GHANA’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AS A FOREIGN POLICY TOOL: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

BY
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(10443056)

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
DECLARATION

I, Asher Safo, author of this dissertation, do hereby declare that this is the result of an original research conducted by me, under the supervision of Dr. Linda Darkwa, during my period of study at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) for the award of a Master of Arts in International Affairs, and that no part of it has been submitted anywhere else for any other purpose. Additionally, all works that have been quoted from, or referred to, have been duly acknowledged.

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ASHER SAFO                        DR. LINDA DARKWA
(Stanent)                        (Supervisor)

DATE: ...........................................                        DATE:...........................................
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dear wife, Yvonne, and my sweet daughter, Bayanka. You give me reason to persevere.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

During the production of this dissertation, I sought and obtained assistance from a number of people, to whom I owe a debt of gratitude. First and foremost, however, my greatest gratitude goes to the almighty God for his gifts of life and protection. I also wish to extend my deepest gratitude to my parents, Mr. Samuel M. Safo and Ms. Ayishetu R. Imoro, for instilling in me the culture of reading and exploring.

Sincere thanks go to Squadron leader Baba Mubarak of the Ghana Air Force and Major Ernest Nambigne, MRS1, Ghana Army, Michel Camp, for agreeing to interviews and providing invaluable information to the research. I should like to thank my superiors at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Ambassadors Leslie Christian and Lawrence Satuh, Chief Director and former Chief Director, respectively for the deep insight they provided on Ghana’s foreign policy. Thank you to Messrs. Yaw Bimpong and Mark Entsie, my successive Heads of Department at the MFA, for their understanding and shrewd advice.

My profound gratitude goes to Dr. Philip Attuquayefio, Senior Research Fellow, LECIAD, for his critical input and for silently urging me on from the sidelines.

I am also indebted to the many scholars and authors whose works I was privileged to consult.

Last but not least, I want express heartfelt gratitude to my dear wife, Captain Yvonne Yomi Asigri, for her love and encouragement during the production of this work.
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<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
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<td>ACR</td>
<td>African Crisis Response Initiative</td>
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<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>Area of Operation</td>
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<td>APCs</td>
<td>Armoured Personnel Carriers</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>South East Asian Nations</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Congo Coordinating Committee</td>
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<td>CGDK</td>
<td>Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLO</td>
<td>Chief Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFC</td>
<td>Deputy Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMZ</td>
<td>Demilitarized Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>Force Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>FUNCINPEC</td>
<td>Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAF</td>
<td>Ghana Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFCSC</td>
<td>Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>INPFL</td>
<td>Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPNLF</td>
<td>Khmer People's National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>Military Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA &amp; RI</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Allied Movement</td>
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<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<td>ONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in the Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PARMEHUTU</td>
<td>Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRK</td>
<td>Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea</td>
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<tr>
<td>RGF</td>
<td>Rwandan Government Forces</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMC</td>
<td>Standing Mediation Committee</td>
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<td>SNC</td>
<td>Supreme National Council</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop Contributing Countries</td>
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<td>UAR</td>
<td>United Arab Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda</td>
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<td>UNEF</td>
<td>United Nations Emergency Force</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNHQ</td>
<td>United Nations Headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSG</td>
<td>United Nations Secretary General</td>
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<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization</td>
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<td>UNYOM</td>
<td>United Nations Yemen Observation Mission</td>
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ABSTRACT

For five decades Ghana has played a significant role in the maintenance of international peace and security mainly through its participation in international peacekeeping operations. Since its troop contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960, the country has steadily increased its contributions to international peacekeeping operations. This dissertation examines the nexus between Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping operations and the achievement of its foreign policy objectives. It proceeds by exploring the utility of participation in international peacekeeping as a tool in executing the country’s foreign policy agenda within the context of the concept of soft power. The paper discusses the significance of peacekeeping on Ghana’s international standing and also examines some of the major achievements and benefits accruing to the country as a result of her participation in peacekeeping. The work, however, unearths some major challenges and costs to the country’s continued participation in international peacekeeping. The paper concludes that participation in international peacekeeping contributes significantly to the achievement of Ghana’s foreign policy objectives and that the benefits outweigh the costs and therefore recommends that Ghana should develop its niche in the area of international peacekeeping, as a means of exerting influence in the International System.
CHAPTER ONE
RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Study

Since it attained independence in 1957, Ghana has consistently demonstrated a commitment to the pursuit of global peace and security. This commitment has often been manifested in various forms including, \textit{inter alia}, the contribution of both uniformed and non-uniformed personnel to sub-regional, regional and global peacekeeping efforts; playing a leading role in negotiation and mediation efforts in sub-regional conflicts; sheltering refugees from conflict-ridden countries in the sub-region; and the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring countries.

As a member of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN), Ghana is bound by the treaty obligations of the organisations as well as the various decisions, protocols and resolutions concluded by these organisations with respect to the maintenance of peace and security on the international arena.\textsuperscript{1} The country therefore has the obligation and legal mandate to participate in activities spearheaded by these organisations including peacekeeping.

Beginning with its very first troop contribution to the UN peacekeeping intervention in the Congo in 1960, Ghana has participated in many peace missions of varying complexity including, among others, the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), from July 1963 to September 1964, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), from 1978 to date,\textsuperscript{2} the ECOWAS peacekeeping interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone (ECOMOG) in the 1990s\textsuperscript{3} and more recently in the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS). These peacekeeping
operations form part of Ghana’s pursuit of its Foreign Policy objectives. Foreign policy, according to Goldstein and Pevehouse, refers to the strategies employed by national governments to guide their actions on the international arena.\textsuperscript{4}

Many observers have commented extensively on the subject of Ghana’s foreign policy. The majority of these commentators agree that the country’s foreign policy has remained largely unchanged since independence. K.B. Asante states that Ghana’s foreign policy has not significantly changed since the days of the first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.\textsuperscript{5} In a paper delivered to a conference at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy in 2002, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hon. Hackman Owusu-Agyemang, indicated that Ghana’s foreign policy has remained unchanged over the years.\textsuperscript{6} The basic tenets of this foreign policy can be summarized as: protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ghana, pursuit of the economic wellbeing of the Ghanaian people, promotion of friendly relations and economic cooperation with other countries, good neighbourliness and a commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{7}

The impetus for the pursuit of the afore-mentioned foreign policy objectives can be found in Article 40 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic, which stipulates the fundamental principles that guide the formulation and conduct of her foreign policy. It may be argued, therefore, that not only is Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping in keeping with her foreign policy imperatives but it is also mandated or at least encouraged by the supreme law of the land. Thus an exploration into the achievements, challenges and prospects of pursuing peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool is worthwhile.
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

For over five decades, irrespective of the type of regime in power, Ghana has consistently contributed personnel to peacekeeping efforts across the globe. This participation in international peacekeeping has been one of the tools the country appears to have heavily utilised over the years in its pursuit of international peace and security, a key tenet of her foreign policy.

While there is extensive literature on Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping operations, captured over these past five decades in the works of such keen observers as Festus Aboagye,\(^8\) Lt-Gen. E. A. Erskine\(^9\) and Major Noble Agyemang-Bioh,\(^10\) the focus of the available literature appears to be on, among others, the history, the techniques, and the experiences of the country’s peacekeeping operations. The literature, it would appear, does not adequately address the nexus between the country’s participation in international peacekeeping and the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. The literature also fails to establish whether or not participation in peacekeeping has contributed to the achievement of her foreign policy objectives. This apparent absence of adequate literature on how Ghana may leverage its contributions to international peacekeeping to pursue its foreign policy objectives leaves a gap, which this research seeks to bridge.

1.3 Research Questions

This research will therefore seek to answer the following and other related questions: To what extent does Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping contribute to the achievement of its foreign policy objectives? How has participation in peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool benefitted Ghana and how does it compare with other instruments in the pursuit of the foreign policy agenda? What are some of the major challenges and costs the country has faced or is
facing in the pursuit of its foreign policy as a result of participation in international peacekeeping?

1.4 Research Objectives

The research sets out to achieve the following objectives:

- To assess the significance of Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping operations to the achievement of the country’s foreign policy objectives
- To assess Ghana’s international standing in relation to its participation in international peacekeeping
- To identify and analyse some of the major achievements and benefits accruing to Ghana as a result of its international peacekeeping efforts
- Based on the findings, to provide a prognosis for the country’s continued participation in peacekeeping operations as a foreign policy tool

1.5 Scope of the Research

This study reviews seven (7) selected international peace support missions to which Ghana has contributed over the five decades of Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping, starting from its maiden troop contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) in 1960, till date. The seven missions selected for review are among Ghana’s major contributions to international peacekeeping over the period, which encompasses the entire history of Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping. It therefore provides an opportunity for investigation into the extent to which such peace operations contribute to the achievement of the country’s foreign policy objectives in the short, medium and long terms. It would also provide the opportunity for the study to make generalisations based on the findings.
1.6 Rationale of the Research

The study endeavours to provide empirical justification for Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping and demonstrate why such peacekeeping efforts should be recognized as a vital foreign policy tool. It also attempts to forecast the future relevance of peacekeeping to the country’s foreign policy objectives and thereby serve as a guide to policymakers in the area of foreign policy formulation. Additionally, it is hoped that the study would add to existing literature as well as raise relevant questions for further exploration.

1.7 Hypothesis

Participation in international peacekeeping has significantly contributed to the achievement of Ghana’s foreign policy.

1.8 Conceptual Framework

The study applies the concept of Soft Power in attempting to explain its assertions and arguments. In order to grasp the concept of Soft Power, it is imperative to understand the notion of power as it is applied in international politics. The Oxford Dictionary of English defines power as the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behaviour of others or the course of events. According to Robert A. Dahl, power is the ability of one actor to influence the actions of another actor where the change in the actions of the former would not have occurred otherwise.\textsuperscript{11} Joseph Nye defines power as the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants.\textsuperscript{12}

Power is measured either as the possession of certain resources or judged by the outcomes of the behaviour of others.\textsuperscript{13} In international politics, power measured in terms of resources traditionally emanates from attributes such as states’ population, military capability, size of
However, an advantage in power resources does not always result in desired outcomes. Joseph Nye in his 2008 Article *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power* further describes power as the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want. According to him, there are three (3) basic ways by which that can be achieved - *coercion*, through the threat or use of force; *inducements*, through gifts, payments and bribes; and *attraction*, through seduction with certain intrinsic qualities.

The third mode is generally referred to as Soft Power, a variant of power whose coinage is credited to Joseph Nye. He defines Soft Power as the ability to affect others to obtain the outcome one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. This attraction is usually reflected through getting others to want the outcomes that one wants, thereby co-opting rather than coercing them. Thus, according to Joseph Nye, Soft Power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. Soft Power transcends the power of persuasion or the ability to sway others through the use of well-reasoned and logical arguments, although these form a key part of the concept. It is also the ability to attract, which often leads to acquiescence. In sum, Nye simply refers to Soft Power as an attractive power.

In individuals, the ability to attract others tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an appealing personality, values, philosophy and moral principles. In the area of international politics:

The Soft Power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others); its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad); and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority).

Therefore, in international politics, a state with an ample cache of Soft Power resources may obtain its preferred outcomes on the international stage because other countries admire it and want to emulate it.
However, Soft Power is distinguished from its sibling, Hard Power, which is basically power of the coercive kind (i.e. the carrot and stick approach) and tends to emanate from attributes like military capability, political stability, and size of economy, among others. It is achieved through the threat or use of military force and/or by means of economic menace or reward. These attributes may be viewed as resources, the possession of which gives the wielder the capacity to either coerce or induce behavioural changes in other states. Joseph Nye calls these attributes Hard Power resources. Traditionally, countries like the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and more recently, China are perceived to hold power of the hard kind mainly due to their possession of the aforementioned attributes.

In spite of its merits, however, the concept of Soft Power is not without its critics. Colin S. Gray contends that Hard Power must remain the essential instrument of state policy, as Soft Power is unsuitable for policy direction since it tends to rely too much on the choices of foreign countries whose preferences would not always be aligned with those of the state in question. Simply put, he believes Soft Power is too dependent on the caprices of foreign countries. Ferguson steps up the criticism of Soft Power by arguing that it has a limited reach adding that its real engine is Hard Power. He further sums up Soft Power as “merely the velvet glove concealing an iron hand.”

Even Joseph Nye, the foremost advocate of Soft Power, in his 2011 book, The Future of Power, acknowledges that the concept does not always have the noblest intentions as, for instance, propaganda could be used as an instrument of Soft Power. In this regard he cautions, “it is not necessarily better to twist minds than to twist arms.”
As previously established, the Soft Power of a state rests on the attractiveness of attributes such as its culture, values and foreign policy. One way of viewing a country’s foreign policy is by observing its reactions to international phenomena or events. For countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, India, Jordan, Nepal and Ghana, contribution of peacekeeping troops forms a major aspect of their reaction to conflict situations in other parts of the world. Such contributions to peacekeeping operations may therefore be correctly construed as part of their foreign policy imperatives. Therefore the concept of Soft Power would best explain the effect of Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping, as a Soft Power resource, on the achievement of its foreign policy objectives, hence the relevance of the concept to the study.

1.9 Review of the Literature

Most of the literature on Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping operations tends to recount the history of events; to record operational successes and/or failures; or to catalogue the operational strategies and techniques employed by Ghanaian contingents on such missions. A handful of authors have attempted to investigate the socio-economic impact of such peacekeeping missions on the country in general, and the individual peacekeepers in particular. What appears to be missing, however, is an exploration into the effect of the country’s participation in international peacekeeping on the achievement of its foreign policy.

For instance, giving his account of the 1994 Rwandan conflict in his book Guns Over Kigali, Brig. Gen. Henry Kwami Anyidoho (rtd),\textsuperscript{25} describes the outstanding display of competence by members of the Ghanaian battalion. The book lauds the tactical prowess of the Ghanaian command and the bravery of a good number of the Ghanaian soldiers in the face of real danger. Anyidoho reveals that due to the high professionalism and commitment of the Ghanaian contingent to the United Nations’ mandate in Rwanda, at the height of the conflict, Ghanaian
soldiers constituted, by far, the majority of the residual force of the UNAMIR, which was charged with holding the fort at a time when all other peacekeeping forces had left. According to Anyidoho, this endeared the Ghanaian peacekeepers to the Rwandese. Indeed, the book reveals the author’s own personal contribution to the peacekeeping effort. Anyidoho, however, fails to discuss the effect of Ghana’s gallant contribution to the UN peacekeeping mission on her international standing and by extension the achievement of her foreign policy objectives.

Similarly, in his book entitled *Peacekeeping Techniques for Africa’s Conflict Management*, Lt. Gen. E.A. Erskine provides a history of Ghana’s participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations emphasizing how the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) as the principal stakeholder in Ghana’s peacekeeping efforts, attempts to adapt to an evolving UN peacekeeping system. Erskine reflects on the contribution of the GAF in peacekeeping operations around the world and examines UN peacekeeping philosophy as well as the principles and requirements of peacekeeping in general. In this regard, he discusses some of the consultations that go on between the top brass of the GAF and the government of Ghana on the one hand and the UN on the other hand, before, during and after the deployment of troops in peacekeeping mission areas.

The author also emphasizes the vital importance of pre-peacekeeping training for African Armed forces, noting that traditionally, the training of the African soldier has tended to centre on techniques and strategies in conventional warfare and consequently advises a redirection of training efforts to reflect relevant techniques in peacekeeping. Additionally, he outlines not only the challenges but also some of the benefits that Ghanaian peacekeeping troops as well as
the nation derive from these operations. He identifies some of the benefits as socio-economic in nature and others as the experience gained by Ghanaian troops.

Notwithstanding the depth of his analyses of the existing peacekeeping techniques and strategies from which he recommends that African peacekeeping troops can draw some useful lessons, and his broad discussion on the traditional role of peacekeeping operations i.e. keeping the peace between two or more warring factions, Erskine does not explore the effect of Ghana’s contribution to the many UN and other peacekeeping efforts on the achievement of the country’s foreign policy objectives.

Another work that deals with Ghana’s engagement in peacekeeping operations abroad is an article by Emma Birikorang entitled, Ghana’s Regional Security Policy: Costs, Benefits and Consistency. In it, the author traces Ghana’s involvement in international conflicts, primarily as a peacekeeper, from its intervention in the crisis in the Congo in the early 1960s through its contributions of peacekeeping troops to other war ravaged countries like Lebanon, Kosovo, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire. Birikorang posits that Ghana’s peacekeepers in the aforementioned theatres of conflict contributed significantly in alleviating some of the vagaries of war in many of these conflict areas. She alludes to the leadership role Ghana has played in championing sub-regional peace and security primarily through her contributions to peacekeeping. According to Birikorang, Ghana was one of the first ECOWAS countries to deploy peacekeepers to Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, even before the United Nations Security Council had time to sanction the action.
The author argues that, in pursuing her national security policy, Ghana identifies participation in peacekeeping operations in conflict ridden neighbouring countries as key to her national interest. She concludes, therefore, that the pursuit of international peace and security is motivated not only by concern for the breakdown in security in these conflict ridden countries, but also by a certain instinct of self-preservation as some of these conflicts could potentially spill over into Ghanaian territory or jeopardize her economic relations with the affected countries, thereby compromising her security and trade interests. According to Birikorang, an instance of Ghana’s engagement in peacekeeping that was motivated by both national interest and a desire to preserve peace was her involvement in the ECOMOG mission in Liberia in the early 1990s. In this particular case the government of Ghana at the time decided to take action to protect the staff of the embassy of Ghana in Monrovia, who were under siege, but also to stabilize the security situation Liberia. The article also examines the pecuniary and experienceable benefits of the country’s engagement in peacekeeping. It however, fails to explore the potential benefits of such peacekeeping engagements to the achievement of the country’s foreign policy.

Major Noble P.E. Agyemang-Bioh, on his part, provides a comprehensive review of United Nations international peacekeeping operations in general, and in particular, Ghana’s participation in these operations in his book *Preparing for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Third Millennium*. The author traces the history of the United Nation’s engagement in peacekeeping in various theatres, with a specific focus on Ghana’s participation and points out certain operational shortfalls caused primarily by inadequate preparations for peacekeeping missions. For instance, he blames the disastrous incidents, including a mutiny and a massacre, experienced by the first Ghanaian UN peacekeeping contingent in the Congo in the early 1960s, on inadequate preparations. Consequently, he outlines proposals for
adequate preparations for the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) on the one hand, and the government on the other, in regards to participation in UN international peacekeeping operations.

According to Agyemang-Bioh, a country may be motivated to engage in international peacekeeping by a range of issues, some of which include, a genuine pursuit of international peace and security; a quest for professional military exposure for its Armed Forces; a pursuit of internal political goals by using it to divert attention from domestic issues; and a desire to attract international attention. He also discusses some benefits gained by Ghana’s continued participation in UN peacekeeping operations which he analyses in terms of lessons learned and experiences gained; financial rewards; and enhancement of international standing. Unlike most of the other publications on international peacekeeping, the book briefly hints at Ghana’s increasing global reputation for excellence in peacekeeping, it however fails to seize the opportunity to engage in a deeper and broader analysis of the country’s participation in peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool.

It is worthy of note that the failure to engage in a deeper conversation on the prospects of peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool is not limited to publications on peacekeeping. Indeed, even works on the formulation and conduct of Ghana’s foreign policy in general, fail to provide an incisive analysis of the role of peacekeeping in achieving the country’s foreign policy objectives. For instance, K. B. Asante in his book *Foreign Policy Making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century* discusses some major aspects of foreign policy formulation in Ghana by examining her past policies and practices and exploring the options open to the country at the dawn of the current millennium. He indicates that the major state institution responsible for the execution of foreign policy is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its satellite Diplomatic missions abroad and goes on to identify diplomacy as the ultimate tool for the implementation
of the country’s foreign policy. Asante, however, fails to investigate the prospects of the county’s participation in international peacekeeping as an instrument for the achievement of its foreign policy objectives.

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from the above publications is that they all have in common one major shortfall; that they all fail to explore the implications of Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping as an instrument for the achievement of its foreign policy objectives; a major interest of this study. The study however draws inspiration from an article by Peter Schraeder entitled, *Senegal’s’ Foreign Policy: Challenges of Democratization and Marginalization*, which posits that that country’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations such as ECOMOG and UNIFIL have enhanced its standing in the international community.

1.10 Sources of Data & Research Methodology

The study is mainly a qualitative research. Qualitative research was used because the research expectations were unknown. The study combines data from both primary and secondary sources. Primary source data was obtained mainly through unstructured interviews with key officials at the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC) and the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. Unstructured interview approach was used, as it is generally less susceptible to bias in comparison with the structured kind. Secondary source data was obtained from books, journal articles, institutional publications, reports, other articles and online news reports.
The descriptive method of analysis was used in examining the data collected for the study. Descriptive research was used to obtain information on the nexus between Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping and the achievement of its foreign policy objectives.

1.11 Organisation of Chapters

The dissertation is presented in four (4) chapters. Chapter one constitutes the research design and provides a background to the problem. Chapter two comprises an overview of Ghana’s peacekeeping engagements over the years. Chapter three critically examines and analyses the extent to which participation in international peacekeeping has contributed to the achievement of Ghana’s foreign policy and also assesses the achievements and challenges of Ghana’s peacekeeping operations. Chapter four provides a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
ENDNOTES

3 Birikorang, E., op. cit.
7 Ibid., p. 23
10 Agyemang-Bioh, N. P. E., op. cit.
13 Ibid., p. 6.
14 Ibid., pp. 3-4.
19 Ibid.
20 Nye, J.S. (2008), op. cit.
22 Ibid.
26 Brig. Gen. Henry Kwami Anyidoho, a Ghanaian by nationality, was the Deputy Force Commander of the UN Mission in Rwanda.
27 Erskine, E. A., op. cit.
28 Birikorang, E., op. cit.
29 Agyemang-Bioh, N. P. E., op. cit.
CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF GHANA’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

2.0 Introduction

In accordance with her membership of the United Nations and other regional intergovernmental organisations such as ECOWAS and AU, Ghana is obligated to contribute to the collective security mechanism prescribed by these international organisations as a means of maintaining global peace and security. It also stands to benefit from that mechanism should the need ever arise. Principally, however, the pursuit of international peace and security has traditionally been at the core of Ghana’s foreign policy, which is inspired by her belief in the principle of peaceful coexistence among the comity of nations. This commitment to international peace and security is reflected in her rich history of continued participation in international peacekeeping efforts across the globe.

To this end, Ghana has contributed to numerous peacekeeping and peace support initiatives mainly under the aegis of the UN, the AU and ECOWAS and has consequently earned for itself the commendation and admiration of many countries and international institutions. Some of the more prominent contributions to peacekeeping and peace support operations undertaken by Ghana, which are examined below, include: the United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II) in Sinai in the 1970s, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in the 1990s, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) also in the 1990s.
2.1 United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC)

The Congo\(^2\) attained independence from the Kingdom of Belgium on 30\(^{th}\) June 1960. Crisis broke out almost immediately after independence following numerous riots portraying the distaste of the citizenry for Belgian involvement in the country’s affairs. Consequently, on 10\(^{th}\) July 1960, Belgium sent in troops to protect and evacuate its nationals and other Europeans.\(^3\)

To compound the crisis, a day after the arrival of the Belgian forces, Katanga\(^4\) declared secession from the Congo.

Faced with a spiralling political crisis and its attendant worsening security situation, the Congolese government on 12\(^{th}\) July 1960 requested for military assistance from the United Nations, ostensibly to protect the state from external aggression.\(^5\) Also, on the same day, the Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, personally appealed to then President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, for military assistance to “help eject the Belgians”\(^6\). In response to the Congolese government’s request, the UN Security Council issued resolution 132 on 14\(^{th}\) July 1960 calling for the withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and establishing the *Operations des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC) thus providing the authority for the Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, to raise the necessary military resources to stabilize the situation in the Congo.\(^7\)

The UN force was to remain in the Congo until such time that the country’s security forces were in a position to do their job.\(^8\)

Within 48 hours of the call by the Security Council, UN peacekeeping troops began to arrive in the Congo. Altogether, 18 UN member countries contributed both military and civil personnel to ONUC. The Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) included Ethiopia, India, Mali, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ireland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Senegal, Morocco, Guinea, Sudan, United Arab Republic (UAR),\(^9\) Pakistan, Tunisia, Sweden and Ghana.\(^10\)
In Ghana’s case, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s initial reaction to the call for troops was in response to Patrice Lumumba’s specific appeal to Ghana for assistance and not that of the UN. With that mindset, Kwame Nkrumah immediately dispatched his envoys to Leopoldville upon receipt of Lumumba’s appeal. Within 24 hours, Nkrumah also sent his Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General H.T. Alexander, after the delegation, to go and assess the form of assistance Lumumba required and whether or not Ghana could afford it. All these preparatory arrangements took place even before the UN Security Council could respond to the Congolese request. On arrival however, the Ghanaian troops quickly became part of the UN force.

By 16th July 1960, the first batch of Ghanaian troops, under the command of Brigadier-General J.E. Michel, had arrived in the Congo. Colonel J.A. Ankrah succeeded General Michel as Contingent Commander in June 1961, when the latter was appointed as the ONUC Chief of Staff. Major-General Alexander, who was initially in the Congo to assess the situation prior to the arrival of the Ghanaian troops, became the de facto commander of the UN forces until General Van Horn of the Netherlands was appointed as the substantive force commander. Before the UN Mission folded up, Ghana had sent, all together, three battalions along with over 150 trucks and hundreds of tons of supplies. To ensure the successful execution of the mission of the Ghanaian contingent in the Congo, Nkrumah created a Congo Coordinating Committee (CCC), which was to monitor and direct the operation from Accra.

From its commencement on 15th July 1960 to its folding up on 30th June 1964, the task of ONUC was to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo; to maintain law and order; and establish a long-term programme of assistance in the face of mutiny by the country’s Armed Forces, an apparent invasion by Belgium and secession by Katanga. At its peak, the UN Mission in the Congo, comprising both military and civilian
personnel, totalled 19,828. After the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in early 1961, the UN Security Council strengthened the mandate of ONUC. Apart from preventing clashes and civil strife, the force was authorized to use force, but only as a last resort, to administer peace, especially by expelling mercenaries, who had been amassing in the province of Katanga and other parts of the country. The main problem confronting the UN Mission in the Congo at the time was Katanga’s attempt to secede. The attempt received a lot of assistance from foreign mercenaries who were hoping to benefit from the rich natural resources that Katanga was endowed with. Indeed, the UN forces were compelled to engage with the secessionist forces led by foreign mercenaries in a number of skirmishes, in April, September and December 1961 and again in December 1962.

The Ghana Armed Forces, untested at the time, gained a lot of experience from its participation in the peacekeeping operations in the Congo. Indeed, according to Major N.P.E. Agyemang-Bioh (2000), for the most part, the Ghanaian contingent seemed unprepared for many developments that ordinarily should have been expected if it was better prepared in terms of planning and pre-deployment training. According to him the consequences of this lack of adequate planning and preparation is exemplified in three major incidents that happened to the Ghanaian contingent; the first was the mutiny of the 3rd Battalion of Infantry in December 1960 at Tshikapa, the second was the massacre of 44 military personnel of the 2nd Battalion of Infantry on 28th April 1961 at Port Franqui and the third was the attack on a patrol of Ghanaian troops by the security forces of the then seceded Katanga, who were referred to as the “Katanga Gendarmes”, in March 1962.

These and many smaller unrecorded incidents, though regrettable, provided the necessary lessons from which the Ghana Armed Forces acquired some experience to guide future
operations. However, apart from these unpleasant experiences, there were some positive outcomes for the Ghanaian Contingent. For instance, many members of the Ghanaian contingent, both civil and military, held positions of leadership and acquitted themselves creditably. As previously noted, even though Major-General Alexander, Ghana’s Chief of Defence Staff at the time, was in Leopoldville as a special emissary of Dr. Nkrumah and not as a member of the UN Mission, he briefly acted as the unofficial Force Commander of ONUC in its nascent stages. Mr. Robert K.A. Gardener, a Ghanaian, was the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) of ONUC from 1962 to 1963. Others included Brigadier-General J.E. Michel, Chief of Staff of ONUC from the start of the operation to August 1961, and Colonel S.J.A. Otu, who doubled as Chief Liaison Officer of ONUC and Military Adviser to the Congolese Government.\(^\text{19}\)

By February 1963, hostilities in the Congo had considerably subsided and life had begun to return to normalcy. The province of Katanga had been reintegrated into the Congo, heralding a gradual phasing out of the UN operations in the country. Thus the gradual withdrawal of all peacekeeping troops from all the TCCs ensued, with Ghanaian participation in the operation coming to an end on 25\(^{th}\) September 1963.

2.2 United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)

In July 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, provoking a joint air and ground attack by Great Britain, France and Israel. The UN General assembly, in reaction, organised an emergency session, which called for a ceasefire, withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory and authorized the establishment of the United Nation’s Emergency Force (UNEF)\(^\text{20}\) to oversee the implementation of the mandate. Ghana was not invited to contribute troops to this UN force and by May 1967, UNEF was withdrawn at Egypt’s request.
Fighting broke out again in the Middle East when Egypt, Syria and Jordan attacked Israel on 5th June 1967. The UN Security Council called for an immediate ceasefire. At the end of hostilities, six days later, Israel had occupied the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and parts of Syria including the Golan Heights. On 22nd November 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, which among other things, called for Israel to withdraw its forces from all territories occupied in the six-day war and to acknowledge and respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states within the region.

On 6th October 1973, Egypt and Syria again attacked Israel in the famous Yom Kippur war overrunning Israel’s “Bar Lev Line” of defence and capturing the Golan Heights. In reaction, the UN Security Council immediately passed Resolution 338, which called for a ceasefire and authorized Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, to establish a peacekeeping force, tasked with supervising the implementation of the mandate of the Resolution. Thus United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II) was born and Ghana was requested by the Secretary-General to provide a battalion and staff officers to join troops from other countries in undertaking the operation.

The first batch of Ghanaian troops comprising 485 all ranks under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W. Bruce-Konuah of the 6th Battalion of Infantry arrived in Cairo on 3rd January 1974 to undertake UN peacekeeping with UNEF II. The Ghanaian contingent was preceded by troops from other countries including Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland and was later joined by troops from Canada, Senegal, Indonesia and others. Like all Troop Contributing Countries, Ghana was allotted one senior staff appointment at UNEF II Headquarters.
Accordingly, Brigadier-General E.A. Erskine, Commander of the Ghana Army, was appointed as the Chief of Staff of UNEF II and was later elevated to Deputy Force Commander.28

Among other things, the operations of UNEF II involved the establishment of a disengagement force between Egypt and Israel. The task of the disengagement force was to deploy into areas from which Israeli Defence Forces were pulling back, such as the Suez Canal, per the terms of Resolution 338 and to monitor possible Egyptian troop movements. General Erskine has been credited as the main architect of the disengagement force, which oversaw the effective stabilization of Sinai and the cooling of tensions between the warring parties.29

As a result of an agreement signed between Israel and Egypt in Geneva, Switzerland, on 4th September 1975, the area of operations of UNEF II and its corresponding responsibilities increased considerably. Consequently the UN Secretary-General requested the Security Council for additional troops to enable the Force effectively execute its task.30 Accordingly, Ghana provided an additional Rifle Company to augment its total contingent strength to 595 all ranks.31

From the arrival of the Ghanaian contingent in the Middle East in January 1974 to the closure of UNEF II operations in June 1979, the Ghana Armed Forces undertook eleven rotations with all six Infantry Battalions enjoying the opportunity to serve with the peacekeeping force.32

2.3 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Following the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank by Israeli forces at the end of the six-day war in 1967, fighters of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), who had been displaced from their home bases, were hosted in Jordan, from where they continued
launching attacks into Israeli territory. In addition to fighting its traditional enemy, Israel, the armed faction of the PLO also came into armed conflict with its Jordanian host. Consequently, under the terms of the Cairo Agreement signed between Lebanon and the PLO in 1970, the Palestinian fighters were relocated to an area south of the Litani River in Southern Lebanon where they established a base of operations against Israel. On arriving in Lebanon, the PLO fighters immediately began carrying out raids across the Israeli-Lebanese armistice line resulting in retaliatory Israeli attacks against Lebanese targets.

In 1975 Lebanon descended into a civil war fought mainly between Christians and Muslims. The PLO actively participated in the war on the side of the Muslims. The Lebanese Government collapsed along with its security architecture. The resulting chaos gave rise to an increase in PLO raids and Israeli counter raids. The United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO), observer mission, was deployed on the armistice line. It was powerless in the ensuing exchanges, which continued until the PLO launched a major commando raid near the city of Haifa in Northern Israel on 11th March 1978, resulting in 37 deaths and 76 wounded among the Israeli population. In retaliation, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) invaded Lebanon on the night of 14th/15th March 1978 in an operation codenamed “Operation Litani” and in a few days occupied almost the entire region south of the Litani River.

Following the attacks of 11th and 14th/15th March 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 on 19th March 1978, which called on Israel to cease military actions against Lebanon; to withdraw the IDF from all Lebanese territories; and to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon. It also authorized the establishment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to enforce the terms of the
Resolution, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese Government to restore its authority in the area.

On 19th March 1978, the UN Secretary-General appointed Ghana’s Lieutenant-General Emmanuel A. Erskine as the first Force Commander of UNIFIL, a position he held till 14th February 1981. Erskine, who was, at the time of the appointment, in charge of UNTSO, immediately set up UNIFIL headquarters at Naquora, Southern Lebanon, on the premises of an UNTSO outstation and set about making arrangements to carry out his task. The first UN troops commenced deployment into Lebanon on 21st March 1978 and comprised mainly of military observers of UNTSO. They were joined by Swedish, Canadian, and Iranian troops of UNEF II operating in nearby Sinai and later by French, Irish and Senegalese soldiers. On the recommendation of Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 427 on 3rd May 1978 increasing the size of the force from 4,000 to 6,000 and by June the force consisted of: France (1,244), Norway (930), Nigeria (669), Ireland (665), Nepal (642), Senegal (634), and Canada (102).

The Iranian and French troops were withdrawn at the behest of their governments in January and March 1979, respectively, and were replaced by Dutch and Ghanaian soldiers in March and September 1979, respectively.38 Indeed, the Ghanaian troops were sent to join UNIFIL straight from their operations with UNEF II in Sinai, which had just wound up.39 On 25th February 1982, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 501 requesting an increase in the strength of the force to 7,000 and accordingly, the Government of Ghana agreed to increase the strength of its contingent.40
Since the arrival of the first battalion of Ghanaian Troops (GHANBATT II) on 1st September 1979, the average strength of the Ghanaian contingent has been around 700 personnel regardless of the fact that UNIFIL force strength has been fluctuating in accordance with the operational and political exigencies in the Middle East, the capacities of Troop Contributing Countries and the needs of the UN.

2.4 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)

In 1863, Cambodia, together with Vietnam and Laos, was colonized by France as one unit (i.e. French-Indochina Union). In the arrangement, Cambodia served primarily as a buffer for French interests in Vietnam and Thailand, hence during much of its colonial history the traditional society therein, largely remained pristine.\(^4\) Even the traditional monarchy was preserved, albeit under the ultimate power of the French. About midway through its rule, France backed the installation of 19-year old prince Norodom Sihanouk as King of Cambodia.

Having awakened to nationalism, the country fought for freedom from France in the first Indochina war from 1946 till it won its independence at the end of the war in 1954 with Prince Sihanouk as sovereign. The period from 1946 to 1970 was characterized by Sihanouk’s degenerating autocratic rule,\(^4\) which provoked profound hostility from the two main rival opposition groups; the Communist Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), popularly known as Khmer Rouge, and the right-wing military faction led by General Lon Nol who eventually overthrew prince Sihanouk and abolished the monarchy in 1970. Civil war broke out during Lon Nol’s rule, at the end of which the radical communist Khmer Rouge led by the infamous Pol Pot triumphed and established a government in 1975.\(^4\) Pol Pot’s regime presided over a virtual breakdown in civil and human rights, tradition, religion, social structure, education and
culminated in the deaths of more than a million Cambodians through starvation, persecution and murder in the so-called “killing fields.”

At this time, the Vietnamese civil war was still raging with the Soviet Union and the United States backing the North and South, respectively. In 1978, Vietnam, with logistical and technical support from the Soviet Union invaded Cambodia, overthrowing Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime and imposing a new communist regime, which styled itself as People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRK), on the country. The ruling PRK was unable to completely subdue the PDK (Khmer Rouge), which, along with two less powerful anti-government guerrilla factions: the royalist Front Uni National Pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperatif (FUNCINPEC), founded by the deposed Sihanouk; and the republican Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), led by Lon Nol's former Prime Minister Son Sann, embroiled the country in a protracted civil war lasting over a decade. Eventually the three opposition factions, under extreme external pressure, established the fragile Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) in 1982 that was internationally recognized but lacked effective internal control. The PRK, backed by Vietnam and the Soviet Union, remained the de facto government of Cambodia. Meanwhile the civil war raged on.

Cambodia had suffered a decade-long civil war interspersed with several attempts at peaceful resolution of the differences between the four factions: the PKR, the Khmer Rouge, the FUNCIPEC and KPNLF. By July 1989, having reached what William Zartman describes as a “mutually hurting stalemate”, the four parties agreed to the Paris Peace Conference under the aegis of France and Indonesia. Among the participants of the conference were all four belligerent Cambodian factions, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the
members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), representatives of the Non-Allied Movement (NAM), and the other two Indochinese states (Vietnam and Laos). The conference attempted to map out a comprehensive peace plan for Cambodia and however became deadlocked over disagreements on a proposed quadripartite power sharing arrangement and was consequently adjourned.

Subsequently, Australia put forth a proposal that envisaged the UN itself taking over the administration of Cambodia, demobilizing the armed forces of the various factions, conducting elections and finally transferring power to a new and legitimate government of Cambodia. In August 1990, following further extensive consultations based on the Australian proposal, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council adopted a framework document as a roadmap for peace in Cambodia. This was endorsed by the Security Council on 20th September 1990 and by the General Assembly on 15th October 1990. As envisaged by the framework document, the Cambodian factions agreed to form the Supreme National Council (SNC), comprising 12 members representing the interests of the four factions. It was hoped that the SNC would help keep the peace process on track and provide a unified Cambodian delegation to the UN General Assembly.

However, by February 1991 fierce fighting had resumed. It continued until all sides accepted a voluntary ceasefire called for by the UN on 1st May. Subsequently, the UN dispatched a four-man observation team led by Major-General Timothy Dibuamah, UN Military Adviser and a Ghanaian by nationality, to assess the situation in Cambodia. General Dibuamah confirmed that the ceasefire was holding.

Following many sessions of intensive negotiations between the four factions in pursuit of a
The peaceful resolution of the Cambodian crisis, often under the auspices of entities like the UN, France, Indonesia, China, and Japan, the ripe moment for settlement presented itself late in 1991 and thus a three-day resumption of the Paris Peace Conference from 21st to 23rd October culminated in the formal adoption and signing of the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, also called the Paris Peace Accords. In the main, the accords committed the four factions to a ceasefire and as envisaged in the Australian proposal, the UN was to impose its authority over Cambodia during a transitional period between entry into force of the accords and the formation of a new government.

Consequently, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 745 on 28th February 1992, establishing the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was mandated with ensuring the implementation of the Paris Accords that included, *inter alia*, monitoring and supervising the ceasefire; supervising the withdrawal of foreign military forces; providing internal security; maintaining law and order; and providing civil administration. Under this mandate, the SNC was to delegate to UNTAC, which would be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), “all powers” necessary to implement the tenets of the Accords.

UNTAC was the most ambitious operation in the history of UN peacekeeping with 22,874 military, police, and civilian personnel. UNTAC’s military force of about 15,900 consisted of twelve infantry battalions; four engineer units, Military Observers, air and logistics support groups and four field hospitals. The Mission’s Area of Operation (AO) was divided into twelve sectors with the Ghanaian contingent providing security for the Phnom Penh Special Zone. The first batch of Ghanaian troops arrived in Cambodia in October 1991 under the ambit of the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which had been established
immediately after the signing of the Paris Agreements in October 1991 and was later absorbed by UNTAC on 15th March 1992 when the latter became operational. Subsequently, two infantry battalions, thirty observers, fifteen UNTAC Headquarters staff, a military police platoon and a civil police detachment were contributed by Ghana during the lifespan of UNTAC’s mandate.56

2.5 United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR)

The people of Rwanda, a former colony of the kingdom of Belgium, are made up of three main ethnic groups consisting of 84% Hutus, 15% Tutsis and 1% Twa.57 Historically the Tutsis were the ruling elite of the erstwhile kingdom of Rwanda and enacted anti-Hutu policies by which they dominated the nation. For the most part, during the colonial era, the Belgian colonial authorities ruled through the Tutsi kings and perpetuated pro-Tutsi policies. This resulted in fewer economic and educational opportunities for Hutus, thus promoting a feeling of inferiority among Hutus.58 As a consequence of this Belgian colonial legacy, the Tutsi Minority dominated Rwandese national and economic affairs for many decades before the country gained independence. This Tutsi minority dominance was the main source of dissension among the ranks of the Hutu Majority, which led to a rebellion in November 1959 that resulted in the massacre of approximately 20,000 and expulsion of about 160,000 Tutsi in to neighbouring countries, with the majority fleeing to Uganda.

Following these events, the Hutus formed the Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu (PARMEHUTU) and called for independence and a guaranteed separate representation. PARMEHUTU won a UN sanctioned Referendum on the abolition of the Tutsi monarchy culminating in the separation of Rwanda from Burundi in 1961, and subsequently led Rwanda to independence on 1st July 1962.59 The PARMEHUTU, an ethnically based party, ruled Rwanda from 1962 to 1973 and was therefore perceived to be unrepresentative of the cross-
section of the Rwandan society leading to widespread disaffection in the public. As a result, on 5\textsuperscript{th} July 1973, Major-General Juvenile Habyarimana, then Minister of Defence and head of the National Guard, staged a bloodless coup, proclaimed a second republic, established a military administration, declared himself President and ruled until his tragic death on 6\textsuperscript{th} April 1994.

Civil war broke out in October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group composed mainly of Tutsi refugees, who fled the country in the 1959 uprising and their offspring, invaded North-Eastern Rwanda from neighbouring Uganda. President Habyarimana’s Rwandan Government Forces (RGF) put up a resistance and neither side was able to gain a decisive advantage for over two years. By 1992, the toll of the civil war, coupled with mass demonstrations, had weakened President Habyarimana’s authority and forced him into a coalition with the domestic opposition. The war lingered on until the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) deployed a neutral force in July 1992 to supervise a truce. Following increasing RPF guerrilla attacks, a ceasefire was agreed between the two factions in March 1993. On 4\textsuperscript{th} August 1993, the parties signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, under the auspices of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi. Among other things, the Arusha Peace Agreement called for the installation of a transitional government; withdrawal of foreign troops; deployment of a neutral international force; and creation of a Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).

Whilst hostilities continued, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 872 on 5\textsuperscript{th} October 1993 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), ostensibly to implement the tenets of the Arusha Peace Agreement. UNAMIR was effectively established on 1\textsuperscript{st} November 1993 with Major-General Romeo Dallaire of Canada and Brigadier-General Henry Kwami Anyidoho of Ghana appointed as the Force Commander and Deputy Force
Commander, respectively. Brigadier-General Anyidoho also doubled as the UNAMIR Chief of Staff. The UNAMIR force deployed into five military operational sectors with the 800-man Ghanaian contingent (GHANBATT) manning the 19 km wide DMZ.

During this period, consultations on the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement continued amid clashes of violence until a jet carrying Presidents Juvenile Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryimira of Burundi and a host of other senior officials of both governments was shot down near the Kigali International Airport on 6th April 1994. The officials were on their way from a consultation trip in Tanzania. This tragic incident reignited the civil war and precipitated the killing of over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the space of a hundred days. The peacekeeping force of UNAMIR, which included, among others, contingents from Belgium, Bangladesh, France, Canada, Tunisia and Ghana, was ill-equipped, under resourced and had a huge human resource deficit. At its peak the total force stood at only 2,548 but was even eventually reduced to a mere 270 by UN Security Council Resolution 912 of 21st April 1994 (though unofficially the force commanders defied their superiors in New York and retained 456 troops). Indeed, prior to the UN’s decision to reduce the force strength, many troop contributing countries had already begun thinning out or in some cases completely withdrawing their troops due to reasons such as deliberate attacks on them by the factions. For instance, on 7th April 1994, a day after the murder of the Rwandan President, ten Belgian peacekeepers were abducted and shot in cold blood by the presidential guards causing Belgium to withdraw her troops.

Though the Ghanaian contingent was the last to arrive at the UNAMIR base in Rwanda, many observers still adjudged it as the most outstanding in the mission. Indeed following the decision by the commanders of UNAMIR to retain a residual force of 456 troops in defiance of
instructions from the Security Council, the Force Commander, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, made it clear to his team that he would only retain a force if Ghanaian troops would be a part of it, since, by his personal assessment, the Ghanaian soldiers had demonstrated a high degree of professionalism, courage, and commitment to the mission’s mandate. He therefore turned to Brigadier-General Anyidoho, who arranged to retain many of the Ghanaian soldiers. 356 out of the residual force of 456 were Ghanaian troops thus constituting the backbone of UNAMIR in its latter days. The selfless commitment of the government of Ghana, coupled with the courage of GHANBAT in staying behind to assist Rwanda, endeared the Rwandan population to Ghanaian troops throughout their stay in the country. Additionally, the GHANBATT medical team, the International Committee of Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) were the only medical establishments that remained to provide much needed healthcare to the numerous Rwandese suffering from shellfire injuries, disease, and malnutrition. GHANBATT also performed all the ceremonial functions in the operational area until the termination of the operation in March 1996.

2.6 ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
2.6.1 Liberia

Liberia, a country founded in 1847 by freed American slaves, was ruled by the founders for almost a century and half. The founders who were commonly referred to as America-Liberians constituted little more than five percent of the population and established a strict hierarchical social system that placed them at the top and the indigenous inhabitants at the bottom. The political and economic dominance of the America-Liberians reached a climax during the presidency of William Tolbert from 1971 to 1980. Tolbert’s regime was characterized by mismanagement, corruption and intimidation. Indeed, a crackdown on anti-Tolbert sentiment and opposition to America-Liberian elitism, during this period, paved the way for political
upheaval leading to a bloody coup d’etat on 12th April 1980 led by Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, a member of the indigenous Krahn ethnic group.

Following the coup, the Krahns assumed the political and economic dominance once held by the Americo-Liberians. Doe ruled with a heavy hand and secured his regime, which was characterized by corruption, with the use of swift Krahn violence. The resulting ethnic tensions and economic stagnation set the stage for violent reaction. This was manifested in the form of an invasion from a base in Cote d’Ivoire across into Liberia led by Charles McArthur Ghankay Taylor on the Eve of Christmas in 1989 aimed at ousting Samuel Doe and re-establishing Americo-Liberian supremacy. By late January 1990, Taylor’s rebel group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) had captured Nimba County in northern Liberia killing thousands of innocent civilians and forcing a larger number to seek refuge in neighbouring Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea. By June, the rebels had reached the capital, Monrovia. They, however, failed to remove Doe from power, resulting in a standoff between Taylor’s NPFL, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), which was a splinter of the NPFL led by Prince Yormie Johnson, and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), that is, the government forces.

Subsequently, a full-scale war involving many rebel factions engulfed the country for the next seven years leading to the deaths of about 20,000 and displacement of almost one million people. The conflict devastated Liberia’s natural and human resources with thousands fleeing into neighbouring West African countries amid widespread human rights abuses.

From the outset, international response to the Liberian conflict seemed to be one of indifference with the United States and the United Nations both conspicuously shying away from an
intervention. The responsibility therefore fell on West Africa to find a solution to the problem and consequently at an ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government summit held in Banjul, the Gambia, in May 1990, West African leaders established a five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) comprised of the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, and Ghana to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. By July 1990, when the SMC failed to forge a negotiated settlement to the conflict, ECOWAS put forward a plan for a military intervention force. In early August 1990, the SMC met and adopted the ECOWAS “Peace Plan for Liberia”, which, among others, called for an immediate ceasefire between and amongst the warring factions; establishment of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to oversee the ceasefire; and the establishment of an interim government.

Thus established, ECOMOG, composed of some 3,500 troops drawn from the SMC member states as well as Guinea and Sierra Leone, on 23rd August 1990, deployed to Liberia to implement the tenets of the ECOWAS Peace Plan. Displeased by what he considered a breach of Liberia’s territorial integrity, Charles Taylor led his rebels in a violent attack on the ECOMOG force immediately it landed.

Ghana originally contributed one battalion and a Force Commander, Major General Arnold Quainoo, to the initial ECOMOG force that arrived in Liberia. However, when persistent hostilities by the NPFL in mid-September 1990 forced a change in ECOMOG’s mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, Ghana accordingly increased her troops to two battalions. As the conflict progressed, the contributing countries and troop strength varied, with non West African countries like Tanzania and Uganda joining in. By February 1990, for instance, the force strength stood at some 8,430 with the highest troop contributor, Nigeria, providing 4,908 followed by Ghana with 1,028.70
In addition to its ground troops, which played combat, administrative and logistics roles, the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) also provided Naval and Air support to the ECOMOG force. Ghana Naval ships were deployed at the very inception of the operation. In August 1990, for instance, Ghana Naval ships YOGAGA and ACHIMOTA provided gunfire to cover the establishment of the initial bridgehead after which they policed the Liberian coast to enforce the ceasefire. Similarly, the Ghana Air Force provided close air support for the landings and establishment of the frontline, and also for the counter offensive against Charles Taylor’s Operation Octopus in 1993. Additionally, on numerous occasions, the Ghana Air Force assisted with the transportation of peace delegations in and out of Liberia as well as providing troop transportation and evacuation of wounded, sick and dead peacekeepers from the Area of Operations. Additionally, Ghana provided a safe-haven for a large number of Liberian refugees fleeing the conflict. To this end, the country in collaboration with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) established a refugee camp to house Liberian refugees at Budumburan in the Central Region of Ghana.

Ghana also brought extensive peacekeeping experience to the ECOWAS endeavour in Liberia. Indeed, according to Natalie Brown, perhaps the Ghanaian troops were the most experienced in peacekeeping as at least two-thirds of the country’s military force is regularly deployed to international peacekeeping operations beginning from their first participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960 to UNIFIL in Lebanon in 1978, where they sharpened their peacekeeping skills.
2.6.2 Sierra Leone

In June 1997, inspired by its modest success in Liberia, ECOWAS sent ECOMOG to intervene in the turmoil that had been raging in Sierra Leone for more than six (6) years. Unlike in the case of Liberia, the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone only received the *ex post facto* authority of the ECOWAS after troops from Nigeria and Guinea were independently deployed in the country to attempt to stop the conflict.\(^{74}\)

In many ways the Sierra Leonean conflict shared many parallels with the raging civil war next door in Liberia. A society comprised of an admixture of descendants of freed slaves from North America, Europe and the Caribbean; captured Africans who were liberated before being sold into slavery, known as *recaptives*; and indigenous African populations, Sierra Leone, was founded in 1772 mainly through the efforts of British abolitionists.\(^{75}\) Prior to independence and long after its attainment on 27\(^{th}\) April 1961, the Creoles, comprised of the settlers and recaptives, struggled intensely with the indigenous Africans for political and economic dominance. However, the collective impact of mismanagement by successive governments led to the degradation of state institutions, disintegration of the Sierra Leonean society and the decline of the political and economic systems. The situation gave rise to a series of civil strikes and political protests fuelled by a general sense of disillusionment among the general population.

By 1991, Whilst President Joseph Saidu Momoh was facing political upheavals in the capital, a former army corporal, Foday Saybanah Sankoh, was leading a few hundred rebel fighters, made up of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians, in an invasion on the eastern provinces of the country. The Sierra Leonean army, which was deployed to rebuff the attack, was facing challenges such as logistical constraints, non-payment of wages and insufficient rations. The
soldiers marched into Freetown to demand their wages, President Momoh fled and a young Army Officer, Captain Valentine Strasser took power. Shortly after Strasser took over in April 1992, Foday Sankoh’s group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), intensified its offensive and soon controlled about one-fifth of the country, largely in the diamond rich east and south.

According to Lansana Gberie, although the RUF claimed that it aimed to overthrow President Momoh and his “corrupt despotic” one-party state, its campaigns were characterized by terror attacks on civilians and wanton destruction of property. Meanwhile, Sankoh had trained in Libya alongside Liberia’s Charles Taylor and, indeed, even fought in Taylor’s insurrection in Liberia in 1990. It soon became clear that it was the better educated Taylor who was remotely controlling the RUF. Indeed, Taylor and Sankoh sustained an alliance that saw the former supplying the latter with arms and ammunitions in exchange for diamonds ostensibly to fund his own rebellion.

The conflict raged on for the next five years during which Valentine Strasser was overthrown in a palace coup in 1996 led by Julius Maada Bio, his close confidante. Maada Bio immediately called for an election that was won by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Barely a year into his presidency, in May 1997, Tejan Kabbah was removed from power by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, who entered into an alliance with the rebel RUF. During the five (5) years of war, which was punctuated with several attempts at pacific resolution, large numbers of unarmed civilians had been the victims of torture, including rather grotesque amputations, and deliberate and arbitrary killings.

From its commencement in March 1991, the Sierra Leonean conflict received little international notice until earlier bilateral military efforts by Nigeria and Guinea later
metamorphosed into an ECOWAS sanctioned intervention in mid-1997 also dubbed ECOMOG. Accordingly, battalions of ECOMOG forces comprising mainly Ghanaian and Nigerian troops, who were on standby in Liberia, were quickly ferried to Sierra Leone. ECOMOG’s mandate was to put a stop to the orgy of violence and restore order. By February 1998, ECOMOG had reinstated Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, who had sought exile in Guinea, thereby returning the situation in Sierra Leone to some semblance of normalcy.
ENDNOTES

1 Ghana began troop contributions to UNIFIL in 1978 and continues to do so to this day.
2 Now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
4 At independence, Katanga was and still remains a province of DRC.
5 Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and his ilk saw the Belgian military presence as an act of war.
9 Now Egypt.
10 Agyemang-Bioh, N. P. E., op. cit.
12 Now Kinshasa.
13 Thompson, W. S., op. cit.
15 Ibid., p. 234
16 Ibid., p. 233
17 Agyemang-Bioh, N. P. E, op. cit.
18 Ibid., pp. v-vi
19 Ibid.
20 UNEF (I) preceded UNEF (II) to which Ghana was a contributor.
21 The famous six-day war.
23 Yom Kippur is a Jewish Tradition celebrated on 6th October as a day of atonement. It is considered the holiest of all days and dedicated to prayer and rest. No active work is allowed on that day even national security is relaxed.
24 The Bar Lev Line was named after then Israeli Chief of Staff, Haim Bar-Lev.
26 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
27 Ibid., p. 22.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., p. 23.
31 Ibid., p. 80
32 Ibid., pp. 82-84.
35 Ibid.
36 El-Hajj, J., op. cit.
37 Ibid.,
39 Ibid., p. 155.
40 Ibid., p. 24.
43 Ibid., p. 1.
44 Ibid., p. 1.
46 Ibid.

39
49 Ibid., pp. 5-6
50 Ibid., pp. 6-7
51 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
52 Ibid., p. 9.
53 Ibid., p. 12
54 Ibid., p. 12.
55 Ibid., p. 27.
56 Ibid., pp. 30-32
58 Ibid.
60 Ibid., p. 5.
61 Ibid., p. 7.
63 Anyidoho, H. K., op. cit. p. 52
64 Ibid.,
65 Ibid., p. 53
66 Ibid., p. 55.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
72 Ibid., pp. 312-313.
76 Gberie, L., op. cit.
77 Ibid.
CHAPTER THREE
SIGNIFICANCE OF GHANA’S PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF HER FOREIGN POLICY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter broadly examines the significance of Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping as a tool in the pursuit of the country’s foreign policy objectives. To accomplish this, the chapter opens by identifying, in broad terms, Ghana’s foreign policy and follows with a discussion on the historical trajectory of the policy. It also outlines the context and parameters within which the country’s foreign policy is carried out and discusses the means by which the policy is conducted, identifying some of the major state institutions assigned with the responsibility of seeing to its implementation.

Using the results of field interviews, set against the backdrop of Joseph Nye’s concept of Soft Power, the chapter explores the utility of Ghana’s regular contributions to international peacekeeping in achieving her foreign policy objectives through, first and foremost, evaluating its effect on the country’s international image and secondly, an in-depth discussion on some of the major achievements and benefits of peacekeeping accruing to the country. It concludes with a discussion on some of the challenges and costs Ghana has had to face as a result of participation in international peacekeeping.

3.1 The Context of Ghana’s Foreign Policy

The context within which a country conducts its foreign policy, to a large extent, is provided by a variety of factors, including, but not limited to, its national interest, its security policy, the perception of its standing in the international system, and the nature of its relations with the other members of the system. Prominent among these, however, is the concept of national
interest. Ghana’s national interest in the area of the country’s foreign policy is defined under Article 35, Clause 2 of the 1992 Constitution, which provides that “the state shall protect and safeguard the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ghana, and shall seek the well-being of all her citizens”.¹ As indicated in chapter one, the context for much of Ghana’s foreign policy is derived from Article 40 of the 1992 constitution, which stipulates the fundamental principles that guide the formulation and conduct of the country’s foreign policy as:

In its dealings with other nations, the Government shall (a) promote and protect the interests of Ghana; (b) seek the establishment of a just and equitable international economic order; (c) promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; (d) adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of the UN Charter, OAU Charter, the Commonwealth, the ECOWAS Treaty and any other organizations of which Ghana is a member.²

Article 73 of the Constitution also enjoins the Government to conduct its foreign relations in accordance with the principles of international law and diplomacy in such a way as to promote the national interest of the country.³ Therefore, in formulating her foreign policy, Ghana’s leaders must carefully consider all the elements that impinge directly or indirectly on the above principles, key among which is the country’s national interest. A fundamental aspect of this national interest is the survival and security of the state.

The formulation process of Ghana’s foreign policy, therefore, takes into account the protection and defence of the territorial integrity of the country, pursuit of economic prosperity, quest for social cohesion, promotion of ideological goals, ensuring the peace and stability of her immediate “neighbourhood” (i.e. the West African Sub-region), supporting wider international peace and security, as well as nurturing and promoting a favourable image of Ghana abroad.⁴ The context of Ghana’s foreign policy is, thus, structured to facilitate the pursuance of these and other related goals. The achievement of the above foreign policy goals is pursued within
the context of such elements as the country’s geography and size, population, economic strength, military strength, culture, history, national identity, among others.

3.2 Ghana’s Foreign Policy

At independence, the first President of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, outlined for the new nation, a foreign policy that can be viewed as non-aggressive yet resolute, Africa-centric yet nondiscriminatory and non-aligned even though birthed in the Cold War. Over the years the country’s foreign policy, even though sensitive to the times, has remained fundamentally intact. Several observers of the country’s foreign policy have attested to this fact. In his book Foreign policy making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century, K. B. Asante noted that “significantly, Ghana’s foreign policy has not changed much since Nkrumah...” Mr. Victor James Gbeho, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, remarked in a 1997 seminar that “the broad tenets of Ghana’s foreign policy have in principle remained the same over the years since the country’s independence in 1957.”

From various studies of Ghana’s unfolding interactions with other actors in the international system, as reflected in the speeches and comments by successive leaders, records of her diplomatic discourse, the 1992 Constitution, various treaties and international conventions entered into by successive governments, the manifestoes of political parties and her reactions to international incidents, the broad tenets of the country’s foreign policy can be synthesized as:

- The protection of the sovereignty, political independence, and the territorial integrity of Ghana;
- The pursuit of the economic wellbeing of the Ghanaian people;
- The promotion of friendly relations and economic cooperation with other countries;
• Fostering political and economic cooperation among African states;
• A commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security; and
• The pursuit of a policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment.

Over the years, successive governments have pursued variants of the above foreign policy imperatives, which might be described as the traditional foreign policy of Ghana, with differing emphasis arising out of the differences in personalities, perceptions and worldview of the leaders. The thrust of this foreign policy, however, is to pursue the national interest of Ghana.

3.3 The Conduct of the Policy

Foreign policy making is a complex exercise, involving several actors and different levels of policy formulation and implementation. A country’s foreign policy can emanate from several different processes within the government machinery. In Ghana, as is in most countries, the execution of foreign policy is the sole prerogative of the Head of State, parts of which may be delegated to subordinates. In Ghana, the President derives the authority to execute foreign policy from Article 75 (1) of the 1992 Constitution. In the execution of foreign policy, the President is supported by state institutions including Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) whose portfolios encompass such matters as international politics, international trade, international finance, international law, foreign investment, consular and migration and other issues related to the country’s interaction with the outside world.

From the above general criterion, different aspects of Ghana’s foreign policy is therefore executed, per the authority of the 1992 Constitution, by the President, Cabinet, Parliament, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MFA & RI), the National Security
Council (NSC), the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the Ministry of Defence, among others.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the main instrument of foreign policy implementation in Ghana. It is the state agency responsible for managing Ghana’s relations with other states and international actors. To achieve this, Article 74 (1) enjoins the President to appoint persons to represent, protect and promote the country’s interests abroad. These representatives abroad (Ambassadors/High Commissioners) operate as heads of Ghana’s diplomatic Missions abroad, which basically function as the MFA’s field offices. The main duties of the ambassadors and their staff are to represent the government of Ghana, protect and promote the interests of Ghana, negotiate on behalf of the state, ascertain, by all lawful means, developments in the country of accreditation and report to the authorities back home. The ambassador and his/her staff report directly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose main role is to provide the President with sound foreign policy advice.

3.4 Significance of Peacekeeping as a Tool in the Pursuit of Ghana’s Foreign Policy Objectives

According to Matt Armstrong, between 2001 and 2010, more than half of all U.N. peacekeeping forces came from seven countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Jordan, Nepal, and Ghana. All these countries are categorised either as Third World or developing countries and do not possess enough economic resources to spare in the pursuit of international adventurism. Yet, at any time over the past two (2) decades, the world’s top five (5) peacekeeping troop contributors are among these seven (7), each of which have individually provided more troops than the combined total of the five (5) permanent members (P5) of the United Nation’s Security Council (UNSC). With the exception of China, whose peacekeeping troop contribution has been increasing in recent years, the other four (4) members
of the P5 (i.e. United States, United Kingdom, France and Russia) have been rather conservative in their troop contributions. The P5 also happen to be among the top global economic and military giants and are therefore better positioned to engage in international peacekeeping. Admittedly, however, participation in international peacekeeping offers relatively greater risks for the more endowed countries than developing countries. Additionally, developing countries such as Ghana tend to enjoy greater benefits from participation in international peacekeeping in comparison with their more fortunate counterparts like the members of the P5.

With regard to payoffs attributable to the increasing participation in international peacekeeping by developing countries like Ghana, Matt Armstrong notes that several such developing countries now employ peacekeeping operations to advance their foreign policy agendas as peacekeeping provides them with a platform for global visibility. India, according to Krishnasamy and Weigold, has adopted a pro-active approach to UN peacekeeping as part of its new foreign policy orientation in the post-Cold War era. They argue that India is motivated to participate in UN peacekeeping operations by its ambitions for recognition and to enhance its international identity and image in a competitive and unpredictable global system. Similarly, discussions with officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration suggest that Ghana’s long history of sustained participation in international peacekeeping affords her the same opportunities as India in that regard. The question, however, remains whether Ghana has taken advantage of the opportunities.

The Soft Power advantages of Ghana’s continuous contribution of troops to internationally sanctioned peacekeeping assignments have afforded the country with much needed international attention. Just as Ghana’s democratic credentials and general security and
political stability have singled her out for admiration by much of the international community, so has her contribution to international peacekeeping operations provided her a voice with which to speak at such platforms as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Generally, powerful countries are blessed with a multiplicity of options with regard to the achievement of their foreign policy objectives. Due to the possession of hard power resources such as superior military, economic might, superior manpower resource from a large and skilled population, stable system of governance and territorial advantage, these powerful countries can, among other options, resort to the carrot and stick approach as a means of achieving their foreign policy objectives. In this regard, they can engage in coercion; through the threat or use of force; or inducement; through gifts, payments and bribes, in other to make their voices heard on the international arena. On the other hand, weaker countries, of which Ghana is one, have fewer options available to them in trying to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Ghana, having no military or economic might and no strategic alliances with powerful states, has but few options available to it as ways of achieving its foreign policy. One such means is by use of the power of attraction; through seduction with certain innate qualities. This means of attaining foreign policy goals is by definition the application of Soft Power. By continuously contributing troops to global peacekeeping efforts, Ghana has gained the attention and admiration of much of the international community, thus accruing for itself much needed currency for articulating and pushing its foreign policy agenda. Participation in international peacekeeping therefore gives Ghana a certain quality of attractiveness and thus constitutes a Soft Power attribute, which may be exploited to the benefit of the country.

On the other hand, with or without Soft Power benefits, Ghana still has motivation for contributing troops to international peacekeeping operations. This is due to the fact that one of
the country’s most entrenched foreign policy objectives, since the days of Nkrumah, is the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly on the African continent. Therefore, efforts by the UN, AU, ECOWAS and other international organisations in the resolution of conflicts and pursuit of world peace through the establishment of peacekeeping operations, have inadvertently provided Ghana with an opportunity to pursue its own foreign policy goals. All the peacekeeping operations that Ghana has participated in, since 1960, have been an effort by the country to achieve one of its most venerated foreign policy objectives; maintenance of international peace and security. While it may not always succeed, due, mainly, to the fact that the achievement of international peace has to be a collaborative effort in this anarchic global world order, Ghana has never missed an opportunity to contribute positively to the achievement of that goal. To this end, the country has consistently contributed troops to international peacekeeping engagements and by so doing pursued its own stated foreign policy objectives. To Ghana’s good fortune however, international peacekeeping presents it with real Soft Power opportunities to catch the attention of the world.

### 3.5 The Importance of Peacekeeping to Ghana’s International Image

Every country wants its voice to be heard on the international arena. In the same vein, every country wants to be seen in a positive light. How one country is viewed by other countries contributes significantly to how they respond to its voice, overtures and actions. The behaviour of weaker countries toward more powerful countries is demonstrably different from their behavior toward one another. Given the anarchic nature of the international system, countries are continually jostling for space to carry through their foreign policy agendas. Ghana is not above this international “rat race” to be noticed and taken seriously when she speaks.\(^\text{15}\) However, without the traditional power resources (economic and military might), the country
has to resort to available Soft Power attributes in order to enhance its image on the international arena. Over the years, peacekeeping has provided Ghana with that attractive quality.

States also seek recognition for their actions as they relate to the processes in the international system. In discussing India and Pakistan’s motivations for participating in international peacekeeping, Kabilan Krishnasamy observes as follows:

States seek recognition for contributing to different areas of the UN. For example, Poland gained significant recognition for initiating and developing the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1979. Canada's leading role in the Ottawa process in December 1996, to place a global ban on production, use and stockpiling of landmine materials, contributed to the enhancement of its image within the international community. In a similar vein, peacekeepers seek recognition for their participation in the UN's primary peace maintenance efforts.

Such recognition can occur in two forms: 'declared' or 'actual' recognition. Declared recognition refers to praise in the form of written or verbal commendations. Declared recognition could have two effects on peacekeepers. First, it enhances their image and identity in the comity of other peacekeepers. Openly declaring that a country is competent in its peacekeeping duties not only creates a certain impression but also places that participant on a higher level than others. This, to some extent, can boost greater participation and serves the peacekeepers' national interest by enhancing its image. But, at the same time, declared recognition can also result in peacekeepers having some expectations in terms of rewards and 'real' acknowledgement within the UN system.

'Actual' recognition comes in the form of 'deed'. It refers to the act of rewarding and giving some real credit for the contributions and participation of member states. Some of these rewards or 'real credit' include consideration for the appointment of national representatives to high-level posts in the DPKO within the UN Secretariat; their inclusion in mission planning and decision-making processes at various levels; and consultation with them on matters relating to peacekeeping.16

By Krishnasamy’s logic therefore, Ghana’s long history of participation in international peacekeeping stands to earn the country international recognition. Indeed, Ghana has been recognised by the UN and other actors in the international system for its role in peacekeeping. Ambassador Leslie Christian, Chief Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirms that peacekeeping has enhanced Ghana’s image internationally.17 He indicates that, for instance, a Ghanaian Military Officer, Timothy K. Dibuamah, was appointed to the UN Military Adviser’s staff at the UN Secretariat in New York in February, 1974, while he was a Major, and soon
rose to become the Military Adviser to the UN Secretary General by January 1981, a position he held till his retirement as a Major General in 1997. In addition to his personal qualities as an outstanding officer, Major General Dibuamah’s appointment was, in part, due to the high regard the United Nations system had for Ghana as a contributor to international peacekeeping operations. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, in an address to the Parliament of Ghana on 8th November 1999, paid glowing tribute to Ghana for its role in international peacekeeping, noting “Ghana’s achievements in the field of international peacekeeping and conflict resolution are laudable”. Another world leader who acknowledged Ghana for her achievements in international peacekeeping was President Bill Clinton of the United States of America during his visit to Ghana in 1997. He praised the country for working tirelessly to preserve peace in Africa and the world.

In recognition of Ghana’s useful contributions to international peacekeeping, the United Nations has rewarded the country by appointing her citizens to high-level posts during peacekeeping missions over the years. These include Force Commanders and Deputy Force Commanders of missions, Military Advisers as well as Chiefs of Staff. The following are among some of the more prominent Ghanaian nationals to be appointed to high-level peacekeeping related posts:
### Table 2.1: List of Prominent Ghanaian Nationals Appointed to UN Peacekeeping Posts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>POSITION</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
</tr>
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According to Ambassador Lawrence Satuh, a former Chief Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, these and other Ghanaian office holders in the UN system reflect a positive image of Ghana abroad.\(^{19}\)

Aside from performing core operational duties while on peacekeeping, Ghanaian peacekeepers engage in extracurricular activities such as delivery of humanitarian assistance and environmental protection programmes. These gestures not only endear the Ghanaian contingent to the local people but also raise the profile of Ghana in the eyes of observers.
Usually, the physical infrastructure like roads, bridges, and housing are severely damaged in conflict zones. Additionally, the ability of the host authorities to provide utilities and other social amenities becomes severely compromised, leaving the social life in a broken state. In an effort to improve the conditions of conflict areas under their purview, the Ghana Armed Forces has instituted a policy, whereby every Ghana Battalion on peacekeeping abroad initiates and executes a social project. Such projects usually include the building of school blocks, constructing access roads and raising bridges where they are needed. They also offer services such as elementary classes for children and small-scale healthcare delivery such as medical and dental clinics. The Ghana Battalion in Lebanon, for example, undertakes English Language classes for conflict-affected children. Ghanaian soldiers are on record to have organised cleanup campaigns during peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and Cambodia. They have also been known to make donations to orphanages. These and other gestures have greatly endeared Ghana to the victims of conflict around the world.

3.6 Achievements and Benefits of Ghana’s Participation in International Peacekeeping

Ghana’s experience in international peacekeeping operations is unparalleled in Africa. Though many other African countries contribute troops to peacekeeping operations, it is only Ghana that has consistently maintained its troops at such conflict zones till the end of the missions even under dire circumstances. Many quickly withdraw at the slightest sign of trouble. For instance, even in the heat of military action when the Rwandan conflict escalated following the shooting down of the plane transporting President Juvenile Habyarimana, the Ghanaian contingent is on record as the only battalion that remained to contain the situation after all others had evacuated. Indeed, most Rwandans ascribe the failure of the peacekeeping operation to the UN system in general but praise Ghana for the little success chalked.
Owing to Ghana’s experience and successes in peacekeeping operations, it is not difficult for the Ghana Permanent Representation to the UN headquarters in New York to secure places for the Ghana Armed Forces in new missions. Additionally, it has been observed that many new entrants into the field of international peacekeeping do not hesitate to tap into Ghana’s rich experience. For instance, in June 1997, the United States Army sponsored two (2) of its officers to attend a peacekeeping training course at the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCS). In the same vein, in July 1998, the Japanese government sent a delegation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) headquarters in Accra, to study preparatory programmes before departure to peacekeeping missions. These and other examples underscore the success of Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping.

While the motive for Ghana’s involvement in international peacekeeping efforts can be found in its genuine commitment to the pursuit of international peace and security, other benefits have accrued to the country and its citizens over the years. The main domestic beneficiaries of Ghana’s engagement in international peacekeeping operations have been the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF), the Ghana Police Service (GPS), and to a limited extent the Prisons Service whose personnel undertake these peacekeeping missions. Peacekeeping also brings direct financial benefits to the state in the form of reimbursements from the UN peacekeeping Fund.

As a result of Ghana’s continued involvement in international peacekeeping, the country has benefited from various training assistance programmes under the sponsorship of advance countries like the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. In this regard, Ghana has been a beneficiary of such programmes as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which was later transformed, under the administration of former US President George W. Bush, into
the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) as part of the United States’ support to African peacekeeping. The programme provides military training and equipment to African national armies to enable them undertake peace support operations and humanitarian relief with the goal of increasing the capabilities of these militaries in such areas as human rights, interaction with civil society, international humanitarian law, military staff skills, and small unit operations. The criteria for selecting a beneficiary country of ACOTA are that the country should be an adherent of good governance and democracy and be consistently engaged in peacekeeping activities.\textsuperscript{26}

In Ghana, peacekeeping training under ACRI/ACOTA takes place at Bundase in the Greater Accra region and offers instruction including, among others, civilian protection, internal defence and humanitarian relief in addition to the traditional curriculum, which used to focus only on conventional warfare, thus bringing participants up to par with the standards of international best practices in peacekeeping. The ACRI/ACOTA programme has been particularly beneficial to the country as it is a capital-intensive venture involving supply of weapons, vehicles, uniforms, fuel and food. The training is contributing immensely to improving the skills of personnel of the GAF; thereby making them combat ready always.\textsuperscript{27} Countries such as France and Canada, through the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Programme (RECAMP) and the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP), have provided similar training to the Ghana Armed Forces.

There are economic benefits to be enjoyed by participation in international peacekeeping, particularly, under the aegis of the United Nations. On 11\textsuperscript{th} April 1996, the UN General Assembly passed resolution 50/222 authorizing the implementation of a compensation system aimed at encouraging Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) to supply operational equipment of
the correct standard for their contingents on peacekeeping missions. Under this arrangement, the United Nations introduced the Wet and Dry Lease reimbursement and self-sustainment systems.

The Wet Lease is an arrangement under which Troop Contributing Countries provide and assume responsibility for maintenance and support of major operational equipment and are later reimbursed for the total cost by the UN. Under the Dry Lease, the countries provide the major equipment and the UN assumes responsibility for their maintenance. Self-sustainment refers to a logistic support concept where the contributing country provides some specific or all logistical support for its contingent on a reimbursable basis. The Government is also advanced money for various allowances accruing to individual personnel totalling about $100 per officer per day. Given that out of the $100, the ordinary contingent member receives $25 per day (making $750 a month), while provision is made for feeding and other amenities, the country makes significant “profits” on each contingent member that it deploys on a UN peacekeeping mission.28

Consequently, peacekeeping engagements have brought pecuniary rewards to the country via the Ghana Armed Forces, the Ghana Police Service and individual personnel through the compensation packages offered by the UN. In 2010, for instance, Ghana received approximately $74 million, as compensation for all UN operations while its total expenditure incurred was just $42 million resulting in a “return” of some $32 million.29

For the Government and the armed forces in particular, these financial gains represent a major supplement to the national defence budget, some of which has been used to purchase aircrafts and other military equipment. For the individual personnel, the UN reimbursement package
offers an important income supplement. With Ghana usually engaged in two (2) or three (3) peacekeeping missions simultaneously, individual Ghanaian soldiers are quite frequently assigned on missions abroad. As a result it is possible for all eligible troops of the Ghana Armed Forces to be rotated on peacekeeping operations at least once in three (3) years. The soldiers have begun to look forward to these missions abroad as their income levels increase exponentially.

Beyond monetary gains, peacekeeping has also provided Ghana a platform to showcase itself on the international scene. While on missions abroad, Ghanaian troops inadvertently become ambassadors of the Ghanaian culture. Through their interactions with their counterparts from other countries, Ghanaian peacekeepers promote the attributes that are uniquely Ghanaian. According to Squadron Leader Baba Mubarak, on occasions such as the National Day of the host country or UN designated holidays, the Ghanaian contingent would usually organize funfairs displaying various aspects of the Ghanaian way of life, including cuisine, clothing, music, and art. They display Ghanaian tourism journals and brochures, show video clips on national life and investment opportunities for the benefit of their fellow peacekeepers from other countries. Indeed, on every presentation of medals day, Ghanaian troops showcase Ghanaian products including made in Ghana clothing, alcoholic beverages like Kasapreko Alomo bitters, Golden Tree chocolates, spices, jewellery, and food items. Fellow peacekeepers and nationals of the conflict country usually quickly buy these up. It was discovered during the course of this research that in Sierra Leone and Liberia, for instance, Kasapreko Alomo bitters and other Ghana made alcoholic beverages have become a local favourite since being introduced by Ghanaian peacekeepers. However, this is an opportunity yet to be fully exploited by the Ghanaian authorities.
This unintended benefit is complemented by the fact that everywhere they go, Ghanaian soldiers have always proved themselves worthy, both on and off the battlefield.\textsuperscript{33} The apparent Soft Power benefits of the valour and high professionalism consistently displayed by Ghanaian troops on peacekeeping missions cannot be over emphasized. Many high-ranking military officers from other countries have attested to the courage and competence of Ghanaian peacekeepers.\textsuperscript{34} Some of these officers have gone on to hold high-ranking government positions in their various countries and their perceptions of Ghana have been shaped by the positive interactions they shared with Ghanaian soldiers while on peacekeeping. For instance, it can be deduced from the many letters of commendation and admiration sent to Lieutenant General Emmanuel A. Erskine by Israeli, Lebanese, and other high-ranking UN military officers, at the end of his tour of duty as Force Commander of UNIFIL, that those officers hold Ghana in very high esteem for the excellence of a son of the soil.\textsuperscript{35}

3.7 Challenges and Costs of Ghana’s Participation in International Peacekeeping

Over the years, Ghana has scored remarkable achievements and enjoyed some handsome rewards for its efforts in international peacekeeping. However, these achievements did not come easy. There are major challenges to surmount, particularly if the country is to take full advantage of peacekeeping as an instrument to achieve some foreign policy objectives. There are also cost implications to contend with. The study exposed some of the challenges and costs of the country’s peacekeeping endeavours as follows:

A major challenge to Ghana successfully utilising peacekeeping as a foreign policy tool is the obvious lack of vibrant collaboration between the country’s main institutional stakeholders in the management and implementation of peacekeeping objectives. The main stakeholders, who include, the Office of the President, the Ghana Armed Forces, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs
and Defence, and the National Security Council (NSC), do not have an established system for managing the country’s peacekeeping policy. There are no designated liaison or desk officers in all these institutions dedicated to the formulation, coordination, and implementation of peacekeeping policy. The majority of the planning and implementation of peacekeeping related assignments are left to the Ghana Armed Forces without a clear input from the other institutions. This problem may be as a result of the fact that Ghana’s defence, national security, and foreign policies appear to be three (3) distinct subjects, instead of one integrated strategy as is the case in countries like the United States.\(^\text{36}\) Indeed, Emma Birikorang indicates that Ghana lacks a well-defined and articulated defence policy document, which has resulted in \textit{ad hoc} responses to conflicts in neighbouring countries.\(^\text{37}\) A well-planned peacekeeping policy with inputs from all relevant stakeholders is not likely to overlook strategies that would highlight the Soft Power benefits of Ghana’s participation in successive peacekeeping operations.

Not only does the apparent lack of coordination between the relevant stakeholders in the planning and implementation of Ghana’s peacekeeping policy adversely impact the achievement of the country’s foreign policy in terms of attracting less rather than more positive international attention, but it also leads to technical failures that affect the performance of Ghanaian troops on peacekeeping missions. Examples include the mutiny of by the third Battalion of infantry in the Congo in December 1960 and the unfortunate massacre of forty-four (44) military personnel in April 1961, also in the Congo.

There has been an argument that Ghana’s continued contribution of personnel to peacekeeping operations limits the Government’s capacity to handle any internal strife or the increasing spate of armed robbery and other violent crimes in the country. According to the GAF, currently,
Ghana contributes about 20% of its total army size to various UN peacekeeping missions, thus spreading the force capacity thin. Given the relative instability of the West African sub-region, the situation portends danger for the security of the country and raises fears of a spillover of some nearby conflict into the country at a time when the Ghana Armed Forces is operating on less than full capacity.

Another major challenge facing the Ghana Armed Forces, in undertaking peacekeeping operations, is the provision of adequate logistics support for troops on peacekeeping missions. Despite its long history of peacekeeping, Ghana is handicapped by inadequate supply of military equipment such as Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), flack jackets, night vision devices, mine detectors, ballistic helmets, image intensifiers, and radars. A major consequence of this inadequacy is that the country is unable to take full advantage of the United Nations’ Wet Lease reimbursement system, which stipulates that all the necessary logistics and equipment for the operation are to be supplied by Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), provided they meet the standards of the UN, in order to be eligible for monthly reimbursements. Under the system, UN inspectors audit a contributing country’s equipment against a predetermined standard. For example, when equipment, such as vehicles, binoculars, and medical accessories are established to have all parts functioning at optimum level, the country is reimbursed with an amount of money almost equivalent to the original cost of the equipment. Countries such as Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Nepal, as a matter of policy, always provide optimal functioning equipment expecting to be reimbursed by the UN.

Ambassador Kabral Blay-Amihie, having served as Ghana’s ambassador to Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire on two (2) consecutive tours of duty, witnessed Ghana’s role in the international peacekeeping operations in both countries during his time. He observed that other troop
contributing countries like Bangladesh and Pakistan always diligently provided fully functional equipment under the terms of the United Nations Wet Lease system in order to enjoy reimbursements. According to Mr. Blay-Amihere, Ghana failed to take advantage of the Wet Lease system in both theatres of operation. He indicates that for failing to supply just five UN standard washing machines for use by the troops, Ghana was losing $17,000 every month. Throughout his tenures as ambassador in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, Mr. Blay-Amihere fought to excite the government’s interest in adopting measures to take advantage of the UN Wet Lease system through the many phone calls, diplomatic dispatches and technical reports he forwarded to the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence on the matter. He suggested a comprehensive review of the country’s approach to UN peacekeeping but all to no avail. Asian countries like Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Nepal have so specialised in taking advantage of the UN Wet lease system that they have begun to rely on it as a means to achieve certain aspects of their defence policies. They do this by procuring quality defence related equipment for UN peacekeeping operations for which they are reimbursed and still get to keep the equipment in their own national defence arsenals. Not only does the inability to provide adequate logistics and equipment deny Ghana of well-deserved revenue, but it also negatively impacts troop morale and on occasion causes embarrassment to the nation.

Another major challenge facing Ghana’s peacekeeping efforts is the issue of the welfare of the troops. According to the Director-General of the Medical Directorate at the Ghana Armed Forces Headquarters, Brigadier General Mahama Alhassan, many Ghanaian soldiers have complained about the horrors that they witnessed in conflict zones, which have left them psychologically traumatised but without any effective government policy to rehabilitate them. This situation has had negative implications not only for their families but also for their colleagues at the operational areas. Additionally, the practice of separating troops from their
families for long periods tends to put a lot of stress on the traditional family unit. Cases of infidelity, both on the part of soldiers on mission and their spouses at home, have been reported and are attributed to the long absences from home.

Closely linked to the general welfare situation are the health implications of continued participation in international peacekeeping operations. There had been an increase in HIV prevalence among uniformed personnel in the 1990s and early 2000s due primarily to operations in high HIV prevalent countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. However, over the past decade, the prevalence rate in the Armed Forces has dipped below the national average, which is about 1.3%. This reduction in HIV prevalence in the Military is attributed to the new policy of testing all personnel earmarked for peacekeeping operations for HIV. Soldiers who are found to be HIV positive are dropped from the list, thereby losing the extra income they would have made if they were deployed and, therefore, take measures to prevent getting infected.

With regard to the financial cost involved in peacekeeping, the country does not incur much cost in the case of UN peacekeeping ventures. In any case, it enjoys some financial benefits for its efforts. Contribution to regional and sub-regional peacekeeping initiatives, on the other hand, is not so financially rewarding. In ECOWAS missions, for instance, Troop Contributing Countries are expected to self-finance the first three months of the operation and to be reimbursed by the organization within six months. Ghana is estimated to have spent in excess of $25 million on troop maintenance and operations during the first ECOMOG operation in Liberia discounting cost of equipment, sea and air lifting of the contingent and the cost of other diplomatic activities.
With regard to loss of human life, the Ghana Armed Forces headquarters indicates that there have been fewer than 200 Ghanaian casualties since the country’s first peacekeeping mission in the Congo in 1960. Nevertheless, there have been lamentations in the Ghanaian public over the deaths of Ghanaian peacekeeping personnel over the last five decades or so.
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CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter recaps the findings of the research, based on which it draws conclusions and finally proffers recommendations as pointers to surmount identified challenges or options to better utilise the opportunity offered by peacekeeping in prosecuting Ghana’s foreign policy agenda.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The study revealed that since independence, Ghana’s foreign policy has remained largely unchanged in its fundamental guiding principles regardless of who is in government. From a survey of relevant documents including the 1992 constitution, the content of the various treaties and international agreements the country has entered into over the years, the manifestoes of political parties, and her general demeanour on the international arena, the broad tenets of Ghana’s foreign policy were summarised as: protection of the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Ghana; pursuit of the economic wellbeing of the Ghanaian people; promotion of friendly relations and economic cooperation with other countries; fostering political and economic cooperation among African states; commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security; and pursuit of a policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment.

Among others, the context of that policy is provided by the 1992 constitution against the backdrop of such factors as the country’s geography and size, population, economic strength, military strength, culture, history, national identity, its national interest, its security policy, the perception of its standing in the international system, and the nature of its relations with the
other members of the system. The conduct of Ghana’s foreign policy is firmly within the remit of the President of the Republic who generally delegates portions of its execution to government agencies whose portfolios cover such matters as international politics, international trade, international finance, international law, foreign investment, consular and migration and other issues related to the country’s interaction with the outside world. These agencies include, among others, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Defence and the National Security Council.

Ghana, even though a Third World country with a struggling economy and without military might, is among the top ten (10) troop contributors to peacekeeping operations around the world. Many of the highest contributors of troops to peacekeeping operations now actively engage in peacekeeping as a means of advancing their foreign policy agendas. Countries like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh actively seek international recognition by participating in peacekeeping. Indeed, India is using its participation in international peacekeeping to advance its ambition of being appointed to the United Nations Security Council. Similarly, Ghana’s long history of participation in international peacekeeping offers her an opportunity to advance her foreign policy.

Ghana is not a global power. It is not endowed with such hard power resources as superior military, economic might, and manpower resource from a large and skilled population, as a result of which it cannot employ coercion or use of inducements as means of achieving its foreign policy objectives. However, the country can resort to Soft Power, the power of attraction, as a means of achieving its foreign policy. Participation in international peacekeeping, in this regard, gives Ghana an attractive quality and, thus, is a Soft Power resource by which the country can achieve its foreign policy objectives. Additionally, since the
maintenance of international peace and security is a cardinal foreign policy objective of Ghana’s, simply contributing troops to international peacekeeping, without any ulterior motive, is an endeavour to achieve its foreign policy agenda.

The international system is anarchic and all countries are jostling for space to carry through their international goals. While powerful countries like the United States, Britain and France use their Hard Power attributes to get what they want from the international system, others like Ghana have to resort to available Soft Power attributes to court the attention of the international community. Over the years, participation in peacekeeping has placed Ghana on a pedestal. Ghana is recognised around the globe due, primarily, to its efforts in international peacekeeping. Indeed, world leaders and other persons of international standing have lauded Ghana for her efforts in the area of international peacekeeping. Additionally, the United Nations has, in recognition of Ghana’s efforts in international peacekeeping, rewarded the country’s efforts by appointing many sons of the soil to high-ranking positions in the UN peacekeeping system. In this regard, peacekeeping has enhanced Ghana’s standing in the international community.

In chapter three (3), the study examined some of the achievements and benefits accruing to Ghana as a result of its participation in international peacekeeping. It was discovered that Ghana has helped achieve peace in countries like Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia. Apart from these achievements, the country is enjoying a range of benefits form peacekeeping. It was shown for example that Ghana is the beneficiary of sophisticated military training programmes replete with state-of-the-art equipment from military powers like the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The country enjoys economic benefits from
peacekeeping, mainly from the United Nations reimbursement system. Peacekeeping also provides a platform for Ghana to showcase her culture and other attributes.

The study also exposes some of the major challenges and costs that Ghana is suffering as a result of its peacekeeping endeavours. Among these are the lack of proper coordination between the country’s relevant bureaucratic structures in managing its peacekeeping objectives; the vulnerability of the country’s defences due to the fact that at every point in time it contributes a substantial amount of its total troop strength to peacekeeping operations around the world; the inability to supply adequate logistics for its peacekeeping troops thereby rendering the country unable to take full advantage of the UN reimbursement system; the general lack of proper arrangements to cater for the welfare of peacekeeping troops and their families; high financial cost of participating in regional and sub-regional peacekeeping operations like ECOMOG; and last but not least the loss of the lives of Ghanaian soldiers to peacekeeping operation.

4.2 Conclusion

The guiding hypothesis of this study is that participation in international peacekeeping has significantly contributed to the achievement of Ghana’s foreign policy. It was established that international peacekeeping occupies primacy of place in the implementation of Ghana’s foreign policy objectives, particularly, in regards to the country’s quest for international peace and security. It was also demonstrated that participation in peacekeeping provides Ghana, perhaps, the most effective platform for global visibility, thereby earning it much needed international recognition and clout. Due to its impeccable record in the area of peacekeeping, Ghana has been hailed on many occasions by the rest of the international community. Her international standing has therefore been greatly enhanced by participation in international
peacekeeping. It was also established that Ghana has no Hard Power attributes and could, therefore, only hope to be noticed on the international arena by enhancing its Soft Power or attractive attributes. Participation in international peacekeeping has, so far, proven to be the cheapest and most reliable source of Soft Power in Ghana’s foreign policy arsenal. The hypothesis is therefore confirmed.

The study has also shown that even though the country is faced with a variety of challenges and costs in the pursuit of international peace and security through peacekeeping, there have been significant achievements and a multitude of benefits accruing to Ghana. Some of the main benefits the study examined include pecuniary rewards, particularly to individual peacekeeping personnel in their personal capacities as well as to the state in general. These financial rewards are mainly accrued from the United Nations reimbursement systems. Other benefits are the variety of specialized training programmes from which Ghanaian troops have gained over the years as well as the platform peacekeeping offers for Ghana to showcase her culture to the outside world. However, due to the fact that the country’s peacekeeping policy appears rather haphazard, ad hoc, and improperly coordinated, the benefits to Ghana tend to be largely accidental rather than as outcomes of a well thought-out and meticulously implemented strategy. Peacekeeping has not been pursued as a tool with enormous potential for the realization of the national interest.

4.3 Recommendations

Based on the analyses of the findings unearthed in the study, the following recommendations are proffered to aid Ghana’s foreign policy decision makers to better utilise the country’s continued participation in international peacekeeping in advancing its foreign policy objectives:
There should be a comprehensive review of Ghana’s approach to international peacekeeping, with the view to enhancing the collaboration between the major stakeholders in foreign policy formulation and implementation on the one hand, and the executors of peacekeeping policy on the other hand. This can be achieved through the establishment of vibrant liaison relations between the Ghana Armed Forces, the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, and the National Security Council Secretariat, each of which plays varying roles in the country’s foreign policy and peacekeeping endeavours. A strong liaison between the above government institutions would serve to better integrate international peacekeeping into the country’s wider foreign policy.

As part of its peacekeeping policy under the United Nations, Ghana should endeavour to always subscribe to the Wet Lease reimbursement system. This can be achieved, primarily, by providing adequate equipment and logistics to the Ghana Armed Forces for each peacekeeping operation. Under the Wet Lease system, the UN reimburses Troop Contributing Countries for the total cost of the provision and maintenance of major operational equipment. Not only will this lower the cost of participating in UN peacekeeping to a bare minimum, but it will also boost the financial rewards to the country as, over time, the cumulative reimbursements surpass the original cost of the equipment. Indeed, countries like Bangladesh and Nepal have so specialised in the Wet Lease system that UN peacekeeping has become an integral part of their national defence and foreign policies. With regard to defence policy, these countries have tailored most of the logistical requirements of their militaries to meet UN peacekeeping specifications enabling them to receive reimbursement for equipment they get to keep at the end of every cycle with the UN. When such equipment, which are usually still in excellent condition due to being hardly put to use, are decommissioned from the UN, they are recycled into the national militaries of those countries. Such expensive equipment as Armoured...
Personnel Carriers (APCs), armoured vests and night vision devices are regularly being recycled from the UN into the militaries of those countries. Ghana should also adopt the same approach to enable it meet some of its national military equipment requirements over time.

Ghana should expand its approach to international peacekeeping beyond mainly military functions to include civilian functions that would serve to diversify the benefits to the country. Instead of just the Ghana Armed Forces, peacekeeping operations should include other organisations like the Ministry of Culture, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC), the business community, the Media, among others. The youth on National Service could be co-opted into peacekeeping activities thus providing them much needed international exposure. The GIPC and the Ministry of Culture could use peacekeeping operations to showcase Ghana’s cultural attributes and business opportunities.

International peacekeeping should be elevated to front seat status in the country’s foreign policy agenda. Ghana’s participation in international peacekeeping can be developed to become the one unmistakable tool for achieving its foreign policy objectives.
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