CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN GHANA’S FOREIGN POLICY: FOCUS ON ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLINESS UNDER RAWLINGS AND KUFUOR

BY

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JULY 2015
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that, this Master of Philosophy (MPhil) thesis submitted to the Political Science Department of the University of Ghana is an original and independent work. I am absolutely certain that this work does not contain any material that has been previously published or material that has been accepted by any institution for the award of any other degree. Sources of materials used have been duly cited and duly referenced.

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ABSTRACT

It is assumed that, change and continuity can occur within the same administration or after a change of government. Ghana after independence has experienced several changes in government. Accounting for over two decades of Ghana’s foreign policy, foreign policy decisions between the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations have undergone changes and continuities.

Therefore, this study sought to explain why such continuities and changes, in the areas of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness which have been the major facets of Ghana’s foreign policy since independence.

Data gathered from interviews, a collection of speeches and statements of the two leaders as well as some Ministers of State, and relevant literatures were analysed within the framework of the two theoretical models adopted by this study: Gustavsson Model of Foreign Policy Change and Goldmann’s Framework of Foreign Policy.

Even though the study began with a preliminary assumption that, personal idiosyncrasy of the leaders can account for the change and continuity, it was revealed that personal idiosyncrasy of Presidents Rawlings and Kufuor cannot be solely sufficient in accounting for the change and continuity in their foreign policies. The study therefore found that, change and continuity in Ghana’s foreign policy (between 1982 and 2008), in the areas of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness, can be explained by an analysis of international factors, domestic economic conditions or state, history, and political institutions, along with personal idiosyncrasy of the two leaders. The study postulates a continuous impact of domestic economy and political institutions on foreign policy whilst the others are transient.
DEDICATION

I humbly dedicate this study to my parents Madam Justina Aniniwaa and Mr Samuel Yeboah. Also to my brother, Owusu Collins and sister, Ruth Yeboah I dedicate this study.
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I sincerely express my heartfelt and profound gratitude to the Almighty God, who has been the Supernatural foundation of every aspect of my life, including academics. I say Glory and honour be unto Your Holy Name for how far You have brought me.

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# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

**AGOA:** African Growth Opportunity Act  
**AU:** African Union  
**CPP:** Conventions Peoples Party  
**CREON:** Comparative Research on the Events of Nations  
**ECOMOG:** ECOWAS Monitoring Group  
**ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States  
**ERP:** Economic Recovery Program  
**FDI:** Foreign Direct Investment  
**GDP:** Gross Domestic Product  
**GNI:** Gross National Index  
**GNP:** Gross National Product  
**HIPC:** Heavily Indebted Poor Country  
**IFIs:** International Financial Institutions  
**IMF:** International Monetary Fund  
**JFM:** June Fourth Movement  
**LECIAD:** Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy  
**MCC:** Millennium Challenge Corporation  
**MFA:** Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
**NDC:** National Democratic Congress  
**NLC:** National Liberation Council  
**NLM:** National Liberation Movement  
**NPP:** New Patriotic Party  
**NRC:** National Redemption Council  
**OAU:** Organisation of African Unity  
**PAMSCAD:** Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment  
**PLO:** Palestinian Liberation Organisation
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>PNDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defence Council</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>ZSP</td>
<td>Priority Solidarity Zone</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 BACKGROUND OF STUDY

After over fifty seven years of existence, since independence, Ghana has come under several governments and leaderships; including civilian and military rule (Frempong, 2007). These governments, during their regime, took control over the framing and executing of foreign policy decisions. In one way or the other, the various regimes dealt with or had relations with external entities such as states, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) and individuals. Foreign policies are the medium and framework within which these relations are embedded (Heywood, 2011; Wittkopf & Kegley, 1995).

It is believed that a considerable level of continuity and change has taken place in Ghana’s foreign policy. As per this assertion, the foreign policies of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)/National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) are no exception to this twin concepts (Continuity and Change). Even under the PNDC government, with the same leadership, there was a change in foreign policy orientation in 1983. The initial foreign policy inclination of the Provincial National Defence Committee (PNDC) led by Chairman Rawlings towards the Eastern bloc was abandoned for a more Western oriented foreign policy direction (Shaw & Okolo, 1995). A change in government can precipitate a change in international behaviour of such states. This may be as a result of the orientation of the new government as well as its leader (Agyeman-Duah & Daddieh, 1994). However, a change in government is not a necessary
precondition or prerequisite for foreign policy change. This is because different
governments can uphold similar or same foreign policy orientation (continuity).

Ghana began to gain credence in the international system after independence in 1957
through her foreign policy. As argued by (Frankel, 1967), Ghana did not deviate from the
norm. Her foreign policy responsibility was devoluted to its elected officials and designated
offices with Nkrumah at the helm of affairs (Debrah, 2002). Ghana’s foreign policy
inhabited a distinctive place in the West African Sub Region, Africa and the world at large.
This is because Ghana, after independence, enacted foreign policy decisions towards
projecting the newly liberated country as a peace seeker and a peace maker in a continent
bedevilled with numerous conflicts and instability.(Odoom & Tieku, 2012). Nkrumah’s
historic foreign policy statement on the eve of Ghana’s independence that:

We are going to see that we create our own African personality and identity. We again rededicate
ourselves to the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa; for our independence is
meaningless unless it is linked with the total liberation of the African continent (Afari-Gyan, 1991:
6; Nkrumah, 1962: 102)

presented the nation as a liberation fighter that seeks to mobilise efforts towards the
emancipation of colonised territories and towards the awakening of the Pan Africanist
ideals.

Nkrumah, therefore, made frantic efforts at achieving this foreign policy objective among
others. These efforts include the convening of conferences for Heads of State as well as
freedom fighters (All African Peoples Conference, AAPC). He also financially supported
other liberation fighters on the continent at large. Ghana symbolically became a ‘Mecca’
for liberation fighters across Africa (Thompson, 1969). Ghana’s foreign policy after
independence was also coupled with efforts at extracting resources such as loans and aid from International Financial Institutions (IFIs) as well as development partners (Odoom & Tieku, 2012). This is evident in his securing of funds for the construction of the Volta River Project in 1961 (Owusu, Waylen, & Qiu, 2008). The Nkrumah regime developed the major foreign policy niches of Ghana that successive governments, including non-democratic regimes, have remained faithful to the salient elements of these policy objectives (Boafo-Arthur, 1993; Odoom & Tieku, 2012). These traditional foreign policy objectives include: support for liberation struggles and movements across the African continent, opposition to racism and minority rule in Africa, Non Alignment, support for the African Union (AU, formerly Organisation of African Unity, OAU) and other Inter Governmental Organisation (IGOs) of which Ghana is a signatory to (Asamoah, 1991). This, to a large extent, shows how important the Nkrumah era (1957-1966) is in any analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy.

Even in the formative years of the nation’s foreign policy, various views had been expressed in journals and magazines about the magnitude of continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy direction. Ruth First (1970) was of the opinion that the National Liberation Council (NLC) pursued a Pro-West foreign policy as opposed to Nkrumah’s Convention’s Peoples Party (CPP). A day after the CPP government was ousted, the London Time reported that “Ghana has swung back to reliance on the West” (London Times, 25 February 1966 cited in Aluko, 1975). However, William Gutteridge contended that the NLC government restored Ghana into a high degree of neutralism rather than abandon the policy of non-alignment and neutralism in its entirety (Gutteridge, 1969).

The difference in emphasis in the foreign policy decisions of the Rawlings and Kufuor’s administrations is explicit. However, one cannot overlook the level of continuity that
existed after Kufuor took-over by. These two administrations contributed immensely towards ECOWAS as well as other peace keeping missions across Africa and the world at large. The two leaders became ECOWAS chairmen for two subsequent years. Ghana, under the leadership of these two leaders, played an instrumental role in securing peace for the sub region in countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. This was exhibited with her role in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) (Birikorang, 2007; Yakohene, 2009). Nonetheless, the two leaders differed markedly in terms of good neighbourliness as well as their emphasis and strategy for economic diplomacy, though they both noticeably aligned to the Western capitalist economies.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Many literatures on Ghana’s foreign policy focus on a narrative of historical facts without necessarily considering the determining factors of such policies. Extant literatures of Ghana’s foreign policy focus more on the initial years of Ghana, immediately after independence or during the Nkrumah administration. This is where the literatures suggest that Ghana played a pivotal role in world politics. Some even argued that Africa in general has no domestic sources of foreign policy hence all her foreign policies are given (Odoom & Tieku, 2012). They analysed policies on the face value of it but no credence is given to the influential factors that precipitated such policies.

However, a large body of literature (Hermann, 1990; Hermann, 1980, 2014; Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2013; Rosati, 2000) point to the need to consider a comprehensive analysis of foreign policy, enunciating how individual leaders perceive, interpret and react to societal pressures with similar or varying institutional structures within a single state.
The Rawlings-Kufuor foreign policy dichotomy is an interesting issue for analysis. This is because these two individuals have diverse personalities; a military leader turned democrat and a liberal democrat respectively. However, baring their differences in terms of orientations there were similarities and obvious differences in their foreign policy choices. Existing literatures have done little in identifying factors that account for such differences and similarities in their foreign policy choices. Some scholars have attributed it to regime change (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). Therefore, this work seeks to engage in an in-depth analysis of the foreign policy orientation of both leaders, identifying and explaining variables that accounted for change and continuity in their foreign policy decisions. Its major significance lies in its comparative nature of the foreign policies of the two leaders with the aim of identifying pertinent factors that accounted for such continuity and change.

Even though national interest is deemed to be the driving force of foreign policy decisions, it would not be enough to explain the seeming differences and similarities (continuity and Change) in Ghana’s foreign policy directions of the Kufuor and Rawlings administrations. Accordingly, there is the need for a thorough investigation into the foreign policies of the two administrations to account for, and explain the pertinent driving forces of their foreign policy directions in terms of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness. This is the burden of this study.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The research therefore seeks answers for the following questions:

1. What were the major policies undertaken under the Kufuor and Rawlings administrations in terms of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness?
2. What were the differences and similarities in the foreign policy orientation of Rawlings and Kufuor?

3. How did personal idiosyncrasy influence change and continuity in Ghana’s foreign policy under Rawlings and Kufuor’s administrations?

4. What other factors accounted for the continuity and change in their external relations?

1.4 OBJECTIVES OF STUDY

1. To explore the major policies of the two leaders in terms of good neighbourliness and economic diplomacy

2. To identify the differences and similarities in the foreign policy orientations of the two leaders in areas of good neighbourliness and economic diplomacy.

3. To ascertain the extent to which personal idiosyncrasies influenced the decision making of these two leaders

4. To measure the extent to which other factors, aside personal idiosyncrasies of the leaders, accounted for change and continuity in the foreign policy decisions of the Kufuor and Rawlings administration

1.5 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In order to undertake this research, there is the need to adopt a theoretical framework in which the work will be situated. Two theoretical models have been adopted: Gustavsson model of foreign policy change and Goldmann framework of foreign policy. The rationale for the adoption of two theories for this study is for them to complement each other. The
ambiguities and lapses in the Gustavsson’s model are augmented by the Goldmann’s framework. Likewise, shortfalls in the Goldmann’s framework are complemented by the strengths of the Gustavsson’s model. More importantly, whilst Gustavsson’s model focuses on foreign policy change, Goldmann gave continuity or stability unbridled attention.

1.5.1 Gustavsson Model of Foreign Policy Change

This model has been applied empirically in an extensive case study of the 1990 Swedish reorientation on its membership of the European Commission (EC) (now European Union – EU) (Gustavsson, 1998). This model is the final output of a thorough analysis of existing models of foreign policy change. It came out of an assessment of the pros and cons of models including Holsti’s model of foreign policy restructuring, Goldmann’s model of stabilizers, Hermann’s model of foreign policy decision making, Skidmore’s model, and Rosati’s model. After his analysis of these models, Gustavsson concluded that these existing models contain both “promising ideas and analytical pitfalls” (Gustavsson, 1999: 74). Consequently, he introduced his model based on the assumption that his alternative model constitutes “a more promising route to the study of foreign policy change” (Ibid). Therefore, his alternative model of foreign policy came as a result of a critique of existing theories. He argues that a theory must focus on the “simultaneous occurrence of changes in the fundamental structural conditions, strategic political leadership and the presence of some kind” (Ibid).

In his model, Gustavsson identified a number of sources or driving forces of foreign policy that are mediated by individual decision makers to cause a foreign policy change. Therefore, inputs flows from the source, altered or maintained by the individual decision maker and then leads to a policy change. Thus the individual decision maker remains at the
centre of the decision making process and everything revolves around them. The source of foreign policy change, according to this model is concerned with fundamental structural conditions that can be broken down into two main categories: international and domestic factors. These two main categories have been subdivided into economic and political factors.

At the international level, a distinction is made between international politics and international political economy. Drawing inspiration from realist theory of international relations, international politics is defined as the “power relations and the traditional military aspects of national security” (Ibid: 83). International economic factors or international political economy refers to the “cross border economic transactions and the institutional conditions governing such transactions” (Ibid). At the domestic level political factors have been operationalized to involve the support needed from voters, political parties, societal actors as well as civil societies to help push a particular foreign policy agenda or direction. Inspiration for this conceptualization was drawn from the public choice theory which explains why much focus is placed on electoral results, opinion polls, and the coalitions formed between major political parties and actors. The economic factors on the other hand involve the general level of economic development of the country. This is observed through statistical economic indicators such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, inflation rate, unemployment rate, per capita income, foreign direct investment (FDI) and interest rates.

The cognitive factor is a resultant of both domestic and international factors. It is believed that these factors do not act in vacuum but feeds into the decision makers system where factors are processed into a change, hence the cognitive factor. This model perceives
foreign policy change as a resultant of the reactions of the individual decision maker towards these factors. The basic unit analysis is the individual decision maker (Hermann, 1980). It may be a group in charge of the decision making however, even in a group they may be like minded or the existence of group think.

This model accentuates the psychoanalytic theory that leaders make foreign policy decisions based on their belief systems. As a result, foreign policy decisions are made base less on the objective analysis or view of the international system but based on the decision maker’s own views, values, history, psychology, perceptions and understandings (Renshon & Renshon, 2008). The model is based on the assumption that the individual must perceive the sources of change (Domestic and International) which intends feeds into their belief systems and trigger change in those beliefs. A change in belief is therefore a prerequisite for a change in foreign policy. The individual model is what Herman and Herman (2001) termed the ‘predominant leader’ under the authoritative decision unit. Conditions under which the predominant leader can thrive include: if the regime has just one individual at the helm of affairs who is mandated either by constitution, general law or practice to commit the nation’s resources to foreign policy; if the foreign policy machinery of government is organised hierarchically with the single most powerful of all the decision makers on top of the hierarchy. This can be under a dictatorship or authoritarian government.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the causal dynamics of foreign policy change, exemplifying the various factors that influence such changes. In the above illustration, the individual is placed in the centre of the decision making dynamics which all things revolves around. The output of the decision making process is based on Hermann’s typology of foreign policy change. 

Adjustment changes are changes that occur in the level of effort or in the scope of recipients. Programme changes involves qualitative changes that occur in the methods and means by which a particular foreign policy problem or event is addressed. Problem or goal changes occurs when there is an abandonment or replacement of purposes or goals in which the state sought to achieve. International orientation changes summarises the overall redirection of the nation’s or actor’s attitude or orientation towards international system. The international orientation changes is deemed to have a simultaneous effect on
international roles or activities of the actor or nation. The role of the feedback is to illustrate how changes that occur feeds back into the system as inputs. In other words, when the change occurs, it affects the international or domestic factors which in turn serves as input to foreign policy change or decision making (Gustavsson, 1999: 2-3; Hermann, 1990: 2-3).

1.5.2 Goldmann’s Framework of Foreign Policy

The main explanatory logic of Kjell Goldmann’s framework or model was to identify intervening stabilisers in the policy making system and process. In other words, theorising about variables that can account for continuity in policy making hence impeding policy change. This model is classified under structural constraints models that more strongly focuses on identifying factors that may stabilise existing policies thereby preventing the penetration of pressures for change from affecting the decision making system. This is directly in line with the aspect of continuity being explored by this study. Though this model focuses on factors that prevents penetration of change, it suggests that pressure for change may emanate from changes that may occur in the environmental conditions, negative feedback, or factor located in the residual category. The main contribution of the theory lies in the originality in identifying stabilizers located in the causal chain of the decision making processes preventing change from occurring (Goldmann, 1988; Gustavsson, 1999). According to Goldmann, stabilisers have a threefold role in the decision making system. First, stabilisers determine whether an input into the decision making system from either of the policy change sources will trigger the process of foreign policy change. Secondly, they determine whether changes that occur in the composition or balance of power within the system has the propensity to affect the overall system of
decision making or will lead to rethinking on the part of the system. Last but not least, stabilisers determine whether and how such rethinking will change policy. The four main types of stabilisers identified by this model can be categorised under: international, cognitive, political, and administrative.

1.5.2.1 International Stabilisers

International stabilisers summarises the relations a state has with other entities (including states and international institutions) outside its defined territories. On the international front, Goldmann identified three main stabilisers- international institutionalisation, third parties and dependence -which can be explored by this study. Goldmann’s notion of dependence concerns the existence of mutual interdependence between two or more states that can act as constraint to change hence a stabiliser for their policies towards each other. This can happen between states that share economic ties and trade relations.

Goldmann conceptualised international institutionalisation to encompass factors including international law, norms and agreement. According to Goldmann, these factors constitute “the traditional method for foreign policy stabilisation in international relations” (Goldmann, 1988: 30 as Cited in Djurfeldt & Gromark, n.d.: 7) and termed it as normative regulation. He considers this as an important inhibitor to foreign policy change. Understanding gained from Goldmann explanation of international institutionalisation is in affirmation of Stephen Kocs’ law based model for understanding foreign policy. Kocs contends that, states foreign policy is shaped by obligations imposed on them by international law (Kocs, 1994). Goldmann argues that the main difference between foreign policies of small and great nations would be that systemic stabilisers are more important and affects the former than the later. This is also an important point for analysis.
The third stabiliser portrays the case where a third party steps in between two states in conflict or in times of crises and this action easily becomes a pattern in a country’s foreign policy. He is therefore of the view that ‘stable relations of amity and enmity help to stabilise some policies’.

1.5.2.2 Administrative Stabilizers

For administrative stabilizers, Goldmann theorises about a set of aspects of administration in the decision making system that sought to stabilise foreign policy and contribute to continuity. It is under administrative stabilizers that factors such as bureaucratic inertia and standard operating procedures are deemed as resisters to change (Hermann, 1990: 8). Bureaucratic inertia is a term that is generally use to depict the ills of bureaucracy. One cannot underestimate the role of various agencies, ministries and other bureaucratic institutions play in the formulation of foreign policy. Sabine Carey in her analysis of aid allocations hypothesized that bureaucratic inertia most likely limits the amount of change in donors’ aid commitments (Carey, 2007).

Bureaucratic inertia can easily be linked to the theories of path dependence. “Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial choice” (Magaret Levi, 1997 cited in Pierson, 2000: 252). This concept will be much useful to this study than bureaucratic inertia per se. Goldman supports this by arguing that “investment implies that policy changes will carry the cost of not using an existing asset which may in turn increase the political cost” (Goldmann, 1988: 48).
1.5.2.3 Political Stabilisers

By political stabilisers, Goldmann meant “the possibility that a foreign policy may be protected against pressures for change by being embedded in domestic politics” (Goldmann, 1988: 43). The definition of domestic politics was quite narrow since it encompasses only domestic struggle for power in the home country. Subsequently, he improved on the concept of domestic politics to include key players on the domestic scene that have the capacity to influence policy. The three main stabilisers he presented under this are institutionalisation, support, and salience.

Institutionalisation reflects aspects of expectation and consistency. An institutionalised policy is the one that gets repeated year after year and that there exist a high level of consistency and predictability. Support connotes how a policy is perceived by the various actors in the state including public opinion. Goldmann posits that enthusiastic or radical support to a policy can make it more or less susceptible to change. In other words, the more support a policy receives from these actors the more likely it is never going to be changed. However, low level of supports from these actors is a determinant or prerequisite for a change in policy. Nonetheless, depending on the political system in place the impact of opinion or role of these actors differ. To Goldmann, when studying parliamentary democracy, the main focus should be on political parties. Nonetheless, additional actors such as public opinions, interest groups, civil societies and other interest organisations can be added. In a study of Ghana’s foreign policy, with seemingly transparent institutions, these actors can be assumed to play a vital role.

The degree of salience of a policy reflects the extent to which decision makers perceive how important or relevant a foreign policy is. A policy considered to have a high level of
salience is deemed to be more important and very relevant to the nation. To Goldmann, the stabilizing impact of the first two forces (institutionalisation and support) depends on the policy’s salience. In other words, the more salient a policy is, the more support it receives from these state actors and consequently the more institutionalised it becomes. Thereby blocking or preventing any source of change from affecting it. It is worthy, of note as pointed out by Goldmann, that salience of a policy does not necessarily have to do with the level of controversy or debate attached to it. This is because, a policy can be salient without being widely debated or controversial. On the other hand, a policy can be widely debated and controversial but lacks saliency. Salience is rather the “extent to which an issue or a policy determines coalitions and cleavages within domestic politics” (Djurfeldt & Gromark, 2006: 10).

1.5.2.4 Cognitive Stabilizers

Goldmann added what is known as cognitive stabilisers as an impediment to change in foreign policy decision making. Cognitive stabilisers are located in the ideas or ideology upon which a policy is based. Goldmann opines that though cognitive stabilisers are located and operate at the individual level, they have to be officially accepted or widely shared within the organisation, political party or government before its stabilising effect is realised (Djurfeldt & Gromark, 2006).

At the initial stage, he acknowledges two difficulties associated with applying the cognitive process literature to the problem of foreign policy stability. One is related to applying it to the level of analysis. Thus the cognitive literature has always been about the beliefs, images and perceptions of individuals but the focus of his study is not just about the stability of views of individuals but concerned with the organisational thinking (Goldmann, 1988). In
other words, it is concerned with the members or actors that make up the decision making system. It can even be the ideas beliefs and images and perceptions of the political party in power. However, this study will not neglect the impact of believe the one most important individual at the helm of affairs (the President) in the making of Ghana’s foreign policy. The second problem is the high tendency for cognitive analysis of foreign policy to assume beliefs to be stable. However, beliefs may change under the impact of ‘discrepant information’ or diversionary tactics (Ibid: 23).

Under this, Goldmann presents three stabilisers for analysis- consistency, centrality, and testability. Testability is the extent to which a belief can be challenged by and withstand discrepant information. It therefore points to “the degree to which such beliefs provide deductions that can be checked against available evidence” (Ibid: 24). This degree determines how resistant they are to discrepant or distorted information.

Consistency of beliefs is deemed to exist when “all links between policy and goal attainment are believed to be positive” (Ibid: 38 as cited by Djurfeldt & Gromark, 2006.). Therefore when there is a strong conviction by leaders or decision makers that the policy line will definitely achieve their sated goal, there will be no need for change. This makes the methodology or policies to achieve the said goal invulnerable to change. Invulnerability to change on fundamental ideas implies invulnerability to foreign policy change hence stability in foreign policy.

Centrality of beliefs connects those parts of the image that are at least central. That is, when other policies or conditions are dependent on such beliefs (Ibid: 24). A belief that is central to a regime affects or has an impact on any other policy is difficult to amend and will in turn hinder policy change and ensure stability. This is because “The more policies a policy
is connected to, and the stronger the links, the more stable the policy” (Djurfeldt & Gromark, 2006: 12).

To sum this up, if the beliefs on which a policy is based are consistent, the policy is stable. Secondly, “the more central the belief in a policy is for the belief system of an actor and the more tightly it is connected with other beliefs, the more stable the policy” (Goldmann, 1988: 25). Last but not least, the less testable the belief in a policy, the less unstable this policy is.

It is believed that, like most theories, Goldmann’s model has its clear advantages and limitations in terms of its application to real world cases. What this study seeks to do is an analysis of continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy under PNDC/NDC and NPP. It is evident from the exposition above that Goldmann’s theory will be more helpful in an analysis of continuity than of change. Another important aspect to address when using Goldmann’s theory is that he describes his theoretical framework as a theoretical sketch. Consequently, he invites the reader to make contributions; believing that such inputs will help develop the theory and broadened its scope. Even though theory development is not an objective of this study, relevant alterations to the theory has been made where necessary. This is because the case (PNDC/NDC and NPP), not the theories, is the focus of the study. Therefore, modifications has been made to aspects of the theory where it is not applicable to the case understudy.

1.6 JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY

Within the field of foreign policy analysis, foreign policy continuity and change seems to be a scarcely investigated subject (Gustavsson, 1999). To add to it, the case chosen for this
study has hardly been investigated; except in few cases. Foreign policy seems not to be in
the lime light in Ghana’s mainstream politics. It is mostly deemed to be a sacred field left
for the bureaucrats and diplomats to deal with it. Hardly will you hear debates on foreign
policy choices no matter how sensitive they are. A cursory look at various state of the
nation’s address in the fourth republic gives an impression of a little attention given to
foreign policy. It is deemed as confidential and not usually exposed to the public except its
dividends. In academia, studies concerning Ghana’s foreign policy experience are
explored. Scholars that have ventured, do it by a narrative of historical facts without
necessarily delving deeper into identifying rationales and influential factors. Therefore, the
significance of this study lies in its coverage of major foreign policy issues in terms of
economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness with special attention to foreign policies
under the PNDC/NDC and NPP administrations. It will serve as an important guide to
politicians, members of the academia as well as workers in the field of international affairs.
Finally, the study will add to the existing literatures on Ghana’s foreign policy during the
period under review.

1.7 THE SCOPE OF STUDY

This is a comparative study of the foreign policy of two leaders who have been presidents
of Ghana. The study will take into consideration foreign policies of Ghana between 1982
and 2008 when they served as Heads of State. The study will use the parameters of good
neighbourliness and economic diplomacy as guiding principles.
1.8 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS

In terms of structure, this study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter (Chapter One) is the introductory chapter that gives a detailed background to the study, the statement of the problem, the research objective, research questions, and scope of study. It is also the section where the theory upon which the research is based is adequately explained and justified. It also encompasses the organisation structure of the study. Chapter Two will focus on reviewing relevant literature in the field of foreign policy in general and Ghana’s foreign policy in particular.

In Chapter Three, the proposed methodological framework within which the study is carried out will be presented. Chapter Four will be the chapter for analysis where the various foreign policy orientations of the leaders will be analysed to identify the influential factors and factors accounting for continuity and change. Finally, Chapter Five will seek to summarise the principal findings from the analysis as well as provide some policy and academic recommendations, and conclusion.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter seeks to review relevant literatures in the field of international relations in general and foreign policy in particular that are of importance to this work. The literature review will examine the main issues on the determinants of foreign policy decision making at the general or international level and then narrow it down to the state level with Ghana as the focus. The two concepts that will run through the review are the concepts of continuity and change in foreign policy orientation of states or actors in the international system. Therefore, the objective of this section is to critically assess and appreciate existing knowledge in the field of foreign policy decision making. The literature review of every research seeks to share results of other studies that are related to the field being studied, relate study to the larger on-going dialogue in the literature, filling academic or literature gaps and extending prior study (Biggam, 2008; Cooper, 1984).

To facilitate the coherent and systematic achievement of these objectives, literatures are reviewed along the following thematic areas: determinants/factors that influences foreign policy decision making, Ghana’s foreign policy since independence, Ghana’s foreign policy under Rawlings and Kufuor’s administration (1982-2008), and the debate on continuity and change in foreign policy. This will facilitate a better understanding of the review as well as the study.
2.2 DETERMINANTS/FACTORS THAT INFLUENCES FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Foreign policies of states are not made in a vacuum; they are usually based on certain influential factors that serve as driving forces for such decisions. Invariably, the behaviour of states in the international system is predicated on certain determinants factors that shape their actions (Reynolds, 1995).

It is based on this long standing assertion that Macridis and Thompson (1967) identified two major approaches to the study and analysis of determinants of foreign policy decision making: ideological and analytical approaches. They contended that these approaches have been in existence and have vied with one another in western thought since the French revolution. The ideological approach avows that, policies of states as well as behaviour of states and the international system in general is influenced or determined by the prevailing political, social, and religious belief systems. This approach attributes foreign policy decisions to ideology or psychology of governments as well as its leaders. In line with this assertion, foreign policies are classified as either democratic or totalitarian, Libertarian or Socialist, and peace loving or aggressive. The analytical approach on the other hand is based on the proposition that foreign policy rest on multiple determinants or influential variables including state’s historic tradition, geographical location, national interest, purposes and security needs (Ibid: 3). This categorisation is very important for this study as well as any other study of foreign policy determinants. This is because, the authors simplify the factors that influences foreign policy; making it easy to understand.

Macridis and Thompson, as far back as 1967, identified public opinion as a determining factor in foreign policy decision making. Public opinion in every country shows
peculiarities and deserves a closer look and emphasis in foreign policy analysis. For instance, as a result of the public outcry of United States public, its troops in Sudan were withdrawn from Sudan (Azikiwe, 2008). During the famine in Ethiopia, the public influenced US response to the situation (Knecht, 2010: 146). These examples show the extent to which the public influence foreign policy. They identified two main ways to which citizens come to bear on foreign policy decisions. Citizens can participate and influence foreign policy as a group (organised whole), or through leaders, intermediaries, and sectional interest groups.

However the deficiency with identifying solely public opinion as a driving force lies in the contention that public opinion thrives more in democracies than any other types of governments. Consequently, it is assumed that public opinion matters little in authoritarian regimes (Telhami, 2014). Therefore in the Ghanaian setting, it is believed that the impact of public opinion between 1981 and 1992 will be different from its impact in the fourth republic. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the citizenry pay less attention to foreign policy. Studies have shown that the public are not au fait on international issues. Although this may vary relative to issue(s) in prominence, the core percentage of the population that are abreast of international issues are few (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). Therefore, it will be overgeneralisation to concretely be categorical about the impact of public opinion across different nations and regimes. The best one can do is to be case specific.

Though these are separate approaches (ideological and analytical approaches), attempts have been made to combine them in foreign policy analysis. In as much as they can be combined, they cannot be applied in every foreign policy decision making of various states. This is because the factors or variables cannot be applied across board. For instance, in the
Macridis edited ‘Foreign Policy in World Politics’, unique factors were identified as influential or determining factors in foreign policy decision making. In Epstein (1967) research into British foreign policy, he identified social stratification as a determining factor of British foreign policy. However, Aspaturian (1967) did not identify any of such in his analysis of the Soviet foreign policy. In essence, Thompson and Macridis’ sought to validate the argument that foreign policy emanates from domestic sources. Their overly concentration on domestic determinants of foreign policy and its analysis, thereby discrediting the systemic factors is problematic. This is because the international system in general comes with its own pressures that, in certain cases, override the domestic determinants. In some cases, states are also forced to tow a certain policy line towards other entities in the international system due to threats and sanctions. Otherwise, international norms and laws would be irrelevant. Though foreign policies are determined to a larger extent by domestic drives than with the foreign environment, there exist an interplay of factors between the foreign and domestic environment (Frankel, 1967).

In contemporary international relations, there is a thin line between the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’. Globalisation has facilitated an interlinked of factors in the international system. Therefore in consonance with this, an adequate analysis of foreign policy should not be limited to solely domestic determinants or approaches. Methodologically this literature (Macridis and Thompson’s “The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy”) is biased due to its over focus on the foreign policy making dynamics of powerful and influential nations in the world; neglecting the intricacies of foreign policy decision making in the less developed, less powerful developing countries such as Ghana, and other African countries.
Studies have shown that there is a possible dichotomy in the roles of individuals and public opinion between developing countries (such as Africa and Asia) and developed polyarchic nations such as the USA and Britain (Foyle, 2003). Foyle (2003) moved the discussion of the influence of public opinion on foreign policy to another level. He forecasted that the emerging and contemporary international system will require practitioners to move from foreign policy within states to a greater attention on cross and multi-national opinion that influences foreign policy as well as the international system as a whole. This is known as world opinion. World opinion can be summarised as “the cross state influence of domestic actors (state A responding to B’s public), and the activities of globalized citizens” (Ibid: 166). From this definition, he foresaw an era of citizens who owe allegiance to the international system and not to any particular state. He buttress his argument with an example of how Woodrow Wilson predicted that world opinion would compel states in the post-World War I era into the initiation and formation of international agreement that will lead to or facilitate international peace and tranquillity. The result of this force was the formation of the League of Nations (LON). This can be said of the formation of the United Nations (UN) to seek world peace in post Second World War era when there was an amass of the world public who did not want a return to the brutalisation and agony of the two world wars.

World public, as well as their opinion, seeks to influence foreign policy through several avenues. These include influence through global norms, treatise, and internationalised legal processes as well as through direct expression of public sentiments (Ibid). The basic assumption of Foyle’s concept of world opinion is that the public, irrespective of their respective country, will be abreast of and more active in and more concerned with
happenings in the international system and countries outside their home country if the world becomes more globalised to the extent that barriers to the movement of human capital and ideas among states are removed. Therefore there is the need to consider the world public and their opinion in foreign policy making and its analysis. This assumption is a valid one because, as a result of the new technological advancement, the world is gradually shrinking and the citizens are becoming global. States are gradually becoming interlinked and the problem of one affects the other. This has facilitated to a larger extent the gradual rise of the powers of international organisations such as the United Nations (UNI, International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the International Criminal Court (ICC). This according to some scholars has made it difficult to distinguish the domestic from the foreign domain (Nalini Kant Jha, 2011).

In addition to public opinion, Foyle (2003) contended that, individual citizens have the propensity to alter the traditional foreign policy stance of national leaders. He argued that, technological advancements has given the individual such an enormous power, advantage and opportunity to influence foreign policy decision making. However, even though the individual citizen may be powerful even to the extent of waging war against a nation, the nation’s leader or President also has a high prerogative of choosing a foreign policy direction. This shows the extent to which national leaders have the power to shape a nation’s foreign policy.

However this assumption might be deficient because examples given were only from the US setting which may not be applicable or valid in other settings. The whole literature focuses on examples given about US foreign policy making, thereby limiting understanding of foreign policy making to just the US foreign policy making process.
Foyle’s focus on the analysis of the power of the nation’s leader was very scanty and cannot suffice a great deal of help in understanding the role and the extent to which leader of nation influence their foreign policy making.

Nonetheless, his focus on national identity as a determining factor of foreign policy cannot be left untouched. Foyle discoursed that national identity plays a vital role in the foreign policy direction of a nation. He believes that, ideational factors has shaped and continues to shape US foreign policy decisions and approaches. This assumption has its roots in the constructivist theory of international relations pioneered by Alexander Wendt. Constructivists argue that foreign policies of state or a nation’s behaviour is shaped by state identities thus “how the state views itself as well as the ways in which it views the other state” (Kaufman, 2013). The core assumption of constructivism that directly relates to Foyle’s conception of national identity is the supposition that, “state identities and interest are an important part constructed by their social structures rather that given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics” (Ibid, p 60). Thus the actions of states towards one another or other entities in the international system are influence by the subjective meanings or perceptions they have for each other (Slaughter, 2011).

Foyle contributed much to the literature on foreign policy determinants. His concept of world opinion is gradually being manifested in international relations. However, his less priority given to the influence of leadership and other sources of influences both domestic and systemic is a flaw to his work. The obvious loophole is his overemphasis on example and instances only in the US. This limits the scope of the literature thereby reducing, to a lager extent, the dynamism and intricacies in foreign policy decision making and analysis.
of other states that has different institutional, procedural and behavioural differences from what exist in the US.

A holistic assessment of the extent to which size can influence the behaviour of states was published in 1973 by Maurice East. The focus of his study was to identify the significant similarities and differences in foreign policy behaviour between small and large states. The analysis was done with data generated by the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) Project on thirty two states. The study distinguished small states as having the following characteristics: small land area, small total population, small total Gross National Product (GNP), and low military capabilities.

It is based on these features of small states that the their traditional behaviour in the international system were framed as: low levels of participations in international affairs, active participation in the activities of Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), high level of backing for international norms and laws, avoidance of the use of force as a technique of statecraft, avoidance of behaviour and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states in the system, they tend to narrow their scope in terms of their concern for foreign policy activities, frequent utilization of moral and normative positions on international issue (Ibid, p. 557). This is known as the conventional model which, though has similar predictions with the alternative model has some differences as well.

The alternative model assumes that small states will exhibit high-risk behaviour whilst low-risk behaviour is predicted by the conventional model. In terms of the level of international activity, both models assume a minimal participation of small states in international activities than with large states. The analysis also revealed how important size is, than development, in accounting for the differences or similarities of engagement in
international activities. It is also revealed that small states initiate less joint behaviour events that do large states, though the traditional hypothesis is that small states are likely to engage in joint behaviour initiation of events. This is because it is less costly due to the pooling together of resources by these joint states (Ibid: 563).

East established a relationship between verbal and nonverbal on one hand and size and development on the other hand. There is a low propensity of small states to participate in international politics. The nonverbal assertion for foreign policy decisions making feeds the traditional notion of high risk behaviour of states in the international system. He assumes that small states are of the likelihood to exhibit behaviour that has low level of risk unlike large states that engage behaviour that exhibit higher level of risk. With respect to the relative importance of foreign policy issues, both models assume and was supported by the data gathered that small states will be interested in a narrower range of international issues than large states. The alternative model further asserts that, small states as well as developing states attach a great deal of importance to economic issues (Ibid, p.573). These are issues perceived to help them develop.

Though the research is old, issues and hypotheses tested are still relevant and valid in contemporary international system and foreign policy analysis. Issues of economic diplomacy, conflict and aggressiveness in the relationship between states are still relevant in the international system. An important aspect of the work that is of relevance to this study is the identification of the importance of economic factors in the determination of the foreign policies of small states. Economic factors have historically played a role in determining foreign policy patterns and orientations. It is believed that the Ghanaian setting
is not an exception to this assertion. Therefore an application of such an analysis in the context of continuity and change will be very useful.

In an analysis of thirty black African states Mcgowan and Gottwald (1975) sought to hypothesise on the relationship between size and level of modernisation to four foreign policy behaviours - policy participation, conflict, political and economic dependence. These concepts were operationalized and data set tested via regression and path analysis. The rationale for their research was that small and less modernised states accounted for about 70% of the number of states in the international system. Therefore these states need to be given research attention in the study of foreign policy. The main argument of the work is that national attributes of small and less modern states impose constraints on their foreign policy choices. Nonetheless, they further contented that the foreign policy of African countries is adaptive. They therefore argued against the traditional notion or emphasis on ideology and personal/leaders’ idiosyncrasies as determining factors of foreign policies. The adaptive approach to foreign policy basically means the propensity for decision makers to frame decisions as response to external happenings or systemic events in order to secure satisfactory performance of domestic structures (Mcgowan & Gottwald, 1975: 472). Four main types of adaptive foreign policies were identified

Acquiescent, where internationally originated demands and changes are mainly responded to, as in the case of Czechoslovakia's response to Soviet demands since 1968; intransigent, where demands and changes of domestic origin are mainly responded to, as in the Rhodesian and South African determination to maintain white domination; promotive, wherein most changes and demands from both environments may be ignored because they cancel each other out, because they are weak, or because of the effective political isolation of the decision makers as in Egypt under Nasser; and preservative, where demands and changes emanating from both the domestic and international
Environments are responded to in making foreign policy, as in the Danish decision to join the European Community (as described in the case study of Hansen, 1974) (Ibid, pp. 473-474).

Consequently, four main propositions were developed out of these adaptive types. The first proposition is that small and less modern states will adopt either promotive or acquiescent foreign policy approaches. The second proposition stipulates that small and less modern states are likely to have decision makers that are less keen towards involvement in foreign policy decision making or international affairs. Thirdly, they assume that small and less modern states will turn towards acquiescent foreign policy strategy as their leaders are directed by an external party. The fourth and last proposition is that small and less modern states will turn towards promotive foreign policy strategy as their leaders are directed internally (Ibid, pp. 477-481). These propositions were deemed valid per the data gathered.

However, their conception of adaptive foreign policy should not be limited to only small states but must be applied to all types of states. This is because systemic factors affect not only small less modernised states but also large modernised states. It is believed for instance, that the era of the cold war, international economic crunch affected the foreign policies of not only small states but also modernised states. Another flaw in this work lies in the neglect of the influence of the leadership in power. This neglect influences this study into the impact of leadership as well as the impact of ideology on foreign policy decision though not on a large scale as Mcgowan and Gottwald did, but with Ghana as a case study. However the extensive focus of the literature on less developed African states constitutes a ground breaking contribution to foreign policy literature. This is because the African experience in terms of foreign policy is least analysed. Therefore it serves as platform for other studies to build on.
Wiarda (2013) gave another dimension to the discussion of foreign policy determinants. In his work titled “culture and Foreign Policy”, he sought to emphasise the relevance of culture as an influential factor to determining a nation’s foreign policy. To him culture seems to be the neglected factor in foreign policy analysis because scholars have not done much in identifying it as a vital determinant of a nation’s behaviour in the international system. The basic assumption of this literature is that every nation has its distinct and unique culture that shapes the way it deals or relates with other states or entities outside its borders. He challenges the ideational stance of a common world culture usually held by Americans. These cultural values including democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, free market, etc. are not upheld in every state in the world. Therefore it will be invalid to assume a world culture or the extinction of all unique cultures for a single common culture.

Wiarda had argued in his earlier writing (Wiarda, 2006) that, though it is widely claimed that globalisation will lead to the gradual extinction of cultures for a common world culture, it might rather produce or lead to diversity and less homogeneity. This assertion is difficult to believe because globalisation and the development in technology have brought the world closer. People now have the keenness to be bilingual or multilingual. Traveling has become easy and businesses and industries are no more stationed in just one country hence foreign direct investment.

Wiarda (2013) exemplifies his argument by maintaining that if culture is not so important to international affairs, Iraq would have adopted democracy whole heartedly. To him cultural barriers are preventing Iraq from adopting democracy. The introduction of the cultural element into foreign policy formation forms vital basis for continuity and change which are the main themes for my study. It is believed that culture has an impact on the
degree of continuity or change in a nation’s foreign policy. Therefore his analysis of the cultural element is highly useful to my study. This is because belief is embedded in culture and they are deemed to contribute to stability or change in the foreign policy of a nation. Though Wiarda argument for culture is valid, his overemphasis on it led to the neglect of other systemic, national attribute and cognitive factors that influence foreign policy making. This study therefore goes beyond just the cultural element of foreign policy into a more holistic analysis of other factors such as personal idiosyncrasy or the impact of the ideology of the leaders or decision makers, examining them in the context of continuity and change.

Kegley and Wittkopf (1997) identified and categorised foreign policy sources into three major categories: international influences, state or internal influences, and individual influences. These categories have several variables under them that affect a nation’s behaviour or foreign policy decisions. International level summarises the systemic features and external pressures that influences or shape foreign policy decisions of states. These variables include prevalence of civil wars, the level of interdependence, trade and market links, and international norms and actions of international organisations.

The internal or state influences are those attributes and internal happenings within a state that shape its foreign policies. These variables include the type of political system, local or domestic public opinion, geopolitics, economic development, and military capabilities. They identified the location and physical terrain (geopolitics) of nations as an important determinant of foreign policy (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1997: 40). They cited that the physical location of Great Britain as an island influenced its relations with the rest of Europe. They
further contended that it can adequately explain why Britain declined a full integration into the European Union (EU) to join the other fifteen states in the early 1990s.

In terms of level of economic development, they hypothesised that the more economically developed a state is, the more likely it is to play an activist role in world political economy. This is because it is evident that economically developed states have high stakes in enterprises beyond their borders. Type of government (constitutional democracy and autocratic rule) they argue place constrains on the policy choices of leaders especially whether or not to use force as a foreign policy mechanism (Ibid, pp. 41-47). The individual influence considers the personal characteristics as well as the beliefs systems and ideology of the leader or decision maker as a determining factor in foreign policy making. These are based on the assumption that states act because individuals chose a course of action and such individuals are influenced by their value judgement and perception in making a policy choice out of a pool of options available. The hero in history model asserts that actions of states can be equated with the preferences and orientations of the decision making officials or national leader (Ibid, p. 60).

Though they did not capture the public opinion factor, the authors have made a mammoth contribution to the literature on foreign policy determinants. It gives the researcher a depth of foundational backing due to its holistic and comprehensive identification and examination of influential factors affecting foreign policy. However its neglect of the factors that can account for continuity and change, especially in the Ghanaian setting is a literature gap this study seeks to fill.

Adding to the literature on foreign policy determinants, Ray and Kaarbo (2008), identified two main approaches. The foreign policy approach summarises the understanding of
international relations that concentrates on how domestic actions seek to influence or determine happenings in the international realm. Therefore to understand the international system, there is the need to understand what goes on within specific states. It is under the foreign policy approach that public opinion, activities of interest groups and type of political system were identified by them as potential determinants of foreign policy. Unlike previous literatures on public opinion, Ray and Kaarbo (2008) opine that three main conditions must be satisfied for public opinion to be considered as a source of foreign policy. First and foremost, the public must have knowledge about the policy options under consideration; secondly, the opinion of the public must exhibit some high level of consistency for decision makers to really understand the preference of the public; third and last, the opinion of the public must be taken into consideration by policy makers. Therefore if an opinion or public does not meet all these three requirements, it does not suffice to be termed as a source of foreign policy. This argument, to a large extent is valid. Interest groups, the media, the military industrial complex were also identified as a major source of foreign policy. However the question still remains whether or not these entities have significant influence on foreign policy decision making.

The psychological approach focuses on the extent to which foreign policies of states are influenced by the leader or decision maker’s beliefs, idiosyncrasy policy making styles and the group perception about the other entity or state they are dealing with. An analysis of this can be done through the psychoanalytic approach that seeks to trace a leader’s current behaviour back to his or her childhood experiences. The image aspect of a leader’s belief constitutes the perceptions and thoughts a leader has about the country or entity he is
dealing with. It can be an enemy image, meaning a leader might see the other entity or country as ‘threatening and immoral’.

Leadership style of leaders was not left out of the factors accounting for foreign policy decision. They believe that what a leader believes in, affects his processing of information and his or her approach to policy making. Leadership styles have been classified into open and closed styles. In as much as these styles can affect decision of states, group decision making has similar effect. Sometimes, for the sake of group consensus, certain policy options have to be ignored whilst some accepted. This is due to the desire to preserve good relations among group members.

Though this literature exhausted many of the major determinants, its limitation lies in the over focus on US foreign policy making and the foreign policy making processes in other Western and developed nations. This makes it difficult to generalise the findings in this literature. This is because what may be valid in the US may be difficult to justify in Ghana, for example. What makes this literature important to this study is its exploration of the psychological approach to decision making. However, what this study seeks to add is the African and Ghanaian context to the analysis which was not captured in this literature.

Mintz and DeRouen, (2010) did a comprehensive work on the determinants of foreign policy. Though some of the variables have been identified by earlier literatures reviewed in this work, they categorised the factors that influence foreign policy into two major groups: international and domestic factors. Their work seems to summarise almost all the extant literatures on this topic. For international factors, they identified arms race, deterrence, the regime type of adversary, strategic surprise and course of alliances as influential factors of foreign policy decisions. Deterrence comes in when states adequately
build up their defence to the extent that no rationale entity will dare to attack it. Arms race is capable of influencing a nation’s foreign policy in situations where states are building military capabilities targeting each other. The tinderbox hypothesis stipulates that there is a higher tendency for states engage in arm racing to go to war. Alliances are forge in the international system for the purpose of joining forces to fight a common enemy or for a common course. Alliances formation could take several forms but the most common ones are for security purposes hence, organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Warsaw Pact, etc. Alliances have the capacity to fuel arms race as well. Alliance formation is by and large an extension of foreign policy by other means. Therefore it obviously has the capacity to influence foreign policy decisions of nations.

The regime type of the adversary factor is explained that the type of regime that a state is dealing with in time of crises serves as an influential factor for a nation’s foreign policy. This is in support of the democratic peace assumption that democracies will not fight each other. This means that if a democracy is in conflictual relations with another democracy, war is not a foreign policy option. However, war between non democratic states is possible and normal. The domestic factors include domestic politics, economic conditions, public opinion, electoral cycles and two-level games. The diversionary tactics factor stipulates that the foreign policy of a nation can be influenced by a leader’s drive to divert attention from domestic problems by using force against and external party. Another factor identified by Mintz and DeRouen (2010) is electoral cycles. They identified that the timing of election influences the foreign policy choices of governments. Leaders will not dare sacrifice their domestic political survival for any foreign policy option they think will give their opponent an advantage over them.
The categorisation of factors that shape foreign policy makes this work more useful. The identification of electoral cycle, arms races and deterrence make this literature unique from others. It makes their work a vital literature to review if one wants to undertake any study in foreign policy. However the neglect of other national attribute factors such as geopolitics and size is a limitation to this literature. What this study seeks to add is to supplement these factors with the addition of the human or the leadership factor in foreign policy analysis. Also as a problem that runs through almost all the literature reviewed in this section, example and instances cited are overly westernised. This, indirectly takes the other part of the world outside the domain of foreign policy analysis. It supports the assertion that foreign policies of such states are given and adaptive with no vital internal or domestic source of foreign policy. However, this study seeks to bring to fore the Ghanaian experience under the PNDC/NDC and NPP which has been neglected by most authors.

2.3 GHANA’S FOREIGN POLICY SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Though Ghana’s (formerly Gold Coast) began dealing with other nations and entities before independence, the indigenes took charge the nation’s foreign policy after 1957 with Nkrumah at the helm of affairs (Debrah, 2002). Even though there are various literatures on Ghana’s foreign policy with diverse perspectives, there seem to be a general consensus about four main issues or parameters that characterised Ghana’s foreign policy.

The first among them is that, the newly independent state became very active in international politics especially matters of African concern. Actions taken included non-alignment, support for liberation fighters (including financial support and training),
engaging in conflict resolution and peace keeping, promotion of African unity and integration, and extraversion politics. Secondly, there is a general consensus that Ghana’s foreign policy between 1957 and 1966 were shaped by Nkrumah’s personality and ideology. It is argued by scholars that the ideals and philosophy of Nkrumah shaped Ghana’s foreign policy. Also Ghana’s influence in the world during the 1950’s and 1960’s transcended its military and economic power. Ghana cunningly took advantage of the prevailing international system through a combination of the power of regionalism, bloc politics (Eastern and Western faction), and threats to shift allegiance and non-alignment. Lastly, it has been identified by scholars that, economic interest dictated Ghana’s relations with the industrialised world or the developed states (Armah, 2004; Asamoah, 1991; Gebe, 2008; Odoom & Tieku, 2012; Thompson, 1969).

Scott Thompson’s seminal work in 1969 offers a ground breaking assessment of Ghana’s foreign policy. It sets the stage for successive writers to build on. Thompson describes Ghana’s foreign policy after independence as ambitious for a small state that has just attained independence. The foreign policy, as stated clearly by Nkrumah on the eve of independence sought to lead African emancipation and unity. This, to a large extent, will increase the influence as well as the power of this small country Ghana. This is what Thompson termed as ambitious foreign policy posture. In furtherance of these policy objectives, two landmark conferences were organised.

Thompson observes that the conference of Independent African States was organised with the hope of establishing diplomatic networks with newly independent states. Thompson argues that the African Peoples Conference was not successful because it did not provide Nkrumah with the framework for the liberation he sought to attain on the continent.
Thompson asserts that the excesses of the Congo crises can account for the turbulent times of Nkrumah’s foreign policy during the early 1960s. He is of the view that Ghana’s initiative towards the crises was of significant value in international politics and the world at large. However the irony is that, a situation that was to uphold the image of Ghana and Nkrumah rather dimmed his significance. He believes that the death of George Padmore in September, 1959 affected Nkrumah’s African policy.

In spite of the counter actions of Nkrumah in Africa, Ghana’s relations with Britain and the US were not affected. Ghana’s relations with these states were economically motivated. Nkrumah needed the economic support of the great powers in order to sustain Ghana’s economy and to boost his move towards industrialisation. He further argued that Ghana’s foreign policy was a reflection of the personality, ideals, philosophy and perceptions of Nkrumah. His world view influenced the way he perceived the international system as well as international organisations. However, Thompson opines that a good foreign policy must not be based on one man alone.

Aside the influence of the Nkrumah persona on Ghana’s foreign policy, Thompson links events within Ghana or domestic factors as having influenced Ghana’s foreign policy. However Thompson believes that these domestic events or sources had no significant impact on his African policy than on his policy towards the external world. Thompson observes that the feud or tension between diplomats and Para diplomatic agencies and internal party opposition (radical that were disillusioned with his brand of socialism) were bad portents on Nkrumah’s foreign policy. The imprisonment of opponents with the institution of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) and the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) led to frequent violence leading to harsher laws and creating an atmosphere of
distrust also affected Ghana’s relations with the outside world. Thompson is of the view that, as public opinion grew against the government it became more difficult for the West to be openly associated with the regime. This is because these actions were obviously in contravention with the values and ideals of the West. However there was a shift to open Eastern relations.

It would be out of place to engage in an analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy without due recourse and review of Thompson’s seminal writing. It serves as a background to studies of Ghana’s foreign policy. This is because its main focus was during the formative and definitive years of Ghana’s foreign policy; the Nkrumah era. Thompson also identified determinants of foreign policies under Nkrumah’s era, such as leader’s ideology, domestic economic conditions and public opinion which is very relevant to this study. However, a cursory review of the literature reveals that its focus on only the Nkrumah era leaves the other regimes especially the PNDC/NDC and NPP regimes ajar. The limitation of Thompson’s work which does not analyse foreign policies under these regimes motivates this study to pursue a comparative analysis of the regimes to fill the literature gap.

Naomi Chazan, in her analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy revealed that two salient features have marked Ghana’s foreign policy since independence. First, Nkrumah and successive governments have adopted and experimented different kinds of foreign policy approaches. These foreign policy niches include non-alignment and positive neutrality, Western and Eastern orientation, purposeful isolation and external supplication. Secondly, she is of the view that despite these variations in foreign policy approaches of the successive regimes, there seem to be a steady decline in Ghana’s global position. This may be as a result of the gradual attainment of independence by African countries.
Though Thompson downplayed the impact of external factors, Chazan believes that change or continuity in Ghana’s foreign policy under Nkrumah’s regime was as a result of a systematic response to the international pressures as well as the interactions of Ghanaians with the Ghanaian state (Chazan, 1984). It is believed that a culmination of a series of external issues and events acted as constraints on Ghana’s foreign policy choices. These issues include the cold war, and Congo crises.

Chazan draws on three critical and well known issues that she believes Ghana’s foreign policy revolved around. These issues are African liberation, Pan Africanism, as well as socialism and non-alignment (Ibid: 98). Chazan, like Thompson is of the view that Ghana’s foreign policy was a direct reflection of the ideals and personality of Nkrumah.

In an analysis of Post Nkrumah foreign policy, Chazan opines that the National Liberation Council (NLC) took Ghana to the West and its Bretton Woods institutions. They followed the guidelines of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Ibid: 100). The Progress Party (PP) under the leadership of Busia that took over in 1969 followed suit. Chazan argues that Busia’s long stay in opposition and Nkrumah’s aggressiveness towards him predisposed him to negating and deviating from Nkrumah’s foreign policy approaches and ideology. It is believed that policy initiatives such as pulling out of non-alignment and Pan Africanism as well as opting for a dialogue with South Africa were influenced by his ideology and the prevailing economic conditions. In line with this, Ghanaian businesses were protected through expulsion of foreigners especially those from African countries with the enactment of the Aliens Compliance Order (ACP) (Ibid.; Adjepong, 2009).

To summarise Acheampong’s development strategy, Chazan notes that it was based on two interlocking principles: self-reliance and regional reallocation. She believes that the
external policy of the NRC was vital part of its development strategy. Upon assuming office, Acheampong’s policy stance of debt repudiation, ‘operation feed yourself” nationalising foreign mining and timber concerns and minimising Ghana’s reliance on foreign expertise signalled his intentions. Of greatest significance was the development of cooperative ties along the West African littoral, which facilitated the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Dapaah-Agyeman, 2003:7).

Though Chazan was not so emphatic in identifying the determinants of the foreign policies of the NRC and the shift to a quasi-Nkrumah Africa policy, it is believed that the ideology of Acheampong (as an Nkrumahist sympathiser and militant nationalists (Aluko, 1975)) as well as domestic economic conditions played a significant role.

Generally, Chazan acknowledged that the changes or shift in Ghana’s global position is as a result of a combination of internal and international factors that occurred after the coup. By this assertion these internal and external factors interlaced to waned Ghana’s international image in the post Nkrumah era (Ibid. p. 112). Her assessment of the twin concepts of continuity and change, attributing it to international pressures and its interaction with the Ghanaian state as well as domestic economic conditions serves as a platform for this study to build on. This is because her analysis of continuity and change was not comprehensive and did not cover the PNDC/NDC and the NPP regime which is the prime focus of this study. This study will go beyond attributing such continuity and change to just international pressures to analyse the impact of the ideology of the leader. This is not to negate the effect of international pressures in the making of foreign policy but to add the impact of the leader in the discussion of foreign policy decision making as well as their impact to continuity and change.

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Aluko draws on the issues of change and continuity in his analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy since independence. The fundamental basis of his work is the assumption that there has been some element of change and continuity in Ghana’s foreign policy since independence in terms of Ghana’s relation with neighbours and West Africa in general, Ghana’s policy towards the rest of Africa, and lastly the policy of non-alignment (Aluko, 1975).

For foreign policy continuity, he identified colonial history, the external environment, and the influence of civil service as factors that has contributed to the continuity in Ghana’s foreign policy. The state of the economy, differences in the ideological orientation of the ruling elite, and domestic political pressures are factors he believes accounted for the change in foreign policy (Ibid. p.58). Like Thompson, (1969) Aluko observes that the civil service of Ghana have a great impact on Ghana’s foreign policy. However, the difference is that Thompson recognised the civil service as a contributing factor for Nkrumah’s foreign policy failures but to Aluko, it is a contributing factor for continuity in Ghana’s foreign policy. He conceded, like earlier writers, on the difficulty in assessing the impact of the domestic political pressure on foreign policy. Aluko stressed on the differences of ideological orientation of the ruling elites as a contributing factor that can help explain the changes in Ghana’s foreign policy since independence. He maintained that this is so because leaders in Africa, like their counterparts in Afro-Asian states have great autonomy over the formulation of their foreign policies. He observed that Nkrumah and his cabinet were radical militants infused with a high degree of Marxist-Leninist ideology(Ibid; Mazrui, n.d.). General Ankrah and Busia are believed to be conservative and subscribe to
liberal democratic principles. Aluko is of the view that Acheampong and his lieutenants are simply militant nationalists familiar with revolutionary ideas (Ibid. p.61).

Aluko’s work is deemed to be a primary reference point in terms of analysis of change and continuity in Ghana’s foreign policy. It draws on the most of the vital factors that can account for a change or stability in foreign policy. However, its limitation of scope (1957-mid 1970s) inspires the researcher to explore such concepts in a comparative methodology of the PNDC/NDC and NPP administrations.

After a review of extant literatures on foreign policy decision making, Odoom and Tieku, (2012) concluded that majority of these works focus on the foreign policy experience of the advanced industrialised countries with few focusing on the developing world. Their main argument is that though international factors have always been part of the influential factors of African and Ghana’s foreign policy, domestic factors and rational calculations of Ghana’s needs by the political leaders constitute a vital part of the determining factors. They believe that Ghana’s foreign policies are primarily driven by domestic factors (Odoom & Tieku, 2012). They further observed that the three foreign policy niches that characterised Nkrumah’s foreign policies have been adopted by successive governments including military juntas. They maintained that the adoption of several foreign policy approaches did not change the core elements of Ghana’s foreign policy stance (Ibid. p.345). They concluded that, the name of the foreign policy game is continuity rather than change. This assertion cannot be true because it has been identified even in the 1960s that there was a shift in foreign policy orientation from a pro West to more pro Eastern orientation (Chazan, 1984; Thompson, 1969).
Odoom and Tieku’s work serves as a background for foreign policy continuity and the analysis of domestic sources of foreign policy, expatiating on how important they are. However, its limitation lies in the assessment of just continuity without due recourse to the concept of change. Another limitation of Odoom and Tieku’s work is the scanty analysis done on the human factor in foreign policy formation of other regimes aside Nkrumah’s era. The literature failed to identify other domestic factors that influence foreign policy. Odoom and Tieku’s over focus on the personality of the leader is problematic. The literature also did not cover the PNDC/NDC and NPP experience in foreign policy decision making. It is the bid to fill this literary gap that this study is influenced. This study goes beyond just an acceptance of the analysis of continuity but also analyse change through a comparative study of the PNDC/NDC and NPP era.

2.4 FOREIGN POLICY UNDER RAWLINGS AND KUFUOR’S ADMINISTRATION

Like any other government, the Rawlings and Kufuor administration had an external environment to deal with. Though both had different approaches and orientations, extant literature suggest that there was no significant deviation from the core principles that had governed Ghana’s relations with the outside since independence (Odoom & Tieku, 2012). Thus, the foreign policy niches laid down by the first president were still upheld. Jerry John Rawlings, who led the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) as well as J. A. Kufuor who led the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have jointly accounted for over twenty five (25) years of Ghana’s foreign policy.

However, due to economic stagnation and poor performance of the Ghanaian economy, post Nkrumah regimes have prioritised economic diplomacy as one of their foreign policy approaches. Boafo-Arthur believes that this problem, to a larger extent, has led to the constant and continuing affiliation with the Western powers as well as their financial institutions. Aside economy and traditional foreign policy concerns, Boafo-Arthur observes that Ghanaian governments since independence have been influenced by their ideological orientation to align either with the West or East. He however noted that it was until the mid-1983 that alliance with the East was jettisoned for more Western oriented foreign policies. The Change in policy came as a result of the inability of the PNDC government to obtain the needed financial assistance from the East. Politically, the government was on the verge of becoming unpopular after several promises of economic development during the revolution. This shift in policy affirms the assertion by Boafo-Arthur that national development (including economic development) has been the driving force of the government to engage the international system. This cannot be fully true because prestige and the zeal to set a pace among African countries in areas such as conflict and conflict resolution also believed to have influenced Ghana’s foreign policy. Ghana engaged in ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and UN peace keeping missions not
for the sake of national development (Dapaah-Agyeman, Addo, 2008). Even though the PNDC government showed commitment to support for liberations struggle and non-alignment, the fundamental motivation of the government’s foreign policy was to guarantee the survival of the state in the midst of a hostile international environment and to stimulate economic growth in order to gain self-sufficiency (Boafo-Arthur, 1993). Ghana’s relations with her neighbours were influenced by the personality of the person in power (Ibid. p.140; Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011). This literature is an important literature if one wants to study Ghana’s foreign policy under the PNDC era. Its focus on economic diplomacy and neighbour relations are areas that are of much importance to this study. However, the scope of this literature is limited only to the PNDC era.

Chazan conceptualised the foreign policy posture of the PNDC, when it took over power, as defiant isolationism. This posture was fuelled by economic concerns and partly by the fear of an externally backed conspiracy in the hope of managing on the hand-outs of its most prominent ally, Libya (Chazan, 1984). Chazan observes that the ailing economy coupled with internal pressures arising out of the promises made by the revolutionary group forced the group to abandon this posture in mid-1983 to a pro West posture.

Chazan argues that Ghana in the 1980’s was more dependent than ever before. The PNDC in the hope of addressing the domestic problems began repairing the relationship with the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank). This was manifested with the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). By the end of 1992, the government had implemented six IMF reform packages. As per Chazan’s analysis, Ghana’s foreign policy under the PNDC was economy driven. The economic conditions domestically influenced the foreign policies than any other
variable. As a result, the impact of ideology played little or no role in Chazan’s analysis. However, it is believed that the ideology of the leader or decision making body plays a role in the making of foreign policy decision. Chazan’s work did not go beyond 1992 where the PNDC metamorphosed into NDC. Therefore the work is limited by its inability to assess the same government in a democratic mode. This is limitation this study seeks to build on as well as span through the NPP era.

Boafo-Arthur (2007) further draws on the concept of change and continuity in his analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy. He engages in a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the governments between 1992 and 2002. The main argument underlying his work is that the country’s quest for economic wellbeing has equally had profound impact of the policy impact on the policy measures taken by the liberal state with regard to either the maintenance of the status quo or change in foreign policy orientation (Boafo-Arthur, 2007: 240)

He however notes that it is typical of poor and underdeveloped states to prioritise economic development with emphasis on economic diplomacy as a tool for achieving its developmental objectives.

He believes that the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government led by former President Jerry Rawlings, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by former President John Kufuor exhibited the interplay or link between economic diplomacy and policy actions. In his view, the direct positive correlation between regime change and change in foreign policy orientation is sometimes hampered by normal political, administrative and personality structures and processes. He further emphasised that impediments to these foreign policy changes include bureaucratic inertia and standard operating procedures.
To him, there was not a dramatic change in the foreign policy of the NDC after the take over from the PNDC. First, the PNDC had already made an ideological shift from a pro Eastern to a pro-Western policy orientation. Secondly, most of the leaders of the new government (NDC) had played important role or were the same people who took charge of the foreign policy decision making during the PNDC regime. Thirdly, public opinion under the NDC had been stifled during the military regime (Ibid: 234-236; Adedeji, 2001).

After the takeover by the NPP government, Boafo-Arthur observes that there was no significant change in foreign policy. However, changes that have occurred ensued in the differences in emphasis and scope of involvement in international affairs rather than a complete transformation of Ghana’s foreign policy orientation. Though change in foreign policy orientation can be predicated on ideological differences, the NPP came to power at a time that the ideological tussle between the East and West had ended. However, the major change in foreign policy orientation between the NPP and the NDC was the policy of Good neighbourliness adopted by the NPP. Thus, economic conditions at the time influenced the government’s policy choices. It should however be noted that the foreign policy change, continuity or point of emphasis are determined by the needs of a nation at a particular point in time.

Boafo-Arthur’s work is undoubtedly a reference point when it comes to the analysis of foreign policy under the Kufuor and Rawlings administration. Notwithstanding, his work is limited by its scope of analysis (1992-2002). Also Boafo-Arthur’s work gives little attention to the idiosyncratic impact of leaders or political party in power on foreign policy. These limitations and gaps in the literature influenced the researcher, to a large extent, to undertake this study.
Ivor Agyeman-Duah focused on examining the philosophical roots of the foreign policies of Kufuor. He opines that Ghana’s foreign policy under Kufuor’s administration has deep roots in the liberal democratic thoughts. Joseph Boakye Danquah is accredited as the first to have laid this theoretical foundation in 1948. Consequently, Kufuor is deemed to take inspiration from this hence, his foreign policy decisions are underpinned by this philosophy. Like Boafo-Arthur (2007), Agyeman-Duah also acknowledges the role of party or governments philosophy in the formulation of foreign policy decisions. The overemphasis of philosophy abandons the role that other relevant variables play in foreign policy formulation. This is because Kufuor’s visitation and subsequent friendly relations with the President of Togo, General Gnassingbé Eyadéma as well as Muammar Gaddafi cannot be explained by his philosophical predisposition. He argues that, the strong traditional background of Kufuor and Nana Akufo-Addo who served as a foreign minister during the NPP regime had a great impact on their respect for traditional institutions which consequently affected their judgements of policies including foreign policies (Agyeman-Duah, 2004).

Kufuor and Akuffu Addo have strong traditional royal upbringing. They were brought up to respect and cherish traditional political institutions. However, he noted that Ghana’s relations with other governments or international bodies were guided by the constitutional framework provided on Article 40 of the 1992 constitution (Ibid). Though Agyeman-Duah like Wiarda (2013) tend to introduce the cultural element to foreign policy decision making, he focused on the individual cultural socialisation which is also a vital ingredient to this study.
2.5 DEBATE ON CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN FOREIGN POLICY

The debate on continuity and change feeds into the theoretical framework of this study. It is a review of this debate that concepts are clarified and variables for continuity and change identified.

Foreign policy decision making is characterised by continuity and change. It is asserted that state’s foreign policies are forever changing, therefore as long as scholars continue to study foreign policy outcomes, change and continuity constitutes has been vital elements. The study of change and continuity in foreign policy is relatively new, emerging in the 1970’s. The idea was first mooted by Rosenau who believed that one area in which research in comparative foreign policy might prove fruitful is “if the concept of change were fashioned into and operational dependent variable” (Rosenau, 1976: 371 cited in Huxsoll, 2003). Deducing from this, it is believed that fashioning the concept of change and continuity in to dependent variable will force scholars to pursue studies into identifying variables that has necessitated such changes and continuities. This is what this research seeks to do in a comparative study of Ghana’s foreign policy under Rawlings and Kufuor’s administration. Traditionally, foreign policy change has been defined to encapsulate major foreign policy diversions and restructuring.

Similarly, Holsti defines foreign policy change as “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations” (Georgescu, n.d.). However these definitions of what constitute foreign policy change is too rigid. Changes to this degree is too rare especially in democracies where there is the existence of clearly laid down principles that guide foreign policy as well as defines the national interest.
As identified by Boafo-Arthur (2007), the bureaucracies and institutions that may have optimal role in the formulation of foreign policy formulation may in themselves be impediment to change. However, defining foreign policy change to capture the major restructuring as well as the more incremental, non-realigning types of foreign policy change will identify minor intricacies in foreign policy making and reveal the dynamism in them. Nonetheless, examining only changes seem to be narrow therefore there is the need for an evaluation of both change and continuity.

Rosenau noted that change cannot be discerned and assessed unless it is analysed in the context of previously constant or continuous behaviour. There are no discontinuities without continuities to highlight them. (Rosenau, 1976: 372 cited in Huxsoll, 2003).

This definition will allow scholars as well as this study to capture relevant causal factors and variables that can account for the continuity and change in foreign policy decisions between Rawlings (PNDC/NDC) and Kufuor (NPP). Aside the operationalization of the concepts of change and continuity scholars have also identify various conditions or prerequisite under which change or continuity can occur.

K. J. Holsti in Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World analysis foreign policy change based on the definition given as “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations”. This is compared to the normal foreign policy change which is deemed to be slow, incremental and with little spill-over between geographic or functional sectors. Holstí’s change focuses on restructuring that strikes at the roots of existing foreign policy orientations seeking to turnover overall policy directions(McVicar, 1985). Holsti draws a distinction between restructuring and
reorienting on the basis of significant changes in: the levels of external involvement, policies regarding types and sources of external penetration, pattern of external penetration, and military or diplomatic commitments.

Out of these behaviours or characteristics, four ideal policy types were identified: isolation, self-reliance, dependence and non-alignment/diversification. Using these four policy types, he establishes twelve possible ideal types of foreign policy restructuring as states move from one of the four foreign policy types to the other. In essence, the four foreign policy types are the dependent variables while the independent variables include external military and non-military threats, internal economic conditions, domestic factions as well as colonial experiences and attitudes towards foreigners embedded in the history and culture of the society. Perceptions held by decision makers as well as their persona and attitudes towards decision making and external actors are thought to be intervening variables. In his conclusion, he identified why some states may be more predispose or vulnerable to change that others. He revealed conditions such as domestic vulnerability, external non-military threats personal characteristics and perceptions of top level officials as well as domestic factions contributed more strongly to foreign policy change than others. The significance of this work lies in its practicability. The author moved from the usual theoretical analysis to an analysis of eight (8) case studies. Nonetheless it is theoretically focused (Ibid).

In *Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect foreign Policy*, Hermann admitted to the existence of profound change in international relations as well as foreign policy. He posits that change is “*a pervasive quality of governmental foreign policy*” (C. Hermann, 1990). His interest in those cases he studied was to identify changes that mark a profound redirection of a nation’s foreign policy. This is because he believes that such
changes have the potentially power consequences that places enormous demand on the government initiating it. He therefore identifies four graduated levels of change that foreign policy can be subjected to. These are: adjustment changes (changes that occur in the level of effort or in the scope of recipients); programme changes (qualitative changes that occur in the methods and means by which a particular foreign policy problem or event is addressed); problem or goal changes (an abandonment or replacement of purposes or goals in which the state sought to achieve); international orientation changes (the overall redirection of the nation’s or actor’s attitude or orientation towards international system).

The international orientation changes is deemed to have a simultaneous effect on international roles or activities of the actor or nation (Ibid: 2-3).

Hermann outlines four major agents- Leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shock- and links them to foreign policy change. He labelled them ‘change agents’. Leader driven change arises as out of efforts by an authoritative policy maker who imposes his persona, perception, and vision in the direction of policy making. Bureaucratic advocacy to change is a contradiction of widely held view that projects them as resistant to change. Domestic restructuring focuses on the change that can be mooted by a segment of the society. Hermann noted that this segment lies outside the mainstream governmental structure. The external shocks sources of change arise as a result of a dramatic world event that has direct impact on the actor (Ibid. pp.9-13).

Hermann’s conceptualisation of change has been useful to both academia and practitioners. It is worthy of note that his work is the only one to receive any real application. Bengt Sundelius (1994) applied Hermann’s model to an analysis of the case of Sweden when it broke its long standing principles of non-alliance and neutrality to join the European
Community in 1990. Sundelius identified domestic restructuring and external shock as the two change agents that facilitated the change in Sweden’s behaviour. Hermann’s work touches on the viable variables that can account for foreign policy change.

Recent works such as Macleod (2002) advances that change or continuity in a nation’s foreign policy can be influenced by several variables. Among the variables indicated are: the general guidelines that characterise a state’s foreign policy including national interest as argued by realist; the role it aspires to hold in the international system; its security policy; its alliances; its evaluation of how it relates with other actors in the international system; and the nature of its relations with other entities in the international system. Macleod maintains that these variables, amongst others, have the capacity to influence the continuity or change in an actor’s foreign policy (Macleod, 2002 cited in Boafo-Arthur, 2007).

Kegley and Wittkopf have contributed substantially to the subject of continuity and change. They argue that change and continuity are major features of the international system. They maintain that even though the focus seems to be skewed towards change, changes are usually accompanied with continuities. In essence, they acknowledge the dynamism of the international system. Therefore, for the global system to be understood there is the need for a clear appreciation and understanding of the change and changelessness of global forces and their impact on world politics (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1981). Their main focus was an analysis of the international system in general and not particular states or actors. However their analysis can be applied and narrowed down to an analysis of a nations’ foreign policy. Therefore, an analysis of continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy as highlighted in a study as this can be done by an evaluation and assessment of both external and internal forces.
A recent, though old phenomenon gaining ascendancy in the analysis of foreign policy change is known as foreign policy substitution. Developed by Most and Starr (1984), foreign policy substitution is based on the assumption that given different resources and tools, countries may respond differently to same conditions. This concept stipulates that actions of states are dependent on the resources available to them at a particular time. As per this assertion, change emanates from available resources but not variables identified by scholars in this review (Most & Starr, 1984; Huxsoll, 2003).

Morgan and Palmer (2000), in a challenge to the concept of policy substitution, argue that as resources assigned to a particular policy increase, resources committed to other policies decrease. They further contend that the efficiency of a policy determines the change in the quantity of state resources and commitment assigned to it.

In addition to the literatures on foreign policy substitution, Clark (2001) conducted a research to examine substitution in the context of political strategy and the use of force. He discovered that diversionary tactics are used by leaders or decision makers as a political substitution strategy to shift attention from the domestic scene. Similar to the argument made on diversionary tactics by Mintz and DeRouen (2010), Clark’s results show that “leaders facing economic concerns and/or domestic opposition prefer trade aggression, a patently private-good-like policy, and substitute such policies in response to changing domestic stimuli” (Clark, 2001: 1).
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The cardinal objective of this study is to identify and analyse factors that accounted for continuity and change in the foreign policy directions of the Rawlings (PNDC/NDC) and Kufuor (NPP) administrations. This chapter deals with the methodology that underlies this study. The chapter is designed to capture the approaches, procedures and techniques that make up this study. This chapter will therefore provide details of the research approach, strategy and philosophical paradigm adopted to address the research issues identified by the study. In addition, means of data collection as well as framework for data analysis will be captured under this chapter. Additionally, benchmarks for tests of validity, reliability and generalizability will be established. Finally, the thorny issue of limitations and problems with the chosen research methodology is adequately outlined.

3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL PARADIGM/ASSUMPTION

Though philosophical paradigms remain largely hidden in most researches, it is very important that it be stated. This is because they influence the practise of the research. It serves as the broad framework in which the research is situated. Most importantly, it is out of the philosophical paradigm that an explanation can be given to why a researcher chose a particular research method or approach (Qualitative, Quantitative or Mixed Methods). It summarises the larger philosophical ideas espoused by the researcher in a study. Other scholars term it philosophical worldview or assumption to mean “a basic set of beliefs that
guide action” (Creswell, 2009: 6). Creswell (1994) explains that, the philosophical paradigm summarises the researchers claim about what knowledge is (ontology), how we know it (epistemology), what values go into it (axiology), how we write about it (rhetoric), and the processes for studying it (methodology) (Creswell, 2003).

Out of the four main schools of thought about knowledge claims or paradigms – post positivism, constructivism, advocacy/participatory and pragmatism- constructivist claim to knowledge or philosophical paradigm is chosen as the framework for this study. Also known as social constructivism, constructivism is often combined with interpretivism. Pioneered by Mannheim, Berger and Luckmann (1967), Lincoln and Guba (1985), social constructivism is based on the assumption that individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live. This makes it relevant for a study such at this whose focus is to understand foreign policy making dynamics and the factors that accounted for continuity or change between the PNDC/NDC and NPP regimes. Social constructivists rely as much as possible on participant’s views of a particular situation, case or event being studied. It is based on the believe that, individuals develop subjective meanings of events. Therefore researchers with this philosophical standpoint are confronted with a variety of views that has to be studied in order to arrive at certain conclusions.

Unlike the other philosophical stance, constructivists rely and adopt open ended the questioning of participants. This is because it is believed to afford the researcher the opportunity to carefully listen to what the people do or say as well as paying attention to details (Creswell, 2009: 8). This assumption is relevant for this research as it seeks to understand the driving forces of decision making in terms of continuity and change. They believe in the relevance of the impact of the specific contexts in which people live, society,
culture and background in peoples’ actions. The intent of the researcher under this paradigm is to make sense of the from the meanings participants have about the world (Creswell, 2007: 21). In this case, meanings of foreign policy decision makers and stakeholders about the world and decision making will be studied in order to understand why the two leaders, given similar if not the same resources, acted in a certain way that either differs or coincide with each other in terms of their foreign relations.

This study therefore rejects the assertion that institutions alone form the basic unit of social and political analysis and agrees with the school of thought that emphasises of human factors as well as environmental factors. Therefore an analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy that focuses only on institutional dynamics will not be adequate for this work to achieve its stated objectives. However a shift from this parochial analysis to a wider scope of analysis would be beneficial to this work as well as introducing to the academic society other units of analysis. Analysis will therefore not be limited to one causative variable accounting for the differences/similarities of foreign policy decisions between the two leaders but on empirical methods combining inductive reasoning with a comprehensive testing of deductive hypothesis.

3.3 APPROACH TO STUDY

Associated with the various claims to knowledge are the approaches to study. There are three main approaches to social science research: quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods approaches. The knowledge claims, the strategies, and the method all add up into making a research more quantitative, qualitative, or mixed (Creswell, 2003). Quantitative research is the numerical representation and manipulation of observations for the purpose
of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect. It is used in a wide variety of natural and social sciences, including physics, biology, psychology, sociology and geology (Wikipedia Encyclopedia, 2005). Other researchers have given different definitions to this term. According to Creswell (1994) quantitative research focuses on “explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analysed using mathematically based methods (in particular statistics)”. Quantitative research is therefore based on the measurement of quantity or amount and it is applicable to studies that can be expressed quantitatively or in numbers. It mostly employs the use of statistical tools in the analysis of data. To Cohen (1980), quantitative research is a form of social research that utilises empirical methods and statements in the collection and analysis of research data.

In quantitative research, the researcher uses the post positivist claim to knowledge as their basis for developing knowledge. Surveys and experiments are at large two major strategies adopted in quantitative researches for data collection. Data for quantitative research are usually collected on predetermined instruments such as close ended questionnaires that yields either performance, attitudinal, observational or census data viable for statistical analysis and interpretation (Creswell, 2003: 13&18). Like Creswell (2003), Babbie (1990) and Keppel (1991) categorised quantitative research into two strategic groups: survey and experimental research strategies. The pattern, behaviour and the views of a population are explained by the survey through an aggregation of the sample size of the population.

In sum, quantitative approach or method to research focuses on the adoption of quasi scientific methods to the acquisition, analysis and interpretation of data of social science research. Its advantage lies in its ability to make prediction. Worrall (2000) noted that, the ability to make accurate predictions is one of the most outstanding features of quantitative
methodology or approach. However, Tewksbury, (2009) contends that quantitative approach to research is deficient due to its inability to adequately account for the full set of potentially influence factors that may be important for understanding how experiences are constructed, varieties are of cases are similar and/or different or perceptions and views are constrained and facilitated.

Alternatively, qualitative approach is one in which the researcher basically builds up their work within the framework of constructivist perspective or advocacy/participatory perspectives. Narratives, phenomenologies, ethnographies, grounded theory studies and case studies are some of the strategies of inquiry used to acquire data. Open ended as well as emerging methods are used to collect data (interview, observation, document data and audio-visual data) with the intent of developing themes for subsequent analysis and interpretation. Like quantitative methods or approach, several scholars have explained qualitative methods in diverse ways (Creswell, 2003: 14).

Strauss and Corbin (1998) admitted to how confusing the concept Qualitative Research is. This is because it means different thing to different people. Strauss and Corbin however noted that: “By the term ‘qualitative research’ we mean any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification.” Qualitative research aims at discovering the underlying motives of actions by individuals or groups, and desires. It employs the use of in depth interviews for this purpose. Other techniques used by qualitative researchers include word association tests, sentence completion tests, story completion tests and similar other projective techniques. This makes qualitative research an important tool in the behavioural sciences where researchers seek to discover the underlying factors that motivate human behaviour. Through such research
we can analyse the various factors which motivate people to behave in a particular manner or which make people like or dislike a particular thing (Kothari, 2004: 3). Qualitative method is deemed to be

A situated activity that locates the observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that makes the world visible. These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations including field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings and memos to the self. At this level, qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln, 2006: 3)

Mustafa, (2010: 52) defined qualitative research as a type of research that is “concerned with phenomena relating or involving kind/quality. To Shank (2002: 5)it is “a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning. All these definitions acknowledge the human factor as well as the less focus on statistics in qualitative approach. In his bid to justify qualitative approach, Tewksbury (2009) believes that it provides a deeper meaning and understanding of problems than quantitative approach. This is because qualitative approach “centralizes and places primary value on complete understandings and how people…understand, experience and operate within the milieus that are dynamic and social in their foundation and structure”. Qualitative approach can also be used to obtain the intricate details about phenomena such as feelings, thought processes, and emotions that are difficult if not impossible to come by when one uses other methods such as quantitative methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This approach therefore solves the problem of insufficient or hidden data that is mostly encountered by the adoption of a quantitative approach. It is believed that the adoption of a qualitative approach will provide an
opportunity for the researcher to stay in touch with participants and well as have a direct
experience with events being investigated. The more descriptive and narrative nature of
qualitative research eases the burden on the researcher who is statistically or
mathematically handicapped. Qualitative methods are also effective in identifying the
intangible factors in a study which cannot be identified by statistical calculation or
mathematics (Mack et al, 2005). However, it has been criticised as time consuming with
regards to the amount of time needed to collect and analyse data (Osuala, 2007).

The third methodological movement which is gaining ascendancy as a growing area of
methodological choice for researchers is the mixed method approach (Cameron, 2011). In
mixed methods, researchers tend to base knowledge claims on pragmatism. Mixed method
researchers adopt the act of collecting data either simultaneously or sequentially as
strategies to best understand research problems. Data collected are both numeric and non-
numeric thereby stuffing the research database with both qualitative and quantitative
(Creswell, 2003: 18-20). In the Journal of Mixed Methods (2006), mixed method is defined
as “research in which the investigator collects, analyses, mixes, and draws inferences from
both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or a program of inquiry’ in a more
comprehensive explanation”. Creswell and Clark (2007: 5) opines that

Mixed methods research is a research design with philosophical assumptions as well as methods of
inquiry. As a methodology, it involves philosophical assumptions that guide the direction of the
collection and analysis of data and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative data in a single study
or series of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches in
combination provides a better understanding of research problems that either approach alone.
Mixed methods or approach arose as a result of the constant contestation between the quantitative and qualitative approaches which are the cardinal approaches. The aim was to develop a third force approach that seeks to combine the vital components of both qualitative and quantitative approaches in order to undertake a research (Jick, 1979).

In order to successfully undertake this study, the researcher uses a purely qualitative approach. The choice for this approach is motivated by the assertion that qualitative research unlike the other approaches, is applicable to qualitative phenomena or problems involving quality or kind. It cannot be applied to phenomena that are expressed in terms of quantity (Kothari, 2004: 3). This study sought to identify non quantifiable influential or determining factors that can account for the similarities and differences in foreign policy directions of the PNDC/NDC and the NPP. Therefore, the use of qualitative approach is highly recommended for this research. Also qualitative method is relevant for a study that seeks to undertake an in-depth study of a case or phenomena rather than just a provision of information in breadth from a large number of units. Qualitative approach is therefore relevant for a study such as this that conducts an in-depth analysis of foreign policy decisions. Also qualitative approach is more suited for a research that aims at investigating the rationale and meaning of particular events or case. This is in contrast to other approaches, especially quantitative approach that are more suited at looking at cause and effect (Sukamolson, 2006: 10). Qualitative research is also useful in research that does not seek to quantify opinions, attitudes, and behaviours of a population towards a certain issue or phenomenon (Ibid, p. 9).

This study does not seek for a quantification of public opinion but for an in-depth analysis of factors accounting for continuity and change in foreign policy.
A qualitative approach is used when there is the need for a detailed understanding of a complex issue. In this situation, understanding can be achieved by establishing a direct contact with the persons involved. This study looks at the analysis of the complexity of continuity and change in foreign policy decision making. Qualitative approach is useful in cases where flexibility of research instruments is vital to the achievement of the research objective. For example, in instances where open ended interviewing is necessary, qualitative approach is the best option to choose. In sum, qualitative approach is adopted by this study because quantitative measures and statistical analysis do not fit the research problem (Creswell, 2007: 40). Quantifying will mean a neglect of the uniqueness of the regimes under study as well as a neglect of individual differences of the two leaders.

3.4 RESEARCH STRATEGY

An identification of an approach, to a larger extent, predetermines certain strategies of enquiry associated with it. Ethnographies, case studies, grounded theory, phenomenological research, and narrative research are major strategies associated with qualitative research (Creswell, 2003: 14). A research strategy basically seeks to describe how the researcher intends to implement the research study. Saunders et al. (2000: 92) contends that “what matters is not the label that is attached to a particular strategy, but whether it is appropriate for your particular research”. This study sets out to account for continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy under PNDC/NDC and NPP, and this will be achieved through the collection and analysis of empirical data. However, the appropriate strategy to be adopted to meet this objective is what this subsection explores. The empirical research in this study is interested in an in-depth study of Ghana’s foreign policy under
these Presidents. This makes the study a comparative study of two regimes whose foreign policies have perceptible similarities and differences. Aside being comparative, there is the need for the adoption of a strategy that is best suited to facilitate an in-depth study of the concept of continuity and change in relation to the PNDC/NDC and NPP governments in the areas of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness.

The research strategy adopted to implement the empirical research is a case study. Anthropologist, Malinowski’s study of Trobriand Islands and sociologist LePlay’s study of families as well as case studies of the University of Chicago’s Department of Sociology between 1930 and 1950 are usually cited as precursors of the qualitative case study (Creswell, 2007: 73). A case study is a type of strategy “in which the researcher explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals. The case(s) are bounded by time and activity…” (Creswell, 2003: 15). Cohen and Manion (1995: 106) describe a case study as one in which the

> Researcher typically observes the characteristics of an individual unit – a child, a class, a school or a community. The purpose of such observation is to probe deeply and to analyse intensively the multifarious phenomena that constitute the life cycle of the unit (Cited in Biggam, 2008: 233).

By implication, this definition stipulates that a case study in demands a close observation, study and analysis of the case or subject being studied. The adoption of a case study as a research strategy drives and facilitates this research to probe deeply into Ghana’s foreign policy under PNDC/NDC and NPP in the areas of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness. Yin (2003), differentiated between qualitative and quantitative approaches to case study. He further discusses explanatory, exploratory and descriptive researches as types of qualitative case studies. Additionally, he defines case study as “an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Ibid. p. 222). The US General Accounting office (1994) defines a case study as

a method for learning about a complex instance, based on a comprehensive understanding of that instance obtained by extensive descriptions and analysis of that instance taken as a whole and in its context (Ibid. p. 234)

One salient point that runs through the definitions stated, except Yin (2003), is the in-depth investigation of a case study approach. Notwithstanding this, Yin espoused the need for a comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon.

This study is concerned with an in-depth study of Ghana’s foreign policy under the PNDC/NCDC and NPP government in order to unravel factors that would have accounted for continuity and change between these two governments. Change and continuity in foreign policy decision making is obviously a contemporary phenomenon attracting attention in international relations, especially after the end of the Cold War.

Yin’s condition of ‘the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ is also satisfied by this research. Since this research is based on the constructivist or interpretivist view of the world, the context lays foundation for comparison. This is because foreign policies that in turn facilitate continuity and change or continuity in policy orientation are not made in vacuum. They are made within the context or an international system, the national or societal system as well as within the framework of a regime. At any level, policies can be influenced. Giving the nature of this research, with a philosophy based on constructivists understanding of the world, a strategy that meets the needs of this research is a case study. As a result, the aim of the study is in consonance with the facets
of the case study approach that requires focus, emphasises on depth of study, and assumes that a phenomenon can be understood through social constructions and interactions as well as placing it within the context it is being studied. This study falls under what Creswell, (2007: 74) terms as a collective case study which involves one issue (continuity and change) with two or more case studies (PNDC/NDC and NPP) to illustrate the issue.

Accompanied to case study are limitations associated with its adoption as a strategy for a study. A major limitation to a case study is the difficulty of making generalisations. Generally, this is as a result of the fewer number of cases being studied as compared to other strategies such as surveys. In this case, selecting two regimes in Ghana since independence cannot suffice a generalisation of factors that will be valid in other regimes. Bell (2005: 11) observes that critics of case study strategy are gingered by the notion that generalisation is not always possible. Yin however believes that the criticism against case study research on the basis of an inability to generalize is harsh. This study therefore exploits the principle of relatability. According to this principle, findings or aspects of this research about factors accounting for continuity and change can be useful or applied to similar situations or subsequent studies. Bassey (1981: 85) contends that “relatability of a case study is more important than its generalizability”.

Case study has longed been questionable on the grounds of validity. In order to survive validity test, five main things has been done in this study: First, the nature and philosophical world view or paradigm of the case study research has been discussed openly and related to the nature of this work; second, well-established data collection methods has been used to collect the empirical data; third, a structured, disciplined, approach to data analysis has also been adopted; and fourth, precise details of data collection and data analysis

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techniques applied to this empirical research will be described in detail, be transparent and available for scrutiny; limitations and potential problems will be clearly outlined.

3.5 DATA COLLECTION

As a purely qualitative study, this research seeks insights into foreign policy making under PNDC/NDC and NPP rather than statistical interpretations. Data for this study was obtained from two main sources: primary and secondary sources. The primary source involved interviewing of respondents as well as perusing first hand documents such as the constitution. Four interviews were conducted. The interviewees were: President Jerry John Rawlings, Ambassador D. K. Osei (Former Ambassador at large and Secretary to President J. A. Kufuor), Professor Baffuor Agyeman-Duah (CEO of The Kufuor Foundation and an author of an autobiography of President Kufuor) and Edwin N. Adjei (Director, Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Bureau at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). In addition, speeches and statements of the two leaders and their ministers were perused in order to have a better grasp of their thoughts as well as ideology on foreign policy issues. Also conference papers on Ghana’s foreign policy as well as files and relevant documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration were examined. In a study such as this, primary source is very relevant because it enhances and facilitates acquisition of information about the subject as well as participants under study (Osuala, 2007). Secondary data for the study was obtained from secondary sources such as books, journals, and newspaper publications on Ghana’s foreign policy in general. However, much attention and priority was given to sources that have information on Ghana’s foreign policy under Rawlings and Kufuor’s administrations. Electronic sources such as Google Scholar,
JSTOR, Sage publications and other websites including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration website were used. Other secondary source materials gathered from the Balme library as well as the libraries of the Political Science Department and the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), all of the University of Ghana, helped enriched this study. The primary data together with the secondary data sought to provide a better understanding as well as a rich picture of the empirical study.

In order to achieve the aim of this research, purposive sampling technique was used. Purposive sampling involves the purposive and deliberate selection of items by the researcher. In this type of non-probability sampling, the researcher remains supreme in the choice of respondents (Kothari, 2004: 59). It is mostly used in qualitative research. Though has been criticised as vulnerable to researcher bias, purposive sampling allows the researcher to conveniently select respondents who have an understanding of the research problem and the central phenomenon under study. In a study such as this one, probability sampling will be irrelevant because the researcher might end up with respondents who have little or no knowledge about the subject matter. Therefore there is the need for a purposive selection of respondents who are knowledgeable in the field of foreign policy, especially Ghana’s foreign policy, as well as officials who served under the regimes under study.

Interviewing was adopted as a technique for collecting primary data. The interviewing technique involves the “presentation of oral-verbal stimuli and reply in terms of oral-verbal responses” (Kothari, 2004: 97). Interview offers opportunity to both the researcher and the respondent. The respondent is able to express themselves in a way they would barely do in an ordinary day. The researcher also has the opportunity to syphon rich and in-depth information, which survey questionnaires cannot achieve, from respondents. Interview
guides were developed separately for respondents representing each side (PNDC/NDC and NPP) of the comparative study. This is because specific policy questions relating to a particular regime cannot be answered accurately and confidently by a respondent who was not part or have no insight with regards to the regime’s policies. Interview questions were grouped under themes that were derived from the theories as well as review of literature as factors that shape foreign policy orientations.

The study uses semi-structured interviewing questionnaire as a guide for its interviews. This allows the researcher to draft open-ended questions in order to gather required data from respondents. Semi-structured interviews are neither restrictive like closed-ended questions nor is it so open to derailment like unstructured interviews. With semi-structured questions, respondents were at liberty to decide on what information to give out, its magnitude as well as its overall detail. Close ended questions restricts both the respondent and the interviewer to a set of predetermined questions with a more narrow scope (Biggam, 2008; Osuala, 2007, Patton, 1990). To avoid interviewer bias, interviews were recorded with interviewees’ permission. This measure also emphasises on the level of precision of information gathered.

3.6 FRAMEWORK FOR DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Data obtained from both primary and secondary sources were subjected to critical contextual analysis. As stated in the data collection section, interviews were structured according to themes in order to help focus on the overall aim and objectives of this research. Qualitative content analysis was used as a technique of data analysis. It is a method for
describing the meaning of qualitative material in a systematic way (Schreier, 2012). It is through the content analysis that various themes are constructed and analysed. Figure 3.1 summarises the overall process of data analysis for this study.

**FIGURE 3.1**

Process of data analysis

- Interpreting the meaning of themes/descriptions
- Interrelating themes/descriptions
- Themes
- Description
- Coding the data
- Reading through all data
- Organising and preparing data for analysis
- Raw data (Primary and Secondary data)

Source: (Creswell, 2007)
CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This Chapter focuses on presenting an analysis of data gathered qualitatively. It is motivated by the need to find answers to the research question that underscores this study as well as achieve the objectives of this study through valid interpretations. It is in this section that data gathered with respect to the case under study is analysed and discussed. It must be noted that this chapter constitute the main part of the study that empirically and comparatively examines the nature of foreign policy under both regimes and consequently account for change and continuity that occurred. The major foreign policies of both administrations in terms of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness; a succinct analysis of continuity and change; an ideological profile of the two leaders; an assessment of the extent to which their personal idiosyncrasy influenced change and continuity in their foreign policy orientation and, an identification of other variables that influenced change and continuity are what constitute this chapter.

4.2 FOREIGN POLICY UNDER RAWLINGS ADMINISTRATION (1982-2000)

4.2.1 Economic Diplomacy

After the overthrow of the Liman administration (PNP), the PNDC took absolute control of the affairs of the nation including the formulation and execution of foreign policy decisions as well as regulate how the nation relates to other entities in the international system (African Union, 2012). The takeover brought together a lot of independent groups
with diverse political backgrounds (Martinson, 2010) who also strived towards making inputs in Ghana’s foreign policy direction (Interview of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, April 23, 2015). In a more detailed broadcast on January 2 1982 to set out the purpose and direction of the revolution, Rawlings stated that the people have been denied the basic right to ‘enjoy the wealth of their labour’. As a result, it is the aim of the revolution to give back to the people, create an enabling economic conditions for people to prosper as well as improve their living standards (Adedeji, 2001). Consequently, it was obvious that these parameters were going to be the foundation of both his domestic and foreign policies.

Many scholars have observed that an accumulation of international and domestic conditions or factors have a dire impact on the foreign policy decisions of a nation, including its economic diplomacy (Gustavsson, 1999; Kaarbo et al., 2013; Ray & Kaarbo, 2008). Ghana, under the Rawlings administration, was no exception to this assertion.

The Rawlings administration was met with a dwindling economy. It was observed, in 1981, that factories were operating at about 20% capacity due to low or inadequate supply of raw materials. The black market was booming in commodities such as cloth, soap, spare parts, sugar, cement, fish, iron rods, matches, fish and other essential commodities. Inflation rose to about 116.5%. The percentage of Ghana’s short term debts of the total reserves was 106.2%, a rise from 39.6% in 1980. The value of workers’ salary and wages fell by 20% of its value in the 1970s. Industrial growth was negative (30%) and the transport sector had virtually collapsed due to unavailability of spare parts as well as the inability to import new vehicles. Prices of available basic commodities such as palm oil, beef, kenkey, and gari rose unpredictably and at a higher rates (Awoonor, 1990; Oquaye, 2004; World Bank, 2015).
Coupled with these was the suspension of oil supplies and the subsequent deportation of over a million Ghanaians by Nigeria. Furthermore, the international system at that time was characterised by a fight for dominance by the Eastern and Western blocs. In addition, the process of decolonisation that had taken over the international system and supported by both blocs constitutes systemic factors that defined the international environment under which the Rawlings administration had to work within (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). Aside these, Rawlings’ accusation of the Limann administration for maladministration, corruption and depraved economic policies led him to promise Ghanaians of a prudent reassessment of Ghana’s foreign economic relations, especially FDI. In other words, Rawlings’ call for a radical revolution implied an end to the excessive and unbridled control of the domestic economy by foreign multinationals. He further promised that all foreign agreements and contracts that were inimical to the interest of the people will be abrogated (Speech by Jerry Rawlings in 1981 cited in Oquaye, 2004).

The PNDC’s focus to ensure a sustainable economy in addition to delivering affordable goods and services to the people of Ghana influenced its policy framework in all aspects, including its foreign policy, especially economic diplomacy. As a result, the preoccupation of the government was to initiate and frame political and economic reforms that seek to address the socio economic needs of masses.

To achieve this socio-economic development, a directive for policy guidelines on foreign affairs was issued in May 1982 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to keep closer ties and collaboration with progressive as well as advanced and prosperous nations in the world (Asamoah, 2014). This directive signifies a government or an administration that was ready to work with any country that has the capacity to salvage the nation from her economic
owes. However, this directive was a direct contradiction to what the June Fourth Movement (JFM) stood for. In addressing the nation on a revised budget for 1981/1982, Dr Kwesi Botchwey (PNDC Secretary for Finance and Economic Planning) contended that the fusion of Ghana into capitalist economic system was the major source of Ghana’s economic woes. Thus, his assertion reiterates Rawlings’ concept of ‘radical transformation’ (an aim to drastically reduce or cut off the “stranglehold that foreign concerns has got on Ghana”) (Boafo-Arthur, 1993: 137), a posture Chazan termed as defiant isolationism (Chazan, 1984). Though other members of the administration such as General Nunoo-Mensah and B. B. D. Asamoah had diverse views from JFM members, the administration at its initial years (1982-1983) forge closer relations with the countries in the Eastern European Bloc as well as progressive countries in Africa, Asia, Caribbean and Latin America. In essence, relations with the West were neglected for the East due to the perception that Western imperialist were the source or cause of Ghana’s economic woes. This believe was held by the JFM or radicals of the PNDC and they had the backing of the Chairman, Rawlings.

President Rawlings contends that even though the PNDC did not have a common ideology: what they had in common was a shared belief in the urgent need to put Ghana firmly on a new part towards repairing the rots of the previous years and working towards social, economic and political renewal. He further explained, in validation of earlier data gathered, that the PNDC was an amalgamation of several groups including those he termed “book socialist”. In clarification, he argued that it was some of these “book socialist” who travelled to various socialist or progressive states “in the rather naïve hope of raising financial help. For the most part, they returned with little except good wishes and some
ideological books and a few scholarships” (President Rawlings, Interviewed on April 23, 2015).

Data gathered show a clear leaning of President Rawlings to the socialist rhetoric in the early years of the revolution. Leading members of the PNDC, including Chris Atim, were tasked to negotiate with some socialist states. In addition, strong ties were built with leaders who were perceived as socialist oriented (for instance Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso).

Edwin Adjei (Interviewed on June 23, 2015), for instance, noted that due to its initial anti-Western posture, economic relations between the Rawlings administration and Libya were strengthened. This relation was preceded by Gaddafi’s immediate acceptance and recognition of the Rawlings administration just after the takeover. This came as a paradox to the widely held alienation of the administration due to its overthrow of a democratic government. Regardless of opposition by neighbouring countries, the Rawlings and Gaddafi administrations developed stronger economic ties. In March 1982, Ghana was able to secure barrels of petroleum worth US$ 20 million to support its petroleum needs. Both nations sent delegations to each other to discuss pertinent issues. These visits were climaxed by the signing of numerous agreements of cooperation in sectors such as agriculture, industry, finance, culture and information. By the late 1982, Libya had supplied about 378,323 metric tons (US$ 1.09 billion) on concessionary terms. It was until the mid-1983, when the Rawlings administration started to forge relations with the West that Gaddafi felt betrayed. As a result Ghana’s economic diplomacy with Libya was weakened and subsequently the gradual fading of some forms of Libya’s support. It must be noted that in the face of all these, economic diplomacy with Libya was not fully or absolutely truncated. Aside economic relations with Libya, the PNDC government’s believe in intra-
African trade and south-south cooperation led to the signing of trade agreements with countries such as Nigeria, Mauritia, and Uganda. Some of these agreements also included scientific and technological exchange programmes aimed at knowledge sharing (Boafo-Arthur, 1993: 142).

After over a year of Western neglect and Eastern skewed economic diplomacy, the economy of Ghana made no significant progress. The description of the economy of 1983 by Green (1987) that “Ghana is an import strangled economy” thereby making Ghana “a hungry economy” was a true reflection of the economy at the time. As a result, the aim of the revolution was not being achieved and the economy continued to further deteriorate.

The failure of the socialist motivated foreign policies, the inability to attract needed resources and assistance from the Eastern European socialist government, compounded by the 1983 famine and bush fires as well as the expulsion of Ghanaian residents in Nigeria put the government under pressure and created the urgent need for survival and economic stability. This led the Rawlings administration to turn to the West, even though it was against its initial ideological predisposition (Boafo-Arthur, 1993; Gyimah-Boadi, 1990; Jonah, 1989). This stance, in terms of the new policy direction was in line with the opinion espoused by a leading member of the administration, Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah. He noted, at a time when the regime undoubtedly favoured and had adopted a socialist posture, that the new administration must not be entangled by ideology.

We are making friends with everyone. We do not intend to take part in big power politics. We are too small and weak to get involved in that. We have stretched out our hands to make friends with everyone regardless of his ideological thinking or his political persuasion. (West Africa, 25 Jan. 1982: 8)

In the midst of the aforementioned internal dynamism of Rawlings’ PNDC and such influential factors, the administration began to forge stronger economic relationship with
the Western International Financial Institutions (IFIs); a relationship which they hitherto were hesitant in strengthening. This led to the agreement on a financial economic reform package termed Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). Dr Kwesi Botchwey rather described Government’s acceptance of SAP/ERP as a “reverse to the moral decay and economic stagnation which had engulfed the country” (Peoples Daily Graphic, 1990).

In April 1983, the administration began the implementation of the World Bank/IMF sponsored ERP, SAP with the aim of reversing the economic decline of previous years caused by preceding governments. President Rawlings opines that the implementation of ERP/SAP was a practical response to real needs. The programme was structured into three main phases: ERP I, 1984-1986; ERP II/SAPI, 1987-1989; ERP III/SAP II, 1990-1992. Among the objectives of ERP I are: to arrest or manage the propelling factors for hyper-inflation (116% in 1981); to improve production of goods in the productive sector of the economy especially the agricultural sector and improving the financial image of Ghana that has been tarnished or dented as a result of maladministration of debts and national reserves.

The ERP II/SAP I was focused on economic stability, pegging economic growth between 5 to 5.5% annually over a medium term; to enhance public confidence in the economy thereby improving public investment to about 25% from 10% within a decade; to effectively and efficiently mobilise national resources for the improvement of the socio-economic well-being of the people of Ghana especially the poor and deprived (Oquaye, 2004: 452-453; Anyemedu, 1993: 19).

The final phase of the programme (ERP III/SAPII), among other things, sought to achieve a yearly annual growth of 5% with a reduction of inflation from 27% in 1988 to a target of
5% per annum; to achieve a target of US$ 85 million surpluses of balance of payment per annum; last but not least is to initiate the implementation of the Program of Action to Mitigate the Social Cost of Adjustment (PAMSCAD) (Ibid). In the view of Donal Rothchild, the ERP/SAP initiatives “reversed the decline of recent years and recovered at least some of the lost ground of the last decade” (Rothchild, 1991: 9). This was as a result of stringent economic reforms introduced by the administration including elimination of price controls, devaluation of the national currency (cedi), trade liberalisation, interest rate increment, increment in customs duties and direct taxes and other exchange rate reforms (Anyemedu, 1993; Ibid: 7; Oquaye, 2004). Government received a lot of financial support (a total of US$ 190 million, 415.8 million and 477 million in 1983, 1984 and 1985 respectively) from the developed world as well as from IFIs in order to facilitate the successful implementation of the programme. These funds were used to improve various sectors of the national economy including agriculture, mining and infrastructural development (Amenumey, 2011; Oquaye, 2004: 454-455).

By the end of 1988, economic growth had risen to 6%; inflation had reduced to 31% from 116% in 1981; growth in the agricultural sector as well as the industrial sector were estimated at 3.6% and 10.3% respectively; the rate of domestic savings increased from GH₵ 62.5 billion in 1985 to GH₵ 84.8 billion. The overall balance of payment surplus rose above GH₵ 22.5 million in 1987 (Issahaku, 2000; Rothchild, 1991). These figures show the steady growth of economic indicators due to the implementation of the recovery programmes. However the implementation of the programme was accompanied by a lot of negatives that affected the poor and deprived whose status this programme aims to alleviate. Actual food production did not receive enough boost hence a downward trend in
such products. This is because there was overreliance of imports of food products such as rice to the neglect of domestic farmers as sources of such produce. There was high rate of unemployment owing to the deployment exercise required by SAP. The devaluation affected the living standards of the people. Coupled with salaries and wages cut was the high cost of health care and educational services. Consequently, PAMSCAD was introduced to relieve the people of the hardship due to the implementation of the ERP/SAP (Gyimah-Boadi, 1990: 331; Oquaye, 2004: 471-479).

It must be noted that the acceptance and subsequent implementation of IMF/World Bank ERP/SAP brought the administration closer to the capitalist economies. As a result, relations with these countries dominated Rawlings’ economic diplomacy for the ensuing years of his administration. The British government, at the initial stages of the adoption of ERP/SAP, gave Ghana a grant of UK£ 69 million to mitigate the nation from its balance of payment Shortfall. As stated earlier, other capitalist economies, including Canada, France, and Italy made financial commitments with the aim of salvaging the economy. Relations with US got strained in 1985 when a relative of Rawlings, Michael Soussoudis was arrested and convicted for espionage in the US. However, the relationship improved in the mid-1980s following an exchange for two Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents who were similarly arrested in Ghana (Owusu, 1994). Afterwards, a visit by US President Jimmy Carter depicted a more friendly relations between the two nations. These relations culminated into a debt forgiveness of US$ 114 million in1989 under the debt relief programme. It is as a result of the improved relations that Ghana became a beneficiary of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Signed into law in 2000 by President Clinton who had also visited Ghana in 1998, AGOA seeks to grant access to the US market
to eligible countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Awuye, 2015; Williams, 2015). Ghana was
selected, among other twenty sub-Saharan African countries, as eligible for AGOA benefits
immediately the initiative was introduced in 2000 (International Trade Administration,
2015). Though most of the AGOA success stories and impacts were seen in the Kufuor era,
the initiative began in 2000 under the Rawlings administration.

Similarly, Canada in her bid to relief African countries of their debt granted Ghana a debt
forgiveness of US$ 77.6 million. Germany and France followed suit and forgave Ghana of
its debts of US$ 295 million and US$ 26 million respectively in 1991. In that same year,
Rawlings made three visits to Paris that connotes strong bilateral relations. Japan made
similar commitments to the Rawlings administration by offering US$ 680 million for
development projects and towards economic sustainability (Ibid; Edwin Adjei, Interview,
June 23 2015).

Even though closer economic ties were forged with the capitalist economies, the Rawlings
administration did not neglect or truncate relations with the Arab world or Middle East and
countries that made up the Eastern bloc; even after the collapse of the Soviet Union or end
of the cold war. Economic and cultural agreements that were signed at the beginning of the
Rawlings administration were not severed in the midst of the ‘ideological shift’. There were
a lot of cultural, educational and training exchange programmes held with these progressive
states. Under these agreements, Ghanaian students received full scholarship to study in
Moscow and Cuba. A large number of security personnel as well as secret service officers
were bound to receive training in the USSR, Cuba and Bulgaria (Boafo-Arthur, 1999: 86-
87). Relations with the Middle East was generally motivated by the need for petroleum.
Therefore, it was natural that the Rawlings administration had good relations with the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), an institution aimed at seeking independence and representing the interest of the people of Palestine everywhere (Barahmeh, 2014). Whilst the action of the administration to forge relations with the PLO was shrouded in economic interest, it was also in consonance with Ghana’s traditional foreign policy stance to render unflinching support of efforts towards decolonisation or independence.

The administration also had financial gains from the Arab countries. Out of the Saudi Fund, Ghana was granted financial assistance of over US$114 million between 1985 and 1987 for the execution of essential projects in the country, including the rehabilitation of the Tema and Takoradi ports and the Kpong Hydro Electric Power. The Kuwait Fund granted a US$ 3.5 million loan for the Northern Power Grid as well as US$ 8.97 million for the Kpong Hydro Electric Power I with low interest rates and convenient repayment terms. Similarly, a soft loan of US$ 10 was granted to Ghana by the Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) for the improvement of the cocoa industry (Boafo-Arthur, 1993).

Ghana was deemed as an aid-driven country under the Rawlings administration (PNDC and NDC). By 1991, the largest bilateral donors were Germany, the United States, Japan, and Canada, which together provided Ghana with US$ 656 million in development assistance. Similarly, the largest multilateral donors included the European Community, the IMF, and the International Development Association, which allocated about US$435 million to Ghana (Library of Congress Studies, 1994a). However, the extensive level of borrowing led the economy into high debt stock. As of 1988, total long term debt was around US$ 2.270 billion. By the end of 1992, and the beginning of the fourth republic, it had increased to US$ 4.88 billion and subsequently to US$ 6.4 billion in 1997. Within 1993
and 1994, Ghana received an assistance of US$ 2.1 billion at donors meeting in Paris chaired by the World Bank. A loan agreement of US$ 16.5 million was signed with the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development to secure funds for the construction of a thermal power plant in Takoradi (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). In the administration’s efforts to boost international economic relations with high domestic dividends, the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) was re-established in 1994. The core mandate of the council, under Act 478, is to promote, facilitate and encourage investment in all sectors of the Ghanaian economy except core mining, petroleum exploration and other free zone activities (Adjei, n.d.; Edwin Adjei, Interview on June 23, 2015).

As a result of the continuous economic downturn, there were calls for the country to be declared a Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) and initiate another economic stabilisation and debt relief programme in the late 1990s. However, the administration declined on the basis that it will do more harm than good. The administration’s experience with capitalist induced recovery and stabilisation programme such as ERP/SAP and the subsequent implementation of PAMSCAD made them sceptical about this new programme. One main strand that defines the nature of economic diplomacy under the Rawlings administration between 1992 and 2000 was the pursuit of a just world order as well as building and strengthening economic ties with all nations at the bilateral and multilateral level.

Also, the Rawlings administration in the 1990’s took economic liberalisation ‘down novel paths’ with the introduction of dual citizenship bill to parliament. This bill sought to open the economy to foreign investors, especially Ghanaian residents abroad. In addition, a lot of investment trips were made by government delegations to market Ghana to the
international community (Akyeampong, 2011). Hitherto, it was shrouded in negotiations with IMF and World Bank for economic rehabilitation coupled with economic cooperation with and among non-aligned countries as a means of breaking “free from standard prescription and conditionality that are far removed from the texture of our agonising reality” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015; Edwin Adjei, Interviewed on June 23, 2015).

4.2.2 Good Neighbourliness

Like every other administration since independence, the policy of good neighbourliness has been a prominent feature in foreign policy targets. However, the Rawlings administration sought to establish closer relationship with socialist and progressive states. This was due to what Edwin Adjei (Interviewed on June 23, 2015) termed security consciousness. He opines that Rawlings wanted to build ties with nations or leaders who belong to similar revolutionary and ideological school of thought with him such as Libya, Algeria, Cuba, and Burkina Faso (after Sankara took over). Because, he found the others not trustworthy. Accidentally, almost all her immediate neighbours in the West African sub region were not ‘Progressive states’. Therefore relations with neighbours were strained. However, reconciliatory efforts were made to establish and improve relations with neighbours. President Rawlings believes that Good neighbourliness is an obvious need in a country whose boundaries cut across ethnic groups, clans and families (President Rawlings, Interview on April 23, 2015). As a result visits as well as goodwill messages were arranged to be delivered to neighbouring states immediately after the coup. The purpose of these visits and messages was to sensitize neighbours on the purpose and motive of the revolution as well as to assure them of the regime’s desire for good and improved neighbour relations (Asamoah, 2014: 360).
Ghana and Togo relations have been tensed since post-independence times. The rift between the fight for Ewe unification and the agitation for the unification of the Togoland greatly influenced Ghana-Togo relations even in post-independence era. Subsequently, a plebiscite was held in 1956 between the Togoland Congress and CPP which the CPP won. Deducting from aforementioned narrative, Ghana’s relations with Togo have a history of tensions and rifts. The minister of foreign affairs made proposals on strengthening the relations but little impact was made. First held in 1972, the Joint Commissions for cooperation meeting was reconvened after twenty years in 1992. This meeting was aimed at improving relations between the two countries. However, it was not successful due to the deteriorating relations at the time.

The two nations accused each other of subversive and covert actions against one another. An attack on March 25, 1993 at the residence of Eyadema in the army barracks was affiliated to Rawlings-backed dissident Togolese soldiers. Togo formally accused Ghana of supporting the attack and threatened Ghana of an undisclosed action which will be in the form of a rebuttal. The Eyadema administration also accused Ghana for supporting an abortive coup in 1987. Togo was also liable for a lot of minor attacks on the Ghanaian border and against Ghanaians residents in Togo. On 5 October, 1990, several Ghanaians were arrested after the clashes in Lomé. Similarly, a lot more were arrested in November that same year. On October 1, 1992, a Ghanaian woman was shot on the Ghana-Togo border by Togolese soldiers for allegedly trafficking drugs. Togo was also accused of backing dissidents in Ghana to engage in acts of violation of human rights and territorial integrity.
The aforementioned factors, coupled with rampant closure of borders by both countries, made it very difficult for the Rawlings and Eyadema administrations to establish cordial diplomatic relations (Edwin Adjei Interviewed on June 23, 2015). The highest level of diplomatic relations both countries could establish was the appointment of Charge d’Affaires (translated as, charged with or in charge of matters) (Google translator, 2015) in each country (Asamoah, 2014). The tension between Ghana and Togo under the Rawlings administration was fuelled partly by comments made by some high ranking officials of the administration. In an interview by the West African Magazine, the PNDC secretary for Foreign Affairs was unequivocal about the spill over effects of the revolution in Ghana to other neighbouring states. Another astute member of the government, Chris Atim is noted to have commented that the new wave of revolution and transformation cannot be truncated but move further to states that have people who desire for change. Chairman Rawlings conclusively stated that:

We know that our revolutionary process threatens those institutions and countries whose systems are based on the exploitation of the common man. And we can understand scientifically why they will want to destroy us (Peoples Daily Graphic, 24 November, 1983 cited in Boafo-Arthur, 1993).

These declarations and statements, to a larger extent, validates the fear of Eyadema’s administration that the Rawlings administration will not hesitate in supporting a similar revolution in Togo. In addition, the administration had made Ghana an abode for the opposition.

Though Ghana’s relations with Ivory Coast was not overly cordial, it was not as bad and rift as Ghana-Togo relations. After the takeover of the PNDC, Rawlings was widely perceived as an ally to Gaddafi and his representative in the sub region. This was due to the initial strong relations that existed between Ghana and Libya at the time. Also Ghana
and Ivory Coast had dissenting views when it was perceived to have granted its support to the Charles Taylor faction of the Liberian civil war.

Another issue that nearly dented the Ghana-Ivory Coast relations was the spill over of a clash between the two nationals as a result football match between Kumasi Asante Kotoko football club of Ghana and Asec Mimosa of Cote d’Ivoire on October 31, 1993 (ASEC Mimosa, 1993; Dzathor, 2003: 5). Ghanaian fans were attacked and beaten after the match. Retaliatory attacks were staged by Ghanaians alike but the two nations amicably settled the rift (Ghana News Agency, 2005; Edwin Adjei, Interviewed on June 23, 2015). The Secretary for Foreign Affairs embarked on numerous visits to hold talks with President Houphouet-Boigny on matters of mutual interest. However, intelligence gathered by the Rawlings administration indicted Ivory Coast as a breeding and converging ground for dissidents who were purposed to attack the regime. These developments feuded hostile relations with Ivory Coast.

In addition, three armed personnel who were captured and executed in 1984 were identified as being part of dissident groups that had plans of infiltrating the country through Togo and Ivory Coast. Likewise, these armed men infiltrated Ghana from Togo and Ivory Coast. In addition, upon the arrest of J. H. Mensah and his colleagues in US, for attempting to smuggle arms into Ghana in December 1985, it was revealed that they had meetings with dissidents in Abidjan and Lomé before the journey. However, the Ivorian President, Houphouet-Boigny denied and disassociated his administration from any such attempt to overthrow the Rawlings administration. Setting up the Ghana-Cote d’Ivoire Border Demarcation Commission, the two nations agreed to settle their long-standing feud over their borders. This gesture constituted a step towards further collaboration and peaceful
coexistence between the two nations. Afterwards, both countries agreed to consider improvement in road and telecommunication system thereby improving ECOWAS mobility (Asamoah, 2014).

There was not much development in terms of Ghana-Burkina Faso relations until Captain Thomas Sankara took over power with a coup in 1983. As an ardent admirer of Rawlings, Sankara staged a replica of the December 31 coup in Burkina. He established institutions similar to what the PNDC established in Ghana after the revolution such as Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs) and Peoples Tribunals. Sankara and Rawlings first meeting was at the border town of Po in late September. Afterwards a meeting of the Upper Volta-Ghana Joint Commission for Cooperation was convened with the aim of strengthening ties between the two nations. Several meetings of the Joint Commission for Cooperation were held to boost bilateral relations as well as improving good neighbour relations. The secretary for foreign affairs was positive about Sankara’s initial relations with the Rawlings administration hence suggested an Nkrumah-styled Ghana-Burkina Faso Union that will develop into a more effective union than the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union of Nkrumah. However, after the overthrow and subsequent death of Sankara, in 1987, the vibrancy of cooperation between the two nations gradually fizzled. Rawlings lost a trusted friend and was not ready to build stronger ties with the perpetrators. The Ghana-Burkina Joint Commission for Cooperation, for instance was suspended arbitrary till July 1998 when it was revived with the aim of establishing a Permanent Technical Committee to take up studies on power generation, irrigation, water transport and the control of waterborne diseases specifically in the Volta Basin (FreshWater, 2004).
Three main factors influence Ghana-Burkina Faso relations under the Rawlings-Sankara administrations. First the two leaders had ideological semblance. They were both socially inclined and motivated by the need to salvage the deprived. It was obvious that Rawlings was Sankara’s political mentor. Related to the first factor is the fact that both leaders assume power through a military coup. Though this cannot be enough justification, but it can suffice for a complementary factor. This is because President Eyadema of Togo came to power through a coup but relations with him was not healthy. Last but not least, these two administrations received enormous support from Gaddafi. It therefore made them allies.

Immediately after the takeover by the Rawlings administration, the Nigerian government under the leadership of Shehu Shagari declined the continuous supply of oil to the regime. This was because the Shagari administration was a friend to the Limann administration. Therefore the overthrow of the Limann administration attracted hostility from Nigeria. Likewise, due to the decline in supply of oil for the PNDC government in 1982, the government saw Shagari’s administration as an adversary. Rawlings had accused the Nigerian, British and US governments of conniving to invade Ghana with the assistance of external or foreign armed forces to reinstate President Limann. In addition, over a million Ghanaians residents were expelled from Nigeria in 1983; a period when Ghana was under severe economic hardship coupled with drought, famine and bush fires. These actions of the Shagari’s administration was considered inhumane, though deemed as a retaliation of the Aliens Compliance Order (ACP). The aforesaid factors shaped Rawlings’ foreign policy and orientation towards Nigeria during Shagari’s regime.
However, following the ousting of Shagari’s regime in 1984, the new regime headed by General Buhari mended some aspects of the Ghana-Nigerian relations. Ghana began to benefit from increased procurement of oil from Nigeria. It is believed that the shared features of the two administrations fostered closer relations between them. Buhari ousted someone who did not consider Rawlings as a friend making them have a common enemy. President Rawlings received a warm welcome in Nigeria when he partook in a four-nation summit aimed at discussing security, stability and economic cooperation among these nations.

The overthrow of Buhari in 1985 by General Babangida did not substantially affect Ghana’s relations with Nigeria. Even though a soft version of the 1983 expulsion was staged in 1985 by this new regime, relations between the countries were not marred. Furious as they could possibly be, the Rawlings administration did not capitalise on this to end diplomatic relations with Nigeria. It must be noted that, this was due to the benefits Ghana had started gaining from the Nigeria. Also, any attempt by Ghana to rebut would have culminated into a negative impact on the affairs of ECOWAS. By the end of 1984, Ghana had become one of Nigeria’s major trading partner. Relations between the two nations led to the signing of a US$ 2.5 million agreement with Integrated Data Service Company Limited to conduct a seismic survey in the on-shore Tano Basin of Half-Assini in the Western region of Ghana. It is worthy of note that a Joint Commission on cooperation between Ghana and Nigeria with the objective of enhancing economic cooperation and development between the two countries was formed. However, Ghana-Nigerian relations were not substantially affected by the internal instabilities in Nigeria. During the civil unrest in Nigeria, in the 1990s, Ghana which was then a member of Commonwealth
Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), agitated for dialogue and not confrontation to remedy the unrest (Asamoah, 2014).

Even though the Rawlings administration has two phases: the military (1981-1992) and democratic rule (1993-2000), foreign policy did not change when there was a switch to democracy. As noted by the Minister of foreign Affairs, Dr Obed Asamoah in a statement to the Chief Directors, Directors and AG Directors on July 26 1993:

> Despite the return to constitutional rule and installation of a new government of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), foreign policy objectives of the country will essentially be that same, even if the tactics of the strategies for achieving these require change. This is primarily because of the rational and consistent basis of our foreign policy in the past progressive policies of the PNDC Government. It means therefore that the guidelines enunciated by the PNDC to constitute the basic tenets of the country’s foreign policy will remain substantially unchanged (Asamoah, 2014: 694).

### 4.3 FOREIGN POLICY UNDER KUFUOR’S ADMINISTRATION (2001-2008)

#### 4.3.1 Economic Diplomacy

The NPP government, under the stewardship of President Kufuor came into power in 2001 with economic diplomacy as one of its foreign policy hallmarks. In his address at the closing session of the induction course for newly appointed envoys, Kufuor reiterated that in the execution of their duties abroad, their primary objective was to promote policies or actions in line with the section of the NPP manifesto for 2000 elections that states that “emphasis will be placed on economic diplomacy and achievement of an equitable and just world, trading relations and economic systems” (Kufuor, 2002: 10; NPP Manifesto, 2000). Having served as a deputy foreign minister under the PP government (1969-1971), Kufuor came into office with a deluge of experience in foreign policy especially in the aspect of diplomacy. This is because, as young as he was, he represented Ghana at high delegates occasions such as the UN General Assembly in New York, the OAU (now AU) Ministerial
Meetings in Addis Ababa, and the Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement in Lusaka (I. Agyeman-Duah, 2003). He also led the Ghanaian delegation to Moscow in the former Soviet Union, Prague (Former Czechoslovakia), and Belgrade (Yugoslavia) in 1970 to discuss Ghana's indebtedness to these countries. This shows the extent to which he has been involved in diplomatic activities before he became President on NPP ticket. Also most of his members of government were astute business men who already had a taste of relations with foreign partners. The four-member Diplomatic Advisory Committee (DAC) (President Kufuor as Chairman, Ambassadors D. K. Osei, and Keto, and Mrs Chinery Hessey) who constantly monitored, reviewed and evaluated government’s foreign policy options consisted of persons who had preference for and a deluge of expertise in diplomacy (Ambassador D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015). With these benchmarks, it was therefore easy to predict the administration’s likeness for economic diplomacy as a foreign policy mechanism employed to harness support for the ailing economy the administration inherited.

The ailing economy of Ghana at the preliminary years of the Kufuor administration had a great impact on the level of importance and urgency it attached to economic diplomacy. Inflation rate as of December, 2000 was 40.50%. Total national reserves including gold had reduced from US$ 53475378.4 in 1999 to US$ 308900899.3 in the year 2000 which was just 8.21% and 4.93% of the total external debts respectively. The nation’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped from US$ 7718110781 in 1999 to US$ 4982849054 in 2000. GDP per capita income was US$ 264 which is a negative development from US$ 419 in 1999. Likewise, annual growth in per capita income dropped from 2% to 1.2% in 1999 and 2000 respectively. Similar to other economic indicators, Gross National Income
(GNI) also followed the downward trend by reducing from US$ 7554234720 to US$ 4835890930. In addition, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) net inflows was also experiencing a downward trend. FDI Net Inflows for 1999 was US$ 243700000 however it reduced to US$ 1659.000 in 2000 (World Bank, 2015).

These indicators points to the fact that the economy of Ghana, as of December 2000, was not in a healthy state. Therefore, it required prudent measures to ensure its sustainability. It is deemed that this ailing economy was the means to the voting pattern and electoral results in the 2000 elections. This is because it is under these severe economic circumstances that Ghanaians were motivated into trying a different government hence, the NPP (Ayee, 2002; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). Therefore the NPP had no excuse but to fix the ailing economy. Apparently, the best means to the Kufuor administration was through economic diplomacy.

Consequently, it was prudent that the Kufuor administration paid much attention to economic diplomacy in the international community. It also prioritised the need to create a conducive and an enabling environment for foreign investors to thrive on. Measures such as stabilisation of the cedi, improvement in the legal framework regulating activities of foreign business men and foreign investment, adequately resourcing security agencies to ensure safety in the country, increasing respect for human rights etc. These, among others, ensured that foreign investors had confidence in the country as well as its government.

The HIPC initiative was a major foreign policy decision in terms of economic diplomacy during the Kufuor administration. Lunched by the IMF and World Bank in 1996, the HIPC initiative was aimed at relieving poor countries of debts that are deemed to be a burden and cannot be serviced. These poor countries are low income countries that are adjudged
incapable of managing their debt burden. In 1999, Ghana became eligible for debt relief under the HIPC Initiative (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2002; International Monetary Fund, 2015). However, it is believed that the Rawlings administration rejected and declined informal calls to HIPC on the grounds that it was first and foremost ideologically wrong; nobody would like to be called poor and heavily indebted. Secondly, the administration was sceptical about its success due to its first encounter with ERP/SAP which led to the introduction of PAMSCAD. Lastly, it was close to an election year and the administration feared the acceptance of HIPC might lead to the introduction of stringent economic measures that may lead to its defeat in the December 2000 elections (D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015; Edwin Adjei, Interviewed on June 23, 2015)

The HIPC initiative had the objective of reducing the Net Present Value (NPV) of external debts to a maximum of 150% of exports and 250% of government revenue at the time of completion point for small economies (International Monetary Fund, 2001). However, as stated earlier, the Rawlings administration decided to reject this idea. On the contrary, between March and April, 2001, the new administration under the leadership of Kufuor accepted and pursued this policy of economic diplomacy wholly. On the international front, three factors propelled the initiation of this initiative. The first factor was the pressures from international non-governmental organisation towards debt relief of poor countries. This crusade was spearheaded by the Jubilee 2000 Coalition that strongly agitated for the cancelation of Third World debt by the year 2000 (Mayo, 2005). As a result of these pressures, the international community was prepared for such a policy option. At this point, though domestic factors may play an active role in terms of influence, the international environment had already been prepared for the thriving of such a policy action. Secondly,
was the implementation of the Bradly plan that sought to provide debt relief and debt reduction for middle income countries. Last but not least was the fact that low income countries, including Ghana were not able to service their debts. Therefore the international community felt the need to do something to salvage the situation (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2002).

On the domestic front, the difficulties in managing the national economy due to lack of adequate fiscal and financial resources is enough justification for the migration of the country into the HIPC Initiative. This is because under the conditions of high budget deficit, high unemployment, foreign exchange constraints, a debt relief will definitely improve the capacity of a nation to enhance the microeconomic stability domestically (Bank of Ghana, 2005). This, in turn will positively influence and boost FDI inflows. Ideologically, the HIPC Initiative is not an antithesis to the neo liberal idiosyncrasy of Kufuor as well as the neo-liberalist principles of the NPP. The Kufuor administration was chastised by opposition as taking Ghana back into the ambit of colonialism after the implementation of SAP/ERP. This is because the forceful need comply with IMF and World Bank conditionalities were considered inappropriate and not feasible because they had failed to stimulate growth and development when adopted under the SAP/ERP initiatives (Centre for Policy Analysis, 2002). It was also criticised by the opposition in Ghana as connoting a bad image of Ghana. The labelling of projects as HIPC projects signifies poverty and in essence glorifying poverty and ‘washing our dirty linens outside’. Nonetheless, in addressing a press conference by the Minister of Information, Nana Akomea on 26th June, 2004 responded to these critics that, labelling projects as HIPC projects is not tantamount to glorifying poverty. He reiterated that the main aim of the
initiative was to enable Ghana attain debt sustainability. He contended that, considering the enormous benefits derived from the initiative, it offers a higher probability to much greater debt relief than any other existing strategy (GhanaWeb, 2004). With a total targeted debt relief of US$ 3.7 billion, the initiative has relived Ghana of huge bilateral and multilateral debts. The HIPC funds and grants have been channelled into poverty reduction mechanisms as well as growth enhancing projects (Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2006).

With the implementation of the HIPC initiative that came with a lot of other poverty alleviation mechanisms such as the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I and II), the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP), National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and Capitation Grant, the nation was gradually experiencing economic as well as rural development (Bawumia, 2012: 5). Total national reserves had increased from US$ 1897057044 in 2005 to US$ 2268926565 in 2006 with an increased percentage of external debt rising from 26% to 61% in 2005 and 2006, respectively. GDP had also risen from US$ 10731883141 in 2005 to US$ 20410331626 in 2006 with an annual growth of 6.3% in 2006, which signals an increase of 0.4% from 2005 growth rate. GDP Per Capita jumped from US$ 501.846 in 2005 to US$ 929.949 in 2006. These figures of the domestic economic indicators depict the extent to which the nation was steadily growing into middle income status (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2006; Cook, 2008; Moss & Majerowicz, 2012).

On August 1, 2006, Ghana under the Kufuor administration signed a US$ 547,009,000 compact with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The compact was to enter into force on February 16, 2007 and end after five (5) years (Millennium Challenge
Corporation, 2013). Though supported by the Bretton Woods institutions, the MCC is an independent US foreign aid institution, designed with mechanisms to ensure qualitative aid delivery and aid effectiveness. The single most important objective of the MCC is to use economic growth as a mechanism to reduce or alleviate absolute poverty (Rose & Wiebe, 2015).

President Kufuor acknowledged that though the nation had enjoyed sturdy, stable and progressive economic development in its bid to achieve full middle income status in 2015, the problem of extreme poverty and rural underdevelopment still linger. Also the government lacked requisite capital investment to fund very important aspects of its priority areas including human resource development as well as the modernization and commercialization of agriculture for wealth creation and alleviation of poverty (Kufuor, August 1, 2006). It was thought that capital investment in the agricultural sector, that directly employs 56% and accounts for about 30% of the country’s GDP, will enhance domestic food security, improve the quality of domestic agricultural crops that hampers Ghana’s ability to enter in to the European market as well as increase the nation’s potential into becoming the leading West African supplier of horticultural products to neighbouring countries and Europe at large (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2013).

Therefore, the rationale behind the compact by the Ghanaian delegation led by Kufuor was to seek investment capital to vital aspects of the economy such as transportation, rural development projects and agricultural development projects. These sectors were allocated 40%, 14% and 37% respectively. Aside the economic factor that motivated such a policy decision, Kufuor noted that the compact has the capacity to deepen the relationship between the two nations (Ghana and USA) (Kufuor, August 1, 2006).
Ghana and the US have had close economic and trade relations for a long time. Even before the Kufuor administration, the Rawlings administration had signed an agreement concerning the development of trade and investment relations with the US on 26th February, 1999 (http://agoa.info/bilaterals/agreements.html). On a four day working visit and invitation to the US, in January, 2001 President Kufuor used it as an avenue to hold talks with President Bush on strengthening US-Ghana economic ties. His visit, which coincided with visits by Abdoulaye Wade and Alpha Oumar Konare, Presidents of Senegal and Mali respectively was dubbed a mini summit. Discussions were centred on support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), AGOA, and also strengthening of democratic governance (Boafo-Arthur, 2007).

The Kufuor administration upon assuming office focused on strategically enhancing the nation’s trade sector in order to fully exploit the benefits of AGOA. The Kufuor administration therefore skewed attention to the textiles or garment industry. In the bid to improve the textile industry and to make it serve as a huge source of youth employment, the government made frantic efforts to acquire export certification visas in 2002. Consequently, the textile exports to the US market under AGOA peaked in 2007 (Asante, Bawakyillenuo, & Ahiadeke, 2012).

AGOA) established its base in Ghana as well as serving as the host for the regional
development program of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) (Ibid: 1-2). As a result of these bilateral economic relations, Ghana was widely perceived as a key
US partner in the African region (Ibid).

Like most Western countries, France welcomed the new Kufuor administration with
another economic initiative aside HIPC. Ghana was included within the Priority Solidarity
Zone (ZSP) by France. The ZSP comprised of 54 countries in Africa, Arab world, Asia,
the Pacific and Caribbean, selected by the Inter-ministerial Committee for International
Cooperation and Development (CICID) to benefit from the Priority Solidarity Fund
(FSP)(France Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003). Ghana and France’s French Development
Agency (AFD) in March, 2001 signed two agreements valued at nine million euros for the
purpose of developmental projects including road rehabilitation, and sewage in ten district
capitals(GhanaWeb, 2001). An eight-day visit of President Kufuor to France from 29th
November to 6th December, 2001 ended with the signing of two major agreements. The
first was another US$ 11.4 million loan agreement with the French Development Agency
(AFD) for the improvement of road networks in the rural areas. The second was an
agreement on HIPC that led to the relief of Ghana’s debts contracted between July, 1983
and June 1999 by the Paris Club (Boafo-Arthur, 2007).

One noticeable feature of the Kufuor administration was his numerous travels around the
world where he engaged governments to purposely seek for financial assistance.
Ambassador D. K. Osei (Interview on April 11, 2015) termed this as ‘direct diplomacy’.
Germany, among others, is one of the nations he visited a lot; making him develop personal
relationship with the German Chancellor Herr Gerhard Schroeder; being the first ever
German Chancellor to visit Ghana. His visit in January 2004 was to commemorate the final product of their 2.8 million Euros contribution to the establishment of the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC) (Ministry of Information, 2005). In a June 2002 visit to Germany upon invitation by Chancellor Herr Gerhard Schroeder, Ghana was relieved off US$ 6,745,000 debt owed under the HIPC Initiative.

The Kufuor administration built strong bilateral economic relations with Japan. These relations were influenced by the government’s commitment to enhanced infrastructural development domestically. Kufuor personally went beyond mere diplomacy to ‘direct diplomacy’ in order to get the Japanese government commit an 80 million (US$) to the construction of the Mallam-Kasoa-Yamoransa highway. Another factor was the government’s zeal to foster the development of communalism as well as easy means of among countries within the ECOWAS sub region. This is because the highway constitute an integral part of the targeted ECOWAS super highway project (Ambassador D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015). In addition, the prudent utilisation and disbursement of HIPC funds as well as the microeconomic stability, and the adoption of stringent measures to ensure prudent management of the economy convinced the Japanese government to relief Ghana of her long standing debt of US$ 1.01 billion (Daily Graphic, 2001).

Professor Baffuor Agyeman-Duah (Interview on March 11, 2015) expressed that, economic relations with South Korea was basically motivated by the Kufuor administration’s attempt to liberalise the Ghanaian economy as well as encourage foreign direct investments. As a result, trade relations between the two nations witnessed steady growth. The Korean economy was into exports of value added hi-tech goods or products such as computer chips, vessels and automobiles (World Bank, 2011). Ghana on the other
hand exported raw materials such as cocoa beans, aluminium and copper waste, scraps and gold. Between 2001 and 2008, the annual average of exports from Korea to Ghana was US$ 80, 166, 500.00 whilst Ghana’s annual average export to Korea US$ 8,855,000.00 (Annual Report Ghana Embassy Seoul, 2008). Even though these figures show a high level of imbalance, the Kufuor administration saw it as an opportunity for Ghanaian investors to expand their horizon (Professor Baffuor Agyeman-Duah, Interviewed on March 11, 2015).

Likewise, the Kufuor administration established diplomatic economic relations with Spain and other Eastern European countries as well as China. President Kufuor’s two days talk held with His Majesty King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Mario Anzar facilitated the grant of a US$ 40 million soft loan for the enhancement of the cardiothoracic centre and a maternity block at Korle-Bu and Okomfo Anokye Teaching Hospitals respectively. Also the loan was used to improve water supply systems in the Eastern Region (Boafo-Arthur, 2007). In furtherance of the ‘Golden Age of Business’ agenda, the government of Ghana was given the leeway to open diplomatic mission in Madrid in order to boost economic diplomacy between the two nations (Ibid). Similarly, in an agreement with the Ghanaian government, China based Alcatel Shanghai Bell granted a US$ 150 million loan in supply of Alcatel products to Ghana Telecom (Akyeampong, 2011). In addition, the Chinese government committed a US$ 7.25 million grant for military and police barracks projects that were completed in 2004 (Ghana Armed Forces, 2015).

Bilateral economic relations facilitated the acquisition of grants for several projects including the Ofankor-Nsawam stretch of the Accra-Kumasi Road, the Kumasi Youth Centre, the Office Block of Ministry of Defence, several rural basic schools, and the Bui Hydro-electric Dam (Chinese Embassy, 2014) which is by far Chinese largest
infrastructural project embarked upon in Ghana (US$ 600 million) (Akyeampong, 2011). Following the business disagreement between Telecom Malaysia and Ghana Telecom, President Kufuor sent a delegation of entrepreneurs and business executives to Malaysia to understudy their system. It was dubbed the ‘learning mission’ between 1st and 4th August, 2002. This action was motivated by the new administrations fretfulness to solve the disagreement as well as to foster South-South relations. The visit was also to afford the delegation to identify new business opportunities. In addition to fostering South-South relations, Kufuor’s four day visit to India ended with the signing of an agreement that sought to establish, among others things, a bilateral investment promotion and protection (Boafo-Arthur, 2007; Williams, 2015).

Multilateral organisations, by 2007, had ranked Ghana as a middle income country with a per capita GDP of US$ 1300. In addition, the exploration and subsequent discovery of oil took Ghana into a new form of economic diplomacy. Ghana began to build ties with countries that make up Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) including the Arab world. Initial discussions had been made prior to 2007 between Ghana and the oil-rich Arab countries for the construction of storage facilities for Ghana’s oil (Akyeampong, 2011: 110; International Food Policy Research Institute, 2011). It is evident from aforementioned factors that economic diplomacy under the Kufuor administration was largely motivated by the need to suffice domestic needs.

4.3.2 Good Neighbourliness

The 2000 election manifesto of the NPP emphasized clearly that the NPP will “establish and deepen friendly relations with other countries, respecting their values and customs and enduring reciprocal treatment” (NPP Manifesto, 2000). Consequently the basic objective of
the Kufuor administration’s diplomacy was to foster and promote friendly relations with all countries, especially with immediate neighbours. This is because, the administration believed that it is through healthy relationship with neighbours that a safe or peaceful neighbourhood or region can be ensured. With this background, it was in line that all Ghana’s neighbours received invitation to the inauguration of President Kufuor (Address by Hackman Owusu Agyeman at LECIAD, 2002). Kufuor’s relationship with neighbours were influenced by his passion to enhance or boost the ECOWAS agenda. This is because it was believed that fostering good relationship with neighbours will help combat sub-regional menace including arms peddlers, human trafficking, armed bandits, child slavery and general sub-regional insecurity induced by rampant intra-state conflicts. Ambassador D. K. Osei (Interviewed on April 11, 2015) asserts that, on personal idiosyncratic basis, President Kufuor believed in the principles of self-determination, non-interference in the affairs of other states and respect for national sovereignty. Within the first eight months of coming into office, President Kufuor had visited all neighbouring countries. This visit was not just once but constantly visited neighbours throughout the tenure of his presidency. For him, good neighbourliness was the major rock upon which his Africa foreign policy was going to be built (Nduom, 2002).

Though Ghana’s relations with Togo before 2001 was not healthy, it was the first nation Kufuor visited after his inauguration. The motivation to boost Ghana-Togo relations emanates from his personal believe that individual sentiments do not matter in foreign policy or interstate relations. Therefore state to state relations must be privileged over personal sentiments and vendetta. The Ghanaian perception of Togo, as an undemocratic neighbour, was an influential factor that negatively affected the relations between the two
nations under the Rawlings administration. However Kufuor, who came into office as a leader with extensive democratic credentials, decided not to antagonise his neighbour. His personal position and belief was that the decision as to how Togo was run should not be made by Ghanaians. In other words, the people of Togo under the principle of self-determination should decide on who governs them and the political system they prefer (Ambassador D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015). More importantly, the fact that the governance system in Togo is perceived as undemocratic should not in any way affect or be a stumbling block between Ghana-Togo relations. President Kufuor believed he had the primary duty to improve relations between the two nations and in the process hope to influence the country towards Ghana’s direction (democracy) (Ibid). By 2002, Ghana had convened a meeting of Joint Permanent Commission for Cooperation with the aim of fostering close collaboration and integration of the ideals of ECOWAS (Nduom, 2002). Kufuor’s healthy relations with Togo culminated into the resolution of border disputes as well as a lot of official and unofficial visits by the two Presidents. Even after the death of Gnassingbé Eyadéma and take over by son Faure Gnassingbé, the Kufuor administration still maintained that peaceful and cordial co-existence that had existed between the two nations.

Like Togo, the Kufuor administration met a seemingly hostile Ghana-Burkina relations upon assuming office in 2001. It has been identified that the Rawlings administration was not on good terms with the Blaise Compaoré. However, Kufuor believed that bitter Rawlings- Compaoré relations must not precipitate a hostile relations between Ghana and Burkina (Ambassador D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015). The ‘Positive Change’ agenda of the Kufuor administration sought to change a lot of things that did not augur well
for the image of Ghana (Speech). Also, the new administration wanted to depict a well suited image of Ghana to the international community. It wanted to portray Ghana as a peaceful nation that is at peace with its immediate neighbours as well as the West Africa sub region as well as Africa at large. The Kufuor administration also wanted to portray a Ghana that is able to keep regional peace; a country that is ready to champion African renaissance. Kufuor’s visits to Burkina and Benin was purposely to revive the Permanent Joint Commission for Cooperation that had collapse due to the bitter relations that existed between the two countries after the death of Captain Thomas Sankara. There was continuous talks on peace, security, stability and economic growth between Ghana and Burkina Faso (Professor Baffuor Agyeman-Duah, Interviewed on March 11, 2015).

The Kufuor administration’s relations with Cote d’Ivoire was coupled with the quest to find lasting solutions to the Ivorian crises. Kufuor, among other things, participated in a lot of accords with the aim of calming warring factions and seeking for solutions. Aside being an ally historically, the motivation for the administration’s posture was the acknowledgement of the destabilising effect the conflict can have on the West African sub region, especially Ghana who is their immediate neighbour.

Edwin Adjei (Interviewed on 23 June, 2015) believes that ethnic ties as well as the similarity of ideology between the Kufuor administration and his counterpart in Cote d’Ivoire played an important role in the cordial relations that existed between the two nations. Kufuor’s involvement in the peace process culminated in his participation in the signing of the Marcoussis Accord signed in France on January 23, 2003 and a host of other conflict resolution meetings in Accra. As the ECOWAS Chairman, the conflict fell under his domain and he deemed it a responsibility to the region as well as the international
community to broker peace between the warring factions and ensure the nation returns to democracy. Under his Chairmanship, ECOWAS assisted in a peace broker in Ivory Coast.

Like in Ivory Coast, Kufuor played a key role in the search for peace in Liberia. He subscribes to the assertion that there can be no development without peace. In other words, peace is a prerequisite for national development. Through ECOWAS, he was able to assist the institution of an interim Government to prepare and oversee the country for elections. As a result, Ghana’s relations with Liberia under the Kufuor administration was captioned by his passion to seek for peace in the region (H.E Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, 2008).

Ghana-Nigerian relations received a major boost during the Kufuor administration (Otoghile & Obakhedo, 2011). The relationship moved from just good neighbourliness to economic diplomacy. The Kufuor administration received a lot of financial support from the Obasanjo administration. Upon inheriting a country that lacked sustainable reserves, Kufuor, in the first month of his administration, visited Nigeria to negotiate a ninety-day credit facility to give the administration the laxity to use the little resource for other sectors of the economy. In addition, the Obasanjo government granted US$ 13 million loan facility for the acquisition of automobiles for the police service which received a lot of backlash from Nigerians. Another soft loan facility of US$ 40 million was secured from Nigeria to pay for Ghana’s share of the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) project (Vanguard, 2004). This project brings together Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana under one cooperative mechanism to share the massive gas reserve of Nigeria. Both countries under the two leaders engaged in massive direct diplomacy. Kufuor had a lot of travels to Nigeria. President Obasanjo was the guest of honour for the occasion of Ghana’s fiftieth anniversary celebration. A high street in the capital of Ghana was also named after him. This shows the
extent of relationship that existed between the leaders as well as the two nations. It was
during the administration of Kufuor and Obasanjo in Ghana and Nigeria respectively that
Ghana-Nigeria relations were strengthened. Closer relations between Ghana and Nigeria
was fostered by the passion of these two nations to seek for peace and stability in the West
African sub region and Africa at large. In essence, the two nations were allies for peace.
They actively participated in peace keeping missions across the continent under the
flagship of ECOMOG and UN.

Generally, Kufuor believed that neighbours are the greatest source of instability. Therefore
keeping hostile neighbours put the nation under a huge security threat because it can be
used as an abode for attackers. Therefore even though Ghana-Togo-Burkina Faso relations
were less vibrant, Kufuor thought a healthy relationship will be able to avert possible
attempts of subversive and covert actions against each other (Ambassador D. K. Osei,
Interviewed on April 11, 2015; Professor Baffuor Agyeman-Duah, Interviewed on March
11, 2015).

4.4 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

As noted in the literature review, the twin concepts of change and continuity is a major
feature of foreign policy formulation in contemporary international system. Like every
other nation, these concepts can be explored in the Ghanaian setting. It is based on this
presumption that this study seeks to explore these concepts in a comparative manner
between the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations based on the foreign policy parameters
of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness.
4.4.1 Economic Diplomacy

It must be acknowledge, first and foremost that there was a change in Ghana’s economic diplomacy during the Rawlings administration under the same leadership. From data gathered, the initial anti-Western foreign policy stance of the Rawlings administration after the takeover was jettisoned for a more pro-Western orientation. It is worthy of note that this change in foreign policy orientation occurred in one administration under the same leadership, President Rawlings (Boafo-Arthur, 1993, 1999; Ambassabor D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015; Edwin Adjei, Interviewed on June 23, 2015).

As a point of emphasis, it must be noted that, after 1983 shift in policy or diplomatic orientation, the Rawlings administration did not totally neglect their old economic links however, more emphasis and concentration was laid on the administration’s relations with the capitalist economies than with the communist or socialist bloc. This shift in ideological focus makes the nature economic diplomacy pursued by both administrations similar thereby representing continuity.

The Kufuor administration came into office with a neo-liberal purview of the international system seeking to make friends with all, with the aim of securing economic independence and domestic economic development. Both governments (after 1983 for Rawlings administration), similarly gave maximum attention or cognisance to building economic stronger ties the Western capitalist economies. Whilst the Rawlings administration implemented an IMF/World Bank initiative (SAP/ERP), the Kufuor administration did same with the implementation of the HIPC programme. However, there is a difference in terms of efforts and level of urgency attached their bilateral relations. Ghana’s economic relations with countries like the US, Britain, China, Japan, India and Germany were
boosted and more dividend oriented than under the Rawlings administration. This resulted in the securing of enormous economic support for domestic projects and economic development, including the US$ 547 million grant from the MCC, which is by far Ghana’s highest grant received since independence. The Kufuor administration moved a step further from what the Rawlings administration did in terms of economic diplomacy (D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015).

Whilst the Rawlings administration was clothed in ideology and hesitated to open up to economic diplomacy with non-progressives, the Kufuor administration welcomed and approached everyone. The administration focused on making Ghana ripped for foreign investment. As a result, several acts were enacted; Private Sector Development was attached to the existing Ministry of Trade and Industry; and the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) was adequately resourced to market Ghana to the investment world; all geared towards creating an enabling environment for FDI. The President was actively and personally involved in bilateral and multilateral economic relations with development partners. This is what Ambassador D. K. Osei termed as ‘direct diplomacy’. This was one of the main reasons why President Kufuor engaged in lots of travels during his administration to the distaste of his opponents. Rawlings on the other hand did not pursue economic diplomacy with such aggressiveness. Most of the economic agreements under his administration were spearheaded by his PNDC secretaries, Minister in charge of foreign affairs or Minister for Finance. For instance, Chris Atim led the government delegation sent to Libya immediately after the coup to seek for assistance (Asamoah, 2014).

Kufuor, on the other hand, personally visited Nigeria to negotiate for the credit facility on the supply petroleum. This implies that these leader, though met similar situations in the
country, approached it differently and yielded similar but with wider margin of success in terms of dividends. However, data gathered shows a high level of consistency between the economic diplomacy of both leaders. The difference identified is of degree of salience and effort they attached to it.

4.4.2 Good Neighbourliness

In the aspect of good neighbourliness, both regime were faced with different neighbour environment. Before Rawlings took over power from the Limann administration, Ghana was on good rapport with her neighbours. Limann was a friend to the neighbouring countries as well as Nigeria. However, these relations turned sour after Rawlings overthrew President Limann (Amenumey, 2011). On the contrary, the Kufuor administration was met with neighbours who were hostile to Ghana as a result of their earlier encounter with the Rawlings administration. Data gathered point to the fact that there was enormous difference in neighbour relations of the two administrations. Though Rawlings administration had good neighbourliness as a policy objective, it was not able to adequately achieve it. There were accusations and counter accusations of subterfuge and subversive attacks between Ghana and her neighbours.

In contrast, the Kufuor administration sought for and made frantic effort at achieving good neighbour relations, even though, it was met with seemingly antagonistic neighbouring environment, left behind by the Rawlings administration. Consequently, by the time it tenure was over in 2009, Ghana was at peace with its neighbours. Therefore, unlike economic diplomacy, where there is a high level of continuity in policies pursued, there is an absolute change in how these two administrations manage or dealt with neighbour relations.
However, a reconciliation of data gathered and the application of Herman’s graduated levels of change, which is espoused by the theoretical model for this study stipulates foreign policy changes in both parameters (Economic Diplomacy and Good Neighbourliness). Foreign policy change that occurred in terms of economic diplomacy between both administrations is termed as an adjustment change. To reiterate its meaning, adjustment changes

Occur in the level of effort (greater or lesser) and/or in the scope of recipients (such as refinement in the class of targets). What is done, how it is done, and the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged (Gustavsson, 1999; Hermann, 1990: 5).

Nonetheless, it must be noted that more evident in results that in actual practise. This is why the Kufuor administration achieved more dividends in terms of economic diplomacy than the Rawlings administration. Also changes such as this is deemed as low level change and best fits more under the concept of continuity. The changes that occurred in their neighbour relations is termed as program change. At this level,

Changes are made in the methods or means by which the goal or problem is addressed. In contrast to adjustment changes, which tend to be quantitative, program changes are qualitative and involve new instruments of statecraft (such as the pursuit of a goal through diplomatic negotiation rather than military force). What is done and how it is done changes, but the purposes for which it is done remain unchanged (Ibid).

This type of foreign policy change is deemed as a high level change.
4.5 A PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILE OF PRESIDENTS RAWLINGS AND KUFOR

4.5.1 President Jerry John Rawlings

It has been established by scholars of political psychology and international relations alike that, the background as well as early childhood socialization of an individual, decision maker or leader has a dire impact on their ideology and general worldview. This is because these background and childhood encounters shape the beliefs of the individual thereby defining their personality. In other words, it is believed that actions of decision makers are not taken in vacuum. In essence, they are influenced by the philosophical or ideological standpoint of the decision maker. Intimately, the ideological standpoint are influenced by the beliefs imbued in the decision maker. These beliefs, in turn, are deemed to be impelled by the background of the decision maker (Hermann, 1980; Walker, 1990).

Brought up by “a strict and strong minded woman who did not hesitate to beat her children in order to instil in them her own strong moral code of honesty, integrity and personal discipline” (Shillington, 1992: 35), Rawlings even at a tender age was noted by contemporaries as a person who “would not tolerate bullying and he readily came to the defence of any underdog who might be mistreated by his or her classmates” (Ibid). Aside being influenced by his mother’s high level of probity, accountability and self-discipline imbibed in him, he admitted to being influenced by Father John. Though Father John’s sermons were captivating, he dealt ruthlessly with people who went astray or were indiscipline (Danso-Boafo, 2014).

In his quest to seek philosophical and practical answers to questions of life, three writings (Richard Bach’s, Jonathan Livingstone Seagull; Ian Rand’s, Fountain’s Head and a book called Rebel Priest) afforded him a purview of the world and its problems. These writings
influenced his views on perfection, the quest for freedom as well as the conflict between selfishness and selflessness. The ‘Rebel Priest’ even gingered him to consider being a priest as a means of working for social justice though he quit because he did not have the temperament for a priestly life (Shillington, 1992: 36). Therefore the worldview and ideological orientation of Rawlings has greatly been influenced by the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions. He witnessed how people suffer under the guise of capitalism (Ibid).

The corruption and the high level of dishonesty inspired him to join the military because he thought “things would be much more straight forward, honest and truthful” (Interview of Rawlings cited in Danso-Boafo, 2014). In his mission to help the poor, he assembled a team of soldiers to engage in stealing from the rich and giving it to the poor or exploited (Shillington, 1992: 37). These actions, among others, shows the extent to which he will go to salvage the poor and exploited. It also demonstrates his distaste for capitalism and the kind of free economy where people are exploited in the name of doing business.

Rawlings’ believe that: “democracy does not just mean paper guarantees of abstract liberties. It involves, above all, food, clothing and shelter, in the absence of which life is not worth living” (Ministry of Information, 1990), draws him closer to socialist anti-imperialist rhetoric of the JFM; even though the New Democratic Movement (NDM), the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG), and the African Youth Movement (AYM) (Martinson, 2010) in addition to the JFM provided ideological backing to the 31st December revolution of 1981. Individuals such as Kwesi Adu, Chris Atim, Nyeya Yen who subscribed to this socialist rhetoric tried convincing Rawlings that “in their ideas, he had the basis for a people’s revolution” (Shillington, 1992: 87). The JFM were inspired by
the psychological gains of the June fourth revolution: the ‘commoner stood against the elites to gain self-respect, and ultimately orienting the people to believe that the rulers of the country are answerable and accountable to them. These results, to a larger extent are in consonance with the ideological beliefs of Rawlings.

However, it will be a hasty conclusion to settle that, his acceptance to lead a revolution dominated by leftist, makes him one of them. This is because it has been revealed in this study that, though he shared many of their ideas, he did not bother distancing himself from them when it got to the practicalities of running the affairs of the nation. His main concern was to serve the needs of the poor and exploited as well as to curb the higher level of corruption and moral decadence of the ruling elite. This concern did not only play a role in his domestic decisions but also influenced his foreign policy decisions as well. On the international scene, he had less pleasure and abhorred the hypocrisy in modern diplomacy. His dislike for bullying and exploitation of the poor by the elite and powerful manifested itself in his outward condemnations of encroachments or attacks of the territorial integrity of any third world country or a member of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). For instance, commenting on the US attack on Libya, Rawlings unequivocally stated that,

The principles which bind the countries of the Non Aligned Movement abhor acts of aggression such as the attack on Libya which undermines the independence of all our countries. What is happening to Libya is the larger version of what many of us have been suffering under the Reagan Administration. The attack could have been on any one of us. It is only logical therefore that we show solidarity with Libya in these trying moments (www.ghanareview.com, n.d.).

He further stated that,
If the US wants to assume this position of power over the rest of the world, then we should all have a say in who gets sent to the white house. The US seems to need help in understanding the reality of international affairs (www.ghanareview.com, n.d.).

In a speech delivered at the World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, Denmark on Saturday 11 March, 1995, he unequivocally questioned the current world order:

But if we are sincerely and effectively making these efforts, and yet it is clearly not enough to address the social injustices in our countries, then are we not justified in questioning the present world order? (Ibid)

The statements above shows the extent to which his ideology and hatred for exploitation of the poor and marginalised played on the international scene.

4.5.2 President John Agyekum Kufuor

Like Rawlings, Kufuor did not have much of parenting from the patrilineal side though his father was alive and was serving as the Oyokohene of the Asante Kingdom. As a young man, he never lived under the tutelage of the father but was under the supervision of his mother who is deemed to be rich and strong willed. However the young Kufuor’s frequent visit to the palace with the father built in him a strong traditional background (Agyeman-Duah, 2003).

His believe in institutions is deemed to stem from his earlier exposure to traditional institutions of the Asante kingdom that has a lot of semblance with institutions of the modern state (Agyeman-Duah, 2004.). He was brought up in a house (Agyafie- translated as father’s house) that harboured the leading members of NLM. It was the visitation of nationalist leaders such as Victor Owusu, K. A. Busia, J. B. Danquah, William Ofori Atta,
Baffuor Osei Akoto and Joe Appiah that gingered Kufuor’s interest into national politics. Hence it is natural if he adopted the neo-liberal philosophical standpoint of such national leaders.

J. B. Danquah, who is deemed to have given an intellectual prominence to liberalism in pre-independent Ghana, was also a philosophical or ideological father to Kufuor (Akufo-Addo, 2015). His famous statement that defined and summarised the overall motive of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in his 1948 address to anti-colonial nationalist:

> The UGCC’s policy is to liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property owning democracy in this land with right to life, freedom and justice as the principle to which the government and the laws of the land should be dedicated in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen (Agyeman-Duah, 2004: xiv).

was quoted by Kufuor to illustrate the ideological rationale of his government. Kufuor drew philosophical inspiration from J. B. Danquah who argued that Africa could not attain political development if the basic tenets of indigenous traditional institutions are ignored (Ayee, 2009).

A thorough review of the various speeches and statements of Kufuor presents him as someone who subscribe to the liberalist ideological standpoint (Ministry of Information, 2005). He believes in development in freedom which is also the motto of the NPP. In a speech delivered at the LECIAD, Kufuor made it clear that the NPP government, “coming from the Danquah-Busia tradition, believes firmly in liberal democratic ideas” (J. A. Kufuor, 2002:9). He was always emphatic on liberalist concepts such as a liberal economy, private sector development, and economic diplomacy. Ambassador D. K. Osei asserts that Kufuor had a more open non-restrictive approach to international relations. He therefore
encouraged and advocated for the efficient solutions to domestic problems in the bid to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In an introductory remarks at the second people’s assembly held on January 7, 2003, he indicated that if domestic challenges such as fuel prices and distortions in utility prices are dealt with, “the nation will have a stronger case in arguing for greater help and the economy will be more attractive for Foreign Direct Investors to bring their monies here” (John Agyekum Kufuor, 2003a). That is why locally, he sought to create an enabling environment for investors. These include stabilisation of the cedi, enabling an open economy where foreign exchange accounts can be opened and maintained in the country.

Consequently, his liberal philosophical ideas made him a strong agitator for good governance, human rights and the tolerance for diversity of views. He expressed his likeness for these benchmarks as well for the impact of Inter-Governmental Organisation (IGOs) and institutions on platforms such as the UN General Assembly. In a speech delivered at the 57th meeting of the UN in New York, President Kufuor unequivocally stated that

We are determined to strive for democracy and good governance, not because these are fashionable buzzwords but because we are convinced, that is the path to the surest, if not always the most rapid, way to development that we require to uplift the conditions of life of our peoples (Kufuor, 13 September 2002).

Nonetheless, he had the Pan African ideology in mind as well. This is because he never hesitated to enumerate the woes of colonialism and publicly condemned exploitation as well as championing African renaissance. At a UN General Assembly meeting he revealed that:

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We do not want to be the objects of pity and charity, and we do not want to provide the grisly images of war, disease, ignorance, famine and poverty on the world's television screens. It was largely as a result of our determination to shed this unacceptable image that many a country on the continent, on attaining independence, desperately rushed into one or other of untried ideology or economic model, that only tended to worsen the woes of self-doubt, left by exploitative or unconscionable colonialism (Ibid).

He therefore saw Pan Africanism, not as an ‘ideology’ but “as a natural evolution which all entitles all of us to take a dignified position in the community of races”(New African, March 2004: 6).

However, his believe in global partnership and its relevance in the development of the underdeveloped made him to concede that

Ghana, like other developing countries cannot alone, achieve the dramatic rate of growth that is required, unless there are significant injections of outside investment in our economy … We need the partnership, markets and support of the international community to sustain our development (Kufuor, 13 September 2002).

This statement shows the extent to which he ascribed to the liberalist assumption of global interdependence. However, he was cautious of the ills that come with overdependence on donor partners. Therefore, among his five priority areas defined by his government for accelerated development was the keenness to wean the nation off unhealthy dependence on donors. Though he is well thought-out as a liberalist, Kufuor was not entangled by that ideology. However, in practicalities and in the execution of his foreign policy decisions, it would be difficult to identify him with a well-defined ideological or philosophical standpoint.
Like Rawlings, Kufuor is deemed to have placed priority on socio economic development of the nation and its citizenry rather than on ideological differences. In his new year’s speech to Ghanaians on January 2, 2003, Kufuor accentuated that his government “has no ideological or egotistical hang-ups” and that “nothing will be done that will increase the suffering of the people simply to satisfy such [ideological] considerations” (John Agyekum Kufuor, 2003b).

4.6 PERSONAL IDIOSYNCRACY AS A FACTOR FOR CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

A review of relevant literatures in foreign policy formulation revealed that the ideology of the leader or decision maker has an impact on what decision is made. Herman is of the view that the personal characteristics of a leader influence his decision making or his foreign policy orientation. Juliet and Kaarbo, in explanation of their psychological approach to foreign policy opined that foreign policies are influenced by the leader’s idiosyncrasy, beliefs, as well as the decision making group’s perception about the entity they are dealing with. The proponents of the two main theoretical models used by this study also accentuate a similar stance. Goldmann’s model acknowledges the importance of the cognitive factor in foreign policy change and continuity. Similarly, Gustavsson places the individual decision maker at the centre of decision making through which all other influential factors must pass through (Goldmann, 1988; Gustavsson, 1999; M. G. Hermann, 1980; Ray & Kaarbo, 2008). The assertion by these scholars influence this study to assess the extent to which the personal idiosyncrasy of the two Heads of State influenced change and continuity in both administrations.
It is obvious from data gathered that Presidents Rawlings and Kufuor subscribed to different ideological stand. Rawlings subscribed to the Marxist-Socialist school of thought that believes in the notion that the society has been stratified into the rich and poor, bourgeoisie and proletariat as well as in popular power. He believed in the existence of this stratification in the international system between the West or capitalist economies and the developing world, especially Africa, Asia and Latin America. He had always argue against the exploitation of these countries in his international speeches and interviews. In addition, the fact that he was able to execute a coup d’état and subsequent executions of army Generals and former Heads of States makes him more predispose to violence and his believe in the use of force to attain peace, equity and justice. In his own words, he espoused this idea in relation to the Ghanaian setting that, “there is no justice in this society and so long as there is no justice, I would dare say that let there be no peace” (Oquaye, 2004: 357).

President Kufuor on the other hand was a neo-liberalist who believed in global interdependence, economic cooperation and liberalisation. He also believed in the efficacy of institutions as well as the dividends of peace and peaceful coexistence with other states in the international system. He believed in the concept and principle of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of other states (Ambassador D. K. Osei, Interviewed on April 11, 2015). It is these tenets that basically makes up the idiosyncrasy of the two leaders.

In terms of economic diplomacy, it has already been established that the two leaders assumed a similar posture. It was only in the initial years of the Rawlings administration that his ideology led him into building economic ties with the socialist progressive states and neglecting the West. However, other factors including the inability to secure enough
funds or economic assistance led him into shifting attention to the Western capitalist economies. Besides that ideological shift, the economic diplomacy of the two administrations largely remains the same. Nevertheless, it will be very difficult to establish a relationship between the extents of continuity that existed in terms of economic diplomacy and the ideological standpoints of the two leaders. This is mainly because, data gathered cannot be used to justify that the continuity in economic diplomacy between the two administrations is due to their personal idiosyncrasy.

It can however be justified that differences in ideology influenced their differences in emphasis and approach. This is because the neo-liberal ideology of Kufuor made him open to all. Due to this openness, he was able to freely approach other leaders and nations that were non democratic. He was able to forge economic relations with states in the Middle East, Russia and likewise build stronger relations with capitalist economies such as US, Britain, Canada and Netherlands. Though Rawlings had shifted to the West, he was consistently criticising the West. He was therefore shrouded in the Marxist-Socialist ideology and did not open up for ‘exploitation’. It has been identified, based on data gathered that both leaders were motivated or directed by their desire to salvage the domestic economy.

Ambassador D. K. Osei contends that, the ideology of the two leaders greatly influenced their neighbour relations. Even though both were elected twice as ECOWAS chairman, there was a vast difference between the two leaders in the aspect of good neighbourliness. This, he believes was influenced by their ideology. President Rawlings had a rift with leaders of Ghana’s immediate neighbours as well as Nigeria. His believe in ‘Peoples Power’ and distaste for deceptive nature of capitalist economies made him dislike
neighbours that were practicing similar political and economic systems or had established links with the West. He saw them as a threat to his regime and therefore harboured opposition members of such countries in Ghana (Edwin Adjei, Interviewed on June 23, 2015). He was accused of supporting dissidents from such countries like Togo and Cote d’Ivoire with the aim of causing a revolution like that of the PNDC. This generated a lot of tension between his administration and neighbouring counties.

Basically, Ambassador D. K. Osei observes that Rawlings was not able to detach himself and his sentiment from his relations with neighbours. Data gathered reveals that one of the major source of his dislike for Eyadema was his detainment in Togo when he was returning from a visit to Libya after handing over to Liman (Asamoah, 2014). Kufuor, on the other hand, who believes in an open non coercive international system did not antagonised neighbours. He established relations with both democratic and non-democratic neighbours. As a point of emphasis, his first official visit as a president was to a non-democratic Togo. Though he received a lot of criticisms for this, he justified it on grounds that good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence is a pre requisite for effective national development. This is because a country that is not at peace with its neighbours is always under a threat of attack and has no peace to focus national energies on national development. This justifies why good neighbourliness and economic diplomacy were the major strands of his foreign policy.

Conclusively, data gathered for this study proves that personal idiosyncrasy alone cannot suffice to explain the change and continuity in the areas of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness, or the making of foreign policy in general between the Rawlings and Kufuor administration. Edwin Adjei (Interviewed June 23, 2015) believes that, foreign
policies cannot be framed just based on ideology of a party or its leader. It must therefore be an end product of a conglomeration of factors which personal ideology will form a part of it. However, he noted that leaders who have the chemistry of cooperation will have cordial relations with neighbours. President Rawlings (Interviewed on April 23, 2015) confirms that any country which bases its foreign policy on the personal idiosyncrasies of its leader is “treading on dangerous ground”. He reveals that by late 1983, it was clear that the PNDC needed more practical thinkers and doers and fewer ideologues. As a result whatever policy orientation taken, in terms of economic diplomacy, by his administration was a “practical response to real needs”. This is what Edwin Adjei termed “dealing with actual realities than ideologies”. Therefore, there is the need to explore other variables that additionally explain these concepts within the Rawlings-Kufuor context.

4.7 OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

The two theoretical models that is being used for this study grants this study a host of other variables that can be used to explain continuity and change for the two administrations. These factors have been classified as international or external and domestic or internal factors. Under domestic factors, variables analysed are the economy, history, and institutions.

4.7.1 International Factors

The international level defines the extent to which factors within the international sphere act as an agent of change or continuity. According to Edwin Adjei, the international system, in this case study, acted as a stabiliser and not a change agent in terms of economic
diplomacy. With the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system became capitalist dominated. Therefore states that had earlier diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc were gradually leaning towards the West. Dr Obed Asamoah, PNDC secretary for foreign affairs observed that the end of the cold war has led to the ideological transformation of Eastern European countries. Most of the Eastern countries embraced the Western induced ERP/SAP. As a result of these new developments in the international system, conservatives like Francis Fukuyama presume this ideological transformation of Eastern Europe as ‘the end of history’ and the spread of liberal democracy as international system of government (Fukuyama, 1989). This shows the extent of transformation that occurred on the international scene. As a result of this, the Kufuor administration had no better alternative for economic diplomatic relations than to continue with the Western oriented relations initiated by the Rawlings administration in 1983.

On the other hand, the international system acted as an agent of change in the area of good neighbourliness. The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union released neighbouring countries off the fear of being attack by dissidents from rival bloc. It was a normal practice during the cold war for the Eastern or Western bloc to support dissidents of a regime that was not an ally. There was a perception among Ghana’s neighbours that Rawlings was an agent of the East in the sub region. Perceptions escalated when he openly built strong relations with Gaddafi. As a result, he became a threat to immediate neighbours as well as countries in the sub region that owed allegiance to the West. This is one of the reasons why he was accused of supporting dissident attacks in neighbouring countries. Like the neighbours, President Rawlings was also on red alert due to the possibility that his
neighbours can allow dissidents to use their countries as infiltration routes. He is noted to have accused Togo and Côte d’Ivoire for allowing dissidents to attack Ghana through their borders. Although the changes in the international system occurred during the Rawlings era, it did not fully change the perception neighbours had about him. However, after about ten years of the end of the East-West rift, Kufuor came into power. At this time, the fear of being antagonised and subsequently overthrown by a neighbour who used to be an ally to a rival bloc was minimal. Most countries had stopped labelling themselves with names of the ideological divide. In addition, ECOWAS and AU were growing stronger and the need for peaceful coexistence were one of the main objectives of these institutions. As a result of these factors, the international environment itself was ripped for good neighbourliness to thrive (Edwin Adjei, Interviewed on June 23, 2015).

Another factor identified by Goldmann framework in the international system that seems applicable to the case study is dependence. The concept of dependence stipulates that there is a tendency for continuity in foreign relations if there is mutual dependence between the actors involved. It is assumed that there is some level of dependence in terms of economic relations between Ghana and the Western capitalist economies. Whilst Ghana depends on them for economic and financial support, they depend on Ghana for raw materials as inputs for their industrial sector. Due to this dependence relation between the two sides, it is very difficult for a government to break economic relations between the two factions, hence continuity.

4.7.2 The Economy

Economic factors determines the extent to which the general economic development affect foreign policy in terms of change and continuity. The stature of the economy can be
observed through variables such as the GDP and GDP growth rate, inflation, level of unemployment, and national debt stock. The state of the economy has been identified as one of the major variables that influences foreign policy formulation, especially for developing states. In the Ghanaian setting, a study by Aluko (1975) identified the economy as a variable for change. However, this study identified the economy as an important agent of stability that ensured continuity in the foreign policies of Presidents Rawlings and Kufuor in the area of economic diplomacy. As stated earlier, the Rawlings administration was faced with a deteriorating economy when it took over power from President Limann. This difficulties in the economy influenced governments to build economic ties with the West after their relation with the East did not yield much dividends as expected. Ideology took the administration to the East and progressive states but the continuous deterioration of the economy compelled them to align to the West. Though efforts were made with the initiation of ERP/SAP, PAMSCAD and obtaining numerous grants from the Western capitalist economies, it did little in terms of domestic economic development. As a result, the Kufuor administration also inherited an economy likened to the state of the economy in 1983.

Like the Rawlings administration, the desire to secure economic sustainability influenced the Kufuor administration to continue economic relations with the West. Though personal idiosyncrasy and party ideology would have influenced the government to build economic relations with the West, President Kufuor preferred weaning Ghana off dependence on donor support. That is why the establishment of trade links was one of the major tenets of his economic diplomacy and not constant receiving of aid or donor support. All interviewees, elaborated on the impact of domestic economic conditions on the stability of
foreign policy under Rawlings. Edwin Adjei for instance believes that domestic economic demands for a turnaround or economic sustainability resulted in consistency of Goals that led to consistency in orientation. As a result, relations with IFIs have been consistently used to pursue such goals with the need to bring about socio-economic uplifting of the people.

4.7.3 History
Ghana has long historical relations with the West, especially Britain, which both regimes could not have avoided. During the colonial rule, Ghana was essentially considered as an extension of the United Kingdom. Its institutions, educational system, laws, and administrative methods were largely a replica of the systems in Britain. Ghanaian civil servants worked under, and were trained by British. Upon independence Ghana adopted the British style of government which was later changed under the first republican constitution. What these benchmarks indicate is that, Ghana’s systems (political, economic, military, and social) were essentially Western by birth. Therefore, due to these strong bonds, various governments since independence have continuously related with the West economically and no government have been able to totally truncate ties with the West, especially Britain.

Even at the height of anti-Western campaign (1961-1966) and the springing up of the philosophy of non-aligned, Dr Nkrumah could not break ties with the British. Surprisingly, it was Dr Nkrumah who, at the Prime Ministers Conference in July 1964, proposed the establishment of the Commonwealth Secretariat (Aluko, 1975: 58). In similar relations to the West, assistance from the US was sought for the construction of the Akosombo Dam (K.
Owusu et al., 2008). Nkrumah himself alluded to this and was re-echoed by Busia in his address to the UN General Assembly that

... [Ghana’s] own historical contacts and experiences have brought it about that we share more common interests with some [Western] countries at this point of time than with others (Ghana Press Release No. 527/68; Times (London), 22 October 1969 cited in Aluko, 1975).

Subsequent governments have all had economic relations with the West. Even the Acheampong government that was not ready to enter into any relations with the West, later modified his stance and negotiated with the Western creditors on multilateral basis. This shows the extent of relations (bilateral and multilateral) Ghana has had with the West since independence. Therefore, the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations were victims of the status quo. D. K. Osei shares in this view that historical ties that yield dividends should not be abandoned. However, this study was not able to validate history as a substantial variable for change in neighbour relations between the two administrations. This is because, historical facts do not show consistency in Ghana’s neighbour relations.

Related to this factor is what Goldmann termed as domestic institutionalisation under political stabilisers. Domestic institutionalisation is basically concerned with the level of expectation and consistency. It is believed that when a nation repetitively follows or pursue a particular line of policy, the action of the government becomes predictable when the nation is faced with a similar problem in the future. That ensures continuity in the foreign policy orientation. In this context, Ghana, in history, has always sought for shield from the West and its Bretton Woods institutions anytime the country is in economic crises. Therefore, anytime the country is in similar situation, the expected remedy or foreign policy choice is to seek for assistance from the West. President Rawlings followed suit and
President Kufuor did same. Edwin Adjei observes that Ghana, under both administrations, virtually became a pupil of the IFIs. This makes the policy of seeking assistance from the Western capitalist economies and their associated IFIs self-reinforcing.

However, the history variable also represents an agent of change in terms of the Kufuor administration’s relations with Cote d’Ivoire. The cordial relations that existed between the PP or Busia administration and Cote d’Ivoire under Felix Houphouet-Boigny was replicated during the Kufuor-Gbagbo administrations. The cordial relationship was based on long standing historical relationship between the Danquah-Busia tradition (PP and United Party-UP) and Cote d’Ivoire (Library of Congress Studies, 1994b). This relationship was predicated the fact that, most of its members sought for asylum in Cote d’Ivoire when they felt threatened during the Nkrumah, Acheampong and Rawlings eras. It is worthy of note that, granting of asylum to ‘dissidents’ was one of the factors that contributed to heightened tensions between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire during the Rawlings administration. It is therefore understandable that a government that has emerged from this tradition will have a healthy relationship with a country that once served as an abode for its founding fathers and members.

4.7.4 Political Institutions

Under political institutions, the civil service as well as the constitution is identified as a major source of continuity in foreign policy decisions. The civil service in Ghana do not change even if there is a regime or administration change. Therefore, there is a high level of continuum in the civil service. There is a high level of institutional memory in the civil service as well. Though they do not play an active or direct part in the policy formulation, they server as an information source on which decisions taken must be based. They,
therefore, serve as a repository of information. Studies have shown how the civil service is an inhibitor to change (Aluko, 1975). This is what Goldmann’s framework termed as administrative stabilisers, where the bureaucracy acts an inhibitor to change. The Kufuor and Rawlings administrations are no exceptions to this. The Chief Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), under the Kufuor administration, Mr Simon Sonia Puli, served in various capacities at Ghana’s Missions in East Berlin, New York (German Democratic Republic), Ottawa and Paris, as Chief of Protocol and Director of Personnel and Training as well as acting Director of the Finance and Accounts Bureau at the MFA under the Rawlings administration. Likewise, all the senior Foreign Service Officers at the MFA, who served under the Kufuor administration, occupied various positions under the Rawlings administration (World Diplomatic Guide-Ghana, 2006).

Another aspect of political institution that act as a stabiliser is the constitution. The second part of the Rawlings regime came with a well drafted constitution that defines how the government of Ghana should conduct itself internationally as well as relating to her neighbours. In terms of economic diplomacy, one aspect captured in Article thirty six (36) clause four (4) is that “Foreign Investment shall be encouraged within Ghana, subject to any law for the time being in force regulating investment in Ghana”. This influenced both administrations’ focus on creating an enabling environment for FDI to thrive. This provision did not only guide the civilian years of the Rawlings administration but also during the revolution years. As admitted by President Rawlings and Dr Obed Asamoah, who was the Secretary/Minister for Foreign Affairs at both terms, that what the legal team of the PNDC put together outlining the administration’s common aims and principles forms
the core of the chapter six (6) “Directive Principles of State Policy” in the 1992 constitution (Interview of President Rawlings on April, 2015; Asamoah, 2014).

The study identified the above-listed variables as factors that influenced change and continuity between the two administrations under study. It must however be noted that these variable are not independent from each other. They are interlinked and a culmination of two or more adequately accounts for change and continuity.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

An analysis of continuity and change in foreign policy is a key to understanding foreign policy decision making and its dynamics. In light of the happenings in contemporary international relations, along with the concept of change and continuity gaining salience, it was imperative that such a study is also conducted in Ghana. The primary aim of this study was to fill in this literature gap. The study was conducted to investigate into factors that account for continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy direction or orientation with the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations as a case study. The study therefore engages in a comparative analysis of the two administrations in the areas of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness. It is believed that these two parameters are sufficient in defining a government’s foreign policy orientation. The researcher therefore conducted interviews with open ended questions. In addition, comprehensive study of speeches and statements of the two leaders involved as well as their ministers of state during the years under review was conducted to unravel the variables that causes continuity and change between the two administrations. The theoretical model employed by this study was used as a framework to draw variables for analysis, thus research questions were drawn out of the theory in order to guide the study. The purpose of this chapter is to summarise the findings of the study, draw conclusions as well as suggest recommendations for future research.
5.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

5.2.1 Research Question 1:

What were the major policies undertaken under the Kufuor and Rawlings administrations in terms of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness?

The study found out that, economic diplomacy and good neighbour relations were the two major foreign policy benchmarks of the two administrations. Both administrations took giant steps in establishing economic relations with IFIs. Also both administrations established and strengthened bilateral relations with donor countries and partners. A major foreign policy decision taken under the Rawlings administration, in terms of economic diplomacy, was the ERP/SAP initiative that seeks to alleviate the nation from its economic woes. Also initial bilateral relations were established with progressive nations. Just like the Rawlings administration, the Kufuor’s administration made giant strands in economic diplomacy with the adoption of HIPC and MCC initiatives as well as the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral ties with development partners including the US, Japan, Britain and China. However, intra West African economic diplomacy was minimal for both administrations, relative to economic diplomacy outside West Africa. In terms of good neighbourliness, both administrations made efforts in establishing diplomatic links as well as friendly relations with neighbouring states. The study found out that good neighbourliness was a policy objective of both regimes though, they approached it differently.
5.2.2 Research Question 2:

What were the differences and similarities in the foreign policy orientation of Rawlings and Kufuor?

The study found out that, there were obvious differences and similarities in the foreign policy decisions of the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations in the aspect of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness. In terms of economic diplomacy, both administrations, under the heaviness to resuscitate the domestic economy, pursued similar economic diplomatic relations. This is because, whilst the Rawlings administration implemented an IMF/World Bank initiative (SAP/ERP), the Kufuor administration did same with the implementation of the HIPC programme. Even in terms of bilateral economic relations, the study identified that both administrations paid much attention to capitalist economies. However, the study identified that the only difference in the economic diplomacy of the two leaders was in terms of level of effort and dividends accrued. It was revealed that, the Kufuor administration made a lot of effort and accrued much in terms of economic diplomacy than the Rawlings administration. In the aspect of good neighbourliness, both administrations differed markedly. The tensions that existed between Ghana and her neighbours during the Rawlings administrations were replaced with cordiality and peaceful coexistence, devoid of the accusations and counter accusations of covert operations that existed under the Rawlings administrations.
5.2.3 Research Question 3:

**How did personal idiosyncrasy influence continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy under Rawlings and Kufuor’s administrations?**

First and foremost, the study established that, the two leaders differed markedly in their ideological or philosophical orientation. Consequently, an analysis of the data revealed that, the dichotomy between Rawlings’ and Kufuor’s neighbour relations were significantly influenced by their personal idiosyncrasy. However, it did not have the same impact on their economic diplomacy. This is because, it has been established that both leaders took a similar route in terms of economic diplomacy. Even though the study establishes that the two leaders differ strikingly in ideology, personal idiosyncrasy alone cannot be sufficient either as an agent of change and continuity or a factor that had a great impact on the formulation of Ghana’s foreign policies during the years understudy.

5.2.4 Research Question 4:

**What other factors accounted for the continuity and change in their external relations?**

The study found out that foreign policy under these administrations were not solely influenced by personal idiosyncrasy, though it influences certain aspects. As a result, international factors, domestic economy, history and political institutions were identified as the other factors that can jointly account for continuity and change between both administrations. These factors were drawn from the theoretical framework that underpins the study. The domestic economy, history and political institutions constitutes the internal factors whilst the external factors are subsumed under the international factors. This, therefore, acknowledges the impact of both internal and external factors on, not only the making of foreign policy under the regimes but also on the concepts of continuity and
change. The study further envisages the continuous impact of these variables on change and continuity as well as Ghana’s foreign policy in general.

5.4 CONCLUSION

What factors accounted for continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy under the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations in the areas of economic diplomacy and good neighbourliness? This was the overarching question that laid the foundation for this study. To answer this question, two theoretical frameworks were adopted to serve as models for the study. The basic assumption for the study was that, the personal idiosyncrasy of the leaders (Presidents Rawlings and Kufuor) could account for such continuity and change. In addition, data gathered was analysed to reveal that both administrations pursued similar policies in terms of economic diplomacy, but differed in neighbour relations. In other words, there was continuity in economic diplomacy, but change in neighbour relations. It was therefore revealed, after an analysis of the ideological stance of the two leaders that, ideology, solely, cannot be an adequate variable for continuity and change. Therefore, discussions of the case study revealed that, other variables in conjunction with personal idiosyncrasy of the leaders accounted for the continuity and change in their foreign policy decisions. These variables are grouped as international factors and domestic factors (domestic economy, history and domestic political institutions).
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations of this study principally address the academia as well as the foreign policy making community. The Study, after an analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy over two decades, revealed the extent of losses and negative impact the nation suffered due to the antagonistic nature of relations with neighbours, under the Rawlings administration. On the contrary, the study also revealed the gains accrued as a result of healthy and cordial relations with neighbours. It is therefore recommended that, subsequent governments must make efforts towards fostering good neighbour relations.

Also, the study revealed that intra West African trade and economic diplomacy was quite marginal. Therefore, it is recommended that subsequent governments build stronger trade links with neighbouring countries. This, to a large extent, will help strengthen ECOWAS in achieving its objectives.

The inadequacy of public opinion as a factor for foreign policy change and continuity speaks volumes about the extent to which citizens are abreast of foreign policy issues. Foreign policy issues seems to be for the reserved few or senior Foreign Service officials and members of the government. However, there must be concerted efforts to bring everyone on board to contribute to such decision making, especially in a democracy.

On a hindsight, the study discovered that Ghana has gradually lost hold of its leadership role on the African continent that existed under Nkrumah. This is partly because, Ghana’s economy is excessively aid driven, though both regimes aimed at weaning Ghana off external overdependence. Therefore, nation lacked the financial resources to spearhead certain activities on the African continent. It is therefore recommended that subsequent
government should fashion out economic diplomacy aimed at industrialisation. This will create jobs as well as serve market point for local producers.

To the academic world, it is recommended that this study be replicated in the analysis of other administrations with the aim of testing the validity of the variables identified in the study. Also, the identification of some domestic sources for continuity and change serves as a foundation for further in-depth analysis on internal sources for Ghana’s foreign policy. In addition, the study precipitates advance studies into why the ‘public’ feature little and have little or no interest in foreign policy decision making.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR RAWLINGS

INTRODUCTION

This research is aimed at accounting for continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy under the PNDC/NDC and NPP administrations.

International

1 What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict?

2 Is the political future predictable; in what sense and to what extent?

3 How much control can one have over his foreign policy?

Foreign Policy in Ghana

1 What has been the driving force Ghana’s foreign policy?

2 What is Ghana’s national interest and to what extent does it affect the foreign policy directions or orientation of a regime?

3 Who is responsible for making Ghana’s foreign policy?

Foreign Policy under PNDC/NDC

1 What influenced the foreign policy posture of the PNDC government in the early years of the take over?

2 What influenced the PNDC’s change of ideological orientation in 1983?

3 What form (s) did the regime’s international economic relations take and what were the outcomes of such policy measures?

4 To what extent was the PNDC/NDC influenced by Ghana’s history of international economic relations?
5 Was good neighbourliness a foreign policy objective of the administration (PNDC/NDC)

6 What was the nature of Ghana’s relationship with its neighbours? (Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Togo, Nigeria)

7 What factors influenced such relations?

**Continuity and Change**

1 Is there a significant difference or similarity with Kufuor’s foreign policy?

2 Is personal idiosyncrasy a factor for the change or continuity?

3 To what extent can other factors (international pressure, state of domestic economy etc.) for such continuity or change?
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE ON KUFUOR’S FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION

This research is aimed at accounting for continuity and change in Ghana’s foreign policy under the PNDC/NDC and NPP administrations.

International

1. What is the essential nature of political life? Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict?

2. Is the political future predictable; in what sense and to what extent?

3. How much control can one have over his foreign policy?

Foreign Policy in Ghana

1. What has been the driving force Ghana’s foreign policy?

2. What is Ghana’s national interest and to what extent does it affect the foreign policy directions or orientation of a regime?

3. Who is responsible for making Ghana’s foreign policy?

Foreign Policy under NPP (2001-2008)

1. What were the major foreign policy initiatives in the areas of economic diplomacy and neighbour relations under the Kufuor administration?

2. What factors influenced such policies?

3. Is there a significant change or similarity with policies pursued under the Rawlings administration?

Change and Continuity

1. What is President Kufuor’s ideological orientation towards world politics?

2. To what extent can his ideology explain the differences/similarities in policies with President Rawlings?
3 Can other factors plausibly account for the continuity and change in their foreign policies?