

**AN EXAMINATION OF THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE  
ANGLOPHONE CRISIS TO CAMEROON'S PEACE AND  
DEVELOPMENT (2016-2019)**

**BY**

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**THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY  
OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD  
OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN  
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**LEGON**

**DECEMBER 2019**

**DECLARATION**

I, CHRISTIAN NENE KWAO AYISA, do hereby declare that this dissertation is an outcome of a research conducted by me, under the supervision of Dr. Afua Boatemaa Yakohene and no part of it has been submitted anywhere for any other purpose. All sources of information collected and materials used have been duly acknowledged and referenced in the bibliography.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this work to God Almighty for granting me the grace and strength to complete this course in spite of the countless hurdles.

I also dedicate this work to my parents, Mr. G. N. Ayisa of blessed memory for encouragement and counsel that continues to linger in my mind and guide me in all endeavors, and my mother, Ms. Juliana Decardi-Nelson, whose immense prayers and resources have brought me this far.

Finally, I dedicate this piece to the good people of Cameroon, especially those who have lost their lives, family, friends, loved ones, those who have had to flee their homes as refugees and IDPs and to the peace-loving citizens who are not giving up, but bent on ensuring the restoration of a peaceful Cameroon for all and sundry.

God bless you all!!!

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My foremost gratitude goes to my Father in Heaven for bringing me to this established end, just like He promised. My profound gratitude goes to Dr. Afua Boatemaa Yakohene, my supervisor, for her immense support and guidance every step of this journey, as well as her patience and counsel on both academic and social issues.

I acknowledge the members of my study group, “LECIAD-Annex”, for their support, inspiration, and motivation.

I also like to acknowledge Dr. Vladimir Antwi- Danso, of the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College (GAFSC), Dr. Festus Aubyn and Dr. Kwesi Aning of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and other scholars for their patience, time, interest, enthusiasm, and unrelenting willingness to avail themselves in spite of their busy schedules to grant me interviews and make inputs towards the successful completion of this research.

I would also like to thank Mr. Shine Alege and the entire Nigerian High Commission in Ghana for their timely response and resourcefulness.

Finally, I acknowledge the administrative staff (Mrs. Mary Ametepe, Ms. Akosua Otchere and Ms. Ruby Tetteh) and all my lecturers at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and diplomacy (LECIAD).

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

|        |   |  |
|--------|---|--|
| AAC    | - | All Anglophone Conference                    |
| AGC    | - | Ambazonia Governing Council                  |
| AGOA   | - | African Growth and Opportunity Act           |
| AIG    | - | Ambazonia Interim Government                 |
| AU     | - | African Union                                |
| BIR    | - | Rapid Intervention Battalion                 |
| C4D    | - | Communication for Development                |
| CACSC  | - | Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium |
| CDC    | - | Cameroon Development Corporation             |
| CFA    | - | Central African Franc                        |
| CNU    | - | Cameroon National Union                      |
| CPA    | - | Comprehensive Peace Agreement                |
| CPDM   | - | Cameroon People's Democratic Movement        |
| CUC    | - | Cameroon United Congress                     |
| ECCAS  | - | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ELECAM | - | Elections Cameroon                           |
| EU     | - | European Union                               |
| FDFA   | - | Federal Department of Foreign Affairs        |
| FWM    | - | Free West-Cameroon Movement                  |
| GAFSC  | - | Ghana Armed Forces Staff College             |
| IDPs   | - | Internally Displaced Persons                 |
| IEDs   | - | Improvised Explosive Devices                 |
| KNDP   | - | Kamerun National Democratic Party            |

|        |   |   |
|--------|---|---|
| LECIAD | - | Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy            |
| NCHRF  | - | National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms                |
| NGO    | - | Non-Governmental Organization                                   |
| OGTR   | - | Operation Ghost Town Resistance                                 |
| OHADA  | - | Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa    |
| PLF    | - | People's Liberation Front                                       |
| RoA    | - | Republic of Ambazonia   |
| SCAUF  | - | Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front            |
| SCBC   | - | Southern Cameroon Broadcasting Corporation                      |
| SCNC   | - | Southern Cameroon's National Council                            |
| SCRM   | - | Southern Cameroon's Restoration Movement                        |
| SCSAF  | - | Southern Cameroons South Africa Forum                           |
| SDF    | - | Social Democratic Front   |
| UBSU   | - | University of Buea Student Union                                |
| UK     | - | United Kingdom  |
| UN     | - | United Nations  |
| UNESCO | - | United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNHCR  | - | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees                   |
| UNICEF | - | United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund          |
| USA    | - | United States of America  |

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## **ABSTRACT**

The hard handedness of the Cameroonian government's security forces against the peaceful demonstration by lawyers, teachers and civil society organizations from Anglophone Cameroon in 2016 escalated an already tense security situation in the country. The repressive response of the state security forces led to civilian deaths and the displacement of over 437, 000 people, mostly in the Anglophone regions of North West and South West of the country. Using a qualitative approach, the study examines the causes of the crisis as well as its ramifications on the people and on peace and development in Cameroon in general. The study found that the causes of the crisis are deep in history, and that the crisis had economic, political, social, and psychological ramifications on Anglophone Cameroonians and the country as a whole, as well as on Nigeria, its western neighbor. The study further noted the efforts of international actors such as the UK, US, and Switzerland, along with ECCAS and the African Union (AU), which have used largely diplomatic approaches to resolve the crisis. The study recommended, among other things, that these external actors intensify their efforts to bring a lasting solution to the crisis.

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.0 Background to the Research Problem

The genesis of the Anglophone Crisis is traced to World War 1 when the country was unequally partitioned between France and Britain, following the defeat of Germany (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997). The Anglophone Crisis, as it is commonly called, refers to the divide between the English speaking and French speaking parts of Cameroon. This divide poses a major challenge to the efforts of the post-colonial state to forge national unity and integration because the Anglophone Cameroonians have allegedly felt marginalized in the predominantly Francophone country. This has resulted in heightened tensions between the two sides and has led to the reintroduction of arguments and actions in favour of ‘federalism’ or even ‘secession’ (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997).

Unlike the secession cases of South Sudan, Kosovo, and Crimea that turned out to be relatively ‘successful’, there have been some unsuccessful attempts at it. These include the attempted secession of Quebec from Canada, Scotland from UK and Catalonia from Spain (Sterio, 2018). On the continent of Africa, cases of secession include the unsuccessful attempts of Biafra from Nigeria, the successful secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia, (Keller, 2007) and more recently, the case of Cameroon.

The Republic of Cameroon which is situated in Central Africa, is bordered by Nigeria to the West and North; Chad to the Northeast; the Central African Republic to the East; and Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of Congo to the South. Since her attainment of independence in 1960, Cameroon has been faced with many challenges, primarily with regards to internal integration of regions that were previously under English colonial rule.

The claim by scholars such as Mukong (2016) that the Anglophone Cameroonians perceive a gradual assimilation of their identity into that of the French is made based on some events and developments in the political and administrative history of Cameroon. 1960 saw Nigeria and East Cameroun (also known as French Cameroon), which were Mandate Territories gaining independence from Britain and France respectively (Mukong, 2016). Soon after, a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations (UN) in February 1961 resulted in Southern British Cameroon becoming a part of the then La Republique du Cameroon (LRC) (Mukong, 2016).

Through the Foumban Conference of 1961, the country became a federation and guaranteed respect for the cultural identity of the Anglophone regions (Campbell, 2016). In May 1972, a referendum was organized for the whole Federal Republic, rather than just the Anglophone territory to decide on adopting a unitary system. With the francophone territory having a demographic advantage of about 80% as compared to the 20% of Anglophones of the population, they managed to get a landslide victory for the adoption of a unitary system. Hence the dissolution of the federal state leading to the creation of the unitary state (Mukong, 2016). Also in 1984, under the Presidency of Paul Biya, the United Republic of Cameroon had its name changed to the Republic of Cameroon which was quite symbolic because this was the official name of Cameroon prior to the adoption of the federal system (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997).

In October 2016, lawyers in the North West region of Cameroon embarked on a strike action after close to ten (10) months of appealing to the Justice Ministry to address some concerns they had put across. In November of the same year, some teachers of primary and secondary schools in the two Anglophone regions also decided to embark on a sit-down strike as well,

to draw the governments attention to some pertinent issues they needed to be tackled (Okereke, 2018).

On the side of the lawyers, their grievances included the call on the Ministry of Justice and the government to replace francophone magistrates and state counsels, who had been posted to courts in the Anglophone regions. These French-speaking officials who were handicapped in English were allegedly undermining the effective practice of the English law. The lawyers also demanded a translation of the main text of business law known as “Organisation Pour l’ Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (OHADA)” into English to address the limitation caused by the language barrier (Mukong, 2016).

The teachers, on the other hand, complained of an increase in francophone teachers posted to the Anglophone regions (mainly Northwest and Southwest regions). Since they could not express themselves well enough, students found it difficult understanding what they taught and as a result failed their exams, rendering them unable to gain admission from primary into secondary schools and from secondary schools into good universities (Mukong, 2016). Other groups of aggrieved citizens joined the protests and strikes over unmet needs such as infrastructure, social amenities and employment opportunities.

Rather than addressing the concerns of the protesters through the appropriate state institutions, the military and gendarmes allegedly meted a crackdown on them in an attempt to disperse the protests and deter the others from following suit. The government’s response, usually through the military, has been characterized by intimidation, arrests without charges, jail without trial, torture and other forms of inhuman abuses (Amin, 2018).

In response to the repressive actions of the military and the government, there seems to be a surge in the number of activist and nationalist groups mainly from the Anglophone regions to counter the military. Initially, the demand was for a peaceful settlement of issues, but as tensions heightened and attempts at dialogue failed, the demands evolved into complete secession of the Anglophone regions from the La République du Cameroun (Amin, 2018). Nationwide, the Anglophone Crisis has become a major topic of discussion, and despite the continuous presence of government forces in the region to calm the instability, it remains unclear the way forward or how the crisis will end. Undoubtedly, this crisis has had some social, economic and political ramifications on the peace and development of Cameroon.

### **1.1. Statement of the Research Problem**

Since the inception of the Anglophone crisis in 2016, Cameroon has been discussed time and again on numerous media outlets over various unfortunate events that have taken place in the country, mainly within the two English-speaking regions. Unlawful mass arrests without trial, intimidation, torture, rape, and murder are some of the gruesome occurrences that have been meted out to sections of the Cameroonian populace (Farouk Chothai, 2018).

On the eve of New Year, President Paul Biya in his end of year address described the agitators as “a group of manipulated and exploited extremist rioters whose activities have led to the loss of lives, destruction of public and private buildings, crippling of economic activities and the desecration of sacred national symbols”(Okereke, 2018). This did not go down well with the aggrieved citizens who were only seeking their human rights and freedoms that were being trampled upon. Initially, the state security forces were accused of using these repressive methods to discourage the protests, but as it went on, various separatist groups emerged to fight the injustice and counter the security forces (Amin, 2018).

The social and political life of the people has not been spared either. Prior to Cameroon's national elections in 2018, the intimidation by both the government security agencies on one hand and the separatist groups on the other hand took to intimidation and other repressive and revolutionary measures as a means of discouraging members and sympathizers of their respective opponents from participating in the elections. There are reports of the military and gendarme checkpoints and barricades mounted at vantage points where protesters, pro-separatists or any one from the English-speaking regions were intimidated, harassed or abused. This was also replicated by the separatist groups amidst attacks on the military and other state security forces (TheGuardian, 2018). Today the United Nations (UN) believes there are about 437,000 displaced persons in Cameroon, some living in bushes and forests while others are seeking protection with friends, families, and religious institutions outside the crisis area while others have fled the country as refugees to neighbouring Nigeria (Kuwonu, 2019).

It is against this backdrop that, this research seeks to examine the social, economic and political ramifications of the Anglophone Crisis and its ability to undermine the peace and development of Cameroon, and by extension its neighbouring countries.

## **1.2. Research Questions**

1. What are the causes of the 2016 Anglophone crisis in Cameroon?
2. What are the social, political and economic ramifications of the 2016 Anglophone Crisis on peace and development in Cameroon?
3. What are some of the spill-over effects on neighbouring countries?
4. What are the steps being taken by the state, ECCAS and the AU to avoid undermining the peace and development of Cameroon?

### **1.3. Research Objectives**

1. To establish the causes of the 2016 Anglophone crisis in Cameroon.
2. To determine the social, political and economic ramifications of the Anglophone Crisis on peace and development in Cameroon.
3. To examine some of the spill-over effects of the crisis on neighbouring countries.
4. To identify some internal and external interventions towards addressing the Anglophone Crisis.

### **1.4. Scope**

This research will focus on the Republic of Cameroon as the principal case study. The study focuses on the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon from 2016-2019. The crisis has been in existence since the 1960s but the study focuses on this period because the inception of the most recent upheaval can be traced to 2016 and the crisis is still ongoing. The scope of this study will cover the origins of the conflict, the events and causes of the 2016 crisis, the effects of the crisis, particularly its social, political and economic effects not just on Cameroon but also on her neighbouring states, and finally the measures and strategies that have been employed in an attempt to resolve this Anglophone Crisis.

### **1.5. Rationale**

This study has its significance embedded in the fact that, it identifies better possible alternative solutions to the crisis and its ramifications. This study will also add to the existing body of scholarly work about the need for conflict resolution measures since conflicts such as these mar the development of a nation as is evident in the case of Cameroon.

## **1.6. Theoretical Framework**

Theories have been one of the tools by which scholars, researchers, or philosophers try to explain some occurrences that take place in a particular environment. Theories are used not only to explain or challenge past or present phenomenon but also to predict future occurrences. Pertaining to this study, the Human Needs Theory (HNT) has been adopted to understand the research problem and guide the study towards achieving its objectives. The study would further rely on the Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) to throw more light on the HNT and its contribution to the study.

### **1.6.1. Human Needs Theory**

As a result of competing interests of states, social groups and individuals, conflicts are bound to emerge. In an attempt to understand, explain or establish the causal factors and dynamics of these conflicts some theorists have written extensively on the HNT. Among the proponents of the HNT are Abraham Maslow, John W. Burton, Marshall Rosenberg, and Manfred Max-Neef. The most prominent among them are Abraham Maslow and John Burton, and this study will rely extensively on their works.

Maslow (1943), in his piece “a theory of human motivation” puts human needs in a five-level hierarchical pyramid with a broad base at the bottom that narrows at the top. He lays emphasis on the fact that human needs are universal and in an ascending order. At the base of the pyramid is physiological needs. This entails food, water and shelter which Maslow believes to be the most essential of all needs. The level right above the base, has the need for safety and security, which comes right before the need for love and belonging on the third level. Self-esteem, he places on the fourth level and on the topmost level of the pyramid, he places self-actualization (Maslow, 1943).



individual to another and from one society to another. What may be of grave importance to a particular individual, group or society, may not necessarily be of such value to or among others. Theorists of the HNT are of the view that denial and hindrance of basic human needs not only ignites a sense of insecurity and discrimination but in some cases, the mere delay of the need could also spark violence (Azam & Rehman, 2018). Thus, any threat to the needs or values of group or society in the form of denial or oppression may spark agitation and unrest. It must be noted that the term security as used above refers to security in its broader sense, as operationalized by the UNDP in its Human Development Report of 1994 (Undp, 1994).

Another assumption of the HNT is that, since we are all humans and our needs are universal to all humans, we are able to connect, understand and appreciate the needs of others. This would in turn make others willing to take alternative steps to try to meet these needs thereby avoiding conflict and destruction while promoting peace and sustainable development.

### **1.6.2. Criticism of the Human Needs Theory**

The HNT has come under some criticism by a number of scholars and theorists especially in the field of peace and conflict studies. One of such criticism is based on the theory of rationality. One of its key proponents, Lauren Park, highlights two shortcomings of the HNT. The first of which is the understanding of the existence of human needs. Secondly, the understanding of the value of the need to a particular society (Park, 2010). Here, Park (2010) draws attention to the fact that, for the needs theory to be efficient and viable, the particular need of the group or society must be clearly identified and established. There have been instances where a presumed need was not necessarily the actual need of the aggrieved party. It may be a case of false conflict; where for some reason the real source of a conflict is not clearly made known. This may be deliberate or unconscious. On the issue of value, all

individuals, groups or societies attach different value to needs and interests. A particular need or interests may not have the same value to two different individuals based on their history, experiences or backgrounds.

Again, theorists of HNT like Burton and Maslow place much emphasis on the fact that unmet needs triggers violence. Christopher Mitchell draws attention to the fact that some needs may be incompatible (like in the case if Israel and Palestine) and may also evolve into something else. For instance, the quest for security may evolve into the need for power and dominance (Mitchell, 1990).

The HNT has also been criticized on the basis that it lays emphasis on the deprivation of the needs, values and interests of a people who believe they have a claim to what they are being deprived of, but it fails to highlight the fact that the realisation of this deprivation is due to a comparison between “the haves and the have not’s” (Etzioni, 1968). In essence, it is when a section of a group perceives or believes that it is being deprived of something that it deserves. It is this weakness of the HNT that the Relative Deprivation theory seeks to address.

### **1.6.3. The Relative Deprivation Theory**

Paul Collier is of the school of thought that puts forward the ‘frustration-aggression’ debate which suggests that the accumulation of frustration over time is what causes people to be aggressive. He lays emphasis on the build-up of the frustration and not just mere frustration. Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) go on further to say that, the frustration is as a result of relative deprivation of needs, the needs, values and interests that Maslow and Burton outline in the HNT discussed above. The theory is widely credited to American

sociologist Robert K. Merton, on his work on the military after WWII (Longley, 2018). Other proponents of the RDT include British sociologist Walter Runciman and Ted Gurr.

The theory of Relative Deprivation, according to Ted Gurr, can be traced back to Aristotle and is of the view that, “the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common person who lacks it” (Gurr, 1970). Lack in this sense is actually realised by comparing one’s condition or situation to that of another. Gurr (1970) explains that, the RDT depicts the heightened tension that emanates as a result of inconsistencies between “what ought to be” and “what is” in relation to collective value satisfaction. In essence, Gurr (1970) is suggesting that, the perceived or actual gap between the expectations of an individual or group and what has actually been achieved or received is what results in ‘collective discontent’. Thus, the magnitude of the gap between “the haves” and “the have nots” influences frustration which is subsequently expressed in violence.

Among some of the earliest definitions of Relative Deprivation, Walter Runciman defines the concept as a situation where “Person A feels deprived of Object X: Person A does not have X; Person A knows of other people who have X; Person A wants to have X; Person A believes obtaining X is realistic” (Runciman, 1966). From Runciman’s definition, it can be deduced that the deprivation is not absolute or self-existent but rather the sense of being deprived per the theory is as a result of a comparison (Ellemers, 2002). Thus, an individual or group compares him or herself or themselves to another to realise that they have been deprived of something due them. Again, it is not just the existence of the difference between individuals or groups but it takes the intentional, and conscious cognitive appraisal of the two groups to arrive at a perception that the perceiver or the perceiving group has been

disadvantaged (Ellemers, 2002). Finally, the demands of the deprived must be realistic in the sense that the perceived disadvantage must really be evidently unfair.

The RDT has not been spared of its fair share of criticisms. It has been criticised for not being able explain why some people join movements whose activities and goals have no direct influence on themselves or their group.

#### **1.6.4. Relevance of the Relative Deprivation Theory cum Human Needs Theory**

The use of the HNT would be used to identify the specific needs, values and interests that the Anglophone Cameroonians claim to be deprived of. The RDT would go on to ascertain the validity of the claim by comparing the variables or conditions of the Anglophone and francophone Cameroonians. Complementarily, the two theories would provide a deeper understanding of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, the cause of the collective action, some effects of the crisis and subsequently, possible alternative solution.

### **1.7. Literature Review**

This review of the literature explores various themes related to this study in three main sections. The subheadings include, secession, types of secession, causes of secession, some cases of secession and their outcomes.

#### **1.7.1. Secession**

Until the latter part of the Twentieth Century, the concept of self-determination had been rarely discussed among scholars and theorists in academia. The whole idea of self-determination through secession was deemed a heresy and unheard of (Heraclides, 1992). An attempt to challenge the government of the day to the extent of trying to divide the country,

break a part of it and declare it autonomous of an already existing sovereign was tantamount to treason. In effect, it could be said that, the separatists or secessionists would be threatening the scope and form of an existing state, and certainly no state would readily accept this proposition without some friction. In the last three decades, there seems to be a hike in the quest for secessionism around the world, and the continent of Africa has not been exempted from its fair share of it (Buchanan, 2003). Despite this claim by Buchanan which is shared by some other scholars Englebert and Hummel (2005) in the social sciences, the concept lacks consensus in definition. A clear example are the definitions of secession by Crawford and Radan which stand at opposite ends of the spectrum. Crawford defines secession as “... the creation of a State by the use or threat of force without the consent of the former sovereign” (Crawford, 2006), whereas the latter defines it as the creation of a new state “upon territory previously forming part of, or being a colonial entity of, an existing State” (Pavkovic & Radan, 2008).

Currently, like many other contested theories in the social sciences fraternity there is no universally accepted definite definition of secession, but Buchanan (2003) goes on to explain a few of the dominant ones. In his first instance, he explains the classic form of secession, which occurs when “a group in a portion of the territory of a state attempts to create a new state thereby, leaving behind the original state in reduced form” (Buchanan, 2003). Here, a group of people decide not to be associated to the state under which they fall; they cease to identify with an existing state as one nation and rather form a new state.

Irredentist secession is where the ultimate goal is not the formation of a new state, but rather the merging of a seceding territory with a neighbouring state. This second typology discussed by Buchanan (2003) is usually the case when the seceding region has more identifiable

features with the neighbouring state than that of the state it seeks to break away from. A typical example is the case of 1961 plebiscite organised by the UN, which saw the muslim dominated Northern part of British Cameroon joining Nigeria as against the Southern part joining French Cameroon.

The third scenario occurs “when there is an agreement between the populations or at least the leaders of two regions (which together comprise the whole territory of the state), to split the state into two new states”, like in the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia into Czech Republic and Slovakia. The fourth and final type of secession that (Buchanan, 2003) touches on is when the secession is enforced or initiated by powerful external forces over a smaller, weaker and less powerful force. This particular instance can be seen in the division of Poland between the Soviet Union and the Nazis (Buchanan, 2003).

In spite of the diversity in conceptualizing secession, Sorens (2005) highlights three (3) distinct features that seem to cut across. These are: the mobilization of people to rally behind the course of secession; the formal detachment of geographical region; and finally, the creation of a new state on the detached territory (Sorens, 2005). Certainly, all three features mentioned above can clearly be observed in the various concepts of secession. This notwithstanding, Sterio (2018) draws our attention to the fact that not all attempts at secession, turn out to be successful, the opposite is rather a more common phenomenon. Only a few attempts at secession have actually been successful, although there are numerous failed attempts, and some others that are still in the pipeline (Sterio, 2018).

### **1.7.2. Forms of Secession**

Scholars such as Sorens (2005) and Englebert & Hummel, (2005) among others have made attempts at grouping secessions into categories. Leaning on the assertion of Sorens, he classifies the theory of secession into cultural, political, economic and other enabling factors (Sorens, 2005).

#### **1.7.2a. The Economic Theory of Secession**

The economic underpinnings of secessionism have featured prominently in the works of scholars in recent times. Generally, the notion is that, regions with peculiar advantage relative to other regions within the borders of a state in terms of natural resource endowments, wealth and human or physical capital are more prone to secession tendencies Beran, (1988). This is worsened if the government is biased or unfair with the management of the resources and allocation of their revenue. Thus if the more endowed region perceive that they have more to gain as an independent state than what they receive as members of a bigger state, it tends to encourage and increase secession tendencies (Dominicé, 2006).

#### **1.7.2b. The Cultural Theory of Secession**

Cultural theories relate to the possibility of secession based on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of a people. It could be said to be the assessment or analysis of secession through a cultural lens or perspective. There is a popular assertion that religion, ethnicity and linguistic heterogeneity are among the commonest basis of secessions. It is believed that societies that are heterogeneous are more prone to secession due to their differences in culture and values (Sorens, 2005). Aside the mere existence of cultural differences, the possibility of secession threats is usually aggravated when governments suppress certain cultural groups over others, which can eventually lead to the formation of political parties along cultural

lines. This is further fueled by a formidable, well-resourced and well organized diasporan presence (Boyle, Katharine & Englebert, 2006).

### **1.7.2c. The Political Theory of Secession**

Political secession theories which is another form of secession focus more on the internal political features and wrangling of countries on a whole, rather than the mere changes in the international environment, discrimination, democratization inter alia, that have featured extensive in this study, (Brown, 2010).

Brown (2010), touches on democracy and democratization in relation to secession. According to Brown (2010), democracy on one hand seems to provide a voice and listening-ear to the voiceless and unheard minority section of a state. This gives the perpetrators, some form of legitimacy, and support to operate since they are made to believe that the secession would serve their interests better. Then again, the democratic transition or democratization usually creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and insecurity stemming from the fear of being ostracized from governance and other benefits. There is also some form of a security dilemma among political groups formed on some peculiar basis such as religion, ethnicity or location, other than a national outlook. Interestingly, the prevalence of secessionist movements in some developed and mature democracies such as France, Canada, Spain, India and the United Kingdom tends to annul the claim of a relationship between secessions and democracy, Seymour (2012).

### **1.7.3. Some Secessions and their Causes**

Considering the prevalence of secession in recent times some scholars have tried to identify the root causes of secession or the reasons behind a peoples opting for secession in an attempt

to better understand the phenomenon. Generally, the causes may be categorized into two main groups: the historic causes and the immediate causes. The historic underpinnings usually create a buildup of animosity and frustration which then bursts into violent active conflict, an aggressive expression of the aggrieved group. For instance, Brown (2010) in his piece concludes that the main causes of secession in recent times have been oppression, lack of democracy, discrimination and massive human rights violation. These are all embedded in a concept referred to as the “just-cause theory”. The just-cause theory emphasizes the relationship between the quest for self-determination and respect for human rights. In this case Brown is of the view that secession is a means to an end, where the end is respect for human rights. In effect, secession is a self-determination tool, used in ensuring that a groups human rights are upheld, preserved and protected. The Kurds, Eritreans and the South Sudanese are examples of cases where the violation of human rights have sparked secessionism.

Ryabinin (2017) in his paper, “the Basic Causes of the Contemporary Separatism” attests to the fact that separatism was an idea that dominated an era in times past and had long been forgotten, but the twenty first century would see quite a number of nationalism geared separatism mainly on the bases of identity. This goes to corroborate to some extent the assertion of Samuel Huntington that post-Cold War clashes would be mainly based on identity. Again, this also supports the suggestion of identity as a factor of conflict under needs theory and a threat to a people’s identity relative to that of others is a causal factor for conflict.

He further highlights that, the causes of secession are numerous and non-exhaustive due to the fact that what triggers secessionism among one group may not be of value to another but

that notwithstanding he posits that there are two main conditions for separatism. The first being the discrimination of ethnic minorities, and the second being the presence of an active national political elite. From the first condition, Ryabinin (2017) clearly doesn't limit the basis of discrimination since they may actually vary in form and magnitude, but essentially, a distinct group of people that perceive that they are being discriminated against would definitely consider secession. It may also take the form of one group portraying their identity or themselves as a superior and more enlightened group as compared to that of another group. Per the second condition of Ryabinin (2017), another precondition for secession is the presence of an active and vibrant leadership that has the ability to whip up support and mobilize his or her people to champion the cause. This active political elite sensitizes the larger group on the problems of the group and why they are issues worth fighting for. They convince and mobilize the supporters to act in a particular manner that would draw attention to the problems of the minority group.

These conditions put across by Ryabinin were arrived at by his study of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Europe, with respect to the various secessions that took place prior to the end of the Cold War and after its end. The scope of his study may be quite limiting considering the fact that as at 2017 when the paper was published there had been a number of secessionist attempts in various places outside his domain of study. Including the secession attempts in other places such as Africa may have unearthed some other conditions or simply made his claim more accurate.

Still on the causes of secession, Sorens (2005) in his paper "The Cross-Sectional Determinants of Secession in Advanced Democracies" outlines seven (7) hypothesis that may lead to secessionism. These are regional language and irredentist potential, history of

independence and relative fiscal income. The others are population, relative representation, multiparty system and ideological difference. The study showed that some factors such as regional language, history of independence, irredentist potential, population, and fiscal relative income showed a standardized regression and relationship with secession. Here again, the study was limited to secessionism in advanced democracies. Unfortunately, no African country was featured in the study. The scope limits the study to “advanced democracies” but the failure to operationalize what the author meant by that leaves the work questionable. Leaving room for ambiguity. Unless, Sorens (2005) wants to suggest that no African country faced with secessionism was advanced in democracy. This may portray an otherwise great work as biased.

Sorens (2005), suggests that the study of the determinants of secession in democracies (not advanced democracies) must be done separately from that of authoritarian regimes. Since the political and social conditions in these two states may differ, there is a possibility of arriving at different results, but since his study was on an aspect of democracies, it may be misconstrued or understood as referring to all countries that are not advanced in democracy as authoritarian. Despite the shortcomings of Sorens’ article, he concludes by emphasizing on the fact that cultural identity is the basis of secessionism but with other contributing factors such as those enlisted above.

The splitting of the former German colony between Britain and France was yet another cause for the Anglophone problem. The divide has been said to be the root cause of the problem (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017). At least from the time of the Germans the people of Cameroon identified themselves as one people united against a common opponent. Then after the Second World War the country was split between the British and the French.

#### **1.7.4. Effects of Secession**

Undoubtedly, secession has multiple effects on different groups of people, actors and entities directly and indirectly related. These effects range from social, political and economic.

On political consequences, Radan (2012) posits that secession distracts the government and its arms from concentrating on their core duties in the day-to-day administration of the state. Rather than giving their full attention to developmental issues and other related matters such as the provision of amenities, social interventions and infrastructure, they tend to be preoccupied with preventing the impending threat of secession which no government would willingly agree to. This distraction usually takes a detrimental toll on the state and makes the government unpopular since they are not able to meet the needs of citizens. Again, depending on the strategy of the government and various actors involved in the secession struggle, bilateral or multilateral relationships between and among states, Multinational Corporations (MNCs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and International Organisations may be strained or in worst cases severed (Radan, 2012).

Socially, Titanji (2009) suggests that secession disrupts social institutions and social bonds that existed prior to the secession struggle. People in the seceding region belonged to various social groups including churches, mosques, schools, sports clubs and other social groups where they made friends and built relationships. There may even be some inter-cultural marriages between people from the host state and the seceding state. All these ties are threatened in the face of secession.

On the economic front, (Miller, 1997) highlights the issue of professionals having to vacate their posts for safety and security. This brain-drain causes stagnation in production and productivity, leading to loss of state revenue especially in state institution. Sorens (2005)

further emphasizes on some other economic consequences in relation to the secessionist struggle which includes the loss of foreign investors, and the halt of most businesses for fear of looting. In an atmosphere of instability, foreign investors would not be willing to take the risk of investing in the affected region nor be willing to expand their existing investments. Shop owners, hawkers, farmers and all other economic activities are affected, causing harsh economic conditions for the state, but most importantly for the individuals and families. Radan as well as Titanji, in their contributions above, address the consequences of successful secession. That is after the total break away of a seceded state. It addresses the post-secession conditions and the effects of the secession on the former host state and the new state (Radan, 2012; Titanji, 2009).

Sorens (2005) on the other hand, delves into the effects of a typical conflict situation as a result of secessionist attempts and the violence associated with it. Considering the focus of this study it may seem as though the submission of Radan (2012) and Titanji (2009) are not too relevant here but interestingly the issues they raised are quite observable even during the struggle for secession, which is usually characterized by violence. Kidd reiterates the widely accepted notion that there cannot be development in the absence of peace. In effect, where there is no peace, there is no development (Kidd, 2013). This, I find interesting because places like Eritrea and South Sudan went through similar circumstances and are now independent states still face serious challenges with development as a result of their secession struggles.

This study seeks to fill this gap in literature by examining the consequences of the Anglophone crisis on peace and development. It would further examine some steps that have been taken towards the resolution of the crisis from various actors such as the state, the AU

and representatives of the Ambazonian regions. Finally, the study would identify some limitations and hurdles that are impeding the peace process and then some suggested solutions to the crisis.

## **1.8. Methodology**

### **1.8.1. Research Design**

The strategy used or adopted in any research is very important. It influences the credibility and the validity of the results to the research problem that the study is aimed at. It provides a well-structured, systematic and scientific manner by which the research is carried out. The research methodology helps to identify the suitable subjects for the study, the data to be gathered, the tools and means of gathering the data, and ultimately the appropriate method of analysing the data collected. There are three (3) main methods of research, these include the quantitative method, the qualitative method and the use of both the quantitative and the qualitative method known as the mixed method (Biggam, 2015; Creswell, 2014).

To Drislane and Parkinson (2011) qualitative research is a research based on using methods such as participant observation or case studies that gives a narrative or descriptive accounts of the issue. Similarly, Nkwi, Nyamongo, and Ryan (2001) states that “qualitative research involves any research that uses data that do not indicate ordinal values”. This definition is centred on the kind of data identified or selected to be used. They are of the view that qualitative research relies on nominal values such as images, texts and sounds. Mostly the data is collected through recording a participant’s view, opinion or account of a phenomenon and then it is transcribed.

Hatch (2002) added that, qualitative research does not rely on one source of data, rather it combines and triangulates information from multiple sources such as observations, interviews, documents as well as audio-visuals. The different sources of data is then organised into themes. Qualitative approach is also often used to obtain detailed information about phenomena such as feelings, thoughts, and sentiments that are difficult to extract or learn about through more conventional methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).

Bobbie (2005), highlights some advantages of qualitative research method which are flexibility and cost. Flexibility here has to do with the liberty of the researcher to alter or modify research questions as well as pose open ended questions and probe into them further for clarity and in-depth understanding. On the issue of cost, Bobbie posits that qualitative research could be relatively less expensive. In his opinion, with the help of a simple recorder, a pen and paper, the researcher could undertake a good research. It is for the above mentioned reasons that the study adopts a purely qualitative approach as the means of achieving its objectives.

The study is going to be a deductive research. An evaluation to ascertain whether perceived ideas actually produce expected results or a particular phenomenon could be situated into an existing theory is termed to be deductive. Since this research is premised on testing the efficacy of an existing theory, in this case, the surge of violence caused by relative deprivation, the deductive approach is the best (Creswell, 2014).

### **1.8.2. Sources of Data**

The primary source of data was collected through interviews with respondents. The interviews were conducted on two categories of people. The first group consists of experts and specialists in the field of peace and conflict studies from the Kofi Annan International

Peace Training Centre (KAIPTC), the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) and the Embassy of Nigeria here in Ghana. The second group consists of some Cameroonians living in Ghana, as well as some living in Cameroon. This includes both Anglophone and Francophone Cameroonians who are employed here in Ghana, students and graduates from Ghanaian institutions.

The secondary data for the study was from books, journal articles, documentaries and internet sources.

### **1.8.2. Target Population**

The study target population constitutes relevant scholars in the field of peace and conflict studies from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and Ghana Armed Forces Staff College (GAFSC) both in Accra. Officials from the Nigerian Embassy in Ghana, and the African Union (AU), as well as Cameroonian Nationals both here in Ghana and in Cameroon formed part of the target population. They were interviewed because of their expertise, in-depth knowledge experience and ability to provide reliable data. The interviews were conducted in English. Why in English? What is the relevance on your choice of language?

### **1.8.3. Sample Size and Sample Method**

The sample size of 30 was obtained from Cameroonian nationals living in Ghana (who are either students or working here), Cameroonian nationals living in Cameroon, Cameroonian Immigrants living outside Cameroon and Ghana, and some Ghanaian, Nigerian and Cameroonian scholars well versed on the subject under study.

The purposive sampling technique was adopted in selecting respondents well versed in the topic under research. Purposive sampling, also known as subjective sampling is a technique where the researcher uses his or her own discretion in the selection of respondents from a population (Etikan, 2016). This technique was used in tandem with the snowballing technique, which allows for interviewees to suggest others who may have some additional in-depth knowledge on the topic under study (Creswell, 2015:206).

The purposive sampling technique was used in selecting the experts who granted audience voluntarily to be interviewed but the sampling technique that enhanced the smooth access to the Cameroonian nationals was the snowballing technique. The researcher began with information at the Centre for International Students of the University of Ghana. From there, the President of the International Students Association introduced some Cameroonian students and Cameroonian nationals who also followed suit.

#### **1.8.4. Data Collection**

To meet the objectives of the research and find answers to the research questions posed, interviews were carried out with a semi-structured interview guide. This gave the interviewees the opportunity to express their own perspectives on the topic and not be bound by close-ended responses in questionnaires but also keep respondents on course. It also enabled the interviewer to probe more for clarity and insight. These interviews helped the interviewer understand people's perception of the topic Creswell (2013). Upon triangulation with secondary data it increased the validity and reliability of the findings.

### **1.8.5. Data Analysis**

The data collected from the interviews were categorized thematically and analysed accordingly. Thematic analysis is the process of identifying salient patterns or themes and use them to address the research problem and objectives within a qualitative data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Meaning, unlike other qualitative analysis approaches, the thematic analysis is not limited to a particular epistemological process.

One common disadvantage that Clark and Braun highlight is the risk of using the main interview questions as the themes (Clarke & Braun, 2013). This may result in reproducing and collating answers to questions asked rather than analysing the themes within the answers. The researcher employed Basic Descriptive statistical tools to facilitate the analysis of information which was recorded electronically or written down during the interviews. This study was analysed using the thematic analysis approach.

### **1.8.6. Ethical Considerations**

One key issue worth noting when it comes to qualitative research is the issue of ethics. Patton and Cochran (2002) stresses on the fact that, ethical considerations are at the core of every qualitative research and concrete measures must be put in place to protect the subjects or respondents or interviewees. Due to the delicate nature of the crisis under study it was necessary to ensure that the safety and security of respondents would by no means be compromised by this research. Most of the respondents were not too enthused to speak to the issues under study. They felt reluctant to speak due to the alleged victimisation and threats some Cameroonians have faced in the past and others continue to face till today. For this reason, ethical considerations were taken into account first by seeking the consent of interviewees before recording their views and opinions on the subject matter, and secondly,

by keeping some respondents anonymous due to the sensitivity of the information given, their safety and security.

### **1.9. Arrangement of Chapters**

This study is organized into four main chapters. Chapter one is the introduction to the study which consists of the introduction to the research, the problem statement, research objectives and questions, the scope, the rationale, the literature review and theoretical framework.

Chapter two presents a historical overview of the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon, from pre-independence to 2016.

Chapter three then examines the developments of the crisis since 2016, the social, economic and political ramifications of the Crisis to Cameroon and its neighbouring countries and interventions by the state and various international bodies.

Chapter four consists of the Summary of Findings, Conclusion, and Recommendations

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## CHAPTER TWO

### AN OVERVIEW OF THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CAMEROON SINCE 1472 TO 2016

#### 2.0. Introduction

This chapter covers the political history of Cameroon since the arrival of the first Europeans, touching on the various political dispensations and highlighting some significant events that may have contributed to the present day Cameroon as we have today. More specifically, this chapter presents the era under the Portuguese, Kamerun under the Germans, the take-over of France and Britain, pre-independence Cameroon and post-colonial (post-independence) Cameroon.

#### 2.1. The Arrival of the Europeans (1472 – 1916)

Prior to the arrival of the Europeans, the vast area now known as present-day Cameroon was occupied by about 200 ethnic groups with quite a number of diverse languages. These include the Bamileke, Beti Pahuin, Fula, Kirdi, Sao, Fang, Baka, Banum, Karuri, Douala and many others (Kasara, 2005). Most of these ethnic groups lived as independent nations with a centralized political structures used in the administration of very powerful kingdoms, chiefdoms and “fondoms”. Contrary to the wide belief that Cameroon’s first encounter with Europe was with the French, their first contact with Europeans was rather with the Portuguese (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). A navigator by name Fernando Po, who was part of an exploration team discovered the land in 1472, and named it “Rios dos Cameroes” which translates to English as “the river of prawns” due to the abundance of lobsters in the rivers (Ngoh, 1979). The Portuguese mainly introduced Christianity and education (reading and writing) to the people.

By the 1800s other nationals such as the Dutch, British, and French had joined the Portuguese in the trade causing it to thrive and blossom. They traded, in slaves and other commodities such as ivory, gold, palm oil, coffee and other foodstuff in the then Rio dos Cameroes, and subsequently Kamerun (Ngoh, 1979). Among the European in Kamerun, the Germans took the lead to establish at the coast, close to the Wouri River, a warehouse which was built in 1868 by the Woermann Company based in Hamburg made the Germans an upper hand over their compatriots. As time went on the number of Germans increased astronomically, causing Germany to consider making Kamerun its protectorate (Ngoh, 1979).

Contrary to the aspirations of the people of Douala, the British who were then ruling neighbouring Nigeria could not meet up with the chiefs in time to officially finalise the agreement. This delay went in favour of the Germans as Gustav Nachtigal arrived on the shores of Kamerun and signed a treaty with the chiefs of Douala in 1884 (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997). The newly signed treaty established a relationship with southern Cameroon where the Germans agreed to protect the southerners from the ethnic groups in the hinterlands.

Coincidentally, the European countries convened in Berlin for a conference to address boundary issues among other things pertaining to the domain of influence of each European state pursuing its interests on the continent of Africa, thus the partitioning of Africa in 1884/5. At the conference, Britain and France relinquished their interests in southern Kamerun, giving the Germans full authority over the territory (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). The Germans embarked on some development in their new colony, built schools, health facilities, road systems in Douala the capital and railway tracks from the coast into the

hinterlands to have access to other ethnic groups and resources (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017).

Unfortunately, despite the extensive developmental plans they had for their protectorate, this dream was short-lived. Internal conflicts with rebellious ethnic groups and the First World War took quite a toll on the Germans hence they were not able to keep up with the developmental agenda. Eventually in 1916 their 30 year rule came to an end and they were forced to cede all their colonies to the victorious European countries per the Treaty of Versailles. In the case of Kamerun, the territory was taken over by Britain and France in a 20% to 80% ratio respectively (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). Britain administered the smaller portion which was a thin strip of land that bordered eastern Nigeria from Lagos, while the rest of the larger territory was administered by France. The British Mandate was referred to as 'Cameroon' which was the English form, while the French gallicized it to 'Cameroun'(Ardener & Ardener, 1996).

## **2.2. British and French Rule (1916 to 1960)**

Following Germany's defeat in World War I, they lost their status as protectors of Kamerun. This in turn made Kamerun a mandate territory of the League of Nations but the issue of who to administer the territory caught the attention of the League of Nations and in 1919, the already existing agreement that had divided Kamerun between the British and France was legalised (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). Kamerun became a mandate territory of Great Britain and France in 1919 and the name was changed to Cameroon. The part governed by Great Britain was referred to as English Cameroon, whilst the other part was generally known as French Cameroon. This division marks the inception of the long standing feud between the two territories (Ardener & Ardener, 1996).

The British governed English Cameroon from the capital of their colony, Lagos in Nigeria. They divided the territory into two: the Northwest and Southwest regions. The British administered Northern and Southern Cameroon as additional semi-autonomous regions of Nigeria, but not necessarily with the aim or aspiration of integrating them to becoming a part of Nigeria (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997). Considering the size of English Cameroon, the British did not find it necessary and prudent to establish a separate administrative body to govern them as an entity, hence English Cameroon was governed from Lagos. Consequently, the governance strategy and distance from Lagos took a toll on the development of English Cameroon (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). Even though the indirect rule of the British from Lagos promoted the civic rights and some freedom for the people, it undermined the rate of growth and development as compared to that of French Cameroon. Secondly, as time went on there was a gradual influx of Igbo migrants which didn't order well with the Southern Cameroonians (Ngoh, 1979). These two grievances led to the emergence of a number of radical groups some of which were pro-federalist while others were sought autonomy. As an intervention to mitigate the increasing pressure among the English Cameroonians, the British initially granted southern Cameroon a semi-regional status but later made it a full scale region under Nigerian federation (Ngoh, 1979). Under their rule, the British introduced English as the official language, their educational curriculum, their currency the British pound, their system of governance and its related institutions as well as their legal system, the Common Law system (ICG, 2017).

In the case of French Cameroon, the French adopted the indirect rule but had their tentacles in almost every nook and cranny of the lives of citizens. Through the system of assimilation they instilled the French culture and identity into citizens and made the French culture and

identity more superior to that of the indigenes (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). A citizen who is well educated in the language and culture of the French, is granted full French citizenship status and is given a French identity which comes with some advantages, benefits and privileged (Lee & Schultz, 2011). This made a vast number of Cameroonians aspire to become more French so as to qualify for French citizenship and enjoy the benefits and privileges. A successfully assimilated Cameroonian was referred to as *évolués*. The legal, social and political practices of France was used to reshape that of French Cameroon, eventually giving French Cameroon an outlook very similar to that of France (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017).

According to Ngoh the French did far better in terms of infrastructure and development across their Cameroonian territory. This achievement was based on the fact that the French relied on forced labour. Citizens were forced to work under harsh conditions of services, sometimes under duress and threats. They were forced to build, construct, but most especially engage in farming activities on large plantations of various cash crops and food crops for very little or nothing at all. The port in Douala was expanded and exports witnessed a hike as a result of increased production. The main products included coffee, palm oil, rubber, cocoa and banana (Ngoh, 1979). At the end of the Second World War, the remaining German owned lands and plantations were confiscated and transformed into the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) which has existed till date and happens to be one of the largest employers in Cameroon. In 1946 under the United Nations, Cameroon was made a Trust territory under the trusteeship of Great Britain and France, as was the case before then and they continued to rule as they did previously.

By the 1950s, only a marginal fraction of French Cameroonians were benefitting from the privileges of assimilating and working in the colonial administration of the French. This relatively small class of people included mainly the elite, the *évolués* and a section of traditional rulers who succumbed to and aligned themselves to the colonial government (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). Together with the colonial government, they formulated and implemented policies that streamlined the political, social, and economic trajectory of Cameroon towards the interest of France. It is the general discontent and resentment among the vast disadvantaged majority, towards the minority ruling coalition that sparked the various nationalist movements in French Cameroon. Atangana (1997) suggests that a section of the native Cameroonian elite were of the perception that they deserved to be ruled in a much better manner than the exploitative and abusive manner by which they were being ruled. This perception was founded on the basis that Cameroon was not an ordinary colony like most of the colonies at the time but rather, a mandate territory of the League of Nations and subsequently the United Nations. The territory was only placed in the care and trust of Britain and France, hence the lack of willingness, efforts or attempts to harness an enabling environment for locals to pursue political aspirations coupled with the longstanding frustration of the masses propelled the nationalist movements in the late 1940s (Atangana, 1997).

Shortly after the Second World War (WWII), a wave of political consciousness swept across the continent of Africa and Cameroon was certainly not left out. This led to the emergence of pockets of political parties and widespread political activism geared towards independence (Momo Lekane & Asuelime, 2017). In the case of Cameroon, some groups wanted a unification of the two territories (British Cameroon and French Cameroon) under a federal system, others opted for the merging of British Cameroon with Nigeria, while some others

also demanded for the independence of British Cameroon as a unit state, making French Cameroon a neighbouring independent sovereign entity (ICG, 2017). This diversity of opinion among Cameroonians at the time weakened their effectiveness and potency in the fight for independence since they lacked consensus. This made the independence struggle more difficult since the various groups had to deal with internal opposition in the form of other groups with opposing ideologies and goals as well as their common enemy, the French, making them lack a formidable united front.

Ngoh (1979) highlights that in 1955 a series of upheavals and rebellion were instigated by the Union des Populations Camerounaises (UPC) in the major towns across the French Cameroonian territory. The UPC was the major political party that had gained vast popularity, momentum and influence in most parts of French Cameroon. They resorted to the use of radical, revolutionary and violent approaches, including the use of arms. The colonial government responded by sending French troops to clamp down on the activities of the UPC and its followers and the outcome has been described as highly destructive and devastating respectively, resulting in the loss of many lives (ICG, 2017). The guerrilla war took place in many places but predominantly in Bamileke, hence the war has been christened the Bamileke War (Kasara, 2005).

In 1956 the UPC was banned and declared illegal but the members continued in their quest for independence through radical means. Time and again, the government with the help of the French military used repressive and offensive methods to clamp down and suppress revolts and uprisings. The relative calm from these aggressive approaches from the government were usually short-lived, but as expected the subsequent years saw a surge in the nationalist groups and their activities across the territory geared towards independence at all cost (Ngoh, 1979).

### **2.3. Towards Independence**

In 1958, the L'Union Camerounaises was formed and headed by Ahmadou Ahidjo, a Cameroonian of Fulani descent. Ahmadou Ahidjo, using a more subtle approach managed to rise to the high office of Prime Minister by appointment that same year on the ticket of the UC (Ngoh, 1979). On the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1960, French Cameroon was granted independence and Ahmadou Ahidjo became the president of the Republic of Cameroon. Not too long after, Nigeria also gained independence, which was on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1960 (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017). This development led to a dilemma as to the fate of the British Cameroonian territory. After years of enjoying some level of autonomy and self-governance under the federal system of Nigeria, a cross-section of the population expected that upon independence the territory would be an independent sovereign (Achankeng, 2012). A delegation of leading political activists among the Anglophone elites embarked on a trip to the UN to petition it. The delegation which was made up of Emmanuel Endeley, Augustine Jua, Solomon Muna and John Foncha, in their petition asked that Southern Cameroon be granted its own independence or a partial independence over a limited period of time to be able to negotiate a much better unification deal (ICG, 2017).

Contrary to their expectations, they were not given the option of independence, but rather a plebiscite was to be organised where the people would choose either to join independent Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon (Campbell, 2016). The referendum was organized on the 11<sup>th</sup> of February 1961 and the predominantly Muslim Northern part of British Cameroon voted to join Nigeria, while the Southern part voted to join the Republic of Cameroon. This outcome was implemented with the declaration of British Cameroons independence on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1961 (Atanga, 2011).

Prior to the independence of Southern Cameroon in October 1961, leaders of Southern Cameroon and representatives of the new government of the Republic of Cameroon met at the Fouban Conference to negotiate and ascertain the nature of the relationship that would exist between the incoming English speaking territory and the Republic of Cameroon pertaining to what system of government would be best for all (ICG, 2017). When the conference which lasted from 17<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> of July 1961 ended, there was widespread discontent and fury among the leaders and people of Southern Cameroon because they felt they had been bullied and forced to toe the line of the wishes of the other party at the conference. First off, they had no intension of reaching a conclusion as early as they were compelled to do. They were of the view that it was just the first of a series of sessions to come up with the final constitution. Secondly, the unique nature of federation they had imagined and wished for was nothing compared to what was imposed on them (ICG, 2017). As if that was not enough, the proposed draft constitution that was even ‘imposed’, was not adhered to in the long run. Hence rather than cooperating and working together to produce a mutually beneficial constitution to govern a supposed egalitarian federal system with some appreciable level of autonomy, the leaders of British Southern Cameroon had an already prepared constitution which largely favoured the ruling government imposed on them.

The 1960s under President Ahidjo were very dramatic times. There were frequent pockets of uproars, riots and unrests mainly in East Cameroon, allegedly caused by the UPC, but they were suppressed and dealt with by the French military (ICG, 2017). From 1962, President Ahidjo signed a number of orders to counter the instability. These included press censorship, the limitation of public freedoms in the country, the limitation of civil liberties, imprisonment of political opponents, and ultimately the transformation of the country into a one-party state (ICG, 2017).

As time went on, the power of the purse and financial autonomy was taken from the federal states and centralised at the national level. Realising this development, some Anglophone elites got distracted from their main focus of championing the Anglophone cause and rather began competing among themselves over political positions in Ahidjo's federal government since that was where they could have access to money and influence (Ndobegang, 2009). President Ahidjo capitalized on the situation to his advantage by pitching the elites of the various feuding ethnic and cultural groups against each other. This was mainly between the ethnic groups in the Northern Grassfields and the Sawa people of the Southern.

By 1965, the plot had succeeded in sowing seeds of discord among the West Cameroonians elite, and this led to a division between Solomon Muna and John Foncha. Muna accused Foncha of being the party's biggest threat by supporting Jua Augustine in his candidacy for the Vice Presidency and by the end of that same year Muna broke away from the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) to establish the Cameroon United Congress (CUC). Later in 1965, an unconstitutional attempted appointment of Ngom Jua as prime minister, was based on the perception that Foncha was not very accommodating when it came to the Anglophone question, but the strong opposition from the federal parliament managed to prevent it (ICG, 2017). A year on, President Ahidjo capitalized on the chaos his attempted appointment had caused among the West Cameroonians and declared the country a one-party state as a means of dealing with the political unrest and allegedly to promote national unity in 1966. In that same year, the Cameroon National Union (CNU) was established as the single national political party and all other political parties were disbanded (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997). As a result, the West Cameroonians lost institutional structures and channels through which they could seek redress.

With the establishment of a single national party, President Ahidjo's quest for centralization was set in motion, and the federal system was gradually replaced. The suppression of federalism continued till the unitary system was finally instituted through a referendum on the 20<sup>th</sup> of May, 1972 (Ndi, 2014). As part of the change, a new constitution was introduced and the name of the country was changed to the United Republic of Cameroon. The disgruntled Anglophones challenged the changes based on the fact that per Article 47 of the 1961 Constitution, there was no provision for such changes to be carried out, especially not by the executive through a referendum. It was only parliament that wielded the constitutional mandate to amend the constitution for such a change to be effected (Mukong, 2016).

Incidentally, 1972 saw a new wave of public activism and opposition among the Anglophones after the government had successfully dealt with the UPC two years earlier (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017). The anglophones began to register their displeasure with regards to the ill treatment, marginalisation and victimization being meted out to them. It was during the CNU National Congress that Bernard Fonlon openly criticised the adoption of the unitary system. Fonlon's outburst was soon followed by the fierce opposition of other key Anglophone personalities such as Albert Mukong, Gorji Dinka, Foncha and Jua who employed diverse avenues and mediums in registering their opposition of the unitary state (ICG, 2017).

Generally, in the 1970s, President Ahidjo managed to successfully turn the economic conditions of the country around for the better. This he accomplished by focusing on agriculture and industry. Cameroon was highly endowed with rich natural resources such as cocoa, coffee, timber, and banana, some of which was exported for revenue and vast lands of fertile soil (Ndi, 2014). Subsequently the discovery of oil further promotes the economic and

political stability of the country. Coupled with the farming of cash crops, revenue from the oil was channelled into a number of developmental projects such as schools, roads harbour expansion among other infrastructure.

Unfortunately, during this same period, human rights abuses and political riots, even though prevalent, were not given much attention. The attention and focus of the government was rather concentrated on dealing with coup threats and putting measures in place to remain in power for as long as possible (Achankeng, 2012). Since these aspirations could possibly not be realised under a democracy, all attempts at any reforms to promote democracy were suppressed. Ultimately, corruption grew astronomically and ate deep into all sectors of the government.

President Ahmadou Ahidjo took the country by surprise when he announced his resignation. He handed over soon after to his constitutional vice in the person of Paul Biya, the Prime Minister at the time. He had a reputation for honesty and competence, and started his tenure in a more liberal and democratic manner, but a coup attempt saw Paul Biya become paranoid and he began to tow the path of his predecessor by further centralising power (Kasara, 2005). In 1984 after winning the presidential election in which he was the only candidate by 99.98%, he replaced the name of the entire country with the official former name of the newly independent East Cameroon, the Republic of Cameroon and went on to remove one of the two stars from the national flag which is believed to represent the Anglophones (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 1997).

#### **2.4. The Quest for Multiparty Democracy**

A new pro-federalist political party by name the Social Democratic Front (SDF) was established on the 26<sup>th</sup> of May 1990 in Bamenda, but unlike most of the other parties, the SDF though predominantly Anglophone, had a more nationalistic and encompassing outlook (ICG, 2017). This can be attributed to the fact that the party was founded by Anglophones, birthed in a major Anglophone town and started functioning before gradually spreading to other parts of the country. The SDF organised a peaceful rally in Bamenda which had a huge crowd numbering about 30,000 people. In an attempt to disrupt the rally and disperse the crowd, the police open fired into the crowd killing 6 and injuring several others. This rather causes an escalation and intensifies riots.

Later that same year, a framework for a multiparty system is put out by the government. Upon realising the rapid rate at which numerous opposition political parties sprang up and formed formidable coalitions, Paul Biya dismissed the whole idea and banned their activities. Starting from July 1991, a campaign of civil disobedience by name “Operation Ghost Town” was launched across the country. Operation Ghost Town which was usually carried out on weekdays was characterised by a halt of all economic activities such as shops, ports, banks, offices and even transport (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Here again, the government’s initial approach was rather offensive. There were widespread arbitrary arrests of opposition political leaders and persons suspected of inciting the public to partake in the civil disobedience. The strikes are finally called off after the government agrees to cooperate with a constitutional committee tasked to draft a framework for the political future of the country. The political prisoners were then released and political parties were permitted to operate (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). By 1992, the SDF had become a force to reckon with. The party contested Paul Biya in the 1992 presidential elections and managed to pull about 36 percent of the

votes, but it was not enough to unseat Paul Biya who won with about 40 percent (Boulaga, 1997).

Essentially, the unification left an impression of a democratic setback, cultural dilution and a feeling of political inferiority on the Anglophones. Most Anglophones are of the perception that there is a deliberate and systematic attempt to marginalise the two Southern Cameroonian regions (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). As a result, the Anglophones saw the reintroduction of the multiparty system as an avenue to broadcast their displeasure.

Two conferences dubbed the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) and All Anglophone Conference-2 (ACC-2) were organised in 1993 and 1995 respectively. At the first AAC, the Anglophones requested that the country return to a negotiated form of federalism (Campbell, 2016). This request was declined by the Consultative Committee for Constitutional Review and replaced with the idea of decentralisation. The idea of decentralisation was not accepted by the anglophones, and until 1995 when the AAC-2 was organised nothing had been done by the government to indicate any commitment to decentralisation. At the second AAC which took place in Bamenda, the demand had evolved from just federalism to federalism or secession (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003).

In 1994, Foncha and Muna who used to be rivals both resigned from the consultative committee and publicly condemned the assimilation of Anglophones. Upon their resignation, Muna and Foncha began to launch diplomatic offensives at the United Nations demanding the independence for Southern Cameroon. The Social Democratic Front's call for a four-state federal system rather than secession was described as ambiguous by some Anglophone militants (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). This led to the formation of a number of Anglophone

militant groups, demanding for federalism or secession. A few of these groups included the Cameroon Anglophone Movement (CAM), the Free West Cameroon Movement (FWM), the Southern Cameroons Restoration Movement (SCRM) and the Ambazonia Movement, but prominent among them was the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) which was formed in 1995 and its goal has been the independence of Southern Cameroon (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017). The SCNC has employed numerous diplomatic steps since 1996, to register its grievances and get the attention of the UN, the EU, Commonwealth, the African Court in Banjul, and some national embassies to intervene but very little has been done to curb the Anglophone situation (ICG, 2017).

## **2.5. Cameroon in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century**

The tail end of the 1990s saw a decline in the activism of the Anglophone opposition internally, and an increased activism among Anglophones in the diaspora. This was due to the increased repressive actions taken against the leaders and some key members of the SCNC. Secondly, the anglophones were divided in terms of ideology, goals and objectives (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003). Most of their leaders were arrested arbitrarily without trial, those who were tried had their trial in military courts and were charged with extreme offences such as treason. Others were kidnapped or received threatening texts, among some other actions to dissuade them from operating, causing them to flee the country. These Cameroonians seeking asylum and refuge as well as other Anglophone expatriates and sympathizers in the diaspora, are the ones who have pursued the Anglophone course in the form of awareness creation and advocacy (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017).

Some techniques employed includes inculcating the Anglophone consciousness into the education system, writings of Anglophone scholars, the clergy, social groups and the various

media platforms (radio, television, social media etc.). In spite of the decline, the activities of the Anglophone militia did not entirely die out. They organised protests ones in a while but more specifically on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October every year the whole Anglophone region embarked on a protest and it was on one of such occasions that the region was declared independent and renamed Ambazonian Republic in 1999 on Radio Buea. This declaration was repeated in 2009 as well (Pommerolle & Heungoup, 2017).

A territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula was finally resolved in June 2006. The negotiation which was spearheaded by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan resulted in Cameroon taking control of the territory endowed with oil. This led to the emergence of a number of separatist groups among the Bakassies who weren't in support of the new boundaries and refused to accept Cameroonian rule (Babatola, 2012). Again after 15 years, Cameroon is hit by its worst violence. This was as a result of a transport union crisis that started in Douala and spread across the country in 31 municipalities (Amin, 2015). Until the 2016 crisis, one other major problem that Cameroon faced was with the Boko Haram insurgency group. The radical Islamist group of Nigeria origin extended its activities into northern Cameroon in 2014 but was suppressed by the joint efforts of Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian military. Since early 2015, Boko Haram has waged an asymmetric war of bombings, largely targeting civilians in urban areas (Rackley, 2017).

## **2.6. Conclusion**

From the above, it is quite obvious that at every critical juncture in Cameroon's history are particular section of the populace is either marginalised, victimised or left out of the core decision-making, hence their views and opinions are not factored in. Unfortunately, even though the francophone, subgroups within the francophone and other ethnic groups have

suffered the same fate, the Anglophone region seems to have suffered far more from this predicament. In spite of the widely believed assertion that they have always resulted to violence in putting across their grievances, that has not been the case. Finally, it must also be noted that, there are different groups among the Anglophones with different goals ranging from secession, federalism and decentralisation in diverse perspectives.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ANGLOPHONE CRISIS

#### 3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the crisis in Cameroon from 2016 to date. It goes further to analyse different themes developed to address the research objectives of the study. The objectives to be analysed include the causes of the crisis, some social, political and economic effect of the conflict, and the effects of the crisis on peace and development in Cameroon. The study also analysed the effects of the crisis on neighbouring countries, human rights issues and interventions of the state and the international community.

#### 3.1. Data Analysis

The researcher employed Basic Descriptive statistical tools to facilitate the analysis of information which was recorded electronically or written down during the interviews. The interviews were mainly conducted in person in the presence of interviewees and some via video and telephone conversations. The resulting responses were collated and will be discussed in the chapter accordingly.

The purposive sampling technique was used in selecting the experts who granted audience to be interviewed but the sampling technique that enhanced the smooth access to the Cameroonian nationals was the snowballing technique. The researcher began with information at the Centre for International Students of the University of Ghana. From there, the president introduced other students and Cameroonian nationals who also followed suit.

The sample size of 30 was obtained from Cameroonian nationals living in Ghana (who are either students or working here), Cameroonian nationals living in Cameroon, Cameroonian

Immigrants living outside Cameroon and Ghana, and some Ghanaian, Nigerian and Cameroonian scholars well versed on the subject under study. The breakdown of the sample is reflected in table 3.1 below.

**Table 3.1: Distribution of Respondents**

| <b>Label</b>  | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>Sample Percentage</b> |
|---|------------------|--------------------------|
| Cameroonian Nationals Living in Ghana                                       | 12               | 40                       |
| Francophone Cameroonians living in Cameroon                                 | 2                | 7                        |
| Anglophone Cameroonians living in Cameroon                                  | 7                | 23                       |
| Ghanaian Scholars   | 4                | 13                       |
| Nigerian Scholars (1 at the Nigerian Embassy in Ghana, 1 living in Nigeria) | 2                | 7                        |
| Scholars (Cameroonian)  | 2                | 7                        |
| Expert at the AU  | 1                | 3                        |
| <b>Total</b>  | <b>30</b>        | <b>100%</b>              |

**Source: Christian Nene Kwao Ayisa (2019), Interviews Conducted.**

### **3.1.1 Administration of Research Tools**

Owing to the qualitative nature of the study, the researcher personally interviewed each of the selected respondents using a semi-structured interview guide. This was facilitated by their telephone contacts and emails, passed on personally through the snowballing technique, on the sites of the institutions the interviewees work with and on social media. The face-to-face interviews, video calls, and telephone calls were really helpful in getting information on all research questions stated on the interview guide.

### **3.2.0. Overview of Anglophone Crisis (2016 to Date)**

Prior to the protest and subsequent strike action on the 11<sup>th</sup> of October, 2016, the lawyers in Bamenda, had received no response at all from the Ministry of Justice or the government on the numerous memorandum and petitions, for close to a year. The demands of the lawyers included the translation of the Code of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) and some other important legal texts pertaining to their practice. They accused the government and the Ministry of Justice for deliberately attempting to “francophonise” the English legal system that practiced the Common Law system inherited from their colonisers. In their petition, the lawyers opined that the posting of francophone legal officers and magistrates who had little to no command of the English language and no knowledge in Common Law was undermining the Anglophone legal system and its efficacy (Ateki, 2017).

For close to a month the lawyers had still not had any response to their demands nor strike action so on the 8<sup>th</sup> of November 2016, they decided to embark on a peaceful protest in Bamenda. Incidentally, the protest which has been widely confirmed to have been peaceful was disrupted by gendarmes and military personnel. The lawyers, and some other citizens including ‘okada boys’ (drivers of commercial taxis that use motorbikes rather than cars) who joined the protest to also seek redress to issues mainly on living standards and infrastructure, were abused, harassed, manhandled and some arrested by the gendarmes. A section of the angered protesters responded by mounting barriers and road blocks at various crossroads across the city and engaged the gendarmes in violent clashes resulting in some unspecified casualties (InternationalCrisisGroup, 2017).

The teachers of primary and secondary schools in the Anglophone regions, led by three teachers' unions declared a strike on the 21<sup>st</sup> of November to also register their grievances. Among their concerns were, the appointment of French speaking teachers who were not proficient enough in the English language, to primary and secondary schools in the Anglophone regions. This made it difficult for the teachers to express themselves and even much more difficult for the students to understand what they were being taught. The teachers were also concerned about the disregard for the “Anglo-Saxon” educational system which they practiced during the era of federalism from independence in 1960 till the state of Cameroon turned unitary through a referendum in 1972. A peaceful protest that was staged across the two Anglophone regions saw thousands of people from all walks of life joining in the protest, especially the youth. It was only in Bamenda that the march took a turn for the worse when some civilians got violent with the military and gendarmes that had tried to suppress the protest by limiting their movements.

The youth engaged the gendarmes by throwing stones and sticks and erected road blocks, but the state security forces responded with violent crowd dispersion measures amidst the use of water cannons, tear gas, physical abuse and gunshots. This resulted in many wounded, some arrests and two casualties, as reported by the National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms the (Commission nationale des droits de l'Homme et des libertés, CNDHL) (International Crisis Group, 2017).

Gradually, the crisis which began in the North-West region, began to spread to the South-West region. A peaceful protest organised on the 28<sup>th</sup> of November by the students of the University of Buea was disrupted by the police called upon by the school's Rector. They were simply requesting for the payment of the president's achievement bonus, the lifting of

the ban on University of Buea Student Union (UBSU) in 2012 and the rejection of the newly introduced penalty on late payment of fees among other grievances. The brutalities were not unleashed on only those engaged in the protest, but also to students in their hostels and halls of residence, who did not take part in the protest. Female students had their rooms broken into, some were whipped, and others were stripped naked and humiliated. There were some reported cases of rape and sexual assault perpetrated by the police and military (InternationalCrisisGroup, 2017).

In the early part of December 2016, the incumbent Cameroon Peoples Democratic Party (CPDM) had planned to organise two rallies, one in Buea and the other in Bamenda. The rally organised in Buea on the 8<sup>th</sup> of December 2016 was peaceful, but unfortunately violence broke out shortly before the commencement of the rally at Bamenda. The violence was triggered by comments of a high-ranking member of the government from the region, downplaying the Anglophone problem, and denying the existence of any Anglophone crisis. This angered the already embittered people of the Anglophone regions and caused the people of Bamenda to vent by vandalizing any government related item, vehicle or institution in sight, including a police station. Here again, about four (4) people were reported to have lost their lives, while many more were wounded and about fifty others arrested.

The Prime Minister, the CPDM Secretary General, the Governor of the North-West region and the National Security Adviser, narrowly escaped being lynched and had to seek refuge in the governor's residence till the situation was brought under control. As measure to curb the situation, there was a beef up of security in the region, especially at hotspots (National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms, 2017).

The two incidents, the 28<sup>th</sup> November violence at the University of Buea coupled with the 8<sup>th</sup> December outbreak at Bamenda culminated in heightened tensions and have placed the regions in the spotlight. Since then, there have been sporadic intermittent clashes between the government forces and various radical activist groups that have emerged since October 2016. At the latter part of November 2016, the Prime Minister set up a fact finding ad hoc committee, responsible for spearheading negotiations towards finding a lasting solution to the crisis. Some may say his visit rather compounded the issue since it exposed a very important loophole in the administrative set up. While the prime minister was on the ground trying to ease tensions and find a headway with the various groups, other Anglophone elite members of the government including the Permanent Secretary of the National Security Council were on air in Yaoundé making pronouncements to the effect that the Anglophone problem was a myth. In effect it did not exist; there was no Anglophone problem. This gave the Anglophone parties represented on the ad hoc committee the impression that the Prime Minister was just a pawn and a glorified position accorded them since the late 1990s but lacked any real power or influence (International Crisis Group, 2017).

In early December 2016, a group of lawyers and representatives of some teacher's trade unions formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC). This group generally referred to as "the Consortium" was headed by Felix Agbor Balla as president. Other leading members included Wilfred Tassang and Fontem Neba. Between December and January 2017, the commission embarked on a number of missions to Bamenda and the demands of the Consortium grew from eleven (11) to about twenty-five (25). On his return from a trip outside the country, the President Paul Biya in a short arrival speech referred to the activist groups as terrorists working against the peace and development of the nation and declared outright war on them. This statement coupled with his New Year's Eve message

where he described the Anglophone nationalists as, “a group of manipulated and exploited extremist rioters whose activities have led to the loss of lives, destruction of public and private buildings, crippling of economic activities and the desecration of sacred national symbols”, did not go down well with the opposition and rather ignited a series of civil disobedience and renewed clashes across the Anglophone regions. It was after one of such alleged clashes with the police that the CACSC called off a meeting with the ad hoc ministerial committee. By then, they were ready to deliver on 21 out of the 25 demands put across. The CACSC declared an Operation Ghost Town Resistance (OGTR), which is a strict stay-home policy where no one is to be seen outdoor engaging in any activity at all throughout the two Anglophone regions. During a Ghost Town period, all forms of social and economic activities, including schools and churches halt operation. No one was to be seen outside the house (Okereke, 2018).

In response to the OGTR, the government arrested the leaders of the CACSC, and declared the group as well as the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) illegal groups. Certainly, this only went on to incite more violence in protest of this move and as a means of dealing with the situation and limiting their ability to communicate and mobilise themselves the government shut down the internet on the 17<sup>th</sup> of January 2017. Initially, the internet was shut to the whole country, but later restored and limited to only the two Anglophone regions. Since then, the separatist groups have also taken to the use of inhumane measures to ensure compliance with their “Ghost town” policy. They have also resulted to burning down schools, homes and entire villages, kidnapping and killing of teachers, principals, students and anyone who refuses to comply with the policy, among other brutalities (Chothai, 2018).

### **3.3. Revival of Secessionist Movements in Cameroon from 2016**

The quest for secession in Cameroon did not start with the 2016 Anglophone crisis, but rather it began with the plight of the Anglophones, when German Kamerun was divided between British and French administrations soon after World War One. Kam Kah (2012) raises the point that the Anglophones registered their displeasure at the divide of Kamerun, and they did same at independence when they had to be reunited as one state again (Echitch, 2014). These secession aspirations subsided significantly over the years but have now resurfaced as a result of certain factors that have emerged.

Searcey (2018), points out that, the prevalence of secessionist movements and their activities have been spearheaded by Anglophone Cameroonians in the diaspora. These are mainly Cameroonians who have had to flee their country into exile or for a safe haven due to unfavourable circumstances back at home. Their activism in recent times, after years of dormancy, is attributed to the outbreak of the Anglophone crisis in 2016, when teachers and lawyers took to the streets in protest of the infiltration of the professions.

Over the years, the Anglophones have felt the French Cameroonians were trying to adopt a form of colonial rule over the English regions, through the administrative structures, military, police personnel and some other institutions (Pius, 2008). In an attempt to ensure that the attempted colonialism does not prevail, the leaders of some secessionist movements such as the SCNC came to the conclusion that they cannot compete in a unified Cameroon under the largely dominant francophone administration. Moreover, during the few years under the “francophonised” Cameroonians, they witnessed the imposition of incompatible policies with respect to language, state symbols and the civil service. Thus, they saw secessionist movements as a means to a more promising end (Pius, 2008).

### **3.3.1. Actors Involved in the Quest for Secession in Cameroon**

Okereke (2018) links the recent Anglophone crisis back to a historical resistance by Anglophone Cameroonians to the assumed attempted assimilation of English-Speaking Cameroonians. He notes that, considering the events of the 2016 crisis, one may be tempted to conclude that the main actors involved in the revival of the Anglophone secessionism were the aggrieved lawyers and teachers. Felix Agbor Balla, an activist lawyer, formed the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), a form of pressure group with the aim of pursuing the goals, wishes and aspirations of the Anglophones. These demands constituted the list presented to the ad hoc committee of which 21 of the demands were agreed upon before the fallout of negotiations. The demands of the CACSC included an end to marginalisation, continuity of the English educational and legal system, unconditional release of all Anglophone political prisoners arrested during the protests (Okereke, 2018).

Also, Agbor Balla initiated the Operation Ghost Town Resistance (OGTR) in January 2017, which is characterized by a religious adherence to a sit-home ritual, anytime it is declared by the CACSC, but usually on Mondays and Tuesdays. In effect, once the OGTR is declared all social, economic, and political activities come to an abrupt halt, and in addition no one is to be seen outside their homes (Okereke, 2018). The government's response to the OGTR was the arrest of the CACSC leaders: Agbor Balla, Aforneka Fortem Neba (lecturer at the University of Buea), Mancho Bibixy (convener of the coffin protest in Bamenda), and Paul Ayah Abine (Justice of the Supreme Court). Realizing the mounting pressure and danger, other leaders such as Wilfred Tassary, Bobga Harmony Mbuton and Elias Eyambe Ebai fled the country into exile (Okereke, 2018).

Okereke (2018) mentions that, as a result of the arbitrary arrests, the exiled CACSC leaders were joined by other interested Anglophone secessionist in the diaspora and took up the leadership of the group and its struggle. Here, the focus of the CACSC which was the return to federalism, was substituted for total secession to create the state of Ambazonia. This new vision was warmly welcome by the Anglophones, leading to the emergence of a number of groups, championing the new vision. Most popular amongst the groups formed are the CACSC, Southern Cameroons South Africa Forum (SCSAF), Southern Cameroon People Organisation (SCAPO), Southern Cameroonians in Nigeria (SCINGA) and Movement for the Restoration of Independence in Southern Cameroon (MoRISC). Other groups Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC), Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), the Southern Cameroon Youth League (SCYL) and Republic of Ambazonia (RoA) were also formed. Among all these groups that were formed, the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) was most organized, more resourced and had the largest membership, hence the SCACUF turned out to be the mother of all the other groups under the leadership of Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe in 2017.

Later that same year, SCACUF established the Southern Cameroon Broadcasting Corporation (SCBC) to sustain Anglophone aspirations through its propaganda and keep its followers and sympathisers abreast. Following the escalation of the crisis in October 2017, the Ambazonia Interim Government (AIG) took over from the Governing Council of the SCACUF (Okereke, 2018). According to Kingsley-Arthur (2018), these groups have now become the domineering groups in the secessionist struggle and are closely followed by Rebels, some of whom are alleged to be disguised as Cameroonian soldiers. These rebels have taken to more abusive and radical methods, in getting the attention of the government and ensuring

compliance among the people. One such instance is the abduction of the Sub-Prefect of the Northwest region from his home in early February 2019 (Pera, 2018).

The last category of secessionist movements is made up of bands of aggrieved and angry young men, and Anglophones who have been dealt various degrees of marginalization at one point or another in their lives. Some are also embittered because they lost a family member, loved one, friend or someone dear as a result of the crisis. Among this category, are four (4) of the largest militias numbering approximately 300 fighters. The largest of them is the Ambazonian Defense Forces (ADF), headed by Cho Ayaba Lucas, who has blatantly taken credit for attacks against security forces and political leaders among other things (Pera 2018). In spite of their common goal, the militias do not owe or pay any allegiance to the political leadership, for anything at all, the relationship between them is rather uncordial and somewhat tensed (Pera, 2018).

### **3.3.2. Some Militant Secessionist Groups in the Two Anglophone Regions**

In a study on the militant groups operating in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon, the International Crisis Group (ICG) placed the estimated number at 500 fighters associated with about 20 groups. Among these, there are some groups that are more dominant and have gained more popularity than others, while some are subsidiaries or sub-groups of others that owe allegiance to their mother groups. A few of the popular ones among them include:

**The Ambazonia Defense Forces (ADF)**, allegedly headed by Lucas Cho Ayaba, the ADF was formed around the latter part of 2017 and operates mainly in the South-Western parts of Mamfe. Lucas was formerly an activist with the Southern Cameroonian Youth League (SCYL), but now the Commander-in-Chief of the Ambazonian Governing Council (AGC)

though in exile. Currently the ADF with a membership of about 200 militants is headed by Benedict Kuah (ICG, 2019).

**The Southern Cameroons Defense Forces (SOCADEF)**, under the command of Ebenezer Akwanga, is yet another militant group with a membership of more than 400 militants, that operates within the administrative division of the South-Western Region of Meme. Incidentally, Ebenezer is also a political asylee in the US. He is popularly known as “General Molua”.

**The Lebialem Red Dragons**, also a militant group operates in the South-Western division of Lebialem, and Ambaland Quifor, headed by Silas Zama with a strength of 200 men is yet another (ICG, 2019).

**The Ambazonia Self-Defence Council (ASDC)**, one of the biggest groups, which also acts as the “interim government” of Ambazonia, is made up of a number of sub-groups. These include: the Manyu Ghost warriors, headed by Martin Ashu with a membership of 200 men; the Red Dragons which is headed by Field Marshall Lekeaka Oliver with a membership of about 200 fighters, and the Ambazonia Restoration Army (ARA), a militia reportedly under control of General Paxson Agbor, a former police officer. Other sub-groups under the Ambazonia Self-Defence Council include: The Tigers of Ambazonia, a militia dominated in the South-West regions of Meme and Manyu divisions; as well as the Southern Cameroon’s Defense Forces (SCDF), headed by Nso Foncha Nkem, an Anglophone Cameroonian, alleged to have formerly served in the US army ICG, (2019).

Apparently, these groups all have their specific modus operandi, by which they could easily be identified with. Some ranging from very minimal approaches to some extreme and brutal measures. Some also started off as pressure groups with very subtle activities, but as time went on, they evolved and adopted stiffer and more severe approaches to get the attention of the government, to be taken seriously or to have their way with whatever they want. It must be noted that even though some of these groups claim to advance the cause of self-determination and secession, they have gone over-board and are now engaged in blatant criminality (HRW, 2018). Interestingly, these groups are well structured internally, with a clearly laid down chain of command with assigned leaders for each township and village. These leaders are responsible for the operations in their various catchment areas and report or answer to their immediate heads.

### **3.4 Strategies to Attain Independence by Secessionists**

Early in the month of February 2018, Sisiku Ayuk Tabe whose whereabouts was not known, was replaced by Dr. Samuel Ikome Sako, a theologian and human rights advocate, as the interim head of government of Ambazonia. Not too long after his appointment, Sako addressed his Ambazonians in a 20-minute video on YouTube. This address was to calm nerves, and to assure followers and supporters of stability and continuity of the secessionist cause (Pera, 2018). This goes to prove that, in spite of the acute internet shutdowns, Ambazonian leaders remain resolute in ensuring that their supporters are kept abreast, involved and committed.

Without the financial and political support from key actors such as the AU, UN, EU and its member states or US, the leaders of Ambazonia have relied on funding from Cameroonians in the diaspora, and among other things, they claim to be staging protests and demonstration

in Brazil, the US, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries (Pera, 2018). In a study conducted by Kingsley-Arthur (2018), the use of the internet and Social Media platforms seems to be one major strategic medium of championing their cause due to its extensive coverage, huge audience and yet low expense rate. The interim president of Ambazonia Sisiku Ayuk Tabe addresses his fellow Ambazonians through YouTube and other social platforms. In addition to the periodic YouTube messages by the leadership of Ambazonia, there is also a website with the address: <https://www.ambazonia.org/en/>, dedicated to broadcasting information from the leadership to Ambazonians.

Due to the experience and skill of the Cameroon Armed Forces (CAF), the Ambazonians have taken to paramilitary guerrilla tactic to match them. The Ambazonians have resorted to guerrilla warfare because of the overwhelming military superiority of the Cameroon Armed Forces (CAF). One source confirms that, “militants have adopted a combination of the guerrilla attitude of freedom fighters in Eritrea and Nelson Mandela’s anti-apartheid movement in South Africa” (Pera, 2018).

The Ambazonian guerrilla fighter have no intention of taking on the CAF directly, their goal is to ambush and frustrate. Some fighters train in thick forests, secluded mountainous areas, and abandoned schools. Some others train in villages close to the borders, then blend in with refugees and immigrants crossing the borders after training or operation. Due to lack of adequate funding, the militants rely on simple and basic weapons, locally made guns and rifles and IEDs, most of which they obtain from attacking the police, police stations or military men (Pera, 2018). The SCACUF, on the other hand, has resorted to other means to force the government to heed to their demands. These include strike actions, mass protests across both regions and the occasional imposition of OGTR (Okereke, 2018).

The SCAUF, in an attempt to push their cause on multiple fronts, through their supporters, members and sympathizers in the diaspora embark on protest marches to various High Commissioners and Embassies as well as international conferences in the US, Europe, and Africa creating awareness of their plight and demanding redress. One of such incidents was the public protests staged in major cities across the world during President Paul Biya's address to the 72nd Summit of World Leaders at the UN Headquarters in New York (Okereke, 2018).

The public protests were deliberately staged by the SCACUF to precede Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe's declaration of the Federal Republic of Ambazonia as independent. The declaration was followed by widespread vandalism amidst the pulling down of Cameroonian national flags in several state buildings and offices in the English regions and the hoisting of the Ambazonia flag. Apparently, the decision to declare Ambazonia independent was part of the resolutions arrived at, during the Conclave of SCACUF supposedly held on July 10 2017 at Buea, capital of the Southwest region (Okereke, 2018). In effect, the declaration of independence was deemed as violation on the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Cameroon and seriously infuriated the Biya administration, which then deployed its special, and most efficient squad known as Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) and other security operatives to suppress the threat. The prolonged military and security operations which was geared towards crushing the Ambazonia threat, blew out of proportion, causing a spill-over effect of fleeing Cameroonians fleeing to Nigeria as refugees. Till date, this has been one of the greatest national security threats the Biya administration has had to face (Okereke, 2018).

As a result of the escalation of the crisis in October 2017, the Governing Council of the SCACUF was replaced by the Ambazonia Interim Government (AIG) with Sisiku Julius Ayuktebe appointed as the AIG Interim President. At the legislative arm of government in Yaoundé, which is dominated by the incumbent Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement (CPDM), discussions of the Anglophone crisis have led to disruptions of parliamentary proceedings by the opposition Social Democratic Front (SDF) parliamentarians for months (Okereke, 2018).

### **3.5 Causes of the 2016 Anglophone Crisis**

Certainly, conflicts or crisis do not just occur suddenly and in a vacuum. They usually build up over time, and in order to understand a particular crisis situation, its dynamics and a possible solution to it, one must first understand its genesis. On the issue of the 2016 Anglophone crisis, scholars have attributed the causes to a number of factors. Essentially, just as Ryabinin (2017) suggests, there is no single cause of the crisis, but rather different opinions and perspectives brings the convergence that generally, all the causes that have been put forward may be classified into two main categories: the remote or historical causes and the immediate Pera (2018). All 30 respondents attest to the fact that the 2016 crisis indeed has some historic antecedents and underpinnings, hence the study is outrightly flawed at birth if both perspectives are not considered in the analysis.

#### **3.5.1 Remote or Historical Causes**

##### **3.5.1a Pre-Independence**

Several events in the history of Cameroon have been tagged as the causes of the Anglophone crisis, starting right from the division of Kamerun after the loss of Germany to the allied

powers in the First World War. Kamerun, the territory which was under the authority of Germany was reassigned to UK and France without the consent or input of the Kamerun nationals themselves. The British and the French partitioned the territory with their own discretion irrespective of existing tribal borders among other factors. The choice to either become a British or French colony was not given to them. Sections of the populace were not very pleased with this development. To many Cameroonians, this marked the beginning of problems. It is still not clear why the country as a single unit had to be divided between France and Britain (Respondent 9, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019). The two different cultural experiences with their two colonialists formed the bedrock for the current alienation existing between the two regions of Cameroon: the two Anglophone regions and the eight francophone regions.

During the era of the British and French, the colonies were administered by different mechanisms. The indirect rule system adopted by the French seems to have been quite beneficial to the people of Francophone Cameroon even though that was not the ultimate goal. With their in-depth scientific and technical knowhow, the French developed infrastructure, promoted agricultural production in both cash crops and food crops and increased industrialization. All these were carried out to facilitate the trade and export for the benefit of France, but since most of these developments were immobile, they resulted in the development of the French Cameroon. The British on the other hand, did not find it economically viable to establish a separate government for their Anglophone territory, rather they governed their English Cameroonian territory as a state under the Nigerian federation. This gave the elite of the Anglophone Cameroonian territory some level of autonomy to self-govern their affairs, but obviously with the lack of requisite experience and finance they

could not have been able to compete with the development of the French Cameroon (Respondent 9, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019).

In an interview with Respondent 15, he reiterated that, the different governance systems by which the two territories were governed led to a huge developmental gap between the British administered Cameroon and the French administered Cameroon. Even though the Anglophone region was and is still heavily endowed with natural resources, the region was not given much attention due to its distance from Lagos coupled with the federal governance system Britain was practicing during the period under which the two anglophone regions were governed as administrative states of Nigeria. Irrespective of these limitations, by the time of independence, the Anglophone Region could boast of companies, a shipping harbour, banks, schools, hospitals and even an airport in Bamenda. All these if considered, placed Anglophone Cameroon in a position to be independent and sovereign, but these were overlooked and the territory was declared unviable to be independent by the United Nations. This left most members of the Anglophone Region feeling deprived of their sovereignty in spite of a decision by the UN General Assembly's resolution suggesting otherwise (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

At the point of independence, the British Cameroonians were denied their right to self-determination. Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon had both gained independence from Britain and France respectively in 1960. The question then was what was to become of the Anglophone Cameroonians since they were a part of Kamerun under German rule as one state, but now possessed two different identities, cultures, legal systems, administrative setups, educational systems, currencies and language. Upon petitioning the UN, the leaders and members of the Anglophone region were of the view that they would be granted

independence (Respondent 9, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019). The question was put to a vote at the 994<sup>th</sup> Plenary Meeting of the 15<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly, where 64 countries voted for independence, 23 countries voted against and 10 countries abstained. The question then is, why is Anglophone Cameroon not independent today?

### **3.5.1b Post-Independence**

Bouddih (2017) explains that all things being equal, Anglophone Cameroon was supposed to have been granted independence on the 1<sup>st</sup> of October 1961, but for the manipulations of France. He accuses France of meddling with the decision of the General Assembly. Since France is believed to support the La Republique du Cameroun and its leadership, it is believed that France managed to overturn the decision of the General Assembly on grounds that that portion of the country is not economically viable to be a state on its own. But contrary to this assertion, with a land size of about 42,710km<sup>2</sup> and a population of about 210,000, there were and are still countries much smaller than Southern Cameroon such as Monaco, San Marino, Marshall Islands, Fiji and among others who have been granted independence and remain viable sovereign states. Focusing on Southern Cameroon, the region was substantially developed, it had schools right from the very basic level all the way to the tertiary levels, shipping yards, a sizeable airport, banks with branches across the region, a good road system among other indicators and determiners of statehood such as recognized boundaries (Respondent 9, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019).

The UN agreed that the Anglophone region and the francophone region were to be two (2) equal states constitutionally, thus the abolition of the federal system is the next historical cause of the 2016 Anglophone crisis. Ambazonia was to retain their historical heritage: their culture, language, ethics, believe, practices etc. In 1972, Ahmadou Ahidjo abolished the

federal system and centralized power at Yaoundé, causing Buea to lose its relevance and status. The imposition of driving on the right-hand side of the road, the metric system and the CFA as currency were all initiatives that the Anglophones were not happy about because these were commonalities they had with Britain that gave them a connection and had become an identity they were attached to. The change in currency caused a devaluation in the purchasing power of the Anglophone population by at least 10 percent. In effect, for no fault of theirs every Anglophone Cameroonian lost 10% of the value of every money, owned, saved, invested, or borrowed. They voiced out their concerns but once again, no one seemed to care about their concerns. This is yet another event in the history of Cameroon that left the people of Southern Cameroon very unhappy. The abolition of the federal system leading to the return to a unitary system left the southern Cameroonians feeling deceived and aggrieved. As if that wasn't enough, what they feared would happen, which is the neglect of the people, region and interests actually happened. Not much was added on to the already existing amenities and infrastructure (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019). Also, the already existing infrastructure such as the shipping yards, airports, schools, and roads were left unmaintained and without a facelift, causing them to deteriorate and go worse of.

### **3.5.1c Governance**

One other thing that came up was the issue of poor governance. Respondent 9 opined that Paul Biya came to office as a young, vibrant and promising candidate who promised sanctity, unity and National Integration. Contrary to that, his administration has been widely characterized by corruption, marginalization and exclusion. Respondent 9 went on to say that, little did they know that the idea of “national integration” was a disguise for assimilation. The subtle and gradual process of assimilation, by way of posting francophone officials into governmental institutions, is one of the things that sparked the Anglophone crisis in Southern Cameroon in 2016 (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

### **3.5.2. Immediate causes**

#### **3.5.2a Legal**

In an interview with Respondent 9, who is now living here in Ghana as a result of the crisis, he recounted that the lawyers in Bamenda wrote a number of declarations to the president over a period of ten (10) months and yet the president nor any member of the government passed a single comment on any of them. Not even merely acknowledging receipt. This is what inspired the lawyers to proceed on the peaceful protest which the government responded to with military and gendarmes clamping down on them amidst various degrees of brutalities and arbitrary arrests, of which Respondent 9 himself was a victim (Respondent 9, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019).

The issues of representation and the nature of recruitment of legal personnel featured extensively in the complaints of the lawyers. Esso is noted to have mentioned that there were 1,542 active magistrates, 91 of whom were in service at the Ministry of Justice, 1,412 worked at the courts and 39 of them were on secondment. An in-depth analysis of this number showed that 1,265 of the magistrates were Francophone and the remaining 227 were English-speaking magistrates. In the case of judicial officers, there were 514 in total, 499 of which were French-speaking officials while only 15 of them were Anglophones. 67 (52.3%) of the 128 magistrates practicing in The North West region are civil law trained francophone magistrates, while 64 of the 97 magistrates in the legal services are francophone. In the case of Bamenda alone, of the 27 magistrates in the legal services, 21 of them, 77.8% are francophone (Ateki, 2017). This affected adjudication of cases, interpretation of the law and cases and every aspect of the legal procedure, as well as everything that needed a form of legal input. Lawyers and magistrates who had been trained, and had practiced the French civil law imposed practices peculiar to the civil law in common law courts (Respondent 9, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019).

### **3.5.2b Education**

In the educational sector as well, Respondent 15, a professor at the University of Buea, explained that francophone teachers and lecturers were posted to Anglophone schools in the Anglophone region and they taught without any clue of the syllabus nor any grasp or control of the English language (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019). One can only imagine the devastating levels of chaos and confusion in the classrooms, not to talk of the huge numbers of students who would be affected by this menace. Educational standards have fallen drastically and a vast majority of students from the two Anglophone regions do not gain admission into prestigious universities in the country. He went on to say that, this situation had not only affected students but it has also had an effect on teachers as well. Some teachers who take up classes that were previously taught or handled by francophone teachers complained that most students did not understand most of the things they were taught and as a result scored low grades. Others have had to bow out of the profession due to frustration or they simply have been overlooked for posting (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

Mukong (2016) explains that the teachers complain that everything inherited from the English Educational systems was slowly fading out of the national education policy. Succinctly, paramount among the complaints are, the influx of Francophone students in English University who have no mastery of English and yet students of English extraction cannot have admission; Teachers from Francophone Cameroon are sent to teach in English speaking areas when they have no good knowledge of English; and Anglophone students in technical schools are forced to write end of course examinations translated poorly from French (Mukong, 2016).

A number of scholars have all declared that the strikes and protests were peaceful. They did not cause and harm or destruction, they were just a crown of citizens exercising their civic rights in seeking the attention of the government (Ateki, 2017; Mukong, 2016; Okereke, 2018). Again, all 30 (100%) of the interviewees attest to the fact that the protests were indeed peaceful until the repressive actions meted out to them by the military and gendarmes. From their responses it could be conclusively said that the response was the security forces were unwarranted, unnecessary and overly extreme. Thus, that was the cause of the 2016 crisis in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon. Subsequently, the counter-response by sections of the citizenry and embittered protesters could be said to be the cause of the escalation of the crisis.

### **3.6. Ramifications of the Anglophone Crisis**

Every single interviewee, highlighted one way or another by which they had been affected by the crisis directly or indirectly, especially the Cameroonians. A few of them made mention of the effects it had had on the state, structures, and the alteration of existing status quo in some aspects of everyday life.

#### **3.6.1. Social Ramifications**

One major effect of the crisis that stood out from 28 of the interviewees was the issue of the shutdown of schools in the affected regions which Respondent 17 terms as de-scholarisation. Since teachers in the regions proceeded on strike in October 2016, about 80% of schools have not reopened to resume academic work. In effect, with the exception of a few families that can afford to transfer their children to schools in unaffected areas or regions outside the two Anglophone regions or outside the country, students across all levels of the academic ladder right from the very basic level through the secondary levels, to the tertiary level have not

been to their classrooms and lecture rooms in 3 years. Even though this situation started as a rebellion by teachers to catch the attention of the government, it has now gotten out of hand. Some radical groups have pitched camp in most of these schools, and converted them into their headquarters of operation and training grounds for their recruits (Respondent 17, personal communication, 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2019).

The smooth day-to-day running of these schools was first disrupted by the illicit imposition of the OGTR which forced all persons in the Anglophone regions to remain at home, including students and teachers. As the crisis worsened and things deteriorated, the radicals, popularly known as ‘Amba Boys’ resorted to physical abuse, intimidation and the kidnapping of students, teachers and headmasters who tried to go contrary to their dictates and continue operating schools. The “Amba Boys” did this to instill fear and ensure compliance, Respondent 17 said. Respondent 12, who is an Anglophone Cameroonian and currently living in the region confirms this. During the interview on the 16<sup>th</sup> of July, 2019 he was home as a result of an OGTR together with his family, which included two (2) children who had not been to school since 2016, but were being home-schooled (Respondent 12, personal communication, 22<sup>nd</sup> July, 2019).

In another interview with Eric, an Anglophone Cameroonian who is now pursuing a master’s programme on scholarship here in Ghana, shares his experience. He also has two siblings back in Cameroon, the younger of the two was supposed to be in final year preparing for her final exams to qualify into the university the following year while the older sibling had just gained admission into the university but both of them have been home since the outbreak of the crisis in 2016, and have not been able to attend school. Meaning their education has been stagnant for three whole years and they would be 3 years behind their colleagues in the

Francophone regions in terms of graduating, acquiring jobs, and the number of years of working before retirement. Personally, Eric himself would have missed his golden opportunity to further his education in Ghana as a result of an OGTR that was declared a day before his flight, had he not left for Yaoundé three days earlier (Eric, personal communication, 9<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

Carl, another Anglophone Cameroonian studying in Ghana, went on holidays with his father to Dubai as a reward for excelling remarkably in his final exams and gaining admission into the university. Prior to their return, they were informed that their neighbourhood had been affected by the crisis and was not conducive for them to return. His parents liaised with an uncle residing in Ghana to get him admission here since he did very well in the exams. Carl is currently in his second year, 2 years ahead of his colleagues back at home. Apart from the issue of cost, a majority of the students cannot transfer to schools in the francophone dominated regions due to the issue of language barrier, do not have relations elsewhere to take care of them or as a result of the financial constraints it would place on their parents or the receiving family (Carl, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019).

Currently, UNICEF estimates that there are more than 855,000 children out of school in the South-West and North-West regions of Cameroon alone. It reports that 2 months after the supposed commencement of the new school year, about 90% of public primary schools (over 4,100 public primary schools) and 77% of public secondary schools (more than 744 schools) have still not reopened. It further reports that about 150,000 children have been displaced and affected by the violence in the region, which may make it difficult or impossible to return to normal academic work (UNICEF, 2019a).

Unfortunately, the idle, ones promising youth in the two Anglophone regions have become victims of the crisis situation. Respondent 17, in an interview explained that, very bright and promising young boys and young men have taken to drinking and taking all kinds of narcotic substances. Unfortunately, these vulnerable victims of the crisis, are being coerced into joining factions and groups that are engaged in various hideous crimes ranging from petty theft, robbery, break-ins, lootings, rape, kidnappings and to murders (Respondent 17, personal communication, 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2019).

Respondent 17 went on to say that some young girls are being taken advantage of against their will into unwanted marriages for money and other material benefits for survival, while others are willfully being sexually promiscuous to be able to afford some basic necessities as a means of survival. This, she says, has led to an increase in teenage pregnancies, the prevalence of Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) as well as maternal mortality, resulting from immature reproductive systems, poor nutrition, attempts at illegal abortions and improper antenatal care, among others (Respondent 17, personal communication, 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2019).

In its August 2019 report, the UNICEF published that, there are 530,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the North-West and South-West regions of Cameroon alone (UNICEF, 2019b). These are people and families who have been forced to move out of their homes and comfort zones by the Anglophone crisis and other related factors. Sharing her personal experience, Respondent 17 has had to relocate her family twice since the inception of the crisis in 2016, from Kumban to Kutaba. Eric's family have had to relocate as well from Komo Village to put up with a friend of the family's in one of the Francophone regions. Some others who could not relocate as a result of factors such as cost or no where to go or

probably because they had to flee their homes at short notice are seeking refuge in the heart of thick forests and bushes, while others have fled to neighbouring Nigeria as refugees.

According to the UNHCR's report Nigeria, there are currently at least 34, 000 refugees scattered among the three refugee settlements provided for the Cameroonian refugees (UNHCR, 2019). Ordinary citizens who once lived in homes and communities are being forced to live under extremely harsh conditions, compared to their previous homes. Some like Racheal had to run for her life and spend days in the bush together with her elder brother and family when her husband was shot in cold blood right before her eyes. They are forced to settle for tedious manual labour which pays next to nothing (UNHCR, 2019). Others are also victims of the more than 200 villages burnt down since the outbreak of the crisis in 2017.

### **3.6.1.1. Psychological Ramifications**

One other crucial effect of the crisis is the psychological imprint it leaves on the people who have directly suffered some traumatic experiences or others who witnessed some traumatic actions being carried out. These have been proven to have negative, long term effects on their victims especially among children. For this reason the UNICEF has outlined a programme dubbed Communication for Development (C4D) to address this menace, but access to these displaced persons have been slow due to the fact that they have been displaced (UNICEF, 2019a). Again, speaking of trauma, there is also the case of relatives, friends and loved ones living outside the crisis regions who are in constant fear, anxiety and uncertainty (Moki, 2019). Not just those living in other parts of the country in Cameroon, but the situation is even worse off for parents working outside the country whose children are in the Anglophone regions and have nowhere to go, or for parents whose children are studying outside, one can only imagine the discomfort and psychological trauma they would be going through should

they hear or see familiar names or places close to home being mentioned in the media, not to talk of cases where spouses have their partners outside. Again if one tries to call home from outside the country and doesn't get any response or the call does not even go through at all, one can imagine the thoughts that would be running through the mind of the person outside the country. According to Moki (2019), these have led to serious cases of depression and in some cases, mental psychosis and loss of life.

### **3.6.2. Political Ramifications**

The initial political effect of the crisis deduced from interviewing 21 (70%) of the respondents shows that the people of the North-West region and the South-West regions especially, have lost trust in the current administrative structure, and are seeking a number of other alternatives. Some stated that they would prefer that the country adopts a federalism with a number of constituent states to ensure decentralization of power and effective administration at the regional and local levels. Others would not settle for a federal system but rather a confederacy due to the failure of the federal system adopted at independence by the predecessors of the current ruling party, while others want an outright secession and granted a full statehood status recognized by the UN and its member states.

Respondent 15, explained that the people of the Anglophone regions have lost trust in the current government and its administrative structure, but there again its next most popular alternative, federalism, is also another issue of concern for a number of reasons. He highlighted the fact that there is no specific form of federalism, nor consensus on which particular type of federalism the people would like to settle on. Whether it should be a two-state, four-state, six-state or a ten-state federalism still remains undecided. He went on to say that what compounds the issue is the fact that the idea of federalism has been tried and tested

before but did not go down well for the Anglophone regions and its people, for this reason the proposed idea of federalism is deemed a façade just like that of the previous years. Alternatively, some Cameroonians have opted for a confederacy similar to that of Switzerland (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

Another key sector that has really been affected by the 2016 Anglophone crisis is elections. As a result of the outbreak of the crisis, the Election Commission of Cameroon (ELECAM), has not been able to organize legislative elections, the election of mayors, and municipal elections across the country. Hence, the office holders of these portfolios have overstayed their constitutionally allocated tenure of office. Municipal Councilors who came into office in September 2013, have had their tenure extended past their five year mandated tenure. Instead of being held on the 13<sup>th</sup> of June 2018, Paul Biya decreed a postponement of the elections for a year. The proposed date was July 2019, but approaching the July 2019 schedule, he has again decreed an extension to for the election of municipal councilors and mayors to come off on the 9<sup>th</sup> of February 2020 (HUGUET, 2019). This may be to the advantage of incumbents who would continue to enjoy their benefits but most of the aspirants are running low on resources for their campaigns while other such as Hon. Cyprian Awudu Mbaya of the Social Democratic Front party are throwing in the towel (JournalduCameroun, 2019).

According to Appiah, and Elorm (2019), the crisis may also affect the diplomatic relations of Cameroon. He explained that states that openly condemn or simply do not support the current Biya administration may strain diplomatic relations with. In the case of Cameroon and the Anglophone crisis, Mr Shine Alege, a Nigerian Diplomat confirms that the granting of asylum to some refugees and political asylees raised some tensions between the two neighbouring states because the Cameroonian government expressed a sense of betrayal,

which stems from the cordial relationship existing between the two countries and the tactical support Cameroon gave in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency group. Then again, upon the extradition of the Cameroonian political refugees and asylum seekers from Nigeria back to Cameroon, Nigeria came under extensive condemnation and a serious backlash from citizens, some countries and international organisations such as the UNHCR for going contrary to the principle of non-refoulement, a key provision pertaining to International Refugee Law. Clearly, Nigeria was torn between granting the request of a good neighbour which had in recent past supported them in fighting the Boko Haram Insurgency group in the North of both countries and compliance with international law (Mr Shine Alege, personal communication, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

### **3.6.3. Economic Ramifications**

Despite the fact that Cameroon has faced some economic crisis in recent times, the Anglophone regions feel their capacity to be productive and resourceful to themselves and the country is being undermined, due to the fact that these two regions are the ‘food basket’ and the deposit of most of the country’s resources. Since the outbreak of the crisis, there has not been any study to ascertain its (the crisis’) direct economic impact on the country, but considering the magnitude and volume of economic activities including oil mining and refining, production of agricultural produce such as cocoa and coffee, among many others that take place in these two regions and their resultant contribution of about 20% of the state’s GDP, one may safely conclude that the crisis has had some inadvertent impact economically (InternationalCrisisGroup, 2017).

Respondent 16, in a conversation, concurs and reiterates the fact that the two Anglophone regions produce cocoa and coffee, two very essential cash crops in Cameroon (Respondent

16, personal communication, 21<sup>st</sup> July, 2019). In addition to the intensive agricultural industry largely managed by the CDC, the North-west region and South-West regions are also the producers of oil which accounts for about 40% of the country's GDP, and timber which accounts for about 4.5% of the country's GDP (Kuwonu, 2019).

Unfortunately, the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa (CHRDA) in collaboration with the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights (RWCHR), Canada, in their 2019 report, reports of instances of the burning of timber trucks along the Kumba-Mamfe road (CHRDA, 2019). The CDC, the second largest employer, next to the government, grows and processes rubber, palm-oil and bananas on about 42,000 hectares (104,000 acres). Most of its plantations are in the crisis stricken South-west and North-west regions of Cameroon, but had to halt production as a result of attacks by some separatist groups (Moki Edwin, 2019). The Sonara oil refinery which produces 42,000 barrel-per-day in Limbe was forced to close down due to a tank explosion on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 2019. The explosion burnt four of its thirteen production units and caused an acute shortage of oil for a few days before the supply was supplemented with imports. The explosion which was believed to be perpetuated by some separatist insurgency groups caused the state millions of US dollars. This goes to show that the key sectors in the Anglophone regions that contribute immensely to the economy of Cameroon are under heavy attack. Ambazonian leaders and fighters, have accused these companies of contributing enormously to the growth of the economy of Cameroon and yet the government has failed to return the favour by providing basic social facilities for the people like good road network, portable water among other things.

They also complained that these companies, situated in the Anglophone regions, are being managed and run by their francophone counterparts whereas very few companies in the francophone regions are headed or operated by English-speaking officials (Kouagheu, 2019).

An association of business leaders known as “Groupement inter-patronal du Cameroun (GICAM)” publicly confessed that the impact of the violence in the two Anglophone regions in the West of the country was forcing companies to halt operations. As a result of the crisis, GICAM pitched the estimated loss of revenue as of October 2018 at about \$470 million, while 13,000 jobs, predominantly in the agricultural sector, were on the verge of closure as of end of year 2018 (Kuwonu, 2019).

Again, in an attempt to control the activities of protesters and separatist groups, the government shut down the internet for a number of days. The initial nationwide shut down was soon limited to the two English-speaking Ambazonian regions for about three months, 17th of January to 21st of April 2017. Shutting down the internet paralyzed several sectors of the local economy, notably banking and microfinance. Other industries that are heavily reliant on the internet, especially online service providers, multinational corporations, telecommunication providers, embassies, consulates, internet cafés inter alia, really recorded loses of astronomical values. Some companies had to rely on generators which is a much costly source of energy compared to that which is provided by the state, thereby causing a hike in cost of production and subsequently a hike in the cost of products or services which the innocent client or customer had to bare. Some companies which could not keep their heads above water had to lay off workers or close down entirely, causing unemployment and distress to the dependents of the now unemployed as Sorens, (2015) predicts. In a related study, the country is believed to have lost an estimated \$4.5million in revenue as a result of

the internet shutdown in the two regions alone (Bright, 2017). If this is at the national level, one can only imagine the losses incurred by institutions, companies, private businesses and individuals whose sustenance and livelihood depended on the internet.

In addition to the above, Cameroon which is a giant in the football industry in Africa had to be stripped of hosting the much anticipated African Cup of Nations that was scheduled for June/July 2019. After a meeting that lasted well over 10 hours straight in Accra, Ghana, the Confederation of African Football (CAF), had to make the difficult decision of changing the host nation due to the fact that preparation for the games were far behind schedule and this was attributed to the security and crisis situation in Cameroon. In the statement released by CAF, the security situation in the country was a major concern that influenced their decision (BBC.Sports, 2018). Considering the millions of dollars accrued to host nations through tourism, investors and the patronage of goods and services during such tournaments, one can only imagine the losses Cameroon has incurred as a result of the Anglophone crisis.

Generally, according to the World Bank's 2018 report Cameroon had been facing some economic challenges causing a dip in GDP. In 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 Cameroon's GDP stood at \$34.94B, \$30.92B, \$32.22B and \$34.80B respectively (World Bank Report, 2018). Clearly the year preceding the crisis was quite tough on the government and people of Cameroon. The inability of the government to meet the demands of some sections of the citizenry. This has been deemed as one of the underlying causal factors of the 2016 Anglophone crisis since the people of the Anglophone regions were of the view that the little the government had in its coffers, was disbursed to regions loyal to the government among the other ten regions (Respondent 9, personal communication, 11<sup>th</sup> August, 2019).

#### 3.6.4. Human Rights Issues

On countless media outlets such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Aljazeera and a few other there have been reports of gory, inhumane and unthinkable atrocities carried out by both separatist groups referred to as “Amba Boys” and the state military as well, mainly in the Anglophone regions. One of such instances is the kidnapping of John Fru Ndi, a very prominent politician and chairman of the opposition party, the Social Democratic Front (SDF). Apparently, the June 28 kidnapping was his second in just two months. Giving his account of his experience, Fru Ndi shared that:

I heard shooting and I ran out of my house,” he said. “Three separatists put me down on the rough cement ground of my courtyard. They hit me in the head and in the stomach. I was grabbed like an animal to be slaughtered. I was taken to what the separatists called their ‘prison.’ I saw at least 15 separatists there, armed with assault rifles. They were smoking marijuana and were under the effects of other drugs. They took off my shirt, raised the Ambazonian flag and sang their anthem. They took pictures of me... The separatists pretend to be protecting the Anglophone people, but they are just abusing them [Mudge, \(2019\)](#).

Upon his release on the 29<sup>th</sup> of June John Fru Ndi said the reason why he was kidnapped was to get him to withdraw his party’s representatives from Parliament.

In another incident, the Human Rights Watch reports on a rape victim who shares her ordeal at the hands of the state military (the BIR). She shared that:

Five soldiers broke in, beat me, and brought me out in front of my neighbors’ house. They asked me and my neighbor, a woman, where the [separatists] were. We said we didn’t know, so they beat us. I was hit in the stomach. A soldier asked a colleague for a condom and told me to go toward the toilet. He followed me with a gun. He said, ‘If you scream or say anything, I will kill you.’ He raped me and left. When I went back home, I found that all my money had been stolen  
HRW, (2019).

She managed to receive post-rape treatment the same day, but said she decided not to report to the authorities, for fear of retaliation, instead, she has since fled Kumbo with the trauma.

These experiences seemed farfetched since they were reported online, so the research sought from interviewees if they had had any personal experiences of like manner. Respondent 21, shared that:

On the 30<sup>th</sup> of December, 2017, en route to Yaoundé from Nigeria my vehicle was stopped by a group of “Amba Boys” at gunpoint. They dragged me out of the vehicle, and enquired of where he was going. I’m sure they suspected I was a government official due to the four-wheel vehicle I was using. Luckily for me, as a result of my research work on the crisis, I had the contact of one of the leaders whom they knew so, they confirmed my assertion via telephone and even though some of them were not very convinced their leader allowed me to go. From the look in their eyes they were willing and would have shot me instantly if I did not know anyone or the call had not gone through (Respondent 21, personal communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 2019).

Respondent 17 also volunteered to share her experience. In her case, after repeated threats and intimidations through texts and other methods, she had to move her family twice, from Kumban to Kutaba. She took the threats seriously because her mum was a well-known politician and diehard supporter of the ruling Biya administration in her community. She went on to say, “three months after moving my dad got bored and homesick of staying out of his marital home of so many years so he decided to revisit our former home to spend some time. Unfortunately, a group of “Amba Boys” kidnapped him from the house and demanded a ransom of \$30,000.00 for his release with an ultimatum. Thankfully, they were able to raise the money on time for his release. Even though he was famished and had been beaten and manhandled, we were happy to have him back alive.” She said she felt very lucky because not too long after:

A close friend of the mine also had her father kidnapped with the same request. They tried all they could to raise the money but money was not forthcoming so they requested for an extension. The family managed to raise the money and met the second deadline. Unfortunately, my friend's dad was returned dead. Apparently, he had been dead for days and left to rot. One could see the surface of the body moving so you would think he might be alive but it was all maggots feeding on the corpse of my friend's dad. Aside the pain and sorrow, the trauma of seeing her dad in that state nearly made her loose her mind" (Respondent 17, personal communication, 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2019).

Conclusively, the Anglophone crisis which took place did not only affect the two regions in which they occurred but woefully affected all these economic activities and the country as a whole.

### **3.7. Effects of the crisis on Neighbouring Nigeria**

In an interview with Mr. Shine Alege, he confirms that Nigeria has really been affected by the crisis is neighbouring Cameroon and coincidentally the affected Anglophone regions are closest to Nigeria. They share borders with Cameroon, and since those two regions are very close in terms of proximity and cultural identity, the people of the border towns in eastern Nigeria seem to have a connection with those of the Anglophone regions. More especially because under the colonial administration the two regions were administered as additional states of Nigeria (Mr Shine Alege, personal communication, 25<sup>th</sup> July, 2019)

He further went on to say that, Nigeria was not prepared for the influx of refugees and asylum seekers it has had to accommodate since the inception of the crisis. Currently, Nigeria is home to some 32,600 Cameroonians according to the 2019 report of the Human Rights

Watch and the government has had to make provision for this unforeseen situation, causing extra pressure on the nations spending and that of the receiving states (HRW, 2019).

Unfortunately, in granting some asylum seekers asylum, Nigeria has been accused by Cameroon of harbouring dissidents and granting them a safe haven. In one of such instances, Sisiku Julius Tabe, Arbacha, Akanga and some 9 others who were officially registered refugees and asylees were extradited to Cameroon after pressures from the Cameroonian government. They were subsequently picked up and tried by the Cameroonian military for charges on terrorism, secession, among others. In March 2019, a Federal High Court in Nigeria, presided over by Justice Anwuli Chikere ruled in favour of the 12 deportees on the bases that, “whether the deportees posed security threats to the Federal Republic of Nigeria or not the Federal Government did not follow due process, violating not only the constitution of Nigeria but also Articles 32 and 33 of the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees (France-Press, 2019). Article 33 states that:

“1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country (UNGA, 1951).”

As a result, the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was charged to pay a compensation of 5,000,000 Naira (Five Million Naira) to the 12 deportees and 200, 000 Naira (Two Hundred Thousand) to some other 39 Cameroonians who suffered a similar fate (France-Press, 2019).

In a related interview, Respondent 21, a Nigerian political science lecturer and conflict expert, confirmed the aforementioned deportation and compensation situation that took place. He adds that, the border towns which have served as receiving grounds for the refugees, are now faced with a number of challenges. In the case of Cross River State, like many other receiving states the refugees who arrive famished and almost destitute are willing to do anything for money to survive. They settle for very minimal wages between \$2 to \$4 a day working as labourers on farms. The Cameroonian towns close to the borders also farm in cocoa making it easier for the refugees to adapt and thrive (Unah, 2018). Most of the young girls and women engage in prostitution to earn a living. It is alleged that the Cameroon prostitutes charge next to nothing compared to their Nigerian counterparts. Apparently, their willingness to settle for lower wages has made them very attractive to employers who find it more economically viable to hire cheaper labour rather than the relatively higher charging Nigerian labourers. This phenomenon has led to a number of brawls and clashes between Cameroonian labourers and prostitutes and their Nigerian counterparts (Respondent 21, personal communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 2019).

Again, Respondent 21 mentioned that in Cross River especially, the refugees, predominantly the young men and children among them are being lured into joining the Boko Haram insurgency group whose activities have spread from parts of northern Nigeria into parts of northern Cameroon in recent times. The desperate young men are lured with juicy promises and money for themselves and their families. They are then given paramilitary training including the manufacturing of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which they use to launch attacks on the military and their tanks (Respondent 21, personal communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 2019).

Finally, Respondent 21 highlights the fact that, the instability in the two Anglophone regions has greatly affected trade and commerce in Nigeria. Prior to the resurgence of the crisis, the Douala port was the preferred choice of importation for most businesses in Eastern Nigeria such as Benue and Calabar due to proximity. He went on to explain that, the distance from Lagos, which is the next alternative port, to Benue is about 804km (approximately 13 hours by road) and from Douala to Benue is 579km (approximately 10 hours by road). The distance from Lagos to Calabar is 772km (approximately 13 hours by road) and yet from Douala to Calabar is only 469km (approximately 8 hours by road). Also, from Lagos to Abia is 595km, on the other hand from Douala to Abia is 573km. Clearly, the Douala port and the Cameroonian route through Kumba was a more economical option to the people of south-eastern Nigeria than that of Lagos. Unfortunately, most of these goods and trucks have been attacked by armed militant groups en route to their destinations. In some cases, the drivers and some passengers lost their lives. This development has affected businesses in eastern Nigeria that import goods through the Douala port significantly (Respondent 21, personal communication, 2<sup>nd</sup> August, 2019).

### **3.8. Interventions of the Crisis by the Government**

At the inception, before the outbreak of the crisis, one expected a simple response, comment or minimal intervention just to calm tempers down, unfortunately the government's initial response was silence, through out the 10 months prior to the series of protests in the latter part of 2016, Respondent 15 said in the interview (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019). This left the aggrieved citizens infuriated since they understood the silence of the government as a sign of unconcern, causing the various groups to take to the streets in a peaceful protest. Unfortunately, here again the response was through military force and the

gendarmes, initially using crowd dispersal methods such as teargas and rubber bullets but as the protesters remained resolute and refused to succumb, the military changed strategy and began to use live bullets, and other harsh methods.

Since the outbreak of the crisis in 2016, the government has taken some steps in an attempt to curb the situation and even though a few have been quite successful, some others have failed. The initial attempts at dialogue was the creation of an ad hoc committee tasked to find possible lasting solutions to the crisis. The Ad hoc committee of the government held a number of meetings with the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), the main group representing the interests of the various sub-groups of aggrieved persons, mainly lawyers and teachers. The meetings had largely been productive considering the fact that the group had managed to make progress from 11 to 21 concessions out of 25. Unfortunately, some events which took place on the 13<sup>th</sup> of January 2017 caused the leaders of the CACSC to call off a meeting scheduled for the 14<sup>th</sup> of January, the following day. There were alleged brutalities, among other repressive actions carried out by the police against some Anglophone protesters in Bamenda. Apparently this turn of events triggered multiple violent reactions across the two Anglophone regions causing further clashes between radical groups and security forces. This led to a break in the dialogue process. The leaders of the CACSC and the SCNC were tagged as terrorists and accused of instigating the people against the government. Most of the leaders were targeted, arrested, and kept in prison without bail nor a trial for months. Agbor Balla, Aforneka Fortem Neba (lecturer at the University of Buea), Mancho Bibixy (leader of the coffin protest in Bamenda), and Paul Ayah Abine (Justice of the Supreme Court) were arrested While others such as Wilfred Tassary, Bobga Harmony Mbuton and Elias Eyambe Ebai fled the country into exile. But Paul Ayah Abine and Felix

Agbor Balla were released in August 2017 and the charges against them dropped (Okereke, 2018).

The Paul Biya government has created a National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism through Article 3(1) of the Presidential Decree N<sup>o</sup>. 2017/013 of 23rd January. The Commission has at the core of its mandate the task to promote and ensure multiculturalism and bilingualism equally across the length and breadth of the country. He again constituted the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee (Decree No. 2018/719 of 30 November 2018), but again this committee has not been very effective in the attainment of its core mandate due to lack of funding and other administrative equipment to facilitate its activities (Nsom, 2017).

Also, new benches have been created for Common Law at the Supreme Court and new departments have been opened at the National School of Administration and Magistracy. The government is also recruiting Anglophone magistrates and 1,000 bilingual teachers to be posted in the legal administration and the various levels in the educational sector respectively. In spite of these interventions, the leaders of the Anglophone movement insist that they could and should have been rolled out way earlier to avoid the crisis entirely (Okereke, 2018).

In addition to the aforementioned, the government has also embarked on some humanitarian interventions. The government has occasionally organised and distributed some food items to displaced families whose homes and villages have been burnt or have had to flee for their safety. Generally, the people of the Anglophone region see these humanitarian interventions as cosmetic, a façade and a deflection from addressing the root causes of the crisis and taking concrete steps to restoring peace (Eric, personal communication, 12<sup>th</sup> July, 2019). The

intervention of the government has been characterized by a combination of soft and hard power. This is seen in the redeployment of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) which is a special force in the military, to the two Anglophone regions to beef up security and the operations of the police and gendarmerie (Okereke, 2018).

Respondent 15 summarizes the response of the government as progressively metamorphosing from silence, denial, disregard, intimidation, dialogue, repression and clamp down (Respondent 15, personal communication, 26<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

### **3.9. International Actors**

Generally, the response of the international community has been sluggish and not forthcoming. Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso (the Dean of the Ghana Armed Forces Staff College (GAFSC)) affirms that, the response of the international community has to a large extent been more passive, rather than active, proactive or action driven. This, he attributes to some major factors. The first of which is lack of political will by the big powers. He explained that there are powerful countries that can easily step in and ensure that the crisis is settled but in today's capitalist world there must be an incentive. What does any country that decides to intervene tend to gain from their intervention, he asked? Historically, the big powers as he called them, have intervened in resource endowed regions, and considering the variety of rare minerals and other resources in the two Anglophone regions, it comes as no surprise that France has a standing army contingent in Cameroon. This also explains why the government is not ready to have any discussions on the breaking away of the two most resource endowed regions in the country (Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso, personal communication, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2019).

Dr. Festus Aubyn, a researcher at the Faculty of Academic Affairs and Research (FAAR), Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC), rather attributes the lack of active involvement of the international community to the principle of subsidiarity, which is a form chain of command. This principle posits that, there is a hierarchical procedure or structure in handling conflict, in the sense that ECCAS only comes in if Cameroon agrees that it is not able to handle the situation. The AU then comes in, in the event that ECCAS is not able to or capable of handling the situation, and finally the UN takes it up if the AU is not able to. Any involvement of any other state actor or non-state actor such as the AU or the UN may be deemed as an infringement on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cameroon, and this may strain diplomatic relation at the least (Dr. Festus Aubyn, personal communication, 15<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

The AU's Peace and Security Council's Protocol, Article 4(j) states that:

“the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act...” (AU, 1993).

However, Article 4 (h) refers to, “the inalienable right to independent existence”. This explains why the AU has not stepped in with its full weight to intervene. An intervention of a third party gives the impression that the government is ineffective and weak. (Dr Festus Aubyn, personal communication, 15<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

Speaking of the full weight of the AU, Dr. Antwi-Danso again discusses the fact that the AU as an entity lacks the necessary capacity (weight) to act as it ought to or as expected of it. He

went on to explain that the AU is woefully financially impotent. For Example, the European Union (EU) bares of 67% of AU's funding, and another chunk comes from China, the US and other development partners (Dr. Vladimir Antwi- Danso, personal communication, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2019). Still on funding, Dr. Aubyn makes mention of the fact that the Peace fund lacks funds, but it is sustained by external donors who make donations based on their interests in a particular conflict, otherwise nothing happens (Dr. Festus Aubyn, personal communication, 15<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

The issue of concern is, who determines when and where there are war crimes when there is media censorship, and does this entity (Head of State, leader) have the moral right to point out the speck in Cameroonian's eyes when the accusing state may have a log in theirs? This brings the study to the issue of moral capacity and respect for the elderly. States in their relationships are guided by a diplomatic principle known as Order of Precedence. This is simply the respect accorded the oldest serving representative, diplomat or ambassador of a country in a room or in a receiving state at any given time. First of all, Paul Biya has served as president for close to 38 years and most of his ambassadorial appointees have been at post for long in their receiving states, hence, most of them are heading the diplomatic corps in their receiving states as Deans of the Diplomatic Corps. For this reason, more recent arrivals find it difficult to mount pressure on the Cameroonian government through their Ambassadors. Moreover, most African states who would have been in the right position to call Cameroon to order, themselves have human rights issues and abuses in back at home. A typical example is the head of the AU coming from Egypt when the former President Mohammed Morsi died in prison custody amidst other human rights issues in the country (Dr. Festus Aubyn, personal communication, 15<sup>th</sup> July, 2019).

In spite of these challenges, the AU has been able to embark on diplomatic interventions, marked by a visit of the AU chairman to Yaoundé, rather than visiting affected areas in the two affected Anglophone regions. From April 25 to May 9, 2018, the African Commission met on the issue and passed a Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in the Republic of Cameroon. Among other things, the resolution condemned human rights violations in Anglophone Cameroon since the inception of the crisis in October 2016 and called for independent investigations to deal with perpetrators of crimes and violations, and ensure justice. The African Commission further encouraged all parties to engage in a dialogue towards restoring calm, security and peace in the shortest possible time (CHRDA, 2019). A source at the AU confirmed that, plans were underway and Former UN General Secretary Kofi Annan was preparing to initiate a peace process when his sudden demise occurred. She added that at the time of the interview, the Anglophone crisis is not on the agenda of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (Respondent 20, personal communication, 3<sup>rd</sup> August, 2019).

After a pre-negotiation meeting with parties involved in the Cameroonian Anglophone crisis from the 25<sup>th</sup> to the 27<sup>th</sup> of June 2019, Switzerland confirmed through their embassy in Yaoundé, that it has initiated negotiation peace talks between the government and some rebel groups. The Swiss ambassador to Cameroon added that the negotiations are being supervised by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in collaboration with the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue based in Geneva, working closely to end the crisis and restore peace (FDFA, 2019).

Until early this year 2019, the US had also been more diplomatic but this trend took a turn when the US placed sanctions on some 20 Cameroonian citizens which included top

government officials, military personnel and some civilians. An aid package worth \$17 million towards the training of Cameroonian military together with scheduled routine training sessions in the US were also withdrawn by the Whitehouse following the inaction of the Cameroonian government in addressing multiple human rights abuse concerns raised against the military (Bashi, 2019).

On the 1<sup>st</sup> of November 2019, the US accused Cameroon of condoning torture and extrajudicial killings of citizens by the country's military, and as a result exempted Cameroon from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 2020. Projecting from the bilateral trade between the two countries, the US embassy in Yaoundé pegged Cameroons export to the US in 2018 alone at \$220million (Adebayo, 2019). So far these are some of the interventions towards a lasting solution to the crisis in Anglophone Cameroon.

### **3.10 Quest for Secession in an Era of Integration**

Considering the fact that 26 out of the 30 respondents, were of the view that secession was a possible solution to the crisis even if it was the last resort, the study decided to delve into this theme a little. The idea of globalization and integration is not an entirely new phenomenon to African states. Most of the post-independent states had enjoyed the windfall of cooperation, especially the freedom movements that fought for independence. Shortly after the introduction of the concept of integration on the continent, during the decolonization period of the late 50s and early 60s, states began to face major setbacks. Most of the states faced intra-state political turmoil, which resulted in some secession attempts. Summarized by Englebert and Hummel (2005), 48 states in sub-Saharan Africa have had to deal with a secessionist situation (Englebert & Hummel, 2005).

According to Appiah, and Kwawu (2019), the end of the Cold War that broke apart federations like the Soviet Union, and the disbandment of Czechoslovakia had a negative impact on the integration of the continent. The OAU at the time had a socialist outlook and its ideological inclination was largely communist. Thus, the fall of the Soviet Union covertly discouraged many states on the ‘socialist’ continent. There was no inspiration to continue being a part of an ideology that had lost its essence to liberalism. The corollary effect was the secession of Eritrea and Somaliland in the early 1990s. Most of the ruling governments at the time received some economic and financial support from the USSR, which they used in supporting their budgets for national development, as well as championing the course of decolonization.

Clearly, upon the fall of the Soviet Union, things began to turn around for the worse. Government who could not provide for sections of the states began to witness the emergence of secessionist groups threatening their legitimacy and territorial integrity and that is the situation Cameroon has found itself (Appiah, and Kwawu, 2019). They went on to say that, comparatively, the secessionist conflicts that Africa experienced were of much smaller magnitudes than any other continent, but clearly they had an immense impact on her quest to integrate, hence stalling her integration process. That notwithstanding, the issue of lives and human rights most definitely supersedes the necessity and importance of integration (Appiah, and Kwawu, 2019).

Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso in an interview opined that secession draws back integration, but the situation in Cameroon and other parts of the continent is only a sign that we are not there yet. We are not prepared to be integrated yet. He went on to say that if we were integrated we would have been ruled by supra national organs with some powers to put the Cameroon

government in check and on its toes, as well as a standing continental security force, which would have brought the situation under control long before now. Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso lamented that, integration is very important and the benefits of integration cannot be overlooked nor downplayed, but that notwithstanding there are human rights issues that must be addressed. Also, the attempts at integrating the francophone and Anglophone regions of Cameroon, have been deemed as clandestine acts of forceful assimilation rather than integration. If the underlying issues are brushed under the carpet without addressing them, the crisis may tone down a bit but would certainly erupt again over time (Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso, personal communication, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2019).

The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), clearly stipulates the importance of member states ensuring, promoting, and protecting the rights all persons in every part of the world, especially within the confines of their jurisdiction (Assembly, 1948). Again, a critical analysis of the crisis situation in Cameroon, juxtaposed to the UDHR and the UN charter clearly emphasizes his point. Quite a number of human rights provisions have been breached by both civilians, and state security forces.

Essentially, the people are entitled to self-determination, and they cannot be forced to “integrate” at the expense and to the detriment of their rights; integration is a laudable concept but cannot supersede basic human rights, and more importantly must be voluntary. Currently, the militant and radical “Amba Boys” are bent on doing anything to cause the government to succumb to their demands. The military and gendarmes are also poised to clamp down their opponents the “Amba Boys” at all cost, to prove themselves capable. This deadlock only means more destruction and casualties. Moreover, the covert attempts at assimilation by the Paul Biya government coupled with the aforementioned reasons, will not

lead to a peaceful solution but might rather escalate the volatile situation. From observation, it would be more prudent to first address or solve the crisis fully, then work towards integrating voluntarily at the pace at which all parties would agree to for peace to prevail and development to thrive.

### **3.11 Conclusion**

Premised on the research objectives of the study, this chapter in a nutshell, embarked on a systematic time travel into the history of Cameroon to understand the antecedents that have led to the current crisis situation in Cameroon. The chapter saw an analysis of the remote and immediate causes of the 2016 crisis and emphasized on the fact that though the crisis has had diverse effects on the country as a whole, the actual conflict is limited to English-speaking North-West and South-West regions. As a result, these regions have suffered and continue to suffer the most fallouts of the crisis situations. These include social, political, economic and psychological effects. The chapter also discussed interventions by both national and international actors to curb the crisis situation, most of which have been more passive, characterized by statements and calls for peace, with the exception of Switzerland's initiation of peace negotiations and US' imposition of sanctions.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 4.0. Introduction

Based on the analysis of findings discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter seeks to highlight the salient issues observed in the quest to achieve the objectives of the study. More specifically the objectives included, establishing the causes of the 2016 Anglophone crisis in Cameroon; determining the social, political and economic ramifications of the Anglophone Crisis on peace and development in Cameroon; examining some of the spill-over effects of the crisis on neighbouring countries; and identifying some internal and external interventions towards addressing the Anglophone Crisis. The study then draws useful conclusions and makes some recommendations based on the findings.

#### 4.1. Summary of Findings

The core of the study, was to understand the 2016 Anglophone crisis in Cameroon, and towards the attainment of this, the study found out that the Anglophone crisis as the name depicts is a crisis limited to the two predominantly English- speaking regions, which are the North-West region and the South-West region. There are not any activities of the separatist groups nor disturbances in any other region with the exception of those caused by the Boko Haram insurgency group in the far Northern region of the country. Hence, the rest of the country is relatively peaceful.

In an attempt to establish the causes of the crisis under study, it came to light that there are two dimensions to this, the first of which is the decades of marginalization, deprivation and exclusion of the Anglophone minority. A minority not only of 20% in the country, but an

Anglophone minority in a widely non English- speaking bloc. A regional bloc consisting of countries with French, Portuguese and Spanish as their official working languages. Their identity, and ties with UK which they hold so dear has continually been threatened. This is seen paramountly in the conversion from federal system to a unitary system of governance in 1972 after it was adopted in 1961. Among other instances, representation of Anglophones at all levels of the government has been significantly and proportionally low since independence. This goes to affirm the relative deprivation theory with respect to the study. Unfortunately, just as Gurr explained, the Anglophones believe that relatively, they have been deprived of equity in governance and their right to choose and have an identity of their own. Juxtaposed to Maslow's theory of needs, the Anglophones can be said to have been denied of the identity which falls within the ambits of the third level of the hieratical pyramid, love and belonging.

On the immediate causes of the crisis, the research found out that the irresponsiveness of Paul Biya and his government's officials to the concerns and grievances of the people of the two Anglophone regions especially, is the immediate root cause of the crisis. The other cause is the repressive nature of the response of the government to the peaceful protests of the lawyers and teachers, by the military and gendarmes. Their main grievance here was the infiltration of the professional spaces with francophone officials, causing a decline in performance output. This action gave the francophone an advantage over the Anglophones by granting more French-speaking Cameroonian employment opportunities, reduced the quality of students from the Anglophone regions and thereby causing a decline in their admissions.

From the interviews, it also came to light that indeed the crisis had had and continues to have dire repercussions on various aspects of their social, political and economic lives. These

include the closure of schools in the two affected regions since 2016 which may lead to increase in illiteracy, the activities and operations of the separatist groups, the Operation Ghost Town Resistance which has caused a decline in economic activities in the region causing developmental stagnation and the general atmosphere of fear and panic. All these have created and intensified various needs under the various levels of Maslow's Pyramid, most especially the physiological needs (food, water, shelter etc.) of the refugees and IDPs, as well as their safety and that of protesters and any other person opposed to the state openly.

The centrality of the HNT is the assumption that all humans have needs and these needs are non-negotiable. Essentially, it is the earnest determination to attain these basic needs, when they are denied an individual or a group relative to another or others that causes conflicts, and clearly that has been the case of the English-speaking people of the North-west and South-West regions of Cameroon.

Over all, the Republic of Cameroon is largely peaceful with the exception of the North-West and South-West Regions of Cameroon as a result of the Anglophone crisis in these two regions. This predicament was shared by every single interviewee. Some interviewees expressed fear of telephone communication being tapped, and social media activities being tracked. Others were not comfortable with the face-to-face interviews at all for fear of informing on them, while others outrightly turned down the interview for fear of it leaking and compromising their security and that of their families and friends.

The findings also confirm that the crisis affected Nigeria and other neighbouring countries of Cameroon. Nigeria has had to bear the cost and responsibility of the refugees and asylees of the crisis since 2016, coupled with some of its related issues such as the Boko Haram

recruitment and other social vices. It also had to pay a cash compensation to the illegally expatriated political asylees in March 2019, this year. Again, the two Anglophone regions have been known to be the food basket of not only Cameroon, but a supplier to its economic partners especially under ECCAS, but since the outbreak of the crisis food supply has not been adequate due to the instability in the food producing Anglophone regions.

Relatedly, this same instability and the Operation Ghost Town Resistance (OGTR) has resulted in the scaling down of staff strength significantly and in some cases the complete closure of establishments. This has caused losses to companies, unemployment to thousands of citizens and the rippling effect on the dependents of these unemployed is nothing to write home about. Fending for families, payment of utility bills, school fees, and many more have become a burden on breadwinners. Which has led some into huge amounts of debt, has led young girls of school-going ages into chasing after men for money and even outright prostitution, while the young boys have taken to petty thievery, mugging, and robbery.

On the issue of interventions, the study finds that at the inception of the crisis, during the initial protest of the lawyers and teacher in October and November 2016, the government was more reluctant to soft methods. It rather overreacted by responding to the protests with repressive measures through the police, military and gendarmes indiscriminately. The government then followed it up by concentrating its military more on the militant secessionist groups while it clamped down on secessionist movements with arrests and stringent laws that sought to suppress the Anglophone secessionists. In more recent times, with the intervention of the US through some sanctions and the proposed peace talks by Switzerland, the government and opposition secessionist movements have begun to ease up towards negotiations and tensions are gradually subsiding.

One issue of concern that emerged was the fate of the militants and “Amba Boys”, post peacemaking and peacebuilding. Here are young men who are, depending on where one stands, victims or culprits of a crisis situation that has gotten them to do very outrageous things including, the use of hard narcotic substances, rape and other sexual offences, illicit murders, rituals etcetera. They have also tasted and wielded some form of power by which they operated haphazardly within certain geographical spheres. The study finds that very little attention and foresight has been given to this unavoidable hurdle that lies ahead, with respect to counseling, psychotherapy and reintegrating them into society.

#### **4.2. Conclusions**

Conclusively, the study affirms that the 2016 Anglophone crisis in Cameroon has affected the peace in the two Anglophone regions and stalled development immensely. The causes of the 2016 Anglophone crisis are clearly an outburst of historical grievances and animosities over unfair treatments and marginalization of the Anglophones by the francophone government. Just like the Human Needs Theory and the relative deprivation theory posits in chapter one. Clearly, the crisis has had its fair share of social, economic, political and psychological effects on individual Anglophone Cameroonians, citizens of the country at large, neighbouring Nigeria and Cameroonians in the diaspora as well. Thankfully the AU, the US and Switzerland are among the actors actively involved in trying to restore peace to the Republic of Cameroon.

### **4.3. Recommendations**

In view of the findings that have emerged from the study, some recommendations are hereby put forth for consideration:

First of all, the government, preferably the President himself should make a public statement acknowledging the crisis, withdrawing his accusation of the separatist leaders of being terrorists and promising his commitment to ensuring a peaceful settlement of the crisis. This should not only be a political talk but one backed by action. As a sign of good faith, the President could start by executing the 21 points agreed upon by the ad hoc committee in January 2017, prior to the breakdown of negotiations. Alternatively, the President should step down entirely since he has become an embodiment and a representation of all the sufferings and mishaps of the Anglophone people. The electoral commission of Cameroon should hold fresh elections, in which President Paul Biya does not contest for a new leader with new ideas whom the people will rally around and willingly unite under.

The study also recommends the rejuvenation of the two commissions (the National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism under Article 3(1) of the Presidential Decree and the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee) and ensuring their operation is free and fair, devoid of any influence and their monthly, quarterly, or biannual reports be made public, and their recommendations be carried out swiftly. This could be done by publicizing their operations and activities live on air and publishing their finding and recommendations in the media. Alternatively, these commissions should be made highly autonomous, and only answerable to the legislature and not the executive to ensure efficiency and liberty to operate without duress. Preferably the National Commission for Bilingualism and Multiculturalism should be constituted by an equal number of Anglophones

and francophone to ensure that the views of the minority are not overridden by their francophone compatriots.

From the study, it is clear that most of the indigenes of the Anglophone Cameroonian regions have lost trust in the military and police as a result of the repressive approaches they adopted in controlling and dispersing protests since 2016. Hence it is recommended that the government withdraws the state military in the catchment area and replaces them with a new peacekeeping unit with a friendlier approach or the UN Peacekeeping Forces comes in to replace them temporarily till the culprits are tried fairly in an open court and justice is served. This would rebuild the lost trust in the police and military.

The study would like to commend Switzerland for taking steps and initiating peace talks but recommends that the French Embassy and British High Commissions in Cameroon join in the talks since they are largely involved in the genesis of the crisis. Also, the peace talks should be widely inclusive, involving opinion leaders such as chiefs, religious heads, separatist leaders, and influential TV and radio figures among the English-Speaking Cameroonians to enhance the peace talks. All participants must reiterate their commitment to making some concessions ensuring that whatever conclusions they arrive at will be upheld and enforced for the sake of peace and development. Be it a widely accepted form of federalism, decentralisation, secession or a unique system birthed by Cameroon, befitting of their unique situation, the government, the leaders, people and all stakeholders should put their differences aside and forge ahead towards a peaceful coexistence.

Finally, counsellors and psychotherapists should be given special training by post-conflict reintegration experts and NGOs in the field, on handling the militants and “Amba Boys” such

that they can safely reintegrate into society without posing a threat to others. Para-counselors could be specially trained for this purpose, to facilitate the process.

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