In this instance vigilantism is indeed a response to actual or alleged eccentricity; which makes the concept of vigilantism different from a mere establishment of communal violence.

In a recent study, Tankebe (2019) agrees to the fact that indeed, vigilantism is a complex concept. He shares the same notion with Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) that the concept of vigilantism involves episodes that demand some people “taking the law into their own hands” as such people aspire to apply or threaten to adopt force or violence against other persons whom they perceive to be what I call a ‘stubborn stack’ to a particular social order. In this sense, vigilantism could unequivocally be regarded as a subversion of rule of law.

Arguably, Tankebe (2019) posits that it is unthinkable to conceive vigilante activity without any inherent political elements. According to him, “no vigilante activity is politically neutral; every act of vigilantism is inherently political in the sense that it always involves the use of power against other persons and in pursuit of certain interests” (Tankebe, 2019a). Political vigilantism,

thus, to a very large extent can be conceived to be occasions in which some individuals take the law into their own hands (Rosenbaum & Sederberg 1974; Tankebe, 2019) so as to enable them pursue their political agenda. This is exactly the case of most vigilante group activities in Ghana. The Ghanaian case of vigilantism can be defined as acts perpetuated by any form of social grouping, which equally augments the partisan agenda of a government in power and the opposition; and are to ensure the election of their respective parties into power as well as be prepared to defend the party (Gyampo *et.al*, 2017).

Against this backdrop, it is imperative to argue that, projecting an all-inclusive definition for vigilantism remains an arduous task due to ‘the inflation of concepts such as: paramilitaries, civil militias, neighbourhood patrols, private security, informal policing, death squads, and even terrorism which has close meaning with the concept’ (Mireanu, 2014, p.2). Legally, vigilantism is seen as criminal because, no law necessarily warrant any custom of "taking the law into one’s own hands" such as crime fighting by non-state actors (Nel, 2016; Amanquandor, 2019; p.8). However, it has been argued that, ‘the act itself cannot automatically be termed as a criminal, but rather its consequence’ (Haas, *et.al*, 2014; Amanquandor, 2019, p.7-8).

In a recent study, Mares and Tore (2019) have provided what they term as ‘traditional’ conception of vigilantism that perhaps features almost all the necessary elements reviewed above. In their words, vigilantism is “the use of extra-legal enforcement of a particular conception of justice or threat or intention to use such enforcement, carried out by informal actors, with the purpose to protect subjectively perceived law and order” (Mares & Tore, 2019; p.4). Vigilantism refers to the activities of voluntary community groups that strive to ensure that nothing negative and unacceptable happens to them or their sworn interests. Nevertheless, in some many nascent democracies, vigilantism is summed up to be "taking the law into one's own hands"(Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974: 542) by violently resorting to the use of brute force to guard one’s interest or a group’s interest. The definition by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974)

contextually fit into the case of Ghana. The vigilante groups have been said to be the cause of election violence in Ghana (Bob-Milliar, 2014; Paalo, 2017; Gyampo et al, 2017; CODEO, 2017; Asamoah, 2019; Asekere, 2020; Alidu, 2020; and Ibrahim, 2020).

Reasoning with the literature on the conceptualisation of vigilantism above, a working definition for political party vigilantism in the Ghanaian context, for the purpose of this study, refers to a situation where a group of macho men affiliated to the political parties take the law into their own hands, visit brutalities on citizens, especially their opponents and sometimes their own party members, for the purpose of harnessing party-political benefits and advantage.

They are mostly equipped with weaponries, use violent attacks to intimidate, seize and sometimes destroy both state and private properties.

2.3 VIGILANTISM IN GHANA

2.3.1 Manifestation of Vigilantism in Ghana: The Background

To forget what happened before you were born is to incessantly remain a child. History demonstrates hard-hitting lessons to people; guides people's actions and inactions today; and serves as a platform which directs decisions that affect the future. Unequivocally, the phenomenon of political party vigilantism has gained inroads and manifested itself into the political discourse of Ghana's fourth attempt at a constitutional rule. It is of vital importance to note that political violence perpetuated by the members of political party vigilante groups is deeply embedded not only in the Fourth Republic but way back to the decolonisation era. Therefore the bedrock of political party vigilante violence is attributed to the vociferous political atmosphere prior to the independence struggle.

Several scholars including Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2004); Gyampo et.al (2017); Tankebe (2019); Asamoah (2019); and Alidu (2020) trace the emergence of vigilantism in Ghana to the struggle against the British imperialist regime around the end of the nineteenth and through to the early twentieth centuries. According to Kimble (1963), this kind of anti-colonial struggle

was characterised by the proliferation of nationalist movements such as the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) which was formed by the people of Gold Coast (now Ghana) comprising the Intelligentsia, chiefs and the commoners; to prevent the British colonial government from taking over their 'idle lands.' Another equally important movement that emerged around this epoch, worthy of mentioning is the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) that was formed and used as a united front by the nationalists to press home for their demands against the British colonial administration. It is proper at this moment to accentuate that the nature and modus operandi of these movements were not aggressive. Conversely, Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2004) argue that, "the united front adopted by the nationalist elites against colonialism later turned antagonistic, especially with the emergence of ... political parties during the decolonisation era" (p.17). According to them, this development has impacted on the nature of politics of Ghana in the subsequent years.

According to Apter (1963) and Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2004), during the early part of the 1930s, partisan organisations were predominantly put together with overwhelming support and endorsement of the elite controlled Youth Associations whose followers were youth in thoughts relative to their numerical ages. The focal lens of their actions was to cling to deliberating on matter-of-fact or realistic methods, procedures and mechanisms by which to stimulate general development of the then Gold Coast (now Ghana). This overall vision was anchored through every appropriate means possible; even when it requires "taking the law into one's own hands" (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974; p.542).

Owing to the proliferation of party-political activities after the Second World War, the concentration of party-political activism tremendously transformed radically from mere recognition and getting representation in the British colonial administration to securing full independence and total abrogation of imperialism. For instance, in a short period of four years after Second World War, two major political groupings; that is, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC, formed on 4th August, 1947 at Saltpond by Paa Grant) and the Convention

Peoples Party (CPP, formed on 12th June, 1949 by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah). As a result of the formation of these two major political parties with divergent ideological beliefs and pursuant to the 1951 Arden Clarke Constitution, there was the urgent need to organise general elections for the first time in the country on the principle of universal adult suffrage. The UGCC was led by their flag bearer Dr. J. B. Danquah and the CPP was led by their leader Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. These political parties sought to take up the mantle of political leadership in the occasion of the British granting self-government and total independence to the Gold Coast.

It is also worthy to indicate that members of the CPP and the NLM caused mayhem and attacked their opponents. There is a clear indication to the effect that political party vigilantism is an old phenomenon in Ghanaian political dispensation. Though vigilantism traces its background to the Ghana's independence struggle from the British colonial rule, the CPP and the NLM at a point in time had a violent and aggressive partisan scuffles as the kind of political system Ghana should adopt in relation to whether federal or unitary state (Tankebe, 2019; Alidu, 2020). The struggle involved the adoption and extensive usage of violent political party vigilante group activities by the supporters belonging to each side. Therefore political party vigilantism has been there since the origins of the modern state. In the period dating back to decolonisation, in the Gold Coast then (now Ghana), there were agitations between party supporters of the CPP and other regionally based political parties like NLM, Togoland Congress, etc. Some of the notable political party vigilante groups that gained notoriety during this period include the Action Groupers formed in 1953 by the NLM and the Action Troupers that emerged in 1954 by the CPP to challenge their counterparts in the NLM. So in the run up to the decolonisation, there were evidence of political party affiliated supporters who were agitating and causing mayhem to support their own political party agenda.

Politics in Ghana is unequivocally organised on political party lines but individuals (independent candidates) normally show up to compete in national elections. According to

Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2004), an exhaustive assessment of the proliferation, formation and organisation of political parties that purport to foster the development agenda of Ghana shows that political parties have certainly had a checkered past. This is evidenced in the very fact that the “pre-independence Ghana witnessed vigorous, but sometimes violent, political party competition” (Gyimah-Boadi & Asante 2004; p.38). Nonetheless, in the post-independence era, the forte of political party groupings that were antagonistic of the CPP progressively declined in the National Assembly. This could be as a result of the passage of some suppressive laws by the majority CPP in the National Assembly. Paramount among such suppressive, tyrannical, authoritative and despotic laws included the passage of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) and the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA). These minor political parties responded to these repressive tendencies with the merging of all the opposition parties to form the United Party (UP).

Worse of it all, in 1964, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the country, through constitutional amendments, succeeded in making Ghana a de-jure one-party state, with his CPP as the only legitimately known and recognised political party in the country. This totally weakened the opposition parties that were more or less formed along tribal or sectorial lines. Nevertheless, on 24th February 1966, the first military coup occurred in Ghana which apparently ended the domineering era of the CPP; and the party was consequently banned. As a routine, whenever there is military takeover in the country (1966-69, 1972-1979, and 1982-1992), political party activity has each time been proscribed.

Notwithstanding the spasmodic military involvements in the post-independence Ghana, a predominantly stimulating characteristic of modern-day politics of the country is that majority of the political parties that were formed after the upheaval of the CPP (First Republic, 1960-1966) have positioned themselves to the rudimentary ideologies of one of the two major opposing political traditions (the CPP and the UP) in Ghana. From the period of Ghana's

attainment of a republican status in 1960 through to 1992, the country has gone through series of political transformations of military cum civilian regimes. In all these years, activities of political party vigilantism were rife; except under military regimes where political party activities were mostly banned; though there were some minimal levels of resistance and internal skirmishes.

From the period 1960 to date, Ghana has witnessed four different republics: 1960, 1969, 1979 and 1992. The latest republic was inaugurated on 7th January, 1993. In fact, two central political traditions are recognised within the political discourse of Ghana. These are the Nkrumah tradition and the Danquah-Busia tradition. Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2004) argue, however, that there is a third political tradition which is being recognized now within the Ghanaian political space. This third political ideology that has emerged is widely believed as the Rawlings tradition (Gyimah-Boadi & Asante, 2004). They assert further that the Rawlings tradition pulls its bearings from each of the previous well-known traditions (both Nkrumah and Danquah-Busia traditions); and organised around the principles of probity, transparency and accountability, as well as promotion of democracy at the grassroots.

Salient among the legendary political ideals and principles likened to the Nkrumah led CPP tradition include socialism, Pan-Africanism, anti- imperialism and active state involvement in the economy. The Danquah-Busia tradition on the other hand has as part of its cherished values the practice of popular sovereignty and liberty of the individual, multi-party democracy, rule of law, free market and private enterprise and initiative (Gyimah-Boadi & Asante, 2004).

The Nkrumah led CPP tradition controlled the politics of Ghana from 1951 to 1966; and ultimately ushered the country into the First Republic in July, 1960. The Danquah-Busia tradition also produced its first government, which is the Progress Party (PP) in 1969 with the inauguration of the Second Republic. In a like manner, the People's National Party (PNP) which

won the 1979 general elections with Dr. Hilla Limann as the leader of the party and president, ushered the country into the Third Republic. It must be put on record that President Limann who campaigned on the theme of continuing with the ‘good works’ of Dr. Nkrumah eventually formed his government chiefly around people who had worked very closely with Dr. Nkrumah.

The period 1992 to date is Ghana’s fourth attempt at a constitutional rule (Fourth Republic). Under the Fourth Republic, it is only the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which claims succession to the Busia-Danquah tradition. Meanwhile, it is observed that the Nkrumahist front has been severally alienated with as many as five known and registered political parties at the inauguration of the Fourth Republic in 1992. These parties included the People’s National Convention (PNC), the People’s Heritage Party (PHP), the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), the National Independence Party (NIP) and the National Convention Party (NCP). The NIP, PHP and a fragment of the NCP later, merged to constitute the People’s Convention Party (PCP). Prior to the 2000 general elections political parties that took inspiration from the Nkrumahist tradition were the CPP (the label approved by the PCP after the courts ruled in contradiction to the PNDC decree barring the use of the name and emblem of the previous CPP led by Nkrumah), PNC, GCPP, and the DPP.

Unlike the previous three republics - 1960, 1969 and 1979-, that produced only a single administration (the CPP in 1960, the PP in 1969 and the PNP in 1979), the country’s fourth attempt at a constitutional rule is undoubtedly the most resilient and the longest serving republic. The Fourth Republic has been able to withstand the test of time and satisfied the Two Turn-Over Test postulated by Samuel Huntington. After the inauguration of the Fourth Republic, the country has witnessed three different transitions (the transition from the National Democratic Congress –NDC- under J.J. Rawlings to the New Patriotic Party-NPP- under J.A. Kuffour in 2001; the transition from NPP under Kuffour to NDC under J.E.A. Mills/Mahama in 2009; and the transition from the NDC under Mahama to the NPP under Akufo-Addo in 2017) producing five different presidents: Rawlings, Kuffour, Mills, Mahama and Akufo Addo.

2.3.2 The manifestation of PPV in Ghana's Fourth Republic (1992 – Date)

The phenomenon of political party vigilantism (PPV) continues to disturb the peace of this country even in contemporary times with the inauguration of the Fourth Republican constitution in 1992. The first election held in 1992 which set the pace for the Fourth Republic witnessed a lot of political tensions among the political actors. This therefore had a momentous impact on the approval or endorsement and validation of the first election results on the part of the losing parties. The losing parties in the presidential election subsequently boycotted the parliamentary elections that were held on a different date. They later issued a famous document dubbed “The Stolen Verdict” that chronicled their perspectives on the 1992 elections; which they doubted the outcome.

In tracing the manifestation of political party vigilantism into the Fourth Republic of Ghana, scholars including Bob-Milliar (2012; 2014) and Armah-Attoh (2017) argue that PPV became so pronounced during the transition of political power and control of state resources from then incumbent NDC which had lost the 2000 general elections to the NPP in 2001. In the Fourth Republic, political party vigilantism became a little bit more pronounced when the NPP won political power in 2000; and the elements of the winning party started doing things unlawfully; seizing people's properties, harassing members of the opposition, and then before we knew what was happening, it degenerated to a point where the other political parties also assumed that the way to probably intimidate others and get them to see things the way they see things, especially to understand and recognise that they are also a force to reckon with. So the opposition political parties, especially the NDC also formed some of these political party vigilante groups. So, while it is a feature of the Fourth Republican democratic enterprise, it started manifesting itself clearly during the NPP administration in 2001 (Bob-Milliar, 2012; Armah-Attoh, 2017). The pervasiveness of acts of political party vigilantism in Ghana's fourth attempt at a constitutional rule indicates that it suddenly, violently and aggressively entered the Fourth Republic.

A critical review of existing literature on political party vigilantism in Ghana's Fourth Republic clearly shows that there are evidences of similar acts of violent attacks, aggressions and takeovers occurred during the transition period in 2009; when the NPP relinquished power to the NDC. Groups associated with the latter, with their pay-back-time mentality, took hostage of public places of convenience, lorry parks and many other State Agencies including the offices belonging to the then National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP), the Metro Mass Transit Limited and the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA). In specific instances, these vigilante groups successfully ousted District Chief Executives (DCEs), managers and staff of state institutions such as the NHIA and NYEP (Armah-Attoh, 2017). Unfortunately, getting to the 2016 elections, political party vigilantism got a very bad name in Ghana; when it came to represent a group of armed people affiliated to political parties, trained and prepared to defend the party and its leaders against their opponents. And this involved possibly attacking people belonging to other parties and even attacking the electoral process. So, the way it originated sometimes, the vigilante groups in the party will owe allegiance to a particular politician within the party.

The transition of the NPP into office in 2017 was not different from previous times and marred the almost smooth process. NPP affiliated groups, mainly led by the Invincible Forces, Delta Force and Kandahar Boys plunged the nation into series of unlawful invasions, seizures and forceful control of public assets and facilities. For example, public places of convenience, lorry parks, toll booths, Tema Harbour, Passport Office and many other public places were invaded by these political party vigilante groups.

In a recent study, Asamoah (2019) argues that some public places including toll booths managed by Ghanaians alleged to be supporters of the NDC were apprehended during the 2017 transition; after the NPP had overwhelmingly won the 2016 general elections with over a million votes. The Daily Graphic (2017) also reported that related episodes of commandeering of community facilities had been recorded at different locations in the country. The associates of the Delta

Force, a political vigilante group linked with the NPP, for example, pounced on the Ashanti Regional Security Coordinator in Kumasi and ferociously battered him and a section of his subordinates (*Graphic Online*, 2017). On a different occasion, the members of the same Delta Force vigilante group again blatantly took the laws into their hands and attacked a Circuit Court in Kumasi. At the end of that historic episode, they managed to free about 13 members belonging to them who had been accused for instigating public disorders at the Regional Coordinating Council. The gang closely assaulted the sitting Judge who was superintending over the case at the court room (*Daily Graphic*, 2017).

This clandestine act in Ghana's Fourth Republic has now degenerated into 'party militias' attacking some members of their own political party. References can be made to the attack on Member of Parliament for Tafo-Pankrono (myjoyonline.com, 2018); and the recent shootings at the NDC Ashanti Regional office which claimed a life (adomonline.com, 2019).

These incessant attacks also manifested during the recently held bye-election on 31st January, 2019 in the Ayawaso West Wuogon (AWW) Constituency following the demise of the Member of Parliament for the constituency, Emmanuel Kyeremanteng Agyarko.

Following from the above political mishaps characterising Ghana's fourth attempt at a constitutional rule, it has been argued that, the brand of party activism remains an affront towards the consolidation of liberal democratic practices in the Fourth Republic of Ghana. In view of this, Bob-Milliar (2014) asserts that:

“Foot soldiers of the NPP used the Akan saying “y’atu aban” (“we have overthrown the government”) to describe the NDC’s defeat in 2000. In its practical manifestations, foot soldiers claiming NPP affiliation seized party patronage objects, including public toilets and lorry parks in Accra and other urban centres” (BobMilliar, 2014, p.126).

Currently, there are quite a number of identifiable political party vigilante groups which continue to threaten Ghana's democratic consolidation. Some of the known political party

vigilante groups threatening the political landscape under Ghana's Fourth Republic that are affiliated to both the NPP and NDC are captured under the tables below:

Table 1. Some known PPVGs purported to have links with the NPP

Names of PPVGs	Places where they Operate
The Maxwell Boys	Kumasi
The Nana Addo Fun Club	Tamale
The Invincible Force	Accra, Tema
The Bamba Boys	Wenchi
The Western Crocodiles	Takoradi
The Bolga Bulldogs	Navrongo, Sandema, Bawku, Bolga, Techiman
The Kandahar Boys	Tamale
The Delta Force	Kumasi
The Burma Camp Youth	Accra
The Action Troopers	Kumasi
The Bugri Naabu Fun Club	Tamale
The Eye Group	Accra
The Young Elephants	Unknown

Source: Asamoah (2019).

Table 2. Some known PPVGs purported to have links with the NDC

Names of PPVGs	Places where they Operate
The Pentagon	Tamale
The Tohazie	Tamale
The Bukurisung	Tamale
The 66 Bench	Tamale, Yendi
The Azorka Boys	Tamale
The Gbewaa Youth	Tamale
The Al Jazeera	Tamale
The Al Qaeda	Tamale
The NATO Forces	Tamale
The Rasta Boys	Agbogloshie
The Se Se Group	Nima
The Aluta Boys	Tamale
The Nima Boys	Accra
The Salifu 11	Asunafo North Constituency specifically Mim and its environs
The Zongo Caucus	Ashanti, Western and Volta Regions
The Untouchable Forces	Accra
The Hawks	Kumasi
The Eagles	Unknown
The Lions	Unknown

Source: Asamoah (2019).

Since the coming into force of Ghana's Fourth Republic, both the NPP and the NDC have made extensive use of PPVGs. Such PPVGs have substantially been used during party-political campaigning. They exist to provide security for political candidates contesting for parliamentary and presidential elections; as well as during instances when the political parties are organising their electioneering events ahead of the national elections (Gyampo et al, 2017). These PPVGs have assumed specific names to prompt exactly how dreadful they are. Tables 1 and 2 above demonstrate some of the known PPVGs purported to have links with both the NPP and the NDC.

2.3.3 The Peculiarities of Vigilantes in Ghana

Having explored the historical underpinnings of political party vigilantism and how it manifested in the politics of Ghana's Fourth Republic, it is also expedient to ascertain the nature of people who actually involve themselves in these surreptitious acts of causing mayhem, intimidating and harassing their political opponents. Thus, the people who belong or join vigilante groups in the political parties have certain characteristics (Alidu, 2019; Tankebe, 2019; Inokoba & Maliki, 2011). Alidu (2019) for example, argued that people who participate in political vigilantism are arguably illiterate, predominantly people in their youthful ages of between 15-35 years, male dominated and relatively poor people in society. On their part, Inokoba and Maliki (2011) point out that the greatest disturbing part of this PPV is that the leaders of tomorrow – the youth - are not only the key actors in vigilantism, but at the same time, the sufferers of these furtive violent acts. It was therefore not surprising that CODEO (2017) also specifically alluded to the fact that the leadership of NPP and NDC are accused of being blameable for the proliferation and sponsorship of the PPVGs.

Adding to the peculiarities of people who engage in political party vigilantism, Tankebe (2019) succinctly asserted that the two dominant political parties in the country – NPP and NDC – create, train and financially and materially sponsor the members belonging to the PPVGs. With a youthful population structure, coupled with lack of opportunities for participating in formal

political, economic and social decision-making, young people become vulnerable to political manipulation and are exploited for violence (Asante, 2006a; Danso & Aborampah-Mensah, 2015; Gyampo, 2011; Bob-Milliar, 2014). In other words, these people involved in vigilantism are young, powerless, poor, and lack opportunities to improve their conditions. Hence they are vulnerable to indoctrination largely by politicians who recruit and fund the vigilantes.

2.4 ROOT CAUSE OF POLITICAL VIGILANTISM IN GHANA

Political party vigilantism has often been treated as a mere political phenomenon much to the neglect of the historical context and social structures that perpetuate them (Alidu, 2020, Burr, 2008; Johnston, 1996). In fact questions ought to be raised as to what has accounted for this phenomenon. This is largely because vigilante groups do not spring up in a vacuum. There is therefore the need to ascertain what accounts for their formation, what is expected of them, what they actually do, how their activities promote the interest of political parties, and how they undermine democratic gains in Ghana (Gyampo, *et.al*, 2017, p.113). In trying to provide responses to these crucial questions, the researcher has broadly identified three major causative agents that almost always manifest themselves and sometimes plague the country into a turmoil. The causes embody economic factors, political factors and social factors. These will be explored later in this sub-thematic area.

In the Fourth Republic, political parties sometimes act so clumsily and regard their opponents as enemies that must be dealt with ruthlessly. It has already been established in the introductory chapter that several elections have been organised under the Fourth Republican constitution, that is, presidential, parliamentary, local government and even bye-elections (Agyemang-Duah, 2000, 2005; Jonah, 2001). The conduct of these elections especially, bye-elections, are fraught with violence and impunity. Statistically, as of 2019, the Fourth Republic has recorded about 30 bye-elections as a result of vacancies created in Parliament due to either death or resignation of a member. Out of this number, 22 of such bye-elections witnessed some form

of electoral violence (Alidu, 2019) by political party vigilante groups. Ironically, when there is no electioneering activity in Ghana, it is generally observed that such vigilante groups seem to naturally go on extermination. Nonetheless, when there is any form of electioneering activity be it voter registration, voting and more seriously, bye-election, these political party vigilante groups suddenly resurrect, creating political mayhem or turmoil.

In the recently held local government and district level elections (Assembly Elections, 2019) which are generally non-partisan pursuant to Article 248 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana; there was manifestation of vigilantism where people took the law into their hands. On 18th December, 2019 it was widely spread in the news that a 29-year old Mohammed Abdul Razak of the Sandamuni Electoral Area in the Wa Municipality has been slashed with a cutlass over assembly election results. According to an eyewitness, the suspect identified as Gabby threatened people around the polling centre that he would inflict machete wounds on someone if his candidate loses the polls (ghanaguardian.com, 2019). Truth to his words, when polls had closed and the suspect's candidate was recorded to have lost, Gabby drew a machete on his victim and slashed the forehead of the victim and bolted away (Morris Banaamwire, Starr News, 2019). The victim was subsequently sent to the Wa Regional Hospital for medical attention. Clearly, one can testify that there is a direct relationship between vigilantism and elections and election related activities under Ghana's Fourth Republic.

As indicated above, this sub-thematic area of the study focuses on finding the root causes of political vigilantism that is gradually gaining stocks in Ghana's political discourse, especially, under the Fourth Republic. For the purpose of this study, the causative factors are broadly classified into economic, social and political.

2.4.1 Economic Factors/ causes of vigilantism

More often, the prevailing economic circumstances in the country can undoubtedly contribute to vigilantism. Indubitably, one of the salient economic causes of vigilantism in Ghana is the

menace of mass and youth unemployment. As a result of unemployment, the idle youth are easily persuaded to engage in vigilante activities just to have (Modernghnana.com, 2019) some kind of material reward by their “pay masters.” Such unemployed youth are of the opinion that by engaging in vigilantism, such a clandestine act may catch the attention of the government of the day to attend to their plights. According to International Labour Organisation Report (ILO, 2017) and Asamoah (2019), unemployment rate in Ghana is gradually reaching an apogee level.

Unemployment coupled with greed on the part of some public officials; high levels of poverty and income disparities which lead to economic inequality in a country mostly culminate in vigilantism. According to Philips (2016), economic disparity that exist within a certain territory significantly accounts for the rationale behind why and how particular precincts experience vigilantism and many other areas do not. He argues further that economic inequality can easily produce organised vigilantism. More so, there remains an inordinate wish for organised vigilantism in under-privileged zones for the reason that citizens who receive lower wages in such communities feel somewhat insecure compared to neighbours who receive relatively higher wages and at the same time have more access to both private and public security (Philips, 2016). As a result of this kind of income disparities, some of the lower income earners resort to self-defense mechanism as an appropriate approach they can adopt to resolve the perceived virtual dispossession of safety in the community. Again, pecuniary variation affords the spreading of labour that remains expediently designed for uniting a specific form of vigilante gang. Once well-to-do people pursue the use of private security, one option available to them is mobilising their own gang. This occurs more often when business tycoons, for instance, organise some form of gang to protect their businesses (Philips, 2016). Nevertheless, irrespective of the financial backing or administrative configuration of vigilantism, pecuniary and security imbalances are consequential to the formation of a more organised vigilantism.

2.4.2 Social Factors/ causes of political vigilantism

Vigilantism within the social spectrum comes about as a result of wariness of debauchery in our communities. Traditionally, vigilantism arises mainly as a results of ethical decadence relating to burglary, stealing, heterodoxy, wizardry and witchcraft, practice of homosexuality, land clashes, religious intolerance, etc. (Adinkra, 2005; Tankebe, 2009; Adzimah-Alade et.al, 2020). Usually, vigilantism occurs impulsively either by individuals or an organised gang that goes from one place to another instigating violence and intimidating perceived criminals. Such gang members take the law into their hands all in the name of imposing ethical stability in our societies. According to Adinkra (2005), Tankebe (2009) and Alidu (2019), the perpetrators of these surreptitious acts are mainly angry youth between the early 20s and late 30s; majority of whom are males.

In Ghana, several acts of vigilantism relating to suspicious social deviance have been recorded. For instance, in April 2011, the sad news broadcast of Amina's predicament went viral on social media when she was arrested by some male students of the Mensah Sarbah Hall Annex B at the University of Ghana, for purportedly stealing a laptop computer and other electronic devices belonging to a female student. The students, who were seen in a video tape, stripped Amina naked and actually battered her with pens and other piecing objects on her private parts. Also, in May 2015, two male ex-convicts were lynched and their bodies burnt by some irate youth at Jirapa in the Upper West Region for allegedly stealing motorbikes and ruminants. The youth, fed up with the increasing spate of stealing in the area, and living in the backdrop of several accused persons being released from prison custody by an Appeal Court, went on a rampage meting out instant justice to suspected criminals. Again, the lynching of Captain Maxwell Adam Mahama, a military officer on Monday, May 29 2017 at Denkyira Obuasi in the Central Region encapsulates this type of vigilantism. According to news reports, he was attacked and subsequently lynched when some village dwellers identified a gun on him during his normal early morning jogging

rounds. This dastardly act was a spontaneous response to an armed robbery incident the night before. The residents suspected him to be one of the alleged robbers; and accordingly raised an alarm which led to the attack and lynching of the military officer. In recent times, on 23rd July, 2020, a 90-year-old Madam Akua Denteh was allegedly accused of witchcraft; and she was subsequently lynched at Kafaba near Salaga in the East Gonja Municipality in one of the newly created Savannah Region.

In the opinion of Cook (2013), mob justice, just like those aforementioned, arise as a means for people to fight back against the growing crime rates in our cities and towns; with these crimes mostly being in the form of assault, rape and murder by unscrupulous social vampires. Minnaar (2001) assessing the social dimension of vigilantism, used the term to describe the action of communities using violence in the form of ‘necklacing’ or stoning to death, against people who rob, rape and commit different crimes in the communities. Fanon (1963) argues that mob justice emerged due to colonial ideologies being ingrained into the native minds of Africans that led to self-hatred, inferiority, and aggressiveness; which can still be seen in modern day Ghanaian body politics. Fanon (1963) further argues that the more violence the natives resorted to in order to fight colonialism and secure their independence, the more violence was introduced and accepted into the everyday attitude of the natives. It is obvious from the above argument that most violence occurs as a way of communicating one’s displeasure for an action or inaction.

History has it that, sometimes, regimes tend to legalise the formation of vigilante groups or committees to ruthlessly deal with all forms of social deviants and crime control. For instance, under the Third Republic of Ghana, the Peoples National Party (PNP) Government under President Hilla Limann established vigilante groups; and further called on well-meaning Ghanaians such as student groups, churches, members of other opposition political parties, youth movements, trade unions, the council on Women and Development, town and village committees, abled-bodied ex-servicemen, pensioners and all other groups interested

in the public good to join. President Limann disregarded his critics who argued that the formation of the vigilante committees was illegal and unconstitutional. In response to his critics, President Limann argued that “the law seeks to defend and protect the weak and the injured, not thieves and criminals” (Limann, 1980). President Limann further asked those who wanted to preach about legalities to avoid any hidden motive to aid and abet evil-doing. He asserted that under the existing laws of Ghana, private citizens could arrest criminals who commit certain kinds of offences in their presence, or when they have reasonable grounds for suspecting them to having committed such offences. Hence, he warned that those who may remain unyielding in their cruel determination to cheat their fellow citizens would be checked with all the forces at the disposal of his government. As way of ensuring some level of control, decorum and limiting the operations of the members of the established vigilante committees throughout the country, the PNP Government introduced education programmes to make the members aware of their powers and limits.

Another social causative factor to vigilantism relates to ethnic cleavages as well as religious considerations. Most societies in Africa including Ghanaian societies are multi-ethnic, multi religious and multi-cultural in nature (Gyimah-Boadi & Asare, 2004). According to a report by the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) on the Population and Housing Census held in 2010, the major ethnic groups in Ghana still remain “the Akans, the Mole Dagbanis, the Ewes, the Ga Adangbes, the Guans, the Gurmas, the Grusis and the Mande-Busangas” (GSS Report, 2012:34). Fortunately on the part of Ghana, there have been minimal or no serious clashes on the basis of ethnic or religious marginalisation because successive governments have had to trade cautiously on tribal, ethnic and religious lines.

2.4.3 Political Factors/ causes of political vigilantism

In Ghana, especially under the Fourth Republic, there is a political twist of almost every human activity. The phenomenon of vigilantism is therefore not immune to this kind of political twist.

As indicated above, Tankebe (2019) is perhaps right to have asserted that there is no vigilante activity that has no political element inherent in it. Political vigilantism is highly reinforced by the actors who perpetuate it mainly in terms of the political benefits that will accrue to them. According to Alidu (2019), when this unwarranted event of political vigilantism occurs, the responses from the state security and even the ruling government itself is politically-driven and most often hypocritical in nature. If this remains unchecked, especially going into the 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections, it will embolden the political party vigilante groups to undermine the constitution, disturb democratic norms and principles as well as compete with the state for monopoly of violence. Such dastardly acts have the potential of not only undermining democratic consolidation but also reversing the democratic gains; and hurting societal moral norms and values (Alidu, 2019).

According to Abotsi (2013), the main political cause to vigilantism in Ghana has to do with the phenomenon of “Winner-Takes-All” politics. He succinctly claims that “since the inception of Ghana’s Fourth Republic in 1993, the country’s political environment has been characterised by political exclusion and negative polarisation” (Abotsi, 2013; p.2). “Winner-Takes-All” politics in the opinion of scholars including Abotsi (2013) and Gyampo (2016) implies an exceedingly divisive and partisan practice that excludes all other persons who are not part of the ruling party from national governance and decision making in a fashion that divides the nation-state and dissipates the much desirable talents and intelligence for national growth and expansion. By this political sub-culture, citizens who are not supporters of the ruling party are continually marginalized and excluded from actively participating in the governance system. This undoubtedly is one of the political reasons leading to the creation of this sort of deleterious phenomenon of PPVGs to challenge and also make the ruling class unpopular so as to wrestle political power from them; which is sometimes characterised by electoral violence. Several factors account for the adoption and practice of the “winner-takes-all” political system in Ghana. Abotsi (2013) identifies three of such factors; viz: ideology, institutions and positive feedback.

The first has to do with ideology where Abotsi (2013) links the phenomenon of winner-takes-all emanating from ideology to the baseline constitutional provisions that allow for convergence of different political parties with divergent ideological tendencies to compete for electoral positions to manage our scarce resources. The constitution bestows enormous powers and its resultant state-capture to the ruling party headed by the President of the Republic. Armah-Attoh (2017) argues that a forensic assessment of the phenomenon of PPV will display that it has its stocks in the mindboggling powers that the 1992 Constitution has vested into the president. The phenomenon of PPV echoes the dimness of genuine checks on the exploitation of incumbency and the close deficiency of statutory sanctions associated with abuses of public and political office for personal aggrandizements.

Armah-Attoh (2017, p.15) argues that “it is an open secret in Ghana’s political landscape that politicians make promises to political party vigilante group members having in mind the vast networks of economic and political patronage that will be at the party’s disposal after election victory”. In fact, it is highly believed that political party vigilante groups embark on all manner of donkeywork on behalf of political parties that they have links with. They do this in expectation of receiving material rewards in the event of their parties winning an election. As a result, political party vigilante group members resort to the use of violence and potent seizure of state properties and facilities when they feel cheated after helping their party to win an election.

The impact of ideology in Ghanaian politics has undoubtedly culminated in the proliferation of dangerous political party vigilante groups; and other variables such as ethnicity and ethnocentrism (as discussed under social causes of vigilantism) that seem to disparage our political and democratic paths.

The second cause of winner-takes-all politics that has subsequently plagued the country into the formation of so many political party vigilante groups is institutions. The institutional outcome

resulting from the phenomenon of winner-takes-all as a cause to the emergence of political party vigilante groups' activity is that sometimes, the actors can attack their own party leaders for appointing people who are not part of their party's struggle to win elections. When such people perceived not to support the party are appointed, the members of the vigilante groups may attack and eventually oust that person out of office.

Touching on institutions, Armah-Attoh (2017) argues that the ineffectiveness of state institutions like the security agencies including the police and the military to ruthlessly crack the phenomenon of PPV professionally is due to what he describes as "*political pandering.*" He argues further that the ineptitude on the part of the law enforcing authorities emanates from the bad faith posture exhibited by political actors, particularly those in opposition, have in state security agencies like the police. In Ghana, over the years, there has been a regime security with very little or no attention on state security. In view of this, a change in a regime inadvertently means that the opposition would naturally lose trust in the state security agencies. They therefore plan of setting up their own security arrangement since they have minimal trust in the state security. Hence, establishing their own political party militia group called party vigilante group. The activities of 'party militia' groups become so pronounced during an election period. It is also worthy to mention that there is minimal trust of the security by the opposition political parties in Ghana because it is the president who "hires and fires" all the top echelons of the various state security agencies (Armah-Attoh, 2017) like the IGP and the CDS. This phenomenon of political interference is partly the reason behind the inability of the police to prosecute political party vigilante group members who are loyal to the ruling party; when they "take the laws into their own hand."

The third factor that has brought about winner-takes-all politics leading to the establishment of political party vigilante groups in Ghana is positive feedback. According to Abotsi (2013), the demonisation of our election processes and its outcomes since the first election in 1992, sufficiently testifies to a deep seated issue of trust and a fear of losing elections. The

consequence has been that electoral loss is equated to surrender in warfare with its concomitant result. Abotsi (2013) further argues that politicians in Ghana know the prospects of electoral victory; so candidates in elections make some juicy promises to vigilante groups that are loyal to them to support; and bring the party to power so as to outclass their political opponents in order for them to dislodge their opponents from occupying those offices. Such political party vigilante group members are therefore promised of contracts and appointments. Political party vigilante groups in Ghana toil for their parties because they expect material rewards after winning political power (Armah-Attoh, 2017).

Abotsi (2013) explains positive feedback as some sort of perverse incentives that inspire the political party leaders to make juicy promises; to these vigilante groups to support and bring their party to power. It must, however, be added that “when in power, politicians are at pains to respect promises made to ensure continued support” (Abotsi, 2013; p. 3) of these political party vigilante groups. The actions of PPVGs by and large mirror conduct of spur-of-the-moment gang that are suddenly created when some persons respond to frustration, dissatisfaction or other tough sentiments (Almond et al., 2001). In the framework of PPV in Ghana, enthusiasts of the governing political party behave the way they do as their anticipations of securing employments, contracts and partisan engagements become a buzzword. In fact, on 1st August 2017, the members of the Invincible Forces, a vigilante group allegedly having a link with the NPP, threatened to cause pandemonium in the Tema Metropolis should the NPP government fail to give them jobs as promised ahead of 2016 elections. The chief scribe of the group had been on record saying that, “You promised that there are certain jobs on the way coming. We exchanged numbers with those who are supposed to employ us. I have called them for almost two months now, but nobody is ready to answer my calls” (Citifmonline.com, 2017). The members of these PPVGs trust that their unlawful behaviours can go without punishment in so far as they have the support of the ruling party. Owing to the frustrations and let-downs of unfulfilled hopes, the members of the PPVGs resort to the use of violence to clamour for their demands from the ruling government they had worked assiduously to bring into power.

2.5 DEALING WITH POLITICAL VIGILANTISM IN GHANA

This is the last sub-thematic area on the review of pertinent literature. It focuses primarily on the current trend of events in Ghana on political party vigilantism. Though not much has been written in the literature on dealing with vigilantism despite its ubiquity, for the purpose of this study I have identified three perspectives on dealing with the phenomenon of political party vigilante group activities in Ghana. They are: the Emile Short Commission of Inquiry; the Passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019 (Act 999); and the Peace Dialogue mediated by the National Peace Council amongst the NPP and the NDC.

2.5.1 The Emile Short Commission of Inquiry

The setting up of the Justice Emile Short Commission of Inquiry is the first approach adopted to deal with the phenomenon of PPV in Ghana. Pursuant to Article 278 (1) of the 1992 Constitution, the Justice Emile Short Commission of Inquiry was set up on 6th February, 2019 by President Akufo Addo. The setting up of the commission of inquiry was necessitated by the unfortunate violence event that occurred during the AWW Constituency bye-election that was held on 31st January, 2019; due to the sudden demise of the MP for the constituency, Emmanuel Kyeremanteng Agyarko. The members of the commission comprised Justice Emile Short (Former CHRAJ Boss) as the Chairman; Professor Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu (Member); Patrick Kwarteng Acheampong (Former IGP, Member); Ernest Kofi Abotsi (Secretary). The Attorney General, pursuant to (Ayawaso West Wuogon Bye-Election Events) Instrument 2019 (C.I. 111) also appointed Eric Osei-Mensah to serve as Counsel to the Commission of Inquiry.

This fact finding commission of inquiry had four terms of reference within which to operate. They include “to make a full, faithful and impartial inquiry into the circumstances of, and establish the facts leading to, the events and associated violence that culminated during the AWW Constituency bye-election; to identify any person responsible for or who has been involved in the events, the associated violence and injuries; to inquire into any matter which it

considers incidental or reasonably related to the causes of the events and the associated violence and injuries; and, to submit within one month its report to the President, giving reasons for its findings and recommendations, including appropriate sanctions, if any.” The commission presented its report on 14th March, 2019 to the president. After one month of sitting, the commission identified significant number of findings and recommendations that were very intriguing. On the issue of findings relating to electoral security, the commission finds that:

“the maintenance of a safe and secure environment for the conduct of elections is vital for Ghana’s democratic governance. Regrettably, however, past elections have often been marred by incidents of violence and states of insecurity resulting in injuries and in some cases, loss of lives. It is therefore utterly important that the management of elections are promised on the assurance of security and optimal guarantees of safety on electoral grounds for the public to exercise their franchises without any fear.” (AWW Bye-Election Report, 2019).

As indicated under Chapter One of this study, bye-elections organised under the Fourth Republic of Ghana have been characterised with much tension. The AWW Bye-Election Report (2019) further reveals that by-elections seem to put emphasis on “attention and competition between the political parties on one electoral constituency”. This therefore heightens the possibility for political party vigilante groups to cause mayhem that has the tendency of resulting in violence. Therefore the electoral management body (EC) in particular and the country in general should make appropriate security arrangements at all times that there is elections in Ghana. In relation to this, the Commission finds that, even though there existed a number of safety measures provided by the EC and the Police within the AWW Constituency on the very day that the bye-election was held, the otherwise sound plan was brusquely interrupted by the SWAT Team who however were not part of the security plan, came in to cause mayhem (AWW Bye-Election Violence Report, 2019).

The Commission once again indicates that there was not satisfactory earlier coordination among the EC and the Police on the matter concerning the safety needs of the area for a fruitful organisation of the bye-election at AWW Constituency. This discovery is very worrying given the significance of coordination in warranting an appropriate mapping of the safekeeping requirements of a bye-election; and the strategic hot spots with respect to previous experiences.

In fact, proper and adequate prior coordination allows the EC to have a lead command in the deployment of security personnel during voting periods in order to avoid state of panic among the voting public.

The commission reveals that the SWAT Team was mounted to carry out a follow-up exercise on intelligence claiming that certain armaments and grenades kept in a storeroom within the constituency and to seize and retrieve them. It is, however, intriguing to note that the police that plays critical security role during elections were not informed on the supposed intelligence. Again, the alleged intelligence facts were not verified in agreement with any recognised or standardised assessment etiquettes to ascertain its reliability. The Report reveals that the SWAT Team did not obtain a search warrant from appropriate authorities like the court; thereby undermining fundamental human rights of citizens as espoused under chapter 5 of the 1992 constitution of Ghana.

The establishment of the Emile Short Commission of Inquiry was necessitated by the allegation of the irresponsible usage of arms by the SWAT Team members who were in masks to disguise themselves. According to the AWW Bye-Election Report (2019), the multitude of evidence gathered from witnesses in both voice and video accounts by the Commission confirms that gunshots were indeed fired by the SWAT Team from the National Security outfit. Notwithstanding the verbalized evidences and audio-visual recordings, the Commission also visited the constituency to observe the prevalence of marks on trees and buildings produced by gunshots and impact scenes generated by emitted shots as confirmed by a ballistic personnel from the Ghana Police Service.

The Emile Short Commission of Enquiry generally made five major recommendations: Structural; Operational; Individual Liabilities; Compensations; and General Recommendations in their final report presented to the government. On the Structural aspect, three recommendations were made to the government for consideration and action. Notably, the

Commission recommended a total evaluation and reform of the ministry in charge of National Security by focusing on clarity of responsibility. Also, it recommended the establishment of a Standing Command and Control Centre with experts drawn from all public sector security forces comprising the military, police, customs and the fire service. The main purpose for such establishment is to assess and process intelligence for rapid deployment. And a clear chain of command allocated to the minister appointed at the Presidency in charge of National Security.

With regards to Operational issues, the Commission made nine recommendations relating to the establishment of procedures through which intelligence gathered can be evaluated and rated before deploying personnel to execute such intelligence. Also, no disguised civilian security men should be deployed during voting in Ghana. Again, all security officers who would be involved on the day of voting to ensure the safety of citizens at polling centers throughout the country must be taken through rigorous training before deployment. Ghana should set and enforce standard directives and procedures to guide the use of weaponries issued to National Security and police officers sent on missions. More importantly, the Commission established that security agencies that deal with gathering and executing intelligence should always be guided by the constitution and show respect to the rights of the people. In view of this, the Commission further established that there should be strict adherence to the rules on searches and seizures. More also, the Commission called on National Security outfit to disband the SWAT Team and reassign the operatives working under that sector. Support for extraordinary operations must be obtained from specialised divisions of the police. Finally, intelligence gathered should be shared amongst appropriate security organisations wherever an operation would necessitate inter-agency collaboration.

Under Individual Liabilities, the Commission implicated five officers for their actions and inactions; and recommended as follows:

“... Mr. Bryan Acheampong be reprimanded for his ultimate responsibility as Minister who authorised an operation of that character on an election day in a built up area; ... Colonel Mike Opoku be reprimanded for being ultimately responsible for the outcome of the SWAT operation

at the La Bawaleshie School Polling Station and immediately release the weapons used for the operation for ballistic testing and analysis for further investigations by the police; ... the immediate removal of DSP Samuel Kojo Azugu from command responsibility at the Ministry of National Security for his failure to command and control the SWAT Team during the operation; ... the criminal prosecution of Mr. Ernest Akomea alias Double for unauthorised possession of firearms under section 192 (1) of the Criminal Offences Act; as well as the criminal prosecution for the offence of assault, to wit, the slapping of Mr. Samuel George by Mohammed Sulemana” (AWW Bye-Election Report, 2019).

The Commission also generally made recommendations relating to Compensations. The Commission made recommendations to the effect that financial compensations are paid to five individuals for sustaining serious injuries due to the careless shootings by the SWAT Team from the National Security. These individuals include Ishawu Yaro, Seidu Zaneh, Mohammed Alhassan, Theophilus Sedofu, and James Moore. Also, the Commission recommends payment of compensation to other individuals whose properties were damaged. They included the owner of a beauty salon, Mrs Justine, and two others whose vehicles were damaged.

Finally, there were General Recommendations too. Notable among them for the purpose of this study include: there must be in existence multifarious approaches to empower the exploration of all facets of the phenomenon of party associated ‘militias’ and vigilantes in the country. The immediate criminalisation of the formation and/or financially supporting ‘militia’ and vigilante groups in Ghana. Also, the Ghana Police Service should review their enlistment processes by adopting the merit system to guarantee that the most competent, and not the most well connected individuals are recruited into the service. The EC was also encouraged to explore the option of resorting to electronic voting or any other appropriate new voting system so as to reduce the use of physical ballot boxes. There was a recommendation to intensify public education by the police on crime-scene management to make certain that the public would stop interfering with crime scenes. This would in the long run protect the integrity of evidence for future prosecution.

It must be added that the Government through the Attorney General, Miss Gloria Afua Akuffo, on 13th September, 2019 subsequently placed a twenty-nine paged “White Paper” on the report by the Emile Short Commission of Inquiry. It was the general hope and confidence of the

citizens of Ghana that the work of the commission would bring closure to politically related violence (vigilantism) that has rocked the country in recent times (GNA, 2019).

2.5.2 The Passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019 (Act 999)

This is the second approach Ghana has taken in recent times to ruthlessly deal with the phenomenon of PPV. As indicated under Chapter One of this study and following the caution by the President during the 2019 edition of the State of the Nation Address, the Attorney General's Department laid before Parliament a Legislative Instrument (L.I. 16/2019) titled the "Vigilantism and Related Offences Bill" on 10th April, 2019. After three months of subjecting the Bill to severe parliamentary scrutiny, it was eventually adopted and passed into law by Parliament of Ghana on 22nd July, 2019; and it has subsequently been assented to by the President on 23rd August, 2019.

The letter and spirit of the "Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019" (Act 999) is "to disband vigilante groups; including political party vigilante groups and land guards; to proscribe acts of vigilantism in the country and to provide for related matters" (p. 1). Despite the fact that the law seeks to criminalise the use of land guards, it however recognises the fundamental human right that empowers property owners to protect their properties with justifiable force in accordance with the law. Hence, the "Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019" (Act 999) clause 1 clarifies "offences specific to political party vigilante groups, the phenomenon of land guards and other acts of vigilantism".

The law on "Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019" (Act 999) also acknowledges the need to make certain that people are not discouraged from coming together to defend and protect the lives and properties of residents in their neighbourhoods or communities; and to prevent other people from committing crimes. The phenomenon of politically-related violence and other forms of threats relating to land guards threaten the infant democracy and the rule of law in Ghana (Kasapafmonline.com, 2019; GNA, 2019; ISD, 2019).

The “Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019” (Act 999) has a total of 11 clauses. Clause 1 focuses attention on the range of violent activities criminalised by the law (the scope of application). Clause 2 lays emphasis on the actual proscription or disbandment of PPVGs in Ghana. Clause 3 is devoted to the prohibition of the formation, organisation, operation or promotion of all kinds of activities associated with PPVGs in the country. Clause 4 centers on the proscription of aiding and abetting any sort of activities initiated, promoted or organised by members of PPVGs. Clause 5 of the law prohibits the funding or sponsoring the formation and operation of PPVGs in Ghana. Clause 6 deals with the prohibition of vigilantism in political party activities. Clause 7 focuses on the prohibition of the activities of land guards. Clause 8 fundamentally prohibits a person convicted under the law from contesting public elections or holding public or political party office. Clause 9 grants power to the Minister to prohibit activities of PPVGs. Clause 10 is essentially on regulations relating to implementation guidelines of the law. Finally, clause 11 deals with the interpretation of the various keys terms associated with the law.

The intriguing issues about the law on Vigilantism and Related Offences Act (2019) include the fact that only one Clause 7 of Act 999 focuses on prohibition of land guards. As many as seven other clauses, namely, clauses 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8 are all focusing on political party vigilante group activities. This is a clear manifestation of the kind of importance the state attaches to its quest to ruthlessly deal with the phenomenon of political party vigilantism which has become an aberration to Ghana’s democracy. The next issue that is worthy of note about the Act is that how can a leader of a political party vigilante group name a person as a member of a supposedly disbanded political party vigilante group as a current member? In so far as the supposedly political party vigilante group is disbanded, it has no current membership.

2.5.3 The Peace Dialogue by the National Peace Council

This is the final approach adopted by Ghana in her quest to deal with the phenomenon of PPV.

As a result of the dangers associated with vigilantism and recurring electoral violence, the National Peace Council (NPC) accepted to play a mediating role in a bipartisan political dialogue between the two dominant party-political groups in Ghana; namely NPP and NDC. This peace dialogue remains an appropriate step where the two leading political parties have to propitiate, settle their differences, forgive each other of wrong doing (if any) and press for reconciliation in the interest of the citizens and protection of their human rights; ahead of the 2020 general elections.

Pursuant to Section (2) of Act 818, the NPC is mandated by law “to facilitate and develop mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, resolution and to build sustainable peace in the country.” The Colombia Ambassador to Ghana, Ms Claudia Turbay Quintero, in like manner, has called on the political parties and the government to be committed to the use of dialogue to resolve political conflicts in the country. She was contributing to a public forum organised by IDEG on the theme “Ending Armed Conflict through sustained Dialogue in Columbia: Lessons for Ghana. The Ambassador stressed that “when problems come, we need to know that they can be resolved through dialogue and negotiations and agreements that are ... in the larger interest of the society (Claudia, 2019). On his part, the Executive Director of IDEG, Dr Emmanuel Akwetey, was optimistic that the political dialogue between the NPP and NDC would help the country to maintain the sanctity of its competitive electoral democracy for national development (Akwetey, 2019). There is no doubt that in Ghana the NPC is one of the paramount organisations to preside or mediate over talks on disbanding vigilantism.

The National Peace Council (NCP) has been the mediator between the two leading political parties: NPP and NDC in Ghana. The bipartisan meeting aims at setting modalities on the disbandment of political party vigilante groups. The two major political parties pledged their unflinching support to disband political party vigilante groups. According to the ruling NPP,

“...anybody who commits act of lawlessness ought to be arrested and punished according to law...” The opposition NDC also asserts that “... vigilantism is a dangerous phenomenon which not addressed, can have devastating effects in the future” especially when the 2020 general elections is few months away. The NPC has through the dialogue designed the roadmap of ensuring that all political party vigilante groups are disbanded prior to the impending 2020 elections. In all, the NPC has devised 22 strategies as a policy framework geared towards peace in Ghana ahead of the general elections. (Ghanaweb.com, 2020).

2.6 Bad Faith Posture in Disbanding Vigilantism

Although studies on PPV athwart the globe and Ghana abound (Adinkrah, 2005; Bob-Milliar, 2012; 2014; Armah-Attoh, 2017; Gyampo, et.al, 2017; Johnston, 1996, Tankebe, 2019; Alidu, 2020; Asekere, 2020; Ibrahim, 2020; Adzimah-Alade et.al, 2020), not much of such studies have explicitly paid considerable attention to why political parties have woefully failed to proscribe these PPVGs after several campaigns on its threat to democracy. Thus, the study fills this significant gap in the literature by establishing the factors accounting for the bad faith posture in working closely to disband PPVGs affiliated to these political parties; and proffer ways to address them.

According to Gerald and Hill (2020), bad faith is the deliberate deceitful deed by not gratifying or accomplishing legitimate or votive commitments. It involves disingenuous way of deceiving another. An exhibition of bad faith is when a party signs a treaty without the intention of fulfilling it. It basically entails violation of basic principles of trustworthiness and decency in dealing with others. An exhibition of bad faith in the opinion of Miyasaki (2008) is a precarious and the same time an unwarrantable kind of deception about the ethical position of every exploit that supports the reckless use of violence for achieving party-political goals.

It must be stated here that “bad faith” is used interchangeably with “mistrust” for the purposes of achieving the objectives of the study. Mistrust basically means absence of certainty about

somebody or something else. It could possibly vary from a decreasing sort of conviction to more or less a complete absence of sureness about the outcome of a certain phenomenon. It implies a genuine doubt based on suspicion. Applying this to the study relating to disbanding political party vigilantism, mistrust is when a political party is not sure whether they go by it and disband their group, another party will also do the same.

Over the years, there have been continually articulated concerns about the terrible outcomes associated with intensities of party-political mistrust on the consolidation of democratic structures in Ghana (Marien and Hooghe, 2011). According to Marien and Hooghe (2011), systematically conducted studies and records for these concerns accounting for the bad faith posture among political actors, however, are often deficient. There is the urgent need to ruthlessly identify such causal mechanisms accounting for bad faith posture.

According to a report by IDEG (2014), representative government is grounded on the need to resolve variances created by partisan contestation of beliefs between diverse party-political groups that construct the dogmatic community. In Ghana, especially under the Fourth Republic, the unity that emerges from an initial disagreement is often temporal which is sooner or later severely subjected to renewed contestation. The study therefore seeks to reveal the factors that create or account for the bad faith posture or mistrust among political actors in disbanding vigilantism which threatens the democratic enterprise of Ghana.

2.7 SUMMARY AND REFLECTIONS ON THE LITERATURE REVIEW

The main thrust of this chapter focused on the review of pertinent previous academic research works that were carried out prior to this study; relating to vigilantism discourse. I started the chapter by defining what actually constitute literature review. The object of this chapter of the study basically focused on the critical assessment and appreciation of existing body of knowledge that impinge on political party vigilantism discourse.

In this section of the study, the etymology and the historical perspectives on vigilantism was explored. To forget what happened before one was born is to forever remain a child. History serves as a guide on everything we do; it was therefore prudent as part of this chapter to explore how societies have undergone series of change through the turbulent periods or from the olden days so as to appreciate the contemporary ways of doing things in the modern state. In this regard, I explored how vigilantism was introduced into the American, the British as well as the African cultures; so as to set the tone for its introduction into the Ghanaian political discourse.

In this review of relevant literature relating to vigilantism, it was alienated on five main thematic areas. The first major thematic area that was explored as part of this section of the study was to critically assess the origin of vigilantism. The second thematic area focused on exploring the divergent opinions that scholars hold on conceptualising vigilantism in the literature. As indicated above, there is no universally accepted conceptualisation of the phenomenon under study. The review of relevant scholarly works showed that it is a grievous blunder to conceive vigilantism from a single spectrum. The literatures reviewed indicated that vigilantism can be conceived from crime control perspective, regime control perspective, and social control perspective (Rosenbaum & Sederberg, 1974). However, Johnston (1996) disagrees with the control regimes identified as there are other elements relating to sociopolitical and socio-legal accomplishments.

Political vigilantism to a very large extent can be conceived as individuals taking the law into their own hands (Rosenbaum & Sederberg 1974; Tankebe, 2019; Mares & Tore, 2019) so as to enable them pursue their political agenda. This is exactly the case of most PPVGs in Ghana.

The Ghanaian case of vigilantism can be defined as acts propagated by any kind of social grouping, which serves the partisan concern of both the party in power and the opposition and are to ensure the election of their respective parties into power as well as be prepared to defend the party (Gyampo *et.al*, 2017). Against this backdrop, it is imperative to argue that, projecting an all-inclusive definition for vigilantism remains an arduous task due to ‘the inflation of

concepts such as: paramilitaries, civil militias, neighbourhood patrols, private security, informal policing, death squads, and even terrorism which has close meaning with the concept' (Mireanu, 2014, p.2).

The third major thematic area that made significant inroads in this section is tracing the background of the phenomenon of vigilantism in Ghana. There was no shred of doubt from the literature that indeed the posture of the colonial administrators set the pace for the citizens' agitations to press home for their demands using every appropriate means possible. With the initial establishment of nationalist movements (ARPS; NCBWA) and later, the proliferation of two major political parties: UGCC and CPP, just four years after WWII was a clear indication that Ghanaians can never be taken for granted. Here, it was established from the pertinent literature that it is through competitive elections that absolute control over the common good could be realised; and this invariably, heightened tensions among people of different political groups. The dividends of such agitations over the years from the colonial days through to the independence era and other regimes is what we are witnessing today.

A close examination of the Fourth Republic reveals acts of political party vigilantism perpetuated by political party vigilante groups which largely commenced in 2000 after the NDC lost power to the NPP (Bob-Milliar, 2014). These inroads made by the identifiable political party vigilante groups in the political arena led to the fourth major thematic area of this study; which focused on establishing the root causes of political party vigilantism in Ghana. Chiefly among the catalogue of issues that contribute in the proliferation of political party vigilante groups included economic factors such as unemployment, high levels of poverty, economic inequality relating to income disparities. There were also social factors like suspicion of wrong doing, ethnic cleavages, religious intolerance, etc. And there were other political factors emanating from the winner-takes-all system, politicisation of the security, disregard of meritocracy to pave way for patronage, etc.

The final major thematic area explored in this section of the study has to do with dealing with political party vigilantism in Ghana. It must be accentuated that not much has been written in

the literature on this thematic area reviewed. Ghana is preparing for its eighth election under the Fourth Republican Constitution in 2020. With the prevalence of these political party vigilante groups, there is the clarion call for all to embrace peace. In this regard, effort was made to identify three sub-thematic areas on the quest to abruptly deal with the phenomenon of political party vigilante groups that CODEO (2017) describes as an aberration on Ghana's democracy. These sub-thematic areas included the Emile Short Commission of Inquiry; the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019(Act 999); and the Peace Dialogue mediated by the National Peace Council. With all these strategies adopted in dealing with PPV in Ghana, there is a bad faith posture or mistrust among the political actors in working closely to disband PPVGs affiliated to the parties. As will be seen in Chapter Five of this study, the study will fill this gap in the literature by establishing the factors accounting for the bad faith posture; and proffer ways to address them.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

Theoretical framework serves as the blueprint for a study founded on a prevailing principle that is connected and echoes the objectives of the research area (Adom, Hussein & Adu-Agyemang, 2018; Grant & Osanloo, 2014). Theoretical framework constitutes the podium upon which a research is carried out by providing “a grounding base, or an anchor, for the literature review, and most importantly, the methods and analysis” (Grant & Osanloo, 2014:12). These arguments advanced by these intellectuals, clearly demonstrates how essential the theoretical framework is to every single methodical study. In view of this, the study adopted the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) propounded by Adams Smith in 1776; and resuscitated by Ganti and Brian (2020); as its framework.

3.2 The Rational Choice Theory (RCT)

The dominant argument advanced by the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) suggests that individuals depend on logical targets to create balanced arrangements that produce results that are aligned by way of achieving their personal outstanding benefits (Ganti & Brian, 2020). RCT is claimed to have been established as a measure of the behavioural uprising in America during the 1950s and 1960s (Ogu, 2013). It tried to explore how individuals acted using practical approaches. This has progressively developed into an emerging style in political science, specifically among the Americans.

The Rational Choice Theory (RCT) has become increasingly employed in electoral politics and party-political competitions in modern times (Scott, 2009). The RCT over the years has proven to have far reaching bearings on elections, interest groups, bureaucracy, coalitions, behaviour in legislatures and vigilante politics. The RCT “is a framework for understanding and often formally modelling socio-political behaviour” (Ogu, 2013; p. 90). The basic principle underpinning the RCT is that the outcome of collective socio-political activities depends on the

individual actors involved during the decision making process. Thus, the RCT primarily places premium on the individual as paramount in every decision making process. Undoubtedly, political party vigilantism is therefore reinforced by rational calculation of the actors (political actors on one hand and the vigilante group members on the other hand): in terms of the political benefits that will accrue to them (Alidu, 2019).

3.3 Assumptions of the RCT

The RCT offers five (5) key perspectives that affect the actors like vigilante group members and their sponsors within the political discourse. These perspectives include individuality, optimality, structures, self-interest, and rationality.

In explaining the rational decision making process among the members of the PPVGs and their pay masters, they are guided by the perspective of individuality. There is no doubt that individuals are indeed the actors who ultimately make decisions. Individuals in our societies conduct themselves and act continuously as rational actors (Abell, 2000). They take calculated risks in which they are expected to maximise benefits. Hence these individuals exist to pursue their self-seeking agenda.

The second perspective espoused by the RCT is the principle relating to optimality. The optimality perspective explains that individuals select their engagements by comparing available choices or alternatives. This suggests that when given the chance, individuals act logically by choosing their preferred options over other alternatives. Abell (2000) postulates that the RCT enables individuals to pursue the desired course to select an alternative that will guarantee an optimum outcome.

The third perspective underpinning the RCT relates to structures. Abell (2000) claims that structures are the standards that give command to every sequence of plans pursued by the individual rational actors during the decision making process. There are variations in the choice of structures available to individuals seeking to achieve optimum results. Notwithstanding the variety of choices available, individual actors have to stick to only one in order to reach the

optimum results. Even though these structures may be injurious, individuals who are resolved to reaching optimum levels repeatedly discover an approach to use. In view of this, the RCT may not automatically display coordination, consent, or parity in the decision making process. Also, structures might not be optimal from the perspective of an individual endowed with limited resources. Nonetheless, the RCT endeavours to clarify exactly how this status quo arises and is sustained via balanced options.

As part of the political milieu that informs the rational decision making process, the theory avers that political actors infer from their unique self-interest that they want to achieve. This precept states that the engagements by the individual remain sacred to the realization of his or her complete self-seeking prospects or personal aggrandizements. When these personal warfare schemes are incorporated in the overall decision, it may help in achieving the selfinterest motive of the individual actors (Abell, 2000).

The final part of the theory argues that the decision making process is linked to how the individual applies rationality to the structures laid down to achieve optimum self-seeking interests (Abell, 2000). The rationality tenet creates the impression that every individual conducts himself or herself in such a way which would be of great benefits to all the actors involved. It portrays a scenario where all individuals are very likely to pursue courses that may be the paramount conceivable choice; which in the long run inure to their personal benefit or advantage.

3.4 Contextual Application of RCT to the study

According to Alidu (2019), the members of the political party vigilante groups are very rational in their association or partnership with political parties. In other words, vigilante groups are very rational with the political parties to align with. The political landscape of Ghana since 1992 is dominated by NPP and NDC. The vigilante group members are rational for supporting either

of the two major political parties; knowing their chances in electoral victory. They are very rational in their choice of political parties to support.

If someone who has no job tries to follow a politician, he or she will definitely get some monetary rewards. Such individuals can easily be recruited into a vigilante group in order that they get their daily bread. It is a very rational calculation. The reason they get into vigilantism is not only because of their daily bread but they are sometimes even promised that if they help the party to win an election, the political actors of the party will recruit them into joining the security agencies like the police, military, and the Fire service. So they join the PPVGs because they know what they are going to get out of it at the end. The members of these PPVGs do not just follow any politician. They apply rationality in following the politician that they feel that he holds position. That politician they feel that he is very visible in the NDC, he is very visible in the NPP. They do not follow low politician. Therefore they are very rational in selecting the politician and the political party to follow.

The theory is applicable to Ghana's case of political party vigilantism because of the wide informal acceptance of the use of vigilante groups by the political parties in Ghana. Almost every political party has more than three vigilante groups trained for various purposes (Paalo, 2017). This presupposes that, between the political parties, there is wide acceptance of the formation and use of vigilante groups. At the extreme poles of the chain of rational choice model are the political party leadership at one end and the members of the PPVGs at the other end. During the process of give-and-take, the political party leadership make juicy promises to the members of the PPVGs. When the political party they paraded eventually secures electoral victory, the members of the political party vigilante groups tend to benefit from the kind of sacrifices they made in bringing the party to power. The members of the political party vigilante groups receive contracts, they get appointments, recruited into the state security set-up, protection from criminal prosecution, and many more benefits. This makes both political parties and vigilante group members very rational actors. This is because both actors are guided by

ego trophic prospects, socio-political prospects as well as retrospective tendencies and prospective benefits in their interactions (Alidu, 2019).

Conversely, political party vigilante group members also believe in the logic that if or when they come to realise that their conditions of living and economic lives are dwindling comparative to the political party leadership which are occupying juicy positions to the detriment of their members, then they resort to rebellion by attacking their own political party leaders. And this is very pronounce under Ghana's Fourth Republic. Also, if the members of the political party vigilante groups become aware of the actual rewards available, and realising that they are not being fairly treated, they again resort to the destructions of state properties, ejection from office, officers they perceive that they never supported the party to come to power, etc.

In line with the above, Alidu (2019) identifies three conditions under which political party vigilante group members would show some level of resistance. First, when the chain of distribution of power and resources is to the detriment of the members of the political party vigilante groups. This is common when positions and contracts are awarded but members of vigilante groups are not considered, they will definitely resist. Second, there will be resistance when the distribution of portfolios does not move in the chain of perceived distribution of power. Finally, when individuals support vigilante groups to operate. Thus, some powerful groups in some political parties can organise people to form vigilante groups. When their leaders are not recognised, there will be resistance. Rationalism in this instance, according to Alidu (2019), is regarded as more or less, a demand and supply system.

Following from the above, it could be deduced that both the political actors and the vigilantes apply maximum rationality as indicated by the theory above; in almost every step that they take. This is demonstrated by the fact that the vigilantes hold the notion that when they are able to assist their party to capture political power, there is the tendency for them to be recruited into the mainstream security system of the country. On the other hand, the political actors also cling

that once the vigilantes are part of the security apparatus, the assumption is that they are there for the party to provide the party officials with security.

3.5 Strengths of the Rational Choice Theory

The application of RCT has been extolled as ideal for a more inferential scheme to partisan scrutiny. According to Becker (1976), RCT is best labelled as an integrated basis for accepting all political conducts. Rogowski (1997) also proclaims that RCT is the most rigorous and the most general theory of both political and social actions that have been advanced in this century. Hirshleifer (1985) modestly expresses that the theory is a universal grammar of social science. Additionally, the RCT is able to withstand generalisation (Ogu, 2013). The theory assumes a unique posture that facilitates its compatibility with any set of operational conventions surrounding the environmentally friendly site in which the actor is extant.

Also, RCT is essential in the sense that people are able to predict the outcome of decisions taken by different actors within the political discourse (Ogu, 2013). The theory has been applied extensively to yield a wide-ranging expectations about the calculable physical world events with potency of declaring a considerable higher set of results than what is already largely believed to be doubtful. The certainty of RCT hinges on operational strategies and the expectations of the actors involved.

3.6 Weaknesses Associated with the RCT

Like many other theories, the RCT is not devoid of shortcomings. There are a number of flaws that have been recognised with the RCT. Some of the critiques levelled against the theory encapsulate the difficulties connected with insufficient flow of information. This flaw can make it challenging for individual actors to take rational and cogent decisions. As a consequence, the various actors involved possibly will depend on other means of taking decisions.

Also, political actions and collaborations are multifarious (Ogu, 2013). In view of this, it may make the application of RCT difficult in certain political decision making processes. Standards

and lifestyles could control exploit; and when these occur, individuals possibly will not query them but use same to hunt evocative political action.

Finally, RCT considers nearly every action by individuals as being rational. By means of classifying every kind of action as being rational, any action that is unreasonable becomes part and parcel of the theory. By counting each conceivable act as being rational, it is therefore not impeccable “how the standards of what is rational and what is not are constructed” (Ogu, 2013:98).

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

The chapter mainly dwells on the methodology within which the study was conducted. Research methodology ultimately explicates the processes or procedures through which data is collated and examined. This is meticulously done to provide or make available responses to the research questions identified by the researcher; and it also helps in realising the objectives of the study. Its focus is on techniques and strategies that were engaged in the course of the study. The chapter is designed to capture the approaches, procedures and techniques that make up this study. According to Rajasekar et al (2006) research methodology is defined as “the procedure by which researchers go about their work of describing, explaining and predicting phenomena” (p.2).

The specific details of the chapter take account of the philosophical paradigm of the study, the research approach or strategy adopted by the study to address the research questions so as to achieve the research objectives, data collection methods, the framework for analyzing the data, the research population, sample size and sampling techniques, ethical issues, and finally the limitations and problems associated with the study.

4.2 Philosophical Paradigm

According to Rehman and Alharthi (2016), philosophical paradigm refers to a set of basic belief system that focuses on one’s way of understanding the reality of the world and how to study it. Creswell (2009; p.6) and Guba (1990; p. 17) assert that philosophical paradigm is “a basic set of beliefs that guide action.” Kamal (2019) posits that philosophical paradigm is regarded as an approach to observe and construe the real world that constitutes the precinct of a research topic. It has a significant impact on the way researchers conduct their study.

The study adopted the constructivism approach which is inextricably linked to the interpretivist paradigm of philosophy. According to Honebein (1996), the constructivism philosophical paradigm as an approach stresses that individuals build their own appreciative and familiarity perspectives of the real world as and when they come into contact with things and replicating on their personal experiences. Many scholars including Hein (1991), Steffe and Gale (1995), Fosnot (1996), Cashman et al (2008) and Adom et al (2016) assert that the heart of constructivism underscores the fact that individuals form or create considerable aspects of what they study through their own special experiences. The justification for adopting constructivists approach is that it enabled the researcher to fully engage the participants of the study. This enabled the researcher to personally discover the factors that account for the bad faith posture among the political actors in working closely to disband PPVGs affiliated to the parties. The interpretive or constructivist scholars including Corbetta (2003), Marcon and Gopal (2005) and Kroeze (2012) maintain that reality is built on social basis and as such could be altered and construed instinctively.

4.3 Approach to the Study

This segment of the chapter stretches on the research design and the research method used in the study. The research design fundamentally is the blueprint or the comprehensive plan to answering the research questions posed for investigation by the researcher (Ditsa, 2004; Burns & Grove, 2003). The research method on the other hand constitutes the research instrument, strategy or scheme adopted by the researcher to execute the plan.

4.3.1 The Research Design

Research design is very essential because it accelerates the smooth navigation of the different research procedures; thereby making research as efficient as possible yielding maximal data with minimal expenditure of effort, time and money. The study adopted the qualitative research design as the approach to answer the research questions and achieve the research objectives. The selection of qualitative approach is concomitant with the philosophical paradigm

underpinning the study. In the opinion of Strauss and Corbin (1990, p. 11), qualitative research design is considered to mean “the research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification”.

According to Almeida, Faria and Queiros (2017), qualitative research approach does not concern itself with statistical or numerical variables; but it focuses on expanding an appreciable level of understanding a particular phenomenon. They argue further that,

“In qualitative research, the researcher is both the subject and the object of his research. The objective of the qualitative methodology is to produce in-depth and illustrative information in order to understand the various dimensions of the problem under analysis. ... Qualitative research is therefore concerned with aspects of reality that cannot be quantified, focusing on the understanding and explanation of the dynamics of social relations” (Almeida et al. 2017; p. 370).

It may be construed to be a research study surrounding the lifestyles of individuals and their experiences, activities, sentiments and approaches as well as about the structural, operational, communal engagements, ethnic and traditional sensations, and collaborations among people.

From the standpoint of Flick (2014), “qualitative research is highly interested in analysing subjective meaning or the social production of issues, events, or practices by collecting data and analysing texts and images rather than number and statistics” (p.542) . This clarification gives a hint on how individuals construct something through their personal experiences of the world. More importantly, Denzin and Lincoln (1994:2) are of the view that, “qualitative research design is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter.” Van-Maanen (1979) also asserts that qualitative research design is “an umbrella term covering an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” (p.520).

There are so many justifications for using qualitative research design in the study. First and foremost, qualitative research design, unlike the quantitative approach, enabled me to make certain a comprehensive or detailed account of the feelings, opinions, and experiences of the

individual participants in the study (Denzin, 1989; Rahman, 2017). This enabled me to construct the perspectives of the respondents regarding the factors accounting for the bad faith posture among political actors in disbanding PPV in Ghana. Also, unlike the quantitative and mixed method approaches, the qualitative research design as opined by Rahman (2017) enables the researcher to have a general understanding of human experiences within a particular setting. Thus, it concerns the study of individual occurrences (Kelin & Myers, 1999); and it possesses capacities to appreciate diverse grassroots expressions, values and actions (Rahman, 2017).

Again, the qualitative research design simplifies the process of collecting data for analysis in diverse approaches including the use of structured and unstructured interview guides, direct participant-observation, document data and audio-visual data (Creswell, 2003; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011; Rahman, 2017). Finally, the qualitative research design according to Maxwell (2012) has a malleable arrangement as it can be created and recreated to a larger scope. Thus, the comprehensive and applicable explores of a phenomenon can be shaped by making use of qualitative research designs. This consequently empowers the respondents in a study to have ample freedom to decide what is unswerving for them (Flick, 2011).

Notwithstanding the above advantages, there are some criticisms levelled against qualitative research design. In fact, the smaller sample size of qualitative research design makes the application of the principle of generalizability to entire research population very problematic (Harry & Lipsky, 2014; Thompson, 2011; Rahman, 2017). Also, qualitative research design “cannot be applied to phenomena that are expressed in terms of quantity” (Kothari, 2004: 3). It must be indicated, however, that the study did not pursue measuring public opinion on PPV; but rather the focal lens of the study was to undertake a thorough assessment of factors that account for the obscene posture of the political actors in working closely to disband political party vigilantism in Ghana.

4.3.2 The Research Method

Research method is described as a “scheme to scientifically solve a phenomenon or a research problem” (Kothari, 2004; p.8). Similarly, other scholars including Harwell (2011) and Creswell (2013) construe research method to mean the scientific approach of deciphering a problem in the world. Saunders et al. (2000) posit that “what matters is not the label that is attached to a particular strategy, but whether it is appropriate for your particular research” (p. 92). The study aims at ascertaining the factors that account for the bad faith posture among the political actors in working closely to disband political party vigilantism in Ghana.

In line with the qualitative method of investigation expounded supra, the study adopted in more explicit terms, a case study approach as opposed to narrative, ethnography, grounded theory, and phenomenological. The justification for adopting a case study over the other research methods is that, it offered me an exclusive opportunity to study the multiple cases of various electoral violent attacks by PPVGs in Ghana, especially the Fourth Republic; to adopt various sources and techniques to gather my data. Additionally, it helped me with the opportunity to make extensive use of rationality principle of duplication in studying one vigilante group to another. The case study strategy permitted the researcher to also conduct an elaborate, diverse assessment of a particular phenomenon using the qualitative method (Feagin et al, 1991). Many scholars including Creswell and Creswell (2018), Johnston et al. (2016), Yin (2009) and Gerring (2004) assert that a case study provides a thorough study of a distinct event (bounded system by time and space) so as to have an understanding of a complicated societal phenomenon. This strategy assisted the researcher to assess the single case of political party vigilantism in Ghana’s Fourth Republic.

4.4 Data collection techniques employed in the study

As a purely qualitative study, this research seeks to undertake an assessment into the phenomenon of PPV in Ghana’s Fourth Republic than statistical interpretations of the phenomenon under study. The study obtained data from primary and secondary sources.

The data from primary source were collected mainly by interviewing respondents through the use of interview guides; to solicit for the perspectives of the participants on the major issues of the study. Kvale (1997) defines interview as a dialogue with a purpose of obtaining a description or opinion of a phenomenon from an interviewee through content analysis. In other words, it is a technique used in qualitative research, and it allows the researcher to ask open ended question(s) to obtain opinions from respondents. This is important technique because it allowed me to reinforce the importance of gaining detailed insight into issues surrounding a phenomenon. In all the interview sections, I used 30-50 minutes. Kothari (2004) posits that interview technique involves the “presentation of oral-verbal stimuli and reply in terms of oral verbal responses” (p. 97).

I adopted both structured and semi structured interview techniques to collate opinions from the interviewees. The structured interview guide is used because it allows the researcher to have or hold a certain idea in asking for more questions through probing (Alshenqeeti, 2014). This also helped me, particularly, when the time was short for me. It enabled me to also arrange the questions in manner that covered all the objectives set out to achieve in this study. In all, it gave me a certain flexibility or room to get all what I wanted from my respondents within the short period of time.

The unstructured interview was used particularly in dealing with some executives of the various PP, especially NPP and NDC; as well as some PPVGs. This technique allows the investigator to build a bond between himself/herself and respondents so that respondents can be more open in their responses (Gubrium & Holstein, 2002). The structured interview guide as a type of interview is not been used with my encounter with some executive members of the various Political Parties and some political party vigilante groups; because answers gotten from this, perhaps, will not be that detailed enough, largely because of its rigid nature (Berg, 2007), into describing why the political actors exhibit some kind of bad faith posture in disbanding vigilante

groups prior to the 2020 general elections. Also, the unstructured interview enabled me to freely interact with the members of some political party vigilante groups in the country.

My data from secondary source for this study were collected predominantly from reading materials like newspapers, journals, books, and magazines. It also included works on both published and unpublished articles and thesis. Again, through the internet, other forms of recognised online academic portals including JSTOR, UG space, and Google Scholar were effectively used. Libraries such as the Balme Library, the Department of Political Science Library, and IDEG's Library were visited.

4.5 Research Population

Research population encapsulates all the elements, variables, events, objects, that satisfy the criteria for inclusion in a study (Burns and Grove, 1993; Sarantakos, 2005). A “population is any well-defined set of units of analysis” (Johnson et al, 2016:214). The target population for this study included party technocrats of the two major political parties that are noted for recruiting political vigilantes in Ghana, security services, lawyers, journalists, civil society organisations and people within academia with expertise in the subject area.

4.6 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

Sampling is one of the pivotal mechanisms in gathering data for a study. As it is mostly impossible to gather data from the entire population, especially in the case of qualitative research, it becomes imperative and a more practical approach for the researcher to draw from the population for further investigation (Johnson et al, 2016). The process of drawing from the population for further investigation is referred to as sampling. The elements that are drawn from the population are also referred to as the sample size for the study (Kothari, 2009; Denscombe, 2003). Borrego et al (2009) argues that qualitative research, as compared to quantitative research, requires a smaller number of elements to aid in thorough investigation of a phenomenon. Nevertheless, the sample size that will be drawn from the

population, should fairly correspond with the larger population. As a result of this, the researcher sampled a total of 15 respondents from the population. The breakdown of the sample is as follows: four (4) political party technocrats with two (2) each from both NPP and NDC; two (2) security officers made up of one (1) each from the police and the military; two (2) members of civil society organisations; three (3) people in academics with expertise in the subject area; one (1) Lawyer; one (1) Journalist and one (1) each from NCCE and NPC. These people were selected by the researcher because of their advanced knowledge on the phenomenon under study.

In arriving at the sample size that was chosen for the study, the researcher employed the usage of a non-probability sampling technique. Generally, there exist two types of sampling: probability and non-probability sampling (Johnson et al, 2016; Osuala, 2007; Biggam, 2008). Probability sampling is the form of sampling, where all elements of the population, have an equal possibility of being included in the sample (Kothari, 2004; Johnson et al, 2016). The non-probability sampling technique, however, is the form of sampling in which the elements of the population have unknown probability of being selected into the sample, and involves a subjective selection from the researcher (Johnson et al, 2016; Croach and Housden, 2003).

In view of this, the researcher used the purposive sampling technique to select the respondents. As advanced by Babbie (2004), the purposive sampling technique offers the researcher the opportunity to choose elements that will remain very symbolic of the population, and also needful. The purposive sampling technique was adopted because of the sensitive nature of the study. It provided the researcher with the opportunity to identify respondents who provided useful and expert information, based on their expertise in political party activism in Ghana.

4.7 Framework for Data Analysis and Interpretation

The qualitative data in my study were wholly gathered from interviews. An interview guide was used in gathering the data. My analyses were rigorously constructed from the original views expressed by the respondents devoid of any contribution from me. The interviews were transliterated and completely presented in the form of direct quotes and text as heightened by respondents. By so doing, it guaranteed my impartial description of the socio-political phenomenon being investigated. Essentially, content analysis was adopted and applied in the qualitative analysis. Content analysis basically is the process of developing meaning from respondents or participants through an interview (Patton, 2002).

Interviews were structured based on themes to let my work reflect on the main objectives and provide simple analysis. The themes were likened and juxtaposed to the responses I obtained from my respondents.

4.8 Ethical Considerations

Ethics play a very important role in conducting any form of scientific study. As a result, researchers highlight ethical codes, principles, and values in conducting their enquiry. Social science research, generally carried out under a qualitative research approach, more often, brings researchers and respondents into direct contact; and as a result, makes it imperative to follow ethical issues (Babbie, 2004). In view of this, Burnham et al (2004), recommend five (5) ethical principles that researchers have to consider in conducting their studies. These include avoiding harm; ensuring the autonomy of the respondents; avoiding deception; informed consent; and ensuring confidentiality (Burnham et al, 2004). In a similar vein, Ryen (2011) maintains that ethics for research revolves around three elements, namely; confidentiality, trust, and codes and consent.

This confirms that ethical principles have to be held on high esteem throughout the research processes. Respondents are to be anonymous and their opinions sought willingly, and not

compelled. Okrah (2015) avers that respondents do not owe researchers any responsibility to provide information during research, and as such, their participation must solely be on the grounds of voluntarism.

For the gratification of the substantial role that ethical principles play in research, the consents of the respondents for this research were totally sought and unconditionally appreciated. The respondents were informed ahead of time, outlining the purpose of the research, which is largely intended for academic purposes, and how their responses will be of inordinate support to the successful completion of the study. On the day of interviewing the respondents, their consents were once again sought before the entire process commenced. The respondents were assured of their anonymity throughout the process.

As the means of data gathering was the use of interviews, ethical principles were stringently adhered to. As Cohen et al (2007) contend that interviews are a sort of intrusion into the private lives of the respondents, especially in reference to the time assigned and the level of delicate questions that are asked. The level of anonymity is upheld in analyses of the data that were collected from the respondents. Names and addresses were expunged from the writing to make certain the anonymity principle. All in all, the ethical principles delineated by Burnham et al (2004) and Ryen (2011) were rigorously observed.

4.9 Limitations

The research encountered some challenges including financial restraints, time constraints and difficulty in reaching the respondents. First and foremost, the researcher was financially constrained. As a result, the researcher was not able to reach some respondents, who were recommended through snowballing.

Also, the researcher was time constrained. This research was conducted at the time that the world was hit with the deadly Corona Virus (Covid-19) pandemic that culminated in a total lockdown of the country. The lockdown was announced at the time that the researcher was on the field collecting data. This absolutely delayed the data collection. However, as the pandemic heightened, the researcher adopted a strategy of conducting most of the interviews on phone and sometimes using the zoom platform. This denied me the opportunity to interact with most of the respondents physically.

Again, the researcher was also met with the challenge of meeting with some of the respondents particularly those from the NPP. This was attributed to the timing of their parliamentary primaries after the restrictions on lockdown were eased. The primaries were held on 20th June, 2020 and so the party machinery was more focused on putting things together to kick-start their preparations towards the general elections. Even though the researcher has indicated that all the respondents granted the interview, this was the little difficulty that was met.

4.10 Chapter Summary

This chapter began with an introduction and proceeded to indicate the philosophical foundation of the study, as well as the research approach. The section also discussed further the methodology used for the work and the justification for using such a method. Again, it discussed the means of data collection and data analysis. Additionally, it explained how the respondents for the study were selected and how the interview process was done. It concluded with explaining the ethical principles that were upheld by the researcher, and lastly, the limitations that were encountered in conducting the study.

In the next chapter (Chapter 5) of the study, I will concentrate on the analysis of data gathered and the discussions.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

The immediate preceding chapter discussed the appropriateness of adopting a qualitative research design as the methodological approach for the study which seeks to identify the factors that account for the bad faith posture among political actors towards working closely to disband vigilante groups affiliated to the political parties; and proffer ways by which they can be addressed.

This Chapter centers on presenting an analysis of data gathered qualitatively from the field with the help of an interview guide. It is motivated by the need to find answers to the research questions that underscore this study as well as achieve the objectives of this study through valid interpretations. It is in this section that data gathered with respect to the study is analysed and discussed. It must be noted that this chapter constitutes the main part of the study that empirically and comparatively examine the factors that account for the bad faith posture among political actors towards working closely to disband political party vigilante groups affiliated to the parties; and proffer ways by which they can be addressed; and an identification of other variables that are relevant to achieving the research objectives and answering the research questions. The data analysis and discussion was done in a thematic manner to chronologically reflect the objectives of the study.

5.2 Factors creating Bad Faith/Mistrust in Disbanding Vigilantism

The study sought to reveal the factors that create or account for the bad faith posture or mistrust among political actors in disbanding vigilantism which threatens the democratic enterprise of Ghana. In responding to the question relating to factors accounting for the mistrust in working closely to disband PPV, PPVGR008 declined that there is no mistrust among the political actors. According to the respondent the two leading political parties –

NPP and NDC – are basically unwilling to disband the vigilante groups affiliated to them. He intimated that such practice is indeed a great shame on the part of the two major parties to garner supporters. The respondent averred that:

I actually don't think it is mistrust. ... There is no mistrust. Neither parties wants to disband their groups. If the opposing party goes ahead and disband their vigilantes first, the other party may not. Let's say NPP disband theirs first, the NDC doesn't want to disband their vigilante group. The same for the NPP. If the NDC goes ahead and disband theirs first, the NPP will rather hide their vigilante groups. If they can keep them, then another party can keep them. These are some of the things we do. It is a great shame of garnering support. It is not mistrust. It is not in their interest to disband these groups (PPVGR008.5/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Notwithstanding the above view held by PPVGR008, a holistic scrutiny of the chunk of empirical data gathered on the field revealed a litany of factors that account for the bad faith posture among the political actors in disbanding political party vigilantism in Ghana. Some experts in Political Science, CSOs, Law, Journalism and some political actors as well as security analysts were interviewed and they registered their opinions. Chiefly among the factors expressed by the experts encapsulated: political mistrust evidenced in our history; nature of public prosecution; politicisation and unprofessional attitude of the security; constitutional gaps; recruitment of vigilantes into the security apparatus; and mistrust in the Electoral Management Body. The details of the data gathered from expert opinions and discussion on these factors are given underneath.

5.2.1 Mistrust Evidenced in our History

The study analysed popular accounts of experts during interviews with them on the basis of the recent high levels of bad faith posture among the political actors in disbanding political vigilantism in Ghana. A significant number of the experts interviewed opined that the prevalence of bad faith attitude in the political community is attributed to the historical trajectories of the country. Ghana, undeniably, has a checkered history. From as far back as the politics of the post-1951 period there have been deep rooted political divisions in the country. During that time, the mistrust was built around the nature and organisation of state

power and governance. The political divide appears so irreconcilable that even the brief moments when the political elites only build a fabricated, temporal and fragile consensus. The political acrimony of the period 1979 to 1981, according to IDEG Report (2014), also to a large extent possible, dramatized the entrenched political positions and mistrust within the Ghanaian political elites. Due to the severe contestation among the dualistic partisan blocs of the nation state, the dividends are the deep rooted political polarisation and bad faith posture among the major political actors of the country in recent times. One respondent in making a solid point on the fact that the historical trajectory of Ghana has contributed to the kind of bad faith posture of contemporary political actors expressly noted

that:

Vigilantism has been there since the origins of the modern state. ... In the period dating back to decolonization, the Gold Coast then, there were agitations between party supporters of the Convention People's Party and other regionally based political parties. So in that run up to the decolonization, we had evidence of party affiliated supporters who were agitating and causing mayhem to support their own political party agenda. ... That in the lead up to political independence, the two dominant political groupings fought against themselves; and that in the process we created a huge gap for trust. So there is mistrust caused by our history (PPVGR002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

This assertion reiterates the view held by Tankebe (2019) that PPV remains an old feature of party politics in Ghana; as there were fierce struggles between Dr Kwame Nkrumah of the CPP and other groups, especially the NLM.

The first election held in 1992 which set the pace for the Fourth Republic witnessed a lot of contestations among the political actors. Such disagreements and contestations significantly had influence on the acceptance of the first election results. The losing party in the presidential election subsequently boycotted the parliamentary elections that were held on a different date.

They later issued a famous document dubbed “The Stolen Verdict” that chronicled their perspectives on the 1992 elections; which they doubted the outcome. Commenting on this, the respondent further indicated that:

... within the Fourth Republican dispensation; ... in 1992 particularly the first presidential election that set the stage for the Fourth Republic, if you like, go and take any newspaper, there

was a lot of violence. ... It is in 1992 that the opposition described it as the “Stolen Verdict”. Yes; the Stolen Verdict. Yes there was several of these electoral violence (PPVGR002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

The above therefore agrees with Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2004) that Ghana has indeed experienced dynamic, and the same time, intense and violent partisan competitions. Undeniably, flowing from the above, one can assert that indeed the history of Ghana actually is a major contributory factor accounting for the bad faith posture or mistrust among the political actors. Some of the political actors therefore take great inspirations from the country’s political history to doubt the current trend of events and may want to be violent during electioneering epoch.

5.2.2 Nature of Public Prosecution

Closely linked to the historical trajectories leading to bad faith posture among political actors in disbanding vigilantism in Ghana is the nature of public prosecution. A significant number of the respondents who were interviewed termed it as political witch-haunting which dates back to the decolonisation time. Over the years, the nature of public prosecution has been that the members of the opposition party are almost always corrupt and deserve to be jailed or prosecuted. In Ghana, incumbent governments arguably, blindly ignore the ills and corruption allegations levelled against their members; and always go after their political opponents. One respondent expressed that:

Chairman Ampofo of the NDC said something, he’s invited to the CID Headquarters. There are mass of these guys following him. Why are they following him? They are following him because they don’t trust the system will give him fair hearing. Now, this MP who owns radio station at Madina, Kennedy Agyapong, says something; and he was arrested. That is under the NDC administration. His followers too went there. So they transfer this mistrust that they have for each other to public institutions when one is not in government (PPVGR002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

Also, vigilantes who are alleged to be affiliates of political parties especially when their party is in power are easily not prosecuted. They enjoy political power and free from prosecution by the state. This has also been part and parcel of Ghana’s political discourse since the era of Dr Nkrumah. This kind of historical hatred for political opponents, especially when they are in opposition has also gained inroads into the Fourth Republic of

Ghana. Reacting to the nature of public prosecution that account for the bad faith posture and mistrust among the political actors in disbanding political party vigilantism in Ghana, a renowned Political Scientist who has extensively researched and written on party politics and activism at KNUST avowed that:

Here is the case that when the CPP eventually won independence, they went after their opponents. They never, it was only one or two people within the CPP; but largely, it was always the opponents who were pursued, levelled with corruption cases; and they were prosecuted. ... Currently, the NDC guys are complaining that Akuffo Addo has suddenly put three of their people to jail. But for him to demonstrate that he is a leader that is fair and just, he should try his own people because they say there are issues to do with corruption within his own government. But it has always been like that. So there is so much mistrust within these two parties (PPVGR002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

Another respondent in a similar manner indicated that:

It is very easy for you to arrest your opponents. The politician will tell you don't send your members to jail. Those who are the people helping you. You won't do that. So because the political class benefit from these vigilantes, they can't prosecute them when the vigilantes are his party members. The vigilantes engage your opponents, they beat them up and some may even lose their lives. Ask police officer come and investigate this particular act. Investigate and prosecute. They will never do that when they are in power (PPVGR009.10/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

This practice of failing to prosecute vigilantes affiliated to the ruling party confirms the views held by Harnischfeger (2003); Daily Graphic (2017) and Alidu (2019) that vigilantes who are politically motivated, publicly execute other people on the streets without any trial. It is therefore not surprising that in Ghana, a government may have adequate evidence to pursue a case against persons and vigilantes affiliated with opposition groups. A lot of such cases may not be dealt with on their merits. They are witch-hunting their opponents. The opposition political parties have always had the fear of political witch-hunting. This is partly a more reason for mistrust or bad faith among the political actors, especially, those in opposition. The study further admits the position of Amah-Attoh (2017) that from the time when PPVGs emerged in the Fourth Republic, past and present administrations and the security agencies have largely failed to prosecute or reprimand members of such party militants when they engross in criminal actions.

5.2.3 Politicisation and unprofessional attitude of the security

Almost every participant who participated in the study greatly attributed the bad faith posture or mistrust among the political actors in disbanding vigilantism to the politicisation of the state security apparatus. The state security agencies like the military and police suffer from politicisation by the major political elites of Ghana. Hence, each faction of the political elite tries to seize the opportunity to control the state security and use it for its own purpose. Accordingly rather than becoming national institutions, the security agencies, especially the police have become the subject of partisan struggles to control them and use them to pursue their respective partisan agenda (IDEG Report, 2014).

The various security agencies have had to endure this kind of politicisation dating back to the colonial days. In the words of Tankebe (2019:255), “the Ghana police force ... appears to be an archaic institution, incorrigibly and unrepentantly allied to its historical colonial ideology and unresponsive to demands of the current liberal democratic political environment.” There was a strong consensus among the respondents who were interviewed to the effect that the current trend of security politicisation account for the bad faith posture or mistrust among the political actors in disbanding political party vigilantism in Ghana. Contributing to the discussion on the politicisation of the state security apparatus, a private legal practitioner in an interview stressed that:

For me, I think it is generally lack of trust in the opposition parties for the security system which is headed by the ruling party. And normally because during their time, they know what they did with it. You understand? So if you are in a system and you manoeuvre and then manipulate it to achieve certain aims and goals; and then you leave and you realize that your opponent has come to take over, you, yourself will not trust it. ... And those who actually trust the system and are supposed to be watch-dogs and make sure that the system works, don't care (PPVGR009.10/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Another respondent in a separate interview intimated that:

The handicap of the police are very real and I don't see a way around it unless we change our constitution and allow the senior police officers to be appointed in some different ways; allow for the police governance body to be administered in a different way. Until that happens, I don't really know what the police can do to help in a constructive way when it comes to vigilantism.

They can pretend to arrest people but then, behind the scenes, political parties will come in and have them released (PPVGR008.5/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

In responding to the politicisation of the security especially the police, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Ghana in an interview expressed that:

The police are equally limited. In this country, the police council is chaired by the Vice President. The IGP is appointed by the president; every senior police position is appointed by the president. So the police is controlled by which ever political party that is in power. ... So what it means is that whichever political party is in power, has the ability to dictate which crimes and which criminals the police pay attention to (PPVGR006.27/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Closely linked to the politicisation of the security, especially the police, is the unprofessional attitude among a section of the police. The empirical data gathered on the field indicated that a significant majority of the experts in Political Science, CSOs, and other security analysts who were interviewed attested to unprofessional attitude of some police personnel. This unprofessional conduct of some police officers greatly account for the mistrust of not only political actors but also, most of the citizens. Respondents indicated that due to mistrust and lack of independence of the police in the discharge of its duties, the police are unable to fight crime and provide effective security during election hence culminating into violence. Police conduct and professionalism especially in proper handling of informants and keeping their identities anonymous was cited as a source of concern that negatively affects trust in the police and puts informants in jeopardy of attacks from suspected culprits.

The views expressed by the experts in civil society organisations and Political Science concurred with Aning (2002) and Appiahene-Gyamfi (2002) who had opined that the abusive and prevalent corruption have created a basic sense of community mistrust with the police.

A Fellow at IDEG expressly asserted that the mistrust and bad faith posture of the political actors is largely linked to the politicisation of the security and the unprofessional attitude of some police personnel. The respondent averred that:

I think the mistrust is due to the politicisation and lack of professionalism of the security, especially the police. I will say to you the next IGP, I know his name. I know who is going to be

the next IGP. If we vote in December, I know who's going to be the next IGP. And he's a very good man. He's somebody I know very well. But what worries me is that this man is a professional, very educated with even a Doctorate. But what worries me is that he's going to be IGP because the political party will say he's our man. ... So if NPP come to power, they know one, two, three people one of whom to become the IGP just as the NDC. Now, if you politicise the top echelons of the security, why should NDC or NPP put its man at the top? They put your man at the top to protect your interests; and this situation is very dangerous for national security (PPVGR001.12/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

In view of the above politicisation of the security, political parties, particularly, opposition parties, tend not to trust the police, especially during elections. Instead of depending solely on the police, the NDC and NPP prefer to entrust the safety and security of their presidential candidates, running mates and campaign contingents, political events, including rallies and delegates conferences to vigilante groups along with the police personnel assigned by the state. There is clear indication from the analysis and the discussions that the two main political parties oscillate and do not trust the security agencies to provide them with security, especially when they are in opposition. Hence, they resort to their own internal security arrangements.

It is against this ambiance that the study reiterates the earlier position held by CODEO (2017) that the increasing politicisation of the public security forces affects their conduct as professionals. There is strong acuity of political intrusion regarding enlistment, reassignment or transfer and promotion of public security employees.

5.2.4 Constitutional Gaps

The politicisation of the security above is closely related to the constitutional gaps; except that there is a second dimension. Thus, a careful analysis of the empirical data gathered on the field and other information within the literature gave indication to two crucial issues: constitutional appointment of security chiefs and the political power architectural design relating to winner-takes-all politics.

Ghana has had four different constitutional advancements since becoming a republican state. Specifically, these constitutions were inaugurated in 1960, 1969, 1979 and 1992. These major constitutional developments of the country have also resulted in the deep rooted mistrust and

bad faith posture among the contemporary crop of political actors. The agitations and contestations for the current constitution started in the 1980s. The repugnant posture of most political actors gives an indication that the agitation for democratic and constitutional progress in the late 1980s portrayed an artificial unity among the political actors.

A report by IDEG (2014) reveals that our desire for a new configuration of government from authoritarian regime to a democratic one overshadowed a critical assessment of the nature and architecture of power and its operationalisation to ensure that it would be inclusive, ensure participation in governance by all; that power would be exercised for all the people, and that all and sundry would be beneficiaries of the dividends of democracy. One of the respondents relating the bad faith posture of political actors to the constitutional deficiencies in an interview indicated that:

It is the constitution that is creating all these problems of mistrust for us. And that is a baggage from the PNDC era. What the constitution should have done is that, the appointment of top Army Officers, Police Commanders, and other chief executive officers of security institutions should have been non-partisan. ... You will not even look at who is the senior most. ... They only select one that they trust. But it shouldn't be that way. So it is the constitution. It is the creation of the constitution that is making it difficult. Until there is amendment or it is non-partisan, we can't do anything. The president will have no role to appoint that will be ok. I always say it will rather make the president better of that when the IGP is not doing his work or job well, you can tell the appointing authority that appointed him that the guy is not performing so fire him. But when you appoint somebody because he is a party member, then you have to know that the party owns him. And all these are as a result of the 1992 constitution (PPVGR002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

In the Fourth Republican constitution of Ghana, there is a procedural rule of democratic elections based on the simple plurality or the first-past-the-post system. In other words, the 1992 constitution portrays the phenomenon of winner-takes-all politics. According to IDEG (2014:2), this electoral policy “was accepted on its face value without interrogating and agreeing on its distributional outcome; that is whether and how it would enhance equitable or inclusive access to power and wealth of the state”. As indicated under sub-section 5.2.1 of this chapter above, the outcome of the 1992 elections and the political crisis (The Stolen Verdict) that followed

really exposed the fundamental gaps and disagreements about the assumptions underlying the architecture of the constitution.

The above therefore confirms the earlier assertions made by Abotsi (2013) and Gyampo (2016) that winner-takes-all politics enshrined under the electoral laws of Ghana is greatly contributing to the kind of mistrust or bad faith posture among the political actors. This is because when politicians especially the opposition who feel being marginalised and excluded in the governance process, will use all fair and foul means including the use of vigilantes to cause mayhem and violence so as to win power. Furthermore, in a political environment that accords extensive powers to the president, and underpinned by strong neo-patrimonial tendencies, winning elections is key to maintain patronage networks, control resources and dispense jobs, public services, or lucrative government contracts (Gyimah-Boadi, 2007; Lindberg, 2003).

5.2.5 Recruitment of Vigilantes into the Security Apparatus

It is extensively becoming an accepted norm and practice that political party that captures political power should or must infiltrate the national security architecture with members of vigilante groups affiliated to the ruling party of the day. Quite significant number of participants who were interviewed explicitly intimated that the rate at which vigilantes belonging to the political parties especially the NPP and the NDC are infiltrated into the various security is very worrying. This is largely increasing the mistrust levels that the political actors have in the national security. One of the respondents ostensibly indicated:

But let's bear in mind the fact that our security officers, National security officers who are appointed directly from the ranks of these vigilante groups who have, because of their political affiliation, they have authority over police officers. You have to ask yourself that in a situation where there are crimes being committed by vigilante groups; who are identified as being associated with the ruling party, no action will be taken against them (PPVGR008.5/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Another respondent indicated that:

Another dubious thing is also recruiting those vigilantes into the main stream security system. Because once they are part of the security apparatus, the assumption is that they are there for the party or government that offer them security. So, it's like job for the boys. So they are not there to defend the country, they are there to defend the party; and this is something dangerous that we need to discourage (PPVGR006.27/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

The irony surrounding the recruitment of these political party vigilante group members into the mainstream national security apparatus is that, they continue to show their total loyalty to the political party that recruited them and not the State itself. They tend to use the ammunitions of the state to even frighten their opponents. Commenting on the infiltration of vigilantes into the national security, a renowned Political Scientist at KNUST opined that:

These are party foot soldiers who were recruited and they are now part of the National Security. Now they have access to arms; and it is the arms that they use to threaten their opponents. And many of them, if you talk to the NDC guys, they've been in power before, that if you go to the BNI a lot of them are party people that they recruit. But they recruit them for what? For them to come and work for the state. And the state now arms them. So then you have these party foot soldiers who were recruited and they are now part of National Security. They try to frighten their opponents. ... These are party members who were recruited into the National Security and given arms to protect me and you. But because they are party affiliated, they won't protect me and you. They will rather protect those who are under the umbrella of the NPP. ... It is the state that recruits them into the security (PPVGR002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

5.2.6 Mistrust in the Electoral Management Body

The Electoral Commission (EC) of Ghana by law is the election management body mandated by law to conduct free and fair elections as well as to manage and regulate the activities of political parties in Ghana. By law, the EC is to be independent and neutral in the discharge of its functions and duties. From the discussions, it is believed by respondents that the EC is not neutral and independent in the discharge of its functions hence mistrust among political parties and their supporters which often results in violence. Sometimes the behaviour and conduct of some staff of the EC gives cause for the neutrality of the EC to be called to question. Some respondents indicated that often the processes leading to the elections and declaration of the election results by the EC are not free and fair; and these result in violence.

In the wake of the 1992 election crisis popularly known as the Stolen Verdict, the political actors ostensibly took entrenched positions. They simply did not trust that the other party in the dispute

would reciprocate politically prudent gestures from the other to ensure amicable settlement. Not even the intercession of the National House of Chiefs could induce a disposition for dialogue by the political divide.

The EC's proposal for setting up Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) merely camouflaged the bad faith posture or the level of mistrust among the country's political actors. The hope that IPAC would become the much needed platform for consensus building among the major political actors has systematically been eroded by the endless contestations over issues in election administration before, during and after elections; making the post-1992 election crisis dubbed the Stolen Verdict, a dress rehearsal of election related crisis in future.

From the time when the Fourth Republic commenced in 1992, the EC has come under severe attacks and mistrust glitches. Though there is IPAC to ensure consensus and build trust among the political actors, most of the decisions of the EC over the years have been settled by the Supreme Court. In 2012, as a result of deep rooted mistrust, the final legality of the presidential election results were determined by the apex court of Ghana. Ahead of 2020 General Elections, the EC was summoned to the Supreme Court in connection with the desire of the EC to change the voters' register for a successful 2020 parliamentary and presidential elections. All these are necessitated by the kind of bad faith posture of the major political actors, especially the NPP and the NDC. Commenting on the current impasse between sections of the political groupings and the EC, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Ghana asserted that:

You see politics is about authoritative allocation of values, who gets what, how and when. So long as we have who gets what, how and when; and we are competing to capture political power, it will be difficult for me to trust you. It will also be difficult for you to trust me. That is why even how to compile the register, we are having divergent views. And this is very clear that it's a constitutional issue. The EC is mandated to do that to the extent that a political party would say that I will not allow you. You cannot go ahead. So, that mistrust is there (PPVGR006.27/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Another participant responding to the kind of mistrust in the EC by the political actors expressed that:

The political actors don't trust the system. If they trusted that genuinely, the EC Chairperson, Jean Mensa wants to change the register and it is because of a genuine course, they will trust the system. ... And because they don't trust the system and because we have allowed it; and because political parties themselves know what is in there so when they are out of it, they want to protect themselves by pouring some false hope and false information into the heads of these young and hungry young men to also be on standby and engage in all these things to protect them. ... If we don't take care, this electoral register thing that we are going to do, we may have a feel of vigilantism. We are likely to have a feel; especially if the Electoral Commission tries in a way to tighten security in the Volta Region or in some regions than in some other regions, you understand. People will not understand because right now there is a perception that in the 2012 one, people came from Togo and Benin to register for a certain party; I don't know though. So this time, they will try to say, bring more security apparatus to intimidate persons and all that. People may not understand that why don't you send the same group to other regions (PPVGR0009.10/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Still on mistrust as a result of the conduct of the election management body, a renowned Political Scientist at KNUST in an interview, also indicated:

Currently, the debate that we are having over the voters register. It is the same mistrust. That the NDC do not trust that the EC will do a just job. If you go to the Supreme Court for judgment; whichever way the ruling goes, they will show signs of mistrust. Everywhere there is mistrust. And that is where it is very difficult. But democracy is built on trust. When your public trust your institutions, whether you are a party member or not, you have to trust the institutions. That is what democracy is about. So in Africa, if you look at the CDD Afrobarometer on public trust of institutions, it is so, so low. So we have to build trust. But currently, no, no, no. there is so much mistrust between the two dominant political parties (PPVGR0002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

In line with the data gathered and the literature, I am of the firm opinion that there is an interesting oscillations among the two leading party-political groups, namely, NPP and NDC; in Ghana's Fourth Republic. When either one is in opposition, the members tend to lose confidence in public institutions like the security services, the Electoral Commission and even the judiciary. The oscillations has been endorsed by the study as a major factor for bad faith in those institutions. Hence the political actors have perception that their opponents may resort to the use of vigilantes whenever there are electioneering activities; and this makes it more tortuous for the parties to disband their PPVGs.

The study therefore confirms earlier assertion by Asekere (2020) that the seed of vigilantism has been propagated and encouraged to the extent that the parties have taken uncompromising

positions in ending the phenomenon of PPV. The RCT explanation is that politicians easily recruit, train and sponsor vigilantes in pursuit of self-interest (Alidu, 2020).

5.2.7 Dealing with mistrust/Bad Faith

As a way of proffering solutions to deal with bad faith or mistrust among the political actors towards disbanding PPV, Easton (1965) stated that “when support threatens to fall below a minimal level, the political system must either provide mechanisms to revive the flagging support or its days will be numbered” (p.124). In view of this, a partisan structure extricates itself entirely from all extra community agilities through its “capacity to make decisions for the society and the probability of their frequent acceptance by most members as authoritative” (Easton, 1965: 96). This recurrent recognition of persuasive resolutions hang on the level of politically motivated trust exhibited by the major actors. Efforts were made to solicit for some stringent ways by which the bad faith posture among political actors in disbanding vigilantism can be resolved; especially when the 2020 presidential and parliamentary elections draws nigh.

The respondents were therefore asked to proffer appropriate mechanisms within which the bad faith posture or mistrust among the political in disbanding political vigilantism could be resolved. In responding to the question on appropriate ways to deal with the issue of mistrust or bad faith among the political actors, a Private Legal Practitioner with the Kulendi@Law Legal Firm, Accra; in an interview asserted that there is the need to have an open political administration and do away with the winner-takes-all style of governance. Over the years, ruling parties have been given enormous political powers which are often abused. Incumbent parties in Ghana virtually appoint top echelons of our security; and influence, control and direct the security personnel to their advantage. The security should not be politicised. It was instructive to note that citizens, irrespective of their political affiliation, must be treated equally; no oppression of the opposition. The respondent indicated that:

You see; the issue is we have to open the government. You know, in Law, we say something that justice must not just be done. It must be seen to have been done. Right now as we are here, we know that justice is what you are or that is what it is supposed to be; but you know it doesn't work. The system doesn't work. We have to put the trust in the people by making sure that each and every person is treated equally. Anyone who infracts the law must be dealt with quickly and jailed. So unless we try to trim down the oppression and the kind of selective just that we have, and it must start with the government in power trying to relinquish some of the powers. They hold on to so much powers such that they try to abuse it. Even though you appoint the IGP, that's what the law says; but you don't have to control the IGP. But that is what we know here. If you are appointed as IGP and if you stop taking command from the up there, they will take you out and replace you. So if you let the police to work and the people know that today, during this election, the police came here and an NPP person messed up and they picked him away; NDC person messed up and they picked him away. The treatment was fair and equal. In this way, the mistrust in the system will definitely dwindle; and nobody will turn for these vigilantes (PPVGR0009.10/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

As a way to proffer solutions to deal with bad faith posture or mistrust among the political actors, another respondent remarked that:

I think transparency has always been the only solution to cure mistrust. You know the government structure in terms of appointment and recruiting of security officials has not been transparent. As we speak they are still recruiting party people into the police service, into the immigration service, into all the services, military and so on and so forth without opening it to competitive application. ... We have had a case whereby news reporters reported that people were flooding the El-Wak Sports Stadium for security recruitment; and all of them were virtually sent home. And yet, they have been recruiting and training people on party basis. ... You saw that it was reported in the news that they should recruit people, to be trained into the National Security and so on and so forth. So all these things are being done by both past and current governments which give credence to the fact that they cannot be trusted. ... So transparency is the key to curb mistrust (PPVGR0004.19/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Similarly, another respondent suggested that political actors ought to be open-minded about issues that have the tendency to dent the democratic principles of the country. The respondent opulently espoused that the political actors must deal with mistrust and bad faith through engagement, dialogue and tolerate divergent opinions; and further stated that:

... Anybody who has been practicing law in the court tends to be a little bit open-minded about everything. Because you can be right today; you go to the Court of Appeal it is over-turned; and you go to the Supreme Court it is over-turned. So you develop an expansive tolerant attitude towards life; that you cannot be right all the time. So at all times it is important for the political actors to engage. ... Let us engage. The thing is not for me and you alone. It is for even generations yet unborn. Let us lay a foundation upon which they can build. That is the core of the mistrust. If the political actors can change their attitude; and be more tolerant; and be more engaging; and be more trusting of those who even disagree with them; I think that we can move forward (PPVGR0003.19/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Flowing from the above, the study totally shares the opinions expressed by CODEO (2017), CDD-GH (2019) to the effect that if mistrust will be reduced to the barest minimum, political parties should eschew hypocrisy; and do away with the mind-set that they should win power at all cost. Also, political actors must at all times sensitize and communicate resolutions taken at IPAC to their enthusiasts.

The study further concurs with IDEG (2014) that mistrust is not just a barrier to dialogue and consensus among the various factions of the political actors; but it also undermines the institutions of the country. When national institutions are weakened by mistrust or bad faith among the political actors, they may become crumbled under aggravated stress. In such situations, unscrupulous political actors together with their vigilante groups would take advantage and plunge the nation into political turmoil.

5.3 Reasons for Joining/Forming PPVGs

The activities of PPVGs have been documented in times past of countries athwart the globe. Therefore Ghana remains not an exemption. Generally, PPV arises largely due to disgruntlement or disappointment created by legitimate institutions that uphold, preserve or sustain law and order in our societies (Asamoah, 2019). It is against this backdrop that there is the need to ascertain what accounts for the formation of PPVGs, what is expected of them, what they actually do, how their activities promote the interest of their political parties in Ghana (Gyampo, *et.al*, 2017).

The response to why people take part in violent PPV according to Tankebe (2019), is so critical for effective policy interventions. The phenomenon of PPV arises in diverse shapes, methods, and scopes. Contributing to the different dynamics of PPV in Ghana, a Senior Research Fellow at IDEG in an interview indicated that:

... Vigilantism, like all other socio-political issues has many sides. We have the purely criminal aspect. People who are not supposed to bear arms manage to get arms, train and inflict violence on others. This is criminal. So to the extent that it is criminal, if they perpetuate any criminal act,

they must be punished according to the law. ... Why would I have to go and bear weapons and follow somebody knowing that you may be arrested or even die? Because if you point a gun at somebody and the person also points a gun at you, one of you is going to die. So the criminal dimension is there. We should deal with it. But more importantly we should also look at the socioeconomic issues that face these people. So it's not just because somebody wants to be a criminal. Kwame Nkrumah will tell you that nobody was born a criminal. It is the society that trains him so. That is one aspect of it. The other aspect is the legal constitutional aspect. The constitution has given so much powers to the president to appoint the heads of the security agencies to the point that they are not able to act. They are not able to act when somebody commits. This is ruling party member, this is ruling party that. Do you want me to jail him so that they remove me as IGP? So then, it's a legal constitution dimension as well. So my point is that there are three major dimensions to the problem. We have the purely criminal law perspective which says that it is an offence. Punish them. We have the socio-economic dimension and we do have the legal. So what people do, which I am against is just to put all the emphasis on the criminal and we have done this over the years but we have not been able to subdue it (PPVGR001.12/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Notwithstanding the above assertion by PPVGR001, for the purposes of data analysis and discussion on achieving the objective of this thematic area, the study largely classified the array of reasons for forming or joining PPVGs into three: economic reasons; social reasons; and political reasons. The study therefore sought to collate respondents' perspectives on the reasons for joining or forming PPVGs in a democratic country like Ghana. The study sought the views of some experts, members of some civil society groups, and PP executives. All the respondents unanimously acknowledged that there are economic, social and political causes of PPV.

5.3.1 Economic Reasons

A substantial number of the respondents agreed with the fact that part of the reasons for the increase in PPV in Ghana is the economic factor. The data gathered on the field significantly revealed that indeed people join PPVGs because of economic factors such as high unemployment, lack of job opportunities, high cost of living, and so on. These issues, according to almost all the respondents, constitute a domineering reason that propel people especially the youth in joining PPVGs in Ghana. In responding to the question relating to the economic reasons for forming or joining PPVGs, the data gathered on the field indicated that PPVGR009 and PPVGR002 share certain salient elements of commonality with PPVGR001. For instance, PPVGR001 held the view that:

... If you look at the phenomenon of political vigilantism very well, you realize that there are economic causes that push these people into this. I have no job, I have no income, and people want me to go into this and I go into this. ... Don't forget one of the main reasons why they follow these politicians is that, when they win, they will be able to give them jobs. So, the people are not like armed robbers who have made a profession from crime. They had gone into this with the expectation of getting a job. That's the bottom line (PPVGR001. 12/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Similarly, PPVGR002 had this to say:

Economically, they need to survive. Party politics is all about survival. The man who comes originally to give them something, promises them that I will.... I am not in power but is able to provide you something. So I am not in power when I get to power, I can provide you better things than this. When I get to power, I will be able to provide job for you (PPVGR0002.15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

Again, PPVGR009 indicted that:

Unemployment is part. Because there are some people who are hungry but when they go for one operation for this vigilantism, they come home with five hundred Ghana Cedis (GH¢500.00) each. That person, he can work and work and work for like two months but he won't even get that five hundred Ghana Cedis. So because of the economic benefits and unemployment that they have, that is what pushes them to do these things (PPVGR0009.10/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

The study therefore agrees with CODEO (2019); Alidu, (2019a & b) Asamoah (2019) and Bob-Milliar (2019), that high rate of unemployment among the youth in Ghana is a primary cause of PPVGs formation. Already, earlier works of Gyampo et al (2017), Paalo (2017), Bob-Milliar (2014; 2017; & 2018), Gyampo (2012), Adigwe (2013) and Everatt (2000), have all stated that part of the reason for the increase in PPV in Ghana is high unemployment among the youth.

Therefore I conceive that the government must create more job opportunities for the youth. Because if people have jobs to do; they get up, they are going to work, they would not be going to do those irrelevant vigilantism. It is in the light of this that the study agrees with Asamoah (2019) that:

There is the need for governments to work towards creating employment avenues for Ghanaian young people, in order to effectively use their strength, skills, knowledge and talents for nation building. The government and the relevant stakeholders must work assiduously to create job opportunities for young people. The perception that one's party must be in power before one can get a job in the public sector must be jettisoned through proper education by the National Commission for Civic Education (Asamoah, 2019:14)

5.3.2 Social Reasons

Closely linked to the economic reasons above is the social issues which most of the respondents concurred to. Almost all the respondents agreed that social factors such as high level of illiteracy, stigmatising the youth groups as unfit to take up leadership roles, marginalisation or being neglected; forgotten off, poor education or low level of education, exclusion, among others, are major factors leading to the formation of PPV in Ghana. For instance, PPVGR0013 argued that because the members of these PPVGs have no monies, greedy politicians easily buy their conscience with just small amount of monies into causing violence during electioneering activities like registration and voting.

Stressing on this PPVGR007 also pointed out in an interview and further quizzed that:

Look, these are guys who hardly make hundred Ghana Cedis a week, and for them to be given five hundred Ghana Cedis to go intimidate or beat up people...what do you expect them to do? (PPVGR007. 3/6/2029. Field Interview, Kumasi)

PPVGR002, PPVGR004 and PPVGR001 argued that poor education or low level of education on the part of these PPVGs allows them to be misinformed by selfish politicians into causing troubles.

Majority of the respondents addressing the social reasons for joining PPVGs asserted that ethnic marginalisation of the youth and other minor ethnic groups is a contributory factor. Supporting the assertions of Everatt (2000), Paalo (2017) Adigwe (2013), Alidu (2019), and Olaiya (2014) agree that the involvements of youths in the political successes have received a less proportionate rate in governance decisions and participation. PPVGR007 for example indicated that:

Marginalisation seems to be the motivating force behind these PPVGs. Often times, the youth complain that they have not settled with anything or job. And for the PPVGs to reassert their importance and to also remind the ruling class that they have been forgotten off, they resort to violence by violently attacking their opponents (PPVGR007. 3/6/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

Furthermore, a major social factor contributing to the formation of PPV in Ghana and accepted by a significant number of the respondents was decline in social control and values. In reference to this, CODEO (2017) indicated that the collapse of patriotism, norms, civic values, and

morals, which is manifested in the reluctance and silence of opinion leaders like chiefs, imams, pastors, etc., in advising the youth on morals that use to keep the society in order, is one of the major causes of PPV by PPVGs in the country. Strengthening the issue relating to the loss of social control and values, PPVGR007 further averred that:

Our chiefs and youth leaders could have certainly stopped this if they were still active in exercising those powers that they used to. But see, today they are keeping mute; they do not care...and that is the problem. This informal mechanism that were used to maintain social order, has collapsed, thereby allowing the youth to go astray (PPVGR007. 3/6/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

The study therefore agrees with Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2204) that social concerns like high level of illiteracy, stigmatizing the youth groups as unfit to take up leadership roles, marginalization or being neglected; forgotten off, poor education or low level of education, exclusion, among others, are major factors leading to the formation of PPV in Ghana.

5.3.3 Political Reasons

Apart from the economic and social reasons attributed to the formation of PPVGs, the views of almost all the respondents and the literature alluded to the fact that indeed there are political reasons that precipitate the formation of PPVGs in Ghana. For instance, PPVGR002 reiterated categorically that:

Yes; and then politics comes to add up to the reasons for joining vigilante groups. Power is almost everything. If I have power, I will be able to better your lives. It is politics that is able to allow them to manipulate and use them to commit crime, and violence that we are talking of (PPVGR001. 15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

According to Asamoah (2019), the political circumstance in a republic is very vital for attainment of law and order. He opined that:

One of the most identified causes of vigilante activity is the 'authoritative allocation of values'. It is projected that if groups feel cheated by the government in the distribution of state resources, there is the potential for people to organise themselves into groups to counter the government through vigilante-style attacks. It is therefore correct to assert that there are political conditions favouring the activity of vigilante groups in the Ghanaian public space (Asamoah, 2019:10).

Another respondent, PPVGR006, averred that:

And in terms of politics, as I have alluded to winner-takes-all. Because if you win, if you take all the booty, then, we will also do whatever it takes for us to capture political power. That is why they try to get some of these land guards and vigilantes to go and fight for them to win political power. And it goes with a lot of juicy things. If you have political power, you can do a lot of things (PPVGR006. 27/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

The study therefore confirms the views held by Abotsi (2013) and Gyampo (2016) that political factors like the winner-takes-all politics in our governance structure and the desire of some politicians to win and hook on to power at all cost make such political actors to recruit and sponsor PPVGs.

Also, there is the sit-tight syndrome whereby an individual has the desire to win elections at all cost. This desire to win elections, amass power and wealth contributes to political violence perpetuated by the vigilantes. In view of this, one of the respondents, PPVGR006, indicated that:

These political parties, their leaders want to win political power; and in trying to win power, they try to use these land guards in political terms. ... You want to capture political power to govern the people of Ghana. If indeed we actually believe in democratic principles that look you want to get the opportunity to serve. So there must be no qualm about that. If you get it, fine. If you don't get it why should you be fighting? If you really understand that in fact you want to go there for the interest of the people or what we know about rational choice theory is that people are going there for yourself aggrandizements. ... They have other motivations; there are climbers who are there for prestige and money and what they stand to gain (PPVGR006. 27/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

From the above, it is clear that both the PPs that form or individuals who join PPVGs basically do so on the basis of rational choice. Taking a clue from the above perspectives shared by the respondents and the literature, I am of the view that no matter the reason that compels a person to form or join PPVGs they are not useful. They are unnecessary and they are harmful.

Although their actions are dangerous, they are in for their own gain; and the gain of the party that patronizes their services. They do not help the state in any way. They only help themselves and the politicians who gang them. So a country of say thirty million people, let me assume that the entire political class with their delegates and all of those people, is estimated to be about a hundred to two hundred thousand people. Deduct it from thirty million. And vigilantes only benefit about half of those hundred to two hundred thousand people at a time. Because whatever

a vigilante is doing, he is doing it for his own party. Let us even grant that there are about two hundred thousand people within the political class, and a vigilante goes to commit a vigilante act somewhere, it will only help his party. In fact in some cases, it will only help one candidate when there is intra-party elections that vigilantes are involved. When two people are vying for the position of parliamentary candidate; and some vigilantes go out and commit an act in support of one of them, the only people who benefit are the vigilantes who were paid and the one candidate they are supporting.

Again, considering the push factors that encourage people to form or join PPVGs, I consider two main issues that are at play here. The first has to do with the kind of attack that members of PPVGs alleged to be affiliates of the ruling party, and secondly, the behaviour of PPVGs alleged to be having links with the opposition parties. In all of these two instances, the members who join the PPVGs apply rationality.

With respect to the party in power, the vigilantes become so manifest and some of the youth join forces with PPVGs mainly attributed to unfulfilled electoral promises. Political actors over the years in their quest to capture political power engage in promising their supporters. When the party supporters including the vigilantes affiliated to the party in power do not receive those promises made to them by their leaders after helping them to secure electoral victory, such PPVGs would inevitably attack their own political party leaders who turn blind eye on their campaign promises. Apart from unfulfilled electoral promises, the ruling party in another breadth suffers from attack by their own PPVGs especially when the vigilantes perceive that people who perhaps did not contribute to the success of the party are appointed to certain positions.

On the other hand, in the context of the opposition, the PPVGs are sponsored by certain people in the party. The person to whom they have attached their fortunes to, is the one who the vigilantes will fight for. So if their patron is a particular politician, then that is the person that

they want to ensure he gets elected during their primaries. In the event of the party winning an election, the vigilantes will once again fight for him to get the best job; so that, that patron can also come and employ some of the boys or the person can have a big salary and he can use some of it to shelter them. So it is all about rational choice.

So, after the elections and they have won, they do not have to worry about combating the other political party members because they have won. So all that they have to do is to worry about positioning their patrons in the job that will allow their patron to get influence; so that they can sort them out. So any appointed position, they want to get it for their people; so that their people can look after them. These are the people that the vigilantes in the opposition party see that in future he can come to power to protect our interests. So, internally, you have these struggles. Therefore the people who form or join PPVGs apply rationality in their dealings.

Undoubtedly, activities by PPVGs generally reflect behaviours of anomic groups, usually spontaneous groups that are formed suddenly when many individuals respond to frustration, disappointment or other strong emotions. The study concurs with Asamoah (2019) that due to the frustrations and disappointments of unmet expectations, the vigilante groups resort to political vigilantism to register their frustrations, disappointments and displeasure with the government. The RCT explanation is that the desire for people to form/join PPVGs is reinforced by personal interests and rational calculation of the actors involved in terms of the political benefits that will accrue to them (Alidu, 2019).

5.4 The Ramifications of PPVGs

It would be a grievous oversight to embark upon a project that primarily sought to do an assessment of PPV in Ghana's Fourth Republic; with its overarching objective of ascertaining the factors accounting for bad faith posture or mistrust among political actors in working closely to disband PPV, without paying particular attention to the ramifications of these PPVGs. In view of this, the study sought opinions of experts in political science, civil society organisations,

security experts, lawyers, journalists and the party technocrats about the dire consequences that the continuous existence of these PPVGs have on our democratic enterprise. The expert opinions sought were classified into economic ramifications; social ramifications; political ramifications; and ramifications of these vigilante group activities on the legal system and security architecture of Ghana. These constituted the thrust of the data analysis and discussions on the ramifications of PPV with the details presented underneath.

5.4.1 Economic Ramifications

Economically, the expert opinions clearly indicated that the activities of PPVGs could lead to economic underdevelopment of the economy; and subsequently affect foreign direct investments and the tourism industry. It could be asserted unequivocally that no rational investor would want to inject capital into a country whose security stability is spasmodic. In responding to the dire economic consequences in an interview, one of the respondents, PPVGR009, indicated that a nation does not only lose its physical infrastructure, but its economic growth also slows down and sometimes prevent investors from coming to invest into such a country. The respondent clearly opined that those political party patrons who recruit and fund vigilantes sometimes eventually end up looting the state through over invoicing of contracts. It was indicated by PPVGR009 that:

And then, definitely those who are organising these vigilantes will end up looting and using our money to fund it. Because they don't fund these groups with their own pocket money. So economically we are also losing as a country. We are losing huge sums of money through bloated contracts. They are deliberately bloated so they will get extra money for these things. Yes, the road is actually seven thousand dollars (\$7,000.00) but when you bring the bill, they will say that look, we will pay you the seven thousand but we will put it inside that you are taking fifteen thousand. When you finish, we will give you your seven thousand and the rest is for us. Then, they will go and spend the extra money charged on such contracts to fund vigilantes. So, definitely, it will affect us negatively (PPVGR009. 10/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Another respondent, PPVGR010, added that the activities of PPVGs have dire ramifications on the local economy of Ghanaian towns and villages. The respondent averred that:

Economic activity is affected negatively by the activities of political party vigilante groups. You know what? We at National Peace Council did some joint research work with the UNDP, CDD-

Ghana, Ghana Anti-Corruption Campaign, and the NDPC. We were told in one of the towns that when the previous party was in power, their vigilante groups maltreated their opponents. So now when the tables turned and the NPP is in power, all the NDC vigilante group members have ran out of town. So the immediate economic consequence is that those people cannot come around to pursue their economic activities. This therefore affects the local economy of the town. Amponsah, if you have looked at Ghana's politics closely, again, you realise that in every election year, it looks like foreign investors go off a little and wait until the election is done before they come and invest. This is because they fear that something untoward may happen and their investment may be wasted (PPVGR010. 21/07/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

When the activities of these PPVGs are poorly managed and escalate into civil war, it has dire ramifications on the economic indices of the country. It is in the light of this that the study concurs with the earlier discoveries made by previous study conducted by scholars like Elbadawi and Bodea (2006) to the effect that organised party-political violence caused by PPVGs can become worse and degenerate into a turmoil which has a higher propensity of depressing long-term economic progress and expansion. The study also concurs with the opinion expressed by the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) of Ghana in an encounter with NCCE (2019) that “violent activities associated with the operations of vigilante groups disturb the peaceful working environment which is a pre-requisite for high labour productivity. The acts of violence by vigilante groups undermine state security and lower investor confidence in Ghana” (NCCE Report, 2019:23).

5.4.2 Social Ramifications

The study also sought to elicit from experts in civil society organisations, political science, security experts, lawyers and journalists some of the social ramifications of PPVGs. The data gathered clearly indicated that a significant number of the participants like PPVGR006; PPVGR008; PPVGR002; PPVGR009; PPVGR010 and PPVGR007 used their interview sessions to allude to the fact that PPVGs are extremely dangerous to the collective existence. For instance, respondent, PPVGR006, indicated that:

... Talking about the negative nature and since it affects the whole nation, it is important that we address it. Otherwise it can escalate and it could lead to loss of lives; and a lot of people could die. The trauma associated with PPVGs is largely about the destruction of individuals as well as social structures of a society (PPVGR006. 27/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

In a similar vein, another respondent, PPVGR010, clearly opined that:

Socially, this vigilante thing is bringing a lot of problems for us as a country. Amponsah, you know I have told you about the young unemployed and the under educated and substance abuse practice. Some of the vigilantes have to take some substance into their system before they can do what they actually do. Some of the people see no reason of going to school to struggle before getting certificate or a degree. Because they see getting a job as just joining a vigilante group. It affects us as a country in this regard because it is the man power that we are losing. People who could have channelled their energies into a more profitable ventures are not doing so (PPVGR010. 21/07/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

The respondent further averred that:

...When the previous party was in power, their vigilante groups maltreated their opponents. So now when the tables turned and the NPP is in power, all the NDC vigilante group members have ran out of town. ... so the practice is that whenever there is a change of government, the vigilantes of the losing party have to flee away for a while until things normalize before they can come back to town. And when they also win elections later, their counterparts will also run away from town because of how they treat themselves. So these vigilante groups have become so powerful to the extent that they decide what happens at a particular time. The net effect is that vigilantism can lead to a situation whereby citizens move or have to run away from their various places of abode; thereby increasing the rate of internally displaced people in the country (PPVGR010. 21/07/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

The study therefore agrees with Hamber (2004) that in a country in which there is prevalence of PPV, an array of inelastic procedures and laws are promulgated. Talking about the negative nature and since it affects the whole nation, it is important that we address it. Otherwise it can escalate and it could lead to loss of lives; and a lot of people could die. It could also continue to mar the beauty of our democratic system. In view of this threat posed by the PPVGs, I challenge the opinion leaders in Ghana like chiefs and religious leaders to condemn the activities of political vigilante groups and reorient their followers about the menace of political vigilantism. The police must also clearly deal with anyone who breaks the peace in the name of political vigilantism.

5.4.3 Political Ramifications

Expert opinions were also sought on the ramifications of PPVGs on the political arena and democratic exigencies of Ghana. In view of this, PPVGR004 averred that:

Obviously, the ramifications on our politics are dire and you can see and feel that the future of our democracy as country looks very bleak. If it is going to be this kind of brutal attacks that

happened at Ayawaso West Wuogon which includes your campus, then our democracy is indeed under threat. In fact some of the attacks happened at your campus where you are studying. So you know very well what I'm talking about. It threatens the stability of this country. It threatens the peace that we are enjoying in this country. Above all, it threatens our infant democracy that we are having (PPVGR004 19/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Similarly, another respondent indicated that the ramifications on our politics will exacerbate the mistrust that people have in the political system. When this becomes uncontrollable, it will affect the legitimacy of our government as a lot of the voting population may choose not to participate in the voting process due to fear of being attacked by a politically motivated vigilante group. In line with this, PPVGR009 articulated that:

As I'm saying it ends up worsening the distrust that the people have in our security apparatus. Because if I know vigilantism exists ... and I belong to the opposition party and I think this election I fear there will be rigging; I will not go and bring the police. I will go and bring vigilantes. So if you have beaten the mistrust, during your time, you do it; me too, I will do it. Then what happens to the security, the police and the military and all that is we won't trust them. This vigilantism can even cause a stir for us not to have a fair election because if people cannot come to vote because they fear vigilantes are around, what is the effect? It means we will not get the good people to represent us as our leaders. Because people have lives. I don't think you, with your wife and children and the work you do, if you are told that in fact, for every twenty persons who go to vote at this centre, eight of them are beating, you would go. You will never go. That is the point. So at the end of the day, those who will go and vote may be about a quarter of those who are supposed to vote. They will end up pushing someone for you. So we lose the trust in our security system; and the elections will end up not representing the true status that they have to represent and of course, because of this vigilantism thing ... it also ends up getting the wrong person for the wrong job. You know if you engage in vigilantism whiles you are in opposition and when you come to power, we push you to positions you don't deserve (PPVGR009. 10/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Due to the fact that activities of PPVGs undermine election results, the study resonates with an earlier work conducted by Teshome (2009); on the grounds that intimidations and violent behavior by vigilantes significantly affect election results. This is because voters are normally intimidated and forced to vote for dangerous candidates in an election. Sometimes too the PPVGs resort to the use of aggression to threaten the supporters of their opponents and frighten them not to come out to vote. Commenting on this aggressive strategy adopted by the PPVGs, a respondent, PPVGR002, asserted that:

... And then sometimes aggression can be used to achieve the political goal. Let's try to weaken our opponents. For instance, the recent Ayawaso West Wuogon bye-election, why did the guys from the national security secretariat use aggression? Why did they beat up the NDC guys? They

wanted to frighten them. Because we heard that there were people massing up at the NDC candidate's house; so they went there. But the idea was not to harm them. But the idea was to frighten them not to vote. ... And in that context, the NPP succeeded in getting these guys not to come out. Because they were scared. And aggression in party politics, sometimes, is allowed. It depends on how you use it (PPVGR002. 15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

Apart from PPVGs activities undermining election results, they also have potential to cause human rights violations. When PPVGs activities are so rife, it is obvious that the sacrosanct fundamental human rights of citizens would be undeniably encroached upon by these vigilantes. They sometimes attack with impunity and totally disregard the rights of their opponents.

5.4.4 Ramifications on the Legal and security Systems of Ghana

A significant number of the respondents registered their opinions with regards to the activities of PPVGs on the legal and security systems of Ghana; that over the years have enjoyed some level of reverence devoid of vigilante attacks. In recent times under Ghana's Fourth Republic, these PPVGs have visited incessant attacks on both the police and the courts. With respect to the attack on the court, all the respondents made categorical reference to the invasion of a Court in Kumasi by some vigilante groups affiliated to the NPP. Indicating the extent of damage of the activities of PPVGs on the court, PPVGR008, without mincing words indicated that:

Now, I used to think that the only organ of government that is protected from vigilantes is our judiciary; the legal system as you described it; our courts. But you remember what happened in Kumasi; when the Delta Forces harassed a Judge and freed their members from custody. That thing is so serious. The fact that we have down-played it is so serious. Because that thing has the power on its own to begin to unravel the entire suburb of our society. But if the judiciary is not protected from these vigilantes, then that's it. You, if you are beaten up by vigilantes, then, there is nothing you can do about it. So, essentially what I will rule is that there is nothing to stop vigilantes. They in fact, will start to rule the nation. Because even the politicians who pay them, will not be able to control them. It will be like we've gone back to the wild world or may be the Stone Age where only the strongest people lived. ... In fact, the court is the only thing between us and a return to the Stone Age. So if we allow our court to be violated by these vigilantes, and they realise that their strength alone is enough to help them evade justice. So you arrest a vigilante and he can just turn up and his friends can just turn up and come and walk him out of the court, then they have nothing to fear. In fact, nothing. So what they will end up doing is, they will turn up at Jubilee House and just go and take over the state (PPVGR008. 5/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Another respondent, PPVGR002, added that:

... Look at the government White Paper on the Ayawaso West Wuogon Report. They tried to shield the vigilantes who were implicated by the Emile Short Commission's Report. For instance, the recommendation was that Double who slapped Sam George, a Member of Parliament should be

prosecuted; and Bryan Acheampong should be reprimanded. But the government says we will not prosecute. Just some few days ago, they interviewed Professor Henrietta Bonsu and she says we have done our bid. It is left with the government. The government of the day will not prosecute his own. So the rule of law that they themselves are telling us that they want to entrench, we don't want to. So the government dismissed all those things. ... The commission enjoys the powers of the Supreme Court. But we ask Professor Bonsu and she says we cannot pass; not to even advice. So that is the challenge (PPVGR002. 15/5/2020. Field Interview, Kumasi).

On the question relating to the ramifications of the PPVGs on the security architecture of Ghana, in an interview with PPVGR005 at the National Headquarters of the Ghana Police Service, the respondent declined that PPVGs do not have any kind of ramifications on the security system especially the Police. However, a Senior Research Fellow at IDEG in an interview on the ramifications of the activities of PPVGs on the national security architecture, disagreed with the opinion expressed by PPVGR005. The Senior Research Fellow at IDEG in responding to the ramifications of PPVGs on the security system of Ghana clearly intimated that:

The impacts of vigilantes on the national security is that they have demonstrated the political limits of their power. As national security, I should be able to do everything and anything to protect the security of the state. The operation of vigilante groups has shown them the limits of their power. That look, you think you have power. The political parties are there. Be careful. If you go too far, you will lose your position. If you go too far, they will transfer you. So, it has exposed some of the weaknesses in our national security system. It has also exposed some of the weaknesses in our constitutional arrangements; by putting so much political powers in the hands of the president. He is able to dismiss, remove, appoint. It's serious (PPVGR001. 12/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Also, respondent PPVGR004 submitted that:

... So if it attacks democracy, it is obviously attacking the legal system and the security system because there have been cases where these vigilante boys of ... the ruling government have physically molested and attacked police officers. And I'm sure you know about the Asp. Nanka Bruce matter at the Jubilee House. You know it involved some Invincible Forces alleged to be from the NPP attacking these police officers. And it's numerous. And the police have complained on several occasion (PPVGR004 19/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

The study therefore concurs with Tankebe (2019) that indeed PPV still poses a danger to the fundamental human rights of citizens; and the process of consolidating democracy. We are gradually getting to a stage where Ghana is moving away from rule of law to rule by political parties and their affiliated PPVGs.

In agreeing with the data and the literature, I will rather modestly opine that all citizens of Ghana, especially those with security specialty, must be very much concerned about the

activities of vigilante groups; because of the threat they pose to democracy; because of the threat they pose to the national security as a whole, and the effect on the electoral process. The PPVGs are people who can act with impunity; and so all political parties, all civil society organisations should show commitment; and appeal to the government to give the police free hand to deal with the vigilantes. Because right now, there is highly political influence on the police and their hands are politically tied.

In line with the data, the study agrees with scholars like Frempong (2017), Alidu (2017) and Ayee (2018) that many people on the electoral roll arguably make guided choices on the voting day. In view of this, we as a people must collectively rise up to the occasion and hold the politicians to check. It is time as citizens we say enough is enough. We the people, not them will decide. Those vigilantes, they must be eschewed from our body politics. So that if you are a political party and you want to bring vigilantism, because of vigilantism alone, we will vote against you. I am of strong conviction that if we do that, certainly, the politicians will stop creating and funding PPVGs. The RCT explanation is that some people on the voters register do cost-benefit analysis before making choices (Ogu, 2013; Alidu, 2020).

5.5 Addressing PPV in Ghana's Fourth Republic

This segment of the data analysis and discussion focuses on an exploration of the legal framework and constitutional spectrum for handling cases relating to vigilante violence in Ghana. The various perspectives shared by respondents as a way to help deal with the phenomenon of PPV in Ghana's Fourth Republic are clearly articulated under this segment of the data analyses and discussions.

5.5.1 The Legal Framework of Ghana on PPV

The current bad faith posture among the political actors intensified when through a Legislative Instrument, Ghana passed the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019 (Act 999) to

proscribe all forms of violent attacks in the country including but not limited to political vigilantism and land guards.

In an attempt to respond to the possible ways to deal with the issue relating to constitutional deficiencies to addressing the phenomenon of PPV in Ghana, a Senior Research Fellow at IDEG asserted that:

... Almost all of us are going to engage in is the extent to which security agencies will be able to enforce the Vigilantism and Other Related Offences Act (2019). If you listen very carefully, there is legal constitutional problem and that legal constitutional problem is due to the fact that the president appoints the heads of the security agencies. Therefore, their hands are tied to be able to deal with political vigilante groups. You have passed the law but it is the police that is going to enforce it. We want to see the extent to which the police, in spite of the fact that the top echelons are politically appointed so the enforcement is going to be tough (PPVGR001. 12/5/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Reiterating this argument and in an interview with one of the renowned Super morning Show Host journalists who have been hosting experts who understand the security architecture, the respondent said that:

Now, the state has passed a law which disbands vigilantism. But none of the political parties has even taken one single action to out-law these vigilantes. They are all acting as if they don't know them; so that when they start acting, they can deny them. But they will be acting in the names of these parties. So, the first and most important thing we have to do is to ensure that every issue of national importance, we position ourselves in a place to get access to the truth even if it is being hidden from us. Probably placing people under cover, if it needs building relations with the whistle blowers or people who are willing to tell the truth about the activities of vigilantes. We must start doing that from now. And we must do it quietly and consistently across board; we must be willing to share information between media houses; so that if things begin to go bad, if the vigilantes start to wear their ugly head in the run up to the elections, we will be in the best position to shut them down by exposing them; shining a light on what they do (PPVGR008. 5/6/2020. Field Interview, Accra).

Notwithstanding the above, majority of the respondents like PPVGR004; PPVGR007; PPVGR003; PPVGR009; PPVGR005; and PPVGR006 agreed with Asekere (2020) that the Vigilantism and Related Offences Act 2019 (Act 999) offers nothing different to augment the criminal laws of Ghana. There are several legal arrangements to deal with political violence in general and vigilantism in particular. Ghana has such constitutional arrangements like (a) the Criminal Procedure Code 1960 (Act 30); (b) Criminal Offences Amendment Act 2012 (Act

849); (c) Presidential Transition Act; (d) the Political Parties Code of Conduct 2004; (e) the Political Parties Act 2000 (Act 574); (f) Article 210 (2) of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana; just to mention but a few. This is a clear indication that indeed Ghana has enough legal framework to deal with PPV.

It is against this backdrop that the study concurs with Asekere (2020) who recently asserted that, if the laws on crime are applied devoid of politicians meddling with the prosecutorial process on battery, assault, disturbing public peace, and vigilantism, this phenomenon will stop; and there would certainly be no need for a new law. Under the present hesitant partypolitical environment, the new legislation does not necessarily take away the likelihood for vigilantism to explode in the future (Asekere, 2020).

The Clause 10 of Act 999 which specifically deals with how to regulate the legislative enactment that proscribes or disbands vigilantism stipulates that the Minister for Justice may within a period of twelve months design the implementation guidelines to enforce the application of the law. However, in an interview with PPVR005 at the Headquarters of the Ghana Police Service, the law enforcement agencies after barely a year of the passage of the Vigilantism and Related Offences Law (2019) are yet to receive implementation guidelines from the Attorney Generals Department. The RCT explanation is that the politicians grant members of the PPVGs protection from criminal prosecution (Alidu, 2020).

5.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter provided the analysis and discussion of data that were collected from the respondents, alongside some existing literature available on vigilantism. The chapter revealed that several factors including nature of public prosecution, appointment and politicisation of top security officials coupled with unprofessional conduct of some security personnel, recruiting of party foot soldiers into security agencies, constitutional gaps, and several others create bad faith or mistrust among the political actors in disbanding PPV. The chapter also outlined some of the possible ways to deal with bad faith among the political

actors. It also discussed the reasons that motivate people to either form or join PPVGs and its ramifications on the democratic enterprise and the legal as well as the security systems of Ghana. The chapter concluded with discussing the appropriate strategies adopted for resolving the phenomenon of PPV.

In the next and final chapter of the study, I will present the summary of key findings revealed by the study, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

The phenomenon of PPV in Ghana according to scholars like Everatt (2000); Gyimah-Boadi and Asante (2004); Gyampo et al. (2017) Paalo (2017); Alidu (2019); and Asamoah (2019) dates back to the period of our struggle for independence. Violent political vigilantism continues to plague Ghana since the return to the practice of multiparty politics in 1992. This in the opinion of CODEO (2017) has become an aberration in the politics of the country, especially in the Fourth Republic. The frailties of state institutions to mitigate these pre-election and post transition hostilities are often complicated by elitist grievances and as well foster animosities that set society up for partisan violence (Asamoah, 2019). This has caused the national legislative body to enact a law to criminalise and prohibit all forms of vigilantism in the country. Yet there are signs of bad faith posture or mistrust among the political actors in working closely to disband these PPVGs affiliated to their parties. It is against this background that this research focuses on accounting for the factors creating the bad faith posture or mistrust among the political actors towards disbanding political party vigilante groups affiliated to the parties and proffer ways by which they can be addressed.

The central question that guided the study was “why have political actors not shown enough commitment towards disbanding these political party vigilante groups despite their suppose confession of being committed to the political processes in Ghana?” This final chapter presents the summary of key findings under the various objectives of the study, presents a conclusion, and proffers some recommendations. The overarching objective of the study was to account for the bad faith posture among political actors towards disbanding political party vigilante groups affiliated to the parties and proffer ways by which they can be addressed. In order to attain the main objective of the study, the work was guided by the specific objectives below:

- To identify the factors that account for bad faith among political actors in disbanding political party vigilantism in Ghana and how they can be addressed.
- To examine the reasons for the formation of political party vigilante groups in Ghana.
- To analyse how the continuous existence of these PPVGs controls Ghana's democratic development.
- To explore the existing provisions in the 1992 constitution and other laws of Ghana that provide mechanisms for addressing this menace on consensus from the actors involved.

The study made use of the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) as the theoretical framework which guided the study. Again, the study adopted the qualitative approach as its methodology. The researcher conducted interviews with open ended questions as the instrument for collecting primary data, and also made use of data from secondary sources.

This final chapter presents the summary of findings based on research questions that were crafted for the study.

6.2 Summary of Key Findings

6.2.1 Research Question 1

What factors account for the bad faith posture among the political actors towards disbanding political party vigilante groups in Ghana and how can this be resolved? The study established that there are several factors that are mutually intertwined which account for the bad faith posture among the political actors in disbanding PPV in Ghana's Fourth Republic. The study found out that the deep harboured hatred among the two major political traditions in Ghana immediately after independence with regards to the nature of our governmental structure and organisation of state power has beleaguered contemporary political actors to also develop some kind of half-baked consensus. The study unveiled that mistrust or bad faith as evidenced in our history has been the spring board for renewed contestations in the Fourth Republican dispensation. The study also found out that closely embedded in our history is the nature of public prosecutions. It was established that successive governments easily find culpabilities

with their predecessors and easily prosecute them. It was generally established by the study that politicians easily arrest and prosecute their opponents. The study revealed gaps in the constitution that empower the ruling party to appoint and dismiss top echelons of the national security officials, especially the police.

The study therefore unveiled clearly that the politicisation of the security agencies coupled with unprofessional conduct of some security officers greatly affects political actors who are in opposition; which motivate the opposition members to resort to raising their own security machinery to protect their presidential candidate and other party functionaries. In addition, the study indicated that the mistrust or bad faith posture is exacerbated by the fact that political party vigilantes are recruited by the ruling party into the mainstream national security architecture of the state. It was revealed by the study that at times, political party vigilantes belonging to the ruling party are given national security tags to intimidate their opponents with impunity. Such instances aggravate the level of bad faith posture and mistrust especially in the security agencies of the state.

On the issue of bad faith posture, the study eventually found out that there is an interesting oscillations among the two leading party-political groups, namely, NPP and NDC; in Ghana's Fourth Republic. When either one is in opposition, the members tend to lose confidence in public institutions like the security services, the Electoral Commission and even the judiciary. The oscillations has been endorsed by the study as a major factor for bad faith in those institutions. Hence the political actors have perception that their opponents may resort to the use of vigilantes whenever there are electioneering activities; and this makes it more tortuous for the parties to disband their PPVGs.

As a way of proffering solutions to deal with the bad faith posture, the study established that there should be open-mindedness in our political discourse such that we revisit the winnertakes-all policy. The study also indicated that transparency must be the guiding principle among the

political actors in the selection process during the recruitment of the security personnel. Above all, the study proffered that bad faith could be dealt with when there is frequent dialogue; but actors should not take entrenched positions.

6.2.2 Research Question 2

What account for the formation of political party vigilante groups in Ghana?

The study established that economically, poverty and unemployment are key drivers that motivate people, especially the youth to engage in PPVGs activities. Thus, the study unveiled that economic factors such as high unemployment, non-availability of job opportunities coupled with high cost of living motivate people who are mostly in their youthful stages to engage in PPV.

Again, the study found out that there are social issues that precipitate the formation of PPV in Ghana. The study established that such social concerns like high level of illiteracy, stigmatising the youth groups as unfit to take up leadership roles, marginalisation or being neglected; forgotten off, poor education or low level of education, exclusion, among others, are major factors leading to the formation of PPV in Ghana.

Also, the study found out that political conditions prevalent in the state at any period could reinforce people to form or join PPVGs. It was established by the study that political factors like the winner-takes-all politics in our governance structure and the desire of some politicians to win and hook on to power at all cost make such political actors to recruit and sponsor PPVGs.

6.2.3 Research Question 3

What are the impacts of political party vigilantism on Ghana's democratic development?

The study clearly established that there are dire ramifications of PPVGs activities on the infant democratic enterprise of Ghana. First and foremost, the study found out that, economically, PPVGs activities scare investor confidence which invariably reduces foreign direct investments. Also, the study revealed that tourism sector would not receive the required economic boost due

to PPV. Hence, the study established that there would be an economic underdevelopment of the country due to prevalence of PPV.

The study further found out that the distress naturally accompanying PPVGs relates generally to the mutilation of individual and social configurations of the general public.

On the political landscape, the study unveiled that the aggressive activities of PPVGs has a higher propensity to undermine the integrity and legitimacy of our electoral outcomes; blatant violations of people's fundamental human rights with impunity; and total disregard for the rule of law.

6.2.4 Research Question 4

Are there provisions in the 1992 constitution and other laws of Ghana that provide mechanisms for dealing with political party vigilantism?

The study found out that the 1992 Constitution and many other laws of Ghana have provided for mechanisms for dealing with PPV. Therefore the study established that the recent law passed by the national law making body which generally seeks to disband PPVGs is not the only legal framework available for dealing with political violence in Ghana. The study revealed that there are other laws such as Political Parties Code of Conduct, the Criminal Procedure Code 1960 (Act 30), the Presidential Transition Act, the Criminal Offences Amendment Act 2012 (Act 849) as well as the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution of Ghana. What is therefore left is the political will to implement these legal provisions; especially when PPVGs belonging to any regime in power could be arrested and prosecuted.

6.3 Conclusion

The overarching research question that necessitated the conduct of the study was "What factors account for the bad faith posture among political actors towards disbanding political party vigilante groups in Ghana and how can this be resolved?" In answering this central research question, the study adopted the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) which offered explanations to

how political actors behave when taking decisions. The study reviewed literature in areas including conceptualisation of vigilantism, vigilantism in Ghana, root causes of political vigilantism and mechanisms for dealing with political vigilantism.

The study adopted the usage of the qualitative approach as the methodology of the study. The data collected unveiled that laws alone cannot help deal with PPV but the prohibition of PPVGs needs the support and commitment of the entire citizenry. There are various factors such as the nature of public prosecutions, constitutional gaps, politicisation and unprofessional conduct of some security personnel towards the opposition parties, recruitment of political party vigilantes into the national security by incumbent regimes and many others that mainly create the bad faith or mistrust among the political actors which make them reluctant to disband their PPVGs.

The study also showed that the bad faith posture could be resolved through open-minded political administration, transparency, rethinking winner-takes-all policy in our governance system and frequent dialogue among the actors involved in proscribing PPV.

The phenomenon of PPV is a threat to our democracy as a country. Political party vigilantism issues have increased over the years and evolved into something else. And obviously that has not been good for our infant democratic enterprise. It is on the ascendancy. It has become even more virulent than the virulent disease. It is now physical, brutal and the same time fatal as it involves guns and other weapons. Therefore all categories of persons/groups including the political class, CSOs, Security Experts, Opinion Leaders, the Traditional Authorities, the Academics and the general citizenry must come together with one voice to fight for total proscription of PPV. This is because Laws alone cannot be used to disband PPVGs in Ghana.

6.4 Recommendations

Inferring from the above explanations and discussions that have been held in relation to the topic, the study makes the following recommendations:

First and foremost, the study discovered massive political influence on the security architecture of the state created by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. This does not allow the security agencies, especially the Police who are in charge of internal security arrangements; to freely exercise their mandates espoused under the laws such as arresting and prosecuting people who infract with the laws of the state. As revealed by the study, there are several ways by which the ruling regimes in Ghana through constitutional arrangements, influence the national security architecture of the country. For instance, the Ghana Police Council is chaired by the Vice President. Also, there are some criminal cases that the Police cannot prosecute unless approval from the Attorney Generals Department. As a result, the security services especially the police is very much constricted with this kind of constitutional framework. Therefore, the study recommended that there should a constitutional amendment that seeks to reduce the level of control of the security agencies especially, the police by the ruling regimes under the Fourth Republic.

Alternatively, the study recommended that Ghana adopts the British and the Kenya Models of appointing the top echelons of the security agencies especially the Police. Both the British and the Kenyan Models stipulate that an independent body devoid of political control is mandated to declare vacancies available for the appointment of the security chiefs. People who are qualified will apply, short listed and interviews are conducted to select the most qualified and given security of tenure. In Ghana, the Public Services Commission could be empowered to undertake this initiative. When this happens, the political class will not have much influence on the police since they are not the appointing authority; and the security chiefs will also enjoy security of tenure to arrest and prosecute miscreants who cause mayhem including vigilantes.

Also, the study established that ruling regimes have woefully failed to arrest and prosecute the offenders of political party vigilante violence. This is especially when such PPVGs are affiliated to the ruling regime. Even those who were arrested had “political release” to avoid prosecution.

The study consequently recommended that the political and by extension, opinion leaders ought to abstain from meddling with the work of the law enforcement agencies. Also, the study recommended that the police and the judiciary should apply the laws equally to the offenders of political violence; if arrested without any form of fear, intimidation, or favour.

Having said this, the empirical data gathered from the field indicated that, the NPC and the NCCE are very pivotal when it comes to sustaining the peace of the country. These two state owned agencies to some extent, enjoy some level of reverence from the political actors. However, they are poorly resourced in carrying out their mandate. It is therefore recommended by the study that the state takes prudent measures to provide adequate resources in terms of finance for both the NPC and the NCCE to carry out their mandates effectively and efficiently. When this is manifested, it will go a long way to help the regional and the district levels for them to be proactive in taking center stage in the vigilantism proscription driven agenda of the country.

Again, unemployment, poverty, high cost of living and unskilled youth were revealed as major motivating factors for people to be recruited into PPVGs. Some security experts have already hinted that the motivating factors for people to form or join vigilante groups are not different from those factors that motivate people, especially the youth to join terrorist groups. In view of this, the study recommended that the Government of Ghana must strategically allocate resources to provide financial support to the unemployed youth. Also, as a way of ensuring sustained job creation, the study further recommended that the government should provide skilled training to the groups associated with PPs. In other words, the study recommended that sustainable small scale businesses and entrepreneurial training centres must strategically be introduced which will aim at targeting unemployed and unskilled youth associated with PPs.

Finally, the political actors must recognise that dialogue at all levels of the political system is paramount. At the national level, the study revealed that there is the IPAC where all the

competing political parties address critical issues that may affect the electoral outcomes and mar the peace of the country. The study therefore recommended that such inter party dialogues must be promoted at the regional, constituency and even at the ward levels which will be helpful in mitigating risks and threats to peaceful elections. More often, lies leading to suspicion creates anxiety between opposing political parties. This inter party dialogue at the grass root will offer the opportunity for all issues to be fact-checked and rumours dispelled appropriately.

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APPENDICES

Introduction

Good morning/afternoon. Please, I want to thank you for granting me the opportunity to meet with you today. I am Amponsah Tawiah, an MPhil student from the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. The study is conducted in partial fulfilment of my requirement for the award of MPhil Political Science Degree. The interview guide is purposefully designed to solicit views on the topic: An Assessment of Political Party Vigilantism in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Please, the interview would last between 30 – 50 minutes; and please, I will be recording the session because I cannot afford to miss anything you will say. Your responses will only be shared with me and my supervisors. This interview is purely for an academic purpose and thus the ethical principle of confidentiality is strongly upheld.

Thank you very much and I am looking forward to your support to enable me to complete this study successfully.

.....

Interviewee

.....

Date

.....

Institution

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL PARTY LEADERSHIP

Exploring the Bad Faith Posture or Mistrust Among the Political Actors in Working Closely To Disband Political Party Vigilantism or Vigilante Groups

1. How will you define or explain the current state of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism?
2. What is your general view on the manifestation of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in Ghana?
3. What are some of the peculiarities of political party vigilante groups and political party vigilantism in the country?
4. What factors are accounting for the bad faith posture of the political parties to disband their Vigilante Groups?
5. How can the bad faith nature among political actors towards disbanding of vigilantism in Ghana be resolved?

Examining the Reasons for the Formation of Political Party vigilantes in Ghana

1. What are some of the economic causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks in Ghana's Fourth Republic?
2. What are some of the social causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks in Ghana's Fourth Republic?

3. What are some of the political causes of political party vigilante groups' violent attacks in Ghana's Fourth Republic?
4. Are political party vigilante groups useful in our political discourse?
5. How do you explain the situation where political party vigilante groups are now

Examining the Ramifications of Political Party Vigilantism or Political Party Vigilante Groups on Ghana's Democratic Development.

1. What are some of the economic impacts of the continuous existence of political party vigilante groups on Ghana's democratic development?
2. What are some of the social impacts of the continuous existence of political party vigilante groups on Ghana's democratic development?
3. What are some of the political impacts of the continuous existence of political party vigilante groups on Ghana's democratic development?

In what ways do the vigilante group activities pose a threat to the legal and security set up of Ghana?

Mechanisms for Addressing Political Party Vigilantism or Vigilante Group Activities in Ghana's Fourth Republic

1. What do you think should be introduced or what can be done to stop the violent attacks in the electoral politics of Ghana's Fourth Republic?

2. What measures can be put in place to stop the economic causes of violent attacks in the electoral politics of Ghana's Fourth Republic?
3. What can be done stop the social causes of violent attacks in the electoral politics of Ghana's Fourth Republic?
4. What can be done to stop the political causes of violent attacks in the electoral politics of Ghana's Fourth Republic?
5. Are there provisions in the 1992 Constitution and other laws of Ghana that provide mechanisms for dealing with political party vigilantism?

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS

Exploring the Bad Faith Posture or Mistrust Among the Political Actors in Working

Closely To Disband Political Party Vigilantism or Vigilante Groups

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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR THE SECURITY AGENCIES

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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR ACADEMICS

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APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL

Exploring the Bad Faith Posture or Mistrust Among the Political Actors in Working

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APPENDIX F: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NCCE

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