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
**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES**

**TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES AND INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES
IN GHANA**

BY

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**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA,
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MIGRATION STUDIES**



CENTRE FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

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DECLARATION

I, Henry Kwasi Kankam Afrifa, hereby declare that, except for references to other people's work which have been duly acknowledged, this thesis is the result of my independent research conducted at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana, under the joint supervision of Professor Delali Margaret Badasu, Professor Joseph Kofi Teye and Dr. Leander Kandilige. I also declare that as far as I know, this thesis has neither in part nor in whole been published nor presented to any other institution for an academic award.



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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my lovely wife

Vida Aku Afrifa

and to my children

Oforiwaa, Twumwaa, Kyerewaa and Nana Kwasi.

God richly bless you for all the sacrifices you have made for me in this journey.



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Regardless of the mountains and valleys we go through in life, we are always confident in this very thing - that He who has begun a good work in us will complete it until the day of our **Lord Jesus Christ!**

I am very grateful to **Jehovah God Almighty** for enabling me to achieve this feat! All praise and honour belong to Him! Indeed with the **Lord Jesus Christ**, ALL things are possible!

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ABSTRACT

Forced migration continues to impact on human populations in several geographical locations across the globe. Ceaseless wars and insecurity compel people to cross borders to seek refuge in different countries. Refugee situations, in general, present a significant challenge to refugees and refugee-hosting nations, especially those in developing countries. Studies in Ghana and sub-Saharan Africa have examined refugees' livelihoods and challenges, the relationship between refugees and host communities in Ghana, and the security concerns raised by host communities due to protracted refugee situations in some contexts. However, not much research has been done in Ghana regarding how refugees maintain transnational ties with their country of origin and other third countries, while negotiating their integration in the host country.

The objectives of this study, therefore, were to examine transnational activities of refugees in Ghana and their channels of communications; to explore the reasons why refugees maintain transnational ties with their country of origin and other third countries, and to find out whether their transnational activities influence their integration in Ghana. The Kunz's Kinetic model of refugee movements and attitudes towards their country of origin was used as the theoretical basis of the study to determine their transnational engagements with their country of origin and other third countries as well as attitudes towards local integration. The Sequential Explanatory Strategy of mixed research method design was used for the study with a quantitative survey conducted on 470 urban and camp refugees in the Western, Central and Greater Accra regions; and the qualitative aspect, i.e. in-depth interviews were administered to 30 refugees, four officials of the Ghana Refugee Board and three opinion leaders within the refugee host communities. The quantitative data were analysed using SPSS version 20 and the qualitative data were analysed using thematic analysis.

The study found that majority of the refugees left their country of origin due to political and governance conflicts; and that refugees engage socially, economically, culturally and politically with their country of origin and other third countries. The study also found that most of the refugees are technologically savvy and they utilized social media (particularly Facebook and WhatsApp) and telephone calls as channels of communication in their transnational engagements. Key reasons given for their transnational engagements included monitoring economic and political developments in their respective countries of origin, checking on welfare of kin and friends and seeking opportunities for resettlement in third countries.

The study also found that only a few of the refugees were socially, culturally, economically and politically integrated in Ghana. The key challenges the refugees faced in their integration in Ghana included lack of employment opportunities, mismatch in skills to available job opportunities, language barrier, unfavourable economic conditions, discrimination in employment because of refugee status, lack of proper integration policy, and the refugees' plans towards third country resettlement or voluntary return to the country of origin. Apart from the political engagements of refugees with their country of origin, which impacted on their political engagements in Ghana; and social and cultural engagements with third countries which impacted on social and cultural integration in Ghana, there was no significant association between their engagements with the origin and third countries and their integration in Ghana. Majority of the refugees opted for third country resettlement as against integrating in Ghana or voluntarily returning to their country of origin.

The study recommends that refugee hosting nations develop policies in consultation with international development partners and Western countries to support refugee resettlement in third countries in both Africa and the West; while host government also provides economic and social opportunities to support refugee integration in the host country.



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
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AU	African Union
CCG	Christian Council of Ghana
CFA	West African CFA Franc (monetary currency)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GAR	Greater Accra Region
GAR	Government Assisted Refugee
GES	Ghana Education Service
GHS	Ghanaian Cedi (monetary currency)
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GRB	Ghana Refugee Board
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organization for Migration
LNTV	Liberian National Television network
LRD	Liberian Dollar (monetary currency)
MMB	Migration Management Bureau
NADMO	National Disaster Management Organization
NGOs	Non-governmental organization
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
UN	United Nations
UNDESA	United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Forced migration continues to impact human populations in several geographical locations across the globe due to ethnic, religious and tribal conflicts, oppressive governments, political upheavals, natural disasters, climate change factors, human rights violations and events seriously disturbing public order, among others (UNHCR, 2020; Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2017; Reed, Ludwig & Braslow, 2016; Onuoha, 2013). The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates indicate that as of the end of the year 2019, over 79.5 million people had been forcibly displaced from their homes worldwide as a result of conflict, generalised violence and human rights violations. Of this number, 45.7 million were internally displaced people, 26 million were refugees (half of whom were below age 18), and 4.2 million were asylum seekers (UNHCR 2020). Developing countries hosted 85% of the world's refugee population. An estimated 68% of this population of refugees came from five countries, namely Syria (6.6 million), Venezuela (3.7 million), Afghanistan (2.7 million), South Sudan (2.2 million) and Myanmar (1.1 million). Uganda, one of the five countries in the world hosting huge numbers of refugees, had about 1.4 million refugees. The rest of the host countries were Turkey (3.6 million), Colombia (1.8 million), Pakistan (1.4 million) and Germany (1.1 million) (UNHCR 2020). Seventy-three percent of refugees lived in countries neighbouring their countries of origin. Only 317,200 refugees were able to return to their country of origin, and only 107,800 were resettled to third countries (UNHCR, 2020).

Forced migration leads to both individual and mass movement of people as people flee precarious situations for the safety and security of their lives, resulting in refugee situations in other countries (Bloch & Hirsch, 2018). Most of these refugees leave their country of origin

to host countries unplanned, thereby using various routes or means of transport. Refugees mostly trek on foot or use vehicular transport as their means of travelling, sometimes from far places to the destination or host country. Some also move to other countries as a result of the acquaintances and family networks they have in those countries (Mascini, Fermin, & Snick, 2012). These refugees end up becoming urban or camp refugees.

Refugee issues have attracted and continue to attract global attention. This resulted in the adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees in December 2018 by the 181 out of 193 member states who voted in favour. The Compact is to strengthen stakeholder and international cooperation and responsibility-sharing in the management of refugee situations (IOM, 2020). Refugee situations present a significant challenge to refugee-hosting nations, especially developing countries as their economies are not relatively strong to support the provision of necessities such as shelter, education, employment, and food to displaced populations (Kandoh, 2012). Sub-Saharan Africa, hosts more than 26% of the world's refugee population with most of them in protracted refugee situations (www.unhcr.org/africa). It is estimated that some 15.7 million refugees (77%) globally were in a protracted situation by the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2020). From 2010 to 2019, the number of refugees in sub-Saharan Africa nearly tripled, increasing from 2.2 to 6.3 million. Conflict and violence in South Sudan, the DRC, Central African Republic, Somalia and Burundi forced millions of people to flee, but other crises contributed to the rise in refugees as well (UNHCR, 2020). Many displaced populations failed to find long-lasting solutions for rebuilding their lives.

Ghana, for instance, has been hosting refugees since independence with most of them in protracted refugee situations. These refugees are settled both in urban areas and refugee camps both in the southern parts along the coast and inner parts of the country (Kandoh, 2012; Dick, 2002). The refugees are mostly from neighbouring countries, including Togo and Cote

d'Ivoire as well as other countries within the West African sub-region particularly Sierra Leone and Liberia (Addo, 2008; Dzeamesi, 2008; Porter et al, 2008; Byrne 2013). The UNHCR, through the 1951 Refugee Convention, obliges refugee-hosting countries to ensure refugee protection and their access to other social and economic services in the host countries (Al-Sharmani, 2004; Bilgili., & Loschmann, 2018). The international instrument by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights also obliges countries to offer protection and basic needs to refugees (OHCHR, 1993). However, refugees in Africa are not able to enjoy most of these guarantees/rights due to the economic, social and security challenges faced by most of the refugee-hosting countries on the continent.

Despite all the predicaments that refugees face from their displacement at the country of origin and the adverse circumstances that they encounter in host countries, refugees engage and maintain transnational ties with family and friends in the country of origin and third countries. Thus, while they seek safety, security, and equal opportunities in the host country, they also continue to maintain transnational ties with relations in their respective countries of origin and with diaspora networks in other third countries. Bryceson and Vuorela (2002) explained that transnational persons have a separate life in their host country and a separate life in their country of origin. These multi-spatial lifestyle practices of refugees enable them to maintain ties with family members as well as pave way for the creation of a complex niche in the host country (Cheran, 2006). Transnationalism can be at the individual or macro level where there is a formalized way of refugee engagements or connections through measures such as voting rights and tax breaks (Bloch & Hirsch, 2018). Refugees' transnationalism includes political, economic, social and cultural activities (Al-Ali et al., 2001). Communication through telephone calls, emails and social media such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter helps to maintain ties between refugees and members in their country

of origin (Bloch and Hirsch, 2018). Refugees also remit to family members and invest in viable economic ventures for their future benefit.

Although refugees engage in transnational activities, some integrate into their host countries as they have no intention of returning to their country of origin. Integration of refugees in the host-country usually depends on the level of attachment the refugees have with their own nationality and country of origin or their local identity (Driel, 2019). The integration of refugees also depends on their place of residence in the host country. Dick (2002) explained that in Ghana, the settlement of refugees in both urban areas and camps helps refugees to integrate. Sustainable economic opportunities also contribute to the integration of refugees in their host countries. Evidence has shown that refugees face legal, economic and social challenges in their process of integration, especially in countries where there are no clear-cut policies fostering refugee integration. Governments, international organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) emphasise that refugees engage in transnational activities and these activities sometimes influence their choice of durable solution options, which are - voluntary return to the country of origin, integration in the host country or resettlement in a third country. Refugees may also decide to settle in third countries due to their connections and networks in those countries or economic advantages that those countries present to them (Omata, 2017). This study aimed at assessing the relationship between refugees transnational activities and integration in Ghana. The study contributes to knowledge on refugee issues in Ghana, a country that is a signatory to conventions and compacts relating to refugee protection and welfare.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

There has been an increase in the number of refugees globally over the past few decades due to ethnic, religious and political conflicts, targeted persecutions and other forms of upheavals.

Ceaseless wars and insecurity influence people to cross borders in order to seek refuge in different countries (Dako-Gyekye & Adu, 2017; Liwanga, 2010). The increase in the forced movement of people from their home countries to different countries does not correspond to the responses provided at both national and international levels to improve the livelihoods of refugees (Kandoh, 2012). Most of these refugees remain in camps or struggle to survive in the urban centres as their location of residence depends on the host country's policies and their acceptability/receptivity by the host communities, or host communities' appreciation of the refugees' experience. Thus refugees go through different phases of change in the host country. Most of these refugees experience conditions that make life desirable or non-desirable to integrate (Dako-Gyekye & Adu, 2017). Refugees, therefore, engage in transnational activities in the social, economic, cultural and political spheres with their country of origin and third countries, sometimes, as an adaptation or coping mechanism for their situation (Omata 2012). However some refugees struggle in maintaining transnational ties as well as integrating into their host country (De Haas & Fokkema, 2011).

Studies have explored the relations existing between refugees and host communities in Ghana and the security concerns raised by host communities due to protracted refugee situations in some contexts (Jacobsen, 1997; Martin, 2005; Agblorti 2011; Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011; Kandoh, 2012; Weiner 1992; Adamson 2006). However, not much research has been done in Ghana regarding how these refugees maintain transnational ties with the origin while negotiating their integration at the destination. Most studies on refugees in Ghana have concentrated on their livelihood strategies and challenges of the refugees, impact of refugees on host community relations; and challenges regarding gaining refugee status, local integration of refugees and return of refugees to their country of origin after the cessation of hostilities and establishment of peace (Dako-Gyekye & Adu, 2017; Omata 2012; Agblorti 2011). The literature on transnational migration in Ghana relates mostly to regular or irregular

Ghanaian migrants staying abroad who maintain transnational ties with the origin (Mazzucato, Kabki, & Smith, 2006; Mazzucato 2009; Owusu, 2000). The research on transnationalism among refugees in Ghana has not been explored very much. There is evidence of studies conducted on African migrants and refugees in Western countries and how they maintain transnational ties with the country of origin (Riccio 2008; De Haas & Fokkema, 2011).

Not much has been done regarding African refugees residing in Africa and how they maintain transnational ties with their countries of origin within the continent and other third countries outside the continent while negotiating integration in the host country. Also, a significant number of scholarly works on transnationalism and integration treated them as separate entities (by either focusing on transnational migration or integration among migrants as separate entities) (Horst, 2013; van Heelsum, 2004). Some of these studies did not explore the linkages between transnationalism and integration. This study, however, focuses on refugees and the mechanisms/strategies they use to maintain transnational ties with the origin as well as with friends and relations in other nations other than their origin countries. It also explores the adaptive mechanisms used by these refugees in negotiating their integration and access to equal opportunities in Ghana. Thus, the study takes a two-prong approach of exploring the concepts of transnationalism and integration as interrelated phenomena instead of seeing them as two dichotomised concepts (or in the lens of mutual exclusivity). The study also examined the variations and nuances in transnational practices and engagements among the refugees with respect to their country of origin dynamics and the communication channels the refugees use in their transnational engagements with their relations in both the country of origin and third countries.

1.3 Research Questions

The study sought to answer the central question of how refugees establish transnational engagements and how the engagements influence their integration in the host country. The study therefore sought to answer the following research questions.

- i. What are the socio-demographic characteristics and migration trajectories of the refugees?
- ii. In what ways do refugees perform transnational activities and which communication channels do they use in their transnational engagements?
- iii. Why do refugees maintain transnational ties with their country of origin and other third countries?
- iv. How does the transnational activities/engagements of the refugees influence their integration in Ghana?

1.4 Research Objectives

The study examined the transnational activities of refugees in Ghana and how these activities influence their integration into the country.

Thus, the specific objectives of this study were to:

- i. Describe the socio-demographic characteristics and migration trajectories of the refugees.
- ii. Examine transnational activities of refugees in Ghana and their channels of communications.
- iii. Explore the reasons why refugees maintain transnational ties with their countries of origin and other third countries.
- iv. Explore the extent to which refugees' transnational activities influence their integration in Ghana.

- v. Make policy recommendations to support the transnational engagements and integration of refugees in Ghana, including refugee governance, protection and welfare.

1.5 Justification of the Study

This research investigates the association between refugees' transnational relations with their country of origin and other third countries, the channels of communication they use in these engagements, and their integration in host nations. The study provides significant information in explaining the gaps in the literature as far as African refugees being hosted in African nations are concerned. This study has become necessary due to the numerous debates on refugee identities, transnationalism, integration and the contribution of refugees in the migration, development and security discourse at both the national and international policy levels.

The study also provides information on the transnational practices of refugees and their integration challenges in host countries, amid their state of being in limbo regarding where to consider as home, as against their strong urge for resettlement in third countries in the West to access opportunities for their personal development and welfare. The study offers an opportunity to address some of these key policy issues on refugees at the micro, meso and macro levels.

Its relevance at the local/community level is to inform policy formulation and implementation in local assemblies and district levels of governance, to inculcate refugee needs and also to recognize their positive socio-cultural and economic contributions to the development of the communities in which they live, as well as their inclusion in the fair allocation of resources within host communities. Such policies will engender a sense of acceptance in the host

communities and may increase the motivation of the refugees to integrate in the host country. The absence of such policies may breed a sense of rejection, suspicion of refugees within local communities, a lack of motivation for refugees to integrate and in worst cases conflicts between refugees and host communities.

At the national level, the research promulgates policy formulation that paves way for refugees to enjoy equal opportunities in terms of access to social services (education, healthcare, water and sanitation among others) with the citizenry in the host communities. Such policies will also recognise the positive contributions of refugees (both skilled and unskilled) to the various strata of labour markets and national economy; address the security challenges resulting from the integration of refugees in the host country; and equitably protect vulnerable populations and refugees. Such policies will reduce the strong metaphors/symbolisms used among some sections of scholarship and the media to portray refugees in a very negative light – as poverty stricken, weak, criminals, and a security risk, among others.

The transnational activities of refugees relating to their economic, socio-cultural, religious and political activities will also shape policies at the national level, particularly policies that will make it less challenging for the exchange of financial capital (remittances), political, socio-cultural and technological ideas across borders; while putting in the necessary measures to avoid the exchange of elements that will engender violent extremism and terrorism, and political destabilization in both the host and origin countries.

At the international policy level, the research could provide information on policies for the protection of vulnerable populations across the globe. The transnational exchanges of political, economic, socio-cultural and technological essentials between host and origin

countries may lead to the positive transformation of countries, cultural diversity and inclusion, impacting positively on international relations and diplomacy among nations.

The study also contributes to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly SDG 1 – end poverty in all forms everywhere, and SDG 10 – reduce inequalities within and among countries (Franco & Minnery, 2020; Oestreich, 2018; Sengupta, 2018; Pradhan et al, 2017). The study brings to the forefront the plight of these refugees in terms of their livelihoods and the inequalities/discrimination they face in host countries, to inform policy that institutionalises the appropriate social protection systems for this category of vulnerable populations. The elimination of discriminatory policies and practices; and the promotion of equitable distribution of economic resources, basic services and opportunities for both refugees and the citizenry alike, will enhance a sustainable future for these refugees and a seamless process towards their integration into host communities.

The study also resonates with SDG 9 - Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation (Franco, Arduz, & Buitrago, 2020; Tomaselli et al 2019). The study advocates for the promotion of industry and manufacturing; financial, technological and technical support; as well as access to information and telecommunications in African countries to enhance transnational and diaspora engagements between refugees and their relations abroad. The transfer of financial remittances, knowledge and skills through advanced technology could lead to a drastic reduction in poverty among refugee populations in Africa.

Though the study area was limited to refugees in the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area, the Buduburam Refugee Settlement and the Ampain and Krisan refugee camps in Ghana, the study brings out some of the key issues faced by refugees, particularly in their transnational

engagements, and their integration in host countries. The research also projects issues relating to refugees more broadly; to inform policy and to find lasting solutions to the challenges faced by this category of vulnerable populations.

1.6 Definition of Terms

Refugee: The definition of refugee incorporates definitions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, as follows:

- a) A person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (The 1951 Refugee Convention, pg 14).
- b) “apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (The 1969 OAU Convention, pg 2).
- c) "persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or freedom has been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order"(the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, pg 3).

Transnational activities: This refers to the refugees’ engagements with their country of origin and other third countries in the various phases of social, cultural, economic and political aspects of life.

Social transnational activities: This includes refugees’ contact with family and friends in their country of origin and third countries.

Economic transnational activities: This includes refugees engagements with the country of origin and third countries in terms of remittance exchanges, trading activities, business ventures and investments and acquisition of property.

Political transnational activities: This includes refugees' willingness and ability to follow political news and political developments in their country of origin or that of other countries. This does not include their right to vote or participate in the politics of their country of origin or other third countries as they are not in the position to exercise such rights due to their status as refugees. Political transnational engagements also includes dressing in the national colours of their country of origin during international day celebrations, singing their national anthem and pledge, and willingness to contribute towards the development of the country of origin; or that of other third countries.

Cultural transnational activities: This measures refugees affiliation to the culture of their country of origin particularly their patronage of their country's local cuisine, singing of folk songs, dressing in their local or traditional attire and the extent to which they use their local languages to communicate in Ghana.

Integration: This measures the level of refugees adaptation in Ghana. It includes social, political, economic and cultural contexts.

Social integration: This measures the extent to which refugees engage with Ghanaians in terms of friendship, attending social gatherings like church and mosque, access to social services, health care and education in Ghana.

Cultural integration: This measures the extent to which refugees can speak the local languages in Ghana, sing the local songs and eat Ghanaian local cuisine, dress in local/traditional dresses specific to Ghana and their level of appreciation of Ghana's cultural values.

Economic Integration: This measures refugees income-generating activities, their access to job opportunities, entrepreneurial training, and property and investment in Ghana.

Political integration: This measures the extent to which refugees are willing and/or able to follow the politics, political debates and development/governance issues, and how these issues impact their lives as refugees. Political integration in the context of this study does not mean refugees have the right to actively participate in politics in the host country (either by voting, joining political parties, expressing support or campaigning for political parties etc). Refugees are not citizens of the host country hence, by law, they are not permitted to exercise political rights pertaining to citizens of the host country.

Place of residence of refugees: This refers to the place of abode or the residential location of the refugees, that is, the place they settled or were made to settle when they arrived in the host country. Two main categories of settlement are camp refugees – i.e. refugees who were settled in temporary camps upon arrival in the host country; or urban refugees- i.e. refugees who decided or were obliged to settle in an urban area rather than in a refugee camp in the host country.

1.7 Organisation of the Study

This study is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter focuses on the introduction of the study, including a statement of the problem, research questions, research objectives and

rationale of the study. Chapter Two focuses on the literature review, incorporating theories and the conceptual framework of the study. Chapter Three provides the methodology of the study which includes the research design, sources of data, target population, sampling procedure, data collection methods and data analysis procedures. Chapter Four provides background characteristics and forced migration trajectory of the refugees. Chapter Five examines transnational practices of refugees, the reasons for engagements and their channels of communications. Chapter Six investigates refugee integration in Ghana and the influence of transnational practices of refugees on their integration in Ghana. Chapter Seven provides summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses literature in relation to refugees and their transnational engagements and integration processes. The chapter specifically focuses on the literature on refugees by providing the global, sub-Saharan and Ghana contexts. It discusses the place of residence of refugees, their integration and host community relations, durable solution options and their transnational engagements with their country of origin and third countries. The theory, as well as the conceptual framework of the study, are also presented in this chapter.

2.2 Defining the Refugee

According to article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, “the term 'refugee' applies to any person who:

“...owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (The 1951 Refugee Convention, pg 14)

Article 1(1) of the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969) also defines the term "refugee" in the same context as that of the 1951 Refugee Convention, stated above. However, Sections 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees introduced elements of external aggression, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in the country of origin, as well

as clarifying the issue of multiple nationalities, in the case where the refugee has multiple nationalities. It states that:

“The term "refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.

In the case of a person who has several nationalities, the term "a country of which he is a national" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of which he is a national if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national” (The 1969 OAU Convention on Refugees, pg 2).

The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, though aligned with the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention, however, broadened the scope and geographical characteristics of refugees by arguing that other people in need of international protection should also be considered as refugees. Section III (3) of the Cartagena Declaration (1984), therefore, referred to Refugees as:

"...persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or freedom has been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order" (The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, pg 3).

Kissoon (2015) derived three interrelated characteristics of a refugee from the 1951 Convention's definition of a refugee that need to be considered in dealing with every facet of refugee socio-cultural, economic and political behaviour and practices. These three characteristics relate to geography - being a person outside the country of nationality; identity - being a member of a particular race, religion, nationality, social group or political opinion; and fear - being persecuted based on identity which is a driving force behind emigration (Kissoon, 2015). Explicitly, every refugee is geographically outside his or her country of nationality and thus, has challenges with citizenship and associated benefits. However, the refugee may maintain identity or membership with a particular race, religion, nationality,

social group or political opinion even though there is still a fear of being persecuted based on identity, which is the driving factor behind the geographical dislocation. Kissoon (2015) further elaborated this as follows:

‘Geography defines the refugee as a migrant foremost, while their position and voice ascribe them a marginal or stigmatized in her country of nationality. This marginality combined with the ‘othering’ that occurs in the country of asylum create a double alienation for the refugee to overcome. Fear uproots, defines the push factors in the migration experience and constrains available choices, making asylum seeking and refugee integration an emotional geography, while borders and identity make it political.’ (Kissoon, 2015, pg.7)

Thus, though, geographical displacement renders refugees as migrants in need of protection and comfort, the newly ascribed status and loss in voice exacerbate their alienation in host communities.

Generally, the flight of refugees has traditionally been conceptualised as political. However, other studies also argue that flight of refugees may be a result of diverse factors, including fear of persecution, response to macro-economic collapse, denial of opportunities to work, and systematic livelihood discrimination (Foster 2007; Zetter, 2007). After their flight, Kissoon (2015) further described the challenging processes that refugees go through in order to acquire the refugee status.

‘Applying for the refugee status is a transformative process: people become ‘cases’, persecution and torture become ‘evidence’, nationality and other forms of identity are subsumed by the labels, ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘refugee claimant’. Each case is determined on its own merits, and the burden of proof is on claimants and asylum seekers to show they are targeted and unprotected against persecution for reasons of their identity in their countries of origin. Once the claim is validated by the receiving state, the state may confer the right of asylum on the individual who is then legitimated as a ‘refugee’ (Kissoon, 2015, pg 7).

This tends to be a daunting task that shapes the integration process of the refugees. It is worth noting that the motivation for refugee flight and the processes of acquisition of the refugee status has consequences for their transnational engagements and integration processes while in the host country.

In theory, the attainment and recognition of refugee status by the UNHCR guarantees legal protection and access to humanitarian services necessary for daily livelihood whilst in the host country (Al-Sharmani, 2004; Bilgili & Loschmann, 2018). Notwithstanding this status, different factors influence the conditions in which refugees find themselves in host countries. According to Cameron (2014), labels that describe people as: ‘refugees’; ‘expellees’; ‘exiles’; ‘displaced persons’; ‘internally displaced persons (IDP)’; ‘economic refugees’; ‘humanitarian refugees’; ‘stateless person’; ‘tsunami refugee’; ‘development refugee’; ‘environmental refugee’; and ‘government assisted refugees (GAR)’ tend to be derogatory and lead to the ‘othering’ of refugees as a peculiar group of people who need special and differentiated treatment. Al-Sharmani (2004) showcased how Colombian refugees in Ecuador were given similar treatment as economic migrants, who usually experience poor job opportunities and working conditions. This kind of disposition engendered the conception that refugees are undesirable migrants and akin to human missiles, traversing sovereign defences of national security into domestic economy and social cohesion (Dowty & Loescher, 1996).

These negative perceptions of refugees has been held by many governments and communities hosting refugees, thereby impacting refugees and their access to essential social service and economic opportunities available in the host country. The negative perceptions of seeing them as human missiles has also negatively impacted many refugees as host governments sometimes see them as a national security threat and therefore locate them in camps that are far away from the cities and urban areas, further exacerbating their plight and intensifying their ‘othering’ in these communities and in the host country.

2.3 Global Context of Migration and Refugees

International migration is a complex phenomenon that encompasses a wide variety of movements involving people of different backgrounds living in countries other than their place of birth (IOM, 2018, UNDP, 2013; Odusanya, 2016). The estimated total number of international migrants has increased from 244 million in 2015 to 272 million in 2019 (IOM, 2018; IOM, 2020). Although most of these movements are voluntary, forced displacements across international borders as a result of wars, ethnic/civil conflicts, disasters, religious conflicts, political upheavals, and oppressive governments and human rights infringements continue to increase (Liwanga, 2010; Kandoh, 2012). Data from the United Nations Development Fund as of 2012 showed that nearly seven percent of the international migrants' stock are forced migrants including refugees (UNDP, 2013). Between 2010 and 2017, a quarter of international migrants were refugees and asylum seekers. The total refugee stock living in host countries across the world in 2016 was 22.5 million. This figure increased to 25.9 million in 2018. It is also worth noting that, 52% of the global refugee population was under 18 years of age (UNHCR, 2017; UNDESA, 2019; IOM, 2020). This situation, therefore, has repercussions on the education, skills acquisition and future development of refugee youth. About 46% of the global refugee and asylum seekers are hosted in North Africa and Western Asia with over 21% living in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDESA, 2019). This practice is in line with previous international conventions relating to the rights and privileges of refugees (Kingston, 1995; OAU, 1969; Cartagena Declaration, 1984). The continuous rise in the global refugee stock is the result of unresolved or renewed conflicts and this phenomenon is more common in Africa (Crisp, 2003). Currently, over two-thirds of refugees in the world are trapped in prolonged exile in poor developing regions where host states and communities often have scarce resources (Milner & Loescher, 2011). Developing countries hosted 86% of the refugees which represents 12.4 million persons (UNHCR, 2014). In sub-Saharan Africa, an outbreak of violence in South Sudan alone led to the outflow of about

500,000 refugees into neighbouring countries such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, and Kenya, while renewed fighting in the Democratic Republic of Congo also led to the outflows of thousands of refugees into Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and surrounding countries (UNHCR, 2014). Consequently 'Refugeeism' has become a default survival strategy for many who are escaping armed conflicts and violations of human rights (Rugunanan & Smit, 2011). The literature indicates that most of the refugee situations are protracted, as unending violence and persecution at the origin makes it impossible for refugees to return home. Such situations have political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, legal, and environmental implications for the international community, host countries and host communities as well (Jacobsen, 1997; Martin, 2005; Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011; Kandoh, 2012; Codjoe, Quartey, Tagoe & Reed, 2013).

2.3.1 International Governance of Refugees

Achieving productive relationships between refugees and host communities is a daunting task to governments, international agencies, development practitioners and academics (Porter et al, 2008). However, the existence of laws and conventions governing refugee situations provide host nations with a legal framework to manage refugees, and also empower refugees to claim some rights and benefits, while not renegeing on their responsibilities and obligations to the host nation. The key international legal regimes governing refugees' situations globally and in Africa are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its Protocol of 1967; the Organisation of African Union (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969); and the Declaration of Cartagena on Refugees of 1984 (Manuh, Benneh, Gebe, Anebo, & Agyei 2010). The 1951 Refugee Convention further guarantees the refugee's enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms; rights to employment, education, housing, and healthcare; and requires refugees to conform to the laws of the host country (Manuh et al, 2010). A key provision of the 1951 Refugee Convention is

the principle of non-refoulement (stated in Article 33 of the Convention) which prohibits host nations from expelling or returning the refugee in any manner whatsoever to a place of persecution. The OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa makes provision for group-based determination of refugee status and expands the definition of refugee by including people who are fleeing for reasons of external aggression or occupation, mass human rights violations, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of their country of origin or nationality (Manuh et al 2010). The Declaration of Cartagena on Refugees of 1984 also broadened the definition of refugee and proposed new approaches to the humanitarian needs of refugees in a spirit of solidarity and cooperation; with a further proposition that the principle of non-refoulement in refugee law should be acknowledged and observed as a rule of *jus cogens* in international law (Manuh et al, 2010). The UN General Assembly in 1950, provided for the establishment of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to protect and find solutions to the plight of refugees. Given the current global challenges regarding mass displacement of people, the UNHCR's population of concern has been expanded to include but not limited to refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, stateless persons, children, people with disabilities and returnees (Betts, Loescher & Milner 2012). Also, significant trends such as climate change, international migration, urbanisation, food insecurity, state fragility, terrorism, and the changing nature of conflict all shape the context of UNHCR's work, challenging it to re-think both who needs international protection and how best to protect and assist those people (Betts et al, 2012).

Many African countries, including Ghana, are signatories to the 1951 Convention and its Protocol of 1967 as well as the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. These countries have also made provisions in local legislation for the protection of refugees in their respective countries. Ghana enacted the Ghana Refugee

Law, 1992 (PNDC Law 305D) which established the Ghana Refugee Board (GRB) as the refugee governance and management institution in Ghana. The GRB works closely with the UNHCR on issues relating to the management and protection of refugees, coordinating international protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to both refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2020; Kandoh, 2012). The Board, which has stakeholder institutional representation, is mandated by law as the sole agency to grant refugee status to asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2020). The Board coordinates and advises Government and ensures that Government policy is implemented and adhered to in the management of refugees. The GRB, therefore, liaises with state actors and other non-governmental organisations; particularly, the implementing agencies of UNHCR, in the implementation of activities for the refugee programme (UNHCR, 2020). The Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) has also set up a Refugee Desk under the Migration Management Bureau (MMB) since 2005 to provide protection for refugees and to seek a permanent solution for problems of refugees in the country. In collaboration with the UNHCR and the GRB, the Refugee Desk of the MMB facilitates voluntary repatriation, local integration, resettlement, emergency resettlement procedures; screening and registration of asylum seekers and conducts refugee status determination interviews. The UNHCR has offices in most African countries, lending support to the states to fulfil their mandate of refugee protection.

2.3.2 Historical Perspectives of Refugee Situations in Africa

In the last century, the African Continent has been entangled in a lot of armed conflicts; political insurgency; tribal, ethnic and religious conflicts; and conflicts over control of resources; natural disasters; poverty; and inequitable allocation of resources that has resulted in an unprecedented increase in internal displacement and protracted refugee situations (Boateng, 2010; Kandoh, 2012). At least 40% of the fifty-three states within the African continent have been enmeshed in war over the last two decades. These conflicts pose a threat

to global security and provide opportunities for international criminal and terrorist networks to operate in Africa (Asasira, 2012). One of the melting-pots of protracted refugee situations in Africa is the Great Lakes Region. The outbreak of war in southern Sudan in 1983 led to a mass flight of people to Uganda, Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Kenya; and in the 1990s countries such as Mozambique, Sudan, Eritrea, Rwanda, and Burundi, witnessed a lot of violence that led to the flow of about 1.3 million refugees into Western Tanzania (Whitaker, 2002; Grabska, 2006; Alix-Garcia & Saah, 2010). The Northern African Region until the emergence of the Arab Spring and Syrian crisis did not experience a lot of refugee situations. The region's recurrent problem has been the inundation of irregular migrants who used the Maghreb as a route to enter the European sub-continent. In the Southern African Region, countries like South Africa, Malawi, and Mozambique have had a substantial share of the influx of economic migrants and refugees fleeing conflicts in other parts of the African continent (Rugunanan & Smit, 2011).

West Africa has experienced lots of refugee movements but on a lesser magnitude compared to the situations in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. Violent conflict displaced thousands of people in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Senegal, and Mauritania (Boateng, 2010). It is estimated that the total number of refugees in West Africa as of the late 1980s were about 20,000 (Owusu, 2000). However, political conflicts in countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo led to an increase in the number of refugees such that by 1994 there were an estimated 700,000 refugees in West Africa (Agblorti, 2011; Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011). Stedman and Tanner (2003) found that the first Liberian Civil War which lasted from 1989 to 1996 led to the displacement of about 80% of that country's population and the influx of refugees to Guinea and Ghana in the early 1990s. A significant number of refugees from the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region also made their way to West Africa (Mensah 2009). This led to an increase in populations in host

countries, putting pressure on limited resources to the extent that some host communities saw the refugees as a burden (Kandoh, 2012). Thus refugees situations in Africa, as a result of instability and conflict has been rife, is putting a lot of burden on host governments whose economies are staggering already, and impacting the refugees negatively in their engagements with their hosts.

2.3.3 Historical Perspectives of the Refugee Situation in Ghana

Ghana has a history of hosting refugees (especially political refugees) since independence in 1957, due to Nkrumah's Africanisation policy of hosting freedom fighters and political asylum seekers from African countries (Dick 2002; Agblorti, 2011; Kandoh, 2012). Notable among these asylum seekers were Miriam Makeba of South Africa and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (Agblorti, 2011; Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011). Being a signatory to the 1957 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Ghana continued to host refugees (though on a lower scale) after Nkrumah had been overthrown in 1966. The UNHCR established its office in Ghana in 1976. In 1985 there were 175 refugees officially registered in Ghana (Dick, 2002). The political conflicts and wars that rocked the African continent in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to a dramatic increase in the number of refugees in Ghana such that by 2004 the number had risen to 48,000 refugees (mostly Liberians), and arguably the highest number of refugees that Ghana has ever hosted (Dick, 2002).

Responding to the influx of refugees in the 1990s, Ghana established refugee camps, notable among them was the Buduburam Refugee Camp established in 1990 – mainly for hosting refugees who fled from the First Liberian Civil War (1989–1996) and the Second Liberian Civil War (1999–2003), as well as refugees who escaped the Sierra Leonean Civil War that lasted from 1991 to 2001 (Addo, 2008; Dzeamesi, 2008; Porter et al, 2008; Byrne 2013). The

Buduburam Refugee Camp was officially declared a settlement in 2011 after the UNHCR officially announced the cessation of the refugee status of the mostly Liberian population. Other refugee camps in Ghana include the Krisan Refugee Camp, established in 1996 (Mensah, 2009; Agblorti, 2011; Yorke, 2013); and the Klikor Refugee Camp which was later closed in 1997 for security reasons (Essuman-Johnson, 2003). Between 2010 and 2012, Ghana experienced another influx of refugees as a result of the post-election conflict in Cote d'Ivoire. Ghana established the Ampain, Fetentaa and Egyeikrom camps in 2011, in response to the refugees' needs (Yorke, 2013). According to Kandoh (2012), there are other pockets of self-settled refugees in the northern parts of Ghana around Bole District, Bundoni in the Zabzugu District and Hamile in the Upper West Region. The presence of refugees in the settlement at Buduburam Refugee Settlement and the refugee camps at Krisan, Ampain, Fetentaa, and Egyeikrom continues to have an impact on host communities, consequently influencing refugee-host relations in those communities.

However, Ghana has been praised in the international circles for its humane treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, with regard to the protection of their rights including their right to work. Refugees in Ghana have the same legal rights as ordinary citizens and they can live, work, and own businesses and properties, just as any other Ghanaian national (World Economic Forum, 2018; Country Profiles- Ghana, 2020). They are however restricted from working in the National Security apparatus (i.e, the Ghana Armed Forces, the Police, Prisons, Immigration and other state security agencies) as working in those agencies requires one to be a citizen of Ghana. Though some of the refugees are in camps, there are no specific restrictions on the movement of refugees so they are free to move everywhere in the country to pursue their business in line with the laws of the country.

Section 11(1) of the Ghana Refugee Law, 1992 (PNDCL 305D) states that a ‘person granted refugee status in Ghana shall be entitled to the rights and be subject to the duties specified in— (a) the articles of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 set out in Part I of the Schedule to this Law; (b) the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967 set out in Part II of the Schedule to this Law; and (c) the Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa set out in Part III of the Schedule to this Law.’ (Ghana Refugee Law, 1992 pg 5).

Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the 1951 Refugee Convention also states the obligations of Contracting States with regard to refugees having the right to wage earning employment, self-employment and liberal professions respectively. On wage earning and employment Article 17 (1,2,3) of the 1951 Refugee Convention states the following:

‘1. The Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage earning employment.

2. In any case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens for the protection of the national labour market shall not be applied to a refugee who was already exempt from them at the date of entry into force of this Convention for the Contracting State concerned, or who fulfils one of the following conditions:

(a) He has completed three years’ residence in the country;

(b) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of residence. A refugee may not invoke the benefits of this provision if he has abandoned his spouse;

(c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality of the country of residence.

3. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the rights of all refugees with regard to wage-earning employment to those of nationals, and in particular of those refugees who have entered their territory pursuant to programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration scheme’ (The 1951 Refugee Convention, pg 22).

Article 18 of the 1951 Refugee Convention also states that the ‘ Contracting States shall accord to a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as

regards the right to engage on his own account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish commercial and industrial companies' while article 19(1) states that 'each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory who hold diplomas recognised by the competent authorities of that State, and who are desirous of practising a liberal profession, treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances' (the 1951 Refugee Convention, pg 23).

Ghana has maintained commitment, to a greater extent, to these provisions protecting refugee rights. The Interior Ministry of Ghana which the Ghana Refugee Board is responsible to, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration have often times stated Ghana's commitment to its international obligations towards the protection of refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention and other binding instruments and protocols, hence Ghana's liberal stance on refugees issues, including their rights to work, as compared to other refugee hosting nations on the continent who have restrictive laws towards refugees.

Ghana's reputation as a beacon of democracy with a stable political and economic atmosphere makes her an attractive destination for migrants and refugees (Agblorti, 2011; Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011). As noted earlier, refugee situations are usually propelled by political instability, wars, violence and ethnic conflicts. The 14-year Liberian Civil War which began in 1989 forced about 750,000 Liberians to become refugees in other countries (Agblorti 2011; Omata 2012). Many Liberian refugees fled to Ghana probably because of the relative political stability Ghana has in West Africa and also because of the use of a common language which is English. After gaining refugee status in Ghana, many Liberian refugees resettled in third countries such as the USA, Canada and Australia, as those countries have better economic,

social and political prospects than Ghana, hence the play of the push-pull theory and the Kunz Kinetic theory in third country choices of the refugees.

2.3.4 Humanitarian Assistance and Refugee-Host Community Relations

In instances where the host community is impoverished, humanitarian and development assistance given to refugees at the neglect of the host community brews resentment, animosity, envy and antagonism towards the refugees thereby undermining the peaceful co-existence between refugees and hosts (Konyndyk 2005; Agblorti, 2011). Some indigenes may even misconstrue the support of international organisations to the refugees as the host-government's support, at the expense of indigenes. Also, as refugees are usually perceived as being poor (Codjoe & Bilsborrow, 2011), if they show signs of living better lives than the hosts as a result of humanitarian assistance, they become objects of resentment and discrimination. Even the regular handout of food and goods in a camp to refugees can incite envy in poor host communities (Lawrie & van Damme, 2003). In Ghana, rations distributed to the refugees by the humanitarian organisations were highly regarded by the local population as a sign of 'good living' irrespective of the quantity (Agblorti, 2011). Some Ghanaians will not patronize the services and goods of Liberian refugees at Buduburam Refugee Camp because they perceived the refugees as better off than them (Omata, 2012).

Some studies conducted in Western Tanzania also confirmed that refugee-host relations were sometimes marred based on the fact that only refugees with ration cards were entitled to receive relief from the humanitarian actors (Dick, 2002). Thus some scholars have argued that development assistance to refugees should be development-oriented, targeting the needs of both refugees and host populations (Jacobsen, 1997; Dick 2002).

2.3.5 Protracted Refugee Situations

According to the UNHCR, a protracted refugee situation is one in which 25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for at least five consecutive years in a given host country (UNHCR, 2004; UNHCR, 2020). This definition, however, has its limitations in that as long as a group of refugees from the same nationality does not reach or exceed the threshold of 25,000 for five consecutive years, it does not consider it as a protracted situation regardless of the groups' duration in exile. For example, UNHCR reported in 2011 that there were 11,500 Liberian refugees in Ghana, 14,000 Somali refugees in Djibouti, and 10,000 Sudanese refugees in Egypt (UNHCR, 2011). All such populations will be excluded from protracted refugee situations if the quantitative limit of 25,000 and above is not met. Thus the circumstances of individuals who have been staying longer in exile are not accounted for as protracted (Milner, 2014). The UNHCR Executive Committee adopted a definition in 2009 that does not include the quantitative limit but rather indicated that it is a situation where refugees have been in exile for more than five years without immediate prospect for the implementation of a durable solution (UNHCR, 2009). Though in recent times the first definition with the quantitative limitation has been used (UNHCR, 2020) scholars like Jacobsen (2001) and Milner (2014) prefer the 2009 definition as it is more inclusive and captures a variety of refugees. The UNHCR estimated that some 15.7 million refugees (77%) were in a protracted situation by the end of 2019, slightly fewer than a year earlier which was 15.9 million (UNHCR, 2020). Examples of such refugee situations include the situation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as more recent situations like that of South Sudanese refugees in Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. In 2019, the situation of Burundian refugees in Rwanda and Uganda also became protracted (UNHCR, 2020).

Some causes of protracted refugee situations are unresolved political conflicts in the countries of origin of the refugees and prolonged displacement originating from the very states whose instability lies at the heart of chronic regional insecurity and debates on engagement with so-called 'fragile states' (Milner & Loescher, 2011, Milner, 2014). The consequences include the deterioration of quality of life as solutions become increasingly elusive over the years (including the prevalence of sexual and physical violence among refugees in camps and protection challenges faced by the elderly, physically challenged, children, women and girls); harassment and exploitation of urban refugees; political and security concerns for countries of origin, host countries and the international community; tensions between host community and refugees over access and usage of social services (health, education) and natural resources; and impact of international refugee regime in terms of resources they need to provide to host nations to manage any such situations (Milner 2014). Protracted refugee situations can also hinder economic growth in some developing countries as resources will be overstretched, and it can also hinder peacebuilding.

Burden sharing among countries within the region of the refugee crisis and between the origin, host and resettlement countries has been suggested among the solutions to protracted refugee crisis. Jacobsen (2001) notes that one of the "durable solutions", promoted by UNHCR in protracted situations is local integration, where refugees are offered permanent asylum and integration into the host society by the host government. The approval of the host country is however critical in the implementation of this solution as without the host country's acquiescence and active involvement it will be much more difficult to help refugees (Jacobsen, 2001). The host community involved in protracted refugee situations is likely to hold one or other of these views – either believing that refugees are there temporarily and should be separated from the community, or seeing the refugees as part of their community (Jacobsen, 2001). Local integration has been found to be a desirable outcome for refugees

and their host countries, and in most cases, a realistic alternative to keeping refugees in camps. Such an approach must be used judiciously, however, local integration will only work if it is acceptable to host governments, the local communities and refugees (Jacobsen, 2001). Some host communities are usually concerned with the socio-cultural, economic and political impact that the integration of refugees could have on their nations and are therefore reluctant to chart that path. Jacobsen (2001), however, notes that local integration should not be advocated as a solution to protracted refugee situations if it threatens the security and instability of either the local community or the refugees.

2.3.6 Durable Solutions versus Refugee Aspirations

An International response to refugee situations is usually expected to move beyond emergency provision to the durable solutions (Betts et al., 2014). Although the UNHCR's refugee-related strategies have conventionally focused on the three durable solutions of resettlement in a third country, local integration in the host country and voluntary repatriation of refugees to the country of origin, the greatest aspiration of almost all refugees residing in developing countries is to be resettled in a developed country (Zetter, 2010; Betts et al., 2014). These solutions are oftentimes inaccessible to refugees due to political reasons and other stringent policy considerations regarding refugee and migrant intake in these countries. The prospects to be even integrated into the host communities are often not available to refugees as it is highly contingent on the host country's integration policies. Therefore refugees are rather left for extended periods in camps, settlements or in some cases, impoverished urban areas, with inadequate access to socio-economic rights and opportunities and with virtually no policies to promote entrepreneurship and self-reliance (Betts et al, 2014). In some cases, even their freedom of movement and right to work are curtailed (Betts, 2009). A study on Somali refugees in Cairo, Egypt by Al-Sharmani (2004) found that the attainment of Western citizenship is a valuable livelihood capital that enables Somalis and their family members to

secure their lives with promising opportunities for the future. Zetter (2010) confirmed that resettlement of refugees in a third country enhances their self-reliance, stability and security while reducing their continuous dependency on international aid for survival. Also when they get the chance to resettle in the West they feel obliged to family members left behind, hence they foster transnational ties as a form of restitution to support these families left behind. Those who had the means, time and energy to dedicate themselves to the development and reconstruction of their country of origin, often made use of the family contacts that they had on the spot. This form of postponed payment formed another motivation to maintain relationships with stay-behinds. Muller (2008) found that the concrete practical, social and cultural support that the respondents received also had a symbolic function; it meant that as long as they kept in touch with their stay-behinds, return remained a possibility for them. In other words, these contacts kept the diasporic dream of return alive.

2.3.7 Camp and Urban Refugees

The refugees' particular relocation experience may influence their choice to reside in an urban area or in camps. This is also contingent on host country policies towards refugee relocation and integration. Hence in certain circumstances, refugees may not have any choice but to settle with the laws and policies governing their settlement in the host country, be it in camps, urban areas or townships. Host governments may be much interested in locating refugees in camps as it gives the government control over the management and protection of refugees on one hand and, on the other hand, ensures containment of the refugees should there be elements among them that pose a security threat to the host communities or host country in general (Adamson, 2006). There are other advantages to the refugees themselves in terms of accessibility to support from international NGOs, charity organisations and development partners. Others have, however, criticised the camping of refugees as against human dignity as it constitutes warehousing of human beings.

Living a self-settled life as a refugee or living in the urban areas also comes with its advantages and challenges alike. While some refugees are attracted to the relatively safe and anonymous nature of the city, others travel to urban areas with the expectation of having greater access to rehabilitation programs and humanitarian aid (Jacobsen, 2006). Although the possibility of third-country settlement in Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) countries is low, there is disproportionate weight in attracting people to the city centre when accessing official UN third-country settlement flows (Pavanello, Elhawary & Pantuliano, 2010). In essence, some refugees find the urban areas as providing better opportunities for independent migration to other locations in the host country and to other third countries as well, particularly for those seeking third country resettlement (Campbell, Crisp & Kiragu, 2011).

Refugees who live in urban areas may also have access to improved and better healthcare than their counterparts in the camps. Using such services will however be dependent on their financial resources and purchasing power. Access to health services remains critical for refugee populations given their large and unpredictable numbers which may sometimes overwhelm public health systems of the refugee hosting countries. They may also be subject to disease outbreaks associated with congestion and large scale population movements. Importation of communicable diseases from the country of origin to the asylum country is possible because of differences in local environments and exposures in the two localities, hence the host countries' public health system should always put measures in place to mitigate such outbreaks of diseases among refugee populations, before they occur (Mwekesege, 1995). Globally, refugees living in towns tend to seek health services from government-supported facilities in the health system with exception of situations where the national health system is non-functional, in which case UNHCR supports them to access health services from private establishments. Despite this global pattern, an analysis of proposals submitted to the Global

Fund by countries that are hosting refugees, showed that about half (52%) of the countries hosting refugees mentioned them in their national HIV strategic plans and less than half (47%) of the countries hosting refugees mentioned refugees in their national malaria strategic plans (Spiegel, 2010). It has been noted, however, that in most cases urban refugees are given inadequate access to medical services between their refugee settlements and their peers. Whereas such reports may not have been objectively certified, reports on refugee challenges such as language barriers, absence of medical personnel, discrimination against refugees, and difficulties in accessing medicines in government medical facilities tend to confirm such assertions. The UNHCR-funded Socio-Economic Survey identified similar problems and found that refugees had problems accessing services in public health facilities (Inter-Aid, 2010; Inter-Aid Uganda, 2010). Though the service was nominally free, even the nominal cost in most cases was beyond what the refugees could afford. In the health sector, available studies have reported reduced use of major urban refugee facilities in relief and preventive care (Mohammed et al., 2016; UNHCR and DRC, 2012). One study found that refugees in Nairobi were less likely to use pregnancy and childbirth-related medical services than Kenyans (Carter, 2011).

The living conditions in most refugee camps in Africa are generally poor. Camps are becoming increasingly densely populated in Africa, hence the provision of basic physical needs such as food, water and shelter is found to be a struggle by UNHCR and partner organizations to balance the phase of stable care and maintenance for long-displaced populations (Lindley, 2011; Campbell, Crisp & Kiragu, 2011). Negative environmental impacts have also been recorded in camps that are situated in semi-arid areas. The literature indicates that refugee camps have on several occasions contributed to a shortage of resources, particularly firewood and sometimes cause insufficient water supply to the extent of even lowering the groundwater level in the long term (Aukot, 2003; RMMS, 2013). A study by

Braun et al (2015) indicated an 11.5% decrease in natural resources such as water within five kilometres of the Dadaab Refugee Camp in Kenya. Enghoff et al (2010) reported a decrease in wood and building materials in an immediate environment. One study found that water supply was particularly poor in parts of refugee camps in Nairobi, which has a large refugee population, so water was sold in jerry cans (UNHCR & DRC, 2012). This situation was not the same for urban refugees.

Urban refugees are also noted to have better economic and employment opportunities than their counterparts in the camps (in the rural areas), as more of such opportunities usually exist in the cities and urban areas than the villages or communities in the rural areas. Many urban refugees engage in small scale businesses or find employment among the proliferation of small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) in the cities. Through their social networks with relatives and friends who already live in urban areas, some refugees may also find work and housing. It has been found that many refugees exploit family or other networks in their host country, to the extent that they head straight for the urban areas and do not go to the camps at all (Campbell et al., 2011; UNHCR and DRC, 2012; Kronick, 2013; Mendenhall et al., 2015).

Refugees working in camps are unable to receive wages under certain labour laws, especially in some countries in Africa, but receive income from UN agencies and NGOs (Pavanello, Eihawary & Pantuliano, 2010). According to the Kenyan Refugee Consortium, 43% of urban migrants are self-employed, 36% unemployed and dependent mostly on remittances, and 21% are employed by others. Urban refugees are primarily engaged and employed in the informal economy (Abdulsamed, 2011). Immigrants working in the informal economy are mainly engaged in menial trade and unskilled labour, with very low incomes (Pavanello, Eihawary & Pantuliano, 2010). The majority of refugees who have access to work are engaged in the

informal economy. High unemployment rates, government regulations and a large population of unemployed youth among the local population limit refugees' access to labour markets. Most refugees and migrants are therefore forced into unorganized work fields and occupations with limited protection (Torezani, Colic-Peisker, & Fozdar, 2008).

Refugees are generally oriented differently towards the host community depending on how they are settled (Jacobsen, 1997). Refugees in isolated settlements or camps are not likely to experience direct interactions with the host community, hence there will be minimal conflicts in their relations, as compared to self-settled refugees living in among indigenes in the host community (Jacobsen, 1997; Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011). Remotely located refugee settlements or camps enhance seclusion, exclusion and non-integration, however, if they are within urban or rural settlements conflicts abound especially in the usage of limited socio-economic and natural resources.

In Ghana, the refugee camps are located in nearby village communities. The Buduburam Refugee Camp which has now gained the status of a settlement is located in the Gomoa District and closer to the capital city Accra, therefore refugees could easily access the city, its markets, educational and job facilities (Dick, 2002). With time the camp expanded to the nearby villages making Ghanaians part of the day-to-day activities of the refugees (Boateng, 2010). The Krisan, Fetentaa, Agyeikrom, and Ampian refugee camps were all located in nearby village communities making it easy for the host community and those in the camps to interact. Some of the Liberian and Ivorian refugees who were rich did not settle in the camps but self-settled in the city of Accra. Jacobsen (1997) argued that self-settled refugees are more likely to feel pressured to 'fit in' and adapt themselves to local ways while refugees in camps probably feel less pressured to do so because they are less connected to and less dependent on their hosts. Refugees in South Africa however face a lot of discrimination and xenophobia

though the country is recognised as one of few African countries that encourage refugees to settle in urban areas (Landau, 2006; Rugunanan & Smith 2011).

2.4 Migrants and Refugees' Transnationalism

Transnationalism according to Basch et al. (1994) constitutes all the multi-dimensional processes in which immigrants use to create and sustain multiple layers of social ties that connect their societies of origin and current settlements. Since most transnational engagements are with families and other close associates, Bryceson and Vuorela (2002) defined transnational families as families that live some or most of the time separated from each other, but remain together by creating a feeling of familyhood for their collective welfare even across borders. Muller (2008) however emphasised that transnational families are not homogenous but vary in terms of access to resources, mobility, lifestyles and various types of capital. Transnational families are usually unified by descent but are dissociated by geography, economic conditions and cultural environments which require mutual effort to maintain the kin union (Muller, 2008). Transnational engagements are also sustained by acts of reciprocity but Sahlins (1974), used the idea of generalised reciprocity in terms of selfless giving. In this case, transnational engagements (either by migrants or refugees) are done with the expectation of bridging or disabling geographical distances/boundaries and maintaining familial bonds with kin in the origin or third countries.

As an international migration concept, transnationalism has been used to study ties of both international migrants and other cross-border mobile populations with their roots and relations in different parts of the world. Van Amersfoort (2001) for instance used this concept to study the impact of modern transnational communities on social cohesion in welfare states. Snel et al. (2003) investigated the relationship between a strong transnational involvement and the integration of migrants into Dutch society. Basch et al. (2004) and Landolt et al.

(1999) also investigated the transnational endearments of Haitian and Salvadorean exiles in the USA respectively. Nevertheless, the transnational activities of refugees have not been much explored. The few studies include one by Muller (2008) on how Afghan refugees in the Netherlands maintain ties with families at home in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. This study in addition to the finding that the relations between Afghan refugees in the Netherlands and their family members left in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan were economic and unidirectional with remittances being the eventual symbol of connection and disconnection with the origin and other places of destination. Muller (2008) also reveals that refugees have families and they engage with families living in multiple countries. Thus apart from their engagements with their respective countries of origin, refugees also engage with friends and relatives in other countries and some refugees also form diaspora associations along ethnic, tribal or country lines (just as the Hometown Associations organised by migrants) while they are in the host country. Another study on the transnational experiences of Bosnian refugees in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands and Eritrean refugees in the United Kingdom and Germany by Al-Ali et al (2001), also suggested that refugees engage politically, economically, socially and culturally with their countries of origin. Al-Ali (2002) also demonstrated how Bosnian refugees in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands engaged transnationally with families back home.

The bad situation in which stay-behinds found themselves was a motivation for transnational ties to be strengthened with own relatives left behind and to get them out of the quagmire of poverty and violence prevailing at the origin (Muller, 2008). Sending and receiving remittance is one important link that ties members of transnational families in their efforts to sustain their relations. Also transnational sharing of family responsibilities such as caring for children, the elderly or ill relatives is another crucial bond of obligation between individual refugees and their relatives who live elsewhere (Al-Sharmmani, 2004). Mascini (2012) also

argued that Burundian Refugees in the Netherlands engaged in social, economic and cultural transnational activities. Transnational social network varies depending on the geographical location. Technology has however been a significant force in facilitating connections with more distant family members.

2.4.1 Ties/Engagement with Origin and Third Countries

Studies reveal that like most international migrants, refugees maintain diverse ties with their countries of origin. Studies by Campbell (2007) and Omata (2012) on the economic activities of African refugees in selected refugee hosting countries in Africa uncovered some economic ties that the refugees had with their origin countries. While Ethiopian refugees in Nairobi relied on relations and established trade networks in Ethiopia to import African dresses, coffee pots and spices for sale in Nairobi, refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo based in Kampala were intensely connected with commercial activities in their country of origin by exporting household items from Kampala to their trade networks in Democratic Republic of Congo (Campbell 2007; Omata, 2012). Omata (2012) also recorded instances where Burundian, Eritrean and Ugandan refugees in Kampala acted as business brokers to commercial organisations in their countries of origin because of the stronger business networks they had with their respective home countries and their high level of competence in the usage of the English language and other local languages as well.

Omata's (2012) study did not only reveal the economic ties of Africa refugees with their countries of origin but third countries as well. The study found that some Eritrean and Somali refugees in Kampala were surviving entirely on remittances sent by their family members living in countries outside Africa. Some of the refugees in Kampala also engaged in business partnerships with former refugees who relocated to Western Countries who serve as the financiers of these economic ventures (Omata, 2012). The key gap in the studies by Campbell

(2007) and Omata, 2012 is their focus on the economic aspects of the refugee livelihoods without the linking it with the social, cultural and political aspects of the refugees' circumstances which also impact on their livelihoods. This study fills that lacuna in their work.

Camp refugees primarily survive on humanitarian assistance as most of them are unable to work and provide for themselves (Monsutti 2005; Lindley, 2010; Bilgili & Loschmann, 2018). Previous studies provide enough evidence to suggest that refugees relied on their ties with family members living outside the host country for other forms of assistance including financial support (Al-Sharmani, 2004). Receiving remittances does not only meet the subsistence needs of refugees but also serves as the principal source of funding for investing into income-generating ventures (Taylor 1999; Orozco 2003). Somali refugees in Kenya for instance have used their transnational ties in Western Countries to mobilise the necessary funds through their diaspora to start businesses in Kenya (Campbell, 2005). Due to the increasing recognition of transnationalism, in recent years, several studies on the role of remittances for refugee livelihoods have emerged (Horst, 2006; Monsutti 2005; Lindley, 2010).

2.4.2 Channels of Communications in Refugees' Transnational Engagements

Communication is an integral part of our daily interactions. In every organisation or in every system some level of communication persists to achieve a required objective. As a people, we need to communicate to ensure there is increase in our productivity, and the reaffirmation of ties and bonds be it family or friendship or any relationship for that matter. Communication has been an age-long avenue bridging the gap between humans in space and time. Communication simply put is the process by which information is exchanged between individuals or groups through a common system of symbols, signs or behaviour. In essence,


it involves the sender (source) who sends information through a medium (channel) to a receiver. The receiver then decodes the message and sends feedback to the sender. The sender uses the feedback to gauge the receiver's understanding of the message. The information (messages) sent are usually signals and symbols which could be verbal or graphic, or non-verbal (gestural, visual or photographic) (Daniel, 2013). This gives the impression that communication can be verbal or non-verbal and the dissemination of such information (verbal and non-verbal) runs on the wheels of the ever-evolving channels available to one within space and time.

Affordable communication and travel, therefore, allow people nowadays to actively exchange between the host and home country. Visiting the origin country and maintaining contact with family and friends at home are good indicators of socio-cultural transnational activities (Itzigsohn & Saucedo, 2002; Snel et al. 2006).

However, this may necessarily not be the case for refugees in comparison to ordinary migrants. Refugees may not have the luxury of visiting their country of origin as such visits will mean putting their lives in peril due to the circumstances prevailing in their countries be it war, ethnic, tribal or political conflicts or persecution as a result of race, beliefs or belonging to a particular social group. Thus refugees might fear in engaging in any form of transnational behaviour due to the threat of personal persecution hanging around them (Mascini et al. 2012). In such peculiar situations advanced communication and networking through the internet and social media platforms become the key means of connecting to their homes or countries of origin.

Vertovec (2004) notes that advanced communication has been a major force in globalization, thus bringing about an intensification of interconnectedness and compression of space and

time. Many channels have been developed while new ones keep emerging, nevertheless, mobile phones seem to stand out among the various channels of communication. Used as a social tool, mobile phones point to one solution to facilitate refugee integration through the development of their social capital (Bacishoga, Hooper & Johnston, 2016). The accessibility of mobile devices largely influences refugees' transnational behaviour. Leung (2011) suggested that the mobile phone is the most critical technology in terms of availability and familiarity for refugees. Originally designed to enable communication and information access anytime and anywhere, mobile phones are increasingly being regarded as a potent tool for addressing social and economic development in developing countries (Hyde-Clarke, 2013; Chiumbu, 2012).

The logo of the University of Ghana is a large, semi-transparent watermark centered on the page. It features a shield with three golden trees at the top, a central golden emblem with a cross and a circle, and a banner at the bottom with the motto 'WISDOM BEGETS PROGRESS'.

Nothing has facilitated global linkage more than the boom in ordinary cheap international telephone calls. Low-cost calls serve as a social glue connecting small-scale social formations across the globe (Vertovec, 2004). For instance, due to advances in communication technologies and ease of travel, Polish migrants in Norway are rarely acutely isolated from their loved ones (Vertovec, 2004). It must be noted, however that communication technologies are important for most migrants, yet these technologies are facilitators, not creators of transnational ties. Technologies do not generate virtual families, where none existed before (Wilding 2006). Vertovec (2004) found that everyday cheap international telephone calls account for one of the main sources of connection among a multiplicity of global social networks. For many of today's migrants (including refugees) transnational connectivity through cheap telephone calls is at the heart of their lives. Vertovec (2004) further indicated that for migrants and their kin in distant parts of the world, telephone calls can only provide a kind of punctuated sociality that can heighten emotional strain as well as alleviate it. Whereas this mode of intermittent communication cannot bridge all the gaps of information and expression endemic to long-distance separation, cheap international

telephone calls join migrants and their significant others in ways that are deeply meaningful to people on both ends of the line.

Mobile technologies have opened up new dimensions in social interaction (Chiumbu, 2012; Mehta et al., 2011). Apart from creating new sources of income and employment, mobile phones provide vital links between refugee populations and their families, and provide a tool to enable them to become self-sustainable (Hyde-Clarke, 2013; Diminescu et al., 2009). Although smartphones and pads have impacted social networks, refugees tend to have simpler, more cost-effective phones (Chang et al., 2011; Leung, 2010). The key impact of the use of mobile phones is the improvement in social links or network ties, thereby enhancing social capital (Chiumbu, 2012; Elliott & Yusuf, 2014). It has been suggested that the development of social capital amongst refugees can facilitate their integration into a country and that ICT has the potential to promote that process (Andrade & Doolin, 2013; Zinnbauer, 2007). Mobile phones are therefore capable of creating and strengthening social capital through improved networking (Sife et al., 2010).

On the other hand, there are many forms of communication technologies available which support social networking and they generally have a positive facilitating effect. They lower the barriers to interaction and encourage greater self-disclosure (Tidwell & Walther, 2002). Mobile phones promote larger and stronger social networks, help preserve social ties, and enhance the functionality of social networks by making members reachable, and facilitating integration (Schaub, 2012; Johnston & Bacishoga, 2013). Migrants use their phones to exploit their social networks (Schaub, 2012). Although the use of mobile phones play an important role in the process of social integration of refugees, it may also reinforce the homogeneity of the group, and thus impact negatively on their social integration into the mainstream community (Johnston & Bacishoga, 2013). Haythornthwaite (2005) also suggested that, while

it is important to be able to communicate, the technology is usually sufficient for bridging activities but not sufficient for building the relationship and developing bonding social capital. The use of mobile phones in trading is known to create more economic opportunities, and expand the target audience or customer base particularly in income generation, finding employment, or for cost and time saving (Diminescu et al., 2009; Mehta et al., 2011; Bhavnani et al., 2008).

Many studies support the fact that the internet and other online networks have been used by the diaspora as channels of communication for the maintenance of existing ties with families and communities globally (Smith 1995; Markham 1998). In an ethnographic study of the use of the internet among Trinidadians in the Diaspora, Miller and Slater (2000) showed that the internet was not only a successful tool used in connecting them back to their roots, it also helped them in creating a transnational space where they could still practise their cultural and religious beliefs even though they were in a foreign country. Muller's (2008) study among Afghan refugees in the Netherlands reveals that the ability to communicate with families at home using internet-based applications is dependent on they also having internet access. The internet connects extended families through online chats and emails despite the vast geographical distance. Thus, the internet enabled them to reaffirm the religious beliefs and rituals of certain social and religious groups of Trinidadian diasporas within the Apostolic and Catholic Church. Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser (1998) also recounted how the internet helped diasporic Burundians to establish *Burundinet*, an Internet web that Burundians in different nation-states used to create a transnational Burundi identity through contact with other Burundians across the globe. Therefore, the internet-fostered connective then enhanced a figuration of a diaspora or one national identity among these Burundians in their multiple locations across the globe. It is in this vein that Al-Sharmani (2004) stresses that the internet provides an extremely effective audio-visual channel through which refugees in different parts

of the world exchange their information, hold discussions, resolve conflicts, and influence decisions about the use of family resources. Somali refugees living in Cairo also used videotapes to maintain ties with families at home and in other parts of the world. Videotape is a very essential tool for the arrangement of marriages, decision making on relocation, and recording daily lives and wedding parties of relatives living in different countries. Somali refugees also used lecture tapes to promote strong Somali values and ways of living even in the transnational space. Online channels of communication also aided Somali refugees in Cairo to pursue online romantic relationships with suitors in the West, some of which ended in marriage (Al-Sharmani, 2004). Communication through the internet created a global virtual space where young Somali refugees in Cairo and other Western Countries discussed different desirable diasporic lives coupled with their common concerns, opportunities and challenges while learning about the lives of other Somali diasporas in their countries of destination (Al-Sharmani, 2004).

Refugees may face a myriad of challenges connecting with family and friends at home and abroad. Staying in contact with the origin country and exploring the possibility of a return might be limited for some migrants and refugees because the internet and phone network is not widely dispersed. Access to social media can be a challenge for some migrants and refugees depending on the host country they are in and its level of internet penetration or connectivity. Leung (2010) describes the challenges of access, affordability, surveillance, and connectivity of others in migrants' social networks. Access to the Internet via Wi-Fi or SIM cards and the means to charge the smartphone's battery are not always available. This creates a general lack of connectivity among asylum migrants. New opportunities for digital surveillance of (irregular) migration and digital border control also pose a particular risk to smartphone and social media usage by asylum migrants (Dijstelbloem & Meijer, 2009; Engbersen & Broeders, 2009; Wall et al., 2017). Using mobile devices and social media

becomes a risk in itself by making asylum migrants vulnerable to unwanted surveillance by state and non-state actors. Studies indicate that asylum migrants use strategies to avoid this risk, for example, through the use of pseudonyms and avatars (Gillespie et al., 2016). The availability of more information via social media does not always mean the migrant or refugee is better informed (Zijlstra & Van Liempt, 2017). Social media enables the extension of one's social network with weak and latent ties and allow information to circulate on an informal basis. This creates uncertainties about the truthfulness of information that is shared online (Miztal, 2000). While migrants are often aware of the uncertain nature of social media information, they are very dependent on this type of unverified information (Burrell, 2012; Emmer et al., 2016; Madianou & Miller, 2012; Parreñas, 2005). In a nutshell, mobile technologies have become one of the easiest ways of fostering transnational relations for both international migrants and refugees. Regardless of its downsides such as the potential for online surveillance by state actors and other 'hostile' groups; as well as its potential to embellish the reality, refugees find it as a veritable tool in facilitating their transnational social, cultural, economic and political engagements with their countries of origin and third countries.

2.5 The Concept of Home and Transience among Refugees

The concept of home is still a debilitating concern among social science researchers with varying views (Brubaker 1989; Faist, 2000). As the famous poet Robert Frost once noted, "Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to take you in" (cited in Kissoon, 2015). Home is therefore not a special space but any space where a person finds acceptance and comfort. However, refugees may find themselves in a situation where they have nowhere to call home or country because they are in a foreign country. This creates a condition that Kissoon (2015), called "doubly homeless" and in some instances "triple homeless". These were labels advocates ascribed to refugees, but it is a wonder if refugees

would use these to describe their own experiences, and how long refugees experienced the conditions that create this multiple homelessness. The refugee and the homeless person have always had something in common i.e. no place to call home or, rather, no place an outsider would deem suitable to be called “home.” (Kissoon, 2015).

Dieterich-Hartwell and Koch (2017) found that being forced into exile and unable to return home may cause natural feelings of nostalgia but may also result in emotional, cognitive, behavioural and physical adversities for the refugee. To bring some form of restitution to exiles and refugees in their state of displacement and dislocation, they proposed the use of creative arts therapies such as music, imagery, dance, role-play among others to draw the attention of the senses and to promote effective restitution, transformation and therapeutic change for the forced migrants (Dieterich-Hartwell & Koch, 2017).

Home may be defined in line with FEANTSA’s (the European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless) definition which falls into three perspectives- ‘having an adequate dwelling (or space) over which a person and his/her family can exercise exclusive possession (physical domain); being able to maintain privacy and enjoy relations (social domain); and having legal title to occupation (legal domain) ... homelessness is defined to constitute rooflessness, houselessness, insecure housing, inadequate housing and unaffordable housing’ (Kissoon, 2006, pg 77). In conceptualising the meaning of home for refugees Fadlalla(2011) indicated that refugees who have lost their original homes may find themselves lost or detached in new environments as their lost home becomes significant for the sense of belonging and the feeling of being grounded that it embodied. Fadlalla (2011) is of the view that the home defines ones physical identity as well, so for refugees to feel comfortable in their new homes (in the host country) they try to reconstruct their perceived concept of the original home, reproducing some of its qualities in the new locations in order

to re-establish the lost ground and reclaim their identity. They may reconstruct these homes using the same or similar symbols, wall hangings as well as positioning of items such as televisions, fridges, and sofas in a way that depicts what they used to have in their original homes in the country of origin. Fadlalla (2011), thus looked at home from four different perspectives: the material; spatial; emotional; and the imaginative, across which important social processes (habitual or everyday activities) are carried out.

The provision of shelter, security and a physical place for activities such as sleep, food preparation, consumption, dressing, etc., constituted the material aspect of home while the actual space occupied by the individual in terms of the physical dimensions of the home and its surrounding landscape constituted the spatial aspects (Fadlalla, 2011). Aspects comprising sense of attachment, belonging, ownership and the psychological traumas of loss and or attempts to acquire the sense of attachment to a new home constituted the emotional dimension of home, while the imaginative aspects are constituted by the narratives, the images or memories and lie in a dimension related to time (Fadlalla, 2011). According to Fadlalla (2011), these four aspects and the social processes of everyday activities form the fundamental pillars of home to its inhabitants which they may engage to recreate and adapt to a new place. It almost always includes fragments of the old home which helps to foster a sense of attachment and integration in the new environment (Fadlalla, 2011).

Chronic exile or permanent homelessness may result where neither the emotional nor material conditions of home are satisfied. In the context of international migration, the journey toward home continues with integration even after overcoming the initial hurdles of settlement. Some refugees quickly adapt and recover from their dislocation while others face daily challenges with settlement (Kissoon, 2015). One of the frequently overlooked psychosocial problems of refugees is the phenomenon of homesickness. Thus refugees, regardless of the interplay of

factors such as their identification/marginality, attitude to displacement, ideological-nationalist orientation abroad, as well as displacement factors and host related factors expounded by in the Kunz model (Kunz, 1981), may have a strong affinity towards their home or country of origin, as it may remain a symbol of uncut umbilical cord between a mother and her baby. For most African refugees, home or the country of origin represents identity and belonging.

2.6 Refugee Agency (Entrepreneurship and Resilience)

Kissoon (2015) conceptualised agency as the ability of individuals to make choices, find alternative strategies to escape perceived or actual obstacles and steady structures, and to take advantage of opportunities when they come. In the views of Long (2001), agency broadly represents people's capacity to outline personal choices, formulate strategies and take initiatives to achieve their objectives, even amid hostility and opposition. Although a significant number of the refugees benefit from humanitarian assistance and remittance from their ties abroad, there is enormous evidence showing that they also engage in income-generating activities such as trading, domestic work, teaching and larger business endeavours within and outside the refugee community (Al-Sharmani, 2004; Cambell, 2005; Omata, 2012).

Betts et al. (2014), in a study of refugees in Uganda, provided strong evidence to dispute the general notion that refugees depend entirely on assistance from donor organisations. Their study showed that refugees are rather actively pursuing economic self-reliance through multiple means. Close to 80% of the refugees in Kampala who participated in the study were surviving without aid. They additionally argued that, contrary to the portrayal that refugees are a burden to host nations, they contributed enormously to the local and national economy of Uganda as customers, suppliers, distributors, employees and employers (Betts et al, 2014).

Turton (2003) therefore emphasizes that refugees ought to be understood as normal human beings who are purposive actors and will seek to devise every means possible to achieve advancement in their current and future lives notwithstanding their place of refuge. Therefore promotion of negative labours by some host countries on refugees, in most cases, do not represent the truth about refugees as some of them may have skills and expertise which when allowed to be deployed, would result in economic development for most of these nations.

2.7 Integration of Refugees

Although integration is a complex phenomenon subject to several theoretical explanations and interpretations (Castles et al., 2001), Heckmann (2016) perceived integration as a process and an outcome based on its dynamic nature and then define it as the gradual process of becoming a member and adjusting one's living conditions in the course of generations. Integration is therefore a give and take disposition that requires obligation from refugees, as well as candidness and sustenance from the host society. As an outcome, Heckmann recognizes integration as equal involvement within the core sectors of society, such as the political, economic, educational, and cultural institutions. Thus, differences between natives and refugees are increasingly diminished by the creation of an enabling environment where everyone benefits equally from the opportunities available in the host country (Heckmann, 2016). Even though integration is often used as a concept of exclusion and distinction with the expectation of that refugees should adjust to prevailing norms of the host-community due to they being perceived as different from the indigenes, it has been found that refugees in most cases are inseparable with their cultures, traditions and other characteristics that define them – and which they move with into the new society or location (Riegel, 2009; Stadler, 2016). Hence total assimilation into a host culture may not be achieved with first-generation refugees except for the second and third generations that host cultures make a significant impact. Kissoon (2015) argued that theoretically, refugees usually find safety when they

arrived in new countries where they feel safe from any persecution and could live freely. They have a conducive space to redefine themselves and take advantage of every opportunity at their disposal towards enhancing their future. However, in reality, some refugees never find their way out of insecurity and instability and this disposition also affects their integration process.

2.7.1 African Tradition of Hospitality and Refugee Integration

Globally, studies have discussed how the expression of hospitality on the part of host-nations and communities influence the acceptance, humanitarian provision and integration of refugees into host communities (Shryock, 2008; el-Abed, 2014; Crisp, 2016). Driel (2019) argued that the level of attachment and identification with one's national and local identity could cause the acceptance or rejection and subsequent integration of refugees. There has been a generally negative attitude towards the acceptance of refugees in many European countries as the nationals fear the presence of refugees presents a threat to their (i.e. the citizen's) national identity (Simmons et al. 2016; Squires, 2015). Thus, countries with strong local identity tend to reject newcomers like refugees and will not offer them any form of assistance to integrate (Schildkraut, 2014; Kunz, 1981). Such communities rather draw boundaries of social exclusion of people with no local identity (Wimmer, 2009). Contrary, studies have also shown that a strong local identity also encourages the demonstration of concerns, feelings of empathy towards the plight of refugees and supportive behaviour towards refugees (Turner & Reynolds, 2001; Newman et al. 2013; Bansak et al., 2016). According to Driel (2019), local identity is defined by the norms, values and beliefs of a community and these equip members of every community with a sense of direction on how to think, feel and behave in a pro-social manner. Thus, when a community ascribes to itself the norms and values of hospitality, they are predisposed to supporting the unfortunate people who identify with that community tending to act in a hospitable manner to refugees.

The African tradition of hospitality which centres on a great sense of oneness and care for the welfare of one another in Africa permeates through almost all African societies and this tradition plays a significant role in refugee-host relations on the continent (Agblorti, 2011). As Helton (2002) argues, this sense of hospitality towards migrants and refugees, in particular, is not only premised on our common humanity but also on ‘the seed of fear that lurks in all of us that can be stated so simply as “it could be me”’. Therefore, despite the economic and political hardships facing many African societies, they are still open to migrants. The literature cites instances where there have been harmonious refugee-host relations despite attempts by governments and insurgent groups to incite violence against refugees. Onoma (2013) recounted that in the year 2000, President Lansana Conte of Guinea called on the nationals to expel Liberian and Sierra Leonean refugees accusing them of rebel incursions in Guinea. While the call resonated with Guineans in Conakry, those in the rural areas resisted the president’s call and rather protected the refugees. The same incidents had happened in the past with local populations protecting refugees in Congo and Uganda (Onoma, 2013).

Though African countries are noted for being hospitable with regard to the hosting of refugees, some countries have become reluctant in doing so citing security concerns (Agblorti, 2011; Adamson, 2006; Jacobsen, 2002). These security threats range from a spill-over of effects of the violence in the sending country into the host country leading to cross-border conflicts between armed groups or refugee/host-community conflicts resulting from distribution or scramble over resources within the host community (Milner, 2000; Stepputat, 2004).

The term Ghanaian hospitality is used to describe the Ghanaian attitude of openness and tolerance towards migrants in general. The hospitable attitude of Ghanaians was shown at the

initial stages of the influx of Liberian refugees to Ghana in 1990. During that period Ghanaians expressed their deep sense of sympathy and hospitality to the refugees by using the limited resources they (the Ghanaians) had to assist those in need (Dick, 2002). This had a positive implication on refugee-host relations. Ghanaians offered land free of charge to Liberian refugees so they could farm and build; took some of the refugees and their children into Ghanaian homes; rented homes to some of the refugees at reduced prices and paid the school fees of those who wanted to continue with their education (Porter et al, 2008). The religious organisations also put in interventions such as supplying food, clothing and financial start-ups for small scale businesses for the Liberian refugees. Over time the refugees in Buduburam spread beyond the camp to live in nearby villages without any resistance from the hosts and many of the refugees praised Ghanaians for their great sense and attitude of hospitality towards them (Boateng, 2010).

The literature indicates that though this sense of hospitality still exists among Ghanaians, it has diminished significantly in recent times (Porter et al, 2008; Boateng, 2010; Omata, 2014). When crime rates in Buduburam Refugee Camp began to rise, associated with commercial sex activities of the Liberian women, the involvement of the youth in pop-culture and ostentatious living, and the protracted nature of the refugee situation, Ghanaians became fed-up with the refugees and started withdrawing support to them (Porter et al, 2008; Boateng, 2010; Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2015). Ghanaians also saw the Liberian refugees as competitors on the job market and started discriminating against them (Omata, 2014).

The establishment of the Krisan, Ampain, Fetentaa, Egyiekrom and the Buduburam refugee camps highlighted the extent of political instability ravaging the West African sub-region, at that time. The gesture of receptivity of Ghana to the refugees also positioned the country as very committed to peace and security both regionally and globally. It can be argued that the

siting and evolution of the Buduburam Refugee Camp from a tiny refugee enclave to a bustling town, spilling over to the Ghana portion of the West African highway and merging with other villages and towns within the vicinity, without any resistance from the host community and the government, also highlights the Ghanaians' sense of hospitality towards foreigners and Ghana government's foreign policy principle of maintaining good neighbourliness for the purposes of enhancing regional trade, peace and security. This showed Ghana's commitment to its regional and international obligations as a member state of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a founding member of the African Union(AU) and a member of the United Nations.

2.7.2 Refugee Settlement and Integration

According to Jacobsen (1997) refugees are oriented differently towards the host community depending on how they are settled. Integration is therefore a give-and-take disposition that requires obligation from refugees, as well as candidness and sustenance from the host society. Heckmann (2016) recognizes integration as equal involvement within the core sectors of society, such as the political, economic, educational, and cultural institutions.

Al-Sharmani's (2004), study of Somali Refugees in Egypt, argues that a new kind of Somali identity within the Somali Diaspora is being constructed by Somalis in Cairo through distinct language and daily practices of Somali Culture in their bid to salvage their dented identity. However, this effort is entangled with privileges to new and old local identities, which result in divisions and a sense of mistrust among the culturally diverse diasporic Somalis (Al-Sharmani, 2004).

Generally, there is a lack of knowledge and understanding of the economic lives of refugees. The little that is known in this regard is limited to their income-generating activities

(Jacobsen, 2014) and their economic impact on host communities (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al., 2012). In the last 15 years, refugee livelihood which the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defined as how refugees 'access their necessities of life, such as food, water, shelter and clothing, has increasingly been perceived by researchers and policymakers as a means of achieving refugees local integration and self-reliance (UNHCR, 2014; Omata, 2014). Sustainable economic opportunities which are key to refugees' integration are, however, a challenge among refugees on the African continent (Bilgili & Loschmann, 2018). Aside from the few non-governmental and international organisations who provide jobs to a substantial proportion of refugees within the camps, refugees are relatively limited in accessing job opportunities outside the camps. This is particular to refugees who do not have the requisite level of education and skills as well as adequate legal access to the labour market. Refugees, thus, engage in family networks and community-based economic activities to gain their daily subsistence and livelihood (Al-Sharmani, 2004; Bilgili., & Loschmann, 2018). Since international non-governmental organisations cannot fully address the employment needs of all refugees and the fact that refugees cannot be perpetually dependant on humanitarian organisations even for basic protection and needs, governments of countries that host refugees have adopted policies and measures to support the economic integration of refugees (Bilgili & Loschmann, 2018). Instead of applying the conventional policy of confining refugees to a camp as pertains to some countries, the Ugandan Government adopted the strategy of self-reliance' of refugees which means that rather than constraining refugees' livelihoods to solely humanitarian relief in the camp, a space is opened for refugees to develop themselves economically within the communities. The Rwandan Government on the other hand structured its refugee policy approach to allow camp refugees the freedom to move outside their designated zones and the right to engage in wage-earning or self-employed activities in the bid to support their integration (Omata, 2014). Betts et al(2012) and Omata (2012) noted that in Kampala, Uganda, some refugees have been

formally employed as teachers, car mechanics and language instructors and the majority of them are self-employed whilst a good number are registered and working in the private and formal sectors of the Ugandan economy. A study by Macchiavello (2003), also disclosed that most of the self-settled or urban refugees in Uganda have been able to find employment and have either achieved self-sufficiency or are on the verge of achieving it. Despite the creation of an enabling environment for refugees to gain employment, Omata (2014) found that some Congolese refugees in Kampala are unable to access employment due to the demand for identity cards by employers before jobs are offered. The existence of bottlenecks such as these where refugees are unable to meet all the criteria for employment hampers their economic integration.

2.7.3 Citizenship, Political Rights and Refugee Settlement/Integration.

Many scholars have argued that citizenship as a political and legal concept is inadequate in providing a comprehensive explanation to the multifaceted and incongruent affiliations and rights that citizens with different socio-cultural backgrounds as well as long-term residents have in migrant and host communities (Brubaker, 1989; Kivisto & Faist, 2009; Tambakaki, 2015). Brubaker (1989) clarifies that citizenship is a misleading criterion for understanding membership in society because, in certain nation-states, citizens trace their affiliation and allegiances from multiple and diverse ethnic and cultural traditions and all these factors determine their identities and the rights that they enjoy. Brubaker's central argument is that whilst citizenship can only capture very forthright legal classifications of people, membership denotes the multifaceted and diverse experiences of different kinds of citizen and non-citizen members of society. Arendt (1968) defined citizenship as the 'right to have rights'. However political rights are bestowed on only citizens or people with similar legal recognition of which refugees are not considered.

In modern nation-states, non-citizens including refugees do not exercise political rights in host countries, as refugees are geographically outside their country of nationality and thus, have challenges with citizenship (Mandal, 2003; Nyers, 2016; Peteet, 2016; Kisson, 2015). Being a refugee could lead to the loss of citizenship and deprivation of not only protection but also all clearly established, nationally recognised identities and rights. Therefore, the physical residence of refugees within the sovereignty and territory of their host nations is not a guarantee of the right to participate in the political structure of the host country (Peteet, 2016). In light of their status as refugees, they are not expected to be politically active and, thus, are legally barred from all political activities during their stay in the host country (Nyers, 2016). The denial of political rights does not mean that refugees are not politically sensitive and concerned with happenings in their environment. However, in the global south, refugees who are hosted in camps are often assumed to remain silent and not exercise agency (Turner, 2006). This assumption explicitly impacts the civic and political integration of refugees in countries where they are regarded as non-citizens.

A study of camp refugees in Ghana by Omata (2017) posits that in a protracted war situation, where refugees remain in exile for a longer duration, they are likely to organise and mobilise other refugees to seek and protect their interests. They may even exercise their agency by advocating for their rights and entitlements through international organisations and political authorities in the host country, despite the limitations in their political rights and freedoms (Omata, 2017). Studies on the political lives of camp refugees by Holzer (2012) and Feldman (2015) proved that refugees are extensively engaged in competitive politicking and within the camps to gain access to power and resources. Omata's (2017) study of refugees in the Buduburam Refugee Camp recounts how Liberian refugees organised themselves according to counties in their home country to effectively seek their welfare. In addition, Liberian refugees in the Buduburam Refugee Camp in Ghana also engaged in ethnopolitics where

former soldiers were recruited and sent back to Liberia to join the fight (Omata, 2017). What called for the ban on refugees' political engagement is when such activities spilled over into the larger society. For instance, in refugee camps in Kenya and Tanzania, the governing agencies and the national authorities have curtailed all political activities because such activism provides fertile grounds for fomenting trouble and fuelling conflict at the origin (Jaji, 2012). The reason behind attempts to de-politicise refugees is based on the supposition that camps are special spaces that provide support to refugees until their restoration into their countries of origin (Hanafi, 2010). Thus whereas refugee camps may be criticised as warehousing for human beings, some host governments find the location of refugees in camps as a sure way of managing and controlling them from any infiltration into the state's political system, as giving them a free movement within the nation may pose a threat to the nations security, in some cases.

2.8 Theoretical Perspectives

This section focuses on the theoretical perspectives and the conceptual framework of the study. It discusses Kunz's Kinetic model and how it could be used to explain refugee movements, their transnational engagements and their durable solution choices. The section also discusses the conceptual framework and how the variables – independent, intermediate and dependent - interrelates to explain the transnational issues and integration influences in the study.

Though three key theories were explored for this study (i.e. the three stage conceptualisation of refugee situations [Voltonen, 2004]; the Push – Pull theory [Lee, 1966]; and the Kunz's Kinetic model of refugee movements [Kunz, 1973; Kunz, 1981]), the Kunz model was chosen for the study due to its suitability and versatility in explaining the refugees' attitudes towards their home countries and the factors that affect their integration in the host country which in

turn informs their transnational engagements with their countries of origin and other third countries.

Valtonen's (2004) model posits that the push factors that lead the people to flee from their countries of origin constitute the Pre-flight stage; the In-settlement stage (which includes issues that facilitate integration in the host community); and the Integration stage, where refugees can participate in the social, political and economic life of the host country as well as the pursuit of settlement goals and substantive citizenship rights. Valtonen's model however, leaned heavily towards the integration of refugees, particularly the settlement processes and difficulties experienced by individual refugees and communities in the West (Valtonen, 2004). Due to its tilt towards integration of refugees, Valtonen's three-stage conceptualisation of refugee situations had limited versatility in explaining both the transnational engagements of refugees with their countries of origin and other third countries and their integration in the host country (which was the main focus of this study).

Deriving from Ravenstein's paper 'Laws of Migration' (Ravenstien, 1889), Lee's (1966) Push-Pull theory summarised the key factors in migration decision making as – factors associated with the area of origin (i.e. push factors), factors associated with the area of destination (i.e. pull factors), intervening obstacles, and personal factors. Push factors refer to the various conditions which compels an individual or a group of people to migrate from a set location to another destination while the pull factors are the strong positives at the destination area which attracts the individual to such a place. Lee (1966) identified the push factors as lack of jobs, few opportunities, primitive conditions, desertification, famine or drought, political fear or persecution, death threats, and poor medical care among others; while the pull factors are job opportunities, better living conditions, political and/or religious freedom, enjoyment, education, and better medical care among others. Between the push and

pull factors Lee (1966) posited that there are ‘intervening obstacles’ (such as physical distance, cultural barriers and political obstacles, and immigration restrictions) and personal characteristics (such as age, sex, and educational level, economic status) that may hinder or propel people from migrating to their desired destination. A refugee is known to be a unique type of migrant who mostly flee from his/her country of origin due to conflicts and the fear of persecution, with the main goal of searching for a place that would guarantee his/her safety and security. The situation of refugees is therefore quite unique in relation to the general migration movements described by Lee in the Push-Pull theory, though refugee situations are subsumed in the theory.

2.8.1 Kunz Kinetic Theory of Displacement and Refugee Movements

Though the Push-pull theory relates in several spheres to refugee movements since they move (i.e. pushed) from usually conflict and violent prone situations and in most cases involuntarily make their way (pulled) to places where they can have their peace and security guaranteed, Kunz (1973, 1981) deriving from the push-pull model, developed a different model to explain refugee movements taking cognisance of their vulnerabilities and the fact that they are a specialised group of migrants in the migration discourse. Kunz’s model constructed as both a motivational and a kinetic model sought to distinguish between movements of free migrants and refugee settlers on one hand; and on the other hand to isolate refugee subtypes from each other (Kunz, 1973). Kunz postulated that the flight and settlement pattern of refugees conform to two kinetic models, the anticipatory refugee movement and the acute refugee movement (Kunz, 1973; Tanle, 2013). Kunz later indentified these two elements as *Displacement Related Factors* (Kunz, 1981).

2.8.1.1 Anticipatory Refugee Movements

The anticipatory refugee senses the danger in advance, plans and moves before a crisis sets in (Stein, 1980 as cited in Tanle, 2013). This is quite similar to voluntary migration or movement where a migrant plans his/her movement in terms of why, when, how and where to move to (Tanle, 2013). Thus they leave their home country well prepared, with a charted route and travelling costs settled and a clear destination in mind, before any military conflicts or generalised violence could distort their orderly movement. They usually arrive in the country of settlement prepared, they may know a bit of the language of the origin or the culture, are usually financially prepared and may have knowledge of about how to re-enter their trade or profession. Most of these refugees are usually educated, alert, and well-to-do (Kunz, 1973). They are often accompanied by their entire family, with their resources intact, and have prepared for a new life. The question of the form of displacement does not arise with anticipatory flights, because anticipatory refugee movements, though triggered by refugee motivations, take place in times when freedom of action, the safety of movement and planned departure are still possible, and therefore their form of departure resemble voluntary migration (Kunz, 1973).

2.8.1.2 Acute Refugee Movements

These movements result from an overwhelming push from war or political crisis or ethnic conflicts or government policy, which requires immediate escape from one's place of usual residence (Stein, 1980 as cited in Tanle, 2013). The acute movement may be a mass flight which includes many who flee because of the atmosphere of panic or hysteria (Tanle, 2013). According to Kunz, model refugees leave their homeland at a moment's notice, which implies their journeys are usually unplanned with the key motivation being their security and safety. They cross their geographical borders into other territories under military pressure, conflict or violence without having any apparent desire to become citizens of another state and

become settlers after sometime in a country willing to offer them hospitality. The acute refugee movement is a total contrast to that of the anticipatory in both selectiveness and movements. Great political changes and movements of armies (in terms of armies quelling rebellion or supporting government against opposing armies when there is a political crisis) informs acute refugee movements (Kunz, 1973). The refugees flee either en masse or, if their flight is obstructed, in bursts of individual or group escapes, and their primary purpose is to reach safety in a neighbouring or nearby country which will grant them asylum (Kunz, 1973). Refugees who find themselves in acute displacement outside their countries of origin may have initially become displaced in a variety of forms including displacement by flight, displacement by force and displacement by absence (Kunz, 1973). The anticipatory and acute movements of the refugees have an impact on their engagements with their country of origin.

In 1981 Kunz reviewed the theory by categorising the social relationships of refugees to the population of their countries of origin into three phases namely: Majority-identified refugees, Events-alienated refugees and Self-alienated Refugees. Kunz classified these three elements as refugees's *Identification of Marginality* under *Home Related Factors* (Kunz, 1981). Kunz's review took into cognisance the fact that individuals who constitute the refugee wave are not equal in their social relationships because some feel more marginal than others towards the society which they left behind- hence the challenges they face in their settlement phase may be traced back to the emotional links they have with and the dependence on their past and their former home country (Kunz, 1981).

2.8.1.3 Majority Identified Refugees

These refugees are firm in their conviction that their opposition to the events in the country of origin is shared by majority of their compatriots (Kunz, 1981). They are usually enthusiastic about their country but not necessarily with the government in power. The majority-identified

are homeward oriented refugees. They identify with their nation, with their homeland and its people but have fled from the current government or social events at home or from a foreign oppressor (Stein, 1980 as cited in Tanle, 2013). The majority-identified refugee can be associated with acute refugee movements as they tend to delay the flight until the danger is paramount, but in most cases, they often long and hope to return home when the threat is over (Tanle, 2013). They are interested in multi-culturalism and may not want to integrate therefore not interested in acculturation.

2.8.1.4 Events-Alienated Refugees

These are refugees who left home because of active or latent discrimination against the groups to which they belong; and they feel irreconcilably isolated from their fellow citizens and have little or no interest in what occurs in their former country (Tanle, 2013). This category of refugees would often seek opportunities to escape and most eager to seek a new identity. Consequently, while acculturation is a likely option for event-related refugees, it is strongly abhorred by majority-identified refugees (Tanle, 2013). This category is uncertain or embittered in their attitude towards their compatriots in the home country because of events immediately preceding the refugee situation or because of past discrimination. They have an original desire to be part of the nation but are embittered because of their rejection by the nation as a whole or by a section of its citizens. They include religious/racial minorities, they were either expelled by their compatriots through anticipatory or acute departure (Kunz, 1981). They usually have a collective knowledge of the events that alienated them in the country of origin and they do not usually entertain the hope of returning to the home country. Having been antagonized by their former compatriots and unable to return, events-alienated refugees look for permanent settlement and frequently become eager assimilationists. The ambivalence of those in this group derives from their original desire to be identified with the

nation, and their subsequent recognition of their rejection by the nation as a whole, or by a section of its citizens (Kunz, 1981).

2.8.1.5 Self-Alienated Refugees


This category of refugees decided to leave their home country not because of any active policy of that society but for a variety of personal reasons which may border on individual philosophies and have no wish to identify themselves with the nation (Kunz, 1981; Tanle, 2013). These self-alienated persons might retain some attachments to the panoramic aspects of their homelands, but their attitudes are overwhelmingly shaped by ideological considerations and their departure is a logical result of their alienation (Kunz, 1981). Other self-alienated exiles turn their energies to preparing a revolution that would change the governments and lifestyle of their homeland, or if possible, the whole world (Kunz, 1981). They may either have high or low traction for transnational engagements. They may retain some attachments to their country of origin but their ideology stems from being victims of alienation. They usually engage in anticipatory refugee moves and are usually well-educated and well-informed.

Kunz (1981) also identified that attitudes of refugees towards displacement can be active or reactive (ref. Figure 2.1). Reactive fate-groups in flight have repeatedly filled history's roads of desperation. The individuals in this category are characteristically the refugees of wars, sudden revolutionary changes and expulsions (Kunz, 1981). The flesh and blood of such refugee movements is supplied by majority-identified refugees. The common characteristic of reactive fate-groups is the nature of their flight; they flee reluctantly, without a solution in sight; they flee because they react to a situation which they perceive to be intolerable (Kunz, 1981).

Purpose groups or self-fulfilling purpose groups almost always comprise persons who became alienated by their insistence on the overriding importance of a certain facet of belief, dogma, or by their passionate pursuit of a form of society that derives its framework from minority ideologies inconsistent with those currently in the home country (Kunz, 1981). Being almost always self-alienated, members of the self-fulfilling purpose groups sometimes leave voluntarily. These categories of refugees may have some ideological national orientation while in exile (Kunz, 1981). Self-alienated refugees continue to live their lives with their key philosophies intact while in the country of asylum and thereby can express their freedoms, especially where the host country guarantees such freedoms.

The majority identified reactive fate groups believe that they share a cause with the majority of their compatriots left behind, many feel guilty for not sharing also their fate with them. This sense of guilt leads some to perceive the existence of a "historic responsibility" which is placed on them, impelling them to work for the cause and compensate for their freedom, by speaking up for those silenced in the home country (Kunz, 1981). For some others in the reactive fate groups, in an effort to forget their past and escape the guilt of leaving their compatriots behind, may engage in a hyperactive search for assimilation and the achievement of material success in the host country. Thus, with regard to country of origin related factors, Kunz posited that refugees' identification/marginality (i.e. either they are majority-identified, events-alienated or self-alienated) informs their attitudes towards their displacement (i.e. reactive fate groups or purpose groups) which in turn informs their ideological and nationalistic orientation abroad towards their home countries (i.e. restoration activists, the passive hurt, eager assimilationist, revolutionary activists, and founders of idealist colonies or utopias). Figure 2.1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the Kunz Kinetic Model.

Figure 2.1: Diagrammatic representation of the Kunz Kinetic Model



Source: Kunz (1981)



Kunz also identified *Host Related Factors* that influence integration in the host country as including cultural compatibility, population policies of the host country and social receptiveness at both the national and community levels in the host community (Kunz, 1981). Kunz identified these three elements as impacting on the integration of the refugees in the host country (Kunz, 1981).

2.8.1.6 Cultural Compatibility

In a linguistically strange environment, the refugees might find themselves excluded and isolated from human contact, and their loneliness may result in depression or even in paranoic hallucinatory reactions (Kunz, 1981). Inability to overcome the gap created by unaccustomed values and practices could similarly lead to inhibition and withdrawal from human contacts (Kunz, 1981). If, in contrast, the refugees find a sufficient number of people in their new home who speak their language and share their values, traditions, lifestyle, religion, political views and food habits, and they can anticipate and evaluate their hosts' actions and responses, the integration will be accelerated and eventual identification with the new country (Kunz, 1981). Thus the main elements of cultural compatibility at the destination includes an appreciation of the language, values, traditions, religion, politics, food and interpersonal relations in the host country (Kunz, 1981).

2.8.1.7 Population Policies of Host Countries

Kunz (1981) identified two categories of societies in host countries which informs population policies, namely: augmentative societies and self-sufficient societies. Some less-populated countries actively support population growth through immigration. Such augmentative societies are likely to look at the refugee as a sought after and valued immigrant who is expected to contribute to the nation's numerical growth (Kunz, 1981). In contrast, demographically self-sufficient countries are less likely to accept large numbers of refugees.

Because they are not particularly anxious to retain and assimilate new arrivals they are less likely to press the refugee to abandon home-oriented outlook and activities (Kunz, 1981). Thus whereas the augmentative societies are receptive to refugees the self-sufficient societies are usually protectionist in outlook with regard to their resources and values hence they are not very receptive or accommodating to refugees (Kunz, 1981). Self-sufficient societies are usually averse to multiculturalism and diversity since they consider it as adulteration of the originality of their cultural and traditional value systems (Kunz, 1981).

2.8.1.8 Social Receptiveness

The level of social receptiveness of the host country will depend on whether it is a monistic (assimilationist), pluralistic (selective integrationists) or sanctuary (tolerant) society (Kunz, 1981). Augmentative societies, as noted earlier, have a high potential of making assimilation of the refugee quite transactional where the refugee pays a price in exchange for the privilege of being admitted (Kunz, 1981). The degree of conformity which they would demand from the newcomer would depend on their social receptiveness: monistic societies are less likely to be hospitable to people who cling to their differing cultures than pluralistic societies of broader experience (Kunz, 1981). The demands for conformity made by a monistic society are thus less damaging if directed towards the events-alienated refugees who, having been antagonized by their former compatriots and unable to return is usually on the lookout for a permanent settlement and frequently become eager assimilationists (Kunz, 1981). The same demands can exert great stress on the majority-identified refugees who are homeward looking as they will see it as coercion in the faces of what they will consider as a premature and emotionally charged choices (Kunz, 1981). The opportunities for advancement which augmentative societies may offer to refugees would be dependent on whether they are multi-ethnic, pluralistic communities receptive to everyone or monoethnic, monistic communities who are quite discriminatory, giving significant preference to sib-arrivals (or related people with same/similar traits) from countries of affinity while keeping only the servant door open

to nationals of other races and traditions not in conformity with their values and system (Kunz, 1981). Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (except for South Africa which is noted for xenophobic tendencies) are not in the habit of such discriminatory behaviour since they are in their early developmental stages, with a still fluid social order. Countries of this nature are noted to be hospitable and receptive to migrants and refugees, as can be alluded to in the case of Ghana. Hence refugees are not expected to face pure discrimination or xenophobia, though they may face elements of 'otherness' from indigenes or host community members. Monoethnic or monistic tendency finds more expression within societies that have passed their fluid stage and become more organised enough to repel from their higher echelons the intrusion of non-sib arrivals i.e. refugees or migrants who may have socio-cultural characteristic or traditions and belief systems that are different from the indigenes the host community/country (Kunz, 1981).

As illustrated in Figure 2.1, The three key elements of Kunz Kinetic theory i.e. home related factors (identification/marginality, attitude to displacement, ideological-nationalists orientation abroad); displacement related factors (anticipatory and acute movements); and home related factors (cultural compatibility, population policies, and social receptiveness of host communities), as single entities or combined factors influence the transnational ties of refugees, their integration in host country and their decisions on the options of durable solutions to choose from

2.9 Conceptual Framework


The Conceptual Framework (Figure 2.2) typifies the key issues in transnationalism and integration for refugees. The framework was adapted from Kunz model of displacement and refugee movements. The dependent variables in the study are transnationalism and integration which are categorised into social, cultural, economic and political spheres. These are influenced by the independent variables which are the background characteristics of the

refugees and the country of origin factors which are refugees' identification/marginality, attitude towards their displacement and ideological-nationalist orientation abroad. The intermediate variables that potentially mediate their transnational activities and integration include host country related factors, third country related factors and the refugees' individual or group agency.

The framework posits that refugees are not likely to engage in political, cultural, social and economic transnational activities; refugees who engage in transnational political activities are less likely to engage politically in the host country; refugees who engage in cultural transnational activities are less likely to be culturally integrated into the host country; and refugees who are not involved in social and economic transnational activities are more likely to be socially and economically integrated in the host country. In a nutshell, the transnational engagements of refugees may influence their integration or non-integration in the host country in one way or the other.

Furthermore, the framework recognises the importance of intermediary variables such as the host country factors, third-country factors and refugee agency (i.e. either individual agency or group agency). Refugees' engagement in transnational activities and integration could be mediated by host country factors, third country factors and the refugees own agency. If there are enabling factors in the host country, such as good policies for refugee integration, favourable socio-economic, cultural and political climate, hosts' positive attitudes to refugees and openness to receive/accept refugees, refugees are more likely to integrate in the host country and may engage less in transnational activities. However, if host country factors are adverse towards refugees they are more likely to be attracted to third country pull factors and less likely to integrate into the host country. Refugees may also use their own individual or group agency to adapt to the circumstances in the host country.

Figure 2.2: Conceptual Framework showing the relationship between Transnational Activities and Integration



Source: Adapted from Kunz Kinetic Model (1981)



Lastly, the independent variables such as the socio-demographic factors and country of origin related factors also influence refugees' integration in the host country and their engagement in transnational activities. Younger refugees who have not experienced the innate cultural and social traditions of their country of origin are more likely to be integrated in the host country compared to elderly refugees who may be considered as custodians of their home country's culture. Also refugees who are married but have had their families separated due to the refugee situation are more likely to engage in transnational activities particularly if they left their spouses and families in the homeland. They may have a desire to either integrate or not integrate in the host country. Home country related factors such as refugees' marginality/identification (that is whether they are majority-identified, events-alienated or self-alienated refugees), their attitude towards their displacement (reactive fate groups or purpose groups) and their ideological-nationalistic orientation abroad, have a critical influence on their transnational engagements and integration alike. Other country of origin factors such as cessation of hostilities, emergence of real democratic values, the absence of the threat of persecution in the homeland, and a stable and peaceful homeland may draw others to engage the homeland and eventually decide to voluntarily return to the country of origin.

2.10 Key observations from reviewed literature and its influence on methodological choices for study.

Key lessons and observations made from the literature included the fact the definition of the refugee kept mutating depending on dispensation, context and geographical location of the refugees (i.e. Europe and Asia, continental America and Africa) as well as the exigencies of the time when it comes to forced migration; and the fear persecution as a result of race, ethnicity/tribe, religion, nationality and membership of a specific social group or political opinion remained the main bane of the refugee (AOU Convention, 1969; Refugee

Convention, 1951; Cartagena Declaration, 1981). The marginalisation, stigmatisation and the ‘othering’ of refugees in almost the host community contexts of the literature review was also highlighted (Kissoon, 2005, Foster 2007; Zetter, 2007; Agblorti 2011; and Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011). This was expressed in negative tags given to refugees such as expellees, exiles and threat to national security among others (Cameron, 2014; Adamson 2006; Dowty & Loescher, 1996). Limitations on natural and economic resources to support livelihoods, as well as envy by host communities regarding international humanitarian assistance to refugees also resulted in refugee-host community conflict and tensions (Konyndyk 2005; Agblorti, 2011; Lawrie & van Damme, 2003). Ethnic conflicts, political instability, wars, and other infringement of human rights also necessitated refugee movements across international boundaries (Liwanga, 2010; Kando 2012; Rugunanan & Smit, 2011).

Refugee populations had increased year on year due to increase in conflicts across the world and the most energetic young people below age 18, who could have formed the labour force of the respective countries found themselves in other, countries apart from their own, as refugees (UNHCR, 2017; UNDESA, 2019; IOM, 2020). Also developed countries were hosting the huge chunk of the world’s refugee population (i.e. 86%) while the advanced countries protected themselves with stringent anti-migrant laws (UNHCR, 2014). Increased conflicts in the West African sub-region also led to the refugee populations that has remained in host countries till date (Mensah, 2009; Kandoh, 2012). Host countries also found expression in protecting the rights and welfare of refugees through the ratification of international conventions and the enactment of local laws such as the Ghana Refugee Law, 1992, pertaining to Ghana. Protracted refugee situations were found in most countries on the continent due to unending conflicts in refugee-producing countries and this impacted negatively on the already ailing economies of the host countries, resulting in discontent and discrimination against refugees and in some cases, xenophobia (Milner & Loescher,

2011, Milner, 2014). With regards to durable solutions, the key aspiration of almost every refugee was to resettle in a Western country for the sake of exploring greener pastures (Al-Sharmani, 2004). The stringent immigrations laws of the developed countries became a hindrance to refugees' aspirations of third country re-settlement.

The place of settlement of refugees in the host countries also impacted them negatively or positively in several ways. However the literature indicated that refugees in urban areas had better opportunities in terms of jobs, employment, transnational engagements and integration than those in the camps or rural areas. Refugees in camps located in rural areas used to have conflicts with host communities with regards to access to limited natural resources for their livelihoods (Jacobsen, 2002). Also integration becomes difficult for them and their skills were limited opportunities available for them in the rural areas – farming, fishing, animal husbandry among others. The exclusion of camp refugees were however highlighted as given their location, interactions with the local host communities was a challenge.

Refugee transnationalism was also distinguished from migrant transnationalism in several ways given the vulnerabilities of the refugees compared to ordinary migrants in the host country as well as their relations with their countries of origin. Regardless of their predicament, refugees managed to engage transnationally with kin and friends in the home country in various spheres but mostly economic as seen in the works of Al-Ali et al (2001), Muller (2008), Mascini (2012), Campbell (2007) and Omata (2012). Technology particularly ICT played a key role in refugee transnational engagements, and their integration as well but sometimes exposing them to danger as well in the case of surveillance from hostile state and non-state actors (Bacishoga, Hooper & Johnston, 2016; Leung, 2011; Dijstelbloem & Meijer, 2009). Home and its definition posed an issue for refugees due to the supposed transience of their stay in the host country which sometimes becomes protracted, as well as the issue of

‘doubly homelessness’ and ‘triply homelessness’ described by Kissoon (2015). The emotional lacuna created as a result of forced displacement from their countries of origin may pose psychological issues for many a refugee as noted by Dieterich-Hartwell and Koch (2017). This is however restituted to some extent as they create a semblance of their home at where possible in the host country. The literature also showed that some refugees are resourceful and entrepreneurial, and that depending on their skills set and the environment in which they find themselves they are able to economic opportunities to support their livelihoods, as identified in the works of Betts et al (2014) with Ugandan refugees. Refugees, like any other migrants, also expressed their agency through several ways.

Integration was also a challenge for many a refugee due to the cultural differences between the host communities and the refugees. However in some areas the African tradition of hospitality played a significant role in their integration or non-integration in the host community. Whereas as some countries were open to migrants, others were also averse to migrants and this created problems for the refugees. The literature indicated that refugees sometimes faced discrimination at market places as they were seen as competitors (Omata, 2014). The literature also explored how refugees navigated around political issues in the host country, in their camps, as well as the bans that was placed on such activities. The review of the literature fed into the choice of Theory for the study i.e. Kunz Kinetic Theory. The home related factors, displacement related factors and host related factors informed the direction of the study.

The research design and methodology employed by most of the literature reviewed heavily leaned on the qualitative methods including in-depth interviews (Agblorti, 2011); focused group discussions (FDGs) and interviews (Dzeamesi, 2008; Yorke, 2013); and FDGs, in-depth interviews, detail daily diary, participant observation, ethnographic camp diaries, and

life histories (Porter et al, 2008; Miller & Slatter 2000). Some of the studies also applied the mixed methods approach like FDGs, in-depth interviews and household surveys (Grabska, 2006; Codjoe et al 2013). Refer to Appendix G for the table illustrating the research methodology used by some of the authors whose works have been reviewed in this study.

This study leaned on the key topics and lessons derived from the literature reviewed as well as the methodological choices of the authors, to inform its choice of methodology as well. The mixed method approach was therefore chosen to balance the facts in the study (deriving from the lessons learnt in literature review), to capture the general views of refugees as well as their experiences in their trajectory from their homeland through to the host country, their transnational ties and their integration.



CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter elucidates the methodology used in conducting the study. It covers the research design, sources of data, target population, sample size, sampling procedure and data collection. The chapter further discusses the measurement of variables, data analysis and presentation phases, the challenges and limitations of the study and ethical considerations.

3.2 Study Areas


Given the obvious dynamics of the population of refugees in Ghana and the country's history of being a haven to refugees mostly from the West African sub-Region and other parts of the world; the Ampain and Krisan refugee camps, and the Greater Accra Region (GAR) were purposively selected for the study (GRB, 2020; Tanle, 2013; UNHCR, 2019). The Krisan Refugee Camp was selected because it is the most diverse of all the refugee camps while Ampain Refugee Camp was selected for the homogeneity of its population, as over 90% of the refugee population in Ampain Refugee Camp are Ivorians (GRB, 2020). The GAR and its immediate environs were also selected because most of the urban refugees are located in the GAR, they are not restricted to a specific area, and are permitted to live and work among the urban residents (GRB, 2020).

Refugees in Ghana are classified based on where they are settled after they arrived in the country, that is, the place they reside upon arrival (GRB, 2020). The UNHCR office in Ghana, in 2017, reported that a little over 50% of the refugees in Ghana are living in four refugee camps while the urban refugees were settled in the Buduburam settlement and the GAR. The four refugee camps are the Ampain and Krisan Refugee camps in the Western Region,

Egyeikrom Refugee Camp in Central Region, and Fetentaa Refugee Camp in Bono Region.

Figure 3.1 shows the new map of Ghana with the sixteen administrative regions and the locations of the refugee camps.

Figure 2.3: Map of Ghana showing refugee camps in Ghana



Source: Geography Dept. University of Ghana (2020)

The map shows that three out of the four refugee camps in Ghana (i.e. the Krisan, Ampain and Egyeikrom refugee camps) and the Buduram Refugee Settlement, are located in the southern part of the country nearly along coastline, while the Fetentaa refugee camp is located in the mid-Western part of the country. The research concentrated on the refugees located in the southern part as they are representative of the mix of nationalities needed for the study. As discussed earlier, the Krisan Refugee Camp presents a mix of nationalities (about 16 nationalities); the Ampain Refugee Camp has over 90% of its residents being Ivorians; the Buduburam Refugee Settlement and its immediate environs presented a mix of nationalities as well with Liberian refugees being predominant; while the GAR also presented a mix of nationalities for the study. Egyeikrom Refugee Camp in the southern part and Fetentaa camp in the mid-western part of the country are predominantly made up of Ivorian refugees, so the choice of the Ampain Refugee Camp was appropriate as it is also predominantly made up of Ivorian refugees.

Located close to Ghana's western border with Cote d'Ivoire, the Ampian and Krisan camps were chosen in order to explore the transnational dynamics of the refugees (particularly the Ivorian refugees) as they happen to be closer to their country than the other refugees from Sudan, Sierra Leone, Togo, Central Africa Republic and Chad residing the Krisan Refugee Camp, whose location is far away from their country of origin. The Egyeikrom and Fetentaa refugee camps are predominantly an Ivoirian population, hence their non-inclusion in the study as Ampain presented the same set of population (Ivoirians) for the study.

The policy of the Government of Ghana does not restrict refugees only to camps, it also consider the urban areas as legitimate protection space where refugees can also live and work (GRB, 2020; UNHCR, 2020). Though some of the self-settled or urban refugees are known to have settled in some of the major cities in Ghana such as Sunyani, Kumasi, and Takoradi,

the GRB and UNHCR-Ghana estimate that majority of the urban refugee population in Ghana can be found in the Greater Accra Region (particularly in the capital city of Accra, and the port city, Tema) as well as the Buduburam Refugee Settlement and its immediate environs (GRB, 2020; UNHCR 2017). The UNHCR also reported that some Togolese refugees are settled in the Volta Region, mainly along the border towns of Aflao, Ho and Hohoe (UNHCR, 2017).

Together with asylum-seekers, refugees are categorised as People of Concern (UNHCR, 2019). UNHCR (2019) indicates that the People of Concern in Ghana are from about 37 nationalities, with the five largest countries of origin being Cote d’Ivoire (6,930 people), Togo (3,514 people), Liberia (735 people), Sudan (642 people) and the Arab Republic of Syria (242 people). Women represent 46.7% of people of concern in Ghana (UNHCR, 2019). The total population for the four refugee camps and urban refugees is estimated at 13,236 (UNHCR, 2017). Table 3.1 shows the refugee population in Ghana according to their place of residence.

Table 3.1: Population of refugees and their place of residence in Ghana.

Place of residence	Population
Greater Accra & it environs (i.e. urban refugees)	6,585
Egyeikrom Refugee Camp	1,459
Ampain Refugee Camp	3,442
Krisan Refugee Camp	767
Fetentaa Refugee Camp	983
Total	13,236

Source: UNHCR, 2017

3.2.1 Ampain Refugee Camp

The Ampain Refugee Camp is located on 32 acres of land in the Ellembelle District of the Western Region of Ghana. It was established on 19th March, 2011 (GRB, 2020; UNHCR, 2017). Ampain Refugee Camp is the largest camp in Ghana as it hosts 51% of the camp

refugees in the country (UNHCR, 2020). The host community of this refugee camp, Ampain is a small community of about 1,100 inhabitants who are predominantly of the Nzema ethnic group. It is located about 57 kilometres from the Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire border town of Elubo, which is two kilometres from Kamgbuli and about seven kilometres from Esiana. The inhabitants are mainly fisher folks and smallholder farmers who grow mostly rubber and cassava. Other alternative economic activities that the inhabitants in the community engage in include working as temporary workers and support staff in the newly established Ghana Gas Pipeline and ongoing road construction projects in the community. There is the presence of several pockets of small-scale mining activities in the area as well (GRB, 2020).

The GRB indicated that this camp was the first of the three camps that were established to accommodate displaced Ivoirians escaping from the hostilities that followed the 2010 Presidential Elections in Cote d'Ivoire. The camp currently provides shelter for 3,442 refugees and out of this number, a little over one percent are other nationals who were domiciled in Cote d'Ivoire during the political crisis whereas the majority are Ivorians (GRB, 2020; UNHCR, 2017). For administrative purposes, the Ampain Refugee Camp has been divided into two areas namely Area A and Area B. Area A has 45% of the population and Area B has 55% of the population. Both GRB (2020) and UNHCR (2017) estimated the camp's refugee population at 3,442. Staff seconded from the National Disaster Management Organisation (NADMO) to the GRB are responsible for the management of the camp. There is one police post with nine police officers and one fire officer. These officers are tasked to ensure the security of the camp and they are rotated monthly. There is also a 30 member refugee Neighborhood Watch Team (NEWAT) in place which supports the Police in ensuring security in the camp (GRB, 2020). The camp largely remains calm though there are occasional security incidents that are dealt with. The close collaboration between the camp management and the national security apparatus enhances the security and peaceful nature of the camp.

Ampain has a community school, comprising of a daycare, a primary and Junior High School. There is no health center in the community so Ampain residents access healthcare from the Esiama and Kamgbuli health centers, with major cases sent to the Saint Martin De Porres Hospital in Eikwe, approximately 13 Kilometers away (GRB, 2020).

3.2.2 Krisan Refugee Camp

This refugee camp is situated on 174 acres of land about one kilometre north of the three coastal communities of Krisan, Sanzule and Eikwe in the Western Region (Agblorti, 2011). Krisan Refugee Camp was set up in 1996 to accommodate the second wave of Liberians who fled the conflict in their country (Agblorti, 2011; GRB, 2020). Some Togolese refugees were also relocated to the Krisan Refugee Camp between 1997 and 1998 after the closure of the Klikor Camp in the Volta Region (GRB, 2020). Agblorti (2011) further added that the camp started hosting refugees from Sierra Leone and other African countries in 1997. Between August and September 2006, 11 African countries were represented in the Krisan Refugee Camp in terms of nationality. These countries were Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Togo (Agblorti, 2011). The UNHCR (2017) observed that Liberians, Sudanese and Togolese formed the majority of the refugees at the Krisan Refugee camp. There were 14 other countries of origin represented in the camp. As a result of the different nationalities, the Krisan Refugee Camp has been described as 'a melting pot of different cultures' by Agblorti (2011). The population in this camp as of February 2017 (i.e. 767) makes it the smallest refugee camp in the country. The Krisan Refugee Camp has a community school, but does not have a health center therefore the refugees have to rely on the Saint Martin De Porres Catholic Hospital located in nearby Eikwe (GRB, 2020). As with all camps in Ghana, the Krisan Refugee Camp is managed by the National Disaster Management Organization (NADMO) staff seconded to Ghana Refugee Board.

Krisan community has an estimated population of 1,500 and is a rural settlement under the Atuabo Paramouncy in the Ellembelle District (GRB, 2020). Majority of its residents are of the Nzema ethnic group (GRB, 2020). Farming, fishing and petty trading are the main economic activities in the community (Agblorti, 2011). Raffia is the main crop of economic importance grown by the farmers in Krisan (GRB, 2020). GRB has indicated that the establishment of the Ghana Gas Pipeline Project has provided an alternative employment opportunity for the people in the Krisan community. The people of Krisan are ruled by a chief, but they are under the jurisdiction of the Atuabo Paramouncy. They of Krisan are very hospitable, and have been living in peace with the refugees in the Krisan Camp since 1996 (GRB, 2020).

3.2.3 Greater Accra Region

The Greater Accra Region (GAR), particularly the Accra Metropolitan Area and surrounding areas (including the Buduburam Refugee Settlement), hosts most of the urban refugees in Ghana (GRB, 2020). There is no refugee camp within the Accra Metropolitan Area, however, within its immediate environs is the Buduburam Refugee Settlement which used to be a camp till its status changed to a settlement in 2011. The countries of origin of some of these urban refugees are Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Togo (GRB, 2020; UNHCR, 2019). The GRB with assistance from the Ghana office of the UNHCR, manages and provides protection and assistance to the urban refugees, registered in Ghana. As UNHCR's implementing partners, the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG) and the National Catholic Secretariat (NCS) also provide additional material support to urban refugees. UNHCR (2017) revealed that there are about 6,585 urban refugees.

3.3 Research Design

The mixed research methods design was employed for the study. Thus, a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in the data collection, analysing and presentation of the findings (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007). The study specifically used the sequential explanatory mixed research method approach (also known as a two-phase model) where the quantitative data were first collected and followed by the collection of qualitative data to help explain or elaborate the quantitative findings (Creswell, 2009, 2012, 2014; Saunders et al., 2012). This design was deemed most appropriate because the quantitative data and results provided a general picture of the research problem while the qualitative data collected refined, extended or explained the general picture (Creswell, 2014). The mixed research method approach has the advantage of leveraging on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative research methods, and offsetting the weaknesses of both methods (Creswell & Clark, 2018; Creswell, 2012, 2014; Kumar, 2014). Teye (2012) noted that the quantitative method and qualitative method when applied exclusively, may not be sufficient to guarantee the full understanding of the issues in a particular study. Thus, there are usually gaps in the full appreciation of issues in a particular study if a single approach is used. Quantitative research can be used to statistically analyse and produce results that can help to assess the frequency and magnitude of a research problem but it cannot provide an in-depth understanding of the research problem from different perspectives which is the strength of qualitative research. Teye (2012) further noted that the quantitative approach is unique in its use of statistical techniques for analysing quantifiable data, and is useful for generalizations and predictions. Though the quantitative research method has the capacity for model specification and the establishment of the nature of correlations between different variables, it is not very good for explaining behaviours and perceptions, and measurements in quantitative research tend to detach findings from real-world contexts (Castro, Kellison, Boyd, & Kopak, 2010; Moghaddam, Walker, & Harre, 2003). While qualitative research

makes up for most of the weaknesses of quantitative research, it is deficient because of the personal interpretations made by the researcher, the ensuing bias created by this, and the difficulty in generalizing findings to a large group because of the limited number of participants studied (Creswell & Clark, 2007). Despite these weaknesses, the qualitative research methods - including the use of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation - are very good for generating detailed data on the experiences, perceptions, emotions, beliefs, and behaviours of respondents (Teye, 2010). Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) found that the mixed methods research approach is good for seeking convergence and corroboration of results from different methods; for the complementarity (i.e., seeking elaboration and clarification of the results from one method with results from another method). For instance, in studying the transnational practices and integration of refugees - whereas quantifiable data from questionnaires gives general rates, and percentages which are necessary for showing frequencies of responses to particular questions, the reasons behind the trend of particular results could only be ascertained using qualitative approaches such as in-depth/key informant interviews and observations. The mixed method research approach, therefore, helps to expand and broaden the dimension of the research and enhances the validity of the findings (Teye, 2012).

Despite the key benefits of mixed methods stated above, there are challenges associated with its usage. Mixed methods can lead to an expansion and broadening of the scope of the research than initially planned; and it is laborious, time consuming and very expensive to conduct a mixed methods research (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; Creswell and Clark, 2010). Teye (2012) has also noted that the cost of hiring research assistants, accommodation, transportation costs as well as their coordination can be a challenge in developing countries where reliable transportation and telecommunication networks are limited. Teye (2012) identified other key challenges of mixed methods as follows: difficulties in the integration of

findings; challenges in prioritization of research methods; conflicts in data interpretation and choice of sample size; and the challenge of adapting to the dynamism of positionalities compared to those using a single approach.

Regardless of its shortcomings, the mixed-methods approach was found to be very suitable for the study as it brought to the fore the key issues of generalisations from the quantitative data, and the very experiential nature of the participants lived experiences during the flight stage, host country experiences, and issues relating to their integration, in the qualitative data. In this study for instance, elements such as the socio-demographic characteristics of the refugees, their channels of communication, and their transnational practices were quantitatively assessed, while the reasons for their transnational engagements and the influences these engagements have on their integration in the host country were generally assessed qualitatively. The mixed method approach served a very good purpose for this research since it presented the lived experiences of the refugees (through the qualitative interviews) as well as the general issues in refugee situations, through the survey.

3.4 Sources of Data

This study used primary data (i.e. a survey, key informant interviews and indepth interviews) and other secondary sources of information. The data were collected from Urban refugees in the GAR and its immediate environs including the Buduburam Refugee Settlement; and the Krisan and Ampain refugee camps in the Western Region. The sources of secondary data included national and local reports (monthly, bi-monthly and annual), administrative material and other relevant documents from the UNHCR Ghana, the Ministry of Interior, the Ghana Refugee Board and Ghana Immigration Service as well as relevant media reportage on migration and refugee issues. Other reference materials were also source from relevant websites and electronic libraries. The secondary sources of data were essential in the

commencement of the review of the literature and in analysing the data to find answers to the formulated questions and objectives set out for this study (Blumberg et al., 2011; Creswell, 2012). The data collected about the refugee population and living conditions from the Ghana Refugee Board, for instance, proved to be of fairly high quality.

3.5 Study and Target Population

The population of this study comprised refugees (both male and female) from African countries residing in Ghana, officials who deal with refugee issues, and some community members living around refugee camps. These refugees reside in the Greater Accra Region and its immediate environs (including the Buduburam Refugee Settlement), the Ampain and Krisan refugee camps in the Western Region.

3.6 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria

According to Polit and Beck (2004), eligibility criteria usually indicate the characteristics that people in the population should have in order to be included in a study. The eligibility criteria for including participants in the study were as follows:

- i. Must be a refugee who is either a female or male aged 18 years or above.
- ii. Must have attained the status as a refugee for at least 2 years.
- iii. Must be resident as a camp refugee in the Krisan and Ampain refugee camps in the Western Region and/or an urban refugee in the GAR and its immediate environs including the Buduburam Refugee Settlement.
- iv. In the case of key informants, one must be an official of the key organisations managing refugee issues in Ghana or a member of the host community.

3.7 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

The sampling frame for the quantitative research was 10,794 and it comprised of the total population of urban refugees in the Greater Accra Region (GAR) and its immediate environs (including the Buduburam Refugee Settlement), the refugee population of the Ampain and Krisan refugee camps in the Western Region (UNHCR, 2017). The population of urban refugees in the GAR and its environs was 6,585, the Ampain Refugee Camp was 3,442 and that of Krisan Refugee Camp was 767 (UNHCR, 2017). Thus, the total population of 10,794 (i.e. the population of the selected study areas above) was used to determine the sample size. The Yamane's (1967) formula then used to calculate sample size for the study. The formula used a 96% confidence level and 0.04 level of precision. Below is the formula:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)} \dots \dots \dots \text{equation 1}$$

Where n is the sample size, N is the population size, and e is the level of precision.

By substituting 10,794 into equation 1, we have:

$$n = \frac{10794}{1 + 10794(0.04^2)}$$

$$n = \frac{10794}{1 + 17.2704}$$

$$n = \frac{10794}{18.2704}$$

$$n \cong 591$$

Therefore, the estimated total sample size for the quantitative aspect of the study was 591.

Multi-stage sampling technique which combined both probability and non-probability sampling procedures was used to select the participants from the sampling frame. Some non-probability sampling procedures have been recommended for use in quantitative research provided it helps to meet the requirements of this type of research (Kumar, 2014). This

sampling procedure was appropriate because it helped to ensure fair representation and diversity, especially with the size of the refugee population and nationalities represented in each of the study areas. Thus, the multi-stage sampling procedure was conducted in two stages. For the first stage, the study purposively selected two refugee camps (the Ampain and Krisan camps) and the urban refugees in the GAR and its immediate environs. The camps were selected based on the diverse/heterogeneous as well as the homogeneous nature of their refugee populations (in terms of their nationalities) while the urban refugee population was selected because they are in the urban area and mostly self-settled, with no restrictions in their movements and residence (GRB, 2020). Hence, the GAR and its environs (for urban refugees) together with Ampain and Krisan refugee camps (for camp refugees) were selected as the study areas. After the selection of the study areas, this study noted that two of the study areas (i.e. Ampain Refugee Camp & Greater Accra) have a fairly large population (i.e. 6,585, and 3,442 respectively) compared to Krisan Refugee Camp (767). Each of the three study areas was divided into various clusters after which a simple random sampling method was used to select participants from the sampling frame. To ensure that the refugees of different nationalities stood an equal chance of being selected, a simple random sampling by proportional allocation was used to select respondents from the Ampain Refugee Camp and Greater Accra while a convenient sample of 110 was chosen from the Krisan Refugee Camp. A sample size of 110 was chosen from the Krisan Refugee Camp to ensure a fair representation of the over 16 nationalities represented in the camp. The urban refugee population in GAR and its environs (including refugees from the Buduburam Refugee Settlement) had a higher number of homogeneous refugee population of Liberian nationals, and the population of refugees in the Ampain Refugee Camp was also homogeneous with over 90% being of Ivorian nationals.

The sample size of 481 was derived after the deduction of the convenience sample of 110 (from the Krisan Refugee Camp) from the total sample size of 591. Below is the formula that this study came up with to determine Ampain Refugee Camp and Greater Accra's proportion of the 481:

$$sn = \frac{SS}{\Sigma 2SAs} \times n \dots \dots \dots \text{equation 1}$$

Where *sn* is the sample size for the respective study area, *SS* is the total sample size for the two study areas apart from Krisan Refugee Camp, *n* is the refugee population in each study area, and $\Sigma 2SAs$ is the sum of the refugee population for Ampain Refugee Camp and Greater Accra and its environs. Statistically, using Greater Accra and its environs as an example:

$$sn = \frac{481}{(6585 + 3442)} \times 6585 \dots \dots \dots \text{equation 1}$$

$$sn = \frac{481}{10,027} \times 6585$$

$$sn = 0.048 \times 6585$$

$$sn \cong 316$$

Hence, the sample size for the GAR and its environs was 316 and that of Ampain Refugee Camp was 165, while the convenient sample from the Krisan Refugee Camp was 110 making the total sample size of 591. Purposive sampling was used throughout the three study areas at the final stage to have access to respondents with the key variables identified under the inclusion and exclusion criteria for this study.

For the qualitative research, a combination of purposive and snowball sampling techniques together with the assistance of gatekeepers were engaged in locating and selecting respondents based on the key variables identified under inclusion and exclusion criteria for this study. Maxwell (1997) notes that purposive sampling is a type of sampling in which, 'particular settings, persons, or events are deliberately selected for the important information

they can provide that cannot be gotten as well from other choices” (pg. 87). According to White (2000), the researcher picks that sample they think is most suitable and will ‘deliver the best information to satisfy the research objectives in question’ (pg. 63). Thus, the units or cases for the study are selected ‘based on a specific purpose rather than randomly’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003, pg. 713). Thirty (30) refugees were successfully interviewed for the qualitative aspects of the study. Additionally, four (4) officials of the GRB and three (3) opinion/community leaders were also interviewed, ref. Appendices E and F for the profile of the refugees, GRB officials and community members interviewed. The recruitment of multiple gatekeepers was essential as refugees are a ‘hard-to-research’ population. The research also addressed the issues of selection and gatekeepers’ bias associated with the use of snowball sampling (Atkinson & Flint, 2001; Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981; Creswell, 2009, 2014).

3.8 Data Collection

A survey questionnaire was used in collecting the quantitative data while interview guides were used for qualitative data collection. These instruments were considered appropriate for the collection of primary data as the mixed methods approach was being used for the study. The instruments also had the advantage of capturing both general views of refugees as well as their lived experiences in terms of the reasons for their engagements in transnational activities, and issues bothering on their integration in Ghana.

3.8.1 Survey

White (2000) explained that the survey questionnaire is ‘a series of questions, each one providing some alternative answers from which the respondents can choose’ (p. 50). The survey questionnaire was useful for getting information on the general views of the refugees regarding the objectives and purpose of the research while the in-depth interviews delved into

the reasons behind some of the answers gotten from the quantitative data. A self-completed questionnaire with seven sections was designed for this study. Section One collected data on the refugees' socio-demographic characteristics. Section Two focused on their migration trajectory from their countries of origin to their present destination in Ghana where they were given refugee status. Sections Three, Four and Five were on the refugees' transnational practices or engagements related to the country of origin and third countries and channels of communications they used in these transnational engagements. Sections Six and Seven were on their integration and the impact of transnationalism on integration (See Appendix A for the designed questionnaire).

The researcher with two research assistants administered the questionnaire in the English language and face-to-face to the refugees sampled. For the survey, a limited number of the respondents in the Ivorian cohort could speak only French and a few within the Sudanese cohort could speak only Arabic. One of the Research Assistants was multi-lingual and could speak English, French and the Ewe languages so he focused on administering the questionnaire to the Ivorians and the Togolese. A third Research Assistant who has been undertaking Arabic interpretation during GRB and UNHCR workshops for the refugees was also recruited to administer the questionnaire to a limited number of Sudanese refugees who could not express themselves adequately in the English language.

Before the administration of the survey questionnaire, it was pre-tested in Accra among 10 refugees during a validation exercise organised by the GRB. The pre-test helped to establish the validity of the questionnaire but their responses were excluded during the analysis stage (Saunders et al., 2012). Four hundred and seventy (470) eligible respondents duly answered all the questions for the survey after a clean-up of the questionnaires that were retrieved. The

total response rate was 79.5% for the survey. This rate was representative of the study population and reasonable to conduct an analysis.

3.8.2 Measurement of Variables

3.8.2.1 Independent Variables

Age: Age was measured how old in years the respondents were. Respondent's age was further categorised into below 20 years; 20-29 years; 30-39 years; 40-49 years; 50-59 years; 60 years and above.

Sex: The sex of the respondents was categorised as male or female based on their biological make-up.

Education: The highest level of education that the respondent has attained. The level of education was classified as no formal education; basic education, Junior High School or Middle School education; Senior High School; Vocational, Technical or Commercial school education; Post-Secondary Diploma (HND); Bachelors Degree/Baccalaureate; and Postgraduate (certificate, diploma, MA/MPhil, PhD etc). The researcher took into consideration the educational system classifications pertaining to the refugees' respective countries of origin and matched them with their correspondent educational system classifications used in Ghana.

Religion: The respondent's religious affiliation as reported by the respondent. The religious affiliation was categorised as Christians and Muslims.

Occupation: The status of the respondent with respect to employment, which is formal employment, trading, farming, crafts/Artisan related work, student, unemployed and others.

Country of origin: This refers to the country that a refugee is a citizen of. The major countries of origin are Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Liberia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Sierra Leone.

Marital status: This refers to the respondent's marital status as at the time the survey was conducted. It was categorised as never married, married and previously married.

Number of children : this measures the number of children of refugees.

Length of stay of refugees in Ghana: This measures the number of years refugees have stayed in Ghana. It was categorised as less than 5 years, 5-9 years, 10-14 years, 15-19 years, 20-24 years and 25-30 years.

Place of residence of refugees: This measures where refugees were settled or their place of abode in Ghana. Refugees were classified as either Camp Refugees or Urban Refugees depending on their place of residence.

3.8.2.2 Intermediate variables

The intermediate variables included *host country related factors* such as cultural compatibility of the refugees to the traditions/culture of the host country, the population management policies and refugee policies of the host country, the social receptiveness of the indigenes in the host community (Kunz, 1981).

The *third country related factors* included the pull factors such as the availability or perceived availability of opportunities for growth in terms of economic, health, education, welfare, and other forms of freedoms cultural and political (Lee, 1966). In a nutshell, the third

country factors included the opportunity for the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights (including the rights to adequate food, adequate housing, higher standard of education and healthcare, social security, water and sanitation, and work/employment, and freedom to express ones culture) and civil and political rights (including the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, electoral rights and rights to due process and a fair trial).

Refugee agency involved the ability of the refugee to take responsibility to originate and direct actions to purposely suit their situation and make it better (Al-Sharmani, 2004; Cambell, 2005; Omata, 2012; Betts et al, 2014). Their agency is influenced by their beliefs, personal philosophies, skills and expertise. It included exercising the discipline to redirect attention and work on finding better solutions for themselves in the midst of their predicament, vulnerabilities and other factors that fought against them. This revolved around identifying opportunities and strengths amidst the weaknesses and threats they were facing in the host country. Refugee agency could be individually inspired or group motivated. Groups that have similar experiences and characteristics (sharing the same field of experience or repertoire) may decide to take a particular action to support themselves and improve their situation.

3.8.2.3 Dependent variables

The dependent variables for the study were *Transnationalism* and *Integration*. The transnational engagements of the refugees in relation to their country of origin and third countries were explored on the social, cultural, economic and political spheres. Their integration in Ghana was also assessed on the social, cultural, economic and political spheres. Likert scale questions and multiple sets of questions were used to measure the level or degree of refugees transnational practices with the origin and third countries and their level of

integration in the host country. They were asked if they were involved in the transnational activities with the country of origin, and/or, if they were involved in transnational activities with third countries. Those who were involved were classified as “Yes” while those who were not involved were classified as “No”. The same method was used for measuring their integration in Ghana where the responses were classified as “Yes” for those who were integrated and “No” for those who are not integrated. (See Appendix A for the set of questions).

3.8.2.4 Other variables measured

Reasons for leaving the country of origin: This refers to the main reason why refugees left their country of origin to Ghana. The major reasons were categorised as tribal/ethnic/religious conflict, political/governance conflict, targeted persecution and other reasons.

Means of travelling to Ghana: This refers to the mode of transport of refugees to Ghana. It was classified as by sea, air, land (by trekking or by car) and other means.

3.8.3 Interviews

All the interviews were semi-structured with the help of two guides (See Appendix B and C). The guides provided the researcher with the opportunity to probe for answers, explanations and build on the responses given (Bailey, 2007; Saunders et al., 2012). A broad array of questions related to migration history, transnational engagements and their impact on the refugees’ integration in Ghana were covered. The interviews explored opinions on refugees’ transnational engagements with their countries of origin and third countries; and also their integration in the host country.

Entrée was done through the officials of the GRB, the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG), and the camp managers of the selected refugee camps. An introductory letter signed by the Director of the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS), University of Ghana, was first sent to GRB explaining the purpose and objectives of the study. The GRB then issued a letter notifying all the refugee camps, the Buduburam settlement and the CCG, of GRB's official approval granting access to the researcher to undertake the study among the camp refugees and the urban refugees as well. The CCG was roped in because they provide project support to the urban refugees and could give the researcher pointers on contacting the urban refugees with the consent of the refugees themselves. To get respondents for the quantitative and qualitative research for urban refugees, the researcher had an initial meeting with the representatives of CCG to discuss the purpose and objectives of the study. The researcher then sent an email (with the questionnaire, interview guide and a scanned copy of the letter of approval from GRB) to the CCG Refugee Project representatives for their review. The researcher had another meeting with the CCG Refugee Project representatives to clarify any contentious issues regarding the research, in line with the CCG's ethical codes for the protection of the personal interest, security and safety of the urban refugees who will offer to take part in the study. Afterwards the researcher was allowed to attend two workshops organised by the CCG for the urban refugees. The first workshop was organised at the CCG conference hall in Accra, in November 2019 and the second workshop was organised at the National Catholic Secretariat (NCS) conference hall in Accra, in December 2019. At these workshops, the researcher was given a brief time slot to explain the objectives and purpose of the study to the refugees and to seek their voluntary consent to participate in the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research.

The researcher also arranged a number of meetings with the camp manager for the Buduburam Refugee Settlement, and with some executives and heads of the refugee groups,

to explain the purpose of the research to them and to seek their consent to participate in the study. The notification letter from the GRB' Head Office was shown to both the camp manager and the executives and heads of the refugee groups during the meetings. After the approval of the camp manager in consultation with the executives and heads of the refugee groups, some of the representatives in these meetings became the main gatekeepers who acted as the nodes through which the researcher got access to the urban refugees in the Buduburam Settlement.

With regard to the camp refugees, the researcher also met with the GRB Regional Coordinator for the refugee camps in the Western Region, the UNHCR representatives and some representatives of the refugee leadership in both camps and explained the purpose and objectives of the study to them with the evidence of approval from the GRB's Head Office, and sought their consent to voluntarily participate in the study. The researcher also sought their consent to be allowed to speak to the camp refugees who may be interested in participating in the study. Through this, the researcher got access to the camp refugees at the Ampain and Krisan Refugee camps to participate in the study.

All the interviews were conducted by the same researcher in a face to face manner and in the English language. The interviewees' responses were recorded with an audio device with their consent and notes were taken by the researcher to validate, clarify or cross-check the information provided in the audiotapes. The interviews were conducted in homes, workplaces, and camps of the refugees for both the urban and camp refugees. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and one hour. After conducting the 30th in-depth interview with the refugees, saturation point was reached so the researcher decided to discontinue the interviews, as the answers had become virtually the same and no new knowledge was being obtained from the respondents. Thus key in-depth interview were conducted on 30 refugees

while key informant interviews were conducted on 7 respondents (ref. appendices E and F for profile of refugees, GRB officials and host community members interviewed).

3.9 Data Analysis and Presentation

As the sequential explanatory design dictated, the quantitative data collected were analysed first using the Statistical Package for Social Science software (SPSS version 20). Descriptive and inferential statistics were then drawn out of the data and relevant pie charts and tables were used to analyse and interpret the results in the light of the objectives set out for this study. The main descriptive and inferential statistical techniques employed in the analysis were frequencies and regression models, respectively. A univariate analysis was conducted to describe the socio-demographic characteristics (i.e. age sex, level of education, countries of origin, among others) of the refugees. Next, cross-tabulations and Pearson's chi-square tests were used in the bivariate analysis to show the association between the independent variables and dependent variables. Finally, a binary logistic regression analysis was run to determine the influence of background characteristics on the transnational engagements and integration of the refugees. This was tested at a 96% confidence level using the SPSS.

The audio data generated from the interviews were transcribed verbatim followed by coding and manually developing themes from the transcripts using Braun and Clarke's (2012) thematic analysis approach. Thus, the themes and patterns generated dictated the narrative discussions of the refugees' transnational activities and integration in Ghana. Besides, the transparency and trustworthiness of the findings and interpretation made from the qualitative data were shown in the inclusion of direct quotes from the transcribed interviews (Blumberg et al., 2011; Tong et al., 2007).

3.9.1 Validation of the Qualitative Findings

The following procedures were used to validate the trustworthiness of the findings and interpretations:

Triangulation. The triangulation was done through the participants sampled for the study to identify the common and divergent themes, theories and the use of surveys and interviews to collect the data (Creswell & Miller, 2000).

Thick and Rich Description. The authenticity of the qualitative results was presented through the deep, dense and detailed accounts of the respondents. Their narratives were provided in strong visual images to readers of this research to experience their lives as refugees in Ghana (Bailey, 2007; Creswell & Miller, 2000; Ponterotto, 2006). The thick description of the experiences of the refugees, exploring in detail their successes and their challenges, enhanced the validity and credibility of the study.

Peer Debriefing. The results were presented at departmental seminars organised by the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana; International Conference on the Social Sciences, Good Governance and Sustainable Development Goals, organised by the School of Social Sciences, University of Ghana; the Cape Coast Summer School organised by Centre for Gender Research, Advocacy and Documentation (CEGRAD) of the University of Cape Coast (Ghana) and the Theologische Hochschule Friedensau (Germany); and the Bergen Summer Research School organised by the University of Bergen, Norway. These events provided opportunities for the results to be challenged and questions asked about the methods and interpretations made. The relevant feedback from these exercises was incorporated into the final interpretation of the findings.

3.10 Challenges and Limitations of the Study

The conduct of this study using a sequential explanatory design encountered a few challenges. As the data collection design was in two phases, the data collection lasted nine months instead of the three months initially planned which affected the budget and overall mobilisation of resources for the study. The process of gaining access to the refugees, especially those located in the Greater Accra Metropolitan Area, through the snowball approach proved challenging as it was difficult to locate them. Multiple nodes and referrals from other refugees were used to address this issue. Another challenge was the time and money devoted to conducting the interviews and survey, particularly the distribution and retrieval of the completed questionnaires.

With regard to the qualitative interviews, some of the referrals made by the gatekeepers did not meet the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the study so the researcher spent more time to search for others who satisfied the criteria. Some of the interviews were conducted at the workplaces (during break times), and others in the residences of the respondents. Distractions by workplace colleagues of the respondents at work, and by children for the respondents interviewed in their homes impacted on the set time for completion of the interviews. Therefore most of the interviews went beyond the set time.

Out of the 591 population sampled for the survey, 470 respondents adequately answered the questions hence the study achieved a 79.5% response rate instead of a 100% response rate. Apart from the camps that gave some stability in terms of mobility for the refugees, the urban refugees were usually mobile hence difficult to track. The researcher and the research assistants made several visits before many of the urban refugees could be tracked to administer and retrieve the survey questionnaire. Secondly, some of the refugees both in the urban areas and the camps expressed their unwillingness to participate in the survey citing

personal reasons and research fatigue. Some of the respondents who initially consented to answer the questions and the interviews withdrew their consent in the course of the administration of the questionnaire or the conduct of the interview, hence the researcher had to move on to other referrals and start the entire interview or administration of questionnaire, again.

Another challenge to the study was the language barrier. Since there were a cohort of respondents who could speak in French only (particularly the Ivorians) and Arabic only (particularly the Sudanese) the researcher had to hire an additional assistant who could speak Arabic. Fortunately one of the two assistants who were initially hired could speak French. Reducing the element of subjectivity in terms of interpretation from French and Arabic into English language posed a bit of challenge in the study. A few of the respondents however fell into this category hence the validity of their responses did not adversely affect the entire work.

Also the refugees kept soliciting for help during most of the interviews and administration of the survey questionnaire regardless of being told in advance that the work was an academic study. Their request for money and other material items made them veer off the core issues of the interview, as they were rather telling the researcher about their plight and current circumstances instead of answering the questions. The researchers' exercised patience in managing such situations when they came up and tactfully brought the respondents back on track.

One of the limitations to the study is that only a few host community members were included in the study and interviewed, as the work had a strong focus on transnational ties of refugees and their integration. The inclusion of more host community members, particularly the opinion leaders and traditional authorities, could have broadened the perspective of the study. This limitation was however

mitigated, to a greater extent, by the information provided by the officials of the key organisations managing refugee issues in the camps and urban areas. Also the focus of the study on only refugees in along the coastal regions in the southern part of Ghana placed some limitations on the generalisation of their experiences (particularly their integration experiences) to cover refugees in the whole of Ghana. If the scope of the study had been extended to cover urban refugees in other cities like Takoradi, Kumasi, and Sunyani; as well as self settle refugees in other parts of Ghana such as the Zabzugu District and Hamile in the Upper West Region of Ghana and those in the Volta Region of Ghana, it could have widened the scope and the chances of generalising the experiences across the country. Nonetheless the inclusion of various nationalities of refugees in the study with different occupations was a mitigation to this limitation, to some extent. There was a potential, on the part of the refugees in this study, to have overblown or over-exaggerated some of their experiences or stories during the interviews, as the thinking was that the more gory and graphic their stories/experiences may be in terms of their plight, the higher their chances of gaining the sympathy of the receivers of such information which in turn may result in some individual or organization coming in to support them. As Kissoon (2015) indicated, each refugees case 'is determined on its own merits, and the burden of proof is on claimants and asylum seekers to show they are targeted and unprotected against persecution for reasons of their identity in their countries of origin' (pg.7). This burden of proof may have resulted in overblowing of experiences on the part of some the refugees. Where the researcher suspected such a tendency, their stories were cross-checked with the histories and existing literature, and also cross-validated with other stories and experiences of other refugees in order to ascertain its authenticity and inclusion in the study.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

The researcher ensured that the ethical issues associated with this research were addressed by putting in place the necessary assurances of confidentiality, anonymity and right of

withdrawal from participation in the study. The objectives for the study were thoroughly explained to the respondents and their consent were sought before administration of the survey questionnaire and the interviews. Thus the respondents were informed that their responses were solely for academic purposes, that they would be recorded and that they had the right to withdraw their participation at any time they felt uncomfortable or for one reason or the other, were unwilling or unable to participate in the study. Both oral and written consent forms were administered to them (ref. Appendix C for the consent form submitted to the interviewees). To ensure privacy and confidentiality, interviews were conducted at the convenience of the respondents and at places where they deemed fit. Also, to ensure their anonymity, refugees' quotations were identified with sex, age and nationality and their place of residence (i.e. either camp or urban refugees) just to ensure the removal of anything that will lead to the identification of the respondents.



CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS AND MIGRATION

TRAJECTORY OF REFUGEES

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the background characteristics of the participants in the study, including the trajectory of their forced migration, means of travelling to Ghana, place of residence in Ghana, length of stay and their reasons for choosing Ghana as their final destination.

4.2 Socio-demographic Characteristics

This section is on the country of origin of the refugees and their socio-demographic characteristics. The socio-demographic characteristics include sex, age, educational status, occupational status, religious affiliation, marital status, number of children, and nationality.

4.2.1 Country of Origin

The study included questions to solicit information on the country of origin of the refugees and Table 4.1 presents the results. From Table 4.1 the highest percentage of the refugees involved in the survey were from Liberia (43.0%), followed by Cote d'Ivoire (34.3%) and Sudan (14.3%). The rest of the countries of origin were Togo (3.2%), Sierra Leone (1.7%), DRC (1.5%), Chad (1.5%) and Central African Republic (CAR, 0.6%) which recorded small percentages and together accounted for less than a tenth of the refugees. The results suggest most of the refugees were from Ghana's neighbouring countries (Cote d'Ivoire and Togo) and other West African countries (Sierra Leone and Liberia). The rest were from other countries in Africa. Significantly, all these countries have experienced political, ethnic and

religious instability or upheavals over the past decades thereby necessitating their movement to Ghana as refugees (Kieth, 2016; Grabska, 2006).

Table 4.1: Percentage distribution of refugees by country of origin

Country of origin and nationality	Frequency	Percentage
Liberia	202	43.0
Cote d'Ivoire	161	34.3
Togo	15	3.2
Sudan	67	14.3
DRC	7	1.5
CAR	3	0.6
Chad	7	1.5
Sierra Leone	8	1.7
Total	470	100%

Source: Field data, 2019

The Liberians and Ivorians were among the countries with majority of refugees in Ghana because Liberia was one of the refugee-producing countries in West Africa in the 1990s while Cote d'Ivoire gained such status in the 2000s. Many of the refugees from these two countries were targeted due to ethnic and political differences. However, majority of the refugees travelled to Ghana because of their acquaintance with other people and also to safeguard their personal security (Hartman, & Morse, 2018).

The phenomenon of having nationals of neighbouring countries moving into a nearby haven when there is trouble in their respective countries is not common to the refugee-producing countries in West Africa who came to Ghana. The same situation can be found in the Eastern and Central African enclaves and other conflict zones in the world where the countries bedevilled with political conflicts, tribal and ethnic wars have their nationals moving to neighbouring countries that were considered as safe havens (Nikoi, Arthur, & Nambe, 2019).

About 1.3 million people from Ethiopia, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic and Southern Sudan have settled in different countries as refugees (Grabska, 2006; Whitaker, 2002). For instance, according to UNHCR statistics as of July 2020, majority of refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya originated from Somalia (53.9%) with other major nationalities coming from South Sudan (24.7%), DR Congo (9%); and Ethiopia (5.8%). Persons of concern from other nationalities including Sudan, Rwanda, Eritrea, Burundi, Uganda and others make up 6.6% of the total population (494,289 as of the end of July 2020). Political developments and the humanitarian situation in the region continue to impact Kenya mainly because of the situation of the two main refugee-producing countries, Somalia and South Sudan, which are neighbouring countries to Kenya (UNHCR- Kenya, 2020). Thus, in most cases, the population of refugees from a particular country may have less or more numbers in the refugee hosting country depending on the proximity or how farther the refugee-producing country is from the host country. There is therefore a parallel relationship, usually, between the host and the refugee-producing countries in terms of proximity and distance between the two countries – the farther the country the less the number of refugees in the host country, and the closer the country in trouble is to the host country the greater the number of refugees from that country. It is not therefore surprising that most of the refugees in Ghana were from neighbouring countries like Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, or from other countries in the West African sub-region like Liberia and Sierra Leone.

4.2.2 Sex Distribution

Majority of the world's refugees are women and children and they are usually considered as a vulnerable group as a result of the experiences they go through in the event of violent conflict or war (Pittaway & Bartolomei, 2001). They usually suffer endemic rape and sexual abuse, sexism and other forms of discrimination, limited access to many of the protective measures and durable solutions available to refugees (Pittaway & Bartolomei 2001).

Table 4.2 presents the sex distribution of refugees who participated in the study. Slightly more than half (51.7%) of the refugees were females while 48.3% comprised of males.

Table 4.2: Percentage distribution of refugees by sex

Sex	Frequency	Percentage
Male	227	48.3
Female	243	51.7
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The sex distribution indicated that there were more female refugees than male refugees in the survey. Migration is considered sex-selective. However, recent evidence has shown that there has been an increase in the trends of migration by women (Stecklov, Carletto, Azzarri, & Davis, 2010). This probably could explain the increase in forced migration by females as compared to males. Women and children become more vulnerable during war and conflict periods hence they seek more avenues for safety and security. Women are often the first responders in a crisis, and whether en-route or in camps, in home countries or destination countries, they play a crucial role in caring for, sustaining and rebuilding their communities. This probably could explain an increase in more female refugees than male refugees in Ghana. Also many of the refugees have returned to their countries of origin since the surge of refugees to Ghana in the 1990s and this might have impacted on the current sex distribution of the refugees in the country.

4.2.3 Age of Respondents

Table 4.3 shows the age of the refugees who participated in the study. More than half (63.7%) of the refugees were less than 40 years old. About 20.2% were 40-49 years and 11.7% were 50-59 years. The least proportion of the refugees were 60 years and above, representing 4.5% of respondents. The results show that most of the refugees were young people.

Table 4.3: Percentage distribution of refugees by age

Age	Frequency	Percentage
Less than 20	38	8.1
20-29	116	24.7
30-39	145	30.9
40-49	95	20.2
50-59	55	11.7
60 years and above	21	4.5
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The findings of this study corroborate other findings (UNHCR, 2017; UNDESA, 2019; IOM, 2020), where evidence has shown that most of the refugees belong to the young and energetic generation.

Most combatants on the African continent are able-bodied young people. As a result, when the conflict is skewed against one party, the majority of those who flee due to their involvement in the conflict are also the young. The aged and children flee at the onset of war but sometimes are unable to cross international borders hence they become mostly internally displaced. This is because whenever there is war, young people have the strength to run away to seek refuge in other countries compared to the elderly. Mostly, the elderly run to other parts of the country, that may be quite proximate to the conflict area, to seek refuge, because they may not have the strength and ability to travel over long distances under the stressful conditions of raging war or conflict to seek refuge elsewhere. Therefore they are usually part of the internally displaced persons when there is war in their country.

4.2.4 Educational Status

As illustrated in Table 4.4, slightly more than half (51.7%) of the refugees had attained Secondary/Vocational education, one-fourth of the refugees had attained Junior High education, 15.3% had attained primary education and 7.4% had no education.

Table 4.4: Percentage distribution of refugees by educational status

Education	Frequency	Percentage
No education	35	7.4
Primary	72	15.3
JHS	120	25.5
SHS /Vocational +	243	51.7
Total	470	100

Source: Field data, 2019

The results imply that at least 92% of the refugees had at least primary education. This level of formal education is quite positive for their skills development in terms of vocational training or further education in the host country, should they have that opportunity, as it is less challenging to build the skills of people with some appreciable level of education than those with no education. Heckman (2016) however noted that forced migration has repercussions on the education, skills acquisition and future development of refugee youth. Most of these refugees face the challenge of continuing their education due to the language barrier and finances (Porter et al, 2008). Moreover the compatibility of their education systems with that of the host country also play a role in their ability to further their education in the host country. If the educational systems in origin country is not compatible to that of the host country it may negatively impact the educational aspirations of the refugees.

In line with the Kunz kinetic model of refugee movements (Kunz,1973) most refugees who are highly educated engage in anticipatory refugee movements – hence they may spot the

crisis ahead of time and prepare and leave the country of origin way before the crisis hit the country. They usually fall within the self-alienated category of refugees. This study however shows that most of the refugees came en mass after the outbreak of full-scale war or conflict in their respective countries of origin. Also, only a minute percentage arrived at the destination country by flight, hence their educational status cannot necessarily be used to infer their prediction of danger before they embarked on their journey to Ghana.

4.2.5 Occupational Status

Table 4.5 illustrates the occupational status of the refugees when they were in their country of origin in comparison to their occupational status in the host-country (Ghana). In relation to the occupation of the refugees in their country of origin, a higher proportion (37.2%) of the refugees were students, followed by those who were unemployed (15.3%), trading (13.2%), formal employment (11.7%) and craft/artisanal work (10.4%).

Table 4.5: Percentage distribution of refugees by occupational status

Occupation in Country of Origin	Frequency	Percentage
Formal employment	55	11.7
Trading	62	13.2
Farming	28	6.0
Craft/Artisanal related worker	49	10.4
Student	175	37.2
Unemployed	72	15.3
Other	29	6.2
Total	470	100
Occupation in Ghana		
Formal employment	21	4.5
Trading	73	15.5
Farming	46	9.8
Craft/Artisanal related worker	92	19.6
Student	49	10.4
Unemployed	126	26.8
Other	63	13.4
Total	470	100

Source: Field data, 2019

In terms of occupational status of refugees in Ghana, a higher proportion (26.8%) were unemployed, followed by those in crafts/artisan related work (19.6%) and the least proportion (4.5%) were engaged in formal employment. This is an indication that their forced migration experience has made them worse off in terms of job opportunities when compared to their occupational status in their country of origin. The proportion who were unemployed in Ghana were almost twice (26.8 %) the percentage of those who were unemployed in their country of origin (15.3 %). The forced migration therefore resulted in an increased rate of unemployment among the refugees. This is in line with findings in other studies that the situation with most refugees in terms of employment opportunities and their employability became worse off when they came into the host country (Omata, 2012). The literature indicates that in most cases they acquired a diminutive status in the host country as a result of their forced relocation, psychological trauma, language and cultural barriers, challenges in matching their skills to the job market in the host country among others (Bilgili & Loschmann, 2018). This study confirmed this assertion as the Ivorian (Francophone) and Sudanese (Arabic) refugees who formed 34.3% and 14.3% of the population of refugees, respectively, indicated language barrier was a challenge to their integration and employability in Ghana, country which uses English as its official language. Consequently, the findings showed that only 4.5% of the refugee population were engaged in formal employment as the English language is required for communication in this sector.

Fifteen percent (15%) of the refugees were engaged in the trade sector in Ghana as oral skills in English was not necessarily required in that sector, compared to 13.2% who were engaged in the trade sector in their country of origin. In addition, the proportion of refugees who were schooling in their country of origin reduced from 37.2% to 10.4% and this could be attributed to lack of finance for refugees to continue schooling or challenges with ‘interoperability’ of the academic systems in the refugee-producing country and that of the host country. The

language barrier may have accounted for the reduction in educational pursuit, as refugees from Arabic and French speaking country may have found it difficult to continue their education in English language. Apart from the language barrier, Omata (2012) argued that some refugees were discriminated against in the job market in Ghana. The Ghanaians saw the refugees as competing with them for the limited opportunities that the marketplace presented for buying and selling, hence the discrimination. This therefore could explain the increase in the number of refugees who were not engaged in any meaningful work. As a result of lack of employment opportunities for the refugees, some of the females in the refugee camps started engaging in commercial sex to earn income for their living, while others engaged in transactional sex in exchange for gifts and other material benefits (Boateng, 2010; Dako-Gyeke and Adu, 2015).

The qualitative results also support the quantitative findings. Most of the refugees indicated that they were not working and were searching for jobs. Some of the refugees were gainfully employed in their country of origin but became unemployed as a result of their forced migration to the host country, hence they had to take up some menial jobs for survival in Ghana. Unemployment was thus a key challenge for the refugees and two of the refugees expressed their frustrations as follows:

“I don’t have any specific job or permanent employment. Currently, I do any decent job that can fetch me money. Sometimes I follow friends to get some labourer work at construction sites within the community. This does not fetch much money that you’ll call monthly or regular salary. I am also a skilled electrician so sometimes people call me to fix electrical faults in their homes and offices. At other times I go out to do jobs like painting and cleaning just to get something to eat and to feed my family as well. To be frank it has not been easy at all” (Liberian, male, 39 years, camp refugee).

“I was gainfully employed in the banking and finance sector in Bangui, before the conflict erupted and I had to come to Ghana. I was really doing well and the salary was not bad at all. Over here in Ghana, as you can see, I am working as a security personnel in this company. It has not been easy for me at all, but I am keeping hope

alive. I have furthered my education since I came in here so I hope to land a good job in the financial sector soon. I now have a Master's degree. I have attended a few interviews. Though I didn't get those jobs, my performance at the interviews wasn't bad at all. I always ask for feedback from the interview panel and I use it to improve performance in the next interview. I know I am gradually getting nearer to my dream job, but for now I have to make ends meet and support my family with this current work of being a security personnel in this private company" (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee).

Other refugees also indicated they had not been able to secure any gainful employment because of the language barrier. Since the official language in Ghana is English, the Ivorians and Sudanese who could only speak French and Arabic respectively were finding it difficult to secure jobs in their respective host communities. Two female refugees narrated their experiences below:

"I'm supposed to work and help my family but it's not possible because of the language barrier, I'm supposed to be a teacher. When I search for jobs, I'm not accepted because of the language barrier. I cannot speak the local language and I am not very fluent in the English language as well. I went for a job interview in Accra and the headteacher of the school asked me if I understand any local language and I said no. When I told him I am Francophone he said it will be very difficult for me to get a job here in Ghana and true to his word, am still unemployed. I worked for a short time as a househelp for a French family who came on holidays in Accra for about four months. I had to return to this camp after they left because I couldn't get any job and living in Accra is difficult. Cost of living is high, you need to pay rent, water bill, light bill etc. I had to come back to the camp to join my family. My mother and my little cousins are here in the came. About seven of us in all. They are looking up to meet their needs. I am now doing some poultry farming, grasscutter farming and growing of potatoes, here in this camp, to support them and still trying to get a teaching job as well. The limitation is that most of the schools in Ampain, Krisan, Ekwe, and surrounding communities are government own and its difficult to get employment in government school as a foreigner" (Ivorian, female, 33 years, camp refugee).

"I am a Sudanese and I speak Arabic. I can understand the English language a little bit but I can't speak it. I have learnt a few words in the Nzema language so I go to the sea side to support the fishermen. When they catch the fish, I work with other Ghanaian women to remove the scales from it and park them in baskets and wooden boxes, to make them ready for sale to the Market Queens and other suppliers. Sometimes I also help the women to smoke the fish. That is currently my source of livelihood. If Ghana was an Arabic country, I would be working as an office clerk by now, as I use to be in my country" (Sudanese, female, 32 years, camp refugee)

The above statement from the Sudanese refugee also shows the extent to which the location of the refugee Krisan Refugee Camp near Eikwe, a fishing community has influenced her occupation and livelihood.

Regardless of these challenges, some refugees indicated that they have been successful in securing jobs in Ghana and that the country is a good place to do business and earn some income if one is only willing to work hard. One Sudanese refugee shared his success story in Ghana as follows:

“When I first arrived in Ghana, I stayed initially for a month in the house of a benevolent person, near the Mammobi Mosque, here in Accra, before registering with GRB to gain my refugee status. We used to go to the mosque together because I am a Muslim, and the guys were very supportive. After gaining my status GRB took me to the Krisan Refugee Camp but I realised that place was not good for a young man like me since job opportunities there were limited. I therefore opted to go to Accra, with the permission of the camp manager, to search for a job. Upon arriving in Accra I started doing some small business during the weekends by selling things like drilling machines that I got from a retail shop to sell on a commission basis. I speak Arabic, Hausa, English and French fluently and I can write well in Arabic and English. So I wrote a business proposal to the GRB and they gave me a seed capital of GHS 1,500.00 which I used to set up a small business of buying and selling provisions. In no time the business started booming so I rented a three bedroom apartment and invited my wife and children (who I left with a relative in Togo while on my way to Ghana) to come and join me. Since then, they have been with me for the past six years. Two years ago I changed the school of my children from a local authority primary school to a private Montessori school. I have also developed my vocational skills and got some training in fixing water pumps and aluminium fabrication glass windows. I used the earnings from these jobs to set up a travel and tour company two years ago! In this restaurant that you’re interviewing me, I double as that manager and supervisor, and also I manage a furniture showroom as well for the owners of this restaurant who are Lebanese businessmen. My wife is now managing our travel and tour business and we have employed some Ghanaians as well. She we have also started setting up our own restaurant since she has training in cuisine and hotel management, and it is coming up a bit so she can double as manager for the travel and tour as well as the restaurant. I think living and working in the city has better prospects for refugees than staying in the refugee camps. My wife and I, we are better-off here in Accra than I used to be when I was in the camp. If I had remained in the camp I couldn’t have invited my family to join me here in Ghana” (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee).

The description by this Sudanese refugee highlights the agency of the refugee in using their acquired skills and expertise to set up businesses and find employment opportunities for themselves and others. This supports other studies by Al-Sharmani (2004), Cambell (2005) and Omata (2012) on the agency of refugees in setting up economic opportunities for themselves to ease their reliance on humanitarian assistance.

4.2.6 Religious Affiliation

Table 4.6 shows the religious affiliation of the refugees. The findings from this study indicated that more than half (83.2%) of the refugees were Christians while 16.8% were Muslims.

Table 4.6: Percentage distribution of refugees by religious affiliation

Religion	Frequency	Percentage
Christians	391	83.2
Muslims	79	16.8
Total	470	100

Source: Field data, 2019

This finding was not surprising as Christianity is a dominant religion in most of the origin countries of the refugees. For instance, Liberia has 85.6% of the population practising Christianity while Muslims represent a minority of 12.2%, with less than three percent of the population belonging to other religious groups such as traditional religion, Baha'is, Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists or no religion (International Religious Freedoms Report, 2019). The 2014 census in Cote d'Ivoire indicated that 50% of the population were Muslim, 41% Christian, and five percent were advocates of indigenous/tradition religions (International Religious Freedoms Report, 2019). In Togo, the population was 43.7% Christian, 35.6% traditional animist, 14% Sunni Muslim, and five percent being followers of other religions (International Religious Freedoms Report, 2019). With regard to the population in Central African

Republic, the International Religious Freedoms Report (2019) estimated that 61% were Protestant, 28% Catholic, and nine percent Muslim; with an estimated two percent belonging to other religious groups, including traditional religious groups and those having no religion. The linkages between religious identity, belief and practice; and forced migration on the African continent have received increased attention since the 2000s (Hollenbach, 2014; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011).

Religious intolerance and factionalism has resulted in violence and displacement of individuals and groups on the African continent. For instance, the Ivorian conflict presents an epitome of how religion could be used to reinforce power dynamics in the political arena as expressed in the relationship between the former President Laurent Gbagbo and the Evangelical Church (Guiblehon, 2011). The political leadership of Cote d'Ivoire since the colonial time to the time of independence has all forged close ties with their religious community. However, Guiblehon (2011) noted that the case of the former President Laurent Gbagbo with the Evangelical Church in the country presented a peculiar case as the leaders of the evangelical church were accused by the national and international media, and the political opposition, of having been led to believe that Laurent Gbagbo was God's choice when he lost the election. The Evangelical pastors developed the doctrine of the personal or individual predestination through divine revelation which makes Laurent Gbagbo God's choice and the other political protagonists outcasts and this religious dimension became a register of legitimation of political power with an impact on the popular imagination (Guiblehon, 2011). Consequently, the conflict that ensued also targeted the Evangelical Church and its members, turning the political issues into a religious crisis as well (Guiblehon, 2011). Christianity happens to be the religion of most of the Ivorian refugees in Ghana as most of them are known supporters of former President Laurent Gbagbo.

Religious and ethno-religious conflicts on the continent leading to the refugee crisis are not peculiar to only Cote d'Ivoire. Countries such as DR Congo, Sudan, Nigeria, Burundi, Rwanda, Chad, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ethiopia and Eritrea have all experienced conflicts resulting from religious and ethnic differences (Onuoha, 2013). Another typical example of religious-related conflict resulting in refugee crisis is the case of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar (i.e. Burma in Southeast Asia) who have mostly become refugees in neighbouring countries due to Political Buddhism, exclusionary policies and marginalization (Ansar, 2020; Siddiquee, 2020; Choudhury, 2019; Ahsan Ullah, 2016).

4.2.7 Marital Status

The findings in Table 4.7 indicate that a little over half (57.7%) of the refugees were never married, 32.8% were married while 9.6% were previously married.

Table 4.7: Percentage distribution of refugees by marital status

Marital status	Frequency	Percentage
Never married	271	57.7
Married	154	32.8
Previously married	45	9.6
Total	470	100

Source: Field data, 2019

The highest proportion of refugees who had never married could be attributed to the negative impact of the refugee crisis and related economic difficulties, which led to a prioritisation of their safety and security over and above their desire to marry. Secondly, most of them may have found it difficult engaging in cross-cultural marriages or marrying people from nationalities or ethnic groups that are different from their own.

Getting married and starting a family is viewed by many refugees as another means to establish social and adult status, but the cost of dowry and wedding expenses prevented the

younger refugees from completing this rite of passage in many instances (Prazeres, 2018). Apart from the limbo in their circumstances as refugees discouraging them from entering into marriage, some of the refugees who had no plans of integrating in Ghana may have thought that marrying in the host country can complicate their situation, particularly their plans to resettle in other third countries. They may have preferred to be successful in their choice of durable solutions first before entering into marriage. Thus, reasons such as lack of money, lack of a real place to call home, decision on durable solution choices, and other priorities may force many refugees to delay marriage. Many of them also hope to achieve other goals such as education, skills development, and resettlement overseas hence will not let marriage block those plans (Prazeres, 2018).

4.2.8 Number of Children

For number of children, the highest proportion of the refugees (34.7%) had one or two children, followed by refugees with no child (28.9%), as illustrated in Table 4.8. Those with five or more children formed the least proportion (11.7%).

Table 4.8: Percentage distribution of refugees by number of children

Number of children	Frequency	Percentage
No child	136	28.9
1-2 children	163	34.7
3-4 children	116	24.7
5 and more	55	11.7
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Refugees who have children staying in other third countries or the country of origin may have a higher propensity of engaging with them than those without children. Also, the craving to support the family who are residing with the refugees as well as those in the origin country,

is a driving force that propels many refugees to engage in entrepreneurial ventures and other forms of work in the host country (Simich, Este, & Hamilton, 2010).

4.3 Place of Residence of the Refugees and their Length of Stay in Ghana

This section focuses on the place of residence of the refugees and their length of stay in Ghana. These experiences at the destination country can influence their transnational practices and experiences.

4.3.1 Place of Residence of the Refugees

A growing number of refugees have settled in the in urban centres and cities in order to get access to employment, healthcare and other social services. The decision of some refugees to live in the city is also strongly motivated by the seeking to avoid being ‘warehoused’ in camps where opportunities are usually limited (Krause & Gato, 2019). Uganda and South Africa happen to be one of those notable countries with a sizeable population of urban refugees. Unlike most refugee hosting countries in sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa does not have refugee camps nor does it offer direct humanitarian assistance to refugees. Majority of its refugees reside in cities and urban areas such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape Town and Durban, and they share social and economic space and services with nationals as well as other categories of migrants in the cities (Nyaoro, 2010). They also have to compete for accommodation and jobs with both the nationals (i.e. South Africans) and migrants from other countries who are living in South Africa. This competition for access to jobs and social services sometimes generates social tension between migrants and nationals sparking bouts of xenophobic attacks.

As illustrated in Table 4.9, the result of this study showed that 58.5% of the refugees lived in camps while 41.5% were urban settlers.

Table 4.9: Percentage distribution of refugees by place of residence

Place of residence of refugees	Frequency	Percentage
Camp refugee	275	58.5
Urban refugee	195	41.5
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Regardless of the limitations generally associated with settling in camps compared to settling in urban areas, some of the refugees indicated that staying in the camps was more beneficial to them than staying in the city, because they got a series of jobs within nearby communities to support themselves and their families. A Sudanese refugee stated the following:

“Initially when we arrived in camp, we worked in the bush to make charcoal but now there are challenges in making charcoal and business is gone down. For this reason, I and my friend decided to stop the charcoal business and we went to the beachside to do secondary jobs to support the fishermen, like washing the fishes and removing the scales, helping with the mending and drying of nets, and frying of fish for the market etc. At least we are usually paid a little but we also get fish to send home. I also go around the communities to wash people’s clothing to earn some money to cater for myself when the fishing season is over” (Sudanese, female, 36 years, camp refugee).

Other refugees were also living in the camp because of family ties. For them the togetherness supports their psychological wellbeing, after having experienced a lot of stressful moments with the conflict in their country of origin as well as the complexities associated with fleeing to their current destination of safety. This sentiment is expressed by an Ivorian refugee as follows:

“I live in the camp because my family is here and we all came from Cote d’Ivoire during the war. I lost my father and my brothers to the war; I came to this camp with my cousins. As you can see, I have this small barbering business. I farm too during the rainy season; and I do some mason works to get some small money as well. I don’t stay all the time in this camp, I have been travelling too. Sometimes I go to Accra to work at some construction sites as a labourer and I return to the camp when I am paid, so I can support my family, my younger cousins. They mean everything to me. Staying together in the camp makes us happy than scattering abroad” (Ivorian, male, 39 years, camp refugee).

There is a marked difference between the living conditions of the camp refugees and urban refugees. Urban refugees live within the cities and town among the nationals of the destination country hence they can search for and access a variety of job opportunities and other social services like healthcare and education, for themselves and their dependants. This helps to improve their standard of living compared to camp refugees who are in a defined place (Omata, 2014). Camp refugees, however, receive support from non-governmental organizations, charities, the UNHCR and the host government because they are in an enclosed and controlled environment compared to their urban counterparts. Most of the camp refugees are unable to work and fend for themselves as they are mostly dependent on the support from these organisations (Monsutti 2005; Lindley, 2010; Bilgili., & Loschmann, 2018). Some of the refugees also rely on their contacts and networks in and outside the camp for their survival (Al-Sharmani, 2004). Though the refugee camps in Ghana do not limit the freedom of movement of the refugees as they can move in and out to work, the locations of the camps are in rural communities making it difficult for the refugees to have access to a variety of job opportunities compared to their urban counterparts. Thus, in Ampain and the Krisan refugee camps, most of the refugees are engaged in crop and livestock farming, fishing and secondary jobs associated with fishing (because the community is in a coastal area) and petty trading, in the camp and within the surrounding communities (GRB, 2020). Others also engage in jobs such as being labourers at construction sites, and washing clothes for people within the community for some payments among other menial jobs.

In terms of their integration into the host country, urban refugees can integrate easily than camp refugees. The following quotes from two key informants illustrate the dynamics associated with the integration experiences of the urban and camp refugees:

“In the urban situation, most of the refugees are self-settled. After registering with the Ghana Refugee Board and the UNHCR, they are usually directed to specific camps but some of the refugees decide to exercise their own agency by connecting with their networks in the cities. Through these networks of friends or family, they get to settle

in the cities. Some of them also have skills that may be in high demand in the cities than in the camps so they move to the cities, especially the teachers, accountants and the nurses. Because in the cities they stay among the nationals and interact frequently with virtually all facets of the socio-cultural, economic and political environment, they are able to integrate easily than those in the camps. The only disadvantage for them is that they may not get the support from the various charities and organisations who usually target their support to their counterparts in the camps”.(Refugee Camp Manager).

“The Sudanese refugees who are in Accra will tell you the the city has a huge market for both formal and informal trading activities. If you put in a little effort you are able to earn something to make ends meet, but the population in the camps an its environs are few, mostly rural so your skills may not be put to use and they’ll become stale. They say the cities also help them to integrate and know the culture better than being in the camps. So, we see that those living in urban areas have more opportunities when it comes to livelihood opportunities than those living in the camps” (Refugee Camp Coordinator).

The camps and the village settings usually restricts the refugees from accessing and taking part in several socialisation programmes, compared to their counterparts in the city. Urban refugees are always with the nationals in the cities and communities they are located hence they have the opportunity to engage in the social, economic and cultural activities, and this helps them to integrate easily with the indigeneous people in the society.

4.3.2 Country of Origin of Refugees and Place of Residence in Ghana

Table 4.10 shows the countries of origin of the refugees and their place of residence in Ghana. The results showed that country of origin differed in relation to their place of residence of the refugees. Majority of the Liberian refugees (96%) in this study were settled in the urban areas, particularly Buduburam and its immediate environs while 4% were in camps. Only 0.6% of the Ivorian refugees were in urban areas while 99.4% were in the camps. All the refugees from Togo, Sudan, DRC, CAR, Chad and Sierra Leone who participated in the survey were camp refugees.

Table 4.10: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by place of residence in Ghana

Country of origin	Place of residence			
	Camp refugee		Urban refugee	
	Frequency	Percentage	Frequency	Percentage
Liberia	8	4.0	194	96.0
Cote d'Ivoire	160	99.4	1	0.6
Togo	15	100.0	0	0.0
Sudan	67	100.0	0	0.0
DRC	7	100.0	0	0.0
CAR	3	100.0	0	0.0
Chad	7	100.0	0	0.0
Sierra Leone	8	100.0	0	0.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Though most of the refugees from Togo may prefer to stay in urban areas, especially because there is a large Togolese and Ewe community in Ghana with whom they can stay, the Togolese who were found in this study were all in the refugee camp. The reason for their stay in a camp in the Western region of Ghana (which is farther from the Volta region where majority of the Ewe's and Togolese community in Ghana are) may be that these refugees saw themselves as being politically persecuted by the Togo government hence they find it as a high risk to be in communities that are closer to their country of origin for fear of being identified and persecuted. A Ghana Refugee Board report (2020) also confirmed the settlement of Togolese in the Krisan Refugee Camp between 1997 and 1998 after the closure of the Klikor Camp in the Volta Region, hence the number of Togolese refugees in the Krisan Refugee Camp. The qualitative data supports this fear of political persecution as expressed by one of the Togolese refugees:

I belong to the tribe of Gilchrist Olympio, the former President of Togo. With the inception of the Enyadema Regime, we were targeted and persecuted so I had to run away across the western border of Togo into the Volta Region of Ghana. I did not feel very safe in the Volta Region so I stayed undercover for a couple of years with a different identity but later on when I realized I was being found out I moved from the Volta region to live in this camp. I feel safe over here than in the Volta Region where

I can easily be targeted by the Faure Nyasingbe Regime (Togolese, male, 45 years, camp refugee).

The fear of political persecution was not only associated with the Togolese refugees, the Ivorians also experienced same. This Ivorian refugee however preferred to live in the city instead of a camp as she thought she and her family could easily be targeted by anti-Gbagbo elements if they were to live in a refugee camp.

I prefer to live in the city and the community because I used to be an activist for former President Laurent Gbagbo when I was in the university. We were very vocal so very well known, I and my husband. Staying in the camp won't help us and our four little children who we need to take to school. So, we decided to settle in Accra, for the sake of getting a proper job, feeling protected by the community and getting better education for our children. I'm a graphic designer, I also do some trade, fashion and that stuff. I do printing, as you can see all the printers around me (*pointing to some printers in the room*). I do online printing, so you send me your file by mail then I take it from there, review it creatively according to the design you like, then print and deliver it, so actually, that's what I do. I completed first degree after I finished my Advance level education in Cote d'Ivoire. I also did some studies in media work so I came here with my husband to adjust. My husband also works with a printing company and the company's medical insurance covers me and the children as well. As you can see, we live in this three-bedroom apartment, with a hall, kitchen, toilet and bath facilities. We are quite okay and we like it being in the city. If we stay in a refugee camp we can easily be targeted by the anti-Gbagbo elements because we were very popular in the Gbagbo's party (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

The results from the qualitative data also showed that most of the Liberian refugees did not want to stay at the Ampain or Krisan refugee camps due to their acquaintances with people in Buduburam and its environments. They had a taste of city life with their initial settlement at the Buduram Refugee Camp, as the camp is closer to the capital city, Accra. The quote below illustrates this point.

A number of Liberians who were in Buduburam Refugee Settlement were relocated to Krisan Refugee Camp. When they came we gave them shelters, better than the ones they were living in in Buduburam but they left. They went back to Buduburam. Why? Because they had lived in Buduburam settlement since they came to Ghana and they are now very much accustomed to city life since the settlement is so close to Ghana's capital city, Accra. So when they were brought here, a rural setting, they couldn't adapt to the rural setting (Refugee Camp Manager).

It must be noted that the Buduburam Refugee Camp ceased to be a camp in 2011 when the cessation clause was applied to the majority of the refugees there. Dick (2002) argued that what necessitated the influx of Liberian refugees to Ghana in the 1990s was the offering of free land for settlement, acquittance and integration. Recent refugees might have made contact with their friends or relatives in Ghana before migrating (Boateng, 2010). The warm reception which is mostly offered by Ghanaians could have also influenced their decision to be urban refugees.

4.3.3 Length of Stay in Ghana

In terms of length of stay of refugees in Ghana, the results from Table 4.11 show that a higher proportion (44.0%) of the refugees had stayed in Ghana for 5-9 years, 19.6% had stayed in Ghana for 15-19 years, 10.9% for 20-24 years, 10.6% for 25-30 years and the least proportion (9.6%) had stayed in Ghana for less than 5 years. This is an indication that a significant majority (90.4%) of the refugees in the study were in a protracted refugee situation.

Table 4.11: Percentage distribution of refugees by length of stay in Ghana

Length of stay of refugees in Ghana	Frequency	Percentage
less than 5 years	45	9.6
5-9 years	207	44.0
10-14 years	25	5.3
15-19 years	92	19.6
20-24 years	51	10.9
25-30 years	50	10.6
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Refugees are considered to be in a protracted situation if they have spent more than five years in exile without any immediate solution in view (Crisp, 2003). Prolonged and unending

conflicts in the origin countries of most refugees in Africa means African refugees stay in host countries longer than expected. It becomes even more prolonged when international relief and supplies for refugees are cut off as the case is currently in Ghana (Jacobsen, 2005; Omata & Kaplan, 2013). Protracted refugee situations may impact negatively on the cordial relations that may initially exist between refugees and the host community as the host usually perceives the refugees as temporary guests. Their prolonged stay begins to serve as a threat to the host community and eventually impacts negatively on the relationship between the two groups (Dako –Gyeke & Adu, 2017).

Furthermore, protracted refugee situations could generate extreme constraints for the return of some refugees, especially the elderly and very young children since there may be no support systems available in their home country to ensure their smooth integration (Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2017). Children born to refugee parents in the host country may also find it difficult adjusting to the culture and systems of their country of origin when returned, particularly in their adolescent years. The reason why refugees from Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire have stayed in protracted situations in Ghana, may be the early start of the wars and political conflicts in their respective countries. Liberia had a civil war from 1989 to 1997 and a second civil war from 1999 to 2003; the Sierra Leonean Civil War started from 1991 to 2002; the first Ivorian Civil War occurred from 2002 to 2007 while the second one occurred in 2011 (Kieh, 2016). All these wars resulted in the influx of refugees from these countries into Ghana and many of them are in protracted situations in the country. Consequently, the refugees' complaint of discrimination in the labour markets could stem from the fact that their Ghanaian host sees them as having overstayed their 'temporary' status as refugees and therefore become a strain on the limited resources in the country.


4.4 Forced Migration Trajectory – Movement from the origin country to the host country.

This section highlights the migratory trajectory of refugees including the reasons for leaving their country, means of travel, and the reasons for choosing Ghana as their destination country.

4.4.1 Reasons for leaving the country of origin

From Figure 4.1, 78% of the refugees indicated that they left their country of origin due to political/governance conflict. This was followed by 17% who left because of tribal, religious and ethnic conflicts. Targeted persecution accounted for the movement of three percent of the refugees from their origin country while two percent also moved as a result of the worsening economic situation and food insecurity, resulting from the conflicts.

Figure 4.1: Percentage distribution of refugees by reasons for leaving the country of origin



Source: Field data, 2019

The reasons given by refugees in this study for fleeing their countries of origin corroborate what is already in the literature regarding the causes of refugee situations in Africa. Political instability resulting from conflicts and generalised violence remains a strong determinant of forced migration in Africa. The political landscape is unstable, unpredictable, and volatile;

dictatorial regimes entrench themselves in power and over time states become weakened, affecting human security (Adepoju, 2000). These issues eventually result in political upheavals and conflicts prompting a host of migratory movements and refugee situations across the continent. For instance, political reasons mainly accounted for the 1991 conflicts in Somalia. This was followed by a wave of civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, and Sudan's Darfur Region, resulting in refugee flows into countries far and near, with Ghana having its share of the flows (Kieh, 2016).

Reasons that accounts for refugee situations also have implications on refugee-host community relations at the destination country. Some studies suggest that an influx of refugees, and locals' reaction to them, may destabilise receiving countries and lead to conflict particularly when there is an actual or perceived negative effect of refugees' presence, such as increased economic competition with the locals, disruption of ethnic balance in the host country, and the arrival of people with ties to rebel or insurgent groups (Getmansky, Sinmazdemir, & Zeitzoff, 2018). Therefore many countries that face forced migrant inflows refuse to admit these 'uprooted' people premised on negative externalities such as increased insecurity associated with refugee presence. Refugee movements have also been found to contribute to the regional clustering of wars (Ruegger, 2018). Refugees can disturb the ethnic set up in the country of asylum and thereby trigger instability. Where there is ethnic power politics in the asylum state there can be an onset of intrastate conflict after a refugee influx.

4.4.2 Country of Origin of Refugees and Reasons for Leaving

Table 4.12 shows that country of origin is differentiated by reasons for leaving by refugees. Specifically, the highest proportion of refugees from Liberia (74.3%), Cote d'Ivoire (100.0%), Togo (40.0%), Chad (57.1%) and Sierra Leone (50.0%) indicated that they left

their country of origin due to political/governance conflicts. Small percentages of the refugees left their countries of origin due to tribal, ethnic and religious conflicts, for example, Liberia (1.0%), Togo (6.7%) and Sudan (1.5%). Also more than a tenth of those who left Sierra Leone (12.5%) did so as a result of tribal, ethnic and religious conflicts.

Table 4.12: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by reasons for leaving the origin.

Country of Origin	Reason for leaving country of origin				Total	
	Tribal, ethnic, religious conflict	Political, governance conflict	Targeted persecution	Economic challenges & food insecurity	N	%
	%	%	%	%		
Liberia	1.0	74.3	4.5	20.3	202	100
Cote d'Ivoire	0.0	100	0.0	0.0	161	100
Togo	6.7	40.0	13.3	40.0	15	100
Sudan	1.5	58.2	0.0	40.3	67	100
DRC	0.0	28.6	28.6	42.9	7	100
CAR	100	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	100
Chad	0.0	57.1	0.0	42.9	7	100
Sierra Leone	12.5	50.0	12.5	25.0	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

The qualitative results of the study also showed that many of the refugees moved out of their country of origin as a result of tribal/ethnic/religious conflict and political/governmental instability. From the qualitative results, refugees from the Central African Republic mentioned religious/tribal/ethnic conflict as a factor that led to their departure to Ghana. The finding is similar to the quantitative results. Some of the refugees indicated that the war was mostly between Christians and Muslims, with the Christians being the victims of the atrocities meted out by the Muslims. The quote below highlights this view.

Well, I left because I noticed that my life was in danger due to the war that has broken out. So, I had to find a way to protect myself and if I hadn't done that like today, I won't be here interacting with you. So, the first reason was to protect my life. It was a religious war. It was between Christians and Muslims. Most of the time, you know those politicians want to take the country to war and bring conflicts through their policies, behaviour and utterances that aims at marginalising other groups and pitching them against others. The rebels came from Chad as we share a border with Chad and Sudan. The Sudanese and the Chadians like these kinds of things. So (the rebels) joined the (Muslim) group to come and take power (in my country). So, when they took power, they started maltreating and killing the Christians, and protecting the Muslims because they belong to the same religion. As a Christian I had to run for my safety (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee)

Violent conflict based on religious factionalism is predominant in the Central African Republic though the country's constitution prohibits all forms of religious intolerance and "religious fundamentalism". A 2018 report by the US Government indicated that religious factions such as the Christian anti-Balaka and the predominantly Muslim ex-Seleka militia forces continued to occupy territories in the western and northern parts of the country, respectively, and sectarian clashes between them and Christian and Muslim populations continued (International Religious Freedoms Report, 2018). There were reported attacks on churches and mosques, and the deaths of religious adherents at those places of worship. The Muslim community indicated its members continued to face predominant discrimination from government officials on account of their religious beliefs or affiliation, including exclusion from public services, such as access to education and healthcare (International Religious Freedoms Report, 2018).

The reasons provided by refugees from Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sudan support the quantitative findings as well. Refugees mentioned that they left their countries because of political/government instability. They indicated that the environment was not good for them hence they had to run to Ghana for the safety of their lives.

We have to run from the southern part of Bamenda in Cameroon to Ghana because we are Anglophone. The group that my father belonged to asked the Government of Cameroon to provide us with our province because we are discriminated against by the French Cameroonians and Yaoundé is the centre for doing everything. When the government saw that we wanted to have our province they decided to kill us. When the government onslaught started, our leaders who were based in Nigeria then declared that we want total freedom to become an independent state. The government then declared genocide on us and commanded the police and the military people to kill us. We had to run into the bush. The forest we got a Good Samaritan who decided to show and lead us to Ghana. He was also running to Ghana and he said he had travelled to Ghana before and found the country to be peaceful. It was so bad that when they see you wearing colour red, they will kill you (Cameroonian, female, 37 years, urban refugee).

Therefore the Government of Cameroon in its bid to quell any successionist tendencies from Anglophone Cameroon decided to quell it by deploying the security forces to enforce order in those territories. It can be seen from the quotation above that this led to a battle which resulted in the fleeing of people into Ghana as refugees.

An Ivorian refugee also indicated that the war in Cote d'Ivoire was highly political and government forces loyal to the current President came at the heels of Gbagbo's supporters that's why she had to flee.

Okay, it was a political, let's say tribal as well, a bit of a tribal and religious war as well. The government forces saw us as the ones supporting the opposition so they wanted to just get rid of us. Even if you belonged to the tribe of Gbagbo and were non-partisan you were targeted. Also because Gbagbo was a Christian, all Christians were also targeted (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

Though there were several factors assigned to the reasons for refugees' departure from their country of origin to the host country, the results of both qualitative and quantitative data showed that most of the refugees left their country due to political or governance conflicts. Agblorti (2011) argued that Liberia's political instability in 1989 forced more than 750,000 Liberians to become refugees in other countries. Political and governance conflicts has the tendency of affecting the entire country as it usually feeds into existing tribal, ethnic and

religious tensions. It therefore become a catalyst for the spread of conflicts and wars in most African countries. The findings of the study corroborates other findings (Agblorti, 2011; Agblorti & Awusabo-Asare, 2011) who argued that political conflicts in Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo led to the exodus of many people migrating to different countries. The reason for the refugees' departure from their destination countries could be explained by the Kunz (1973) Kinetic theory which indicated that majority-identified refugees will flee from current political or government regime that they find to be oppressive.

Also, where there is a co-ethnic refugee influx (i.e. where there are same or similar ethnic groups in the host country), the influx enlarges the demographic and political leverage of the kin group, possibly resulting in clashes with other groups in the country in the instance where such minority groups are excluded from governance and national development (Ruegger, 2018). Ruegger (2018) however noted that refugees alone do not consistently influence armed violence and that such violence can occur only in combination with the indigenes where political or tribal/ethnic tensions already exist in the receiving country.

4.4.3 Mode of Travelling to Ghana and Travel Experiences of Refugees

As illustrated in Table 4.13, majority of the refugees indicated vehicular mode of transport (78.9%) as their main means of travel to Ghana, followed by sea (14.3%), other means (3.2%), trekking on foot (2.8%) and the least proportion (0.9%) by air.

Table 4.13: Percentage distribution of refugees by mode of travel to Ghana

Mode of travel to Ghana	Frequency	Percentage
By Sea	67	14.3
By Air	4	0.9
By Land - Vehicular travel	371	78.9
By Land - Trekking on foot	13	2.8
Other means	15	3.2
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The qualitative results support the findings of the quantitative study. Most of the participants indicated that they got to Ghana by land. They further indicated that they encountered some unpleasant challenges on their way to safety Ghana. Almost all participants expressed dissatisfaction on their journey from their country of origin to Ghana:

I came by land with a vehicle. But it was not easy. We came in a taxi and when we got to Ghana we had to stop and run and go to pick another taxi. People were just looking at us, they didn't understand us; they didn't understand the circumstances we've been through nor our challenges; indeed the journey was tough before we could get to safety; it stretched our physical strength and psychological well-being (Ivorian, male, 45 years, camp refugee).

The quotation above indicates that the Ivorian refugee after he had entered Ghana, still harboured the view of being pursued by rebels. This state of mind is common to most refugees and people who move from conflict zones into places of stability. It takes some time for refugees and people being pursued from conflict zones to settle down and believe that they are safe, as a little tricker or sound similar to a situation they might have seen or heard in the conflict zones they are running away from could trigger a sense of insecurity in their minds. Refugees may therefore face additional stressors as host countries are not well prepared to meet the mental health needs of incoming refugees (Neuner, Elbert, & Schauer, 2018; Im, Ferguson, Warsame, & Isse 2017).

Another refugee from Sudan also narrated the dangers that he had to go through in the journey from Sudan before he finally reached Ghana.

When I left Sudan, I came to Chad and from Chad, I came to Cameroon all by car. From Cameroon, I went to Nigeria. At that time, there was Boko Haram in Nigeria and the way was not safe because they're attacking and killing people. So, I decided to go to Niger where I almost fell into the hands of some Tuareg rebels. I managed to disguise myself so I was not identified and from Niger, I crossed to Benin. From Benin, I came to Togo and from Togo, I reached Ghana. So, it's a long journey (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee).

The quotation above also indicates that apart from the conflict in the country of origin, refugees have to go through other difficult trajectories before they get to their desired

destination countries. They may face similar situations of conflict in their journey, making it double jeopardy for the refugee in certain times of their journey – that is, moving from a predominant conflict in the country of origin into another struggle while enroute to a place of safety. In all these, the resilience of the refugee is tried, hence upon reaching the final destination they are able to survive better when the conditions of peace, security and stability are in existence in the destination country.

Another refugee from the Central African Republic mentioned that his means of transport to Ghana was by Air. He indicated that he had to hide and make the necessary arrangement for a passport to enable him to come to Ghana.

I came to Ghana by air, but I had to hide myself to do my passport. So, I used the relation of some of my friends that I trust. Because I myself at that time, I don't want to move around during the day. So, I even had to cover myself and dress in a strange way so that no one could recognize me (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee).

Two other refugees from Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire mentioned that they came to Ghana by sea. However, the refugee from Cote d'Ivoire indicated that apart from travelling with the ship, she also travelled via public transport at some point in her journey to Ghana.

I came straight by the sea from Liberia to Ghana by the ship called the Bulk Challenge in 1996. Cote d'Ivoire at the time did not allow the ship to berth at its shores so that we can disembark so the ship could only fuel and continue its journey on the coastline, to no where! We were on the ship for one week and we were really stressed. When we got to Ghana, after a few back and forths, the government allowed the ship to berth for us to disembark. That was a great relief for us my brother! That is why I don't joke with Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, the President of Ghana at the time. I am not supposed to talk politically given my status as a refugee but, my brother, I like the man because he saved our lives. Had it not been him who allowed us into Ghana, I wouldn't know where I and my family would have been right now. (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

We used what we call pinasse. It's a kind of boat, we had to use it because we were on the island, so we took the pinasse to Plateau, from there we had to walk a bit to a nearby town. Then we picked a taxi to continue our journey. The state security agencies were really checking people in taxis so we concealed our identity and we did

not show the security officials our documents because if they found out who were, they would have arrested us. At some points in the journey we paid bribes to these Ivorian security agencies before we were finally allowed to continue with our journey. I was really relieved when we finally got to the Elubo border and we were finally admitted into Ghana (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

The quotes above shows that the journey a real challenge for the refugees with some coming in by ship and others travelling in cars, and others trekking in some parts of the journey. This confirms that most of the refugees did not anticipate that the country could be plunged into such conflict so they may not have planned ahead to evacuate. Lack of funds, and the disruption in travel routes as a result of the raging conflict could have accounted for why they had to use varied means of transport to leave their country of origin.

Those who travelled by air may have seen the warning signs ahead so they might have prepared and left the country way before the conflict ensued. Through their social networks in Ghana, some of the refugees settled into Ghana in a seamless manner and made use of their networks to secure jobs or start their private businesses. One Ivorian refugee recounted how he saw danger ahead and left Cote d'Ivoire before the full scale conflict began.

When I realised the partiality of the Government of France towards my President Laurence Gbagbo, I projected into the future and I saw instability ahead. I just went into my local bank and transferred my money into my foreign accounts at the Standard Chartered bank. I booked my air tickets, contacted my friends in Ghana to secure accommodation for me and within a month I was in Accra, Ghana. I must say I got here six months before the actual conflict began. (Ivorian, male, 45 years, camp refugee)

These are refugees who anticipated the conflict and were able to move away from the country way ahead of a full-blown conflict. They can be termed as anticipatory refugees in line with Kunz theory (1973).

4.4.4 Stepwise Migration: Countries Visited before Arriving in Ghana and Reasons for Leaving those Countries

Table 4.14 shows the refugees' respective countries of origin and their stepwise migration trajectory (i.e. whether they settled in other countries before they finally moved to Ghana). The trend of the results showed that most of the refugees from Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Sudan, DRC, CAR and Sierra Leone travelled directly to Ghana while 57% of the Chadian refugees and 25% of the Liberian refugees stayed in other countries before finally travelling to Ghana. The proximity of some of these countries to Ghana accounted for the reason why most of the refugees moved directly to Ghana without staying in other countries.

Table 4.14: Country of origin and stepwise migration trajectory of refugees

<i>Country of Origin</i>	<i>Lived in other countries before coming to Ghana</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Yes (%)</i>	<i>No(%)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Liberia	25.2	74.8	202	100
Cote d'Ivoire	0.0	100.0	161	100
Togo	6.7	93.3	15	100
Sudan	9.0	91.0	67	100
DRC	28.6	71.4	7	100
CAR	0.0	100.0	3	100
Chad	57.1	42.9	7	100
Sierra Leone	25.0	75.0	8	100

Source: Fieldwork, 2019

According to Valenta (2020), there are notions that among labour migrants stepwise migration suggests migrants have preconceived multistage trajectories where each migratory step is meant to result in better working conditions. However, entering higher-tier countries also requires larger resources, therefore, stepwise migrations are long-lasting projects of developing individual resources in different host countries (Zufferey, 2019). In the case of refugees, the immediate motivation for stepwise migration is not getting to a higher-tier country but rather getting to a place that is safer and secure than the country of origin or the

conflict zone they are fleeing from. A higher-tier country is always aspirational - in terms of resettlement in a third country- after they have secured a place of safety and security. Thus, whereas migrants may move from one country to another to acquire the required resources, skills and capital before they move to the most desirable country, refugees will move from one country to another to seek for safety and personal security first, before they think of building their capacity/skills, and acquiring the required resources and capital to facilitate their vision of resettlement in a third country (Paul, 2015). An in depth interview with one of the refugees revealed the following:

When the crisis began in Sierra Leone, I first moved to Guinea Conakry because our town was closer to the border with that country. I stayed there for two months thinking the AU or UN will intervene in the conflict in Sierra Leone so I can return. I monitored the news and I realised things were getting worse in my country. The situation in Guinea Conakry was also not so good for my personal safety and security so I decided to connect with some of my relatives in Senegal where I stayed for four months. In Senegal I had a challenge getting a job because of the language barrier. Being a Sierra Leonean and English speaking, it was difficult getting a job in a French speaking country, Senegal. One of my friends phoned me from Ghana and told me about the economic opportunities here and the fact that language is not a barrier, so I rallied some money and moved to Ghana. Currently, I work in a hotel as a security officer and I am also into poultry farming, fish farming and maize production in this camp. My standard of living here is better than when I was in Guinea and Senegal. Once a while I call to check on my friends in Guinea and the family in Senegal. I am gathering money and planning for third country resettlement probably in Germany or America (Sierra Leonean, male, 38 years, camp refugee)

The stepwise migration also helps with their transnational connections in other third countries. This Sierra Leonean has said he has been contacting some of the friends he made in Guinea and the family and friends in Senegal since he came to Ghana. His step-wise migration trajectory therefore has had an impact on his transnational engagements with other third countries apart from his country of origin.

4.4.5 Reasons for the Choice of Ghana as a Destination

As shown in Table 4.15, about 87.2% of the refugees indicated that they chose Ghana as the final destination to seek protection, safety and security. Proximity to country of origin was the reason why 20.6% of the refugees decided to come to Ghana while 19.8% of the refugees chose Ghana due to Ghana's stable democracy and existing peace. This was followed by refugees who indicated that Ghana was the only alternative country for their destination (12.1%), to search for better income/more suitable job opportunities (9.6%), to live with relatives and friends in Ghana (9.1%) and using Ghana as a transit point to seek a third country settlement (6.6%).

Table 4.15: Percentage distribution of refugees by reasons for choice of Ghana as the destination.

Variable	Frequency	Percentage
To seek protection, safety and security	410	87.2
To live with relatives and friends in Ghana	43	9.1
To use as a transit point to seek third country settlement	31	6.6
To search for better income/ more suitable job opportunities	45	9.6
Ghana has a stable democracy and the country is relatively peaceful	93	19.8
Because of its proximity to my country of origin	97	20.6
That was the only alternative I had at the time I left my country	57	12.1

Source: Field data, 2019

(Multiple responses)

Findings from the qualitative results support the quantitative findings. Refugees mentioned that they chose Ghana as their destination due to peace, to seek opportunities, to be with relatives and friends, and also because Ghana was closer to their country of origin. A Sudanese refugee indicated that Ghana is a peaceful country, hence his migration to Ghana.

Because I see that Ghana is peaceful and it's a democratic country and when I was in Sudan, I had some friends here in Ghana. They told me a lot about Ghana and I said to myself that if the country is peaceful, let me go there so that I can protect myself and also secure a job to support my livelihood. They also said if you do business here, like buying and selling it works very work and you can get a lot of profit because people buy things (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee).

In addition, a refugee mentioned that he was in the process of continuing plans for his education hence the war was an opportunity for him to migrate to Ghana to continue his education.

Yea, even before the war, I was planning to further my education by persuing an MBA in Ghana. When the war came I just took advantage of it and moved straight to Ghana so that I can do what I've planned already. This was the first reason which motivated me to come straight to Ghana, to learn English and then to pursue my Master's degree. I attended one of the private universities in Ghana and now I have my MBA in Finance (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee)

Refugees from Cote d'Ivoire also mentioned that they came to Ghana due to proximity. They mentioned that they desired to go to some other countries but the distance was far, and Ghana presented the closest opportunity for them to secure their personal safety and security.

Because Accra is not far from Abidjan as compare to the distance between Abidjan and Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, we decided to come to Accra. We wanted to go to Ouagadougou but I realised that if you want to go to Burkina Faso, the position of rebels on the roads in the north of Cote d'Ivoire will be a hindrance and a risk to my personal safety. But the same was not the case for Abidjan and Accra- there were no rebels on the way apart from Government forces, so I chose to come to Accra. Also the fact that there is peace and security here in Ghana and democracy is well practiced, I was convinced I am safer in Ghana than any of the West African countries (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

Ghana was a neutral country for us, as the country did not take sides in our war. You know and believe we have enemies and one of them is the people from Burkina Faso, because they took sides. Ghana was also closer, anyway and a better place to stay than Burkina Faso. Actually I had wanted to go to South Africa but the distance is far and I didn't have the resources to travel to that place so I settled in Ghana. In future, when I get an opportunity I will migrate to South Africa and settle there" (Ivorian, female, 45 years, urban refugee).

Most of the refugees explained that they came to Ghana because of peace, safety and security.

Kissoon (2015) argued that refugees usually find safety when they arrive in new countries.

They need a place where they could be free from persecution and safe to live freely. They have a conducive space to redefine themselves and take advantage of every opportunity at their disposal towards enhancing their future. Ghana has been a peaceful country compared

to her neighbouring countries. This is the reason why many refugees left their country of origin to find safety in Ghana. In addition, the level of hospitality, openness and tolerance displayed by Ghanaians also accounted for the reception of the refugees. Dick (2002) argued that Ghanaians express their deep sense of sympathy and hospitality to refugees. The other reason accounting for Ghanaians acceptance of refugees is the the common humanity that all human beings share, that is, Helton's (2002) postulation, the fear that 'it could be me'.



CHAPTER FIVE

TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES OF REFUGEES AND THEIR CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION

5.1 Introduction

The chapter examines the transnational activities of refugees in Ghana and their channels of communications. The first part describes refugees' social, cultural, economic and political/civic engagements with their country of origin and third countries. The second part discusses the traditional and modern channels of communications used by the refugees in their transnational engagements.

5.1.1 Social Engagements with Country of Origin

The respondents were asked to provide information on the types of contact and frequency of social engagements with their countries of origin. Social engagements refer to refugees getting in touch with families or friends in the country of origin. The results as shown in Table 5.1, indicate that slightly more than half (51.7%) of the refugees do not engage socially with their country of origin while about 48.3% have had and continue to have social engagements with their contacts in their country of origin, since they arrived in Ghana. The data in Table 5.1 suggests the majority of respondents do not take part in social engagements with their country of origin.



Table 5.1: Percentage distribution of refugees by social engagements with country of origin

Social engagements	Frequency	Percentage
Made contact in country of origin		
Yes	227	48.3
No	243	51.7
Total	470	100
Category of contacts in country of origin		
Family		
Yes	184	81.1
No	43	18.9
Total	227	100.0
Friends		
Yes	123	54.2
No	104	45.8
Total	227	100.0
Frequency of contacts with family in the country of origin within the last 12 months		
Monthly	116	63.0
Quarterly	40	21.7
Biannually	15	8.2
Yearly	7	3.8
Never	6	3.3
Total	184	100.0
Frequency of contacts with friends in the country of origin within 12 months		
Monthly	46	37.4
Quarterly	31	25.2
Biannually	12	9.8
Yearly	4	3.3
Never	30	24.4
Total	123	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019.

In the qualitative study, the participants attributed their non-engagement with their countries of origin to a number of reasons including poor communication networks, unavailability of certain channels of communication, challenges with accessibility and affordability of communication channels, and loss of familial ties, among others. Among the Ivorians, the

dominant reason was fear of being located and targeted by the opposition or enemies from the country of origin. The following quote illustrates this view:

.... Once when I logged on to Facebook, I saw some pending friendship requests on my page so I checked and I realised that these people requesting friendship are people who were working with the rebels. I quickly deleted their friendship requests and changed my Facebook address. I don't use my picture on Facebook anymore. I also changed my name and removed all identifiers that anyone could use to track me online. I now use an icon as my Facebook photo. If I had not noticed they were at the other side of the divide they could have tracked me to where I am and probably harmed me. Social media is quite dangerous for us refugees and we have to be very careful with it and balance the advantage against the disadvantages' (Ivorian, female, 32 years, camp refugee).

The quote above confirms findings from other studies which indicate digital surveillance of social media activities by state actors and other entities is a major vulnerability for irregular migrants and refugees (Dijstelbloem & Meijer, 2009; Engbersen & Broeders, 2009; Wall et al., 2017). Hence the refugees use pseudonyms and avatars on their social media handles to mitigate this risk of surveillance and targeting by these state actors (Gillespie et al., 2016).

The Ivorian refugee further stated that he does not travel to the border town of Elubo because he fears he could be identified, tracked and persecuted by Ivorian Government forces.

I have been in Ghana since 2010 and I have never gone to Elubo before because the government forces usually patrol around those areas in mufti, collecting intel on the opposition members or anyone perceived to belong to the opposition, i.e. . So should any of them identify me that will be the end of my life. People went to Elubo and never came back again, all we heard was that they have been captured and imprisoned or they were missing" (Ivorian, male, 45 years, camp refugee)

This assertion by the Ivorian refugee shows the dynamics of transnationalism and engagement of refugees with their countries of origin particularly for refugees whose camps are located closer to the borders of their country of origin, the very country they are running away from. Depending to the level of peace in the country of origin or otherwise, residing in a location

close to the border with the country of origin may limit their transnational engagements or enhance them. This is consistent with an earlier work by Bloch, & Hirsch (2018), which shows that most refugees do not take part in social engagements with families and friends in their country of origin. Bloch & Hirsch (2018) further argue that refugees are unwilling to engage with the country of origin because of the innate fear of persecution by a dominant tribe (in the case of tribal and ethnic conflicts) or persecution from a dominant political regime of the time (in the case of a political or governance conflict) in the country of origin. Some refugees may decide not to engage with family members or friends due to this fear of being targeted, tracked and persecuted. The key informant interviews with the camp managers also confirmed that some refugees in Ghana left their countries due to political persecution therefore they fear that their engagement with their country of origin might lead to further persecution. This finding also corroborates Kunz's (1981) Kinetic Model on refugee movements.

Table 5.1 also indicates that of those who indicated they have social engagements in their country of origin (i.e. 48.3% of the total population for the quantitative study), about 81.1% said they contacted family while 54.2% said they contacted their friends in their country of origin. With regard to those who contacted their family members, about 63% contacted their family members monthly in the last 12 months, 21.7% contacted their family members quarterly in the last 12 months; and the least proportion (3.3%) had not contacted any family member in the last 12 months but those within this category indicated they do so either biennially or once in a while. For refugees who contacted their friends in their country of origin, about 37.4% contacted their friends monthly in the last 12 months, 25.2% contacted their friends quarterly in the last 12 months, 24.4% had never contacted their friends in the last 12 months but indicated they do so either biennially or once in a while; and the least proportion (3.3%) of friends had been contacted yearly. Table 5.1 further suggests that the refugees have different frequencies of engagements with families and friends in their countries of origin, suggesting that the times of engagement may differ from one refugee to

another as earlier noted in the work of Muller (2008). The findings of the current study are consistent with earlier studies which indicate that in spite of refugees being away from their country of origin, they still have forms of communication and social engagements with their relatives and friends at the origin (see Al-Ali, 2001; Al-Ali, 2002; Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002).

The observation from the key informant interviews with refugees also support the fact that the refugees engage with their family members and friends back home. The in-depth interviews revealed that the principal reasons for the refugees' social engagements with their country of origin included checking on the welfare of families and friends, and sometimes discussing their plans and sharing information with them, particularly on well-being and personal security as indicated in the following narratives:

My mother lives in Liberia and I need to maintain close ties with her. She is now aged and always need someone to talk to her. When she hears from me and gets to know that I am doing well, she has full joy; and so am I too when I hear from her (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

Whilst some refugees were engaging with parents to seek their welfare as shown in the quotation above, other refugees also made contacts with nuclear families left behind, as illustrated below:

I left my ex-wife and two children in Cote d'Ivoire. I can't go back now because I was targeted so I contact them regularly through telephone calls, to check on how they are doing (Ivorian, male, 39 years, camp refugee).

In key informant interviews with some of the Camp Managers, it was gathered that most refugees follow events back home by listening to radio, television news and documentaries. Some others also rely on social media channels and the Internet. A Camp Manager indicated that owing to the refugees' periodic use of these channels of communication, they can keep abreast with political, economic, socio-cultural and technological developments in their

country of origin. The camp manager also described the channels of communication utilized by the refugees to contact their relatives and other friends at home.

The refugees do contact their families in their respective countries of origin. They keenly follow the news and information back home, through social media, the internet, radio and television. The Liberian refugees here like watching LNTV (the Liberian National Television network) almost all the time. They also call their relatives back home. They share information with them so sometimes, the decisions that they take here are based on the information that they have gathered from home, either through relatives who are there or from the television, radio and social media. So, there is always an interaction between those who are here in the camp and those in the country of origin, especially, among relatives (Refugee Camp Manager)

The statements above indicate that the refugees have ways of monitoring events back home, and as a result are not cut off from their origin. The use of radio, television, social media and the internet serves as important communication channels in reaching their families and friends at home.

The above findings agree with earlier studies, which also found that owing to the availability of radio, television and social media channels, refugees are duly connected with their roots (Al-Sharmani, 2004; Mascini, et al., 2012). Though refugees may be living in host countries that are very faraway from their country of origin, the availability of the internet, telephones and forms of communication tools makes it possible for them to sustain relationships in their country of origin (Shah, 2019).

Further investigation during the in-depth interviews suggest that not all refugees can contact their family members as some of these relatives may have died during the conflict in their country of origin; or their whereabouts are unknown and the refugees have no means to trace them. In the following statement, a refugee mentioned that his family was annihilated through

the political conflicts and tribal wars that bedevilled his country, and that being the only survivor, he has no one to contact in the country of origin.

I cannot connect home because I lost all my relatives to the war. On this camp, however, I have friends from my tribe and country and we have joined forces together to strengthen our social bonds and culture. (Sierra Leonean, male, 38 years, camp refugee).

Conflict situations that often gets to a cataclysmic state results in the scattering and separation of families (UNHCR, 2013). Some refugees also indicated they have surviving families in their origin countries but they are unable to contact them because of their inability to locate them; they cannot be traced. The quote below demonstrates such a phenomenon:

I have relatives in Cameroon but I cannot engage with them because I don't even know where they are. They have all run into the forest and in the forest, there is no place to charge your phone so we are not in touch with them. I think they are alive because we keep getting information from others that they have been seen in one location or the other" (Cameroonian, female, 37 years, urban refugee).

The statement made by the Cameroonian refugee above confirms earlier studies by Beaton et al. (2018) which indicated that some refugees may not be contacting home because their families cannot be traced.

5.1.2 Country of Origin of Refugees and Social Engagements with the Origin

The analysis in Table 5.2 indicates there were country of origin differentials in terms of social engagements with the origin. More than half (67%) of the Liberian refugees reported having had social engagements while 42.9% of Chadian refugees also engaged socially with their country of origin in the past 12 months. The results further show that 38.8% of Sudanese refugees and 36% of Ivorian refugees had socially engaged with family members or friends in their country of origin in the past 12 months. However, no refugee in DRC and CAR is reported to have had any social engagements with their contacts in their country of origin and

93.3% of Togolese refugees had also not socially engaged with contacts in Togo in the last 12 months.

Table 5.2: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by social engagements with country of origin

Country of origin	Social engagements with country of origin		Total	
	Yes (%)	No(%)	N	%
Liberia	67.3	32.7	202	100
Cote D'Ivoire	36.0	64.0	161	100
Togo	6.7	93.3	15	100
Sudan	38.8	61.2	67	100
DRC	0.0	100.0	7	100
CAR	0.0	100.0	3	100
Chad	42.9	57.1	7	100
Sierra Leone	37.5	62.5	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019.

The in-depth interviews with some of the refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic revealed that the fear of persecution was the primary reason for their lack of social engagements with the country of origin. Some mentioned that they could be a target of tribal and ethnic persecutions if their identities were revealed through communication with families and friends at home; and others also did not contact due to sentiments of being branded as traitors by their kinsmen and countrymen in the country of origin. A Congolese refugee expressed it in the following narrative.

By contacting relatives at home, your identity and location can be traced, and you will become a target of attacks from the opposition even in the host country. Some people back home will brand you as having betrayed their cause for not staying at home to fight against the enemy. They think we should have stayed to fight for the liberation of our people and our tribes, but that will mean risking our lives and I was not prepared for that. In order to avoid being branded in this manner, some of us have decided not to contact home. A couple of us have started a new life here in Ghana (Congolese, female, 32 years, camp refugee).

The statement also conforms to the Kunz Kinetic model (Kunz 1973) as it explains why some refugees feel irreconcilably alienated from their country of origin. Such refugees are more

inclined to integrate into the host country or move to a third country and have affiliations to start a new life so that they can forget the past or prevent targeted persecutions from the country of origin while in the host country.

The engagement of Liberian refugees with their country of origin (67.3%) could be attributed to their long stay in Ghana and the fact that the conflict that brought them to Ghana is over and democracy is fully restored in Liberia. It has been noted that second generation refugees (that is, children of refugees born in the host country) could also engage with the country of origin as a way of maintaining ties with the origin. Hence the assertion that transnational engagements are primarily done by first generation refugees may not always hold, although it has been noted that the frequency and intensity of engagements differ between the two groups, with first generation refugees engaging on regular basis than second generation refugees (Levitt, 2009).

5.1.3 Social Engagements with Third Countries

This section describes the transnational social engagements of refugees and its frequency, with third countries. Social engagements with third countries refer to engagements with another country, other than the country of origin or the host country. The results as shown in Table 5.3 indicate that exactly half of the refugees reported they have engaged socially with third countries. Furthermore, for those who engaged socially in third countries, about 51.4% and 66.8% contacted their family and friends respectively.




Table 5.3: Percentage distribution of refugees by social engagement with third countries

Social engagement	Frequency	Percentage
Made contact in third countries		
Yes	235	50.0
No	235	50.0
Total	470	100.0
Category of contacts in third countries		
Family		
Yes	121	51.4
No	114	48.6
Total	235	100
Friends		
Yes	157	66.8
No	78	33.2
Total	235	100
Frequency of contacts with family in third countries		
Monthly	60	49.6
Quarterly	31	25.6
Biannually	11	9.1
Yearly	6	5.0
Never	13	10.7
Total	121	100.0
Frequency of contacts with friends in third countries		
Monthly	50	31.8
Quarterly	50	31.8
Biannually	15	9.6
Yearly	18	11.5
Never	24	15.3
Total	157	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Again, for refugees who had contacted their family, about 49.6% reported contacting their family members monthly in the last 12 months, while 25.6% contacted their family members quarterly in the last 12 months. The least proportion (5%) were those who contacted yearly as seen in Table 5.3.

With regard to refugees who contacted friends, about 31.8 % contacted their friends monthly in the last 12 months, 15.3 % had never had any contact in the last 12 months but indicated they only contact when necessary. About 11.5% reported contacting friends yearly (Table 5.3).

The qualitative results indicated that some of the key reasons for engaging in social contacts with third countries were to seek opportunities for resettlement, and family reunion, particularly for those who had family relations there. Explaining why they would engage with third countries, one of the refugees noted:

I engage with family in the USA and friends in Australia because I want to check out opportunities there for resettlement. The assurance of resettlement in a third country is very important for me so engaging with them is very important. Through them am able to check the resettlement packages available for refugees, the standards of living, economic conditions, the availability of jobs and other incentives like healthcare, education, social welfare systems and skills building for refugees in both countries (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee)

The results of the study show that half (50%) of the refugees engaged with family and friends in third countries. Observation made during the qualitative aspects also showed that the refugees made these contacts with third countries to find out the opportunities for resettlement, family reunion and to establish networks with others. The findings of this study suggest that most of the refugees would want to resettle in a third country.

5.1.4 Country of Origin of Refugees and Social Engagements with Third Countries

Table 5.4 shows the differences in social engagements with third countries in relation to the refugees' country of origin. From Table 5.4, a higher proportion of refugees in Chad (71.4%) had contacted people in the third countries. This was followed by Togolese refugees (66.7%), Liberian refugees (64.9 %) and the least proportion (25%) was refugees from Sierra Leone.

Table 5.4: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by social engagements with third countries

Country of origin	Social engagements with third countries		Total	
	<i>Yes(%)</i>	<i>No(%)</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Liberia	64.9	35.1	202	100
Cote D'Ivoire	35.4	64.6	161	100
Togo	66.7	33.3	15	100
Sudan	37.3	62.7	67	100
DRC	57.1	42.9	7	100
CAR	33.3	66.7	3	100
Chad	71.4	28.6	7	100
Sierra Leone	25.0	75.0	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

Liberian refugees had a higher proportion of engagements with contacts in third countries due to the resettlement program they had some years ago which took a lot of refugees overseas. The beneficiaries of the resettlement programme still maintain ties with their family and friends at the Buduburam Settlement, and with Liberian refugees in other parts of the country.

The nationality of a refugee and the level of engagement with third countries are influenced by the factors or events at the origin that necessitated the eventual fleeing and acquisition the refugee status. Relating this finding with Kunz's (1981) theory and the conceptual framework adopted for this study, it is clear that Chadian and Togolese refugees in Ghana were more of events-alienated refugees. This category of refugees would often seek opportunities to escape and are most eager to seek a new identity (Kunz, 1981; Tanle, 2013). The crave for third country resettlement may explain why a higher proportion of the Chadian and Togolese refugees engaged with third countries.

5.2 Predictors of Social Engagements of Refugees with Country of Origin and Third Countries

Table 5.5 represents the binary logistic regression of predictors of social engagements with both country of origin and third countries. In this model, the dependent variables used were “Engagement with country of origin” and “Engagement with third countries”. Respondents (i.e. the refugees) were asked whether they engage socially with the country of origin or not (for engagements with country of origin); and whether they engaged socially with third countries or not (for engagements with third countries). Respondents were made to choose between a ‘Yes’ to affirm their social engagements and a ‘No’ for no social engagements. Given the objective of the study, the researcher’s interest was in the ‘Yes’ responses so that was assigned a code one (1) while the ‘No’ responses were assigned with the code zero (0). The variable “Engagement with country of origin” was then regressed against the independent variables to build the model. The same method was used to code the dependent variable “Engagement with third country” where “Yes” was assigned a code one (1) while “No” was assigned a code zero (0) and the model constructed for that dependent variable with the independent variables

For country of origin; place of residence, education, length of stay in Ghana and occupation in Ghana predicted social engagement of the refugees. Urban refugees were about 13 times (OR = 12.825) more likely to have social engagements with their country of origin than their counterparts in the camp.




Table 5.5: Binary logistic regression showing predictors of social engagements with country of origin and third countries

Variables	Country of origin				Third countries			
	Odds Ratio	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Place of residence								
Camp refugee (RC)								
Urban refugee	12.825	0.000*	5.273	31.190	2.258	0.019*	1.144	4.458
Sex								
Male (RF)								
Female	0.879	0.604	0.538	1.434	0.497	0.004*	0.308	0.801
Age of respondents								
less than 20 years (RC)								
20-29	2.586	0.063	0.951	7.031	2.598	0.052	0.992	6.806
30-39	3.987	0.014*	1.317	12.073	1.847	0.251	0.648	5.268
40-49	3.226	0.052	0.991	10.500	2.127	0.189	0.690	6.551
50-59	3.384	0.074	0.887	12.912	3.008	0.092	0.836	10.825
60 and above	7.459	0.014*	1.494	37.249	3.021	0.148	0.674	13.536
Education								
No education (RC)								
Primary	2.215	0.122	0.808	6.069	2.235	0.098	0.861	5.798
JHS	2.260	0.098	0.861	5.934	1.923	0.159	0.775	4.774
SHS /Vocational +	3.608	0.007*	1.411	9.222	2.145	0.092	0.884	5.203
Religion								
Christians (RC)								
Muslims	1.240	0.526	0.637	2.415	0.746	0.376	0.389	1.428
Marital status								
Never married								
Married	0.933	0.815	0.525	1.661	1.128	0.673	0.644	1.978
Previously married	0.469	0.081	0.200	1.098	0.926	0.851	0.415	2.066
Number of children								
No child (RC)								
1-2 children	1.082	0.807	0.575	2.039	1.116	0.720	0.612	2.037
3-4 children	1.045	0.910	0.488	2.237	1.029	0.939	0.499	2.120
5 and more	0.591	0.282	0.227	1.540	0.390	0.046*	0.155	0.981
Length of stay in Ghana								
Less than 5 years (RC)								
5-9 years	0.546	0.148	0.240	1.239	0.606	0.203	0.280	1.311
10-14 years	0.328	0.073	0.097	1.108	0.570	0.309	0.193	1.681
15-19 years	0.212	0.006*	0.070	0.639	0.863	0.754	0.344	2.166
20-24 years	0.132	0.001*	0.038	0.450	0.561	0.272	0.200	1.572
25-30 years	0.120	0.001*	0.035	0.413	0.635	0.387	0.227	1.777
Occupation in Ghana								
Formal employment (RC)								
Trading	0.348	0.080	0.107	1.134	0.495	0.224	0.159	1.537
Farming	0.428	0.189	0.121	1.517	0.445	0.194	0.132	1.508
Craft/Artisanal related worker	0.304	0.049	0.093	0.992	0.756	0.629	0.243	2.349
Student	0.549	0.404	0.134	2.245	0.373	0.152	0.097	1.437
Unemployed	0.171	0.003*	0.054	0.540	0.371	0.076	0.124	1.109
Other	0.249	0.025*	0.074	0.843	0.311	0.049	0.097	0.996
_cons	0.438	0.382	0.069	2.786	0.838	0.845	0.142	4.931

Source: Computed from field data, 2019

RC= Reference category

This may have resulted from the fact that the urban refugees were less restricted in terms of movements and also more exposed to a wider variety of communication channels available in the cities and towns compared to their counterparts in the camp who may have limited means of communication.

The model also shows that refugees who were 30-39 years old were about four times more likely (OR= 3.987) than those less than 20 years to socially engage with the country of origin while refugees who were 60 years and above were about seven times more likely (OR=7.459) to socially engage with the country of origin compared to refugees who were less than 20 years old.

In terms of education, refugees with Senior High School and Vocational education were about four times more likely (OR = 3.608) to socially engage with kin and friends in their country of origin than their counterparts who had no education. Many of the refugees relied on modern technologies to communicate which require some level of education. Modern technologies play a key role in the transnational communication of refugees (Al-Sharmani, 2004). The refugees with no formal education may have been handicapped in this regard and therefore were not able to engage with family members back home. The refugees with Senior High School or Vocational Education may be more adept with modern social media and information communication technology and therefore may follow trending issues on the internet and other electronic media channels. Their attention may thus be drawn to social media trends in their countries of origin.

With regard to the length of stay in Ghana, refugees who have stayed in Ghana for 15-19, 20-24 and 25-29 years (OR = 0.212; OR= 0.132; and OR = 0.120 respectively) are 78.8 percent, 86.8 percent and 88.0 percent respectively, less likely to engage socially with their country

of origin compared to their counterparts who have stayed in Ghana for less than five years. Şimşek (2019) indicated that most of the people who had stayed longer in the host country may have established stronger networks and social capital within the host country over the years, hence may be less interested in engaging with the country of origin. Also refugees who came to the host country at a younger age may have grown to inculcate the social bonds of the host country therefore may not have many social bonds in the country of origin to engage with.

In terms of occupation, the Odd Ratio for refugees who were unemployed was (OR 0.171) translating to they being 82.9 percent less likely to socially engage with the country of origin compared to their counterparts in formal employment. The unemployed refugees may not be engaging with their country of origin because they were not settled yet, particularly with their means of livelihood, hence searching for a job that will provide them with a means of earning income may have taken precedence over engaging with their country of origin.

Furthermore, place of residence, sex and the number of children the refugees had, significantly predicted social engagements with third countries. Urban refugees were about two times more likely (OR= 2.258) to have social engagement in third countries compared to camp refugees. The urban settings exposed the self-settled or urban refugees to a variety of lifestyle options, news materials and other general engagements as well as a myriad of socio-economic, political and cultural activities hence they had a higher propensity to engage with both countries of origin and third countries than their counterparts in the camps. The refugee camps are generally located in rural settings or communities with homogeneity of socio-economic, political and cultural activities so the refugees may have limited exposure to modern ways of life compared to their counterparts in the cities and other urban areas. A quotation from the qualitative interview supports this assertion:

“As an urban refugee, I interact with a lot of people from different countries in Accra. There are a variety of economic activities here in the city. My interactions with the environment, the people, and the fast-moving systems enable me to engage more with my relatives in the country of origin and also chart ways by which I can get them to join me here and enjoy the city life as well. I also engage with friends in third countries to explore opportunities for third country resettlement. I stayed in the Ampain Refugee Camp for about six months when I arrived in Ghana, but I soon realized that the boring nature of the place, the lack of economic activities and the one-way culture, was making things difficult for me. Apart from colleagues who speak French, I could not interact with anyone else, particularly in the host communities because I couldn't speak the Nzema language. My mother is a Sudanese and my father is a Congolese. I was born and bred in Congo. I am multilingual so I can speak French, Arabic, English and a little bit of Spanish. Over here in Accra, I speak Arabic when I go to the mosque. With the French, English and a little Spanish I can also interact with lots of people in the city. I have Ghanaian friends, and friends from other nations. I have been going to a friend's internet café to teach students basic IT. I connect with my relatives in Sudan and Congo when I go to the café and I also check on other friends in Norway, Sweden and the USA. There was only one internet café in the camp and at times when the internet network and computers break down there will be no communication. Such situations hardly occur in the city. I like the life in the city though it comes with high expenditure, but if you work hard you will make it. I prefer to be here than being in the Ampian Refugee Camp, so that I can interact with modern systems, work and also connect with my social networks in other parts of the world” (Congolese, male, 25 years, urban refugee).

With regard to the sex category, the regression model shows that female refugees were 50.3% less likely (OR = 0.497) to socially engage with third countries compared to their male counterparts. This is probably because female refugees may have a high propensity of intergrating in the host country than the male refugees. With that propensity, they may have become less interested in engaging with third countries. The number of children a refugee had also came out significant. Refugees with five and more children were 61 percent less likely (OR = 0.390) to engage socially with third countries compared to refugees with no children.

The quantitative results also indicate that the refugees' social engagements with the country of origin and third countries is almost a split. The difference however lies in the country

dynamics as well as the personal networks that the refugees may have in both places (i.e. the country of origin and third countries). The binary regression model also predicted other factors including place of residence and length of stay among factors as predictors of social engagements or non-engagement with both the origin and third countries. For those who were engaged socially in both places, the key reason was to check on the wellbeing of friends and family as well as the prevailing news and developments particularly in the country of origin; and to seek for resettlement opportunities and greener pastures in the third countries.

5.3 Cultural Practices Related to Country of Origin and Third Countries

This section discusses the cultural activities of refugees in both countries of origin and third countries. It captures the language, dressing, food, religion, songs and the general cultural organization of the refugees in the urban areas as well as those in the camps. The reason was to explore how they practised aspects of their own culture in Ghana. The extent to which they are nostalgic about their cultural and traditional practices may influence their engagements with the country of origin.

5.3.1 Cultural Practices of Refugees' Country of Origin

From Table 5.6, about 46.4% of the refugees indicated that they always used the local language of the country of origin for communication to their colleagues in Ghana. Slightly less than one fifth (18.0%) of the refugees indicated that they often used their country of origin's local language for communication to their colleagues in Ghana. Less than a tenth (8.7%) of them indicated that they rarely used their country of origin's local language for communication in Ghana.

Table 5.6: Percentage distribution of refugees by cultural practices of country of origin

Use your local language for communication in	Frequency	Percentage
Always	218	46.4
Often	85	18.0
Sometimes	67	14.3
Rarely	41	8.7
Never	59	12.6
Total	470	100
Eat local dish of country of origin		
Always	325	69.1
Often	70	14.9
Sometimes	45	9.6
Rarely	22	4.7
Never	8	1.7
Total	470	100
Sing/listen to folk songs/music from country of origin		
Always	74	15.8
Often	177	37.7
Sometimes	151	32.1
Rarely	42	8.9
Never	26	5.5
Total	470	100
Dance to the traditional and local songs of country of origin		
Always	37	7.9
Often	28	6.0
Sometimes	129	27.4
Rarely	240	51.0
Never	36	7.7
Total	470	100
Popular culture of these culture		
No	441	93.8
Yes	29	6.2
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The qualitative results showed that refugees used the native local language of their respective countries to communicate mostly when they meet as a group or as people from the same origin. In their group meetings, they used their local language as a medium of communication;

and when the English language is used at such meetings, it is translated into their local language for the benefit of all.

Ehh ... from time to time when we meet among ourselves then we've been using our local language and sometimes we also speak in French or English. However the French and English are usually translated into the local language for the benefit of the others who cannot speak those two languages. For me speaking in our language within the group gives me a sense of being and identity. It makes me feel at home. It feels like all is not lost after all. (Central African, male, 29 years, urban refugee).

Studies by Arendt (1968) and Omata (2014) resonate with the views of the 29 year old Central African refugee, that refugees may have been out of their home country but they use language to express their true sense of identity and belonging.

As a family, our culture is our being. And for me, this is derived from the local language. Without it, we have no identity to live by. So, I speak to my children using our local language and tell them some of the heroic stories of our ancient traditions so they can understand and learn. Sometimes they like the stories, sometimes too they put on a nonchalant attitude to whatever I say in the local language (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

Thus even though refugees are outside their home country, the use of their native language coupled with engagements in other cultural practices help them to maintain their cultural identity as noted. Al-Sharmani (2004) in a study of Syrian refugees in Cairo, noted that language played a significant role in the preservation of the cultural identity of the refugees.

In addition, about 70% of the refugees always eat a local dish of their country of origin in Ghana, while about 15% of refugees often eat the local food of their country of origin in Ghana. The finding implies that most refugees eat their country of origin's local food in Ghana. The availability of the local cuisines of their country of origin in Ghana, including its ingredients, is probably an indication that there is a community of their nationals in Ghana who prepares their local dish.

The qualitative findings of the study support the quantitative results. From the qualitative results, most refugees eat the local dishes from their country of origin. Refugees from Cote d'Ivoire indicated that they get access to their local foods on the Ghana - Cote d'Ivoire border. Some even indicated that they eat more of their village food in Ghana than they use to eat while in their country of origin. Refugees from Sudan and Liberia mentioned that they liked their local cuisine than any other, hence their motivation for eating their local foods in Ghana.

“Okay, at the camp we still eat food from Cote d'Ivoire. Because at the barrier, I mean Ghana-Cote d'Ivoire border, they sell some food items from Cote d'Ivoire. So, some women at the camp go there, buy them and come and sell them back in the camp. So, we have some of the food that we eat. I even eat my village's food here more than I did when I was in Cote d'Ivoire. I have been eating acheke most of the times” (Ivorian, female, 33 years, camp refugee).

“But if I want to prepare Sudanese food, mostly I can't get the items here. So they've Banku and we too we've banku, but if we compare our Banku with the Ghanaian Banku, it's not the same at all and it's very difficult for me to get the items to prepare the Sudanese food. So sometimes when we meet together as Sudanese, we try to prepare some Sudanese food to eat and enjoy. What we usually do is to prepare the local stew and add the usual lemon and tinned fish to it. We eat bread with it. I like my children born here to get used to our food. They are getting too used to the Ghanaian dishes and they may lose the taste of their own in the long run (Sudanese, female, 30 years, camp refugee)”

“Indeed, we cook our local food a lot because as Liberians we love our local cuisine. We love the cassava leaves, bitter leaf, Toborghee, and potato greens. Ghanaians eat what they call Fufu, we call it dumboy. Our Fufu may not be entirely different from theirs. We have different dishes of all kinds. Every tribe has theirs. I have taught my Ghanaian wife how to prepare the cassava leaves stew which we use for eating rice. I think she had some challenges eating it at first but now she enjoys it more than I do. That is the beauty of appreciating our diverse cultures. I also eat their Kpepei during the Homowo festival. My wife is from the Ga tribe in Ghana so they celebrate the Homowo festival and eat Kpepei during the festival. I celebrate the festival with them as well” (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

One of the refugees also indicated that there is a specific restaurant specialising in Congolese cuisines in Accra where he and his friends patronise most of the time.

‘I usually patronise a small restaurant in Osu, here in Accra. They specialise in Congolese cuisine. I and my friends patronise the restaurant a lot. It is owned by a Congolese businesswoman married to a Ghanaian. Most of the cooks and attendants are also Congolese. She gets most of the local spices imported from Congo DR. When you enter the restaurant, the décor, the music, the artifacts and the entire environment makes you feel you are in a restaurant in Kinshasha! I like the place a lot but I cannot go there all the time because the food is quite expensive. On occasions, when I get some visitors, we go there to eat (Congolese, male, 25 years, urban refugee)

In terms of listening to folk songs, more than a third (37.7%) of the refugees often sing or listen to folk songs from their countries of origin while a little less than a third (32.1%) sometimes sing or listen to folk songs. The least proportion (5.5%) never sing or listen to folk songs from their countries of origin. For those who never sing or listen to folk songs from their countries of origin, the reasons may be that they are integrating well in Ghana and so are enjoying Ghanaian music; or they may be people who naturally do not like listening to music or have no affinity for folk songs.

The qualitative results also showed that refugees listen to their countries’ music. Some of the refugees came to Ghana with Liberian and Sudanese tapes or music so they listen to them frequently.

“Wahoo! It’s interesting! When I was at the Krisan Refugee Camp, during festive periods and anniversaries, we (the Sudanese) used to organize programmes and we’d danced to our local music. We download some of the Sudanese music on our phones through the internet, particularly through the YouTube channel. Some of my country folks also brought some tapes when they were coming from Sudan. So, we used to put on the music and we’d danced and enjoyed ourselves. In Sudan, we like our music very well. Even today, we’ve the old songs and new songs. The new songs composed by the young ladies and guys are just to show what’s going on. But the old songs when you listen to them, you’ll feel like you’re in Sudan” (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee)

“For the music, indeed we’ve various kinds of music. We listen to them and sometimes while we’re at a meeting we sing some of them. We have some of them recorded and people listen to them” (Liberian, male, 61 years, urban refugee)

With regard to dancing to traditional and local songs of the country of origin, about 27.4% indicated that they sometimes dance to some of the traditional and local songs. The results imply that most (i.e.72.6%), of the refugees do not dance to the traditional and local songs of their country of origin. Majority of the refugees were probably feeling at home in Ghana in the areas of music and dance but not in the area of food consumption or dietary behaviour. Integration at the destination is not in all areas of the life of migrants and refugees as they hold on to some aspects of their lifestyle or culture while changing others.

On the contrary, the qualitative results of the study showed that most of the refugees engage in cultural transnational activities like dressing and dancing. The respondents mentioned that they have the freedom to wear any cloth. In addition, most of the refugees explained that they meet as a group to celebrate their culture.

“When we talk about traditional dresses or something like that, most of the time we may be referring to only a particular group of traditional dance or dancers because each group or tribe may have their type of clothes and type of dance. But we don’t have common traditional cloth or something like that. We’re free to wear anything that we are comfortable with or things that may not offend someone else” (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee).

“Yes, indeed what we do is that because we hold meetings together here and I am the President of my tribal grouping, we try to as much as we can to hold in high esteem and practise our culture because it’s very important that we do so in order not to lose our identity, where we come from and who we are. So, when it comes to the issue of marriage, the issue of dealing with the elders, the issue of dealing with one another and how to go about it and how to relate to one another, we want to do it our cultural way. So, we meet either once a month to discuss our issues and how best we can sustain our cultural ideals while in Ghana” (Liberian, male, 59 years, urban refugee).

The innate drive to maintain the culture and to keep it unadulterated was one of the key reasons why the refugees cherished their cultural ideals.

“I don’t want to forget my roots. I cannot be a Ghanaian no matter how long I stay here in Ghana. That’s why my culture is dear to me”. – (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee)

“I maintain cultural ties so that I don’t forget about my country because I know no matter how long, I stay in exile in Ghana, I will have to go back one day” (Congolese, female, 32 years, camp refugee)

“My culture is part of me. It is how I was raised. It is an integral part and I cannot hide it. That is what defines who I am so I cannot throw it away, but I am open to other cultures as well and I respect them for what they are” (Ivorian, female, 58 years, urban refugee)

5.3.2 Country of Origin of Refugees and Cultural Engagements with the Origin

As shown in Table 5.7, there was a connection between country of origin of the refugees and their cultural engagements with the origin . All the refugees from the eight countries listed in the study indicated they have engaged culturally with their respective countries of origin in one way or the other. Refugees from DRC stood out as having engaged culturally (i.e.100%) with the origin in all the indicators stated for culture engagements. Refugees from all the other countries showed significant levels of cultural engagements with the country of origin and some levels of non-engagement as well.

Table 5.7: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by cultural engagements with the origin

Country of origin	Cultural engagements with country of origin		Total	
	Yes (%)	No(%)	N	%
Liberia	66.8	33.2	202	100
Cote d’Ivoire	75.2	24.8	161	100
Togo	86.7	13.3	15	100
Sudan	89.6	10.4	67	100
DRC	100.0	0.0	7	100
CAR	66.7	33.3	3	100
Chad	71.4	28.6	7	100
Sierra Leone	75.0	25.0	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

Though not very many, some refugees expressed disgust about aspects of their culture, hence they were reluctant to practise it. The example below typifies that:

‘My culture oppresses women. Yes, it oppresses us the females. You always have to do what your husband says as if you are not a thinking human being. I left him in Sudan because of the war and the oppression I faced through the culture. Some of the women are okay with the culture, but I am not. My education teaches me something different. I am an independent woman; I am resourceful; I can also work and earn money to support myself; I am intelligent and skilful in several areas. Women are free elsewhere. Women are not free in some cultures, like my own, in Sudan. Over here in Ghana and in this city of Accra, I am free to be myself. I understand he’s married another woman. I had to flee the oppression of a culture that will not let me express myself as me. Every time I had to express myself through my husband. That is not fair to women at all, everywhere!’ (Sudanese, female, 27 years, urban refugee)

In the above case of the Sudanese woman, the issue of gender discrimination, suppression and repression is revealed. As a ‘modern non-traditionalist’ female, she did not accept the downsides of the culture and therefore took advantage of the war to flee. Hence she’s been able to bring herself to safety and also free herself from cultural bondage, thus overcoming the jeopardy of the conflict and war situation in the country and also the conflict of the self against the ‘archaic’ cultural norms. It can be inferred from her statement that the conflict in Sudan was both physical and symbolic, for her. Whereas refugee situations are generally associated with untold hardships for the refugees, she rather found freedom in the situation since she’s been able to breakaway from the bonds of an oppressive culture whose victims are mostly female.

‘I am not interested in my country anymore. My disinterest is as a result of the Government that is currently ruling the country. Because I belong to a particular tribe, they targeted me and my family. I was targeted for elimination when it wasn’t my fault to have been born into that particular tribe. I am happy to take on Ghanaian citizenship and I have initiated the process for that. I have a Ghanaian boyfriend and we are planning to marry. I am eagerly looking forward to this new beginning (Congolese, female, 32 years, urban refugee)

The first quotation above reveal what can be considered a gender-based oppression by a particular culture in addition to the war which made it difficult for the refugee in question to reconcile with the country of origin, and the second one is related to tribal persecution. These two can be described as event-related refugees in line with the Kinetic model of Kunz (1981). According to the theory individuals in this category are highly unlikely to connect back home

but will rather seek opportunities to adapt to particular cultures of the host country or opt for a third country settlement where they can get a fresh start to life (Kunz, 1981; Tanle, 2013).

5.3.3. Country of Origin of Refugees and Cultural Engagements with Third Countries

From Table 5.8, shows that the refugees' cultural engagements with third countries also differed in terms of their country of origin. All refugees from the eight countries indicated that they had engaged culturally with people in third countries. All the CAR (100%) refugees culturally engaged with third countries. Among the rest of the refugees, the proportion who culturally engaged with third countries ranged from 25% in Sierra Leone to 90.1% in Cote d'Ivoire.

Table 5.8: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by cultural engagements with third countries

Country of origin	Cultural engagements with third countries			Total
	Yes(%)	No(%)	N	
Liberia	61.9	38.1	202	100
Cote d'Ivoire	90.1	9.9	161	100
Togo	26.7	73.3	15	100
Sudan	53.7	46.3	67	100
DRC	14.3	85.7	7	100
CAR	100.0	0.0	3	100
Chad	57.1	42.9	7	100
Sierra Leone	25.0	75.0	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

Some of the determinants of the refugees' culture attraction to third countries included the music and popular culture of those countries, their traditional and religious practices, and the compatibility of the refugees language to the official languages of these third countries. The sharing of colonial and historical bonds were also some of the determinants of their cultural engagements with third countries.

The strong attraction of the nationals of the Central African Republic to third countries and the non-attraction to their own country of origin has been variously confirmed in the qualitative interviews and supported by the Kunz theory. Almost all of them were events-alienated refugees who suffered targeted persecution as a result of political, religious or tribal affiliation. Consequently, they were very unwilling to be associated with the origin, but were rather attracted to that of the host or other third countries.

The qualitative interviews revealed that the refugees were attracted to the cultures of the third countries because for some it gave them strong leverage to explore their cultural freedom. Some of them were attracted because they saw dressings, hairstyles and haircuts on the internet through musical videos, and they wanted to be part of it. A refugee expressed this sentiment in the quotation below:

“I like the culture of the US. It is full of freedom that’s why am attracted to them. You are free to wear anything you want to wear. I like their hairstyles, the tight dresses they wear, the eyelashes, the nails and the various colours in their make-up. I see these in the music videos and they use them to reveal their personality and creativity. Over here even with this small haircut that I have done and the dress that am wearing which is just a little above my knee, the local community people in this Buduburam settlement are branding me as a prostitute. This is very unfair! Can we be ourselves and stop pretending to be what we are not? We must have the freedom to be ourselves. Some African societies and cultures are too rigid and I think Ghana is one of them! I want to go to America! My seven-year-old son is already there with his paternal grandmother and I am planning to join them sooner than later” (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee)

Others were also attracted to it because of the colonial history and bonds while for some refugees they were consciously studying the culture to get used to it so that they will not face many challenges in resettling in those countries.

‘I maintain cultural ties with my guys in the US because we consider the US as our colonial master. That bond needs to be kept just like that of the French, the English and the Portuguese with the Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone countries

respectively in Africa. My father worked with international organisations and I know how colonial bonds are very useful in networking. It is important to maintain a bond with the superpower nation of the world, the United States of America!’ (Liberian, male, 61 years, urban refugee).

‘I always study the Canadian culture because I will be going there sooner or later through family reunion. I am training myself through studying their culture, imitating some aspects here, and studying their news and trends of development in that country so that when I get there I can easily fit in. I have been studying their pronunciations of certain letters in the English language and other aspects of living in Canada through YouTube videos. I am preparing myself for resettlement in Ontario soon!’ (Sierra Leonean, female, 29 years, urban refugee)

5.3.4 Predictors of Cultural Engagements with Country of Origin and Third Countries

Table 5.9 is a binary logistic regression showing the predictors of refugees’ cultural engagements with the country of origin and third countries. The dependent variables used in this model were “Engagement with country of origin” and “Engagement with third countries”. The researcher asked the refugees (i.e. the respondents) whether they engage culturally or not with the country of origin (for engagements with country of origin); and whether they engaged culturally or not with third countries (for engagements with third countries). The respondents were asked to choose between a ‘Yes’ to affirm their cultural engagements and a ‘No’ for no cultural engagement. Considering the objective of the study (i.e. exploring the transnational ties of refugees and their integration in Ghana), the researcher’s interest was in the ‘Yes’ responses so that was assigned a code one (1) while the ‘No’ responses were assigned with the code zero (0). The variable “Engagement with country of origin” was then regressed against the independent variables to build the model. The same method was used to code the dependent variable “Engagement with third country” where “Yes” was assigned a code one (1) while “No” was assigned a code zero (0) and the model constructed for that dependent variable with the independent variables.

As illustrated in Table 5.9, the results from the binary logistics regression analysis of the data showed that age and the length of stay of refugees in Ghana predicted refugees' engagements with the culture of their country of origin while domiciled in Ghana.

Table 5.9: Binary logistic regression showing predictors of cultural engagements with the country of origin and third countries

Variables	Country of origin				Third countries				
	Odds Ratio	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]		
Place of residence									
Camp refugee (RC)									
Urban refugee	1.032	0.939	0.463	2.302	0.908	0.794	0.439	1.878	
Sex									
Male (RC)									
Female	1.401	0.209	0.828	2.370	0.829	0.475	0.496	1.386	
Age of respondents									
less than 20 years (RC)									
20-29	2.458	0.088	0.874	6.910	1.596	0.355	0.593	4.292	
30-39	2.979	0.062	0.947	9.369	3.100	0.046*	1.020	9.415	
40-49	3.695	0.038*	1.075	12.693	2.963	0.077	0.889	9.870	
50-59	5.616	0.019*	1.321	23.882	1.019	0.978	0.270	3.842	
60 and above	5.407	0.055	0.964	30.336	0.685	0.629	0.147	3.185	
Education									
No education (RC)									
Primary	0.601	0.429	0.171	2.118	1.482	0.447	0.537	4.093	
JHS	0.938	0.918	0.276	3.187	0.871	0.771	0.344	2.204	
SHS /Vocational +	0.497	0.245	0.153	1.616	0.784	0.597	0.318	1.933	
Religion									
Christians (RC)									
Muslims	1.568	0.272	0.702	3.502	0.205	0.000*	0.103	0.408	
Marital status									
Never married									
Married	1.323	0.392	0.697	2.510	0.642	0.159	0.346	1.190	
Previously married	1.947	0.189	0.721	5.258	0.564	0.185	0.242	1.315	
Number of children									
No child (RC)									
1-2 children	1.042	0.908	0.523	2.075	1.209	0.574	0.624	2.342	
3-4 children	0.720	0.444	0.310	1.670	1.476	0.343	0.660	3.301	
5 and more	0.810	0.701	0.276	2.374	1.631	0.331	0.608	4.377	
Length of stay in Ghana									
Less than 5 years (RC)									
5-9 years	0.338	0.056	0.111	1.029	1.193	0.677	0.521	2.733	
10-14 years	0.647	0.575	0.141	2.963	0.288	0.026*	0.097	0.859	
15-19 years	0.177	0.006*	0.052	0.603	0.650	0.389	0.244	1.730	
20-24 years	0.075	0.000*	0.020	0.279	0.453	0.148	0.155	1.324	
25-30 years	0.226	0.035*	0.057	0.902	0.299	0.029*	0.102	0.883	
Occupation in Ghana									
Formal employment (RC)									
Trading	0.870	0.827	0.250	3.031	0.439	0.227	0.115	1.670	
Farming	1.279	0.744	0.293	5.579	0.584	0.457	0.141	2.412	
Craft/Artisanal related worker	1.809	0.352	0.519	6.298	0.353	0.118	0.096	1.302	
Student	0.779	0.745	0.172	3.524	0.451	0.312	0.096	2.115	
Unemployed	1.080	0.901	0.324	3.595	0.487	0.270	0.135	1.750	
Other	0.527	0.319	0.150	1.859	0.199	0.020	0.051	0.773	
_cons	4.594	0.164	0.536	39.403	6.568	0.061	0.919	46.925	

Source: Computed from field data, 2019

RC= Reference category

Refugees aged 40-49 years were about four times more likely (OR = 3.695) to observe cultural activities of their countries of origin than those who were less than 20 years old. Also refugees who were 50-59 years old were about six times more likely (OR= 5.616) to observe cultural activities of their countries of origin compared to those who were below 20 years of age. The reason may be that refugees who are elderly may tend to appreciate the culture of the country of origin better and may see themselves as custodians of the culture. The younger generation may not have experience or imbibed much of the local culture at the origin hence may not see themselves as the protectors of their local culture.

Refugees who have been in Ghana for 15-19, 20-24, and 25-30 years with (OR=0.177; OR= 0.075; and OR= 0.226) respectively were (82.3%, 92.5% and 77.4%) respectively, less likely to be involved in cultural activities of their country of origin compared to those who have been in Ghana for less than 5 years. This is a truism in that the longer the refugees stayed in the host country the more they appreciated the culture and way of life of the people in the host country. Omata (2012), in a study of Burundian refugees found that those who had stayed for less than 5 years in the host country maintained their cultural ties with their country of origin. The probable reason could be that they had not been in the country for long, hence they still had a strong attachment and great memories of their culture at the origin.

In addition, the age of respondents, religion and length of stay of refugees in Ghana, significantly predicted their cultural engagements in third countries. Refugees who were 30-39 years of age were three times more likely (OR = 3.100) to have been involved in cultural activities in third countries compared to those who were less than 20 years. With regard to religion, refugees who were Muslims were 79.5 percent less likely (OR= 0.205) to be involved in cultural activities in third countries compared to their counterparts who were Christians. It is probable that the Muslims were not attracted to the cultures of the Western

countries because of the secular nature of the countries' cultural practices compared to some countries in the Middle East that are purely Islamic nations and had strict codes of conduct in the public space including the type of dresses males and females should wear.

Significantly contributing to the cultural engagements in third countries is the length of stay of the refugees in Ghana. Refugees who have stayed in Ghana for a duration of 10 to 14 years and 25 to 30 years with (OR = 0.288) and (OR = 0.299) respectively, were 71.2 percent and 90.1 percent respectively, less likely to be involved in cultural activities in third countries compared to their counterparts with less than 5 years duration of stay in Ghana.

5.4 Economic Engagements with Country of Origin and Third Countries

This section describes the economic engagements of refugees in their country of origin and third countries.

5.4.1 Economic Engagements with Country of Origin

Table 5.10 shows that a vast majority (88.7%) of the refugees had no economic investment in their country of origin.




Table 5.10: Percentage distribution of refugees by economic engagements in the country of origin

Economic Investment	Frequency	Percentage
Economic investment in the country of origin		
Yes	53	11.3
No	417	88.7
Total	470	100.0
Sending remittances (Money) to country of origin		
Yes	23	4.9
No	447	95.1
Total	470	100.0
Sending remittances (goods) to country of origin		
Yes	32	6.8
No	438	93.2
Total	470	100.0
Receiving remittances (Money) from country of origin		
Yes	43	9.1
No	427	90.9
Total	470	100.0
Receiving remittances (goods) from country of origin		
Yes	23	4.9
No	447	95.1
Total	470	100.0
Frequency of remittances sent to family contacts in country of origin		
Monthly	4	17.4
Quarterly	6	26.1
Biannually	6	26.1
Yearly	7	30.4
Total	23	100.0
Frequency of remittances received from family contact in country of origin		
Monthly	17	39.5
Quarterly	10	23.3
Biannually	7	16.3
Yearly	9	20.9
Total	43	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The qualitative results also showed that most of the refugees do not have properties or investments in their country of origin.

“Currently I don’t have a property and any investment in Bamenda, Cameroon. I used to have a house that my late father bequeathed and I have been able to save some money at the bank but when I realized the government is definitely clamping down on us and it is becoming bloodshed of one civilian after another, we quickly got the money out of the bank and my little sister, my two children and I managed to travel to Ghana. Because my late father was an active member of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), the group that has been seeking for the secession of English-speaking southern Cameroon from French-speaking Cameroon, we were targeted and I had to run away with my children. Some friends who survived the attacks sent me photos of the building and it was totally in ruins, razed down by government forces” (Cameroonian, female, 37 years, urban refugee).

A Sudanese also mentioned that he had a cattle ranch in his village and some farms but he got reports that the cattle ranch has been destroyed by rebel and cattle rustlers, and the farms has been plundered.

“Of course I used to have investments but they are no more...I had a large cattle ranch in my village and I use to employ local folk to work on the ranch as I spent most of the time in the city. I also had about ten acres of maize farm and I used to do mixed cropping on the land as well. During the war, rebels and cattle rustlers plundered my ranch and my farms. The last time I saw the land it was in a sorry state. I saw it on social media. I couldn’t visit the place because my life was in danger and I had to run for safety. I lost everything, all my investments and property to the war (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee)

Also, majority of the refugees indicated they had not sent money (95.1%) and goods (93.2%) to the country of origin. With regard to receiving remittances, the majority of the refugees also indicated that they had not received remittance in the form of money (90.9%) and goods (95.1%) from their country of origin. This is very much supported by the migration literature in that reverse remittances may usually be common with the ordinary migrants (Mazzucato, 2011), but it may not be so in the case of refugees whose countries may already be in turmoil through conflicts or whose tribes and relatives may have suffered injuries or death through the conflicts in the country of origin.

In terms of remittance to family members in their country of origin, 30.4% of the refugees send money annually to their family members in the country of origin, 26.1% send remittance quarterly to family members in their country of origin and the least proportion (17.4%) send remittances monthly to family members in their country of origin. About 39.5% also said they receive money monthly, 23.3% receive money quarterly and one-fifth receive money annually.

The qualitative results of the study showed that most of the refugees hardly send money or goods to their relatives and friends in their countries of origin. They explained that they did not have the resources to cater for themselves in the host country, so it was quite challenging for them to send money or goods to the origin. A Sudanese refugee reported that he does not get much income from his economic activity here in Ghana, as a result he is incapable of sending money to relatives in Sudan. Some quotes below illustrate their views:

“Nothing, I don’t send them anything. Most of them find it difficult to even believe us. They always think having been able to escape the war, we are doing well. They don’t seem to understand that we are also facing challenges in fending for ourselves here in Ghana as refugees” (Sudeneese, male, 34 years, camp refugee)

“I have not been able to send money to my family back home because of two reasons: the first one is - as you know, what I’m doing as work here doesn’t give me much money to cater for myself so it is difficult to assist those at home. Secondly, I need to protect my personal identity, safety and security. Too much engagement with them will overexpose me and I can be a target even over here. You know some African governments are capable of ‘finishing’ you or ‘neutralising you’ even in a foreign country. I have to protect myself.” (Central African, male, 29 years, urban refugee)

On the contrary, some of the refugees also indicated they sometimes send money, clothing and some souvenirs to relatives and friends at the origin. One Sierra Leonean refugee explained that the cost of dresses in Ghana were cheaper, hence once a while they send some clothes, footwear and some artefacts to Freetown. A key informant mentioned that refugees who are working were able to send either goods or money to their relatives in their country of origin.

“So you could see that those who are working here or are earning something are able to send something across to their relatives. It is an information they wouldn’t want to share but when they try to do a transaction and they face challenges then they will come to us to complain, and when you ask them where they were sending the moneys or goods to, then they will tell you that they were sending them to their relatives in the country of origin. Most of them send moneys to support expenditure costs for the weddings, naming ceremonies, birthday celebrations and funerals of their family members in the country of origin” (Refugee Camp Coordinator)

Very essential family responsibilities and compassion for those left behind also compel some of the refugees to send money home, though economic activity may not be very rife for them in Ghana. One Liberian refugee and an Ivorian refugee narrated their stories below:

“I have a child who is currently in Liberia with my former wife. In fact my former wife was here with me but she deserted me and absconded with the child to Liberia in 2011, when she signed on to return to Liberia. She went away with the child without my knowledge and consent. I qualified to stay as a refugee, so I took to the opportunity to stay. As a qualified refugee, I still receive stipends and necessary incentives from the UNHCR; and I also do some small jobs here and there to generate income. My child is fifteen years old at the moment. I usually call to check on how he’s doing and send money for his upkeep and education as well. My mother is also very old, the only surviving relative I have apart from my child so I also send money to her as well, though not as regular as I do for my child. I sometimes send him money through Western Union transfers and usually, when others are visiting the country, I do send clothes and other valuable materials that he would need” (Liberian, male, 47 years, urban refugee).

“I have been sending my mother and father some moneys not on regular basis but occasionally, especially, during Christmas time, Easter and also on their birthdays. I usually send about CFA 1000.00 that is about GHS 200.00. Sometimes when there is a funeral in the family I’ll be informed to make a contribution to the funeral ceremony. This I have done on about three occasions. I have some friends at the Elubo border who operate the mobile money transfer both for Ghana and for Cote d’Ivoire. So I’ll send them the amount of money through the Ghanaian mobile money system especially through MTN mobile money and they will, in turn, convert it to the CFA and send it through the Ivorian Mobile money system to my family in Abidjan. Also when a family member is having graduation, a naming ceremony or a wedding, I also send them clothes especially Ghanaian designs such as Woodin, the GTP with Ghanaian Adinkra symbols in them, and the colourful Kente cloth. They usually like the Kente cloth for such happy ceremonies because it is very colourful and fitting for such occasions. Last year I sent my sister some clothing, shoes and bags to support her wedding ceremony” (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee)

Also, the refugees mentioned that they received remittance from their friends and family members in the country of origin. The remittances were usually sent from the proceeds of family investment and properties.

I sometimes receive remittances from my uncles, because my mum's father left them a big house and they have rented part of the building. So sometimes they send us some money and sometimes too, the money will not come, but we cannot complain, because they're the ones taking care of the place and they can decide to take all the money and we cannot say anything... Yes, because we are not there to monitor the income being accrued from the property. Sometimes I receive about LRD 28,000.00, which is around GHS 1,500.00" (Liberian, male, 32 years, camp refugee).

An Ivorian refugee also indicated that she used to receive money at first from relatives but now it's more of foodstuffs that she gets.

When I first arrived in Ghana with the children, I used to receive some remittances from my husband for my upkeep. At that time my husband was in Cote d'Ivoire and I had come in ahead of him to Ghana. I have not received any money from any family member or friend since we came here and after my husband joined us. However, the family in Cote d'Ivoire sometimes send me foodstuffs and other spices which I used in preparing Ivorian dishes and stews for my husband and children. The family is not having it easy in Cote d'Ivoire so I don't even expect that they should support me in any manner. When I eat such foods and smell some of those spices, they remind me of home and the very environment in which I was before I came to Ghana. Sometimes the food and smell makes me so homesick and I usually long to return home but I cannot do so because I still feel it is not very safe for me and my nuclear family to return to the country. I was a political activist for the opposition party, the party of Former President Laurent Gagbo, so you can imagine. (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

The quotation above reveals how through food the refugee was able to connect to her environment in Cote d'Ivoire, and reminisce the beauty of the homeland. Though she longs to be in the homeland, she still feels it is unsafe to return because of her role as a political activist for former President Luarent Gbagbo's party.

5.4.1.1 Country of Origin of Refugees and Economic Engagements with the Origin.

Table 5.11 shows the difference between the the country of origin of the refugees and the remittances they receive from their countries of origin. With the exception of refugees from Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Sudan who indicated that they received remittances from family members in the country of origin, refugees from other countries indicated they do not receive remittances from family members or friends in the country of origin. Liberian refugees (14%) formed the highest proportion of refugees, among the three countries whose refugees’ received remittances from their country of origin.

Table 5.11: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by economic engagements with the origin

Country of origin	Remittance from Country of Origin		Total	
	Yes (%)	No(%)	N	%
Liberia	14.4	85.6	202	100
Cote d’Ivoire	8.1	91.9	161	100
Togo	0.0	100.0	15	100
Sudan	1.5	98.5	67	100
DRC	0.0	100.0	7	100
CAR	0.0	100.0	3	100
Chad	0.0	100.0	7	100
Sierra Leone	0.0	100.0	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

The economic engagements that refugees had with their countries of origin was key to some refugees. In expressing their agency, they were engaged in a form of ‘transnational trading’ where they buy goods from the host country and send them through transport agents to their contacts in the home country, who in turn sell the goods and transfer the profits to the refugees in Ghana via money transfer systems. Others also had intentions of returning to the country of origin, so they had started engaging economically with their countries of origin in order to

prepare the way for them to establish businesses and livelihood resources before they return to their home country. For others, maintaining ties was their means of survival in Ghana.

‘I buy goods (clothing, foodstuffs, artefacts) from here in Accra and I send it home. The family sells them they get some profit and they also send me some of the profit so that it keeps both of us going’ (Liberian, female, 59 years, urban refugee)

I intend to return to Liberia and establish a business there, so I have sent two water pumps, some rubber tubes, some agricultural implements and inputs as well. I also sent a chainsaw machine home. My children have started work on it already. I have instructed them to get the business going so that when I return I will not be a burden to anyone’ (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

‘...I maintain these economic ties with my country of origin because they send me money for survival. (Sudanese, male, 32 years, camp refugee).

5.4.2 Economic Engagements with Third Countries

From Table 5.12, the majority of the refugees had no economic investment (99.4%) in third countries. Also, majority of the refugees had not sent remittances such as money (99.6%) and goods (97.4%) to the third countries.




Table 5.12: Percentage distribution of refugees by economic engagements with third countries

Economic Investment	Frequency	Percentage
Economic investment in third countries		
Yes	3	0.6
No	467	99.4
Total	470	100
Sending remittance(Money) to third countries		
Yes	2	0.4
No	468	99.6
Total	470	100
Sending remittances (goods) to third countries		
Yes	12	2.6
No	458	97.4
Total	470	100
Receiving remittances (Money) from third countries		
Yes	115	24.5
No	355	75.5
Total	470	100.0
Receiving remittances (goods) from third countries		
Yes	19	4.0
No	451	96.0
Total	470	100
Frequency of remittances sent to family contacts in third countries		
Quarterly	1	50.0
Yearly	1	50.0
Total	2	100.0
Frequency of remittances received from family contacts in third countries		
Monthly	61	53.0
Quarterly	21	18.3
Biannually	8	7.0
Yearly	25	21.7
Total	115	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

In addition, majority of the refugees indicated that they had not received remittance in the form of money (75.5%) and goods (96.0%) from third countries. Four percent of the refugees indicated they received remittances(goods) from the third country while 24.5% also indicated they received financial remittances.

From the population of refugees who received and sent money to family members in the third countries, the results show that half of the refugees sent money to family members in third countries quarterly and annually. In terms of those who received money from their family members in third countries, slightly more than half (53.0%) received money monthly, 21.7% receive money annually and the least proportion (7.0%) received it biannually.

Whereas African refugees in Western countries may be able to send remittances to kin and networks in other third countries, this was not the case for refugees resident in Africa. Probably the weak economies of these developing countries, coupled with high rates of unemployment hindered the refugees on the continent from sending remittances to relatives and friends in third countries. The trend is therefore tilted towards African refugees receiving remittances from relatives in the third countries than the reverse.

This trend is seen in the qualitative results where some refugees indicated they received remittances from their relatives in third countries such as Canada, the United States of America and Australia. The funds are usually sent through money transfer channels such as Ria, Western Union, MoneyGram and other bank transfer systems.

“I have some a sister in the US, and two cousins, one in Canada and the other in Australia. My sister in Canada is the one who is currently supporting me. She regularly sends me some Canadian Dollars but you know it is not very much in comparison to the US dollars when you convert it to Ghana Cedis, but I have been managing it as and when it comes in. As the saying goes, half a loaf is better than none” (Cameroonian, female, 37 years, urban refugee).

Remittances from abroad form one of the key livelihood systems for refugees in Africa, particularly those who have networks and relations in the Western countries (Taylor 1999; Orozco 2003). The increase in the number of businesses dealing with money transfer issues in the Buduburam Refugee Settlement and its environs is another testament of the economic contributions of refugees to the host community's development. Their transactions, no matter

how big or small, contributes to the profit of many businesses in the Buduburam settlement and its immediate environs. A key informant at the Buduburam confirmed this.

There are a lot of vendors and banks within the Kasoa and Buduburam enclaves who operate the money transfers through Ria, Western Union, MoneyGram and bank transfers and the refugees patronise these banks and vendor to receive remittances. Recently, representatives of the Western Union Company came to this settlement to launch one of their products with the objective of supporting the refugees in their external monetary transactions'. (Local Opinion Leader/Community Member, male, 40 years, Buduburam Village).

5.4.2.1 Countries of Origin of Refugees and Economic Engagements with Third

Countries.

Table 5.13 shows that the country of origin is differentiated by remittances from third countries. Refugees from all the eight countries indicated that they receive remittances (in the form of money) from third countries. However those who received these remittances were not many compared to those who indicated they were not receiving any remittances. An analysis of the data in Table 5.13 showed that those who indicated 'yes' were 115 in number, representing about 24.5% of the overall population of 470 refugees who took part in the survey. Specifically, the highest proportion (43.6%) of the refugees who received remittances from third countries were the Liberian refugees, followed by 33.3% of refugees from CAR, and the least proportion (8.1%) from Cote d'Ivoire.

Table 5.13: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by economic engagements with third countries

Country of origin	Remittance from third countries		N	Total %
	Yes	No		
Liberia	43.6	56.4	202	100
Cote d'Ivoire	8.1	91.9	161	100
Togo	13.3	86.7	15	100
Sudan	11.9	88.1	67	100
DRC	14.3	85.7	7	100
CAR	33.3	66.7	3	100
Chad	14.3	85.7	7	100
Sierra Leone	12.5	87.5	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

5.4.3 Predictors of Economic Engagements of Refugees with Country of Origin

Table 5.14 represents a binary logistic regression showing predictors of economic engagement. The dependent variable used in this model was “Engagement with country of origin”. Respondents (i.e. the refugees) were asked whether they engage economically with the country of origin or not. Respondents were asked to choose between a ‘Yes’ as an affirmation of their economic engagements with the origin and a ‘No’ for no economic engagements with the origin. The researcher’s interest was in the ‘Yes’ responses as one of the studies objective was to explore the transnational engagements of the refugees. So the ‘Yes’ responses were assigned a code one (1) and the ‘No’ responses were assigned with the code zero (0). The variable “Engagement with country of origin” was then regressed against the independent variables to build the model. The results of the model show that place of residence, age, length of stay and occupation in Ghana predicted the refugees’ economic engagements with their country of origin.




Table 5.14: Binary logistic regression showing the predictors of economic engagements with country of origin

Variables	Odds Ratio	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Place of residence				
Camp refugee (RC)				
Urban refugee	13.049	0.000*	3.477	48.969
Sex				
Male (RC)				
Female	0.466	0.051	0.217	1.002
Age of respondents				
less than 20 years (RC)				
20-29	1.931	0.597	0.168	22.143
30-39	3.131	0.373	0.255	38.500
40-49	4.811	0.233	0.364	63.645
50-59	3.485	0.381	0.213	56.972
60 and above	13.415	0.084	0.707	254.581
Education				
No education (RC)				
Primary	1.379	0.730	0.222	8.566
JHS	0.557	0.529	0.090	3.437
SHS /Vocational +	2.186	0.355	0.416	11.481
Religion				
Christians (RC)				
Muslims	2.879	0.062	0.948	8.749
Marital status				
Never married				
Married	0.721	0.485	0.289	1.802
Previously married	1.184	0.789	0.343	4.093
Number of children				
No child (RC)				
1-2 children	1.476	0.454	0.532	4.092
3-4 children	2.234	0.194	0.665	7.509
5 and more	1.446	0.629	0.324	6.452
Length of stay in Ghana				
Less than 5 years (RC)				
5-9 years	1.926	0.353	0.483	7.680
10-14 years	0.153	0.121	0.014	1.639
15-19 years	0.228	0.041*	0.055	0.943
20-24 years	0.082	0.004*	0.015	0.452
25-30 years	0.068	0.004*	0.011	0.426
Occupation in Ghana				
Formal employment (RC)				
Trading	0.065	0.001*	0.013	0.336
Farming	0.118	0.020*	0.020	0.711
Craft/Artisanal related worker	0.277	0.058	0.074	1.044
Student	0.135	0.071	0.015	1.186
Unemployed	0.187	0.010*	0.052	0.669
Other	0.228	0.038*	0.056	0.921
Cons	0.055	0.085	0.002	1.487

Source: Computed from field data, 2019

RC= Reference category

Urban refugees were 13 times more likely (OR = 13.049) compared to camp refugees to have an economic investment in their country of origin. Refugees who had stayed in Ghana for 15-19 years, 20-24 years, and 25-29 years (OR = 0.228; OR=0.082; OR=0.068 respectively), were correspondingly, 77.2 percent, 91.8 percent and 93.2 percent less likely to have an economic engagement with the country of origin than those who have stayed in Ghana for less than five (5) years. The probable reason may be that refugees who have stayed longer in the host country may have established some appreciable level of economic investments (i.e. trading, buying and selling, farming, corn mill, fish ponds, vocational training school etc) or may have acquired some properties (land, building etc) through their entrepreneurial activities or individual agency. In such a case, they may tend their focus in monitoring their investments and maximising their profits in the host country than investing in the country of origin where they feel persecuted. That may not be the case for refugees who arrived a few years ago and are yet to find their feet in the host country, in terms of finding employment to support their livelihoods.

Survival was one of the reasons why the refugees engaged in transnational economic ties with kin and friends abroad. Others also used financial remittances received to invest in businesses so that they can make some income in order to wean themselves economically from the networks abroad.

“I maintain economic ties with friends and family in the US so I can seek their support to keep myself. They often send me money and I use it to pay my children’s school fees, feeding, pay for medication when they are sick and also pay off our rent. I have invested some of it in farming that brings in some money for us all the time, small though, but regular” (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee)

“I use the money I receive from my brother in Canada to invest in some business projects here in Ghana. I have been able to invest some in a small business of buying and selling fast-moving goods, and through that, I have been able to buy land in one of the villages in the Central Region. I intend to develop it and go and stay there to take care of some farm projects for some time. But I have intentions of joining my seven year old son in the US too” (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

The interviews also revealed that some of the refugees had made a conscious effort not to engage with friends in third countries since, from their experience, the people abroad had stereotyped refugees as beggars. One refugee indicated that he does not even call them to check on them anymore.

“My brother, you know these people who have gotten the opportunity to live in the Western countries like the USA, Canada, Germany, UK, France and Australia think that we refugees are beggars! I have friends in these countries but initially, I was calling on them to check how they were doing. They were my childhood friends but now that they got to know about my refugee situation, when I call they don't pick. I later realized they thought I was going to beg them for money just as others are doing. I respect myself that's why I work to feed myself and my family. I am into fish farming and poultry farming. I have two fish ponds here on the camp. Hence, I don't solicit money from anyone abroad nor do I receive monies from them. I don't send remittances abroad because I don't think they need my money either. They should wallow in their little own thinking” (Sierra Leonean, male, 38 years, camp refugee)

Horst (2008) found that interest in remittances has increased dramatically, with the awareness that migrant remittances are vital in a considerable number of national economies worldwide. However, this may not be the case for refugees, in most cases, as some of them may not be able to remit to their relatives in the country of origin due to the particular circumstances and vulnerabilities they (the refugees) find themselves in at the destination country.

Another significant predictor of refugees' economic engagement with country of origin was their occupation in Ghana. Refugees involved in trading (OR = 0.67) were 93.5 percent less likely compared to their counterparts working in the formal sector to get involved in economic engagements with their country of origin. Refugees who were into farming (OR = 0.118) and those who were unemployed (OR = 0.187, PV = 0.010) were correspondingly 8.82 percent and 81.3 percent less likely to engage in economic activities with their country of origin.

5.5 Political and Civic Engagements with the Country of Origin and Third Countries

This section describes political and civic engagements including nationalism/patriotism towards the country of origin and third countries.

5.5.1 Political/Civic Engagements with Country of Origin

On political and civic engagements, the results from the data analysis presented in Table 5.15 showed that the majority (65.5%) of the refugees dressed in national colours of their country of origin during international day celebrations.

Table 5.15: Percentage distribution of respondents by nationalism/patriotism towards country of origin

Nationalism/Patriotism	Frequency	Percentage
Dress in national colours of country of origin during International day celebration		
Yes	308	65.5
No	162	34.5
Total	470	100.0
Sing national anthem of the country of origin		
Yes	403	85.7
No	67	14.3
Total	470	100.0
Refugees contribute to the country of origin		
Strongly agree	93	19.8
Agree	173	36.8
Neutral	97	20.6
Disagree	104	22.1
Strongly Disagree	3	0.6
Total	470	100
Follow political developments in the country of origin		
Yes	220	46.8
No	250	53.2
Total	470	100
Member of any formal group in the country of origin		
Yes	268	57.0
No	202	43.0
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Similarly, more than eight out of every ten (85.7%) of the refugees sang the national anthem of their country of origin. In addition, more than a third (36.8%) of the refugees agreed that they would contribute to the development of their country of origin. About one-fifth (19.8%)

of the refugees strongly agreed that they would contribute to the development of their country of origin while the least proportion (0.6%) strongly disagreed.

Those who indicated they would not contribute to the development of their country of origin cited personal reasons, corruption in government circles and the mistreatment they faced which engineered their departure, as the reasons for their lack of interest in their country of origin. They could be classified as self-alienated refugees by the Kunz (1981) theory. The quotation below lends credence to this point:

We have a corrupt government in our country and the structures for checking graft are very weak or virtually non-existent. The cronyism is too much in all facets of life, so even if you want to work in the Civil Service or you are engaged in private business you need to have a link in the top level of government to protect your interest and you in turn have to give kickbacks particularly if you don't belong to the tribe of the political class. I cannot invest my resources in such a country for it to go into the pockets of other people (Liberian, male, 39 years, camp refugee)

I had to run away from death and persecution as well as cultural oppression in Sudan, my beloved country. Government security agencies were involved in the war. I lost my Mom and two siblings. I cannot contribute to a country that has killed my relatives and wanted to kill me. I cannot contribute to a culture that suppresses women. I need citizenship in another country where I can feel safe. It is not about patriotism or nationalism, it is about having the right to live in peace, safety and security and be free to explore one's vision. It is about enjoying one of the most fundamental human rights as enshrined in the UN Human Rights Charter, the right to life! The government in my country wanted to kill me so why should I contribute to its development? (Sudanese, female, 27 years, urban refugee)

In terms of the refugees' political engagements (ref. Table 5.15), about 46.8% of them indicated that they follow political developments in their country of origin. Also, more than half (57.0%) of the refugees indicated that they belong to a formal group in their country of origin. These are indications that the refugees were politically engaged with their country of origin but they expressed it in different forms. Adamson (2006) found that the relationship between diaspora groups and their country of origin is 'as likely to be defined by a desire for

transformation, contestation and political change, as it is by nostalgia, continuity and tradition' (pg 155).

Horst (2008) also noted that refugees in the diaspora play a critical role in the politics of their country of origin as, oftentimes, the leadership of the political opposition is amongst those refugees who move further abroad. Horst (2008), further noted that political events and conflicts in the country of origin continue to influence and often divide refugee communities, and political links to the country of origin remain significant for refugees abroad.

The findings from the qualitative results showed that refugees were politically engaged with the country of origin so that they can update their knowledge on the key political trends, policies of the government and the trajectory of the country's development.

I read and monitor the news about my country, Cote d'Ivoire, every day and sometimes I keep in touch with only a few of our political counterparts in the country. I encourage them to continue with the fight for freedom of our people. We will of course return when our political party comes into power so we need to maintain the ties for political reasons and political capital. We know one day, and very soon, our hero, the one and only son of the soil, and still my President, Laurent Gbagbo, will come back home to continue his good works (Ivorian, male, 45 years, camp refugee).

Things are getting worse by the day in Sudan and I hope it gets better. I listen to the news and I recite the national anthem to my children so they will know how to sing it. They were born in this camp and they have no knowledge of the national anthem of Sudan. I follow the politics so that I can know when things are better, with regard to our democracy and governance, so that we can return to our beloved country (Sudanese, female, 36 years, camp refugee).

For the refugees who do not follow politics in their home country, they mentioned that politics was a bad thing. They indicated that politics was not good and sometimes led to conflict. The lack of interest of refugees in politics could be attributed to their experiences with conflicts and persecution stemming out of political, religious and ethnic factors.

“ I don’t care about politics. If I wake up in the morning and I want to follow the news, I follow it. I pray, go to Church and do what I have to do and come home and sleep. I don’t even want to hear anything about politics, because I know what it’d showed me. Back then in Cote d’Ivoire, politics led to the killing of some of my family members and others also experienced other forms of persecution. Some have been imprisoned up to date. Why should I follow such a thing?” (Ivorian, male, 29 years, urban refugee)

“Actually, I don’t follow the politics or encourage participation in it base on political lines. Partisan politics is not a good thing for Africa. We have to just love our contries and seek to develop them. Back home, partisan politics could create a problem for yourself and your family as well as other friends elsewhere. I refrain from partisan politics and I always tell my friends and my people to also refrain, but they do what they want. You cannot impose my ideas and experiences on them. Some of them know what partisan politics has done to us but they are still following it. They need to learn a lesson, seriously.” (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

A key informant also explained that sometimes the refugees engaged in transnational politics. He recounted that there has been an exodus of people moving from their various camps in Ghana to their country of origin to engage in political activism. For instance, in 2017, about 20 Ivorians went back to participate in the elections.

“Some of the refugees are very organized politically, hence they are able to engage in political activities back home. We don’t encourage that in the camps here. We don’t encourage political activism or groupings here as such political organizations can create factionalism and conflicts within the camp, but the refugees remain tacitly organized along political lines. We also know that they have their diaspora associations and most of their leaders are old opposition politicians. Some of them are called CEFRI which is a French acronym and another is called ARID in French. They use these associations to get their support base together while in exile here. Last year and this year, we had a lot of people going back to Cote d’Ivoire. In 2017, we had about 20 Ivorians returning. In 2018, we had about 390, almost 400 returning. In 2019, we have almost 1000 going back. And before all these mass movements, we interact with them and they tell us that they are going to participate in elections in their country in order to regain influence in the political spheres of the country. So that is how these refugees returned to give support to the opposition party so they can capture political power” (Refugee Camp Coordinator).

The point made above buttresses existing literature that refugees also pursue political goals in their countries of origin, directly or indirectly, through a myriad of avenues. Some of these

ways include recruitment into armed groups, creating and supporting national identity politics, using mass media for political purposes and political propaganda, voting and influencing political debate (Horst, 2008). The utilisation of transnational opportunity structures to pursue political goals in various states as well as the country of origin to create a link between domestic and transnational politics is the main pre-occupation of some refugee groups and Diasporas abroad.

5.5.1.1 Country of Origin of Refugees and Political/Civic Engagements with the Origin.

From Table 5.16, the country of origin of refugees is associated with political and civic engagements with the origin.

Table 5.16: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by political/civic engagements in the country of origin

Country of origin	Political and civic engagements		Total	
	Yes	No	N	%
Liberia	28.7	71.3	202	100
Cote d'Ivoire	8.7	91.3	161	100
Togo	33.3	66.7	15	100
Sudan	26.4	71.6	67	100
DRC	0.0	100.0	7	100
CAR	0.0	100.0	3	100
Chad	28.6	71.4	7	100
Sierra Leone	12.5	87.5	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

The pattern shows that except refugees from DRC and CAR, all other refugees from the various countries were engaged, in one way or the other, in political and civic activities in the country of origin. More than a quarter (28.7%) of the Liberian refugees were involved in political and civic engagements with the country of origin. Also, 26.4% and 8.7% respectively of the refugees from Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire were engaged in political and civic activities. Countries like the CAR and DR Congo had protracted conflict situations and most of the refugees fled due to targeted persecution hence they may have avoided getting involved in

political or civil affairs there, due to the fear of attracting attention and state surveillance to themselves.

Another key informant, however, indicated that some of the refugees followed news and political trends in their country to pick only the negative aspects of whatever was happening in their countries so that they can use it to validate and justify their applications for resettlement in third countries in the West or to attract support from international NGOs and charitable organisations.

The refugees do patronize the internet café at the camp. They usually go there to source for news items that presented their country of origin in a bad light, or the issues of protracted conflicts, tribal murders, ethnic wars and the like. They then copy the links of these news items and use them in emails and letter they send to international organizations and other charity bodies, to buttress their points and to seek support from such charities. Some also copy ongoing news items regarding the persecution of their tribes or their clans' people that have been reported online through credible media channels and use them to justify arguments why they should be resettled in a third country (Refugee Camp Manager)

By doing so the refugees are able to woo the sympathies of international NGOs and charity organisations to come to the aid. The camp manager further intimated that sometimes the stories the refugees put out there may not be wholly true, and that their livelihoods may be far better than what they were presenting to the outside world.

5.5.2 Political/Civic Engagements with Third Countries

From Table 5.17, majority (84.5%) of the refugees indicated they do not dress in the national colours of other third countries during national day celebrations. With regard to following political issues, about 25.7% of the refugees indicated that they followed political developments in third countries.

Table 5.17: Percentage distribution of refugees by political/civic engagements with third countries

Description of activity	Frequency	Percentage
Dress in national colours of other third countries' during national day celebrations		
Yes	73	15.5
No	397	84.5
Total	470	100
Follow political developments in other third countries		
Yes	121	25.7
No	349	74.3
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Lobbying Western governments through diaspora groups to put pressure on governments in their country of origin to effect political change was one of the reasons why some of the refugees maintained political ties with third countries. Those who were very politically astute and highly educated were also very much interested in connecting to diaspora groups and hometown associations so that they can get funding and garner other support to resettle refugees in those Western countries.

“I maintain political ties with contacts in third countries like Norway, Canada, the USA, United Kingdom. I follow their politics and we have diaspora political groups in these countries to which I belong. I contribute to discussions on their respective online for and platforms. We do this to seek opportunities through the diaspora groupings to put pressure on those in government to effect proper democratic and political change with actual freedoms in our country of origin, so that we can safely return to our countries. Indeed, I may not get the opportunity to be resettled in these Western countries but if there is political change in my country as a result of the influence of these third countries, I can safely return home. We have a strong Sudanese diaspora in Norway and they try to project the plight of Sudan (particularly how the political instability is impacting on the development of Sudan) to the Norwegian government so that change can come to our motherland’. (Sudanese, male, 32 years, camp refugee)

For some of us who are considered as political refugees, we have created networks with some genuine civil and political groupings in some of these Western countries. We use our diaspora groups to lobby these governments so that we can acquire

political asylum in some of these Western countries. The only country I don't want to resettle in the West is France, because they helped to depose my president, the only genuine president of Cote d'Ivoire, President Laurant Gbagbo (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

These transnational political activities by Diasporas are not a new phenomenon. Past examples where transnational organisations sought to politically transform the 'home' includes the overseas Chinese in the 1911 Revolution; the Jewish diaspora in the creation of Israel; and the activities of Irish-Americans to the political conflict in Northern Ireland (Horst 2008).

According to Adamson (2006), transnational community actors can also work for political change indirectly by networking with a variety of inter-governmental, state and non-state actors in the host country and internationally, to raise international awareness, thereby increasing pressure for political change in the country of origin. Some of the strategies refugees may use include lobbying decision-makers, parliamentarians, cabinet ministers, influential citizens and the general public about the situation in the home country. They also lobby inter-governmental and state institutions to place the issue on the international agenda or take action unilaterally while influencing non-governmental organisations to start campaigning against human rights abuses and the like in the country of origin (Horst 2008). Some refugees may also use their international recognition or expertise in sports and other professions to send out key messages to the West to effect change in their country of origin.

5.5.3 Predictors of Political/Civic Engagements with the Country of Origin and Third Countries

Table 5.18 presents results of the binary logistic regression analysis of political and civic engagements in both countries of origin and third countries. The dependent variables used in this model were "Engagement with country of origin" and "Engagement with third countries".

The refugees were asked whether they engage politically with the country of origin or not (for engagements with country of origin); and whether they engaged politically with third countries or not (for engagements with third countries). They were then asked to choose between a 'Yes' as an affirmation of their political engagements and a 'No' for no political engagements. The researcher's interest was in the 'Yes' responses so that was assigned a code one (1) whereas the 'No' responses were assigned with the code zero (0).

The variable "Engagement with country of origin" was then regressed against the independent variables to build the model. The same method was used to code the dependent variable "Engagement with third country" where "Yes" was assigned a code one (1) while "No" was assigned a code zero (0) and the model built for that dependent variable with the independent variables. The results showed that sex, age of respondents, marital status and length of stay in Ghana predicted political and civic engagements with the country of origin.




Table 5.18: Binary logistic regression showing the predictors of political/civic engagements with country of origin and third countries

Variables	Country of origin				Third countries			
	Odds Ratio	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]		Odds Ratio	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
Place of residence								
Camp refugee (RC)								
Urban refugee	1.662	0.222	0.736	3.753	2.022	0.096	0.882	4.632
Sex								
Male (RC)								
Female	0.325	0.000*	0.179	0.588	0.240	0.000*	0.136	0.425
Age of respondents								
less than 20 years (RC)								
20-29	1.890	0.326	0.530	6.739	23.612	0.004*	2.725	204.597
30-39	4.061	0.045*	1.034	15.949	23.113	0.006*	2.502	213.479
40-49	3.731	0.080	0.856	16.262	26.353	0.005*	2.745	253.007
50-59	9.077	0.009*	1.753	47.010	14.520	0.029*	1.321	159.622
60 and above	4.414	0.133	0.637	30.584	3.417	0.393	0.204	57.239
Education								
No education (RC)								
Primary	1.973	0.367	0.450	8.648	2.296	0.254	0.551	9.572
JHS	2.372	0.230	0.578	9.730	1.341	0.683	0.328	5.478
SHS /Vocational +	2.865	0.131	0.730	11.242	3.250	0.082	0.861	12.265
Religion								
Christians (RC)								
Muslims	2.181	0.053	0.991	4.803	0.677	0.342	0.304	1.512
Marital status								
Never married								
Married	0.479	0.048*	0.231	0.994	1.097	0.786	0.562	2.140
Previously married	0.440	0.125	0.154	1.254	0.718	0.551	0.242	2.132
Number of children								
No child (RC)								
1-2 children	1.036	0.923	0.503	2.135	1.292	0.469	0.646	2.582
3-4 children	0.663	0.385	0.263	1.673	1.011	0.980	0.424	2.413
5 and more	0.672	0.477	0.224	2.011	0.535	0.276	0.173	1.648
Length of stay in Ghana								
Less than 5 years (RC)								
5-9 years	0.295	0.011*	0.115	0.760	0.679	0.428	0.261	1.768
10-14 years	0.616	0.427	0.187	2.032	0.540	0.360	0.144	2.022
15-19 years	0.365	0.062	0.126	1.053	0.657	0.445	0.223	1.931
20-24 years	0.389	0.116	0.120	1.264	0.291	0.051	0.084	1.004
25-30 years	0.663	0.492	0.205	2.143	0.828	0.766	0.240	2.855
Occupation in Ghana								
Formal employment (RC)								
Trading	0.692	0.618	0.164	2.931	0.117	0.001*	0.033	0.420
Farming	1.092	0.905	0.255	4.685	0.236	0.036*	0.061	0.910
Craft/Artisanal related worker	1.063	0.927	0.286	3.949	0.136	0.001*	0.041	0.451
Student	0.712	0.688	0.136	3.727	0.245	0.071	0.053	1.131
Unemployed	1.159	0.823	0.318	4.226	0.232	0.013*	0.073	0.737
Other	1.039	0.956	0.263	4.109	0.166	0.005	0.048	0.578
_cons	0.126	0.077	0.013	1.249	0.083	0.087	0.005	1.431

Source: Computed from field data, 2019

RC= Reference category

Female refugees were 67.5 percent less likely (OR = 0.325) to engage in the politics of their country of origin compared to their male counterparts. Refugees who were 30-39 years were four times more likely (OR = 4.061) to follow political activities in their home countries compared to refugees who were less than 20 years of age. Also, refugees who were 53-59 years were about nine times more likely (OR = 9.077) to follow political developments in their country of origin than refugees who were less than 20 years old. In terms of marital status, refugees who were married were 52.1 percent less likely (OR = 0.479) to politically engage with their countries of origin compared to refugees who were never married. With regard to length of stay in the host country, refugees who have been in Ghana for 5-9 years were 70.5 percent less likely (OR=0.295) to engage in politics compared to those who have been in the country for less than five years.

In addition, sex, age and occupation of the refugees significantly predicted their political engagements with third countries. Female refugees were 76.0 percent less likely (OR = 0.240) to follow political developments in third countries compared to their male counterparts. In terms of age, refugees who were 20-29 and 30-39 years old were about 23 times more likely (OR =23.612 and OR =23.113 respectively) to engage politically with third countries than refugees who were less than 20 years old. Refugees who were 40-49 years of age were about 26 times more likely (OR= 26.353) to engage politically with third countries than refugees who were less than 20 years; while refugees who were 50-59 years old were about 15 times more likely (OR=14.520) to follow political developments in third countries or engage politically with third countries.

With regard to the occupation of the refugees, traders (OR = 0.117), were 88.3 percent less likely compared to the refugees who are formally employed to follow political developments in third countries. Refugee farmers with (OR = 0.236) and crafts/artisanal related workers

(OR = 0.136) were 76.4 percent and 86.4 percent respectively less likely compared to those formally employed to follow political developments in third countries. The unemployed refugees on the other hand with (OR = 0.232) were 76.8 percent less likely to engage in politics in third countries compared to refugees who were formally employed.

5.6 Key Channels of Engagements with Country of Origin and Third Countries

This section describes the key channels of engagement of refugees with their country of origin. This includes engagements with family and friends in their country of origin and third countries.

5.6.1 Traditional and Modern Channels of Engagement with Country of Origin

Table 5.19 presents refugees' channels of engagement with family members in their country of origin. A higher proportion of refugees used Facebook (27%) as a medium of engagement with family members in their country of origin. This was followed by those who used the telephone (23.0%) and video conferencing (1.3%).

Table 5.19: Percentage distribution of refugees' channels of engagement with family and friends in the country of origin

Channels of engagement with family in the country of origin	Frequency	Percentage
Through friends and other nationals visiting country of origin	4	0.9
Telephone calls	108	23
Video conferencing	6	1.3
Facebook	127	27
WhatsApp	88	18.7
Channels of engagement with friends in the country of origin		
Through friends and other nationals visiting country of origin	2	0.4
Own visits to country	1	0.2
Telephone calls	22	4.7
Video conferencing	4	0.9
Facebook	77	16.4
WhatsApp	38	8.1

Source: Field data, 2019

**Multiple choice

The results also show that about 16.4% of refugees used Facebook as a channel of engagement *with friends* in their country of origin, 4.7% through telephone calls, 0.9% through video conferencing and the least proportion (0.2%) through their visits to the country of origin

This study has revealed that there has been a major shift from the traditional communication channels like letter writing, sending messages through people, to the use of modern and sophisticated channels, especially the use of Information Communication Technology (ICT's), notable among them, the mobile phone device. Studies of migrants' use of mobile phones confirmed that the device has now become the predominant ICT device of choice (Shapendonk and Moppes, 2007). Since its introduction in 1983 the mobile phone has out-diffused virtually every prior technology, including bicycles, radios, television sets, wallets, wireline phones, and wristwatches, and have done so in the last twenty-five years (Kalba, 2008). The use of ICTs, like mobile phones, provides the opportunity for users to send and receive text messages, video and audio messages, and pictures in real-time. According to Wilding (2006), this form of communication is important to transnational families because it helps them in "constructing or imagining a 'connected relationship', and enables them to overlook their physical separation by time and space" from their family members. This accounts for the high usage of Facebook and Whatsapp among refugees in their engagements since it supports text, audio and video messaging. Invariably, the use of Facebook and Whatsapp also comes at a cheaper cost in terms of data consumption as compared to telephone calls where they complained about the increasing cost of calls from Ghana to their respective countries of origin.

Although some of the refugees complained about the high cost of telephone calls when connecting from Ghana to their country of origin, they also indicated there was no other media or communications channel to reach their relatives except they used the phone calls. This

meant that they could not connect with relatives as often as they wanted to, due to the high cost of the telephone calls. They indicated that limited ICT infrastructure and internet penetration in their country of origin meant they could not use modern social media channels, which presented a lower communications cost, to contact relatives at the origin. As espoused by Mascini et al. (2012), if internet connectivity is not widely spread in both origin and host countries, the possibility of refugees staying in touch with family and friends or following up on developments in origin becomes limited. This may impact on their decision to voluntarily return to their country of origin as well, since they hardly hear what is happening at the origin. They also note that besides such practical reasons, refugees might also fear to engage transnationally due to the threat of personal persecution (Mascini et al. 2012). In addition, the availability of financial and material resources to refugees may also determine the intensity of engagements they may have with contacts in the origin country. As noted by Bakker et al. (2014) in their studies on refugees' transnational behaviour, the resources available to refugees in the host country and the potential resources in the origin country play a key role in explaining refugees' transnational behaviour. These sentiments were expressed by some refugees as follows:

It is expensive calling Liberia from Ghana these days you can buy GHS10 of credit and by the time you say 'hello' all of it is finished. You'll need a lot of money to call to my village in Liberia so when I think about the cost involved I don't call often. I can use GHS10.00 to buy ingredients here to prepare a nice Liberian local dish of my family, however when I buy phone credit of GHS 10.00 it will be depleted within a few minutes through a call to Liberia. Nowadays I use mostly the social media such as Facebook and WhatsApp to make calls. (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee)

A Sudanese refugee also indicated that he has no option than to use the telephone calls to check in on the grandmother who is the only existing relative in the country of origin. He indicated that limited internet connectivity in the country of origin is the more reason why he uses the telephone and not WhatsApp or Facebook call.

“I use the telephone to call to speak to my grandmother who’s the only one left in the village now. I call through someone’s phone. That’s the only way I can reach her because of poor internet connectivity in the village. I use a telephone to also get in touch with other relatives in Sudan. That’s the only option I have because they don’t have Facebook. Because the telephone calls are also expensive, I call for a short while” (Sudanese, male, 34 years, camp refugee)

A key informant confirmed that information communication technology remains a lifeline for many of the refugees, hence ownership of telephones and use of social media and internet applications is very important for them. They use it to connect with the outside world and to seek opportunities for resettlement, among others.

Technology. It's the main weapon of the refugees who live in this camp, especially when it comes to the use of android phones and more complex gadgets. In fact there are even bloggers on the camp. Those ones you find them almost all day at the internet café here using the computer and communicating outside, engaging in contacts abroad to seek opportunities like scholarships, tracing of families abroad for family reunion and third country settlement among other things (Refugee Camp Manager).

Another key informant also confirmed the refugees’ reliance of social media and modern ICT in their engagements abroad and the origin.

One my friends operates a business centre here in Krisan and another branch in the Ampain township. He told me that the refugees used to patronise it a lot. You know these business centres provide several services from, printing, photocopying, scanning, internet browsing etc. He told me that the younger refugees from both camps used to patronise the services of these centres a lot at the initial stage of their arrival. They used to do a lot of scanning of their passports, filling of forms and sending them to international NGO’s and charities abroad to seek third country settlement. I also used to go to his business centre here in Krisan and I saw some of the refugees there using the services. He says some them were successful in getting international support and they are now in abroad, what we call Abrokyire here in the village. They have gone to Abrokyire! These guys have lots of opportunities than us the indigenes, you know. We are here, we want to go to Abrokyire, but no opportunity for us. They came in, surf the internet small, complete forms online and they are gone. Are they not luckier than us? But all the time they want to portray they are suffering. That is not wholly true’(Local Opinion Leader/Community Member, male, 48 years, Krisan Village)

The expose from the community member tells how the indigenes see the refugees, as more privileged than the host community members. Such perceptions could sometimes result in

tensions in refugee-host community relations and also discrimination against the refugees. Agblorti (2011) and Konyndyk (2005), found that humanitarian assistance to the refugees as well as misconceptions and mis-perceptions by the local community of the welfare of refugees sometimes resulted in tensions in refugee-host community relations.

5.6.2 Traditional and Modern Channels of Engagement with Third Countries

Table 5.20 illustrates that a higher proportion of refugees engaged with family and friends in third countries through Facebook (19.1%), followed by telephone calls (11.9%), WhatsApp (11.7%) and 0.2% through friends and other nationals visiting those third countries.

Table 5.20: Percentage distribution of refugees' channels of engagement with family and friends in third countries

Channels of engagement with family in third countries	Frequency	Percentage
Through friends and other nationals visiting third countries	1	0.2
Telephone calls	56	11.9
Video conferencing	3	0.6
Facebook	90	19.1
WhatsApp	55	11.7
Channels of engagements with friends in third countries		
Through friends and other nationals visiting third countries	1	0.3
Telephone calls	20	4.3
Video conferencing	1	0.2
Facebook	104	22.1
WhatsApp	56	11.9

Source: Field data, 2019

Regarding engagements with friends in third countries, higher proportion of refugees also used Facebook (22.1%), while 11.9% engaged through WhatsApp, 4.3% through telephone calls and 0.3% through friends and other nationals visiting those third countries.

Therefore the predominant channels for engaging with contacts in third countries was Facebook and Whatsapp. The key reason for the usage of these social media channels of

communication was mainly due to their affordability and ease of usage, as expressed by the refugees in the quotes below:.

I use telephone calls if there are no other options to reach contacts in third countries. I don't like using telephone calls because when you call and the person does not pick up the call, it goes to the voicemail automatically and it ends up deducting a huge chunk of your call credit as well. Though leaving voice messages on the phone does not provide the 'real feeling' of talking to that person in real time and exchanging ideas, sometimes we have to make do with it. With other channels like Facebook and WhatsApp, I leave messages, videos, and photos on their platforms and anytime the person comes online they will respond to my messages (Sudanese, male, 32 years, camp refugee)

Facebook and WhatsApp provide offer better value for money and they are more emotionally rewarding. The Facebook app, for instance, gives me a better view into the lives of family and friends in third countries, particularly when I go through their photos, videos and voice notes which they leave on their pages. You have a real feel of your friends, even though they are far away from Ghana (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

These assertions by the refugees regarding use of Facebook and WhatsApp, however, cannot be taken as the truth in its entirety. Whereas studies by Misztal (2000) identified that although social media enables the extension of one's social network with weak and latent ties and allow information to circulate on an informal basis, it also creates uncertainties about the truthfulness of information that is shared online as people usually exaggerate reality through social media. Although migrants are often aware of the uncertain nature of social media information (Emmer et al., 2016; Burrell, 2012), they are very much dependent on this type of unverified information (Dekker et al., 2018). A Liberian refugee expressed it as follows:

When I see the pictures of my friends on Facebook I can see life is going on well for them. Some of them have nice houses and cars and they look better off in terms of their standard of living, than some of us who are living in this settlement here in Ghana (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

One of the refugee camp managers confirmed that some of the social media photos that the refugees who have resettled in third countries send to their counterparts in Ghana usually presents an exaggerated reality of their living conditions in the third country.

Some of these refugees who have resettled in countries in the West usually take photos in front of beautiful buildings and nice cars, and post them on their Facebook pages or send them through WhatsApp to their counterparts in here in the camp. Sometimes when they come to show it to me I try to explain to them that it is fake. How can one stand in front of a national building and say that is their new property they acquired after they resettled in the US just a few months ago? How can one take a picture in a national park, riding a white horse with other people in the picture which indicates clearly that this is a national park where people are having fun, and they tell you that is the new white horse they have purchased since they arrived in Canada eight months ago? You can see others standing in front of cars like Bentley, Lincoln Continental and they would post those videos and photos that those are their properties when they barely got there within the last three months. Such distorted presentation of the reality out there by some of these refugees resettling in third countries serves no purpose than to put a lot of pressure on us here, increase the eagerness of their counterparts here to push for third country resettlement packages, and when they fail to get the resettlement packages, sometimes lead them into depression. I always tell the refugees in this camp that only a few of those photos on social media are truthful. The rest presents a fake reality of what actually exists! (Refugee Camp Manager)

The qualitative results show that refugees communicate with friends in the third country through Whatsapp, calls and Facebook.

“I usually communicate with friends and my children through WhatsApp chats and calls, Facebook chat and calls, and Tango” (Liberian, male, 61 years, urban refugee).

I am comfortable using Facebook to connect because it is easy for you to find your friends on it. We can share pictures and videos in real-time and it's good to have fun with it. It is also very cost-effective. (Congolese, male, 25 years, urban refugee)

In contacting the family members in my country of origin Liberia, I use the telephone as that is the only medium I have to reach them. But for those in the third countries, I use Facebook messenger and WhatsApp to reach them. Indeed calling to my village in Liberia is more expensive for me than calling to the US, Australia, the UK and Canada using Facebook messenger (Liberian, male, 59 years, urban refugee)

5.7 Ownership of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Devices among Refugees and Other Methods used in Refugees' Transnational Engagements

This section describes the ownership of ICT gadgets and their usage among refugees. The level of technological savviness and the use of modern communication gadgets may also enhance refugees' transnational engagements with the country of origin and third countries, as well as their engagements with people within the host country.

5.7.1 Ownership of ICT Devices among Refugees

From Table 5.21, majority (73.6%) of the refugees owned smartphones, 17.9% were using basic phones (non-smartphones), 7.7% were not using mobile phones, while 0.2% were using tablets and laptop computers.

Table 5.21: Percentage distribution of refugees by ownership of ICT technological devices

Ownership of technological devices	Frequency	Percentage
Smartphones (android, iphone etc)	346	73.6
Laptop Computer	1	0.2
Desktop Computer	2	0.4
Tablet	1	0.2
Basic phone ('Yam'- phone)	84	17.9
None	36	7.7
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

As noted by Kalba (2018) the use of the mobile phone has out-diffused virtually every prior technology in the last twenty-five years. Dekker, Engbersen, Klaver and Vonk (2018), also posited that smartphones usage is very essential to refugees as they use it stay connected with family and friends in their country of origin, to receive advice from relations in other third countries, as well as communicate with other colleague refugees during the force migration journey. Dekker et al (2018) also noted that social media access through smartphones is a crucial source of information for asylum seekers in their migration decision-making (for example, in their choice of the host country). Smartphones offer an internet connection, global positioning system (GPS), and a digital camera, in addition to a variety of apps and other information and communication resources that enable refugees to develop “smart” strategies regarding their forced migration (Dekker et al, 2018). Per the result of this study it is an undeniable fact that the refugees’ first choice of ICT device they would acquire is a mobile phone (smartphone).

The findings of the qualitative results support the quantitative results. Most of the participants indicated that they have android phones that enable them to communicate with their friends and family. A key informant mentioned that refugees own android phones and they have access to free computers with internet access for their communication.

No, Tablet also I don't have for now. I intend to purchase one soon. Yea. I have an iPhone and that's what I use for sending and receiving my WhatsApp messages, facebook messages and video calls from friends and family (Sudanese, female, 27 years, urban refugee).

Yes, most of them, especially the men and the young women have smartphones but not the old ladies. A refugee will use his or her money to go buy an android phone than to buy a book to read because, within an hour or few minutes, he or she can benefit from the phone than going to buy a book. None will choose a book over a smartphone. Communication is very essential for them and the internet and social media are highly essential in the life of every refugee. They share a lot of information on social media that keeps their hopes alive! (Refugee Camp Coordinator).

They use android phones! Most of them, the youth in particular, use better phones than this one that I am using (*shows the interviewer a basic phone*). We have internet cafes or labs in some of the refugee camps. Over here in Ampain Refugee Camp we have about 30 computers at the internet café and every refugee has access to it for. The facility has made provision for 1.5 hours of free internet browsing every day, for refugees who are interested in using the facility for emails and other forms of communication. They make use of this free internet facility always (Refugee Camp Manager).

Some desktop and laptop computers as well as smartphones are very expensive so refugees who do not have the money to secure any of these devices may prefer using the desktops in the internet café in the camp.

5.7.2 Usage of ICT Devices in Transnational Engagements

Table 5.22 showed that, 62.8% of refugees use smart mobile phones for transnational engagements, 2.65% of refugees use a laptop, 1.9% use a desktop and 1.5% use a tablet for transnational engagements.

Table 5.22: Percentage distribution of respondents by use of technological devices in transnational engagements

Usage of technological devices in transnational engagements	Frequency	Percentage
Mobile phones (android/iphone/basic)	295	62.8
Laptop computer	12	2.6
Desktop computer	9	1.9
Tablet	7	1.5
Other electronic devices	22	4.7

Source: Field data, 2019

*** Multiple choice

5.7.3 Membership of Online Groups and Networks

Table 5.23 also shows the membership of online groups among refugees. The results showed that about nine out of ten refugees (94.0%) do not belong to any online hometown association platform. Similarly, majority of the refugees do not belong to online diaspora/transnational groups.

Table 5.23: Percentage distribution of respondents by membership of online groups and networks

Membership of online groups	Frequency	Percentage
Hometown Association (online)		
No	442	94.0
Yes	28	6.0
Total	470	100.0
Diaspora/transnational groups (online)		
No	448	95.3
Yes	22	4.7
Total	470	100.0
Online Refugee for a		
No	460	97.9
Yes	10	2.1
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The qualitative results, however, showed divergent views with regard to refugees' membership of online groups and networks. Some refugees mentioned that they do not belong to any association or group because their members are scattered, with some having limited internet accessibility so it is challenging for them to come together. The quote below highlights the views of a refugee.

“No please, I don't belong to any online group. It's because most of us are living in different locations. Some are here in Accra and some of them are living at here at Krisan Refugee Camp. Some of us are single and others have families. We're thinking that we can try and create something like the Sudanese Association for refugees in both the urban centres and the camps but it is quite difficult to achieve this as the priorities are different. It would be great if we had it so that we can share essential information among ourselves. (Sudanese, male, 34 years, camp refugee)

However, some refugees mentioned that they belonged to online associations where they meet frequently. Some of the refugees from the Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire indicated they belonged to online associations.

“Of course Yes! We’ve our association like you what you saw yesterday. It’s because of our online association that we got that information to meet at the Christian Council for a workshop. One of our organisers relayed the information onto our online platform that GRB would be having an workshop for urban refugees and because we are all hooked to the platform most of us attended. We use our online association to share vital information. Sometimes we also have meetings online using apps like the Teams, Zoom, Bluejeans etc”. (Central African, male, 29 years, urban refugee).

“Yes I belong to an online association. It is, called ‘l’Amicale de Leaders de Demain’, rendered in English as ‘Tomorrow’s Leaders Association’. Anyone can join as long as you’re a refugee ” (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

The Refugee Camp Coordinator also confirmed the existence of such online associations for the sharing of vital information and announcements among the refugees in Ghana.

Yes, they have such associations , especially in Egyeikrom and Ampain refugee camps. They have tribal groupings. So when you go to Ampain, they have those from the Western side, we have Fangolo and Giglo and they are the Geres. So they have the Gere Association and they have their leaders. If you go to Egyeikrom, they have their tribal groupings as well. They always identify themselves with their tribes because it is a sign of strength and strong bonding and it is also a way for socio-economic networking. So if I know we are all Fantes and you are suffering and I have food, I will give you and when you also see me next time suffering, you will help me. So it that kind of social network that they keep to support their livelihoods and survival in a foreign land. (Refugee Camp Coordinator).

5.7.4 Country of Origin of Refugees and Ownership of ICT Devices

From Table 5.24, country of origin is differentiated by ownership of technological devices. Most of the refugees from various countries own smart mobile phones. All refugees from CAR and Chad owned only smart mobile phones. About 80.6% and 71.8% of refugees from Sudan and Liberia respectively, had smart mobile phones. Only refugees from Liberia had laptop computers (0.5%) and desktop computers (1.0%).

Table 5.24: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by ownership of ICT devices

Country of Origin	Ownership of ICT devices						Total	
	Smartphone (Android, iPhone, etc)	Laptop Comp.	Desktop Comp.	Tablet	Basic phone (Yam)	None	N	%
	%	%	%	%	%	%		
Liberia	71.8	0.5	1.0	0.0	19.3	7.4	202	100
Cote d'Ivoire	71.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	27.3	1.2	161	100
Togo	80.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	0.0	13.3	15	100
Sudan	80.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	17.9	67	100
DRC	71.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	28.6	7	100
CAR	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	100
Chad	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7	100
Sierra Leone	62.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	37.5	8	100

Source: Field data, 2019

Some refugees however, indicated they were not owning any technological devices. About 37% of refugees from Sierra Leone, 28.6% of those from DRC, 17.9% from Sudan and 13.3% from Togo, all indicated they had no technological devices.

Since I don't have any technological device which I can use to contact my friends and relatives at the moment. I use to have a mobile phone but it got spoiled about three months ago. I intend to buy a mobile phone as soon as I can. I patronise the internet café at the Ampain Refugee Camp most of the time. On Thursdays in particular I travel from here (Krisan Refugee Camp) to Ampain just to access the internet facility at the camp. That has been my source of connectivity for the past three months so when the computers breakdown or the network at the café is not connected due to exhaustion of the credit, then I become very upset as I do not have any other means to get connected to family and friends; or to access the needed opportunities for resettlement out there. In such situations I plead with friends here to use their mobile phones to make my calls' (Liberian, male, 39 years, camp refugee).

The above quotation illustrates some of the frustrations and challenges refugees have to go through as a result of having no ownership ICT devices for communication.



CHAPTER SIX

TRANSNATIONALISM AND REFUGEE INTEGRATION IN GHANA

6.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the refugees' experiences and integration in Ghana, their views on contributions to development, transnationalism and integration. The first section describes their experiences and integration. It is followed by their views on refugees' contribution to the development of the host country, and the last section discusses transnationalism and integration of refugees.

6.2 Refugee Experiences in Ghana

This section describes social, cultural, economic and political/civic integration. Also included in this section are challenges faced by refugees in Ghana and the strategies adopted for overcoming the challenges.

6.2.1 Social Integration in Ghana

Table 6.1 presents the social integration of refugees in Ghana. The social integration includes how close the refugees are to Ghanaians and their access to social services in their respective communities. This includes access to education and healthcare, their community engagements and interactions and adaptability to the social systems and values pertaining to their communities. Their attendance at social events such as weddings, funerals, naming ceremonies, birthday celebrations and community durbars are also indicators of their social integration in the communities. The results showed that about 37.7% of the refugees were socially integrated in Ghana while 62.3% of them were not socially integrated in Ghana.

Table 6.1: Percentage distribution of refugees by social integration in Ghana

Social Integration	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	177	37.7
No	293	62.3
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The qualitative results of the study showed mixed results, some refugees were socially integrated while others were not. Some of the refugees however indicated they took part in social activities like funerals, weddings and naming ceremonies. Specifically, refugees from Sudan and Liberia mentioned that they were socially integrated in Ghana because they attend church services with Ghanaians, hang out with them, and watch football matches at the restaurants and drinking spots with Ghanaians. In addition, a Liberian refugee indicated that he has Ghanaian friends because he attended school with them. One Sudanese refugee expressed the extent of his social integration in the quote below:

I socialize, especially with my Ghanaian friends. We attend the Mosque together, go to the market, play football together and go to the video club to watch football games together. Even when I was at the Krisan Refugee Camp, our Ghanaian friends used to visit us in the camp and we used to play football on the field near the office of the Camp Manager. We sometimes watched football and talked about our favourite teams, and players and how much they earn per week etc (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee).

Below are some quotations from a Buddhist, Christian and a Muslim indicating how their respective religious practices helped them to seamlessly integrate into the host communities. The Buddhist indicated the practices, such as attending temple services, naming ceremonies and funerals, have helped her to integrate into the Ghanaian community.

My social interactions with Ghanaians is mostly through my religious group's activities. Buddhism in Ghana is not widespread compared to other religions like Islam and Christianity, so our bond with members is tighter. As the saying goes, *the fewer the merrier*. I attend weddings and naming ceremonies, funerals and other social gatherings organised by our temple and members of the faith. I was already a Buddhist before I came to Ghana. The religion has really helped me to integrate very well. I know several places in Ghana because, on occasions, we travel outside Accra for some events. I have been to Kumasi, and Obuasi in the Ashanti Region before. I

have been to other places such as Takoradi, Tarkwa, Cape Coast, Axim, Koforidua, Aburi, and Tamale among others. I have experience a mix of cultures in Ghana. I am yet to go to far the north of Ghana. I wouldn't know how I could have managed without the social acceptability of my Ghanaian Buddhist colleagues". (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

In addition, other Christian refugees reported that the church has been supportive in terms of their integration in Ghana; by meeting both their physical and spiritual needs. For most of the refugees the church had now become a family to them.

I came with a child to Ghana. I am a Christian. I attended the Assemblies of God Church when I was in Cote d'Ivoire but in Ghana I attend the Perez Chapel. Perez Chapel members have done a great lot for us since we came to Ghana. I remember when I gave birth to my second child, the church members took care of us and they brought us mattresses, blankets, bedsheets, pillows, clothes, shoes, and food. They are a family to me that's why I attend Perez Chapel. Through my Christian faith, I feel very much accepted and I feel I have a family in Ghana" (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee)

Also, the Muslim refugees indicated that they were assisted by their members to integrate in Ghana. With their members' support, they were able to register at the Ghana Refugee Board to aid their integration.

I am a Muslim. When I arrived in Ghana in December 2010 during Christmas time, I stayed in Mammobi in Accra up to the end of January 2011 with some Sudanese and Ghanaian Muslim friends. I made these friends when I first visited the Mommobi Mosque in December 2010 to pray. It is at this place that they directed me to the Ghana Refugee Board to register and go through the necessary procedures to get my refugee status. The Mammobi Mosque for me is like home as I have most of my friends there and the very people who supported me to settle in Accra. (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee)

The comments above demonstrate the power that religious practice, sports (particularly the game of football) and other social events, play in enhancing good relations between refugees and the host communities, resulting in the seamless integration of the refugees into these host communities. Religion and ethnic groupings fostering a sense of integration and belonging for refugees in host communities is not something peculiar to only refugees in Ghana

(Kissoon, 2015; Nawyn, 2006). For instance, Bosnian refugees in the United States of America also found religion as a point of contact to the local communities (Nawyn, 2006). Kissoon (2015), in a study of refugees in Kenya, found that refugees who were Muslims were able to integrate faster with their hosts because of their religious affiliation.

Most faith-based organisations have welfare systems that assist refugees to resettle. In this study, most of the refugees mentioned churches such as the Perez Chapel, Winners Chapel, Christian Action Faith Ministries and the International Central Gospel Church, among others, as having support systems in place to support refugees who attend their churches - to settle and feel more comfortable in Ghana. The key reason for the support by the churches may be to win new souls for Jesus Christ, and to strengthen the faith of those who are already Christians among them so that they are not wooed to join other religions, or leave the faith to engage in social vices. Thus, while the Christian churches were meeting the needs of the refugees, the refugees were also being drawn to the Kingdom of God by attending the churches and participating in their activities. The Ghana Refugee Board and the Ghana office of the UNHCR also work closely with faith-based organisations such as the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) – a non-governmental, non-sectarian, development-oriented organization established by the Seventh-day Adventist Church; the Christian Council of Ghana (CCG) - an ecumenical, research based and advocacy organization with a long history of working towards an increased realization of social and economic rights of the disadvantaged and less privileged in society; and the National Catholic Secretariat (NCS), to support the welfare of refugees in Ghana. These organisations support refugees with project interventions in the areas of healthcare; education; water, sanitation and hygiene; food security; economic development; emergency management; building of shelters; and enhancing community empowerment and self-reliance through livelihood projects.

Some of the refugees in this study also indicated that their versatility in the usage of the local language has helped them to socially integrate and become more acceptable to the Ghanaians. An Ivorian refugee, who used to sell fruits, toffees, and chocolates by the roadside in Accra with other Ghanaians, said this:

Now I can speak the Twi and Ga languages fluently. When I came to Accra nine years ago, I stayed among the fisher-folks in Labadi for three and a half years. When they bring the fish from the sea, we peel the scales from it and pack them into those wooden boxes for sale to the market queens. I was paid with money and sometimes I get some fish as well to feed my two children. I also learnt the Ga language through my daily interactions with the fishermen and fisher folks. I was doing same job in Abidjan so it was so easy when I managed to overcome the language barrier here in Ghana. When my husband finally joined us and we relocated to Achimota, we lived among the Akans, so I started doing this buying and selling business by the roadside as well and now I can speak the Twi language as well. I used to follow the cars when there is a traffic jam and along the traffic lights to sell fruits, toffees, chocolates and chewing gums to the passengers. After settling here in Legon, my husband and I hired this shop and I now sell all these provisions here. I can speak Ga, Twi, English and French! In fact, only a few of the people here know I am an Ivorian. Most of them think I am either a Ga or an Akan. The daily interaction with the Ghanaians as really helped me to learn the language and socially integrate. (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

The testament above indicates that daily interaction and community engagements through work, in particular, help refugees to learn the local language and facilitates their social integration in their host communities. Kappa (2019) argued that language forms part of refugees social integration process. Refugees from the Middle East in Denmark learned the Danish language to enable them to interact with the various communities they found themselves in (Kappa, 2019). Learning of the host communities language thus help refugees to interact at the socio-cultural and economic levels, paving the way for a seamless integration into the host community. It is therefore important for Ghana to make available language centres and teachers to help refugees learn the local languages. Through this vital skills could be transferred by the refugees to host communities. The learning of the host communities' language by refugees could also strengthen refugee-host community host community relations and reduce the incidents of conflict that usually occur between these two groups.

Also, a camp manager mentioned that some refugees are well integrated socially so they can seek financial support from their Ghanaian friends when they are in need. This mostly happens for refugees who have integrated through religious bonds, ethnic affiliations and other forms of associations. The Camp Manager indicated that Togolese refugees for instance can get help easily from the Ewe ethnic group than refugees from different countries because of their association and ethnic affiliation. The quote below illustrates the view of the Camp Manager:

“There are refugees in this camp who get support from people within the host community when they are in dire need. Yes, they get support in terms of money, foodstuff, clothing etc. Some of them also get it through the churches and charitable organisations and other NGOs. It will interest you to know that the Togolese refugees benefit a lot in this place because the Ewe community support them a lot. They speak the same language and they understand their culture very well so they see themselves as kin. Some of these community members oftentimes invite the refugees into their homes, especially on weekends, when they have special occasions, to spend time and to take part of their events, ceremonies etc. So for some of these refugees here, the local community is more than a blessing” (Refugee Camp Manager).

On the other hand, some refugees mentioned that they are not socially integrated because they do not have Ghanaian friends. A refugee from the Central African Republic mentioned that he is not integrated in Ghana because he does not have friends. The quote below highlights his view.

I have no Ghanaian friends and I hardly have anyone visiting us from the local community. Though we meet and greet each other, I do not feel I am part of the community. I rather have colleagues from CAR and Cote d’Ivoire visiting me from time to time. Even it was one of my refugee colleagues who connected me to get a job with this security company (Central African, male, 29 years, urban refugee).

Social integration is usually fostered in instances where refugees are better able to interact with the host community at all levels and in all spheres of life. The literature indicates that where refugees are secluded in camps that are not closer to any of the local communities, it becomes difficult for the social aspect of integration to take place (Jacobsen, 1997; Agblorti

and Awusabo-Asare, 2011). In Ghana, most refugee camps are located close to towns, villages and cities so it becomes easy for refugees to engage in social activities with the host communities. However, the willingness of the refugees to interact and the perception of the host community members as well as their acceptability of the refugees, play a key factor in their social integration. This probably explains why most refugees in this study are not integrated socially. Probably if Ghana was operating a policy of self-settlement for refugees, it could have probably fostered their integration in their respective host communities. A sizeable number of the urban refugees were from French-speaking countries hence the language barrier could be a reason for their inability to integrate into society. Johnston and Bacishoga (2003) argued that social integration fosters homogeneity of minority groups into main stream communities.

6.2.2 Cultural Integration in Ghana

In the present study, cultural integration of the refugees was examined for some key variables. This included refugees' appreciation (understanding) and usage of the local languages spoken in Ghana; preparation and consumption of any Ghanaian local dish, appreciation of Ghanaian music (both folk songs and pop-culture), dressing and dance as well as core Ghanaian practices such as hospitality, and respect for the elderly, among others.

Table 6.2 shows the extent to which the refugees were culturally integrated in Ghana. About 62.6% of the refugees disagreed that they are culturally integrated into the Ghanaian society while 14.5% were neutral in their response on cultural integration. The least proportion (4.0%), however, strongly agreed that they have been culturally integrated into the Ghanaian society.

Table 6.2: Percentage distribution of refugees by cultural integration in Ghana

Cultural integration	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	19	4.0
Agree	28	6.0
Neutral	68	14.5
Disagree	294	62.6
Strongly disagree	61	13.0
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

It can be observed that the vast majority of the refugees were not culturally integrated into Ghanaian society. Various reasons have been adduced to explain this gap, key among which is the language barrier. Apart from the Togolese who seem to bond quite well with their counterparts in Ghana (i.e. the Ewes), most of the refugees at the Ampain Refugee Camp are Ivorians who cannot speak the local Nzema language. The Krisan Refugee Camp also has refugees from Sudan, Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and other countries whose cultural norms are different from that of the host community. Unlike the Togolese refugees, those from Sudan, Central African Republic and Sierra Leone did not have any related ethnic groups in the host community.

Secondly, most of these rural communities have a homogeneous culture, making it challenging for the refugees to penetrate compared to the cities where the cultures are heterogeneous. Other factors such as the refugees' own apathy towards the camp life, the craving for third country resettlement, and other future plans they have of returning to their home country, may be a hindrance to their cultural integration.

With regard to cultural integration, the qualitative results of the study confirmed the quantitative results. The refugees mentioned that they participate in the Ghanaian cultural practices. They mentioned that they liked Ghanaian cuisine. Some of them also recounted the

difficulty they had in eating Ghanaian meals when they first arrived in Ghana and the fact that with the passing of time, they were able to adjust and eat Ghanaian meals. A Sudanese refugee said he likes eating “Waakye” (rice and beans) and Banku” (corn dough food). Also, an Ivorian mentioned that he also likes groundnut soup, rice and fufu. Some of the refugees explained some of the Ghanaian dishes they eat:

“When I came first, I couldn’t eat the Ghanaian food. Because if I compared that one with our food, it’s different. But after I spent some time with the Ghanaians, I was able to eat some of the food like Waakye and Jollof. But up till now, I haven’t eaten their banku, because as I told you earlier, it’s very soft and I won’t be satisfied if I eat it. But what I like eating is the Waakye, rice and Kenkey – I’ve eaten kenkey and fish several times because the Kenkey is heavy and it feels like one of our local foods in Sudan; unlike the banku which is usually light. I like the Kenkey because I see it as an adaptation of a local food in Sudan” (Sudanese, female, 27 years, urban refugee)

“I eat Akyeke, which is the same food I use to eat when I was in Ivory Coast. I also eat groundnut soup, rice and Fufu. In Cote d’Ivoire I never ate Waakye or Banku or Kenkey so I am enjoying them here in Ghana. The fufu, rice, and groundnut soup in Ghana are the same as the ones in Cote d’Ivoire so eating them was very easy for me.’ (Ivorian, male, 39 years, camp refugee).

The quotations above reveal that the refugees’ preferences of food in the host country is sometimes informed by the food’s similarity to the food they were eating in their country of origin. The Sudanese indicated his preference for Kenkey is informed by its closeness to the local dish in Sudan, while for the Ivorian, groundnut soup with Fufu or rice is preferred because he was eating the same in his country of origin. Some refugees also indicated that they have adapted to eating the Ghanaian dishes since they found some of them very palatable.

‘I like the Ghanaian dishes, and I have adapted to eating them now that I have stayed here for over 15years. I eat most of the food Ghanaians eat. I eat rice balls, Fufu, and Kokonte with groundnut soup; I also eat the Kenkey and fish, Apapransa and Abenkwan; and Akple and okro stew soup, Fetri Dekyi, the Ewe’s call it. . Sometimes when I long so much for some of the local dishes in my country, I travel to Accra where I have discovered one fine restaurant where they do Sierra Leonean dishes. The owner is a Sierra Leonean and most of the cooks are also Sierra Leoneans; so they know how to combine the recipe very well to bring out the through savour in the same manner as one can have in Sierra Leone. I like patronising that restaurant but I do so once a while on occasions like my birthday, the Sierra Leone national day celebrations or anytime I get the opportunity to travel to Accra’ (Sierra Leonean, male, 38 years, camp refugee).

The refugees also mentioned that there are other Ghanaian cultural activities like dressing and dancing that they practiced. They recounted certain aspects of the Ghanaian culture that resonated with their culture, especially music and dressing. Refugees who were culturally integrated could bond well with the indigenes in their host communities than those who were not culturally integrated. The quote below confirmed the claims made by some of the refugees, regarding similarities in the culture of their countries with that of Ghana. Thus, it explains why some refugees are able to eat Ghanaian food, sing and dance to Ghanaian songs/music.

I appreciate the Ghanaian way of dancing and culture because some of them are almost the same as the dance and music types of my tribe in Liberia. This has helped me to integrate well in Ghana (Liberian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

You know ... no matter what the distinction may be, Africans have similarities of culture and that's one of the best things you can find on the continent; so we appreciate Ghanaian culture a lot. The Ghanaian way of dancing and their culture is something that you need to look into and appreciate, because you cannot say that your culture is better than someone's culture. It's better to listen, to observe and understand why people do things the way they do it, instead of passing judgement. We find it almost the same as our culture. The dressing, the food, music, styles of building and several other things are almost the same. (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

There is no significant cultural change in the sense that, if you take the Ivorians, they also have the Akan ethnic group who form about 37 percent of the country's population. In the Akan ethnic groups are sub-groups such as the Baoulé, Ebríé (Kyama) and the Nzema's who can also be found in the Western part of Ghana. Their cultures are not significantly different from the Ghanaian culture. So, for most of the food we eat, they also eat; and most of the dresses we wear, they also wear; the way we drum and also dance is not significantly different. So, they can integrate their culture into ours and they are also able to relate to what we do. And our communities are also able to relate with what they do. The only problem is the language barrier, which is French (Refugee Camp Coordinator).

Also an Ivorian refugee said that she started learning a Ghanaian language to facilitate her integration in the country. She indicated that at the initial stages she encountered challenges but she did not give up so now she can read, write and speak the Twi language. Evidence has shown that the language barrier is very key in the cultural integration of refugees (Ngan et

al., 2016; Watkins et al., 2012). This helps to transmit the values and traits of culture. The refugees' inability in learning the Ghanaian languages isolated them from having smooth interactions with Ghanaians, there by hindering their integration.

Since I came to this camp I have not been able to practice the Twi I learnt in the city because the community here mostly speak the Nzema language. When I was staying in Takoradi, the people were speaking Fante and I learned a bit of the Fante. It is similar to the Twi language. I think it's a bit difficult for me here in terms of the language than it is when I visit Takoradi. In Takoradi they mostly speak Fante and Twi, mostly the Fante. Since the city dwellers don't speak one language it is quite easy interacting with the people because, at least, you will get someone speaking Twi, the language I speak, but over here in the camp the case is different" (Ivorian, female, 33 years, camp refugee).

Some of the refugees could not integrate culturally because of the close affinity they had with their own culture. Some of them indicated that their culture is what defined them and that they wanted to transfer it unto their children, just in case they got an opportunity to return to the country of origin, they would not be deficient in their own culture. Miller and Slater (2000) argued that most refugees use the internet as a connecting tool to help them trace back their roots or connect with people to maintain their cultural ties. They maintain their culture and would want to transfer it to their children. A refugee said this when asked about cultural integration in Ghana:

"I rather like to maintain my culture so I can transfer it to my children because we are in a foreign land. When some of my friends travelled to Yamoussoukro I asked them to buy specific local dresses and specific foodstuff as well so that I can train my children on the dresses to wear and on how to eat their tribes' cuisines. They are getting too used to the Ghanaian dishes. I also teach them some of our local languages and I try as much as possible to speak it with them. I downloaded most of the traditional songs from the internet or sometimes we watch them on my phone together. When we came here they were very young and some of them were born here as well, they have incorporated Ghanaian culture and music and language easily. It is therefore difficult to re-orient them with their own culture". (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee)

"I think we don't have to force our culture on our children. We were privileged to have our own culture because we were living in our own country. They are also privileged to have their own form of culture, a globalize culture, that helps them to fit

very well into the international market. I teach them our local culture though, but I also allow them to inculcate the Ghanaian culture as well. In future, they can work in both Cameroon and other countries in West Africa as they interact with both Ghanaians and other nationalities within the Accra area. It is a good thing to have an international outlook” (Cameroonian, female, 37 years, urban refugee)

The results of the study showed a relationship between intergenerational ties and cultural integration, cultural fosterage and cultural preservation. There was a clear dilemma from the older generation of the refugees that their actual culture was being adulterated and being eroded as a result of their forced migration to, and continued stay in Ghana. Though they tried all means possible to preserve it, they lamented the minimal impact they were making as the dominant culture of the host country continued to impact their children who were born in Ghana as well as those who were brought into the country at a younger age (Miller & Slater, 2002). The phenomenon presented a clash of ideologies as there were those who were in favour of perpetuity of the culture of their country of origin, even in the communities they lived in, in Ghana. This perpetuity was however very much challenged by intergenerational differences and perceptions, as well as globalization. Some of the refugees who were of the view that their children needed diverse cultural exposure to fit them into the international systems of globalisation while others were strong advocates of the preservation and cultural purity of the country of origin’s culture. The inability of refugees to integrate culturally could also be linked to their desire to resettle in other countries. This probably could explain why most refugees were not culturally integrated.

6.2.3 Economic Integration in Ghana

Table 6.3 shows the economic integration of refugees in Ghana. Refugees’ economic integration included their level of access to the job market, the opportunities available for them to undertake economic activities themselves (own and run their own businesses), ownership of property, availability of entrepreneurial skills training, their economic assets or

investments in Ghana and whether their remittance engagements and income are enough to sustain their livelihoods. Economic integration also comprised of the support they receive from the UNHCR, the GRB and other charitable organisations that is meant to establish them economically to enhance their economic independence. About 99.4% of the refugees indicated that they were not economically integrated in Ghana while 0.6% of the refugees said they were economically integrated in Ghana.

Table 6.3: Percentage distribution of refugees by economic integration in Ghana

Economic integration	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	3	0.6
No	467	99.4
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The reason why most refugees were not economically integrated could be attributed to their employment status and their place of residence. In Ghana, most of the refugee camps are located in the rural areas so accessibility to employment opportunities is a challenge (Dick, 2002). This limits refugees involvement in economic activities thereby limiting their chances of economic integration. Due to the limited employment opportunities by refugees, Bilgili and Loschmann, (2018) argued that host-governments and other international NGOs and charities should create support systems and make interventions to enhance the livelihoods and economic integration of the refugees in the host country.

Though the Ghana Refugee Law, 1992 (PNDCL 305D), indicates that refugees in Ghana have the same legal rights as ordinary citizens, i.e. they can work and own businesses and properties, just as any other Ghanaian national; the challenge generally has been their accessibility to the job market as some refugees have indicated that they have been discriminated against on several occasions because of their refugee status. A 2014 country report by the US Department of State noted that with regard to employment, refugees could

apply for work permits through the same process as other foreigners. Work permits, however, generally were issued only for employment in the formal sector, while the majority of refugees worked in the informal sector (United States Department of State Report, 2015). Refugees no more receive rations from the UNHCR office in Ghana, hence they are encouraged to undertake business and receive support from organisations such as the Christian Council of Ghana and the Adventist Development and Relief Services (ADRA), in areas of farming, animal husbandry, soap making, and other such informal means of skills development to support their livelihoods.

The qualitative interviews provided mixed results regarding economic integration. Some refugees indicated that they had businesses or investments in Ghana to support their livelihoods. A Liberian refugee indicated that his wife has a bakery and sewing business and this has helped them to integrate in Ghana. Also, a refugee from Cote d'Ivoire mentioned that he has a house in Ghana for renting.

“My wife had a business and I also had a business. I had a communication business long ago, but it folded-up. Because of a few reasons, sometimes your expenses can outweigh your income and that creates a problem. I still have my records of these businesses that I registered with the Management of this Buduburam settlement. My wife runs a sewing business, she bakes and teaches as well. Her businesses are what is supporting us now, I am giving my full backing to it, supporting her in every way possible.” (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

“...My husband and I have managed to put up a little brick building on the land we purchased a few years ago, after he joined me here in Ghana. We have advertised it on the Tonaton website for renting. It is a single room that's why we have want to hire it out. We are a big family - three children, my husband and I am expecting our last baby as well. We intend to use the rent to expand it, then we can move into it later (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

Some of the refugees were engaged in petty trading while others were in big business ventures, especially those in the urban areas.

From the narratives above, it is apparent that the urban refugees had more job opportunities than the camp refugees. The camp refugees had to work within a limited scope of opportunities in the rural settings in which they were located, hence they were usually faced with economic difficulties, compared to their counterparts in the urban areas. Different measures could be adopted to mitigate the plight of camp refugees. Omata (2014) argued that in Rwanda, the government has adopted a policy that allowed refugees the freedom to move outside the camp to engage in income-earning activities. Ghana may not benefit from the economic potentials of refugees if they are not given the opportunity to use such potentials. The quotes below illustrate some of the variations in their economic engagements:

“I am a businessman and am into all sorts of buying and selling of goods, and I operate this restaurant, as well as the manager for some Lebanese company . They saw my potential and employed me as a manager so I manage staff some of whom are foreigners and Ghanaians as well. When it comes to earnings, let’s say I earn about GHS 1,200 per month, from managing the restaurant. With the other buying and selling business that I do, I can get a profit of about GHS 2,000 per month from the buying and selling of general goods and provisions. When I make such a profit, I invest back into the business by buying more supplies, and I pay rent and school fees as well. But I also do some business, like somebody will call me to sell a car for him. If I did that I can get about GHS 300-400 as a commission but that business doesn’t come always. Sometimes too some people can call me to do something for them like servicing their water tanks. So my job is not one. Sometimes I take a car to Kumasi and sell the car there”. (Sudanese, male, 35 years, urban refugee)

I am currently unemployed therefore getting food to eat on daily basis is at times a challenge. My family and I have to grapple with this every day. I am here with my father and two younger brothers. My father is quite old. It’s not easy for us at all because I’m supposed to work and help my family but it’s not possible because of the language barrier. I’m supposed to be a teacher. When I search for a job, I’m not accepted because of the language barrier, the local language, I don’t understand. I went for a job interview in Accra and the head of the school asked me if I understand any of the local languages and I said no. I told him I’m Francophone and even the English, I try hard to express myself in English, so how much more the local language. The employer told me that it will be difficult for me to get a job in Ghana. Since I completed school in a private university here in Ghana in 2017, there hasn’t been any job for me and it hasn’t been easy for me. I’m suffering with my family” (Ivorian, female, 32 years, camp refugee).

The results implied that few refugees had integrated economically, however, the qualitative results showed that most of the refugees had an investment in Ghana. A key informant mentioned that some refugees had houses and land in Ghana but they do not disclose it to people. They only disclosed their properties to authorities when there was a problem. This probably could explain why in the quantitative results most refugees mentioned that they are not economically integrated in Ghana.

Yes. Some of the refugees have got houses and acquired lands as well. But it will take extra diligence, time and building of trust before they show you some of these things. You will never know them if you're a field operative who just comes to the camp to work for a shortwhile and go away. No never! You will know they have property if you are very close to them. They wouldn't want to disclose this to people they don't trust. (Refugee Camp Manager).

It could also be that most refugees do not consider their investments as a form of integration, but rather a means of earning a living. Economic integration of refugees is sometimes a challenge as there are limited opportunities available for refugees in the formal sector to sustain themselves economically. In some cases too, refugees may lack the needed skills and requisite knowledge to enable them to compete in the job market with indigenes. Refugees, thus, engage in family, networks and community-based economic activities to gain their daily subsistence and livelihood (Al-Sharmani, 2004; Bilgili., & Loschmann, 2018). Some countries allow refugees freedom to integrate economically by providing opportunities. For instance, in Rwanda, there is a structured program for refugees to enable them to integrate. Refugees have the freedom to move outside their designated zones and they also have the right to engage in wage-earning or self-employed activities (Bilgili., & Loschmann, 2018). In Uganda, some refugees are employed as teachers, car mechanics and language translators. In Ghana, there are projects like Ghana Gas Pipeline and road construction works, small scale mining that refugees are engaged in (GRB, 2020; UNHCR, 2017). The lack of skill to match the job market, the limbo to resettle in a third country, and the other limitations such as

language barrier in discrimination in the job market may be some of the reasons why they are not economically integrated in Ghana.

6.2.4 Political/Civic Integration in Ghana

The key indicator for the refugees' political integration was the extent to which they followed or had an interest in the political developments and discourses in Ghana. As shown in Table 6.4, a higher proportion (94.9%) of refugees indicated that they were not politically integrated in Ghana while 5.1% indicated that they were politically integrated in Ghana.

Table 6.4: Percentage distribution of refugees by political integration in Ghana

Political Integration	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	24	5.1
No	446	94.9
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The qualitative results collaborated with the quantitative results. Most of the refugees mentioned that they were not integrated politically in Ghana. Language barrier, experience from their countries, and unwillingness to participate were among the reasons why refugees were not politically integrated in Ghana. A Sudanese refugee mentioned that she does not engage in politics because she needs to focus on her education. In addition, an Ivorian refugee indicated that she does not have an interest in Ghanaian politics, and that contributed to her inability to integrate politically. Nyers (2016) argued that due to the situation of refugees, they are mostly not politically active because they are legally barred from participating in politics in the host country. In addition, Turner (2006) explained that camp refugees are mostly silent due to their locations. The confinement of some of the refugees in camps and their experiences in the host country could have accounted for the reason why most refugees were not enthused about following political issues in the host country.

“It’s because I don’t have so much time to listen to political issues. I’m in school, the Ghana Institute of Languages I’ve to focus on my education. I am also a caterer, so I take orders from my clients, bake and deliver to them as well to make some money to finance my education. Focus is therefore my mantra” (Sudanese, male, 27 years, urban refugee).

“No, not really... Because already I don’t want to interfere, I don’t want to even have an opinion because really it is not advisable for me to do so as a refugee. It is also illegal for me to do so” (Ivorian, female, 32 years, camp refugee)

“Yea, time to time, I follow the political discussions in Ghana. But sometimes when they’re using the local languages for the discussions on radio and television, then I get lost ” (Central African, male, 38years, urban refugee).

However, a participant from Liberia explained that he listens to politics in Ghana but do not participate while an Ivorian refugee indicated he hates politics because of the political conflicts he experienced in his country of origin.

“Oh, yes. I do listen to it and I try to analyse it and I follow it. But to participate, no. We are refugees and the law does not allow us to do so. It’s interesting. I do follow the political discussions in the country, the competitive rivalry between the political parties, particularly the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party, when it gets to election time. I even study their manifestos to check their international commitments towards us as refugees when they come into power. I don’t take sides, I cannot take sides, but all their policies also help me in my decision making as a refugee, to stay in Ghana, to apply for third country settlement or the voluntarily return to Liberia, my motherland. You know Ghanaian politics is very open. You can see, you can criticize, you can give constructive criticism and you can also contribute immensely. One of the things that I also found is that we find that uniqueness brother-relationship between the constituency and that of the one who is elected” (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

No, I don’t like politics. I hate politics. I don’t follow politics. It is because of politics, a lot of people died in Cote d’Ivoire and there’re some people I’ve not been hearing about them again. I don’t know if they’re still alive or dead and some are my friends. It is because of conflict resulting out of politics that’s why I find myself here. I’d rather focus on my creative work as an artist and create the beauty of nature than follow politics. Even my artworks do not portray politics, they rather depict the beauty of life and happiness. We have gone through a lot of difficulties as refugees, no need to focus on the negatives; rather focus on the positives of life (Ivorian, male, 29 years, urban refugee).

It is very obvious from the quotation above that some of the refugees were very keen in following political issues because of the bad experience they have had with it and how traumatizing the experience had impacted them.

Despite the bitter experiences that most of the refugees had as a result of political conflicts in their country of origin, a significant number of them were interested in following politics in their country of origin and the political developments in Ghana as well. An Ivorian refugee expressed his opinion on political issues.

Though I have had to run away from my country because I was perceived as a follower of Laurent Gbagbo, I still follow the politics in Ghana and one interesting thing I have realised is that Ghanaians talk a lot on radio and television especially the phone-in programmes but you don't fight. That is a good sign of political maturity, though I have seen in the news some pockets of violence during by-elections and general elections. That scale of violence, though not the best, is very manageable and not on a larger scale as to bring about political instability and war in the country. I have always advised my Ghanaian friends to move away from any political talk that can lead to hatred and violence. I always use my situation as an example for them to follow. I don't want any Ghanaian to fall into this refugee crisis. At least there is peace in Ghana and I am also having peace of mind to engage in my small business and support my livelihood, so that's great. That is my contribution as a refugee to the development of Ghana. Just like what my Bible tells me I have to pray for the peace of Jerusalem because in its peace will I have my peace. My Jerusalem at the moment is Ghana. I have to pray for Ghana and contribute as well to its economic and political development in ways within my power. Why? Because if Ghana should be on fire (God forbid), we will all be on fire. (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

The results of the study showed most of the refugees had no interest in following or discussing political issues in Ghana due to their experiences with politics in their countries of origin. Most of the refugees fled from their country of origin to Ghana due to political and governance conflicts (Owusu, 2000). It is very clear from the quotations from the two Ivorian refugees, above, that the political conflict in Cote d'Ivoire had a traumatizing impact on many of the citizen who belonged to the opposition party, impacting their willingness to follow political activity. Refugees from different countries also expressed concerns about their

experiences as a result of political/governance conflicts. The difference in opinion showed the extent to which the refugees experienced the negative impact of politics on their lives, and this might have accounted for their lack of interest in following political discourse in Ghana. Although some refugees indicated that the politics in Ghana is free from conflicts and that people could express their opinions freely without any interference, the language barrier hindered some of the refugees from fully understanding and following Ghana's political discourse via the mass media. A significant number of the refugees were from Cote d'Ivoire, a French-speaking country, hence their inability to follow political discussions which are usually done in the English language or the other local languages in Ghana.

6.3 Transnationalism and Integration

This section discusses the transnational engagements of the refugees with their countries of origin and third countries, and its relationship with their integration in Ghana.

6.3.1 Social Engagements with the Country of origin and Social Integration in Ghana

The results in Table 6.5 show that there was no association between refugees' social engagements in their country of origin and social integration in Ghana (P value =0.105). This implied that refugees social engagements with their country of origin did not influence their social integration in Ghana in any significant manner.

Table 6.5: Social engagements in the country of origin versus social integration in Ghana

Social engagements in the country of origin	Social integration in Ghana		Total	
	Yes(%)	No(%)	N	%
Yes	41.4	58.6	227	100
No	34.2	65.8	243	100
Pearson chi square = 2.6300		P value = 0.105		

Source: Field data, 2019

Nearly half (41.4%) of the refugees who had social engagements in their country of origin were socially integrated in Ghana. Also, approximately 66% of the refugees who had no social engagement in their country of origin were not socially integrated in Ghana.

6.3.2 Cultural Engagements with the Country of Origin and Cultural Integration in Ghana

As shown in Table 6.6, there was no association between refugees' cultural engagement in their country of origin and their cultural integration in Ghana (P value =0.058). Hence there was no significant influence of refugees' cultural engagements in country of origin on their cultural integration in Ghana.

Table 6.6: Cultural engagements in the country of origin versus cultural integration in Ghana

Cultural engagements with country of origin	Cultural integration in Ghana					Total	
	Strongly agree	agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly disagree	N	%
	%	%	%	%	%		
Yes	3.2	5.4	14.3	65.9	11.2	349	100
No	6.6	7.4	14.9	52.9	18.2	121	100
Pearson chi square = 9.1088			P value = 0.058				

Source: Field data, 2019

Slightly more than half (52.9%) of the refugees who were not culturally engaged in their country of origin were not culturally integrated in Ghana. Also, 3.2% of the refugees who were culturally engaged in their country of origin strongly agreed that they were culturally integrated in Ghana; while 65.9% of the refugees who were culturally engaged in their country of origin indicated they were not culturally integrated in Ghana.

6.3.3 Economic Engagements with the Country of Origin and Economic Integration in Ghana

Table 6.7 shows that there was no association between the economic engagement of refugees in their country of origin and economic integration in Ghana (P value = 0.226).

Table 6.7: Economic engagement in the country of origin versus economic integration in Ghana

Economic engagement with the country of origin	Economic integration in Ghana		Total	
	Yes(%)	No(%)	N	%
Yes	1.9	98.1	53	100
No	0.5	99.5	417	100
Chi square = 1.4681		P value =		0.226

Source: Field data, 2019

Almost all (99.5%) of the refugees with no economic engagement in their country of origin were not economically integrated in Ghana. This situation may be as a result of their initial dependence on support from UNHCR and other charitable organisations. The initial provision of rations and other charitable support to the refugees might have contributed to their lack of interest in economic activities at the initial stages.

6.3.4 Political Engagement with the Country of Origin and Political Integration in Ghana

Table 6.8 shows that the refugees' political engagements with their country of origin was associated with their political integration in Ghana (P value = 0.000).

Table 6.8: Political engagements in the country of origin versus political integration in Ghana

Political engagements with the country of origin	Political integration in Ghana		Total	
	Yes(%)	No(%)	N	%
Yes	12.1	87.9	99	100
No	3.2	96.8	371	100
Pearson chi square = 12.7363		P value =		0.000

Source: Field data, 2019

Almost all (96.8%) of the refugees who had no political engagements with their country of origin were not politically integrated in Ghana. About 12.1% of refugees with political engagements in their country of origin were politically integrated in Ghana.

The quantitative data thus indicated no association (and in effect influence) between social, cultural, and economic engagements with the country of origin on the one hand and social, cultural and economic integration in the host country. However, the quantitative results showed that there was an association between political engagement in the country of origin and political integration in Ghana. The results indicated that majority of the people who were not politically engaged in their country of origin were not integrated politically in Ghana. Given that the key driver for their forced migration was political/governance conflicts, their lack of interest in political activities/developments in their country of origin automatically reflected on their lack of interest in the political issues in Ghana. The trauma of political conflict, therefore, had a big role to play in their lack of interest in political issues in the host country, as expressed by this Ivorian refugee:

I was a political activist in the university, my boyfriend then, who is now my husband, both of us were strong activists for President Laurent Gbagbo. We were hounded down like dogs. Luckily we were able to escape the death squad but some of our colleagues unfortunately fell victim to it. Therefore I don't follow very much the politics in Ghana and I have zero engagement policy, for now, in the politics of Cote d'Ivoire so long as Alassane Dramane Ouattara remains President. There are a few restricted/closed online political groups that I belong to though. I fear any open engagements will result in these people in the Ouattara Government tracking us to this place and doing harm to us. For now, my husband and I are focussed on this our business and caring for our children. We just want to keep a low profile here in Ghana until the appropriate time when we will rise again. That is, when our own and true President, the President of the land, the true and unadulterated son of the soil, His Excellency Koudou Laurent Gbagbo, returns to power. I am truly looking forward to that day! (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee).

6.3.5 Social Engagements with Third Countries and Social Integration in Ghana

Table 6.9 shows that the refugees' social engagements with third countries was associated with social integration in Ghana (P value = 0.000). More than half of the refugees (55.0%) who had social engagements with third countries were not socially integrated in Ghana. About 45.0% of the refugees with social engagements in third countries were socially integrated in Ghana. The refugees' desire for third country resettlement, among other reasons, may have been the reason for their lack of social integration in Ghana.

Table 6.9: Social engagements with a third country and social integration in Ghana

Social engagements with third countries	Social integration in Ghana		Total	
	Yes(%)	No(%)	N	%
Yes	45.0	55.0	235	100
No	29.4	70.6	235	100

Chi square = 13.7843 P value = 0.000

Source: Field data, 2019

6.3.6 Cultural Engagements with Third Countries and Cultural Integration in Ghana

As shown in Table 6.10, refugees' cultural engagement in the third country was associated with their cultural integration in Ghana (P value = 0.000).

Table 6.10: Cultural engagements with third countries and cultural integration in Ghana

Cultural engagements with third countries	Cultural integration in Ghana					Total	
	strongly agree	agree	Neutral	Disagree	strongly disagree	N	%
	%	%	%	%	%		
Yes	0.6	3.8	12.8	66.2	16.6	320	100
No	11.3	10.7	18.0	54.7	5.3	150	100

Pearson chi square = 51.1823 P value = 0.000

Source: Field data, 2019

A little over half of the refugees (54.7%) who did not have cultural engagements with third countries indicated they were not culturally integrated in Ghana. Also, about 66.2% of the refugees who were culturally attached to third countries disagreed to be culturally integrated

in Ghana. The trend showed that those who were culturally engaged in third countries were not culturally integrated in Ghana. This is an indication that their attraction to third country cultures may have negatively influenced their cultural engagement in Ghana.

6.3.7 Economic Engagements with Third Countries and Economic Integration in Ghana

As shown in Table 6.11, there was no association between refugees' economic engagement in third countries and their economic integration in Ghana (P value = 0.889). Almost all (99.4%) of the refugees who had no economic engagements with third countries were also not economically integrated in Ghana. All the refugees who had an economic engagement with third countries were not economically integrated in Ghana.

Table 6.11: Economic engagements with the third country versus economic integration in Ghana

Economic engagements with third countries	Economic integration in Ghana		Total	
	Yes	No	N	%
Yes	0.0	100.0	3	100
No	0.6	99.4	467	100
Pearson chi square 0.0194		P value = 0.889		

Source: Field data, 2019

6.3.8 Political Engagements with Third Countries and Political Integration in Ghana

Table 6.12 illustrates that there was an association between refugees' political engagement in third countries and political integration in Ghana (P value = 0.021). Almost all (96.3%) of the refugees who had no political engagements with third countries were not politically integrated in Ghana. Also, 9.1% of refugees who had political engagements with third countries had been politically integrated in Ghana.

Table 6.12: Political engagement with third countries versus political integration in Ghana

Political engagement with third countries	Political integration in Ghana		Total	
	Yes(%)	No(%)	N	%
Yes	9.1	90.9	121	100
No	3.7	96.3	349	100
Pearson chi square = 5.339		P value = 0.021		

Source: Field data, 2019

As earlier indicated the apathy of the refugees towards political activities in the host country may have resulted from the negative and traumatic experiences they might have had with the politics of their country of origin.

Though other factors may hamper the refugees' integration in Ghana, it can be drawn from the data that the more they engaged with the third countries the less their social, cultural and economic engagements in the host country. The area of politics however remained the same, in that their lack of interest in following political issues in third countries also meant a lack of interest in political developments in the host country. The politics and its trauma may have continue to hound the refugees hence their lack of interest in politics anywhere.

6.4 Challenges of Integration of Refugees in Ghana

The study further examined the challenges the refugees faced regarding their integration into the host communities in Ghana. Multiple responses were given by the refugees. As illustrated in Table 6.13, 72.3% of refugees indicated language barrier was a major challenge hampering their integration in Ghana. This was followed by discrimination in employment (60.0%) and the lack of employment opportunities for refugees (58.7%).

Table 6.13: Percentage distribution of challenges of refugee integration in Ghana

Challenges refugees face in their integration into Ghana	Frequency	Percentage
Skills not matching employment opportunities available	67	12.1
Lack of employment opportunities	276	58.7
Language barrier	340	72.3
Unfavourable economic conditions	158	33.6
Discrimination in employment because of refugee status	249	60.0
Lack of proper integration policy	102	21.7
Refugee's plans towards third country settlement	30	6.4
Refugee's plans towards returning to the country of origin	14	3.0

Source: Field data, 2019

***Multiple choice

Unfavourable economic conditions was a barrier faced by 33.6% of the refugees while more than a fifth (21.7%) indicated a lack of proper integration policy. Also 12.1% of the refugees indicated their skills did not match the jobs available in host community hence integrating economically was a challenge to them. Plans of resettling in a third country was the reason why 6.4% of the refugees were not integrated in Ghana while the least proportion (3.0%), attributed their inability to integrate to their plans towards returning to the country of origin.

This implies that refugees from different nations have peculiar challenges integrating into the country due to the differences in language, profession and skills-set, unfavourable economic conditions and personal plans of returning home or resettling in a third country, among others. Refugees, in their bid to integrate into the host country and legalise their stay may also need to go through some documentation processes. A key informant indicated that some refugees showed their willingness to integrate into Ghana.

But interestingly there were times when some of the refugees walked up to me, in my office and told me they wanted to integrate into the local community. For example, for a young refugee male who was brought to this camp when he was about eight years old and has since never travelled to his country of origin (now aged 24) came to me one day and told me he wanted Ghanaian citizenship. He said all his friends are Ghanaians, he went to the Ghanaian schools with them, and now goes to church with them and plays football with them; he goes to the fishing ponds with them to fish and therefore he considers himself as a Ghanaian than being a national of his country of

origin. He said all he knows about his country of origin are stories told to him by the parents, the history books he has read about his country and the news he follows in the media. He said, matter of factly, that he has no experiential knowledge of the country he comes from and that Ghana means everything to him that's why he wants to integrated and secure Ghanaian citizenship. Yes, sometimes the frustration of having no experiential knowledge of their countries of origin can set them into thinking in this manner. This kind of situation is not only particular to refugees who came here at a younger age, but also to those who were born here" (Refugee Camp Manager).

Key among the challenges associated with refugee integration that emerged from the qualitative results included lack of employment opportunities and language barrier. Almost all refugees interviewed mentioned a lack of job opportunities as a major hinderance to their integration. A refugee from Cameroon and another from the Central African Republic mentioned that they find it difficult to get jobs in Ghana. Documentation and unequal opportunities for both Ghanaians and refugees were cited as some of the reasons for their inability to secure gainful employment. The following quotes explain their views:

Wherever I go for employment they do not value my educational certificate. Apart from this problem there is also the sheer lack of employment opportunities in Ghana, even the Ghanaians themselves find it difficult securing jobs. Interestingly whenever I go for formal employment like teaching or office work, the employers will ask that I should bring my certificate. I have some certificates from a few courses I did in Ghana but the major one, like my Bachelors degree, are all left in Cameroon because I had to flee with my child and junior sister. The employers usually as for the major certificates which I cannot provide, so they don't employ me. I have attended about eight interviews since I came here and the problem has been the same. (Cameroonian, female, 37 years, urban refugee).

As a matter of fact, I am a surrogate son of a former diplomat and a businessman in CAR. My education was being sponsored by this businessman till the crisis erupted. He was arrested and imprisoned so I had to flee to Ghana for safety. While in CAR I was working as an accountant in one of his business entities and at the same time schooling. With my schooling truncated midway, I now work as a shopkeeper in the bookshop of a church in Accra. I must say I got this job due to my commitment in church as a Christian, since I have no Ghanaian friends per se. I have tried a few jobs but because I left most of my certificates in the home country, they all denied me the job! (Central African, male, 29 years, urban refugee)

A refugee from Sudan also mentioned the language barrier as a challenge for his integration.

Language barrier made it impossible for the refugees to communicate and interact with

Ghanaians:

“It’s very difficult because first I didn’t know how to go out with the people since I was a newcomer, and also the barrier of the language still remains a challenge for most of us. I speak Arabic and French not English language” (Sudanese, female, 32 years, camp refugee).

These findings to some extent contrast that of Dako-Gyeke and Adu (2017) in their study of integration challenges and coping strategies of residual Liberian refugees in Ghana. Some of the challenges they found included disruptions in their social networks, disputes over resources with host community members, lack of employment due to the high unemployment rates in the country and increased levels of criminal activities in and around the camp (Dako-Gyeke & Adu, 2017). The findings of this study are however similar to studies by Omata (2014), who argued that refugees are mostly discriminated against at their various workplaces and they are sometimes denied job opportunities. Foster (2007) also argued that the phenomenon of refugees being denied access to employment opportunities is common in many host countries. Al-Sharmani (2004) reported that in Ecuador, refugees faced similar issues such as lack of employment opportunities and poor working conditions. Refugees who did not have the requisite level of education and skills found it difficult getting jobs compared to those with a higher level of formal education (Al-Sharmani, 2004). Though Dako-Gyeke and Adu (2017) found that the language barrier was a major challenge for refugees integration in Ghana, since they focused on only Liberian refugees, the issue of language barrier was limited as compared to this study which had a wider scope covering refugees from over eight countries. A number of these refugees, particularly the Ivorians and the Sudanese, were unable to speak the English language which is the official language of Ghana hence they found it challenging interacting with the host community members. Their inability to speak

English and other local languages served as a barrier for them to interact with the host and integrate.

These findings echoes the social receptiveness angle of the Kunz theory which explains that when refugees face serious challenges in the host country, they are less likely to get integrated into the communities as they may see the environment as unfriendly and hostile for their survival (Kunz, 1981). Bilgili & Loschmann (2018), argued that international and non-governmental organisations cannot fully address the employment needs of all refugees. However, some policies and measures have been put in place by some governments to ensure that refugees get integrated into host communities. In Ghana, refugees are given the chance to integrate through legal processes and documentation, and employment opportunities in the sectors of road construction and agriculture, among others, are offered to them (GRB, 2020).

6.4.1 Harassment and Discrimination

The qualitative data of the study showed mixed results of harassment and discrimination against refugees. Some of the refugees indicated that they have experienced discrimination while others expressed contrary views. Discrimination of refugees has been documented in other African countries (Landau, 2006; Rugunanan & Smith 2011). These studies reported that refugees go through the various ordeals in their search for jobs due to discrimination. The findings of this study also showed that refugees were discriminated against in various ways relative to job and healthcare. A refugee from the Central African Republic and another one from Liberia mentioned had never experienced discrimination in their stay in Ghana.

I've never experienced discrimination in Ghana since I came here. They treat me like a brother. I have a Ghanaian wife and God has blessed us with two wonderful children! I intend to get work in Ghana's banking sector, probably with one of these banks. Am still searching for that job. (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee).

No, I haven't been faced with any discrimination, if I go into the Ghanaian community, I see myself as a Ghanaian and if I come here to this camp, I see myself as a refugee.(Liberian, male, 32 years, camp refugee).

On the other hand, some refugees indicated they faced discrimination at work and when receiving health care. A Sudanese refugee mentioned that she was discriminated against while accessing healthcare due to the language barrier and the fact that she is a refugee.

Yes, because I don't speak the Ghanaian language and I am also a refugee, when I went to the hospital for treatment they didn't call me. I sat down for a while after they finished treating the Ghanaians then they later called me. Yes, this happened in the big hospital in Eikwe. I left this camp for the hospital in the morning and I returned to the camp late in the evening. I left at 6:00 am to return at 7:30pm! That is not fair! That is discrimination! I think we need a fully equipped medical facility here in this camp. (Sudanese, female, 32 years, camp refugee).

The Camp Manager, however, indicated that some of such claims are sometimes not wholly true:

For instance, refugees may go to access healthcare in the hospital there, and may come back and complain to me that they went there and spent almost four hours and they were not called or attended to and so forth and so on. There may be some element of truth in it but a lot of these allegations may be unfounded because if they have the health insurance card they will be treated. Indeed, the hospital authorities have no business discriminating against a refugee or any person. Sometimes when they make these complaints and we follow it up with the hospital we find out that it is the refugee who has rather gone to verbally abuse the officials or other Ghanaians over there. On one occasion, I went to the hospital to investigate an allegation of discrimination and the official told me that the refugees think since they are under international protection they should be given preferential treatment over the Ghanaians in the cue. They told the refugee to be in the cue and that he'll be treated when it gets to his turn, as people are seen by the doctor on first-come-first-served basis, but the refugee got angry and insulted the officials. Such situations oftentimes results in arguments between the Ghanaians accessing healthcare, in the hospital officials and the refugees. When these things happen, as Camp Managers we go there and have a chitchat with the hospital officials on how to manage it discreetly and tactfully so that it does not bring conflict between the host community and the refugees. This is the more reason why we need our own health post here in the camp, to cater for minor ailments. Having a health post here will solve many of such issues and complaints ” (Refugee Camp Manager).

Some of the refugees also cited discrimination at the marketplaces and in the informal work places as well. Omata (2012) noted that the high level of unemployment in Ghana made it difficult for refugees to find jobs. Secondly, some businesses and government institutions

were not recognising the professional certificates of the refugees which has been issued in their countries of origin, hence most of the refugees were forced to work in the informal sector where they faced a lot of competition and discrimination from the local folks. Agblorti (2011) found that some Ghanaians saw the refugee women selling in the local market as competitors and will not allow them to trade without paying entry fees. The Ghanaians also preferred buying things from their fellow Ghanaians than buying from the refugees trading in the local market as they had the perception that the refugees are better-off than the Ghanaians because they (the refugees) receive international support (Omata, 2012). Some of these claims are also corroborated in this study as indicated in the quotations below:

The local people do not allow us to sell at the market so I go to the seaside to help the men with their fishing by washing the fish and preparing them for sale. Because I don't understand the local language it is difficult to get good employment and all my certificates are also in Arabic. (Sudanese, female, 32 years, camp refugee)

The Ghanaians favour employing their own nationals than others and they pay less for refugee labour. I went to do some painting at the Ghanaian village named Esiamia, a couple of years ago, and I was not paid the adequate rate for the work done. I was given a very meagre amount not corresponding to the work I did. I also worked as a security man for two months and received no pay. When I asked the supervisor about my pay he told me this is Ghana and not Cote d'Ivoire. A Ghanaian was owing me GHS 480 for some construction work I did for him and he has not paid up to date. (Ivorian, male, 39 years, camp refugee).

Such levels of discrimination and cheating of refugees on the job market have a strong impact on refugee-host relations and could potentially result in conflict if not addressed appropriately. It will also not foster refugee integration into the local communities as the refugees perceive they may be treated as second class citizens if they opt for integration in Ghana.

6.4.2 Strategies Adopted to Overcome Challenges of Integration in Ghana

To find out if the refugees were making any efforts to overcome the challenges facing them regarding integration, they were asked to indicate, in multiple responses, the strategies they have adopted to overcome their integration challenges. Table 6.14 shows that close to half (41.7%) of the refugees were learning local languages as a strategy to overcome challenges of integration, 33.0% had adopted acquisition of more skills to fit into the labour market, 18.9% had adopted the Ghanaian culture, and the least proportion (4.3%) had married Ghanaians to overcome challenges with their integration in Ghana.

Table 6.14: Strategies adopted to overcome challenges of integration in Ghana

Strategies adopted to overcome challenges of integration	Frequency	Percentage
Acquisition of more skills to fit into the labour market	155	33.0
Local language learning	196	41.7
Intermarriages with Ghanaian	20	4.3
Adaptation of Ghanaian culture to support migration	89	18.9

Field data, 2019.

The qualitative findings support the quantitative results. The interviews revealed that some refugees adopted measures such as learning local languages for communication, intermarriages and learning new skills for job placement to help them integrate. A Sudanese refugee mentioned that he had to learn the local languages to enable him to communicate to the Ghanaians in the local community.

First of all, when I came to Ghana, I didn't understand any of the local languages. So, I tried hard to learn two of the local languages, that is Twi and Nzema. I interacted with the community a lot so I can understand the languages; I got some teacher friend as well who supported me and guided me with some books so I learnt the fundamentals. In a few months time I was able to communicate with Ghanaians in simple terms. I realised that the more you try to speak the more they support you and the more they get to understand that you want to be like them. Also I was very glad that I could speak Hausa before I came to Ghana and some of the Ghanaians, particularly those in the Zongo communities could speak the Hausa language, so language no more became a barrier for me. It is really helping me with getting clients for my barbering business. I am also searching for a proper job and I hope to secure one very soon. (Sudanese, male, 34 years, camp refugee)

A camp manager also mentioned that some refugees learn new skills to enable them to get employment opportunities.

A lot of them have learnt new skills. For instance, the Togolese as I told you, are very skilful in digging borehole water supply systems. When they came here the other nationalities on the camp also tried to learn that skill by under-studying them because the business was fetching so much money. If you take one group of skilled workers in the trade to sink a borehole water system in a house in Accra, they will charge you between GHS 5,000.00 and GHS 7,000.00 for the work, and this is apart from transport, accommodation and feeding you have to provide for them. They were so skilful that within a maximum of a week they would finish digging the borehole water system. GHS 7,000! That's good money" (Refugee Camp Manager).

Marrying the local people was also one of the strategies that was used by some refugees in order to overcome their integration challenges. Some of the refugees had married Ghanaians and had children with them so acquisition of property and integrating was not particularly a challenge to those in that category. A Liberian refugee however said that he married to avoid engaging in immorality, and not necessarily to get integrated.

For now I'm managing a school along with my second wife who is a Ghanaian. We've a school that is booming in the settlement with many students. She's an educator and am also one so we're managing the school very well. My first wife got resettled in America with the children and I had to manage myself but I don't believe in this fornication or adultery matters. I am Muslim and my religion does not bar me from marrying a second wife. So to avoid all these illegitimate kinds of affairs, I got a Ghanaian as a second wife, with the consent of my first wife. Besides, she's an African and she loves me and I also love her. She assisted me when I was in complete distress, she's there for me so in the end we decided to marry. So, we appreciate each other as Africans and not whether she's a Ghanaian or not. The idea is that we're both Africans and my first wife is okay with it. (Liberian, male, 54 years, urban refugee).

Thus the results of the study showed that most the refugees adopted new ways of integrating in Ghana, some of which were the acquisition of new skills and learning of local languages. Kissoon (2015) argued that refugees adopt various measures that enable them to overcome the challenges associated with their integration. Communication played a fundamental role in the refugees' integration process. The ability of refugees to communicate in different local languages facilitated their integration process as it was important for refugees to communicate

with local people at social and religious gatherings, and other meetings. Long (2001) emphasised that the ability of refugees to build their own capacity through training, education and acquisition of new skills enables them to integrate. The establishment of language learning centres at the various camps could serve as a motivation for the refugees to learn the local languages in Ghana. Their inability to learn the local languages has had a great impact on their day to day activities within the local communities and it has hampered the integration of many.

Also the refugees could be given specialised training in specific areas of endeavour to help them to fill some significant gaps in Ghana's labour market. The findings of this research also resonates with studies by Bilgili and Loschmann, (2018) who argued that refugees face challenges in integrating, hence they resort to acquiring new skills through education and training in various areas of expertise to enhance their admissibility into the job market. In this study most of the refugees were not equipped with the required skills to make more impact in the labour market or to compete with the indigenes (Ghanaians) for employment. It is therefore not surprising that some of the refugees were continuing their education and others were learning new skills to facilitate their integration.

6.5 Views on Refugees' Contributing to the Development of the Host Country

Table 6.15 shows the views of refugees on whether they should make a conscious contribution to the development of Ghana. Almost one out of every four (37.2%) of the refugees agreed that they must contribute to the development of Ghana and 15.5% also strongly agreed that refugees must contribute to the development of Ghana. A little above a quarter (29.6%) of the refugees expressed a sense of neutrality when it comes to contributing to the development of the Ghana and the least proportion (1.3%) strongly disagreed on the issue of contributing to the development of Ghana.

Table 6.15: Percentage distribution of refugees’ views on contributing towards the development of Ghana

Refugees contributions to the development of Ghana	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	73	15.5
Agree	175	37.2
Neutral	139	29.6
Disagree	77	16.4
Strongly disagree	6	1.3
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

These mixed reactions from the refugees potentially emanate from the experiences they have had with the host country and host community members. If the laws in the host country are very stringent and impose a lot of limitations on refugees they are not likely to support the development of the host country. However if the host government’s policies are favourable towards the welfare of the refugees they are more likely to contribute to the development of the host country. Thus government policies and external assistance, relations between the refugees and the host community and the attitudes of the refugees themselves are critical factors in their integration (Jacobsen, 2001).

The results from the qualitative data also revealed that most refugees agreed and supported the idea of refugees helping to develop the host country. The refugees mentioned they have a role to play in ensuring development of the host nation and this could be done through paying taxes, contributing to sports and art work, and other forms of work.

“Why not? For sure we need to contribute to the development of Ghana! Even this art I’m doing, I’m planning of going on an art exhibition in the UK within the next four years. I have started looking out for sponsorship. In the meantime however, I am planning to travel to all the Senior High Schools in Ghana to showcase my art work and encourage the study of art in schools. I have consulted the Ghana Refugee Board, the UNHCR, the Ghana Education Service and the Ministry of Education to embark on this project and we are at the early stages of the planning. From the national level, I can then venture into international tours across other African countries, then move to the European countries and finally to America! By showcasing the artwork to the

world, it will portray Ghana in a good light and attract foreign investment into the country. It will also be a platform through which African refugees can express their sentiments and plight to the world. (Ivorian, male, 29 years, urban refugee)

We're living in the country so you're supposed to contribute to its development in any way that you can. We don't need to engage in anything that's against the laws of the country. For instance, as I work as a security officer, I pay tax. I see the deductions on my payslip every month. I am just praying that the politicians will channel our taxes to the development of the nation and not into their pockets as it happens in my country, the Central African Republic! (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee).

Ghana is our country of refuge! We must support its development and peace! It is our Jerusalem! In the peace of Ghana will we also have our peace! Therefore we pray and also contribute our quota, in any small way we can, to support the peace and development of Ghana. Just as the Bible says in Psalm 122:6 *Pray for the peace of Jerusalem: May those who love you prosper.* Ghana is our Jerusalem (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee).

Thus most of the refugees expressed the need to contribute to the development of Ghana as they will also benefit from any improvement in the economy of the country.

6.5.1 Country of Origin of Refugees and Willingness to Contribute to the Development of the Host Country

Table 6.16 shows how refugees willingness to develop the host country is differed by their country of origin. The results showed 65.4% of the Liberian refugees affirmed they needed to contribute to the development of Ghana while 16.8% remained neutral on the issue. Only 17.8% of the Liberian refugees disagreed on the issue of contributing to the development of Ghana. Also about 44.8% and 42.9% of refugees from Sudan and Chad, respectively, were neutral regarding their willingness to contribute to the development of the host country. About 44.1% of the Ivorian refugees also confirmed their willingness to contribute to the development of country, 37.9% remained neutral while 18% disagreed on the issue.

Table 6.16: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by willingness to contribute to the development of the host country

Country of origin	Contribute to the host country development				Total	
	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	<i>N</i>	%
	%	%	%	%		
Liberia	30.2	35.2	16.8	17.8	202	100
Cote D'Ivoire	3.1	41.0	37.9	18.0	161	100
Togo	26.7	33.3	26.7	13.3	15	100
Sudan	4.5	34.3	44.8	16.4	67	100
DRC	14.3	14.3	42.9	28.6	7	100
CAR	0.0	33.3	33.3	33.3	3	100
Chad	0.0	57.1	42.9	0.0	7	100
Sierra Leone	0.0	50.0	25.0	25.0	8	100
Total	74	175	138	83	470	

Source: Field data, 2019

The length of stay of the Liberian refugees in Ghana may have contributed to their willingness in supporting the development of the nation, as many of them have stayed in Ghana for 20 years or more. One Liberian refugee express how Ghana has been a home for her since she arrived in the country in the early 1990s.

I have stayed in Ghana for close to 30 years. I came here with my husband and our three girls. They were quite young when they came. One of them is married to a Ghanaian and they have two children, the other one is working in a private health facility in Accra as a nurse and the last girl has just completed her polytechnic education. The two girls now have Ghanaian boyfriends and they are planning to marry. For us Ghana has become our home so we have to support its development. I can now boast of having two grandchildren who are Ghanaians! They can grow to hold high positions in Ghana in future! (Liberian, female, 58 years, urban refugee)

The quote above shows how some of the refugees see Ghana, as a home and a place for their future development. The inter-marriages between the refugees and Ghanaians has also played a key role in enhancing this sense of family.

6.6 Extent of Refugees' Attachment to the Host Country

The study also further explored the extent to which the refugees were attached to the host country, Ghana. It explored three main areas that showed how attached the refugees may be

to Ghana namely: their willingness to acquire the citizenship of Ghana, their views on current place of homeland, and their choice of durable solutions. As shown in the Kunz model(1981) some of the refugees, particularly the Events-alienated refugees, feel irreconcilably isolated from their fellow citizens and have little or no interest in what occurs in their former country and they are always eager to seek a new identity and are also believers in acculturation (Tanle, 2013). Since these category of refugees left home because of an active or latent discrimination against their groups (e.g. tribal, ethnic, social etc), they usually have a low interest or no interest in transnational engagements with their country of origin and hence may have a strong attraction to resettlement in a third country or integration in the host country.

6.6.1 Desire to Acquire Ghanaian citizenship

Table 6.17 shows that about 68.3% of the refugees indicated that they do not want to obtain Ghanaian citizenship while 31.7% responded to the contrary.

Table 6.17: Percentage distribution of refugees by desire to acquire Ghanaian citizenship

Acquiring Ghanaian citizenship	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	149	31.7
No	321	68.3
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

This brought to the fore the need for the Ghana Refugee Board to assist refugees who want to integrate and also offer the needed support to those who wanted to voluntarily return to their country of origin or resettle in a third country. This results however contradicts the findings of a study by Kibreab (2003) who argued that refugees are mostly integrated into the host country. Challenges such as language barrier, lack of employment opportunities and discrimination, among others, may be reason why most of the refugees do not desire to have Ghanaian citizenship or integrate in Ghana.

6.6.1.1 Country of Origin of Refugees and Desire to Acquire Ghanaian Citizenship

The results in Table 6.18 shows the country of origin of the refugees and the differences in opinions with regard to their desire to acquire Ghanaian citizenship. About seven out of ten (71.4%) of the refugees from Chad wanted Ghanaian citizenship and slightly more than half (53.3%) of the Togolese refugees wanted to acquire Ghanaian citizenship. About half (50%) of the refugees from Sierra Leone wanted to be Ghanaian citizens while 31.3% of refugees from Sudan also wanted to acquire Ghana citizenship.

Table 6.18: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by desire to acquire Ghanaian citizenship

Country of origin	Acquiring Ghanaian citizenship		Total	
	No(%)	Yes(%)	N	%
Liberia	51.5	48.5	202	100
Cote D'Ivoire	91.9	8.1	161	100
Togo	46.7	53.3	15	100
Sudan	68.7	31.3	67	100
DRC	100.0	0.0	7	100
CAR	100.0	0.0	3	100
Chad	28.6	71.4	7	100
Sierra Leone	50.0	50.0	8	100
Total	321	149	470	

Source: Field data, 2019

Evidence has shown that most refugees integrate or acquire citizenship at their destination (Kibreab, 2003; Hovil and Lomo, 2015). The sharing of common cultural traits between the Togolese and the Ghanaians on the eastern side of Ghana may have accounted for why most of the Togolese refugees wanted to acquire Ghanaian citizenship.

6.6.2 Refugees' Views on Current Place of Homeland

The study also explored the views of refugees on where they considered as their homeland. As shown in Table 6.19, about six out of ten (61.1%) of the refugees considered their country of origin as home, while nearly a quarter of them (24%) considered Ghana as home. A small percentage of the respondents (10.4%) however considered a third country as home. Some of the refugees chose Ghana as their home because of the safety and security of the nation.

Table 6.19: Percentage distribution of refugees by views on current place of homeland

Where refugees consider home	Frequency	Percentage
Ghana	113	24.0
Country of origin	287	61.1
A third country	49	10.4
Other	21	4.5
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

Thus, regardless of being forced from their country of origin as a result of war and other violent conflicts and having suffered the brunt of such conflicts, a significant percentage of the refugees indicated that their country of origin is their home. This supports the fact that regardless of the risks at the origin, for most of the refugees the origin represented the originality of their home due to socio-cultural, historical, economic and political ties they have with the homeland. These are some of the definitions the refugees gave to the place they call home when they were interviewed.

“For me, home is where my family is and actually my family is in Ghana so Ghana is my home. My family is my children and husband. At first, my home was my parents’ house and they passed on so now, my home is where my children and husband are, that’s all”. (Ivorian, female, 36 years, urban refugee)

“My home is my country of origin. Unfortunately, it is bedevilled with conflict, political and tribal persecutions and bitter relationships regarding control over resources. Sudan remains my home, that is the earth that gave birth to me, that is where my inheritance is, that is where my historical antecedents are. Regardless of everything, there is no place like home and I pray there is peace someday so that I will reunite with my family” (Sudanese, Female, 30 years, camp refugee)

“For me, home is any place that you can find peace of mind, safety and be free to move and trade and to get your livelihood. Ghana is my home and the home of my children. When there is total peace in Cote d’Ivoire and I feel it’s safe to go back, I can just go and visit and come back to Ghana. My husband and I have already acquired a piece of land here we have started our building project. We now have a single room on it. Our three children are here with us, two were born here and am expecting the fourth at the moment. I will say the children are in fact Ghanaians, so for us Ghana is our home” (Ivorian, female, 35 years, urban refugee)

The qualitative results showed that some refugees considered Ghana as their choice of home. They mentioned that Ghana is a peaceful country and it has a better democratic system of governance. Others also mentioned that they have been in Ghana for a long time and therefore Ghana is their home. These are probably refugees who were in the process of integrating into the Ghanaian culture or have integrated. They probably wanted to be in Ghana without travelling back to the country of origin. In addition, their experiences in their country of origin may have also influenced their desire to stay in Ghana as some of them felt traumatised and targeted.

“Yea, because Ghana gives me everything and it’s peaceful, there’s a democracy, it’s a great nation and respected internationally. So, I’m happy to belong to Ghana as long as I’m here” (Congolese, male, 25 years, urban refugee).

“Hmmm. It depends on my country. Today I am alive because Ghana opened her doors to accommodate me. If in 2011, Ghana had said, “don’t come here?” then Cote d’Ivoire would have been my first home. Ghana is home because I have been here for nine years! If I had been in Cote d’Ivoire, I wouldn’t know what would have happened to me by now. My brother, war is never a solution! I have my peace, security and personal safety here in Ghana” (Ivorian, female, 32 years, camp refugee).

“There are refugees who are genuinely traumatised and have no hope! And what they perceive here is like heaven as compared to their country of origin. There are refugees here who were the only survivors of their families, when the atrocities began, so for them, Ghana is home” (Refugee Camp Manager).

The quantitative results of the study showed that most refugees considered their country of origin as their home. However, the results of the qualitative showed a different picture. Most of the refugees considered Ghana as their choice of home. The findings of the study are similar to a study by Boer, (2015) who argued that Congolese refugees consider Congo as a place of home. In this study, probably, the nostalgic longing for the country of origin regardless of the circumstances under which the refugees were moved out, remained the main reason for considering the origin as home, while the idea or dream of living in a developed world (though not yet achieved but seen through films and testimonies from other refugees

who have settled in these advance countries), accounted for their choice of the third country as home. Another reason could be that some of them have been able to integrate in Ghana and therefore felt comfortable in staying in Ghana. On the other hand the challenges they faced in being able to integrate in Ghana may be the reason why most refugees were also looking to a third country as their home. Also some of these refugees may have ties with people in third countries which probably could influence their motivation to choose third countries as their destination.

6.6.2.1 Country of Origin of Refugees and the Place they Consider as Homeland

Table 6.20 shows the country of origin of refugees in relation to where they considered as their homeland. The results showed that the highest proportion (66.7%) of refugees from Togo considered Ghana as their home, this was followed by 50.0% from Sierra Leone and about one third (35.8%) of refugees from Sudan considered Ghana as their home. In addition, about 85.7% of refugees from Chad indicated their country of origin as where they considered as home and about 80.1% of refugees from Cote d'Ivoire considered their country of origin as home, as well. Also, all refugees from the Central African Republic indicated a third country as a place they considered as home.

Table 6.20: Percentage distribution of country of origin of refugees by where they consider as home

Country of origin	Where refugees consider as home				Total	
	Ghana	Country of origin	A third country	Other	N	%
	%	%	%	%		
Liberia	30.2	54.0	8.4	7.4	202	100
Cote D'Ivoire	8.7	80.1	10.6	0.6	161	100
Togo	66.7	33.3	0.0	0.0	15	100
Sudan	35.8	44.8	16.4	3.0	67	100
DRC	0.0	71.4	0.0	28.6	7	100
CAR	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	3	100
Chad	0.0	85.7	14.3	0.0	7	100
Sierra Leone	50.0	37.5	0.0	12.5	8	100
Total	113	287	49	21	470	

Source: Field data, 2019

6.6.3 Refugees' Choice of Durable Solution

For most refugees in host countries in Africa, the option of settlement in a third country, especially in the West remained one of the best for them (Agblorti, 2011). As shown in Table 6.22, close to three quarters (71.7%) of the refugees wanted to resettle in the third country and 15.1% wanted to return to their country of origin. The least proportion (13.2%) wanted to permanently stay in Ghana.

Table 6.21: Percentage Distribution of refugees' choice of durable solutions options

Plans of durable solutions	Frequency	Percentage
Stay in Ghana permanently	62	13.2
Return to country of origin	71	15.1
Resettle in a third country	337	71.7
Total	470	100.0

Source: Field data, 2019

The option of a third country settlement is however difficult to acquire given the stringent immigration laws are being promulgated by most of the Western nations and the drive to encourage containment of refugees in countries close to their country of origin or within the region of their country of origin. The findings of this study are similar to a study by Sharmani (2004) who found that Somali refugees in Cairo wanted to resettle in a third country especially in the Western World. Most of the refugees were of the view that a resettlement in the third country will help to better their standard of living compared to integration in the host country or a return to their country of origin.

The qualitative results also corroborated with the quantitative results and showed that most of the refugees wanted to resettle in a third country. They stated that resettling in third countries like Canada and Australia will provide them better opportunities than being in Ghana. Zetter (2010) argued that resettlement of refugees in the third country will help them in their self-reliance, stability and reduce their continuous dependency on international aid

for their survival. Their choice of third country resettlement will offer them promising opportunities (Al-Sharmani, 2004). Refugees preference to third country may have consequences on the host country as their focus on a third country may make them a bit reluctant in contributing their quota towards the development of host country.

“I prefer the third country like Canada as home, because over there I am sure I can get into the banking or financial sector, which was the job I was doing before the conflict erupted in my country and I had to run to Ghana. I have done some research on refugees in the Canada and I have seen there are a variety of opportunities over there. I am sure I can make more money in Canada with my MBA qualification than being in Ghana and working as a security personnel. As I said I am searching for a financial sector job here as well and I hope I’ll get one soon” (Central African, male, 38 years, urban refugee).

Abglorti (2011) found that most Liberian refugees were reluctant to return to their country of origin because they had businesses in Ghana which they were unwilling to let go of; the lack of capital to start life in Liberia was also a big challenge, and most importantly the dream of a possibility of resettling in the United States of America was a key focus. This information was corroborated by the quote below from a Liberian urban refugee:

I always dreamed about going to the United States, but one day I saw a Kangaroo in a movie from Australia and since then I have developed an interest in Australia as well. I’ve been thinking of going to Australia ever since. The ultimate goal, however, is the USA. I learnt from some friends and family in the USA that if you’re a refugee and you get in there, after a while the government will take care of you, provide you with a national identity and social insurance card with which you can access social services such as health, education and general welfare. I have a small business here too, some farming business, so sometimes am in a dilemma between keeping my business here or leaving it behind and going to resettle in a third country. I can leave my business and go to the US as there are better opportunities over there, but I cannot leave my business and go back to Liberia! The Liberian economy is still in shambles and undergoing repair. The USA, here I come. (Liberian, male, 32 years, camp refugee).

Some of the refugees also gave political reasons for their choice of a third country emphasizing the role of France and the European Union in the war and conflict in Cote d’Ivoire.

I will like to resettle in Germany, yes but I don't know how to speak German, so English speaking countries and French-speaking countries preferable though; but of course not Belgium or France. These are cruel nations whose meddling in the affairs of their former colonies in Africa has brought great sorrow and hardships to the citizens of those countries in Africa. Look at what is happening in Congo DR and Cote d'Ivoire. In 2004, when the President of France decided to meddle in our affairs, he pushed the UN to put an embargo on Cote d'Ivoire. Those who had the chance to go to France said France put pressure on European Union that if Ivorians had passports with Schengen visas in them, they should not be allowed into the EU. These two countries, France and Belgium, are wicked colonialists (Ivorian, male, 45 years, camp refugee).

The statement above shows how politically poised some of the Ivorian refugees in the Ampain refugee camp are. They are of the view that France played an adverse role in the ousting of President Gbagbo hence their open hate for France. A community leader further confirmed this assertion.

My brother, we have been going to the Ampain Refugee Camp to provide healthcare to the refugees. If you interact with them, you realise that some of them are radicalised in their outlook towards Western nations like France and Portugal. They will tell you Portugal did not treat Mozambique well; and that it is the same manner that France is treating Cote d'Ivoire. Hence their dislike for France and Portugal. They hope to return when Gbagbo comes to power, they will say (Local Opinion Leader/Community Member, female, 42 years, Ampain village).

Some of the refugees also mentioned that they preferred staying in Ghana but on the condition that they secure employment and better schools for their children.

“I will like to stay in Ghana but getting employment in Ghana is difficult. If I get employment and get a better school for my children I will definitely stay in Ghana. Yes, because Ghana is a peaceful country, there is no war and conflict so I like this place and I will like to stay here. The only issue is that I am unemployed and my children speak French. The school fees for the French schools in Ghana are also very expensive so it is making things difficult for us” (Cameroonian, female, 37 years, urban refugee).

Both the quantitative and qualitative findings showed that refugees prefer third country resettlement than staying in the host country. Evidence has shown that most refugees in developing countries prefer resettlement in a third country in the Western World which

probably could help them improve their social and economic status as there are more employment opportunities there (Zetter, 2010; Betts et al., 2014). On the other hand, it could also be that most refugees do not know the necessary steps to take to ensure their integration. The prospects for refugees to integrate are sometimes not available. Betts (2009) argued that sometimes the refugees are left unattended when it comes to their integration in host countries. Also resettling of refugees in third countries have been noted to offer security, peace and self-reliance to the refugees (Zetter, 2010).



CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

Forced migration resulting from adverse factors continue to impact population distribution across the globe (Liwanga 2010; Kandoh, 2012). Africa has experienced lots of armed conflicts, natural disasters and political persecutions resulting in increased internal displacement and protracted refugee situations in many countries (Boateng, 2010; Kandoh, 2012). Ghana hosts approximately 13,334 refugees mostly from the African continent (UNHCR, 2019).

Refugee situations in general present significant challenges to refugees and refugee-hosting nations, especially those in developing countries (Kandoh, 2012, Adamson, 2006). As the number of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers have grown worldwide, intense debate has emerged about how long and how well they integrate into host countries. Studies on the integration of refugees and their transnational relations with countries of origin are not novel. Globally, studies have paid attention to these issues. For instance, Muller (2008) has explored transnational ties of Afghan refugees in the Netherlands. Lim (2009) studied Sudanese refugees settling in the USA, Mascini et al (2012) also focused on transnational practices of Burundian refugees in the Netherlands and Al-Ali et al (2001) on Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in the Netherlands.

Most of these researchers did not study integration and transnational activities of refugees together but as separate entities. They also focused on refugee transnational practices with the country of origin only. This study is innovative as it links transnational practices of

refugees with both origin and third countries and how they influence their integration in the host country.

To understand these nuances and fill the gap, this study explored the transnational activities of the refugees and how these activities influence their integration in Ghana. Specifically, the study described the socio-demographic characteristics and migration trajectory of refugees; their transnational activities; their channels of communications; the reasons why they maintained transnational ties with their country of origin and other third countries; and it explored the extent to which their transnational activities influenced their integration in Ghana. A mixed research method approach, using both quantitative and qualitative methods were adopted to achieve the objectives of this study. The quantitative data were analysed using SPSS version 20 and the qualitative data were analysed using thematic analysis. The summary of the findings, implications for the theory and recommendations are discussed in this chapter.

7.2 Summary of Key Findings

The quantitative survey was conducted on 470 refugees while another 30 refugees were interviewed for the qualitative aspects of the research. For the quantitative survey, slightly more than half (51.7%) of the respondents were females, and the highest proportion of the refugees was 30-39 years. In terms of educational status, slightly more than half (51.7%) of the refugees had secondary/vocational education. Regarding the occupation of refugees in their country of origin, the highest percentage (37.2%) of the refugees were students, followed by those who were unemployed (15.3%), trading (13.2%) and formal employment (11.7%). The percentage who were unemployed in Ghana was almost twice (26.8 %) of the percentage that was unemployed in their country of origin (15.3 %). Also, the majority (83.2%) of the refugees were Christians while 16.8% were Muslims. With regard to the country of origin or

nationality, the highest percentage of the refugees were from Liberia (43.0%), followed by Cote d'Ivoire (34.3%) and Sudan (14.3%). Slightly more than half (57.7%) of the refugees had never married, a little below a quarter (32.8%) of the population were married while 9.6% were previously married.

Concerning the migratory trajectory of the refugees, the results showed that the majority (78.9%) of the refugees travelled to Ghana by land via vehicular transport while the others travelled by sea, by trekking on foot and other means. A small percentage (0.9%) of the refugees came by flight. The majority (86%) of them came directly from their country of origin to Ghana while a few (14%) of them did stay in other countries for a short while (i.e. stepwise migration) before finally arriving in Ghana.

On place of residence, almost one out of every six (58.5%) of the refugees were camp settlers while 41.5% were urban settlers. The qualitative results showed that there is a difference in the condition of camp refugees and urban refugees. Camp refugees were limited in terms of the availability of job opportunities as the camps are situated in rural communities. They were however not limited in their freedom of movement and could travel in and out of their camps as well as interact with the host community. The urban refugees were open to a myriad of job opportunities in the cities, however cost of living (especially accommodation) was higher compared to those in the camps who had free accommodation. In terms of length of stay in Ghana, the highest proportion of the refugees had stayed in Ghana for 5-9 years. Almost one in every eight (78%) of the refugees left their country of origin due to political/governance conflict, followed economic and personal reasons (17%), targeted persecution (3%) and tribal/ethnic/religious conflicts (2%). The qualitative findings also support that most of the migrants left because of political/governance conflict. The guarantee of personal safety, peace

and security, as well as proximity to country of origin, were some of the reasons why the refugees made Ghana their place of sojourn.

The second specific objective examined the transnational activities of refugees in Ghana and their channels of communications. The study showed that the refugees were socially, culturally, economically and politically engaged with both the country of origin and third countries. The findings indicated less than half of the refugees were socially engaged with their country of origin and also 50% were socially engaged with third countries. In addition, most of the refugees contacted their family members and friends monthly to seek information on their welfare and to get updates on developments in the country of origin.

The majority (67%) of Liberians engage in social activities with the country of origin compared to refugees from other countries. In addition, place of residence, education of refugees, length of stay and occupation of refugees predicted social engagement in the host country. Also, place of residence, sex, number of children ever born and occupation of refugees in Ghana predicted social engagement in third countries. The results also showed that a higher percentage (71%) of the refugees from Chad were socially engaged with third countries followed by Togo (66.7%) and DRC (57.1%). Furthermore, most of the refugees engaged in cultural activities such as the use of the local language of their country of origin to communicate, and eating of their local dishes while in Ghana. The binary logistic regression results showed that the age of respondents and length of stay in Ghana predicted cultural engagement in the host country while age of respondents, religion and length of stay predicted cultural engagement in third countries. A sizeable number of the refugees (68%) also indicated their attraction to the cultures and values of third countries. All the nationals of the Central African Republic indicated they were attracted to the cultures and values of other third countries, followed by the Ivorians (90.1%), Liberians (61.9%) and Chadians (57.1%).

The enjoyment of cultural freedoms and democratic ideals were the core reasons for their cultural attraction to third countries.

A few (11.3%) of the refugees had economic investments in their country of origin and this was supported by the findings of the qualitative study as the refugees indicated that they do not have money to invest or remit family and friends in the country of origin. A small number of refugees indicated they send money (4.9%) and goods (6.8%) to the country of origin while 9.1% of the refugees indicated they receive financial remittances and goods (4.9%) from family and friends in the country of origin. The highest proportion of nationals who receive remittances from relatives and friends in the country of origin were the Liberians (14%). The results of the regression analysis showed that place of residence, length of stay in Ghana and occupation in Ghana predicted economic engagement in the country of origin. The study also showed that only 24.5% and 4.0% of the refugees received remittances in the form of money and goods respectively from third countries. The refugees used such funds to cater for their living cost and some also invested them in small business ventures, as revealed in the qualitative study.

Most of the refugees also expressed strong nationalistic sentiments with regard to their reverence of their national colours (65.5%), and the national anthem (85.7%); and also willingness to contribute to the development of their country of origin (56.6%). On political engagements, however, a little over half of the refugees (53.2%) indicated that they do not engage in politics because of its potential to engender conflict and create dissensions among citizens, political parties and ethnic groups in Africa. Some also pointed out that their present predicament (of being refugees) is a direct result of their participation in politics when they were in their countries of origin hence their lack of interest in following political developments there. However, about 46.8% of the refugees were of the view that politics and

governance cannot be decoupled from nation-building hence they continue to keenly follow political developments in their countries of origin and seek opportunities for future participation, particularly when stability returns to their countries of origin. A quarter of the refugees (25.7%) also indicated they follow political development in third countries.

On key channels of communication, the refugees relied mostly on social media (Facebook and WhatsApp chats/audio/video calls) as well as telephone calls to facilitate their transnational interactions with their country of origin and third countries. Considerations on cost savings informed their heavy reliance on the social media channels than actual telephone calls in such engagements. Furthermore, the highest percentage (73.6%) of the refugees owned mobile smart/android phones, followed by basic phones (17.9%) and other electronic devices such as tablets, laptops and desktop computers (0.8%). About 7.7% of the refugees who had none of these devices relied on internet cafes and communication centres in channelling their transnational engagements.

Family connections, innate cultural attachments, remittances and patriotism/nationalism fueled the refugees' engagements with their country of origin while the aspirations for third country resettlement, enjoyment of fundamental human rights and freedoms, economic and socio-cultural rights; the lobbying of foreign governments, diaspora groups and international organizations to effect political and socio-economic changes in country of origin; the welfare of the family; and the crave for remittances to support their livelihoods in the host country, fueled their engagements with the third country.

The last specific objective of the study sought to explore the extent to which transnational activities influence the integration of refugees in the host country. The results of the study showed that most (62.3%) of the refugees are not socially integrated in Ghana. They indicated

that they do not have friends to help them integrate socially and the language barrier is a hindrance to their socio-economic integration. However a few (37.3%) of the refugees noted that they are socially integrated - they have Ghanaian friends whom they can rely on in times of need, they attend social events and can interact freely with the host community members. On cultural integration and appreciation of Ghanaian local values only a small percentage (10%) of the refugees agreed they were integrated culturally. Three-quarters of the refugees (75.6%) indicated they were not culturally integrated while 14.5% indicated neutrality to the cultural ideals of Ghana. A huge majority (99.4%) of the refugees indicated they were not economically integrated in terms of investments, access to jobs, entrepreneurial skills training, assistance from the Government of Ghana, development partners, the UNHCR and international charities and NGOs. The qualitative data however indicated that some of the refugees were economically engaged, having ownership of investments in Ghana in the form of small scale enterprises/businesses and landed property through which they earn a living. A little over 90% of the refugees also indicated they are not politically integrated in Ghana.

Regarding the influences of their transnational engagements on their integration, it was found that there was no association between their social, cultural and economic engagements with the country of origin on one hand and their social, cultural and economic integration in Ghana (P values = 0.105; 0.058; and 0.226 respectively).

The data also revealed that there was an association between refugees' social engagements with third countries and their social integration in Ghana (P value=0.000). More than half (54%) of the refugees with social engagements in third countries were not socially integrated in Ghana while a little below half (45.0%) of the refugees with social engagements in third countries were socially integrated in Ghana. More than half (54.7%) of the refugees who do not have cultural engagements with third countries also disagreed that they were culturally

integrated in Ghana while 66.3% of the refugees who had cultural engagements with third countries disagreed they were culturally integrated in Ghana. There was however no association between the refugees' economic and political engagements with third countries and their economic and political integration in Ghana (P-value =0.889 and 0.021 respectively).

The refugees noted that language barrier, lack of employment opportunities, marked cultural differences, unfavourable working conditions, some forms of discrimination in employment, lack of receptivity from host communities, lack of a proper integration policy by the Government of Ghana and the refugees' durable solution preferences are some of the challenges hindering their socio-cultural, economic and political integration in Ghana. Strategies such as local language learning, academic and vocational training to match the labour market, intermarriages with Ghanaians, and gradual adaptation to the Ghanaian culture and way of life – were being employed by the refugees to mitigate their integration challenges.

Most of the refugees (61%) however, indicated their countries of origin remain their home while others (24%) stated they consider Ghana as their home since they have the needed peace and security compared to what currently pertains in their country of origin. On durable solution choices, however, majority of the refugees (71.7%) expressed the desire to be resettled in a third country in the West so that they can enjoy great opportunities and other socio-cultural, economic and political freedoms that pertained in these advanced democracies.

7.3 Conclusions

This study revealed that political and governance conflicts accounted for the forced migration of the majority of the refugees in Africa. Safety, peace and security was the major factor in

their choice of Ghana as a place of refuge. Most of these refugees' mode of transportation to Ghana was by land. Majority of them came directly from their country of origin to Ghana while others were involved in various forms of stepwise migration before they arrived in Ghana. Also, most of the refugees engaged in social, economic, cultural and political transnational activities with their country of origin and third countries.

Telephone calls and modern social media channels such as WhatsApp and Facebook were the dominant channels of refugees' transnational engagements with their origin and third countries. The refugees faced challenges in integration in Ghana. The refugees who were not economically, politically, socially and culturally integrated in Ghana indicated language barrier, inadequate economic opportunities, lack of proper integration policy and discrimination were among the factors responsible for their inability to integrate. In essence, these factors were more responsible for their inability to integrate in Ghana than the influences they had from their engagements with their countries of origin and third countries. Regardless of the conflict raging in their countries of origin and the adverse circumstances they went through before getting out of their country, most of the refugees indicated that their country of origin remained their home though they are interested in being resettled in a third country in the West.

The study contributes to the body of refugee literature by unearthing the transnational activities of refugees in Ghana, their integration challenges and adaptation/coping mechanisms. The study also revealed that regardless of their challenges the refugees were resourceful and try to engage in economic ventures to support their livelihoods. Thus, the key aspects of the refugees' economic agency were highlighted in the study, thereby debunking the dominant narratives in the literature that portray refugees as pests, beggars, poverty-stricken and a burden on the economies and social systems of their host countries.

Secondly contrary to findings of previous studies that link refugees transnational engagements mostly to their country of origin, this study reveals a trichotomous approach to refugee transnationalism, i.e. transnational engagements with the country of origin, engagements with third countries and engagements with kinship and social networks within the host country.

The findings generally underscore the theoretical underpinnings of the study in several ways. In terms of the flight and settlement pattern, the refugees conform to kinetic model of Kunz (1973) of anticipatory refugee and the acute refugee movements. War and violent conflicts fueled by political dissensions and tribal/ethnic insurrections required the refugees to flee their homelands at a moment's notice and with their journeys unplanned, they just moved out for the sake of protecting their lives. This forced movement of the refugees also resonates with the push factors in Lee's Push-Pull model (Lee, 1966). Some of them came in groups while others came as individuals travelling long distances through dangerous places during day and night time, appearing at the frontiers of Ghana with their families and a few personal belongings that they could take along with them in their journey. This was the situation particularly with most of the Liberian, Ivorians, Sierra Leoneans and Togolese refugees in Ghana. Most of this category could be found in the Ampain and Krisan refugee camps, and the Buduburam refugee settlement. A small number of the refugees however came through the Anticipatory refugee movement – particularly the Ivorians who are well settled in some parts of the city of Accra.

With regard to Kunz theory that categorizes the social relationships and attitudes of the refugees towards their displacement and their country of origin into three phases, a significant majority of the refugees in this study falls into the category of majority-identified refugees and events-alienated refugees. Only a small number fall into the category of self-alienated

refugees. Generally, the refugees engaged with both their respective countries of origin and other third countries. However, on a balance, they engage more socially, culturally, economically and politically with their country of origin than they did with the third countries. The sentiment of patriotism and nostalgia for the home countries resonated through the majority of responses of the refugees with some of them expressing the willingness to contribute to the development of their home country. This confirmed Kunz's theory that many of them being majority-identified refugees had a strong affection for their country of origin but were just not interested in the government of the day. The minority who decided not to contribute to their country of origin may fall into the category of the events-alienated refugees. They might have left their country because of active or latent discrimination against their groups (eg. political, tribal, ethnic, social etc) and felt irreconcilably isolated from their fellow citizens therefore had little or no interest in what occurred in their country of origin. Majority of the refugees opted for third country resettlement. This does not necessarily relate to the Kunz kinetic model and categorization as other factors such as enjoyment of socio-cultural, economic challenges, and the urge to seek better opportunities and greener pastures rather pulled them to make that selection (Lee, 1966). Moreover, the literature also confirms that most refugees in developing countries almost always opt for resettlement to third countries in the West instead of local integration or return to the country of origin.

7.4 Recommendations

From the policy perspective, the selection of a third country by most of the refugees as the durable solution option and the limitations placed on resettlement of refugees shows that the policy of containment by Western nations may not necessarily work in Africa. Hence it is recommended that refugee-hosting nations should engage in discussions and partnerships with third countries, particularly in the West, on ways to enhance access to resettlement packages in Western countries as a durable solution option for refugees on the African

continent. The refugees can also be counselled to seek third country options in Africa where they may be granted re-settlement status without much difficulty. Regardless of their challenges, countries such as Uganda, South Africa and Rwanda are among the countries on the continent that can be considered for the resettlement of refugees because of the progressive policies they have towards refugees and migrants.

Uganda, South African and Rwanda are recommended because of their receptive and friendly policies towards refugees. Uganda, one of the top refugee-hosting nations in Africa is noted to have an open-door policy towards migrants and refugees. Refugees live in urban areas and are not confined to camps. Apart from having access to social services including healthcare and free education, refugees also have the freedom of movement and the right to work, as enshrined in the country's Refugee Act 2006 and Refugee Regulations of 2010. The country has also received a lot of commendations from the international community for promoting the self-reliance of refugees through its housing and agricultural initiatives. The UNHCR has commended Uganda's management of refugees as a model of development-based assistance as one of the best examples for other countries to follow. South Africa, considered as the largest industrial power on the continent, hosting millions of migrants from Africa and other parts of the world, also has progressive policies and laws towards refugees and asylum seekers. The country's 1998 Refugee Act as well as the Bill of Rights upholds progressive ideals such as well-being of everyone in the country, equality before the law, non-discrimination and respect for human. The country does not have a camp policy so refugees live amongst the host communities with no restrictions to their movement. Refugees also receive social assistance and free medical care. Rwanda also promotes and implements freedom of movement, the right to work and financial inclusion for both refugees and migrants.

The results of the study show that most of the refugees were not working and lacked employment opportunities. The Government of Ghana, working in collaboration with international development partners and organizations such as the UNHCR, the Ghana Refugee Board, migration-focused NGOs, and Corporate Ghana, through consultation must develop and implement policies to enhance the training of refugees in vocational skills and entrepreneurial ventureship; and support job-matching schemes for such refugees at the workplaces to open their access to economic opportunities and thereby enhance the livelihoods of both the camp and urban refugees.

The findings of the study show that most of the refugees were faced with language problem and that limits their integration process. This is because some of the refugees were from Francophone countries hence it was very difficult for them to express themselves in English, the official language of Ghana, and other Ghanaian local languages. The UNHCR in collaboration with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture should contract the ministries to roll out courses through the Bureau of Ghana Languages and the Centre for National Culture to support refugees integration by enhancing their proficiency in the local languages as well as the English language which is the official language of Ghana. Proficiency in the languages in the country, as well as a significant appreciation of the cultural values of Ghana, can accelerate their integration and support their access to the job market, education and another social service. The research found that the language barrier was one of the key barrier to the refugees' integration and access to the job opportunities in the country as most of them are from Francophone countries. The promulgation and implementation of inclusionary policies that factor in ethnic minorities and diversities in a nation's population is one of the ways through which host governments can limit the incidents of instability within their countries.

By facilitating vocational training, job-matching schemes, language training, and resettlement packages for refugees, as a refugee-hosting country, Ghana will reinforce her commitment to both regional and international obligations/compacts relating to the protection of vulnerable populations in general and refugees in particular. Ghana will further enhance her reputation on the international stage as a humanitarian and hospitable country. She can then leverage on her humanitarianism and progressive management of refugees to acquire good deals for her citizenry during bilateral and multi-lateral negotiations on similar or other issues. Supporting the wellbeing and protection of refugees in addition to Ghana's reputation as a key contributor to international peace-keeping efforts also highlights her Foreign policy principle and commitments to the maintenance of regional/global peace and security, reinforcing her position as a member of the UN Security Council and other international bodies such as the ECOWAS, AU, and the Commonwealth. Through Ghana's support, the refugees can also become important players in the country's economic development. Being part of the diaspora of their respective countries of origin, the refugees can also help to unlock trade barriers and political hindrances to the benefit of both Ghana and their countries of origin, when Ghana seeks their welfare.

With regard to future research, future studies may focus on the gendered aspects of transnational relations and the integration of refugees in Ghana. Some issues of gender and patriarchal domination surfaced in the aspect of cultural transnationalism and engagement with both the country of origin and third countries. Research into gendered dynamics of the social, cultural, economic and political transnational engagements of refugees and how they affect their integration in Ghana including challenges to integration and coping/adaptation strategies is recommended.

The study also revealed that about 44% of the refugees had stayed in the country for 5-9 years while 47% had stayed for 10-30 years. Also, 71% of the refugees had children. Transmission of cultural and traditional values of the country of origin to the second generation of the refugees (children of refugees born in Ghana) seems to be a major challenge for the refugees as some were in favour of keeping their cultures sacrosanct while others thought mixing the cultures will make the children more internationally acceptable and increase their marketability in the labour market across the globe. Hence research on the integration of second-generation refugees and their transnational activities with the country of origin and third countries will probably bring out findings that can provide relevant inputs for policy adoption on second generation refugee integration in Ghana.



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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
CENTRE FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

SURVEY ON TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES IN GHANA

INTRODUCTION AND CONSENT

Hello, I am a PhD student at the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana, Legon – Accra. I am conducting a study on ‘The transnational activities and integration of refugees in Ghana’. The information will be used to improve our understanding of the transnational activities in which refugees engage and how they influence the refugees’ integration in Ghana. I would be grateful if you could answer the questions below. Your participation in this study is essential but voluntary and you can withdraw at any point. Any information provided for this study would be treated with the utmost confidentiality and used only for academic purposes. Thank you.

INTERVIEW INFORMATION

Questionnaire number Date of interview.....

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

Write down or tick [✓] your response in the appropriate spaces provided for the following questions.

SECTION 1: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

1. Country of origin and nationality
2. Sex 1. Male [] 2. Female []
3. Age (on last birthday)
4. Highest level of education
 1. No formal education []
 2. Basic education []
 3. JSS/JHS/Middle Sch. []
 4. SSS/SHS []
 5. Vocational/Tech/Commercial []
 6. Post-secondary diploma (HND etc.) []
 7. Bachelor degree/Baccalaureate []
 8. Postgraduate (Cert. diploma, MA/MPhil, PhD etc.) []
 9. Other (specify):
5. Religion

1. No religion []
 2. Catholic []
 3. Protestant (Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist etc.) []
 4. Other Christian []
 5. Islam []
 6. Traditionalist []
 7. Other (specify):
6. Marital status
1. Never married []
 2. Cohabiting/Informal/Consensual []
 3. Married []
 4. Divorced []
 5. Separated []
 6. Widowed []
7. Do you have children?
1. Yes [] (go to question 8)
 2. No [] (go to question 10)
8. If you answered yes, how many children do you have in total?
.....
9. How many of your children are :
1. Living with you in your current location
 2. Living elsewhere in Ghana
 4. Living in the origin country.....
 3. Living outside Ghana (please specify countries)?
.....
.....
10. What was your occupation in your country of origin before being displaced?
.....
.....
11. What is your current occupation in Ghana?
.....
12. Do you engage in any other income-generating activities apart from your current occupation?
1. Yes [] (go to question 13)
 2. No [] (go to question 14)
13. If you answered yes, please specify those income-generating activities you are engaged in
.....
.....
14. On average how much money do you earn monthly from your work and the other income-generating activities?
1. Work
 2. Other income-generating activities

SECTION 2: FORCED MIGRATION TRAJECTORY

15. For how long have you been in Ghana? (Specify year of arrival)

.....

16. What was your reason(s) for leaving your country of origin?

- 1. Tribal/ethnic/religious conflict []
- 2. Political/governance conflict []
- 3. Target persecution []
- 4. Other (specify)

17. By which means of travel did you get to Ghana?

- 1. By sea []
- 2. By air []
- 3. By land (road) – vehicular travel []
- 4. By land - trekking on foot []
- 5. Other (specify)

18. Apart from your country of origin, did you live in any other country before coming to Ghana?

- 1. Yes [] (go to question 19)
- 2. No [] (go to question 20)

19. If you answered yes, kindly complete the table below:

	Name of the country	Length of stay	Reason(s) for leaving
1.			
2.			
3.			

20. What are your main reason(s) for coming to stay in Ghana? The answer provided below is *multiple choice* so tick [] your response in the appropriate spaces provided.

- 1. To seek protection, safety and security []
- 2. To live with relatives and friends in Ghana []
- 3. To use as a transit point to seek third country settlement []
- 4. To search for better income/more suitable job opportunities []
- 5. Ghana has a stable democracy and the country is relatively peaceful []
- 6. Because of its proximity to my country of origin []
- 7. That was the only alternative I had at the time I left my country []
- 8. Other (specify)

SECTION 3: TRANSNATIONAL PRACTICES / ENGAGEMENTS RELATED TO THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

3.1. Social practices/engagements with the country of origin

21. Do you engage/keep in touch with contacts in your country of origin?

Other					
-------	--	--	--	--	--

33. On average how much money do you send to your contacts in your country of origin per year?

Ties	Amount
Family	
Friends	
Other	

34. Which channels do you use in sending money to your contacts in your country of origin?

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| 1. MoneyGram [] | 4. Momo transfer [] |
| 2. Western Union [] | 5. Through friends visiting the country of origin [] |
| 3. Bank transfers [] | |
| 6. Other (specify) | |

.....

35. Do you send other items or other material goods to your contacts in your country of origin?

- | | |
|------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Yes [] | 2. No [] (go to question 37) |
|------------|-------------------------------|

36. If your answer is yes, please select from the options below which type of goods you send in a typical year?

	Category	Items	Family	Friends	Other
1.	Food items	Milk, sugar, canned food, cereals etc			
2.	Clothing	Dresses, shoes, clothes etc			
3.	Electronics	Fridges, computers, television, mobile phones, sound systems etc			
4.	Other (Specify)				

37. Which channels do you use in sending items/material goods to your country of origin?

- Friends visiting the country of origin []
- Courier Services (e.g. EMS, DHL, FedEx, local agencies etc) []
- Other (specify)

38. Do you receive money from your contacts in your country of origin?

- | | |
|------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Yes [] | 2. No [] (go to question 42) |
|------------|-------------------------------|

39. If yes, how often do you receive money from your contacts in the country of origin?

Remittances from the country of origin	Frequency				
	1.Monthly	2. Quarterly	3. Biannually	4. Yearly	5. Never
Family					
Friends					
Other					

40. On average how much money do you receive from your contacts in the country of origin per year?

Ties	Amount
Family	
Friends	
Other	

41. Which channels do **your contacts in your country of origin** use in sending money to you?

- | | |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| 1. MoneyGram [] | 4. MoMo transfer [] |
| 2. Western Union [] | 5. Through friends visiting Ghana [] |
| 3. Bank transfers [] | |
| 6. Other (specify) | |

42. What do you use the money you received from contacts in your country of origin for?

43. Do you receive other items or other material goods from your contacts in your country of origin?

- | | |
|------------|-------------------------------|
| 1. Yes [] | 2. No [] (go to question 45) |
|------------|-------------------------------|

44. If your answer is yes, please select from the options below, which type of goods do you receive in a typical year?

	Category	Items	Family	Friends	Other
1.	Food items	Milk, sugar, canned food, cereals etc			
2.	Clothing	Dresses, shoes, clothes etc			
3.	Electronics	Fridges, computers, television, mobile phones, sound systems etc			
4.	Other (Specify)				

45. Which channels do **your contacts in your country of origin** use in sending items/material goods to you?

1. Friends visiting Ghana []
2. Courier Services (e.g. EMS, DHL, FedEx, local agencies etc) []
3. Other
(specify).....

46. What is your main reason or motivation for maintaining economic ties with your country of origin?

.....
.....

3.4.Civic/political practices with the country of origin

47. Do you follow political developments/news in your country of origin?

1. Yes []
2. No []

48. Would you dress in the national colours of your country of origin especially during international football games, national day celebrations, etc.?

1. Yes []
2. No []

49. Would you sing the national anthem of your country of origin when it is being played?

1. Yes []
2. No []

50. Are you a member of any formal or informal groups (diaspora groups, hometown associations, online forums etc.) of your country of origin, in Ghana?

1. Yes []
2. No []

51. What is your main reason or the key motivation for maintaining civic/political ties with your country of origin?

.....
.....

52. What are the key challenges you face or you are likely to face when engaging with your country of origin?

.....
.....

53. Do you think refugees must contribute to the development of their country of origin?

1. Strongly agree []
2. Agree []
3. Neutral []
4. Disagree []
5. Strongly disagree []

54. When it comes to the development of your country of origin what key areas would you like to see improved?
(choose in order of importance)

1. Peace and Security []
2. Agricultural Sector []
3. Justice/Judicial Sector []
4. Trade and industry []
5. Economic development []
6. Political Stability and strengthening democracy []
7. Technological advancement []s
8. Other (specify)

SECTION 4: TRANSNATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES

4.1 Social practices/engagements with other third countries

55. Do you engage or keep in touch with contacts in other countries apart from your country of origin?

1. Yes []
2. No [] (*go to question 59*)

56. Which contacts do you have in these third countries?

1. Family []
2. Friends []
3. No contacts []
4. Other (specify)

57. Mention the countries these contacts are currently staying in?

.....

58. How often have you gotten in touch with your contacts in third countries within the last 12 months?

Transnational Ties to Third countries	Frequency of contact (at the least)				
	1.Monthly	2. Quarterly	3. Biannually	4. Yearly	5. Never
Family					
Friends					
Other					

59. What is your main reason or the key motivation for maintaining social ties with your contacts in these third countries?

.....

4.2. Cultural practices/engagements with other third countries

60. What are some of the cultural practices or engagements that draw you to these third countries?

1. I like the music and popular culture of these countries []
2. Their dominant religion is the same as mine []
3. Their democracy and economic growth []

1. MoneyGram []
2. Western Union []
3. Bank transfers []
4. MoMo Transfer []
5. Through friends visiting Ghana []
6. Other (specify).....

75. What do you use the money received from your contacts in other third countries for?

76. Do you receive other items or other material goods from your contacts in other third countries?

1. Yes []
2. No [] (go to question 79)

77. If your answer is Yes, please select from the options below which type of goods you receive in a typical year from your contacts in third countries?

	Category	Items	Family	Friends	Other
1.	Food items	Milk, sugar, canned food, cereals etc			
2.	Clothing	Dresses, shoes, clothes etc			
3.	Electronics	Fridges, computers, television, mobile phones, sound systems etc			
4.	Other (Specify)				

78. Which channels do they use in sending items/material goods to you from other third countries?

1. Friends visiting []
2. Courier services (e.g. EMS, DHL, FedEx)
3. Other (specify).....

79. What is your main reason or motivation for maintaining economic ties with your contacts in other third countries?

4.4. Transnational political/civic practices with other third countries

80. Do you follow political developments/news in other third countries?

1. Yes []
2. No []

81. Would you dress in the national colours of other third countries especially during international football games, national day celebrations, etc?

.....

87. Kindly state reasons why you prefer using these methods/channels in your engagements with your contacts in your country of origin.

.....

88. Within the past 12 months, what means (methods/channels) have you used to engage or keep in touch with your contacts in these third countries? *Please tick[√].*

Answer		Family	Friends	Other
1.	Through friends and other nationals visiting my country of origin			
2.	Own visits to the country of origin			
3.	Post mail (letter writing)			
4.	Telephone calls			
5.	SMS Text messages			
6.	Recorded messages on CD/DVD-ROM or pen-drives			
7.	Electronic mail (emails)			
8.	Blogging			
9.	Video conferencing(Skype, Viber)			
10.	Twitter			
11.	Instagram			
12.	Facebook (chats, audio & video calls)			
13.	WhatsApp (chats, audio & video calls)			
14.	Diaspora/Hometown Associations' for a			
15.	Online groups (based on ethnic, nationality, ideological lines etc)			
16.	Other (specify)			

89. Which of these methods/channels listed above do you frequently use in your engagements with your contacts in these third countries?

.....

90. Kindly state reasons why you prefer using these methods/channels in your engagements with your contacts in these third countries.

.....

91. Which of the following digital tech devices do you own? The answer provided below is *multiple choice* so tick [√] your response in the appropriate spaces provided.

1. Mobile phone (smart, android, iPhone etc.) []
2. Laptop computer []
3. Desktop computer []
4. Tablet []
5. Other (specify)

92. Do you use any of the following digital tech devices to facilitate your transnational engagements?

Answer		Yes	No
1.	Mobile phone (smart, android, iPhone etc)		
2.	Laptop computer		
3.	Desktop computer		
4.	Tablet		
5.	Other (specify)		

93. Do you belong to any of the following formal or informal groups online?

Answer		Yes	No
1.	Hometown Associations (online)		
2.	Diaspora/Transnational groups (online)		
3.	Online refugee for a		
4.	Other (specify)		

SECTION 6: INTEGRATION

6.1 Social integration in Ghana

94. Do you have close Ghanaian friends you could call upon when you are in need?

1. Yes []
2. No []

95. Do you attend church or mosque in Ghana with Ghanaians?

1. Yes []
2. No []

96. Do you access the same social services (healthcare, education etc) as Ghanaians?

1. Yes []
2. No []

97. Do you attend Ghanaian weddings, funerals, naming ceremonies and birthday celebrations?

1. Yes []
2. No []

6.2. Cultural integration

98. The table below provides options for your engagements with Ghanaian culture. Kindly show your response by ticking the appropriate box that applies.

5. Strongly disagree []

SECTION 7: IMPACT OF TRANSNATIONALISM ON INTEGRATION

113. The table below provides options on the extent to which your transnational engagements can influence your integration in Ghana. Kindly show your response by ticking the appropriate box that applies.

	Statements	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
	Frequency	1	2	3	4	5
1.	My engagements with my country of origin are helping me to integrate in Ghana					
2.	My engagements with my country of origin are influencing me to return to my country of origin					
3.	My engagements with other third countries are helping me to integrate in Ghana					
4.	My engagements with other third countries are influencing me to settle in a third country.					

114. Where will you consider as home?

- 1. Ghana []
- 2. Country of origin []
- 3. A third country []
- 4. Other (specify).....

115. Some refugees plan to stay in Ghana permanently, others want to resettle in other countries and others want to return to their homeland permanently. What are your plans?

- 1. Stay in Ghana permanently []
- 2. Return to country of origin []
- 3. Resettle in a third country []

116. If you selected Resettlement to a Third Country as your option for Q114, kindly state the country of your choice for resettlement.

.....

Thank you

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CAMP AND URBAN REFUGEES



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
CENTRE FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

INTRODUCTION AND CONSENT

Hello, I am a PhD student at the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana, Legon – Accra. I am conducting a study on ‘The transnational activities and integration of refugees in Ghana’. The information will be used to improve our understanding of the transnational activities in which refugees engage and how they influence the refugees’ integration in Ghana. I would be grateful if you could answer the questions below. Your participation in this study is essential but voluntary and you can withdraw at any point. Any information provided for this study would be treated with the utmost confidentiality and used only for academic purposes. Thank you.

A. Origins of the refugee and his or her family

1. Can you introduce yourself? (Age on last birthday, country of origin & nationality, sex, the current level of education & religious affiliation, marital status etc.)
2. Describe your condition in your country of origin before being displaced? (level of education & religious affiliation, occupation etc.)
3. Describe your family background? (country of origin & nationality of a spouse, the total number of children etc.)?

B. Destination - Ghana

1. Describe your condition in Ghana? (employment status, number of your children living with you etc.)
 - Current occupation
 - Any other income-generating activities apart from your current occupation (please specify).
 - Estimate total monthly earnings (include current earnings & other income-generating activities).
 - Number of children living elsewhere (e.g. in other parts of Ghana, in other countries – mention, etc.)

C. Migration History

1. Can you describe your migration history?
 - When did you arrive in Ghana?
 - How long have you stayed in Ghana?
 - What are the reasons and circumstances under which you left your country of origin (targeted persecution of my tribe or as an individual, war, conflict – ethnic, political etc.)
 - Do you feel you were specifically targeted as an individual, tribe or group?.
 - What means did you use in your journey to Ghana (i.e. by foot, ship, vehicular travel or both)?
 - How many countries did you travel through before arriving in Ghana?

- How long did stay in each of the countries?
 - What are your reasons for leaving these countries?
2. What are your reasons for fleeing or choosing Ghana as a destination? (i.e. social networks, proximity to country of origin, language, cultural characteristics etc.)
- How long did it take you to settle in Ghana after your arrival?
 - What were the challenges you faced at the initial stages of settling in Ghana?

D. Transnational Engagements

1. What kind of relationships or networks do you have with your country of origin and other third countries? (Probe for engagements with social networks in the country of origin and other third countries etc.).
2. Describe how you maintain ties with your social networks (i.e. family & friends) in your country of origin?
 - What communication channels do you use to maintain these ties?
 - How frequently do you maintain these ties?
 - What are your reasons for maintaining these ties?
3. Do you have social networks in other third countries (Probe for friends & families, etc. residing in these countries)/
 - What are your reasons for maintaining these ties?
4. How are you maintaining your cultural practices and ties in Ghana (probe for speaking of their local dialect, cuisine, traditional dress, music, religion etc.)?
 - What are your reasons for maintaining these cultural practices and ties?
5. Do you have cultural ties or attraction to other third countries?
 - What are your reasons for this cultural attachment?
6. How are you maintaining economic ties to your country of origin and other third countries (probe whether the refugee sends or receive remittances, business engagements etc)?
 - What are the uses of the remittances that are sent or received (probe for forms of investments or properties at these countries, etc.)?
 - What are the reasons for these exchanges in remittances?
 - Which channels are these remittances are sent or receive through?
7. Do you have friends that are refugees or non-refugees in other parts of Africa or outside of Africa?
 - How do you engage with them?
 - What is the main focus of these engagements or discussions?
8. Do you follow any political or civic group activities in your country of origin or third countries?
 - In what ways do you follow these groups?
 - How will you identify with your country of origin (i.e. wear national colours, sing the national anthem, observe national holidays etc.)?
 - What are your reasons for identifying with your country of origin?
9. What are your views on whether or not refugees contribute to the development of their respective countries of origin?

E. Channels of transnational engagements

1. What are the specific methods (i.e. diaspora groups, hometown associations etc.), communication channels (e.g. telephone calls, letters, blogging, social media etc.) or media that you prefer to use in your engagements (i.e. social, cultural, economic & civic/political) with social networks in your country of origin and other third countries?

- How frequently do you use these methods, communication channels etc. (specify)?
- What are the reasons behind your preference?
- Do you use different methods, communication channels or media with your engagements with third countries?
- What are the reasons for the difference?

F. Integration process

1. What ways have you integrated into the Ghanaian society (probe for speaking any Ghanaian language, Ghanaian friends or relatives in terms of nuptial bonds, able to use any social facilities etc.)?
 - How frequently do you visit your Ghanaian friends and acquaintances?
2. How do you appreciate Ghanaian culture? (probe for cuisine, music, dance, festivals, etc.)
3. How would you describe the extent of your social and cultural integration in Ghana? (probe for investments/properties in Ghana, other sources of economic support such as UNHCR, churches, NGOs, etc.)
4. How would you describe the democratic developments and politics in Ghana?
5. How are you able to hold authorities responsible for refugee matters accountable (probe for the level - civic/political at which the refugee hold authorities accountable)?
6. How would you describe your experiences with the Ghanaians and their society (Probe for relations with and feelings of belongingness in their host communities in terms of acceptance and respect for refugees)?
7. What are your high and low points with your interactions with Ghanaians? (Probe for what they like or do not like about their host communities, xenophobia tendencies, discrimination or harassment, friendliness and cordiality).
8. How would describe your integration in Ghana (probe for its success or failure, sense of belonging)?
 - What are the positive outcomes of their integration?
 - What are the challenges they face in their integration?
9. How will you describe your level of integration in Ghanaian society?
 - What have been the challenges in your integration process?
 - How have these challenges affected your integration in Ghana (Probe for positive or negative impacts)?.

G. Impact of transnational ties on refugee integration in Ghana

1. How would you situate your transnational ties to your country and/or third countries as a contributing factor to your integration process in Ghana (probe the positive or negative impacts of the transnational practices/engagements on the integration process)?
2. How would you define home?
 - Where will you describe as home (country of origin, Ghana or third countries)?
3. Which country will be your primary choice for integration (Ghana, return to the country of origin or resettlement in a third country)?
 - What are the reasons for your choice?
4. What feelings and thoughts will you like to share to understand your experience as a refugee?
 - How have these feelings and thoughts affected you?
5. What other information do you want to add or need to clarify?

Thank you.

APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDES FOR EXPERTS AND KEY INFORMANTS



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
CENTRE FOR MIGRATION STUDIES

INTRODUCTION AND CONSENT

*Hello, I am a PhD student at the Centre for Migration Studies of the University of Ghana, Legon – Accra. I am conducting a study on ‘**The transnational activities and integration of refugees in Ghana**’. The information will be used to improve our understanding of the transnational activities in which refugees engage and how they influence the refugees’ integration in Ghana. I would be grateful if you could answer the questions below. Your participation in this study is essential but voluntary and you can withdraw at any point. Any information provided for this study would be treated with the utmost confidentiality and used only for academic purposes. Thank you.*

A. Introduction:

1. What is the core mandate of your organisation?
2. What is your role within the organisation?

B. Socio-demographic information about refugees in Ghana.

1. Where do refugees in Ghana or the camp come from?
2. What are their socio-demographic characteristics (age, sex, level of education, marital status, employment status etc.)?
3. What are the new trends regarding inflows and outflows of refugees in the country?
 - What are the reasons for these new trends?

C. Key motivations for refugees in Ghana to maintain transnational ties

1. What are the motivations for refugees in Ghana to maintain transnational ties to both the countries of origin and other countries?
2. How beneficial are the transnational activities of the refugees to their livelihoods and welfare while they are in Ghana?
3. What are the marked differences between the transnational engagements of self-settled refugees and those in the camps (probe for instances, reasons and statistics if they are any)?
4. What would you consider as the main challenges that refugees in Ghana face with regard to their transnational engagements with the countries of origin and other third countries? What recommendations will you give to mitigate these challenges?
5. What measures should the Government of Ghana, the Ghana Refugee Board or the UNHCR put in place to facilitate the transnational activities of refugees especially regarding remittance transfers? What are your reasons for these measures?

D. Methods/channels used by refugees in their transnational engagements

1. Which channels do you think the refugees use in their engagements with their countries of origin and or family/friends in other third countries (probe into the use of traditional forms of engagement – diaspora groups, hometown associations, telephone calls etc.)?

2. What are your views about the use of ICT and modern digital technologies (i.e. social media, smartphones, tablets etc.) by refugees to facilitate their transnational engagements and communication?
 - What role has these technologies and modern gadgets played in fostering the transnational engagements of refugees in Ghana?
3. How frequently do you think they use these digital technologies and social media channels?

E. Integration of refugees in Ghana

1. What is Ghana's policy for the integration of refugees in the country?
 - What are the guidelines and policies for refugee integration in Ghana?
2. What are the avenues of support for refugees in Ghana?
3. What is Ghana's policy regarding the free movement, employment opportunities and engagement in economic activities by refugees in the country (probe for some examples)?
4. What is your view about refugees' disposition about integration into Ghanaian society?
5. How would you describe the relations between the refugees and their host communities?
6. What are the key challenges that refugees face with regard to their socio-cultural, economic, political and civic integration in Ghana?

What extent would you say the transnational engagements of refugees impact on their decisions to return to their countries of origin, integrate in Ghana, or resettle in third countries?

 - What ways have their transnational engagements facilitated their integration in Ghana or otherwise?
 - What extent do their transnational engagements with their countries of origin and other third countries impacted their integration (either positively or negatively) in Ghana (Probe for instances if there are any?)
 - How beneficial or otherwise do you think these transnational engagements are to the refugees in terms of their livelihoods and integration in Ghana?
7. What other information do you want to add or need to clarify?

Thank you.



APPENDIX D: PROTOCOL CONSENT FORM

Title of Study	The transnational activities and integration of refugees in Ghana.
Principal Investigator	Henry Kwasi Kankam Afrifa
Certified Protocol Number	

General Information about Research

I am a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Migration Studies (CMS) of the University of Ghana, Legon-Accra. I am researching *The Transnational Activities and Integration of Refugees in Ghana*.

The research seeks to find out the transnational activities of the refugees and how these activities influence their integration in Ghana. This field research is being conducted as part of my studies. I would be grateful if you could spare me a bit of your time me one hour interview with you.

Benefits/Risks of the study

Your participation in this study may not bring you any tangible benefits, but the findings will contribute to policy formulation and implementation to support the welfare and issues relating to the management of refugees in Ghana, with a potential for replication abroad. Also, there are no potential physical risks associated with this study; however, some questions may invade your privacy, and you are free to answer or decline to answer.

Confidentiality

Any information provided for this study would be treated with the utmost confidentiality. Only the researcher and supervisors can have access to information provided and under no circumstance will your identity be revealed to a third party or a comment attributed to you without due process. The information you provide will be used only for academic purposes.

Compensation

The study has not made provision to compensate for your participation in this study either in cash or material; however, transportation costs will be paid to a participant who has to travel to meet the researcher.

Withdrawal from Study

Your participation in this study is essential for its success but voluntary, and you can withdraw at any point of the research without a penalty. Under no circumstance will you be adversely affected if you decide to participate and later withdraw your decision to participate.

Contact for Additional Information

If you need either further information, clarification about this research or in case of research-related injury; please contact the Director, Centre for Migration Studies of University of Ghana, Prof Joseph Kofi Teye on +233 245 733233 or Email: jteye@ug.edu.gh

Thesis Supervisor:

Put a supervisor's name here of the Centre for Migration Studies, the University of Ghana on put his or her name or Email: put his or her email.

If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant in this study, you may contact the Administrator of the Ethics Committee for Humanities, ISSER, the University of Ghana at ech@isser.edu.gh / ech@ug.edu.gh or 00233- 303-933-866.

Section C- PARTICIPANT'S AGREEMENT

"I have read or have had someone read all of the above, asked questions, received answers regarding participation in this study, and am willing to give consent for me to participate in this study. I will not have waived any of my rights by signing this consent form. Upon signing this consent form, I will receive a copy for my records."

Name of Participant

Signature or mark of participant

Date



APPENDIX E: PROFILE OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (REFUGEES)

Profile of Key Informant Interviews (Refugees)										
No	Nationality	Place of Residence	Sex	Age (yrs)	Education	Religion	Marital status	No. of children	Length of stay in Ghana(yrs)	Occupation
1	Liberian	UR/BS-E	Male	54	Master's Degree	Muslim	Married	5	24	Entrepreneur / Educationist
2	Liberian	UR/BS-E	Male	59	Bachelor's Degree	Christian	Married	8	29	Reverend Minister
3	Liberian	UR/BS-E	Female	36	Post-Sec Diploma	Christian	Ever Married	1	18	Business-woman
4	Liberian	UR/BS-E	Male	61	Secondary Education	Christian	Married	8	28	Retiree
5	Liberian	UR/BS-E	Female	58	Basic Education	Christian	Ever Married	5	29	Trader
6	Ivorian	UR/A	Male	29	Post-Sec Diploma	Christian	Never Married	0	8	Artist / Student
7	Sudanese	UR/A	Male	35	Post-Sec Diploma	Muslim	Married	3	9	Entrepreneur, Restaurant Owner
8	Sudanese	UR/A	Female	27	Post-Sec Diploma/Voc. Training	Muslim	Ever Married	0	6	Caterer/Student
9	Cameroonian	UR/A	Female	37	Bachelor's Degree	Christian	Married	2	5	Trading
10	Liberian	UR/A	Male	47	Bachelor's Degree	Christian	Ever Married	1	21	Teaching

University of Ghana <http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh>

11	Central African	UR/A	Male	38	Master's Degree	Christian	Married	2	8	Private Security Sector Work
12	Central African	UR/A	Male	29	Secondary Education	Christian	Never Married	0	7	Shop-keeper
13	Ivorian	UR/A	Female	36	Bachelor's Degree	Buddhist	Married	3	9	IT/Printing and Design
14	Ivorian	UR/A	Female	35	Post-Sec Diploma	Christian	Married	3	9	Trader
15	Congolese	UR/A	Male	25	Post-Sec Diploma	Christian	Never Married	0	8	IT Instructor, Student
16	Sierra Leonean	UR/A	Female	29	Vocational Training	Muslim	Ever Married	1	10	Caterer / Student
17	Sudanese	CR/K	Female	32	Secondary Education	Muslim	Married	2	7	Farming, Fisherfolk work
18	Sudanese	CR/K	Female	30	Secondary Education	Muslim	Never Married	0	6	Petty trading
19	Sudanese	CR/K	Female	36	Post-Sec Diploma	Muslim	Ever Married	3	8	labourer work (construction)
20	Liberian	CR/K	Male	39	Technical education	Christian	Married	4	25	Labourer work (construction)
21	Sudanese	CR/K	Male	34	Secondary Education	Muslim	Never Married	0	12	Fishing, Barbering, Photography
22	Sierra Leonean	CR/K	Male	38	Secondary Education	Christian	Married	2	12	Farming (Poultry, Fishing, Crop)
23	Liberian	CR/K	Male	32	Secondary Education	Christian	Never Married	0	13	Farming, Labourer work (Construction)

24	Sudanese	CR/K	Male	32	Post-Sec Diploma	Muslim	Married	2	10	Translator
25	Togolese	CR/K	Male	45	Bachelor's Degree	Christian	Married	2	15	Volunteer Work, Farming
26	Congolese	CR/K	Female	32	Secondary Education	Christian	Never Married	0	10	Unemployed
27	Ivorian	CR/A	Male	45	Master's Degree	Christian	Married	1	9	Trading, Community Volunteering
28	Ivorian	CR/A	Male	39	No Formal Education	Christian	Ever Married	2	10	Barber, Labourer (Const.), farming
29	Ivorian	CR/A	Female	33	Post-Sec Diploma	Christian	Never Married	0	11	Poultry/Crop farming
30	Ivorian	CR/A	Female	32	Bachelor's Degree	Christian	Never Married	0	10	Unemployed
Keys	UR/BRS-E	Urban Refugee, Buduburam Refugee Settlement & Environs								
	UR/A	Urban Refugee, Accra								
	CR/KRC	Camp Refugee, Krisan Refugee Camp;								
	CR/ARC	Camp Refugee, Ampain Refugee Camp								


Field data, 2019



APPENDIX F: PROFILE OF EXPERTS AND KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS (GRB & HOST-COMMUNITY MEMBERS)

Profile of Key Informant Interviews (GRB Officials & Host-Community Members)					
		Nationality	Sex	Location	Occupation
1	Refugee Camp Coordinator (Regional)	Ghanaian	Male	Takoradi, Western Region	Refugee Camp Coordinator (Regional), GRB
2	Refugee Camp Manager	Ghanaian	Male	Ampain Refugee Camp	Camp Manager, GRB
3	Refugee Camp Manager	Ghanaian	Male	Krisan Refugee Camp	Camp Manager, GRB
4	Refugee Camp Manager	Ghanaian	Male	Buduburam Refugee Settlement.	Camp Manager, GRB
5	Local Opinion Leader/Community Member	Ghanaian	Male	Krisan Village	Teacher/Farming, GES
6	Local Opinion Leader/Community Member	Ghanaian	Female	Ampain Village	Health Worker, MoH/Farming
7	Local Opinion Leader/Community Member	Ghanaian	Male	Buduburam Village.	Businessman

Field data , 2019



APPENDIX G: METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES OF SOME SELECTED ARTICLES IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW OF THIS STUDY

ARTICLE OR PAPER	DATA COLLECTION METHODS
Addo, J. (2008). Exploring the livelihoods strategies of Liberian refugee women in Buduburam, Ghana (Master's thesis, Universitetet i Tromsø).	Survey, focused group discussions, in-depth interviews.
Agblorti, S. K. M. (2011). Humanitarian assistance to refugees in rural Ghana: Implications for refugee–host relations. <i>Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift–Norwegian Journal of Geography</i> , 65(2), 75-82.	In-depth interviews.
Agblorti, S. K. M., & Awusabo-Asare, K. (2011). Refugee-host interaction in the Krisan Refugee Settlement in Ghana. <i>Ghana Journal of Geography</i> , 3, 35-59.	Survey, in-depth interviews
Boateng, A. (2010). Survival voices: Social capital and the well-being of Liberian refugee women in Ghana. <i>Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies</i> , 8(4), 386–408.	Survey, in-depth interviews, focused groups
Byrne, J. (2013). Should I stay or should I go? National identity and attitudes towards local integration among Liberian refugees in Ghana. <i>Refugee Survey Quarterly</i> , 32(1), 50–73.	Focused group discussions and interviews
Codjoe, S. N. A., Quartey, P., Tagoe, C. A., & Reed, H. E. (2013). Perceptions of the Impact of Refugees on Host Communities: The Case of Liberian Refugees in Ghana. <i>Journal of International Migration and Integration</i> , 14(3), 439-456.	Focused group discussions, household surveys.
Dako-Gyeke, M., & Adu, E. (2015). Challenges and coping strategies of refugees: Exploring residual Liberian refugees' experiences in Ghana. 16(1), 96–11. <i>Qualitative Social Work</i> . 10.1177/1473325015596218. JOUR.	Focused group discussions, in-depth interviews
Dzeamesi, M. (2008). "Refugees, the UNHCR and host governments as stakeholders in the transformation of refugee communities: A study into the Buduburam Refugee Camp in Ghana," <i>International J. of Migration, Health and Social Care</i> , 4, 28-41.	Interviews, secondary data
Grabska, K. (2006). 'Marginalization in Urban Spaces of the Global South: Urban Refugees in Cairo'. <i>Journal of Refugee Studies</i> , 19(3), 287–307.	Household surveys, in-depth interviews, observation

<p>Kandoh, M. M. (2012). Forced Migration: Socioeconomic Implications for Hosts Communities in Southern and Northern Ghana. Retrieved from www.hioa.no/content/download/17625/190127/file/MorforKandoh.pdf</p>	<p>Secondary data, semi-structured interviews and informal discussions.</p>
<p>Omata, N. (2012). <i>Struggling to find solutions: Liberian refugees in Ghana</i>. UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service.</p>	<p>Semi-structured and unstructured interviews</p>
<p>Porter, G., Hampshire, K., Kyei, P., Adjaloo, M., Opong, G., & Kilpatrick, K. (2008). Linkages between livelihood opportunities and refugee-host relations: learning from the experiences of Liberian camp-based refugees in Ghana, <i>Journal of Refugee Studies</i>, 21(2), 230-252.</p>	<p>Focus group discussions, in-depth interviews, detail daily diary, participant observation, ethnographic camp diaries, and life histories.</p>
<p>Rugunanan, P., & Smit, R. (2011). Seeking refuge in South Africa: Challenges facing a group of Congolese and Burundian refugees. <i>Development Southern Africa</i>, 28 (5), 705-718.</p>	<p>In-depth interviews, focused group discussions</p>
<p>Whitaker, B. E. (2002). Conflict Issues: refugees and host communities in western Tanzania. <i>Journal of Humanitarian Assistance</i>, pages 1{23.</p>	<p>Semi-structured interviews, focused group discussions, participant observation</p>

