Abstract:
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have been called to action in instances where the state has either been deficient or ineffective in managing affairs. Undoubtedly, the process of democratization in Africa has produced mixed results due to several factors among which include poorly organized elections and its associated violence. Electoral violence prevention has become an integral part of international electoral assistance programs without the needed understanding of what works and in what specific contexts, leading to role duplication and waste of resources. Civil Society Organizations both local and international have assume prominent role in ensuring electoral violence prevention but with little success in the African context. While significant intellectual efforts have been made to respond to the phenomenon of electoral violence through understanding its causes and consequences, very little is known about the circumstances under which civil society organizations succeed in electoral violence prevention. This study, theoretically, grounded in institutionalism and elite consensus, used qualitative research tools such as unstructured in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to explore key questions such as how civil society organizations collaborate with other actors in the prevention of electoral violence in Ghana; how CSOs obtain the commitments of political elites towards electoral violence prevention; the nature of international cooperative strategies and alliances employed towards electoral violence prevention. The study focuses on Ghanaian civil society organizations such as Coalition of Domestic Election Observers, Institute of Democratic Governance, Institute of Economic Affairs, and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding that have a national coverage and a long history of engagement in the electoral processes. The data for the study was gathered with reference to the 2008, 2012 and the 2016 elections and analysed through the process of content analysis. The study has brought to the fore the following understudied phenomena: institutional rivalry that has the potential to undermine electoral violence prevention in Ghana and how CSOs mediate losers‘ consent and provide legitimacy for electoral processes and outcomes. The study finds that losers‘ consent in Ghana is mediated through two interrelated factors; the anticipation of winning future elections and the dilemma of opportunity cost associated with lack of consent. Finally, the study argues that, elite consensus must be characterized by the processes of elite congregation that will permit democratic norm diffusion thereby preventing strategic electoral violence and incidental electoral violence in Africa.
