Abstract:
Over the past ten years, high-income
countries in the North have provided
considerable financial aid to establish and
support national blood transfusion services
in low-income countries in sub-Saharan
Africa. This action has largely been driven
by concerns relating to the contribution of
blood transfusion to the HIV epidemic in
the region, leading to the overwhelming
objective of ‘‘safe blood.’’ Whilst there
have been definite benefits to transfusion
services, we believe this aid has resulted in
unintended but serious negative outcomes,
which we describe here and argue should
prompt a re-thinking of how to provide
support to blood transfusion services in
sub-Saharan Africa.
Support has targeted either single countries
such as Malawi, Rwanda, Burkina
Faso, and Uganda [1,2] or multiple
countries [3]. Funds, available only for
limited periods, have been used to support
a combination of infrastructure design and
construction; purchase of equipment;
screening for transfusion-transmitted infections
and quality assurance; and the
recruitment of blood donors. As a direct
consequence of this funding, some of the
underlying principles of transfusion services
practised in the high-income donor
countries have been applied in sub-
Saharan Africa recipient countries (Box
1). These principles may be based on
sound practice in wealthy countries but do
not necessarily apply to sub-Saharan Africa at this time. We argue that
considering the needs of sub-Saharan
Africa, external aid was to some extent
misdirected in the areas of donor recruitment,
overall organisation, and availability
of products.