

**THE THREAT OF CROSS-BORDER
TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA: A CASE
STUDY OF BURKINA FASO.**

BY

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**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE
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DECLARATION

I, **SALOMEY SAFOA**, do hereby declare that this dissertation is the end product of my own research under the supervision of Dr. Emmanuel Ken Ahorsu of the Legon Center of International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), at the University of Ghana towards the award of an Master of Arts (MA) in International Affairs, and that, to the best of my knowledge, it neither contains materials previously published by another person nor materials which have been accepted for the award of any other degree by this or any other university except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.



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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the Almighty God for his grace and his mercies and to my family, for their support and prayers throughout this entire process. Finally, to my friends and colleagues whose support and efforts made this work a success, this is for all of us.




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To all my colleagues and friends of 2019/2020 badge, I am very happy to have been part of this great family, God's favour, blessings and grace to you all.




ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

1D, 1F	1 District, 1 Factory
AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AMISOM	African Union Mission to Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FPRC	Front for the Renaissance in the Central African Republic
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GFAT	Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement



LIFG	Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
MINUSCA	Multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping mission in Central Africa Republic.
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
MNLA	The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
NABCO	Nation Builders Corps
NIF	National Islamic Front in Darfur
NMRD	National Movement for Reform and Development
OAU	Organization of the African Union
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PoW	Panel of the Wise
PSC	Peace and Security Council
SADA	Savannah Accelerated Development Agency
SHS	Senior High School
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
TSCTP	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN Refugee Agency



UNSC

United Nations Security Council

UPC

Union for Peace in the Central African Republic

USA

United States of America



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
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ABSTRACT

Since 2016, Burkina Faso has witnessed increasing phenomena of cross border terrorism particularly, by the Al-Qaeda (AQIM) terrorist group, which has dire implications for Burkina Faso's national security and development. Towards this end, this particularly study was primarily concerned with exploring the national security and development ramifications of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. The study employed the exploratory and descriptive qualitative research approaches which relied solely on secondary data sources (through literature review from books, journals articles, working papers, and online internet sites) for content data analyses. Major findings of the study reveals that, Burkina Faso's intervention in the Mali terrorist situation has caused Al-Qaeda to shifted attention from Mali and concentrated predominately in carrying out series of attacks in Burkina Faso since 2016 to date. In addition, the Al-Qaeda terrorist groups such as AQIM recruit unemployed or frustrated youth including some Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso to help them in carrying out their clandestine atrocious attacks. Subsequently, the study reveals that there are some structural systems and weaknesses which has made Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border terrorism such as globalization and its effects of trans organized crimes, the fragile security nature of the Sahel region, the porous border control systems in Burkina Faso, among others. Subsequently, the study shows that the main national security ramifications of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso include high tendency for escalating already existing political, religious and ethnic tensions existing in the country, proliferation of sophisticated small arms and other light weapons, perpetual insecurity and threats to citizens' lives, among others, whilst the development ramifications include disruption disruptions in major economic, agricultural and other business activities, among others. This study also shows that the major challenges confronting the effective tackling of cross border terrorism by Burkinabe Government include financial challenges, personnel constraints, and difficulty in obtaining reliable information, among others. The study also shows that there are some cues and lessons which could be taken by Ghana from the experience of the cross border terrorism in Burkina to be able to avert similar situation from happening in Ghana since Ghana is a neighbouring country to the south of Burkina Faso. Paramount among these lessons include nationwide deployment of military forces, equitable national development, the effective border control and effective participation in regional and international organizations. Towards this end, the study concludes that Burkina Faso's response (through regional and international security cooperation) to the emerging threats of cross border terrorism from the northern section of the country has been tardy and inadequate, hence contributing to persistence of the crisis even to date. The study finally recommends that the Burkina Faso Government should ensure that its state security institutions and personnel for engaging in counter terrorist operations should be adequately financed, well-resourced and equipped since it a major challenge faced by the institutions in providing quality service delivery.



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study


Terrorist activities include brutal or risky acts to human life that damage administrative or state machinery; and seem, by all accounts, to be proposed to scare or pressure a regular citizen populace or to influence policy directions of a legislature or government decisions by terrorizing or intimidation; through mass bombings, killings or shootings (Gus, 2017). Notwithstanding, Fortna (2015) defines terrorism in its broadest sense as the utilization of deliberately aimless strategies or methods as ways to create fear or panic, so as to accomplish a political, strict religious or ideological point.

Terrorism in recent time has gained much importance in academic discourse owing to its destructive and disruptive potential. This has occasioned the need for states within the West African sub region to reassess their role in efforts designed to combat terrorism both individually and as a community. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Earlier cases of terrorism predate the World War years. Terrorism may be traced to the French revolution and beyond, way before globalization emerged as a catalyst pushing it into the international forum (Ashie, 2015).

Contemporary terrorism gained prominence in the national security spheres following the September 11 attacks in the United States of America (USA). The September 11 terrorism was carried out by an Islamic Jihadist or militant group, Al-Qaeda, in the USA on Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001 (Mueller & Stewart, 2012). The assaults killed 2,996 people, caused about

6,000 injuries and caused economic damages roughly \$10 billion in property and expenses totalling \$3 trillion (Mueller, J., & Stewart, 2012).

Subsequently, there are increasing concerns among researchers in contemporary international system about threats posed by terrorist activities on national security and international development. This is because of the expanding consequences of terrorism across the globe, with its overwhelming destructive effects being felt in the Middle East (especially Libya, Syria and Afghanistan) and Africa (especially Mali, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria and Morocco), (Hussein., 2015). These worries are further compounded by obligations of Governments and global Governance systems and structures to guarantee global peace and security of nations. Ensuring protection of its citizens and their livelihood; which is a definitive objective and goal of Human security. With an increase in cross border terrorist activities in West Africa, issues pertaining to the security of states have become a matter of regional interest. In other words, the dangers of terrorism on development and security makes it topical for special attention, especially as it relates to the West African sub-region.



In West Africa in particular, terrorist activity is rife in the Sahel Region particular Mali and Burkina Faso and also in the Lake Chad basin particular Nigeria. The region in the past few years has recorded terrorist activities by Islamist extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Jama'atu Ansarul Musilimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru), Ansa Al Dine, Islamic State in Great Sahara and Boko Haram, with the latter being the most active within the Region (Duah, 2019). The Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria has been center of action for terrorist acts, since 2009 to date.

The source of terrorism in West Africa are usually intertwined and varying. However, religious and political extremism have featured predominantly in the terrorist activities as witnessed in the West African sub-region. For instance, terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda groups in Mali and Burkina Faso assumes a political dimension, whilst the terrorist activities by the Boko Haram in Nigeria stems more from a religious extremist perspective (Duah, 2019).

The Mali terrorist situation begun in 2012 due to developmental disparities between Northern and Southern parts of Mali which instigated violence protest especially in the north (Lecocq, et al., 2013). Consequently, matters escalated, and by 16th January, 2012, several armed groups in the North emerged to protest against the Malian to detached from the country and form an independent state to be called Azaward (Lecocq, et al., 2013). In view of this, The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which is an insurgent group representing the Tuaregs in the north had gained significant control of major areas in the region by April, 2012, following a coup d'état which ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré from power in March, 2012 (Bleck, & Michelitch, 2015). Subsequently, the rebels were in control of the three largest northern cities in Mali including Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao (Wing, 2013). This attracted a response from the Malian Military to counter the rebels. However, the military intervention

proved futile since The MNLA were more sophisticated in weaponry than the Military due to the unflinching support they received from the Islamist group, Ansar Dine.

The MNLA, the Ansar Dine and other terrorist groups in the region begun imposing and implementing strict Sharia Laws in the northern parts of Mali (Perry & Affa'a-Mindzie, 2013). This destabilized the peace and security hitherto enjoyed in the region, and prompted an urgently intervention from Burkina Faso by virtue of being a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership to Partner to help restore peace and security to the northern parts of Mali. The Burkinabe forces were very instrumental and successful in their partnership with the Malian Military in reclaiming the seized territories by the terrorist groups and driving them away (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015). As a result of this, the terrorist groups got infuriated with the intervention role played by Burkina Faso and diverted attention to them. These has led to several Islamist Jihadist group including Al Qaeda carrying series of attacks in Burkina Faso since 2015 to date (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015).

The terrorist situation in Burkina Faso is not considered to be religiously motivated, instead a trans-border terrorism which has political underpinnings. Burkina Faso's membership to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and also the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, bestowed on her, the mandate to restore peace and security in Mali (Palmer, 2016). This largely motivated Burkina Faso's involvement in the Malian crisis, which unfortunately attracted several Islamic or Jihadist retaliations from Extremist groups including Al-Qaeda and the Tuaregs from 2016 to date. This study focuses on analyzing cross border terrorism in West Africa, with specific reference to the Burkina Faso crises since 2016 to date.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Despite the considerable progress made in terms of peace consolidation in some parts of West Africa it seems that there are apparent structural deficiencies which have made much of the region particularly susceptible to emerging threats such as terrorism (Bamba, 2014). These vulnerabilities include weak border control systems (leading to porous territorial boundaries) and inadequate coordination and information-sharing among relevant national security agencies, as well as limited institutional cooperation across borders with neighbouring countries (Bamba, 2014). The porosity of the borders is exacerbated by the Economic Community of West Africa State's (ECOWAS) Protocol on free movement of people, goods and services.

Terrorists could easily operate across borders, making all countries in West Africa susceptible to terrorist attacks. Additionally, it could facilitate terrorists and criminal gangs to also elude apprehension, as demonstrated by Boko Haram to a large extent. For instance, the activities of Boko Haram are not limited to only Nigeria. Boko Haram has also carried out attacks and abductions in Chad as well as in Cameroon.

Burkina Faso, the main focus of this study, has experienced a slow but steady increase in terrorist activities in nearly five years, including numerous cross-border attacks in its northernmost region bordering Mali (The UN Refugee Agency – UNHCR, 2017). In 2017, the Sahara Branch of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine, and the Macina Liberation Front came together to form Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM and other groups like Ansarul Islam and ISIS in the Greater Sahara are all known to operate in Burkina Faso (The UN Refugee Agency – UNHCR, 2017). These terrorist organizations successfully recruited the marginalized, poor, and disadvantaged Fulani inhabitants for their purposes (Vhumbunu, 2023). Since the start of 2015 when violence began to spread across the Sahel region, Burkina Faso

bordering Mali and Niger, experienced regular attacks - hundreds of people were killed (Mehta, 2021). It is imperative to note that the attacks usually strike the north and east of the country, though the capital Ouagadougou has been targeted three times and most of these attacks are carried across or very close to their borders with the abovementioned countries. According to the United Nations (UN), over 700 people have been killed since 2015 and about 560,000 are currently internally displaced due to terrorism in Burkina Faso (*Aljazeera Africa News, Dec 25, 2019*).

The biggest of the attacks, albeit the country has experienced dozens of terrorist attacks, is attack on a military base and Arbinda town in Soum province, in the country's north 35 civilians, almost all of them women on Christmas eve 2019 (*Aljazeera Africa News, Dec 25, 2019*). Several attacks in churches and other public places have claimed dozens of lives. The Burkinabe government and international agencies have rolled-out several measures to eradicate terrorism not least cross border terrorism including strengthening her porous borders and the formation of special anti-terrorism units in the military.

Although a plethora of literature on terrorism, counter terrorism and cross border terrorism in the World in general and West Africa in particular exist, there is a dearth of academic literature on cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. As a result, the study intends to fill this lacuna by examining the dynamics of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso, the structural weaknesses that makes the country susceptible to this canker, what the Burkinabe authorities and other international entities have done / doing to arrest the threat and what the future portends for the country in terms peace and violence.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What is the nature and pattern of the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso?
2. What are the structural weaknesses, national security and development ramifications and challenges of terrorism in Burkina Faso?
3. What lessons can be drawn by Ghana from the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso?

1.4 Research Objectives

1. To evaluate the nature and pattern of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso.
2. To explore the structural weaknesses, national security and development ramifications and challenges of terrorism in Burkina Faso.
3. To forecast lessons that could be learnt by Ghana from the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso.

1.5 Scope of the Study

Even though a number of studies have explored terrorism as a security and development issue in Africa and the world, this study will concentrate on West Africa and narrow down to cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. It will study key interventions by state and the international community including ECOWAS, AU and UN in countering cross border terrorism, particularly in tackling the terrorist situation in Burkina Faso. The period under consideration for this particular study will be from 2016 to 2020.

1.6 Rationale of Study

This study hopes to bring to light the measures and preparation that are required by the states, through its security agencies, other state/non-state organs and civil society to help deal with the emerging threats of terrorism. It also hopes to propose measures that Burkina Faso could adopt, in collaboration with other sub-regional and regional agencies, to prevent or minimize terrorist attack in that country. This study will also contribute to the body of knowledge in the field of international relations, conflict and security studies with regards to effective approach or mechanisms of addressing or tackling trans-border terrorism, with specific reference to experience from Burkina Faso.

1.7 Hypothesis

The international, regional and national response to the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso has been tardy and inadequate, which has contributed significantly to the persistence of the crisis even to date.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

This particular study utilized both the concept of national security and the theory of security cooperation in its analysis.

1.8.1 Concept of National Security (State Security)

The study will be situated within the concept of National Security.

The Concept of National Security is a document based on the Analysis of Threats to the State that includes the basic strategic principles and priorities for the prevention of threats to the state that must be considered when developing new documents for policy planning, regulatory

enactments, and action plans pertaining to national security (Gomólka, 2021). In breaking it down, security is the protection from risk, harm, danger or threat. Nevertheless, Buzan & Hansen (2010), explains security as the freedom from attacks or dangers and the ability of nations and communities to preserve the functional integrity and unique identity from being eroded by threatening situations or attacking forces.

In spite of its relatively long existence, national security has eluded global definition and has no generally accepted definition (Donohue, 2011). The concept has for a long time been interpreted narrowly to mean physical security of the state from external aggression or protection of national interests. This notion of state security has often been described as the traditional concept of national security (Johnson, 2010). Some of the proponents of this concept of national security include Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Alexander George, Harold Brown, Walter Lippmann, Harold Lasswell, Thomas Schelling and Alexander George.

According to Walter Lippman, a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war (Lippmann, 1943). Harold Brown on his part considered national security as the ability of the states to preserve its physical integrity and to maintain its international economic relations on reasonable terms (Brown, 1983). To Brown, national security also means preservation of a nation's institutions and governance from disruption from external forces, and to control its frontiers (Brown, 1983).

Despite the above scholarly views, there has been various evolutions for the concept of national security, though it has no generally accepted standard definition. The traditional conceptualization of National security focuses predominantly on the protection of the territorial

or physical boundaries of states as a way of preventing external aggression of opposing forces, as well as preserving the national interests, as a strategy of ensuring peace and security (Meagher, 2012). This means that, traditional conceptualization of security sought to perceive that, the individuals or citizens of a state are safe if the territorial boundaries are protected from external attacks of other states. It is in this vein that this study focuses mainly on terrorism attack and national security for its analysis. Thus, terrorism attack and its ramifications on Burkina's national security. This is because it helps in understanding how the national security of Burkina Faso is being threatened with the growing threats of cross border terrorism in the northern section of the country.

1.8.2 Theory of Security Cooperation

This study also utilizes the theory of security cooperation in its analysis. The term “cooperation” first appeared in the fourteenth century (Oye, 1985). Cooperation derived from the Christian Latin cooperatio in the fifteenth century, means a collective endeavor (Oye, 1985). It is composed of co from cum and operare, meaning “with” or “together,” and “to act” respectively (Oye, 1985). To cooperate is to act together, the joining of individual efforts for a common end. Draperi however defines security cooperation as the coordinated activity of agents pursuing different security objectives and seeking to establish common rules (Draperi, 2012). Some of the major proponents of this theory are Ernst Haas, Charles Lipson, Stephen D. Krasner and Keohane Robert. Grieco defines security cooperation as the voluntary adjustment by stakeholders or actors of their policies so that they manage their differences and reach some mutually beneficial outcome (Grieco, 1993). Grieco identifies that the theory of security cooperation is posited on the following key elements;

First and foremost, actors or stakeholders should agree to work together voluntarily without coercion by other states. Secondly, in cooperation, actors or stakeholders devote their efforts towards a security agenda which they have common interests. Finally, security cooperation according to Grieco involves a long-term engagement through the establishment and operation of an institutional regime for joint action and not cooperation based on a one-time interaction (Grieco, 1993).

Robert Keohane in his work, *After Hegemon*, argues that security cooperation can develop based on past corresponding interests among stakeholders (Müller, 2002). Keohane adds that, security cooperation happens when the security approaches really followed by one government are viewed by its partners as facilitating realization of their own security objectives, as the result of a process of security policy coordination (Müller, 2002).

In Helen Milner's review of *Security Cooperation Among Nation*, she makes reference of Robert Keohane's definition of security cooperation as happening, when actors conduct their behaviour to the real or anticipated preference of others, through a process of policy coordination (Milner, 1992). In her view, security policy coordination implies that the security policies of each state have been adjusted to reduce the negative consequence for the other countries. According to her, the concept of security cooperation must have two essential elements. Firstly, is the assumption that every actor's behaviour is focused towards some security goal. The security goal may not be the same for all actors, but it is an assumed rational behaviour on the part of all.

In Helen Milner's survey of security participation among countries, she makes reference to Robert Keohane's meaning of security collaboration as happening, "when on-screen characters

alter their conduct to the genuine or foreseen inclination of others, through a procedure of approach coordination (Milner, 1992).

Secondly, security cooperation rewards actors with gains. The kind or magnitude of the gains, she says, may not be the same for each actor but must be mutual. Actors, in helping each other to realize their security goal, by adjusting their policies in cooperation with other stakeholders, serve their own security interests. Milner further explains that to get the theory right, it is important to know what security cooperation is not. She cautions that acting unilaterally without taking into consideration the security impact on others, does not depict security cooperation. Though the act may not affect the security gains of others, such unilateral security actions may be uncooperative. The negative implications of security cooperation on others must be considered.

To further understand what the theory entails, it is established that security cooperation refers to communication, collaboration, coordination, participation, mediation, interaction, and collective action are standard terms in international relations and security studies that presuppose, generally implicitly, security cooperation.

Security Cooperation may arise due to common security welfare objectives or national interests of a state or region. The need for security cooperation is evident in such endeavours as the global postal system; fighting crime, especially transnational crimes; managing ecological threats and joint use of natural resources such as rivers; and the evolution of the international public health system to fight epidemics and pandemics, as well as addressing sanitation crises.

The essence of cooperation theories is the extent to which the incentives for, or benefits from security cooperation can be seen to outweigh the incentives of acting unilaterally. This theory is also suitable for this study. This is because it helps to better understand and appreciate the need for security cooperation between Burkina Faso, Mali and other international stakeholders to address the emerging security threat of cross-border terrorism in the northern section of Burkina Faso.

Despite the strength of the theory of security cooperation in explaining the essence of addressing cross-border terrorism particularly in West Africa, there are critiques of the theory. One of the obstacles to security cooperation is that conflict and competition between actors or stakeholders may lead to failure in cooperation even when actors have common security interests (Umbach, 2010). Such competition and conflict between and among actors may inhibit willingness of actors to cooperate effectively. Also, the theory of cooperation stresses only on the collaborative efforts by actors to address a common challenge or pursue a common security goal but it understates the range of functions that institutions and actors or stakeholders must perform to help achieve an effective and efficient security cooperation (Resnick, 2012).

The criticisms notwithstanding, it still suitable and appropriate for analysis in this study. Though Burkina Faso currently cooperates with individual West African states, particularly, Mali towards addressing the cross border terrorism in the northern section of the country, it also cooperates with the entire international community including the ECOWAS, AU and UN to tackle security issues and threats posed by the cross border terrorism in the northern section of Burkina Faso. Therefore, the theory of Security Cooperation helps in providing an explanation for why the engagements of states in West African such as Burkina Faso towards addressing

security threats such as cross-border terrorism has given rise or necessitated regional and international security cooperation to tackle the menace.

1.9 Literature Review

Various studies and researches have been done on terrorism in Africa, and West Africa in particular. However, most of these works have not focused on cross-border terrorism in Africa, with specific reference to the West African sub-region, and especially in Burkina. The significance of previous scholarly works cannot be over emphasized. This helps in highlighting their contribution to the better understanding of current study and also helping to tease out knowledge gaps which current studies seek to fill. Gravetter & Forzano (2018) asserted that the essence of undertaking a research is to contribute to new discoveries or fill any knowledge gap.

Terrorism as a security threat to the international system goes back to historic time. The phenomenon of terrorism dates back to ancient time. However, Saunders (2014), identified that earliest significant manifestation of terrorist activities was felt in the international system during the era of French revolution and the Russian revolutions from 1878 to 1881. Subsequently, terrorism was employed as means for changing a socio-economic and socio-political status quo as evident by the anarchists in France, Spain, Italy, as well as radical nationalist groups in Ireland, Armenia, Macedonia and Morocco in the 20th Century (Saunders, 2014).

Before the First World War, terrorism featured predominantly in countries such as Turkey, Poland, India and Romania between 1923 and 1939 (Downes, 2011). Also, during the World War Two, terrorism was employed in countries such as states such as German and Italy to liquidate opponents and repress people (Whittaker, 2012). During this era, urban terrorism was

later replaced by rivalry guerrilla groups in states such as China, Vietnam and some Latin American countries (Whittaker, 2012).

However, between 1960 and 1970, terrorism in the international system experienced a paradigm shift to Middle East especially due to Israel occupation of Arab lands and the Americas (Ehteshami & Elik, 2011). In 1968, there was a hijacking of an EL AL plane to Rome by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), (McNab, 2011). This was subsequently followed by the hostage and torture of the athletes of the Israeli 1972 Olympic Team in Munich by Palestinian terrorists (Reeve, 2011). This was referred to as “The Munich massacre,” which was an attack during the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, basically on Israeli athletes. This attack was aimed at achieving recognition for an independent Palestine state and a safe homeland for the Arab Palestinians (Reeve, 2011). In addition, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against the US, led by Osama bin Laden was seen as a new phase of trans-terrorism in the international system, since it’s the strategies and mode of operation, including civilian casualties and fatalities were unprecedented (Neria et al., 2011).

Prior to 2009, Terrorism in Africa had been pronounced in the Northern Africa and the Sahel regions, as well as Central and Eastern Africa in states including Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Central African Republic, Somalia and Kenya (Harbeson & Lyman, 2013). However, after 2009, terrorism became much pronounced in West Africa following the resurgence of the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria (Uzodike & Maiangwa, 2012). Walther & Retailié, (2010), asserted that terrorism in West Africa assumed a professional crescendo since 2009 which destabilize the peace and stability of the entire West African region. This is because the Boko Haram begun to adopt strategies including killings, assassination, kidnapping, arson, bombings and social media threats which engendered fear and insecurity, thereby attracting the attention of the international

community of the national security and human security threats posed by groupin Nigeria and the entire West African region (Walther & Retailié, (2010).

With respect to Burkina Faso, Romaniuk (2015), revealed that Burkina Faso had enjoyed relative peace and security until the 2014 election which led to the defeat of President Blaise Compaoré. This resulted in an uprising upon refusal of President Blaise Compaoré to accept the result, which was met with a mass protest by some section of the general Burkinabe populace. Romaniuk (2015), pointed out that terrorist situation in Mali is due to the activities of Al-Qaeda groups from Libya which made it imperative for Burkina Faso which is a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership to provide peacekeeping forces and other counter terrorist strategies in curbing the menace (Romaniuk, 2015).

Romaniuk (2015), explained that unfortunately, the move by Burkina Faso to counter terrorist situations in Mali has rather attracted the wrath and attention of the Jihadist groups, resulting in the current trans-border terrorist situation in Burkina Faso since 2015. He therefore concluded that due to the sporadic attacks carried out in Burkina Faso, there is the need for ECOWAS to take urgent measures in addressing the situation before it escalates to other parts of the West African sub-region.

Iwata (2016), examined border and regional security issues of Burkina Faso and its neighboring West African countries from the perspective of cross-border local cooperation, particular on international cooperation among local governments and border issues. He emphasized that conflicts and political disputes have characterized the political history of some West African states including Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso. However, he pointed out that terrorism has become internationalized and regionalized issues across national borders in Africa,

but revealed that the terrorist situations in Mali and Burkina Faso in the 21st Century have significantly affected the economic and security situations, not only in the two states, but also neighboring states as well.

Iwata (2016), established that border issues and conflict have been of great concern to African states since independence in the 1960s, but explained that cross border conflicts in 21st century in Africa have assumed a different character as terrorists have also featured as major actors in such conflict situations. He identified that to be able to effectively tackle the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso, there should be an effective cross border cooperation which involves active participation of local government through the process of decentralization. Iwata (2016), identified that since poverty is one of the main causes of terrorism in West Africa, local government participation through decentralization could help address poverty and extreme economic hardship and prevent Jihadist recruitment of local people who may be lured by terrorist groups to protest against the existing status quo through vandalism and violent acts. He emphasizes that in order to promote cross-border cooperation, it is unavoidable option to ensure the active involvement of local governments and people inhabiting the borderlands. Therefore, it is expedient to normalize the institution of local governance in order to restart the cross-border local cooperation.

Larivé, M. H. (2014), identified that to be able to effectively deal with cross border terrorism in West Africa, President François Hollande of France launched *Operation Barkhane*, in 2014. *Operation Barkhane*, is a military operation which consisted of about 3,000 counterforce intended to initiate a new phase in the fight against radical Jihadist or Islamic terrorism in Africa, with special focus on West Africa (Larivé, 2014). *Operation Barkhane* utilizes a ‘hard power’ security approach to implement a security-development nexus strategy towards tackling Islamic

terrorism including the cross border terrorism in West Africa.(Larivé, 2014) identified that the ultimate objective of *Operation Barkhane* is to regionalize the counterterrorism strategies efforts, especially in the Sahel regions, as well as improve cross-border counterterrorism and securitization in West Africa. Towards this end, the French military forces are deployed to five main countries in Africa, including, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Burkina Faso, and these are collectively known as the ‘G5 Sahel.’

Gaye (2018), established that there are several complex causes and ways in which the peace and security in sub-Saharan African are threatened. These ranges from competition struggle over scarce resources, ethnic and electoral violence, civil war among others. However, with specific reference to the Mali and Burkina Faso cases, Gaye (2018), points out the cross border terrorism has becoming an emerging security threat in West Africa which if addressed urgently could distort the peace and security in the entire region. He points out that cross border terrorism in West Africa are further exacerbated by old or already conflict situations and tensions which are given less security attention.Gaye (2018), revealed that tensions between Fulani herders and farmers in both Mali and Burkina Faso struggling over scarce water and land resources have significantly contributed to the complexity and dynamics of the cross border terrorism in the region, making it extremely difficult for an effective resolution of the tension in the region.

He pointed out that in the face of scarce natural resources and opportunities including land, water and employment opportunities, some Jihadist groups had flourish who usually recruit Fulani herders to gain access and control over some cross border roads, resources and opportunities. He therefore concluded that to be able to effectively address the cross border terrorism in the Mali and Burkina Faso regions, it is imperative to get better understanding of the economic and political aspects of conflicts between herders and farmers in a context of exploitation of

increasingly scarce natural resources, against a backdrop of growing extremist movements in the Sahel region. He therefore recommends that there should be new development of Regional Security Complex approach towards addressing cross border terrorism in West Africa.

The above studies in this section promotes the better understanding of the topic under study by revealing the nature and scope of terrorism as it pertains to the West African sub-region. However, they did not concentrate on the security implications of the growing threat of cross border terrorism in West Africa for the peace and security of states in the sub-region. This gap in the above literature is what this study seeks to fill by utilizing the concept of National Security and Security Cooperation to explore the implication of cross-border terrorism in West Africa from the perspective of Burkina Faso.

1.10 Sources of Data and Methodology

1.10.1 Research Philosophy

Research philosophy refers to the process through which research assumptions, knowledge, and nature are produced (Žukauskas, 2018). The assumption is seen as the starting point of logical reasoning by Ukauskas et al., (2018). In a scientific study, the paradigm, or philosophical style of thinking, encompasses ontology, epistemology, methodology, and methodologies (Ukauskas et al., 2018). Lincoln and Guba (1985) added axiology as an additional layer to scientific paradigms (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The research will be conducted using the interpretivism/constructivism paradigm. The interpretivism paradigm's ontology is that reality and the researcher are inextricably linked. Again, the interpretivist makes the epistemological premise that abstract thinking and descriptions of the meaning and form of human experiences are the foundation for

knowledge. Interpretivism is characterized using case studies, interviews, phenomenology, ethnography, ethnomethodology, and grounded theory (Ukauskas et al., 2018).

Furthermore, Saunders et al. (2015) demonstrated how people develop their ontological viewpoints through culture, language, numerous meanings, and interpretations. Additionally, it enables researchers to investigate people's feelings and views. According to the interpretivist, knowledge is defined as the application of simplified theories and ideas, narratives, tales, perceptions, interpretations, and new insights and worldviews (Saunders et al., 2015). In terms of axiology, or the function of value in research, the researcher becomes a subject of the study, adopts reflexivity, and co-creates the phenomenon's many realities. Interpretivists apply qualitative research methods to undertake in-depth examinations of a specific phenomenon. We use inductive analysis and tiny sample sizes. Nonetheless, a variety of interpretations are available (Saunders et al., 2015). Thus, the interpretivism/constructivist paradigm serves as the theoretical underpinning for most of the qualitative research (Chowdhury, 2014; Maxwell, 2012).

Interpretivism is synonymous with idealism, a philosophical school of thought that incorporates a range of techniques, including social constructivism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. These viewpoints highlight a flaw in the objectivist approach, which asserts that persons make meaning of the world independently of consciousness (Collins, 2018). The interpretivism paradigm is based on Immanuel Kant's basic concept of morality, which serves as a moral norm (Cureton, 2013). The interpretivist is more subjective since it is concerned with grasping individuals and their interpretations of their surroundings. The interpretivist's primary premise is that people's realities are socially created, which is why this paradigm is also known as the constructivist paradigm (Tubey et al., 2015). According to interpretivists, investigating physical events is not the same as studying human people and their social environment (Tubey et al., 2015). The

concerns of trustworthiness and credibility are central to the interpretivist/constructivist paradigm in a scientific investigation. These standards are in direct opposition to positivist criteria like validity, dependability, and objectivity. Positivists evaluate the rigour of quantitative research using generalizability, validity, reliability, objectivity, and accuracy (Carminati, 2018). However, qualitative research that seeks to investigate, uncover, and gain insight into a particular phenomenon should place a premium on trustworthiness as a criterion for determining the quality of the qualitative research results (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Investigations would be based on strong reasoning that supports the technique selected and the methods used to gather and analyse data for the study to fulfill the standards for credibility and authenticity.

1.10.2 Data Sources

There are two main sources of obtaining data. These include primary and secondary sources of data. This study employed secondary source of data. The objectives of this study, as well as the model framework, were used to gather relevant information for this research. Much of the material was gathered from online searches. The Boolean technique was used to get relevant articles for this research topic by a combination of words such as concept of national security, nature and pattern of cross-border terrorism in Bawku, Structural weakness, Development ramification, Challenges of terrorism in Burkina, lessons drawn from cross border terrorism in Burkina, sometimes linked by “AND”, “OR” from search engines such as Google scholar, Biomed central, PubMed, Wiley-online library, AJOL, and EBSCOHOST. Before selecting articles for the review, they were scanned and reviewed. The publishing status, evidence, reference, and whether it was evaluated all played a role in the selection process. For scientific studies, recent articles published from 2016 were selected. But some articles published in 2005 and below were also considered for review because of their classical importance to the studies.

1.10.3 Research Design

The study was largely descriptive and qualitative, relying solely on secondary data from the following sources: journal articles, books, and relevant online sources which were qualitatively analysed and incorporated into this research. The qualitative method allows the researcher to explore and understand the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (Creswell, 2014). According to Boateng (2018), the qualitative method also explores the meanings, attitudes, values, and beliefs people associate with a phenomenon to establish a better understanding, rather than to test to either support or disprove a relationship. There are three main methods of research design which includes mixed research, quantitative, and qualitative research design methods (Leavy, 2017). However, in terms of methodology, this research utilized the qualitative exploratory case study method for data collection and analysis. Qualitative research produces general understanding of rich, contextual, and unstructured, non-numeric data through conversation with research participants in a natural setting (Goodman, 2011). Bazeley & Jackson (2013), affirmed that the qualitative approach gives valued results required for researchers to fully comprehend contexts. Robson & McCartan (2016), similarly, asserted that qualitative methods are reinforced by researchers because the paradigm portrays a world in which reality is socially constructed. A qualitative exploratory case study design was employed for this particular study because of the flexibility or non-rigid nature of the qualitative research method. The method allows for exploration of other sources of obtaining data without strict restrictions and applications as in the case of the quantitative research method (Mackey & Gass, 2015). A qualitative research design could make use of secondary research such as reviewing available literature or data and also conducting in-depth interviews, case studies, field tests, among others (Klenke et al., 2016). Qualitative exploratory case study design helps in

formulating a more precise problem statement (Verner & Abdullah, 2012). A qualitative exploratory collective case study design facilitates the conduct of investigations into a social phenomenon without explicit expectations (Baskarada, 2014). A case study research design plays an important role in advancing a field's body of knowledge (Filo et al, 2015). Parker et, al. (2009), asserted that a case study is a specific phenomenon occurring in a bounded context. Tetnowski (2015), argued that the significance of case study research is its emphasis on 'how' and 'why' questions and therefore Crowe et al., (2011), consider it appropriate for descriptive and exploratory studies. Woodside (2010), pointed out that case study focuses on describing processes, individual or group action in a whole setting, and/or the sequence of events in which an action occurs. The qualitative case study approach supports both theory building, particularly, where existing theoretical and conceptual frameworks are inadequate and acts as a guide to empirical research (Baskarada, 2014). The Qualitative exploratory case study approach also enables researchers to closely examine data within a specific context (Thomann & Maggetti, 2020).

1.10.4 Data Analysis

Information obtained from the above sources were analyzed by quality content analysis in order to provide a more holistic and in-depth analysis of the contemporary challenges to the human and national securities of the implications of the growing cross border terrorism in the Burkina Faso-Mali regions. In addition, data obtained from the secondary sources indicated were analyzed through the concept of National Security as well as theory of Security Cooperation to provide a better insight into the challenges and prospects of tackling cross-border terrorism in West Africa, with specific reference to the Burkina Faso case. Findings from the study will be used to make recommendations based on the outcome of data analysis of the study.

1.11 Arrangements of Chapters

The study will be organized into the following four chapters:

Chapter One contains the Introduction of the Study.

Chapter Two also entails an Overview of terrorism and cross border terrorism in Africa.

Chapter Three contains Examining Cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso.

Chapter Four covers the Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.



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
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
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CHAPTER TWO
OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM AND CROSS BORDER TERRORISM IN
AFRICA.

2.1 Introduction

The phenomenon of cross border terrorism is gradually having its toll on Africa. The West Africa sub-region is no exception to the phenomena of cross border terrorism, replete with much nuances and complexities (with regards to actors, modus operandi and security and development challenges). This Chapter therefore reviews the cross-border terrorism in Africa. It starts with terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, and some selected major cross border terrorism in

Africa. It also examines the causes and the security and development consequences associated with cross border terrorism in Africa. Finally, the Chapter analyzes the response by the African Union (through partnership with the UN and AFRICOM) in addressing terrorism and cross border terrorism in Africa.

2.2 Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa

Terrorism involves violent or hazardous acts inimical to human existence and survival. It violates state law and have a clandestine motive to coerce or intimidate a civilian population or to influence the policy direction of a government through the use of force; or to affect the agenda of a government by assassination, mass destruction or kidnapping (Bruce, 2013). Fortna (2015) defined terrorism as the utilization of purposefully unpredictable violence as a way to induce fear or terror, with the intention to accomplish an ideological, political or religious aim. There have been increasing global concerns about the impact of terrorism and activities of insurgent groups on national security and national development of states (Agbiboa & Maiangwa, 2014). This is because terrorist and violent extremist activities pose a threat to state security as well as human security, thereby negatively affecting national development agenda (Aleyomi, 2020).

In contemporary international system, terrorism has become a common phenomenon in the Middle East with the call by Islamic militant groups to return to the political philosophy of Islam rather than democracy, which they perceive as serving the interests of the West. This is explained in Classical terms by Samuel Huntington as the ‘Clash of Civilization’ (Sulliman, 2020). This led to the formation of Al-Qaeda and sprinter groups which spread to Africa including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), (Hairiya, 2017). The motive to return to the political philosophy of Islam by the Al Qaeda groups instigated Osama bin Laden to carry out

the attack on the World Trade Zone and Pentagon in the US on September 11, 2001 (Gerges, 2011).

The US led NATO invasion in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2011 which led to the overthrow and deaths of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi respectively, created a vacuum and instigated the rise and vibrancy of terrorist organisations in the Middle East and Africa (including Libya and the Maghreb), (Kawczynski, 2011). Consequently, insurgent and terrorist groups have sprung up in Africa and West Africa including, Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab (Abasa, 2015). Notwithstanding this fact, ISIS feature as the richest, powerful and most-deadly terrorist group in the contemporary international system (Abasa, 2015).

The phenomenon of terrorism is gradually having its toll on the Africa continent, and particularly the West Africa sub-region, where the phenomenon is replete with much complexities and dynamics. Africa is considered the poorest continent in the world with greater insecurity and developmental crises (Aduloju & Pratt, 2014). This is due to the numerous wars and conflicts coupled with dire human security challenges witnessed or evident in most parts of the continent. This unfortunate situation is further exacerbated by the phenomenon of terrorism which is posing greater security and development threats to most states in recent times (Aduloju & Pratt, 2014).

There are several terrorist organizations or groups in Africa which carry out serious attacks to press home their needs. Paramount among the groups include the Lord's Resistance in Uganda, Al-Shabbab in East Africa (particularly, Kenya and Somalia), Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Tunisia, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb who initially operated in Sahel regions of North Africa (including Libya, Algeria, Egypt, among others), but currently making waves in West

Africa in states like Mali and Burkina Faso), and also Boko Haram in Nigeria, which has extended its jurisdiction to Cameroon, among others (Abasa, 2015).

The ragging human security consequences of terrorism in Africa including loss of lives and properties, as well as insecurity for social and economic activities cannot be oversimplified. Terrorism and violent extremism in most parts of Africa, particular in the Sahel and West Africa regions, serves as a continuous reminder of the security threats posed by terrorism on the continent. This is the urgency for all stakeholders to adopt pragmatic and proactive measures to effectively tackling the menace. This requires a well-coordinated inter-agency and stakeholder partnership, which is usually lagging in Africa due to poor cooperation among states and inter-security agencies, coupled with insufficient personnel and resources to deal with the threat (Williams, 2016). The increasing volatility of terrorism in Africa, particularly in the Sahel regions have led to major insecurities on the continent, sometimes resulting in state failure (Williams, 2016). Terrorist situations in states such as Libya, Somalia, Kenya, Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria have erupted unintended dire security consequences which destabilizes the peace and stability hitherto experienced on the continent. The increasing phenomenon of terrorism has led to the proliferation of small arms and light weaponry which has exacerbated transnational criminality, posing severe security challenges to the continent (Aning & Annan, 2015).

The current active Terrorist groups in West Africa include the JNIM, ISGS, Ansarul- Islam, ISWAP, Boko Haram; all of which are in one way or the other affiliated to either Al-Qaeda or ISIS (Duah, 2019). The source of terrorism in West Africa including political, economic, religious or ideological factors are usually intertwined and varying. However, religious and political extremism have featured predominantly in the terrorist activities as witnessed in the

West African sub-region. Terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda groups in Mali and Burkina Faso assumes a political dimension, whilst the terrorist activities by the Boko Haram in Nigeria stems more from a religious extremist perspective (Okemi, 2013).

2.3 Some Selected Major Cross Border Terrorism in Africa

There is plethora of cross border terrorism which abound on the African continent. Therefore, this section is dedicated to reviewing some of these increasing security threat on the Africa on the African continent. Some of the scenarios to be reviewed in this section include cross border terrorism between Tunisia (Ras-Jedir border) and Libya, cross border terrorism between Mali (Timbuktu and Gao -Northern Mali), and Algeria, cross border terrorism among Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon, cross border terrorism among Central African Republic (Northern borders), Chad and Cameroon, cross border terrorism between Sudan (West Darfur border) and Chad and cross border terrorism among Nigeria (north-eastern Nigeria borders), Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

2.3.1 Cross Border Terrorism between Tunisia (Ras-Jedir border) and Libya

The 2010-2011 uprisings in Tunisia (also called the Jasmine Revolution which begun the Arab Spring) distorted a hitherto peace and security the country had enjoyed, and the long-standing informal arrangement governing border trade relations between Libya and Tunisia (Benner, 2019). Libya has experienced the scourge of terrorism and civil strives from October 20, 2011 to date, with associated harsh economic conditions and insecurities, following the death of President Muammar al-Gaddafi (Pommier, 2011). Tunisia on the other hand, transitioned from authoritarian to democratic governance (Fraihat, 2016). Insurgent groups in Libya therefore resorted to terrorism and violent extremism as a mechanism to continue to maintain trade relations in Tunisia's eastern borderlands to cope with the harsh economic conditions in Libya.

In relation to the above, the eastern borderlands of Tunisia are confronted with three major crises including dire security threats in Western Libya, regular interruption of cross-border oil supply by Libya due to the hard economic conditions in Libya, and also porosity of Tunis' border control security (Günay & Somnavilla, 2019). These three crises have significantly disrupted regional stability and the region's economy (particularly in the border city of Ben Guerdane, where exchange of currency in the region is highly concentrated in the border region between Libya and Tunisia), (Meddeb, 2020). Therefore, Ben Guerdane is an epicenter for cross-border trade between Tunisia and Libya (Meddeb, 2020). However, cross border terrorism by some terrorist groups from Libya including the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), also known as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya (Arabic: *بليبييا المقاتلة الإسلامية الجماعة*), has led to the increasing phenomena of smuggling, leading to sporadic social unrest in Tunisia, particularly in Ben Guerdane. This is because vehicles, trucks and individuals are used to carry commodities whilst Pick-up vehicles are used to smuggle goods in the desert (Meddeb, 2020). This has led to several deaths and destruction of properties in Tunisia. Many people have been displaced from Ben Guerdane to Misrata and some even become homeless (Meddeb, 2020). For instance, the first attack, at the Bardo Museum in Tunis by the Islamic State group in March 2015 killed 22 (Meddeb, 2020). Three months later, 38 tourists, most of them British, were shot dead at Port El Kantaoui, near Sousse (Ibid). The cross border terrorism in the eastern borderlines of Tunisia has also led to stagnation in major economic activities including trade with dire economic security implications on Tunisia (Ibid, 2020). Terrorist groups from Libya occasionally attacked major border cities in Tunisia including Ras-Jedir and Ben Guerdane as witnessed in 2016 (Ibid). The motives of the terrorist groups from Libya were to free all terrorists from Libya who were arrested in Tunisia, establish smuggling connections in Tunisia,

particularly, in Ben Guerdane (since the economic buoyancy of Ben Guerdane is significantly dependent on cross-border trade activities) and ensure closure of Libya's borders and changes in Libya's trade control policy. This is to favour the terrorist groups from Libya (Ibid). In 2016, drivers and merchants of truck from Tunisia objected to a new customs taxes levied by Libyan authorities and restrictions on the smuggling of gasoline from Libya. This is because Libya was supposed to benefit more from the levies at the expense of traders or merchants from Tunisia (Chauzal & Zavagli, 2016). According to its provisions, Tunisian merchants were allowed to import at one time tax-free goods capped at 4,000 Libyan dinars (just under \$3,000) per day from Libya and transport up to 150 liters (40 gallons) of gasoline through Ras Jedir (Meddeb, 2020). Merchants in Tunisia therefore, organized a two-month sit-in under the slogan "Let Ben Guerdane live," and called on the governor of Medenine Governorate (in which Ben Guerdane is located) to intercede on their behalf (Meddeb, 2020). However, their plea was met with several oppositions by terrorist groups from Libya which have escalated tensions in the region to date.

Several diplomatic initiatives have been taken by state officials from both Tunisia and Libya with little results achieved in resolving the cross-border terrorism between Tunisia and Libya (Zoubir & Dris-Aït-Hamadouche, 2013). Most diplomacy efforts between the two states (i.e. Tunisia and Libya) became futile in resolving cross border tensions between Tunisia (Ras-Jedir border) and Libya. Tunis upon realizing the pressure of security threats mounting up on its borders tried to utilize people-to-people diplomacy and grassroots mechanisms by permitting local municipalities and civil society groups to initiate cross-border agreements with localized power centers or authorities in Libya (Meddeb, 2020). The stakeholder consultation in resolving the border terrorism in Tunisia therefore included a mix of state representatives and municipal council members (including included the Association of Traders of Ben Guerdane, Tunisian-

Libyan Brotherhood Association and committees of civil society activists) from Tunisia and leaders of local powerful non-state groups and municipal councils from Libya (Meddeb, 2020). However, efforts from these stakeholders have proven futile in resolving the Border terrorism at Tunisia, particularly, Ras-Jedir border since terrorist attacks continue to occur in the region to date.

2.3.2 Cross border terrorism between Mali (Timbuktu and Gao -Northern Mali) and Algeria

Mali is a landlocked country which has two main points of entry in the southern and northern parts of the country. Kayes and Sikasso-Zegoua in the southern part of the country is where trade flows take place especially from Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire (Cantens & Raballand, 2017). Commodities enter northern Mali through three main routes: from Algeria and other northern African countries (Libya, Egypt) through Niger, Menaka.Mauritania to Timbuktu,from through Kidaland through cities like Timbuktu and Gao in north Mali (Harmon, 2014). Cities such as Timbuktu and Gao have gained much prominence in Mali owing to their historic trade relevance which attract nomadic and rural population as well as foreign investors and businessmen and women into the country.

The cross-border terrorist situation between northern Mali and Algeria ensued as a result of proliferation of terrorist groups in the region of Timbuktu and Gao with sophisticated weapons and arms, following the closure of Algeria's borders with Mali in 2013 (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015). The closure of Algeria's border led to the reduction in trade volumes between Mali and Algeria by two-thirds with its dire negative economic ramifications on Mali's economy (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015). Consequently, several insurgent groups emerged in Mali to smuggle goods in and out of Mali to Algeria and Mauritania due to the harsh economic conditions prevailing in

Mali (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015). A good example is northern Mali, where narcotics traffickers and jihadi groups operate in the same territories. When terrorists took control of Gao in 2012, they burned cargoes of hashish in Gao and In-Khalil (Mali) in order to be seen as fighting vice and maintaining law and order and Islamic purity in territories controlled by narcotics traffickers (Micallef & Farrah, 2019). This induced Algeria to intervene in the crisis which led to several clashes between Algerian security forces and terrorist groups. This led to about 50 deaths in the Gao and In-Khali regions of Mali and displaced several inhabitants to move further south to cities such as Mopti, Segou and Sikasso (Micallef & Farrah, 2019).

Also, in an attempt to smuggle goods in and out of Mali, there have been several clashes between terrorist groups from Mali with some border security control officials and personnel in Algeria and Mauritania (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). This has led to several deaths, destruction of properties, disruptions in major economic activities and displacement of citizens in border areas of Mali, Algeria and Mauritania (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015). Subsequently, the cross border terrorism in Tunisia and some of its grave humanitarian consequences continue to persist even to date. France and ECOWAS advanced some diplomatic and military interventions towards resolving the cross border terrorism between Mali (Timbuktu and Gao -Northern Mali) and Algeria (Salem & Ahmed, 2013). However, Ince (2018), describes the interventions by France, ECWOAS and the AU's in the cross border terrorism between Mali (Timbuktu and Gao - Northern Mali) and Algeria as an unsuccessful since the crisis continues to persist. It will be highly impossible to utilize military intervention as a task of forcibly disarming an undefeated group of militias and terrorist groups from Mali, pacifying a ruined country. Therefore, effective negotiation efforts through consultations with aggrieved insurgent groups, as diplomatic

negotiations and mediations between state officials of both states could help in resolving the conflict situation in the region.

The major problem that contributed to the lack of success and complexity in resolving peace in Mali during the crisis is the infiltration of Al-Qaeda terrorist group who had taken advantage of the fragile nature of the region to carry out their clandestine operations (Kone, 2017). This has largely contributed significantly to the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso which will be discussed into details in the next Chapter.

2.3.3 Cross border terrorism among Chad, Nigeria and Cameroon

Chad has is a very vital state in Central Africa owing to its geographical location which separates the savanna in the south from the Sahara in the north and having a huge population of about sixteen (16) million people (Ruppel & Funteh, 2019). However, Lake Chad for the past two decades, has been stricken with famine and drought due to shortage of rainfall and drying up of major rivers in the state (Ruppel & Funteh, 2019). To worsen this situation, Chad has been confronted with challenge of terrorism and border terrorism which has worsen the already existing plights of citizens in the country (Ibid). The UN therefore describes the crisis in Chad as the World's Most Complex Humanitarian Disaster, especially due to its cross border terrorism involving non-state actors (particularly insurgent groups from Cameroon and Nigeria), (Ibid). For instance, on 10th January, 2015, 19 people were killed in a suicide bombing in Maiduguri (Falode, 2016). On 4th February 2015, the Chad Army killed over 200 Boko Haram militants (Falode, 2016). Soon afterwards, Boko Haram launched an attack on the Cameroonian town of Fotokol, killing 81 civilians, 13 Chadian soldiers and 6 Cameroonian soldier (Falode, 2016).

Regardless of efforts to beef up security along the border between Chad and Niger, Boko Haram terrorists in particular continue incursions into Chad (Ibid). About 8,000 people are currently

displaced in the Chad border areas (Maza et al., 2020). Chad is currently hosting approximately 6, 500, Nigerien refugees in the Dar-es-Salam camp due to attacks by Boko Haram in Diffa, Niger (Maza et al., 2020). In the regions affected by the attacks by Boko Haram, it is estimated that more than 6.3 million people face hunger (Palinkas, 2020). About 4.4 million Nigerians are in Adamawa and Borno Adamawa in northern Nigeria, about 1.4 million Cameroonians about 400,000 Nigeriens, and about 133, 000 Chadians are faced with food insecurity as a result of the border terrorism in Chad with Nigeria and Cameroon (Bol –Lake Chad regions), (Okunade, 2019). The UN estimates that over 9 million people need humanitarian assistance across the Lake Chad Basin (Okunade, 2019).

As a result of the humanitarian crises in Chad due to the cross border terrorism, there have been intermittent closure of the borders and major trading routes in Chad and the ban of large vessels by the Chadian Government from using the Lake Chad (Iocchi, 2020). In addition, the major roads between Lagos and N'djamena by Lake Chad or by Fotokol and Kousseri in Cameroon, have also been closed and declared military zones (Iocchi, 2020). This has had significant impact on both local and international trade and commerce, with dire economic security implications on Chad.

2.3.4 Cross border Terrorism among Central African Republic (Northern borders), Chad and Cameroon

Cross border terrorism in the Central African Republic (CAR) is concentrated in the Western parts of the country (Arieff, 2014). Aside the Douala-Beloko-Bangui area, which serves as a major trading center in the CAR, all other traders shuffle from one border to rural areas based on trade products and opportunities which presents itself from neighbouring countries (most often

Cameroon), (Cantens & Raballand, 2017). Owing to the civil war which ensued in the CAR in 2012, coupled with the instability prevailing in Chad and Cameroon due to the activities of Boko Haram, other insurgent groups have taken advantage of the situation to seize the major resource zones and trade routes in border cities and towns in western parts of the CAR (Cantens & Raballand, 2017).

Insecurity is widespread among western border cities and villages of the CAR including Alindao, Baboua and Bahamo (Cantens & Raballand, 2017). They are usually raided by local militias and armed groups. To compound the situation, the deployed Blue Helmet contingents of the Multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping mission in Central Africa Republic (MINUSCA) in 2014 often result in clashes with rebels or insurgent group, making restoring peace in the country very difficult (Hunt, 2017). Subsequently, there is the proliferation of violent acts and crimes including homicide, rape, murder, armed robbery, kidnaps and physical assaults on innocent civilians, among others in the western border regions of the CAR (Welz, 2014). Most notably, fighting around Bambari between the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) and the Front for the Renaissance in the Central African Republic (FPRC) in 2016 intensified violence across the border regions which paved way for Boko Haram to infiltrate and also commit atrocious attacks in those areas.

During situations of unrest, the Government of the CAR sometimes impose curfews and closure of roads and borders with little or no prior notice to citizens (Welz, 2014). The Central African Republic continues to face a serious protection crisis due to the increasing phenomena of international humanitarian law and human rights violations despite the signing of the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in 2019. The Agreement was to restore peace and stability in the country (Welz, 2014). Unfortunately, it is the citizens who have become major

victims of the cross border terrorism about the western borders of the CAR. The Central African Republic (C.A.R.) in the 2019 Human Development Index, ranked last but one with about 80 percent of the country's 4.7 million population estimated to be living in poverty (Otekunrin et al, 2020). It is in this vein that the UN establishes that almost 3 million people residing in the C.A.R. require humanitarian assistance (Otekunrin et al, 2020).

2.3.5 Cross Border Terrorism between Sudan (West Darfur border) and Chad

Sudan is located in north-eastern Africa and has an estimated population of about thirty-five (35) million people with the largest land surface area (of area of approximately 250,000 square kilometres) on the African continent (Suliman, 2011). Sudan gained independence in 1956 from Britain and Egypt and became the first country in the Sub-Saharan Africa to have chalked this success (Suliman, 2011). However, the country since 1956 has been bedeviled with series of intermittent civil wars spanning for almost four decades to date (Suliman, 2011). The conflict situation in Sudan is described as the longest conflict crisis on the African continent with no hope of ending soon (Adebajo, 2012).

The introduction of Islamic Shari`ah (Law) by the Arab-Muslim government in Khartoum in 1983 resulted in a bloody civil war which had trickle down to date (Adebajo, 2012). This situation has also attracted several terrorist activities in Sudan which has contributed largely to the cross border terrorism in the regions between Sudan (West Darfur border) with Chad. (Ibid). The main terrorist groups which has carried out atrocious acts in this region include the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), (Ibid). In 2001, the SPLA for instance was accused by Africa Watch of utilizing methods of terrorist methods in their fight for autonomy. Consequently, the SPLA attacked civilian oil targets, killing a significant number of civilians and aid workers, as well selling rockets to civilians (Ibid).

Sudan has a specific long-standing history and significance in the development and security of the people and Government in Chad, since Sudan is also influenced by wider international fields including Libya, Egypt, France, and the United States (Johnson, 2011). Despite the fact that Sudan was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993, the border terrorism between in Sudan's western Darfur region on the border with Chad became pronounced since September and have lingered on to date (Johnson, 2011). This has led to over 2 million people being displaced in Darfur and more than 200,000 Sudanese residents living in Chadian refugee camps (Johnson, 2011).

This necessitated the establishment of the UN Humanitarian in Sudan in 1989 known as Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) to address the humanitarian crises that arose as a cause of the conflicts (Sholeye & Madibbo, 2020). However, the government adopted intense military means as a mechanism of opposing any demands from the southerners for equality and autonomy. This has even resulted in the ban to the UN's Humanitarian or relief assistance in the country, exacerbating the already deplorable state of the crisis (Banda Chitsamatanga & Malinga 2021). As a result, there has been continuous 21 years of a never ending civil war in Sudan with grave humanitarian consequences including over 200,000 deaths as a result of starvation and malnutrition due to the crisis (Conley et al., 2022).

Dafur is found in western Sudan with an estimated population of over seven (7) million people with more than thirty ethnic groups including Arabs and non-Arabs (Ibid). The contemporary Darfur crisis evolved from February, 2003, due to clashes between two rebel factions (i.e., The Sudan Liberation Army - SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement - JEM) to challenge the status quo of the central government of the National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Darfur

(Woldemichael, 2020). The rebel groups wanted the government to cease discrimination, marginalization and human right abuses against the African ethnic groups in the country (Rapanyane & Legodi, 2021). The Central government in turn labelled the rebel groups as terrorists. It marshalled counterattacks against them and all other non-Arab civilians who seem to be a threat to the ruling government and the northern Arabs (Ibid). This created a situation of Crime against Humanity in the country, with drastic humanitarian consequences (Ibid). This was because the government carried out atrocious military attacks on African ethnic groups including the Massaleit, Zaghawa and the Fur who were antagonistic against northern nomadic Arab ethnic groups in the country (Ibid). There was power struggle between the African ethnic groups and the nomadic Arab ethnic groups who had the backings of the central government (Ibid).

The crisis mostly intensified as a result of movement of nomadic Arabs into traditional farming communities of the southerners in search for water and greener pastures for grazing (Augustine & Blessing, 2020). This mostly resulted in bloody clashes with dire humanitarian crises. Aside religion and ethnicity contributing majorly to the crisis in Sudan, fighting over resources between northern nomadic Arabs and southern traditional farmers became the order of the day (Ibid). For instance, the discovery of large oil deposits in the Abyei in the early part of 1978, gave rise to tensions even up to date (Ibid). This led to the emergence of SLA and JEM who gained the support of some rich businessmen as well as the local populace in Darfur, as well as some militant groups from Chad (Ibid). The intensity of the conflicts later led to the emergence of a new rebel group in 2004 known as the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) adding to the complexity of the crisis (Ibid). However, the northern nomadic Arabs are well provided with sophisticated weaponry by the Khartoum government to disarm the southerners in terms of any clashes. This has aggravated several international criticisms against

the government of Sudan of doing little to calm the storm but rather fuelling the crisis, which is becoming almost difficult to resolve with the passage of years.

In his response to factors that caused the Sudan Crisis, El-Nasrudeen, argues that President Omar al Bashir and the Arab-oriented central government's arbitrary rule, retrospective laws and biased policies against the Darfur non-Arab African Sudanese such as the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit (Schuetz, 2023). El-Nasrudeen adds that "The crisis demonstrates a deep disrespect for human dignity by the fundamentalist religious ideology of Arab supremacy, the government of Omar al-Bashir pursued a puritanical Islamists ideology of brutality against non- Muslim and non -Arab Sudanese who were predominantly Christians and the like (Openiyi, 2020). It was on this basis that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on July 30, 2004, passed Resolution 1556 on Darfur, requiring the Sudanese government to disarm the local Arab militia and the Janjaweed and ease the ethnic crisis within one month or else face sanctions (Herr, 2020). However, this yielded no result and the crisis in the region continues to persist. The United Nations described the Sudan crises as the worst contemporary humanitarian crisis that had bedeviled the contemporary international community (Thakur, 2016).

The UNSC, in the wake of severe atrocities committed against civilians in Darfur with the government doing little to salvage the situation, issued a presidential statement on April 2, 2004, expressing concern about the grave humanitarian concerns in Darfur and calling on the Government to protect civilians in the region, allow humanitarian agencies full access to Darfur and to final ensure a cease-fire is reached (Thakur, 2016). Following this, the Security Council on May 25, 2004, issued another Presidential statement expressing deeper concerns about large scale crime against humanity perpetuated in Darfur and called on the Government to disarm the Janjaweed Militia group which was causing so many atrocities against non-Arab Muslims in the

region (Thakur, 2016). Subsequently, the UNSC on June 11, 2004 adopted Resolution 1547 which was not specifically meant to deal with the Darfur Crisis but called upon the parties to use their influence to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in the Darfur region (Thakur, 2016).

The first comprehensive resolution by the UNSC to deal with the Darfur Crises was adopted on July, 30, 2004, and this was known as Resolution 1556 (Ibid). The Resolution described the situation in Darfur as constituting a threat to international peace and security and stability in the region (Ibid). The Resolution 1556 also reiterates the government's primary role to protect its citizens and to disarm militia groups to ensure the cease perpetuation of violent acts against non-Arabs in Darfur (Ibid). The Resolution also emphasized the need for the government to allow full access to humanitarian agencies to provide relief assistance to victims of the conflict (Ibid).

In contrast to the above, Baballah Maguid EL Mahgoub explained that, Resolution 1556 by the UNSC was anti-Sudan, because eleven out of the fifteen UNSC members voted in favour of the U.S.-drafted Resolution, while China, Russia, Pakistan, and Algeria abstained (Ibid). The voting pattern was to approve of the US-led military intervention in Somalia as means of resolving the conflict. El-Maghoub describes the resolution as dangerous and anti-Sudan, because China, Russia, Algeria and Pakistan maintained that sanctions can only escalate the problem and not prevent war (Ibid). This has contributed significantly to the cross border terrorism in the region of West Darfur with Chad.

2.3.6 Cross border terrorism among Nigeria (north-eastern Nigeria borders) with Cameroon, Chad and Niger

In Nigeria, the security circumstance due to the terrorist activities by Boko Haram remains a significant concern and threat to scale up counter terrorist operations required to deal with the insurgent group. The cross border terrorism in the north-eastern borders with Cameroon, Chad

and Niger has gained greater momentum following the pledging of allegiance of the Boko Haram to ISIS (Idahosa, 2015). Boko Haram gets its funding through ransoms from kidnappings, thefts, gifts, blackmail and financing through its system of partnerships with other terrorist groups or associations, for example, the Islamic State (ISIS) (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013).

Apparently, Boko Haram also gets financing and backing from Al-Qa-ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQLIM or AQIM), (American Foreign Policy Council, 2013). This has enabled the Boko Haram proceed with self-destruction bombings and attacks in Nigeria and have extended attacks to neighboring countries including Cameroon, Chad and Niger in revenge to cooperation among Cameroon, Chad, Niger with the Nigerian Government through the Multinational Joint Task Force to clamp the terrorist group (Idahosa, 2015). Subsequently, the formation of the Multinational Joint Task Force in 2014 to counter Boko Haram has rather led to killings, rapes, abductions, destruction of properties with increasing displacement of innocent citizens and refugee crises in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria (Idahosa, 2015).

The above situation has contributed significantly to the reason why the cross border terrorism in Nigeria north-eastern Nigeria borders) with Cameroon, Chad and Niger continues to persist. The United Nations estimates that Boko Haram violence has cost the lives of led to about 30,000 deaths and displaced about 2 million in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad (Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020). Despite some progress, the situation on the ground continues to deteriorate, with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence (Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020).

Zen (2018), established that Boko Haram attacks killed nearly 2,500 Cameroonians between 2014 and 2017. For instance, on February, 4, 2015, Boko Haram raided and killed 70 people in the Cameroon border town of Fotokolon (*BBC, February, 4, 2015*). Also, on 5th February, 2015, Boko Haram killed six people including a pregnant woman and five men and injured two people

when they raided the Cameroonian border town of Mayo-Tsanaga (Zenn, 2018). Similarly, on 31st December, 2017, a suicide attack by a girl assumed to belong to the Boko Haram factions at a café in Bia killed one person and injured 28 others (Zenn, 2018).

On December 18, 2019, Boko Haram killed 14 people, injured five people and 13 went missing in the attack near the village of Kaiga on the shores of Lake Chad, Imouya Souabebe (*France24 New, 2019*). Similarly, on May 3, 2020, the President of Chad revealed that Boko Haram killed at least 92 Chadian soldiers in the deadliest attack on the nation's forces ever (*African News, 2020*).

In Niger, Boko Haram's attack on the village of Toumour in the Diffa region on December 14, 2019 led to at least 27 deaths, several injuries and caused many to go gone missing (*African News, 2019*). The attack led to the destruction of between 800 and 1,000 houses, the central market and numerous vehicles (*African News, 2019*). It is reported that the Diffa region located on the Niger's border with Nigeria, has been frequently attacked by Boko Haram since February 2015 (*African News, 2019*).

In September, 2015 Boko Haram raided the town of Banki, 130 km southeast of Maiduguri, Borno State, on the border of Nigeria and Cameroon, kidnapped about 40 young adults, women and children and killed 18 in the process (Hassan, 2019). Similarly, On January, 6, 2020, Boko Haram bombed a market in Gamboru, Borno, killing at least 38 people. On February, 9, 2020, they killed at least 30 people in Auno, Borno. On March, 23, 2020, they carried out massacres against the Chadian and Nigerian armies (Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020).

Consequent to the above, it is estimated that more than 500,000 people have been displaced from Chad and 30,000 have fled to Nigeria (Ekumaoko & Ezemenaka, 2020). At the same time, Cameroon is hosting 278,000 refugees from the Central African Republic and 104,000 from

Nigeria, due to cross border terrorism fueled by Boko Haram (Ibid). The crisis has become so complex and continues to persist due to modus operandi adopted by Boko Haram, making it very difficult to tackle.

2.4 The Response by the AU in addressing Terrorism in Africa

Several attempts are made by the AU in tackling terrorism and cross border terrorism in Africa. This section makes an on two major partnership undertaken by the AU towards addressing terrorism and cross border terrorism in Africa. These include partnership between the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the United Nations (UN) and the partnership between the APSA and the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).

2.4.1 Partnership between the United Nations and the APSA in addressing Terrorism in Africa

At the 1999 Summit of the Organization of the African Union (OAU), President Moammar Gadhafi of Libya proposed the change of the name OAU to African Union (AU) (Alexis, 2020). The goal of AU was to promote integration as well as ensure improvement in the peace and stability of the African continent. Consequently, in 2000, a Constitutive Act was adopted in the Lome Summit which subsequently led to the creation of the AU in May, 2001 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Citaristi, 2022). The AU was officially launched in 2002 at the first General Assembly of 54 Heads of States held at Durban. The decision to establish an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) was taken at the creation of the AU. This finds legal expression in the 2000 Constitutes Acts which states that:

African elites and leaders are conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitute a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of the development and integration agenda (Packer & Rukare, 2002).

The expression in the Constitutive Act therefore necessitated the need for the formation of the APSA with the objectives to promote and ensure harmony, stability and security on the African continent. This also finds grounds in the expression, “*The African Solution to African Problems.*” APSA was supposed to enhance the capacity of the AU in addressing the scourge of conflicts evident on the African continent towards the realization of peace, security, harmony and stability on the African continent (Rodt, 2012). The main structure of the APSA includes the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise (PoW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the AU Commission and the Peace Fund (Rodt, 2012).

Since the main mandate of the UN is to prevent the world from the scourge of wars, it does collaborate with various Security frameworks or mechanism in various parts of the world to achieve its main goal (Thakur, 2016). In this regard, the UN has been a major partner to the APSA. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter requires the UN to collaborate with regional arrangements towards ensuring and promoting global peace and security. Therefore, to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security, regional organizations such the AU play partnership roles with the UN to tackle or address emerging security threats or conflict situations, with special reference to the African continent (Thakur, 2016).

The APSA is seen by the UN as one of the frameworks for promoting international peace and security. It is in this vein that the UN by necessity partners or collaborate with the AU through its APSA in addressing and curbing conflict situations and security threats on the African continent (Kuwali, 2022). Towards this end, the UN has been very instrument in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations on the African soil, particularly in partnership with the AU through the

APSA. The UN therefore provides financial support, equipment and troops for most peacekeeping operation in Africa, and this is mostly done in cooperation with the APSA (Plank, 2022).

To strengthen the bond between the UN and AU, the two agencies in 2006 signed a Joint Declaration to enhance their cooperation. The Joint Declaration was supposed to enhanced cooperation between the AU and UN in the areas of human rights, human development, human resource development, financial management and peace and security (Veron & Sergejeff, 2021). Similarly, in 2017, the UN and AU signed a UN-AU Framework geared towards enhancing cooperation in the area of peace and security which was intended to institutionalize strategic cooperation between the two organizations with regards to addressing security threats and conflicts including terrorism and cross border terrorism on the African continent (Wondemagegnehu & Kebede, 2017). The collaboration between the AU and UN has therefore supported Regional Counter Terrorist operations through the provision of intelligence, troops and financial assistance in tackling terrorism including cross border terrorism. The UN Secretary-General's remarks to the African Regional High-Level Conference on Counter Terrorism and Prevention of Violent Extremism Conducive to Terrorism on July, 10, 2019, expressed how collaboration between the UN and AU has led to efforts towards preventing radicalisation and recruitment, through partnership with African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram and similar forces, in tackling terrorism and the spread of violent extremism including cross border terrorism in Africa (UN, 2019). African leaders through the AU on January 30, 2015, authorised a 7,500-strong force

to fight the rebels, including pledges of troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin (African News, 2020).

2.4.2 Partnership between the AFRICOM and the APSA in addressing terrorism in Africa

The primary focus of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) is to help the US carry out its 'Global War on Terror' in Africa since its establishment in 2007 in relation with the US' 'Global War on Terror' after 9/11 (Matsilele & Mudau, 2021). In this regard, the US has subtly linked terrorism to development of Africa and cooperates with the AU in some instances towards addressing terrorism including cross border terrorism in Africa.

The Department of Defense of the US through AFRICOM helps to address terrorism on the African continent. The US perceives it as a rational choice to partner with African states in combating terrorism on the continent ever since its declaration on the Global War on Terror. The presence of AFRICOM in Africa has encouraged cooperation between some African states and the US in carrying out its counter-terrorism operations. This include the fight against terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in West Africa (i.e. northern Nigeria and Cameroon), Tuareg in Mali, Al-Qaeda in Northern and Southern Africa and Al-Shabaab in East Africa which are still active on the continent (Hendricks, 2022). For instance, in Africa, in spite of the presence of about 1300 U.N. peacekeeping force and the 4,500 French troops, the United States also has deployed about 5000 troops towards enhancing peacekeeping operations and counter terrorism operations on the African continent (Seligman, 2020).

Through AFRICOM, President Obama encouraged the establishment of a drone base in Cameroon with deployment of about three hundred military personnel purposely deployed to provide intelligence support to the multilateral coalition fighting Boko Haram, the Jihadist radical group which threatens the peace and security of the Nigerian and Cameroonian states.

There are about eight bases in the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia, Djibouti, Seychelles, Kenya and Somali (Seligman, 2020). These bases were established to concentrate in addressing and tackling terrorism in the region. The Uganda base is purposely designated to clump and vanquish the Lord's Resistance Army which is causing severe mayhem and atrocities in the Central Africa (Seligman., 2020).

In West Africa, out of the about 5000 US troops on the African continent, about 1000 was deployed to the West African region due to the terrorist situation in Nigeria, Mali and Burkina by Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda groups in the region (Ibid). The US has surveillance facilities in Niger, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Chad, and also Cameroon inclusive (Ibid). The drone base in Cameroon is the 13th Surveillance base established by the US in Africa (Ibid). Though AFRICOM does not accompany West African forces on combat missions, following a deadly ambush in Niger, which led to the killing of four (4) U.S. military personnel in October 2017, the United States plays a significant supportive role to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, a framework of about 5,000 troops from five countries in West Africa including, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Burkina which was formed in 2017 (Ibid).


The US plays this supportive role by facilitating other Western military and French troops and operations in providing transportation, air refueling and drone surveillance (Ibid). Therefore, the presence of AFRICOM in Africa has therefore helped in minimizing and curtailing the enormity of security risks which dangerous militant or terrorist groups may have posed on the African continent due to their operations.

Nevertheless, most Africans are of the view that terrorism is not the major security threats in Africa but instead poverty, ethnic and tribal violence, electoral violence and civil wars, proliferation of arms, mass youth unemployment, epidemics and pandemics, among others

(Ejiofor, 2022). Therefore, most African leaders are hesitant to cooperate effectively with the US to support the vision of AFRICOM which seems not to be in the core interests of Africans, but rather the US. This accounts for the reason why some phenomena of terrorism including cross border terrorism continue to prevail in most parts of Africa.

2.5 Conclusion

Terrorism and for that matter cross border terrorism are not a recent phenomenon in Africa. It is in this vein that this Chapter made an extensive overview of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, and also reviewed some selected major cross border terrorism in Africa, as well as causes, the security and development consequences associated with such cross border terrorism in Africa. The Chapter finally, reviewed the response by the African Union (through partnership with the UN and AFRICOM) in addressing terrorism and cross border terrorism in Africa. This serves as a precursor to analyzing the Burkina Faso cross border terrorism which will be done in the next Chapter to know the similarities and differences in terms of nature, dynamic, security and development implications as well as responses and the lessons which could be learnt by Ghana from the Burkina Faso experience, especially since it shares border to Ghana to the north.



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
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CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS OF CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM IN BURKINA FASO.

3.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso. It gives brief background to the political history of Burkina Faso to understand the nature and complexities in addressing the cross border terrorism in the country, the nature and dynamics of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso, the structural weaknesses that make Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border Terrorism. It also analyzes the national security and development ramifications of the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso, the response and challenges in addressing the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso and finally, lessons which could be learnt by Ghana from the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso (since it is Ghana's neighbouring country to the north).

3.2 The nature and dynamics of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso

The cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso without relating it to the aftermath of the 2012 Malian crisis which also posed national security threats to Burkina Faso. The 2012 Mali terrorist situation begun due to developmental disparities between Northern and Southern parts of Mali which instigated violence protest especially in the north (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015). Matters escalated, and by 16th January, 2012, several armed groups in the North emerged to protest against the Malian to detached from the country and form an independent state to be called Azaward (Bleck, & Michelitch, 2015). In view of this, The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which is an insurgent group representing the Tuaregs in the north had gained significant control of major areas in the region by April, 2012, following a coup d'état which ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré from power in March, 2012 (Farhaoui,

2013). Subsequently, the rebels were in control of the three largest northern cities in Mali including Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao (Coulibaly & Bratton, 2013). This attracted a response from the Malian Military to counter the rebels. However, the military intervention proved futile since The MNLA were more sophisticated in weaponry than the Military due to the unflinching support they received from the Islamist group, Ansar Dine.

In relation to the above, the MNLA, the Ansar Dine and other terrorist groups in the region begun imposing and implementing strict Sharia Laws in the northern parts of Mali (Marchal, 2013). This destabilized regional peace and security which prompted an intervention from Burkina Faso. By virtue of being a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, Burkina Faso assistance is needed to restore peace and security to the northern parts of Mali. In partnership with the Malian military, Burkinabe forces were very instrumental and successful in reclaiming the seized territories from the terrorist groups (Bleck & Michelitch, 2015).

The terrorist situation in Burkina Faso is not considered to be religiously motivated. Instead, is viewed as a trans-border terrorism which has political underpinnings. As a member of ECOWAS and Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, Burkina Faso has a mandate to ensure that peace and security is restored again in Mali (Hamani, 2019). This largely motivated the intervention of the Burkina Faso in the Mali crisis which has unfortunately attracted several Islamic or Jihadist retaliations from groups including Al-Qaeda from 2016 to date.

3.3 The Structural Weaknesses Which Makes Burkina Faso Susceptible to Cross Border Terrorism

There are some structural systems and weaknesses which has made Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border terrorism. Paramount among them include globalization and its effects on

transnational organized crimes, the fragile security nature of the Sahel region, the porous border control systems in Burkina Faso, poverty and extreme economic hardships and the increasing conflictual relations between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Burkina Faso.

3.3.1 Globalization and its effects on Transnational Organized Crimes

The globalized nature of the contemporary international system has made necessary and possible for people to move from one geographical region to another or one country to another (Hirst et al., 2015). This phenomenon of global interconnectivity is what is captured as Globalization. Globalization is an international phenomenon with increasingly complexity in scope and impact. Hirst, et al., (2015), define Globalization as the process of integrating economies, cultures, technology and governance across national borders, usually refer to as trans-territoriality.

There have been some new dimensions in Globalization which has facilitated inter-connectedness across the globe. These include discoveries in ICT, advances in modes of transportation and excessive fluidity of capital (Ferguson & Mansbach, 2012). There are various aspects of globalization such as economic (example exports and import), technology and innovation (such as the use of computers and social media), political (such the promulgation and practice of liberal democracy across most parts of the world), socio-cultural (such as exchange programmes through education), among others.

The impact of globalization has also made it possible for terrorists to also move now from one region to the other or one state. Therefore, all states in the international system including Burkina Faso are exposed to transnational organized crimes such as terrorism; cross border terrorism, money laundering, cyber frauds, human and drug trafficking, among others (Brenner, 2017).

This explains the reason why Burkina Faso is currently confronted with the threats of cross border terrorism.

3.3.2 The Fragile Nature of the Sahel Region

The Sahel region is considered one of the hotspot for terrorism in Africa (Alexander, 2015). In view of this, most states in the Sahel region including Mali and Burkina Faso are exposed to terrorism and cross border terrorism, particularly from Al-Qaeda affiliates in the region (Brenner, 2017). Most terrorist groups, particularly AQIM (which is the North African branch of Al-Qaeda), have gained possession and control over some trade routes and resource reserves (particularly oil) of some countries in the Sahel region; thereby denying the general populace of such countries from benefitting or enjoying the greater good of the country's resources (Hansen, 2019). This has exacerbated the poverty levels in some states in the Sahel region including Libya, Mali and Burkina Faso.

As indicated by Harmon (2014), two distinct sorts of contentions are prevailing in the Sahel region due to the struggle over natural resources; oil, diamond, fish resources, timber and alluvial gold. Harmon (2014), explains that the two main kind of contention in the region arises due to states participation in open clashes over the exploitation which are available along the common borders and the second kind of contention is identified with the illicit exploitation of natural resources, which are then used to fuel conflict in the region. This has led to proliferation of small arms conflicts and light weaponry, lootable natural resources and severe violent situations and conflicts in the Sahel region (Hansen, 2019). Consequently, AQIM has carried out attacks all over the Sahel region. For example, AQIM and its affiliate, al-Mourabitoun, claimed responsibility for the 2016 Ouagadougou attacks on Café Cappuccino and Hotel Splendid which

led to the death of 30 people (Hansen, 2019), and escalated cross border terrorist activities in Burkina Faso.

3.3.3 The Porous Border Control Systems in Burkina Faso

Countering terrorism and cross border terrorism requires much revenue to acquire sophisticated surveillance machine and security personnel or intelligence at the ports and harbours, airports and borders (Quartey, 2019). This will ensure that states are not taken by surprise by the magnitude of damages such crimes can cause if carried in their countries or region. Unfortunately, the porous nature of most borders across the Sahel region including Burkina Faso has contributed significantly to the increasing phenomena of cross border terrorism as witnessed in the region. In addition, insufficient governments' revenue towards the course of fighting terrorism and the pervasive culture of corruption among personnel of our state security agencies (Harsch, 2017), have paved way for the prevalence of terrorism and cross border terrorism as witnessed today in the Sahel region including Burkina Faso.

Consequently, there are times that state security forces or joint security forces in the Sahel region are overwhelmed in terms of personnel and weapons to counter the terrorists (particularly Al-Qaeda). This situation makes cross border terrorism more pronounced and conspicuous in recent times as evident in Burkina Faso.

3.3.4 Poverty Coupled with Extreme Economic Hardships

Poverty and extreme economic hardships are part of the major causes of terrorism in the Sahel region including Burkina Faso (Aubyn, 2013). More often than not, background information of people who have been arrested for committing terrorist acts across borders (with particular reference to Mali and Burkina Faso), are people from poor backgrounds who are desperate to do

anything possible, including engaging in criminal activities as a means of coping with harsh economic conditions they experience (Hansen, 2019).

For instance, the Malian terrorist situation begun in 2012 due to the developmental disparities between the northern and southern parts of Mali. Consequently, matters escalated, and by 16th January, 2012, several armed groups in the North emerged to protest against the Malian Government to be separated from the country and form an independent state to be called Azawad (Bleck, & Michelitch, 2015). In view of this, The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNL), which is an insurgent group representing the Tuaregs in the north had gained significant control of major areas in the region by April, 2012, following a coup d'état which ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré from power in March, 2012 (Farhaoui, 2013). Subsequently, the rebels were in control of the three largest northern cities in Mali including Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao (Coulibaly & Bratton, 2013).

In the case of Burkina Faso, evidence exist to show great disparity in poverty levels between the north and south, with the north experiencing appalling conditions in terms of poverty levels (Okolo et al., 2011). This confirms the assertion by Aregbesola (2012), that poverty and economic deprivation are the main cause of the terrorist situation in Africa. Therefore, an attempt on the part of the youth in Mali and Burkina Faso to show resentment against the extreme poverty and deprivations has caused them to become susceptible Jihadist recruitment or resort to Islamic extremism. This they anticipate will provide better conditions in the north where the government had failed to address the developmental plights bedeviling the region.

3.3.5 Increasing Conflictual Relations between Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers in Burkina Faso

As already identified in this study, one of the major economic activities in Burkina Faso, and to a larger extent the Sahel region is livestock rearing or transhumance activity. Environmentally, Burkina Faso as a tropical country enjoys relatively conducive climatic conditions and ample rainfall throughout the year which favours the growth of vast grass vegetation to support the primary economic activity of the Fulani herdsmen which is transhumance activity or Pastoralism (Yembilah, 2012).

Burkina Faso has vast vegetation lands and water bodies such as rivers and streams which serve as avenues for Fulani herdsmen to settle in the country and engage in cattle rearing (Yembilah, 2012). In addition, most parts of Burkina Faso, especially the northern sections which has a significant number of Fulani dwellers. The place is free of tsetse fly infestations which makes the country very favourable for transhumance activities (Yembilah, 2012). However, harsh environmental conditions such as tsetse fly infestations and unfavourable weather conditions including drought in Burkina Faso influenced the Fulani herdsmen to move and forcefully possessed or settled on other territories already occupied by local farmers such as the Deou twon in Oudalan province (which is few kilometres from the border between Mali and Burkina Faso without harsh environmental conditions). Thus, the convergence point for livestock breeders from Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso (Ibid). This forceful possession of territories with favourable environmental conditions by the Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso sometimes requires the use of violent and aggressions, which are sometimes countered by state security apparatuses or local farmers leading to severe clashes or conflictual relations between farmers and Fulani Pastoralists in the country (De Longueville et al., 2019). This has subsequently resulted in destruction of

farm lands, pollution of water bodies and several violent situations in most parts of northern Burkina Faso in particular (De Longueville et al., 2019).

In addition, most Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso became susceptible to the Jihadist recruitment which further worsened the increasing phenomena of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. This is because most Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso perceive or anticipate that being part of terrorist groups such as the Al-Qaeda will provide them with a buffer or support in terms of forceful possessing territories with favourable environmental conditions, which often comes with the use of violent and aggression amidst counter reactions from state security apparatuses or farmers (Karambiri & Brockhaus, 2019). This goes to reinforce the views of Abbas (2012), that Fulani in West Africa, including Burkina Faso, perceive pastoralism as a way which is essential to the fundamental survival and existence. As result, they will go extra mile to join terrorist groups with a believe that, it will give them the chance to sustain their pastoral life, which is very essential to their survival and existence.

3.4 The National Security Ramifications of Cross Border Terrorism in Burkina Faso

This section discusses national security implications of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. The main national security threats of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso escalating political, religious and ethnic tensions in the country, proliferation of sophisticated small arms and other light weapons, perpetual insecurity and threats to citizens' lives, forced displacement and refugee crisis and finally, increase in government security expenditure towards tackling terrorism.

3.4.1 Escalating Political, Religious and Ethnic Tensions Existing in Burkina Faso

As already identified in earlier sections of this study, the political history of Burkina Faso coupled with previous political transitions in the country has engendered or be marred with some

political, religious and ethnic tensions. Consequently, the immediate national security risk of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso is an opportunity for the rekindling or refuelling already existing political, religious and ethnic tensions, especially by poor Fulani herdsmen and other unemployed youth who have become susceptible to terrorist groups recruitment (Alley, 2017). This to a very large extent pose a great national security threat to the relative peace and security enjoyed in Burkina Faso. This is on the grounds that frustrated and aggrieved youth including Fulani herdsmen could become susceptible to terrorist groups recruitment. They could capitalize on support from the terrorist groups to worsen or escalate already existing political, religious and ethnic tensions and conflicts in the country. This creates security threats for everybody including their very own blood relations in Burkina Faso. Thus, everybody is in danger in Burkina Faso if the increasing phenomenon of cross border terrorism is not checked and contained.

3.4.2 Proliferation of Sophisticated Small Arms and Other Light Weapons

Terrorists such as Al-Qaeda who are main stakeholders in the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso rely on adequate protection in terms of weapons for defense against any state security forces or Joint Task Forces during their operations (Apau, 2019). Therefore, Al-Qaeda terrorist groups import into the Mali-Burkina Faso border area sophisticated small-arms and weaponry which are used as means to provide security for the running of their operations (Apau, 2019). This is due to the fact that are instances where the Malian or Burkinabe state security officials or forces from the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership would like to cause the arrest or even kill members of terrorist organizations such as the Al-Qaeda (Ibid). Therefore, to resist arrest and recruit more members into their Jihadist group, supply small-arms and other weaponry to their members to escape from any danger of arrest.

Though, the Burkinabe Government has put in place measures to enhance security of the country, the prevalence of cross border terrorism is likely to pose great security threats to the nation. With the proliferation of small arms and other light weapons which sometimes end up in the hands of Fulani herdsmen who have become susceptible to terrorist recruitment, innocent citizens including local farmers as well as security personnel and institutions for maintaining law and order in Burkina Faso become the enemies of these terrorists (Rupesinghe, 2018). This also affects the security of Burkina Faso since citizens may not be curtailed about their safety any longer or may live in perpetual fear in the country. What is worrying is the fact that the Fulani herdsmen in Nigeria who have become susceptible to terrorist recruitment sometimes possess very sophisticated and much powerful weaponry and small arms as compared to the weapons used by the state security personnel or officials. This most at times incapacitate the Nigerian state's security agencies in their efforts to clamp down the Fulani herdsmen's terrorist activities in Nigeria.

3.4.3 Perpetual Insecurity and Threats to Citizens' Lives

The proliferation of small arms and other weaponry coupled with escalation of political, religious and ethnic tensions due to the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso has resulted in the increase in crime rates perpetuated particularly by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in various parts of Burkina Faso (Aborhey, 2019). This had led to the prevalence of atrocious acts such as extortions, abductions, rape, stealing, kidnapping (such as the Western couple kidnapped in Djibo in 2016), physical assault such as armed-robbery, shootings, lootings usually on innocent citizens in Burkina Faso and in the border region between Mali and Burkina Faso (Aborhey, 2019).

The above situation prevails because terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda take advantage of the fragile nature of the Sahel to engage in criminal activities especially along the border regions of Mali and Burkina Faso (Apau, 2019). Also, Fulani herdsmen and other disgruntled youths who feel disadvantage with the prevailing socio-economic status quo in Burkina resort to criminal activities as a normalcy for survival (Apau, 2019). Consequently, some Fulani herdsmen and aggrieved youths in Burkina Faso who become dissatisfied or frustrated due to existing socio-economic structural systems, rather resort to joining radical groups such as Al-Qaeda. Subsequently, they end up using hard drugs which gives them impaired judgements and consequently increases their proclivity to commit crimes without mercy or conscience. This poses great threats to the national security of Burkina Faso.

3.4.4 Forced Displacement and Refugee Crisis

The United Nations had described the cross border terrorism which ensued in Burkina Faso in 2016, as a complex humanitarian crisis which has bedeviled the West African region (Adeniran, 2020). According to the Red Cross and the UN, nearly 300,000 people have been forced to flee their homes whilst half a million people no longer have access to health care due to the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso (African Union, 2020). Although difficult to enumerate, the crisis is believed to have resulted in over 100 deaths since 2016 (African Union, 2020). This is due to deliberate attacks by Al-Qaeda militia on traditional non-Islamic towns and villages in Burkina Faso and Mali, perceived not to share the same ideology, ethnicity or background with rebel groups (African Union, 2020). Consequently, there has been several destruction of villages, looting, killings, sexual and other human rights abuses on non-Islamic towns and villages in border towns and villages in Burkina Faso (Ibid).

In addition to the above, there have been pollution of water bodies, making life very unbearable for inhabitants in border towns and villages in Burkina Faso (Ibid). Others have also been affected with other humanitarian crises including starvation and malnutrition with attendant malnutrition diseases (Ibid). In addition, there have been evidences of gang rape cases against non-Islamic, women and children in the border towns and villages of Burkina Faso (Ibid). This resulted in forceful displacement and refugee crisis of most inhabitants in the region. What has further worsened the humanitarian situation due to the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso is the prevention of the UN Humanitarian Team by Al-Qaeda groups from providing relief assistances to victims of the conflicts (Ibid). These practices by the terrorist groups violate international norms and laws and have exacerbated the humanitarian plights suffered by victims of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. This poses great national security challenges to Burkina Faso.

3.4.5 Increase in Government Security Expenditure towards Tackling the increasing Phenomena of Cross Border Terrorism within the Burkina-Mali border regions

With the growing incidence of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso, greater onus now lies on the government to take pragmatic steps towards addressing the menace. To effectively address the increasing phenomenon of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso, it is imperative that the Burkinabe Government increase its security budget in terms of acquisition of new and advanced weapons, employing the services of international and local security expertise and intelligence, as well as training more security personnel to help fight the menace (Ibid). If this is not done, the available security personnel and resources will be over-stretched in terms of having to tackling domestic security challenges in Burkina, in addition to addressing cross border terrorism.

In relation to the above, there will be a much greater drain on government's expenditure to tackle the cross border terrorism across Burkina Faso if not effectively tackled now. For instance, the security budget of Nigeria as at 2008, stood at ₦444.6 billion (Duke, 2019), before Boko Haram started its intensive devastations in the country from 2009. However, the proposed Nigeria's security budget in 2015 was ₦969 billion (Duke, 2019), which was more than double the budget in 2008. In 2018, the security budget of Nigeria stood at ₦1.334 trillion (Duke, 2019). Thus, the rise of the Boko Haram insurgent group since 2009 has been a major drain on national budget and has also stretched the security personnel in the country. Consequently, the security budget of the Burkinabe Government will continue increase if pragmatic measures are not taken to effectively clump the increasing phenomena of cross border terrorism which confronts the country.

3.5 The Development Ramifications of the Cross Border Terrorism in Burkina Faso

This section discusses how the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso has become an emerging threat to socio-economic development in the country, with special reference to the welfare of citizens. The development ramification of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso includedisruptions in major economic, agricultural and other business activities, disruptions in cultural, religious and educational activities, challenges to improved health delivery and services, high tendency for electoral violence and threats to national security management and finally, perpetual fear and panic.

3.5.1 Disruption in Major Economic, Agricultural and Other Business Activities

The effects of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso (particularly in border towns and villages) has led to a significant disruption in major economic, agricultural and other business

activities in those areas. The unpredictable and intermittent attacks by Al-Qaeda terrorist groups has limited movement of people and led to the burning down of shops in the border regions of Burkina Faso, hence posing dire consequences to economic, agricultural and other business activities especially in areas such as Deou in Oudalan province, Markoye and Songhai village (Hamani, 2019). This is because the cross border terrorism in these areas have limited movement and also forced significant number of people to flee and abandon their farmlands, businesses and other economic activities for the safety of the lives.

In Burkina Faso, most of the agricultural activities happen in the north with produce being transported to the south (Nielsen & Reenberg, 2010). Also, most businessmen and women also move from the south to the north for economic activities (Nielsen & Reenberg, 2010). Consequently, most agricultural, businesses and economic activities in northern parts of Burkina Faso are affected because of the fear of people losing their lives because of cross border terrorism by the Al-Qaeda terrorist group in the region (Hamani, 2019). In addition, the stagnation in agricultural activities pose threat to the general food security in Burkina Faso and to a larger extent the entire Sahel and West Africa (Hamani, 2019). Therefore, the abrupt interruptions in agricultural, economic and business activities will further exacerbate the already existing unemployment crisis in northern parts of Burkina Faso with its attendant consequences such as increase in crimes, low standard of living, poor nutrition, among others.

3.5.2 Disruption in Cultural, Religious and Educational Activities

The 2016 attacks by AQIM and its affiliate, al-Mourabitoun at Ouagadougou on Café Cappuccino and Hotel Splendid led to the death of 30 people (Hansen, 2019). This created tensions to gather in large crowds in most parts of Burkina Faso for some cultural, religious and educational activities even to date (Hansen, 2019). Subsequently, there have been destruction of

schools, churches and other cultural and recreational centers in Burkina Faso following the emergence of cross border terrorism in the country since 2016 (Hansen, 2019). Typical example is when armed men on motorcycles burnt down a school in Béléhédé village in Burkina Faso's Sahel region in early 2018 in a war against Western education (African Union, 2020). By March 2020, over 2,500 schools had closed in Burkina Faso, as 222 education workers had been "victims of terrorist attacks" by Al-Qaeda (African Union, 2020). This has led to increasing panic and fear among Burkinabe citizens in the border regions of the country to gather for cultural, religious and educational purposes.

The destruction of the schools, churches and some recreational centers in the northern border areas of Burkina Faso could lead to increase in school drop-outs, high illiteracy among the youth and possibility of being recruited by radical or terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. Also, the infrastructure development in northern Burkina Faso could be in shambles due to the increasing phenomena of cross terrorism.

The rich culture heritage of Burkina Faso is one of the unique characteristics which sets the country apart on the international stage. Religion is one of the major components of culture anywhere in the world. However, the frequent terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda in northern Burkina Faso promotes the culture of religious intolerance among most Christians and Muslims in Northern Burkina Faso and to other parts of the country (Hansen, 2019). Subsequently, there is restriction to the enjoyment of freedom of association in most parts of Burkina Faso due to the perpetual fear of unexpected attacks by terrorist groups.

3.5.3 Challenges to Improved Health Delivery and Services

Closely related to the above, Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks led to the destruction of some public and private health facilities particularly in the border regions in northern Burkina Faso (Baldaro & Diall, 2020). This is because the cross border terrorism in these areas have limited movement and also forced significant number of health personnel to flee and abandon health centers, and facilities in the name of ‘Safe Heavens’ elsewhere. The restriction in movements has also crippled sick people from coming out to go and seek for health treatments. This is because there are intermittent curfews imposed by the Burkinabe Government in terrorist target zones (Baldaro & Diall, 2020). In addition, most health personnel flee further southwards of the country for the fear of losing their lives (Baldaro & Diall, 2020). This has contributed to worsening the health security of Burkinabe nationals especially in this era when the international community has been confronted with the Corona Virus pandemic with dire impacts on Africa.

3.5.4 High Tendency for Electoral Violence and Threats to National Security Management

The increasing phenomena of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso due to the inability of the Government to completely clamp down the menace now could make most of the youth found hope in radical groups such as Al-Qaeda especially as witnessed in most parts of northern Burkina Faso to press home their demands (McCauley & Posner, 2019).

The cross border terrorism in northern Burkina Faso has made some youths including Fulani herdsmen much violent than before (McCauley & Posner, 2019). This has led severe political tensions especially during electioneering periods when they feel a prospective political candidate to contest for an election will not favor their interests or dreams (Ibid). Also, most security personnel in the border towns and villages in northern Burkina Faso such as Koudougou, Bobo Dioulasso, Banfora, among others who could have helped stabilize and restored peace in the country through tackling the crisis have resigned or migrated outside Burkina Faso (Devermont,

2019). They move with their families to other countries such as Nigeria and Ghana because some of these security personnel either lose their lives, colleagues or relatives by intervening in the crisis (Devermont, 2019).

Also, many security personnel are losing their lives whilst the few existing personnel who could intervene in the crisis received insufficient remuneration from the government to motivate them fight the Al-Qaeda terrorists (Devermont, 2019). There have been several cross-border attacks on security forces in Burkina Faso since 2016. These included Tin Akoff (January 15, 2016, with two deaths), Koutougou (May 18, 2016, with two wounded), Intangom (May 31, 2016, with three deaths), Markoye (September 1, 2016, with two deaths, three wounded), Intangom (October 12, 2016, with four deaths, two wounded), and Nassoumba (December 16, 2016, with 12 deaths, four wounded), (Ref World, 2020).

The above situation has empowered the Al-Qaeda terrorist groups especially in northern border region of Burkina Faso against the intervention strategy that the Burkinabe Government hoped to have relied on as an efficient way of dealing with them in their cross border terrorism in Nigeria. This situation creates generate political tensions in particularly, northern Burkina Faso, during electioneering periods.

3.5.5 Perpetual Fear and Panic

Generally, there is intense fear and tension because of the cross border terrorism by Al-Qaeda in the border towns and villages in northern Burkina Faso (Keyate, 2018). Most people in northern Burkina Faso are now terrified to go public places or engage in even normal daily routines for the fear of surprise attacks by some violent Al-Qaeda terrorists (Keyate, 2018). What has worsened the case especially in the border regions of northern Burkina Faso is the deployment of

troops by the Burkinabe Government as a counter strategy to terrorist activities in the region. This occasionally result in frequent clashes and exchanges of gun shoots between the Burkinabe national security forces and Al-Qaeda or Tuareg forces, sometimes on daily basis. Consequently, there is limited peace and security for inhabitants in the northern Burkina Faso and the entire country at large.

3.6 Response to the Cross Border Terrorism in Burkina Faso

Cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso, the Burkinabe Government deployed and operationalized a joint Army-Gendarmerie counterterrorism task force known as the Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT), with an initial strength of 1,000 troops, following the Ouagadougou (Ref World, 2020). However, after October 12, 2016 attack in Intangom, the Government augmented the GFAT with additional 500 troops (Ref World, 2020). With regards to security cooperation, Burkina Faso has cooperated on both regional and international levels in tackling cross border terrorism especially in the Sahel region. For instance, the Government of Burkina Faso has increased its collaboration with the United Nations on counterterrorism matters and participated in international fora, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF) Sahel Working Group (Ref World, 2020). Burkina Faso is also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the ECOWAS and the G-5 Sahel group (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) that was created in February 2014, and as such has cooperated significantly with all these stakeholders in addressing cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso (Ref World, 2020). Despite the fact that the phenomenon of cross border terrorism still prevails in Burkina Faso, little success has been chalked in the fight against the menace. The greatest success which could be referenced is the destruction of a terrorist base at Alidouougou in Burkina Faso, on May, 25, 2020 (Ref World, 2020).

Notwithstanding the security cooperation efforts by the Burkinabe Government to address cross border terrorism in the country, the international community is unable to effectively respond in a timely manner. In other words, the security cooperation between the international community and the Burkinabe Government in tackling cross border terrorism in the country has been tardy and inadequate. This incapability has led to the destruction of life, property and economic gains and pose dire national security and development threats to Burkina Faso.

The failure of the international community to securitize the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso early enough has contributed significantly to the challenge of tackling the crisis. If the crisis continues to persist as it is currently, it may even spread to other geographical areas outside Burkina Faso to neighbouring states such as Ghana. Therefore, there is a need to effectively tackle the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso through improved security cooperation by states, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and international organizations to securitize the crisis as an existential global threat.

3.7 Challenges to Tackling the Cross Border Terrorism in Burkina Faso

Notwithstanding the attempts by the Burkinabe Government through security cooperation at the regional and national levels, there are some challenges which militate against the effective tackling of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. Paramount among them include financial constraints, personal constraints, difficulty in obtaining reliable information, economic hardship and insufficient job opportunities in Burkina Faso, porous borders and limited awareness creation/ignorance on the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso.

3.7.1 Financial Constraints

The cost of tackling terrorism is a very expensive. As more equipment and personnel are required to deal with the prevailing or emerging security threats. As revealed by Santoro, (2020),

the US uses about \$ 3 trillion to fight global terrorism. An average of \$4.8 million per day on counterterrorism activities, and this is about twenty times what ECOWAS is spending in its fight against terrorism. Tackling cross border terrorism as witnessed in Burkina Faso requires much revenue to acquire sophisticated surveillance and intelligence equipment and train security personnel for deployment at the ports and harbours, airports and borders.

Though, Burkina Faso engage in security cooperation with regional and international stakeholders in addressing cross border terrorism in the country, insufficient financial rewards and benefits of officials of the Burkinabe national security agencies make most of them susceptible to bribery and corruption (Idaewor, 2020), hence militating against the efforts towards achieving complete success in the fight. In addition, the Burkinabe Governments' revenue and resources in addressing cross border terrorism is insufficient to change patterns and trend of such threats. This has significantly affected the effectiveness of the Burkinabe Government in its objectives of tackling the cross border terrorism in the country.

3.7.2 Personnel Constraints

Tackling cross border terrorism requires a large number of trained or expert security personnel. This is because such security threats and the modus operandi adopted by actors who perpetuate them in contemporary times. However, in most African countries such as Burkina Faso, there are limited state security personnel to manage dire security situations such as the cross border terrorism (Idaewor, 2020). The 1500 troops of Groupement des Forces Anti-Terroristes (GFAT), established by the Burkinabe Government in addressing the cross border terrorism in the country constitute personnel constraint and will always be a snag in the efforts in clamping the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso.

3.7.3 Difficulty in Obtaining Reliable Information

The success of tackling the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso can thrive effectively on reliable informants or information. However, there is difficulty in obtaining reliable information on the clandestine moves and tactics of terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Sahel region (Idaewor, 2020). Sometimes, out of about 100 informants contacted, only 10 out them will be genuine or reliable (i.e. there is limited in-flow of information), (Idaewor, 2020). Sometimes the process of tackling the cross border terrorism through security cooperation between Burkina Faso and international community usually rely on tip-offs from other security agencies before they could act, instead of ability to access first-hand information from the Burkinabe state security forces (Idaewor, 2020). Acting on tip off information sometimes delay actions which makes it extremely difficult for the effectiveness in clamping down cross border terrorism in the country.

3.7.4 Economic Hardship and Insufficient Job Opportunities in Burkina Faso

There is an alarming rate of mass unemployment among most youths in almost all African states including Burkina Faso. The inability of the Burkinabe Government to tackle these issues make these youths susceptible to Jihadist recruitment (Harsch, E. (2017). This has largely contributed to the prevailing cross border terrorism perpetuated by the Tuaregs from Mali and the Al-Qaeda in Burkina Faso. Therefore, notwithstanding the security cooperation between the international community and Burkina Faso, the high incidence of poverty and limited job opportunities

continues to serve as a bait which makes most youth including the Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso to be susceptible into terrorist groups recruitment.

3.7.5 Porous nature of Borders in Burkina Faso

One of the major factors facilitating cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso is the porous nature of borders especially in the northern part of the country (Itumo et al., 2017). Burkina Faso has a greater challenge in terms of border and harbour controls and this makes it easier for the movement of terrorists (such as the Al-Qaeda) to and fro the country to carry out their clandestine operations. The porous nature of Burkina Faso's borders allow terrorism into the country, with impunity. There is also lack of equipment to ensure effective surveillance at borders, coupled with high rate of corruption, which incite terrorists to use such avenues for their activities (Itumo et al., 2017). This has made it very difficult and almost practical impossible for Burkina Faso to be successful in its preventive and combative efforts of the cross border terrorism in the country.

3.7.6 Limited Awareness Creation/Ignorance on Cross Border Terrorism in Burkina Faso

The phenomenon of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso and the entire West Africa cannot be effectively prevented if the citizens and the entire international community are ignorant of the development and security ramifications of the phenomenon to Burkina Faso, the sub-region and entire international community. However, there are some citizens even in the neighboring countries of Burkina Faso such as Ghana who are not even aware of the security threats happening in Burkina Faso (Itumo et al, 2018). This can hinder the extent to which states will

mobilize resources in addressing threats such as cross border terrorism as prevailing in Burkina Faso.

3.8 Lessons which could be Learnt by Ghana from the Experience of the Cross Border Terrorism in Burkina Faso

There are some lessons Ghana can learn from the cross border terrorism situation in Burkina to avoid similar situation from happening in Ghana. Paramount among these lessons include nationwide deployment of military forces, equitable national development, the necessity for an effective counterterrorism strategic plan for combatting terrorism in Ghana and West Africa, effective border control and effective participation in regional and international organisations.

3.8.1 Nationwide Deployment of Military Forces

The terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda, particularly, Northern Burkina Faso was exacerbated by the lack of well-equipped deployment of military forces nationwide. Majority of the Burkinabe Security Forces are concentrated in the Southern part of the country as compared to the north (McCauley & Posner, 2019). With regards to Ghana, the strength of military forces in the Northern Regions especially the Upper West and East is inadequate. There is the need for creation of well-equipped battalions to dominate those regions. This will allow the Airborne Force which presently controls the Upper East and West Regions to play its role as a special

force throughout the country, especially with the rise of any insurgency group that would wish to cause mayhem in those regions.

3.8.2 Equitable National Development

High level of poverty and lack of job opportunities is identified in this study as major factors which make most unemployed youths including some Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso to become susceptible to Jihadist group recruitment. To address the situation, the Burkinabe Government have some social intervention policies in place including the Universal Health Insurance Project instituted in 2008, and establishment of an inter-ministerial committee in 2010, responsible for driving efforts to develop a national policy on social protection that sets out a road map presenting the global vision on social protection in Burkina Faso (Samb & Ridde, 2018). In Ghana, there is a seeming equitable development across the nation. However, poverty levels in the Northern Regions are still high. There is the need to speed up deliberate government interventions such as Savannah Accelerated Development Agency (SADA), Free Senior High School (SHS) Policy, 1 District, 1 Factory (1D, 1F), Nation Builders Corps (NABCO), Planting for Food and Jobs to bridge the development gap between the North and the South.

3.8.3 The Necessity for an Effective Counterterrorism Strategic Plan for Combatting Terrorism in Ghana and West Africa

One of the main ways which Ghana can prevent and combat terrorism in the country and the West Africa region is by having a National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana. Ghana's National Framework for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Ghana which was developed in 2019 is in the right direction as it provides the strategic security and cooperative interventions which aims at promoting security in the country with regards to preventing terrorism in the country and around

neighboring countries, as well as the entire sub-region. This includes a well-defined, inter-agency approach for preventing and combating violent extremist groups and terrorists who threaten the security of Ghana and to protect her national interests from such attacks. The Framework also involves skills and knowledge geared towards enabling the youth to become employable or empowered economically through a vocation or occupation to discourage most unemployed youths from perceiving terrorism as a better strategy of pressing home their demands.

3.8.4 Effective Border Control

The increasing attack of Northern Burkina Faso by the Tuaregs and Al-Qaeda terrorist groups is largely due to free and uncontrolled movement of people across its borders. The porous borders allowed for massive smuggling of sophisticated weapons into the border towns and villages of Northern Burkina Faso which unfortunately are used by terrorist groups in their clandestine atrocious attacks. Security at Ghana borders is a challenge. There is the need to tighten security along the borders to prevent cross border crimes including terrorism. Therefore, the legislative approval of the Ghana Immigration Service to use weapons is a step in the right direction. In addition, the Ghana Armed Forces should be well resourced to undertake border security operations in support to the Police and Administrative Services.

3.8.5 Effective Participation in Regional and International Organisations

The crisis caused by the Al-Qaeda and Tuareg terrorist groups in the border regions between Burkina Faso and Mali was aggravated by the delayed response from regional organisations such as the ECOWAS, the AU and the UN. Even though Burkina Faso has been a regional player in

the Sahel region and ECOWAS has one of the strongest army in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and West Africa as a whole, it is not able to rely solely on its domestic Security Forces in dealing with the Al-Qaeda. Hence, the need for support from the AU, the ECOWAS and the UN, which unfortunately did not provide timely intervention in dealing with the Al-Qaeda insurgency group in the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. This is partly because of the lukewarm attitude exhibited by some member states in dealing with the terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda for fear of being attacked later. Currently occupying the position as the leader of ECOWAS, Ghana's participation in Regional and other International crisis situations through participation in ECOMOG, UN Peace Support Operations as well as the 2014 Ebola and Covid-19 response have been greatly applauded and recognized internationally. There is the need to maintain this standard in to order gain timely regional and international support in times of crisis such as cross border terrorism.

3.9 Conclusion

Acknowledged for its stability and its immense contribution to ECOWAS regional stability, as well as the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism, Burkina Faso is now confronted with the dire challenges of cross border terrorism which ensued from Mali. The nature of the crisis is such that the terrorist situation in Mali due to Al-Qaeda attacks in the northern parts of Mali destabilized the peace and security enjoyed in the cross border regions between Mali and Burkina, and prompted an urgently intervention from Burkina Faso by virtue of being a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership to Partner to help restore peace and security to the northern parts of Mali. The Burkinabe forces were very instrumental and successful in their partnership with the Malian Military in reclaiming the seized territories by the terrorist groups and driving them away. As a result of this, the terrorist groups got infuriated with the

intervention role played by Burkina Faso. These has led to several Islamist Jihadist group including Al Qaeda carrying series of attacks in Burkina Faso since 2016.

With respect to the dynamics of the crisis, the Al-Qaeda has now shifted attention from Mali and concentrated predominately in carrying out series of attacks in Burkina Faso since 2016 to date. In addition, the Al-Qaeda terrorist groups such as AQIM recruit unemployed or frustrated youth including some Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso to help them in carrying out their clandestine atrocious attacks.

In relation to the above, the Chapter reveals that there are some structural systems and weaknesses which has made Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border terrorism. Paramount among them include globalization and its effects of trans organized crimes, the fragile security nature of the Sahel region, the porous border control systems in Burkina Faso, poverty coupled with extreme economic hardships and the increasing conflictual relations between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Burkina Faso.

The Chapter points out that the main national security threats of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso include high tendency for escalating already existing political, religious and ethnic tensions existing in the country, proliferation of sophisticated small arms and other light weapons, perpetual insecurity and threats to citizens' lives, forced displacement and refugee crisis and finally, increase in government security expenditure towards tackling the increasing phenomena of cross border terrorism within the Burkina-Mali region.

Similar to the above, the Chapter reveals that the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso has become an emerging threat to socio-economic development in the country, with special reference to the welfare of citizens. The development ramification of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso include disruptions in major economic, agricultural and other business activities,

disruptions in cultural, religious and educational activities, challenges to improved health delivery and services, high tendency for electoral violence and threats to national security management and finally, perpetual fear and panic.

The Chapter also shows that Burkina Faso through regional and international security cooperation has garnered efforts towards effectively tackling the cross border terrorism in the border regions between Mali and Burkina Faso. Notwithstanding the security cooperation efforts by the Burkinabe Government to address the cross border terrorism in the country, the international community as whole has been unable to effectively respond in a timely manner to the security emergencies. In other words, the security cooperation between the international community and the Burkinabe Government towards addressing the cross border terrorism in the country has been tardy and inadequate. This incapability has led to the destruction of life, property and economic gains and post dire national security and development threats to Burkina Faso. If the crisis continues to persist as it is currently, it may even spread to other geographical areas outside Burkina Faso to neighbouring states such as Ghana or even outside West Africa where it originated.

The Chapter points out that notwithstanding the attempts by the Burkinabe Government through security cooperation at the regional and national levels, there are some challenges which militate against the effective tackling of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. Paramount among them include financial constraints, personal constraints, difficulty in obtaining reliable information, economic hardship and insufficient job opportunities in Burkina Faso, the porous nature of borders in Burkina Faso and limited awareness creation/ignorance on the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso.

The Chapter unravels that there are some cues and lessons which could be taken by Ghana from the experience of the cross border terrorism in Burkina to be able to avert similar situation from happening in Ghana since Ghana is a neighbouring country to the south of Burkina Faso. Paramount among these lessons include nationwide deployment of military forces, equitable national development, the necessity for an effective counterterrorism strategic plan for combatting terrorism in Ghana and West Africa, effective border control and effective participation in regional and international organizations.



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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

4.1 Introduction

This Chapter provides the summary of research findings, recommendations and conclusions. The study was carried out under the Conceptual frameworks of National Security and Security Cooperation with the major argument that Burkina Faso's response (through regional and international security cooperation) to the emerging threats of cross border terrorism from the northern section of the country has been tardy and inadequate, hence contributing to persistence of the crisis even to date. The concept of National Security was chosen because it helps to better understand, appreciate and explain how the because it helps in understanding how the state

security of Burkina Faso is being threatened with the growing threats of cross border terrorism in the northern section of the country. The concept of Security cooperation was also selected to help in providing an explanation for why the engagements of states in West African such as Burkina Faso towards addressing security threats such as cross-border terrorism has given rise or necessitated regional and international security cooperation to tackle the menace.

Therefore, the main objectives of the study were to evaluate the nature and dynamics of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso, explore the structural weaknesses that make Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border Terrorism, explore the national security and development ramifications of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso, to evaluate the response and challenges in addressing the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso and to forecast lessons that could be learnt by Ghana from the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso (since it is Ghana's neighbouring country to the north).

4.2 Summary of Major Research Findings

In summarizing the major findings, there is the need to again look at the main questions that guided the study:

1. What is the nature and dynamics of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso?
2. What are the structural weaknesses, national security and development ramification and challenges of terrorism in Burkina Faso?
3. What lessons can be drawn by Ghana from the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso (since it is Ghana's neighbouring country to the north)?

The following are summaries of the major findings based on the research questions asked.

4.2.1 The findings on the nature and dynamics of the cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso are:

- ❖ That Burkina Faso's hitherto stability, its immense contribution to ECOWAS stability, and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism, Burkina Faso is now confronted with the dire challenges of cross border terrorism which arose from Mali.
- ❖ That the al-Qaeda-led terrorist situation in northern Mali destabilized the peace and security hitherto enjoyed across the border regions between Mali and Burkina and prompted an urgent intervention by Burkina Faso nationally and by virtue of being a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership saddled with restoring peace and security to the northern parts of Mali.
- ❖ That Burkinabe forces partnership with Malian forces and their success in reclaiming the seized territories infuriated the terrorist groups. As a result, many Islamist Jihadist group including Al Qaeda decided to attack Burkina Faso since 2016.
- ❖ That Al-Qaeda shifted its attacks from Mali to Burkina Faso since 2016. That Al-Qaeda terrorist groups such as AQIM recruit unemployed or frustrated youth including those of Fulani herdsmen in Burkina Faso for their activities.

4.2.2 Findings on the structural weaknesses that make Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border Terrorism include:

- ❖ In relation to the above objective, the study revealed that there are some structural systems and weaknesses which has made Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border terrorism. Paramount among them include globalization and its effects of trans organized crimes, the fragile security nature of the Sahel region, the porous border control systems

in Burkina Faso, poverty coupled with extreme economic hardships and the increasing conflictual relations between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in Burkina Faso.

4.2.3 Findings on the national security and development ramifications of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso

- ❖ To address the above objective, the study showed that the main national security ramifications of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso include high tendency for escalating already existing political, religious and ethnic tensions existing in the country, proliferation of sophisticated small arms and other light weapons, perpetual insecurity and threats to citizens' lives, forced displacement and refugee crisis and finally, increase in government security expenditure towards tackling the increasing phenomena of cross border terrorism within the Burkina-Mali region.
- ❖ Similar to the above, the study revealed that the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso has become an emerging threat to socio-economic development in the country, with special reference to the welfare of citizens. The development ramification of the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso include disruptions in major economic, agricultural and other business activities, disruptions in cultural, religious and educational activities, challenges to improved health delivery and services, high tendency for electoral violence and threats to national security management and finally, perpetual fear and panic.

4.2.4 Findings on the response and challenges in addressing the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso

- ❖ To address the above objective, the study uncovered that Burkina Faso through regional and international security cooperation has garnered efforts towards effectively tackling the cross border terrorism in the border regions between Mali and Burkina Faso.

Notwithstanding the security cooperation efforts by the Burkinabe Government to address the cross border terrorism in the country, the international community as whole has been unable to effectively respond in a timely manner to the security emergencies. In other words, the security cooperation between the international community and the Burkinabe Government towards addressing the cross border terrorism in the country has been tardy and inadequate. This incapability has led to the destruction of life, property and economic gains and pose dire national security and development threats to Burkina Faso. If the crisis continues to persist as it is currently, it may even spread to other geographical areas outside Burkina Faso to neighbouring states such as Ghana or even outside West Africa where it originated.

- ❖ Subsequent to the above, the Chapter points out that notwithstanding the attempts by the Burkinabe Government through security cooperation at the regional and national levels, there are some challenges which militate against the effective tackling of cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso. Paramount among them include financial constraints, personal constraints, difficulty in obtaining reliable information, economic hardship and insufficient job opportunities in Burkina Faso, the porous nature of borders in Burkina Faso and limited awareness creation/ignorance on the cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso.

4.2.5 On probable lessons for Ghana on the cross-border violence in Burkina Faso, the study found

- ❖ That from the experience of the cross-border terrorism in Burkina, Ghana is vulnerable to terrorist attacks and needs to deploy effective border control measures.

4.3 Contribution of the Study to Theory/Academia, Policy Making and Practice

4.3.1 Contribution to Theory/Academia are:

- ❖ That the concepts of National Security and Security Cooperation could be used in explaining threat of cross-border terrorism from a state's (i.e. Burkina Faso) perspective. That the study complements already existing studies with regards to how the structural weaknesses makes Burkina Faso susceptible to cross border terrorism. That it also demonstrated how synergy between national and regional or international forces can be deploy in the fight against militant groups.
- ❖ That it helped in understanding the efforts, prospects and challenges by Burkina Faso in addressing cross border terrorism.

4.3.2 Implications for Research, Practice and Policy

- ❖ The research opens how states could become legitimate targets to terrorist groups because they help states under attack to stem the tide of terrorism.
- ❖ In terms of policy implications, the study calls for the need for governments in developing countries, particularly states in West Africa, to promote clearly defined national counter terrorism regulatory frameworks and policies.

4.4 Conclusions:

The study concludes that:

- ❖ That Burkina Faso' structural weaknesses contributed significantly to the phenomenon of cross-border terrorism in Burkina Faso.

- ❖ That the increasing phenomenon of cross border terrorism has significant implications for the national security and socio-economic development of Burkina Faso.
- ❖ That addressing cross border terrorism in Burkina Faso and to a large extent in West Africa, requires harmonization of national security strategies with that of national development strategies which has potentials for promoting effective regional and international security cooperation.
- ❖ That Burkina Faso' efforts towards addressing cross border terrorism in the country and in the West African sub-region could be jeopardized if effective measures are not taken by the governments and all stakeholders to address or tackle the challenges as identified in this study.
- ❖ That Burkina Faso's response (through regional and international security cooperation) to the emerging threats of cross border terrorism from the northern section of the country has been tardy and inadequate, hence protraction of the crisis.

4.5 Recommendations

Based on the findings, the study suggests:

- ❖ That Burkina Faso should solicit effective regional and international security cooperation to effectively tackle the dire national security and developmental challenges created. This will ensure effective, efficient and viable policies are formulated and implemented towards tackling the menace.
- ❖ That the Government should ensure that its state security institutions and personnel for engaging in counter terrorist operations (particularly against Al-Qaeda and Tuaregs

terrorists), across the border region between Mali and Burkina Faso should be adequately financed, well-resourced and equipped to deliver.

- ❖ That Burkinabe citizens should be sensitized to become security conscious in order to better appreciate the threat posed by terrorism.
- ❖ That more research and dissemination of the findings should also be carried out on the prevailing and emerging national security threats to enable policy makers better address the security challenges posed by terrorism.
- ❖ That the Burkinabe Government to promote comprehensive development across the country without leaving out any part or segment of the country. This will help prevent conspiracy theories that promote terrorism.



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
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