

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA**

**LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA'S LOCAL  
GOVERNANCE SYSTEM: THE CASES OF THE ACCRA  
METROPOLITAN, KETA MUNICIPAL AND SHAI ODOKU  
DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES**

**BY**

**AKPEKO AGBEVADE**

**(10086818)**

**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA,  
LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT  
FOR THE AWARD OF PHD POLITICAL SCIENCE DEGREE**

**MAY, 2018**

## DECLARATION

I do hereby declare that besides the quotations and other references, which have been duly acknowledged, this is a research carried out under the able leadership of Prof. J.R.A. Ayee as the Principal Supervisor and supported by Dr. Bossman E. Asare and Prof. R.E.V. Gyampo. This work has not been submitted in whole or in part for a degree anywhere.

I am, however, solely responsible for any weakness, marginal or substantial, which may be identified in this thesis.

.....  
**AKPEKO AGBEVADE**  
**(STUDENT)**

.....  
**PROF. J.R.A. AYEE**  
**(PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR)**

.....  
**DR. BOSSMAN E. ASARE**  
**(SECOND SUPERVISOR)**

.....  
**PROF. R.E.V. GYAMPO**  
**(THIRD SUPERVISOR)**

## ABSTRACT

The study sought to discuss the local economic development (LED) strategies, their beneficent outcomes, how the strategies were financed as well as the actors involved in the implementation process and the dynamics that shaped the process using the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) and Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA) as case studies. The study employed the actor-oriented approach to development intervention as the theoretical framework. Using the triangulation and the multiple case study approaches of research design, the study drew a total sample size of 551 with 533 from the residents of the three Assemblies using the stratified sampling technique with the breakdown as follows: 178, 187 and 177 from the AMA, KeMA and SODA respectively and 18 respondents using the purposive sampling. These respondents were selected to solicit views on their roles as actors in the LED implementation process and to ascertain the extent to which LED impacted their lives.

A number of findings came to light. First, the three Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) pursued strategies driven by their peculiar circumstances which resulted in the implementation of diverse LED strategies in some cases. However, there were some similarities in the LED strategies implemented by the three MMDAs. Second, the MMDAs' sources of financing LED programmes could be classified into three main categories namely; inter-governmental transfers, donor or private sector funding and internally-generated funds. The ability of an MMDA to attract funds was largely determined by factors such as the strategic nature and category of the MMDA, its leadership, political and personal commitment of some top level staff to LED implementation, the available economic development incentives and the immediate returns that investors expected to gain from their investments. Third, the implementation of LED was shaped by the activities of various actors with different interests. The activities of the actors in the LED implementation process accounted for variation in the degree of success in the three MMDAs, which reinforces the politics of LED implementation. In addition, the actors' involvement in the LED process hinges a lot on their capacity and resource endowment. Furthermore, the success of LED intervention depends on the willingness of the actors to collaborate with each other. Fourth, the local governance structures also influenced the LED implementation process, the extent of which depends on how the actors in the LED implementation process interacted with them (local structures). Fifth, the implementation of LED in the three MMDAs was shaped by the following dynamics: politics which took the form of political transition, political leadership, political recruitment, and micro politics; leadership, land tenure system, institutional, administrative and procedural issues. Sixth, the implementation of LED resulted in the following beneficent outcomes: employment opportunity creation, income generation, infrastructure provision and poverty reduction in the three MMDAs. However, the impact of LED on poverty reduction was limited to the households of LED participants. The implementation of LED was impeded by challenges such as limited funding, lack of institutional capacity, policy inconsistency, lack of political and leadership commitment and support to implement MMDA bye-laws, non-availability of land and the politicization of LED.

Based on the findings, the study recommends the following: the harmonization of all poverty reduction related strategies with LED, the launching and immediate implementation of the National LED policy, the designation of a particular fund and earmarking of a certain percentage of the District Assembly Common Fund (DA CF) for

the implementation of LED as well as the formulation and implementation of a national policy aimed at joint land ownership between the MMDAs and traditional authorities for LED purposes, the adoption of change management strategies for the transformation and capacitation of the institutions and human resource at the MMDAs for effective LED implementation as well as popular participation to include the traditional authorities, community-based organisations (CBOs) and the private sector. Furthermore, economic development incentives in the MMDAs should be created, excessive politicization of LED programmes should be reduced and education and sensitization on LED programmes both at the national and local levels should be stepped up and coordinated.

The most forceful lesson learnt is that actors are very important in the implementation process of LED and should therefore have the requisite capacity and resources in the right mix, at the right time and deployed for the right purpose. In addition, the actors should be willing to cooperate with each other in the entire LED process.

## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to all who have believed in my God given potential and stood by me in difficult times.

I also dedicate it to my dear wife Mrs. Belinda Yayra Agbevade and my two nephews; Edinam and Etonam Amekplenu.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I am grateful to the most High God for His grace, mercy and favour for the past four years and making a dream of finishing Ph.D. in Political Science a reality.

I am also thankful to my lead supervisor Prof. J.R.A. Ayee who is my mentor and life coach for his interest in my academic and professional life. You always invited me to your library, gave me books and articles to enrich the thesis. Your tolerance and effective supervision has brought me this far. Prof. am eternally grateful to you. Am also grateful to Dr. Bossman E. Asare, the Head, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon and Prof. R.E.V. Gyampo, for being the second and third supervisors respectively. Gratitude is extended to Prof. Emmanuel Debrah and Dr. Evans Aggrey-Darkoh for supporting my Ph.D. application into the University of University and exchange programme at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.

Mention is also made of my dear and lovely wife Mrs. Belinda Yayra Agbevade for her sacrifices and words of encouragement over the past four years of my study. To you Madam Faustina Hli Tay my mother am thankful for all your sacrifices as a single parent in providing me with a strong academic foundation in the face of difficulties. My only biological sibling Mrs. Enam Agbevade Amekplenu am thankful to you as well.

Mr. and Mrs. Theophilus and Veronica Ahwireng, Prof. Agyeman Badu Akosa, Rev S.D.K. Dumevi, Rev. R.M.K. Attih, Catechist Godwin Aklamanu, Mr. Innocent Agbevade and Mr. Daniel Agbevade also deserve special mention for their words of encouragement, emotional and spiritual supports.

My acknowledgement is incomplete without extending appreciation to my respondents especially Mr. Philip Quansah, Mr. David Pometu and Mr. Frederick Asiamah of the AMA, KeMA and SODA respectively. The rest are Mr. Martin Eson-Benjamin the CEO of Millennium Development Authority, Joseph Nartey of the Kpong Irrigation Scheme, Dr. Joseph A. Dadzie, the Consultant of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd for their assistance during the field work.

To my colleagues at the Entrepreneurship Training Institute Richard Kofi Asravor,

Dosseyi Tete Katchan, Prince Coffie Aklamanu and Gifty Ketor I say a big thank you for the moral support.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Content	Page
DECLARATION .....	i
ABSTRACT .....	ii
DEDICATION.....	iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xi
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xiii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiv
CHAPTER ONE.....	1
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK .....	1
1.1.INTRODUCTION .....	1
1.1.1. Meaning and conceptualization of development in the study .....	1
1.1.2. Background to the study.....	1
1.2. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM .....	6
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY .....	7
1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY .....	8
1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY.....	9
1.6. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY .....	9
CHAPTER TWO .....	12
LITERATURE REVIEW .....	12
2.1. INTRODUCTION .....	12
2.2. GENERAL STUDIES ON LED .....	12
2.3. AFRICAN STUDIES ON LED .....	25
2.4. GHANAIAAN STUDIES ON LED .....	34
2.5. STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE.....	40
2.5.1. Meaning of Local Government and Local Governance .....	40
2.6. GENERAL STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE.....	41
2.7. AFRICAN STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE .....	42
2.8. GHANAIAAN STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE.....	48
2.9. GENERAL STUDIES ON POVERTY REDUCTION .....	53



2.10. AFRICAN STUDIES ON POVERTY REDUCTION .....	53
2.11. GHANAIAAN STUDIES ON POVERTY REDUCTION .....	55
2.12. STUDIES ON POLITICS IN GHANA .....	62
CHAPTER THREE .....	65
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	65
3.1. INTRODUCTION .....	65
3.2. THE ORIGINS OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH.....	65
3.3. THE MEANING AND FEATURES OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH .....	65
3.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE THEORY .....	69
3.5. THE STRENGTHS OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH.....	71
3.6. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH .....	72
3.7. EMPLOYMENT OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH.....	73
3.8. RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	75
3.9. CONCLUSION.....	76
CHAPTER FOUR .....	77
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY .....	77
4.1. INTRODUCTION .....	77
4.2. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY AREAS.....	77
4.2.1. The Accra Metropolitan Assembly .....	78
4.2.2. The Keta Municipal Assembly .....	83
4.2.3. The Shai - Osudoku District Assembly .....	86
4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN .....	91
4.4. TYPE OF STUDY .....	93
4.5. POPULATION OF THE STUDY .....	94
4.6. SAMPLING TECHNIQUE OF THE STUDY .....	94
4.7. SAMPLE SIZE OF THE STUDY .....	95
4.8. SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION .....	96
4.9. INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION .....	96
4.9.1. Questionnaire.....	97
4.9.2. Elite Interview .....	97
4.9.3. Focus Group Discussion.....	98
4.10. INSTRUMENT OF DATA ANALYSIS .....	98
4.11. MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY LEVELS .....	99

4.12. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNING OF THE STUDY .....	101
4.13. CONCLUSION .....	101
CHAPTER FIVE .....	103
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS .....	103
5.1. INTRODUCTION .....	103
5.2. BACKGROUND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED IN THE MMDAs .	104
5.3. FINANCING OF LED PROGRAMMES .....	104
5.4. LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE MMDAs .....	108
5.4.1. LED Initiatives or Programmes .....	109
5.5. THE ACTORS IN THE LED INTERVENTION PROCESS AND HOW THEY FACILITATED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED .....	118
5.6. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ACTORS AND THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES .....	127
5.7. THE DYNAMICS IN LED PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION .....	128
5.8. BENEFICENT OUTCOMES OF LED IN THE MMDAs .....	132
5.8.1. Employment generation .....	132
5.8.2. Capacity Development Programmes .....	135
5.8.3. Improvement in quality of life .....	143
5.8.4. Infrastructure provision .....	144
5.9. MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY LEVELS .....	145
5.10. CHALLENGES TO LED IMPLEMENTATION IN AMA, KEMA AND SODA .....	146
5.11. CONCLUSION .....	151
CHAPTER SIX .....	153
DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS .....	153
6.1. INTRODUCTION .....	153
6.2. BACKGROUND TO LED AND LED INTERVENTIONS IN THE THREE ...	153
6.3. FINANCING OF LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT .....	157
6.4. THE LED PROCESS .....	161
6.5. THE ACTORS IN THE LED PROCESS .....	162
6.6. THE DYNAMICS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED PROGRAMMES .	167
6.7. BENEFICENT OUTCOMES OF LED .....	171
6.8. MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY LEVEL .....	173

6.9. CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED.....	173
6.10. CONCLUSION .....	178
CHAPTER SEVEN .....	179
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	179
7.1. INTRODUCTION .....	179
7.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .....	179
7.3. CONCLUSION .....	183
7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS .....	184
7.4.1. Policy Recommendation.....	184
7.4.2. Fiscal Recommendation .....	185
7.4.3. Institutional, Human Resource and Capacity Development Recommendations .....	185
7.4.4. Private Sector Involvement Recommendations .....	186
7.4.5. Recommendations on over- politicization.....	187
7.4.6. Participation and Education Recommendations.....	187
7.5. LESSONS LEARNT.....	188
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	190
APPENDICES .....	211

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 4. 1: Number of organisations, industries and establishments in the AMA .....	80
Table 4. 2: Percentage of residents in each sector of the AMA .....	81
Table 4. 3: Percentage of occupation of employed residence in the AMA .....	81
Table 4. 4: Distribution of livestock, birds, fishes and others in the AMA.....	82
Table 4. 5: Livestock and fish production in the KeMA .....	84
Table 4. 6: Crop production in the KeMA.....	85
Table 4. 7: Crop production in Metric Tons in the Shai-Osudoku District .....	88
Table 4. 8: Animal production in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly .....	88
Table 4. 9: Sample category and reasons for interviewing.....	95
Table 4. 10: Sample size of the study .....	95
Table 4. 11: Sample size of the residents of the MMDAS .....	96
Table 4. 12: Average number per household in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.....	100
Table 4. 13: The poverty line of the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	100
Table 5. 1: MMDAs and their sources of funding LED programmes .....	105
Table 5. 2: MMDAs and the number of sources for funding LED programmes.....	105
Table 5. 3: Budgetary allocation of MMDAs .....	106
Table 5. 4: Summary of AMA PPP Projects .....	110
Table 5. 5: LED initiatives in the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	112
Table 5. 6: Shareholding structure for financing the Accra City Car Parks Ltd in the AMA .....	115
Table 5. 7: Cost of implementing capacity development programme in the AMA in January, 2012 .....	115
Table 5. 8: LED initiatives in the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	116
Table 5.9: LED actors in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.....	119

Table 5. 10: The primary actors and their roles in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.....	121
Table 5. 11: Secondary actors and their roles in AMA, KeMA and SODA.....	122
Table 5. 12: Direct employment created in the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	133
Table 5. 13: Names of groups and companies generating employment in SODA .....	133
Table 5. 14: Names of LED interventions and employment generated in KeMA .....	133
Table 5. 15: Levels of employees and number employed in the Accra City Car Parks Ltd PPP of the AMA.....	134
Table 5. 16: The breakdown of indirect employment generated in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.....	135
Table 5. 17: Indirect employment generated at SODA .....	135
Table 5.18: Capacity development programmes of the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	136
Table 5. 19a: Has the LED programme been beneficial to you?.....	136
Table 5. 20: Areas of LED benefit.....	138
Table 5. 21: Areas of LED benefits in the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	139
Table 5. 22: Name of Hair Style and amount charged in KeMA .....	140
Table 5. 23: Before and after effect of Capacity Development Programme on mango farmers in SODA.....	141
Table 5. 24: Beneficent outcome to rice farmers in Asutuare, SODA .....	142
Table 5. 25: Industries and their numbers in the SODA.....	142
Table 5. 26: Comparison of LED and improvement in quality of life between the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	143
Table 5. 27: Comparison of the areas of improvement in quality of life following LED implementation in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.....	144
Table 5. 28: Infrastructure provision in the AMA, KeMA and SODA as LED benefits	144

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1: Map of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly .....	79
Figure 4. 2: Map of the Keta Municipal Assembly .....	83
Figure 4. 3: Map of the Shai- Osudoku District Assembly .....	86
Figure 5. 1: MMDAs and LED Initiatives.....	117
Figure 5. 2: PPP PROCESS FLOW CHART .....	124
Figure 5. 3: Comparison of MMDAs and the LED benefits .....	137
Figure 5. 4: Comparison of areas of LED benefit between the AMA, KeMA and SODA .....	139
Figure 5. 5: Poverty status among LED beneficiaries in the AMA, KeMA and SODA using the 1US\$ a day approach .....	146
Figure 5. 6: Challenges faced by LED beneficiaries in the AMA, KeMA and SODA ..	150

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1D1F	One District One Factory
AMA	Accra Metropolitan Assembly
BAC	Business Advisory Centre
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CHPS	Community based Health Planning Systems
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibilities
DCD	District Coordinating Director
DCE	District Chief Executive
DDF	District Development Facility
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
GEL	Golden Exotics Limited
GIFMIS	Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information Systems
GIZ	Gesundheits Information Zentrum
GPRS 1	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
GPRS 2	Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
GRIB	Ghana Rice Inter-professional Body
GSGDA	Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IGFs	Internally Generated Funds
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INGOs	International Non-governmental Organisations
KeMA	Keta Municipal Assembly
KIS	Kpong Irrigation Scheme
LEAP	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty
LED	Local Economic Development

LGUs	Local Government Units
MASLOC	Microfinance and Small Loans Centre
MC	Municipal Coordinator
MCD	Municipal Coordinating Director
MCE	Metropolitan Chief Executive
MCE	Municipal Chief Executive
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MiDA	Millennium Development Authority
MMDA	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assembly
MMDAs	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies
MMDCEs	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives
MOFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NGOs	Non-governmental Organisations
NPP	New Patriotic Party
PID	Public Investment Division
PPPs	Public Private Partnerships
PSIs	President's Special Initiatives
REP	Rural Enterprise Programme
RFP	Request for Proposal
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SIF	Social Investment Fund
SMDCs	Sub-Metro District Councils
SODA	Shai-Osudoku District Assembly
SSEA	Small Scale Enterprises Association
SSEs	Small Scale Enterprises



TAs	Transaction Advisors
UDG	Urban Development Grant
UMB	Universal Merchant Bank
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPRP	Urban Poverty Reduction Project

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **1.1. INTRODUCTION**

##### **1.1.1. Meaning and conceptualization of development in the study**

Development is a multi-dimensional, continuously changing and a dynamic concept with no universally accepted definition. The Brandt Commission Report (1980) for instance intimated that “development never will be, never can be defined to universal satisfaction”. Uphoff (1972) corroborated this assertion by indicating that “development is probably one of the most depreciated terms in social science literature having been used more than it has been understood”. Development indices such as poverty reduction, unemployment, inequality, increased cultural independence, self-reliance, structural, attitudinal and institutional changes, economic growth acceleration, better education, cleaner environment, individual freedom, higher standards of health and nutrition etc have been identified by scholars (Sapru, 2012; Dudley Seers, Todaro, 1977; World Bank, 1997). To them, the end result of development is to improve the quality of human life through increased economic, political and civil rights of all people across gender, ethnic groups, religions, races, regions and countries. From the above, it can be gleaned that development is a multi-faceted term, however, in this study, the emphasis would be on local economic development with focus on poverty reduction, employment creation, income generation and infrastructure provision.

##### **1.1.2. Background to the study**

Since independence in 1957, Ghana has implemented a number of development strategies and policies aimed at poverty reduction under a number of institutional frameworks.

Notable among the strategies implemented in Ghana are the Seven Year Development Plan, 1963-1970, the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 1983 which resulted in the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 1987, the Ghana Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Service (GRATIS) project, 1987, National Action Plan for Poverty Reduction, 1995, Vision 2020, 1996-2020, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 2000, Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), 2001, President's Special Initiatives (PSIs) on garment and textiles and agriculture (Cassava and oil palm), 2001-2007, Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1), 2003-2005, Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 2), 2006-2009, Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), 2008, the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I), 2010-2013, GSGDA II, 2014-2017, One District One Factory (1D1F), 2017 among others (Ayee, 2007:15; Ninsin, 2007:98; Amoako-Tuffour and Armah, 2008:4-7; Mensah et.al. 2013, Mensah et.al. 2017).

Institutions such as the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) etc. were also established to promote development aimed at poverty reduction.

These development strategies are mainly statist and market -oriented. The statist-oriented approach refers to the situation where the state captures the “commanding heights” of the economy to avert exploitation by owners of capital in order to ensure resource redistribution. Under this approach, the market forces of supply and demand are absent. However, under the market-oriented approach, the role of the state is circumscribed, and the state only provides an enabling environment (legal, institutional and infrastructure) for effective functioning of the market forces. The economic activities are determined by the market forces of demand and supply. Privatization, liberalization and deregulation are some of the development strategies implemented. The market-oriented approach though

promotes wealth in general, it is characterized by inequality and injustice in resource distribution (Bevir, 2009: 124-127; Smith, 2007: 249-250; Ninsin, 2007: 87). Bevir (2009) proposed market governance as a mechanism for the two approaches to exist in tandem. He defined market governance as the situation where the state governs the operations of the market by ensuring that markets are as perfectly competitive as possible. Under the market governance, the state ensures that goods and services are exchanged at the appropriate prices so that both the supplier and buyer are not shortchanged. As a result, the state prevents corruption, price gouging, collusion and information hoarding (Bevir, 2009: 125).

In spite of the policy and institutional frameworks, the desired development to reduce poverty has still not been realized due to the “crisis of governance” in particular centralization, implementation bottlenecks and lack of institutional coordination thereby making governance central to development thinking (Wunsch, 2014:5; Tsikata, 2007: 56; World Bank, 1989:60).

Arkadie (2012) and Chhotray et. al. (2009) have offered two reasons for the introduction of governance into development thinking. First, governance allows for a move away from the narrow focus on the markets to a broader view of other institutions. This was because the focus on the markets in the 1980s proved to be disastrous. The outcome is the need for institutions for effective operations of the market. Institutions in this context represent laws, rules, regulations and norms. Second, governance has reflected a heightened concern for political and administrative development and the policy process (Arkadie, 2012:54; Chhotray et al. 2009:102).

Governance as a concept has several meanings. However, we may define it as the utilization of economic, political and administrative authority in the management of a

nation's affairs at all levels of the state by leaders in collaboration with various stakeholders (UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 1992; Dwivedi, 2002:37). At the heart of governance therefore are power, authority, leadership, rules and regulations. Good governance which is a subset of governance is a term imbued with norms such as participation, fairness, transparency, decency, accountability, responsiveness, efficiency and effectiveness (Turner and Hulme, 1997).

Some of the challenges of centralisation such as lack of citizen participation, non-responsiveness, weak state capacity, loss of state legitimacy etc. (Saito, 2011: 486; Elong Mbassi, 2009:259; Ndegwa, 2002) have led to the clamour for decentralisation, which was considered as “a fad or the latest fashion in development administration” to bring local economic development (LED) to be spearheaded by local government units (LGUs) (Awortwi, 2013: 40; Saito, 2011: 486; Yatta, 2009: 301, Conyers, 1983). Decentralisation refers to the territorial distribution and transfer of power, responsibilities and resources from national state actors to non-state actors such as grassroots organisations and associations, NGOs and the private sector (Ayee, 2013:567; Elong Mbassi, 2009:262). Decentralisation has several benefits including; political, administrative, economic, fiscal, and developmental (Wunsch, 2014: 2-5; Saito, 2011: 484; Turner and Hulme, 1997: 151; Smith, 2007:101; Ayee, 2004:128).

In spite of its perceived benefits, decentralisation, has some weaknesses. For instance, it creates inefficient bureaucracies that lack capacity (human and financial) to adequately implement policies, elite capture, corruption, patronage, absence of transparency in decision making which affects upward and downward accountability and coordination problems (Ayee and Dickovick, 2014:91; Rees and Hossain, 2013:4; Mahama, 2013:21; Saito, 2011: 488; Bevir, 2009:66).

Decentralisation was implemented by Ghana in 1988 to deepen local governance following the implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Guy et.al. 2013: 109; Ayee, 2002:173). Articles 35(6)(d) 240 (1) and 245(a) of the 1992 Constitution and the Local Governance Act 2016 (Act 936) have all made provisions for Ghana's local governance and gave political, administrative, economic, social and developmental powers and authority to the MMDAs to create an enabling environment for development (Republic of Ghana, 1992: 36, 150, 152; Republic of Ghana, 2016: 19-20). However, the MMDAs largely focused on political, social, administrative and legislative functions to the detriment of development functions hence their continuous reliance on central government for development. This reliance gave rise to local economic development (LED) as an alternative development strategy to stimulate and transform the economies of MMDAs, create new jobs, and promote income generating opportunities and infrastructural improvement for accelerated poverty reduction and also align natural and human resources of localities to match both global and regional markets as well as the employment opportunities fitting both the people and the locality (Republic of Ghana, 2013:1, Government of Ghana and UNDP, 2011:3, Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002:24).

The LED may be defined as “the process by which local governments, local businesses and other actors outside the locality join forces and resources to enter into new partnership arrangements with each other or other stakeholders to create new jobs and stimulate economic activities in municipalities, towns and villages”. The LED is therefore a bottom-up process which is driven by local actors using local resources to develop the economic capacity of localities to improve the economic status and the quality of life of indigenes for poverty reduction in the MMDAs (Republic of Ghana, 2013: 1-2, 2014:3). In renewing commitment to LED implementation, the government in December, 2013 formulated the

National LED policy with the vision statement being “to create responsive local economies for improved standards of living, economic growth and sustainable development” and an overall policy goal of “facilitating economic growth, employment and income generation in order to promote household welfare and alleviate poverty” (Republic of Ghana, 2013:9).

A number of studies have found that there exists a relationship between decentralisation and LED which has led to job creation, economic stimulation, poverty reduction and infrastructural development as core benefits (Oduro-Ofori, 2016:31; International Labour Organisation, 2006, 2007:6; German Agency for Development and Cooperation, 2008:3; Mensah et. al. 2013:163; Stansel, 2005:55).

It is against this backdrop that this study examines local economic development (LED) and the extent to which it has addressed poverty in its various forms in three of the LGUs in Ghana, namely, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) and Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA).

## **1.2. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Since the return to constitutional rule in 1993, policy frameworks such as the 1992 Constitution, the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936), the National LED policy, 2013, the MLGRD Operational Manual on LED for District Assemblies in Ghana, March, 2014, the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), 2011, among others have been designed to promote LED in Ghana.

Similarly, at the institutional level, institutions such as the NDPC, MMDAs, and NGOs were established to play pivotal roles in promoting LED (Mensah et.al. 2013: 166). The MLGRD and the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) were established with a secondary or indirect responsibility to promote LED.

In the literature, LED as a bottom-up approach to development has largely been examined from the policy and institutional perspectives, adoption of strategies and the role of LGUs, international organisations and medium scale enterprises as actors in LED in Ghana. Much attention has not been given to the financing of LED, the role of organisations in the LED process from the pre-initiation stage through to the monitoring and evaluation stage, the impact of LED on poverty reduction and the dynamics that shaped the implementation process of LED. This study, therefore, fills these gaps by not only examining some of the benefits of LED such as the employment creation, income generation, infrastructure provision and poverty reduction, how it was financed, actors in the LED process but also the dynamics in LED implementation and how these dynamics shaped the process of implementing LED using the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

### **1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY**

The general objective of the study is to discuss how the LED was implemented, how the implementation impacted poverty reduction, employment creation, income generation, and infrastructure provision, the challenges encountered and how dynamics such as politics, land tenure system, leadership will and commitment, administrative, institutional and procedural shaped the LED implementation process in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. MMDAs in Ghana are charged with the responsibility to spearhead LED implementation. The 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana in Articles 36(6d), 240(1), and 245(a), 252(1), Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) and the National Decentralization Action Plan and Policy Framework (2015-2019) have made the MMDAs the nerve centers of grassroots development through the transfer of both administrative, legal, political, social, economic, developmental and fiscal powers, authorities and functions to them.

Specifically, the study seeks to:



1. Examine the role of actors and the specific local structures in the LED process from pre-initiation stage through to the monitoring and evaluation stage in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and the dynamics involved;
2. Discuss how the LED programmes were financed in the AMA, KeMA and SODA;
3. Discuss the LED strategies implemented in the three MMDAs and the beneficent outcomes in terms of poverty reduction, job creation, income generation and infrastructure improvement;
4. Discuss the commonalities and differences between the AMA, KeMA, and SODA in terms of poverty reduction, job creation, income generation and infrastructure improvement with the aim of explaining what worked, what did not work and why;
5. Discuss the challenges of LED and how they inhibited the LED implementation process in the AMA, KeMA and SODA; and
6. Highlight the lessons and the implications for the theoretical, comparative and empirical literature.

#### **1.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY**

The AMA, KeMA and SODA have poverty rates of 10.6%, between 10% and 14.9% and 23.2% respectively. In terms of unemployment, the AMA is pegged at 7.2%, the KeMA 38% and 30.8% for the SODA (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). To reduce the rate of poverty and unemployment, the three MMDAs implemented various LED initiatives such as public private partnerships (PPPs), creation of enabling environments, infrastructure improvement, capacity development etc. The implementation of these LED initiatives and their effects on poverty reduction, employment creation, income generation, infrastructure provision as well as the dynamics at play have endeared these MMDAs to this study.

### **1.5. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY**

The study has a three-fold significance. These are as follows:

First, the study emphasizes the influence of contextual factors or variables in the design and implementation of policies and programmes through an examination of the role of local structures and actors in the LED process and how they influenced the success or failure of LED. This helps to explain the dynamics involved.

Second, the study contributes to the comparative literature in that it focuses on the commonalities and differences in the implementation and impact of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and explains what worked, what did not work and what can be done to make it work. This will enable us tease out the best practices which can be applicable to other LED initiatives in other MMDAs in Ghana. The methodology of before and after LED interventions in the three Assemblies will add useful insights into the comparative and best practices dimensions.

Third, from a policy perspective, the study shows that poverty reduction at the local level especially is still a big governance issue and problem in developing countries like Ghana and that there are emerging initiatives and interventions such as LED that can be used to address it, notwithstanding their limitations.

### **1.6. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY**

The study is structured into seven chapters. These are as follows:

Chapter 1: Introduction and conceptual framework. This chapter addresses issues on the research problem, research objectives, justification of the study, significance of the study, and organisation of the study.

Chapter 2: Literature Review. The literature review of the study is structured along the following lines:

- (a) General studies on local economic development,
- (b) African studies on local economic development,
- (c) Ghanaian studies on local economic development,
- (d) General studies on decentralisation and local governance,
- (e) African studies on decentralisation and local governance,
- (f) Ghanaian studies on decentralisation and local governance,
- (g) General studies on poverty and poverty reduction,
- (h) African studies on poverty and poverty reduction,
- (i) Ghanaian studies on poverty and poverty reduction, and
- (j) Studies on Ghanaian politics.

Chapter 3: Theoretical framework. This chapter includes the theoretical underpinnings of the study, the advantages and disadvantages of the actor-oriented approach to development intervention, the justification of the actor-oriented approach theory ahead of competing theories and how the theory will be employed to explain the research problem, objectives and findings of the study.

Chapter 4: Methodology and Research Instrument. It includes the profile of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai-Osudoku District Assemblies. The population of the study, sampling technique, sample size, tools of data collection, sources of data collection, instrument of data analysis and their strengths and weaknesses as well as the instrument for measuring poverty reduction and the philosophy underpinning the thesis will be addressed.

Chapter 5: Data Analysis. It analyzes the data collected to address issues relating to the LED strategies implemented by the MMDAs, financing of LED, the extent to which the actors' interventions facilitated the design and implementation of LED, how the local

governance structures impacted the LED process, the outputs and outcomes of LED strategies in terms of job creation, income generation, infrastructural development and poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. It also deals with some of the dynamics involved.

Chapter 6: Research Findings and Discussions. The chapter will discuss the findings of the study in the context of the theoretical, comparative, and empirical literature in LED, local governance, politics and poverty reduction. The chapter will also examine the degree to which the actor-oriented approach to development intervention positioned LED to impact poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. Some of the dynamics will again be highlighted and explained without necessarily repeating earlier ones.

Chapter 7: Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations. This will include the lessons learnt and their implications for the theoretical, comparative and empirical literature.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1. INTRODUCTION**

There is literature on local governance, poverty and poverty reduction strategies in both the developed and developing countries. In the developed countries, literature abounds on local economic development (LED) because of the commitment to deepen development. In the case of Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), however, there is limited literature because LED as an alternative approach to development is a recent phenomenon (Oduro-Ofori, 2016:18) and therefore less attention has been given to it in the local governance system. Most of the literature on LED in SSA have come from scholars and researchers in South Africa which is considered as the “laboratory” of LED in Africa (Rogerson, 2006). In Ghana, studies on LED have come from experts in local governance, public administration and rural and regional development.

The literature review is structured along ten (10) broad areas, namely, general studies on LED, African studies on LED, Ghanaian studies on LED, general studies on local governance, African studies on local governance, Ghanaian studies on local governance, general studies on poverty and poverty reduction strategies, African studies on poverty and poverty reduction strategies, Ghanaian studies on poverty and poverty reduction strategies and studies on Ghanaian politics.

#### **2.2. GENERAL STUDIES ON LED**

The LED has generally been defined as a partnership between the public, private, non-governmental organisations and local government units (LGUs) with the principal goal of creating local employment (World Bank, 2003:1; Varol, 2010:98; United Nations Human Settlement Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2005:2; Blakely, 1994:49). Blakely (1994) and

Varol (2010) extended the definition by adding that the partners in LED utilizes available local resources (human, natural materials and institutions) as well as formulating endogenous policies to create new employment opportunities for the local citizens (Blakely, 1994:49; Varol, 2010: 98). Varol (2010) and UN HABITAT (2005) posited that LED is aimed at improving the future quality of life of all people within a given geographical area with emphasis on the poor and marginalized and it is also self-sustaining (Varol, 2010:98; UN HABITAT, 2005:2).

From these explanations, it can be seen that LED is a bottom-up approach to development that is futuristic and uses all available local resources to create new employment opportunities. However, these studies did not indicate the end result of LED which is poverty reduction. This study will therefore fill this gap by examining the impact of LED on poverty reduction in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) and Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA).

Studies have also been devoted to the LED process. The LED process could be divided into two dimensions; namely, the pre-LED process and the actual LED process. First, the pre-LED process, Blakely and Bradshaw (2002:76-78) emphasized the importance of institutions in the coordination and implementation of LED and the determination of the geographic scope as preliminary activities to be undertaken before the commencement of the LED process. They identified economic development corporation as the institution to spearhead the implementation of LED and enumerated community participation, institutional or organizational leadership with vision and ability to translate this vision into reality and institutional legitimacy as the conditions for the success of LED institutions. On the geographic scope, they indicated that the area to be selected for the LED intervention is determined by the regional labour force or an equivalent interconnected

zone that is physically and economically integrated and the possibility of maximizing the area's total resource base efficiently.

Second, the actual LED process. Scholars have identified sequence of steps that are followed in the implementation of LED interventions. However, they differ in their propositions of the LED process. Blakely and Bradshaw (2002:78-80) for instance, identified data gathering and analysis of the economic situation of the locality, selection of local development strategy, selection of local development projects, building of action plans, project detail specification and the preparation of development plan and implementation as the LED process whilst Vilorio-Williams (2007:13) espoused start-up and consensus building, territorial analysis and institutional mapping, sensitizing and promoting a local forum, designing a LED strategy and action planning, implementation of LED interventions and services and feedback, monitoring and evaluation, and sustainability of LED interventions. An examination of these two LED processes reveals some similarities; such as locality analysis and diagnosis, selection of LED strategy, formulation of action plans and implementation of LED strategies. While Blakely and Bradshaw saw data collection as a key issue in the LED process, Vilorio-Williams echoed the importance of building consensus among the partners as well as building feedback, monitoring and evaluation into the LED process. My study complements Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) and Vilorio-Williams' (2007) by analyzing the LED processes in the AMA, KeMA and SODA to ascertain the extent to which the LED programmes in these MMDAs followed the LED cycle identified.

In terms of LED principles both Rice (2005:6-7) and Vilorio-Williams (2007: 12) identified the following as principles that underpin LED implementation:

1. The territorial approach. This approach emphasizes the collaboration between LGUs and other local stakeholders to implement LED interventions that results in local development. It also ensures that local resources are utilized effectively and development is seen as territorial rather than a process;

2. The integrated approach/participation and social dialogue approach. It calls for balanced development strategies through local awareness, consensus building, institutional partnerships and networking of capacities to ensure sustainable growth of LED. Vilorio-William (2007) further indicated that the success of this approach is anchored on four axes; namely, improvement of the competitive local firms, attraction of inward investment, upgrading of human capital and labour skills and upgrading of local infrastructure. Both authors identified the creation of voice for the local actors as a result of their participation in the LED process. The participation empowers the indigenes and all other actors by encouraging both horizontal and vertical cooperation and coordination among the actors thereby reducing policy overlaps.

3. Both Rice (2005) and Vilorio-William (2007) saw sustainability as a LED principle. However, they looked at it from different perspectives. While Rice (2005) argued that sustainability in LED can be attained through public private partnerships (PPPs) which gives legitimacy, sustainability and institutional confidence to the development process, Vilorio-William (2007) intimated that the involvement of the actors allowed for sharing in the beneficent outcomes of LED in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

This work extends these studies by interrogating the degree to which these principles were inculcated into the implementation of LED interventions in the three MMDAs in particular and Ghana in general and to recommend policy measures based on the findings.



Capkova (2006), World Bank (2002), Pieterse (2006), and Blakely (1994) identified LED strategies such as the provision of financial services, property related tools, marketing assistance, infrastructure development, technical and information assistance, organisational structure, training and development, provision of quality services and empowerment and regeneration of disadvantaged localities. My work will extend these studies as it discusses the LED strategies implemented and the degree to which these strategies reduced poverty in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

The UN-HABITAT (2005) added to the literature on LED strategies by defining LED strategies as process-oriented and non-prescriptive endeavours which incorporate three elements, namely;

- (i) local values such as poverty reduction, basic needs, local jobs, integration of social and environmental values;
- (ii) economic drivers which include value added resource utilization, local skills training, local income retention and regional cooperation; and
- (iii) development which encompasses the role of structural change and the quality of development (UN-HABITAT, 2005:2).

The UN-HABITAT (2005) further argued that strategic planning is a necessity for the success of LED and consequently posed four strategic questions namely, “where are we now?; where do we want to go?; how are we going to get there?; and how do we know when we have arrived?” (UN-HABITAT, 2005:3). The studies on the LED strategies were general and not focused on any specific geographical area. My study is limited to the AMA, KeMA and SODA and examines some of the factors that influenced the selection of LED strategies in each of the MMDAs and how they impacted poverty reduction.

Studies have also been undertaken on the prerequisites for successful LED implementation. Blakely and Bradshaw (2002:56) identified resource and capacity as factors that determine the success of LED implementation. They; however, pointed out that most LED interventions have concentrated on the resource aspect to the detriment of the capacity component. They argued that when capacity is given the needed priority, it has the advantage of making up for the limited resources in LED because the capacity has the tendency to turn the resources into development opportunities. The thesis will complement Blakely and Bradshaw's study by analyzing the degree to which the resources and capacity components were given priority in the implementation of LED interventions in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

With regard to success indicators in LED, Vaughan (1997) identified economic diversification and the introduction of new production as some indicators of successful LED projects. Similarly, Stohr and Fraser (1981); also indicated that the economic success of LED is related to its ability to increase production through increased private sector investment and confidence as well as increasing the turnover and investment made by local firms. Vilorio-Williams (2007:14) corroborated Vaughan (1997) and Stohr and Fraser's (1981) studies in her study which examined LED initiatives across Africa, Latin America and Eastern Europe, and enumerated eight (8) elements as success factors in LED programmes. These are; concentration on the capacity of small enterprises for improved efficiency and competitiveness, maintaining flexibility to adjust to the local environment, building on existing local structures, actors having a common direction or vision in order to ensure commitment of local, regional and national authorities, implementation of staff development schemes and proper monitoring and evaluation schemes, building connection for information and learning among local businesses, developing communication and promotion strategies, and investing and supporting LED programmes and interventions for

a period ranging between six and ten years. This study will extend these studies by not only assessing the extent to which these success indicators of LED were prevalent in the AMA, KeMA and SODA but also interrogates the degree to which these indicators culminated in the creation of employment opportunities and income generation and ultimately poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

Challenges to the implementation of LED have also been identified. They include the lack of resources, inadequate qualified personnel, human hindrances such as attitude to work, inadequate information systems, lack of systematic feedback and the absence of clear-cut responsibility, absence of poverty reduction targets and integration of the various LED partners (UNDP, 2003).

Blakely and Bradshaw (2002:180-189) identified land availability as one of the challenges to successful implementation of LED initiatives. In their view, without the control of land, LED is impossible. They further proposed that LGUs adopt creative landbanking which they defined as the practice of acquiring and improving contiguous parcels of land aimed at starting new businesses or developing new markets through the concept of community land trusts as the remedy to solving the land problem in the implementation of LED. In their opinion, LGUs could use zoning regulation tools such as incentive zoning, overlay or floating zoning and special districts (business improvement districts (BID)). This study will add up to the UNDP's work (2003) and Blakely and Bradshaw (2002) by examining the challenges faced by the AMA, KeMA and SODA in the implementation of LED, how these challenges impeded the attainment of poverty reduction and how the AMA, KeMA and SODA managed the challenges. In addition, the study will interrogate the extent to which land impacted the implementation of LED as well as the mechanisms the three MMDAs have in place to deal with the land menace.

Studies have identified both positive and negative relationships between decentralisation and economic growth. Proponents of the former include Liu and Liu (1995); Akai et. al. (2006); Stansel (2005); Nelson et. al. (2006); and Shah (1996).

Scholars such as Davoodi and Zou (1998); Xie et al. (1999); and Zhang and Zou (1998) also found a negative relationship between decentralisation and local economic growth and development. The differences in the relationship are mostly attributed to important differences in the cultural and institutional issues of the nations studied (Stansel, 2005:56).

These studies used the nation as the unit of analysis. This work will complement these studies by narrowing to LGUs using the AMA, KeMA and SODA as the unit of analysis. This will allow for the identification of the unique factors that either promoted or hindered the implementation of LED in the three Assemblies. This approach is supported by Stansel (2005), who indicated that the use of the nation as the unit of analysis is problematic because of numerous important contextual differences such as cultural and institutional differences between countries and the way to resolve this challenge is to examine small political units within a single nation (Stansel, 2005:56).

Studies by Hammond and Tuson (2009); World Bank (2003); Rusu (2014); Bateman, (2013); and Ofreneo (2007) examined the different roles of LGUs in the promotion and implementation of LED. Hammond and Tuson (2009) interrogated the relevance of government organisations for local economic growth in analyzing the impact of fiscal decentralization on county population of the United States (U.S.). Rusu (2014) indicated that LGUs should provide the necessary conditions such as basic infrastructure and urban development services for the private sector to effectively function. Bateman (2013) on the other hand advocated local state ownership of key enterprises and assets that would produce and ensure revenue flow in the city. Ofreneo (2007) intimated in a study in

Marikina City and Naga City both in the Philippines that LGUs were able to play the role of employment generation through LED when the capacity of LGUs were built in training and development. The World Bank (2003) cautioned that LGUs should actively interrogate their economic base, understand local obstacles to economic growth and investment and also pursue strategically planned programmes and projects. Goetz and Clark (1993) cited in Oduro-Ofori (2016) proposed participation, facilitation, regulation and adjustment as major roles of LGUs in the promotion of LED.

Similarly, the UN-HABITAT (2005) advocated strong and appropriate institutions as conditions necessary for the success of LED and proposed four activities that governments should undertake. These activities are:

- (i) the combination of governance with culture to gain respect, legitimacy and acceptance of the local citizens;
- (ii) the need for clear decision rules and procedures in government;
- (iii) safe political environment; and
- (iii) an enabling environment that should have a high ease of business entry and efficient regulation enforcement (UN HABITAT, 2005:4).

Cabigas (2007) broadened the literature on the role of LGUs by underscoring the importance of local governments having Public Private Partnership (PPPs) arrangements in the LED. My study will extend these studies on the role of actors by examining not only the role of LGUs in the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA but also the role of other actors such as NGOs, Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), among others and how their participation in the LED process impacted poverty reduction.

Studies have examined the specific roles and the reasons why LGUs are involved in LED programmes. Some of these are reviewed below.

Peterson (1981) enumerated the following three specific roles as the reasons why LGUs are involved in LED activities: first, economic prosperity. This is required for protecting the fiscal base of local governments and the penchant to deliver a reasonable quality of public services at reasonable tax levels; second, economic development activity is politically popular; and third, the sense of community responsibility that LGUs owe the localities hence the need to do what is good for the community. In contributing to the literature on why LGUs are involved in LED, Molotch (1976) and Logan and Molotch (1987) pointed to the existence of urban growth machine which pursues LED through land use thereby adding value to the land for the members of the growth machine. In their view, the growth machine consists of elites who are able to influence the LGUs to implement particular policies consistent with the growth machine. Pagano and Bowman (1995) singled out the importance of visionary leadership in LGUs as the main reason why LGUs got involved in LED programmes. They argued that the vision of LGUs' leadership and the kind of image (economic development goals) that they want the LGUs to attain compelled the LGU leadership to engage in development projects which creates job opportunities and sources of income generation for the indigenes. This study complements Peterson (1981), Molotch (1976) and Logan, Molotch (1987) and Pagano and Bowman (1995) by examining the reasons and the roles of the AMA, KeMA and SODA in LED.

However, the involvement of LGUs in LED is contingent. Pagano and Bowman (1995) for instance argued that LGUs threatened with fiscal survival due to disruption in revenue will automatically be actively involved in LED to search for appropriate LED policies to redress the fiscal difficulty while Wolman and Spitzley (1996) posited that LGUs characterized with fiscal equalization grants from higher levels of government or with

larger LGUs and less fragmented systems of local government, mobile capital and residents do not face the same fiscal problem hence their involvement in LED programmes will not be the same. This thesis adds up to the study of Pagano and Bowman (1995) and Wolman and Spitzley (1996) by analyzing the factors that culminated into the adoption and implementation of LED interventions in the three MMDAs.

Pike et. al. (2015) discussed the role of Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) in England as local institutions in LED and argued that these institutions work in a multi-agent and multi scalar institutional environments and the nature of the environment influenced their capacity and scope in shaping LED. They argued that though the LEPs have shaped LED through funding, integration of decision making, development of tailor-made strategies among others, they were however controlled by the centre. Their postulation confirms the findings of Ayee (2004) that centralization was masquerading itself as decentralization. My study extends Pike et.al.'s work by interrogating the LED implementation in the three MMDAs to unravel the local institutions in the MMDAs and how they contributed to the implementation of LED.

Lasimbang (2008) examined the role of indigenous people in the context of LED and indicated that indigenous people used local materials for their crafts, tools and discourages wasteful use of resources. In addition, she intimated that they were characterized by diversity of small scale economic activities and subsistence production. However, market economy and globalization threatened the existence of the indigenous people and communities. To overcome the threat posed by globalization and market economy, Lasimbang (2008) proposed the creation of a niche market for the indigenous people while at the same time encouraging them to play the "global card". The study will complement Lasimbang's by examining the factors that threatened the role of the indigenes in the AMA, KeMA and SODA in the implementation of LED.

On LED financing, Rusu (2014) indicated that the success of LED is dependent on financial stability. Bateman (2013) extended the literature on LED financing by examining the local financial systems, financial institutions and how they had in the past and might better in the future play a role in the promotion of the local enterprise sector, and in the growth and sustainable development of the local economy. These studies fell short of indicating the sources of finance for LED. My study will therefore fill this lacuna by discussing the sources of finance for LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and assess the extent to which these sources have impacted the implementation of LED in achieving poverty reduction.

Ortiz (2007) and Guiza (2007) in their respective studies identified employment generation and economic development which resulted in the reduction of poverty as some beneficent outcomes of LED in LGUs in the Philippines. They identified effective leadership, good governance practices and readiness to use local resources as success factors.

Studies by Encina (2007); Aumenttado (2007); Ibrahim (2007); and Mendooza (2007) showed that the gains from LED go beyond what were identified by Ortiz (2007) and Guiza (2007) by highlighting the importance of LED in nurturing peace and security. They also identified good governance practices as success factors in reducing tension in communities prone to conflict and bridging the gap between conflicting parties. LED outcomes such as poverty reduction, employment generation and economic stimulation also made local economies to be economically viable. This resulted in the local citizens getting involved in economic activities that put food on their tables instead of engaging in conflict and violence for their upkeep and survival (Encina, 2007:45-47; Aumenttado, 2007:49-50; Ibrahim, 2007:51-52; Mendooza, 2007:53-55). The thesis will extend these studies as it examines the degree to which LED resulted in job creation, income generation, infrastructural development, economic stimulation and poverty reduction and the extent to



which leadership and good governance practices inhibited or promoted the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA

On LED and poverty reduction, the UN-HABITAT (2005) indicated that for LED to result in effective poverty reduction, it must have inclusive economic development that allows the promotion of local wealth creation which ensures that those traditionally left out people become active participants and have access to opportunities resulting from development. Inclusiveness in their view refers to equally recognizing the formal and informal economies in the development process and the conditions necessary for LED to have the needed impact on poverty reduction (UN-HABITAT, 2005:4-5). This study will complement the UN-HABITAT's work as the study discusses the impact (if any) of LED on poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

Bond (2003) identified two conflicting approaches in LED, namely, Orthodox LED and Developmental LED. He argued that both approaches create jobs but the Orthodox LED is very capital intensive and that the claims for sustainable new jobs appear highly exaggerated. This is because the more incentives are used to attract the investments the more companies relocate mainly to chase the incentives, hence creating employment in one locality and unemployment from where they relocated.

On the politics of LED, Wolman and Spitzley (1996: 130-131) indicated that the various actors in the LED process pursue different interests. They for example; indicated that politician are engaged in LED programmes because of the electoral success that they stand to gain, credit claiming and the avoidance of blame, the indigenes' interests in the LED process was always aimed at safeguarding their economic and social survival since most LED projects brought about the need for relocation and the entrepreneurs interest is linked to the availability of economic incentives and the returns on their investments. Wolman

and Spitzley (1996:133) espoused that the decision of each actor in the LED process was based partly on the expected action of the other players. The study complements their work by interrogating the interests of the various actors in the LED process, how they were able to attain their interests and how the pursuit of these interests shaped the LED process.

In fine, the general studies on LED have been on the strategies, prerequisites for successful implementation, success factors, challenges, financing, financial institutions, PPPs, the role of LGUs, governance and effective leadership, the beneficent outcomes, the role of LED in poverty reduction and the politics of the LED process involving the actors. This study will not only extend these studies but will also fill some of the gaps by examining how LED was financed in the AMA, KeMA and SODA, the role of the actors in the LED process and how the actors shaped the LED process, the impact of LED on poverty reduction and the dynamics involved.

### **2.3. AFRICAN STUDIES ON LED**

The African studies on LED indicated some factors that led to the emergence of interest in LED. They include, among others, economic challenges, changes in the national and international economic environment, forced structural adjustment programmes, natural and political shocks and their outcomes namely, poverty, unemployment, a fall in industrial activities, debt crisis, colossal currency devaluation and the inability of governments to intervene at the local level (Nel, 2001:1004; Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2005:3; Municipal Services Project, 2001; Helmsing, 2003).

Yatta (2015) on his part attributed the emergence of LED in Africa to the economic crisis of 2008 and the stagnation that African countries experienced during the two decades preceding the crisis. He also identified other factors such as population growth and rapid urbanization on one hand and globalization on the other hand as factors that also

contributed to the adoption of LED as a development strategy in Africa. Yatta mentioned the new context of economic development which emphasized the involvement of local areas across the nations of Africa in the development process and the logic of global firms locating to local territories where they can have comparative advantage as globalization factors that influenced the adoption and implementation of LED. This study extends that of Yatta (2015) by examining the factors that triggered the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

Meyer-Stamer (2006) identified three angels of LED implementation in South Africa. These were poverty alleviation, urban planning and business-oriented angels. He indicated that the poverty alleviation angel focused on small projects which struggled because of poor governance support structures. The urban planning angel concentrated on infrastructure development. This angel of LED also suffered because investors needed immediate return on their investments, however, the projects took a long period to mature in yielding returns to the investors. The business-oriented angel dealt mostly with increasing competitiveness of a locality. This approach was reduced to paying of lip services devoid of action. This study will extend Meyer-Stamer's by examining the angels from which LED interventions were implemented in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and to assess the factors that promoted or hindered each of the angels.

The literature on the approaches to LED in Africa are copious, however, they are completely different in perspective from that of the general studies.

Yatta (2015) examined the approaches to LED using time frames. He identified three phases of LED; namely,

1. The study phase which lasts between four and six months period. This phase involves an assessment of the local economy to determine its viability for LED initiative,

2. The political dialogue or consultation phase which lasts for about six months. This phase is aimed at building a shared vision among the multiple actors, and

3. The implementation phase. This phase according to Yatta needs not be limited. It involves the rallying of the various actors for action in their individual and collective capacities.

Kamara (2017) in his study examined the approach from the actor's role perspective and proposed the hybrid centric collaborative approach to enhancing capacity for LED following the failure of both the state centric and society centric approaches. The hybrid centric collaborative approach focused on an all-encompassing governance that incorporates the contribution of the state, the private sector and civil society. Relating the concept to LED, Kamara postulated that the state maintains its orthodox role of creating an enabling environment for the functioning of the entire system, the private sector generates jobs and income and the civil society facilitates sound service delivery and mobilizes people and groups to effectively participate in development as well as supporting poverty reduction programmes by empowering citizens and pressurizing government and the private sector institutions for local accountability and public finance management.

This work complements Yatta (2015) and Kamara (2017) by interrogating the various phases of LED in the three AMA, KeMA and SODA and the roles of the state represented by the LUGs, the private sector and CSOs in the adoption and implementation of LED interventions in the AMA, KeMA and SODA, their impacts and the dynamics at play.

On the LED process, Enzama (2008) and Yatta (2015) agreed with Vilorio-Williams (2007) that LED is a process. Enzama (2008) defined the LED process as “the practical steps, methods and approaches the LED actors employ in order to facilitate capacity of

firms or clusters to upgrade” (Enzama, 2008:10). Both Enzama (2008) and Yatta identified five steps in the LED process. The former’s process include organizing the efforts, strategic analysis and planning, selecting the LED strategy, implementing the LED strategy and reviewing the LED strategy whilst the later identified assessing the local economy, moving from knowledge to vision and then programmes, translation of programmes into projects and the prioritization and selection of projects through the dialogue process, translation of the LED strategy into action plan and finally the implementation and monitoring of the LED strategy. A close examination of the processes espoused by the authors revealed that the processes were basically the same. The difference between the processes is not semantics but rather the choice of words. This study complements these studies by discussing the processes adopted by the AMA, KeMA and SODA in the implementation of their LED programmes.

Some of the studies focused on the social and economic benefits. Socially, the implementation of LED strategies have empowered local societies and generated local dialogue as the local citizens participated in decisions affecting them. The LED process also made local institutions more transparent and accountable thereby strengthening the growth and development of CSOs. From the economic perspective, LED strategies generated sustainable employment in enterprises more capable of enduring changes in the global economic environment and also they contributed in attaining goals of decent work (Rodriguez-Pose, 2001:10, 2009b:11; Helmsing, 2002, 2003; ILO, 2008a).

Challenges such as lack of government capacity, poor governance, data shortcomings, lack of funding, conceptual impression and theoretical underdevelopment, poor LED networks and unsustainable knowledge platforms were some of the factors that constrained the success of LED (Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007:528–533, Hofisi et.al. 2013).

On financing LED, Patterson (2008) espoused that LGUs got funds for financing LED programmes either through Internally Generated Funds (IGF) or from higher government tiers. She posited that LED has no secured funding sources and as such there was reliance on unpredictable charitable donors such as the World Bank, European Union, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department for International Development (DFID) among others (Patterson, 2008:11-15). This study extends the study of Patterson (2008) as it discusses the sources of financing LED in the three MMDAs.

Other scholars also examined LED as an alternative approach to development in Africa and identified strategic planning, interdependence of the various actors and instruments such as local taxation, local public spending and borrowing and inter-communality as factors necessary for the success of LED (Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2005:2-3; Helmsing, 2003:68; Yatta, 2009:301-306).

Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, (2005) like the UN-HABITAT (2005) argued that the success of LED is conditioned on strategic planning which provided a more flexible and effective approach to simultaneously enhance economic growth and reduce poverty (Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2005:2-3). Helmsing, (2003) also posited that the success of LED depended on the interdependence of the various actors. Put differently, the success of LED requires collective and public action for the programming and delivery of the various actors (Helmsing, 2003:68).

Yatta, (2009) expanded the literature on LED by discussing the governance aspect through the concept of local economic governance which is referred to as the body of regulations of sub national territories aimed at generating jobs and income essentially focusing on the competitiveness of local economies and the improvement of living conditions of populations. He also intimated that the success of LED largely depended on three

instruments namely, local taxation, local public spending and borrowing and inter-communality (Yatta, 2009:301-306).

Schuuman (1993) and Binns and Nel (1999) also argued that LED as an alternative approach to development may be able to offer a more people-centred and locality specific alternative approach to the structural adjustment programmes that dominated the development policy panorama in SSA for the past decades which failed to adequately address the changing reality on the continent.

My study will extend these studies by examining the degree to which the conditions necessary for the success or otherwise of LED impacted LED implementation in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and also assesses how local taxation, public spending and borrowing impacted the financing of LED.

Studies by Helmsing (2003), and Rogerson and Rogerson (2010) also identified the LED actors. Whilst Helmsing (2003) identified local government, community organisations, local producers and their associations and their roles in the promotion of LED, Rogerson and Rogerson (2010) counselled that the actors, especially small towns and LGUs should be strengthened to make them attractive and viable, and there should be engagement between LGUs and entrepreneurs to ensure local sourcing and supplier linkages.

Nyawo and Mubangizi (2015) also examined the role of LGUs as actors in LED and indicated that the LGUs (Municipality) assisted the informal economy through business support for such as training in business management. However, lack of capacity, lack of cooperation between the municipality and other actors, politicization of the LED, and unnecessary bureaucracy negatively affected service delivery during the implementation of LED in the Mtubatuba Municipality (Nyawo and Mubangizi, 2015: 1-15).

On the actors, the African studies like the general studies concentrated on the role of LGUs in the implementation of LED. The Republic of Namibia (2008) extended the studies on the actors by classifying the actors into two. These are public and social actors. The former comprises of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), regional and traditional authorities and the latter consists of employers, NGOs, community-based organisations (CBOs) and faith-based organisations. Yatta (2015) narrowed the actors in the implementation of LED to only the local ones. He enumerated the Municipal Council, Local LED Committees, Dialogue groups and Local Communities as the main actors. In his view, these actors mobilize the needed resources for the successful implementation of LED strategies. This study will again fill the gap by examining the role of these and other actors in the adoption and implementation of LED.

On LED initiatives, Helmsing (2003) indicated that there are three new generations of LED initiatives; namely, community economic development, enterprise development and locality development and it is from these initiatives that LED programmes, interventions and strategies are derived. Strategies such as “One Village One Product” (OVOP) in Malawi, beekeeping in the West Nile in Uganda, tourism, Multi-Purpose Community Centres (MPCC) in South Africa among others have been examined in Africa (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010; Enzama, 2008; Edoun and Jahed, 2009). Rogerson and Rogerson (2010) advised that the effectiveness of the strategies hinges on their ability to create an enabling local business environment for small enterprise development. Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005:17) continued the discussion on enabling environments by outlining three forms of enabling environments in LGUs. These are: economic hardware, economic software and organisational capacity or “orgware”. They stressed that the existence of these enabling environments resulted in the flourishing of LED. The studies on LED initiatives will be complemented by examining the forms of initiatives implemented in the



AMA, KeMA and SODA and their impact on job creation, income generation, infrastructural development and poverty reduction.

The African literature on LED also examined legal and institutional regimes and their impact on the success of LED.

Rogerson and Rogerson (2010) and Patterson (2008) underscored the importance of legislative frameworks and their roles in establishing and strengthening PPPs to promote LED activities in South Africa. Similarly, Khumalo (2015) in a four-country study in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa indicated that all the countries had robust legal regimes in place for effective implementation of LED.

Success in LED was hindered in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe because the role of local structures and leaders were unclear, the system was used for political control by central governments, there was lack of community participation while in South Africa the challenge was tension between national direction and locality preferred choices. All the four countries had resource constraints (human and financial) as factors that militated against LED (Khumalo, 2015).

My study will extend these studies on legal frameworks by examining the legal, policy and structural frameworks in Ghana's local governance system and how they shaped the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and also assesses how these frameworks facilitated or hindered the implementation of LED.

Masuku et. al (2014) in their discussion on LED revealed that LED served as a means of creating job opportunities and income generation, however, the lack of entrepreneurship skills undermined the ability of the local citizens to establish and own businesses. Masuku et. al. (2014) like Khumalo (2015) and Nyawo and Mubangizi (2015) pointed out bottlenecks such as communication breakdown, lack of community participation in the

LED process and the politicization of the entire LED programme as reasons accounting for LED projects not addressing the economic needs of the Big 5 False Bay Local Municipality.

Ramukumba (2012) in contributing to the literature on the objectives of LED such as employment creation, income generation, poverty reduction etc. explained how the tourism potential of LGUs can be tapped to achieve the objectives. Ramukumba (2012) asserted that businesses owned by emerging entrepreneurs were making positive contribution to LED objectives through the creation of employment for community members. The employment created resulted in poverty reduction and improved standard of living for the local citizens. Ramukumba (2012) buttressed the views expressed by other scholars by reechoing the point that the sustenance of LED programmes is dependent on LGUs' support.

On the linkage between LED and poverty reduction, Nel (2001) proposed that the focus of LED on poverty reduction and job creation should be sustained. His study showed a mixed result of the impact of LED on poverty reduction. Whilst LED nearly resulted in the creation of full employment in the tourism sector, only few dozen jobs were generated in the mining sector where thousand jobs were lost. He identified internal constraints, lack of resources and capacity, lack of financial transfers, non-inclusion of the private sector, among others, as the causes of the negative situation (Nel, 2001: 1003-1024). Similarly, the Isandla Institute of the Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) in 1998 also concluded that while LED was well understood and rigorously applied, it did not significantly improve the lives of the poor. My study will not only complement these studies by assessing the impact of LED on poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA but also examine the dynamics in the three MMDAs that accounted for the impact.

In summary, African studies on LED like the general studies also focused on the reasons for the adoption of LED, the strategies, financing and the merits and demerits. However, the African studies extended the merits by grouping them into social and economic ones and also discussed the sources of funding LED and the challenges. In addition, the African literature also dealt with the constraints that militated against the successful implementation of LED. Furthermore, it examined the legal and policy regimes and how they impacted LED. The concept of good governance and approaches to LED were addressed. The impact of LED on poverty reduction was also addressed. However, no extensive study has been conducted on the role of the other actors apart from LGUs in the LED process. This study will fill the gap on the role of actors by examining the roles and the interests of the other actors in the LED process from pre-initiation stage through to the monitoring and evaluation stage in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and how these shaped the LED process. In addition, my study will also add to the literature on the sources of financing LED and the impact of LED on poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA by discussing what works, what does not work and why and the dynamics in the three MMDAs.

#### **2.4. GHANAIAN STUDIES ON LED**

Oduro-Ofori (2016) indicated that LGUs do not have a clear and long-term LED strategy to follow. He attributed this to the issuance of the four-year periodic guidelines from national development policy by the NDPC. As a result, MMDAs identify programmes, projects and initiatives that are pro-LED for the short term. The absence of a long-term LED strategy for MMDAs compelled them not to have specific policies on the promotion of LED. Consequently, MMDAs promoted LED based on the resource endowment of the local area. He agreed with the assertion of Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, (2005) and UN-HABITAT (2005) that the adoption and implementation of a strategic local economic

development policy which meets the needs of the LGUs is a prerequisite for effective LED (Oduro-Ofori, 2016:23, 28).

In contributing to the literature on the process of LED, the Republic of Ghana's MLGRD (2014) like Vilorio- Williams (2007) and Enzama (2008) also indicated that LED is a process. The Republic of Ghana (2014:17) identified pre-initiation, initiation, diagnostic analysis, LED stakeholders dialogue, implementation of LED action plan, resource mobilization and monitoring and evaluation as the processes. A careful review of the process also shows that the LED process starts with a trigger which varies from territory to territory but the process ends with monitoring and evaluation. Comparing this process with that of Vilorio-Williams (2007) and Enzama (2008), the Republic of Ghana (2014) made provision for resource mobilization which the other two authors failed to do. My study will add up by examining the degree to which these processes were followed in the adoption and implementation of LED interventions in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

On LED strategies and initiatives, Ofei-Aboagye (2009) identified micro-credit provision, agro-processing, structural development, health and educational activities, upgrading the skills of artisans, etc. as LED interventions. Mensah et. al. (2013) extended Ofei-Aboagye's study through the identification of four main LED initiatives in the Atebubu-Amantin District Assembly and challenges faced in their implementation. First is; agriculture because of its beneficent outcome of growth and poverty reduction in rural areas. Second are; infrastructure programmes such as roads, market and electricity. The dividend for this initiative was the possibility of leading to higher farm and non-farm productivity, employment creation and income generation. Third is; human resource development, which is meant to develop the technical competence of the farmers in modern practices such as the management and use of irrigation facilities, manure and fertilizer application and that of entrepreneurs in conceptual and managerial aspects of

business. Fourth is; financial assistance for businesses. This initiative helped in reducing poverty by generating income, creating jobs, allowing children to go to school, enabling families to obtain healthcare and empowering people to make choices that best served their needs. (Mensah et. al. 2013).

Similarly, Oduro-Ofori (2016) identified the following as LED initiatives adopted by MMDAs:

1. municipal development planning and implementation;
2. provision of infrastructure;
3. permitting land use planning and physical development;
4. provision of extension services and training programmes;
5. support and implementation of government, ministry, department and agency development programmes and projects; and
6. skills provision, training programmes and the provision of credit facilities.

To him, LED has had minor impact due to the focus on “hardware” aspect of LED which was infrastructure instead of the “software” aspect which encompasses training programmes, access to credit and other intangible strategies that promote local economic development (Oduro-Ofori, 2016:26).

Oduro-Ofori (2016) extended the study on the actors by identifying local government institutions such as the Business Advisory Centre (B.A.C.), Agriculture Development Unit, the Office for National Culture, Departments of Town and Country Planning, Cooperatives, Works and Community Department as well as Sub-Committees such as Development Planning, Culture, Tourism and Agriculture as directly involved in LED promotion at the various LGUs (Oduro-Ofori, 2016:25). Both Mensah et.al. (2013) and Oduro-Ofori (2016) identified lack of institutional coordination between the local

government institutions as a hindrance to the effective performance of these institutions to promote LED. Other challenges include lack of finance, inadequate agricultural assistance, poor road network and other infrastructure and market accessibility, inadequate technical and incompetent human resource to provide the required skills in order to customize the training to suit the needs of their beneficiaries, ineffective coordination among the District Assembly (DA) and development partners, improper targeting of beneficiaries and lack of capacity to monitor and evaluate the impact of the programmes (Mensah et.al. 2013). This work will extend these studies by examining the role of the local government actors, development partners and the private sector in LED, discuss how their roles and interests promoted or hindered the implementation of LED and the dynamics that accompanied their involvement and consequently, how LED impacted poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

Ghanaian studies also focused on the policy perspectives of LED. Mensah et. al. (2017) analyzed the policy trajectory of LED implementation in Ghana from the pre-independence era to date and described the period preceding 1987 as the “lost decades of LED implementation” because development plans were mostly top-down with little or no input from the grassroots and these development plans were sectorial rather than territorial. They described the period from 1988 where Ghana started implementing decentralization, the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, the passage of various Acts of Parliament and national development frameworks that promoted the role of MMDAs in local development and preparation of the National LED policy and its operational Manual by the MLGRD as the period of “policy maturity”. Mensah et. al. (2013a) similarly identified the 1992 Constitution, DACF, Ghana Vision 2020, GPRS 1, and GPRS 2 as some legislative policies and frameworks of LED. Mensah et. al. (2013b) concentrated on the policy and institutional perspectives of LED. They identified the NDPC, MMDAs, MLGRD, Ghana

Regional Appropriate Technology Industrial Services (GRATIS) projects, rural banks and traditional authorities as the institutional frameworks for LED.

Oduro-Ofori (2016) added to the literature on the policy and institutional frameworks by indicating that though these frameworks supported MMDAs in the promotion of LED, they failed to specifically stipulate what the MMDAs are supposed to do and how. In addition, the frameworks also failed to provide sanctions to MMDAs which did not actively get involved in LED (Oduro-Ofori, 2016: 23). The study will extend these studies by examining how the policy and institutional frameworks shaped the implementation of the LED and the dynamics involved and fill the gap by assessing the impact of LED on poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

Akudugu (2013) identified the top-down approach to implementation, poor formulation of national LED policy that was incapable of providing strategic direction for LED promotion, capacity constraints of the MMDAs, and multiple and divergent actor rationalities as the bane of LED promotion at the MMDAs. This thesis complements that of Akudugu (2013) as it discusses the challenges faced and how they hindered or promoted the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA

On the typology of LED programmes implemented in Ghana, scholars had varied views. Whiles Mensah et. al. (2017) identified five variations of LED in Ghana; namely, central-government led LED, local-government championed LED, local organizations and local NGO-spearheaded LED, international organization-initiated LED and individual –led LED. Akudugu and Laube (2013) on their part stated traditional LED and contemporary LED as the variations. My study complements these studies by analyzing the LED implementation of the AMA, KeMA and SODA to unravel the variation of LED implemented and the factors that necessitated the choice of the typology.

Some studies have focused on the role of international organizations in LED implementation in Ghana, Akudugu and Laube (2013:6) and Mensah et. al. (2017) identified the ILO, GIZ and UNDP as actors. Whereas Akudugu and Laube (2013) saw the actors as drivers of LED in Ghana, Mensah et.al. (2017) opined that these international organizations have reinvigorated the spirit of LED in Ghana. Both set of authors intimated that though these organisations used different approaches, they however had the search for endogenous development based on local actors, resources and capacities as their prime focus. Sustenance of the interventions in the MMDAs where these international organisations' initiatives were implemented was identified as the challenges after the exit of the international organizations from the MMDAs since there were no alternative sources of funding the interventions apart from the funds provided by the international organizations. My study extends these studies by examining the role of international organisations in the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and to assess the mechanisms of sustenance in place.

The study by Akudugu and Laube (2013) also analyzed the enabling environment for LED implementation in Ghana. They identified that the environment for LED implementation was disenabling because of the intact power relation between the NDPC which made LED a top-down development prescription, imposition of LED intervention on the citizens by the MMDAs, political pressure, weak private sector, inadequate human and financial resources and capacity, varying rationalities and interests of actors hence LED not flourishing (Akudugu and Laube, 2013:9-11, 14). This study will complement that of Akudugu and Laube (2013) by examining the extent to which enabling environment for LED was created in the three MMDAs since they used only the Bongo District for their study.



From the literature on LED in Ghana, it can be deduced that extensive studies have not been explicitly conducted on establishing the effect of LED on job creation, income generation and poverty reduction. This study will therefore fill these gaps by not only examining the impact of LED on poverty reduction but also how LED was financed, the role of the actors and how their interests shaped the LED implementation process and the dynamics involved to be able to tease out the differences and similarities in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

## **2.5. STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

### **2.5.1. Meaning of Local Government and Local Governance**

Local government is generally seen as the public organizations authorized to decide and administer public policies within a relatively small geographical area (locality) which is a sub division of a regional or national government. In this study, local government is construed to mean Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) and all state actors operating at the local government level.

Local governance refers to a polycentric system in which a variety of actors are engaged in local public decision-making process (Denters, 2011:313). Olowu and Wunsch (2004:4) defined local governance as a rule-governed process through which residents of a defined area participate in their own governance in limited but locally important matters; they are the key decision-makers in determining what their priority concerns are; how they will respond to them, and what and how resources will be raised to deal with those concerns; and are the key decision makers in managing and learning from those responses. They continued to argue that the representatives of the local residents may and frequently perform these decision making functions as agents and remain accountable to (and removable by) the people through procedures specified by law (Local Governance Act, 2016, Act 936 as in Ghana). Their choices and limits are structured through rules

determined by the larger political systems of which they are part. Thus intergovernmental relations are a key factor affecting the nature of the governance regime.

From the above meanings of local government and local governance, it is abundantly clear that the former deals with state actors implementing public policy to bring about development (LED) in a locality while the latter refers to the interaction of these actors, the institutions, rules and regulations that govern their interactions.

The definitions also bring to the fore governance indicators for local government units. Governance indicators are measurements that describe and evaluate LGUs ability to govern. The indicators are grouped into process and outcome. The process indicators consist of the extent to which clear goals such as poverty reduction, infrastructure provision etc are set for the public and the degree to which the LGUs problems are resolved through the political process. The outcome indicators on the other hand concentrates on the ability of LGUs to govern their respective localities. The indicators are made up of LGUs ability to raise revenue, the strength of the legal system, the success rate of implementing policies, the realization of policy goals and the extent of poverty, levels of freedom and participation (Bevir, 2009:96-97).

## **2.6. GENERAL STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

Most of the literature focused on the meaning or definition, why the shift to local governance, the benefits, setbacks, and the typology (Turner and Hulme, 1997, Saito, 2011, Denters, 2011).

Empirical studies on local governance have been on its effects on economic performance (Saito, 2011), benefits of decentralisation as an aspect of good governance (Smith, 2009), local governance and changes in local politics and government (Denters, 2011). This study will extend these studies by examining the extent to which the economic and fiscal

decentralisation impacted LED and also examines how LED impacted poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

## **2.7. AFRICAN STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

Studies on local governance in Africa generally focused on the following thematic areas:

- (i) different dimensions of governance such as accountability, autonomy and capacity, the typologies of decentralisation (Wunsch, 2014; Olowu, 2001);
- (ii) framework of analysis such as financing arrangements, decision making powers, personnel management, accountability mechanisms, involvement of other institutional actors and competition among political parties at the local level to determine the effectiveness of decentralisation (Olowu, 2001);
- (iii) factors necessary for effective local government (Wunsch, 1998);
- (iv) constitutional, legal and administrative environment of local government (Olowu, 2012; Kiwanuku, 2012; Bergh, 2013); and
- (v) local government reform programme (Kessy and McCourt, 2013).

Wunsch (2014); emphasized that the adoption and implementation of decentralisation led to increase in the legal, fiscal and administrative authority of sub national governments (SNGs) and also resulted in the achievement of other dimensions of governance such as: autonomy, accountability and capacity. He also argued that autonomy remains quite restricted by several top down forces especially the control exercised by state authorities and by the dominant political parties in many African countries. There is some downward accountability of SNGs to local citizens through increasingly institutionalized subnational elections but accountability in many cases continues to flow mostly upward to actors at the centre. He also identified capacity challenge as a bane to effective decentralisation in

Africa. In his view, decentralisation in many African countries exhibits a paradox in that it both strengthened central authority as much as it weakens it (Wunsch, 2014:2).

Wunsch (2014) like other authors identified three forms of decentralisation, namely, deconcentration, devolution and delegation. He further identified four dimensions of governance which are relevant to decentralisation which are: autonomy, accountability, authority and capacity. In his opinion, only when the appropriate mixes of these dimensions in quality are present can we expect LGUs to be effective and responsible vehicles for action. The various forms of decentralisation initiative emphasizes different levels of these qualities (Wunsch, 2014:1)

Olowu (2001) in an evaluation of African Democratic Decentralisation in Ethiopia, Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana used financing arrangements, decision making powers, personnel management, accountability mechanisms, involvement of other institutional actors and competition among political parties at the local level as the framework of analysis. Olowu (2001) indicated that in the area of financing arrangements the LGUs in all the countries relied on the central government for the transfer of funds. All the countries were empowered to generate and manage their IGFs. In the case of decision making, there were varied means. Whereas in countries like Ethiopia and Ghana, the LGUs had elective offices, in Uganda, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria, the LGUs decision making power was in the area of budget approval.

With respect to personnel management, LGUs personnel were paid by and responsible to the central governments in all countries except Ethiopia where the regional state does this. It is instructive to note that in Ghana, the personnel of the following departments: central administration, finance, education, youth and sports, agriculture, physical planning, waste

management etc. are some categories of LGUs personnel responsible solely to the LGUs (Republic of Ghana, 2016: 47, 110).

In the area of accountability mechanisms, diverse mechanisms were identified. For instance, Ethiopia had in place institutional mechanisms such as Tender Boards and Local Government Public Accounts Committee and Local Government Auditor to enhance accountability. Cote d'Ivoire had an election mechanism where the mayor and the deputies were elected. There was minimum accountability to the people due to local government chief executives monopolizing power at the expense of the local government councils in Nigeria. In Ghana, the accountability mechanism was an election by two-thirds of members of the MMDAs present and voting after the president had nominated Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs). This made the MMDCEs accountable to the central government.

In the case of involvement or participation of other institutional actors, there was little involvement of the private sector and non-state organisations in Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria, whilst there was active engagement and involvement of the private sector and NGOs in the provision and delivery of basic services in Ghana and Uganda (Olowu, 2001).

With regard to competition among political parties at the local level, the ruling party in Ethiopia neutralized the other political parties while Ghana's local governance system frowned on party politics (Olowu, 2001:14-23).

The study will complement that of Olowu (2001) by narrowing to specific MMDAs in Ghana (AMA, KeMA and SODA), examine the degree to which the framework of analysis he used impacted local governance in the AMA, KeMA and SODA, how these promoted or hindered the implementation of LED and impacted on poverty reduction.

Wunsch (1998) in a comparative analysis of LGUs in South Africa, Botswana and Swaziland identified three factors as necessary for effective local government. These factors were; resources, authority, and a working grassroots-based political process. In his opinion, greater levels of each of these were expected to be positively associated with improved local government performance. He indicated that a working grassroots-based political process included internal operations and was essential for the appropriate delivery of services for local needs.

In comparative terms, Wunsch (1998) indicated that Botswana rated the highest in all the three independent variables followed by South Africa with strong resources and authority while Swaziland lagged behind with limited resources, authority, and a local political process because its decentralisation was only a few years “old”.

Wunsch (1998) concluded that local governments in Southern Africa presented a mixed but not discouraging picture and intimated that the variance among the three countries can be explained by their respective environments and policy choices.

This thesis will extend the study of Wunsch by examining the degree to which the independent variables he identified impacted local governance in Ghana and its influence on the promotion and implementation of LED using the AMA, KeMA and SODA as case studies. Furthermore, the study will single out the working grassroots-based political process as a factor and assess the dynamics it brought to the implementation of LED and poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. This factor is selected because LED is considered a bottom-up approach to development and grassroots-based organisations are very vital in its success.

Olowu (2012) in a study on the “constitutionalization” of LGUs in Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Ghana showed that these countries have had mixed results. The

“constitutionalization” of local government resulted in (re)democratization, accountability, participation of all segments of society, empowerment of local citizens as well as the transfer of power and authority from central governments to LGUs.

However, Olowu (2012) intimated that the laws served as an impediment to effective local government administration. He identified the following as the impediments:

(i) The laws were structured in such a way that LGUs became appendages of central governments. For instance, in Ghana, the laws allowed the central governments to appoint people to the MMDAs which resulted in elite capture where central government leaders appointed their cronies onto the various assemblies.

2. The reliance of LGUs on central government for financial transfers also limited the fiscal autonomy of LGUs in all the four countries. This made the central government to impose projects on the LGUs and also earmarked how such transferred funds should be used. The reliance on the central government for transfer of funds had implications on the borrowing capacity, capacity to award contracts and select own contractors as well as the capacity to impose tax at the local level.

3. Weak capacity of the LGUs in terms of human resource. This was mostly due to the reliance of the LGUs on central governments to transfer the requisite human resource. This did not only make the LGUs to lack the competent human resource but also the transferred personnel saw themselves as accountable to the central government instead of the local citizens.

4. Coordination issues between the variety of institutional actors within the nation state and LGUs.

In a similar study, Kiwanuku explored local government’s institutional challenges to good governance in Uganda and concluded that the legal-administrative environment slowed

good governance. He pointed out that the legal-administrative structures and provisions hampered citizens' level of involvement and dynamism to effectively engage LGUs. The lack of timely and adequate information also greatly limited citizen participation. The lack of capacity of LGUs to hire and retain competent personnel frustrated the performance of SNGs. Kiwanuku recommended that central governments should formulate policies that supports the inclusion of all citizens, strengthening institutional policy reform processes and empowering local government structures to support genuine political and administrative independence.

Kessy and McCourt (2013) revealed that local government reform programmes in Tanzania led to significant devolution of authority and resources. They also identified persistent capacity deficits, increased financial dependence on the central government and political and institutional constraints as factors that undermined the achievements and the intentions of the reformers (Kessy and McCourt, 2013: 109-117).

My study will extend the studies of Olowu, Kiwanuku and Kessy and McCourt's by interrogating how the constitutional and legal-administrative provisions impacted the implementation of LED and assess the degree to which its implementation impacted poverty reduction, job creation, income generation and infrastructural development using the AMA, KeMA and SODA as case studies.

Bergh (2013) argued that the conditions for local state-society synergy was absent in rural Morocco. She intimated that there was growth of CBOs at the local level following the participatory development projects. However, this did not reflect in the expansion of civil society that could engage in partnerships with LGUs, either for service provision or co-governance due to the lack of capacity and most of the CBOs were used as instruments by political actors for clientelist purposes (Bergh, 2013: 160-171). My study complements



that of Bergh as it examines the role of CBOs and other actors in the local governance system and LED process in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and highlights the dynamics that their roles brought on board.

## **2.8. GHANAIAN STUDIES ON LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

Ayee (2004) described Ghana's decentralisation as a top-down one or recentralization which is initiated by the central government. He identified lack of financial and administrative autonomy of the MMDAs and lack of political will and commitment of the central government to devolve power to the MMDAs as the reasons for his assertion (Ayee, 2004:125-154).

Ayee and Dickovick (2014), contrary to Ayee (2004) indicated that decentralisation in Ghana resulted in the formal transfer and distribution of authority, power and resources to elected officials at the subnational level. However, they like Ayee (2004) identified autonomy, accountability and capacity as factors which constrained the flourishing of local governance (Ayee and Dickovick, 2014:91-111).

Awortwi (2013) applied the evolutionary theory of path dependency theory to explain the past, present and future trajectories of decentralisation and local government institutional development in Ghana and Uganda. He indicated that Uganda made a little progress more than Ghana in strengthening local government institutions (Awortwi, 2013:40-51).

On local governance finance, two main sources of finance have been identified (Oduro-Ofori, 2016: 29; Ayee and Dickovick, 2014: 96; Guy et.al. 2013:105-156, Ayee, 2004: 135,). While scholars are unanimous on the DACF as a governmental transfer to the MMDAs, there appears to be a division on the other source. For instance, Ayee (2004) and Ayee and Dickovick (2014) identified ceded revenue which consists of entertainment duty, casino revenue tax, gambling tax, betting tax among other centrally collected funds by the

Internal Revenue Service (now Domestic Tax Unit of the Ghana Revenue Authority). These monies were transferred to the MLGRD which then shared them among the MMDAs.

Guy et. al. (2013), on the other hand indicated local taxation which include property rates, royalties from the sale of natural resources, ground rent, fees for the exercise of business activities, fines and rent. Related to the local taxation is IGFs which includes rates, lands, fees and fines, licenses, rents and investment incomes. The IGFs are low due to the following reasons: tax bases of the MMDAs are static and limited, complex structures in terms of planning for revenue collection, ineffective mechanisms for collecting internal revenue and absence of appropriate sanctions for tax defaulters (Ayee and Dickovick, 2014:96). Oduro-Ofori (2016) also stated that the District Development Fund (DDF) is the second source of finance available to MMDAs. The DDF is a performance based fund given to LGUs based on their performance following the implementation of the proposed development activities by MMDAs. The LGUs are annually assessed using the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT) and the LGUs that passed the assessment were provided with funds. The bulk of the facility comes from Ghana's development partners (Oduro-Ofori, 2016: 30).

The DACF is a fund which initially directed that 5 percent (later increased to 7.5 percent in 2008) of the total revenue of Ghana shall be shared among the MMDAs on the basis of a formula approved by parliament annually. The DACF amounts to 37 percent of revenues for the MMDAs (Ayee and Dickovick, 2014: 96, Guy et. al. 2013).

In contributing to local governance finance and development, Ahwoi (2017:254-263) indicated that the DACF is to ensure "even and balanced development between the deprived and under-developed districts on one hand and the endowed and relatively

developed districts on the other hand. However, the fund could not achieve this because of factors such as the application of the principle of equality to existing inequalities which only perpetuated unequal development, service pressure on the MMDAs, great expectations from the fund, less priority given to developmental issues in the utilization of the fund, unacceptable sharing formula of the fund, among others.

Local governance finance in Ghana is fraught with challenges such as autonomy constraints imposed by the DACF Act, 1993 (Act 455) in the utilization of the DACF, earmarking by central government of how the fund should be spent by the MMDAs, MMDCEs abuse of disbursement procedures among others. In addition the MMDAs also lacked the requisite human and technical capacity to mobilize and generate revenue in their jurisdictions (Ayee, 2004:136, Ayee and Dickovick, 2014:97, Oduro-Ofori, 2016:30).

Appiah-Agyekum et. al. (2013) remarked that the absence of legislative instrument on the management of the Members of Parliament's share of the District Assembly Common Fund (MPsCF) is a challenge in local government finance. They also indicated that the monitoring of the fund was a shared responsibility between the Local Government Agencies such as the audit and finance departments and other external stakeholders like the Auditor General's Department and also the effectiveness of monitoring the disbursement and utilization of the MPsCF was strongly influenced by the relationship between the DCE and the MPs in the local government area.

This study will extend these studies on local governance finance as it examines how financial sources available to the AMA, KeMA and SODA assisted in financing LED and consequently how it contributed to poverty reduction.

On accountability in Ghana's local governance system, Ayee (2004) identified two folds of accountability. These are; accountability by the MMDCEs to the MMDAs and

accountability by the MMDAs to the public. In his view, accountability to the MMDAs is weak because the MMDCEs are centrally appointed while their offices serve as the nerve centres of the MMDAs. In addition, there is strong central government presence at the LGUs due to the appointment of 30 percent of the MMDAs' membership by the president. This has blurred accountability in the MMDAs as these government appointees served as "watchdogs" (Ayee, 2004:142). For the MMDAs to be accountable, two requirements were identified, namely, a broad set of responsibilities assigned to the MMDA members and potential revocation of the mandate or appointment of an MMDA member using legal provisions in the Local Governance Act. Local political and accountability process also depends on the ability of the MMDAs to cooperate and work with CSOs (Ayee, 2004: 144-146; Ayee and Dickovick, 2014: 98).

Lack of knowledge of the rights and responsibilities of the local electorate, access to relevant information, and time and resources to organize and present demand as well as the feeling of powerlessness and disillusionment were identified as drawbacks to local citizens demanding for accountability (Ofei-Aboagye, 2008:255, 258). Ofei-Aboagye (2008:244) posited that political decentralization is the most visible of all the approaches to decentralisation. The other approaches, namely, administrative, fiscal, decentralized planning and management of PPPs experienced various challenges such as the local level PPPs being an evolving phenomenon with the larger (Metropolitan and Municipal) assemblies venturing into collaboration with the formal private sector. The smaller assemblies have been limited to contracting private operators to assist in revenue collection and waste disposal services. Checks and balances were also built into the system through the roles allocated to various actors. However, these provisions have not worked well due to the partisan national political environment (Ofei-Aboagye, 2008:244). My study will extend that of Ofei-Aboagye as it examines how the AMA, KeMA and SODA deployed

PPPs in the implementation of LED and the impact it had on job creation, income generation, infrastructural development and poverty reduction.

Ayee (2013) like Wunsch (2014) intimated that decentralisation is a “paradox” in Africa in that it functions both as a tool in conflict resolution and prevention while its implementation can also create conflict. This study extends that of Ayee by discussing the degree to which decentralisation contributed to LED in creating viable local economies for the local citizens to channel their potentials into productive activities instead of engaging in activities that can create tension and conflict and its associated negative impacts.

Ahwoi (2017:181-188) interrogated the role of strategic leadership on effective local level development in Ghana. He emphasized the importance of strategic leadership in local development. He identified changes in the structure, personnel and objectives in Ghana’s local governance system as factors necessitating the need for strategic leadership. He singled out the MMDCE who is the embodiment of political leadership at the local level as the one to provide the needed vision, the direction and the purpose for the assembly. In addition, the MMDCE must engage in “outside-the-box” thinking to ensure stability, induce confidence and generate future growth. For effective local level development, Ahwoi proposed the concept of local strategic partnerships where the MMDCE builds consensus with stakeholders such as the MP, the chiefs and traditional authorities, local leadership of political parties, organized labour, CSOs, CBOs, NGOs, and the residents. This thesis will complement Ahwoi’s work by discussing the role of political leadership and local level stakeholders, their interests and how their involvement in the LED implementation process impacted the choice of LED interventions in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

## **2.9. GENERAL STUDIES ON POVERTY REDUCTION**

The general studies on poverty reduction have focused on the strategies of poverty reduction, the challenges, the causes of poverty, and the use of aid as a poverty reduction strategy. The general studies also indicated that a single policy cannot be implemented in poverty reduction; rather a blend of policies with sustainable growth anchored on the poor participating and sharing in the proceeds of the policy through job creation, income generation etc. (Cromwell et.al. 2005:26, Handley et.al., 2009:34, Khan, 2009:16, Chibba, 2008:199).

Leonard (1989) posited that the environment and poverty have reciprocal impact on each other. Using the “vicious cycle” argument of the relationship between poverty and the environment, he indicated that poverty alleviation is likely to reduce environmental degradation in the long-run, and arresting and reversing environmental decline is likely to help the poor out of poverty.

These studies used the nation state as the unit of analysis. My study complements these studies as it analyzes poverty reduction from the perspective of local governance and also fills the gap through the examination of how LED as a development approach had impacted poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

## **2.10. AFRICAN STUDIES ON POVERTY REDUCTION**

Handley et. al. (2009) identified poor governance as undermining the creation of enabling environment to combat poverty in SSA. Khan (2009) extended the literature on governance in poverty reduction by recommending a growth-enhancing governance strategy that focuses on assisting developing countries to identify critical constraints to poverty reduction and growth and how to develop institutional capacities to address them.

Crook (2003) used the comparative framework of empowerment of the poor, pro poor growth, social equity, human development and spatial or inter-regional inequality to measure the success of poverty reduction in Africa's decentralization programme and advanced the argument that the degree of responsiveness of decentralization to the poor and the degree to which there is an impact on poverty is influenced by the politics of local-central relations and the ideological commitment of the central political authorities to poverty reduction. To use decentralization as an instrument of poverty reduction, Crook (2003) recommended the strengthening and broadening of the accountability mechanisms, both horizontally and vertically at both the local and national levels. My study adds to that of Crook (2003) by identifying what factors shaped the adoption and implementation of LED in the three MMDAs as a poverty reduction strategy.

Francis and James (2003) espoused that decentralization serves as an institutional framework for the implementation of poverty reduction strategies in Uganda. They identified two modes of decentralization in Uganda, namely; the technocratic and patronage modes. The former mode is concerned with poverty reduction strategy plans with conditional financial resources from the centre which gave the grassroots little or no voice in poverty reduction strategies. The later though uses locally generated funds, they however, indicated that the funds were limited and were largely used in the performance of participatory planning. Due to the weaknesses associated with the two modes, Francis and James (2003) concluded that the resources provided by the centre towards poverty reduction were used to build political alliances and loyalties at the local level by the national authorities. The study extends that of Francis and James (2013) by analyzing the instrumentality of LGUs through the implementation of LED interventions in poverty reduction in Ghana with focus on the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

## **2.11. GHANAIAN STUDIES ON POVERTY REDUCTION**

Amoako-Tuffour (2008) stated that the poverty process in Ghana may have been driven systematically by demographic changes, systemic policy failures and deterioration in the institutions and processes of economic management than by adverse terms of trade of the major exports of Ghana and corruption (Amoako-Tuffour, 2008:17-18).

Contributing to the discussion on the use of employment as a strategy to reduce poverty, the ILO (2004) proposed the use of small and micro enterprises (SMEs) as a tool with the potential to create large numbers of jobs with reasonable levels of productivity and income. Technical and entrepreneurial skills as well as technology and credit, access to market information, business training and counselling, infrastructural development and integration of PWDs were identified by the ILO as essential resources and conditions necessary for SMEs to play the vital role of job creation (ILO, 2004:13-14).

In a related study, Baah-Boateng (2008) examined employment policies, projects, the employment agenda inherent in the GPRS 1 and the efficacy of the informal sector in employment creation. He however pointed out that most of these policies and projects had short life span and the employment opportunities associated with them could not outlive the termination of the policies and projects hence no significant impact was made (Baah-Boateng, 2008:229-230). In addition, he indicated weak integration of employment strategies, lack of basic information on employment, income and the profile of the labour force, poor analysis of the dynamics and the untapped potential of the informal economy, and absence of enabling environment for private sector as factors that militated against the use of employment as a poverty reduction strategy in Ghana (Baah-Boateng, 2008: 233-237).



In a sharp contrast to Baah-Boateng's view on employment sustainability for poverty reduction, the ILO (2004) posited that employment creation policies can be sustained through commitment from all stakeholders and the fostering of partnership and alliance not only among the ILO tripartite constituents (Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, Ghana Employers' Association and the Trades Union Congress) but also with other national actors such as the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and engagement with international development partners and bilateral donors (ILO, 2004:18). They also emphasized the view espoused by Khan (2009) that the poor and the marginalized should benefit from the distribution of the proceeds from poverty reduction strategies through wages and work-related income as the mechanism to ensure effectiveness of the use of employment creation in poverty reduction (ILO, 2004:16-18).

My study builds on the work of the ILO (2004) and Baah-Boateng (2008) as it examines the employment opportunities created and the spillover effects on income generation through the implementation of LED strategies and how it impacted poverty in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

Adjei et.al. (2012) enumerated scholarships to brilliant but needy children, construction of classroom blocks and community health centres, etc. as NGOs' strategies to reducing poverty. Proximity of the NGOs to the problem areas, human development strategies, mobilization of requisite human and financial resources and proper socialization and integration within the community were mentioned as conditions that accounted for the success of NGOs in poverty reduction. However, challenges such as financial constraints, delays in the release of donor funds, communities' strict adherence to cultural practices that are inimical to community advancement and poverty reduction, lack of community spirit and enthusiasm to support project implementation and maintenance, low level of community participation in the design and implementation of poverty reduction strategies,

and transportation and communication barriers were enumerated as some setbacks to NGOs' role in poverty reduction.

Since LED is a partnership between LGUs and other actors including NGOs using available local resources to reduce poverty, this study will draw on the lessons from Adjei et.al's work to analyze the role of NGOs and other actors in the LED process in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and discuss the impact on poverty reduction, employment creation, income generation and infrastructural development.

Oduro (2001) discussed the characteristics, the processes and procedures and the requirements of an effective public expenditure programme geared towards poverty reduction. In her contribution, she stressed the need for poverty reduction strategies in Ghana to be aimed at building up on the poor's stock of assets, improving their access to infrastructure, basic utilities and services and the creation of well-functioning markets. These actions in her view will facilitate an improvement in the productivity of the poor and increase the opportunity for income generating activities.

My study will extend Oduro's work as it discusses the inter-governmental transfers to the MMDAs such as the DACF and the donor-funded DDF as public expenditures on LED. In addition, an assessment of how these inter-governmental financial transfers aided LED in the creation of new employment opportunities, income generation, infrastructural development and poverty reduction will be done.

Twerefou and Osei-Assibey (2008) hold a similar view which has been espoused by Leonard (1989) when they highlighted the inextricable nexus between the environment and poverty and indicated that due to this relationship, the GPRS 1 incorporated environmental conservation in poverty reduction in the programme document. To them, the enforcement of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the surest way for ensuring

environmental sustainability for poverty reduction (Twerefou and Osei-Assibey, 2008:297, 303). They captured weak diagnosis of poverty in environmental issues, less priority given to environmental issues, absence of information on the impact of the private sector particularly the informal economy on the environment, and broad policy measures as forces that hindered the GPRS 1 from attaining the desired poverty reduction target (Twerefou and Osei-Assibey, 2008:304). Since LED is aimed at using available resource endowment of localities which are mostly natural resources to reduce poverty, there is the likelihood of exploiting these resources without recourse to their depletion and availability for future generations. The study will therefore extend this study as it explores the extent to which the AMA, KeMA and SODA implemented the LED via the utilization of the local resources to reduce poverty. Most importantly, the study will also assess how LED implementation through the exploitation of these natural resources ensured sustainable poverty reduction.

Armah (2008) opined that poverty monitoring system must monitor processes, outcomes and impacts to provide a comprehensive view of policy performance. Poverty monitoring targets must consist of a rich balance between the inputs and outputs and the final outcome and impact indicators (Armah, 2008: 168). As a result of these requirements in poverty monitoring and evaluation coupled with other challenges such as the reconciliation of local targets with international ones, data limitations, multiplicity of actors, lack of funding, capacity constraints and weak institutional coordination, the monitoring and evaluation of poverty reduction strategies have not been given the needed commitment both at the national and LGUs levels.

My study complements Armah's work by discussing and highlighting the various stages of the LED process with emphasis on the monitoring and evaluation stage to assess the

various indicators and how they are measured for beneficent outcomes such as poverty reduction, employment creation, income generation and infrastructural development.

Boafo-Arthur (2014) indicated that globalization and economic liberalization policies such as the ERP and SAP with their associated capital inflows in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) though contributed to development in SSA countries; have, however, increased the debt portfolio of SSA countries through debt repayments. As a result, SSA countries are unable to garner the needed capital for investment in industrial activities for employment creation hence majority of the citizens are unemployed thereby perpetuating poverty (Boafo-Arthur, 2014: 147-163).

Ninsin (2007) argued that the Ghanaian state was weak hence unable to protect society from the market forces. As a result, under market reforms, poverty has become endemic afflicting the labour force who are concentrated in the urban centres from which political activities gravitates, thereby diminishing their will to act in public affairs or become effective citizens. In addition, poverty has also weakened the citizens' sovereign power in participating in their own governance and holding their leaders accountable (Ninsin, 2007: 94,102).

Ninsin (2016) argued that poverty is a major feature of Ghana's social structure and a powerful determinant of the relationship between the electorate and the political class and will continue to influence the dependency relationship of the electorate on the political class and their elected representatives.

This study will extend the studies of Boafo-Arthur (2014) and Ninsin (2007 and 2016) as it interrogates how LED as an alternative development policy resulted in the creation of employment opportunities and empowered the local citizens to participate in local governance and consequently reduced poverty in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. In

addition, the study will also analyze the extent to which poverty issues influenced the relationship between the electorates and the political class in the implementation of LED interventions in the three MMDAs.

Studies have established the linkage between local governance and poverty reduction. However, the results are mixed. While some studies indicated that local governance impacted poverty reduction positively others indicated otherwise (Bevir, 2009; Asante and Ayee, 2008a; 2008b). For instance, Asante and Ayee, (2008a) pointed out that even though decentralization positively impacted poverty reduction, its impact is dependent on factors such as effective implementation of poverty reduction strategies, transfer of financial resources, and targeting of poverty-reducing public investment by LGUs. In their view, all the typologies of decentralisation should be considered simultaneously when assessing the impact of decentralisation on poverty reduction.

In another study, Asante and Ayee (2008b) concluded that decentralized governance in Ghana has fallen far short of reducing poverty. They pointed out that MMDAs have allocated financial resources towards education, health, and local government and rural development programmes which are important aspects of poverty reduction, however, the MMDAs were not able to introduce programmes to improve upon productivity, create employment and generate income. In addition, they also stated that in spite of the HIPC initiative and poverty alleviation funds availability, there were still difficulties in micro, small and medium enterprises in accessing credit (Asante and Ayee, 2008:183-203).

Ayee and Debrah (2014: 139) also opined that the tardy progress made in decentralisation has resulted in the persistence of centralized and bureaucratic administration with inefficient delivery of public services, widespread corruption and exacerbated poverty and the marginalization of disadvantaged groups such as women and youth.

Ofei-Aboagye (2008) espoused that the gains from decentralisation through the demarcation and identification of areas with common geographical, historical, socio-cultural and economic features have made the nation aware of the nuanced nature of development as well as the nature of poverty. As a result, partners and MMDAs have collected district specific baseline socio-economic information for planning, monitoring and evaluation purposes which are nationally unavailable (Ofei-Aboagye, 2008:254).

There are also studies that dealt primarily with the contribution of decentralisation to LED. For instance, Stansel (2005) postulated that decentralisation is generally seen as a tool to promote local economic development (Stansel, 2005:55). He identified two mechanisms that enhanced the contribution of decentralisation to the promotion of LED.

First, is the knowledge problem, which states that the wide dispersion of knowledge makes central plans to fail. In Stansel's view, decentralized authorities are much better equipped to provide the economically efficient quantity and quality of public goods. Local authorities are in a better position to be responsive to variations in local demands.

Second, is the idea of government as a monopolist. With the increase in LGU territories, the extent or potential for exploitation will vary. Stansel (2005) further opined that increased competition between individual LGUs can limit central government's ability to extract monopoly rents, thereby enhancing economic efficiency, and thus economic growth.

According to Oates cited in Stansel (2005) the basic economic case for fiscal decentralization is the enhancement of economic efficiency: the provision of local outputs that are differentiated according to local tastes and circumstances results in higher levels of social welfare than centrally determined and more uniform levels of outputs across all jurisdictions.

Oduro-Ofori (2016) also argued that decentralisation had led to the speeding up of infrastructure provision necessary for LED, training and provision of credit to entrepreneurs, among others, (Oduro-Ofori, 2016:31).

## **2.12. STUDIES ON POLITICS IN GHANA**

Politics affects both the policy and institutional frameworks for LED. In other words, the contextual variables such as leadership support, administrative reforms and their strategies, commitment and the performance of leaders, the institutions and the environment in which they operate as well as economic events affect the implementation of policies and programmes such as LED. Consequently, a change in the political environment, such as change in government has its rippling effects on the leadership, institutions, policies, strategies and structures not only at the national level but at the SNGs level as well. These political alterations come along with their dynamics such as the “authoritative allocation of resources” (“who gets what, when, where and how”) among the various MMDAs (Lasswell, 1936).

Some publications on politics in Ghana deal with some of these contextual variables. They are reviewed below.

Ayee (2007) indicated that political leadership in Ghana is influenced by four main factors, namely, the challenges that face political leaders, the neoliberal environment within which the leaders work, culture and the media.

He used the four criteria by Leach and Wilson (2002) namely, maintaining the cohesion of the administration, developing strategic policy direction aimed at contributing to change, relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, and the personal dimension or style to measure the performance of political leadership of Rawlings and Kufuor. He showed that both leaders exhibited some qualities of transactional leadership which

created opportunities for corruption and other rent-seeking activities (Ayee, 2007:16). He holds the view that the performance of both Rawlings and Kufuor were limited by their personal preoccupations and weaknesses, and the challenges they faced. He recommended mentorship and seasoning in party structures and other institutions for effective political leadership in Ghana (Ayee, 2007: 165-187).

Ninsin (2007) identified the orderly transfer of power through the 2000 elections from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) as the most significant achievement in Ghana's transition to democracy. He also indicated that the growth in scope and self-confidence of CSOs, media pluralism and the establishment of democratic institutions such as the National Media Commission (NMC), the Electoral Commission and Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and their relative autonomy to function in a free and impartial manner as helping to consolidate democracy in Ghana since 1993 (Ninsin, 2007:88-89).

Ayee and Debrah (2014) indicated that administrative reforms during the post-colonial period were intended to transform the centralized administrative system inherited from the colonial government. The reforms were part of the strategy of facilitating development because Ghana's development depended on a rejuvenated public administration. They stated that since 1984 when the ERP/SAP were launched, public sector reforms were influenced by the New Public Management model which created expectations of a more efficient, effective and accountable public sector. The reform strategies included deregulation, divestiture or privatization, outsourcing, anti-rent seeking and anti-corruption measures, PPPs and performance-based accountability. They pointed out that though the reforms were aimed at solving problems, they may also be viewed as responses to external pressures from the country's development partners and international financial institutions (IFSs) such as the World Bank (Ayee and Debrah, 2014: 138-139).



Debrah (2009) postulated that politics in Ghana since independence was shaped by events on the economic front more than the popularized issues of ethnicity, regionalism and personal ambitions. In his opinion, most of the political transitions be it military or democratic were to a large extent influenced by economic circumstances such as high cost of living, low standard of living, macroeconomic instability, poverty, deprivation etc.

### **2.13. CONCLUSION**

Comprehensive studies have been done on LED, local governance and poverty reduction across the nine levels of literature reviewed. In addition, the reviews showed that there exists a connection between LED and poverty reduction, local governance and poverty reduction and local governance and LED. The reviews also indicated that no study has primarily considered local governance, LED, poverty reduction and politics in a single study. This study will therefore fill this gap by evaluating the implementation of LED and its impact on poverty reduction as well as the dynamics involved using the AMA, KeMA and SODA as case studies.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

#### **3.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter is devoted to the theoretical underpinnings of the study. The actor-oriented approach to development interventions forms the theoretical framework of the study. The origins, meaning, features, strengths and weaknesses of the approach will be discussed in addition to how it will be employed.

#### **3.2. THE ORIGINS OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH**

The root of the actor-oriented approach to development intervention dates back to Max Weber's characterization of social action (Long, 2004: 14). The theory was developed following the impasse in development studies where the focus of development was not people - centred, but rather obsessed with the conditions, contexts and "driving forces" of social life, determinism, linearity and institutional hegemony to the neglect of those who shape and transform the development landscape (Long, 2001). The actor-oriented approach to development intervention was initially mooted by the anthropologist, Norman Long, in his study of the Peruvian Land Reform Programme of 1969-1975 (Long, 2004:16). The theory focuses on the actions and interactions of individual actors and social groups in shaping the process and outcome of development interventions.

#### **3.3. THE MEANING AND FEATURES OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH**

The actor-oriented approach is defined as the interaction between actors (both local and external) and how they are locked in a series of intertwined battles over resources, meanings and institutional legitimacy and controls in development interventions. It is also defined as the encounters that take place between "development experts" (local and

foreign) and the beneficiaries in solving the development challenges of a locality” (Long, 2001). From the above definitions, it could be inferred that the actor-oriented approach to development intervention is focused on the actions and the interests of the actors in the development process and how they shape the process to generate development interventions.

There are four features of the actor-oriented approach.

First, there are actors. Actors are stakeholders who shape the policy process from the agenda setting stage through to the policy termination or change stage. They have a vested interest in the policy as well. Koponen (2004:11) and Long (2004:25) identified the state, international institutions, bilateral donors, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), development agencies, private institutions, institutional frameworks, and structures as well as individuals as actors in development intervention. Koponen (2004:11) indicated that the state’s role in the development intervention process is to provide an enabling environment within which development can effectively take place. The state performs this role through overseeing the institutional frameworks by guaranteeing legal rights to private property and rule of law and making good when there are market failures. In Koponen’s view, international institutions and bilateral donors do not always increase human capabilities or the reduction of poverty; however, their intervention enhances the achievement of development goals (Koponen, 2004:11). This study will extend the actors to include local government units (LGUs) who are responsible for the creation of the enabling environment at the local governance level.

Second is; development intervention, which is a purposely created, socially-constructed and negotiated process involving multiple actors such as the state, international organisations, NGOs, and individual philanthropists operating in the society. Development

interventions are always aimed at solving development problems such as unemployment, poverty, infrastructure deficits, and human development among others. The intervention refers to the actual programmes that the actors initiate after the identification of a development need of a locality. The intervention usually triggers the processes leading to the attainment of development goals. In this regard, intervention is considered as the third dimension of development after the development goals and processes. Two forms of intervention have been identified by Koponen (2004) and Long (2004). These are, planned and unplanned interventions. They postulated that both the planned and unplanned interventions have intended and unintended intentions. Planned intervention is composed of complex sets of historically-unfolding social encounters and struggles over meanings and resources, in which certain spatial and temporal dimensions play a role in linking events and processes (Long, 2004: 27). The focus of this study will be planned intervention since LED is an intentional, deliberate and conscious intervention by the actors to create employment, generate income, improve infrastructure and reduce poverty.

Development intervention performs four main functions. These are as follows:

1. It serves as a catalyst for the generation of development ideas, discourses, and negotiation among the actors;
2. It culminates into actions, institutions and structures needed to achieve developmental goals;
3. It recognizes and calls for support from all actors as the surest way to achieve developmental goals (Koponen, 2004:6); and
4. It also brings to the fore the intra -and - inter institutional struggles among the actors over perceived goals, administrative competencies, resource allocation, and institutional

boundaries for the necessary adjustment to be done for the achievement of development goals (Long, 2004:25-26).

Third is; the interaction among the actors to adopt and implement a particular development intervention. The interaction is always characterized by lobbying, negotiations, disagreements, compromises, confrontations, alliance formation, and conflicts over which development intervention to adopt and implement. During the interaction, each actor adopts strategies to influence the process in its favour. The ability of an actor to influence the process depends on its' resource base, capacity, knowledge and value, and the power that it wields among others (Long, 2004:26).

Fourth is; the social interface analysis as a mechanism for dealing with the challenges posed by the multiple actors' interaction. Social interface is the process of exploring and understanding issues of diversity and conflict inherent in the intervention process. Interface occurs at points where different, and often conflicting life worlds or social fields intersect.

Social interface analysis aims at elucidating the types and sources of social discontinuity and linkages present and to identify the organizational and cultural means of reproducing or transforming the linkages. The exploration of the social interface provides a more adequate analysis of policy transformation processes, and enables the understanding of the different responses of the actors to planned interventions.

Social interface analysis enables the actors to find a middle ground between the micro and macro theories of change by showing how interactions between them shape the outcomes of particular intervention policies with patterns of change at the regional, national and international levels (Long, 2004: 28).

Social interface situations are more complex and multiple in nature and contains many different interests, relationships and modes of rationality and power. While analysts focus on points of confrontation and social differences, these must be situated in broader institutional and knowledge or power domains. In addition, it requires a methodology that counterpoises the voices, experiences and practices of all the actors involved, including the experiential learning curves of policy practitioners and researchers (Long, 2004:27). In the words of Long (1999 cited in Tafon, 2013:12) “continued interaction between the actors enables the development of boundaries and shared expectations that shape the interaction of the participants so that overtime the interface itself becomes an organized entity of interlocking relationships and intentionalities”. Such relationships are often characterized by contestations between the actors to influence the policy process.

From the features, development intervention is not merely a bottom-up implementation of policies or planned programmes. It is an interaction where “planned interventions” are shaped by the different actors through dialogues, discourses, conflicts, negotiations and compromises. The actors engage each other in series of consultations to arrive at a “satisficing” development strategy, that is, a strategy that is acceptable to all the actors. The consultation process involves collective identification of goals, specifying alternative ways of achieving the goals, assessing the alternatives against standards taking into consideration factors such as costs and benefits, the available resources, and capacity before selecting the best alternative.

### **3.4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE THEORY**

There are several competing approaches to development intervention aside the actor-oriented approach. Notable among them are:

The market-driven development theory which considers the firm as the central object of analysis and the attractiveness of a locality is the object of public policy or local action (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010: 469).

The local economic re(generation) theory focuses on how localities can minimize falling behind and how the economic regeneration of these localities can be achieved by mobilizing local entrepreneurship, raising the capabilities of local people and promoting inclusive economic organization (Gomez and Helmsing, 2008:2490).

The alternative local development theory postulates that there is a growing number of people and localities unable (due to severe market failure) or unwilling to participate in (capitalist) market-driven development, either because they lack essential capabilities or assets or because people are motivated by a search for different humane, socially or environmentally responsible lifestyles (Gomez and Helmsing, 2008:2491).

Whereas the market-driven theory failed to indicate what development intervention the market forces make to better the development of localities, the local economic re (generation) theory also fell short of identifying who the actors or drivers of development intervention are, and the alternative local development theory though identified the challenges faced by localities, however, did not offer a solution to solving the problem.

The actor-oriented approach, on the other hand, does not only identify the development problems faced by localities, but also the actors in the problem identification, the process of development intervention and the drivers of the intervention and also highlights activities such as negotiations, compromises, confrontations and conflicts as characteristics of the intervention process which are features of the public policy process and politics. It is these characteristics that have influenced the choice of this theory as the theoretical framework of this study ahead of the others.

### **3.5. THE STRENGTHS OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH**

The actor-oriented approach has the following merits:

1. Its relevance lies in its aim to elucidate the types and sources of social discontinuity and linkages that underscore the processes of development intervention (Tofan, 2013:12);
2. It aids in identifying the organizational and cultural means of reproducing or transforming the social discontinuities and linkages between the various actors (Tofan, 2013:12);
3. It helps to understand the meaning and value that the various actors attach to intervention practices or processes as well as the positions they take or the actions they pursue, and how they affect or influence the outcome of development interventions;
4. It entails looking at the organising practices and strategies of the actors. This implies a concern for how various actors or parties organise themselves around the problems of conceptualizing and promoting intervention approach (Long, 2001: 26);
5. It shows how the actors engage each other over a common problem. In this respect, the organisation of development intervention is thus viewed as “a complex set of social interaction and practices” (Long, 2001: 26). According to Long (2001) “using the notion of intervention practices allows one to focus on the emergent forms of interactions, procedures, practical strategies and types of discourse, cultural categories and sentiments present in specific contexts” (Long, 2001:26);
6. It investigates the methods and processes adopted by the various actors to promote development intervention or pursue their interest in the intervention process (Akudugu, 2013:39); and



7. Its' bottom-up nature coupled with the participation of the actors in the intervention process results in the design and implementation of suitable and appropriate development policies that is not only owned by all the actors but also meets the development needs of beneficiary localities.

### **3.6. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH**

The approach is also characterized by the following weaknesses:

1. It focuses on areas of disagreement among the various actors, and strategies or actions the actors adopt in such action arenas;
2. Since there is multiplicity of actors, it makes accountability very difficult. That is who is to account for what, what to account for and to who are the actors accountable in the development intervention process;
3. It calls for multiple actors in development policy implementation thereby resulting in the “complexity of joint action”. This is because given the number of participants with diverse perspectives and multiple clearances, the chances for successful implementation will be sharply reduced (Ayee, 1994:138);
4. The intensity of participation by an actor in the intervention process depends on a range of factors including the strength and interest in the policy, organisational and resource capacity (Turner and Hulme, 1997:77). Since all the actors may not be equally endowed in these factors, some of the participants especially the beneficiary localities may always be seen as contributing less to the process hence have a lesser say during the intervention process and always taking directives from the endowed actors; and
5. Implementation is also a highly political process. It is an arena where those with interests in a policy engage in negotiations, conflicts, confrontations and compromises over the allocation of resources and goals of the policy (Grindle, 1980 cited in Turner and Hulme,

1997:77) As such, actors who could not influence the development intervention initiative at one stage may demand their “pound of flesh” at the stage where they have influence.

For the study not to suffer from the weaknesses of the actor-oriented approach, the thesis adopted the consultation process inherent in the theory. The consultation among the actors during interaction to select a development intervention assists in narrowing the disagreements that often characterizes the intervention process hence the actors arriving at a consensus. The challenges of accountability and multiplicity of actors was addressed by examining the specific roles of each actor in the LED process and also inquired to find out what accountability mechanisms were in place. In addition, a critical assessment of the monitoring and evaluation stage of the LED process was done in relation to the role of the actors. This assessment helped to unravel the role of the actors in the adoption and implementation of LED programmes in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. To resolve the setback of unequal level of actor participation, the study analyzed the input and contribution of all the actors in the LED process. The input and contribution in this context refers to both tangible resources (land, material and financial), and intangible ones such as knowledge, capacity and ideas among others. Finally, the study assessed the role of the MMDAs in the LED process to ascertain the extent to which their coordination provided a level playing field for the participation of all the actors in the LED process.

### **3.7. EMPLOYMENT OF THE ACTOR-ORIENTED APPROACH**

From the discussions of the actor-oriented approach to development intervention, the study conceptualizes local economic development (LED) as an intervention involving the interaction between actors, the use of strategies, initiatives, programmes, processes, resources and an encounter with structures aimed at creating new employment

opportunities, generating income, improving infrastructure and reducing poverty through the use of available local resources in a given area. In addition, LED is seen as a bottom-up approach to development where multiple actors (central government, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs), international organisations, private sector, community-based organisations (CBOs), and residents) participate through planned interventions to find a lasting solution to the development challenges faced by MMDAs. Actors are defined as individuals (be they local citizens and philanthropists), and organisations (public and local, international and private) with the responsibility and interest of promoting local economic development in Ghana's local governance system making use of the available local resources. The development interventions used in LED include but not limited to public private partnerships (PPPs), "soft" and "hard" LED strategies including the creation of an enabling business environment, capacity development, access to finance, provision of inputs such as fertilizer, and infrastructure, among others. LED is also viewed as a process oriented approach to development intervention which involves; pre-initiation, initiation, diagnostic analysis, LED stakeholder dialogue, implementation of LED action plan, response mobilization and monitoring and evaluation (Republic of Ghana, 2014). The various actors are bound to have diverse and conflicting views and interests during their interaction in the process.

First, the study employed the actor-oriented approach by analyzing the LED interventions, the activities that characterized the actors' interaction at each of the stages of the LED process and also discussed how the actors' interaction in the process influenced the choice of LED initiatives and how the interaction also promoted or hindered the implementation of LED in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) and Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA).

Second, the thesis used the social interface analysis to examine how the interests of the various actors were managed at the intersections to arrive at a “satisficing” LED strategy for the creation of new employment opportunities, income generation, infrastructural improvement and poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

Third, my study deployed structures as an actor to analyze how the formal and informal structures in Ghana’s local governance system promoted or hindered the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

### **3.8. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The study was guided by the following seven (7) research questions:

1. What were the LED initiatives designed and implemented in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and what were the similarities and differences among them for purposes of highlighting best practices?
2. Who were the actors in the LED process in the AMA, KeMA and SODA, what were their roles and how did they perform them in the process and the dynamics associated with their involvement?
3. How did the role of the local structures and initiatives of the actors impact the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA?
4. How were the LED programmes financed in the AMA, KeMA and SODA?
5. How did the LED benefit the AMA, KeMA and SODA in terms of job creation, income generation, poverty reduction and infrastructure development?
6. What were the challenges and how did they hinder the LED implementation process?
7. What are the lessons learnt and their implications for the theoretical, comparative and empirical literature?

### **3.9. CONCLUSION**

This chapter has focused on the actor-oriented approach as the theoretical framework of the study. In spite of the weaknesses of the approach, the study finds the actor-oriented approach as more suitable than the market-driven development, local economic re(generation), and local alternative development theories in explaining the issues involved in the adoption and implementation of LED. The issues include creating new employment opportunities, generating income, reducing poverty, stimulating economic activities and how the multiplicity of the actors and the structures (resources, capacity, institutional and legal) in Ghana's local governance system contributed to LED in alleviating poverty in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. It also helps us to deal with the dynamics involved to establish what worked, what did not work and how best practices can be adopted in the implementation of LED in other MMDAs in Ghana.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY**

#### **4.1. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter is devoted to the methodology. Specifically, it deals with the justification for the selection of the three study areas, namely, the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) and Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA), their profiles, the population of the study, sampling technique, sample size, tools of data collection, sources of data collection, instrument of data analysis and their strengths and weaknesses, the instrument for measuring poverty levels as well as the philosophical underpinning of the study.

#### **4.2. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY AREAS**


Ghana has a three-tier district categorization namely, the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) (Republic of Ghana, 2016). For a geographical area to be designated either as a Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly (MMDA), the area must have a minimum population of 250,000, 95,000 and 75,000 people respectively. In addition, the area must have the economic viability to provide the basic infrastructure and other development needs from the locally generated resources (Republic of Ghana, 2016:13). Ghana has a total of 216 MMDAs with the breakdown as follows: six (6) Metropolises, forty-nine (49) Municipalities and one hundred and sixty-one (161) Districts. Each of the MMDAs has a Chief Executive who is “appointed by the President with the prior approval of not less than two-thirds majority of the members of the MMDA present and voting at the meeting” (Republic of Ghana, 1992:151).

The justification for the areas will be done on individual Assembly basis.

#### **4.2.1. The Accra Metropolitan Assembly**

Accra as a local authority has been in existence since the colonial days. It was known as the Accra City Council (ACC). The AMA was established in 1988. The AMA as it exists now was created in 2012 with Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 2034 following the carving out of the La Dadekotopon Municipal Assembly. It is the metropolitan capital, the regional capital for the Greater Accra Region as well as the national capital of Ghana. It consists of ten Sub Metropolitan District Councils (SMDCs), namely, Osu Klottey, Ashiedu Keteke, Ablekuma South, Ablekuma North, Ablekuma Central, Okaikoi North, Okaikoi South, Ayawaso West, Ayawaso Central and Ayawaso East. The Assembly consists of 72 communities, 76 Electoral Areas with a corresponding 76 Assembly members, and thirteen (13) Members of Parliament (MP) who are non-voting members (GSS, 2014:3).

Geographically, the AMA is bounded to the north, west, east and south by - Ga West, Ga South, La Dadekotopon Municipal Assemblies and the Gulf of Guinea respectively (Figure 4.1). It covers a total land area of 139.674 Km<sup>2</sup> (GSS, 2014:1).



**Figure 4.1: Map of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly**  
**Source: GSS, 2014:2**

Its vision is to become “A New Accra, clean and environmentally sound where the City Authority mobilizes sufficient resources, both internally and externally; and utilizing these resources judiciously to benefit the people of the City” (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2016: 15). Its mission is “to improve the quality of life of the people of the city of Accra especially the poor, the vulnerable and excluded by providing and maintaining basic services and facilities in the areas of education, health, sanitation and other social amenities, in the context of discipline, a sense of urgency and a commitment to excellence” (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2016: 16).

In economic terms, the Assembly is the economic hub of the Greater Accra Region and the rest of the country with a daily migrant influx of about one million people not only from Ghana but other West Africa countries (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2016: 2). In addition, the metropolis hosts a number of manufacturing industries, oil companies, financial institutions, telecommunication, tourism, education, health institutions and other



important establishments (Table 4.1). The metropolis has an unemployment rate of 7.2% as against the national rate of 28% (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2016: 2). This low level of unemployment in the AMA as compared to the KeMA which has 38% and SODA 30.8% is attributed to the existence of the numerous institutions indicated in Table 4.1. These institutions provided job opportunities for the residents and the migrants who moved to the metropolis. The migration of people to the AMA has led to inadequate housing facilities which has resulted in 29 squatter and slum communities, low access to social services such as electricity, water, unemployment etc. and its resultant outcome of poverty. More importantly, the AMA has commercial and residential lands, some of which are the subject of litigation (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2012: 12; 2016: 2).

**Table 4. 1: Number of organisations, industries and establishments in the AMA**

Category	Number	Number of Branches
Manufacturing industries	350	-
Oil companies	36	-
Commercial Banks	9	81
Development Banks	4	19
Merchant Banks	4	7
Discount Houses	3	-
Home Finance Mortgage Bank	1	-
Foreign Exchange Bureau	218	-
Insurance Companies	9	-
Insurance Brokerage Firms	12	-
Telecommunication	6	-
Health	132	-

**Sources:** [www.ghanadistricts.com](http://www.ghanadistricts.com) and [www.npa.gov.gh](http://www.npa.gov.gh)

It has a population of 1,665,086 with males and females constituting 48.1 percent and 51.9 percent respectively. The poverty level and incidence of the groups are 10.6 percent and 2.5 percent respectively (GSS, 2014:1, 3, 15, 2015: x, 2007:9). The residents are engaged in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy for employment such as trading, construction, fishing, farming, manufacturing and services (Table 4.2 and 4.3). A

total of 91,556 people representing 5.5% of the residents in the AMA are engaged in two predominant agricultural activities namely, fishing and farming with the former employing 71, 214 people (77.8%) and the latter 20,342 people (22.2%) ([www.ghanadistricts.com](http://www.ghanadistricts.com)). The farming activities are sub-categorized into crop farming, tree planting and livestock rearing. Table 4.4 indicates the distribution of livestock, birds, fishes and others in the metropolis.

**Table 4. 2: Percentage of residents in each sector of the AMA**

Sector	Percentage
Primary	13.08
Secondary	22.34
Tertiary	64.48
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: [www.ghanadistricts.com](http://www.ghanadistricts.com)

**Table 4. 3: Percentage of occupation of employed residence in the AMA**

Activity	Percentage
Managers	5.3
Professionals	7.9
Technicians and associate professionals	4.0
Clerical support workers	3.7
Service and sales workers	38.5
Agricultural forestry and fishery workers	1.7
Crafts and related trade workers	20.1
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	6.1
Elementary occupations	12.6
Other occupations	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2010 Population and Housing Census, p. 36

**Table 4. 4: Distribution of livestock, birds, fishes and others in the AMA**

<b>Livestock</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Number of keepers</b>	<b>Average per keeper</b>
Beehives	2,269	27	84
Cattle	28,424	597	48
Chicken	145,772	1,659	88
Dove	5,230	16	86
Duck	4,353	139	31
Goat	47,403	1,445	33
Grass cutter	4,364	93	47
Guinea fowl	4,021	75	54
Ostrich	202	17	12
Pig	15,826	369	43
Rabbit	4,643	144	32
Sheep	23,660	790	30
Silk worm	15	3	12
Snail	4,883	15	326
Turkey	378	29	13
Fish farming	1,944	12	162
Marine fishing	45	3	15
Inland fishing	84	2	42
Others	3,382	100	34

**Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2010 Population and Housing Census, p.47**

In terms of tourism, the AMA has a long coast (beaches) of about 12.5km with hotels such as the Ambiance, Oceanic, Nordsee, and Korle Gonno Beach Hotel. The metropolis also has Monumental buildings such as the Ussher Fort, James Fort, museums (such as the Ghana National Museum), libraries (such as the Ghana Library), and galleries (Accra Metropolitan Assembly, 2016: 12-13).

It has implemented six broad LED programmes namely, enhancing access of small-scale enterprises to local and national markets, business development services, advocacy and dialogue for private sector promotion, development and technical improvement and technical skills development and PPPs which were aimed at poverty reduction, infrastructural development, job creation and capacity building (Fieldwork, April, 2017).

#### 4.2.2. The Keta Municipal Assembly

The Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) with Keta as the municipal capital is one of the 25 administrative districts in the Volta Region. It was carved and created out of the former Anlo District by L.I. 1475 in 1989. It was upgraded to a municipal status in 2007 with L.I. 1868. It lies within Longitude  $0.30^{\circ}\text{E}$  and Latitudes  $5.45^{\circ}\text{N}$  and  $6.005^{\circ}\text{N}$ . It is located to the east of the Volta estuary, about 160km from Accra. It shares boundaries with Akatsi South, Ketu North and South, South Tongu Districts and Gulf of Guinea to the north, east, west and south respectively (Figure 4.2). The KeMA occupies a total surface area of  $753.1\text{km}^2$ . It has the Keta-Avu Lagoon which is the largest lagoon in Ghana.



**Figure 4. 2: Map of the Keta Municipal Assembly**

**Source: GSS, 2014:2**

Its vision is to become the leading performing district assembly in local governance to achieve the highest level of socio - economic development in Ghana. In terms of mission, it exists to harness all human and material resources within its jurisdiction to improve the living conditions of the people by promoting effective and efficient local governance and

the provision of socio - economic infrastructure and services for accelerated development (Keta Municipal Assembly, 2016:6).

The political and administrative structures of the municipality consists of 74 Assembly Members with 21 being government appointees, the MCE and two MPs for the Keta and Anlo Constituencies, 14 Zonal Councils and 50 Electoral Areas. Keta was an important trading post between the 14<sup>th</sup> and late 20<sup>th</sup> centuries due to the activities that characterized the port and fort Prinzenstein, which was built by the Danes in 1784. The Municipality is mainly an agrarian economy, with the majority of the population engaged in crop farming, livestock keeping, fishing and other related trading activities (Table 4.5).

**Table 4. 5: Livestock and fish production in the KeMA**

<b>Livestock</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Number of keepers</b>	<b>Average per keeper</b>
Beehives	60	15	4
Cattle	4,311	118	36.5
Chicken	60, 788	4,999	12.2
Dove	2,135	94	22.7
Goat	15,200	2,031	7.5
Grass cutter	131	15	8.7
Guinea fowl	1,686	151	11.2
Ostrich	272	27	10.1
Pig	2,398	234	10.2
Rabbit	465	35	13.3
Sheep	2,406	309	7.8
Silk worm	51	4	12.8
Turkey	934	132	7.1
Fish farming	1,418	16	88.6
Marine fishing	2,179	17	128.2
Others	834	168	5

**Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2010 Population and Housing Census, p.50**

It is well known for the production of shallots which are produced along the Keta lagoons and streams. Other vegetables such as okro, tomato and pepper are also extensively cultivated. Maize and cassava are also grown in the northern part of the municipality (Table 4.6) (Annual Work Plan and Budget for 2017:4, GSS, 2014:4).

**Table 4. 6: Crop production in the KeMA**

<b>Crop</b>	<b>Cropped Area (HA)</b>	<b>Average Yield Metric Ton/HA</b>	<b>Total Production M. Tons</b>
Maize	1200	0.6	720
Cassava	1350	7.0	9,450
Sweet Potato	70	13	910
Cowpea	900	0.4	360
Onion	180	10	1,800
Shallot	960	0.67	640
Tomatoes	941	17	15,997
Chili Pepper	480	1.37	660
Okro	180	3.33	600
Pepper	1,000	4.5	4,500
Sugarcane	500	35.0	17,500
Carrot	92	15.2	1,400
Spring Onion	32	1.25	40

**Source: Department of Agriculture, Keta Municipal Assembly, November, 2017**


It is involved in salt mining which is currently done under natural (evaporation) conditions. Sugar- cane is also grown in the flood prone areas stretching from the Shime area to Hatorgodo and Atiavi. The sugar-cane is produced annually and is processed into local gin called “akpeteshie”. The municipality’s endowment with water bodies such as the Atlantic Ocean, lagoons and creeks has also made fishing a major economic activity (Annual Work Plan and Budget for 2017:4, GSS, 2014:4). It is endowed with historical significant centres such as Fort Prinzenstein, Atorkor Slave Market, sandy golden beaches, Cape St. Paul light house, Anlo military headquarters among others (GSS, 2014:4).

It has a population of 147,618 which is made up of 46.4 percent males and 63.6 percent females with poverty level and incidence of the two groups between 10 and 14.9 percent and 20-29.9 percent respectively (GSS, 2014:17, 2015:x, 2007:9). It is faced with unemployment which is pegged at 38 percent as against the estimated 28 percent for the nation. In response to the unemployment challenge, it implemented the following LED interventions: cassava and gari processing at Heluvi, and Tsiamé, soap and detergent production at Anloga and Keta, beads making at Tegbui and Keta, honey and beekeeping

at Kedzi, Kente weaving at Afiadenyigba etc. (KeMA 2016 Annual Performance Report). These interventions resulted in the local citizens acquiring skills that enabled them to start their own micro-businesses such as beads, soap and detergent making, bee keeping among others with their resultant employment creation and consequently income generation with a trickledown effect on poverty reduction.

#### 4.2.3. The Shai - Osudoku District Assembly

The Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA) is situated in the South-Eastern part of Ghana in the Greater Accra Region. It occupies a total land area of about 968.361km<sup>2</sup> and has Dodowa as the district capital. The SODA shares boundaries with the North Tongu District to the north-east, Yilo and Lower Manya Districts to the north-west, Akwapim North District to the west, Kpone Kantamanso District to the south-west, Ningo Prampram District to the south and the Ada West to the east (Figure 4.3). The Volta River washes the north-eastern portions of the district (GSS, 2014:1).



**Figure 4. 3: Map of the Shai- Osudoku District Assembly**  
Source: GSS, 2014, 2

The vision of the SODA is to transform the district from an economically-deprived to a viable district where there are prospects for gainful employment. With regards to mission, it exists to create an enabling environment for the equitable provision of services for the total development of the district in collaboration with all Stakeholders (SODA, 2016:4).

The SODA was created following the L.I. 2137 in June, 2012 which mandated the splitting of the Dangbe West District Assembly into two districts namely, the Ningo Prampram and Shai- Osudoku District Assemblies (GSS, 2014:1). The splitting was necessitated because of the vast size of the district thereby undermining local governance. Though the SODA did not have the required population size of 75,000 people as at the time of its creation, political motives fundamentally accounted for its creation with a population size of 51, 913. Other reasons adduced for the creation include; the huge land coverage area, resource endowment and the commitment to deepen local governance. The district is constituted of 22 electoral areas, 4 Town/ Area Councils which are; Dodowa, Ayikuma, Asutware and Osuwem. One unique thing about the SODA is that secretaries have been appointed for all the Town and Area Councils to assist the Assembly members in revenue collection and community mobilization. The assignment of secretaries is absent in the AMA and KeMA because of their size and population. For instance, the AMA has ten Sub Metropolitan District Councils (SMDCs) with 72 communities and the KeMA 14 Zonal Councils. Assigning secretaries to the sub-district structures in the AMA and KeMA will therefore have serious financial and material repercussions because of the numbers involved.

The SODA is largely rural with 58.6% of the active labour force in agriculture and its related employment. The unemployment rate is 30.8% (GSS, 2014:6, 41). The District is noted for the production of fruits such as mangoes, pineapples, and watermelons. In addition, rice production and aqua culture are practiced in the Asutware area (Table 4.7). It also undertakes animal production with cattle, goats and poultry rearing being the



leading activities (Table 4.8). Commercial farms such as the Golden Exotic Ltd and Tropo Farms are also in the district. Quarry is the only industrial activity in the district and the major manufacturing industry was the Asutuare sugar factory. Due to inefficient management and the continuous losses made by the factory, the Divestiture Implementation Committee (DIC), in the wake of the ERP and SAP auctioned and stripped the factory of all its assets (GSS, 2014:7). The site is presently occupied by the Kpong Irrigation Scheme (KIS) (SODA, Planning Department, November, 2017).

**Table 4. 7: Crop production in Metric Tons in the Shai-Osudoku District**

<b>Crop</b>	<b>Cropped Area (HA)</b>	<b>Average Yield Metric Ton/HA</b>	<b>Total Production M. Tons</b>
Mongo	1,138.4	30	34,152
Pineapple	5	50	250
Watermelon	50	46	2,300
Rice	3,000	6.502	19,506

**Source: Shai-Osudoku District Assembly, Planning Department, November, 2017**

**Table 4. 8: Animal production in the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly**

<b>Livestock/Animal</b>	<b>quantity</b>	<b>Number of keepers</b>	<b>Average animal per keeper</b>
Beehives	36	3	12
Cattle	28,339	437	65
Chicken	54,378	1,515	36
Dove	742	7	106
Goat	8,134	712	11
Grass cutter	598	28	21
Guinea fowl	5,083	183	28
Ostrich	113	11	10
Pig	1,832	130	14
Rabbit	405	9	45
Sheep	4,329	219	20
Silk worm	75	6	13
Snail	10	1	10
Turkey	1,045	113	9
Fish farming	2,069	5	414
Inland fishing	126	3	42
Others	212	18	12

**Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2010 Population and Housing Census, p.57**

The District has a population of 51,913 with 48.7 percent being males while 51.3 percent are females. The level and incidence of poverty among the two groups are 23.2 percent and 55.1 percent respectively which is the highest in the Greater Accra Region (GSS, 2014:20, 2015: x, 2007:9).

Since the adoption of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1) and Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 2), the district has implemented the following LED initiatives: rice farming at Asutuare, pineapple and mango farming and processing at Dodowa, Agormeda, Sota and Abornya as well as grafting of mango seedlings (Fieldwork, April, 2017).

It has few tourist attraction sites, namely; Shai Hills Resource Reserves, Dodowa Forest, Chenku Falls and Adumanya Apiary (GSS, 2014:8).

The vision statements of the three MMDAs are not significantly different as they are concerned with local development in spite of differences in context. For instance, while the AMA seeks to mobilize resources both internally and externally to create a clean and environmentally sound city for the benefit of the people, the KeMA sets out to be the leading MMDA to achieve socio-economic development in Ghana. SODA is also pre-occupied with the economic transformation of its jurisdiction to provide gainful employment for the citizens.

The high number of population in the AMA, high waste generation and environmental pollution coupled with the high rate of social vices account for the adoption of that vision whilst limited economic activities in the KeMA and SODA made the two MMDAs to focus on the development of their respective economies.

In terms of mission statements, the AMA and KeMA exist to improve the quality of life of their citizens. Whilst the AMA seeks to better the quality of life of the citizens through

the provision of basic amenities and making sure the residents imbibe the culture of discipline and commitment to excellence, the KeMA seeks to do same through mobilization of resources and the provision of socio-economic structures and services. The SODA due to its economic deprivation, sets out to create an enabling environment which allows for the equitable provision of services for development with all stakeholders. From the missions, it is clear that all the three MMDAs are concerned with local economic development in order to better the lot of their residents. This notwithstanding, the SODA as a rural district placed emphasis on how development will be attained through the creation of an enabling environment and partnership with other stakeholders.

The AMA, KeMA and SODA also have variations in poverty levels which are 10.6, between 10 and 14.9 and 23.2 respectively, unemployment rates of 7.2% in the AMA, 38% in the KeMA and 30.8% in SODA. To reduce the poverty levels and unemployment rates, the three Assemblies implemented various LED strategies. For instance, in the AMA, the focus of LED interventions has been on public-private partnerships, infrastructural improvement and capacity development for business owners. On the other hand, in KeMA and SODA, the emphasis has been on empowering the residents through the use of the Assemblies' natural resources. In addition, both KeMA and SODA undertakes "demand driven" LED; thus the local citizens' request for specific programmes based on their localities' needs. Again, the SODA always aspires to create an enabling environment for business activities to thrive (Fieldwork, April, 2017).

In economic terms, the local economy of the AMA is driven by the manufacturing and the service industries while the economy of the KeMA is driven predominantly by agricultural activities. Though some industrial activities are undertaken, they are on small scale basis, owned and managed by sole proprietors (GSS, 2014:4). The SODA just like the KeMA, also has its economy driven by agriculture. Agricultural industrial activities such as fruit

processing are also undertaken in the Assembly because of the large scale fruit production. Quarry is another industrial activity undertaken in the SODA. However, this is also done on small-scale basis due to the absence of investment in the area.

In terms of population vis-à-vis geographical area, the AMA is the smallest in terms of land coverage compared to the KeMA and SODA, however, its population is higher than the two. This is attributed to it being the national, regional and metropolitan capital and the economic hub of the country hence the influx of people from all walks of life within and outside the country.

Comparing the agricultural produce of the MMDAs, the three Assemblies are engaged in the production of similar crops and animals with slight variations in the quantity produced. The SODA dominates in livestock production followed by the KeMA and AMA. Of the three MMDAs, it is only the SODA that is not involved in marine fishing because it is an inland district.

Taken together, the AMA, KeMA and SODA have exhibited diversity of experiences in relation to their vision and mission, LED interventions, programmes and initiatives, local governance, political institutions, local economy, population, poverty levels and incidence, unemployment levels and agricultural produce which are useful for comparative and best practices purposes.

#### **4.3. RESEARCH DESIGN**

The triangulation approach was used in this study. In the social sciences, triangulation refers to the combination of two or more theories, data sources, methods or investigations in the study of a single phenomenon to converge on a single construct, and can be employed in both quantitative and qualitative studies (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012:156; Hussein, 2009).

The triangulation approach was selected for confirmatory and completeness purposes. The confirmatory purpose helps in the validation of qualitative results by quantitative studies, assists in validating quantitative research instruments when the research phenomenon under investigation has little theoretical underpinnings and it is applied to confirm if instruments were appropriate for measuring a concept (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012:156). For completeness purposes, triangulation helps to increase the in-depth and understanding of the phenomenon under investigation by combining multiple methods and theories. Triangulation for completeness purposes is used mainly in researching the less explored or unexplored research problems (Yeasmin and Rahman, 2012:156).

According to Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) and Hussein (2009), triangulation has the following advantages:

1. Increases the wider and deeper understanding of the study phenomenon.
2. Increases the accuracy of the study due to the usage of multiple research sources thereby ruling out trivial explanations.
3. Stimulates the creation of inventive methods, new ways of capturing a problem to balance with conventional data collection methods.

Notwithstanding these merits, scholars such as Yeasmin and Rahman (2012) and Hussein (2009), have indicated that triangulation is fraught with the following challenges:

1. Inconsistency among the data. The data obtained through triangulation may be inconsistent, not confirming and also not contradictory.
2. Results in contradiction.
3. If the researcher is not clearly focused theoretically or conceptually, the research will not produce a satisfactory outcome.

The study used the triangulation approach in spite of the weaknesses due to its innate comprehensiveness. To minimize the effect of the approach's weaknesses on the study, this study first collected uniform data (data on LED strategies, employment, infrastructure provision, employment creation and income generation) from the AMA, KeMA and SODA. The uniform data assisted in neutralizing or eliminating data inconsistencies and contradictions that characterized the triangulation approach. Second, data collected was theoretically conceptualized to focus on the expected outcome of the extent to which LED implementation in the three Assemblies had resulted in employment creation, income generation, infrastructure improvement and poverty reduction.

#### **4.4. TYPE OF STUDY**

The study is a case study type of research because of the focus on three selected geographical areas, namely, the AMA, KeMA and SODA. The case study research method is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin 1984:23 cited in Zaidah: 2007:2).

The method has the following advantages:

First, the examination of the data is most often conducted within the context of the situation in which the activity takes place.

Second, variations in terms of intrinsic, instrumental and collective approaches to case studies allow for both quantitative and qualitative analyses of the data.

Third, it helps to explain the complexities of real life situations which may not be captured through experimental or survey research (Yin, 1984).

The method has the following demerits:

1. It is often accused of lack of rigour and dependence on a single case and microscopic.
2. Provides very little basis for scientific generalisation since they use a limited number of subjects.
3. It is often labelled as being too long, difficult to conduct and producing a massive amount of documentation (Yin, 1984).

To overcome weaknesses such as lack of rigour, robustness and single case exploration, the study adopted the multi-case design by examining the cases of the AMA, KeMA, and SODA experiences in LED. The examination of these cases showed the numerous sources of evidence through replication rather than sampling logic. In addition, the “before” and “after” comparative analysis as well as the dynamics were evident in addition to the best practices which can be replicated in other MMDAs in Ghana.

#### **4.5. POPULATION OF THE STUDY**

The population of the study consisted of the staff of the planning units of the three MMDAs, finance and budgeting, business advisory centres. The other members of the population were the residents of the three MMDAs, Rural Enterprise Programme, as well as the LED partner organisations such as the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA), KIS, Ghana Rice Inter-professional Body (GRIB), Golden Exotic Ltd, Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd, transaction advisors (TAs), Public Investment Division (PID) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) among others.

#### **4.6. SAMPLING TECHNIQUE OF THE STUDY**

The study used different sampling techniques due to the multiple populations involved in the study. In the case of the MMDAs, purposive sampling was used to select each of the Planning Officers, Directors of the Business Advisory Centres and Directors of Finance

and Budget were interviewed. The LED scheduled officers were also interviewed. Stratified sampling was used in the sampling of residents because of the heterogeneous nature of the population. The population of the MMDAs was stratified into LED-beneficiaries and non-LED beneficiaries. The reasons for sampling the various categories are indicated in Table 4.9.

**Table 4. 9: Sample category and reasons for interviewing**

<b>Sample Category</b>	<b>Reason for Interview</b>
MMDA Planning Officers	To collect information on economic planning issues in the MMDAs involving LED
Trade and Industry Officers/Business Advisory Centre	To collect data on businesses and industries existing in the MMDA
Finance/Budget Officer	To collect information on the financing and budgetary allocations for LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA
GRIB, KIS, Social Investment Fund, GEL, UMB, Labour Enterprise Trust, First Africa Group, EY, PID, REP and others	To collect data on their involvement in LED programmes in the AMA, KeMA and SODA
MLGRD (LED Officer)	To collect data on the performance of MMDAs in LED
Residents	To collect data on the extent to which the LED initiative have been beneficial to them

#### 4.7. SAMPLE SIZE OF THE STUDY

The total sample size of the study was 551. The details are shown in Tables 4.10 and 4.11.

**Table 4. 10: Sample size of the study**

<b>SAMPLE CATEGORY</b>	<b>AMA</b>	<b>KeMA</b>	<b>SODA</b>	<b>General</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
Planning Officer	1	1	1		3
Trade and Industry Officer	1	1	1		3
Finance/Budget Officer	1	1	1		3
GEL			1		1
Sheenfeel			1		1
MiDA			1		1
KIS			1		1
REP		1			1
Adidome Farms		1			1
Accra City Car Parks Ltd	1				1
PID	1				1
MLGRD (LED officer)				1	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>18</b>



The reason for interviewing the members of the sample size in Table 4.10 are indicated in Table 4.9. With regards to the residents, a sample size of 533 LED beneficiaries was drawn from the AMA, KeMA and SODA with the break down as follows: 178, 178 and 177 respectively (Table 4.11). The formula used in calculating the sample size was:

$$\frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)}$$

Where N refers to the population of the MMDA

$e^2$  refers to the margin of error which was  $0.075^2$

**Table 4. 11: Sample size of the residents of the MMDAS**

NAME OF MMDA	SAMPLE SIZE	MALE	FEMALE
AMA	178	86	92
KeMA	178	83	95
SODA	177	86	91
	533	255	278

NB: The gender breakdown was done using the population ratio of male to female as indicated in the justification for each of the MMDAs.

#### **4.8. SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION**

Data was collected using both primary and secondary sources. Field work consisting of survey and in-depth interviews (elite interviews and focus group discussions) was employed for primary data collection. Secondary data was obtained from books, journal articles, chapters in books, as well as official government publications and internet sources.

#### **4.9. INSTRUMENTS OF DATA COLLECTION**

Data for the study was collected using questionnaires, face to face and elite interviews and focus group discussion schedules.

#### **4.9.1. Questionnaire**

A questionnaire is a list of carefully structured questions, chosen after considerable testing, with a view to eliciting reliable responses from a chosen sample. The aim of a questionnaire is to find out what a selected group of participants do, think or feel about the subject under study (Collis and Hussey, 2003:173).

The study used both the closed-ended questions and open-ended questions. Closed ended questions such as “have you benefitted from any LED programme?, have the LED programme been beneficial to you?, what are the areas of benefit?” etc. were covered. Questions such as “how much budgetary allocation of the MMDAs was assigned to the implementation of LED programmes?, what is the percentage of the budgetary allocation to the total expenditure of the MMDAs?, how has LED impacted employment, income generation and poverty levels in the MMDAs?”, among others were some of the open-ended questions covered.

#### **4.9.2. Elite Interview**

Elite interview is the form of interview in which respondents are selected because of their unique qualities or knowledge in a given area. The respondent’s elite status depends on their role in society as well as their access to information that can help answer a given research question, though persons who get elite treatment in research are often persons of political, social, economic or academic importance. The purpose of elite interview is not to collect pre-specified data but to gather information to assist in reconstructing some event or discerning a pattern in specific behaviours (Manheim and Rich, 1995: 161-162).

The justification for choosing the elite interview is that it helped the study to define the process of LED implementation in Ghana’s local governance system since the population sampled were practitioners and officers with a wide range of knowledge and expertise in

the field. The information received from the respondents were treated as data and not necessarily as facts as other sources such as interviews with other respondents and secondary materials were used to validate their responses.

#### **4.9.3. Focus Group Discussion**

Focus group discussion is a method used to gather data relating to the feelings and opinions of people who are involved in a common situation. Under the guidance of a group leader, selected participants were stimulated to discuss their opinions, reactions and feelings about the subject matter of LED and how it impacted them either positively or negatively in employment creation, income generation and poverty alleviation. The idea of focus group discussion is based on the notion that respondents listening to other group members' views feel encouraged to voice their own opinions. The explicit use of the group interaction to produce data and insights that would be less accessible without the interaction found in a group provides the researcher with rich data (Collis and Hussey, 2003:166).

For the study to derive the dividends of focus group discussions; a relaxed atmosphere was created and opinions and views expressed by participants were recorded during the discussion. Only issues related to LED, employment creation, income generation and poverty reduction were discussed with the respondents. This was to avert the chances of respondents digressing from the research topic and objective. Finally, during the discussion, the researcher ensured that every participant had equal opportunity to voice out the opinion instead of few people dominating the discussion.

#### **4.10. INSTRUMENT OF DATA ANALYSIS**

The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used in analyzing the quantitative data while qualitative data was analyzed by quantifying the data; that is converting the qualitative data into numerical and quantitative data.

#### **4.11. MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY LEVELS**

The study used the World Bank approach of less than one dollar a day to measure the extent to which LED implementation impacted poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. The one dollar a day approach refers to the minimum income level used as an official standard for determining the proportion of a population or household living in poverty. A household that earns and spends less than the one dollar a day is said to be below the poverty line and households that earn and spend more than the one dollar a day is above the poverty line. The poverty line, which is sometimes referred to as the poverty threshold, is the smallest amount of money that a household needs to live on; to buy what is needed. It is the imaginary line drawn by the experts which has a particular amount that if anybody earns income which is lower than this amount is known as poor and others who earn more than this amount are known as non-poor. The determination of the poverty line assists governments, international organisations, development agencies and other development actors to identify poor areas and the kind of development interventions to implement. The first set of poverty measurement using this approach was published in the World Development Report 1990 (World Bank Development Report, 1990). The US\$ 1 a day is calculated as follows:

$(\text{GH}\text{\textcent equivalence of US\$ 1} * 30 \text{ days}) * \text{Average number per household.}$

Where the GH\textcent equivalence of US\$ 1 was GH\textcent 4.50

The Average number per household. This is determined by the total number of people residing in households divided by the total number of households in the MMDA (Table 4.12).

**Table 4. 12: Average number per household in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

<b>Name of MMDA</b>	<b>Average number per household</b>
AMA	3.7
KeMA	3.8
SODA	4.4

**Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2010**

**Table 4. 13: The poverty line of the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

<b>Name of MMDA</b>	<b>Poverty line in GH¢</b>
AMA	499.50
KeMA	513.00
SODA	594.00

**Source: Fieldwork, February, 2018**

From Table 4.13, it could be deduced that a member of a household in the AMA, KeMA and SODA needs a minimum of GH¢ 499.50, GH¢513.00 and GH¢594.00 respectively a month to be above the poverty line and those who earn below the said amounts are classified as below the poverty line. The variations in the poverty line among the MMDAs are accounted for by the differences in the average number per household where the SODA recorded the highest followed by the KeMA and AMA in that order.

The World Bank approach was chosen for the study for three main reasons;

- (i) It is an internationally acclaimed approach and
- (ii) It is scientific.

The “before” and “after” comparative analysis was used to complement the World Bank one dollar a day approach. This aided in establishing the impact of the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA on poverty. In other words, the study measured the extent to which the implementation of LED in the three MMDAs has either positively or negatively influenced the poverty levels of 10.6 percent in the AMA, between 10 and 14.9 percent in the KeMA and 23.2 percent in the SODA.

The study also examined the dynamics brought about in the LED process as a result of local governance structures, institutions, leadership, resources (human, fiscal and land), the authoritative allocation of resources and the initiatives and interests of the various actors in the LED process. In addition, the extent of similarities and differences in the implementation of LED and beneficent outcomes such as employment creation, income generation, infrastructure improvement and poverty reduction due to these dynamics were also assessed in the AMA, KeMA and SODA.

#### **4.12. PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERPINNING OF THE STUDY**

The study was guided by the Positivist approach to the social sciences. This approach to the social sciences claim the label scientific because of the assumption that things can be studied as hard facts and the relationships between these facts can be established as scientific laws. From the positivists' perspective, such laws have the status of truth and social objects can be studied in the same manner as natural objects. The positivist belief in the following: scientific method, objectivity, value neutrality, quantification, nomothetic approach and rejects religious assertions.

The proponents of the approach include Augustus Comte, Herbert Spenser and Emile Durkheim who constitute the positivist tradition in the nineteenth century. There is also the logical positivist of the Vienna Circle in the early twentieth century championed by A.J. Ayer and Rudolf Carnap and finally the standard positivist account developed in the post-war period in the West. This was associated with Carl Hempel.

#### **4.13. CONCLUSION**

The chapter has discussed the methodology of the study. It dealt with the justification for the selection of the AMA, KeMA and SODA as well as the different variations of LED programmes implemented in the MMDAs. In addition, the chapter also compared and

contrasted the features of the MMDAs and identified differences in population size, unemployment rates, poverty levels, political institutions and local economy. However, there are similarities between the AMA, KeMA and SODA in their agriculture produce with respect to crop farming and animal rearing with slight differences in quantity produced. These similarities are accounted for by the resemblance in the weather conditions, the use of the same agricultural practices such as labour intensive and inadequate use of technology in the three MMDAs.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

#### **5.1. INTRODUCTION**

The chapter is guided by the actor-oriented approach to development intervention and the following research objectives:

1. to examine the role of actors and the specific local structures in the LED process from pre-initiation stage through to the monitoring and evaluation stage in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and the dynamics involved;
2. to discuss how the LED programmes were financed in the AMA, KeMA and SODA;
3. to discuss the LED strategies implemented in the three MMDAs and the beneficent outcomes in terms of poverty reduction, job creation, income generation and infrastructure improvement;
4. to discuss the commonalities and differences between the AMA, KeMA, and SODA in terms of poverty reduction, job creation, income generation and infrastructure improvement with the aim of explaining what worked, what did not work and why;
5. to discuss the challenges of LED and how they inhibited the LED implementation process in the AMA, KeMA and SODA; and
6. to highlight the lessons and the implications for the theoretical, comparative and empirical literature.

This chapter is devoted to the data presentation and analysis. Specifically, it addresses the following issues: background to LED implementation and LED strategies implemented in the MMDAs; financing LED; the actors, their roles and how the roles facilitated LED



implementation; the actors and their interaction with the local governance structures; the beneficent outcomes of LED in terms of job creation, income generation, infrastructure improvement and poverty reduction, the dynamics and how they shaped LED implementation. In addition, the measurement of poverty, the challenges encountered in the LED implementation process and how they influenced the process were also analyzed.

## **5.2. BACKGROUND TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED IN THE MMDAs**

The implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA was influenced by different historical contexts and years in which they were adopted.

The implementation of LED in the AMA dates back to 1988 when the Assembly was established. However, with the various re-demarcations that the Assembly went through till 2012 when the Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 2034 was promulgated, the implementation of LED in the AMA could be said to have begun 2014 (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The KeMA on the other hand traces its history to the implementation of LED to 1985 when the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) was established. In spite of this, LED can be said to have effectively started in the KeMA in 2013 when the Assembly began the Rural Enterprise Programme (REP) (Fieldwork, January, 2018). Finally, the implementation of LED by SODA started in 2003 and stemmed from the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) 1 from 2003-2005 when the government saw the need to reduce poverty in the country. As a result, various poverty reduction interventions were rolled out (Fieldwork, April, 2017).

## **5.3. FINANCING OF LED PROGRAMMES**

The three Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) have sources of financing their LED programmes (Table 5.1.).

**Table 5. 1: MMDAs and their sources of funding LED programmes**

AMA	KeMA	SODA
Internally Generated Funds (IGFs)	Rural Enterprise Programme (REP)	Internally Generated Funds (IGFs)
District Development Facility (DDF)		District Development Facility
Urban Development Grant (UDG)		District Assembly Common Fund (DACF)

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

The sources can be categorized into three; namely, intergovernmental transfers, donor or private sector funding and IGFs. It can be inferred from Table 5.1. that, the AMA and SODA had all the three categories of LED financing while the KeMA had only intergovernmental transfers from the REP.

In terms of numbers the MMDAs had different sources (Table 5.2.).

**Table 5. 2: MMDAs and the number of sources for funding LED programmes**

Name of MMDA	Number of sources
AMA	3
KeMA	1
SODA	3

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

From Table 5.2., the AMA had three main and regular sources, the KeMA had only one and three in the case of the SODA. The AMA attracted funding from the UDG because it is classified among urban MMDAs whilst the KeMA and SODA could not get funding from the UDG because they belong to the rural category. The ability of the AMA to attract high sources of funding can be attributed to the status of Accra as the national capital with the accompanying focus and priority given to its operations. The KeMA had only one source of funding due to lack of leadership commitment from 1988 to 2016 and the lack of political will from the Municipal Chief Executives (MCEs), Municipal Coordinating Directors (MCDs) and assembly members between 1988 and 2016 to the implementation of LED programmes, leading to non-prioritization of LED initiatives. Furthermore, both AMA and SODA financed LED programmes through IGFs and DDF. The SODA used

part of its share of the DACF on LED programmes which the AMA and the KeMA did not.

The three MMDAs indicated that there were annual budgetary allocations for LED programmes. The AMA and the SODA had progressive increasing budgetary allocations for the implementation of their LED interventions while the KeMA on the other hand, had a fixed annual budgetary allocation (Table 5.3.). The variation in the budgetary allocations between the AMA and SODA on one hand and the KeMA on the other hand, is due to the former having different activities under the implementation of LED programmes such as stakeholder consultations, feasibility studies, baseline surveys, field trips among others whilst the latter had fixed items like remuneration for resource persons, cost of stationery and fuel (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

**Table 5. 3: Budgetary allocation of MMDAs**

<b>NAME OF MMDA /YEAR</b>	<b>2012 Amt in GHC</b>	<b>2013 Amt in GHC</b>	<b>2014 Amt in GHC</b>	<b>2015 Amt in GHC</b>	<b>2016 Amt in GHC</b>	<b>2017 Amt in GHC</b>
AMA	-	-	37,000,000	38,000,000	39,000,000	43,000,000
KeMA		18,800	18,800	18,800	18,800	18,800
SODA	131,164.28	183,630	257,082	897,988	980,000	700,000

**Source: Fieldwork, January-February, 2018**

In comparison, the AMA had the highest financial allocations to LED programme implementation, followed by the SODA and KeMA in that order. The KeMA's low budgetary allocation can be attributed to lack of previous political leadership commitment and the allocation of budget not by the Assembly itself but rather the submission of LED budget by the Business Advisory Centre (BAC) to the REP for sponsorship (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The MCD pointed out that the Assembly in the past had shown no financial commitment to LED programmes due to lack of awareness on the importance of LED in propelling the local economy for local development (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

Institutional commitment to the budgetary allocation was varied among the MMDAs. The LED budget of the AMA was prepared by the Budget and Rating Committee, that of the KeMA was done by the Municipal Coordinator (MC) of the BAC and that of the SODA was usually initiated by the District Planning Officers. Again, there were differences with respect to the approval of the LED budget. The budgets of the AMA and SODA were always approved by their General Assemblies whilst that of KeMA always received approval from REP which is the funding agency. The implication is that LED financing and implementation in the AMA and SODA are considered as an Metropolitan, Municipal and District (MMDA)- wide activity due to the involvement of the General Assembly in approving the budget.

However, the extent of involvement varies. Whilst the budget was initiated by the planning unit at SODA, it is the Budget and Rating Committee which did it at the AMA. This can result in misplaced priorities in the AMA because the Budget and Rating Committee may not be privy to the needs of the assembly.

The AMA and SODA had no difficulties in attracting funding for LED. However, the SODA had challenges in attracting large funds from the private sector for financing LED due to the long gestation period that such investments take to yield returns for the investors who in most cases wanted immediate returns on their investments. The KeMA on the other hand had a difficulty in attracting funding for LED due to two main reasons, namely;

- (i) the non-marketing of the economic potentials of the MMDA to prospective investors and
- (ii) the absence of leadership drive and interest in LED programmes as a result of the non-realization of the capacity and non-utilization of the natural resource endowment of the Assembly to transform the local economy for development (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

All the three MMDAs had mechanisms in place to monitor their LED finances. The AMA described its monitoring mechanisms as excellent whilst that of KeMA and SODA were very good (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The assessment of the monitoring mechanisms for the KeMA and SODA were confirmed because the LED interventions were implemented, however, that of the AMA could not be fully confirmed since the public private partnerships (PPPs) interventions (apart from the Accra City Car Parks Ltd) were not implemented (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

There were, however, variations in the monitoring mechanisms. Whilst the AMA used the Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information Systems (GIFMIS) and the Budgeting and Rating department for the monitoring, the KeMA and SODA used supervision, inspection and visits by monitoring teams (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The AMA used the GIFMIS because of the amount allocated for LED programmes and the implementation of PPPs as LED initiatives. The monitoring in the SODA was done by planning officers, engineers and other departmental heads while in the KeMA, it was done by the MC of BAC who generated and implemented the budget (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

#### **5.4. LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INTERVENTIONS IMPLEMENTED BY THE MMDAs**

This section of the chapter is devoted to the various LED initiatives implemented by the MMDAs, the actors involved in the implementation process, the roles of the actors, the factors that promoted or hindered their participation in the LED process and the dynamics involved in the implementation process.

#### **5.4.1. LED Initiatives or Programmes**

The three MMDAs pursued different LED interventions. The data on the LED initiatives is presented below.

The AMA before the promulgation of Legislative Instrument (L.I.) 2034 in 2012 had implemented five (5) broad LED programmes namely, (i) enhancing access of Small Scale Enterprises (SSEs) to local and national markets, (ii) business development services, (iii) advocacy and dialogue for private sector promotion, (iv) development and technical improvement and technical skills development and (v) PPPs in the Accra City Car Parks Ltd project. However, with the coming into effect of the L.I. 2034, the AMA implemented PPPs as the only LED initiative (Table 5.4) (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The AMA being a metropolitan, regional and national capital has a large span of commercial lands most of which are not developed and also had markets which are substandard. As a result, it leveraged on these and used the available lands as its equity to the PPPs. Financial constraints resulting in delay in the diverse development projects that the AMA had to undertake and the need to facilitate development in the various sub-metropolitan district councils (SMDCs) were identified as the reasons for the adoption and implementation of these LED initiatives (Fieldwork, January, 2018). However, only the Accra City Car Parks Ltd PPP is operational. The electoral defeat of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) with its resultant political transition, administrative breaches such as the AMA not following the due process before advertising Request for Proposal (RFP), safeguards including environmental and fire safeties not approved etc., and the AMA not having land titles to the PPP sites accounted for the halt in the process for the other ten PPPs (Fieldwork, February, 2018). In addition, the administrative breaches resulted in only four of the ten PPPs having contractors expressed interest at the RFP stage of the PPP process (Fieldwork, February, 2018).

**Table 5. 4: Summary of AMA PPP Projects**

Item	Project	Transaction Advisor	Estimated Land Size in acres	Estimated Value in US\$	Contractor after Request for Proposal (RFP)
1	Mallam Market	CPCS International	5.84	17,680,000.00	
2	Makola/31 <sup>st</sup> December Market	Deloitte and Touché	7.5	29,046,600.00	Excellent and Wilson
3	Tuesday Market	Kwame Ansah and Associates	4.08	24,345,862.00	Pro Design Ltd
4	Salaga Market	Kwame Ansah and Associates	1.27	4,055,946.00	
5	London Market	Kwame Ansah and Associates	0.7	2,766,986.00	
6	City Corner Residential Housing	C-Nergy	7.27	307,436,607.00	Excellent, Buddos and Sino Ltd
7	Convention/Community Center	C-Nergy	3.77	156,558,513.00	
8	Mallam Atta Market	Ernst and Young, Ghana	12.08	89,000,000.00	
9	Katamanto Market	Shawbell Consulting	10.71	25,200,000.00	
10	PWD and Kwasiadwaso	PKF	11.4	50,700,000.00	Consiki with EBID
11	Accra City Car Parks	-	0.4	5,500,000	Seth Adjei and Consortium

**Source: Public Investment Division of MOFEP and Fieldwork, January, 2018**

The KeMA, on the other hand, implemented two distinct LED programmes, namely; traditional handicraft LED initiative and the non-traditional LED initiative. The capacity development intervention was used as a tool for implementing both initiatives. Bag weaving with straw and raffia, leatherworks, beads making and batik, tie and dye are all classified under the traditional handicraft LED initiative while hair dressing, cream production, poultry farming, tomatoes puree production, creation of enabling environment

for the traditional handicraft initiatives to flourish, creation of marketing opportunities for the LED beneficiaries, access to financial credit mostly from the Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC) are classified under the non-traditional LED initiative (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

In the case of the SODA, software and hardware LED initiatives were implemented. The software initiatives consisted of the creation of enabling environment for business operations, streamlining of business registration processes to reduce the challenges faced by investors, capacity development programmes for the indigenes, access to credit facilities for business operations (Fieldwork, April, 2017).

The hardware programmes were implemented in the areas of maintaining existing road infrastructure, potable water provision to the communities, sanitation infrastructure provision. Others include social infrastructure services such the building of schools and Community based Health Planning System (CHPS) compounds in the district aimed at quality health and education services delivery (Fieldwork, April, 2017).

The implemented LED initiatives are represented on Table 5.5 below.



**Table 5. 5: LED initiatives in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

NAME OF MMDA	LED PROGRAMME	CLASSIFICATION	INTERVENTION
AMA	PPPs	PPPs	Partnership with the private sector for infrastructure provision
	Business Development Services	Business Development Services	Capacity development programmes
KeMA	Traditional handicraft and Non-traditional handicraft	<b>Traditional handicraft</b> Bag weaving with straw and raffia, leatherworks, beads making, batik, tie and dye. <b>Non-traditional</b> Hair dressing, cream production, tomatoes puree poultry farming, creation of enabling environment, business linkages	Capacity development programmes, access to finance, creation of marketing opportunities
SODA	Software LED and Hardware LED	<b>Software LED</b> Creation of enabling environment, easy permitting for businesses <b>Hardware LED</b> Provision of infrastructure	Capacity development programmes and private sector involvement

**Source: Fieldwork January, 2018**

From the above, the MMDAs adopted different strategies in the implementation of LED. The AMA implemented both PPP and business development programmes as its LED intervention, the KeMA implemented both traditional handicraft and non-traditional LED initiatives and the SODA implemented software and hardware LED. Comparatively, the AMA's PPPs and hardware interventions implemented by the SODA are similar since they were aimed at infrastructure provision. In addition, both the AMA and SODA leveraged on the available lands to woo investors to their respective localities. The AMA for instance, offered lands as its equity to the PPPs (Table 5.4.) and the SODA also offered land and

enabling environment for companies such as the Golden Exotics Company Ltd (GEL) and Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd.

The business development programmes by the AMA, software LED by the SODA and the non-traditional LED interventions by the KeMA are also similar because the end results were to develop the capacities of the residents and their business establishments through resourcing them to be capable both financially and skills wise. In addition, the three MMDAs implemented LED programmes aimed at value addition. For instance, the capacity development programmes at Keta and Srogbe for beads making, bag weaving with straw and raffia (*ketsi*) among others enabled the residents to utilize the natural resources by way of value addition and the capacity development programmes for mango farmers in Dodowa and Agomeda on one hand and same for rice farmers in Asutauare also ensured that the beneficiaries got the maximum yield from their farming activities (Fieldwork, January, 2018). Furthermore, both the AMA and SODA sought to take advantage of national and international markets. This was done in the SODA by the Millennium Development Authority (MiDA) through the establishment of business linkages between the mango farmers and the business world whilst that of the AMA was done by fusing quality control measures, advertising and marketing into the product and training programmes. The KeMA's capacity development programme had no direct intention of taking advantage of the marketing opportunities; however, it had a separate initiative of creating marketing opportunities through attending and exhibiting LED products at trade fairs in the country (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

A critical examination of the LED interventions also revealed some differences. For instance, whilst the AMA's LED programmes were focused on PPPs and the residents taken advantage of both national and international markets, the KeMA was concerned with indigenous capacity development, value addition to the natural resources and the provision

of marketing opportunities for the products of the LED beneficiaries locally and nationally. In terms of infrastructure provision, while the AMA used PPP arrangements, the GEL which is a company in SODA spearheaded the infrastructure provision as part of its (GEL) corporate social responsibility (CSR).

Even though the KeMA and SODA used their available natural resources for the implementation of LED initiatives, there were some variations. In the KeMA, apart from the bag weaving which made use of the natural resource endowment of the municipality, the other initiatives such as batik, tie and dye, hair dressing among others did not use raw materials from the locality. In contrast to the KeMA, the SODA took advantage of the water-logged and fertile nature of the land for rice production to undertake large scale rice production and also leveraged on the 22 kilometer stretch of the Volta River that washes the north-eastern portions of the district to promote fish (*tilapia*) farming in the district.

In terms of financial accessibility as a LED intervention, the partners of the AMA in the Accra City Car Parks Ltd namely, Merchant Bank (now Universal Merchant Bank Ghana Ltd (UMB)), First Africa Group, Labour Enterprise Trust, ELGA Ghana, OMNIA, and Seth Adjei and Consortium provided a total of US\$ 5.5 million for the project in 1997 (Table 5.6.) and the Social Investment Fund (SIF) funded the business development services programmes (Table 5.7) whilst the KeMA and SODA relied on the use of MASLOC (a government initiative to boost local entrepreneurship) and financial institutions (Dangbe and Shai Rural Banks) respectively (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

**Table 5. 6: Shareholding structure for financing the Accra City Car Parks Ltd in the AMA**

<b>Name of Actor</b>	<b>Amount in US\$</b>	<b>Equity in Percentage</b>
AMA	550,000	10%
UMB	594,550	10.81%
First African Group	2,051,500	37.3%
Labour Enterprise Trust	1,217,150	22.13%
ELGA Ghana	748,000	13.6%
OMNIA	128,150	2.33%
Seth Adjei and Consortium	210,650	3.83%
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,500,000</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Source: Accra City Car Parks Ltd, February, 2018**

**Table 5. 7: Cost of implementing capacity development programme in the AMA in January, 2012**

<b>No</b>	<b>Name/Type of Intervention</b>	<b>Cost in US Dollars</b>
1	Technological improvement for SSEs Development	19,798.57
2	Enhancing local and national for SSEs	15,782.50
3	Creating enabling environment and dialogue	17,245.53
4	Promoting SSEs development	14,680.98
	<b>Total</b>	<b>67,507.58</b>

**Source: Social Investment Fund, March, 2018**

The divergence between the AMA on one hand and KeMA and SODA on the other hand is due to a number of reasons. First, the AMA is an urban Assembly hence its ability to attract funding from the SIF for its Urban Poverty Reduction Project (UPRP) whilst the KeMA and SODA are rural-coastal and rural-forest Assemblies respectively. Second, the AMA is the economic hub of Ghana hosting a total of 17 commercial, developmental and merchant banks with 107 branches ([www.ghanadistricts.com](http://www.ghanadistricts.com)) whilst the KeMA has one each of rural and commercial banks and the SODA two rural banks and one commercial bank (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The KeMA used the MASLOC because of the unwillingness of the financial institution (the Anlo Rural Bank) to extend financial credits to the local entrepreneurs as residents in the past did not repay loans given to them. The SODA used the Shai and Dangbe Rural Banks because of their willingness to assist in granting the credit facility (Fieldwork, January, 2018). Putting together all the three

MMDAs' LED interventions, one could say that whilst the AMA generally pursued contemporary and private sector spearheaded LED, the KeMA and the SODA have implemented traditional and locality driven LED interventions.


In terms of the residents who benefitted from the various LED interventions, 132 respondents representing 74.2% from the AMA indicated that they benefitted from capacity development programmes whilst 46 respondents representing 25.8% indicated not applicable because they had no employment through the LED initiatives. In KeMA, 177 of the respondents representing 99.4% indicated capacity development as the LED initiative they benefitted from whilst one respondent representing 0.6% indicated the creation of marketing opportunities as the LED initiative benefit. One hundred and seventy six (176) respondents representing 99.4% indicated capacity development programme and provision of agricultural inputs as the LED initiative they benefitted from in SODA whilst one respondent representing 0.6% also benefitted from capacity development programme, agricultural inputs and marketing opportunities (Table 5.8.).

**Table 5. 8: LED initiatives in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

		Type of LED initiative					Total
		Capacity development programme	Creation of marketing opportunities	Not applicable	Capacity development programme and provision of agricultural inputs	Capacity development programme, provision of agricultural inputs and marketing opportunities	
Name of MMDA	AMA	132	0	46	0	0	178
	KeMA	177	1	0	0	0	178
	SODA	0	0	0	176	1	177
Total		309	1	46	176	1	533

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018

Figure 5.1 below indicates a summary of the MMDAs and their various LED initiatives.



**Figure 5. 1: MMDAs and LED Initiatives**

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

From Figure 5.1., though the indigenes benefitted from LED interventions, it could be distilled that whilst 132 respondents from the AMA benefitted directly from the capacity development programmes, another 46 are end result (employment opportunity creation) beneficiaries. The end employment opportunities were created by the 132 respondents who benefitted from the capacity development programmes. In KeMA, 177 and one respondents benefitted from the capacity development programme and creation of marketing opportunities respectively. Whilst in SODA, 176 of the respondents benefitted from a combination of capacity development programmes and provision of agricultural inputs and one respondent also benefitting from a blend of capacity development

programmes, provision of agricultural inputs and marketing opportunities. In short, one can say that all the respondents in the KeMA and SODA benefitted from LED interventions whilst in the AMA, those who gave not applicable are end result beneficiaries of LED.

#### **5.5. THE ACTORS IN THE LED INTERVENTION PROCESS AND HOW THEY FACILITATED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED**

Local economic development (LED) is mostly referred to as a partnership between LGUs and other actors. They include public sector organisations, private investors, the citizens of the locality, philanthropists, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to utilize the natural resources to create job opportunities, income generation and infrastructure improvement. The three MMDAs had actors collaborating with them in the implementation of their respective LED programmes. The actors in the three MMDAs are classified into primary and secondary actors (Table 5.9). From Table 5.9, it can be distilled that both the AMA and SODA had seven sets of primary actors, whilst the KeMA had four.

**Table 5.9: LED actors in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

<b>NAME OF MMDA</b>	<b>PRIMARY ACTORS</b>	<b>SECONDARY ACTORS</b>
AMA	AMA, Public Investment Division (PID) of Ministry of Finance, UMB, First Africa Group, Labour Enterprise Trust and contractors, Social Investment Fund	<b>Transaction Advisors (TAs)</b> 1. Ernst and Young 2. Shawbell Consulting Ltd 3. Deloitte and Touché 4. Kwame Ansah and Associates 5. CPCS International 6. PKF 7. C-Nergy <b>Capacity development facilitators</b> 1. J.S. Addo Consultants Ltd 2. Project Management Consultants Ltd 3. Management Development and Productivity Institute (MDPI)
KeMA	KeMA, BAC, REP, Adidome Farms, Indigenes	Capacity development facilitators
SODA	SODA, KIS, GEL, Sheenfeel, Indigenes, MiDA, GRIB.	Hopeline Institute, Wience /Copa Connect, ABIANS, International Water Management Institute, Sustainable Farming Group, University Research Centre

**Source: Fieldwork, January – February, 2018**

Comparing the primary actors in (Table 5.10.), the AMA, KeMA and SODA were the key local government units (LGUs) responsible for the implementation of LED within their respective jurisdictions. The AMA and the SODA initiated and hosted the implementation of LED whilst the KeMA only hosted the LED initiatives and left the initiation and implementation to the MC of BAC of the municipality. The AMA was the only assembly that had the PID responsible for the coordination of its LED interventions whilst the coordination in SODA and KeMA was done by the SODA and KIS together and BAC respectively.



For financing of LED interventions, the AMA had partners who joined forces to fund the Accra City Car Parks project (Table 5.6.) and the SIF financed and served as the implementing agency for the business development services programmes while the REP was the sole financier of LED interventions in the KeMA. The SODA had the GEL which financed projects as part of its CSR in the district. With respect to the delivery of capacity development programmes, the AMA had four (4) consultants, the KeMA had the Adidome farms in addition to the individual resource persons as facilitators whilst the MiDA facilitated for the SODA (Table 5.9). The GEL and Sheehfeel Company Ghana Ltd of the SODA and the Accra City Car Parks Ltd of the AMA were the corporate actors directly involved in employment generation as a LED initiative.

In the area of resident's involvement in the LED process, the KeMA and SODA had their residents involved in the process. This made the LED programmes to be demand driven, bottom-up and timely. The involvement was through programme initiation and participation in the capacity development programmes. In the case of the AMA, the interventions were top-down with no involvement of the indigenes hence participants had challenges such as poor timing, little information about the programmes and low participation for the business development services interventions. The low participation was evidenced by only ninety-four (94) individuals participating in the business development services programme in the AMA (AMA, January, 2012). The non-involvement of the residents in the LED planning process in the AMA also resulted in the reluctance of the residents to release land for the PPP projects (Fieldwork, February, 2018). The SODA was the only MMDA among the three which had a primary actors providing agricultural input support services. This stemmed from the fact that most of its LED interventions were agriculture related.

**Table 5. 10: The primary actors and their roles in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

Name of MMDA	Name of primary actor	Role in LED implementation
AMA	AMA	1. Initiated the LED process 2. Provided land for PPP initiatives
	Public Investment Division of Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning	1.Coordinated the implementation of PPPs 2. Did due diligence and ensured that everything was set for PPP implementation
	Universal Merchant Bank	Provided funds for the implementation of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd
	First African Group	Provided funds for the implementation of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd
	Labour Enterprise Trust	Provided funds for the implementation of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd
	Social Investment Fund	Financed and implemented the business development service programmes
KeMA	KeMA	Hosted the implementation of LED programmes
	BAC	Initiated and championed the implementation of LED
	REP	Funded all LED programmes in the KeMA
	Adidome Farms	Organised capacity development programmes for LED beneficiaries in poultry farming
	Indigenes	1. Initiated the demand for LED programmes 2. Participated in capacity building programmes as trainees
SODA	SODA	1. Initiated the LED process through need identification 2. Funded LED projects 3. Monitoring and evaluation 4. Gave approval
	Kpong Irrigation Scheme (KIS)	1. Initiated LED programs through baseline surveys 2. Provided land and year round irrigation services to rice farmers and GEL 3. Implemented, monitored and evaluated LED programmes related to rice farming
	GEL	1. Provided infrastructure to the community 2. Generated employment opportunities
	Sheenfeel Company Ltd	1. Generated employment opportunities
	MiDA	1. Capacity development programmes for mango farmers in Agomeda and Dodowa
	GRIB	1. Input supply 2. Mechanization services 3. Market price negotiation 4. Agro-business support services
	Indigenes	1. Initiated the LED process by making a demand on the KIS 2. Beneficiaries of LED interventions

**Source: Fieldwork, January – February, 2018**

In the case of the secondary actors, the AMA had seven TAs and three capacity development facilitators and SODA had six actors while the KeMA had one (Table 5.11.).

**Table 5. 11: Secondary actors and their roles in AMA, KeMA and SODA**

Name of MMDA	Name of secondary actor	Role (s)
AMA	Transaction Advisors	Undertook ten feasibility studies and assisted in the procurement process
	Capacity development facilitators	Facilitated the capacity development programmes for LED beneficiaries
KeMA	Resource persons	Facilitated the capacity development programmes for LED beneficiaries
SODA	Hopeline Institute	Machinery services
	Wienco/Copa Connet	Inputs/credit, marketing of produce and extension services
	ABIANS	Input credit and marketing of produce
	International Water Management Institute	Field trial and demonstration on mixed organic fertilizers (Fortifier Compost)
	Sustainable Farming Groups	Input support, marketing, machinery hire and extension services
	University Research Centre	Field trial on nutrient management

**Sources: SODA, Ministry of Food and Agriculture Department, November, 2017 and Fieldwork, January, 2018**

The TAs performed the following two key roles in the LED implementation process:

- (i) undertook ten feasibility studies for all proposed PPP projects in the Accra metropolis.

These feasibility studies enabled the AMA to determine the full project cycle costs, affordability limits, risks and their costs, optimal value-for-money and methods of delivery and

(ii) assisted in the procurement process following the laid down regulations in the National Policy on Public Private Partnerships (2011) (Republic of Ghana, 2011:4) and the provisions of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663).


After the procurement process, the TAs were engaged in negotiations, commercial and financial close (Fieldwork, January, 2018). These roles performed by the TAs aided the implementation of LED initiatives in the AMA because, due to the feasibility studies, the AMA committed itself to PPPs that had value for money. The PPP processes, however, were truncated at the procurement stage due to three main reasons:

First, during the due diligence stage, the PID revealed that the AMA did not have land title for all the lands labeled for its PPP initiatives;

Second, there were administrative and institutional breaches from the AMA. As a result of political expediency, the AMA did not follow the due process in PPP implementation including receiving approval from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Fire Service, land documentation and equity on board. (Figure 5.2). The PPP projects ended at the Approval 3a stage (Figure 5.2.).

From Figure 5.2., it emerged that the AMA did only project identification, but failed to submit a developed concept note to the PID and register the projects before recruiting the TAs to conduct the feasibility studies and submitting the procurement documentation to the PID. In spite of these breaches, the PID gave conditional approval to the AMA to continue with the PPP process with the proviso that it regularized the administrative and the PPP process since 2016 was an election year and there was the urgent need to implement tangible projects to woo the electorates to vote for the incumbent government (NDC) (Fieldwork, February, 2018), and

Third, there was a change in government after the 2016 general elections which saw the incumbent NDC losing power to the opposition NPP. The NPP having won political power needed to reward its financiers and economically empower its “foot soldiers”. As a result, all PPP project processes were put on hold for review (Fieldwork, January, 2018).



**Figure 5. 2: PPP PROCESS FLOW CHART**  
**Source: PID of MOFEP, February, 2018**

In the KeMA, the secondary actors were the resource persons who facilitated the capacity development programmes. Their roles aided the implementation of LED because they

equipped LED participants with the requisite skills for hair dressing, cream production, batik, tie and dye, beads making among others. In the case of SODA, the secondary actors were mainly into the provision of agricultural support services such as chemicals, fertilizers and agro-business services.

The roles played by both primary and secondary actors in the three MMDAs facilitated the implementation of LED. For instance, after the AMA identified a specific project for PPPs with the prior approval of the General Assembly, the TAs undertook feasibility studies and also engaged in negotiations and the PID ensured that the AMA got value for money through due diligence. The PID through its due diligence role partly contributed to the truncation of the ten PPP projects which saved the AMA from land litigation challenges (Fieldwork, February, 2018). In the KeMA, the actors were also involved in the process. Since most of the LED initiatives were demand driven, it implied that the beneficiaries were actively involved in the selection of the LED programmes to be implemented. Once the demand was presented, the BAC then prepared a budget which was sent to the REP (the financier of LED projects in KeMA). When approved, the LED initiative was then implemented.

The case of SODA was not different from the other two Assemblies as there was an active involvement of all the actors. For example, in the case of rice farming initiative, the LED initiatives were mostly demand driven, thus the rice farmers requested for what they wanted. In addition, the KIS and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture Department of SODA jointly initiated the kind of initiative to undertake. Furthermore, the General Assembly, the planning officers, engineers and other departmental heads were also involved in the process. The planning officers also initiated the process for budgetary allocation for LED, the finance office put the figures together and then it got approval from

the General Assembly. The engineers and other departmental heads including the planning officer(s) undertook monitoring and evaluation of the implemented LED programmes.

The KIS' involvement took the form of baseline surveys to identify potential projects, rice varieties and the demands of the rice farmers. It also included project identification, education and sensitization of the local citizens on the benefits of the project, initiation, management and implementation, monitoring and evaluation to identify lapses in projects and recommendation of appropriate interventions to help improve the project. The active involvement of the KIS was attributed to it being a government agency and was bound to implement government policy of poverty reduction through initiation of projects at the door step of the populace. GRIB was also involved in the entire process of LED pertaining to rice farming.

On mango farmers, the Dodowa farmers indicated that LED programmes were imposed on them. Their Agomeda counterparts however, intimated they were involved in the process from 2003 to 2012 at the instance of the assembly member of the electoral area. However, with a change of the assembly member due to electoral defeat, they were no more involved in the process. This implies that in SODA, the involvement of the LED beneficiaries was diverse. The GEL was also involved in the LED process through their CSR. This company identified the needs of the community or sometimes got requests from the SODA before undertaking infrastructure improvement programmes.

From the foregoing, it can be inferred that all the three MMDAs had the actors involved in the LED process. However, there were variations. For instance, in the AMA and the SODA, they were involved in the adoption and implementation of LED but in KeMA, the opposite was the case as LED implementation was entirely left in the hands of the BAC. In addition, among the three MMDAs, the SODA had the highest level of involvement of

the actors in the LED process as all the actors saw the need to improve the economic and infrastructure development of the area. In both KeMA and SODA (rice farmers), the LED initiatives were demand driven. In terms of infrastructure provision, whilst the AMA determined the kind of infrastructure to provide before advertising for TAs, the SODA mostly gave room to the GEL to determine the kind of projects to embark on as CSR. On balance, the actions of the actors did facilitate the implementation of LED in the KeMA and SODA while their inactions hindered the continuation of PPP projects in the AMA.

## **5.6. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ACTORS AND THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES**

Local governance structures refers to the rules, regulations and institutions within which the MMDAs and the LED actors operated. These structures either promoted or hindered the effective implementation of LED.

In the AMA, the structures promoted the implementation of LED. This was because the structures allowed for TAs to apply through the procurement department of the AMA and the TAs also did their feasibility studies and made their recommendations. However, the AMA failed to continue its PPPs because of reasons such as:

- (i) change in government in 2017,
- (ii) weak state institutions. This is referred to as the inability of state institutions to achieve their stated objectives due to lack of capacity to design and implement policies. The weak institutions in this context encompasses inadequate human, institutional, regulatory and financial capacities. These weaknesses have made the institutions to lack independence (the capacity to take policy decisions without interference from politicians).
- (iii) inability to obtain land title for the ten sites earmarked for the projects (Fieldwork, January, 2018).



In the KeMA, the structures hindered the implementation of LED due to power play. This was because, LED budgets presented as part of the Assembly's budget never made it to the General Assembly for discussion. Lack of leadership commitment from the MCEs and MCDs from 1988 to 2016 to the implementation of LED as a vehicle for local development accounted for this hindrance (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

In SODA, all the actors (KIS, GRIB, Golden Exotic Company Ltd, Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd and the LED beneficiaries) indicated that the local governance structures promoted their activities. The KIS for instance, gave the reason that they were all government institutions and understood the "language of public sector management". However, there were instances where the actors in SODA faced challenges with the leadership of the Assembly not siding with their suggested LED programmes.

In comparative terms, whilst lack of due diligence, weak and lack of independence of state institutions and political expediency hampered the implementation of LED in the AMA, the functionaries in the KeMA itself rather hindered the implementation of LED. In SODA, there was effective interaction among all the actors. The impact of the personalities on LED in KeMA resulted in difficulties in LED financing and the assembly not implementing hardware LED interventions whilst the challenges in the AMA resulted in the truncation of all the PPP projects except the Accra City Car Parks Ltd. SODA however, experienced a smooth implementation of LED initiatives.

## **5.7. THE DYNAMICS IN LED PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION**

Local governance in Ghana is influenced by political, economic, cultural, geographical, leadership, and natural resources (for example land) factors. The political factor is important because whatever happens at the national level politically impacts the local governance system through the political recruitment process (hiring and firing, and transfer

of central and local government personnel) and the transfer of fiscal resources from the centre to the periphery. For instance, a change in government equally affects the leadership of the various MMDAs.

LED implementation was shaped by four main forces in the three MMDAs. These were: political, leadership will and commitment, land tenure system and administrative, procedural and institutional issues.

First is political which took two forms, namely elections and political transition with its associated political recruitment.

In the AMA, political expediency coupled with 2016 being an election year shaped LED implementation in that, in the NDC government's bid to secure votes, the government initiated ten PPP programmes in market infrastructure hence LED activities were vibrant (Fieldwork, January, 2018). It was found that in the KeMA, LED activities were active during the electioneering period because politicians who want to win elections either as constituency executives, aspiring members of parliament etc inject a lot of money into community-based organisations (CBOs) activities to boost their chances of winning elections (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The SODA's experience took the form of local governance elections where the person who gets elected as an assembly member determines the vibrancy of LED. For instance, in the Agomeda electoral area, the assembly member before the 2014 local governance election was effective in LED programmes, therefore, the residents actively participated in LED programmes thereby making LED vibrant during the period.

In terms of political transition, the defeat of the NDC in the 2016 elections and subsequent formation of new government on January 7, 2017 by the NPP shaped the implementation of LED in the three MMDAs. This is because it brought about political recruitment where

new MMDCEs were appointed as well as the transfer of some key personnel of the MMDAs.

In the AMA, the newly appointed MCE requested for a hold on all PPP initiatives for review since August, 2017 thereby resulting in a halt of the programmes (Fieldwork, February, 2018). Though Article 35(7) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 stipulates that “a government shall continue and exercise projects and programmes commenced by previous governments” (Republic of Ghana, 1992:36). This implies that LED took a nose dive in the AMA following the political transition in January, 2017. In the KeMA, the political transition rather brought life into LED implementation due to the eagerness of the newly appointed MCE and MCD to implement LED as well as the interest in the government’s flagship programme christened “One District One Factory” (1D1F). In the SODA, the political transition and its concomitant political recruitment could be traced to 2001 where the DCE and DCD at the time were interested in LED implementation hence brought a lot of actors such as the MiDA and the residents (especially the Agomeda and Mango farmers) on board hence LED saw a ray of light. However, following the retention of President Kufuor in the 2004 elections, he appointed new DCE and DCD whose interest in LED were the opposite of their predecessors hence LED was negatively impacted (Fieldwork, February, 2019).

The issue of land tenure system also exacerbated the dynamics. Most lands in the Accra metropolis are owned by families, clans and stools and therefore; the AMA must acquire them from the owners before it can use them. However, the AMA did not acquire the land title to the ten proposed PPP sites (Fieldwork, February, 2018). This retrogressively shaped LED implementation. In the KeMA, the land tenure system negatively impacted LED implementation because the residents who participated in LED programmes could not get

lands to operate their businesses (Fieldwork, January, 2018). In the SODA, land tenure system was not an issue due to, for instance, the KIS which owns about 3,028 hectares of land distributed it among 2,480 rice farmers and the Golden Exotics Ltd (Fieldwork, January, 2018). From the above, it could be inferred that while land tenure systems negatively shaped LED in the AMA and KeMA, the reverse was the case in SODA.

With regards to leadership will and commitment, the MCEs, MCDs and assembly members in KeMA from 1988 to 2016 did not have the needed commitment and will to implement LED programmes. As a result, LED did not receive the needed executive support. However, with the change in government following the 2016 general elections and the subsequent appointment of a new MCE and the transfer of new MCD to the KeMA in August, 2017, LED had started receiving the needed attention. This was evidenced by the MCE contributing GH¢ 2,000.00 in October, 2017 from his personal resources for the commencement of a leatherwork training for the youth of the municipality (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

The AMA had administrative, procedural and institutional systems negatively influencing LED implementation. This is because, the AMA saw itself as a superior MMDA hence did not pay heed to the PID's PPP process, it also did not get fire and environmental approval from the Ghana National Fire Service and Environmental Protection Agency respectively. These coupled with the outcome of the 2016 general elections resulted in the truncation of the AMA's PPP programmes at 3(a) which is "Submission of procurement documentation and evaluation of procurement document as indicated in Figure 5.2 above.

It is clear that the AMA had administrative, procedural, institutional, land tenure system as well as politics shaping the implementation of its LED intervention. The KeMA had politics through political recruitment and political leadership in terms of style, interest and

approach and land tenure system impacting the implementation of LED. The dynamics impacting LED at SODA were not different from that of the AMA and KeMA because political leadership and recruitment as well as micro politics also brought some dynamics in the implementation of LED. Putting the AMA, KeMA and SODA together, the implementation of their LED interventions were shaped by national and local politics through political recruitment and resource allocation as well as leadership and land tenure system.

### **5.8. BENEFICENT OUTCOMES OF LED IN THE MMDAs**

The aim of every LED programme is to create employment opportunities, generate income, and provide infrastructure. These fundamental benefits resulted in both quantitative and qualitative outcomes. The beneficent outcomes will be discussed along the following lines: employment creation, capacity development, income generation, quality of life and infrastructure provision using the before and after comparative analysis approach.

#### **5.8.1. Employment generation**

The implementation of the various LED interventions resulted in the creation of direct and indirect employment opportunities for the residents of the three MMDAs. The direct employment created is represented on Table 5.12. The table shows that the LED interventions in SODA yielded the highest employment, followed by the KeMA and AMA in that order. SODA recorded the highest employment opportunity because the LED beneficiaries were organized into groups and the GEL as well as Sheenfeel Company Ltd also gave direct employment to the residents (Table 5.13). Even though the KeMA had series of LED interventions (Table 5.14), there were however restrictions that each of the programmes should have a maximum of twenty-five (25) participants for the traditional handicraft LED programmes whilst non-traditional programmes had a maximum of fifty

(50) participants per programme. Each programme was organized once per quarter (Table 5.15.). The AMA had the Accra City Car Parks Ltd as the only LED intervention programme generating direct employment (Table 5.15.) over a period of eighteen (18) years.

**Table 5. 12: Direct employment created in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

Name of MMDA	Direct employment created
AMA	594
KeMA	1,500
SODA	5,944
Total	8,038

Source: Fieldwork, January – February, 2018

**Table 5. 13: Names of groups and companies generating employment in SODA**

Name of Group	Number of members
Dodowa Mango Farmers Association	50
Agomeda Mango Farmers Association	150
Asutuare Rice Farmers Association	2480
Golden Exotics Company Ltd	2,464
Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd	300
Fish ( <i>Tilapia</i> ) farming	500
Total	5,944

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018

**Table 5. 14: Names of LED interventions and employment generated in KeMA**

Name of LED intervention	Number of participants/quarter	Total participants per annum	Total participants for five (5) years
Traditional handicraft	25	100	500
Non-traditional	50	200	1000
Total	75	300	1,500

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018

**Table 5. 15: Levels of employees and number employed in the Accra City Car Parks Ltd PPP of the AMA**

Levels of employees	Number employed	
Management	9	
Cashiers	4	
Securities	12	
Janitors	6	
Office Assistants	2	
<b>Total</b>	<b>33 multiplied by 18 = 594</b>	

**Source: Fieldwork, February, 2018**

With respect to indirect employment, AMA recorded 470 due to the business development services programmes. The 94 beneficiaries each employed an average of five people in their establishments. The KeMA recorded six and the SODA had the highest of 13,678 (Table 5.16). The SODA generated the highest indirect employment because of the activities of “*agrigators*”, i.e., partners in the production value chain who were not directly involved in the farming activities. They include millers who bought “*paddy rice*” (un-milled rice), buyers and sellers. The engagement of permanent farmhands and casual labourers by the Agomeda and Dodowa mango and Asutware rice farmers also accounted for the high indirect employment (Table 5.13). The KeMA recorded the lowest because most of the LED interventions did not require the services of others. However, there were some internal linkages between the hair dressing and cream production beneficiary cohorts in that 210 of the 465 beneficiaries of the hair dressing initiative also received capacity development training in cream production (Fieldwork, January, 2018). In the AMA, no internal linkage was identified.

**Table 5. 16: The breakdown of indirect employment generated in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

Name of MMDA	Employment generated per year
AMA	470
KeMA	6
SODA	13,678

**Source: Fieldwork, January – February, 2018**

**Table 5. 17: Indirect employment generated at SODA**

Activities of indirect employment	Number employed
Casual labourer (Dodowa and Agomeda Mango farmers)	3,000/season * 2 seasons in a year
Permanent farmhands (Agomeda mango farmers)	2,250
Motorbike riders	7
Taxi drivers	3
Land preparation labourer (Asutuare rice farmers)	3,872
“Agrigators”	1,500
Mango vendors	46
<b>Total</b>	<b>13,678</b>

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

### **5.8.2. Capacity Development Programmes**

The three MMDAs had capacity development programmes: however, the rationale for organizing the programmes were somewhat different and were based on needs (Table 5.18). In the case of the AMA, the members of the Small Scale Enterprises Association (SSEA) had training which upgraded their skills, managerial and operational capabilities. In the KeMA, the capacity development programmes were meant to equip the residents with basic knowledge in hair dressing, bead making, batik, tie and dye, leatherworks and poultry farming. This implies that the LED beneficiaries in the AMA already had the knowledge in managing their SSEs. In contrast, the beneficiaries in the KeMA were given capacity development programmes in order to acquire new skills. With respect to SODA, the capacity development programme by the MiDA was done for 50 mango farmers in Dodowa and 150 mango farmers at Agomeda. The programme was meant to serve two



main purposes: to improve the quality of mango production in the two areas and to empower the mango farmers to take over the management of their farms at the end of Compact 1 since the Compact spans from 2007 to 2012 (Fieldwork, January, 2018). Both AMA and SODA had technical and commercial issues embedded in their capacity development programmes as well as access to both local and national markets, whilst capacity development programme in KeMA was inward looking than taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the locality. In SODA, programme sustainability was a component of the capacity development programme which was absent in the AMA and KeMA.

**Table 5.18: Capacity development programmes of the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

Name of MMDA	Type of Capacity Development Programme
AMA	Access of SSEs to local and national markets, business development services, advocacy and dialogue for private sector promotion and development and technical skills improvement and development
KeMA	Foundation training in hair dressing, beads making and batik, tie and dye
SODA	Mango seedling grafting, mango production value chain, farm records management, farm sanitation and linkage between the mango farmers and buyers.

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

With regards to the beneficent outcomes, all the 533 respondents representing 100% indicated that the LED intervention had been beneficial to them (Table 5.19a and b). Both AMA and KeMA each accounted for 33.4% of the respondents whilst SODA accounted for 33.2%. Figure 5.2 indicates the graph showing the breakdown.

**Table 5. 19a: Has the LED programme been beneficial to you?**


	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	533	100.0	100.0	100.0

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018.**

**Table 5.19b: Comparison of the benefits of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

		Has the LED programme been beneficial to you?	Total
		Yes	
Name of	AMA	178	178
MMDA	KeMA	178	178
	SODA	177	177
Total		533	533

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018



**Figure 5. 3: Comparison of MMDAs and the LED benefits**

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018

Respondents indicated employment opportunity creation, income generation, equipment and input provision and training support as the benefits from LED. Thirty three percent (33%) of the respondents indicated that LED had benefitted them in employment creation, income generation and training support, 24.8% training support, 21.2% employment

creation, income generation, equipment and input provision and training support as benefits derived from LED interventions. The rest of the respondents representing 21% indicated employment creation and income generation as benefits from LED (Table 5.20).

**Table 5. 20: Areas of LED benefit**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Training support	132	24.8	24.8	24.8
employment creation and income generation	112	21.0	21.0	45.8
All four	113	21.2	21.2	67.0
Valid employment creation, income generation and training support	176	33.0	33.0	100.0
Total	533	100.0	100.0	


**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

Comparatively, 74.2% and 25.8% of the respondents from the AMA indicated training support and employment creation and income generation respectively as the outcome from LED. At the KeMA, 98.9% and 1.1% of the respondents indicated a combination of employment creation, income generation and training support together and employment creation and income generation respectively as LED benefits. The respondents of SODA just like their KeMA counterparts, also had 63.8% and 36.2% of the respondents pointed to a blend of employment creation, income generation, equipment and input provision and training support together and employment creation and income generation respectively as LED benefits (Table 5.21 and Figure 5.4). It is clear that the residents from the three MMDAs benefitted in diverse ways from the various LED interventions as the figures have shown.

**Table 5. 21: Areas of LED benefits in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

		If yes, in what areas has it been beneficial				Total
		Training support	employment creation and income generation	All four	employment creation, income generation and training support	
Name of MMDA	AMA	132	46	0	0	178
	KeMA	0	2	0	176	178
	SODA	0	64	113	0	177
Total		132	112	113	176	533

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018


**Figure 5. 4: Comparison of areas of LED benefit between the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018

On income generation, 25.8% of the respondents from the AMA indicated that through the Accra City Car Parks Ltd, they got employment. It came to light that the employees earned

between GH¢ 450.00 and GH¢ 4,500 as monthly salary depending on the level (Table 5.15 above) whilst the income of the respondents of KeMA was dependent on the hair style (Table 5.22). The study found that during festive occasions such as Easter, Christmas and New Year and *Hogbetsotso za* (the festival of the people of the Anlo State), the income generation of the KeMA respondents increased because of the high demand for hair dressing (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

**Table 5. 22: Name of Hair Style and amount charged in KeMA**

Item	Name of Hair style	Amount Charged in Gh¢
1	Rasta	25 – 30 Based on the size
2	Corn roll	15
3	Twist	10 – 15
4	Weave-on	10 – 15
5	Washing	1

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

In the AMA, as a result of the capacity development programmes, the members of the SSEs had between an average of six to eight apprentices whilst five of the KeMA respondents who developed their capacities through hair dressing had between four and six of such apprentices. While each apprentice paid GH¢ 300.00 to learn the hair dressing for three years in KeMA, the fees vary in the AMA. For instance, well established SSEs members charged between GH¢ 1,500 and GH¢ 2,000 for the same period of three years apprenticeship whilst short term apprenticeship ranging from six to twelve months is between GH¢ 2,500 and GH¢ 3,000 (Fieldwork, February, 2018). This the respondents indicated had served as an additional source of income. Furthermore, the 210 respondents of KeMA who learned hair cream production also stated that they produced the hair creams and shampoos that they used in their salons; as a result, they were able to make some savings. In addition, out of the 315 respondents who indicated batik, tie and dye, 45 responded that they were already working as seamstresses before they joined the batik, tie and dye programme out of which they earned additional income. One beneficiary also

stated that she now produced the batik, tie and dye for her family (Fieldwork, January, 2018). The LED beneficiaries in SODA however, did not have any apprenticeship since the capacity development programmes were mainly channeled into agricultural activities.

The benefits derived from the capacity development programme in SODA for mango farmers are illustrated in Table 5.23. These culminated into income generation for the mango farmers because they were able to plant more mango trees per acre and saved GH¢ 150.00 per acre.

**Table 5. 23: Before and after effect of Capacity Development Programme on mango farmers in SODA**

<b>Name of beneficent outcome</b>	<b>Before the capacity development programme</b>	<b>After the capacity development programme</b>
Mango grafting	Mango trees took five years to yield fruits	Mango trees took a maximum of three years to yield
Mango grafting	Mango farmers planted maximum of 30 plants per acre from seed growers	Mango farmers planted between 40 and 80 grafted mango plants per acre
Mango grafting	Cost reduction. A seed from growers was GH¢ 5.00 multiplied by 30 plants = GH¢ 150.00	Mango farmers no long bought mango plants from seed growers. They raised their own seedlings hence saved money.
Mango grafting	Stagnated yield of 3 tons per acre.	Improved and consistent increase in yield of between 4 and 5 tons per acre
Mango grafting	Low income on yield due to poor mango quality. 3 tones multiplied by GH¢ 1600 = GH¢ 4,800/acre	Had high income on yield due to high quality. Between 4 and 5 tons multiplied by GH¢2,200 = Between GH¢ 8,800 and 11,000/acre.
Training in book keeping	Farmers were not able to keep records of farm transactions	Now able to keep record of farm transactions. Hence able to tell profitability level
Training on farm sanitation	Farmers were not able to export to other countries due to unhygienic farming practices.	Now able to export to other countries due to Global partnership for Good Agricultural Practices (Global-GAP) Certificate.

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

The benefits derived from capacity development programmes indicates that they contributed to both qualitative and quantitative gains for the AMA KeMA and SODA.

The interventions by the KIS and GRIB in Asutuare also impacted rice farming in the area (Table 5.24).

**Table 5. 24: Beneficent outcome to rice farmers in Asutuare, SODA**

<b>Name of actor</b>	<b>Intervention</b>	<b>Before the intervention</b>	<b>After the intervention</b>
KIS	Grouping of rice farmers into association	Rice farmers were operating as individuals	Rallied rice farmers into group and gave them voice
KIS	Supply of water through irrigation	Farmers relied on rainfall	Farmers no longer relied on rainfall for rice farming. Did all year rice farming
GRIB	Supply of agro-chemicals at subsidized price	Bought one bag of NPK fertilizer at GH¢ 57.50	Now bought one bag of NPK fertilizer at GH¢ 56.50
GRIB	Provision of mechanized services at subsidized price	GH¢ 600.00 per hectare	GH¢ 550.00 per hectare
GRIB	Agro-business and support services	All rice farmers concentrated on only rice farming	One rice farmer switched from rice cultivating to rice marketing

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

Both the AMA and KeMA derived qualitative benefits from the implementation of LED interventions. The AMA experienced a reduction in road congestion on the John Evans Atta Mills Highway and minimization of vehicle break-in because of the Accra City Car Parks Ltd. The creation of enabling business environment in the SODA inured to the Assembly's benefit (Table 5.25).

**Table 5. 25: Industries and their numbers in the SODA**

<b>Name of Industry</b>	<b>Number of firms</b>
Manufacturing	2
Pure water	7
Fish farming	10
Quarry	23
Total	42

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

### 5.8.3. Improvement in quality of life

To establish whether LED interventions had resulted in improvement in the quality of life, the respondents were asked “Do you think LED has helped to improve the quality of your life?” All the 533 respondents responded in the positive (Table 5.26).

**Table 5. 26: Comparison of LED and improvement in quality of life between the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

		Do you think LED has helped to improve the quality of your life?	Total
		Yes	
Name of	AMA	178	178
MMDA	KeMA	178	178
	SODA	177	177
Total		533	533

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

To ascertain the areas that LED had brought improvement in the quality of life of respondents, they were asked “What are the areas of improvement in quality of life?” The respondents mentioned areas such as being able to pay their wards school fees and support their spouses. Others also indicated that before the training programme, they were depending on their parents, however, they were now self-reliant. Another set of people also stated that they now remit their parents on weekly and monthly basis. Another benefit was that they were now able to rent their own rooms (Table 5.28).

Comparatively, the residents of the MMDAs responded that they had multiple benefits from the implementation of LED with the SODA recording 100% (177 respondents), AMA and KeMA having 99.4% (177 respondents) and 98.9% (176 respondents) respectively (Table 5.27). The AMA had one respondent representing 0.6% and the KeMA two respondents representing 1.1% all indicating savings for unforeseen circumstances as other benefits that improved the quality of their lives.



**Table 5. 27: Comparison of the areas of improvement in quality of life following LED implementation in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

	If yes, please indicate how?		Total
	Others	Multiple benefits	
AMA	1	177	178
KeMA	2	176	178
SODA	0	177	177
Total	3	530	533

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018

#### 5.8.4. Infrastructure provision

Table 5.28 shows the infrastructure provision of the three MMDAs. The AMA's PPP project, the Accra City Car Parks Ltd provided a 550 car parking capacity since April, 2000. The KeMA on the other hand had no infrastructure provided. The SODA through the CSR of GEL made significant contributions to infrastructure provision. It is instructive to note that whilst the AMA's infrastructure was provided through a PPP arrangement, that of the SODA was by means of CSR by the GEL.

**Table 5. 28: Infrastructure provision in the AMA, KeMA and SODA as LED benefits**

Name of MMDA	Name of Infrastructure	Amount in GH¢ or US\$	Location	Year
AMA	Accra City Car Parks Ltd	5.5 million dollars	Accra John Evans Atta Mills Highway	2000
KeMA	-	-	-	-
SODA	Extension of laboratory		Akuse Public Hospital	2012
	Three (3) drilled wells with regular analysis by ISO 17025 approved laboratory		Kasunya	
	Electrification projects		Kasunya and Agbazo	
	Educational facilities	GH¢117,000.00	Kasunya	2012 to date
	Road infrastructure including bridge	GH¢114,000.00	District wide The bridge links Niapanya and Kasunya	2012 to date
	Road construction	GH¢240,000.00	Roads around the GEL plantation	2012 to date

Sources: [www.gelgh.com](http://www.gelgh.com) and Fieldwork, January, 2018

### 5.9. MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY LEVELS

There were significant improvements in poverty reduction among the LED beneficiaries. One hundred and thirteen (113) (63.5%) 58 (32.6%) and 7 (3.9%) respondents of the AMA were “above the poverty line” “below the poverty line” and “did not indicate their income levels” respectively after the implementation of the LED initiatives.

In the KeMA, 107 (60.1%), 61 (34%) and 10 (5.6%) were found to be “above the poverty line”, “below the poverty line” and “did not indicate their income levels” respectively after the implementation of the LED interventions.


In SODA, 141 (79.7%), 32 (18.1%) and 4 (2.3%) were found to be “above the poverty line”, “below the poverty line” and “did not indicate their earnings” respectively in the post LED intervention period in the SODA (Table 5.30 and Figure 5.6).

Consequently, 67.8% of the total respondents across the three MMDAs are above the poverty line whilst 28.3% are below the poverty line and the poverty level of 3.9% could not be gauged. It can therefore be inferred that LED interventions in the three MMDAs had brought about some improvement in the reduction of poverty.

**Table 5.29: Poverty status in the AMA, KeMA and SODA using the 1 US\$ a day approach**

		Poverty Status			Total
		Above Poverty line	Below Poverty line	NR	
Name of MMDA	AMA	113	58	7	178
	KeMA	107	61	10	178
	SODA	141	32	4	177
Total		361	151	21	533

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018



**Figure 5. 5: Poverty status among LED beneficiaries in the AMA, KeMA and SODA using the 1US\$ a day approach**  
**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

#### **5.10. CHALLENGES TO LED IMPLEMENTATION IN AMA, KEMA AND SODA**

The challenges faced by the three MMDAs in the implementation of LED can be grouped into: inadequate finance, lack of institutional capacity, policy inconsistency, lack of both political and leadership commitment and support to implement MMDA bye-laws, non-availability of land, and the politicization of LED (Table 5.30 and Figure 5.6).

First, the three MMDAs had challenges with financing their LED activities. This challenge for instance, compelled the AMA to opt for PPPs as the driver of LED. In the case of the KeMA, the challenge was in getting budgetary allocation for the implementation of LED

programmes and start-up capital for LED beneficiaries. SODA's financial challenge also hindered the LED beneficiaries from buying inputs and chemicals for their farms. The financial challenge has equally impacted the activities of the LED beneficiaries. For instance, 32 (18%), 24 (13.4%) and 21 (12%) of the respondents of the AMA, KeMA and SODA respectively indicated finance as a challenge they faced (Table 5.30)

Second is, lack of knowledge in modern trends and equipment. This challenge was peculiar to only KeMA and SODA. In the KeMA, the beneficiaries had foundational capacity development programmes hence their products were unable to compete externally and they also lacked modern equipment in hair dressing, batik, tie and dye among others. On the part of SODA, the farmers lacked modern equipment for land preparation and harvesting. In cases where the equipment were available, they were inadequate. For instance, the GRIB had one transplanter, three power tillers and one thresher which served the 2,480 registered rice farmers (Fieldwork, January, 2018).

Third is, challenge over land, which was pronounced in the AMA. The study found that the AMA did not have title to the lands that it earmarked for the ten PPPs. This culminated into 72 (40.4%) of the LED beneficiary respondents in the AMA having challenge with land to carry out their business operations. The KeMA on the other hand had little challenge with land compared to the AMA. Fifteen (8.4%) beneficiary respondents in the KeMA intimated that they had challenge with getting a place to put their containers. The SODA respondents did not have any challenge with land. This was due to the LED intervention of easy business permit and the KIS irrigation lands that the rice farmers were using.


Fourth is, lack of access to market, problem of getting permit to operate business had a cumulative percentage of 23 (4.3%) respondents across the three MMDAs. However,

0.3%, 76% and 86% representing six (6), 135 and 152 respondents of the AMA, KeMA and SODA respectively intimated that a combination of challenges such as finance, land, lack of modern knowledge, equipment and technology hindered them in their operations as LED beneficiaries.

**Table 5.30: The challenges faced by LED beneficiaries in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

	What are the challenges faced after the training programme									Total
	Finance	No marketing opportunities	Difficulty in getting a place to set up	Difficulty in getting permit	Lacks latest skills in knowledge acquired	Lack of modern equipment in trade learnt	Combination of the above challenges	No response	Not applicable	
AMA	32	11	72	10	0	0	6	1	46	178
KeMA	24	0	15	2	1	1	135	0	0	178
SODA	21	0	0	0	0	4	152	0	0	177
Total	77	11	87	12	1	5	293	1	46	533

Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018



**Figure 5. 6: Challenges faced by LED beneficiaries in the AMA, KeMA and SODA**

**Source: Fieldwork, January, 2018**

Fifth is, lack of capacity. The three MMDAs did not have the requisite human resource and institutional capacity for the implementation of LED. In the three MMDAs, there were no designated LED officers. The planning officers were responsible for LED in the AMA and SODA whilst the MC of BAC was in charge of LED in KeMA. As a result, LED did not receive the needed attention as a priority policy intervention to improve the quality of life in the districts.

Sixth is, policy inconsistency which was unique to the AMA. In the AMA's city car park project, there was a 550 car park capacity, however, the AMA also implemented the "AMA

on-street-parking policy” which allowed motorists to park on the street at a fee which went directly to the AMA. Related to this was the activities of some of the AMA guards who extorted money from motorists to park at unauthorised places. These undermined the operations and sustainability of the Accra City Car Park project (Fieldwork, February, 2018). Seventh is the politicization of LED initiatives. In the AMA, for instance, the politicization took the form of political patronage where the political party in power always sought to reward its loyalists by awarding them with PPP contracts. Accordingly, whenever there was a regime change, the entire process was reversed or ongoing projects were halted- policy discontinuity (Fieldwork, February, 2018). In the case of KeMA, the politicization was evident during election periods. It is during election periods that politicians inject money into empowerment activities that will garner votes for them. Attempts by the MC of BAC to depoliticize LED resulted in participants in Afiadenyigba boycotting a training programme in kente weaving (Fieldwork, January, 2018). In the SODA, the change in assembly membership for the Agomeda electoral area, DCE and DCD positions resulted in the Agomeda and Dodowa mango farmers respectively failing to participate in the LED process.

## **5.11. CONCLUSION**

The chapter has dealt with the historical background of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA and established that different factors influenced the adoption and implementation. It was also realized that LED policy implementation started in different years in the three MMDAs and were all triggered by different factors. The chapter also pointed out that all the three MMDAs pursued similar LED interventions such as capacity development programmes, however, the use of PPPs as a driver of infrastructure provision was implemented by the AMA while



infrastructure provision was championed by GEL in the SODA as part of its CSR. The KeMA did not record any infrastructure provision in its LED programmes.

The interventions were need - based with the end result being job opportunity creation, income generation, infrastructure improvement with the ultimate aim of reducing poverty. The local governance structures interacted with the various actors and the interaction shaped the outcome of LED interventions. All the three MMDAs had diverse sources of LED financing with some commonalities and differences. Finance, low level of technology, access to market in the KeMA and SODA and the politicization of LED hindered the promotion of LED in the three MMDAs. Finally, micro and macro politics and leadership shaped LED adoption and implementation in the three MMDAs and brought some dynamics in resource allocation towards LED. In addition, the AMA had issues with land acquisition, procedure, due diligence and environmental, health and safety permits which severely hampered the implementation of PPP projects. In sum, the implementation of LED had resulted in the reduction of the poverty levels of the AMA, KeMA and SODA, however, the impact was limited to the households of LED beneficiaries.

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS**

#### **6.1. INTRODUCTION**

The thesis sets out to discuss the dynamics in the implementation of local economic development and its implications for the creation of employment opportunities, income generation, infrastructure provision and ultimately poverty reduction in the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA), Keta Municipal Assembly (KeMA) and Shai-Osudoku District Assembly (SODA).

The chapter discusses the findings of the study in the context of the theoretical, comparative, and empirical literature on LED, local governance, poverty reduction and politics. It also examines the degree to which the actor-oriented approach to development intervention promoted or hindered LED to impact poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. Some of the dynamics will again be highlighted and explained without necessarily repeating earlier ones.

#### **6.2. BACKGROUND TO LED AND LED INTERVENTIONS IN THE THREE MMDAs**

The study found that the three Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) had different historical backgrounds to LED and diverse situations such as unemployment, poverty and infrastructure deficit. These findings confirm the study of Helmsing (2002:84) and Rice (2005:6) that the process of LED does not occur by chance and in a vacuum but rather the process is always triggered by different situations. However, the factors leading to the emergence of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA were different from those identified

by other scholars. Whereas unemployment, poverty and inadequate infrastructure were identified as the factors triggering LED, Rice (2005:6), Geert van Boekel, (2005), Barzelay (1991) and Nel and Binns (2001) identified factors such as refugee crisis, devastating war, and shifts in government policies as the push factors for LED in South Africa and Spain. However, the end results for the initiation of the LED interventions were the creation of employment and poverty reduction among the residents of the various jurisdictions.

Generally, LED programmes are implemented through various strategies. The AMA, KeMA and SODA implemented strategies that had some similarities and differences. The three MMDAs implemented LED strategies such as capacity development programmes, hardware and software LEDs, public private partnerships (PPPs), traditional and non-traditional LED programmes, provision of financial access, enabling business environment, provision of marketing opportunities etc. The findings of the study reinforces the studies by the World Bank, (2002); Helmsing (2003); Rogerson and Rogerson (2010); Enzama (2008); and Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra (2005) among others who in their various studies identified different LED strategies implemented by MMDAs.

Comparatively, there was a similarity in the area of capacity development programme. However, there was a divergence. The AMA's adoption of the PPP component of LED underscores the views of Cabigas (2007), and Kamara (2017) that local government units (LGUs) can partner with the private sector which is considered as the engine of growth for employment creation in LED interventions. It also falls within the third phase of LED which gave birth to modern PPPs which focused on development from within in order to reduce dependence on non-local organisations to pave way for expansion in development benefits for groups within localities (Bingham and Mier, 1993: ix). The AMA being a metropolitan

assembly and adopting PPPs as a LED programme also confirms the position of Ofei-Aboagye (2008) that metropolitan and municipal assemblies partner with the formal private sector to provide services. The provision of infrastructure through PPPs in the AMA is also in tandem with the urban-planning angle of LED espoused by Meyer-Stamer (2006:11) which promoted infrastructure development in urban areas as a LED approach. The AMA's adoption of PPPs as a driver of local development is also in conformity with the LED principle of PPP as espoused by Rice (2005:7). However, the KeMA being a municipal assembly but not involved in LED PPPs is at variance with the literature on municipalities and PPPs (Ofei-Aboagye, 2008). The implication of adopting PPPs as a LED intervention have the tendency to free the limited fiscal resources of the MMDAs for other developmental projects since the private sector partners the MMDAs in the funding of identified projects as experienced in the Accra City Car Parks Ltd project.

The use of local resources was one of the strategies adopted by the MMDAs to pursue the LED agenda. The general literature on LED asserts that LGUs utilized their available local resources to create new employment opportunities, generate income and improve infrastructure provision (Blakely and Bradshaw, 2002: 24, Vilorio-Williams, 2007:11). The use of indigenous raw materials makes the implementation of LED initiatives less expensive for the LED beneficiaries. This is because the LED beneficiaries do not incur additional costs such as the cost of transporting the raw materials to the locality. However, in situations where the beneficiaries have to get raw materials from other places, the initiative turns out to be expensive as witnessed under the batik, tie and dye initiative in the KeMA where the LED participants bought the calico, dye and the designs from outside the Assembly.

The effectiveness of LED strategies hinges on the creation of enabling business environment (Rusu, 2014; UN-HABITAT, 2005). Both AMA and SODA implemented the enabling environment as one of the LED strategies to attract business investments. This initiative saw the SODA attracting organizations such as the Golden Exotics Limited (GEL), Sheenfeel Company Ghana Ltd and fish farming companies such as the Tropo Farms Ltd and TAs and contractors to the AMA for PPP projects. Though the AMA and SODA implemented the business enabling environment strategy, however, the strategy failed to attract the needed investments into the Assemblies due to the absence of economic development incentives for investors. Economic development incentives which is defined as the direct financial benefits that MMDAs use to incentivize a firm's opening, expansion, or retention have four merits and principles for LED namely, growth from within, investment in the residents and their skills, connection of the locality to the globalized world and boosting of trade in the locality (Parilla 2018:19-25).

Bond (2003) argued that the availability of economic development incentives in a locality serves as a bait for investors to locate to the area thereby resulting in the establishment of more business organisations through the orthodox LED approach. Similarly, Ramukumba (2012:11) intimated that enabling environment interventions create conditions such as subsidies and grants to lure investors into localities deprived of direct investments. In the South African case, the enabling environment resulted in the creation of “cathedrals in desert” in that the incentives were sent to areas where they were not needed but, in the AMA, and SODA, the business development incentives were absent and, in the cases, where they existed, it was spearheaded by the central government. The KeMA, on the other hand, did not implement the enabling business environment strategy hence could not attract private entities

to the Assembly. From the foregoing, it could be said that the AMA, KeMA and SODA did not have the right conditions to attract the private sector into LED implementation as emphasized by Pennink (2014:249) when he supported the position of Helmsing (2003) that LED has dramatically changed because it has become a norm that MMDAs are responsible for the creation of enabling environments and conditions for entrepreneurs and investors to seize business opportunities in the area.

### **6.3. FINANCING OF LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

The success of LED intervention policies largely hinges on funding (Rusu, 2014, Bateman, 2013). The study revealed that the three MMDAs had different and limited sources of financing LED. These sources were either inter-governmental transfers, donor funds or internally-generated funds (IGFs). The limited sources of funding resulted in the MMDAs having limitations on the number and nature of LED interventions to implement. In addition, the limited funding sources also culminated into the MMDAs having just a small number of the indigenes participating in the various LED programmes. It could therefore be said that the higher sources of funding coupled with abundant funds will result in more residents participating in LED programmes thereby increasing the number of beneficiaries with its spillover effects on poverty reduction and new employment opportunity creation. In the literature on LED financing, the Ghanaian sources reinforce those of South Africa where LED activities were funded through IGFs, transfers from higher government tiers and charitable donations from international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) (Patterson, 2008: 11). The findings also confirm the studies by Ayee (2004:134-141), Ayee and Djikovick (2014:96) and Ahwoi (2010:173-185), among others, about the varied and insufficient sources of local governance finance in Ghana.

The study also found that the private sector was hesitant to finance long term LED projects in the SODA due to the long period of maturation and the KeMA had no private sector actor expressing interest in funding LED activities. This finding gives credence to the view espoused by Meyer-Stamer (2006:11) in his urban planning angel of LED where he postulated that investors were not willing to invest in long term LED programmes because they needed immediate return on their investments.

There was variation in the MMDAs ability to attract funding for their respective LED programmes. The AMA was able to attract more funds than the KeMA and SODA because of its urban status and strategic nature as a national, regional, metropolitan capital and the economic hub of the country. The AMA's attraction of high funds attests to the view expressed by Ahwoi (2017) that there is always discrimination in favour of urban MMDAs over rural MMDAs when it comes to fiscal decentralization because the urban MMDAs have to deliver municipal services to a higher population density whilst the rural MMDAs are less densely populated. In Ahwoi's view, the allocation of higher funds to the urban MMDAs than the rural MMDAs creates no tension because the parliamentary approval of the DACF and mechanism of allocation is seen to be fair (Ahwoi, 2017:124-125).

The SODA could not attract funds for long term LED projects because of the long period that investments took to mature. This confirms the study of Meyer-Stamer (2006:11) that investors were reluctant to invest in long term projects because of their desire for quick returns on their investments. The KeMA could not attract enough funds for its LED programmes due to the non-marketization of its economic potential for prospective investors to invest in the municipality. The non-marketing affected the KeMA in that potential investors did not have enough information on the Assembly and the LED products were also not known to potential

customers. As a result, investment became stagnant and business transactions were inward looking instead of integrating with the global environment. This affected the ability of the KeMA to create more employment opportunities and reduce poverty. In the words of Nyawo and Mubangizi (2015:8), “with marketing, customers and investors are made aware of the various products and investment opportunities”.

The absence of marketing results in lack of business information among customers and investors, product and investment opportunities become unknown to the outside world, business becomes stagnant and nonexistent due to isolation from global investors. In addition, the non-marketing also affects the capacity of the local enterprises (LED beneficiaries) to take advantage of open trade and fully participate in the global markets which boosts businesses, generate more employment opportunities and revenue for the LED beneficiaries (Nyawo and Mubangizi, 2015:8). The access to market information by both customers and investors as well as producers (LED beneficiaries) according to Hay (2004) and Nicter and Goldmark (2009) also positions SSEs to both seek and respond to new opportunities. This opinion is corroborated by the Municipal Service Project (2010) that MMDAs used the “place marketing” as a tool in local governance to attract investments from outside through the promotion of their respective economic advantages.

The three MMDAs could not attract enough business opportunities to their respective jurisdictions hence the limited funding for the implementation of LED programmes. The central government took over the “juiciest and most flexible and easiest to collect revenue sources leaving the LGUs with the driest, most inflexible and most difficult to collect revenue” (Ahwoi, 2010:167). Consequently, the MMDAs were left with limited, difficult and unattractive taxes to use as baits to attract business investments into their localities. In



circumstances where the incentives existed, it was championed by the central government characterized by cronyism and “building cathedrals in the desert” This finding is in contrast to that of Blakely and Bradshaw (2002:43) who stated that LGUs attracted business establishment into localities by means of tax inducement, industrial bonds, tax cuts, free land, and reduced utility rates as some incentives to woo investors.

In terms of dedicated financial institutions and secured funding for the implementation of LED programmes, the three MMDAs did not have any financial institution and system solely dedicated to LED implementation, hence no secured source of funding LED in Ghana. This situation threatens the sustainability of LED as espoused by Bateman (2013). The non-existence of secured funding for LED implementation led Patterson, (2008:11); Akudugu and Laube, (2013) and Mensah et.al. (2017) to question the sustainability of LED interventions if international organisations should withdraw from funding LED projects.

On budgeting, the AMA, KeMA and SODA all had budgetary allocations and subsequent approvals for LED implementation. This is in consonance with the Local Governance Act, 2016 (Act 936) which stipulates that “Each District Assembly is responsible for the preparation, administration and control of the budgetary allocation of the office of the District Assembly and the Departments of the District Assembly” (Republic of Ghana, 2016:64) and the position of Akudugu and Laube (2013:12-14) that there was budgetary allocation for LED implementation in the Bongo District; however, the allocation was inadequate. This study’s finding that the budgetary allocations of the AMA and SODA were approved by their respective Assemblies is in the letter and spirit of the 1992 Constitution and the Local Governance Act, 2016. However, the point that the budget of the KeMA always had approval from the Rural Enterprise Programme (REP) rather than the General Assembly of the KeMA

is at variance with local government budgeting legislation. The budgetary allocation for LED programmes by the three MMDAs demonstrates that the MMDAs were committed to the implementation of LED initiatives. However, the lack of fiscal autonomy of the MMDAs hindered the realization of this commitment.

#### **6.4. THE LED PROCESS**

LED is procedural and thus it follows a process from initiation through to the monitoring and evaluation stage driven by various actors at the various stages. The AMA, KeMA and SODA followed the LED process in spite of the variations. In the works of Vilorio-Williams (2007:11); Enzama (2008:10) and Republic of Ghana (2014:17), the LED process is a series of sequential activities that are designed based on the local context, social, economic, political, institutional and administrative conditions. The commonality of all the three Assemblies having started their LED process from the initiation stage with different triggers and ending with monitoring and evaluation also affirms the popular view in literature that LED does not occur by chance or in vacuum but the conditions of the locality determine the triggers (Helmsing, 2002:84; Republic of Ghana, 2014:5; Rice, 2005: 6) and the fact that LED is a learning process where the reviewed strategy serves the purpose of either changing the strategy or terminating it. The LED interventions implemented in the AMA, KeMA and SODA had targets of creating new job opportunities, generating income, providing infrastructure and reducing poverty. These indicators of LED also confirm the view espoused by Enzama (2008:15) and Armah (2008:168) who proposed that effective monitoring and evaluation of LED should be based on clear benchmarks and indicators for measurement from the onset of the policy.

The involvement of multiple actors and stakeholders at the various stages of the LED process as witnessed in the three MMDAs is also supported by the studies of Enzama (2008:15), Long (2001); Mensah et. al., (2013); among others. LED involves actors negotiating and cooperating with each other to deliberately initiate development interventions aimed at resolving the development deficiency of a locality or district.

The three MMDAs used different monitoring and evaluating mechanisms. The AMA, on one hand, used the Ghana Integrated Financial Management Information System (GIFMIS) and the Budget and Rating Committee to track the implementation of its PPPs whilst the KeMA and SODA adopted inspection by various officers to monitor and evaluate the LED strategies. This points to the fact that there are multiple tools and techniques for monitoring and evaluating the success or failure of LED policies and the most important thing is to have a yardstick to measure the extent of success or failure. As Ayee (2000:3-4) rightly pointed out there are numerous alternatives and techniques for evaluation and as such no agreement on the criteria to be used in the monitoring and evaluation of public policies and programmes.

## **6.5. THE ACTORS IN THE LED PROCESS**

LED is concerned with the interaction between local and external actors and how they are involved in series of dialogues and negotiations over the utilization of local resources aimed at implementing development interventions to solve development problems such as unemployment, infrastructure gap, income generation and poverty of a given geographical area. The study found that the three MMDAs had actors working in partnership for the implementation of the various LED initiatives. This concurs with the literature on LED and confirms one of the features of the actor-oriented approach that development interventions

concentrated on the actions and interactions of individual actors and social groups in designing and shaping the LED process and the resultant outcome (Long, 2004, Helmsing, 2003).

Contrary to the findings of Mensah et.al. (2017) and Akudugu and Laube (2013) that international organisations were at the forefront and reinvigorated LED implementation in Ghana, the study found that international organisations were not actors in the LED process in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. However, the study found that the actors were not only local government units (LGUs) in the implementation of the LED but included others such as the transaction advisors (TAs), capacity development facilitators, private sector firms, the residents and other government agencies (including Kpong Irrigation Scheme (KIS), Public Investment Division (PID) of the Ministry of Finance, decentralized government ministries such as the District Agriculture Development Offices, Business Advisory Centre). This implies that the actors in the LED process are not cast in iron, rather the involvement of a particular actor in a locality is influenced by the available resources, the type of LED intervention, the ability of the MMDAs' leadership to market, attract and create the right economic development incentives, the benefits the actors stand to gain, the status and strategic nature of the MMDA and the central government's interest in the MMDA.

On the involvement of the residents, LED is also seen as an encounter between “development experts” (local and foreign) and the beneficiaries in solving the development challenges of a locality (Long, 2001). Local actors occupy concrete positions in the LED process, and therefore any attempt to leave them out and not consider their contributions could spell doom for the LED intervention. However, the involvement of local actors in the LED process is dependent on the local capacity, quality of the local community and the characteristics of the resources of the locality (Pennink, 2014:251-252). The study found that LED implementation

in the KeMA and SODA was demand driven and bottom-up. This accounted for the successful implementation of the LED initiatives in the two districts unlike the AMA which saw the PPPs being top-down and consequently the challenges faced with the residents with regards to land acquisition for the projects.

The Republic of Namibia (2008) extolled the importance of involving residents and their networks in LED. To the Namibians, the residents' involvement is characterized with merits such as self-help, leadership, participation, cooperation and trust. Similarly, Nour posits that community and indigenes' involvement in LED is crucial for awareness creation, monitoring and problem solving (Nour, 2011 85). It is the absence of some of these merits (such as trust and cooperation) of residents' involvement and politics that saw the AMA's PPPs inoperative.

It has been argued that one of the goals of local governance and LED is participatory governance aimed at bringing democracy to the door step of the citizenry and the bottom-up nature of LED in the KeMA and SODA helped in the progress made (Ayee, 2004, Ayee and Dickovick, 2014). The AMA's top-down approach to LED implementation rejects the bottom-up and participatory nature of LED and local governance. It reinforces, however, the finding of Akudugu (2013) that the bane of LED implementation in the Bongo District and Berekum Municipal Assemblies has been the use of the top-down approach.

According to the actor-oriented approach, in determining the kind of development intervention, the actors usually engage in dialogue, negotiation and lobbying and sometimes conflicts. The actor(s) with the highest strength in terms of resources, knowledge and bargaining power always dominates (Long, 2004:26). The study found that the LED process was characterized with dialogue and negotiation among the actors devoid of conflicts as envisaged by the actor-oriented approach. This was because of the power variations among

the actors. The actors in the three MMDAs had different resource levels. In the KeMA and SODA, the residents just made requests and the other actors supported in the process by providing the needed resources. However, in the AMA, there was little interaction among the actors before the Assembly kick started the PPP process. This was due to the AMA being strategic and therefore assumed that it could not approve everything within the LED process. However, the PID, which is the coordinating body of PPPs in Ghana to ensure value for money, identified the weaknesses in the PPP process and directed the AMA to follow due process in its PPPs. This act of the PID saved the AMA from court cases. This finding corroborates Ayee's (2017:53) finding that effective coordination among state institutions is one of the criteria for measuring the robustness of state institutions (Ayee, 2017:53).

The success of LED interventions depends on a healthy interaction, dialogue and cooperation among the actors acting in concert thereby producing political trust among themselves (Helmsing, 2005; Barzelay, 1991). The study had a mixed finding as far as the interaction is concerned. While the SODA had all the actors having a healthy interaction among themselves, the same cannot be said of the AMA and KeMA. This smooth interaction among the actors in SODA confirms the social interface feature of the actor-oriented approach to development intervention which stipulates that the interaction among the actors allows them to find a middle ground in shaping the LED intervention to arrive at a LED strategy and development intervention that is satisfactory to all the actors and the district. The experience of AMA and KeMA equally confirms the occurrences during the interface stage of the actor-oriented approach that social interface situations are multifaceted and complicated due to the "complexity of joint action" with numerous actors, varied interests, relationships, rationalities, power and veto points (Long, 2004; Ayee, 1994; Akudugu and Laube, 2013). The mixed

findings mean that where the actors cooperate with each other, the chances of LED succeeding is high and the reverse is true.

The involvement of actors in the LED process is always aimed at improving the development conditions of the area (Long, 2004: 25; Koponen, 2004:11). The involvement of the actors through their respective LED interventions did improve the conditions of the MMDAs through employment generation, improvement in income levels, infrastructure provision and poverty reduction. However, the three MMDAs failed to provide the needed conditions such as a congenial environment for effective LED implementation as espoused by the UN-HABITAT, (2005); Bateman, (2013); and others.

MMDAs in the implementation of LED also partner with the private sector through PPPs by making localities attractive and viable for investment (Cabigas, 2007; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2010). The AMA's PPPs follow the view espoused by Cabigas (2007) and Rogerson and Rogerson (2010); however, the political, administrative and land tenure system dynamics are at variance with the literature. The findings in SODA, complement the existing literature on LGUs partnering with the private sector. In SODA, the private sector firms assisted in infrastructure provision not on PPP basis but rather as part of their CSR.

Conversely, in KeMA, the central assembly did not provide the needed conditions for LED implementation as postulated in the literature. The findings from KeMA also affirm the central role of LGUs in LED implementation as indicated by Cabigas (2007) and Rogersons and Rogerson (2010). LGUs are responsible for the empowerment of the informal sector through LED interventions such as capacity development programmes (Nyawo and Mubangizi, 2015). The thesis confirms this finding in the three MMDAs under retrospect because the

Assemblies, to some extent, collaborated with other actors in developing the capacities of the residents.

In fine, it could be said that the actor-oriented approach did facilitate the implementation of LED interventions in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. However, the existence of the actors alone is not enough for the effective implementation of LED, because the actors must have the right mix of resources and capacity at the right time deployed for the right purpose and prepared to work in collaboration. It is this collaboration among the actors that catapulted LED in SODA ahead of the AMA and KeMA.

## **6.6. THE DYNAMICS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED PROGRAMMES**

The implementation of LED in the three MMDAs was shaped by various factors. These factors brought about some dynamics in the Assemblies. These dynamics are discussed below.

First of such dynamics is politics. Politics is ubiquitous and as such it impacted the LED programmes of the MMDAs. The implementation of LED was shaped by multiple actors with diverse interests. Some of these actors and their interests are discussed below.

First of such actors are politicians who view the implementation of LED programmes as a collective good that contributes to their electoral success and political advantage. In the words of Wolman and Spitzley, (1996:130-131), politicians engage themselves in LED activities for two reasons; namely: credit claiming which is defined as an act to generate a belief in a relevant political actor(s) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor(s) considers desirable and blame avoidance which stems from the fact that politicians wish to avoid the accusation of standing by and doing nothing while the indigenes are unemployed, less infrastructure in the locality and high



level of poverty. These political interests were reflected in the study. For example, the penchant of the central government (NDC) to secure votes during the 2016 general elections and the substandard markets in the AMA impelled it to develop interest in the AMA's PPP projects through supporting the Assembly to hasten the process for the implementation of the PPP projects. However, the defeat of the incumbent government (NDC), in the 2016 elections with its associated political transition saw a halt in the LED process in spite of the legal provision in Article 35(7) of the 1992 Constitution which enjoins successive governments to continue projects started by their predecessors (Republic of Ghana, 1992: 36). In the KeMA, the desire of the local politicians to win local level elections resulted in their investment in LED activities across the municipality. However, in SODA, the politics of LED took the form of political recruitment into the Assembly through transfers and appointments.

Second, the residents' interests are in the areas of their survival during LED projects with emphasis on PPPs. This is because PPP projects always came along with relocation which in most cases threatened their social and economic survival. As a result, they often resist such development programmes. This was experienced in the AMA where the residents were reluctant to release their lands for the PPP projects. Apart from the threat to their social and economic survival, their non-participation in the LED process was another reason. The AMA's case echoes the position that LED policies are often promulgated through centralized decision-making process involving the actors. Conflicts within the LGUs are minimal, decision making processes tend to be closed until the LED projects are about to be consummated. The reverse was the case in the KeMA and SODA because the residents were involved in the LED process. The different experiences of the study goes to reinforce the merit

of involving LED project beneficiaries in the local governance and development intervention processes.

Another dynamic was the land tenure system in the AMA and KeMA which impacted negatively on the implementation of LED. The land tenure system saw the truncation of the ten PPPs scheduled for 2016 and LED beneficiaries in KeMA not accessing land to operate. It is clear that the AMA had the political leadership and commitment to the implementation of LED, however, it failed to involve, unite and win the commitment of the localities for the LED policy as a result of the land tenure system. This contradicts the views espoused on leadership in LED, local governance and politics which point that leadership should provide opportunity as well as the needed vision, direction and purpose for all the actors to contribute to the LED process. In addition, leadership is expected to think outside the box by envisaging likely challenges and winning the confidence of the followers for generating future growth (Ahwoi, 2017:182, Republic of Namibia, 2008).

In the opinion of Tagoe (2010:13), the success of LED depends on authentic transformational leaders who will empower the private sector to generate local wealth, move the decentralization agenda forward and deal with unemployment. Ayee (2017: 41) further affirmed that the absence of transformational leaders with clear vision and goal has been the bane of Ghana's recent political leadership. It can therefore be argued that political commitment alone is not enough for the success of LED programmes; they must be backed with the appropriate vision, goal, foresight to envisage problems and involvement of all actors in the entire LED process.

The leadership dynamic in KeMA was different from that of AMA. This is because the KeMA had a leadership which was not committed to LED implementation between 1988 and 2016.

Ayee (2017:57) averred that leadership is paramount and cannot be taken for granted. The success of LED interventions requires the commitment and support from the highest level of government (Ayee, 2017:57, Republic of Namibia, 2008). However, from August, 2017, LED implementation restarted in that the newly appointed MCE and MCD showed commitment to LED due to their human centered nature and the need to implement the NPP government's flagship programme of 1D1F. The personality of the KeMA leaders influencing their support to LED affirms the view espoused by Ayee (2007) that leadership is influenced by the personal characteristics of the leader. The commitment to LED due to the 1D1F programme also reinforces the view of Mahama (2013:46-47) that political parties upon winning political power translates some of their campaign manifestoes into policies. The implications for the KeMA findings are that local governance and LED will find it difficult to flourish because of the absence of a concrete roadmap for local development. As a result, political leaders implement policies that are convenient to them and their party.

Leadership impacted the implementation of LED in SODA. Following the implementation of LED in 2003, the DCE and DCD at the time had interest in the LED policy and consequently involved stakeholders especially the mango farmers in the process. However, after the general elections in 2004, new DCE and DCD were appointed as a result of political transition appointments. Subsequent leaders failed to involve the actors in the LED process. The activities of political recruitment in the form of appointments and transfers at the LGUs resulted in leadership inconsistency in LED policy implementation and sometimes policies suffering setbacks because people were not appointed on the merit principle as broached by Max Weber (1992). Ayee (2007b:12) amplified this view when he pointed out that there is a

“departure from the legal-rational criteria basis of appointment which encapsulate education, experience and potential to other factors such as family, ethnic origin and political affiliation”.

It is clear that leadership, politics, bureaucratic administration and land tenure system brought some dynamics in the implementation of LED in the three MMDAs. However, leadership largely shaped the implementation because the nature of leadership at a particular point in time decided the direction of LED in the MMDAs.

### **6.7. BENEFICENT OUTCOMES OF LED**

The end result of every LED intervention is to create new employment opportunities, generate income, provide infrastructure and reduce poverty in a locality. The study found that the LED initiatives implemented in the AMA, KeMA and SODA had these objectives as the beneficent outcome.

The various LED interventions implemented by the AMA, KeMA and SODA brought about both direct and indirect employment opportunities and income generation in the localities. Ghana's unemployment rate is currently hovering around 28% (Ghana Statistical Service, 2010). The adoption and implementation of deliberate LED policies across the 216 MMDAs in Ghana will aid in the fight against unemployment because every MMDA will be creating employment opportunities within its jurisdiction with its associated spillover impact on income generation, improvement in quality of life and poverty reduction. The findings emphasize the point that the objectives of LED policies are to generate both economic and social benefits to the residents of a geographical area. Scholars such as Ramukumba, (2012); Rodriguez-Pose, (2001:10, 2009b:11); and others have all identified employment opportunity creation and income generation as a primary objective for the implementation of LED interventions. In addition, these benefits of LED contributed to the reduction in poverty and

improvement in the quality of life of beneficiaries. Poverty reduction as a beneficent outcome of LED has been underscored by the UN-HABITAT (2005:4) when it indicated that “LED is now recognized as a key component in broader efforts to reduce poverty. There is also an emerging consensus that LED cannot bring about effective poverty reduction without incorporating explicit poverty reduction efforts”. The position of the UN-HABITAT (2005) have equally being buttressed in studies by Stansel (2005:55); and Nel (2001:1003-1024). Since LED is a local governance approach to local development, its (LED) sustenance as a poverty reduction mechanism is dependent on a strong local governance system backed by effective implementation of poverty reduction strategies, fiscal decentralization, and targeting of poverty-reducing public investment by LGUs. This means that LED cannot attain its intentions in the absence of a robust local governance system.

The study had a mixed finding as far as LED and infrastructure improvement is concerned. For instance, in the AMA and the SODA, the private sector partnered the Assemblies to provide infrastructure. However, the partnership was under different contexts. That of the AMA was done through PPP projects whilst in SODA, the private entity saw infrastructure provision as part of its CSR to the MMDA. In the case of KeMA, no infrastructure was provided under the LED interventions implemented. For MMDAs to experience augmentation of their infrastructure through LED, they need more business establishments within their areas with good understanding of CSR and PPPs. However, this is dependent on the MMDAs being given a free hand to allow the business entities in the discharge of their CSRs and PPPs. Even where there is a partnership between the MMDAs and the private sector, infrastructure provision will not be automatic if the appropriate legal, administrative and institutional regimes are not followed duly.

The inability of local governance structures and legislative regimes' inability to strengthen PPPs for the implementation of LED initiatives was enumerated as the bane of LED (Rogerson, 2010; and Patterson, 2008) whilst Khumalo (2015) revealed that the existence of robust and working legal systems facilitated the implementation of LED in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Tension between the central and local governments on the direction of local development, central government control, unclear role of local structures and leaders, lack of community participation and political settlements militated against the use of PPPs as LED intervention in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Khumalo, 2015).

#### **6.8. MEASUREMENT OF POVERTY LEVEL**

The study showed that there were improvements in poverty reduction across the AMA, KeMA and SODA due to the improvement in income level and quality of life. However, the income generation was not evenly distributed among the residents because the participation in LED programmes was not opened to all residents who were willing to take part. This occurrence resulted in some of the residents still leaving below the poverty line. By implication, if the MMDAs had adequate resources to permit all willing residents to benefit from LED interventions, "*ceteris paribus*" poverty reduction would be significant across the three MMDAs. In addition, if the distribution of LGUs' LED PPPs were done fairly devoid of patronage and cronyism, poverty reduction would be even in the MMDAs (especially in the AMA in particular).

#### **6.9. CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF LED**

The implementation of LED was also plagued with numerous challenges as indicated in various studies (Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, 2007:528–533; Hofisi et.al. 2013). The study

found challenges such as inadequate finance, lack of institutional capacity, policy inconsistency, lack of both political and leadership will to implement MMDA bye-laws, non-availability of land, and the politicization of LED. Some of these are discussed in detail in the paragraphs below.

First, the financial challenge. Lack of funds to implement LED interventions hindered the nature, type and the number of participants to select for the various initiatives implemented. The financial challenge did not only impede the MMDAs ability to roll out LED policies but also the scale and the type of LED policy to implement. In addition, the financial incapacity accounted for the KeMA and SODA's adoption of traditional and locality induced LED whilst the AMA opted for private sector led LED. Furthermore, the lack of funds for instance compelled the three MMDAs to cap the number of residents who could participate in capacity development programmes. Financing of LED is a big issue. For instance, the Republic of Ghana (2013:2) highlighted that LED funding remains a challenge to be addressed. Similarly, Patterson (2008: 10); and Rodriguez-Pose and Tijmstra, (2007:528–53) have all hinted that LED had limited funding in MMDAs. In Patterson's view, MMDAs had pro-poor statements in their LED policies, however, these were not given the commensurate attention in their LED budgets (Patterson, 2008:11). Patterson's position was confirmed by the study in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. The study deduced that the three MMDAs had policies aimed at reducing poverty, however, there was limited budgetary allocation in the AMA and SODA. For example, the budgetary allocations in 2016 and 2017 for the AMA and SODA were 32% and 20% respectively of the two Assemblies' total budget whilst the KeMA did not make any central budgetary allocation for LED implementation. The financial constraints compelled Mensah et al (2017) and Akudugu and Laube (2013) to doubt the sustainability of LED in

Ghana if the funding from the ILO, GIZ and UNDP are withdrawn. In Ahwoi's (2010:242) view, the limited finance to the MMDAs to implement LED stemmed from the limited national cake available to central governments of Africa hence the restrictions on funding available to LGUs for LED implementation.

Second, capacity constraints were also a bane to LED implementation in all the three MMDAs of the study. The constraints took the form of human, institutional and resources. The MMDAs did not have the requisite human resource, institutional capacity to champion the LED process. These militated against LED in policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Blakely and Bradshaw (2002:56) highlighted this position when they espoused that "theories of LED have traditionally focused mainly on the resource part of the LED equation, neglecting the capacity part" These findings are in line with the case studies of Nyawo and Mubangizi, (2015); Masuku et. al. (2014); Mensah et. al. (2013); Oduro-Ofori (2016); Akudugu (2013) and Akudugu and Laube (2013) in South Africa and Ghana, which saw capacity constraints as a hindrance to LED implementation. Capacity constraints have generally been identified by Ayee (2017) Tsikata (2007) and other scholars as a major hindrance to policy implementation. For example, Ayee (2017:49; 56) intimated that state institutions such as the Civil Service which is supposed to be the main instrument for national development and policy implementation lacks the capacity to move with the times and to effectively implement public policies. Similarly, Ahwoi (2010:242) mentioned lack of trained and experienced personnel as a big stumbling block to local governance. He adduced factors such as lack of training for the available local government staff, inability of local government training institutions to meet the training needs of local governments and their inability to



attract skilled manpower due to their poor image. In short, the MMDAs in Ghana lacked the appropriate “LED policy champions”.

Third, the study also identified inconsistency in policies as a challenge to the implementation of LED interventions. This was peculiar to the AMA. The Assembly implemented two parallel policies on car park that undermined each other; these were the PPP project of the Accra City Car Park Ltd and the AMA on street parking policy. This negatively affected the flourishing of the Accra City Car Park project because motorists preferred to park on the streets rather than going to the PPP project site. This policy inconsistency could be referred to as “inward or internal policy inconsistency” which is a complete departure from the inconsistency that resulted from “complexity of joint action” and lack of institutional coordination as amplified by Ayee (2017:54) and Tsikata (2007) that in Ghana, most institutions work in silos and do not work across ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs). The inconsistent policy has demotivated other private sector organizations from partnering with the AMA and other MMDAs into the construction of other car parks.

Fourth, non-availability of land to bolster the implementation of LED. The implication of this challenge for LED and local governance is that the MMDAs and LED beneficiaries will not be able to implement LED interventions that requires land. The effect of this challenge will be the continuous retardation of local economic development and its associated unemployment and poverty problems. The finding is in tandem with that of Blakely and Bradshaw (2002:180) who stated that without available land and its effective management and control, local economic development efforts will be essentially impossible. In the same vein, Oduro-Ofori (2016:24) underscored the importance of planning for land use and permitting for physical development as a LED intervention strategy in Ghana.

Furthermore, politics was one of the challenges that inhibited the implementation of the LED policy in the three MMDAs. The political challenge took three main forms, namely; political regime change and its concomitant political transition in the AMA; lack of political leadership commitment to implement LED from 1988 to 2016 and politicization of the implementation of LED interventions in the KeMA; and local governance electoral politics and political recruitment in the case of SODA. Since politics affects every fiber of society, the happenings in the political arena be it local or national impacts LED. The implication is that, if political transitions are not properly managed, they impede the implementation of LED as witnessed in the AMA. In the same way, if political leaders are not willing to implement LED policies, unemployment, lack of infrastructure and poverty will be pervasive in the MMDAs and the absence of a blueprint to ensure continuity in leadership at the LGUs will also impact negatively on LED. The impact of politics on LED has been extolled by Lasswell (1936) when he opined that politics determines the authoritative allocation of resources. Myerson (2015) corroborated Lasswell's position when he argued that the success of LED depends on both local and national politics and the relationship between the two.

Another challenge was lack of knowledge in modern trends and equipment. This challenge was specifically mostly experienced in the SODA and KeMA. This culminated into the LED beneficiaries not producing high standard products thereby not able to compete at the market place. The low knowledge level of LED beneficiaries influenced Enzama (2008) to caution that for LED beneficiaries to globally compete effectively and gain in the economy, they have to upgrade. Upgrade in this context means competitive enhancement of LED beneficiaries' skills to make better products and become more efficient. In the words of Enzama (2008:13), skills upgrading will result in the quality of production and product.

## **6.10. CONCLUSION**

The chapter sought to discuss the findings of the thesis within the context of the theoretical, comparative and empirical literature of LED, local governance and politics using the actor-oriented approach to development interventions. The study found that there is a linkage between LED, local governance and poverty reduction and politics in that, a working local governance system within a safe and congenial political arena is a precursor for effective LED implementation geared towards poverty reduction.

The actor-oriented approach to development intervention is also seen as a kingpin to the implementation of LED policies aimed at poverty reduction; however, the existence of actors is not enough for the success of LED. The thesis opines that the success of the LED actors is also dependent on timely and appropriate resources and capacities deployed for the right purposes.

In addition, LED is shaped by the dynamics of the political environment, leadership, administrative and institutional structures as well as land tenure system. These dynamics accounted for some differences in the implementation process of LED and the final outcome in the AMA, KeMA and SODA. The significance of politics, leadership and land has been highlighted by the study in that these three concepts have featured both as dynamics and challenges. This goes to underscore their relevance in the implementation of LED.

The study concludes that LED resulted in poverty reduction in the AMA, KeMA and SODA; however, the reduction in poverty was limited to the households of LED beneficiaries.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **7.1. INTRODUCTION**

This thesis set out to examine the dynamics of local economic development (LED) and their implications for the creation of employment opportunities, income generation, infrastructure provision and poverty reduction using the actor-oriented approach to development intervention. The study proceeds from the premise that the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA was shaped by the activities of multiple actors in the LED process to produce LED initiatives.

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the main findings of the study and their implications for the implementation of LED, highlight the conclusion, and make some recommendations which might improve the implementation of the LED process in Ghana. The chapter ends with some of the key lessons learnt.

#### **7.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

The findings of the study are summarized based on the research objectives as follows:

First, the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA was shaped by the activities of multiple actors with various interests. In the AMA, for instance, the Assembly which was the lead local government unit (LGU) in the implementation process was interested in passing on the development needed by the locality to the private sector hence the adoption of public private partnerships (PPPs). The private sector on its part was interested in economic development incentives before going into partnership with the Assembly. The Public Investment Division (PID) of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) was

also interested in the effective coordination of all PPPs to ensure value for money. Above all, the strategic nature of the AMA to secure votes for the incumbent government National Democratic Congress (NDC) during the 2016 general elections compelled the central government to also commit itself to the implementation of the PPP LED projects. The residents though had interest in the LED projects because of the possible employment opportunities, were more interested in the survival of their social and economic activities since most redevelopment activities through PPPs always came with relocation issues which mostly resulted in economic and social destabilization. These conflicting interests led to the unsuccessful implementation of the ten PPP projects in that the defeat of the NDC in the 2016 general elections brought about political transition in January, 2017 with the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government and its newly appointed Metropolitan Chief Executive (MCE) reviewing the entire process. The residents were also unwilling to release their lands for the projects, and the PID's directive to the AMA to secure environmental and fire safety approvals was not heeded. In the case of the SODA, the study found that all the actors had a common interest of improving the economic base of the area to create employment opportunities, income generation, infrastructure provision and poverty reduction. In this regard, the actors collaborated with each other hence the successful implementation of LED. With regard to the KeMA, the actors did not have similar interest and therefore, did not collaborate with each other as was the case in SODA. In the KeMA, the collaboration was between the Business Advisory Centre (BAC), Rural Enterprise Programme (REP) and the residents with no leadership commitment from the key personalities of the Assembly between 1988 and 2016. Another feature that is associated with multiple actors in the LED process was power play which culminated in imbalances among the actors in influencing the LED process. The ability

of an actor to influence the process was dependent on its resource and capacity endowment. The study revealed that in the KeMA and SODA, the involvement of the residents was mostly limited to making requests for LED interventions and the other actors take up the implementation. In the case of the AMA, the powerful and the strategic nature of the AMA enabled it to skip the concept note development and project registration stages of the PPP flowchart while the residents were not involved in the project identification stage. Nonetheless, the PID and the residents influenced the LED process in latter stages of implementation which resulted in the halt of the PPP implementation process. It is clear that the actor-oriented approach to development intervention does facilitate the implementation of LED initiatives; however, its success in LED depends a lot on they (actors) having similar interest, working in collaboration and having the needed resources and capacity.

Second, the local governance structures and actors impacted the implementation of LED interventions in diverse ways across the three Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs). The study found that whilst the local governance structures promoted the implementation of LED in the AMA, external factors such as political transition following the outcome of the 2016 general elections, weak state institutions, and land tenure system inhibited the implementation process. In the KeMA, for instance, the local governance structures coupled with the lack of leadership commitment between 1988 and 2016 from the Municipal Chief Executives (MCEs) and Municipal Coordinating Directors (MCDs) hindered the successful implementation of LED interventions. With regards to the SODA, the structures promoted the implementation of LED initiatives from the pre-initiation stage through to the monitoring and evaluation stage. This was because all the actors were aware of the structures and the procedures to follow in dealing with them.

Third, the MMDAs had three main sources of financing their LED programmes. These sources were intergovernmental transfers, donor or private sector funding and IGFs. In spite of these sources, the MMDAs differ in how they financed their LED programmes. The AMA for instance funded its LED programmes from the internally generated funds (IGFs), District Development Facility (DDF), Urban Development Grant (UDG), Social Investment Fund (SIF) and finances from partner organisations in PPP projects. The KeMA had its source of financing LED from the Rural Enterprise Programme (REP). The SODA funded its LED initiative programmes from the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), DDF and IGFs.

Fourth, the study found that the three MMDAs implemented somewhat different LED strategies with some similarities. In terms of the differences, the AMA generally implemented contemporary LED whilst the KeMA and SODA both implemented traditional LED, the AMA implemented PPPs whilst the KeMA and SODA implemented non-traditional LED and hardware LED respectively. A close examination of the strategies showed some similarities such as the AMA's capacity development programmes can be likened to the non-traditional LED and software LED interventions of the KeMA and SODA respectively. The PPP initiatives implemented by the AMA are also similar to the hardware initiative implemented by the SODA.

The study further revealed that the choice of LED strategy was needs –based and MMDA specific and the choice of a strategy was triggered by different factors. For instance, the need to meet the numerous development challenges coupled with lack of fiscal capacity compelled the AMA to choose PPPs, whilst the enrollment of the KeMA on REP triggered the commencement of LED and the implementation of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 1), 2003-2005 marked the implementation of LED strategies in the SODA.

Fifth, the study found that the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA resulted in beneficent outcomes including, the creation of new employment opportunities, generation of income, infrastructure provision and poverty reduction. The provision of infrastructure was limited only to the AMA and SODA. It came to light that the AMA used PPPs as the vehicle for infrastructure provision whilst in SODA, private entities established through LED interventions provided the infrastructure as part of their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Though LED brought about poverty reduction, its effect was limited to the households of the beneficiaries of the LED programmes.

Sixth, the MMDAs faced challenges such as lack of finance, non-availability of land, capacity constraints, policy inconsistency, lack of marketing opportunities, and politicization of LED interventions among others. These bottlenecks impeded the smooth implementation of the various LED strategies.

### **7.3. CONCLUSION**

The thesis sought to discuss the dynamics that impacted the implementation of LED in the AMA, KeMA and SODA using the actor-oriented approach to development intervention. The implementation of LED in Ghana's local governance system was influenced by dynamics such as micro and macro politics, leadership, institutional and administrative and procedural regimes as well as the land tenure system especially in the AMA. The thesis is based on the actor-oriented approach to development intervention and how the actors shaped the LED implementation process. The thesis concludes that the effectiveness of actors in LED depends a lot on the power, resources and capacity of the actors. In addition, the willingness of the various actors to collaborate with each other throughout the LED process is a major prerequisite for its successful implementation.



In fine, there is a nexus between politics, local governance and LED. The existence of a congenial political environment supported by a robust local governance system will enhance the implementation of LED to achieve its expected objective of developing local economic capacity for development thereby creating employment opportunities, generating income, and providing the needed infrastructure with the ultimate result of poverty reduction.

#### **7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS**

From the above discussions, the following recommendations are made for the attention of governance and development experts, LED practitioners, policy makers, government and its institutions, local government administrators, politicians, students and researchers in politics, local governance, local economic development and poverty. The recommendations are categorized into five main areas, namely; (i) policy, (ii) fiscal, (ii) institutional, human resource and capacity development, (iii) private sector involvement (iv) politics and (v) participation and education

##### **7.4.1. Policy Recommendation**

1. Harmonization of all poverty reduction related policies of the current NPP government such as the “Planting for Food and Jobs”, “One District One Factory (1D1F)”, “Coordinated Programme for Social and Economic Development” and the LED so that resources can be channeled to make implementation coherent and effective instead of the current situation where scarce resources are dissipated among competing policies such as the “Planting for Food and Jobs” and “1D1F”. The dissipation of scarce resources starves the policies and the implementing institutions of the needed resources.

2. The NPP government’s flagship programme of “1D1F” should be extended to the SODA for the establishment of mango and rice processing factories so that value can be added to

these products before getting to the market. In the KeMA, an anchovy processing factory should also be established to kick start a LED intervention because of its comparative advantage.

3. The National LED policy and the Operational Manual should be launched and its implementation effected immediately to make it mandatory for all MMDAs to implement LED interventions. To whip up the commitment level of MMDAs to the implementation of LED interventions, incentives such as annual awards and locality marketing should be instituted as some benefits to MMDAs for championing LED implementation.

4. There should be a policy on land tenure system where MMDAs can jointly own lands with traditional authorities within their jurisdictions for LED and other local development purposes. This will lessen the challenges associated with residents and MMDAs accessing land for LED purposes.

#### **7.4.2. Fiscal Recommendation**

1. There should be a central government fund specifically designated for the financing of LED activities in all the MMDAs in the country. In this connection, a certain percentage of the DACF should be earmarked for the implementation of LED policies in the MMDAs instead of the current practice where MMDAs have the luxury of determining whether to spend a portion of the DACF on LED or not.

#### **7.4.3. Institutional, Human Resource and Capacity Development Recommendations**

1. The implementation of change management strategies. Change management in this context refers to deliberate interventions aimed at modifying the existing values, norms, the organisational structure and the behaviour of the human resource to reorient them towards the

implementation of LED interventions. Strategies such as training, team building, and empowerment among others could be implemented to develop the capacity of the staff of the LED unit and other officials involved in LED implementation. The norms, values, goals and the structure of institutions involved in LED implementation should be aligned to the vision and goal of the LED policy. This will make the institutions and the human resource to be proactive in the implementation of LED.

2. LED intervention implementation should not be tied to the tenure of office of the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) and District Coordinating Directors (DCDs) at the MMDAs; rather, it should be continued even when there is a change in leadership at the MMDAs. Related to this recommendation is that the central government should desist from interfering in recruitment through transfers at the local governance level. This does not auger well for the continuation of LED policies.

3. The independence of state institutions such as the PID should be protected. This should be done by ensuring permanent tenure for the key officers. Their independence will allow them to apply rules and regulations without fear or favour.

#### **7.4.4. Private Sector Involvement Recommendations**

1. The Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663) should be reviewed to make the procurement process for LED PPPs less cumbersome and also promote PPP activities for LED by enabling indigenous companies to actively participate through bidding and winning MMDA LED contracts. The winning of LED contracts by indigenous companies will serve as a source of motivation for other indigenous companies to also apply. In addition, if indigenous companies execute LED contracts, the residents benefit through employment and income generation and above all the returns to the indigenous companies are mostly reinvested in the area.

2. The state (government and MMDAs) should provide the enabling environment for the private sector within their various jurisdictions to contribute to LED initiatives. To achieve this, CBOs should increase their advocacy activities for LED which will ensure that both MMDAs and the private sector are held accountable in the performance of their roles in LED.
3. Incentives should be made available with strict legal and institutional regimes in the MMDAs for LED promotion. These incentives should be created at where they are needed to avoid the South African experience of “building cathedrals in deserts”. The existence of incentive schemes at the MMDAs have the potential of attracting investments to the areas thereby creating employment opportunities, income generation and ultimately reducing poverty.

#### **7.4.5. Recommendations on over- politicization**

1. Politicians at all levels should desist from the over-politicization of LED interventions. They should rather make those resources available to the MMDAs to facilitate the implementation of LED.
2. Central government’s involvement in the implementation of LED should not be driven purely by the electoral fortunes it stands to gain, but rather should fall within the general development plan of the nation and the MMDAs in particular.

#### **7.4.6. Participation and Education Recommendations**

1. The MMDAs as the lead state institution at the local level should allow for broader stakeholder consultation at all the stages of the LED process. Some of the stakeholders to engage should include the traditional authorities, CBOs, residents, NGOs, private business entities etc. The consultation process provides the opportunity for all the actors to make inputs

into the interventions thereby making room for total ownership of the LED programme and the generation of the needed support (political, financial and land) for the implementation of the LED initiatives.

2. Education and sensitization exercises to create awareness among the stakeholders about the importance of LED as the vehicle for local development. The education and sensitization programmes should emphasize the roles of the various stakeholders and how vital the performance of such roles contribute to the attainment of LED objectives.

3. Knowledge is power and therefore, there should be effective information dissemination about all LED and local development issues by the MMDAs. This will make the actors aware of the development needs of the localities and the kind of interventions to make to bridge the development gap.

## **7.5. LESSONS LEARNT**

From the foregoing discussions, the thesis highlights the following seven lessons which have implications for LED, local governance, politics and poverty reduction in Ghana:

1. The existence of actors in the implementation of LED is not sufficient for its successful implementation. The actors must be willing to cooperate with each other and they must also have the requisite resources and capacities in the right mix, at the right time and deployed for the right purpose.

2. Local governance structures impact LED implementation in diverse way; either positive or negative depending on how the actors relate with the structures.

3. The success of LED depends a lot on the commitment of LGU leadership and political commitment in promoting, marketing the resource endowment and the economic potential of

the locality to the outside world. The marketing assists not only in attracting the needed investment into the area but also show cases the MMDAs' products and the economic potential to outsiders.

4. The MMDAs had different sources of financing their LED policies. The ability to attract funding for their LED programmes depends a lot on their strategic nature, leadership and political commitment, the priority given to LED as a local development tool and the immediate returns that private investors expected to get from their investment in the locality.

5. Different factors influenced the adoption and implementation of LED initiatives in the MMDAs, hence their adoption of LED programmes that are “perceived” to be different. However, a critical examination of the strategies showed some similarities.

6. LED implementation resulted in poverty reduction. However, the benefits were not widespread in the MMDAs, instead they were limited to the households of LED participants.

7. The implementation of LED was impacted by not only local level politics but national politics as well.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### BOOKS

- Ayee, J.R.A. (1994). *The Anatomy of Public Policy Implementation: The Case of Decentralisation Policies in Ghana*, Aldershot: Avebury.
- Ayee, J.R.A. (2000). *Saints, Wizards, Demons and Systems: Explaining the success or failures of Public Policies and Programmes*, Accra: Ghana Universities Press.
- Ayee, J.R.A. (2017). *Leadership and the Ghanaian State today: Reflections and Perspectives*, Accra: Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Bevir, M. (2009). *Governance*; London: Sage.
- Bingham, R.D., & Mier, R. (1993). *Theories of Local Economic Development: Perspectives from across the disciplines*, London: Sage Publications.
- Blakely, E.J. (1994). *Planning Local Economic Development*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Blakely, E.J., & Bradshaw, T.K. (2002). *Planning Local Economic Development: Theory and Practice*, London: Sage Publications.
- Chhotray, V., & Stoker G. (2009). *Governance Theory and Practice: A Cross –Disciplinary Approach*, London: Palgrave.
- Collis, J., & Hussey, R. (2003). *Business Research: A Practical Guide for Undergraduate and Postgraduate Students* (2<sup>nd</sup> Ed.), New York: Palgrave.
- Handley, G., Higgins, K., & Sharma, B. (2009). *Poverty and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview of the Issues* Working Paper 299, London: Overseas Development Institute.

- Helmsing, A. J. H. (2001). *Partnerships, Meso-institutions and Learning. New Local and Regional Economic Development Initiatives in Latin America*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies.
- Long, N. (2001). *Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives*. London, Routledge.
- Mahama, C. (2013). *Politics of Decentralisation Reforms in Ghana: The Experiences of Northern Ghana*, Kumasi: University Press.
- Manheim, B. J., & Rich C. R. (1999). *Empirical Political Analysis: Research Methods in Political Science*, New York: Longman.
- Peterson, P.E. (1981). *City Limits*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pagano, M.A., & Bowman, A. O'M. (1995). *Cityscapes and Capital*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Sapru, R.K. (2012). *Development Administration*, New Delhi: Sterling Publishing Private Ltd.
- Smith, B.C. (2009). *Good Governance and Development*, New York: Palgrave.
- Todaro, M.P. (1977). *Economics for a Developing World*, London: Longman Group Ltd.
- Turner, M., & Hulme, D. (1997). *Governance, Administration and Development: Making the State Work*, New York: Kumarian.
- Uphoff, N.T. (1972). *The Political Economy of Development: Theoretical and Empirical Contributions*, California, University of California Press.



World Bank, (1989). *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth, Long Term Perspective Study*, Washington DC: The World Bank.

World Bank, (2002). *Defining Local Economic Development a Premier*. Washington DC: World Bank Urban Development Division.

World Bank, (2003). *Local Economic Development a Primer: Developing and Implementing Local Economic Development Strategies and Action Plans*, Washington DC: World Bank.

#### **CHAPTERS IN BOOKS**

Ahwoi, K. (2010) *Local Government and Decentralisation in Ghana*, Accra: Unimax Macmillan Ltd.

Ahwoi, K. (2017). *Decentralisation in Ghana: A Collection of Essays*, Accra: Winmat Publishers Ltd.

Amoako-Tuffour, J. (2008). “The Evolution of Poverty in Ghana: 1960-2000” in Amoako-Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (eds.), *Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action*, Plymouth: Lexington Books.

Armah, B. (2008). “Monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies” in Amoako-Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (eds.), *Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action*, Plymouth: Lexington Books.

Arkadie, V.B. (2012). “Good Governance and Donors” in Sundaram, K.J. and Chowdhury A. (eds.), *Is Good Governance good for development?* London: Bloomsbury.

- Asante, F.A., & Ayee, J.R.A. (2008). “Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction” in Aryeetey, E., & Kanbur, R. (eds.), *The Economy of Ghana: Analytical Perspectives on Stability, Growth and Poverty*, Accra: Woeli Publishing Services.
- Asante, F.A., & Ayee, J.R.A. (2008). “Decentralisation, Poverty Reduction and the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy” in Amoako- Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (eds.), *Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action*, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Aumentado, E.B. (2007). “Poverty Reduction for Peace and Development: The Bohol Experience” in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Awortwi, N. (2013). “The Past, Present, and the Future of Decentralisation in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Local Government Development Trajectories of Ghana and Uganda” in Rees, C.J., & Hossain, F. (eds.), *Public Sector Reforms in Developing and Transitional Countries: Decentralisation and Local Governance*, New York: Routledge.
- Ayee, J.R.A. (2002). “Governance, Institutional Reforms and Policy Outcomes in Ghana” in Dele O., & Soumana S. (eds.), *Better Governance and Public Policy in Capacity Building for Democratic Renewal in Africa*, Bloomfield: Kumarian.
- Ayee, J.R.A. (2004). “Ghana: A Top-Down Initiative”, in Olowu, D., & Wunsch, J.S. (eds.), *Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralisation*, London: Lynne Rienner.

- Ayee, J.R.A. (2007). "Keynote Address: Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development," in Ayee, J.R.A. (ed.), *Ghana at 50: Government, Politics and Development*, Accra: Department of Political Science and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
- Ayee, J.R.A. (2007). "A Decade of Political Leadership in Ghana, 1993-2004" in Bofo-Arthur, K., (ed.), *Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State*, London: Zed Books.
- Ayee, J.R.A. (2013). "Decentralisation and Conflict in Africa: A Paradox" in Kalu, K.A., Uzodike, U.O., Kraybill, D., & Moolakkattu, J. (eds.), *Territoriality, Citizenship and Peacebuilding: Perspectives on Challenges to Peace in Africa*, London: Adonis and Abbey.
- Ayee, J., & Dickovick, J.T. (2014). "Ghana: Decentralisation in a Two-Party Democracy" in Dickovick, J.T. and Wunsch, J.S. (eds.), *Decentralisation in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Baah-Boateng, W. (2008). "Employment Generation for Poverty Alleviation" in Amoako-Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (eds.), *Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action*, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Bergh, S.I. (2013). "Assessing the scope for Partnerships between Local Governments and Community - Based Organisations: Findings from Rural Morocco" in Rees C.J., & Hossain F (eds.), *Public Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries: Decentralisation and Local Governance*. London: Routledge.
- Cabigas L.I. (2007). "Partnership on Integrated Community Development Programme between the Land Bank Countryside Development Foundation, Inc (LCDFI) and Microfinance Institutions (MFIs)" in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development*

*for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.

Čapkova S. (2005). “Local Government and Economic Development” in Čapkova S. (ed.), *Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative*, Budapest and the Department of International Development Publication.

Cromwell, E., Luttrell, C., Shepherd, A., & Wiggins, S. (2005). “Poverty Reduction Strategies and the Rural Productive Sectors: Insights from Malawi, Nicaragua and Vietnam” in Lúdia Cabral (ed.), *Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 258*, London: Overseas Development Institute.

Denters, B. (2011). “Local Governance” in Bevir, M. (ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of Governance*, London: Sage.

Dufhues, T. Theesfeld, I, Buchenrieder, G., & Munkung N. (2011). “The political economy of decentralisation in Thailand- Does decentralisation allow for peasant participation?” Paper prepared for presentation at the EAAE, 2011 Congress Change and Uncertainty, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland.

Dwivedi, O.P. (2002). “On Common Good and Good Governance: An Alternative Approach” in Dele O., & Soumana S. (eds.), *Better Governance and Public Policy in Capacity Building for Democratic Renewal in Africa*; Bloomfield: Kumarian.

Encinas, D. (2007). “Experiences and Lessons learned in implementing LED Initiatives in Conflict and Post-Conflict Areas” in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good*

- practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Guiza, E.C. (2007). “Local Employment generation: The Bulacan Experience” in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Guy, G., Hugouneq, H., & Vaillancourt, F. (2013). “Local Public Finance in Ghana” in Dafflon B., & Madies T. (eds.), *The Political Economy of Decentralisation in Sub Saharan Africa: A New Implementation Model in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya and Senegal*. Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
- Ibrahim, D. (2007). “A Sharing of Concrete Experiences and Insights: The Datu Paglas Story” in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Kessy, A.T., & McCourt, W. (2013). “Is Decentralisation still Recentralisation? The Local Government Reform Programme in Tanzania” in Rees C.J. and Hossain F (eds.), *Public Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries: Decentralisation and Local Governance*. London: Routledge.
- Koponen, J. (2004). “Development Intervention and Development Studies” in Kontinen, T. (ed.), *Development Intervention: Actor and Activity Perspectives* Helsinki: University of Helsinki.

- Long, N. (2004). “Actors, Interfaces and Development Intervention: Meanings, Purposes and Powers” in Kontinen, T. (ed.), *Development Intervention: Actor and Activity Perspectives* Helsinki: University of Helsinki.
- Mbassi Elong, J.P. (2009). “The Role of Decentralisation in the Governance of African States” in Bellina S., Magro H., & Villemeur de V. (eds.), *Democratic Governance: A New Paradigm for Development*, London: C. Hurst and Co Ltd.
- Mendoza, M. (2007). “The Challenges of Peace and Development in a Poor and Divided Community: The Case of Sulu” in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Ninsin, K.A. (2007). “Markets and Liberal Democracy”, in Boafo-Arthur, K., (ed.), *Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State*, London: Zed Books.
- Ninsin, K.A. (2016). “Elections and Representation in Ghana’s Democracy” in Ninsin, K.A. (ed.), *Issues in Ghana’s Electoral Politics*, Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Ofei-Aboagye, E.O. (2008). “The Challenges of Decentralisation” in Agyeman-Duah, B. (ed.), *Ghana: Governance in the Fourth Republic*, Accra: Ghana Centre for Democratic Development.
- Ofreneo, R.E. (2007). “Strengthening LGU capacity in Development Planning, and Employment Promotion in Marikina City and Naga City” in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches,*

- Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Olowu, D. & Wunsch, J.S. (2004). Introduction: Local Governance and Democratic Decentralization in Africa in Olowu, D., & Wunsch, J.S. (eds.), *Local Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic Decentralisation*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Ortiz, I. (2007). “LGU -Driven Local Economic Development and Employment generation strategies: Six Cases from the Philippines” in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Rees, J.C., & Hossain, F. (2013). “Perspectives on Decentralisation and Local Governance in Developing and Transitional Countries” in Rees, J.C. and Hossain, F. (eds.), *Public Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries: Decentralization and Local Governance*, New York: Routledge.
- Saito, F. (2011). “Decentralization” in Bevir M. (ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of Governance*, London: Sage.
- Theodoulou Z. S. (1999). “Starting from the Scratch: The Research Process” in Theodoulou, Z.S., & Rory O’Brien (eds.), *Methods of Political Inquiry: The Discipline, Philosophy and Analysis of Politics*, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Tsikata, K. (2007). “Challenges of economic growth in a liberal economy” in Bofo-Arthur, K., (ed.), *Ghana: One Decade of the Liberal State*, London: Zed Books.

- Twerefou, D.K., & Osei-Assibey, E. (2008) “Environmental Sustainability and Poverty Reduction in Ghana” in Amoako- Tuffour, J., & Armah, B. (eds.), *Poverty Reduction Strategies in Action*, Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) and EcoPlan International Inc. (2005). *The Local Economic Development Series: Promoting Local Economic Development through strategic Planning*, Vol. 1, Nairobi: UN-HABITAT and EPI.
- Viloria-Williams, J. (2007). *The ILO Model- An Introduction*, in Parisotto, A. (ed.), *Local Economic Development for Employment generation, Peace and Security, Approaches, Tools, and Good practices in the Philippine*, Report of an ILO-SRO Manila Technical Workshop, Geneva: ILO.
- Wunsch, J.S. (2014). “Decentralisation: “Theoretical, Conceptual and Analytical Issues” in Dickovick, J.T., & Wunsch, J.S. (eds.), *Decentralisation in Africa: The Paradox of State Strength*, London: Lynne Rienner.
- Yatta, F. (2009). “Local Economic Governance” in Bellina S., Magro H., & Villemeur de V. (eds.), *Democratic Governance: A New Paradigm for Development*, London: C. Hurst and Co Ltd.

## **ARTICLES IN JOURNALS**

- Adjei, P.O., & Agyemang, S. (2012). “Non-Governmental Organisations and Rural Poverty Reduction in Northern Ghana: Perspectives of Beneficiaries on Strategies, Impact and Challenges” *Journal of Poverty Alleviation and International Development*, 3(2), pp. 47-73.



- Akudugu, J.A., & Laube, W. (2013). *Implementing local economic development in Ghana: Multiple actors and rationalities*, 113, ZEF Working Paper Series, pp. 1-19.
- Appiah-Agyekum, N.N., Danquah N.Y.B., & Sakyi, E.K. (2013). "Local Government Finance in Ghana: Disbursement and Utilization of the MPS share of the District Assemblies Common Fund" *Commonwealth Journal of Local Governance*, 12, pp. 90-109.
- Bateman, M., Ortiz, J.P.D., & Maclean, K. (2011). *A post-Washington consensus approach to Local Economic Development in Latin America: An Example from Medellin, Colombia*, Background Note, Overseas Development Institute, pp. 1-6.
- Bateman M. (2013). "Financing Local Economic Development: In Search of the Optimal Local Financial System", in OFSE (Hg.) *Osterreichische Entwicklungspolitik, Analysen Berichte Informationen mil dem Schwerpunktthema Private Sector Development-Ein neuer Businessplan für Entwicklung?* 43-52.
- Bond, P. (2003). "Debates in Local Economic Development Policy and Practice", *Urban Forum*, 14, (2-3), 147-164.
- Chibba, M. (2009). "Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries: No consensus but plenty of solutions" *World Economics*, 9(1), 197-200.
- Conyers, D. "Decentralisation: The latest fashion in development", *Public Administration and Development*, 3(2), 97-109.
- Davoodi, H., & Zou, H. (1998). "Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth: A cross country Study", *Journal of Urban Economics*, 43, 244-257.

- Debrah, E. (2009). "The Economy and Regime Change in Ghana, 1992-2004" *Ghana Social Science Journal*, 5 and 6(1 and 2), 84-113.
- Dudley, S. (1969). "The meaning of Development", *International Development Reviews*, 11(4), 2-6.
- Edoun E.I., & Jahed, M. (2009). *The Merits of Decentralization and Local Economic Development in South Africa*, Global Action for Africa's Development, South Africa, Pretoria, 1-26.
- Enzama, W. (2008). "Quest for Economic Development in Agrarian Localities: Lessons from West Nile, Uganda", Working Paper 452, The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, pp.1-46.
- Foster, K.A. (1993). "Exploring the links between political structure and metropolitan growth", *Political Geography*, 12, 523-547.
- Geert van Boekel (2005). *Applying the comprehensive LED approach: The case for Mozambique*, Cooperative Branch, Geneva: ILO.
- GIZ (2008). Local and Regional Economic Development: Working towards a business-friendly environment in districts and regions. Accra, GIZ.
- Hammond, G.W., & Tosun M.S. (2009). "The Impact of Local Decentralisation on Economic Growth: Evidence from U.S. Counties" *Discussion Paper No. 4574*, Bonn: The Institute of Labour Studies, 1-28.

- Helmsing, A.H.J. (2003). "Local Economic Development: New Generations of Actors, Policies and Instruments for Africa." *Public Administration and Development*, 67 – 76.
- Hofisi, C.M., Mbeba, R., Maredza, A., & Choga, I. (2013). "Scoring Local Economic Development Goals in South Africa: Why Local Government is failing to score", *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, MCSER Publishing, Rome, 4(13), 591-595.
- ILO, (2004). Working out of poverty in Ghana: The Ghana Decent Work Pilot Programme, Geneva: ILO.
- ILO, (2004). Promoting Employment through Enterprise Development. Ghana Decent Work Country Programme and Local Economic Development Initiative, Geneva: ILO.
- ILO (2009). Financing Local Economic Development: Old Problems, New Strategies. ILO-Ghana Decent Work Country Programme Conference Proceedings 2009, Akosombo, ILO.
- ILO (2012). Up-Scaling Local Economic Development: Lessons from the Ghana Decent Work Programme. Turin, ILO.
- Kamara, R.C. (2017). "Creating enhanced capacity for Local Economic Development through Collaborative Governance in South Africa" *Socioeconomic Challenges*, 1(3), 98-115.
- Khumalo, P. (2015). "Decentralisation and Local Economic Development in Four Southern Africa Countries", *Journal of Social Science*, 45(1), 22-30.

- Kiwanuka, M. (2012). “Decentralisation and Good Governance in Africa: Institutional Challenges to Uganda’s Local Governments”, *The Journal of African and Asian Local Government*, 44-59.
- Lasimbang, J. (2008). “Indigenous peoples and Local Economic Development”, *Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact*, (5), 42-45.
- Lin, J.Y., & Liu, Z. (2000). “Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth in China” *Economic Growth and Cultural Change*, 49, 1-12.
- Logan, V.R., & Molotch, H. (1987). *Urban Fortunes: The political economy of place*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Masuku, M.M., Jili, N.N., & Selepe, B.M. (2016). “The Implementation of Local Economic Development Initiatives towards Poverty Alleviation in Big 5 False Bay Local Municipality” *African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure*. 5(4), 1-11.
- Mayer-Stamer, J. (2006). “The Hexagon of Local Economic Development in south Africa”, Mesopartner Working Paper No.5, *Duisburg*.
- Mensah, J.K., Bawole, J. N., & Ahenkwa A. (2013) “Local Economic Development Initiatives in Ghana: The Challenges and the Way Forward”, *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 3(2), 142-160.
- Mensah, J.K., Domfeh, A.K., Ahenkwa A., & Bawole, J. N. (2013). “Policy and Institutional perspectives on Local Economic Development in Africa: The Ghanaian perspective”, *Journal of African Studies Development*, 5(7), pp. 163-170.

- Mensah, J.K., Bawole, J.N., & Ahenkan, A. (2017). "Local Economic Development in Ghana: From the "lost decades" to a policy "maturing" stage", *Development Southern Africa*, 34(5), 607-621.
- Molotch, H. (1976). "The City as a growth machine", *American Journal of Sociology*, 2, 302-330.
- Municipal Services Project, (2001). "Local Economic Development in South Africa", *Occasional Paper* No.6. Cape Town, Municipal Services Project.
- Ndegwa, S. (2002). "Decentralization in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey", *Africa Region Working Paper Series*, No.40, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Nel, E. (2001). "Local economic development: A review and assessment of its current status in South Africa." *Urban Studies*, 38(7), 1003-1024.
- Nel, E., Binns, T., & Bek, D. (2009). "Misplaced Expectation? The Experience of Applied Local Economic Development in Post-Apartheid." *Local Economy* 24(3): pp. 224-237.
- Nel, E. L., & McQuaid, R. W. (2002). "The evolution of local economic development in South Africa: The case of Stutterheim and social capital." *Economic Development Quarterly* 16(1): 6074.
- Nelson, A.C., & Foster, K.A. (1999). "Metropolitan governance structure and income growth", *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 21, 309-324.
- Nichter, S., & Goldmark, L. (2009). "Small firm growth in developing countries" *World Development*, 37(9), 1453-1464.

- Nyawo, J., & Mubangizi, B.C. (2015). "Arts and Craft in Local Economic Development: Tourism possibilities in Mtubatuba Local Municipality", *African Journal of Hospitality, Tourism and Leisure*, 4(2), 1-15.
- Ofei-Aboagye, E. O. (2009). "Economic Decentralisation and Local Development: Concepts and Issues", *Journal of Local Government Studies*, 1(1), 1-28.
- Olowu, D. (2001). "Decentralisation Policies and Practices under Structural Adjustment and Democratization in Africa", *Democracy, Governance and Human Rights Programme Paper Number 4*, Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1-31.
- Olowu, D. (2012). "The Constitutionalization of Local Government in Developing Countries-Analysis of African Experiences in Global Perspective" *Beijing Law Review*, 2, 42-50.
- Patterson, C. (2008). "Country Report, Local Economic Development in South Africa", GIZ.
- Pennink, B. (2014). "Dimensions of Local Economic Development: Towards a Multi-level, Multi-Actor Model", *Journal of Business and Economics*, 5(1), 249-256.
- Raco, M. (2000) "Assessing Community Participation in Local Economic Development - Lessons for the new urban policy" *Political Geography*, 19(2000), 573-599.
- Ramukumba, T. (2012). *The Local Economic Development in the Eden District Municipality, Western Cape Province, South Africa: A Case Study of Emerging Entrepreneurs in Tourism Industry*, *American Journal of Tourism Research*, 1(1), 9-15.

- Rodriguez-Pose, A., & Tijmstra S. (2005). "Local Economic Development as an Alternative Approach to Economic Development in Sub Saharan Africa": *A Report for the World Bank*, Washington DC: The World Bank, 1-20.
- Rogerson, C.M., & Rogerson, J.M. (2010). "Local Economic Development in Africa: Global context and research directions", *Development Southern Africa*, 27(4), 465-480.
- Rusu, E (2014). "Decentralization and Local Economic Development in the Knowledge Society", *Management Strategies Journal*, 26(4), 59-67.
- Stansel, D. (2005). "Local Decentralisation and Local Economic Growth: A cross –sectional examination of U.S. metropolitan areas", *Journal of urban Economics* 57, 55-72.
- Wolman, H., & Spitzley, D. (1996). "The Politics of Local Economic Development", *Economic Development Quarterly*, 10(2), 115-150.
- Wunsch, J.S. (1998). "Decentralisation, Local Governance and the Democratic Transition in Southern Africa: A Comparative Analysis", *African Studies Quarterly*, 2(1), 19-45.
- Wunsch, J. (2000). "Refounding the African State and Local Self-Governance: The Neglected Foundation" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(3), 487-509.
- Xie, D., Zou, H., & Davoodi, H. (1999). "Fiscal Decentralisation and Economic Growth in the United States", *Journal of Urban Economics*, 45, 228-239.
- Yeasmin S., & Rahman K.F. (2012). "Triangulation Research Method as a Tool of Social Science Research" *BUP Journal*, 1(1), 154-163.
- Zaidah, Z. (2007). "Case Study as a Research Method", *Journal Kemanusi*, bil.9, 1-6.

Zhang, H., & Zou, H. (1998). “Fiscal Decentralisation, Public Spending, and Economic Growth in China”, *Journal of Public Economics*, 67, 221-240.

## OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS

Accra Metropolitan Assembly, *Report on a Training workshop organized by SIF/AMA for Small Scale Enterprises in January, 2012*.

Accra Metropolitan Assembly, *The Economic set up of Accra*, accessed at [www.ghanadistricts.com](http://www.ghanadistricts.com), retrieved on 12<sup>th</sup> November, 2017.

Ghana, Republic of, (1992). *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992*, Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation.

Ghana, Republic of, (2011). *National Policy on Public Private Partnerships (PPP), Private Participation in Infrastructure and Services for Better Public Services Delivery*, Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation.

Ghana, Republic of, (2012). *The Composite Budget of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly for the 2012 Fiscal Year*, Accra: Accra Metropolitan Assembly.

Ghana, Republic of, (2013). *National Local Economic Development (LED) Policy*, Accra: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.

Ghana, Republic of, (2014). *Operational Manual on LED for District Assemblies in Ghana*, Accra: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.

Ghana, Republic of and United Nations Development Programme, (2011). *Local Economic Development, 2011 Annual Working Paper*, Accra.



- Ghana, Republic of, (2015). *National Decentralisation Policy Framework; Accelerating Decentralisation and Local Governance for National Development*, Kumasi: University Printing Press.
- Ghana, Republic of, (2016). *The Composite Budget of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly for the 2016 Fiscal Year*, Accra: Accra Metropolitan Assembly.
- Ghana, Republic of, (2016). *The Composite Budget of the Keta Municipal Assembly for the 2016 Fiscal Year*, Accra: Keta Municipal Assembly.
- Ghana, Republic of, (2016). *The Composite Budget of the Shai-Osudoku District Assembly for the 2016 Fiscal Year*, Accra: Shai-Osudoku District Assembly.
- Ghana, Republic of, (2016). *Local Government Act, 2016 (Act 936)*, Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, Accra.
- Ghana, Statistical Service, (2007). *Patterns and Trends of Poverty in Ghana: 1991-2006*, Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.
- Ghana, Statistical Service, (2014). *2010 Population and Housing Census District Analytical Report: Accra Metropolitan Assembly*, Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.
- Ghana, Statistical Service, (2014). *2010 Population and Housing Census District Analytical Report: Keta Municipal Assembly*, Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.
- Ghana, Statistical Service, (2014). *2010 Population and Housing Census District Analytical Report: Shai-Osudoku District Assembly*, Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.
- Ghana, Statistical Service, (2015). *Ghana: Poverty Mapping Report*, Accra: Ghana Statistical Service.

Brandt Commission Report, (1980). *Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A Programme for Survival*, London: Pan Books

Keta Municipal Assembly, (2016). Annual Performance Report of Business Advisory Centre.

Namibia, Republic of (2008). Regional and Local Economic Development White Paper, Windhoek: Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development.

United Nations Development Programme (2011). *Country Programme Document for Ghana (2012-2016)*, Accra, United Nations Development Programme.

World Bank, (1997). *World Development Report*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Yatta, F. (2015). *Local Economic Development in Africa: Implementation, Constraints and Prospects, Dialogue and capacity building of local and regional authorities in EU partner countries in the fields of development and local governance*, Kampala: PLATFORMA.

## **INTERNET SOURCES**

Khan, M.H., (2009). “Governance, Growth and Poverty Reduction”, *DESA Working Paper, No. 75 Economic and Social Affairs*, accessed at [www.google.com](http://www.google.com), retrieved on 2<sup>nd</sup> June, 2017.

Oduro-Ofori, E. (2016). “Decentralization and Local Economic Development Promotion at the District Level in Ghana” in Dick, E. Gaesing, K., Inkoom, D. and Kausel, T. (eds.), *Decentralization and Regional Development: Experiences and Lessons from Four Continents over three decades*, accessed at [www.springer.com](http://www.springer.com), retrieved on 5<sup>th</sup> November, 2016.

Pieterse E. (2006). *A Framework to Link Local Economic Development to Anti-Poverty Strategies*, accessed at <http://www.dplg.gov.za>, retrieved on 17<sup>th</sup> March, 2017.

[www.ghanadistricts.com](http://www.ghanadistricts.com), retrieved on 23<sup>rd</sup> October, 2017.

#### **UNPUBLISHED SOURCES**

Akudugu, A.J., (2013). *Organising and implementing Local Economic Development initiatives at the District level in Ghana*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, Rheinischen Friedrich – Wilhems Universität.

Hay, D. (2004). “Delivering support to crafters”, *Delivery: The Magazine for Local Government*, Spring, 2004, (p. 54).

Oduro, A. D. (2001). “A Note on Public Expenditure and Poverty Reduction in Ghana” *Paper presented at a Workshop on Macroeconomic Stability, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Ghana*, Accra.

Tafon, R. (2013). *The Actor-Interface Case of Development Intervention in the Conservation of Mount Cameroon National Park, Buea, Cameroon*, Masters Dissertation Unpublished, Sodertorn University.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1



## UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

### ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)

*P. O. Box LG 74, Legon, Accra, Ghana*

My Ref. No .....

1<sup>st</sup> November, 2017

Mr. Akpeko Agbevade  
Department of Political Science  
University of Ghana  
Legon

Dear Mr. Agbevade,

**ECH 025/17-18: LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA'S LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM: THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ACCRA METROPOLITAN, KETA MUNICIPAL AND SHAI-OSUDOKU DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES**

This is to advise you that the above reference study has been presented to the Ethics Committee for the Humanities for a full board review and the following actions taken subject to the conditions and explanation provided below:


Expiry Date:	31/10/18
On Agenda for:	Initial Submission
Date of Submission:	18/09/17
ECH Action:	Approved
Reporting:	Bi-Annually

Please accept my congratulations.

Yours Sincerely,

Rev. Prof. J. O. Y. Mante  
ECH Chair

CC: Dr. Bossman E. Asare, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana.





Appendix 2  
**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA**  
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

March 23, 2017

Ref. No.: .....

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

Dear Sir/Madam,

**INTRODUCTORY LETTER**

I write to introduce to you, **Mr. Akpeko Agbevade**, a PhD student in the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. Mr. Agbevade is writing his thesis on the topic: **"LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN GHANA'S LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM: THE EXPERIENCES OF THE ACCRA METROPOLITAN, KETA MUNICIPAL AND SHAI OSUDOKU DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES."**

I would appreciate if you could assist him with the necessary information on the above-mentioned-subject.

Please, be informed that the information you volunteer will be needed for academic assignment and will be treated as highly confidential.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,

Bossman E. Asare (PhD)  
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES

P. O. Box LG 64, Legon, Accra, Ghana.

• Telephone: +233 (0) 303 965 246

• Email: [pscience@ug.edu.gh](mailto:pscience@ug.edu.gh)

• Website: [www.ug.edu.gh](http://www.ug.edu.gh)

**APPENDIX 3**

**CATEGORY: LED BENEFICIARIES**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

I am a Ph.D. student in Political Science in the above university researching on the topic “Local Economic Development (LED) in Ghana’s Local Governance System: The experiences of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai Osudoku District Assemblies. As part of the processes leading to the write up, I would be very grateful if you could assist in providing answers to the following questions. Information provided would be used for academic purpose only. For enquiries please contact Mr. Akpeko Agbevade on 0243340551. Thank you.

Questionnaire ID: .....

1. NAME OF MMDA:

.....

2. Type of LED initiative. 1. Capacity development programme 2. Provision of agricultural inputs 3. Creation of marketing opportunities 4. Not Applicable

3. Sex 1. Male 2. Female

4. Age 1. 18- 25 2. 26 – 32 3. 33 – 40 4. 41 and above

5. Has the LED programme benefitted you?

1. Yes 2. No

6. If yes, in what areas has it benefitted you?

1. Employment creation 2. Income generation 3. Equipment and input provision 4. Training support 5. Others

7. Do you think the LED has helped to improve your quality of life?

1. Yes 2. No

8. If yes, please indicate how.

1. Able to look after my children by paying their fees

2. Able to pay my utility bills

3. No more depending on my parents

4. Able to support my parents

5. Others

9. What are the challenges faced after the training programme?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

**THANK YOU**

**CATEGORY: MMDA PLANNING OFFICERS**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

I am a Ph.D. student in Political Science in the above university researching on the topic “Local Economic Development (LED) in Ghana’s Local Governance System: The experiences of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai Osudoku District Assemblies. As part of the processes leading to the write up, I would be very grateful if you could assist in providing answers to the following questions. Information provided would be used for academic purpose only. For enquiries please contact Mr. Akpeko Agbevade on 0243340551. Thank you.

1. NAME OF MMDA:

.....

2. When did LED start in the Assembly?

.....

3. What factors necessitated the adoption, promotion and implementation of LED in the Assembly?

4. What LED initiatives, programmes or strategies are implemented in the Assembly?

5. What are the localities in the Assembly where LED is being implemented?

6. What factors influenced the adoption and implementation of specific LED strategies in the localities?

7. Who are the LED partners in the Assembly?

8. Are the partners involved in the LED process in the MMDA?

1. Yes      2. No

9. What is the extent of involvement of the actors?

1. Active   2. Dormant   3. Passive

**THANK YOU.**



**CATEGORY: MMDA FINANCE OFFICER**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

I am a Ph.D. student in Political Science in the above university researching on the topic **“Local Economic Development (LED) in Ghana’s Local Governance System: The experiences of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai Osudoku District Assemblies.** As part of the processes leading to the write up, I would be very grateful if you could assist in providing answers to the following questions. Information provided would be used for academic purpose only. For enquiries please contact Mr. Akpeko Agbevade on 0243340551. Thank you.

NAME OF MMDA:.....

1. Is there a budgetary allocation for LED in the MMDA? 1. Yes 2. No

2. How is the budgetary allocation done?

.....  
.....  
.....

3. What is the amount involved? What is the percentage allocation for the entire budgetary allocation for MMDA?

4. What are the sources of the budgetary allocation for the LED programme?

.....  
.....

5. How is the allocation disbursed?

.....

6. Is there a monitoring mechanism in place to ensure that the amount is used for the intended purpose? 1. Yes 2. No

7. If yes, what is that mechanism?

.....  
.....

8. Who are the actors involved in the monitoring and evaluation?

.....  
.....

9. How effective has the mechanism been?

1. Excellent 2. Very Good 3. Good 4. Quite good 5. Not effective

10. Is it difficult in attracting funds to finance LED? 1. Yes 2. No

11. If yes, what is the nature of the difficulty?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

**THANK YOU**

**CATEGORY: OTHER ACTORS**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

I am a Ph.D. student in Political Science in the above university researching on the topic “Local Economic Development (LED) in Ghana’s Local Governance System: The experiences of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai Osudoku District Assemblies. As part of the processes leading to the write up, I would be very grateful if you could assist in providing answers to the following questions. Information provided would be used for academic purpose only. For enquiries please contact Mr. Akpeko Agbevade on 0243340551. Thank you.

**1. NAME OF ORGANISATION:**

.....

2. How did your organisation get involved in LED implementation?

3. Did you participate in the selection of the LED initiative in the MMDA?

4. Did you participate fully in all the stages of the LED process in the MMDA?

1. Yes 2. No

5. If No, indicate the stages of the process that you participated.

6. What was the extent of your participation?

7. Do you think your participation impacted the final decision of selecting the LED programme implemented?

1. Yes 2. No

8. Did you get the needed cooperation from the MMDA in the process?

1. Yes 2. No

9. Did the local governance structures in any way hinder or promote your involvement in the LED process.

1. Yes 2. No

10. Please indicate how the local governance structures hindered or promoted your participation.

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

I am a Ph.D. student in Political Science in the above university researching on the topic **“Local Economic Development (LED) in Ghana’s Local Governance System: The experiences of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai Osudoku District Assemblies.** As part of the processes leading to the write up, I would be very grateful if you could assist in providing answers to the following questions. Information provided would be used for academic purpose only. For enquiries please contact Mr. Akpeko Agbevade on 0243340551. Thank you.

1. The role of the Public Investment Division in the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly.
2. Who were the contractors? Names will be highly appreciated.
3. The nature of the Public Private Partnership: Thus the commitment of the AMA apart from the land.
4. The amount involved for each of the projects.
5. Did the Public Investment Division get the necessary cooperation from all the other actors involved?
6. Was the procurement process for the award of the contract fully followed?
7. Did you encounter any challenge in the process as a transaction advisor?

**CATEGORY: ACCRA CITY CAR PARKS LTD**  
**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**  
**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

I am a Ph.D. student in Political Science in the above university researching on the topic **“Local Economic Development (LED) in Ghana’s Local Governance System: The experiences of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai Osudoku District Assemblies.** As part of the processes leading to the write up, I would be very grateful if you could assist in providing answers to the following questions. Information provided would be used for academic purpose only. For enquiries please contact Mr. Akpeko Agbevade on 0243340551. Thank you.

1. When was the Public Private Partnership started with the AMA?
2. Who are the partners involved?
3. What is the nature of the PPP?
4. How many people have been employed so far after the implementation of the PPP?
5. What is the capacity of the car park and the land space covered?
6. What are the charges for parking?
7. What is the average number of cars that park in a day?
8. What is the nature of the relationship between the Company and the AMA?
9. What are the challenges faced in the operation of the car park?

**THANK YOU**

**CATEGORY: LED OFFICER AT MLGRD**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE**

**UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON**

I am a Ph.D. student in Political Science in the above university researching on the topic **“Local Economic Development (LED) in Ghana’s Local Governance System: The experiences of the Accra Metropolitan, Keta Municipal and Shai Osudoku District Assemblies.** As part of the processes leading to the write up, I would be very grateful if you could assist in providing answers to the following questions. Information provided would be used for academic purpose only. For enquiries please contact Mr. Akpeko Agbevade on 0243340551. Thank you.

1. Brief background information on Local Economic Development (LED) implementation in Ghana.
2. Is there a policy framework for LED implementation in Ghana?
3. How is LED implementation financed in Ghana?
4. Are there sources of financing LED in Ghana and what are those sources?
5. What structures are in place for effective LED implementation in Ghana?
6. Are there mechanisms in place to monitor the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies’ (MMDAs) LED implementation?
7. If there are, what are they?
8. What is the nature of the relationship between your outfit and the MMDAs when it comes to LED implementation?
9. In your view, has LED implementation so far attained its intended objective of job opportunity creation, income generation and infrastructure provision or improvement and ultimately poverty reduction?
10. What are some of the challenges encountered in the course of LED implementation?

**THANK YOU**