


Contents lists available at [ScienceDirect](https://www.sciencedirect.com)

# Research in Transportation Business & Management

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/rtbm](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/rtbm)

## Sounds good on paper but problematic in practice: PPP in Ghana's transport sector

Kwame Asamoah<sup>a</sup>, Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah<sup>b</sup>, Clement Mensah Damoah<sup>a,\*</sup>, Edmund Poku Adu<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management, University of Ghana Business School, P. O. Box LG 78, Legon, Accra, Ghana

<sup>b</sup> Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, P. O. Box LG 64, Legon, Accra, Ghana

### ARTICLE INFO

#### Keywords:

Public-private partnership  
Transport sector  
Effectiveness  
Complexity

### ABSTRACT

The study sought to examine the complexities involved in the implementation of public-private partnerships in the transport sector using the experience of Intercity STC Coaches Limited and private partners in Ghana. The study seeks to contribute to the literature on public-private partnership by examining the implementation challenges associated with the partnership between a public and private transport entities. An exploratory qualitative design through semi-structured interviews and document reviews is adopted for the study. The paper uses the complexity of joint action as the theoretical framework. The study contends that the presence of a challenge, the threat of a challenge or the quest to realize an untapped opportunity offers the basis for a PPP to kick-start. Despite the ideals, there are challenges which impede the effective operationalization of partnerships. These are discussed with clear policy suggestions to address them.

### 1. Introduction

The movement of people from one destination to the other to undertake many essential pursuits which may include, inter alia to schools, place of work or worship, for shopping and leisure, for instance, demonstrates the unique role played by the transport sector. Transportation also plays a crucial role in carting goods from where they are produced to where they are actually needed. This makes the role of transportation quite essential in the economy of any country and for this reason, the efficiency of the transport system has an implication on the economic activities of a country (Hakim & Merkert, 2016). In the advanced world, there are many different forms of modern transport which are well developed and effective. However, in Africa, road transport continues to be the main form of transportation for goods and people on a day-to-day basis (Willoughby, 2013). The use of public transport especially the state-owned transport systems are very common in Africa which help in the movement of people and goods from one location to the other. The growth of populations coupled with urbanization in the cities of many developing economies is on the ascendancy beyond the containment capacities of existing road transport facilities. There have been attempts by many African governments to adopt the use of public-private

partnership models to inject efficiency and effectiveness in meeting the needs and expectations of the citizens. The use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) for investment in transport infrastructure has a long history, spreading rapidly in Latin America in the 1980s and the 1990s in the UK (Colverson & Perera, 2012).

The adoption of PPP models is so imperative to a country as it serves as a source of financial resource, technology, and technical expertise that the government needs to achieve its development agenda (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015). Consequently, the notion of public-private partnership (PPP) has become a rewarding venture where governments all over the world look for opportunities and expertise from the private sector to help in the delivery of public goods effectively and efficiently (Damoah & Asamoah, 2020). As a result, various researchers have delved into the implementation and operations of public-private partnership which is seen as sensitive policy gaining roots as wild bushfire (Cheung, Chan, & Kajewski, 2012). Investigations into PPP implementation have largely focused on areas such as procurement, relationship management, risk management, and financial viability (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2017; Soomro & Zhang, 2015).

In recent times, the challenges impeding the successful implementations of PPP has received much attention from researchers. Tang,

\* Corresponding author.

E-mail addresses: [kasamoah@ug.edu.gh](mailto:kasamoah@ug.edu.gh) (K. Asamoah), [eyeboah-assiamah@ug.edu.gh](mailto:eyeboah-assiamah@ug.edu.gh) (E. Yeboah-Assiamah), [cmdamoah@gmail.com](mailto:cmdamoah@gmail.com) (C.M. Damoah), [epadu@st.ug.edu.gh](mailto:epadu@st.ug.edu.gh) (E.P. Adu).

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rtbm.2021.100682>

Received 17 February 2020; Received in revised form 28 May 2021; Accepted 3 June 2021

Available online 10 June 2021

2210-5395/© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Shen, and Cheng (2010) have argued that various studies across the globe have examined and investigated the successful or otherwise implementation of PPP projects, albeit more focused on the developed countries (Osei-Kyei & Chan, 2015; Wibowo, 2004). Again, these studies seem to have focused on the areas largely bothering on PPP in the construction, energy and waste management sector whilst the transportation sector which is also an important sector of the economy seems to be relegated to the background (Biygautane, 2017; Yeboah-Assiamah, Asamoah, & Kyeremeh, 2017).

Using the case of Ghana's PPP in the transport service sector, the current study contributes to the literature by examining the nature and the implementation of this partnership between a public transport entity [Intercity STC Coaches Limited (ISTC)] and three private entities. This study is of much significance as ISTC is Ghana's first and only wholly-owned transport company that has operated in the transport sector for over five decades although without any rigorous academic scrutiny. The study is underpinned by these key objectives: To assess the antecedents and nature of the partnership between ISTC and its partners; expectations and achievements of the private partners and an assessment of the challenges related to the PPP implementation process. The study presents and discusses key insights which are drawn from the study to inform policy and practice.

## 2. Theoretical framework: Complexity of joint action

The study adopts the 'Complexity of Joint Action' model of policy implementation (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973). The model postulates that the successful implementation of a policy hinges on an agreement by the various actors involved in the policy implementation. Thus, the implicit or explicit interest of the actors and the main principals must seek and be in harmony before success can be achieved in the implementation process. This action of compromise by the actors has been referred to as 'veto points'. Studies by Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973 on the creation of employment for minority groups in Oakland, which was known as the Economic Development Administration (EDA) Programme established the complexity and convolutedness of the programme. This was because, of the "changing actors, diverse perspectives and multiple clearances" (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973 p. 93). The model additionally recognizes the diverse participants and varied opinions that must be synchronized before a policy can be implemented. The meaning ascribed to success varies among the different participants who have different ideas as to what path should be taken in the implementation process.

Though the afore-mentioned has been critiqued by Bardach (1977), Bowen (1982), and Van Meter and Van Horn (1975) it is apposite for this study since some insights can be gleaned from it with the implementation of ISTC's PPP. Buabeng (2015, p. 20) contends that "the model is generally viewed as useful. For instance, it demonstrates that the complexity of joint action reveals the organized complexity of the policy sphere in which each actor struggles to impose his definition of the situation". Subsequently, requests for coordination may be next to useless, since "each wants coordination on his own terms" (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973).

There has been a paradigm shift in the ideology which supports the involvement of the private sector in the management and financing of public goods lately. This is predominantly in the developing countries but not completely absent from the developed worlds like Europe and to a large extent the UK (Juan, Estache, & Trujillo, 2007). Despite the challenges of PPP, governments all over the world continue to use it as an avenue to advance their development agenda in the area of infrastructure and service delivery with the view of reducing fiscal cost, especially in the transport sector. For instance, Juan et al. (2007, p. 5) assert that "transport infrastructure where the end-user is represented by corporate or commercial clients tends to be less risky given their higher payment capacity of tariffs and charges (i.e., airports, ports, cargo railways, etc.). Conversely, transport infrastructure where the end-user is represented by consumers tends to have more affordability

issues and therefore higher risks (i.e., urban transport, toll roads, etc.)".

The key point here is that the ISTC's PPP agreement presents a clear case of complexity of joint action. The study examines the innate interest of the agreeing parties (ISTC and their Private Partners) in order to provide a good perspective in unravelling the challenges inherent in the contractual and procedural bottlenecks of the arrangement. In this light, the Complexity of Joint Action theory aids in tracing the nemesis of the implementation of the ISTCs PPP agreement. Consequently, it offers a good viewpoint for suggesting recommendations to address the implementation weaknesses of the PPP arrangement.

### 2.1. Literature review: Defining PPP

The definition of public-private partnership is not agreed upon unanimously. As a result, theorists and practitioners have come up with their own concepts (Mouraviev & Kakabadse, 2016). Although certain fundamental characteristics are listed in the different meanings suggested by scholars, PPP is mostly thought of as contractual arrangements between public bodies and a private sector company.

PPP is described by Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge (2018) as an agreement in which a government entity and a private company, for-profit or non-profit, collaborate to conduct or embrace a traditionally public enterprise. It is therefore a deal with no less than one government agency or unit routinely included and a consortium of private enterprises to implement a large, capital-intensive, city construction project. The qualities of these undertakings and unavoidable public ownership are private capital and the management of the planning, construction, repair and long-term operation of the infrastructure and the expenditure on capital.

In turn, Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015) argue that PPP is used in terms of the contractual arrangement between the private and public sector, characterized by public sector agencies that work in the building, renovation, maintenance or management of public facilities to assist the public service in whole or in part. The public entity does not give ownership of the facility under these terms, but the private partner usually invests its own money in the construction and creation of the property.

As a result of the above, public-private partnerships may be described as the coming together of the public and private sectors to establish and deliver public goods and services while maintaining public control of the services provided. The basis of the relationship is that both sides have special features that provide benefits in a particular aspect of service planning and delivery. The best partnership agreements draw on the strengths of private and public sectors to develop complementary links (Bland & Overton, 2016; Santandrea, Bailey, & Giorgino, 2016).

Bajwa, Kitchlew, Shahzad, and Rehman (2017) intimate that,

PPP is not a partnership rather, a new organization in itself. It is an interdependent form (I-Form) organization that embraces two dominant groups, representing public and public-sector partners, which are different in their characteristics but dependent on each other for achievement of their respective and collective interests and goals (p. 1).

From the foregoing, we define public-private partnerships as the coming together of the public and private sectors to build and deliver public goods and resources to achieve cohesion and change.

There are various models of PPP: design and build (DB), design, build, finance and operate (DBFO), build, lease and operate (BLO), build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT), build, own and operate (BOO), lease, own and operate (LOO), and alliance (Bayliss & Van Waeyenberge, 2018; Lohmann & Roetzel, 2014; Trebilcock & Rosenstock, 2015). Additionally, Skelcher (2005), categorizes PPPs into five forms, or types of which are: Public leverage, contracting out and competitive tendering, franchising, joint venture and strategic partnering.

## 2.2. Public–private partnership in transportation

Governments have traditionally been the primary funders of major highway infrastructure programmes (Verweij, 2015; Verweij & Gerrits, 2015). In this case, the city administrator imposes a user charge proportional to the externality of congestion (Chen & Nozick, 2016). The ratio of income from the congestion charge to the expense of capacity, which is the degree of self-financing, equals the elasticity of building cost concerning capacity at the maximum capacity level (Lindsey & De Palma, 2014). As a result, optimum congestion pricing relying on the marginal cost pricing theory, which would cover the fixed costs associated with optimal capacity supply, is a major pricing mechanism for the government-funded toll road (Tirachini, Hensher, & Rose, 2014).

Even though there is no widely agreed concept of sustainable transportation, Mihyeon Jeon, Amekudzi, and Vanegas (2006) argue that a sustainable transportation infrastructure should be reliable and efficient in ensuring secure and equal access to basic economic and social services, foster economic growth, and support environmental integrity. Rao and Vokolkova (2007) note that this makes for a more effective and efficient distribution of public services, allowing government money to be channeled into other fields where direct public investment and action are required. It is also true that partnerships do not inherently include mega-investments, but may include more people in partnerships which can bring all desired results usually associated with PPPs, particularly in the Botswana transport sector (ibid).

The Government of China, for instance, has extensively implemented PPPs to encourage urban growth, provide high-quality services and goods which has led to a reduced fiscal burden. Public–private partnerships (PPP), which are the largest investment sector, are becoming increasingly critical for improving the development of society in China. Of the several PPP ventures that have been acquired, amounting to approximately CNY 5570 billion between January 2014 and June 2017, investments in transportation account for at least 20% (Liu, Wang, & Wilkinson, 2016; Yuan, Li, Guo, Zhao, & Skibniewski, 2018). The aim of getting the private sector into infrastructure development and activity is to increase the quality and efficacy of government services and public goods distribution. They also claim that transportation programmes and the advancement of transportation services have an impact on social issues such as poverty, health, education, road control, gender equality, social protections, communicable diseases and trafficking, and labour work.

It can be noted from the above that in the transportation sector, PPP has contributed significantly to transport infrastructure development. However, other scholars indicate that little effort has been paid to improving the service sector when it comes to transportation, especially day-to-day travels (Damoah & Asamoah, 2020). The current study contributes to the literature by examining the nature and the implementation of this partnership between a public transport entity [Intercity STC Coaches Limited (ISTC)] and three private entities as its partners.

## 3. Methods

### 3.1. Study context: The CASE

This section briefly describes the actors involved in the ISTC public–private partnership, namely, ISTC, Smice International, Nordic Logistic Limited and M Plaza Coach Services. The ISTC came into being in the year 1909 as a Government Transport Department to cater for the needs of the central government. After that, on 9th March 1965, it was made a body corporate through the Legislative Instrument (LI) number 414 and was to run commercial passenger services, and the name was changed to the State Transport Company (STC). It was later incorporated in June 1995 as a Limited Liability Company under Ghana's Companies Act, 1962, (Act 179) in the name, the State Transport Company Limited. Over the years, the Company metamorphosed and it is currently known

as the Intercity STC Coaches Limited since October 2003. Currently, the government of Ghana owns 20%, while the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), owns 80% of the shares of the ISTC making the ISTC a wholly publicly owned company. The ISTC has as its vision and corporate goal “to be the leader in the road passenger transport industry in Ghana and the ECOWAS sub-region” (Intercity STC Coaches Limited, 2017, para. 3). Additionally, it seeks as its mission “to consistently and profitably deliver the safest, most comfortable and reliable road transport and allied services using highly motivated and competent workforce and state of the art facilities to meet the aspirations of all stakeholders” (Intercity STC Coaches Limited, 2017, para. 4).

The other partners in the PPP included Smice International Limited. “SMICE” is an acronym for Servicing Mining, Industrial and Construction Equipment. Smice International Limited is wholly Ghanaian owned and was incorporated on January 31, 1996. Also, the MPLaza Coach Services is another partner of the ISTC. MPLaza Coach Services is a subsidiary of Mariset Company Limited, a wholly Ghanaian-owned hospitality holding company. Last but not least of these partners is Nordic Logistic Limited. Nordic Logistic Limited is a registered Ghanaian company located in the Airport Residential area. The company was set up in October 2013 by its current founder and only shareholder, Mr. Kwasi Ofori. Nordic was set up with a capital of 100,000 Ghana cedis (approximately 20,000 Euros) and comprised 100,000 shares.

### 3.2. Study design

ISTC's PPP agreement remains the single of its kind in the transport service sector in Ghana. The examination of this single case gave room for an in-depth appreciation of the phenomenon. Such depth and detail could best be achieved through the use of qualitative approaches and techniques.

Moreover, the novel nature of PPPs in the transport sector in Ghana was the basis for the use of the exploratory case study design of qualitative research. The study focused on answering the following three questions:

- What is the nature of ISTC's public–private partnerships?
- How is the partnership being implemented?
- How do nature and processes impede the successful implementation of the partnership?

One-on-one stakeholder interviews were the main source of primary data for the study. These interviews were conducted throughout January 2018 at the work premises of the target respondents. Approximately every interview lasted between forty-five (45) minutes to sixty (60). This interview process was semi-structured. It was facilitated by an interview guide; a set of predefined questions based on the research objectives interspersed with occasional probing and follow-up questions. This was the main instrument for primary data gathering (attached as an appendix).

There was the need to interview the right mix of respondents from the two main actors in the partnership: The Public Sector and their Private Partners. The purposive sampling technique was used to select the right individuals capable of providing requisite information for the attainment of the objectives of the research. There was also an element of snowballing technique adopted, some respondents were recruited based on the information provided by initial participants (Yin, 2017).

No respondents were coerced; however, prior consent was sought from ISTC, and confidentiality agreements signed with all respondents before interviews were conducted. Due to time and financial limitations, no travels were made to respondents in other locations apart from their work premises. Furthermore, all interviews were conducted in the stipulated time (.ie. January 2018). However, this did not affect the robustness of the study since the information generated was saturated for subsequent presentation and analysis.

At the end of the data collection, period twelve (12) key respondents

were engaged. These included nine (9) ISTC and three (65) respondents from their private partners. These respondents were found to have been instrumental in the PPP arrangement in the sector under study. Qualitative data analysis required the researcher to categorize and make meaning out of collected data, intending to communicate this information to the research audience. All the interviews were recorded with the assistance of a voice recorder and this was augmented with the making of some notes in a notebook. The recorded interviews were then transcribed, afterwards, a thematic analysis was done. Themes were generated based on the objectives of the research for coherence in the presentation of the findings.

Quotations were used where appropriate to explain the themes raised. In such events, the “PS” was used as a citation for respondents from the Public Sector and “PrS” for Private Partners. This was done to protect and create anonymity to maintain the confidentiality of the information from respondents. Moreover, secondary data was used to confirm the discussed findings generated on the field. This triangulation improved the reliability of the findings generated from the study. Secondary information included company reports, bulletins, newspaper items, journal articles and public documents were consulted.

#### 4. Data analysis and discussion

This section presents and discusses the data elicited from key respondents. Consequently, this section is organized along these themes: *the antecedents and nature of the partnership between ISTC and its partners; expectations of the private partners and how they actually fared; challenges in the PPP implementation process.*

##### 4.1. Antecedents and nature of the partnership between ISTC and its partners

The first objective of the study was to assess the triggers of the partnership, the rationale for the PPP, and nature and form the partnership took.

##### 4.1.1. Initial prevailing challenges: Conditioning factors to trigger partnership

Inter-city transportation is very vital in the development agenda of any country. However, most countries, globally, are presently facing an intractable challenge of financing public transport. Due to poor financial performance, many public transport firms are not able to service their debts and buy new vehicles (Kiggundu, 2009). According to information gathered, the ISTC took the initiative to undertake the PPP upon the realisation that it could not on its own satisfy the demands of its customers, considering the countless challenges it faced before the PPP. It was observed by one of the respondents from the ISTC that:

the thing is we don't have buses. You know, we don't have enough buses to operate or to cover our routes. And when it happens like that, the company breaks down. You see, that is why all these agreements came in to bring more buses for us to waken up our services and that has not come (PS, 2018).

Another respondent intimated that:

you know the government of Ghana in the year 2016 gave the ISTC about 50 buses. After those buses were procured for the company, we saw that we started turning things around. But then, the 50 buses were still not adequate for our operations. So, in order to serve our customers well, we decided to enter into some partnership with these private individuals (PS, 2018).

He further contended that:

they have a timeline within which they have to submit their buses and we are expecting that as soon as those buses are brought in, some of our abandoned routes are going to be reactivated. And in fact, if

you look at the percentage share of the profit per the agreement, you will see that it is not so lucrative. But then, the sustainability of our major routes, that is of paramount interest to us because we want to sustain these routes ... (PS, 2018).

This underscores the age-long assertion that public-owned companies usually enter into PPPs with the hope of minimizing costs while at the same time ensuring customer satisfaction.

##### 4.1.2. Objectives of the partnerships for transport service delivery

To inject efficiency and vibrancy, the ISTC decided to embark on public-private partnerships to help in maintaining its market share in the transport sector; preventing the ISTC from collapsing due to unavailability of buses; strengthening the revenue mobilisation of ISTC; enhancing ISTC's competitiveness in the transport sector; ensuring that ISTC plies identified lucrative routes, and creating opportunities for the private partners of the PPP to ride on the success of ISTC to grow. In narrating the main objective of the partnership as its quest to be customer-oriented, one of the respondents explained:

... the objective was that we are now in a competitive world and we didn't want to lose some of our major roads to our competitors because we have run these roads for quite a long time. But then the demand is now so high that the few numbers of buses that we have cannot suffice the roads. So, in a way of sustaining the roads, we asked these private people to come and join us. So, that even if we are not making profit, we can still serve our customers until the time that our own buses arrive (PS, 2018).

He further opined that,

... it's a matter of just engaging them to sustain our roads. Because we see some of the roads to be more profitable. And then if you leave your more profitable roads to your competitors, you are going to be out of business very soon, and we don't want to be out of business (PS, 2018).

PPPs can be originated either by the public sector or by the private sector (Sedjari, 2004) In the case of the ISTC partnership, it was initiated by the public partners with a view to meet the growing market needs of the company and increase profits. This explained by a key respondent from the ISTC:

The prime objective of this partnership was to ensure that ISTC did not lose its customer base and long-established roads to competitors., ...we didn't want to lose some of our major roads to our competitors because we have run these roads for quite a long time (PS, 2018).

The narrative above was corroborated by respondents from the private sector (partners) who alluded to the fact that the process was initiated by the public partners (at least with three of the partners, Smice, M Plaza and AMPS Family) to meet growing markets. One of the respondents explained:

the whole idea was brought up by ISTC". ... when the ISTC realised the "lucrative" nature of the "Tudu to Aflao route" and their (ISTC's) inability to make good use of the route due to the lack of buses, they approached us and asked for investment support (PrS, 2018).

The party in question agreed to ISTC's proposal after undertaking feasibility studies and subsequently gave the ISTC twenty-five (25) buses for the route in question, thereby starting the partnership.

On the other hand, it is observed in the case of Nordic Logistic Limited, the private sector initiated the process of partnership. This is confirmed by an interviewee from the company who also indicated that it is sometimes prudent to attach oneself to an already established brand so as to avoid some of the needless waste of resources that usually characterize efforts at starting your own company. According to a key respondent, though the ISTC had the difficulty in providing the required

number of buses to expand its operational capacity, the company “has their reputation over some years” and “we have the buses - we have the capacity to bring in buses”. It was, therefore, the prudent choice to partner with ISTC since “they benefit from our buses and we also benefit from their name” (PrS, 2018). The above corroborates Sedjari (2004) view that a public-private partnership can either be started by the public company or the private company as the partnership of ISTC exhibits both features. Again, Kahyaogullari (2013, p. 251) contends that “PPP can be best distinguished in the implementation phase”. Siddiquee (2011, p. 132), notes that “the degree of public sector involvement varies significantly between types”.

#### 4.1.3. Form and nature of the public-private partnership

**4.1.3.1. Franchising.** An assessment of the arrangements and conditions of the PPP connotes the tenets of franchising. As indicated earlier, a franchise is characterized by the issuing of license by the state agency involved to the private entity to do business or provide a service on its behalf and it is through the use of user fees that the private company gets its income (Skelcher, 2005). Thus, there appears to be a thin line between contracting out and franchising since the government becomes the “arranger” in both cases. Though in contracting-out, the agency involved pays the private entity for the service rendered, whereas, in franchising, it is the users of the service who pay the private entity. In effect, the partnership of ISTC shows a franchise in nature. For instance, in one of the cases, a key informant explained:

.... Here [name withheld.], according to agreed terms gives “10% on the revenue” generated to the ISTC, and that is “the kind of agreement that we have with ISTC” (PrS, 2018).

He further explained that the private partner would, however, use the STC logo yet the former would be responsible for financing every activity including the provision of buses, payment of drivers and servicing. He put it this way:

“the buses are going to use ... their [ISTC] emblem. They [ISTC] are going to make us use of their terminals... But then we [Nordic Logistics] are going to provide our own buses”. ...we are going to have our own drivers” (PrS, 2018).

Additionally, the ISTC partnership with Smice International, AMPS Family and M Plaza Coach Services fashions in a similar manner. In these partnerships also, payment of fares is done to the private companies. Though in the mind of the commuters they are paying the monies to ISTC, it is actually the private firms that the money is directly going to before ISTCs share is given to them afterwards. Considering the nature of the partnership, one could deduce that some of the buses operating in the name of ISTC are not actually theirs; instead, they belong to a private company that has been permitted to use the name and logo of ISTC to operate, while ISTC benefits from it. This arrangement consequently falls in line with the argument by Pollitt and Smith (2002) that postulates that the monopoly rights of government are transferred to the private party after the private party acquires the franchise through competitive tendering. However, in the case of ISTC, there was no competitive tendering though a contract has been signed by the parties. It is also the case that under a franchise arrangement, the private party bequeaths ownership of the infrastructure involved to the public company, but this is not the case in this arrangement either.

**4.1.3.2. Strategic partnerships.** On the other hand, the PPP arrangement between Smice International and ISTC brings forth the idea of strategic partnering. Ashkenas, Ulrich, Jick, and Kerr (2002) as cited in Skelcher (2005, p. 357) argue that “strategic partnering between public and private agents involves a situation in which there is no boundary in terms of the distinctions between the constituent parties.” More so, strategic partnering has been defined by Grimshaw, Vincent, and

Willmott (2002, p. 482) as “permeable organising practices that are intended to yield mutually beneficial outcomes.” On their part, Roumboutsos and Chiara (2010) state that strategic partnering generates a win-win benefit after a Strength, Weakness, Threats, and Opportunities (SWOT) analysis have been carried out in the various sets of the respective sectors.

As noted by a respondent from one of the private partners (name withheld),

they (ISTC) realized that the Tudu to Aflao route would be lucrative but they did not have enough smaller buses for this cause. So, the then managing director approached us and asked for investment support. So, we agreed after undertaking feasibility studies. Also, the partnership is an alliance type, in that we provide buses and they provide the drivers and both of us work to our mutual benefit (PrS, 2018).

From the above, it can be said that while ISTC was looking for avenues to ply the lucrative Tudu to Aflao route, the private partner (as quoted above) was also looking at how they were going to benefit from their partnership with ISTC financially and this is typical of the Kumasi-Accra route which is operated by M Plaza Coach Services and Nordic Logistics Limited. In summary, it is observed that based on the first objective of this research, the partnership between ISTC and its partners take different forms. These partnerships take the form of strategic partnerships and franchising as espoused by Skelcher (2005). Though under a typical franchise a license is issued, this is not the case of ISTC's PPP. However, a mutual agreement in the form of a contract has been signed and can be abrogated by one partner if it feels short-changed in the process of implementation when the necessary legal procedures are followed. The contractual agreement can be modified when it becomes necessary. It is worth noting that, there is no specific legal regulatory framework that this PPP operates within apart from the signed contracts.

#### 4.1.4. What is expected of the actors? The deal

**4.1.4.1. Capital investment and specifications.** The private entities under this partnership were to provide the buses as agreed based on the terms of the contract. In this case, Smice International has provided 25 minibuses as per the agreement, and the same is true for the AMPS Family which has provided 10 minibuses, and M Plaza Coach Services has provided 10 buses. However, Nordic Logistics Limited has provided 7 out of the original 100 said in the contract. This brings to fore the relevance of the complexity of joint action propounded by Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973. While one actor is taking steps to fulfil all the terms of the contract, others may not fully observe the terms of the contract. This is may be due to different perceptions, objectives and ambitions being pursued by the different actors in the transportation business. All these buses run from designated ISTC terminals. However, these buses were to meet the standard of ISTC before they can be passed to be used. It was said by one respondent from ISTC that,

we (ISTC) have our own specifications so that if you want to bring a bus to partner us, you must meet our specifications. For example, if you can see the new coaches that we are using, we have Wi-Fi on-board, we have washroom facility on board, we have ... CCTV camera. The standard that we set for ourselves, we want whoever is coming also to match those standards such that, we don't run different coaches (PS, 2018).

From the aforesaid, it is evident that though these buses are provided by the private entities, they have to keep to ISTC's standards based on the quality of the buses and their features. Therefore, any bus that does not conform to the standardization of ISTC is rejected although the contract has been signed.

**4.1.4.2. Human resource development.** Per the agreement, ISTC was to

employ and train drivers. However, these drivers would be paid by the private entity. This was reiterated by one respondent saying,

“ISTC has a culture in terms of safety, reliability, and comfort and we don’t want to lose those credentials ... “our noble company and therefore when you want to partner us, we don’t allow you to bring your own drivers” (PS, 2018).

Thus, even though the private partners provide the buses, these buses are manned by drivers who have been specially trained by ISTC.

The research reveals that before their employment with ISTC, all drivers are tested on reading and writing and given further training for one month, which includes two weeks of theory and two weeks practical. The purpose of this training is to reorient the driver into the ISTC driving standards. The training period is then followed with an attachment with senior drivers who monitor and write reports on the trainee driver for about a month. ISTC officials consequently assert that even if a private partner “has the best of the drivers”, these drivers “must pass through STC training and recruitment system” before they can be integrated into the ISTC as drivers (PS, 2018).

**4.1.4.3. Operations and operational cost.** Concerning the management of the buses, it rests in the bosom of the private entities. Though ISTC employs drivers to man these buses and run maintenance services at their workshops, supervision of this maintenance is done by the private companies owning the buses. Operations that include but not limited to maintenance, washing and fueling of the buses are borne by the private partners of ISTC. A respondent from one of the private entities, stresses that “ISTC manages the drivers and we manage the project” (PrS, 2018).

This is in line with the general conviction among neoliberals that the private sector has superior knowledge in managing assets than the public sector. As such, engaging the private sector brings synergy and the public sector’s “authority to legislate and regulate, and its solemn obligation to sustain the public interest with the private sector’s capacity for risk-taking, innovation, marketing, and for tapping a variety of financial resources” (Finney & Grossman, 1999 as cited in Asare & Frimpong, 2013, p. 115). The combination of the ‘strength’ from both sides helps in salvaging the many problems of society (Finney & Grossman, 1999). As noted by Awortwi (2004), PPPs not only limit risks but also shares the risks associated with investments between the partners. The public sector can gain expertise, skills, and resources from their partnering with the private sector and the sharing of responsibility among the parties to ISTC’s PPP clearly underscores this point.

**4.1.4.4. Profit-sharing.** According to the partnership agreement, proceeds from the partnership are shared on a 90% and 10% basis to the private partners and ISTC respectively. This is done after all operational cost, including washing of buses, maintenance and the payment of salaries of the drivers have been settled.

## 4.2. Challenges in the PPP implementation process

From the data gathered, the challenges of the ISTC PPP are discussed along with the following themes: human resource management issues and non-fulfilment of contractual terms.

### 4.2.1. A. Human resource management issues

Every policy decision comes along with some challenges. It is easier to formulate policies intended to solve public problems, however, when it comes to implementation, there may be difficulties, some smaller and others larger. Bardach, 1977, intimates that:

It is hard enough to design public policies and programmes that look good on paper, it is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the constituencies to which they are responsive, and it is

excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries or clients (Bardach, 1977, p. 3).

It was generally observed the one major challenge with the partnership is on how drivers are recruited to man the buses and their attitude towards work. A key respondent from one of the private firms alleged that there is a difficulty in working with the drivers since they do not “belong” to them but ISTC. Respondents at the ISTC explained the difficulty. He opined in controlling and ensuring discipline among the drivers because of the arrangement. A key respondent made this statement:

... there are certain issues like driver’s indiscipline and others which are really dragging down progress.... Because ISTC manages the drivers and we manage the project, it poses some sort of difficulty in smooth operation. This is so because owning a project while someone manages the drivers is another thing (PrS, 2018).

It is the case based on the feedback on the management of the drivers that, there are times the drivers decide not to show up to drive or even exhibit indiscipline behaviours to the representatives of the private firms at the various terminals, but little can be done by them to sanction these drivers. These drivers belong to a union and the day they decide to go on a strike it means the buses will be grounded and commuters will be stranded while the private partners lose money.

Therefore, it is prudent the ISTC allows the private partners to employ their own drivers so they can have oversight responsibility, while the ISTC keeps them in check over their professional standard. In the case of irresponsibility on the part of the drivers, it takes time to sanction them since it may have to go through the drivers’ union and then to the management of ISTC. This has been a major challenge to the smooth implementation of the PPP of ISTC. This challenge may be due to the multiplicity of actors with various motivations for being part of the PPP arrangement.

### 4.2.2. Non-fulfilment of contractual terms

It was observed from the data collected that, some of the private firms did not meet the deadline they were supposed to deliver the number of buses per the agreement signed with them. From data gathered, the private partners appeared not to be faithful in many ways. This is consistent with complexity of joint action (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973) due to uncertainties to determine whether actors will definitely act in the way that they are expected to do. This stems from the fact that none of the actors, as at the time of this research, has been able to deliver on their “promises”. An ISTC respondent further reiterates that:

in the agreement, they were to procure 100 new buses for the STC. Now in the absence of that, just some few months ago, they brought some... I mean five ... old buses for us to use for the meantime. And I learned... some of the cars they brought have been there for ten years and currently that is what we are using (PS, 2018).

There is, therefore, the indication management of the ISTC are a bit frustrated about the failure on the part of the private partners to deliver the required buses as stipulated in their respective agreements. Thus, the timelines given for the delivery of most of the buses have elapsed but the failure by some of the private partners to deliver the buses to ISTC has negative implications for the effective running of the PPP. This notwithstanding, there is also the difficulty in reconciling the number of buses that have been delivered by the private partners to the ISTC. For instance, while an official of the ISTC indicates that only five buses had been given by Nordic Logistic Limited, an official from the latter claim 13 buses have been given to the former.

The argument here, at least from the private partners’ perspective is that their reluctance in providing buses based on the contract can be understood in terms of ISTC not having enough terminals to run these buses. For these partners’, it will not make economic sense to give buses

to the ISTC if there are no terminals for the buses to operate from. Also, the routes that these buses are supposed to ply have become a problem. Again, the partnership obliges the ISTC-owned buses and “alliance” buses not to ply the same route, but this has not been the case. Consequently, this has affected the operations of the private partners and contributes to the reason why they have not sent the actual number of buses they ought to have sent. From the foregoing, it can be said that, if parties involved in the partnership are going by the agreement they signed and adhering to it strictly, there will be harmony in operations and this will ultimately help achieve the goals of the partnership.

## 5. Conclusion

From the research findings, the study derives these key insights which are discussed below:

Firstly, the presence of a challenge, the threat of a challenge or the quest to realize an untapped opportunity offers the basis for a PPP to kick-start. The data from this study contends that a prevalent challenge of the difficulty in meeting the growing passenger fleet due to inadequate buses propelled the public agency to enter into a PPP agreement with private partners.

Secondly, PPP arrangements are entered into with higher hopes of maximizing potentials through the injection of adequate capital and other related resources. The quest to meet the growing market and other routes which were deemed viable to doing business prompted the public transport agency to enter into PPP so that the private partners through franchise and strategic partnerships would inject additional resources. The finding provides support to an observation by Hrelja et al. (2018, p. 327) who contend that analysis of public transport services in England and Sweden, argues that “well-functioning public transport systems result from network-oriented planning and management.” They observe that the partnerships exhibit characteristics of what in previous research has described as ‘relational’ or ‘collaborative’ partnerships in which social learning processes and collaborative qualities – such as trust and joint working towards shared goals - are claimed to be important aspects when explaining the outcome of the partnerships.

The current study observed that the expectations or objectives for which these partnerships were established have to a large extent been met. The findings corroborate an argument by Willoughby (2013) whose analysis of six-country/city cases posits that despite the challenges that affect PPPs, they have had the strongest and widest impact in the very large cities of São Paulo and Seoul, tackling serious congestion and deterioration of public transport.

Notwithstanding the successes chalked from the ISTC partnership with its private entities, the study observed some operational and institutional challenges. The study contends that ensuring effectiveness in the PPP process requires a robust legal and contractual arrangements with binding provisions where each party commits to their part of the deal. The provisions should be enforceable, and each party should be held to acknowledge and fulfil their part of the pact. The study reveals how the private partners failed to live up to expectation in terms of providing the expected number of vehicles which was to be the key capital injection to boost service delivery and overall performance. It is within such contexts, that Yeboah-Assiamah (2015) maintains that it is not about merely involving private partners which would necessarily help improve service delivery “the processes before, during and after engagement of the private sector in service provision are imperative for the efficiency and effectiveness of the process... if after engaging private sector [the public agency] coils back in their shelves and sit on the fence may render privatized services poorly provided” (ibid, p. 284). Against such backdrop, Dong, Wang, and Yang (2016), contend that PPPs prosperity in many contexts is dependent on the long-term capacity of project finance brought by the private sector, with supervision and network planning by the government.

In order words, the policy document or contractual arrangement, especially, the terms of reference which stipulates the obligations and

expectations of each partner should be drafted in details and attention.

Throughout the implementation of the partnership, the study revealed that the ISTC’s failure to observe the contractual provisions predominantly with regard to the provision of adequate terminals appeared to be affecting the smooth implementation of the partnership and this can be attributed to the lack of a clear legal regulatory framework which has the tendency of making a PPP successful or fail (Appuhami, Perera, & Perera, 2011). This has consequently affected the provision of buses needed to make the partnership more successful. Based on the research findings and the preceding discussions, these recommendations will be relevant to policy practitioners, policy researchers, and stakeholders involved in the negotiation and implementation of PPP. First, in order to ensure that the private sector complies with the terms of the contract signed in the partnership, there should be a form of bonding fee which the private firms will be required to pay once they default in meeting the deadline of the agreement. This will ensure the relative effective implementation of future partnership agreements.

Every policy decision comes with some challenges. It is easier to formulate policies intended to solve public problems, however, when it comes to implementation, there may be difficulties, some minor and others bigger. Bardach, 1977 intimates that:

it is hard enough to design public policies and programs that look good on paper, it is harder still to formulate them in words and slogans that resonate pleasingly in the ears of political leaders and the constituencies to which they are responsive, and it is excruciatingly hard to implement them in a way that pleases anyone at all, including the supposed beneficiaries or clients (Bardach, 1977, p. 3).

## Appendix A. Appendix 1

Interview guide for selected respondents at the ISTC

Interview questions

1. What kind of partnership exists between ISTC and its partners?
2. What is the objective for the establishment of this partnership?
3. What kind of government policy or program is this partnership in line with?
4. What are the legal or regulatory frameworks that are backing the partnership?
5. Which agencies or institutions provided some sort of technical or financial advice for the establishment of this partnership?
6. What are some of the preparations and planning that went into this partnership?
7. What were some of the challenges faced during the preparatory stages of this partnership?
8. What are the clear roles and responsibilities for each partner?
9. In what ways have your partners lived up to your expectation with regard to their roles and responsibilities?
10. In your view has the objective for the establishment of this partnership been achieved?
11. What are some of the ways by which your achievements can be ascertained?
12. What are some of the challenges you have encountered so far in your partnership?
13. How has the challenges affected your operations?
14. What has been done/ can be done to address the challenges enumerated?
15. Any recommendation to the government with regards to this partnership?

## Appendix B. Appendix 2

Interview guide for selected respondents of ISTC Partners

1. What kind of partnership or arrangement exists between you and

## ISTC?

2. What is the objective for the establishment of this partnership?
3. What kind of government policy or program is this partnership in line with?
4. What are the legal or regulatory frameworks that are backing the partnership?
5. Which agencies or institutions provided some sort of technical or financial advice for the establishment of this partnership?
6. What are some of the preparation and planning that was done towards this arrangement?
7. What were some of the challenges faced during the preparatory stages of this partnership?
8. What are the clear roles and responsibilities for each partner?
9. In what ways have the ISTC lived up to your expectation with regards to their roles and responsibilities.

## References

- Appuhami, R., Perera, S., & Perera, H. (2011). Coercive policy diffusion in a developing country: The case of public-private partnerships in Sri Lanka. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 41(3), 431–451.
- Ashkenas, R., Ulrich, D., Jick, T., & Kerr, S. (2002). The boundaryless organization. *Facilities*, 20(10), 350.
- Awortwi, N. (2004). Getting the fundamentals wrong: Woes of public-private partnerships in solid waste collection in three Ghanaian cities. *Public Administration and Development*, 24(3), 213–224.
- Bajwa, S. U., Kitchlew, N., Shahzad, K., & Rehman, K. U. (2017). Public-private partnership (PPP) as an interdependent form (I-form) organization. *International Journal of Public Administration*, 1–9.
- Bardach, E. (1977). *The implementation game: What happens after a bill becomes a law*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Bayliss, K., & Van Waeyenberge, E. (2018). Unpacking the public-private partnership revival. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 54(4), 577–593.
- Biyygautane, M. (2017). Infrastructure public-private partnerships in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar: Meanings, rationales, projects, and the path forward. *Public Works Management & Policy*, 22(2), 85–118.
- Bland, R. L., & Overton, M. (2016). Assessing the contributions of collaborators in public-private partnerships: Evidence from tax increment financing. *The American Review of Public Administration*, 46(4), 418–435.
- Bowen, E. R. (1982). The Pressman-Wildavsky paradox: Four addenda or why models based on probability theory can predict implementation success and suggest useful tactical advice for implementers. *Journal of Public Policy*, 2(1), 1–21.
- Buabeng, T. (2015). Implementation of a public-private partnership in local government in Ghana: A study of Ga West and Adentan municipal assemblies in the Greater Accra region. *African Journal of Governance and Development*, 4(2), 17–32.
- Chen, R., & Nozick, L. (2016). Integrating congestion pricing and transit investment planning. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 89, 124–139.
- Cheung, E., Chan, A. P., & Kajewski, S. (2012). Factors contributing to successful public-private partnership projects: Comparing Hong Kong with Australia and the United Kingdom. *Journal of Facilities Management*, 10(1), 45–58.
- Colverson, S., & Perera, O. (2012). *Harnessing the Power of Public-Private Partnerships: The role of hybrid financing strategies in sustainable development*. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development.
- Damoah, C. M., & Asamoah, K. (2020). Public-private partnerships for improved service delivery: The case of intercity STC coaches in Ghana. In *Development in Practice* (pp. 1–10).
- Dong, Z., Wang, M., & Yang, X. (2016). Comparative study of China and USA public-private partnerships in public transportation. *Journal of Modern Transportation*, 24(3), 215–223.
- Finney, G., & Grossman, D. A. (1999). Public-private partnerships in the twenty-first century. In *Current Issues in Public Administration* (6th ed.). Cengage Learning: Wadsworth.
- Grimshaw, D., Vincent, S., & Willmott, H. (2002). Going privately: Partnership and outsourcing in UK public services. *Public Administration*, 80(3), 475–502.
- Hakim, M. M., & Merkert, R. (2016). The causal relationship between air transport and economic growth: Empirical evidence from South Asia. *Journal of Transport Geography*, 56, 120–127.
- Hrelja, R., Rye, T., & Mullen, C. (2018). Partnerships between operators and public transport authorities. Working practices in relational contracting and collaborative partnerships. *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 116, 327–338.
- Intercity STC Coaches Limited. (2017). Vision and Mission. Retrieved from <https://stc.gov.gh/vision-and-mission/>.
- Juan, E., Estache, A., & Trujillo, L. (2007). *Public-private partnerships in transport* (pp. 1–26). The World Bank.
- Kahyaogullari, B. (2013). Public-private partnerships in developing and developed countries: The UK and Turkish cases. *Journal of Economics & Administrative Sciences/Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 15(2).
- Kiggundu, A. T. (2009). Financing public transit systems in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In *Challenges and Prospects*. Kampala: Department of Architecture. Makerere University.
- Lindsey, R., & De Palma, A. (2014). Cost recovery from congestion tolls with long-run uncertainty. *Economics of Transportation*, 3(2), 119–132.
- Liu, T., Wang, Y., & Wilkinson, S. (2016). Identifying critical factors affecting the effectiveness and efficiency of tendering processes in public-private partnerships (PPPs): A comparative analysis of Australia and China. *International Journal of Project Management*, 34(4), 701–716.
- Lohmann, C., & Roetzel, P. G. (2014). Opportunistic behavior in renegotiations between public-private partnerships and government institutions: Data on public-private partnerships of the German armed forces. *International Public Management Journal*, 17(3), 387–410.
- Mihyeon Jeon, C., Amekudzi, A. A., & Vanegas, J. (2006). Transportation system sustainability issues in high-, middle-, and low-income economies: Case studies from Georgia (US), South Korea, Colombia, and Ghana. *Journal of Urban Planning and Development*, 132(3), 172–186.
- Mouraviev, N., & Kakabadse, N. K. (2016). Conceptualising public-private partnerships: A critical appraisal of approaches to meanings and forms. *Society and Business Review*, 11(2), 155–173.
- Osei-Kyei, R., & Chan, A. P. (2015). Review of studies on the critical success factors for public-private partnership (PPP) projects from 1990 to 2013. *International Journal of Project Management*, 33(6), 1335–1346.
- Osei-Kyei, R., & Chan, A. P. (2017). Comparative analysis of the success criteria for public-private partnership projects in Ghana and Hong Kong. *Project Management Journal*, 48(4), 80–92.
- Pollitt, M. G., & Smith, A. S. (2002). The restructuring and privatisation of British Rail: Was it really that bad? *Fiscal Studies*, 23(4), 463–502.
- Pressman, J. L., & Wildavsky, A. (1973). *How great expectations in Washington are dashed in Oakland*. University of California: Berkeley, LA, USA. University of California Press.
- Rao, N., & Vokolkova, V. (2007). Public-private partnership in road transport sector in Botswana. In *Paper presented at the CODATU (Conference)(12th, 2006, Lyon, France)*.
- Rouboutous, A., & Chiara, N. (2010). A strategic partnering framework analysis methodology for public-private partnerships. *Journal of Financial Management of Property and Construction*, 15(3), 235–246.
- Santandrea, M., Bailey, S., & Giorgino, M. (2016). Value for money in UK healthcare public-private partnerships: A fragility perspective. *Public Policy and Administration*, 31(3), 260–279.
- Sedjari, A. (2004). Public-private partnerships as a tool for modernizing public administration. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 70(2), 291–306.
- Skelcher, C. (2005). *Public-private partnerships*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Siddiquee, N. A. (2011). Rhetoric and reality of public-private partnerships: Learning points from the Australian experience. *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 19(2), 129–148.
- Soomro, M. A., & Zhang, X. (2015). Roles of private-sector partners in transportation public-private partnership failures. *Journal of Management in Engineering*, 31(4), Article 04014056.
- Tang, L., Shen, Q., & Cheng, E. W. (2010). A review of studies on public-private partnership projects in the construction industry. *International Journal of Project Management*, 28(7), 683–694.
- Tirachini, A., Hensher, D. A., & Rose, J. M. (2014). Multimodal pricing and optimal design of urban public transport: The interplay between traffic congestion and bus crowding. *Transportation Research Part B: Methodological*, 61, 33–54.
- Trebilcock, M., & Rosenstock, M. (2015). Infrastructure public-private partnerships in the developing world: Lessons from recent experience. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 51(4), 335–354.
- Van Meter, D. S., & Van Horn, C. E. (1975). The policy implementation process: A conceptual framework. *Administration & Society*, 6(4), 445–488.
- Verweij, S. (2015). Achieving satisfaction when implementing PPP transportation infrastructure projects: A qualitative comparative analysis of the A15 highway DBFM project. *International Journal of Project Management*, 33(1), 189–200.
- Verweij, S., & Gerrits, L. M. (2015). How satisfaction is achieved in the implementation phase of large transportation infrastructure projects: A qualitative comparative analysis into the A2 tunnel project. *Public Works Management & Policy*, 20(1), 5–28.
- Wibowo, A. (2004). Valuing guarantees in a BOT infrastructure project. *Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management*, 11(6), 395–403.
- Willoughby, C. (2013). How much can public-private partnership really do for urban transport in developing countries? *Research in Transportation Economics*, 40(1), 34–55.
- Yeboah-Assiamah, E., Asamoah, K., & Kyeremeh, T. A. (2017). Decades of public-private partnership in solid waste management: A literature analysis of key lessons drawn from Ghana and India. *Management of Environmental Quality: An International Journal*, 28(1), 78–93.
- Yin, R. K. (2017). *Case study research and applications: Design and methods*. Sage Publications.
- Yuan, J., Li, W., Guo, J., Zhao, X., & Skibniewski, M. J. (2018). Social risk factors of transportation PPP projects in China: A sustainable development perspective. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, 15(7), 1323.

**Kwame Asamoah** is an Associate Professor and current Head of the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management at the University of Ghana Business School. He holds a PhD in Public Administration from Jackson State University. He teaches Public Policy, Issues in Public Administration and Public Sector Human Resource Management. His main research interest includes Public Policy Analysis, Decentralization, Human Resource Management and Organizational Behaviour.

**Emmanuel Yeboah-Assiamah** served as a TRECCAFRICA Fellow at the School of Public Leadership, Stellenbosch University, South Africa between 2015 and 2018 where he obtained a PhD in public and development management. He also holds an MPhil in public administration and first-class honors in political science from the University of Ghana. He

currently serves as adjunct lecturer at the Ghana Institute of Management & Public Administration (GIMPA) as well as the University for Professional Studies, Accra (UPSA) where he teaches leadership and management respectively. Dr. Yeboah-Assiamah also serves as Consultant and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), a leading think tank in Ghana. Emmanuel has recently won a post-doctoral fellowship at the Global Development Institute, Manchester University. Currently, Dr. Yeboah-Assiamah works as a lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. His areas of research and publication include public sector management and leadership; development management; governance, decentralization and local governance; privatization and urban service delivery; collaborative governance; and sustainability with focus on complexities. Emmanuel has written widely with his papers published by inter alia, Sage, Emerald, Taylor and Francis, Wiley and Sons and Elsevier, and also serves as reviewer for many reputable journals.

**Clement Mensah Damoah** is a graduate of the University of Ghana, where he obtained both his Bachelors and MPhil degree in Political Science with Archaeology and Public Administration respectively. He currently serves as a Teaching and Research Assistant at the Department of Public Administration and Health Services Management, University of Ghana Business School. His research interests include public-private partnership, Public Sector Innovation, Collaborative Governance/ Co-production and Public policy.

**Edmund Poku Adu** is a Teaching Assistant at the University of Ghana and has a Master of Philosophy in Public Administration from the same institution. Before obtaining his MPhil degree he was also a Teaching/Research Assistant at the Department of Political Science at the same University. Apart from experiences in academia, he also has over half a decade's experience in running his own business in Ghana, which includes [chalekasa.com](http://chalekasa.com) which is a social media start-up in Ghana.