Asian Journal of Political Science
ISSN: 0218-5377 (Print) 1750-7812 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasi20
Sino-Ghana bilateral relations and Chinese
migrants’ illegal gold mining in Ghana
Emmanuel Debrah & Richard Asante
To cite this article: Emmanuel Debrah & Richard Asante (2019) Sino-Ghana bilateral relations and
Chinese migrants’ illegal gold mining in Ghana, Asian Journal of Political Science, 27:3, 286-307,
DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2019.1669473
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2019.1669473
Published online: 26 Sep 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 44
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rasi20
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
2019, VOL. 27, NO. 3, 286–307
https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2019.1669473
Sino-Ghana bilateral relations and Chinese migrants’ illegal
gold mining in Ghana
Emmanuel Debraha and Richard Asanteb
aDepartment of Political Science, University of Ghana, Accra, Ghana; bInstitute of African Studies, University of
Ghana, Accra, Ghana
ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article examines the participation of some Chinese migrants in Chinese Migrants; Illegal Gold
illegal gold mining (known as galamsey) in Ghana, and how the Mining/Galamsey; Bilateral/
Government’s policy to address the issue created diplomatic Diplomatic Relations; South–
tension between China and Ghana. Drawing on primary data from South Cooperation; Ghana
in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 250 respondents and
supplementary information from archival sources and personal
observation, the study found that small-scale gold mining is an
area legally reserved for Ghanaian indigenes, who faced stern
competition from some Chinese migrants’ miners. Their ability to
mobilize resources and machinery to execute galamsey virtually
displaced the indigenes from their source of livelihood and
caused environmental catastrophes. The Ghana Government’s
policy response to the Chinese migrants’ galamsey, which led to
arrests, sentencing and deportations of some Chinese miners,
angered Beijing and fractured Ghana–China diplomatic ties. But
the dispute could not collapse the entrenched bilateral relations
between the two nations because the calculated mutual benefit
derived from the relations was thought to be higher than the
Chinese galamsey issue. Policy reforms which legally integrate
Chinese migrants’ miners into the small-scale mining sector would
stop galamsey and strengthen Sino-Ghana relations.
Introduction
China has always had constructive diplomatic and economic relations with Ghana. Post-
independence ties between the two nations have evolved from a political ideological one to
economic cooperation (Aidoo, 2016). The beginning of China–Ghana friendship was con-
structed on the Socialist framework forged by the first-generation leaders of China and
Ghana – Zhou Enlai and Kwame Nkrumah, respectively. In the search for the Socialist sol-
ution to his grandiose development programmes, Nkrumah embarked on a momentous
state visit to China in 1961, which was reciprocated by Zhou in 1964. Ghana was one
of the countries that rallied support for China’s bid to join the United Nations. Inspired
by the South–South cooperation agenda, China offered a $20 million interest-free loan
repayable in Ghanaian exports to support Nkrumah’s statist development agenda
(Thompson, 2012). Since the end of the Cold War, Ghana has benefited from Chinese’s
direct investments. For instance, in 2012, China granted a whopping $3 billion low-
CONTACT Emmanuel Debrah edebrah@ug.edu.gh
© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 287
interest loan to Ghana, which the Ghana Government described as a gesture of friendship
(Aidoo, 2016; Sanderson & Forsyth, 2013). Bilateral trade between the two nations as of
2012 stood at $5.4 billion. Of this, Ghana’s exports to China were 77.2% (Jianzhong,
2013). Chinese’s investments have led to the successful implementation of key projects
such as the Cape Coast Sports Stadium, the Bui Hydro-electric Dam, the Kpong Water
Supply Expansion Project, the Gas Pipeline Project and the Sunon-Asogli Power Plant
(Idun-Arkhurst, 2008).
While recognizing that the encouraging efforts made by Chinese companies to direct
equity into some businesses in Ghana have propelled relative economic growth based
on a win–win paradigm, some critics of Sino-Africa relations have raised concerns
about China’s economic activities on the continent such as the ‘appetizing’ loans that
are perceived as potential recipes for deepening the debt burdens of poor countries (Bräu-
tigam, 2011) and the fact that most Chinese investments are small to medium-sized
(Aidoo, 2016; The Guardian, 2017). Also, there is the perception that the large Chinese
businesses and small-scale private actors interacting with Ghanaian business counterparts
and population at various levels diversely serve as agents or actors of Beijing’s foreign
policy agenda (Aidoo, 2016). Others have argued that, when examined closely, the
benefits from complementary economic contributions by Beijing have been largely sup-
planted by the competition with local businesses for the capture of the indigenous retail
market (Baah & Jauch, 2009). However, it must be emphasized that the focus of this
article is not directed at claims about whether China is in Ghana to exploit its rich
natural resources andWestern media stereotypes such as land grabbing and empire build-
ing (Bräutigam, 2011); neither is it about the role of Chinese’s migrants in the agri-food
sector – agricultural aid (Cook, Lu, Tugendhat, & Alemu, 2016), nor the rising Chinese
trade and aid flows to the continent. It also gazes beyond anecdotal studies on the galam-
sey – unregulated artisanal gold mining crisis in Ghana that vaguely put the blame on the
role of local actors and the persecutions of Chinese migrant miners (Aidoo, 2016; Asante,
2018). On the contrary, this article examines the Ghana government’s policy intervention
to halt activities of some Chinese migrants involved in galamsey, which created a diplo-
matic rumpus between the two nations and its ramification on Sino-Ghana diplomatic
and economic relations. It contends that the targeted anti-galamsey policy could not
destroy Sino-Ghana relations that are deeply anchored on mutual trust, respect and
South–South and win–win economic cooperation. Against this backdrop, the article
addresses these empirical questions: (i) to what extent have some Chinese migrants par-
ticipated in illegal gold mining in Ghana? What policy measures did the Government of
Ghana adopt to halt the galamsey menace? How did the reaction by the Chinese Govern-
ment to Ghana’s anti-galamsey policy affect relations between the two countries? Why has
China–Ghana friendship endured, and what hat lessons have been learnt from galamsey
and China’s economic activities in Africa?
The paper is structured as follows: this introduction is followed by an examination of
the theoretical foundation of bilateral relations and the historical trajectories, legal regime
and the actors in order to comprehend how galamsey has evolved. It analyses the Govern-
ment’s policy intervention to halt the galamsey menace, China’s response to the policy and
its effects on the two nations’ relations, and explains why Sino-Ghana bilateral relations
remained consolidated despite the diplomatic roar. It concludes by drawing lessons for
the rest of Africa.
288 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
The theoretical and empirical literature on Sino-Africa relations
The literature on Sino-Africa relations is replete with competing perspectives on why
China has increased its presence in Africa. Each of these strands sheds light on the ques-
tion of why foreign actors such as China tend to influence other nations through invest-
ments and other forms of economic activities and forge bilateral relations. For instance,
according to the Realists, governments are not charitable institutions but rather stra-
tegic-minded entities that act in line with their national interests. Realism argues that
national interests dominate decision-making in countries and foreign aid, for instance,
is dependent on donor interests (Morgenthau, 1962). The Realists believe that the inter-
national system is largely characterized by stern competition, and states act out of the
desire for power and security. Neo-realists would even argue that states’ economic con-
ditions in the global balance are just as important as traditional security arenas. Therefore,
neo-realists regard foreign assistance/aid, for instance, as a tool to ensure the longevity of
donors’ influence. For instance, they contend that all types of humanitarian aid are politi-
cal because it provides channels for donor countries to gain political advantage over the
recipient ones. Liska (1960) has suggested that foreign investment can advance the
donor country’s position by consolidating a friendly regime’s legitimacy, increase the
donor’s access to resources and expand the donor’s influence over recipient countries.
On the basis of this, dependency theorists contend that countries such as Ghana are
unable to exert influence over their own economic decisions because the system dictates
that they export natural resources to the powerful countries such as China (Krasner,
1985). Therefore, Chinese investments and trade deals in Africa are often regarded as
being detrimental to the continent’s growth and development (French, 2014). China’s
trade deals are perceived as forms of ‘neocolonialism’, and China is the new ‘imperial
power’ in Africa. Hence, the expression, the ‘Chinese are coming’ has become a derogatory
remark to describe Chinese investments in Africa (The Economist, 2011, p. 1).
However, when China’s role in Ghana is closely examined, it might not fit into the ideo-
logical debates enumerated above. A more optimistic view that is often cited to justify
foreign assistance and formation of bilateral relations is the ‘technique of statecraft’ para-
digm (Baldwin, 1966, p. 3). This means that wealthy nations administer assistance to
needy countries to promote their foreign policy objectives: Thus Chinese’s investment
model in Ghana may be rooted in ‘South–South’, ‘win–win’ and ‘mutually beneficial’
development deals fostering self-reliant development among low-income countries
(Asante, 2018). Therefore, it is the case that China is helping Africa to develop through
their aid project. For instance, between 1956 and 2006, China gave more than $5
billion for 800 aid projects in Africa (Burgis & Wallis, 2010; Thompson, 2012). This per-
spective holds that Chinese investments and trade deals with Africa have contributed to
economic development. Jayaram, Kassiri, and Yuan Sun (2017) indicated that Chinese
investments in Africa have led to job creation, skills development, and the transfer of
new technologies – albeit inadequate – and practices generally associated with Western
business norms. Also, the Idealist School views foreign aid as humanitarian service –
based on ethical concerns. Therefore, cooperation among nations such as China and
Ghana (China-Ghana) is devoid of competition, conflict and the ‘we or they’ structure
(Zafar, 2007). Cook et al. (2016), for instance, believe that China’s support system has con-
tributed to ‘creative peace’. For instance, a growing feature of China–Africa relation is the
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 289
phenomenal holding of political consultations between Chinese and African leaders at the
United Nations. Indeed, China has recently not only completed the construction of the
African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa but also increased its troop contributions
to United Nation peacekeeping forces in Africa. Therefore China–Ghana bilateral
relations may be one of the ways of promoting mutually beneficial development initiatives.
The methodological imperative
Data for this study depended largely on in-depth interviews and information gathered
from 10 communities in six regions of Ghana from June 2016 to December 2018. The
regions and communities were: Eastern (Kyebi & Anyinam), Central (Dunkwa-on-Offin
& Beposo), Western (Tarkwa-Nsuaem & Prestea Huni-Valley), Ashanti (Obuasi &
Konongo) and Brong Ahafo (Kenyase & Hwediem). These communities are well-
known mining hubs where large companies have extracted gold for many years and
where fairly recently both locals and foreigners including some Chinese migrants have
mined gold. The study deployed this qualitative method in order to deal with the inter-
actions among the different actors whose interests and perspectives have shaped the
galamsey phenomenon and impacted Sino-Ghana relations. The method allowed the
researchers to witness the arrests, trials and deportations of some Chinese illegal miners
and engage the illegal miners and state officials in close conversations to gain insight
into the Chinese migrants involved in illegal mining.
The primary information was obtained through face-to-face interviews using unstruc-
tured questions on 250 participants chosen through the purposive and snowballing
approaches as well as the direct observation of events and processes involving some
Chinese migrants’ galamsey activities, and Ghana Government and Chinese officials’
respective responses to the issue. There were two principal groups of respondents. The
first key informants comprised officers from some state institutions and other individuals,
namely 10 each from Immigration, Police, Armed Forces, Attorney-General’s Department
(AGD), Members of Parliament (MPs), Ministers, District Chief Executives (DCEs),
Assembly Members, civil society activists, media anchors, and chiefs or their representa-
tives, as well as five Chinese officials at the Accra Embassy. This group of interviewees were
chosen through the purposive method because of their comprehensive knowledge, under-
standing and association with the galamsey issue, while the MPs/Ministers participated in
anti-galamsey policy-making, the Police, Army, AGD and Immigration officers were in
charge of its enforcement/implementation (arrest, prosecutions and deportations of the
Chinese illegal gold miners), the media anchors and civil society activists who mobilized
public opinion against galamsey, the DCEs/Assembly Members are responsible for local
government administration of the study areas and chiefs are the rulers and custodians
of lands in the mining communities.
The second group of informants included 75 indigenes who have been operating small-
scale gold mining for many years and 60 Chinese illegal miners whose galamsey activities
peaked in 2016 and drew government and public resentment. These respondents were
reached through a snowball sampling technique that involved making contacts with key
respondents who, in turn, provided lead information about next contacts. This method
was extremely helpful given the sensitive nature of illegal gold mining, the political con-
troversies associated with it and the general public reaction to it. The application of this
290 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
technique ensured that the respondents’ anonymity was safeguarded by holding their
identity confidential. In particular, the Chinese were more concerned about possible
arrests if their real identities were divulged to the state operatives involved in clamping
down on their galamsey activities. Even some state officials and chiefs expressed
concern about their safety in the communities if it was discovered by the local illegal
miners that they had disclosed information about their activities to outsiders.
The primary information gathered through interviews and observation was comple-
mented with secondary sources from a review of the literature retrieved from books, pub-
lished/unpublished reports, journal articles, newspapers and internet publications on the
salient subject of Sino-Africa relations, and some Chinese migrants’ galamsey activities.
These secondary data were triangulated with transcripts and notes collected from the
field (through interviews and observation) and subjected to content and thematic analysis.
This approach allowed for data structuring for clarity of the ideas and examination of par-
ticipants’ perspectives and insight of the hidden similarities and differences in their
opinions (Nowell, Norris, White, & Deborah, 2017).
History and regulatory framework of gold mining in Ghana
This section examines the trajectories and the legal regime of the gold mining industry in
order to understand the nature and dynamics of the galamsey issue. It notes that legitimate
gold mining has been executed on two fronts, namely indigenous small-scale mining and
mechanized mining on large scale by foreign companies. Evidence from interviews attests
to the fact that gold mining has been one of the most important economic activities in
Ghana since time immemorial even though the extraction of the mineral on large com-
mercial scale is fairly recent. Early scholars observed that ‘gold mining had been carried
out by the natives for thousands of years long before the Phoenicians landed on the
Guinea Coast of West Africa’ (Arhin, 1970; Balkema & Junner, 1973; Kesse, 1985). Scho-
larly accounts indicate that throughout the history of mining, small-scale gold mining has
been reserved for the indigenes (Aidoo, 2016; Arhin, 1970). For a long time, Ghanaians
have legitimately mined gold and other minerals on their farmlands and compounds
(Interview, Chiefs, Obuasi & Kyebi, July 2017). They had also procured gold from
streams, rivers and coastal gravel and sand, and dredged and dived riverbeds to extract
gold before pit-mining was introduced (Taylor, 2006). Arhin (1970) has observed that
pre-colonial gold mining was controlled by chiefs – the spiritual and political heads of
the communities. The indigenes mined and used gold for ceremonial and ornamental pur-
poses. Chiefs and family heads that controlled gold mines used slave labour. However,
when it became a valuable means of exchange, wealth accumulation and a source of
power, other non-family members contracted on the ‘abusa’ system were brought into
it (LaTorre, 1978). Dumett (1998) reported that in the Asante kingdom, the Asantehene
granted permission to private persons to undertake gold production. He ensured that a
certain size of gold-nuggets found on any part of his empire was first sent to the
monarch who retained a proportion and then returned some to the sub-chief and
miner who discovered them (LaTorre, 1978, p. 63). However, the arrival of the Portuguese
around the fifteenth century changed the nature and playing field of gold mining in the
then Gold Coast. After discovering a large gold deposit between the Ankobra and Volta
rivers, which they namedMina (mine), an effort was made to organize gold into a lucrative
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 291
business. Trade forts and castles, which were built on the coasts to establish permanent
trading links with Europe, also aimed to exploit gold in the Gold Coast. For instance,
the building of the Elmina, Komenda and Axim castles and forts by the Portuguese,
Dutch, Danes and later the British to trade in slaves also helped consolidate the gold
business. Profits from gold and other merchandise from West Africa flew to Europe for
their state-building projects, which also created the economic foundation for colonial
rule in the nineteenth century (Balkema & Junner, 1973).
Thus the indigenous gold business which was largely sustained through rudimentary
technology organized under the tutelage of the paramount chief of a locality was to be sup-
planted by British concessioners who trooped to the land of gold.
By 1874, when it became evident to the British colonial government that a more direct
access to gold mining areas was a possibility, it gave official backing to gold exploration in
the Gold Coast. This led to the gold rush in the Gold Coast. While the initial ‘Jungle Boom’
was modest because dense forests and local chiefs’ unwillingness to open their areas to a
deluge of foreign fortune hunters impeded easy access, British newspapers, industrial and
geographical journals reporting about the potential of gold in Gold Coast brought large
companies into the mining sector. Between 1878 and 1883 close to 25 companies were
formed to mine gold in the Gold Coast (Rosenblum, 1973). The colonial government
initiated regulations to govern mining in the country through the granting of concession
permits. One of the earliest companies to mine gold in the colony was Ashanti Goldfields
Company (AGC), which was incorporated in London on 25 May 1897. It began under-
ground mining in 1907 at Obuasi. When Lonrho assumed ownership of AGC in 1969
after acquiring majority equity share in the company, it launched a capital-intensive
mechanisation programme to increase production targets to about 650,000 oz per year.
However, it later faced operational difficulties that compelled it to reduce its staffing
from approximately 10,000 to less than 6600 in 2003. This led the company to switch
from surface to underground operation (Taylor, 2006). In April 2004, it merged with
AngloGold to form AngloGold Ashanti. Newmont-Ghana joined the gold mining frater-
nity in 2006, and operated surface gold mining in nine communities in the Brong Ahafo
Region until 2016 when it shifted to underground mineralization.
Ghana’s mining sector is bifurcated into formal and informal components. While the
former is duly regulated by legislation, the latter is largely unregulated and has become
susceptible to both indigenous and foreigners’ predatory activities. Yet, over the years,
Ghana’s mining sector has undergone legislative restructuring as part of the institutional
renewal programme of post-structural adjustment economic reforms to promote sustain-
able environment, value for money, and more importantly, to discourage illegal mining
activities (Interviews, MPs, Accra, May 2017). To this end, the Minerals and Mining
Law 1986 (PNDCL.153); Small Scale Gold Mining Law, 1989 PNDCL.218 and Minerals
and Mining (Amendment) Act 1994 (Act 475) were replaced by the Minerals and
Mining Act of 2006 (Act 703). This Act mandated licensed miners to adopt effective
and efficient methods that are compatible with good mining practices (safety rules) and
protection of the environment such as refilling of degraded lands (Republic of Ghana,
2006). Despite these efforts, some large companies with permits to mine gold have not
wholly complied with environmental safety measures, and their negligence has led to
sporadic spillages of harmful chemicals and pollution of water bodies. In many instances,
chiefs and opinion leaders in the mining communities have raised red flags about
292 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
environmental challenges from the activities of big and licensed mining companies such as
AngloGold Ashanti and Newmont-Ghana. These notwithstanding, it is the activities of
small-scale illegal gold miners (the informal side) that have received the most media/
public and government condemnation (Interviews, Anonymous illegal gold miner,
Study Area, June 2017).
Actors and the rationale for engaging in illegal gold mining
This section identifies the actors involved in galamsey and examines their raison d’être for
engaging in it. It is now clear that the actors involved in illegal gold mining in Ghana are
complex even though, generally, the two distinguishable perpetrators are ibdigenes and
foreigners. It is estimated that a significant proportion of Ghanaians in the mining
enclaves engage in galamsey. In the mining communities, some indigenes with connection
to the local governance system have either engaged directly in illegal gold mining or col-
luded with others to partake in it. For instance, Aidoo (2016) noted that the galamsey dis-
course has overlooked the preponderant role played by local and traditional political forces
and actors such as the constitutionally non-partisan local chiefs, district assembly
members and community leaders that have served as conduits between the ‘corridors of
power’ and local people. Also, evidence gathered from the study areas indicates that the
local youth age between 18 and 35 years have found illegal gold mining a lucrative
venture – it is the principal source of livelihood for them (Interview, Chiefs and Youth,
Tarkwa-Nsuaem, May 2017).
A salient factor that has stimulated the surge in galamsey by the local people is the lack
of formal employment opportunities in the country. According to some local opinion
leaders, ‘the absence of job facilities in most towns, cities and villages in Ghana has
forced a large number of the idled youths into galamsey’ (Interviews, Chiefs and Assemble
Members, Study Communities, November 2018). Thus, in several mining communities, ‘a
large number of unemployed youths who feel betrayed by the state’s inability to provide
them with jobs in the formal sector have thronged to the small-scale illegal gold mining
arena’ (Interview, Chiefs and Local Illegal Miners, Study Communities, August 2017).
The lack of employment for the youth, in particular, has been linked to the implemen-
tation of Western-led economic reforms in the early 1990s – public sector restructuring
– downsizing of the state job market, which led to loss of employment, thereby driving
many of the jobless local population to the unregulated small-scale illegal gold mining
sector. The view of one prominent chief captured the situation more succinctly, ‘in the
name of economic reforms, people were thrown out of jobs… and frustrated by the
sudden loss of jobs, these people who needed to survive the economic hardships have
turned to galamsey’ (Interview, Chiefs, September 2017). For instance, since Ghana
signed on to the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) recapitalization facility in 2016,
the corridors to employment in state institutions were closed to most educated youths
and young adults – a move that triggered a rise in galamsey activities (Interview, MPs
Accra, June, 2017).
Another factor closely connected to the unemployment issue is poverty. The World
Bank (2005, p. 2) admits that ‘small-scale mining is largely a poverty-driven activity, typi-
cally practiced in the poorest and most remote rural areas of a country by a largely itin-
erant, poorly educated populace with few employment alternatives’. In a country where
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 293
poverty levels are moderately high, those who find themselves below the poverty line have
turned to the unregulated small-scale mining arena to look for livelihoods (Interviews,
Youths, Study Area, October 2017). Poor economic conditions in the country such as
high inflation and prices of goods that have compounded the plight of both low-
income public and private sector workers has contributed to the rise of illegal mining
activities. Unable to pay their medical, water and electricity bills, the low-income
earners have supplemented their meager salaries through galamsey operations (Interview,
MPs, Youths and Chiefs, Accra, June 2017). Given that a significant proportion of the local
miners operate without the requisite legal permit, their activities have partly contributed to
the destruction of the natural environment (Interview, Member of Parliament and DCE,
Study Area, January 2017). This is because, according to some respondents, ‘the local
miners have shifted from the use of rudimentary tools such as pickaxes, pans and
shovels to carry out surface mining to applications of modern technologies including
gold extraction with mercury in rivers’ (Interview, MP and DCE, Study Area, January
2017).
Even though small-scale gold mining is an area reserved for indigenes, the sector has
been invaded by other foreign nationals. Over the past decades, the involvement of
foreign miners operating galamsey has surged due to three inter-related factors: first,
the passage of the Small-Scale Mining Law, PNDC Law 218 which opened up the
mining space for private participation; second, the high value and price of gold on the
world market particularly from 2008; and third, the absence of a definite and well-
thought-out policy on how, where and when to mine the phenomenally large gold deposits
in the country – that stretch from the coastal regions to northern Ghana – in other words,
a weak regulatory framework and enforcement regime (Interviews, Study Areas, June–
December 2017). According to Aidoo (2016, p. 50), ‘He Wenping, the Director of the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences believes that, low-level Ghanaian officials and busi-
nessmen have contributed to the nebulous nature of the legal perceptions of galamsey’
…Many miners (Chinese miners) are not clear about Ghana laws since there are middle-
men who bring them over and help them sign contracts to do galamsey’ (Bloomberg News,
2015, p. 1). The latter factor, in particular, has aided the entry of foreigners from neigh-
bouring and far-away countries to engage in galamsey. Two categories of foreigners
have participated in galamsey: first, a Ghana Chamber of Mines report established the
prevalence of foreigners from diverse nationalities such as Togolese, Malians and Burki-
nabe, and those of Middle East, Europe and North African origin. For instance, among
the 29 foreigners arrested on galamsey offences in the Eastern Region were Togolese, Bur-
kinabe, Malian, Russian and Ukrainian nationals (Myjoyonline, 2017).
Second, recent studies on foreigners’ participation in galamsey have uncovered the
active role of some Chinese migrants – they have been found to be the dominant non-indi-
genous group involved in galamsey (Aidoo, 2016; Asante, 2018; Sanderson & Forsyth,
2013). The researchers found that some Chinese migrants, largely from Shanglin
County in Guangxi Province, have settled in predominantly gold mining communities
(the study areas). Also, Burrows and Bird’s (2017, p. 3) earlier study revealed how some
Chinese’s migrants have integrated into the host (mining) communities to the extent
that television advertisements, signposts and soap operas in the restaurants are in
Chinese language because a number of Ghanaians in the area have become proficient in
Mandarin. The participation of some of the Chinese migrants in galamsey is complex:
294 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
first, Burrows and Bird (2017, p. 3) reported that some of them are ‘highly organized with
one Chinese illegal gold miner kingpin employing over 300 Chinese migrants. Second,
some Chinese companies would register with Ghana Investment Promotion Centre
(GIPC) in order to obtain a license to do business, usually in the construction sector
and then connive with some Ghanaians to divert to the small-scale illegal mining area
(Interview, Immigration Officers, Accra, July 2017). Funds from China are then applied
to strengthen the capacity of the illegal gold miners (Aidoo, 2016). There is a widespread
belief among Ghanaian illegal gold miners that the ability of some Chinese migrants to
mobilize funds to procure sophisticated mining machinery has enhanced their deep pen-
etration and domination of the galamsey (Interview, Youth, Study Area, March 2017).
But not all are involved in galamsey: in other words, a number of Chinese migrants are
genuine business operatives legally admitted into the country. For instance, ‘the execution
of the numerous contracts granted to Chinese companies necessitated the recruitment of
Chinese artisans and technicians into the country with work permits’ (Interview, Immi-
gration Officers and MPs, Accra, June 2017). According to Baah and Jauch (2009), 150
of the 230 workforce employed on the Esipong stadium at Sekondi-Takoradi, and a
majority of the workers for the Bui hydroelectric project were brought from China and
given work permits. Also, a handful of Chinese are engaged in the formal sector as aca-
demic instructors, diplomats and businessmen in the telecommunication industry
(Idun-Arkhurst, 2008). The Ghanaian media has estimated that there are over 40,000
Chinese resident migrants in the country even though the data on the number of
Chinese migrants in Ghana are often in dispute – for instance, Marfaing and Thiel
(2011) put the figure in the range of l0,000–16,000 and Mohan, Lampert, Tan-Mullins,
and Chang (2014, pp. 20–21) quoted between 7000 and 20,000 but the Chinese media esti-
mates the ‘Shanglin gang’ working in the mining industry in Ghana to be 50,000 (South
China Morning Post, 2013, p. 1). These studies indicated that out of the estimated 40,000
Chinese migrants in the country, 30,000 are engaged in galamsey (Aidoo, 2016; Crawford,
Agyeyomah, Botchwey, & Mba, 2016; Sanderson & Forsyth, 2013). However, the continu-
ing arrests of more illegal Chinese gold miners fromMarch 2013 to February 2019 are sug-
gestive of relatively high number of Chinese migrants’ presence at galamsey sites
(Interviews, MPs, Accra, October 2017).
The effects of some Chinese migrants’ galamsey activities
Despite its illegality, galamsey is a flourishing business, which constitutes a significant part
of the informal sector of the Ghanaian economy. The general opinion indicates that it
makes a contribution to the overall growth in the gross national product of the
economy (Interview, MPs, Accra, June 2016). Also, of the estimated 7000 direct and 3.1
million indirect jobs the mining sector creates, galamsey sustains over 2.9 million employ-
ments (Interview, Civil Society Activists, Accra, February 2017). However, there is a
growing concern that the illegal small-scale gold mining perpetrated by some Chinese
migrants, which peaked in 2016, has caused environmental catastrophes in the mining
communities even though activities of some licensed mining companies and locals have
also caused havocs. Some respondents indicated that ‘the introduction of sophisticated
mining equipment such as excavators, crushing machines/changfa, water platforms and
suctions for mining in rivers by some Chinese illegal miners has hurried the destruction
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 295
of the environment’ (Interview, Civil Society Activists, Media Anchors, Study Areas,
March 2017). The adoption of new mining methods by some of the Chinese migrants
such as the use of excavators for dredging and the application of mercury and cyanide
have polluted such rivers as the Ankobra, Pra, Offin and Birim that have served as
main sources of drinking water for communities in the study area. Some interviewees
believed that ‘the contamination of water bodies with harmful chemicals may be directly
or indirectly linked to the many deaths and other injuries from collapsed pits in the
affected communities even though this claim is not supported by authentic medical
data’ (Interview, Media Anchors & Chiefs, February 2017). The destruction of forests
and vegetation by some Chinese illegal miners has obstructed rural farming: the fear of
slipping into a mining pit has driven many subsistence farmers from their cherished pro-
fession, thereby causing frequent shortages of food stuffs and general disappointment for
the loss of livelihoods in the mining communities’ (Interview, Chief & Farmer, February
2017).
The social cost of galamsey aside, its economic risk has proven to be detrimental to the
country’s nascent economy, which relies on foreign exchange from gold. Disclosure by
some state officials shows that ‘galamsey has led to revenue losses because the business
is concealed in secrecy due to its illegality’ (Interview, MPs, Accra, March 2017). For
instance, the government reported that ‘in 2016 alone, about $2.3 billion worth of gold
was smuggled out of Ghana, mostly to China and India without payment of the required
taxes’ (Interview, MPs, Accra, March 2017). Thus many foreign actors in the galamsey
sub-sector, notably Chinese illegal miners, have repatriated their accumulated profits
outside the country thereby deepening capital flight (South China Morning Post, 2013)
– one of the factors hurting the economy even though some Chinese migrants’ invest-
ments in galamsey have produced spillover effects for other business-related activities
such as petty-trading, socialization and cultural integration (Interview, MPs & Chief,
Study Area, February 2017).
A corollary to some Chinese migrants’ galamsey activities was the spontaneous rise
in anti-Chinese sentiments in some of the mining communities. Two factors precipi-
tated the hiked hatred against them. First, ‘the local youth face excessive competition
from some Chinese migrants over galamsey rush – the charge widely circulated in
the mining communities is that some Chinese migrants with more resourced have dis-
placed the indigenes/locals from their traditional galamsey business’ (Interview, Chiefs
and local Youth, Study Areas, June 2017). Second, some local miners had become
‘jealous of the relatively rich Chinese migrants involved in galamsey’ and accused
them of exploiting their resources, even though the charge could not be corroborated
by evidence from the field (Interview, Chinese Miners, Study Areas, June 2017). The
anti-Chinese hatred became intense to the extent that ‘organized local gangsters fomen-
ted criminal attacks on the Chinese migrants in the mining communities, which pro-
voked self-defence actions by the latter’ (Interview, Chinese Officials & Illegal Miners,
Police Officer, Study Areas, August 2017).
Government’s policy intervention against galamsey
What policy measures did the Ghana government adopt to deal with galamsey? How did
they affect the Chinese illegal miners? Successive governments have devised varying
296 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
methods to tackle illegal gold mining. The earliest attempt was an appeal to legislation
(Interview, MPs, Accra, July 2016). The thinking at the time was that ‘there were loopholes
in the mineral laws that ought to be sealed through legislative amendments’ (Interview,
MP, Accra, August 2016). Consequently, in 2015, the government introduced the Minerals
and Mining (Amendment) Act 900 that altered the Minerals and Mining Act 703, 2006,
based on the assumption that ‘the change would sharpen the punitive sections of the Act’
(Interview, MP, Accra, July 2016). The new law criminalized all illegal small-scale mining.
It also made foreigners’ engagements in galamsey as well as Ghanaians who collude with
non-citizens to participate in artisanal mining a criminal offence. The law empowered the
courts to impose fines, confiscate assets, machinery and any mineral extracted by foreign
nationals through illegal means. Under Act 900, Ghanaians found guilty of carrying out
galamsey would receive a sentence of a fine ranging between ||GH¢ 2,000/($442)–GH¢
20,000/($4420) or imprisonment up to 10 years, and GH¢30,000/($6,630)–GH¢300,000/
($66,297) or imprisonment for a period of 20 years in the case of foreigners (Republic
of Ghana, 2015, p. 4). The fines derived from the prosecutions of illegal miners were to
be appropriated to offset the cost of restoring the environment (Interview, Minister,
Accra, July 2016). Evidence gathered from the police and AGD revealed a series of prose-
cutions of many Chinese illegal gold miners (see Table 1): for instance, in April 2017, a
High Court at Sekondi ordered the seizure of ‘water-homes’ and other equipment on
the River Ankobra built and used by Chinese illegal miners. The prosecutor told the
court that the well-built ‘water-homes’ also referred to as ‘Chinese FPSO’ by the local
people, was a ‘floating structure with toilet facility, tent for sleeping, and mosquito nets
to protect the miners from insects. In the preliminary trial, the court remanded five
Chinese illegal miners in police custody’ (Daily Guide, 2017, p. 1). Despite this, the
legal penalty was not enough of a deterrent to halt their galamsey: for instance, in Septem-
ber 2017, ‘four Chinese nationals who were granted bail by a Cape Coast Court appeared
before the same court three days later for the same offence because they paid the fines with
little difficulty’ (Interview, Media Anchors, Accra, December 2017) even though the com-
bined effects of the legislation and judicial actions lowered the intensity of galamsey.
The taskforce strategy
Despite ‘invoking the law and judiciary/courts to create restore sanity in the mining sector
such as the creation of “fear and panic” among galamsey operators, the measure used
could not yield the desired outcome – some of the Chinese migrants persisted in their
illegal gold mining business’ (Interview, MP/Minister, Accra, March 2017). A taskforce
approach was therefore hailed as ‘a bold step towards the fight against some Chinese
migrants’ galamsey aggression’ (Interviews, DCEs & Assembly Members, Study Area, Feb-
ruary 2017). Two sets of taskforce were inaugurated: the first was a five-member high-
powered Inter-Ministerial Taskforce created in March 2013 by President John Mahama
with a charge to end galamsey. This taskforce had the power of arrest and prosecution
of illegal miners, seizure of mining equipment, and revocation of licenses of Ghanaian
miners who had colluded with some Chinese migrants to carry out galamsey. The Task-
force conducted sporadic swoops on mining sites and arrested several Chinese illegal
miners and their Ghanaian associates. For instance, between April and June 2017 about
5234 Chinese migrants’ illegal miners were arrested and deported (see Table 2).
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 297
Table 1. Prosecutions of some Chinese illegal miners.
Year (period)
Region 2013–2016 2016–2017
Eastern 147 78
Central 231 122
Western 342 136
Brong Ahafo 251 131
Ashanti 434 234
Source: Ghana Police Service & Judicial Service, Accra, February 2018.
However, the Taskforce method failed to stop the Chinese illegal miners due to collusion
and corruption, and a lack of transparency in their operations with regards to their arrests
and release: in many instances, some seized equipment found their way back to the
owners, and prosecutions of some arrested Chinese illegal miners were halted without
sound justifications (Interview, Civil Society Activists, Accra, July 2017).
Some interviewees believed that political and diplomatic undercurrents were among the
reasons that weakened the fight against galamsey. For instance, according to an intervie-
wee, ‘President Mahama faced a political dilemma of invoking Ghanaian laws to decimate
some Chinese migrants’ galamsey infrastructure and lose the appetizing Chinese low-
interest loans, which his administration so much needed to resuscitate the economy
(Interview, MP, Accra, August 2017). Aidoo (2016, p. 61) expressed similar sentiments:
For diplomatic reasons that included the promise of accessing Chinese financial resources for
development projects in Ghana, the then newly elected John Mahama and the NDC admin-
istration faced a tough balancing act between domestic concerns and relations with China.
As it became evident that the political/inter-ministerial taskforce approach had failed to
deliver the dividend, the second technique, a military solution, gained popular approval
(the media and civil society/environmental advocacy groups, e.g. clamoured for it). But
the military approach was propagated through the political process. For instance, a key
aspect of 2016 election campaign exchanges revolved around the question of how to
halt the growing illegal mining activities by some Chinese migrants. The opposition
New Patriotic Party’s presidential candidate, Nana Akufo-Addo, contended that the wor-
sened galamsey situation was due largely to the unprecedented influx of some Chinese
migrants into the country during the Mahama administration (Graphic.com, May 22
2017). The opposition candidate told voters at Obuasi (one of the heart-beats of some
Chinese migrants’ galamsey activities) of ‘a plan to regularize and streamline the oper-
ations of galamsey across the country by transforming it into a small-scale mining industry
so that the youth in the mining communities could find work to do’ (Ghanaweb, July15
2016). The campaign message implied a revolutionary policy to overturn the preeminence
of some Chinese migrants over the artisanal gold mining business in favour of indigenous
people – something the incumbent President Mahama had failed to achieve (Interview,
Table 2. Deportations of Chinese Illegal Gold Miners.
Year (period)
Country of origin 2010–2013 2014–2017 Total
China 4500 734 5234
Source: Ghana Immigration Service, Accra, August 2018.
298 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
MPs, August 2017). In the aftermath of the election, the victorious opposition candidate
declared Zero Tolerance for Chinese migrants’ illegal gold mining activities in the country.
The government took radical actions against illegal mining including a 21-day ultimatum
to galamsey operators to disengage from their activities; a six-month moratorium on all
forms of small-scale mining – this was extended; a halt to the issuance of new licenses
to small-scale miners; and an evacuation of equipment from the mining sites’ (Interview,
MP/Minister, Study Area, December 2017).
These administrative orders did little to awe some of the Chinese migrant’s illegal
miners into terminating their activities, thereby forcing the ‘deployment of security per-
sonnel to drive the illegal miners from the mining strongholds’ (Interview, Army
Officers, December 2017). The early security operatives dispatched to patrol the forest
and water bodies were drawn from the Police, Navy and Army Engineering units of the
Ghana’s Armed Forces. The dreaded taskforce, which was codenamed ‘Operation Van-
guard’, was ‘to pull down the Chinese migrants’ illegal mining infrastructure and end
the activities of the recalcitrant miners in water bodies’ (Interview, MPs & Army
Officers, Study Area, December 2017). The Taskforce conducted military operations in
the mining communities, destroyed equipment and drove away significant number of
Chinese migrants engaged in illegal mining (see Table 3).
Soliciting the media support
The media in Ghana has always been a key ally of the government’s policy education
process (they have played a leading role in disseminating information on important
policy issues). Therefore, the decision to bring the media on board to fight the entrenched
Chinese illegal gold miners was a move of major importance. On April 2017, a Media
Coalition Against Illegal Mining (MCAIM) comprising News Times Corporation
(NTC), Graphic Communications Group Limited (GCGL), Ghana Broadcasting Corpor-
ation (GBC), Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), Private Newspaper Publishers Associ-
ation (PRINPAG), Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA), Ghana
Community Radio Network and the Christian Council of Ghana was formed to use advo-
cacy to mobilize mass support for the government’s anti-galamsey policy. A key objective
of MCAIM was ‘to provide advocacy platform where citizens could be mobilized to put
positive pressure on government so that it will not relent in its efforts to uproot illegal
miners from artisanal gold mining’ (Interview, Media Anchors, Accra, December 2017).
The MCAIM used drama shows, town hall meetings and ‘naming and shaming’ strategies
to ‘humiliate’ perpetrators of galamsey. The intensified media reports on television and in
Table 3. Items seized from arrested Chinese Illegal Miners.
Type of equipment seized
Region Excavator Water pump Vehicle Motor bike Changfans Weapons
Eastern 370 910 60 54 3368 83
Western 267 567 31 65 2430 129
Central 231 325 45 73 1422 67
Brong-Ahafo 345 529 36 109 1098 79
Ashanti 621 789 70 237 4861 123
Source: Compiled from dailyguideafrica.com. 2018. ‘New chapter for Operation Vanguard by Col. Michael Amoah Ayisi,
National Commander of Operation Vanguard’, p. 1.
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 299
newspapers heightened public awareness, and engendered continuous public debates on
the negative effects of galamsey. Specifically, the vociferous media anchors raised public
consciousness about the dangers that loomed on health, environmental and human
safety (Interview, Media Anchors, Accra, December 2017). The media force introduced
into the anti-galamsey campaign hit the Chinese illegal miners very hard by reinforcing
the already charged public ill-feelings against them (Interview, Chinese illegal miners,
November 2017) – it weakened the miners’ ability to defile the government’s anti-galam-
sey policy, albeit minimally (Interview, Civil Society Activists & Media Anchors, Accra,
December 2017).
Overall, the implementation of the anti-galamsey policy proved to be effective. The ban
order and the security severance deterred many Chinese illegal miners. Many of the
Chinese migrants involved in galamsey voluntarily left the mining communities for
their country (Interview Chiefs and Immigration Officers, Study Area, December 2018).
Rarely were the few arrested for violating the rules Chinese nationals. Indeed, during
the period the ban was in force, less than eight Chinese were arrested, and between
May and August 2018 when the implementation of the anti-galamsey policy ended,
only one Chinese illegal miner (Xu Yonghui age 36), had been arrested by the taskforce
at Nsabrekwa Number ‘4’ in the Wassa Amenfi West Municipality in the West Region
(The Chronicle, 2018). The decision by the government to lift the long ban on galamsey
in August 2018 is suggestive of the virtual withdrawal of the Chinese nationals from
galamsey engagements (Interview, Chinese Official & Immigration Officers, Accra,
November 2018).
China’s reaction to the government’s anti-galamsey initiative
China has always insisted that its foreign policy objective towards Africa is to ‘promote
friendship and therefore, non-interference in the affairs of developing countries’ (Inter-
view, Chinese Official, Accra, November 2017). The question, then, is how did China
react to the handling of the Chinese illegal miners’ issue? In what ways did it affect
China–Ghana bilateral relations? The Chinese’s reaction to the implementation of the
anti-galamsey policy was one of frustration and disappointment. China had expected a
more humane approach to the galamsey affair. According to one informant, ‘Beijing
was offended by the arrests, prosecutions and deportations of some Chinese illegal
miners by the Government of Ghana as well as the distorted or biased media reports
on Chinese people, especially cartoons that defamed Chinese leaders and senior
officials’ (Interview, Chinese Officials, Accra, August 2017). One of the strongest
Chinese challenges to the policy was in respect to the legislative framework for the
mining sector. Beijing believed that loopholes in the Minerals and Mining Act opened
it for abuse by the mining actors, which trapped some Chinese migrants into it’ (Daily
Graphic, May 10 2017). China contended that ‘had the government taken appropriate
measures to regulate the conduct and procedures for legitimate mining, fewer people
would risk doing illegal mining’ (Interview, Chinese Official, Accra, August 2017).
Again, China criticized the government for the imposition of heavy fines on Chinese
illegal miners’ (Interview, Chinese Officials, Accra, August 2017) even though the
MCAIM observed that low fines was responsible for the persistence of galamsey
(Myjoyonline, December 2 2017).
300 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
China also accused the government of implementing an anti-galamsey policy which
lacked transparency. In one of the official correspondences to the Ghana Government,
Chinese officials demanded a ‘full disclosure of the identity of all Chinese illegal miners
including those repatriated in order to elevate the mutual trust on both sides’ (Citifmon-
line, April 8 2017) but the ‘government did not comply with the Chinese’s directive’ (Inter-
view, MP/Minister, Accra, November 2017). Beijing further demanded a levelled playing
field that gave Chinese migrants the opportunity to obtain/secure legitimate permits to
participate in the mining business (Interview, Chinese Officials, Accra, August 2017).
As a further step towards preventing the government from humiliating some Chinese
migrants involved in illegal mining, ‘China requested the transfer of arrested Chinese
nationals to face prosecution under Chinese due process in its Accra Embassy’ (Interview,
Immigration & Police Officers, Accra, November 2017). In an effort to diffuse public hate
against Chinese migrants, the Chinese Embassy repudiated the local accomplices, particu-
larly chiefs, security personnel and politicians whose dubious actions ‘misled some
Chinese nationals to undertake illegal mining in the communities’ (Interview, Chinese
Officials, Accra, August 2016). According to some respondents, ‘some Ghanaian business-
men’s strategy involved ‘enticing’ some innocent Chinese investors into the illegal mining
sector and later deserted them when faced with illegality charges’ (Interview, Chinese
Officials and Illegal Miners, Study Area, March, 2017). China’s frustration was particularly
directed at some leading politicians and security personnel for allegedly ‘extorting money
from Chinese nationals with promises of mining job offers’ (Interview, Chinese Officials &
Illegal Miners, Study Areas, August 2017). An earlier account by Aidoo (2016, p. 60) cap-
tured the corrupt behaviour of Ghanaian officers in respect of Chinese illegal gold mining
activities:
The activities of Chinese illegal miners through the help of the local and traditional leaders
are sustained by the existing frailties in the relationship between government monitoring
institutions and the local/traditional structures in Ghana. These existing weaknesses that
played out at both the national and sub-national levels, aided by other given factors, resulted
in complicated outcomes for governments in Beijing and Accra… during the Chinese galam-
sey crisis in Ghana.
One strategy Beijing adopted to handle the galamsey issue was to lean on its diplomatic
relations with Ghana. The Chinese Embassy in Accra reminded the Government of
Ghana to deal with the Chinese illegal miners within the spirit of Sino-Ghana relations.
China reminded Ghana of ‘an extremely harmful bilateral relations… . if the handling
of Chinese illegal miners resulted in avoidable casualties’ (Citifm.com, April 11 2017).
At the height of the attacks against the Chinese illegal miners, China was compelled to
adopt a cold attitude towards the disbursement of the remaining $2.4 billion out of the
$3 billion loan support facility earmarked for Ghana and the hope of receiving the rest
of the loan hit a rock. Beijing presented a fresh proposal for a renegotiation of the
terms of the loan on the excuse that Ghana had become an oil-exporting country even
though extraction of oil in commercial quantities preceded the loan’ (Interview, MPs,
August 2017). China also decided to alter the ground rules for granting future loans to
Ghana by including a soft condition that enjoins the Government of Ghana to resolve
Chinese illegal miners’ issue within Sino-Ghana diplomatic rules of engagement (Inter-
view, Chinese Officials, November 2017).
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 301
On its part, ‘the Government of Ghana felt that China was only interested in the well-
being of its citizens without regard to the effect some of the Chinese migrants’ galamsey
activities had on Ghanaians’ (Interview, MP/Minister, Study Area, September 2017).
Therefore, the Ghanaian Government’s anti-galamsey action was thought to be in the
best interest of its citizens:
The Chinese threat or whatever does not bother me.… if the tables are turned, the Chinese
will not want someone to be in their country working to the detriment of China’s future. The
letter and the issues raised in it have no consequence whatsoever on the government’s pro-
gramme to fight the canker. We are going to do it irrespective of whoever says what. There
will be “no sacred cows”. This is our country and we have to enforce our laws to sanitize the
country and guarantee the future of our citizens. (Myjoyonline.com, April 11 2017, p. 1)
The tug-of-war over galamsey underscored the relative tension between the two nations in
their search for amicable solutions to the issue. While Ghana regarded the Chinese’s ‘pro-
tectionist’ approach as ‘a mark of disrespect to the laws and sovereignty of the country’
(Interview, MP, November 2017), ‘the Chinese disapproved of the former’s method to
punish its citizens’ (Interview, Chinese Official, Accra, August 2017). President Akufo-
Addo’s remarks at a durbar of chiefs at Kibi that ‘we all know the laws of Ghana have
no sympathy for nationality whatsoever. It does not give permit to visitors or anybody
to engage in illegal mining. Whosoever is caught will be made to face the full rigour of
the law’ (Citifm, April 16 2017, p. 1) revealed the undercurrent rancor that characterized
China-Ghana negotiations over some Chinese migrants’ galamsey.
Why have China–Ghana bilateral relations endured?
In the end, the war of words did little to destroy the relations between the two countries
(Interview, MPs, March 2017). Even at the height of the ‘persecutions’ of some Chinese
illegal miners, ‘China showed some level of cooperation’ (Interview, Chinese Officials,
Accra, August 2017). ‘China understood the reality of the galamsey menace and
thought that it would be in its own interest to support the government to implement
the measures intended to tackle it’ (Interview, Chinese Embassy Officials, Accra, August
2017). The Chinese assured the government of the importance China attached to the
fight against illegal mining:
The Chinese side is firmly opposed to the involvement of Chinese citizens in illegal mining in
Ghana, and supports the efforts taken by the Ghanaian government to tackle the issue within
the legal framework. The Chinese side has made its position clear to both the former NDC
and current NPP governments. Illegal mining issues have been on top of my (Chinese
Ambassador) agenda since I assumed office and I have been communicating with the relevant
authorities in Ghana over the issue and how to find amicable solutions to the menace. (Daily
Graphic, May 10 2017, p. 1)
Determined to consolidate this cooperation, the Chinese government in Beijing sent
two separate high-level delegations to hold bilateral discussions with the Ghana Govern-
ment on the vexed issue of some Chinese nationals’ involvement in galamsey. After the
consultations, ‘the Chinese government established a Working Committee to examine
the factors that had triggered the ‘invasion’ of some Chinese migrants’ miners to
Ghana, and develop a roadmap to address the problem’ (Interview, Chinese Officials,
Accra, August 2017). China further announced a policy action aimed to persuade many
302 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
Chinese migrants doing galamsey to return to their homeland, and months after these
engagements, ‘about 4000 Chinese migrants voluntarily returned’ (Interview, Chinese
Officials, Accra, August 2018).
Within the spirit of friendship (South-South fraternity), the Chinese Embassy in Accra
continued with its donations to support some state institutions. The ‘donations of GH¢
10,000 and assorted office equipment to the Attorney General’s office to support the
organization of consultative workshops for the Office of the Special Prosecutor Bill and
a Sumto vehicle to the Ghana police by the Ghana Association of Chinese Society’ (Citif-
monline, June 9 2017), ‘formed part of the ongoing Chinese’s support to the government’s
capacity building programmes’ (Interview, Chinese Officials, Accra, August 2017). Upon
the request of the Ghana Government, China pledged to offer $15 billion loan to Ghana to
implement its industrialization (One-District-One-Factory) programme – this demon-
strates the two nation’s continued commitments to a cordial bilateral relation’ (Interview,
MP & Chinese Official, Accra, February 2018). Also, according to Akufo-Addo, ‘the anti-
galamsey policy did not mean we (Ghanaians) have any qualms with the Chinese govern-
ment or we hate the Chinese nationals’ (Citifm, April 16 2017).
President Akufo-Addo’s statement reflects the deep and unshakable bilateral
cooperation between the two countries, which dates back to the 1960s when their political
elites joined forces to promote their common interests. Since Ghana returned to demo-
cratic rule in 1992, Sino-Ghana relations have grown alongside market-oriented
exchanges, and witnessed high FDIs’ inflows from China to Ghana (see Table 4). The
visits of Chinese politicians such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to Ghana in 2003 and
2007 respectively with reciprocated visits to Beijing by Jerry Rawlings, John Kufour,
John Mahama, and the current Vice-President and First Lady, Rebecca Akufo-Addo
and President Akufo-Addo have yielded bilateral dividends: along with these diplomatic
visits came economic benefits in the form of array of infrastructure loans and grants to
facilitate Ghana’s development (see Table 5).
Even when the implementation of anti-galamsey policy generated some form of discord
between China and Ghana, diplomatic ties seemed to deepen. ‘Recent developments and
exchanges attest to the well-cemented bond between the two nations’ (Interview, MPs,
Accra, February 2018). In contrast to the perception of broken relations, President
Akuffo-Addo conferred the Order of the Star of Ghana (the highest national honour)
on the Chinese Ambassador, Madam Baohong in April 2018. The citation acknowledged
China as a reliable partner/friend in Ghana’s development:
The award is in recognition of Madam Baohong’s distinguished conduct as a diplomat, and
exceptional contribution to Ghana’s socio-economic development and for the increased
economic cooperation and development front between China and Ghana during her
period of stay in the country. (Ghana News Agency, 2018, p. 1)
Table 4. USA versus China FDI inflow to Africa.
Year (period)
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
USA 5.8 4.2 4.0 6.7 11 2 0.1 5.7 6.4 0.1
China 0.3 1.9 4.9 1.8 2.1 3.2 2.3 3.8 3.7 3.2
Source: www.sais.cari-org/data-chinese-and-america-fdi-to-africa/.
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 303
Table 5: Some of China’s Financial Assistance to Ghana.
Sector Projects Funds inflows
Energy Bui hydro-electric power dam project; continuous $562 million
support for rural electrification
Transport Reconstruction of the 17 km Ofankor–Nsawam road $28 million interest-free loan
$50 million for rehabilitating James Town
fishing port
Education Scholarships and training programs for Ghanaian Grants; enhanced soft power through positive
students and public officials international image for sharing development
experience;
$16 million loan for developing University of
Health and Allied Science
Health, water & The construction of a 100-bed capacity general Grant
sanitation hospital for malaria treatment at Teshie,
construction of the 60-bed Dangme East District
Kpong water supply extension project
Defence Construction of an office complex for the Ministry of $9 million with $7.5 million grant from the
Defence Chinese government
Source: Idun-Arkhurst, Isaac. 2008. Ghana’s Relations with China. The South African.
Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA). Johannesburg, South Africa: SAIIA.
The Chinese’s response was reciprocal of Ghana’s good relations with China – an affirma-
tion of the growing cordial relations between the two nations:
It demonstrated the President’s strong commitment to promoting China–Ghana friendship
and further development of our relations… This supreme glory belongs to the great country
I represent and the great leader who has nominated me as Chinese Ambassador to Ghana…
It belongs to the people of China and the whole Chinese Community in Ghana, I came to
Ghana with hopes and dreams, and I leave the country with friendship and honour.
(Ghana News Agency, 2018, p. 1)
Conclusion and lessons
This article has shown that the anti-galamsey policy was an initiative that sought to avert
an environmental catastrophe and protect indigenous business from falling into the hands
of some Chinese illegal miners. The implementation of the policy, which led to the arrest,
sentencing and deportation of some Chinese galamsey miners, angered Beijing because
diplomacy rather than arrests and prosecutions was thought to be the most viable alterna-
tive to addressing the issue. Despite the resultant tension, the two nations prioritized their
six-decade long bilateral relationship over the implementation of the unpleasant anti-
galamsey policy. The article has established that the sustained bilateral relationship was
largely predicated on Beijing’s willingness to cooperate with the Government of Ghana.
This makes it trite to say that the gesture of cooperation exhibited by China during the
implementation of the anti-galamsey policy is an affirmation of its non-interference
policy in the politics of developing countries such as Ghana. Indeed, the involvement of
some Chinese migrants in illegal gold mining in Ghana could not be a clandestine
move by China to exploit the natural resources. This is because the nature of the involve-
ment of Chinese migrant miners in the illegal gold mining business reveals an individually
motivated activity rather than a state-sponsored endeavour. This done, the next task is to
establish the salient lessons that could be learnt from the study.
First, cordial states’ bilateral relations largely depend on mutual respect for their
nationals. Because states enter into pacts based on their prior determined benefits,
304 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
situational changes with potential risks to their interests – security and safety of their citi-
zens, may correspondingly alter the mood of their relations. The observed activities of
some Chinese illegal miners in several parts of the country, which caused considerable
damage to the environment, were seen by the Government of Ghana to be injurious to
the survival of Ghanaians. Ghana felt that the invasion of some Chinese migrants in the
artisanal mining sector was unacceptable because it is a reserved area for indigenes. The
anti-galamsey initiative was, therefore necessary to protect the indigenous population
from losing their source of livelihoods – small-scale mining – to foreigners. China’s
responses – diplomatic protest and subtle retaliation – were also an attempt to secure
the safety and liberty of its citizens (protect them from arrests and humiliation) even if
they are involved in some form of economic illegality in a friend’s country.
Second, China’s diplomatic and economic relations with Ghana are based on mutual
trust, respect and win–win cooperation. Thus, during the implementation of the anti-
galamsey policy, China recognized that the only way to guarantee a healthy relation
with Ghana was to collaborate with Ghana Government to deal with the galamsey chal-
lenge. China’s decision to engage the Ghanaian government through diplomatic dialogue
led to an understanding and mutually acceptable solution to the Chinese galamsey issue.
By cooperating to resolve the issue, China has shown that it respects Ghana’s sovereign
decision to implement the anti-galamsey policy to guarantee the security of its citizens.
Therefore, the claim that China is in Ghana to exploit its resources is far-fetched.
China is in Ghana to lend support for its economic development. Within the spirit of
South–South cooperation, Beijing has provided technical assistance in terms of engineers
and other professionals to reconstruct Ghana’s development.
Third, mutual economic benefits/gains define the survival of nations’ bilateral relations.
When the Sino-Ghana relationship was strained by the implementation of the anti-galam-
sey policy, it was salvaged by the respective country’s appeal to their deep-rooted bilateral
relations. Both nations recognized that a weakened bilateral relationship triggered by
implementation of an anti-galmasey policy would not auger well for their common econ-
omic interests. Ghana’s quest to attract FDIs to fix its economy that needs oxygen of funds
would have to lean on China. Ghana risks losing China’s sympathy for the continuing
grant of softloans. Beijing may act to truncate future grants of financial and technical
assistance to Ghana under the pretext of aid fatigue – the new policy mantra of some Euro-
pean countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands. Economic punishment from China
could affect the implementation of Ghana’s development programmes such as grants of
scholarships and support for institutional capacity building. Similarly, retaliation by
Ghana could hurt Chinese economy, albeit only marginally. Given that Ghana’s retail
market is under siege by cheap goods from China which have badly affected the survival
of many local retailers, a reaction by Ghanaian authorities would dislocate Chinese small-
scale businesses and possibly reduce the volume of imports from China. Ghana loses much
from smuggling of gold through galamsey to China. Also, China has always counted on its
African allies, particularly Ghana, to propagate its interest in the United Nations – the gal-
vanized moral and political support for each other at major international forums has
advanced their common interests and aspirations.
Fourth, sustaining Sino-Ghana relations is a balancing act. Ghana Government needs
to reciprocate China’s investment gesture and also act within the South–South interest and
reform the small-scale mining regime to broaden the scope of participation to non-
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 305
Ghanaian players. This requires innovative measures to streamline the regulatory frame-
work to provide space and permits for the Chinese migrants’ miners to undertake legiti-
mate and sustainable small-scale mining rather than tearing their illegal mining
infrastructure through arrests and deportations.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Emmanuel Debrah is an Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political
Science at the University of Ghana Legon, Accra. His research interest covers areas such as govern-
ance, democratic development and policy and published articles relating to decentralization, elec-
toral governance and public policy.
Richard Asante is senior lecturer in the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon. His
research areas are democratic governance, international relations and local governance.
References
Aidoo, R. (2016). The political economy of galamsey and anti-Chinese sentiment in Ghana. African
Studies Quarterly, 16(3/4), 55–68.
Arhin, K. (1970). Succession and gold mining at Manso Nkwanta. Research Review, 6, 104–116.
Asante, R. (2018). China and Africa. A model of South–South relations? China Quarterly of
International Strategic Studies, 4(2), 1–21.
Baah, A. Y., & Jauch, H. (2009). Chinese investments in Africa: A labour perspective. Accra and
Windhoek: African Labour Research Network.
Baldwin, D. A. (1966). Economic statecraft. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Balkema, A. A., & Junner, N. R. (1973). Gold in the gold coast. In Gold coast geological survey
memoire (Vol. 4, pp. 60–67). Accra: Republic of Ghana.
Bloomberg News. (2015). IMF agrees to lend Ghana Almost $1 billion to boost Economy. Retrieved
from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/imf-agrees-to-lend-ghana-almost-
1-billion-to-bolster-economy.
Bräutigam, D. (2011). The dragon’s gift: The real story of China in Africa. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Burgis, T., & Wallis, W. (2010). Continent drives a harder bargain. Financial Times. Retrieved from
http://www.ft.com/reports/africa-china-trade-2010.
Burrows, E., & Bird, L. (2017). Gold guns and China: Ghana’s fight to end galamsey. Retrieved from
africanarguments.org/2017/05/… /gold-guns-and-china-ghanas-fight-to-end-galamsey/.
Citifmonline. (2017). Respect our laws - Nana Addo to Chinese galamsey operators. Retrieved from
citifmonline.com/2017/… /respect-our-laws-nana-addo-to-chinese-galamsey-operators/.
Cook, S., Lu, J., Tugendhat, H., & Alemu, D. (2016). Chinese migrants in Africa: Facts and fictions
from the agri-food sector in Ethiopia and Ghana. World Development, 81, 61–70.
Crawford, G., Agyeyomah, C., Botchwey, G., & Mba, A. (2016). Impact of Chinese involvement in
small-scale gold mining in Ghana. Policy Brief, 33110(May), 1–15.
Daily Graphic. (2017). Call Chinese illegal miners to order - Hamid tells Chinese Ambassador.
Retrieved from https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/call-chinese-illegal-miners-to-
order-hamid-tells-chinese-ambassador.html.
Daily Guide. (2017). Government seizes Chinese galamsey ship Tuesday, 11 April.
Dumett, R. E. (1998). Eldorado in West Africa: The Gold Mining Frontiers, African Labour and
Colonial Capitalism in the Gold Coast 187501900. Athens: Ohio University Press.
306 E. DEBRAH AND R. ASANTE
French, H. (2014). China’s Second Continent: How a Million Migrants are Building a new Empire in
Africa. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Ghana News Agency. (2018). President confers national awards on Chinese envoy. Retrieved from
www.ghananewsagency.org/print/131139.
Ghanaweb. (2016). Galamsey queen exposed. Retrieved from https://www.ghanaweb.com/
GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Galamsey-queen-exposed-539667.
The Guardian. (2017). https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/15/ghana-deports-chinese-
goldminers.
Idun-Arkhurst, I. (2008). Ghana’s Relations with China. Johannesburg, South Africa: The South
African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA).
Jayaram, K., Kassiri, O., & Yuan Sun, Y. I. (2017). The closest look yet at Chinese economic engage-
ment in Africa. Retrieved from https://www.mckinsey.com/…africa/the-closest-look-yet-at-
chinese-economic-engage.
Jianzhong, G. (2013). China–Ghana relations and the focus of Chinese diplomacy in Africa.
Retrieved from gh.china-embassy.org › Home › News and Events. Oct 23.
Kesse, G. O. (1985). The mineral and rocks resources of ghana. Rotterdam, Boston: A A Balkema
Publishers.
Krasner, S. (1985). Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism. Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
LaTorre, J. R. (1978). Wealth surpasses everything: an economic history of Asante, 1750–1874.
Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley.
Liska, G. (1960). The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Marfaing, L., & Thiel, A. (2011). Chinese commodity imports in Ghana and Senegal: Demystifying
Chinese business strength in urban West Africa, Working Paper 180. Hamburg: German
Institute of Global and Area Studies.
Mohan, G., Lampert, B., Tan-Mullins, M., & Chang, D. (2014). Chinese Migrants and Africa’s
Development: New Imperialists or Agents of Change? London: Zed Books.
Morgenthau, H. (1962). A political theory of foreign aid. American Political Science Review, 56(2),
280–310.
Myjoyonline.com. (2017). Tension mounts in Amansie Central over Chinese galamsey activities.
Retrieved from myjoyonline.com/news/2016/august-24th/tension-mounts-in-amansie-central-
over-chinese-galamsey-activities.php.
Myjoyonline.com. (2017). Chinese Embassy threat won’t stop fight against galamsey - Minister.
Retrieved from https://www.myjoyonline.com/news/2017/April-11th/chinese-embassy-threats-
wont-stop-fight-against-galamsey-minister.php
Nowell, L. S., Norris, J. M., White, W., & Deborah, E. (2017). Thematic analysis: Striving to meet the
trustworthiness criteria. International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 16, 1–13.
Republic of Ghana. (2006). Minerals and Mining Act (Act 706). Accra: Asempa Publishing.
Republic of Ghana. (2015). Minerals and Mining (Amendment) Act 900. Accra: Assembly Press.
Rosenblum, P. (1973). Gold Mining in Ghana, 1874–1900. New York: Columbia University.
Sanderson, H., & Forsyth, M. (2013). China’s Superbank: Debt, oil and Influence – How China
Development Bank is Rewriting the Rules of Finance. New Jersey: Wiley-Bloomberg.
South China Morning Post. (2013). Low costs and huge profits: Irresistible lure for Chinese to mine
Ghana’s gold. Retrieved from https://www.scmp.com › News › China.
Taylor, A. A. (2006). An Economic History of the Ashanti Goldfields Corporation, 1895–2004: Land,
Labour, Capital and Enterprise. Thesis submitted to the London School of Economics and
Political Science in accordance with the requirements of the University of London for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The Chronicle. (2018). One Chinese grabbed for galamsey. Retrieved from thechronicle.com.gh/
index.php/2018/11/18/one-chinese-grabbed-for-galamsey.
The Economist. (2011). The Chinese are Coming… to Africa. Retrieved from http://www.
economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/04/chinese_africa.
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 307
Thompson, R. (2012). Assessing the Chinese Influence in Ghana, Angola, and Zimbabwe: The
Impact of Politics, Partners, and Petro. Center for International Security and Cooperation
(CISAC). Stanford: Stanford University.
World Bank. (2005). The Millennium Development Goals and Small-Scale Mining: A Conference for
Forging Partnerships for Action. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Zafar, A. (2007). The Growing Relationship Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa:
Macroeconomic, Trade, Investment, and aid Links. Oxford: Oxford University Press.