ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL SECURITY COOPERATION TO ADDRESS THE MARITIME SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

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(10505007)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LEGON MAY 2016
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Dissertation is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Juliana Appiah and that no part of it has been submitted anywhere else for any other purpose.

(……………………………….)  (……………………………….)
Godwin Livinus Bessing  Juliana Appiah
Student  Supervisor

Date:..................................  Date:..................................
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the glory of God and to my family and mother whose prayers, support and reassurance were inspirational to me throughout the course. You kept me going, God bless you all for your support.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my profound gratitude and appreciation to my supervisor, Dr. Juliana Appiah for her time, guidance, advice and encouragement given me in the preparation of this work.

I also thank my wife and children who supported me in prayers and endured my absence throughout the course. I equally thank my parents and siblings for their concern and prayers during the course.

Finally, I give thanks, glory and honour to my maker and sustainer without whom I am nothing. He makes all things beautiful.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy</td>
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<td>AIS</td>
<td>Automatic Identification System</td>
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<td>APS</td>
<td>African Partnership Station</td>
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<td>APSI</td>
<td>African Partnership Station Initiative</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<td>COFUMACO</td>
<td>Company Fusiliers Marine Commando</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRESMAC</td>
<td>Regional Centre for Maritime Security in Central Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIMS</td>
<td>ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization</td>
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<td>FAS</td>
<td>Force Armée Senegalaise</td>
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<td>FW</td>
<td>Fixed Wing</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFCSC</td>
<td>Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College</td>
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<td>GGC</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GGG</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea Guard</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoA</td>
<td>Gulf of Aden</td>
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<td>GoG</td>
<td>Gulf of Guinea</td>
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<td>GMA</td>
<td>Ghana Maritime Authority</td>
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<td>IMB</td>
<td>International Maritime Bureau</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<td>ISPS</td>
<td>International Ship and Port Facility Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUU</td>
<td>Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOSC</td>
<td>Law of the Sea Convention</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Maritime Coordinating Centre</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>Maritime Domain Awareness</td>
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<td>MdG</td>
<td>Marinha de Guerra</td>
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<td>MSSIS</td>
<td>Maritime Safety and Security Information System</td>
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<td>NIMASA</td>
<td>Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MPA</td>
<td>Maritime Patrol Aircraft</td>
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<td>NN</td>
<td>Nigerian Navy</td>
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<td>ORBAT</td>
<td>Order of Battle</td>
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<td>OPV</td>
<td>Offshore Patrol Vessel</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>Regional Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>RHIB</td>
<td>Rigid Hulled Inflatable Boat</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMAC</td>
<td>Regional Maritime Awareness Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSLAF</td>
<td>Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>STP</td>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDOC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTMIS</td>
<td>Vessel Traffic Management Information System</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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ABSTRACT

This study focused on the need to address maritime security challenges in the GOG. The main objective of the study was to discuss maritime security and multi-national cooperation in the GoG. This was essential because maritime security threats in the GoG were putting the region on the spotlight in global maritime insecurity challenges with dire national, regional and global consequences. Maritime security threats identified in the GoG related to maritime boundary disputes, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, acts of violence at sea, trafficking in narcotics, fake and sub-standard pharmaceuticals, national and transnational crime, Pollution and environmental degradation. Key findings which emerged included the fact that weak states were unable to police their maritime domains effectively. It was also found that there was the need to develop on the sub-regional initiatives to maritime security, with the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) playing lead roles and supported by related institutions and international organizations. The study concluded that capacity building is a sine qua non to achieving a favourable maritime security situation in the GoG with cooperation as a key enabler.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background

The sea has historically been of great importance as a highway for commerce as well as a provider of food and other resources. For these reasons, the sea commanded the attention of early maritime states like Spain, Portugal and Britain. Additionally, the seas offer nations legal access to virtually the entire world in a manner completely different from the dictates of land border and sovereignty of airspace. This characteristic of the sea is due to its vast nature and interconnectivity. In essence, the strategic value of the sea is derived not only from its resource base, but also from the access it provides to non-adjacent areas.

As a result of the resource and strategic value of the sea, littoral nations are often richly endowed. Due to the fact that nations are not equally endowed, different forms of cooperation between nations exist today. These different forms of cooperation are basically for economic reasons and also to protect interests. One of such is the European Union (EU) which is an international union of twenty-seven independent states founded to enhance political, economic and social cooperation.\(^1\) Similarly, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a regional group of nations which cooperate to promote economic integration and self-sufficiency.\(^2\)

Regional cooperation is a process in which nations enter into agreement in order to collectively achieve economic, socio-political and security objectives. Maritime regions of the world usually adopt such cooperation due to the vastness of adjoining waters and the difficulty in securing it by
a single nation. One of such regions is the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). The GoG is an arm of the Atlantic Ocean which extends between Cape Palmas at the South-eastern tip of Liberia to Cape Lopez in Gabon. The sub-region which comprises several littoral states from West and Central Africa attracts interest because of the immense resource potentials and access it offers. These resources are critical to the world’s energy balance. Consequently, the security of the GoG sub-region is inherently linked to global security.

The huge resources and transnational disposition of the GoG attracts a lot of illegalities like piracy, poaching and oil theft which constitute maritime security threats to the sub-region. Consequently, policing and protecting the GoG against a wide spectrum of threats has become necessary to nations in the sub-region as means of ensuring maritime security. Maritime security is a state wherein a nation’s marine assets, maritime practices, territorial integrity and coastal peace are protected, conserved and enhanced.

Maritime security threats do not respect boundaries. Accordingly, states must focus on cooperation to counter these threats. The level of cooperation among the world's navies, maritime services and related agencies is increasing at an impressive rate. However, the time has come to introduce a degree of formality to the process in order to realize the effectiveness necessary to maintain momentum and seal possible gaps. Consequently, it is important that countries in the GoG act in concert to overcome these threats. It is on this basis that this paper seeks to examine the challenges and prospects of forging sub-regional maritime security cooperation in the GoG.
Security deficiency over the depleting maritime resources may not necessarily be deliberate, but as a result of genuine lack of capacity on the part of the relevant security agencies to maintain credible presence and deterrence. This is especially so in the GoG where developing littoral states have relied on the classical realist state-centric notion of security with virtually little or no maritime security cooperation efforts. As such, virtually all the littoral states in the GoG have operated semblance of navies that could best be described as coast guards, as a means of maintaining security within their maritime domains.

In spite of the various regional and sub-regional attempts at economic integration and the establishment of some multilateral maritime associations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) and the Maritime Organization of West and Central African States (MOWCA), there has not been much headway in collective maritime security in the GoG. This is regardless of the fact that the maritime security threats in the GoG are common, transnational and shared. Consequently, a breach in security of any littoral state affects the entire maritime domain in the GoG. There is therefore the need to consider alternative security arrangements as a means of addressing maritime security in the GoG.

A report published by the Brenthurst Foundation posits an African perspective on maritime security. According to the Report, “maritime security is anything that creates, sustains or improves the secured use of Africa’s waterways and infrastructure that supports these waterways”. It accordingly encompasses “a vast range of policy sectors, information services and user communities, including maritime safety, search and rescue, policing operations,
operational safety for offshore oil and gas production, marine environmental monitoring protection, naval support operations”.7 Clearly, promoting maritime security has become expedient given the poor attention to and ineffective management of the continent’s vast maritime domain and assets, which have been directly linked to several emerging threats to peace, security and development.

The devastating effects of transnational maritime crimes such as piracy, armed robbery at sea, illegal unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing in the GoG maritime domain has negatively impacted on the security and development in the region. These crimes accounted for over $2 billion in lost revenue in the region in 2012, aside from posing serious security challenges in the GoG and destabilizing global energy prices.8 These challenges range from environmental degradation and physical security of assets to security of sea lines of communication. They also encompass political, socio-economic and environmental concerns of the nations of the GoG. Equally, the poorly mapped border areas in some parts of the GoG have created inter-state conflicts over claims on potentially oil-rich areas.

To address these challenges, there should be a paradigm shift from state or sovereignty-centred security to collective effort where littoral states of the GoG should harness resources in a multi-national cooperation for the security of the region. Collective response therefore constitutes a centerpiece in preventing and combating the menace. It is in the light of the above challenges to maritime security in the GoG that the current study is being undertaken, not only to highlight the challenges, but to map a way forward through a collective security approach.
1.2 Problem Statement

The emerging complexities in maritime insecurity arising from use of technology, and the technicalities of the laws of the seas, call for a concerted effort by contiguous navies to pool resources together to tackle common problems of maritime insecurity bordering on common national interests. Statistics indicate that the scourge of the emerging threats in the GoG has overtaken the Gulf of Aden (GoA), off the Coast of Somalia. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 966 sailors in the GoG were attacked against 851 in the GoA in 2012.\(^9\) The GoG is also becoming a hub of insecurity compared to the Strait of Malacca (SoM) and GoA. Notably, cooperation by allied navies in the GoA and SoM has been responsible for stemming the tide of insecurity.

Most of the navies in the GoG have limited capacity to address the myriad of security problems in their areas of operation. The transnational nature of maritime crime means that gaps of insecurity could be left in some areas where capacity is limited. Ensuring efficient maritime security in the GoG could therefore be effectively and efficiently achieved through a collective effort, rather than by individual littoral states acting alone, and therefore requires a comprehensive and integrated approach that goes beyond the policies and resources of individual states.

Fortunately, a number of regional organizations share common interest in maritime security in the GoG and could be enabling facilitators of cooperation. They include ECOWAS, ECCAS, MOWCA and the GGC. The geographical and mandate overlap amongst these various sub-regional organizations call for greater integration and coordination of maritime initiatives. The
maritime security issues in the GoG have also been subjects of two United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR); UNSCR 2018 of 30 August 2011 and UNSCR 2039 adopted on 29 February 2012. Resolution 2018 urged the GoG states to develop a comprehensive response in the region through cooperation among states, regional organizations and maritime stakeholders. It was complemented by UNSCR 2039 which urged the Secretary General (SG) to support efforts towards mobilizing resources to assist in building national and regional capacities in close consultation with States and regional organizations. The Resolutions have triggered off some initiatives and strategies like the African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS), ECOWAS and ECCAS Integrated Maritime Strategies that will be discussed in the subsequent Chapters. This work therefore intends to assess the prospects and challenges of regional and multinational security cooperation as a means of addressing the maritime security challenges in the GoG with a view to offering recommendations for capacity building of maritime stakeholders in the sub-region. Arising from the foregoing therefore, this study seeks to provide answers to the following research questions:

- What is the relationship between multi-national cooperation and maritime security in the GoG?
- What are the current maritime security structure and multi-national cooperation arrangements in place to ensure security in the GoG?
- What are the challenges and prospects of multi-national cooperation for security in the GoG?
- How could multi-national cooperation and security be enhanced in the GoG?
1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of the study is to discuss maritime security and multi-national cooperation in the GoG. The specific objectives are to:

- Establish the relationship between multi-national cooperation and maritime security in the GoG.
- Analyze the current security architecture in the GoG and the multi-national cooperation arrangement in place to ensure security in the region.
- Identify the challenges of multi-national cooperation and security in the GoG.
- Proffer a Way Forward and the prospects for enhancing multi-national cooperation and security in the GoG.

1.4 Rationale for the Study

The significance of the study is that it would benefit policy makers of various nations, especially those that make up the GoG, as its findings could lead to the development of policies that would enhance multi-national cooperation and security in the region. It would also benefit nations within the GoG environment and maritime stakeholders such as shipping companies, multinational oil companies as well as users of the GoG maritime area. In addition, the Ghana Navy, as the core instrument of Ghana’s maritime environment will benefit from the findings and recommendations of the study in fine-tuning its maritime strategy. Lastly, it would contribute to existing literature on maritime security in the region and offer me the opportunity in satisfying the requirements for the award of a Master of Arts Degree in International Affairs.
1.5 Scope of the Study

The study highlights the maritime security challenges in the GoG and assesses current security mechanisms ranging from national, sub-regional, regional and institutional maritime security arrangements to address the challenges. The thrust of the paper is, however, to assess the existing maritime security strategies in the GoG, with a view to identifying and filling gaps in capacity building and enablers to enhance maritime security in a collective regional and multinational cooperation set up.

1.6 Hypothesis

The study will be guided by the hypothesis that, collective security in a multinational regional and sub-regional setting will enhance maritime security in the GoG.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The theory that undergirds this study is Cooperation. Cooperation is a process in which nations enter into agreement in order to collectively achieve economic, socio-political and security objectives. Maritime regions of the world usually adopt such cooperation due to the vastness of adjoining waters and the difficulty in securing it by a single nation. The transnational nature of maritime issues highlights the need for some form of cooperation between or among maritime states. The need for maritime security cooperation especially in the GoG is further accentuated by the lack of capacity by most African coastal states to individually address maritime governance issues that present any degree of complexity.
Robert Keohane, a scholar of international relations summarized Cooperation as “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination.”\textsuperscript{11} He further posits that Cooperation basically, should lead to rewards for all states, not necessarily equal rewards, but everyone should benefit. Cooperation can be between two states or a multiple number of states. In cooperation, states will have to surrender some sovereignty to international bodies in order to promote greater cooperation, manage conflict, and promote peace, stability and security.\textsuperscript{12} Supporting the assertion, President Woodrow Wilson, in his Fourteen Points Agenda for peace, among other things, called for a new world order based on international cooperation and peace. Similarly, other proponents on Cooperation Theory such as David Mitrany see cooperation as essential in a world of interdependence. He argues that shared economic interests create a demand for international institutions.\textsuperscript{13}

Contrary to all the negativities attached to cooperation by the Classical realists, because of the high premium they attach to state security, cooperation is possible when there is some cultural identity among states. The communal cultural identity of African states tends to foster cooperation. The fact that most African states are leaning towards liberalism and democracy means that there are bound to be limited inter-state and intra-state conflicts that could provide the foundation for cooperation on economic and security matters. The cooperation theory is further supported by institutionalists who believe that states want to cooperate and that is why they join organizations that promote peace. They further argue that, for cooperation to work, the international system needs to be filled with democratic states with open markets and institutions like the EU to facilitate security.
Robert Keohane, who is known to belong to the neo-liberalists in international relations also, puts up a central argument that cooperation can under certain conditions develop on the basis of pre-existing complementary interests among states. While he uses microeconomic theory of cooperation to explore economic cooperation among states, Keohane believes his theory has relevance to other areas of international relations. His mild prescriptive interest derives from his belief that international cooperation is a "good" that policymakers should strive to increase because it creates the potential for the realization of joint gains among states. However, he adds the caveat that the procedural merits of cooperation must also be evaluated in terms of the substantive ends to be achieved. Keohane’s arguments on cooperation are applicable to the complementary interests the GoG states could derive from a cooperative security arrangement to fight common maritime security problems in the sub-region.

The Theory of Cooperation is applicable to this study because, in an effort to police the maritime environment, virtually all the littoral states in the GoG have relied on individual national efforts. The capacity deficiency of some of the States has often left gaps which are exploited by pirates, poachers and other miscreants who perpetrate all forms of maritime crimes for their personal gain. Cooperation would entail pooling resources of individual countries together which could generate a multiplier effect in filling the security gaps.

In the Strait of Malacca, the Indonesian, Malaysian and Singaporean navies in the region have embarked on maritime security cooperation since 2004 which has significantly curbed the menace of maritime insecurity. In the West African sub-region, a bilateral initiative between the Nigerian Navy and the Beninois Navy in an Operation codenamed Operation Prosperity in 2011
significantly reduced piracy and other maritime crimes. The successes chalked in the bilateral cooperation in Operation Prosperity, formed the basis for the zoning of the maritime environment under the current multinational cooperation arrangement under the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS). The initiatives will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapters.

The Theory of Cooperation is not flawless as some criticisms have been levelled against it. Neo-Liberal Institutionalism assumes that States focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others. As such, whether cooperation results in real gain or loss is not very important to States, according to the School of Thought. In contrast, neo-realism or structural realism assumes that States are largely concerned with relative rather than absolute gains. The more States care about relative gains, the more a gain for one State will tend to be seen as a loss by another and the more difficult it will be to achieve cooperation.\(^\text{17}\)

The realists’ position on the State as a unitary or primary actor and the anarchical nature of the international system which calls for a self-help system gives a pessimistic view about the prospects for international cooperation. Their belief is that competition for power in the international system rather than cooperation is the normal state of affairs.\(^\text{18}\) Classical realists are more concerned with human nature. They believe that people in general are selfish and aggressive. The main actors of the international system, the States, are guided by this and essentially war is inevitable. Neo-realists are more concerned with the distribution of power in the international system. According to them, the international system lacks a sovereign authority that can make and enforce binding agreements. Without such authority, the States are given an
opportunity to do what they like which makes it difficult for States to trust each other and cooperate. Classical realists such as Hans Morgenthau and ER Carr contend that international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interest. They further argue that international institutions are unable to mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation. Morgenthau, in his characteristic emphasis on state power based on national interest as the primary activity of States, downplays the need for cooperation among States. In the same vein, Robert Gilpin, in his analysis of Hegemonic Stability Theory, contended that maintaining transnational cooperation requires a hegemonic or dominant power to stabilize world liberal economy, while the decline of the hegemonic State will cause a dramatic collapse of the system thereby undermining cooperation. Realism therefore presents a pessimistic view of the prospects for international cooperation.19

In spite of the various academic disagreements on the theory of international cooperation, military cooperation or alliances have existed between and among nations for various reasons. Whether the reasons are for power or furthering of national interests, international cooperation could also provide an avenue for common State interest especially in military cooperation and as such provides a good theoretical academic framework for the current study.

1.8 Literature Review
There exists a range of published and unpublished literature on the GoG with majority of the unpublished works dwelling on the naval aspects of activities within the region. This is
understandably so considering the fact that the GoG is predominantly a maritime environment that requires naval presence for the defence and protection of resources within the region.

In the book, *Oil Policy in the Gulf of Guinea: Security and Conflict, Economic Growth, Social Development* written by Traub-Merz and Yates, the writers dwell on the economic imperatives of oil and gas in the GoG as they affect development. There was however, no reference to cooperation or security issues within the region. Another work is that by Rowell A, Marriot and Stockman on *The Next Gulf, London, Washington and Oil Conflict in Nigeria* which considered only the need for cooperation between the multi-national oil companies operating in the region in the area of exploration and marketing. It also considered joint agreement among the companies in the area for provision of social amenities for communities within their prospecting domains. The authors did not focus on the issue of multi-national cooperation in the area of security.

In his book, *Maritime Security: An Introduction*, Michael McNicholas, writing in 2007 after the events of September 11, touches on maritime terrorism, the vulnerability of port facilities and other maritime assets that could be likely targets of terrorists. He also delves into trans-national maritime crimes such as piracy, armed robbery at sea, drug smuggling and weapons of mass destruction whilst suggesting certain remedial actions to deal with the threats. The issues touched on in the book could be beneficial to maritime states in formulating policies and guiding their maritime security framework in line with the provisions of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code but it does not address the contemporary maritime security challenges in the GoG and more importantly, how these challenges could be addressed through multi-national, sub-regional, regional and international security cooperation.
An overview of the Book titled *The “1,000 Ship Navy” - Maritime Security Partnerships* reveals that security in the maritime domain can be guaranteed if governments around the world have the capabilities to directly confront common threats like piracy, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration and that no single navy or nation can do this alone. Recognizing this new international security landscape, a former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) of the US Navy called for a collaborative international approach to maritime security, initially branded the “1,000-ship Navy”. This concept envisions US naval forces partnering with multinational, federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources. As posited by the CNO, Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, “policing the maritime domain will require substantially more capability than the US or any other individual nation can deliver.” The book, from the National Research Council examines the technical and operational implications of the “1,000-ship Navy” as they apply to different levels of cooperative efforts between the US Navy and other maritime stakeholders including international maritime security agencies. Through this facility, maritime security cooperative apparatus, including those in the GoG could benefit from individual national capacity building in support of regional and sub-regional maritime security cooperative set-ups. Maritime States in the GoG have indeed benefited from the US Government in the area of creating maritime domain awareness (MDA), free platform acquisition and capacity building through training and exercises. These could complement the maritime security cooperation effort in the GoG. However, the “1000-Ship Navy” lays emphasis on global maritime partnership as opposed to the multinational regional and sub-regional partnership emphasized in this study.
In Geoffrey Till’s revised and updated edition of *Sea power: A Guide for the 21st Century*, he reminds us that the sea has always been central to human development as a source of resources, and as a means of transportation, information exchange and strategic dominion. It has provided the basis for mankind's prosperity and security, and this is even more relevant in the early 21st Century, with the emergence of an increasingly globalized world trading system. Globalisation leads to a belief that inter-state conflicts are unlikely in the current era, primarily due to economic interdependence and reduction in misperceptions due to enhanced cultural interaction. With contemporary military operations being joint and combined there is some level of military cooperation which could also be translated in the traditional peace time policing roles of navies of contiguous littoral nations to enhance maritime security. This underscores the clamour for maritime security cooperation among countries in the GoG.

From the foregoing discussions, most of the works reviewed are either restrictive in scope or support the thrust of this paper on capacity building in regional or multi-national security cooperation as a panacea to addressing maritime security challenges in the GoG. Some of the works viewed maritime defence and security of the GoG as the reasonability of a single nation and not that of nations of the GoG. It is therefore this gap in literature that this study will fill by considering the imperatives of regional and multi-national cooperation in the GoG nations and security of the region.

1.9 **Sources of Data**

Data for this research was collected from both primary and secondary sources.
1.10 Methodology

The methodology used in this study is qualitative or descriptive. The primary sources of data were based on unstructured interviews of military and civilian personnel in the relevant fields. In particular, discussions and interviews were held with Commodore Stephen Darbo, Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) Eastern Naval Command, who is the Chief of Naval Staff’s representative at meetings for operationalization of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy; the Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear Admiral Geoffrey Mawuli Biekro for his role in policy development for the Ghana Navy and Captain (GN) Issah Adam Yakubu, an astute researcher on maritime security. Telephone and email correspondence were carried out with Rear Admiral Adeniyi Adejimi Osinowo of the Nigerian Navy who has been involved in sub-regional and regional maritime issues. Contact was established electronically and by phone with staff from ECOWAS Secretariat and the Gulf of Guinea Commission.

Secondary data was sourced from scholarly works such as books, journals and articles on international relations, maritime security and conflict resolution. The Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), the Balme, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training School (KAIPTC), Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) Libraries, the UN Library (Dag Hammarskjöld) in New York and the internet equally provided useful sources of reference material.
1.11 Method of Data Analysis

To ensure authenticity, data obtained from the various sources were analysed qualitatively to establish their credibility and reliability. From the analysis made, relevant deductions were drawn and appropriate conclusions as well as recommendations were derived.

1.12 Method of Data Presentation

The data collected were presented in a descriptive form.

1.13 Limitation

The major limitation of the research study was the inability of the researcher to have access to classified information and security documents available from Embassies and relevant offices of GoG nations in Ghana. However, relevant books, reports, seminar papers, written documents on the GoG and other relevant publications were used to mitigate the shortcomings and the validity of the research as well as the findings of the study.

1.14 Chapter Arrangement

The study is presented in four chapters as follows:

Chapter 1: Research Design.

Chapter 2: Overview of Maritime Security in the GoG.

Chapter 3: Analysis of Maritime Security Responses in the GoG and the Way Forward.

Chapter 4: Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.
Endnotes

5 Brenthurst Foundation is South African Think-Tank on African development matters.
7 Ibid.
8 Countering Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea - USNI News news.usni.org › Foreign Forces July 12, 2013.
13 David Mitrany (1975), Quoted in Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, p. 7
15 Ibid., p.30
16 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid., p. 49.
22 Ibid.
24 The 1,000 Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network (US Naval Institute, 2006)
27 Joint military operations involve the use of different services (Army, Navy, Air Force) whilst Combined operations are those involving militaries of different countries.
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA

2.0 Introduction

This Chapter begins the discussion on maritime security overview in the GoG with the definition, extent or geographical delineation of the GoG. Thereafter, it examines the geo-strategic importance and emanating security threats. The Chapter finally concludes with an examination of the maritime security architecture in the GoG to determine their capacity to respond to the maritime threats.

2.1 Extent of the Gulf of Guinea

There are several definitions of the Gulf of Guinea. Geographically, it is the Atlantic coast stretching from Senegal to Angola. Institutionally, it includes the eight members of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), namely; Angola, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and São Tomé and Príncipe created in 1999. By definition, a Gulf refers to a large inlet of an ocean similar to a bay but is often longer and more enclosed by land. The American Heritage Science Dictionary also defines a Gulf as a large body of ocean or sea water that is partly surrounded by land. It normally encompasses small bays, estuaries of rivers and rich marine resources. The water mass may be large, shallow in some part and deep in other areas. Comparing the definition and the natural projection of the maritime environment, the geographical area defined along the coast from the region situated at the west seacoast of the Atlantic Ocean from Senegal extending to Angola will be adopted in this study as the GoG.
Littoral States forming the GoG region are shown in Figure 1. It is the maritime environment covering the littoral states of Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. It has a coastline of 3,240 nautical miles (nm) which is approximately 6000 kilometres (km).³

Figure 1: Map of West And East-Central Africa Showing The Gulf of Guinea

Source: Microsoft Encarta 2010

2.2 Strategic Importance of the Gulf of Guinea

The GoG is a vast, diverse and highly important region. Its strategic importance lies in the fact that it serves as a critical gateway to the world for virtually all of its littoral countries, including the land-locked countries of Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger and the Central African Republic which depend on access to the sea for import and export of goods and services from and to major global markets. It has also become the new frontier for what is widely touted as the “second
scramble for Africa”; only that this time, the prize is not territories but access to and control of newly discovered vast hydrocarbon resources. The GoG is endowed with abundant natural resources, which if carefully managed, could contribute to the sub-region’s prosperity as well as global prosperity.

In addition to established oil producers such as Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Angola, several West African countries including Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Senegal have made discoveries of crude oil in commercial quantities, bringing the estimated projection of proven deposits for the region to about 50.4 billion barrels with actual production of about 5.4 million barrels per day. These figures may look insignificant in comparison to Saudi Arabia’s proven reserves of 264.2 billion barrels. However, the GoG still presents the single largest block of crude deposits in the South Atlantic. The Gulf of Guinea is currently the leading sub-Saharan African oil production region and home of the continent’s main oil-producing countries, Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. The GoG alone produces around 5 million barrels of oil per day (bpd) out of the total of 9 million barrels produced in sub-Saharan Africa. Its oil reserves are mainly offshore and can be exploited and transported along direct maritime routes toward the U.S.A, Asia and Europe.

Judging from these figures, the GoG is set to become the world’s leading deep-water offshore production area. This is aside the abundance of other non-living as well as living marine resources in the region. The GoG is also widely known to be home to a substantial bio-diversity of marine and rain forest resources, especially fish and timber; resources that are highly prone to imprudent exploitation in the context of weak or non-existent national and regional regulatory
frameworks for extraction and exports. Furthermore, the geographical position of the GoG presents an important comparative advantage for oil supply. This is in terms of its relative proximity to the world’s main consumers of energy and the absence of narrow maritime shipping lanes known as choke points.

What is evident from some of the indicators above is the inherent vulnerability on sustainable resource harvesting due to over or unregulated exploitation. The design and implementation of any effective maritime strategy to tackle threats to regional security must therefore take cognisance of the unique and also multifaceted nature of maritime insecurity. The enormous resources the GoG offers and its good access, justifies the need to secure it from all forms of threats. However, due to the vast maritime expanse of the sub-region, no nation can singly provide the level of security required. It is evident that there is a growing need for enhanced maritime security cooperation in the GoG and the collective participation of nations is required in this regard. It is therefore necessary for GoG nations to cooperate in efforts to provide the needed maritime security in the sub-region.

2.3 Maritime Security Threats in the Gulf of Guinea

Exerting and sustaining security control over the vast maritime area in the GoG is a daunting task facing all the GoG nations. To effectively address the challenge requires some regional or sub-regional multi-national security framework. Security of the maritime area relates to the prevention of unlawful acts in the maritime domain whether they impact on the nations of the region or not. Maritime security threats in the GoG relate to boundary dispute, including maritime boundaries, illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, acts of violence at sea,
trafficking in narcotics, fake and sub-standard pharmaceuticals, national and transnational crime, Pollution and environmental degradation. Details of the threats are discussed below.

2.3.1 Maritime Boundary Disputes

Enduring disagreement over maritime boundaries between the GoG nations has the potential for precipitating armed conflicts, particularly when the disputed areas have significant economic resources. These disputes also make it difficult for the GOG nations to address shared security challenges in a collaborative manner. Examples of boundary disputes in the GoG include those between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula; Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River; Gabon and Equatorial Guinea over Mbane Island and Corisco Bay boundaries; and the festering one between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire over the segments of their oil-rich waters. These boundary disputes have continued to constitute a threat to regional security arrangements and would impinge on the establishment of multi-national cooperation outfit in the region.

2.3.2 Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) Fishing

As a result of capacity deficiency and weak legal and regulatory framework on fisheries management, the GoG maritime environment is poorly policed. The waters have therefore become a haven for foreign fishing trawlers, most of which involve in IUU fishing. Illicit fish catches off West Africa are part of a global problem straining world stocks. The United States and the European Union estimate illegal fishing yields as much as $23 billion worth of seafood worldwide annually, of which the oceans off West Africa record the world's highest proportion of illegal catch at about 37 percent of the region's total, according to researchers. Studies also
suggest that poaching by vessels from Asia, Europe and other parts of Africa costs the sub-region about $370 million annually.\textsuperscript{17} In addition to the financial losses, poaching also has human security costs. Households and individuals are affected directly by reduced availability of seafood in local markets. Data from the United Nations (UN) Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) indicates that fish accounts for most of the protein intake in most countries. In Ghana, it is 63 percent and 62 percent in Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe.\textsuperscript{18}

Overall, IUU fishing is at the root of unsustainable management of fishery resources in the GoG.\textsuperscript{19} It has a number of indirect effects, including the drastic reduction of incomes and loss of means of livelihood in fishing communities and poses a threat to the economic livelihood and food security of GoG nations. It could also create imbalances in the marine ecosystem of the sub-region.\textsuperscript{20} The effects of IUU fishing in the territorial waters or EEZ of any nation within the sub-region could have spill-over effects on others. The huge loss this activity causes annually suggests its magnitude and sophistication within the wide maritime area of the GoG. These indices call for coordinated action by affected nations, as no single nation in the sub-region possesses the platforms and reach required to combat this threat. It is therefore necessary for countries in the sub-region to cooperate by pooling resources to establish a robust surveillance mechanism to cover the limits of the GoG. Nations could also cooperate by conducting joint/combined operations in this regard to achieve the desired effectiveness.

\subsection*{2.3.3 Acts of Violence at Sea}

Contemporary international maritime law makes a distinction between two acts of violence at sea; piracy, perpetrated on the high seas and armed robbery or theft at sea within territorial seas
(12 nautical miles from shore). To these could be added criminal acts against economic, military and security infrastructure at sea. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) ranks the GoG as one of the most troubled global waterways. Since the late 1990s, this sub-region consistently ranked among the top piracy hot spots worldwide. Records reveal that unlike other parts of the continent, the vast majority of these attacks in the GoG result in actual boarding of vessels by pirates. Further details on the severity of piracy in the GoG compared to the rest of Africa are shown at Figure 2. Between 2002 and 2004, piracy attacks in the sub-region exceeded recorded incidents in the rest of the continent. While there is some debate about definitional issues and data reliability, there is broad consensus that criminal activity in this part of the continent is worrisome. This reflects a heightened level of maritime insecurity in the region.

**Figure 2: Comparison of Piracy Incidents between GoG and Rest of the World (2004-2010)**

![Diagram showing piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea vs. Rest of Africa from 2004 to 2010. The Gulf of Guinea had significantly higher piracy incidents, with 120 cases compared to 80 in the Rest of Africa.](http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh)
High rate of piracy restricts free shipping, which negatively impacts trade in the GoG. This trend could scare investors and destroy the economies and collective prosperity of nations in the sub-region. Pirates use lethal weapons and usually operate across borders in order to evade arrest. This implies that it would be difficult for nations in the GoG to deal with this threat singly. Collaboration between concerned nations in this regard is vital for effectiveness. This fact underscores the need for cooperation among countries in the sub-region to combat the threat in order to enhance security in the GoG.

2.3.4 Trafficking in Narcotics, Fake and Sub-standard Pharmaceuticals

According to a recent study published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC), organized transnational crimes such as theft and oil bunkering, trafficking in small arms and light weapons (SALW), human trafficking and illegal migration have been on the rise along the West and Central Africa coasts since 2000. According to the Report, the GoG has been tagged as one of the preferred transit hubs in the global trade in narcotics and psychotropic substances largely from South America, as well as destination for fake and sub-standard pharmaceuticals coming from Asia and the Far East. Thus, the GoG region has become a major
hub in the global drug trade and other illicit commercial activities. The region therefore faces daunting challenges that are capable of undermining the already slow and painful development efforts. At the same time, many parts of West and Central Africa are experiencing the adverse effects of the spread of fake and sub-standard pharmaceutics including some 37 tonnes of illicit painkillers seized in West Africa, mostly in Benin and Togo, in 2012 alone.

### 2.3.5 National and Transnational Crimes

Growing crime complicates the tenuous security climate in the GoG maritime domain. Poor maritime governance significantly facilitates oil theft also referred to as “illegal bunkering” in some literature in the Niger Delta region, with dire regional ramifications. This highly organized activity costs the sub-region around $1.2 billion every year in lost revenue. In addition, the criminal gangs responsible for oil theft contribute to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region. Recent evidence suggests that the weaponry is becoming more sophisticated and lethal as the criminal gangs seek to evade national law enforcement personnel. Also, there are increased cases of kidnapping and terrorism in parts of the sub-region occasioned by the quest by militants for resource control or religious extremism. These criminal acts constitute serious destabilizing factors for security in the region.

### 2.3.6 Pollution and Environmental Degradation

Pollution and environmental degradation are relatively unchecked in the GoG. The 2005 Abuja Declaration reiterates issues highlighted in an analysis by the FAO. The analysis indicates that a mismanagement of fisheries resources in the region has led to stock depletion, distorted ecological balance and environmental degradation. Less than 25 per cent of the countries in the
sub-region have ratified the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation.

2.4 Overview of Maritime Security Architecture in the GoG

Apart from the constitutional responsibilities placed on navies or coast guards to defend the territorial integrity of their nations from seaborne threats, they have also been mandated to safeguard living and non-living resources in the oceans to ensure economic prosperity. There are other maritime security agencies established as state institutions to complement maritime security efforts. In Ghana and Nigeria for instance, the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) and the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) play vital oversight responsibilities on issues concerning maritime security. Other littoral nations in the GoG may have similar State institutions in their maritime security network. Whilst the intention in this research is not to go into detailed analysis of all these institutions, inter-agency cooperation with the maritime security forces is necessary to provide a holistic solution to maritime security challenges in the region.

Beside national initiatives, there are also various regional and sub-regional institutions whose activities bear on maritime security. There are equally international security institutions and organizations that have contributed to capacity building in enhancing maritime security in the GoG in various ways. This section of the research will therefore give a general overview of navies in the GoG and regional and sub-regional institutions like the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GCC), Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) and the Gulf of Guinea Guard (GGG). Contemporary initiatives from the AU, ECOWAS and ECCAS relating to maritime
security would also be highlighted. The overview will then provide the necessary foundation for
detailed analysis of the maritime security responses in Chapter Three.

2.4.1 Classification and Ranking of Navies

Maritime forces in the form of navies or coast guards, naval aviation and in some cases marine
police are the primary security operators in the GoG maritime environment. As indicated earlier,
the maritime insecurity in the GoG is a reflection of the type and capability of navies or coast
guards. To have a fair idea of the type or classification of navies or coast guards in the sub-region,
the Canadian Leadmark ranking system which they used to benchmark the Canadian Navy is
used. The system identified nine ranks and categories of navies ranging from Major and Medium
Global Force Projection, Medium Regional Force Projection, Adjacent Force Projection, Offshore
and Inshore Territorial Defence, Constabulary and Token Navies. Table 1 depicts the
classification and ranking of navies per the Leadmark strategy, with particular emphasis on navies
in the sub-region.

Table 1: Classification/Ranking of Navies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Type of Navy/Description</th>
<th>States/Navies in Category</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank 1</td>
<td><strong>Major Global Force Projection Navy (Complete)</strong> –</td>
<td></td>
<td>United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>This is a navy capable of carrying out all the military roles of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>naval forces on a global scale. It possesses the full range of</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>carrier and amphibious capabilities, sea control forces, and nuclear</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attack and ballistic missile submarines, and all in sufficient</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>numbers to undertake major operations independently.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank 2</td>
<td><strong>Major Global Force Projection Navy (Partial)</strong> –</td>
<td></td>
<td>Britain, France.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>These are navies that possess most if not all of the force</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>projection capabilities of a &quot;complete&quot; global</td>
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</table>
navy, but only in sufficient numbers to undertake one major "out of area" operation.

| Rank 3 | Medium Global Force Projection Navy – These are navies that may not possess the full range of capabilities, but have a credible capacity in certain of them and consistently demonstrate a determination to exercise them at some distance from home waters, in cooperation with other Force Projection Navies. | Canada, Netherlands, Australia. |
| Rank 4 | Medium Regional Force Projection Navy – These are navies possessing the ability to project force into the adjoining ocean basin. While they may have the capacity to exercise these further afield, for whatever reason, they do not do so on a regular basis. | South Africa Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco |
| Rank 5 | Adjacent Force Projection Navies – These are navies that have some ability to project force well offshore, but are not capable of carrying out high-level naval operations over oceanic distances. | Nigeria Tunisia |
| Rank 6 | Offshore Territorial Defence Navies – These are navies that have relatively high levels of capability in defensive (and constabulary) operations up to about 200 miles from their shores, having the sustainability offered by frigate or large corvette vessels and (or) a capable submarine force. | Kenya |
| Rank 7 | Inshore Territorial Defence Navies – These are navies that have primarily inshore territorial defence capabilities, making them capable of coastal combat rather than constabulary duties alone. This implies a force comprising missile-armed fast-attack craft, short-range aviation and a limited submarine force. | Ghana Namibia Senegal, Tanzania Cameroon Mauritius Gabon Eritrea |
| Rank 8 | Constabulary Navies – These are significant fleets that are not intended to fight, but to act purely in a constabulary role. | Ghana has probably moved a rank up because of acquisitions b/n 2010 and 2012 |
As depicted in the Table above, majority of the navies in the GoG are branded as Token Navies. This brand refers to the smallest and weakest navies in the world that can hardly protect the maritime assets in their maritime areas of interest. Of the GoG Navies, the Nigerian Navy ranks highest as an Adjacent Force Projection Navy followed by Ghana, Senegal, Cameroon and Gabon, ranked together as Constabulary Navies. The remainder, comprising navies or coast guards of Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, DR Congo, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone Liberia and Sao Tome and Principe which are the majority (about 74%) are branded as Token Navies. In terms of regional economic groupings, nine out of the twelve littoral States in the ECOWAS sub-region, representing 75% are branded Token Navies whilst five out of seven (71%) in the ECCAS sub-region have the branding. This indicates a very serious capacity deficiency in both sub-regions. The reasons for the maritime insecurity in the GoG are therefore not far-fetched.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank 9</th>
<th><strong>Token Navies</strong> – These are navies that have some minimal capability, but this often consists of little more than a formal organisational structure and a few coastal craft. These states, the world's smallest and weakest, cannot aspire to anything but the most limited constabulary functions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Benin, The Gambia, Guinea, DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Comoros, Malawi, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.4.2 The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)

The GGC was created in 2001 in Libreville but only became operational in March 2007, when its Executive Secretariat was set up in Luanda, Angola. Its membership includes eight states, seven in the Central African sub-region (Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Sao Tome and Principe) and one in West Africa (Nigeria). The Commission was established in response to the need for a permanent framework for consultations and negotiations on common threats and challenges in the region with respect to maritime security. Its mandate includes the promotion of regional consultations for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts that may arise from the delimitation of borders and the economic and commercial exploitation of natural resources within the territorial boundaries.35

The GGC has the potential to serve as a mechanism to prevent and resolve conflicts emerging from the economic and commercial exploitation of natural resources in the region. The Commission also affords a forum to forge cooperation among member States in combating maritime security threats in the sub-region. Its membership of eight maritime States mostly from the ECCAS region, does not give it the required representation of the entire GoG region. The mandate of the GGC is therefore limited in coverage.

2.4.3 The Maritime Organisation of West and Central Africa (MOWCA)

The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa (MOWCA) was established in 1975 to coordinate maritime responses in the two sub-regions of ECOWAS and ECCAS but it
only became active and institutionalized around 1999. In October 2006, IMO and MOWCA convened a meeting in Dakar, in order to discuss the establishment of a system whereby the various national entities responsible for carrying out “coast guard functions” could cooperate both domestically and regionally for the benefit of West and Central Africa as a whole. The meeting led to the development of a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a sub-regional integrated coastguard network in West and Central Africa, which has been signed by coastal states from the region.

MOWCA covers nearly twenty-three States in West and Central Africa, including land-locked States of Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Mali and Niger. The large number of States and corresponding maritime space involved provides an avenue for holistic intervention mechanisms for the GoG, however, implementation of initiatives may be a bit cumbersome. Additionally, there have been very significant initiatives produced by MOWCA which have not translated into concrete and actionable plans mainly due to the lack of political will of member States or the non-availability of funds to push forward the agenda. Nevertheless, MOWCA could serve as an important link for the various contemporary maritime security initiatives in the ECCAS and ECOWAS sub-regions that seem to garner political and international support. It would therefore be better to organise the maritime States under their various regional economic communities (RECs) such as ECOWAS and ECCAS with the MOWCA Secretariat providing a liaison. This is even more practicable considering the ECCAS and ECOWAS initiatives already in place. Even within the various RECs, provision has been made in their maritime security strategies to zone the contiguous littoral States to provide effective and efficient implementation. Since the various maritime zones and regions are
supposed to have maritime coordinating centres (MCCs) with representation from adjacent zones and regions, coordination between zones and regions will enhance maritime security in the entire region. The AU could then give the needed leadership and also mobilise funds through the international community to support the initiatives.

2.4.4 Gulf of Guinea Guard (GGG)

The Gulf of Guinea Guard (GGG) is a United States European Command (EUCOM) initiative to assist countries in the GoG in protecting their natural resources and achieving long-term security and stability. The focus of this initiative is to prevent the region's political, economic, and social issues from becoming regional stability problems requiring international involvement. In 2003, EUCOM, based in Stuttgart in Germany, proposed a comprehensive security concept for the GoG. This was in consolidation of past United States Navy (USN) assistance programmes and ongoing training cruises under the Africa Partnership Station Initiative (APSI) in the GoG. EUCOM’s proposed operational objectives comprised a maritime surveillance system, a regional maritime security and control centre and interdiction-capable forces. It identified the lack of maritime cooperation among the GoG nations and the absence of functioning navies in most of the States as major obstacles to sub-regional security.

2.4.5 Other International Initiatives

Equally engaged in the national, sub-regional and regional maritime security initiatives in the GoG are the US Africa Command, AFRICOM, the EU, UN and other international partners collectively aimed at capacity building. AFRICOM has generated controversies and political ill-will, especially in Africa. Reasons for this are many, but the sum of it all is that AFRICOM is
perceived by many African nations as a grand deception plan of the US. It is believed to be harmless in appearance but providing cover for hatching highly insidious plans. In spite of its seemingly selfless objectives, AFRICOM could be viewed as being more of the problem than the solution in the GoG. This is because its operations may, in the long run, achieve the exact opposite of what it intends to prevent. It could become a target of terrorism, thereby attracting terrorism to the sub-region. It is therefore imperative that GoG nations rise to the challenge of insecurity in the sub-region by cooperating in order to generate home-grown interventions and influences.
Endnotes

1 Microsoft Encarta 2010
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5 Ibid.
7 Goldwyn, D. L., and Morrison, J. S., op. cit, p. 18.
9 Ibid.
10 Ukeje, Charles & Ela Mvomo, Wullson , op. cit, p 9.
11 Ibid.
13 Ukeje, Charles & Ela Mvomo, Wullson , op. cit, p 18.
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15 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/15/us-westafrica-fishing-idUSBRE82E0HD20120315 , accessed 15 Oct 14
16 Ibid.
19 Ukeje, Charles & Ela Mvomo, Wullson , op. cit, p 22.
20 Ibid
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 Ukeje, Charles & Ela Mvomo, Wullson , op. cit, p 21.
27 Ibid
28 Ibid
29 Estimates based on calculations by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies Faculty
31 The Abuja Declaration on Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture in Africa, NEPAD “Fish for All Summit”, (Abuja), 25 Aug 05, p. 17.
34 Comment made by researcher who is an active senior officer in the Ghana
36 Ibid., p.12
CHAPTER THREE

ANALYSIS OF MARITIME SECURITY RESPONSES IN THE GoG
AND THE WAY FORWARD

3.0 Introduction

Chapter Three assesses the maritime security cooperation initiatives in the GoG and proffers a way forward. The Chapter begins with an overview of the contemporary maritime security responses aimed at enhancing multi-national cooperation in the GoG, followed by a capability analysis of the GoG navies or coast guards to foster cooperation. The Chapter then discusses the challenges to the maritime security arrangements in the GoG and proffers a Way Forward to enhancing multi-national security cooperation in the GoG.

3.1 Overview of Contemporary Maritime Security Responses in the GoG

Response to the threats in the GoG maritime environment is a function of the type of security architecture in place. Various maritime security interventions aimed at addressing the plethora of maritime security problems in the sub-region have been planned and adopted with little success. The current strategies are being developed at the continental and sub-regional levels with an important caveat on sub-regional cooperation by zoning contiguous littoral and some land-locked nations.

At the continental level, the African Union (AU) has developed the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) which builds on previous national and international frameworks regulating maritime initiatives in Africa. The strategy was adopted by the Second Conference of African Ministers responsible for maritime-related affairs, in Addis
Ababa, Ethiopia in December 2012. In addition to the strategy, the Addis Ababa conference adopted a plan of action for its operationalization. The conference further endorsed the proposal to establish within the AU Commission, a fully-fledged Department of Maritime Affairs and a high level College of Champions.² Composed of selected African leaders, the College of Champions will seek to leverage, through sustained lobbying, the necessary political will and source the required resources for the implementation of the strategy.

At the regional level, ECCAS began work on formulating a security strategy for the GoG in October 2009.³ The strategy has six objectives; information sharing and management, joint surveillance of maritime space, harmonization of actions at sea, introduction of regional maritime tax, acquisition of equipment for joint use and institutionalization of a periodic maritime conference.⁴

In implementing its maritime security strategy, ECCAS has divided its maritime space into three zones; A, B and D. Zone A is to be manned by Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zone B consists of Republic of Congo and Gabon; Zone D covers Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe. Each of the zones is supervised by a multinational coordination centre (MCC) and all three centres are under the command of a Regional Coordination Centre for Maritime Security of Central Africa (CRESMAC) established in Pointe Noire in the Republic of Congo.
Notwithstanding some modest gains, individual Central African States are finding it difficult to continue to finance and support naval operations on their own, pending the operationalization of CRESMAC. Accordingly, there is still the need for substantial assistance to be provided to regional States and the various coordinating structures already set up in the sub-region, in particular, CRESMAC and the multinational coordination centres, to assist in the effective implementation of the ECCAS maritime security strategy.

Based on the ECCAS model, ECOWAS also initiated a sub-regional maritime security strategy, the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy (EIMS). In 2012, ECOWAS created the Pilot Model Zone E as its first operational zone involving Nigeria, Niger, Benin and Togo. The Pilot Model is meant to be the basis for operationalization of strategies for Zone F comprising Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea and Zone G covering Senegal, Mali, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde. Like the ECCAS model, ECOWAS envisages that member states in the designated zones will coordinate their maritime activities, share information and generally pool resources. However, the challenges faced by ECCAS could well manifest in the ECOWAS initiative too requiring a sub-regional intervention.

3.2 Analysis of Capabilities of Navies/Coast Guards in the GoG

Generally the capacity of the navy or coast guard any nation has directly reflects on its maritime security situation. The stronger a navy is, the more it is able to have influence within its maritime environment and beyond. The Canadian Leadmark Classification and ranking of navies in the world in Chapter 2, classified fourteen of the nineteen navies (74%) in the GoG as Token Navies
and therefore incapable of influencing maritime events in their own waters. Table 2 depicts the current capabilities of the various navies or coast guards in the GoG indicating their manpower state and the various platform-mix in their inventory. The compilation is from the authoritative Jane’s World Navies Publication 2014.5

Table 2: GoG Maritime States’ Order of Battle (ORBAT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Figures</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Large</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Patrol Craft Large</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Inshore</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Patrol Craft Small</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Coastal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Aviation FW</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>3000²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Large</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Small</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coastal Patrol Craft</td>
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<td>None operational</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inshore Patrol Craft</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fast Patrol Boat</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Large</td>
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<td>Patrol Craft Large</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Small</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Patrol Craft Small</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Landing Craft</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Large</td>
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<td>Patrol Craft</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Small</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coast Guard Aviation</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Republic</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>17000²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Large</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Frigate</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patrol Craft Small</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Corvette</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo DR</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>6700</td>
<td>Sao Tome and</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fast Attack Craft</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Principipe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Inshore Patrol Boat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Harbour Patrol Boat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the capability figures provided in the Table, it is worthwhile to assess the collective capability of the navies or coast guards in the various maritime security zones established by the ECCAS and ECOWAS strategies.

The ECCAS region has three geographical maritime zones, A, B and D. Zone A groups Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zone B has Republic of Congo and Gabon whilst D integrates Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe and is said to be the most at risk from maritime insecurity. In Zone A, the maritime sea area is vast for Angola (864 nm) with a tiny stretch for DRC (20 nm). Both countries’ navies were classified as Token Navies, however, Angola has made an impressive headway in modernization of its navy with the acquisition of 12 large patrol craft and 6 inshore patrol craft. Apart from 4 inshore patrol craft which were commissioned in 1993, the rest were commissioned between 2006 and 2009, indicating a modern fleet. The Navy also has an impressive Naval Aviation Wing that could support maritime operations in the Zone and beyond. The DRC Navy however continues to remain as a Token Navy with an old fast attack craft of doubtful serviceability, commissioned in
1976. The only advantage DRC has is its large manpower but it is likely that they are not skilled considering the fact that DRC is still going through security sector reform (SSR). Cooperation between the two navies would therefore be to the advantage of DRC.

In Zone B, Gabon Navy, classified as Constabulary Navy is paired up with a Token Republic of Congo Navy. In the inventory of the Congolese Navy, are 4 large patrol craft commissioned in 1960 and 7 small patrol craft against 10 large and 7 small patrol craft of the Marine Gabonaise respectively. In terms of capability, the Congolese Navy does not have a credible maritime force and therefore stands to gain from the more potent Gabon Navy in the maritime security cooperation.

Both Equatorial Guinea Navy and Sao Tome and Principe Navy were classified in the Leadmark Survey as Token Navies whilst the Cameroonian Navy emerged as a Constabulary Navy. Whilst the Sao Tome Navy’s capability still remains negligible, that of Equatorial Guinea is an emerging naval power in the ECCAS region with a modern and credible fleet that appears to be ahead of the Cameroonian Navy in terms of combat power and fleet modernization. Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea could therefore offer an operational lead to take Sao Tome along. Maritime cooperation is therefore a force multiplier for the individual navies in the Zone.

Following the ECCAS example, ECOWAS has also stratified its contiguous navies into 3 geographical zones; E, F and G. Zone E, the Pilot Zone comprises Nigeria, Benin and Togo Navies. Nigeria is the maritime power in the Zone with its large mix of combat and support assets. Both Benin and Togo are also making impressive efforts at modernization through the
acquisition of modern platforms. Currently, the assets of Benin should be able to protect its short 65-metre coast and also contribute to any joint patrols in the Zone. Similarly, Togo should also be able to influence events within its waters with the 6 patrol craft, 3 of which were delivered in 2014. Nigeria should then play a lead role even though the Maritime Coordination Centre (MCC) has been sited in Cotonou, Benin Republic. Niger Republic is also in the Zone but it could only make impact by contributing troops, liaison officers and air assets.

Zone F in the ECOWAS maritime security zoning has Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso (the latter being the land-locked partner). Maritime Zone F appears to be the most challenged because the effectiveness of the navies in terms of their capacity diminishes in a westward direction. Guinea with no operational platform, Sierra Leone and Liberia with limited donated assets and Cote d’Ivoire with a nearly moribund navy over the years of its political problems, leaves Ghana with the only potent maritime force. The coastline in this Zone is the longest. It will require strategic siting of its MCC and use of MDA and air assets to complement assets largely from the Ghana Navy, in order to favourably influence events within the zone. In the long term, capacity building of the other maritime forces in the zone needs to be enhanced.

The Senegalese Navy, Gambian Navy, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde navies constitute Zone G. Apart from the Senegalese Navy, the other navies in the group are Token Navies per the Leadmark classification. In terms of capability, per Table 2, Senegal has a substantial number of large patrol craft which could be complemented by one each from Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau. The Guinea Bissau Navy is essentially a very limited coastal patrol force with few
operational assets and poorly trained manpower and is therefore the least assertive in the Zone. The Gambian Navy is also very small and highly dependent on donor support especially from Taiwan. The US Navy has installed Maritime Security and Safety Information System (MSSIS) in the Gambia, providing the Gambian Navy with up to date information on maritime traffic in the country's territorial waters, and in the region which could enhance MDA. Lack of funds over the years has led to a steady deterioration in the Gambian Navy's combat capability. With its current small fleet, the navy can undertake only limited patrol duties along the coastal zone. Its contribution to the Maritime Zone is therefore likely to be minimal especially when its 2 large patrol boats are civil patterned donation from Spain in 2007.  

In the Leadmark ranking of navies in Chapter 2, the navies of Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, DR Congo, Sao Tome and Principe, Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cape Verde were branded as Token Navies. From the evaluation of the GoG Maritime States’ ORBAT in Table 2, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe and Democratic Republic of Congo have probably maintained their status as Token navies. Cote d’Ivoire and Republic of Congo navies have very limited capacity whilst those of The Gambia and Cape Verde are slightly limited. Liberian Coast Guard and Sierra Leone Navy are relying on donated assets and also need to build capacity to contribute meaningfully to any maritime security cooperation effort. Togo, Benin and to a large extent Equatorial Guinea have made new acquisitions to rejuvenate their navies. Ghana also made several new acquisitions to warrant an upward adjustment of its ranking as a Constabulary Navy to an Inshore or Offshore Territorial Defence Navy. Cameroon and Senegal seem to be dipping
because of ageing fleet whilst Gabon maintained the status quo as a Constabulary Navy. Nigeria is still maintaining the lead with a massive recapitalization programme.

From the current assessment, it is evident that capacity building is gradually being fulfilled but still remains a major limitation of a greater number of navies in the GoG. These gaps could be filled through multinational, bilateral, regional or sub-regional initiatives that are currently coming up in the GoG region. Also, critical enablers such as shore radars to maintain a good MDA backed by use of maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) could also assist in closing the deficiency gap. To a large extent, littoral States in the GoG therefore stand to gain from maritime security cooperation by pooling maritime resources to support each other.

3.3 Challenges of Sub-Regional Maritime Security Cooperation in the GoG

Having given an analysis of the capabilities of navies or coast guards in the GoG, it is worthwhile examining the possible challenges that could militate against the strenuous efforts of this multilateral engagement. Any strategy to improve maritime security cooperation in the GoG will need to be realistic, taking full account of the challenges. Some of these challenges include inadequate maritime security capacity, political dynamics in the region, judicial and legal shortcomings.

3.3.1 Inadequate Maritime Security Capacity

Naval power is crucial to the ability of a State to protect its EEZ and continental shelf against illegal encroachment or contingencies. Most nations of the GoG have weak and ill-equipped navies which constitute a challenge to the realization of maritime security cooperation in the
region. Basic equipment such as functioning surveillance systems, patrol craft and trained personnel are in short supply. Failure to carry out necessary repairs or refit of the naval platforms over the years is partly responsible for the current state of affairs in the GoG navies.

In spite of promising statements by leaders across the sub-region, one thing which remains quite clear and common is a weak domestic capacity. Across the sub-region, there is little evidence of political will on the part of oil-rich nations to commit substantial resources towards building robust maritime security capacities. This has resulted in ineffective navies in the sub-region. The weak domestic capacity for maritime security observed in some nations in the GoG may be a result of inadequate funds as most of the least endowed navies are also those that are economically constrained. These factors call for collaborative action among nations in the sub-region. Accordingly, nations could pool resources in order to establish a dedicated fund which would be used to enhance collective maritime security capabilities in the GoG. Besides, integrated initiatives on a continental, regional or sub-regional level are likely to receive international support than those that are nationally-based.

Insufficient reliable intelligence to nations in the sub-region also poses a serious challenge to a coordinated effort at ensuring maritime security. Intelligence could be obtained through effective surveillance and monitoring of the maritime environment. The use of advanced surveillance radars is a cost effective means of achieving this considering the huge cost of acquiring ships and maintaining them at sea. Additionally, there is a poor capacity for generation of reliable intelligence and intelligence sharing among nations in the GoG which is necessary to track
illegal activities. Consequently, cooperation in this regard, is required by nations in the sub-region in order to effectively combat the threats.

The Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) initiative introduced by the United States Navy (USN) to some nations in the sub-region is a welcome development that could improve maritime domain awareness (MDA) in the GoG. It reduces time-on-task thereby saving cost which would have been incurred through constant patrolling. The technology is yet to be fully domesticated and deployed to cover the entire maritime expanse of the GoG. Furthermore, the sub-region lacks the manpower and technological base to support this equipment. It is therefore necessary for nations in the sub-region to collectively invest in training and research and development. This would enhance capacity building and self-reliance among nations which is necessary to combat existing maritime security threats in the GoG without external intervention.

3.3.2 Political Dynamics in the Region

Most of the political obstacles drawing back regional integration in ECCAS and ECOWAS sub-regions are also responsible for any effective maritime security cooperation. A key issue in both ECOWAS and ECCAS is the different colonial histories of member States which have produced different bureaucratic cultures, systems and official languages. Often overlooked or considered to be insignificant, these disparities have been accentuated by the efforts of France in continuing to exert influence within its former colonies thus discouraging their full integration with their Anglophone neighbours.
Countries of the GoG are from varying economic groupings which pose a challenge to the success of multi-national cooperation. This would remain a challenge in the realization of multi-national cooperation because there could be issues of dual loyalty to regional organizations as well as likely or perceived insincerity among the nations.

Inter-state conflicts over boundary limitations, overlapping EEZ and exploitation of resources within the GoG region constitute a big challenge and a hindrance to the realization of a multi-national cooperation and security in the region. The poorly mapped border areas within the GoG create a lot of avenue for inter-state conflicts over conflicting claims on potential oil-rich areas. This was exemplified in the settled case of the boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula and the looming maritime boundary claim dispute between Ghana and La Cote d’Ivoire.

### 3.3.3 Legislative and Judicial Shortcomings

While countries in this sub-region are signatories to most relevant international conventions, very few have taken concrete measures to ratify and institutionalize these protocols domestically. Creating and enforcing the necessary provisions would require sustained political will, the enactment of enabling legislation, the strengthening of relevant institutions and enforcement mechanisms and devoting adequate financial and human resources to maritime security. This vulnerability is highlighted in local media reports about poachers apprehended in the sub-region, who often have to be released after paying only minimal fines because the country in question did not have the right laws. However, even when appropriate laws exist, the ability to effectively prosecute depends on the strength and
independence of the judiciary. In most cases a combination of corruption, inefficiency and capacity constraints compromise the effectiveness of the judicial system.

3.4 The Way Forward and Prospects

Insecurity in the GoG maritime environment has reached today’s worrying levels because affected countries have neglected or ignored their maritime domains. An effective approach to addressing the security challenges in the GoG requires consistency between domestic and partner initiated programmes. Additionally, significant regional cooperation is required given the transnational nature of threats in the sub-region. Thus, an effective approach must incorporate national, regional and global realities. While the precise configuration could largely be country-specific, the approach must be comprehensive in nature and would require certain institutional changes, short-to-medium term remedies aimed at tackling the symptomatic problems as well as long term measures directing at the root causes. As a way forward, the measures include a demonstrable political commitment, recapitalisation and increased operational efficiency of maritime forces, improved MDA and information sharing, creating public awareness and improving economic governance and development along the coast.

3.4.1 Demonstrable Political Commitment

Lack of political will has been one of the problems behind the maritime security challenges in the GoG. This is because relics of the land-centric approach to security still persist. Given the transnational nature of maritime security threats, political will must also be expressed across the sub-region on reinforcing maritime security. Accordingly, countries in the sub-region must be willing to cede sovereignty concerns to advance regional solutions in this regard. The success of
political and policy pronouncements as envisioned in the various maritime security cooperation strategies and initiatives are dependent upon long-term engagement and an inclusive and participatory political process. Some GoG nations have already taken tangible steps to elevate maritime security issues. Since the maritime security issues in the GoG gained global attention, through the UNSCR 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012), a lot of littoral States in the GoG have taken bold decisions to recapitalize their navies and coast guards. Home-grown initiatives aimed at building regional and sub-regional cooperation have also emerged, indicating positive commitments to address the incessant maritime insecurity in the GoG.

3.4.2 Recapitalization and Increased Operational Efficiency

The growing maritime insecurity in the GoG mirrors the limited capabilities of its navies and coast guards, with common inadequacies in platforms and MDA. Typically, this situation limits maritime security forces to territorial waters. GoG nations therefore need to take immediate steps to increase operational efficiencies of their maritime security apparatus to detect, apprehend and prosecute offenders. This requires the acquisition of appropriate equipment and technology, training of personnel and obtaining adequate surveillance infrastructure. GoG nations also need to develop processes and policies that would enhance inter-agency coordination and domestic/sub-regional information sharing and analysis.

The USN and AFRICOM through the Africa Partnership Station (APS) have been very instrumental in supporting capacity building initiatives across the sub-region. Several GoG nations are taking steps to enhance their operational efficiency. Some have demonstrated commitment to collaborative action through the MOWCA initiative. From the foregoing, some
effort is being made by nations in the GoG towards enhancing their maritime security capabilities for improved efficiency. The efforts, however, need to be sustained. Furthermore, there is the need for GoG nations to cooperate and integrate the various efforts in order to establish a robust and comprehensive mechanism for ensuring maritime security in the sub-region. This would boost self-reliance and complement interventions from developed nations and the international community.

3.4.3 Improved Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Information Sharing

MDA is a key component of an active, layered maritime defence-in-depth.\textsuperscript{13} It is achieved by improving ability to collect, fuse, analyze, display, and disseminate information/intelligence to operational commanders. MDA is defined as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment.\textsuperscript{14} It is part of a US government interagency and international maritime security effort pivoted on reliable or accurate intelligence.\textsuperscript{15}

No formal system of information gathering and exchange exists between States or organizations in the region. Efficient coordination of inter-agency activities, including the maritime operations centres, will require the establishment of common procedures, particularly on joint operations and information sharing. Standard operating procedures and joint training programmes on maritime policing operations will also need to be developed.
3.4.4 Creating Public Awareness

The sea power of a nation could be an instrument for ensuring maritime security. The renowned maritime strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan stated six elements necessary for attainment of sea power. One of these elements is the ‘character of the people’. This implies that the attainment of sea power by any nation partly depends on the character of its people among other factors. The citizens of littoral nations require an aptitude for the sea and this could be achieved through public awareness of the nature of the sea and the opportunities it holds.

The maritime domain is a multi-disciplinary sector involving military, civilian transport, fishing, recreational activities and naval defence interests. Several national administrations in the region, however, appear to have limited awareness of the full ambit of the maritime domain. As a result, maritime security challenges are generally relegated to the military sector, ignoring legitimate civilian interests, in particular with regard to transport and commerce. Consequently, there is the need to raise appropriate awareness of the maritime domain in its broadest possible scope, both at the national and regional levels. Sensitizing leaders and the general public about potential maritime security benefits and risks makes it easier to build national/regional partnerships for investments in maritime security. Furthermore, understanding the implications of continued existence of maritime security threats in the GoG also helps domestic and sub-regional actors better understand their respective roles. This awareness would foster cooperation between nations in the sub-region which is necessary to ensure effective maritime security in the GoG.
3.4.5 Improving Economic Governance and Development on the Coast

Poor economic governance of the hydrocarbons and shipping industries has allowed the development of illegal offshore trade in crude oil and refined petroleum. It has also enabled the elites to grow rich, often through corruption, while the majority remains poor. Such inequality is a major cause of crime along the coast. According to the GGC, “there is a link between oil trafficking and the rise of violent pirate attacks in the region.”\textsuperscript{17} A core part of GoG maritime security strategies should be focused on eliminating opportunities for corruption and ensuring that proceeds benefit those most in need.\textsuperscript{18}

Poverty and lack of viable livelihood also push those living in coastal communities to turn to crime. This is especially pronounced in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta Region where a criminal culture is most pronounced. All coastal States need to take steps to improve living standards and create job opportunities along the shore. Coastal States and international oil and gas companies also have a shared responsibility to guarantee natural resource extraction directly benefits local communities through job creation, infrastructure projects and social welfare.\textsuperscript{19}

3.4.6 Strengthening Maritime Law Enforcement

Weak law enforcement in the GoG has allowed maritime crime to proliferate. Trafficking in oil, petroleum products, arms, drugs and people and illegal fishing create a favourable environment for violent crime. To curtail these activities, GoG States’ maritime security strategies should prioritize the strengthening and professionalization of naval forces, maritime law enforcement bodies, port authorities and maritime administrative agencies.\textsuperscript{20}
In partnership with donors, States should build capacity in these organs through transparent recruitments, training and the purchase of technologically advanced tools. Most ECOWAS and ECCAS member States do not have adequate legal frameworks covering actions at sea and policies to address piracy and armed robbery against ships. It is necessary to consider the enactment of national maritime legislation to regulate the activities and the areas of cooperation with other neighbouring States.
Endnotes

4 Ibid
6 Jane’s World Navies put the strength of the GN as 2000 which is lower than current confirmed manpower level of 3000.
7 Jane’s World Navies put the strength of the NN as 7000 which is lower than current confirmed manpower level of about 17000
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Luanda Declaration on Peace and Security in the Gulf of Guinea, Luanda, 29 November 2012, p. 3.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 25
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the findings of the study and based on the findings makes conclusions leading to recommendations. The first Chapter of the study set out the various parameters of the research design with the objective of employing multinational cooperation regionally or sub-regionally to address the maritime security challenges in the GoG. The research design therefore sought to test the hypothesis that collective security in a multinational regional and sub-regional setting will enhance maritime security in the GoG. The theory of Cooperation was adopted as the theoretical framework supporting the study in spite some criticisms especially from the realist school of thought levelled against the theory. Chapter Two defined the geographical limits and gave an overview of the geo-strategic importance of the GoG. It then discussed the maritime security threats confronting the GoG and gave an overview of the maritime security architecture in place. In particular an examination of the type of naval architecture mandated by the various constitutions of the littoral States to safeguard the resources and keep security in the respective maritime environments was carried out. Chapter Three was the thrust of the research. It began with a critical assessment of various multinational cooperation initiatives in the GoG. It then continued with an analysis of capabilities of navies/coast guards and challenges confronting sub-regional maritime security cooperation in the GoG. Finally, the Chapter gave a way forward to mitigating the identified challenges and enhancing cooperation in the region. Based on the discussions and analysis, the following are presented as summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
4.1 Summary of Findings

It was noted from the research that the GoG region does not have a conclusive definition and as such delineating the extent of the region either geographically or institutionally varied in various literature. Having considered various definitions, the research settled on the littoral area from Senegal to Angola, comprising nineteen littoral States as the geographical definition of the GoG.

It was also noted that the GoG region cuts across various regional economic communities like ECOWAS, ECCAS and to some extent SADC as some countries in the ECCAS region also belong to SADC. Initiatives therefore need to be more integrated to achieve the desired results. There are also different monetary zones and other colonial legacies such as cultural and colonial affiliations that have been inimical to regional integration and that could also pose as obstacles to the cooperation sought for collective security in the region or sub-regions.

The strategic importance of the region as a resource base especially in the global energy requirements for hydrocarbons also came out as an important finding and this was particularly important because of the general instability in the Middle East which is the major global oil supplier. In particular, more than half of the daily oil production in sub-Saharan Africa comes from the GoG and by projection the GoG is set to become the world’s leading deep-water offshore production area. Other living and non-living resources, including sea lines of communication for trade were also identified as contributing to the strategic dimension.

Accompanying these prospects and opportunities for development in the region, are traditional and emerging security threats within the GoG maritime domain which constitute serious destabilizing factors for the region. Maritime insecurity is a major regional problem that is
compromising the development of this strategic economic area and threatening maritime trade in the short term and the stability of coastal States in the long term. Piracy and armed robbery at sea are particularly gaining notoriety in the region and the GoG is said to have overtaken the GoA and Somali waters as the world number one. So serious are the issues of piracy and armed robbery that two UNSCRs 2018 of 2011 and 2039 of 2012 had to be issued to draw regional and sub-regional attention to mapping out strategies and garnering international support for response initiatives. The region is equally plagued with IUU fishing which costs the sub-region an estimated $370 million dollars annually. Other identified threats to security in GoG maritime area are national and transnational crimes, pollution, maritime boundary disputes and trafficking in narcotics and fake sub-standard pharmaceuticals.

Unlike most land-centric threats that are limited in geographical area and location, threats in the maritime area are transnational and shared. Consequently, any strategies to contain them need to be integrated and holistic. A major feature in the maritime security apparatus of the GoG is the capacity deficiency on the part of most navies and lack of critical enablers such as sound resource base to invest in technology to facilitate MDA. Other reasons for the limited capacity of maritime forces are the focus of security on land and the lack of political will on the part of leaders and their governments to invest in maritime security. Failure to address these security threats would continue to impact negatively on human and economic security in the region. Thus, it behoves on the nations of the GOG to establish a common maritime security mechanism through multi-national cooperation to confront these threats.
Analysis also showed that majority of the Armed Forces of the nations of the GoG do not have the required security structure or adequate maritime capability to effectively combat the emerging security threats in the region. This phenomenon is the result of years of neglect of security operators in the maritime environment. These obvious inadequacies have adversely affected the capability of the nations of the GoG to effectively ensure the security of the GOG maritime environment, thus, desiring the need for a multi-national maritime framework for the security of the area.

On the positive side, GoG nations have now established initiatives for maritime security cooperation through contiguous zoning of littoral States in the ECOWAS and ECCAS blocs. Regionally, the AU has also fashioned out a regional strategy, AIMS, which should drive the initiatives in the various sub-regional blocs. Individual States are also building capacities by recapitalising their navies and building infrastructure by using technology to enhance their visibility in MDA. All these enablers together with sustained political will could turn events around to ensure a secured maritime security environment in the GoG region.

4.2 Conclusion

Containing maritime insecurity in the GoG requires an integrated approach involving all stakeholders in the maritime industry at the national, regional, sub-regional level with collaboration of international partners. Bilateral and multinational cooperation is therefore one veritable means of bridging the gap of the varied and limited national and regional capacities.
Littoral States in the GoG and regional organisations have launched specific operations and are formulating strategies to improve security. Those States most affected aim to build navies and increase resources for coastal policing in the hope of deterring criminals. Multi-national cooperation and security models that are being practiced in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca could be said to have considerable potentials for deterring maritime crimes in the respective maritime domains. As the study revealed, bilateral cooperation between Benin and Nigeria in Operation Prosperity in 2011 significantly reduced piracy in Benin waters.

At the regional level, within the framework of its peace and security polices, ECCAS has created a regional maritime security centre and organised joint training exercises. Maritime policies are however, embryonic and symbolic and States are unable to maintain a continuous presence at sea. In the case of ECOWAS, maritime cooperation is still in its infancy and is hampered by political tensions and distrust among States. At the inter-regional level, cooperation between ECCAS and ECOWAS would allow regional patrols to exercise the right of ‘hot pursuit’ beyond maritime borders. All these initiatives are pointers to the fact that the hypothesis set for the study is achievable and could be enhanced by first building individual national capacities.

The institutionalisation of regional cooperation and the increase in the number of international initiatives must not obscure the fact that rising crime in the GoG is also due to poor governance. Most States in the region have been unable to control economic activities in their maritime zones to ensure economic development. This collective failure has created a major opportunity for criminal networks that feed on the needs and resentments of local communities. Urgent
measures are needed to reverse this trend.

Innovative approaches focusing on regional and international cooperation have facilitated the development of integrated maritime strategies focusing on piracy and armed robbery at sea in the GoG region. Regional strategies also seek to tap into African countries’ potential to build sustainable maritime economies. For these various strategies to become reality, sustained political will and commitment at the national level, enhanced cooperation among Central and West African organizations and the necessary support of the international community in providing technical assistance and facilitating resource mobilization remain key. To address the complex factors of insecurity in the GoG, its structural causes should also be dealt with. Security-focused approaches on sea and land must be part of holistic strategies to address rampant governance deficiencies, social and economic development challenges, as well as widespread youth unemployment.

Addressing the maritime security challenges in the GoG is also contingent upon an improved capacity to put naval resources to sea, either unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally as part of a cooperative regional effort, and of attaining better MDA. Better monitoring and management of maritime resources is also required, as well as an enhancement of the ability to report and alert authorities of illegal and illicit activities. This will result in a shared picture of MDA and reduction of the number of illegal activities as well as enabling authorities to be aware of the vessels in the region. Ultimately, combating maritime security depends upon the implementation of a holistic and integrative approach. While an increase in political will and determination to contribute the necessary resources and adopting an integrated approach to
improving maritime security is required, there are enough reasonably encouraging demonstrations of intent to expect encouraging progress in the years ahead.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the analysis made in the research including the findings and major conclusions, the following recommendations are made:

- To ensure that the various regional and sub-regional initiatives achieve the desired objectives the AU, ECCAS, ECOWAS, MOWCA and the GGC should work collectively and adopt immediate measures to ensure greater levels of cooperation in collective efforts to promote maritime security in the GoG.

- In that connection, the AU, ECCAS, ECOWAS, MOWCA and GGC should specifically consider integrating their maritime surveillance, information-gathering and international law enforcement agencies, on matters relating to maritime security in the GoG. High level ministerial or presidential engagements will provide the necessary goodwill to support the initiatives.

- Member countries in the GoG region should engage international partners as a matter of urgency to increase capacity building of maritime forces in the medium to long term.

- The RECs should also consider acquiring MPAs and use of technology such as AIS and RMACs to enhance MDA and thus save time on task of deploying vessels for a long period of time.

- In the short term, ECOWAS and ECCAS member States should consider operationalizing the various contiguous zones created in their sub-regional initiatives and intensify joint patrols at sea.
• International partners such as the EU, AFRICOM, IMO and individual developed countries should provide logistics support to ECOWAS and ECCAS to improve their capabilities to counter maritime insecurity.
  ➢ In particular support should go into infrastructure, radar, communications equipment and training of maritime security personnel.
  ➢ They should also support ECOWAS to set up a joint coordinating centre, similar to the ECCAS Regional Maritime Security Centre in Pointe-Noire, Republic of Congo. It would provide ECOWAS with the capacity to collect and disseminate data related to maritime security in West Africa.

• Taking into account relevant activities being carried out by IMO and other UN entities in the region, as well as provisions of Security Council Resolution 2018 (2011), the UN should work with ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC to facilitate collaboration and integration of the various sub-regional based strategies.

• The UN should also help mobilize resources to assist in building the national and the regional capacities, and in coordinating international assistance for maritime security in the GoG, in close consultation with regional States and organizations.

• The UN should work with ECCAS, ECOWAS and the GGC to organize an international donors’ conference to mobilize resources to acquire and maintain infrastructure and equipment to support maritime security operations in the region.

• ECOWAS and ECCAS member States should consider taking measures to build capacities to criminalize acts of piracy and to support the development of judicial institutions dealing with the issue.

• The law enforcement agencies of ECOWAS and ECCAS member States should
consider taking steps to be connected to existing regional and international networks for combating organized crime, including criminal activities at sea.
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