GHANA ARMED FORCES’ PARTICIPATION IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN MALI: POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS TO GHANA

BY

AMINU MOHAMMED SHAIBU

(10155516)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LEGON NOVEMBER 2014
DECLARATION

I, Aminu Mohammed Shaibu, hereby declare that this study is my original piece of research and that no part of it has been submitted anywhere for the award of any degree. In places where the work of other authors have been cited, due acknowledgements have been made and references made to such authors. I therefore accept full responsibility for any errors therein.

AMINU MOHAMMED SHAIBU (STUDENT) 

DR KEN AHORSU (SUPERVISOR)
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the ever loving memories of my late father, Alhaji Shaibu Karim (May his soul continue to rest in perfect peace) and my sweet mother, Hajia Mariam Shaibu. It is also dedicated to my lovely wife Fuseini Assana and children; Jamila, Mariam and Hussein who had to sacrifice the fatherly company to spare me some time during the study. May the Almighty Allah bless all of you.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I thank the Almighty Allah for providing me with the strength, wisdom and determination throughout the period of writing this research work. I wish to express my profound gratitude to Dr Ken Ahorsu, a Senior Research Fellow at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) under whose supervision and guidance I was able to complete this thesis. His useful corrections, suggestions and dedication to see me through the period of the study are exceptional.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to the staff of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) and LECIAD Libraries for their wonderful assistance to me during the period of the research. I also wish to acknowledge the support of Dr. Kwesi Aning and Mr. Festus Aubyn, Dr. Thomas Jaye and Colonel Emmanuel Kotia (PhD) all of KAIPTC for their support. This work could not have been completed on time without their involvement.

My final gratitude goes to the senior lecturers of LECIAD, the Commandant and Directing Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces Command and staff College (GAFCSC) for their unflinching support and encouragement during the entire period of the programme. May God richly bless us all.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENT</th>
<th>PAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CHAPTER ONE

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

1.0 Background to the Study ................................................................. 1
1.1 Statement of the Problem ................................................................. 3
1.2 Research Questions ............................................................................. 5
1.3 Objectives ......................................................................................... 5
1.4 Rationale of the Study ...................................................................... 5
1.5 Theoretical Framework ...................................................................... 7
1.6.0 Literature Review ........................................................................ 9
1.6.1 Promoting Global Peace and Security ............................................. 9
1.6.2 Terrorism and Religious Militancy ................................................. 11
1.6.3 ECOWAS and Conflict Management ................................................ 12
1.7 Research Methodology and Sources of Data ..................................... 14
1.8 Arrangement of Chapters .................................................................. 15
1.9 Scope of the Study ........................................................................... 15
Endnotes ................................................................................................. 16
CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MALI CONFLICT AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN BELLIGERENTS

2.0 Introduction..............................................................................................................................17

2.1 An overview of the crisis in Mali ........................................................................................... 17

2.1.1 Marginalisation of Northern Mali .......................................................................................19

2.1.2 Groups and Principal Actors in the Conflict in Mali.................................................................20

2.1.3 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)........................................................................21

2.1.4 Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)...............................................21

2.1.5 Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA)..................................................23

2.1.6 Ansar Dine............................................................................................................................23

2.1.7 The Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA).........................................................................24

2.1.8 Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF).......................................................................25

2.1.9 The Government of Mali..................................................................................................25

2.1.10 Ganda Koy/Ganda Izo Militias..........................................................................................25

2.2 The Conflict in Mali: The Tuareg Dimension......................................................................26

2.2.2 Grievances.........................................................................................................................27

2.2.3 Economic Marginalization................................................................................................27

2.2.4 Access to Land and Environmental Change......................................................................28

2.2.5 Political Marginalization...................................................................................................29

2.2.6 Violent Repression............................................................................................................29

2.2.7 Failure of Successive Governments to Implement Provisions of Peace Agreements.........29

Endnotes........................................................................................................................................31

CHAPTER THREE
MINUSMA MANDATE, GHANA’S ROLE AND POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS TO GHANA

3.0 Introduction...........................................................................................................................34

3.1 MINUSMA Mandate...........................................................................................................34
3.2 Ghana’s Role in Resolving the Malian Conflict ................................................................. 36
3.3 GHANENGCOY Organisation ........................................................................................... 36
3.4 GHANENGCOY Mission .................................................................................................. 37
3.4.1 Horizontal Construction ............................................................................................. 37
3.4.2 Vertical Construction ................................................................................................... 38
3.4.3 Water Production ......................................................................................................... 38
3.4.4 Logistics ....................................................................................................................... 39
3.4.5 Other Tasks ................................................................................................................. 39
3.5 Ghana Aviation Contingent Unit ...................................................................................... 39
3.6 The Consequences of the Malian Crisis on the West African Sub-region ....................... 40
3.7.0 Potential Security Threats to Ghana ............................................................................. 43
3.7.1 Terrorism ..................................................................................................................... 43
3.7.2 Kidnapping .................................................................................................................. 44
3.7.3 Piracy .......................................................................................................................... 45
3.7.4 Hijacking ..................................................................................................................... 46
3.7.5 Mercenarism ............................................................................................................... 46
3.7.6 Health Implications...................................................................................................... 48
3.8.0 Possible Ways of Preventing Reprisal Attacks on Ghana ............................................. 48
3.8.1 Collaboration and Information Sharing ........................................................................ 48
3.8.2 Adequate Institutional Cooperation across International Borders .............................. 49
3.8.3 Preparedness of Security Forces Against the Threats................................................. 50
3.8.4 Appropriate Training and Equipment for Security Services ...................................... 50
3.8.5 Public Awareness and Alertness ................................................................................ 51
Endnotes .................................................................................................................................. 52

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 53
4.1 Summary of Key Findings ............................................................................................... 53
4.2 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 56
4.4 Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 57

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 59
# LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>Africa International Support Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>All Peoples Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
<td>Alternative Supply Route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>ECOWAS Standby Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Populaire Ivorien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAF</td>
<td>Ghana Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoG</td>
<td>Government of Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberian United for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDFC</td>
<td>Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDSF</td>
<td>Malian Defence and Security Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
<td>United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJP</td>
<td>Movement for Justice and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>Movement for the National Liberation of the Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCI</td>
<td>Movement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPIGO</td>
<td>Ivorian Popular Movement for the Far West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>Main Supply Route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJAW</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSO</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDA</td>
<td>Rassemblement Democratique Africain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSCs</td>
<td>Regional Security Complexes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSCT</td>
<td>Regional Security Complex Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSRG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary-General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOB</td>
<td>Temporary Operating Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF</td>
<td>UN Emergency Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>UN Operation in Cote D’Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOGBIS</td>
<td>UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>United Nations Transition Assistance Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

Ghana has been participating in peacekeeping operations on the sub-regional, regional and international levels since the 1960s. Since then, the country has been contributing troops, police and military staff officers, civilian staff and military observers. The country has become one of the largest troop contributors to UN peacekeeping operations and as of November 2014, Ghana was contributing troops to 6 UN missions across the world. Ghana’s participation in MINUSMA has drawn a lot of debate in respect of security threats to the country as some of the negative forces in the conflict including religious extremists have threatened to attack countries that will intervene or interfere in the conflict in any form. Although the debate is ongoing in the media and other forums, there has not been any academic research to substantiate the claim. This study examines the potential security threats to Ghana as a result of the participation of her Armed Forces in MINUSMA. Primary data from interviews with global security experts, senior military and police officers as well as international news analysts were conducted to augment secondary data which were obtained from books, journal articles and the internet. The study revealed a number of potential security threats including terrorism, piracy, kidnapping, hijacking and mercenary activities. It concluded by recommending joint police/military patrols collaboration of security forces of Ghana with their counterparts in neighbouring countries, strengthening of cooperation between internal and external security agencies as well as extensive public education to sensitise the general public as ways of managing the threats.
CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH DESIGN

1.0 Background to the Study

Since the end of the Cold War, the emergence of intrastate conflicts has become one of the major threats to global peace and security. Post-September 11 2001 events in global politics including the declaration of Global War on Terror (GWOT), the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan have all given the indication of the extent of global insecurity. In addition to the spread of terrorism, transnational security threats such as arms trafficking, human trafficking, drug trafficking, piracy, kidnapping, hijacking, money laundering and smuggling among others have also weakened the security of several countries including West African states.

It is worrying to note that Africa is becoming a breeding ground for Islamist terrorist cells and religious militancy. Most terrorists use the continent as safe haven. Boko Haram is believed to be operating with impunity in Nigeria. The activities of the group for example, have greatly challenged the national security apparatus of Nigeria. With their sophisticated warfare and ‘guerilla tactics’, Boko Haram, which translates as “Western Education is forbidden,” has committed heinous crimes in the name of Islam. According to Kaldor M. (2006), the new warfare tends to avoid battle and to control territory through political control of the population, but whereas guerrilla warfare, at least in theory, as articulated by Mao Tse-Tung or Che Guevara, aimed to capture ‘hearts and minds’, the new warfare borrows from counter-insurgency techniques of destabilization aimed at sowing ‘fear and hatred.’ Similar guerrilla tactics have been adopted in conflicts on the African continent. In Africa, intrastate conflicts such as civil
wars have called for military interventions by the UN, regional as well as sub-regional bodies such as the AU and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) respectively.

The conflict in Mali has a long history. It could be traced from the early independence days in the 1960s and the series of Tuareg rebellions that followed. A pact was signed in 1992 following the early 1990s rebellion. It however failed to produce the desired results and a new rebellion occurred in 2006. The 2006 rebellion was relatively less significant until Tuareg rebels, many of whom were in Libya returned to Mali following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. Their arrival with sophisticated weapons from Libya increased the momentum of the rebellion as a new Tuareg rebel movement; the Movement for the National Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) also added a religious dimension to the crisis. The Tuaregs teamed up with the AQIM to fight the Malian government, although for different objectives. The conflict was intensified when military officers staged a coup d’ état in March 2012 followed by the capture of Northern Mali by the MNLA and other terrorist groups. In spite of the fact that Tuareg autonomy previously had been a facade for other demands for power and positions, the MNLA declared full independence of Azawad.² The MNLA and the Tuaregs brought the Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal townships of Northern Mali under rebel control.³

On 11 January 2013, French troops launched an air assault on strongholds of the rebels in the North.⁴ This was followed by the French Army troops’ raids on most of the rebel controlled areas. The French Forces were assisted by Chad and Niger, ended the offensive of the rebels and gained control over the cities of Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Despite the French intervention, the rebels appear not to have completely lost the battle for Northern Mali. The Tuareg rebels and their affiliates are believed to have the capacity to put up strong resistance and attack towns
formally under French control. For fear of the spread of religious fundamentalism and terrorism, the AU and ECOWAS got involved in finding lasting solutions to the conflict.

As part of finding solutions to the Mali crisis, a joint ECOWAS/AU mission and the Malian Army called the Africa International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), deployed in the rebel controlled areas in 2012. On 1 July 2013, MINUSMA was established pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 which took over the peacekeeping mandate from AFISMA. Because the UN/AU/ECOWAS do not have standing forces of their own, member countries are obliged to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions. It is within this context that Ghana deployed troops to Mali. The deployed troops are a contingent of construction engineering company and an aviation contingent unit. However, the participation of Ghana could have implications for the country’s security in case the militant Islamist groups decide to launch reprisal attacks against Ghana’s interest within and outside Mali. This has raised security concerns of potential attacks on Ghana and other Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) by terrorists and extremists in Mali. This work attempts to examine the expected security threats, implication for peace and security in Ghana, and how the threats should be managed.

1.1 Statement of the Research Problem

Ghana has participated in several international, regional and sub-regional peacekeeping missions in the past without blemish. However, its contributions to MINUSMA seem to have generated a lot of public debates due to the strategic context or the environment and issues at stake. Religious extremism, ethnicity and deep-seated political and socio-economic marginalization of the northern part of the country have all contributed to making the Malian crisis substantially multifaceted. Moreover, in Mali, there are several ideological, religious and jihadist groups
which operate with impunity across borders and across the Sahel wielding a high degree of influence in both Western and Northern parts of Africa. In its attempt at restoring peace and security in Mali, MINUSMA has had to deal with many threats some of which are transnational in nature.

Before the deployment of MINUSMA, there were threats from these terrorist groups and religious extremist groups in Mali including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of reprisal attacks against TCCs who contribute to “an invading force”. The experiences of Kenya and Uganda in their participation in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) are evidence of how terrorism, for example, can be inflicted on TCCs. In Somalia for instance, religious extremists, the al-Shabab have similar ideology as the AQIM, Ansar Dine and the MNLA regarding the “Islamisation” of the territories that they control. In the Middle East, there is an ongoing conflict over the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate by a group called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and it is believed jihadist groups in West Africa such as Boko Haram and AQIM are taking inspiration from the religious militants in the Middle East.

Although Ghana has not suffered from reprisal attacks as a result of participation in peacekeeping in the past, due to some of the past experiences of other countries such as Kenya, Uganda and the United States of America, there are concerns that Ghana’s participation in MINUSMA can pose a security threat to the country. However, no scholarly study or research in that regard has been conducted to disaggregate this claim. What exist are mere speculations and media reports. It is within this context that this study attempts to examine the potential security threats to Ghana as a result of its participation in the UN operations in Mali with a view to suggesting possible ways of preventing attacks on Ghana.
1.2 Research Questions

The research questions that would be critical in addressing the research problem are as follows:

a. What are the causes of the crisis in Mali and who are the main belligerents?
b. What is the peacekeeping mandate of MINUSMA?
c. What are the potential security threats to Ghana as a result of its participation in MINUSMA?
d. How can the security threats to Ghana be managed?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The objective of the study is to examine the potential security threats to Ghana following GAF’s participation in PSO in Mali with a view to making recommendations. Specific objectives of the study will be to:

a. Provide a historical overview of the conflict in Mali.
b. Examine the mandate of MINUSMA.
c. Ascertain the potential security threats to Ghana as a result of her participation in MINUSMA.
d. Identify ways of managing potential security threats to Ghana as a result of her participation in MINUSMA.

1.4 Rationale of the Study

The study seeks to investigate the possibility of reprisal attacks on Ghana as a result of the participation of her armed forces in PSO in Mali. Boko Haram has gained notoriety in Nigeria.
AQIM, together with the MNLA and the Tuareg rebels have become very active in northern Mali. Given that al-Shabab relentlessly attacks Kenya for various reasons including the latter’s participation in PSO in Somalia, now that Ghana has deployed its troops in Mali, what could be the concomitant security threats to its national security and what must Ghana do to prevent or manage any breach of its national security.

The findings of the study will be beneficial to the individual, institution, Government of Ghana (GoG) and the academia. At the individual level, every citizen of Ghana will be awoken to the realities of a possible reprisal attacks by terrorists. Citizen vigilante will greatly help in ensuring that infiltrators in the communities are fished out and reported to the police for subsequent action to be taken by the authorities concerned. Again, the researcher who happens to be a military officer will get a better understanding of the potential threats to Ghana thereby enabling him to provide informed suggestions to the GAF High Command in its effort at protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ghana including preventing and fighting terrorism.

At the institutional level, the GAF and the various security services including the Ghana Police Service, the Prison Service, the Ghana Immigration Service and the Bureau of National Investigations among others will begin to take the appropriate strategies towards enhancing the existing security measures. The findings will also help the institutions to put in place specific measures that will enable them effectively ensure internal security and prevent or fight terrorism whenever it occurs.

At the Government or national level, the findings and recommendations of the study will enable the national security and the GoG formulate the appropriate anti-terrorism laws and policies. Again, the findings will help the GoG in taking the right decisions towards adequately equipping
the various security services by way of providing appropriate logistics and information gathering and sharing mechanisms both among the Ghanaian security services and in collaboration their counterparts in neighbouring countries.

As an academic exercise, the findings of this study are expected to add to the body of knowledge in the academic environment either in the same area of study or in any other related fields. It will therefore provide future researchers an appropriate source of reference.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

This work is based on the concepts of religious militancy, and religious militancy is analyzed within the context of Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). Religious militancy has been on the ascendancy in West Africa. From the Niger Delta region of Nigeria to the Sahel regions of West Africa, militant groups have taken advantage of limited economic and political opportunities as a tool to recruit people for conflict. Preaching a version of Islam according to their own ideological interpretation, these groups remain intolerant of other religious beliefs, and have, as their main strategy, the spread of terror and violence.

The activities of these Islamist groups have also had implications for other West African states. This is the case because of the regionalization of the conflict, a concept that is adequately explained by the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT). The RSCT was propounded by Barry Buzan in 1983 in his book People, States and Fear. In 2003, the RSCT was presented as a grand theory in a book Regions and Powers by Buzan B. and Waever O. with the aim of creating a linkage between constructivism and structuralism. The RSCT is a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another. The basic concept
underpinning Regional Security Complexes (RSCs) is that “most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than long ones, insecurity is often associated with proximity.”

Most of the countries within the West African sub-region have experienced one form of civil conflict or another but the ongoing conflict in Mali presents a peculiar case. This is because of the strong religious influence that is being exerted by AQIM, Ansar Dine, MUJAO and the MNLA in line with the demands of the Tuaregs. For declaring the “independence of Azawad”, the MNLA, AQIM, and the Tuareg rebels and their affiliates perceive any intervention force as a stumbling block in their quest for statehood. The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to which Ghana pledged an engineer company was initially the main peacekeeping force that the sub-regional security arrangement could mobilize to keep the peace in Mali in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into other neighbouring countries.

For ECOWAS, the case of regional security complex has not had concomitant effects on the mobilization of efforts towards regional security because many West African states remain poor. Nevertheless, the strength of the RSCT to this work is that the crisis in Northern Mali had assumed regional dimensions. First, the relative gains of these groups in Northern Mali threatened the modest gains recorded by Mali in its democratic dispensation. In addition, it created conditions for the proliferation of arms across the Sahel regions of West Africa, which already have fertile spots for mushrooming Islamist groups in West Africa. Effectively, the Mali conflict has been regionalized because these Islamist groups were keen to open a new front, after occupying areas that include the Niger Delta in Nigeria and Northern Africa. The worst case scenario is that worsening security in Mali would further undermine the quest for the already-
fragile security in West Africa, and terrorist groups in West Africa would coalesce with their counterparts in Mali as they use tools of violence and fear to wage war in the sub-region.

As a result of the regional effects of the conflicts in Mali, ECOWAS had to intervene in the conflict by employing a range of measures including pacific settlements of grievances and the possible use of coercion. As one of the few countries in West Africa with an enviable record in conflict resolution, specifically peacekeeping, Ghana has had to play a leading role in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Mali. However as one of the TCCs, Ghana’s participation in PSOs in Mali has implications for Ghana’s national security. It is these potential security threats that this work seeks to examine.

1.6 Literature Review

In the review of the relevant literature, particular attention is paid to the concept of terrorism, UN peacekeeping as well as an overview of ECOWAS interventions in intra-state conflicts in the West African sub-region.

1.6.1 Promoting Global Peace and Security

The incidences of conflicts in Africa have been high after the Cold War. The break-up of former USSR after the Cold War led to the situation where weapons were brought into Africa. The weapons were then sold at cheap prices to sustain the economy of nations that emerged from the break-up. This resulted in the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in Africa. Thus many militia groups began to have access to SALW. In addition, most of the leaders in Africa who had become autocratic and brutal because of the support they had from super powers could no longer count on this support after the Cold War. Many groups began to challenge the authority of these leaders and this often led to civil wars.
Kofi Annan, the 7th UN Secretary General observed the high incidence of conflicts in Africa after the Cold War:

In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries in Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts accounting for more than half of all war related deaths world-wide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons. The consequences of these conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long term stability, prosperity and peace of its peoples.\textsuperscript{10}

One of the tools that the UN has used to promote peace and security after the end of the Cold War in the West African sub-region is peacekeeping. Peacekeeping entails the coordinated presence of military, police and civilian personnel responsible for a wider range of task such as humanitarian assistance, policing, human rights and electoral monitoring, social and economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.\textsuperscript{11} In West Africa, Liberia and Sierra Leone are but a few of the countries which have benefitted from peacekeeping missions.\textsuperscript{12}

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the 6th UN secretary General, expressed the importance of UN peacekeeping thus:

United Nations peacekeeping stands out as one of the Organisation’s most original and ambitious undertakings in its effort to control conflict and promote peace. It is an inspired innovation. The Blue Helmets will continue to break new grounds as the UN is called upon not only to contain conflicts and alleviate the suffering they cause, but also to prevent the outbreak of war among nations and to build towards enduring peace.\textsuperscript{13}

Threats to global security have changed since the UN was established. Non state actors have become credible threats to the dominance of states. Religious militancy is one example of the category of threats that have overwhelmed some of the world’s powerful states, such as the United States of America (USA) and Britain. In West Africa, the internal security problems in Northern Mali and the
role played by Islamist groups are indications that the religious militancy can weaken security in West Africa.

1.6.2 Terrorism and Religious Militancy

Regional insecurity remains a bane in West Africa. Recent security crisis in Northern Mali has underscored the fragile nature of security in West Africa, and the threats posed by terrorists and Islamists groups in West Africa. Globally, terrorism remains one of the often discussed issues. Historically, terrorism has its origins in revolutionary political violence, and is currently being associated with an illegal unconventional war against a society or against an established order.\textsuperscript{14}

Although there are multifarious definitions of the concept, terrorism has generally been used to denote “an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by clandestine individual, groups, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets.”\textsuperscript{15} There are various causes of terrorism; however, prevalence of poverty and limited access to economic and political space accounts for the proliferation of terrorist groups.

After September 11, 2001, Africa has become the focus of many countries in the global fight against international terrorism. The current focus on Africa is partly informed by the centrality of the continent to emerging global security discourses. The continent had been victim of the 1998 terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Dares Salaam and Nairobi in which over 200 people were killed. In spite of this, it was not until the September 2001 attacks in the US, and in the face of the prioritisation of Africa’s oil in US strategic energy calculations, that the continent – and by extension, West Africa – became integrated into the US-led ‘global war on terror’.\textsuperscript{16} But as global efforts have intensified so has the sophistication with which these terrorists groups have evolved. Unfortunately religious militancy has merged with terrorism in some parts of Africa,
creating an impression that Islam is synonymous with terrorism, a view that has rather denigrated Islam.

1.6.3 ECOWAS & Conflict Management

The UN remains the vanguard of international peace and security. The UN uses many measures such as enforcement action, hybridization of peacekeeping and Peace Support Operations (PSOs) to promote peace and security in countries. The United Nations (UN) accepts that regional organizations have a duty to promote peace and security. In Chapter Eight of the UN Charter, regional organizations are allowed to use peaceful means to settle disputes. Recently, the concept of Peace Support Operations (PSOs) has also become an important aspect of the tools used by the UN to promote global peace and security. PSO combines the use of coercion and peaceful measures.

In Africa, the ECOWAS sub-region is often acclaimed as the sub-region with the most developed peace and security architecture. Primarily established for sub-regional integration and economic development, the community has evolved over the last few decades to undertake peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. In 1978, ECOWAS leaders signed the protocol on Non-Aggression and in 1981 they again signed the protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence. These two protocols provided the legal basis for ECOWAS to take collective military action to safeguard the peace and security of member states. In 1999, members of ECOWAS also adopted the protocol relating to the mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace-keeping and security.
The history of ECOWAS in the area of conflict management has not been without difficulties, starting with the Liberia crisis in the late 1990s, which led to years of humanitarian crisis. The war also discovered the wide network of states such as Burkina Faso and Libya, which provided support for Charles’ Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The politics of the West African sub-region also came to light as the sub-regional power, Nigeria, had to contend with resistance from Francophone West African states, who were not willing to intervene in the Liberia civil war. After Liberia, ECOWAS has since intervened in countries such as Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire.

A significant outcome of the Liberia and Sierra Leone civil wars is that ECOWAS became aware of the importance of establishing a new peace and security framework that would take into consideration, the problems encountered during peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some of the problems encountered in Liberia and Sierra Leone include lack of logistics, lack of funding, intra-politics within the ECOWAS sub-region between Anglophone and Francophone countries, poor communications between forces and ECOWAS Secretariat, and many others. Unfortunately, there are still gaps in mobilising forces for peacekeeping. ECOWAS is dependent on foreign donors for support; many countries in the sub-region are not committed to peacekeeping missions and other ECOWAS projects, and many others.

Religious militancy has gained roots in West Africa in the wake of various attempts by Islamists groups to promote a caliphate across the sub-region. This is particularly the case in countries such as Mali and other Sahel states, which have become beehive for Islamists movements, who have long been active in Northern Africa as a part of a long chain of the global al-Qaeda network. In the case of Mali, a country that has been relatively peaceful, the recent power
vacuum created in the wake of a military insurrection in 2012 has further given space to Islamists insurgents, known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), backed by Islamist movement, Ansar Dine. Emboldened by the apparent security gaps in Northern Mali, Islamist groups successfully annexed large swathe of territories in Northern Mali and worked progressively towards the establishment of a caliphate. How ECOWAS would respond to these threats in the sub-region is critical to peace and security in West Africa.

As Ghana contributes troops to PSO in Northern Mali, there is a high possibility that Ghana could also suffer some reprisals from rebel groups within Mali. These militant groups could take advantage of Ghana’s porous borders and send SALWs to the country. The troops within Mali can also be attacked unprovoked by Islamist militant groups. With Ghana’s oil resources, it would be easy to mobilise people who are not satisfied about the management of oil revenue to start a civil war. The whole of the ECOWAS sub-region can also be destabilised by religious militancy, and countries in West Africa will become unattractive as destinations of investments. These require that policies are implemented to prevent the negative aspects of Ghana’s participation in PSO in Mali.

1.7 Research Methodology and Sources of Data

The study employed a descriptive research design to have an in-depth understanding of the potential threats to Ghana’s national security as a result of its participation in PSO in Mali. The research population was security experts including civilians, police and senior military officers. Semi-structured interview guides were administered. The use of the semi-structured interview guide was to allow the use of specific information which could be compared and contrasted with
information from other interviews. Sources of data included both primary and secondary data. The secondary sources included books, journal articles and internet sources such as Google Scholar used mainly in reviewing the literature. The primary source of data was the result of the field survey which made extensive use of semi-structured interview guide. The data was analysed by using descriptive formats to ensure that research questions were answered and the research objectives effectively achieved.

1.8 Arrangement of Chapters

The study will comprise 4 chapters including the introductory chapter which shall be the research design. The chapter shall also include a literature review intended to act as a foundation for the rest of the study. Chapter Two provides an overview of the conflict in Mali, identifies the causes of the conflict and analyses the main belligerents in the conflict. Chapter Three examines the peacekeeping mandate, Ghana’s role in MINUSMA, and potential security threats to Ghana. The chapter also identifies ways of managing the potential security threats. Chapter Four comprises a summary of major findings, conclusions and recommendations.

1.9 Scope of the Study

Although the Ghana Armed Forces has been involved in peacekeeping missions for several decades and is currently undertaking five missions in different countries across the world, the scope of this study will be limited to GAF participation in PSO in Mali (MINUSMA) and the likelihood of reprisal attacks on Ghana by the rebels and their affiliate terrorist networks. Mali is chosen because of the increasing threats of religious extremism, rebel and terrorist activities in the country following the fall of the Gaddafi regime which provided impetus for the crisis in that country.
Endnotes

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Cyril I Obi, Post-Conflict Transition in Africa: The State and Civil Society, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsalan, Sweden Published online: 22 Jul 2010.
18 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MALI CONFLICT AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN BELLIGERENTS

2.0 Introduction

The intensity of terrorist attacks across the world appears to be declining but there has been an increase in violent religious extremism across West Africa and the Middle East, where new and old armed groups are threatening weak states and creating security threats that largely affect the entire world. There has been an increase in the number of violent terrorist activities in Africa and the Middle East largely due to the Arab spring.¹ This chapter provides an overview of the conflict in Mali, its causes and analysis of the main belligerents in the conflict.

2.1 An Overview of the Crisis in Mali

Poulton R. and Yousouf I. opine that the root causes of the conflict in Mali during the pre and post colonial eras have been compounded by one-party rule following the attainment of independence in 1960. According to them, there was heavy military presence in the northern parts of the country in an attempt by the then president to crush all forms of rebellion that intermittently occurred. No northerner was included in the higher levels of political decision making, leading to the development of the phenomenon of “self-help” and resistance by the northern populations. The French army moved from St Louis in Senegal to other areas of West Africa in the nineteenth century with the aim of conquering much of the sub-region and by 1855, they succeeded in taking Kayes. The French reached Timbuktu in 1894, faced fierce resistance from the northerners but succeeded in conquering Gao by 1898.²
The Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) was founded in 1946 following the Brazzaville Conference of 1944 which gave French-African leaders the right to form political parties. The first president of Mali, Modibo Keita ruled the country with an “iron-fist,” establishing one-party regime which deliberately excluded northerners from the top echelons of national politics. An expression of resentment against the prevailing injustice by the northern tribes was met by brutal repression. The brutal repression by the regime made it unpopular and led to a coup d’etat in 1968. The coup brought Moussa Traore to power. He ruled the country until 1991 when he was overthrown by the military following Tuareg rebellion and popular uprising in 1990.

Moussa Traore’s regime was not able to address the mountains of development challenges that confronted the entire country. Instead, he concentrated his attention and resources on the capital city, Bamako and tried satisfying senior military officers much to the neglect of the northern population who suffered from military brutalities and drought. These caused huge economic and social disruptions especially to the Tuareg people some of whom migrated extensively across the country.

The overthrow of the Moussa Traore regime which occurred on 26 March 1991 by the military ushered in a new opportunity for democracy. The transition was led by Colonel Amadou Toumani Toure with a civilian administration under Prime Minister Soumana Sacko. Dr Alpha Oumar Konare then became the first elected president under the Third Republican Constitution after winning the 1992 General Elections which was preceded by series of negotiations.
2.1.1 Marginalisation of Northern Mali

The Bambara Kingdom of Segou was founded in 1712 by Bilton Coulibaly. The Kingdom created a permanent regiment of Tonjon composed partly of warriors captured in battles and became very influential in the making and unmaking of kings. In 1818, Sekou Amadu created the Fulani theocratic State of Macina which was run with centralised rules based on Islamic Sharia. In Mali, Islam had both positive and negative influence. Unlike the Arab invasion of the Maghreb, Islam filtered across the desert over the centuries, and installed itself peacefully in the region. But the French colonial rule came to replace traditional rulers with a direct and centralized administration. The commandant was ruthless as he became the “arbiter of law and order” and exactions were routinely perpetrated by the guards who were always brought in from another part of French West Africa. The centralized colonial system of administration thus destroyed many of the mechanisms which regulated local life in Mali.

The Tuaregs rejected centralization even in the pre-colonial era as exemplified by their resistance to the French since January 1894. The brutality of the French against Tuareg rebellion to a large extent further alienated the latter and the entire northern ethnic groups from the rest of the country. It was the alienation among other things which led to the demand for autonomy. The MNLA has since been fighting for autonomy and actually declared the independence of Azawad. The word “Azawad” has come to signify the whole of Mali’s 6th, 7th and 8th Regions but which can include all people (Tuareg, Songhoy, Boso, Fulani and Moor) living in this region but which can also be referred to only Tuareg and Moor nomads, according to the political head at the moment.
In addition, an armed conflict with religious extremists and ethnic separatists in the northern part of the country is undermining the integrity of the Sahelian state. The disintegration of state institutions and the emergence of a dictatorial regime combined to seriously set the stage for deep seated crisis that has been ongoing for some time now. Thurston 2012: 4 noted that “the political chaos in Bamako and the military challenge in the north are undeniably related: confusion about who has legal authority and political power to rule the country hinders efforts to organize a credible effort to reintegrate the north.” 12

The political crisis in Mali therefore displays many of the challenges exhibited in post-conflict societies. Civil conflicts in any part of the world could leave in their wake fragile states that are often unable to meet the demand for national and human security. This creates a great deal of destabilization effect that could cause global insecurity.13 The role of democratization in post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and peace building is very important.14 Diamond (2006) agrees to the fact that, phased democratization is the right timetable for the restoration of electoral politics.15

2.1.2 Groups and Principal Actors in the Conflict in Mali

This segment outlines the principal actors in the current conflict in Mali including AQIM, the MNLA, MUJWA, Ansar Dine, IMA, MDSF, the Government of Mali, Ganda koy and Ganda Izo militia.
2.1.3 Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQIM is an extremist group that developed out of the civil conflict in the 1990s in Algeria. It was known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe salafiste pour la predication et le combat, GSPC) before it formally allied with the al-Qaeda in 2007. The GSPC first established itself in Mali in 2003 after successfully kidnapping 32 Western tourists in southern Algeria. Mali, through the mediation of Iyad Ag Ghali who is currently the leader of Ansar Dine, secured their release. In return, and as part of the deal, the hostage takers obtained relative immunity on Malian territory. As a result, AQIM has firmly established itself in Mali and has been able to flourish due to the ‘construction of social arrangements at various levels including local, national and international levels.’ AQIM as an extremist group does not only recruit from amongst the Tuaregs, Arabs and Moors but also from sub-Saharan Africa. The group is divided into several mobile cells and sub-groups with the capability of moving from one country to the other to evade security services of their victims. A strong relationship exists between AQIM and illicit drug traffickers, who use the Sahel to transport drugs from South America to the West. The group escorts drug convoys and provides close security, whilst the drug traffickers provide AQIM with funds to acquire vehicles and weapons. The kidnapping of Western nationals for ransom has somehow generated a prosperous industry, which has involved local and international, notably French, actors. The main objective of AQIM is to create a new state where they could establish strict Islamic law (Sharia).

2.1.4 Movement for the National Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)

The MNLA was created in October 2011 as a coalition of Tuareg groups in northern Mali and it is therefore one of the main actors in the conflict. The group started with the intention of creating...
an independent secular state in northern Mali called Azawad. The MNLA launched its first successful military attack on 17th January 2012 on the Malian Army in Ménaka, north-eastern Mali, following consultations that had taken place amongst Tuareg communities. A number of such attacks followed, notably among them was the one on 30th March 2012 where they successfully took control of Kidal, the position of the Malian Army’s counter-insurgency headquarters. The MNLA’s military strength is provided mainly by returnees from Libya who took part in the conflict that ended the Gaddafi regime. Most of them returned to northern Mali with sophisticated weapons and ammunition. The political leadership of the group is however dominated by close relatives of Ibrahim Bahanga, a key figure of the 2006 rebellion who died in 2011. Ag Mohamed Ag Najim, the leader of the MNLA was sidelined by the 2006 Algiers Accords, and Ibrahim Bahanga also rejected the provisions of the Accord. The group has no detailed political programme, lack adequate resources leading to its inability to build on its strength which caused its ousting by other extremist groups in many parts of northern Mali. But the group has moderated its initial uncompromising position and now accept some form of federal arrangement in Mali. In an interview with Major Ernest Nyuur, the commander of the Ghana Engineer Company, this was what he said:

“Currently the MNLA is primarily a political movement advocating self-rule for an independent homeland in Azawad; however, the movement does not reflect the desire of the entire Malian Tuareg population. The MNLA is positioning itself for the upcoming negotiations between the Government of Mali and the supporters for an autonomous Azawad. These activities include: moving fighters out of barracks and moving civilians in, recruiting new members amongst the local population, trying to win the hearts and minds of the local population and also trying to discredit MINUSMA units. These actions are aimed at rebuilding
MNLA as a credible and legitimate stakeholder in the upcoming negotiations. It is also intended at regrouping its fighting elements to unknown locations in order to maintain an operational freedom for its armed wing, in case the negotiations end in an unfavorable way for the MNLA. This group signed the Ouagadougou Peace agreement on 18 June 2013."28

2.1.5 Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA)

MUJWA is a terrorist group which emerged in late 2011 as a splinter faction of AQIM.29 The group has carried out a number of kidnappings in the region and terrorist attacks in Algeria in similar fashion as AQIM. It has taken advantage of anti-Tuareg sentiments in Gao to gain popular support from some Songhai/Peul groups who form the majority of the population in the area.30 This enabled it to launch successful armed attacks against MNLA positions in the town in June 2012, leading to the expulsion of the MNLA from urban areas in northern Mali.31 The group is also known by its French acronym MUJAO (Mouvement Unicité et Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest).32 The main objective of MUJWA is to spread jihad across a larger section of West Africa. It aligned with AQIM and Ansar Dine during the capture of Gao in the 2012 Tuareg rebellion but the group has no permanent allies.

2.1.6 Ansar Dine

Ansar Dine is one of the principal actors in the Malian conflict that was formed by Iyad Ag Ghali, a key figure in Tuareg politics. Ag Ghali was deeply involved in the 1990 Tuareg rebellion, but later played a lead role in the negotiations to end the 2006 rebellion. He later changed to a more rigorous form of Islamic fundamentalism. Ag Ghali was involved in the initial Tuareg consultations before the latest rebellion. However, he rejected the MNLA’s separatist
project unless it was to impose strict Sharia throughout the country. Consequently he was sidelined by the MNLA and then went on to form Ansar Dine.\textsuperscript{33} The stronghold of the MNLA is the Tuareg-dominated Kidal region of northern Mali. Ansar Dine initially fought alongside the MNLA and its contribution was immense and decisive in a number of engagements at the beginning of the conflict in Mali. As Ansar Dine forces moved south, they became strategically important due to their growing numbers and equipment, with resources provided by their main sponsors, AQIM. Moreover, as Ansar Dine increased the frequency of its attacks, it gradually replaced the MNLA and even managed to recruit MNLA fighters on a paid basis.\textsuperscript{34} By May 2012, the MNLA and Ansar Dine commenced bilateral consultations in an attempt to achieve reconciliation. Subsequently, this effort resulted in a statement declaring a planned merger, with Ansar Dine recognising the independence of Azawad and the MNLA accepting the Islamic character of the new state.\textsuperscript{35} However by 1\textsuperscript{st} June 2012, expatriate MNLA leaders had rejected this agreement based on ideology. Divisions in the group further deepened after the failed attempt at reconciliation and by 29th June 2012, serious clashes with MUJWA fighters aligned with Ansar Dine forced the MNLA to leave Gao and Timbuktu.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{2.1.7 The Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA)}

Another fast growing extremist group is the Islamic Movement for Azawad. The IMA was formed in January 2013 by Alghabass Ag Intalla following his public announcement to the effect that he would split from Ansar Dine to form IMA. The leader of the IMA, Alghabass Ag Intalla was an influential member of Ansar Dine and the successor to the traditional ruler of Kidal in northern Mali\textsuperscript{37}. The group said it was against terrorism, would be prepared to fight Ansar Dine,
and was willing to participate in an inclusive political dialogue. Some MNLA members have allegedly joined this group.\textsuperscript{38}

\subsection*{2.1.8 Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF)}

The MDSF is the government forces. It is internally divided, lacks the required military capability, and has been implicated in several reported and unreported human rights abuses against northerners and minority groups over the last several years.\textsuperscript{39} The levels of personnel and logistics have been negatively affected by defections of personnel of Tuareg ethnic origin to the MNLA in early 2012 and by desertions due to low morale and lack of prospects for proper career development. Sections of the military have constantly been accused of collusion with illicit drug and hostage traffickers.\textsuperscript{40} In addition, the military is reportedly providing support to allied and ethnically-based irregular militias such as the Ganda Koy and Ganda Izo.\textsuperscript{41}

\subsection*{2.1.9 The Government of Mali}

The Government of Mali is one of the most important stakeholders in the conflict. Based on negotiations in August 2012, the interim president formed a government of national unity that brought together the opponents and supporters of the March 2012 military coup.\textsuperscript{42} The government has however, been weakened by interference by the military.\textsuperscript{43} The successful elections in 2013 however relatively saved the situation. This is because, the government is now showing great deal of commitment to keeping the fragile peace in the country as a result of the benefits of SSR programme and the support the international community and MINUSMA in particular is offering to the MDSF.
2.1.10 Ganda Koy/Ganda Izo Militias

Besides the well-known extremist groups such as AQIM, MNLA and MUJAO, there exist in Mali other militia and vigilante groups formed to protect ethnically based interests.\(^{44}\) The Ganda Koy is one of such groups. It is a Songhaï-based militia which was established in 1994 with the prime aim of providing security for sedentary black tribes of the Gao region of northern Mali.\(^ {45}\) Its formation was also, in part, a reflection of general disapproval amongst non-Tuareg groups regarding provisions made in peace agreements. Its prominent leaders were a number of army officer deserters.\(^ {46}\) Ganda Izo on the other hand is a Peul-based militia which was formed in 2008 to provide protection to the Peul ethnic group, although there are now some non-Peuls in the group. It has received training and some logistical support from the Malian army, but has not been armed or given a formal security role.\(^ {47}\) They are aligned with MUJWA and opposed to the ideology of the MNLA.

2.2.0 The Conflict in Mali: The Tuareg Dimension

Three major Tuareg rebellions in the post-colonial period took place in 1963, the 1990s and 2006-2008. The current conflict started in January 2012. Although AQIM, Ansar Dine and MUJWA took control of territories which were under the control of the MNLA, the renewed instability indicates that structural problems in Mali have not been solved yet.\(^ {48}\) For that reason, “whilst each new conflict has its own proximate drivers, they are all related to unresolved issues spilling over from previous armed conflicts.”\(^ {49}\) Cultural and historical particularities of Mali explain the origins of conflict in that country.\(^ {50}\) The motivations of rebel groups in northern Mali relate to the “regional exceptionalism” of the north and to grievances arising from entrenched economic and political marginalisation.\(^ {51}\) Additionally, ineffective governance, weak state
structures and corruption have all contributed to insecurity in northern Mali. In the view of Humphreys and Ag Mohamed, there is no evidence to suggest that greed-based explanations relating to the control of natural resources have ever been a contributing factor to the origin of conflicts in Mali.\textsuperscript{52}

2.2.1 Grievances

Almost all grievances in the Mali conflict have stemmed from issues such as economic marginalization against the north, which has been aggravated by land policies and environmental change; political marginalisation; and the use of violent repression against the Tuaregs and northern tribes.\textsuperscript{53} Furthermore, the failure of successive governments to implement provisions made in peace agreements has served to reignite periodic rebellions by the Tuaregs against the central government.

2.2.3 Economic Marginalization

Economic marginalization dates back to the colonial period and the process of decolonisation. The drawing of national boundaries interrupted caravan routes and formally prevented access to traditional pasture grounds.\textsuperscript{54} Since independence in 1960, northerners have suffered proportionately from economic neglect and marginalisation more than the rest of Mali. For example, during General Moussa Traoré’s reign, the military regime proved incompetent as economic managers and successive governments have increasingly failed to deliver public services.\textsuperscript{55} Economic marginalisation has continued into recent times, manifesting in a lack of investment in the north and a perception of unequal access to health and education.\textsuperscript{56}
Socioeconomic data for the period 1995 – 1997 suggests that in the north these conditions were exceptionally poor compared to other regions of the country.57

2.2.4 Access to Land and Environmental Change

According to Abdalla (2009), the Tuareg rebellions have strong roots in access to land rights, which have been affected by environmental change, thereby threatening livelihoods and reinforcing the economic marginalisation of Tuaregs.58 This is because northern Mali is prone to environmental challenges, including drought, desertification, deforestation, soil erosion and an insufficient supply of potable water.59 During colonial times, the French pursued a policy of land registration which caused many Tuareg communities to lose their right to the land they had previously inhabited.60 At independence in 1960, Tuareg access to land was further eroded due to President Modibo Keïta’s policies of land nationalisation, agricultural modernisation and sedentarisation of nomadic groups.61 These anti-nomad policies, which were sustained by Moussa Traoré, further contributed to the marginalisation of Tuareg communities and precipitated the 1963 rebellion.62 Natural disasters, such as the droughts in 1973-4 and 1984-5, seriously reduced livestock numbers and led to migrations of young men to urban centres in the Maghreb and West Africa. In the case of the 1984-5 drought, the Tuaregs who migrated to Algeria and Libya returned in 1990 to launch the armed revolt against Moussa Traoré’s regime.63 In both drought periods, the Tuareg have felt that foreign aid and local assistance have not been distributed equitably.64 This is because communities in northern Mali received proportionally far less in terms of development programmes and opportunities when they needed these the most.65 Furthermore, international aid destined for drought-stricken areas has often been embezzled and redirected.66
2.2.5 Political Marginalization

Tuareg rebels argue that they have suffered political marginalisation, which was exceptionally harsh in response to their uprising of 1962. For much of the period from the first uprising to the overthrow of Moussa Traoré in 1991, the north was under military rule and the governors appointed, if from the region, were Songhaïs. Whilst Moussa Traoré’s various governments included a ‘token’ Tuareg minister, northern Mali had little influence over politics during his reign. Consequently, there was a gross under-representation of Tuaregs and Arabs in post-independence cabinets, the army and in senior civil service positions until the democratic transition in 1991.

2.2.6 Violent Repression

Successive Malian regimes have dealt with Tuareg rebel movements through military repression. Between 1962 and 1964, Modibo Keita dealt with the rebellion through military repression, as did the regime of Moussa Traore in response to the rebellion in 1990. As a result, ‘a generation of Tuareg, born in the 1950s, grew up with forced sedentarisation and education, socio-economic destruction by drought and state agents, and socio-economic marginality in the nation states ruling their land thereby leading to strong resentment.

2.2.7 Failure of Successive Governments to Implement Provisions of Peace Agreements.

The failure of successive Malian governments to implement provisions of various peace accords in the past is one of the reasons for the reemergence of Tuareg rebellion in Mali’s history. “Mediation efforts after the 1990 rebellion led to the Algerian-sponsored Tamanrasset Accords of 1991, and later the more comprehensive National Pact.
The latter promised the gradual demilitarisation of the north and the complete integration of the rebels into special units of the national forces. Furthermore, it recognised the north’s economic marginalisation and promised a ten-year economic recovery plan. At the same time, constitutional changes were introduced that transferred a number of state powers to the region. The pact however lacked financial resources and its implementation, particularly the integration component, was continuously postponed. This non-implementation, coupled with periods of drought and discontent among integrated Tuareg soldiers, provoked the rebellion in 2006.\textsuperscript{74}

New accords that were sponsored by Algeria in 2006, attempted to revive some of the National Pact provisions, particularly the creation of a northern security force, named the Saharan Security Units. However, there were delays once again in implementing the accords, leading to a resumption of guerrilla warfare by a splinter Tuareg faction.\textsuperscript{75}

In retrospect, the Tuareg rebellion is because of a combination of factors such as historical marginalization, access to basic life sustaining services and bad governance. The crisis in Mali has taken on another form as other militant groups have joined the Tuareg rebels. These groups, as mentioned earlier have sought to use religion as a pretext to create chaos. To protect the democratic dispensation in Mali ECOWAS is intervening in the crisis. As a member of ECOWAS, Ghana has contributed to the Peace Support Operations (PSOs). How Ghana’s participation in PSOs would impacts on security within Ghana? The next chapter is dedicated to answering this question.
Endnotes

1 TE-SAT 2013, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, Van Deventer, the Netherlands.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid
26 Ibid
27 Ibid
28 Interview with Major Ernest Nyuur, Commander of the Ghana Engineer Company 1 on 22 October 2014.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.


69 Ibid.


73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

MINUSMA MANDATE, GHANA’S ROLE AND POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS TO GHANA

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses MINUSMA mandate, the mission, structure and roles of the Ghana contingent in Mali. It is important to note that an engineering construction company was first deployed from the beginning of the AFISMA mission and in September 2014, an aviation unit was also deployed to support MINUSMA and other UN missions worldwide. The potential threats to Ghana’s national security as well as the possible ways of preventing any reprisal attacks on Ghana are examined. The potential security threats would be reprisal attacks perpetrated mainly by armed elements, religious extremists or terrorists. The security threats are also transnational in nature and could involve terrorism, piracy, arms trafficking, human trafficking, kidnapping and mercenarism.

3.1 MINUSMA Mandate

MINUSMA was established by Security Council resolution 2100 of 25 April 2013 to support political processes in Mali and carry out a number of security-related tasks. The Mission was tasked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.1
The Security Council amended the mandate of the Mission by unanimously adopting resolution 2164 of 25 June 2014, and decided that it should focus on duties, such as ensuring security, stabilization and protection of civilians. The mission also has the task of supporting national political dialogue and reconciliation, and assisting the reestablishment of State authority, the rebuilding of the security sector, and the promotion and protection of human rights in Mali. The Security Council requested the Mission to expand its presence, including through long-range patrols and within its capacities, in the north of Mali beyond key population centres, notably in areas where civilians were at risk. It was also to provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisers and Women’s Protection Advisers, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict.²

The Mission should also exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to anticipate, prevent, mitigate and resolve conflict. It should monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Mali. The Council urged the signatories to the ceasefire agreement of 23 May 2014 to respect it fully and immediately implement its provisions, including the liberation of prisoners and the establishment of an international commission of inquiry, and requested the Secretary-General to facilitate the swift establishment of that commission.³

The Security Council expressed its strong support for the key role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali in the peace talks, and requested the envoy to continue his good offices and active engagement towards the launching of an inclusive process open to all
communities in the north. The MINUSMA military component is to assist in providing the safe environment for the stabilisation of the Malian state, and extension of state administration, protection of civilians, and prevention of the return of armed elements to the key population centres, in order to enable the Malian authorities develop their capacities and resume national responsibilities for the population and State.4

3.2 Ghana’s Role in Resolving the Malian Conflict

Ghana and Mali have had longstanding diplomatic relations. Before independence, the famous Mali Empire transcended Ghana’s territories, and trade relations between the Ghana and Mali Empires was good. Mali is also famous for ancient and tourist cities such as Timbuktu and Gao. After independence, Ghana’s first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah made every effort to form a union with Guinea, Mali, and Guinea. As countries in West Africa, Mali and Ghana remain staunch members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As the conflict in Mali, rages, Ghana has a responsibility to help end the crisis. The discussion in this section will be centered mainly on MINUSMA Mandate and the roles that the Ghana Engineer Company (Ghanengcoy) and the air force contingent unit are playing in support of MINUSMA.

3.3 GHANENGCOY Organisation

MINUSMA authorized strength for Combined Construction Engineering Company is organised into a number of troops (specialised sub-units). One Combined Construction Combat Engineering Company Headquarters with appropriate number of tactical vehicles as required. one Vertical construction Engineering Troop with adequate number of tactical vehicles mounted with military radio for tactical use. One ambulance vehicle (attached from the Support Troop),
trucks and other support vehicles as required. One Horizontal construction Troop with one excavator cum dumper, one medium duty dozer and two dump trucks and adequate number of tactical vehicles mounted with military radio for tactical use, trucks and other support vehicles as required. One water production Troop and one Logistic Support Troop including a maintenance section, signal section, supply section and transportation section.\(^5\)

### 3.4 GHANENGCOY Mission

The mission of GHANENGCOY is to initially deploy to Timbuktu as part of Sector West to provide mobility and construction engineering support to MINUSMA units in order to enhance MINUSMA’s ability in accomplishing its mandate. GHANENGCOY’s core tasks are indicated below:

#### 3.4.1 Horizontal Construction

The tasks of the horizontal construction sub-unit of the GHANENGCOY include the maintenance and upgrade of Main Supply Routes (MSRs) and Alternative Supply Routes (ASRs). It is also undertaking helipad construction, maintenance and repair, site preparation for camp construction (clearing, compaction and leveling), launching of bridges and maintenance. GHANENGCOY Horizontal construction sub-unit is responsible for airfield maintenance and repair, reinforcing security in aid of force protection within the camp, construction of defensive positions as appropriate at GHANENGCOY positions and carrying out training of personnel in Peacekeeping Techniques, Rules of Engagement (ROEs), UN SOPs and other relevant procedures. The sub-unit is prepared to be deployed as a detachment in any location in the MINUSMA Area of Responsibility (AOR) and also prepared to undertake any other tasks on order.
3.4.2 Vertical Construction

The tasks of the Vertical Construction sub-unit of the GHANENGCOY include construction of permanent and transit camps, rehabilitation and repair of existing building and structures. It is also responsible for the erection of prefabricated accommodation (hard and soft walled), relocation and re-deployment of Temporary Operating Bases (TOB) where operational role has significantly reduced to potential threat areas within integral resources. The sub-unit carries out training of personnel in Peacekeeping Techniques, ROEs, UN SOPs and other relevant procedures, prepared to be deployed as a detachment in any location in the MINUSMA AOR and prepared to undertake any other tasks on order.

3.4.3 Water Production

The tasks of the water production sub-unit of the GHANENGCOY include the drilling of wells as per Mission Support geological survey and the installation of water purification and treatment equipment. Other tasks include the training of personnel in Peacekeeping Techniques, ROEs, UN SOPs and other relevant procedures. The sub-unit is prepared to be deployed as a detachment in any location in the MINUSMA AOR and also prepared to undertake any other tasks on order.

3.4.4 Logistics

The tasks of the logistics component of the GHANENGCOY include providing logistic support to each of the sub-units and provide physical security to the camp. It is also to carry out training of personnel in Peacekeeping Techniques, ROEs, UN SOPs and other relevant procedures, and prepared to undertake any other tasks on order.
3.4.5 Other Tasks

Other tasks include undertaking humanitarian activities to win the “hearts and minds” of the populace and improve the image, reassurance aspects and presence of MINUSMA operations and maintain liaison with the MDSF especially the Engineering Units, UN Agencies/NGOs, and other allied security forces that are within its area of work and operations.

3.5 Ghana Aviation Contingent Unit

In September 2014, Ghana deployed to Mali, one Military Medium Tactical Fixed Wing Aircraft (Casa-295) for the provision of long term air transportation services in support of UN peacekeeping activities worldwide. The Ghana Aviation Contingent unit deployed in Bamako but may be deployed for limited periods in Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal in support of MINUSMA and other UNSC authorized missions across the world. The aircraft is among other things capable of multi role quickly reconfigurable (Quick Change) to carry cargo, troops, civilian personnel, paratroopers, vehicle or injured personnel. Additionally, the aircraft is designed to have high survivability against offensive threats, equipped with combat approved equipment and is capable of conducting missions in most demanding and hostile environments.

The services the unit is rendering are;

“Administration and logistics support flights, Humanitarian aid distribution, tactical airlift, cargo re-supply, troop movements, troop insertions/extractions, quick reaction force response, VIP transport, medical transport, search and rescue, air reconnaissance, patrol observation, freight/personnel dropping and monitoring flights”6
The role of the aviation unit is very crucial not only to the success of MINUSMA but to a very large extent, all UN missions worldwide. This also confirms the significant role that Ghana has always played in sub-regional, regional and international PSO.

### 3.6 The Consequences of the Mali Conflict on the Sub-region

The consequences of the conflict in Mali on the West African sub-region have been extensively debated. The conflict served to reinforce the fallout of the Arab spring especially the Libyan crisis. For example, in reiterating the consequences of the Libyan crisis especially on the Sahel region the Nigerien President, Mahamadou Issoufou, stated that:

> The Libyan crisis amplifies the threats confronting countries in the region. We are already exposed to the fundamentalist threat, to the menace of criminal organizations, drug traffickers, arms traffickers… Today, all these problems have increased because weapon depots have been looted in Libya and such weapons have been disseminated throughout the region… eventually bringing to power religious extremists.⁷

There is increasing evidence of growing links among criminal gangs and extremist groups involved in drug trafficking, terrorism, kidnappings and human trafficking. Such interconnections exist in two forms: a) international militant groups and criminal networks, such as AQIM, operating in the region have exploited their ethnic affiliations with rebel groups operating in the Sahel, like Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s “Signed in Blood Battalion” and Mali’s Ansar Dine, to expand their activities; b) a confluence of militant groups operating in the Sahel that have established links with the local population in order to facilitate their activities.⁸
The conflict in Mali raised the prospects of the worst forms of “abuse and fanaticism”. The spread of terrorism and general insecurity in the Sahel region in particular and the entire West African sub-region are seriously threatening the territorial integrity of countries in West African. The war in Mali has thus given impetus to Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MDFC) in Senegal. Additionally, Burkina Faso is very much concerned with the permanent presence of the Tuareg minority in the extreme north of the country. Also, Jihadists and extremists can strike any time making them a persistent threat and constant source of apprehension for decision-makers and civilian populations alike.

The conflict in Mali has a serious humanitarian consequences. Several thousands of people have been displaced since the beginning of the current conflict which started in 2011. A huge number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) moved to the south, mainly Bamako to seek refuge. 50,000 Malians moved to settle in Burkina Faso, 80,000 moved to Mauritania and 60,000 moved to Niger. By mid 2013, donors had committed to disbursing 28% of the US $139 million requested for food security and the 17% of the US $73 million requested for interventions in the area of nutrition. In addition, as at March 2013, the international community committed to disbursing 3.5 billion Euros to help Mali resurrect its economy. Aside the existing developmental priorities, there are now very fundamental security challenges that must be effectively and efficiently resolved. The conflict in Mali has become a drain particularly on the economies of neighbouring countries as they have to grapple with the mounting refugee problems thereby threatening food security in the sub-region.
The conflict however brought to the fore, the pan-Africanist desire to intervene in crisis and conflict situations when the need arise. As noted in the literature, the sub-regional organization, ECOWAS has been responding to the call for the restoration of normalcy during conflict and crisis situations in member states. All respondents agreed that the desire for appropriate levels of socio-economic development cannot be achieved without peace, security and politico-economic stability. It is therefore not surprising that ECOWAS and the AU rose to the occasion by deploying AFISMA to contain the situation before MINUSMA took over. This is a clear demonstration of the desire by African leaders for a secure and peaceful continent necessary for democracy and good governance to thrive.

Additionally, PSO in Mali stands to benefit the Malian people through the restoration of normalcy and helping in executing developmental projects in the form of Quick Impact Projects (QIP), rebuilding the damaged infrastructure and undertaking humanitarian operations. Also, TCCs and individual peacekeepers benefit financially from peacekeeping. Over the last several years, peacekeepers have had their living standards raised as a result of the monetary gains that accrue to them.

Furthermore, the crisis in Mali has helped in raising awareness regarding the poor state of equipment of the MDSF for which reason it is being addressed by the UN and other donor agencies. Under the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme in Mali, personnel of MDSF are being trained and equipped to effectively perform their assigned roles without blemish. Related to this is the issue of the marginalization of the northern part of the country (one of the main causes of the conflict) which is being given the appropriate prominence; and helping in finding the ways and means of addressing the problem.
3.7.0 Potential Security Threats to Ghana

There are potential threats to the physical security of Ghana as a result of the participation of GAF in PSO in Mali. During interviews with respondents, they identified some of the potential security threats to include terrorist attacks, kidnapping, piracy, hijacking, mercinarism and drug trafficking. Other transnational organized crimes such as smuggling, trafficking in arms and humans and money laundering are other security breaches and threats that may be on the increase.

3.7.1 Terrorism

Terrorism is a real threat to all countries in the world and no country is immune from it because perpetrators target countries or their interests abroad.\textsuperscript{15} For example, if a terrorist group thinks a particular country is doing anything against its interest, that country and its interests could become target.\textsuperscript{16} AQIM had earlier on threatened to attack any country that would intervene in the Malian conflict. Following the Battle of Gao, MUJWA also warned that it would not “hesitate to attack countries or personnel that would be involved in an invasion force within the Azawad region.” This implies that now that Ghana is playing key roles in MINUSMA, AQIM and MUJWA may add Ghana to its target list of nations to attack as a way of revenge for participating in the mission. The French intervention and subsequent deployment of AFISMA, which was later changed to MINUSMA, will largely serve to deprive the Tuareg of attaining real independence for the Northerners in Mali. Using the 25 September 2013 terrorist attacks on a Kenyan shopping mall as a case study, it may be concluded that similar attacks on Ghana cannot be ruled out. Respondents of the survey agreed that the threat of terrorism on Ghana is real. A successful terrorist attack on Ghana as happened in Kenya could go a long way to demoralize
troops in the field whose relatives and colleagues may have been part of the victims. Additionally, any terrorist attacks on Ghana will instill fear and panic in the population. The potential threat of terrorism therefore calls for the need for the security agencies to step up their intelligence gathering strategies to avert terrorist attacks on Ghana.

3.7.2 Kidnapping

Kidnapping of high profile officials and expatriates for ransom is one of the means by which terrorists raise fund for their illegal operations. The terrorists in Mali or their affiliates are likely to resort to kidnapping of high profile officials of Ghana or expatriates. A successful kidnapping of officials especially if it happens outside the country may be detrimental to the country’s participation in PSO in Mali. The kidnappers are likely to use their victims as a bargaining chip to demand for the immediate withdrawal of Ghanaian troops from Mali. Such a situation although may not directly influence a decision to withdraw from Mali, would likely cause an intense public debate and agitation in the country. Public opinion or pressure by civil society groups could influence the nation to withdraw her troops from Mali. This could be severely detrimental to the international image of Ghana as haven of peace and security in the West African sub-region. There is the need for the Ghanaian government to undertake aggressive education of the citizenry on the nation’s role in Mali so as to garner its support. Also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration needs to work to reassure Ghana’s development partners that Ghana is safe for investment in spite of the imminent threats.

In light of the security threats, it is expected that the government would provide sufficient resources and the necessary surveillance assets for security agencies to carry out their roles effectively. Additionally, effective collaborative mechanisms need to be adopted to enable
cooperation among the intelligence networks of other countries. This will go a long way to secure the country’s interests at home and abroad.

### 3.7.3 Piracy

The International Maritime Bureau ranks the Gulf of Guinea as one of the most troubled global waterways. Currently the Gulf of Guinea is second only to Somali waters in the number of attacks at sea.\(^{17}\) This increases the cost of doing business and insurance for freight companies as a result of high risks. In recent times, piracy has been a security concern in the Gulf of Guinea. The rebels, extremists or jihadists and their affiliate groups are likely to resort to or influence the spate of piracy along the Gulf of Guinea. A successful and sustained spate of piracy would make Ghana an insecure place to transact business. It will also deprive the country of essential commodities as well as revenue from imports and exports. The loss of revenue will impede the country’s efforts at poverty reduction and socio economic development thereby causing public upheavals leading to a state of insecurity. Effective collaboration between extremists and militants along the Gulf of Guinea would further aggravate the threat and would be detrimental to the interest of Ghana at home and abroad. Respondents however differed with respect to piracy as potential security threat to Ghana but it is believed that the threat of piracy cannot be ruled out. There would be the need for constant patrols by the Ghana Navy in collaboration with other navies of the sub-region to fight the menace. Fortunately, Exercise Obangame Express, a multination maritime exercise comprising countries along the Gulf of Guinea has come to partially address this concern. The exercise involves the US, Europe and Africa Naval forces focusing on addressing common maritime issues. The exercise aims at enhancing the capabilities of the countries in anti-piracy operations through information sharing and coordination among
the Gulf of Guinea navies. The collaboration is expected to improve safety and security in the gulf of guinea.

3.7.4 Hijacking

A potential security threat to the peace and stability of Ghana is hijacking of aircrafts and vehicles by armed elements that have links with the rebels in Mali. Terrorists and extremists often undertake hijacking of people either for monetary ransom or for political concessions or for purely criminal purposes. Hijacking is one of terrorist modus operandi which could result to serious safety and security concerns as happened to the USA on 11 September 2001. Hijackers could create a state of tension and insecurity in the country because no one may be able to predict the next victim. The Twin Towers of New York City were brought down by the terrorist who used hijacked commercial planes for that purpose. Although Ghana has not got a national airline, similar hijacking of commercial planes in the country would likely result to a devastating security situation. Any breaches of national security on a large scale may result to taking stringent measures including withdrawal of troops from Mali. There is the need for the security agencies to undertake constant anti-hijacking drills and exercises as well as sensitization of the general public on security alertness.

3.7.5 Mercenarism

Mercenaries are people who are paid by a third party to fight in a country that they do not belong to. All respondents are of the opinion that mercenarism is a potential threat to the peace and national security of Ghana. Mercenarism could result from alliances between extremists, rebels and terrorists on one hand and disgruntled individuals or groups in Ghana on the other hand with the aim of causing insurgency situation in the country. Even if the rebels do not call for
withdrawal of Ghanaian troops, the GAF will require its troops to fight insurgency back home in order to restore the authority of the central government. A situation of this nature is likely to cause serious breaches of the peace and national security which could undermine the politico-socio-economic stability of the nation. A strong border patrolling and collaboration with border officials within the sub region will go a long way to avert mercenarism not only in Ghana but also across the entire West African sub region. The government needs to network all security and intelligence agencies such as the GAF, Police and Ghana Immigration Service as well as the Bureau of National Investigations (BNI). The government also needs to collaborate with neighbouring countries such as Nigeria which is currently fighting the Boko Haram terrorists to ensure effective and efficient intelligence gathering. An accurate intelligence gathered will go a long way to secure the nation’s borders by tracking all suspicious activities. According to Aning K. and Amedzrator L.,

“Through his pan-African policy, Gaddafi supported West African migrants by allowing them to reside and work in Libya. The migrants, some of whom were Tuareg, were trained by Gaddafi to fight for him in regional wars and the 2011 Libyan conflict. After the ousting of Gaddafi, these mercenaries migrated to their home countries with stockpiles of arms. This has contributed to the easy availability of arms which are being used by militants in the Sahel to stage attacks against central governments.”\textsuperscript{19}

For instance, it is estimated that about 81,000 Kalashnikovs, Israeli Sub machine guns, mortars, hand grenades, grenade launchers, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery and missile launchers are circulating in the Sahel.\textsuperscript{20} These weapons could easily get to Ghana due to the porous borders and the lack of cooperation and intelligence sharing among countries in the sub-region.
3.7.6 Health Implications

The national security of a state is also as important as the health of a state. Therefore one area that the security of Ghana can be affected is in the area of health. With the reported outbreak of Ebola disease in West Africa, and reports that Mali has recorded two cases thus far, personnel from the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) participating in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) in Mali are potentially at risk of contracting the disease. The other aspect is also that the carriers of the virus, when back from Mali, can also spread the virus particularly if there are limited health safeguards to isolate and threat people who have been affected. From a health point of view, Ghana could be at risk if health safety measures are ignored when diagnosing possible carriers of the Ebola virus among personnel who would return from Mali after participating in PSOs. As a vaccine is yet to found for the virus, it would be devastating for Ghana to record an Ebola case with its attendant impact on free movement of persons, goods and services as well as transportation within and outside the country.

3.8.0 Possible Ways of Preventing Reprisal Attacks on Ghana

The potential threats to the security of Ghana for its role in Mali could be surmounted by a number of strategies. These include collaboration and information sharing among relevant national intelligence agencies, adequate institutional cooperation across borders with neighbouring countries and preparedness of security forces against the threats.

3.8.1 Collaboration and Information Sharing

Respondents observed that the security agencies need synergy in fighting terrorism. Inter-service rivalry needs to be eschewed to promote pragmatic national security. Adequate collaboration and
information sharing among Ghana’s intelligence and security agencies would be a way of achieving networking. Collaboration is essential because intelligence agencies and operatives would be able to know what other sister agencies know. Once information is obtained and shared among the relevant security agencies, the activities of suspected terrorists could be monitored and their operations foiled. Also, all attempts at planning and carrying out hijacking, piracy or kidnapping could be closely monitored and perpetrators arrested and brought to book. The Government of Ghana needs to provide a common communication platform to assist all security and intelligence agencies to easily access and share data and intelligence.

3.8.2 Adequate Institutional Cooperation across International Borders

Most of the potential security threats to Ghana could be said to be transnational in nature. Respondents are of the view that a system of networking and cooperation among security agencies of neighbouring countries and all other countries in the sub region could be mutually beneficial. Terrorism can be controlled if a network of security and intelligence agencies of all countries in the sub region is established for the purposes of information gathering and intelligence sharing. Piracy could be managed if all the navies within the sub region take Exercise Obangame Express seriously as it would enhance cooperation, coordination and information sharing. Additionally, the government would have to raise the security concerns with the ECOWAS, the AU and the UN so as to rally the necessary international support and cooperation.
3.8.3 Preparedness of Security Forces against the Threats

The potential security threats to Ghana are all national security issues with the potential of destabilizing the country hence requiring the attention of all stakeholders. The GAF and other security services need to step up their individual and collective training efforts. Training ought to be mission specific such that specialized units could be given specific roles to play in times of crisis. The Police needs to be proactive by taking steps to win the “hearts and minds” of the general public. Appropriate anti-terror, anti-piracy and anti-hijacking training units should be formed to undertake such tasks as this is necessary to serve as deterrence to potential trouble makers.

3.8.4 Appropriate Training and Equipment for Security Services

Training needs assessment should be conducted by all security services in Ghana to determine the most appropriate type of training that should be undertaken given the changing nature of the security threats that confront the nation internally and externally. National security threats have invariably become asymmetrical in nature thereby requiring the security services to adapt to the change by reviewing their training packages and doctrines. In an interaction with a number of officers of the security services in Ghana, it was clear that training doctrines and models are not periodically reviewed to meet current training requirements. Moreover, the state of equipment of the security services requires massive improvement to meet current trends. The need for the provision of adequate logistics and other resources as well as well-trained human resources cannot be overemphasized. Additionally, aerial surveillance craft such as drones should be acquired to enhance information gathering.
3.8.5 Public Awareness and Alertness

The attitude of the general public in terms of security consciousness is an important ingredient in preventing any security threat to the state. The Ghanaian public must be educated to be security conscious by observing, questioning and reporting any suspicious activities of individuals or groups to the appropriate quarters. Because the police for instance cannot be everywhere, such information would help in tracking down terrorists or bandits before they strike. This might take a long time to achieve and so it is better that authorities start to sensitise and conscientise the general public forthwith.
Endnotes

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 GHANENGCOY Briefing Notes from the first Commander of Ghanengcoy, Maj Ernest Nyuur (Oct 2013).
6 Letter of Assist from UN to the Government of Ghana (2013-053), general terms and conditions of deployment to MINUSMA.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Prosper Nii Nortey Addo, the deputy head of the AU mission in Liberia (Jan 2014).
16 Ibid.
18 http://www.marsecreview.com/tag/exercise-obangame-express/ (accessed on 15 Feb 14)
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of key findings of the study, conclusions and recommendations on what needs to be done in order to prevent or manage reprisal attacks on Ghana by the terrorists in Mali or their affiliates elsewhere. The recommendations are guided by the findings of the study and the literature reviewed.

4.1 Summary of Key Findings

The study was undertaken with the main objective of finding out the potential security threats to Ghana as a result of the participation of its armed forces in the PSO in Mali. The study reviewed extensively, literature on terrorism, peacekeeping and ECOWAS interventions in conflict situations in the West African Sub-region. The causes of the conflict in Mali, analysis of the main belligerents in the conflict and their interests as well as the role that Ghana is playing as part of MINUSMA were also reviewed. As a purely qualitative research work, the study administered semi-structured interview guides to solicit information from respondents who were mainly experts in the field of international relations and global security. Some Officers of the GAF and the Ghana Police Service were also interviewed. Four main objectives guided the work namely: to provide a historical overview of the conflict in Mali; examine the mandate of MINUSMA; ascertain the potential security threats to Ghana as a result of her participation in MINUSMA; and identify ways of managing potential security threats to Ghana as a result of her participation in MINUSMA.
Historically, the study found out that in the past, the Tuareg ethnic group used to be the dominant and one of the most influential ethnic groups in Mali. Having lived in Northern Mali since the beginning of the Fifth Century BC, they have in the past few decades sought to attain independence and self-determination. The struggle for recognition, inclusiveness in political decision-making and greater autonomy led the Tuareg to launch series of rebellions against the Malian government.

In March 2012, a coup d’ état against the government was followed by the capture of Northern Mali by Tuareg rebels and other terrorist groups. The fall of the Gaddafi regime led to the return of Tuaregs and extremists with arms to Mali thereby providing momentum to the rebellion. A state of insecurity that was created led to intervention by French troops;- AU deployed AFISMA and then MINUSMA took over.

Ghana deployed an engineering construction company and an aviation contingent unit as part of the PSO, the reason for which it is likely to face reprisal attacks. This made GAF and other security services to intensify joint patrols for effective monitoring of activities of suspected armed elements and terrorists in the country to avert any attacks on Ghana.

The negative forces in Mali include the Tuareg rebels, AQIM, MNLA, MUJWA, Ansar Dine and the Islamic Movement for Azawad among others. They have varying interests some of which clash and become sources of conflict and internal rift.

The study found that the root causes of the conflict in Mali stem from issues such as economic marginalization which have been aggravated by land policies and environmental change; political marginalization and violent repression. Additionally, the failure of successive Malian
governments to implement the provisions of previous peace agreements has also been found to reignite periodic rebellions.

The study found that the conflict in Mali has both positive and negative consequences on the sub-region although the negatives outweigh the positives. The negative consequences include the spread of terrorism and extremism, and serious humanitarian crisis caused by huge refugee problem with the potential of causing food crisis in the West African sub-region. Moreover, scarce national resources of states are redirected towards keeping the peace instead of resolving mounting developmental challenges. This serves as a drain on national economies. On the other hand, there are a few positives including the pan-Africanist desire to intervene in conflict and crisis situation in Africa, increase in donor support for infrastructural development, humanitarian operations, direct benefits to peacekeepers and the fact that it has raised awareness regarding the under-resourced nature of the MDSF.

Additionally, MINUSMA has the mandate of Stabilising key population centers, support the re-establishment of state authority throughout the country and support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national political dialogue and the electoral process. The mission is also mandated for protection of civilians and UN personnel, support for humanitarian assistance, support for cultural preservation, support for national and international justice, promotion and protection of human rights.

The study also found that the risk of reprisal attacks against Ghana by negative forces in Mali is imminent and that some of the potential security threats to Ghana include terrorism, piracy, kidnapping, hijacking as well as mercinarism among others. The threat of terrorism and other
transnational organized crimes calls for high level of alertness and preparation in order to prevent them from happening or to mitigate their effect when they occur.

In order to manage the above potential security threats to Ghana as a result of her participation in MINUSMA, effective collaboration between the intelligence agencies such as the BNI, the Police, the Immigration Service and the GAF will be necessary in forestalling any attacks on Ghana. The GAF as the lead agency could strengthen cooperation among intelligence agencies to promote trust, build confidence and encourage the sharing of intelligence to prevent any attack on Ghana.

Adequate institutional cooperation across international borders, preparedness of security forces, appropriate training and equipment for security forces as well as public education to create awareness and alertness can all play a vital role in ensuring the safety of the nation against possible attacks.

4.2 Conclusions

The participation of GAF in PSO in Mali could lead to reprisal attacks by negative forces in that country because AQIM and MUJWA had threatened to attack any country or personnel that would interfere or intervene in the crisis. Secondly, examples of reprisal attacks as happened in Kenya and Uganda are enough reasons to believe that this could happen to Ghana.

The security threats to Ghana would be in the form of terrorism, kidnapping of senior public officials and expatriates, piracy, hijacking and mercinarism among others. Other transnational organized crimes such as smuggling, trafficking in arms and humans and money laundering could also be on the increase in Ghana.
The negative consequences of the crisis are not only on security issues but also on humanitarian issues due to massive refugee movements across the sub-region. Notwithstanding these, the study found that there are some positives such as pan-Africanist desire to intervene in conflict and crisis situation in Africa, increase in donor support for infrastructural development, humanitarian operations, direct benefits to peacekeepers and the fact that it has raised awareness regarding the poor state of equipment of the MDSF, for which reason appropriate solutions are being found to address the anomaly.

The study also concludes that measures such as effective collaboration between intelligence agencies such as the BNI, the Police, the Ghana Immigration Service and the GAF are necessary. The GAF as the lead agency therefore needs to strengthen joint training and cooperation among intelligence agencies to promote trust, build confidence and encourage the sharing of intelligence to prevent any attacks on Ghana.

4.3 Recommendations

As a result of the discussions and conclusions made above, the study makes the following recommendations:

The GAF should intensify joint military/police patrols for effective monitoring of suspicious activities of individuals and groups especially religious groups and NGOs in Ghana. This will among other things, serve as deterrence to terrorists and criminals and put the security services on top of issues.

Secondly, the GoG, the Police, the GAF and other security services should collaborate with their counterparts in neighbouring countries to foster cooperation and sharing of information on
security matters in addition to strong border controls. By this, criminal gangs and individuals who move across borders would be tracked, arrested and prosecuted.

Finally, the study recommends that rigorous public education and awareness creation should be undertaken by the government so that the general public is informed of the potential security threats, the measures being put in place and the role that each member of the public is expected to play in the scheme of things.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Aboagye, F., and Bah, A.M.S., Tortuous Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, UN and International Humanitarian Interventions in Liberia, (Pretoria: ISS, 2010).


Articles


Obi, C.I., Post-Conflict Transition in Africa: The State and Civil Society, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden, Published online: 22 Jul 2010.


Reports and Documents


GHANENGCOY Briefing Notes from the first Commander of Ghanengcoy, Maj Ernest Nyuur (Oct 2013).

Interview with Major Ernest Nyuur, Commander of the Ghana Engineer Company 1 on 22 October 2014.

Letter of Assist from UN to the Government of Ghana (2013-053), general terms and conditions of deployment to MINUSMA.


Prosper Nii Nortey Addo, the deputy head of the AU mission in Liberia, Jan 2014.

UN Peacekeeping Background Notes accessed 29 Aug 2014.


Websites


