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LEGON JUly 2015
DECLARATION

I, Kingsley Ofoe Doe, do hereby declare that this work is entirely by my personal efforts except references to other works in support of this dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Afua Boatema Yakohene. It is a record of my own research work and has not been previously presented in any form whatsoever in application for a degree elsewhere. All sources of information collected and materials used have been duly acknowledged by reference and bibliography.

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DATE …………………………..

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my dad, Anthony Patterson Tsatsu Doe for his support and encouragement.

To Jemima Ama Bentumaa Barnes, thank you for the prayers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express a profound gratitude to God Almighty for His guidance and protection.

I also extend sincere gratitude to Dr Afua Yakohene and all faculty members and staff of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, University of Ghana.

I further thank my family and friends for their moral support.

Finally a special thanks to all my colleagues of the LECIAD class of 2014/2015 for making our class a very interesting one.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>COW</td>
<td>Correlates of War</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep ad Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPT</td>
<td>Democratic Peace Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISIS</td>
<td>Islamic State in Iraq and Syria</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAD</td>
<td>Mutually Assured Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>STRATFOR</td>
<td>Strategic Forecasting Incorporated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMIG</td>
<td>United Nations Monitoring Group in Georgia</td>
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ABSTRACT

Many scholars content that the democratic peace theory (DPT) is one of the most convincing and yet controversial research in the field of international relations. DPT postulates that democratic states are more peaceful in their relations with other democratic states than they are in their relations with non-democracies. Most of the proponents of this theory have alluded this ‘peace’ firstly to common and shared democratic norms between democracies that prevent conflicts of interest from degenerating into hostilities, and secondly domestic institutional constraints of checks and balances on the foreign policies of leaders of democratic states. This dissertation seeks to provide a critique of the democratic peace theory drawn from the lens of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 for the reason that even though both states were democratic, they still fought a war in 2008 which is in contrast to the tenets of the DPT. The research also used realism as a theoretical framework to evaluate the relations between states in the international system. Using the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 as a case study, data was gathered through secondary sources and used as qualitative data of analysis to arrive at its conclusions. The study concludes that firstly, democratic peace theory has failed to adequately explain inter-state relations between electoral democracies; secondly the norms of compromise and cooperation amongst democracies and also the complicated and tedious political mobilization processes involved with garnering support for war effort could not prevent military war between Russia and Georgia because it was realism and not democratic peace that characterised the relations between the two states; and finally electoral democracies are likely to engage in militarized actions against each other if their interests are threatened or being democratic is not enough to prevent war in the pursuit of national interest. In this instance nationalism translated into realism.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Research Problem

In contemporary international relations (IR) theory, many scholars believe there is perhaps no subject more contested than the Democratic Peace Theory\(^1\)—the idea that democratic or liberal states rarely engage in inter-state wars and that they are less likely to become involved in militarized disputes (MIDs) among themselves—is the most robust, “lawlike” finding generated by the discipline of political Science.\(^2\) According to Jack Levy, the DPT is “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of international relations.”\(^3\) In practical terms, the theory suggests that a world of liberal or democratic states will be peaceful and fewer violent conflicts will occur. This theory has been popularized by Thomas Paine, Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson.\(^4\)

Democratic peace is rooted theoretically in the writings of Immanuel Kant, and in particular his work on "Perpetual Peace."\(^5\) Kant claims that peace is a reasonable outcome of the interaction of states with a republican form of government. He believes that the republican constitution “gives a favourable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e., perpetual peace."\(^6\) Liberal states in Kant’s view are characterized by certain criteria that distinguish them from authoritarian and other autocratic, nondemocratic forms of government.\(^7\) These include a republican form of government based on the rule of law that is governed in a representative manner through separation of powers; respect for human rights; and interdependent social and economic relations. According to Kant, taken together, these criteria are necessary and sufficient to create stable peace between two states with the expectation that this peace will endure.\(^8\)
In order for one to understand and appreciate the foundations of the DPT, one has to understand the meaning of democracy as well as peace and war and the interaction between the three terminologies. In the contemporary usage, the term democracy has ‘loosely’ been used to refer to a government chosen/elected by the people.

Larry Diamond defines democracy as free and fair elections which has familiar attributes as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, clear rules of law, an independent judiciary, checks and balances on elected officials and civilian control of the military. According to Rummel “by democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least 2/3 of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights.”

Levy and Thompson posit that war has been a persistent pattern of interaction between and within states and other political units for millennia. In its many varieties, it is probably the most destructive form of human behaviour. War kills people, destroys resources, retards economic development, ruins, militarizes societies, reshapes cultures, disrupts families, and traumatizes people. Preparation for war, whether for conquest or for protection, diverts valued resources from more constructive social activities, and it often undermines security rather than enhances it. War also has a profound impact on the evolution of world politics and the behaviour of states in the international system. Levy and Thompson broadly define war as sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations. This definition includes great power wars like World War I.
The Correlates of War (COW) project define war as a military conflict with more than 1000 killed in battle in one year.\textsuperscript{14}

Regarding ‘peace’ the term is said to originate most recently from the Anglo-French \textit{pes}, and the Old French \textit{pais}, meaning “peace, reconciliation, silence, agreement” (11th century).\textsuperscript{15} But, \textit{Pes} itself comes from the Latin \textit{Pax}, meaning "freedom from civil disorder."\textsuperscript{16} Peace is a sign of harmony characterized by the lack of violence, conflict behaviours and the freedom from fear of violence.\textsuperscript{17} Commonly understood as the absence of hostility, peace also suggests the existence of healthy international relationships, prosperity in matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the true interests of all.\textsuperscript{18}

Although the subject matter of democratic peace was not rigorously and scientifically studied until after the 1960’s, its basic principles and concepts have been advanced since the early 18\textsuperscript{th} century and has been extrapolated to be a conflict management and resolution mechanism for modern states in the international system which addresses issues of democracy, war and peace.

1.2 \textbf{Russo-Georgian Relations}

Relations between Georgia and Russia date back hundreds of years and remain complicated despite certain religious and historical ties that exist between the two countries and their people. The first formal alliance between both states was the Treaty of Georgievsk which made Georgia a protectorate of Russia in 1783. This agreement guaranteed Georgia’s territorial integrity and the continuation of its ruling Bagrationi Dynasty in return for prerogatives in the conduct of Georgian foreign affairs by Moscow.\textsuperscript{19} Also each of the
Georgian kingdom’s monarchs would require confirmation and henceforth be obliged to swear allegiance to Russia’s emperor.

The consequences of this treaty proved disastrous for the Georgians. In 1785, the Persians invaded Georgia and again in 1795, but the Russians did not provide the assistance they had promised in the treaty. Belatedly, however, Catherine I in 1796 sent an expedition of 30,000 troops to exact punishment on the Persians but this endeavour was short-lived when Catherine I died and her son Paul succeeded her. In December 1801, Paul I, successor to Catherine the Great adopted laws that saw the forceful annexation of Georgia to join the Russian empire which was finalised by a decree on January 8, 1801. Georgia regained independence from Russia in 1918 shortly after the Bolshevik revolution and established its first Republic. However this first republic was short-lived as Georgia was again invaded and occupied by Russia to form the Soviet Union in 1922. Subsequently although Georgia again attained independence from Russia in 1991; the bilateral relations between both states were again strained as a result of Moscow’s support for the separatist regions of Georgia namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Tensions in Georgia date back at least to the 1920’s, when South Ossetia made abortive attempts to declare its independence but ended up as an autonomous region within Soviet Georgia after the Red Army conquered Georgia. On July 3rd 2008, an Ossetian village police chief was killed by a bomb and on that same day the head of the pro-Georgian government in South Ossetia Gregory Sarnayev was also attacked with a roadside bomb and escaped with injuries. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported that on same night both the Georgians and South Ossetians launched artillery attacks on each other’s villages and checkpoints. The hostilities continued and on the on the night of
Thursday, August 7, 2008, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia. The forces marched on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. Georgian forces launched a full offensive against the South Ossetian separatists however they encountered very fierce resistance while trying to take the city. In spite of heavy fighting, the Georgian troops never fully secured the city, nor the rest of South Ossetia. On the morning of August 8, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armoured and motorized infantry forces along with air power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed with which the Russians responded —within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, August 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia. These clashes continued for four days 8th-12th August 2008, until French president, Nicolas Sarkozy also in his capacity as European Union (EU) president, negotiated a ceasefire agreement on 12th August 2008 between Russia and Georgia.

1.3 Statement of the Research Problem

The DPT postulates that democratic or liberal states rarely go to war with each other and are less likely to be involved in militarized disputes. This theory is generally accepted as one of the key remedies for enhancing peace and cooperation amongst states in the international system, a fact which historically, has guaranteed peace among democratic nations, arguably without exception. This theory however, does not hold true in all inter-state relations as was evident in the Russo-Georgian War of 2008. This study would like to examine how the 2008 Russo-Georgian War to a large extent challenges the DPT.
1.4 Research Questions

- Does the DPT encourage peace and cooperation between states in the international system?
- What were the peculiar factors that led to the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and how does it challenge the DPT?
- What was the impact of the war on current Russo-Georgian relations?

1.5 Objectives

- To find out if the DPT encourages peace and cooperation between states in the international system.
- To find out the factors that led to the Russo-Georgian conflict of 2008 and how it challenged the DPT.
- To ascertain the effects of the war on current Russo-Georgian relations.

1.6 Hypothesis

The democratic peace theory postulates that democracies do not go to war with other, however the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 demonstrates that the DPT is challenged in some regards.

1.7 Scope

The study centers on the relations between Russia and Georgia from the 18th century to the 21st century with particular emphasis on 20th Century relations between both states how these relations eventually led to the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. Although there have been many militarized conflicts between democracies in the global system, for the purposes of this research, the scope will be restricted to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 for the reason that as
of writing, it is the most recent breakout of full scale hostilities between two independent democratic states in the international system.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The idea that democratic states rarely engage in inter-state wars runs counter to the realist and neorealist theoretical traditions that have dominated the field of international politics. Theories of political realism originated through the works of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli, emerging as an international relations based approach in the inter-war years of the 20th century. This research is guided by the theory of Realism.

Realism as described by Haslam, “is a spectrum of ideas” which revolve around the four central propositions of Political Groupism, Egoism, International anarchy and power politics. Realism is a tradition of international theory and is entrenched on four central propositions.

a) Realists hold that the nature of the international system is anarchic and decentralised with no central authority above the states which is in the position to regulate inter-state relations and hence states pursue power for their survival.

b) Realists posit that sovereign states are primary actors and thus the most important determinants on the international platform. International Institutions, Non-governmental Organisations, and Multinational Corporations and individuals are viewed as having very little influence on the world stage.

c) All states within the international system are unitary and rational actors. They tend to pursue self interest in their interactions with one another and thus act rationally to achieve results that are most desirable by the state. There is the proposition of a zero sum game and so states aspire to accrue as many resources as possible.
d) States can never be certain of the future intentions of other states, there’s always a state of mistrust between them and all their actions in the international system are geared towards survival. States therefore build up their militaries which may eventually culminate into a Security Dilemma.35

The study of the causes of conflict in international relations has traditionally been dominated by realist theories, which emphasize states’ competition for power and security in a high-threat international environment. In this chapter the research summarises some of the key concepts in realist theories of international conflict, including anarchy and the security dilemma, and their hypotheses on the causes of conflict between states in the international system.36

Scholars divide up realist theories in different ways, but one common distinction is between “classical” realism and “structural” realism. Structural realism is often equated with the “neorealism” of Waltz, but it also includes “defensive” realism and “offensive” realism. A fifth variation of realism, which formed in response to structural realism, is “neoclassical” realism.37

Classical (or traditional) realists believed that there are numerous sources of state behaviour and hence of the causes of war. In addition to the importance of the absence of central authority in the international system, which was central to the theories of Hobbes and to a certain extent of Rousseau,38 classical realists emphasized the role of human nature as a source of aggressive behaviour and war. They point to aggressive instincts, selfishness, greed, pride, and passion as key factors leading to human aggression.39
Defensive realism asserts that the anarchic structure of the international system creates potential security threats, but they dispute the assertion that anarchy in itself forces states into conflict and war. If all states seek only security, and if there are no predatory states seeking expansion, and if all states know that, then states can avoid war. This raises the question of the importance of perceptions of the intentions of other states. They also emphasize the importance of actual threats, of which intentions are an important component. Some strong powers can be benign. Defensive realists recognize, however, that states are sometimes aggressive, that great powers occasionally make bids for hegemony, thereby resulting in frequent wars.

Offensive realists argue that the sources of conflict in the international system can be traced to the structure of the international system, the inherent uncertainty about adversary intentions, and anarchy, without invoking domestic variables. Even if the adversary has currently nonthreatening intentions, there is no guarantee that such intentions will not turn belligerent in the future, either through a change in orientation of those in power or a change in regime that brings a more hostile regime to power. Thus offensive realists argue that the security dilemma cannot be diminished, and that any weapons build-up is likely to generate counter-responses and conflict spirals. To summarize, offensive realists offer a strictly structural theory of war and peace and emphasize the role of the pursuit of power in the context of anarchy and uncertainty.

Democratic peace theorists advocate that realism is not applicable to democratic states’ relations with each another, as their research proves that these states do not attack each other. Realists dismissed the above assertion by democratic peace theorists and assert that several wars that could have been fought between democratic states were averted only by other
reasons such as the presence of nuclear weapons and its consequent Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Grotius an idealist is critical of realism and posits that men by virtue of living in a society are capable of compromise and understanding that certain rules and principles are necessary for the preservation of human society. Indeed some democratic peace theorists, notably Bruce Russett, believe that in an international system comprising a critical mass of democratic states, "It may be possible in part to displace the 'realist' principles of (anarchy, and security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice the practise of international relations to the marginalization of 'liberal' or 'idealist' ones since at least the seventeenth century."\(^43\)

Kegley examines realism after the Cold War and, given its failure to predict the end of the Cold War, assesses its future usefulness. After the Cold War, new challenges to realism have emerged in the form of liberal and neoliberal theories. Challengers argue that realism has failed in its descriptive, explanatory, predictive and prescriptive endeavours (the four things that good theory ought to be able to do).\(^44\)

Kegley identifies some challenges to realism:\(^45\)

- Poor predictive power- Realism could not predict the end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, disarmament etc.
- Poor explanatory power- too many inconsistencies and anomalies to continue to believe that realism can explain our world.
- Poor prescriptive power- deals with war threatening situations by recommending policies that lead to war.
Finally, Kegley argues for a merging of both realism and liberalism for neither is going to be completely correct nor will one always be better than the other. By merging the two, one can hopefully pull the best from both.46

Kegley’s assertion is important this is because even though these two theories of realism and liberalism have been dominant when attempting to explain the relations between states in the international system, neither of the two has had outright domination of the international system and thus the merger of the principles of both theories will be most favourable in striking a delicate balance in dealing with issues of contention in the international system.

Notwithstanding the criticisms levelled against Realism by the proponents of Idealism, one can still consider the theory as an ideal theoretical framework for this study due to its critique of the DPT realism is very significant in critiquing the DPT (which falls within the ambit of Liberalism) and better helps to explain that democracies do sometimes go to war especially in situations where their interests are at risk. Following from this, realism helps to further elaborate on the fact that, merely sharing similar political governing policies will not make states substitute their interests for those of another state. Consequently, this can cause states to go to war with each other even if they are democracies.

1.9 Literature Review

Kant advances support for the DPT by asserting that peace is the expected outcome of the interaction of states that have republican governments (which in this era is interpreted as representative democracy).47 Kant argues that the democratic constitution “gives a favourable prospect for the desired consequence, i.e. perpetual peace. The reason is this: if the consent of the citizens is required before leaders declare war (as is the case in the republican
constitution), nothing is more natural than that they should be very cautious in instigating such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.” Contrasting republicanism (democracy) with other forms of government Kant argues further that, “on the other hand, in a constitution which is not democratic, and under which the subjects are not citizens, a declaration of war is the easiest thing in the world for a leader to decide upon, because war does not require of the ruler, who is the proprietor and not a member of the state, the least sacrifice of the pleasure of his table, his country houses, his court functions and the like.” Kant’s assertions seek to explain the effects of a republican (democratic) constitution on the peace-war relations between democratic states.

Russett and O’Neal in Triangulating Peace, explicate the democratic peace in a larger theoretical framework, and articulate that the Kantian tripod; (democracy, trade (capitalism) and international organizations) and peace are mutually reinforcing and complement each other. They argue that “conflict is abound in the anarchic international system but the resort to military hostilities is inhibited… by democracy, trade etc.” They further opined that the institutions, principles and practices of Western-style democracy provides a powerful constraint on the actions of arbitrary government in the conduct of foreign relations. The popular constraints on the decisions of leaders of non-democratic states are usually much weaker. Russett and Oneal in their work challenge the democratic peace from a realist perspective. They posit that international politics takes place in an environment heavily influenced by realist considerations, and hence in assessing the democratic peace, the concerns of realists must be taken into account. One cannot help but agree the assertions of Russett and O’Neal and this is because of how historically, autocratic leaders have single-handedly led their states into devastating wars. For instance Saddam Hussein leading Iraq to invade Kuwait in August 1990, this action by Saddam Hussein consequently led to an
international coalition of states attacking and forcibly ‘removing’ Iraq from Kuwait. This led to massive infrastructural damage in both countries. Mention can also be made of Idi Amin’s invasion of Tanzania in October 1978, which resulted in his eventual overthrow and subsequently plunged Uganda into civil war.

Gartzke agrees with Russett and Oneal and opines that democracies fight each other less often because they disagree less frequently or less intensely and thus have little about which to fight.\(^54\) Thus democratic states have little to disagree about and even if they do disagree, it is less antagonistic. There have been quite a number of occasions in which democracies disagree with each other but most importantly these disagreements do not degenerate into armed hostilities. Gartzke further posits that democracies are not constrained in their actions by institutions or norms but rather because the initial incentives for conflict do not exist in the first place.\(^55\) For instance, when it emerged in July 2014 that the United States had been spying on Germany, German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed grave displeasure over the development but swiftly stated that peaceful bilateral relations with the United States was non-negotiable.

Schumpeter also considers the international effects of trade and capitalism on peace in the international system.\(^56\) Schumpeter sees the interaction of trade and liberalism as the foundation of democratic peace. Capitalism, he suggests, produces an unwarlike disposition in states; its populace is “democratized, individualized and rationalized.”\(^57\) As evidence to support his claims, Schumpeter presents three evidences; first throughout the capitalist world an opposition has arisen to “war, expansion, and cabinet diplomacy;” secondly contemporary capitalism is associated with peace parties; and third the capitalist world has developed the means of preventing war, such as The Hague Court.
Schumpeter's explanation for democratic peace was simple, only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars. No democracy would therefore pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of international interventionism. When free trade prevails, "no class" gains from forcible expansion: “foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as accessible to each nation as though they were in its own territory.”\(^{58}\) One would like to disagree with the claims of Schumpeter since the most capitalist state in the international system, the United States, has engaged in more interventions in the 21\(^{\text{th}}\) Century than any other state. For example, the United States led wars in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

Fukuyama at the end of the Cold War presented a famous argument that humanity had reached “the end of history”\(^{59}\) and that liberal democracy has become the clear government style of choice. He states that “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post war history, but the end of history as such: that is the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.” After arguing that Western liberal democracy stood unchallenged, he contends that this triumph of liberal democracy will ensure peace in the world especially among nations which adapt to this new civilisation (democracy).\(^{60}\) Clearly the basis of this assertion by Fukayama is similar to that espoused by Kant and Schumpeter.

However in contrast to the pacific view of democratic government, Niccolò Machiavelli debates that not only are free republics not peaceful, they are the best form of state for imperial empire-building.\(^{61}\) He further asserted that establishing a republic fit for imperial expansion is, moreover, the best way to guarantee the survival of a state.\(^{62}\) Machiavelli believes that democratic states are the most violent as they seek to impose their will and
strength on others. The imperial expansion, he posits, results from the way liberty encourages increased population and property, the free citizens equip large armies and provide soldiers who fight for public glory and the so-called common good, because they are in fact their own. In recent history, admittedly the historical record of numerous United States interventions in the post-war period supports Machiavelli’s argument. Aggression by the liberal state has also characterized a large number of wars. For instance, both France and Britain fought expansionist colonial wars throughout the 19th century. The United States fought a similar war with Mexico in 1846-48; waged a war of annihilation against the American Indians, and intervened militarily against sovereign democratic states many times before and after World War Two.

Rosato in The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory asserts that one potential explanation for the flaws in the logic of the democratic peace theory is that democratic peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe. Second, the United States has been the dominant power in both of these regions since World War II and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional peace. According to Rosato the so-called democratic peace is therefore as a result of America’s ‘dictatorial’ influence over states in the Western Hemisphere and that in regions where the US influence diminishes, this ‘peace’ is minimal or non-existent.

The American preponderance argument may also account for belief that democracies are more likely to trade with each other, more likely to ally with each other, and that they are more likely to enter wars on behalf of fellow democracies.
Gat’s work on *The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: the Impact of Modernity* also makes laudable contributions to this discourse as he ropes in the utility of technology and globalization and democratic peace. He establishes a far more complex process for achieving democratic peace rather than establishing a simple relationship between an independent variable (liberalism/democracy) and a dependent variable (peace). He identifies that democratic peace does not exist in autocratic and pre-modern democratic states not because they are not democratic enough, but because they have not been affected by the modern transformation of modern states. According to Azar, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been characterized by an industrial-technological revolution which has made it imperative for states to cooperate. He reveals that, this has largely contributed to the peace and security in the international system due to the cooperation among states especially in tackling global challenges. One is bound to agree with Gat given the collaboration between states in maintaining and operating the international space station that supports space research for all countries that have the means to.

### 1.10 Sources of Data

The sources of data for this study are secondary sources. The secondary sources include information from textbooks, journals, articles and other e-documents from libraries and the internet.

### 1.11 Research Methodology

This research uses qualitative data analysis: “which is primarily an exploratory research used to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions and motivations that help to develop ideas or hypotheses for potential quantitative research.” The study also reviews existing data
and literature on the DPT and assesses the various dimensions researchers in the field have examined the subject matter.

1.12 Limitations of the Study

Due to the inability to hold interviews on the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, this study offers an assessment of the war based on secondary sources. Several attempts to get firsthand information from the Russian Embassy in Accra and the European Union’s (EU) office in Accra for interviews due to the absence of a Georgian embassy or consulate in Ghana proved futile. Some information of events that unfolded before the war as well as the efforts made by the EU to diffuse the tensions between both countries before it escalated into full hostilities all proved futile due to non-response from any of the above institutions. The effects of this non-response was that I had to rely on accounts from secondary sources to analyse the subject matter.

1.13 Organization of the Study

Chapter one consists of an introduction, conceptual framework and an arrangement of the chapters.

Chapter two contains an overview of the democratic peace theory as well as examining a general view of democracy, war and peace terminologies. The chapter further details a background into the type of democracy practiced in Russia and Georgia. And whether the kind of democracy they practise is in line with the idea of democracy as professed by the democratic peace theorists.

Chapter three presents a background into the historical relations between Russia and Georgia and further delves into the remote and immediate causes of the breakout of the Russo-
Georgian War in 2008. The chapter further offers criticisms against the democratic peace as propounded by realists.

Chapter four presents the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
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CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

2.0 Introduction

This chapter explores the subject matter of democracy and its various types as well as assessing a general view of the democratic peace theory. The chapter further examines whether the two countries in question; Russia and Georgia are democracies, and whether the kind of democracy they practise is in line with the idea of democracy as professed by the democratic peace theorists.

2.1 Democracy

The term democracy is derived from two Greek words ‘demos’ denoting ‘people’ and ‘kratein’ meaning ‘to rule’. Although Abraham Lincoln, the sixteenth President of the United States (1861-1865), popularised democracy as ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people’, the concept has in the course of history come to mean different things to different people.\(^1\) According to Diamond, in tracking and understanding the idea of democracy it is important to have a high degree of theoretical clarity about the term. What prevails instead in the increasing empirical and theoretical research on democracy is conceptual confusion and disarray so serious that Collier and Levitsky have identified more than 550 "subtypes" of democracy.\(^2\) Fortunately, most conceptions of democracy today (in contrast with the 1960s and 1970s, for example) do converge in defining democracy as a system of political authority, separate from any social and economic features.\(^3\) In contemporary practise, the word democracy has ‘crudely’ been used to denote to a government chosen or elected by the people.
The Oxford Dictionary defines democracy as "a system of government in which all the people of a state or society ... are involved in making decisions about its affairs, usually by voting to select people to represent them in a legislature or similar assembly." According to Huntington, a system is democratic when “its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes.”

The above definitions of democracy are austere and tend to converge towards the procedural elements of democracy most notably the conduct of elections. There are other more comprehensive definitions of democracy, Rummel believes that “By democracy is meant liberal democracy, where those who hold power are elected in competitive elections with a secret ballot and wide franchise (loosely understood as including at least 2/3 of adult males); where there is freedom of speech, religion, and organization; and a constitutional framework of law to which the government is subordinate and that guarantees equal rights.” Small and Singer also define democracy as a nation that (1) holds periodic elections in which the opposition parties are as free to run as government parties, (2) allows at least 10% of the adult population to vote, and (3) has a parliament that either controls or enjoys parity with the executive branch of the government.

2.1.1 Types of Democracy

Types of democracy refers to kinds of governments or social structures which allow people to participate equally, either directly or indirectly in the political process. Democratic states can be classified in so many different ways such that a contemporary compilation shows that this might range to as many as 550 subtypes. Some of these types of democracy include the following:
Direct democracy, (also referred to as pure democracy)\textsuperscript{10} is a form of democracy in which the citizenry take decisions (e.g. vote on, form consensus) on policy initiatives or govern directly. Representative democracy is an indirect democracy where sovereignty is held by the people's representatives, e.g. electoral democracy.

A liberal democracy is a type of representative democracy with protection for individual liberty and property by rule of law. An illiberal democracy has weak or no limits on the power of the elected representatives to rule as they please.

Several definitions and types of democracy have been advanced by different scholars and academics in the field of political science, these variations in the definitions of democracy are mostly dependent on the objectives of the researcher. This study shall lay emphasis on electoral democracy and determine whether based on the tenets of electoral democracy, Russia and Georgia can be classified as democracies.

\subsection*{2.1.2 Electoral Democracy}

Contemporary minimalist conceptions of democracy—which Diamond terms \textit{electoral democracy}, commonly acknowledge the need for minimal levels of civil freedom in order for competition and participation to be meaningful. Typically, however, they do not devote much attention to the basic freedoms involved, nor do they attempt to incorporate them into actual measures of democracy.\textsuperscript{11} According to Diamond, electoral democracy is a system of government at the level of the nation state, a means for the people (with equal political rights as citizens) to choose their political leaders, and if they wish to replace these leaders in regular, meaningful, free and fair elections, there is sufficient freedom for the elections to be meaningful, free and fair.\textsuperscript{12}
Joseph Schumpeter posits that electoral democracy is a political system in which the principal positions of power are filled “through competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”

### 2.1.3 Russian Electoral Democracy

On the federal level, Russia elects a president as head of state and a legislature, one of the two chambers of the Federal Assembly. The president is elected by the people for, at most, two consecutive six-year terms (raised from four years from December 2008). The Federal Assembly (Federalnoe Sobranie) has two chambers: the State Duma (Gosudarstvennaja Duma) has 450 members, elected for five-year terms (also four years up to December 2008), all of them by proportional representation. The Federation Council (Sovet Federatsii) is not directly elected; each of the 83 federal subjects of Russia sends 2 delegates to the Federal Council, for a total of 166 members.

Since 1990, there have been six elections for the presidency and seven for parliament in Russia. In the six presidential elections, only once, in 1996, has a second round been needed. There have been three presidents, with Boris Yeltsin elected in 1991 and 1996, Vladimir Putin in 2000 and 2004 (Yeltsin had already relinquished power to Putin in 1999), Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 and Vladimir Putin again in 2012. In federal elections, the President is elected in a two-round system every six years, with a two consecutive term limitation. Prior to 2012, the term of office was four years. If no candidate wins by an absolute majority in the first round, a second election round is held between two candidates with the most votes.

According to Freedom House, Russia does not have a democratic political organization, instead, what prevails there is a facade of democracy, with a Constitution, formal elections, political parties, and other attributes typically found in democracies. On March 2, 2008,
shortly before the outbreak of military hostilities between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was elected to succeed Vladimir Putin as president of Russia in multi-party elections contested by the incumbent and opposition political parties. Based on the above assertions, this research concludes that Russia’s governance structure conforms to the tenets of electoral democracy.

2.1.4 Georgian Electoral Democracy

On the national level, Georgia elects a head of state - the president - and a legislature. The President is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 5-year term. The Georgian Parliament (Sakartvelos Parlamenti) is unicameral with 150 seats. In the Parliament, 77 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms and the other 73 members are elected by majority vote in single-member constituencies to serve 4-year terms. The depiction of government structure is as follows; Chief of State: President Giorgi Margvelashvili, and the Head of Government: Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili.

According to Freedom House, Georgia's Constitution and electoral laws guarantee universal suffrage, equal voting rights, and the right to direct and secret ballot. However since Georgia's independence from the Soviet Union in 1992, the country's hybrid system has instigated widespread internal instability. For most of this period, the opposition parties and private mass media enjoyed high levels of independence, but there has been a lack of fair competition for political power, thereby causing unconstitutional changes of power in 1992 and 2003. The "Rose Revolution" of November 2003 led to the resignation of President Eduard Shevardnadze following mass protests over rigged parliamentary elections. Since then, several elections have taken place in Georgia including extraordinary presidential
elections in January 2004 which witnessed the rise to power of popular president Mikheil Saakashvili with 96.27 percent of ballots cast, repeat legislative elections in March 2004, and regional and municipal elections in October 2006. Electoral standards improved in all of them, confirmed by local and international observers.  

In the January 2008 elections, shortly before the breakout of the war, Georgia re-elected Mikheil Saakashvili as president through competitive multi-party elections in which multiple political parties contested.

Based on the above facts and history about the Georgian electoral processes and elections in the 21st century, this research concludes that Georgia conforms to the dictates of electoral democracy.

2.1.5 Electoral Democracy and Democratic Peace Theory

This section deals with the contention of whether the tenets of electoral democracy are in harmony with the doctrines of the DPT. One can say that electoral democracy is consistent with the propositions of the DPT to an extent because of the following reasons:

a) Elections confer legitimacy on an individual or groups of people to govern for specified periods of time. These persons whose rule has been legitimised through the elections are accountable to the electorate who voted them to office and hence are bound by public opinions. This is consistent with DPT because institutional explanations of the democratic peace posit is that public opinion and also the fear of reprisal from the voters restrain leaders of democratic states from stepping up the use of violence in their relations with other states in the international system.
b) Elections provide opportunities for parties to come together to reconcile differences. In democracies, a loss in elections is not a total obliteration of the opposition but rather the opposition parties have the opportunity to regroup and put their ‘house’ in order for the next elections. Any disputes arising from these elections are resolved through peaceful democratic means such as in the law courts or through political concessions by the victor to the opposition. The peaceful means of resolving internal conflicts within democratic states are externalised in their relations with other states. This however condition is in contrast with what pertains in non-democratic states where the leaders of such states resort to the use of extreme violence to suppress the opposition in the face of in fierce political competition.

2.2 Democratic Peace Theory

Although the idea of democratic peace is an old one citing a rarity of militarized disputes between democratic states, an explosion of scholarly interest in the topic has taken place since 1990. However, subsequently a number of scholars have cautiously sought to modify the claim of democratic peace theorists to “democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other.” The democratic peace also includes a handful of other claims, such as:

a) Democracies tend to prevail in wars they fight with autocratic states.

b) In wars they initiate, democracies suffer fewer casualties and fight shorter wars than non-democratic states.

c) Democratic states locked in disputes with each other choose more peaceful means of resolution than other pairings of states.

Explanations of the democratic peace usually fall into one—or a combination of—three main categories: First, democratic institutions and structures place constraints on the ability of
leaders to fight other democracies, or simply make them reluctant to choose war; secondly norms shared by democratic states cause them to view each other as pacific and unthreatening; and finally democracy tends to foster economic interdependence, which reduces the likelihood of war. Typically, theories of the democratic peace are divided into structural and normative theories.

Maoz and Russett, attribute structural explanations the democratic peace to the institutional constraints inherent in democracies. Leaders in democratic states must obtain approval for war from cabinet members or legislatures, and ultimately from the electorate. The structural model also asserts that complex political mobilization processes impose institutional constraints on the leaders of two democracies confronting each other to make violent conflict unfeasible.

Owen explains that the normative explanations of the DPT on the other hand localizes the cause of the democratic peace in the ideas or norms held by democracies where they believe it would be unjust to fight one another. It is the position of normative theorists that democracies do not fight each other because the norms and cultures of compromise and cooperation that are employed in the settlement of internal conflicts come to play in their inter-state relations and hence prevent their conflicts of interest from escalating into violent clashes.

2.2.1 Institutional/Structural Explanation of Democratic Peace Theory

The case for institutional restraints to war dates back to Kant (1795), who opined that:

“[I]f the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared (and in this constitution it cannot but be the case), nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war. Among the latter would be: having to fight, having
to pay the costs of war from their own resources, having painfully to repair the
devastation war leaves behind, and, to fill up the measure of evils, load themselves with
a heavy national debt that would embitter peace itself and that can never be liquidated
on account of constant wars in the future.”

Democracy thus gives power to those most likely to be killed or wounded in combat, and
their relatives and friends (to those who pay the majority of the war taxes) to influence the
direction of the foreign policy of the state.

The institutional model rests upon two main assumptions:

a) International challenges require political leaders to mobilize domestic support to their
   policies. Such support must be mobilized from those groups that provide the
   leadership the kind of legitimacy that is required for international action.

b) Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can be accomplished
   only in situations that can be appropriately described as emergencies.

Maoz and Russett explain that international exploits in a democratic political system
requires the mobilization of both general public opinion and of a variety of institutions that
make up the system of government, such as the legislature, the political bureaucracies, and
key interest groups. This implies that very few goals could be presented to justify fighting
wars in democracies. Additionally it also implies that the process of national mobilization
for war in democracies is both difficult and cumbersome. On the other hand, in non-
democratic societies, once the support of the key legitimizing groups is secured, the
government can launch its policy with little regard to public opinion or for the due political
process.

Maoz and Russett further assert that because, in many cases, the legitimizing groups may
benefit from the use of force in foreign affairs, the leadership may feel little restraint in its
dealings with other states. This set of assumptions implies, therefore, that due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage wars, except in cases wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen as justifying the mobilization costs. The time required for a democratic state to prepare for war is far longer than for non-democracies. Thus, in a conflict between democracies, by the time the two states are militarily ready for war, diplomats have the opportunity to find a non-military solution to the conflict.  

Within this context, then it can be assumed that the greater the number of individuals and, more importantly, the greater the number of institutions that must approve a decision for war within a state, the less likely it is for the leadership of that state is to decide for war.  

Conflicts between a democracy and a non-democracy, however, are driven by the lack of institutional constraints on the mobilization and escalation process of the latter. The democratic state finds itself in a no-choice situation. Leaders are forced to find ways to circumvent the due political process. Thus, in such a conflict, the non-democracy imposes on the democratic political system emergency conditions enabling the government to rally support rather rapidly. Conflicts between non-democratic systems are, by the same token, likely to escalate because both leaderships operate under relatively few structural constraints. The failure of initial efforts to find a peaceful solution may result in a rapid flare-up of the conflict into a violent level. In addition to trying harder than autocrats, democrats are more selective in their choice of targets. Defeat typically leads to domestic replacement for democrats, so they only initiate war when they expect to win.
2.2.2 Normative/Cultural Explanations of Democratic Peace theory

Democracies are considered more peaceful because they have shared cultural and democratic norms. This explanation presumes that “the culture, perceptions and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts without the threat of violence domestically within states come to apply across national boundaries.”

In democracies conflicts are typically resolved without violence and it is expected that democracies will apply these norms in their external relations. The existence of democratic systems hinges on consent and trust of the governed; therefore, mutual trust and respect are paramount for peaceful resolution of conflicts. It is based on two basic assumptions:

a) States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behaviour that are developed within and characterize their domestic political processes and institutions.

b) The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash between democratic and non-democratic norms is dominated by the latter, rather than by the former.

The first assumption suggests that different norms of domestic political conduct will be expressed in terms of different patterns of international behaviour. Democratic regimes are based on political norms that emphasize regulated political competition through peaceful means. Winning does not require elimination of the opponent, and losing does not prohibit the loser from trying again. Political conflicts in democracies are resolved through compromise rather than through elimination of opponents. This norm allows for an atmosphere of "live and let live" that results in a fundamental sense of stability at the personal, communal, and national level. We term these democratic norms.

The second assumption deals with the limits of the ability to apply certain norms in an anarchic international system. In such a system, states put their survival above any other
value they seek to promote. If states come to believe that their application of domestically developed democratic norms would endanger their survival, they will act in accordance with the norms established by their rival. Democratic norms could be more easily exploited than could non-democratic norms. Hence democracies are more likely to shift norms when they are confronted by a non-democratic rival than is the non-democratic rival to shift to democratic norms of international conduct. Political culture and political norms constitute images that a state transmits to its external environment. One of the most important images that a democratic state can communicate to its environment is a sense of political stability. Likewise, instability conveys images linked with non-democratic states.

Dickson asserts that disagreements come about primarily because two or more parties clash over competing interests or values. Escalation from initial dispute to crisis typically occurs when at least one of the parties perceives little prospect of a satisfactory resolution and decides to communicate the strength of its resolve by making overt or covert reference to the availability of military options. Sometimes the issues at stake are not sufficiently vital to either party to warrant military threats in the first place. Sometimes also these issues are overtaken by other events such as a change in political leadership or even by acts of nature that alter the terms of contention. And sometimes the parties are able to achieve mutually agreeable arrangements that remove from contention some or all of the issues precipitating the dispute. Such arrangements, or peaceful settlements, merit special attention because they are directly related to the democratic status of disputing parties. As has been asserted earlier, international disputes of democratic states are in the hands of individuals who have experienced the politics of competing values and interests and who have consistently responded within the normative guidelines of bounded competition. Dickson concludes that in situations where both parties to a dispute are democracies, not only do both sides subscribe
to these norms, but the leaders of both are also fully cognizant that bounded competition is the norm, both for themselves and their opponents.\textsuperscript{61}

Some adherents of the DPT have debated that democracies are generally peaceful in their foreign relations irrespective of the type of regime they are interacting with, this is referred to as the monadic peace.\textsuperscript{62} Some proponents on the other hand posit that democracies are only peaceful in their dealings with other democratic states, this is referred to as dyadic peace.

2.2.3 Monadic Democratic Peace

As Maoz and Russett summarize, there appears to be “something in the internal makeup of democratic states that prevents them from fighting one another despite the fact that they are not less conflict-prone than non-democracies.”\textsuperscript{63} Monadic peace theorists hypothesize that in a crisis, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to initiate the use of violence regardless of the political regime of the adversary.\textsuperscript{64}

Quackenbush and Rudy argue that an evaluation of the democratic peace is necessary, for several reasons. First although most empirical analyses and theoretical explanations have focussed on the dyadic nature of democratic peace, arguments in favour of a monadic democratic peace have become increasingly prominent.\textsuperscript{65} Unfortunately, empirical evaluations of the monadic democratic peace have tended to be bivariate and rely upon simple statistical tests such as comparison of means.\textsuperscript{66} Secondly, the 2001 attack by the United States and other democracies on Afghanistan and the 2003 attack by the United States and other democracies on Iraq are recent, very salient events that call for the monadic democratic peace argument to be re-examined.\textsuperscript{67}
In conclusion, this idea of a monadic democratic peace fits perfectly with the classical liberal ideas of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson regarding the peaceful nature of democracies.\textsuperscript{68}

2.2.4 Dyadic Democratic Peace

One of the conventions within the democratic peace literature is that democracies are peaceful \textit{only} in their relationships with other democracies and not in general.\textsuperscript{69} Dyadic democratic theorists hypothesize that in a crisis, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to initiate the use of violence against other democracies.\textsuperscript{70}

The basic assumption of dyadic peace asserts that “the expectation of democratic states that non-democratic opponents will often resort to force and/or will refuse to negotiate in good faith leads democratic decision makers to adopt more coercive foreign policies, which include the first use of force in international crises”.\textsuperscript{71} This postulation leads to an alternative proposition which states that ‘In a crisis, the more democratic a state, the less likely it is to initiate the use of force against other democracies.’\textsuperscript{72}

Some dyadic based accounts of the DPT to date are hinged on social constructivism. Risse-Kappen argued that democracies transfer their internal model of conflict resolution – peaceful compromise and negotiations – to international politics. As Risse-Kappen puts it, “the validity claims of peacefulness are substantiated by one’s own domestic structure.”\textsuperscript{73} The mutual perception as democracies paves the way for (and is then itself reinforced by) co-operative interaction across a broad range of fields; co-operation is facilitated since democracies, having no fear of aggression from each other, suspend the precautions that international anarchy imposes otherwise on co-operative endeavours between states. Over
time, democracies develop security communities, dense networks of co-operation and integration where mutual trust reigns and the security dilemma is perpetually absent.\textsuperscript{74}

The explanations of the dyadic peace come in two versions. The first highlights characteristics like transparency and audience costs to prove that democracies are more reliable in entering binding contracts. The second assumption postulates that democratic leaders face a higher risk to be removed from office when they lose in conflict.\textsuperscript{75} According to Lipson, the ability to enter reliable, lasting contracts, in turn, hinges on four institutional attributes of democracies:\textsuperscript{76}

a) Transparency gives partners insights into the “inner fabric” of democratic deliberations and creates trust in the sincerity of democratic leaders’ public statements

b) Audience costs are relevant: commitments made by leaders to their electorates concerning external promises – e.g. their support for treaties they have negotiated – means that they cannot retract easily without suffering a loss of reputation among voters.

c) Constitutional procedures – notably ratification – bind not only leaders, but also parliaments and opposition to a given international legal instrument.

d) Finally, continuity in democratic institutions means that successor government remain bound by obligations undertaken by their predecessors.

These four attributes which are not available to the same degree, and not available at all in combination in non-democratic states, accounts for the exceptional ability of democratic states to be reliable partners in their external relations.\textsuperscript{77}
2.3 Other Potential Causes of Democratic Peace

Three other potential causes of democratic peace have been be considered. First, rich states do not fight one another because they have far more to lose than to gain by doing so. Rich states are often engaged in heavy trading with one another, the costs of a war would be enormous and the benefits would be little. Since most democracies in the post-World War II era were economically developed states, it was their economic structure, rather than their type of political system, that prevented them from fighting one another. Secondly, rapidly growing states would harm themselves by engaging in conflict against other rapidly growing states—again, because conflict and war would harm the economic benefits associated with growth. Fighting other rapidly growing states is both more costly and risks reversing the positive economic growth pattern. Most democracies experienced rapid economic growth and for that reason refrained from conflict with each other. Third, most democracies in the post-World War II era have been in some sort of a direct or indirect alliance with one another. These alliance bonds, rather than their political system, prevented them from fighting one another.

In addition to the above factors, the potentially confounding effects of geographic contiguity and military capability ratios on dyadic conflict involvement are also expounded as some of the reasons why states do not attack each other; the farther away states are from each other, the less likely for their interests to clash and hence reducing the possibilities of conflicts between them. These variables are also considered to be very relevant because they have been found to be highly potent predictors of conflict escalation.
2.4 Conclusion

This chapter has summarised the tenets of the DPT from many facets and from these one may deduce that there is some evidence to the fact that the democratic peace theory is consequently explicatory of peace and cooperation between states in the international system. Its advocacy therefore will reduce the likelihood of inter-state conflicts and subsequently make the world a safer place for habitation.
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CHAPTER THREE

ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY IN LIGHT OF THE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR OF 2008

3.0 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to primarily critique the cogency of democratic peace theory's causal logic. The chapter first presents a background of the historical relations between Russia and Georgia and further delves into the remote and immediate causes of the breakout of the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and the international responses to the war. The chapter additionally assesses the economic and human costs of the war to both Russia and Georgia, the realist’s conception and explanation of the war and concludes by taking a look at the effects of the war on current Russo-Georgian relations.

3.1 2008 Russo-Georgian War
3.1.1 Background to the Conflict

In 2008, tensions arising from hostilities between Georgian and South Ossetia brought Georgia into direct clashes with Russia. Ostensibly, there have been fractious and irreconcilable points of disagreement between Russia and Georgia, but the most important and immediate cause of the war stemmed from the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia on 7th August, 2008.

Twentieth-century relations between Georgia and South Ossetia were strained by an Ossetian uprising between 1918 and 1920, during which Ossetia, previously a part of the Russian Empire, unsuccessfully tried to establish its own Soviet republic. Tensions in Georgia date back at least to the 1920s, when South Ossetia ended up as an autonomous region within Soviet Georgia after the Red Army conquered Georgia. In 1989, South Ossetia lobbied for
joining its territory with North Ossetia in Russia or for independence. Georgia’s own declaration of independence from the former Soviet Union and subsequent repressive efforts by former Georgian President Gamsakhurdia triggered conflict in 1990.²

At the end of the Soviet Union, fewer than 70,000 Ossetians resided in South Ossetia, but they formed nearly 70% of the population of the region on the border with Russian North Ossetia.³ Both Georgians and Ossetians are Orthodox Christians, but they are members of different ethno-linguistic groups.⁴ Following the Soviet invasion of Georgia in 1921, Ossetia became an autonomous oblast (province) of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.⁵ Soviet rule was characterized by peacefulness, with high rates of intermarriage.⁶

During the period of Georgian nationalism at the beginning of the 1990s, and indeed through to the 2008 war, both Georgia and the South Ossetians viewed their neighbour’s motives with suspicion: “Ossetians saw remaining in Georgia as threatening their survival, whereas Georgians saw Ossetia as a tool of Moscow in undermining Georgian sovereignty and aspirations to independence.”⁷ Low-level clashes in 1989 led South Ossetia to declare itself an independent Soviet Democratic Republic in September, and nearly three months later, the Georgian parliament abolished South Ossetian autonomy.⁸

In January 1991, hostilities broke out between Georgia and South Ossetia, reportedly contributing to an estimated 2,000-4,000 deaths and the displacement of tens of thousands of people.⁹ According to some estimates, some 20,000 ethnic Georgians resided in one-third to one-half of the region and 25,000 ethnic Ossetians in the other portion. Many fled during the fighting in the early 1990s or migrated.¹⁰ In June 1992, Russia brokered a cease-fire, and Russian, Georgian, and Ossetian “peacekeeping” units set up base camps in a security zone
around Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The units usually totalled around 1,100 troops, including about 530 Russians, a 300-member North Ossetian brigade (which was actually composed of South Ossetians and headed by a North Ossetian), and about 300 Georgians.

Monitors from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) did most of the patrolling. A Joint Control Commission (JCC) composed of Russian, Georgian, and North and South Ossetian emissaries ostensibly promoted a settlement of the conflict, with the OSCE as facilitator. Article 3 of the agreement provided a rough outline of the methods that the Joint Control Commission (JCC) could use to enforce its mandate: “In case of violation of provisions of this Agreement, the Control Commission shall carry out investigation of relevant circumstances and undertake urgent measures aimed at restoration of peace and order and non-admission of similar violations in the future.” The Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) incorporated Russian, Georgian and Ossetian military units. In 1994, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) received a mandate to monitor the JPKF.

Prior to the 2008 war, the ceasefire agreement popularly referred to as Sochi Agreement had come under criticism for failing to put a firm end to the conflict and for giving Russia a disproportionate role in its implementation. Although the region in contention endured nonviolence for about twelve years, talks aimed at the political (rather than the military) resolution of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict did not occur until 1999. Some observers warned that Russia’s increasing influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia over the years transformed the separatist conflicts into essentially Russia-Georgia disputes. Most residents
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia reportedly were granted Russian citizenship and passports and most appeared to want their regions to be part of Russia.\textsuperscript{16}

In Georgia in late 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili came to power during the so-called “rose revolution” (he was elected president in January 2004), he pledged to institute democratic and economic reforms, and to re-gain central government authority over the separatist regions.\textsuperscript{17} In early 2004, President Mikheil Saakashvili began to increase pressure on South Ossetia by tightening border controls\textsuperscript{18} and in May 2004, unsuccessfully attempted to restore Tbilisi’s control in South Ossetia in response to reports of smuggling,\textsuperscript{19} breaking up a large-scale smuggling operation in the region that allegedly involved Russian organized crime and corrupt Georgian officials,\textsuperscript{20} leading to a series of armed clashes.\textsuperscript{21} He also reportedly sent several hundred police, military, and intelligence personnel into South Ossetia. Georgia maintained that it was only bolstering its peacekeeping contingent up to the limit of 500 troops, as permitted by the cease-fire agreement. Georgian guerrilla forces also reportedly entered the region. Allegedly, Russian officials likewise assisted several hundred paramilitary elements from Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Russia to enter. Georgia accused Russia of sending military equipment including tanks and armed personnel carriers from North Ossetia into South Ossetia and allowing as many as 1000 Russian mercenaries to fight for South Ossetia.\textsuperscript{22}

Following inconclusive clashes, both sides by late 2004 ostensibly had pulled back most of the guerrillas and paramilitary forces.\textsuperscript{23}
3.1.2 The 2008 War

The exact nature of the start of the August 2008 war is uncertain, characterized by a controversy over whether Russia or Georgia was the initial aggressor.\(^{24}\) Tensions heightened in South Ossetia on July 3, 2008, when an Ossetian village police chief was killed by a bomb and the head of the pro-Georgian “government” in South Ossetia, Dmitriy Sanakoyev, escaped injury by a roadside mine.\(^{25}\) That night, both the Georgians and South Ossetians launched artillery attacks on each other’s villages and checkpoints, reportedly resulting in about a dozen killed or wounded. The European Union (EU), the OSCE, and the Council of Europe (COE) issued urgent calls for both sides to show restraint and to resume peace talks.\(^{26}\)

On July 8, 2008, four Russian military planes flew over South Ossetian airspace. The Russian Foreign Ministry claimed that the incursion had helped discourage Georgia from launching an imminent attack on South Ossetia.\(^{27}\) The Georgian government denounced the incursion as violating its territorial integrity, and on July 11, 2008 recalled its ambassador to Russia for “consultations.”\(^{28}\) The day after the Russian aerial incursion, then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Georgia for two days of discussions on ways to defuse the rising tensions between Georgia and Russia. She stated that “some of the things the Russians did over the last couple of months added to tension in the region,” called for Russia to respect Georgia’s independence, and stressed the “strong commitment” of the United States to Georgia’s territorial integrity.\(^{29}\)

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discussed the over flights at a closed meeting on July 21, 2008. Although no decision was reached, Georgian diplomats reportedly stated that the session was successful, while Russian envoy Vitaliy Churkin denounced the “pro-Georgian bias of some Security Council members.”\(^{30}\)
On July 25, 2008, a bomb blast in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, killed one person. On July 30, both sides again exchanged artillery fire, with the South Ossetians allegedly shelling a Georgian-built road on a hill outside Tskhinvali, and the Georgians allegedly shelling two Ossetian villages. Two days later, five Georgian police were injured on this road by a bomb blast. This incident appeared to trigger serious fighting on August 2-4, 2008, which resulted in over two dozen killed and wounded. Kokoity threatened to attack Georgian cities and to call for paramilitary volunteers from the North Caucasus, and announced that women and children would be evacuated to North Ossetia. Georgia claimed that these paramilitary volunteers were already arriving in South Ossetia.

On the night of August 7 2008, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of South Ossetia into the capital, Tskhinvali, which is very close to their shared border. South Ossetia accused Georgia of launching a “massive” artillery barrage against Tskhinvali, while Georgia reported intense bombing of some Georgian villages in the conflict zone. Georgian President Saakashvili that evening announced a unilateral ceasefire and called for South Ossetia to follow suit. He also called for the reopening of peace talks and reiterated that Georgia would provide the region with maximum autonomy within Georgia as part of a peace settlement. Georgia claims that South Ossetian forces did not observe the ceasefire and hence did not end their shelling of Georgian villages but rather intensified their actions, “forcing” Georgia to declare an end to its ceasefire and begin sending ground forces into South Ossetia. In no time the Georgian military controlled much of South Ossetia including its capital Tskhinvali.

Russian President Medvedev addressed an emergency session of the Russian Security Council on August 8, 2008. He denounced Georgia’s incursion into South Ossetia, asserting
that “women, children and the elderly are now dying in South Ossetia, and most of them are citizens of the Russian Federation.” He stated that “we shall not allow our compatriots to be killed with impunity. Those who are responsible for that will be duly punished.” He appeared to assert perpetual Russian control in stating that “historically Russia has been, and will continue to be, a guarantor of security for peoples of the Caucasus.” On August 11, 2008, he reiterated this principle that Russia is the permanent guarantor of Caucasian security and that “we have never been just passive observers in this region and never will be.”

In reaction to the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia, on the morning of August 8, 2008, Russian forces entered South Ossetia, using armoured and motorized infantry forces along with massive air power, launched large-scale airborne attacks in the region and elsewhere in Georgia. Russia again quickly dispatched seasoned professional troops (serving under contract) to South Ossetia that engaged Georgian forces in Tskhinvali on August 8. That same day, Russian warplanes destroyed Georgian airfields, including the Vaziana and Marneuli airbases near the Georgian capital Tbilisi. Saakashvili responded by ordering that Reservists be mobilized and declaring a 15-day “state of war.”

Reportedly, thousands of Russian troops had retaken Tskhinvali, occupied the bulk of South Ossetia, reached its border with the rest of Georgia, and were shelling areas across the border by early in the morning on August 10 (Sunday). These troops were allegedly augmented by thousands of volunteer militiamen from the North Caucasus. According to Friedman, given the speed with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack — the Russians must have been expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded in defeating the main Georgian force and
pushing a retreat of the Georgian forces. By Sunday, August 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.46

On August 10, the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Edmond Mulet, reported to the U.N. Security Council that the U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG; about 100 observers in all) had witnessed “ongoing aerial bombardments of Georgian villages in the Upper Kodori Valley” the previous day.47 On Monday, August 11, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, attacking on two fronts, one was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian city of Gori,48 where the Russians bombed apartment buildings in the city —within undisputed Georgian territory—and occupied the city.49 The second drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This attack was calculated to temporarily cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its seaports. The UNOMIG also had observed “the movement by the Abkhaz side of substantial numbers of heavy weapons and military personnel towards the Kodori Valley.”50 Mulet also warned that Abkhaz separatist leader Sergey Bagapsh had threatened to push the Georgian armed forces out of the Upper Kodori Valley. In violation of their mandate, the Russian ‘peacekeepers’ did not attempt to stop such deployments of Abkhaz rebel weaponry, Mulet reported. Fifteen United Nations Monitoring Group in Georgia (UNOMIG) observers were withdrawn from the Kodori Valley because the Abkhaz rebels announced that their safety could not be guaranteed, Mulet stated.51 These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to undertake it.52

Russian peacekeepers also permitted Abkhaz forces to deploy in the Gali region and along the Inguri River near the border of Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. Russian military and
Abkhaz militia forces then moved across the river into the Zugdidi district, southwest of Abkhazia and undisputedly in Georgian territory (although some part is within the peacekeeping zone). Bombs fell on the town of Zugdidi on August 10. As the local population fled, Russian troops reportedly occupied the town and its police stations on August 11. Reportedly, the Russian military stated that it would not permit the Abkhaz forces to occupy the town of Zugdidi. The next day, the Russian military reported that it had disarmed Georgian police forces in the Kodori Valley and the Georgian police had pulled out.53

On August 10, Russia sent ships from the Black Sea Fleet to deliver troops to Abkhazia and take up positions along Georgia’s coastline. Russian military officials reported that up to 6,000 troops had been deployed by sea or air. Russian television reported that Igor Dygalo, Russian naval spokesman and aide to the Russian navy commander-in-chief, claimed that Russian ships had sunk a Georgian vessel in a short battle off the coast of Georgia.54 Georgian officials reported that the Russian ships were preventing ships from entering or leaving the port at Poti. The Russians reportedly also sank Georgia’s coast guard vessels at Poti. Russian troops occupied a Georgian military base in the town of Senaki, near Poti, on August 11, 2008.55

3.1.3 Ceasefire

On August 12, the Russian government announced at mid-day that Medvedev had called Javier Solana, the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to report that “the aim of Russia’s operation for coercing the Georgian side to peace had been achieved and it had been decided to conclude the operation.”56 In a subsequent meeting with Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and chief of Armed Forces General Staff
Nikolai Makarov, Medvedev stated that “based on your report I have ordered an end to the operations to oblige Georgia to restore peace.... The security of our peacekeeping brigade and civilian population has been restored. The aggressor has been punished and suffered very heavy losses.” Seemingly in contradiction to his order for a halt in operations, he also ordered his generals to continue “mopping up” actions, which included ongoing bombing by warplanes throughout Georgia, the occupation of villages, and destruction of military bases, bridges, industries, houses, and other economic or strategic assets.⁵⁷

Later on the same day, Russian president Dimitry Medvedev met with visiting French President Sarkozy, who presented a ceasefire plan on behalf of the EU.⁵⁸ President Medvedev reportedly backed some elements of the plan. French Foreign Minister Koucher then flew to Tbilisi to present the proposals to the Georgian government. Medvedev and Saakashvili consulted by phone the night of August 12-13 and they reportedly agreed in principle to a six-point peace plan, according to a press conference by president Sarkozy.⁵⁹

The peace plan calls for all parties to the conflict⁶⁰ to cease hostilities and pull troops back to positions they had occupied before the conflict began. Other elements of the peace plan include allowing humanitarian aid into the conflict zone and facilitating the return of displaced persons. It however omitted any reference to Georgia’s territorial integrity. The plan also calls for the withdrawal of Russian combat troops from Georgia, but allows Russian “peacekeepers” to remain and to patrol in a larger security zone outside South Ossetia that will include a swath of Georgian territory along South Ossetia’s border.⁶¹ The plan also calls for “the opening of international discussions on the modalities of security and stability of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.” This seems to provide for possibly greater international roles in peace talks and peacekeeping, both of seminal Georgian interest. However, it does not
specifically state that international peacekeepers will be deployed within South Ossetia. Supposedly, the Russian “peacekeepers” will cease patrolling the area outside South Ossetia after the modalities of international peacekeeping are worked out and monitors are deployed within this area, a process that could take some time.\textsuperscript{62}

An emergency meeting of EU foreign ministers on August 13 approved the peace plan and the feasibility of the involvement of EU monitors. Medvedev hosted the \textit{de facto} presidents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Moscow on August 14, where they signed the peace agreement. On August 15, then-Secretary of State Rice travelled to Tbilisi and Saakashvili signed the agreement. France submitted a draft resolution based on the plan at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on August 19, but Russia blocked it, reportedly stating that only the verbatim elements of the vaguely written plan should be included in the resolution.\textsuperscript{63}

Georgian observations after the war claimed that a Russian regiment crossed into South Ossetia early on August 7, when hostilities had barely escalated whereas Russia responds that this was part of the normal movements related to the peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{64} The Russian view holds that Russian combat units entered South Ossetia only after Georgian president Saakashvili had ordered an attack on the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on the evening of August 7, 2008.\textsuperscript{65} Secondly South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia and hence Russia’s action was all in line to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia.\textsuperscript{66}

\subsection*{3.2 The Costs of the War to Russia and Georgia}

\subsubsection*{3.2.1 Logistics and Equipment Losses}

After the war, Strategic forecasting incorporated (Stratfor) a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the
world stated that Russia "has largely destroyed Georgia's war-fighting capability." According to *Moscow Defence Brief*, Georgia lost its air and naval forces and its air-defence systems. The Georgian army lost large quantities of equipment to the Russians during the conflict. Russia estimated that the Georgian Air Force lost three Su-25 attack aircraft and two L-29 jets.

A Russian air attack on Marneuli Air Force Base destroyed three AN-2 aircraft. Russian airborne forces set fire to two Mi-24 helicopters and one Mi-14 on 11 August. Georgian Defence Minister Davit Kezerashvili said that Georgia lost materials worth $250 million. According to Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, his country saved 95 percent of its armed forces. The 4th Brigade had more casualties than any other Georgian military unit.

In 2009, Russian Army Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov stated that Georgia was rearming, although the armament was not directly provided by the United States. According to Makarov, the Georgian Armed Forces had exceeded their pre-war strength by 2009. Russia admitted that three of its Su-25 strike aircraft and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber were lost, in addition to at least three tanks, 20 armoured and 20 non-armoured vehicles. *Moscow Defence Brief* provided a higher estimate, saying that Russian Air Force total losses during the war were one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber, one Su-24M Fencer fighter-bomber, one Su-24MR Fencer E reconnaissance plane and four Su-25 attack planes. Anton Lavrov listed one Su-25SM, two Su-25BM, two Su-24M and one Tu-22M3 lost.
3.2.2 Economic and Financial Losses

On the day the war started, reports attributed to the Russian finance minister indicated that there was capital flight of six billion dollars from Russia. On the same day Fitch Ratings a leading provider of credit ratings, commentary and research located in New York and London lowered Georgia’s sovereign debt ratings from BB- to B+, commenting that there were "increased downside risks to Georgia's sovereign creditworthiness." Standard and Poor's an American financial services company considered as one of the Big Three credit-rating agencies, also lowered Georgia's ratings.

While Georgia has no significant oil or gas reserves on its own, it is an important transit route that supplies the West, through the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (BTC pipeline) and many analysts expressed fear that the war may damage the pipeline which is a major source of revenue for Georgia. According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the five-day war cost Russia an estimated 12.5 billion rubles, a daily cost of 2.5 billion rubles.

3.2.3 Human Costs and Casualties

According to RIA Novosti, Russia's international news agency, the number of Russian Fighters killed in the conflict was 64, whereas Reuters reported a slightly larger figure of 67 which included 3 soldiers missing in action and 283 wounded. The Ministry of Defence of Georgia reported that 169 Georgian forces were killed with 1 soldier missing in action. Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also reported that as many as 947 persons were wounded.
3.3 **International Reactions to the War**

International reaction to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 encompassed many states and inter-governmental organisations. The conflict had a substantial humanitarian impact and affected the private and commercial markets of both Russia and Georgia. Some of these responses from the international community are elucidated below.

### 3.3.1 Sovereign States

**United States**

US president George W. Bush said to Russia, "Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century.""91 "Russia has invaded a sovereign neighbouring state and threatens a democratic government elected by its people," said Bush. "Such an action is unacceptable in the 21st century.""92 President George W. Bush called the Russian bombings a dangerous escalation.93 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, "We call on Russia to cease attacks on Georgia by aircraft and missiles, respect Georgia's territorial integrity, and withdraw its ground combat forces from Georgian soil."94

**Italy**

Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Franco Frattini stated, "We cannot create an anti-Russia coalition in Europe, and on this point we are close to Putin's position." He stressed that Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was a close ally of Putin.95 About an eventual deployment of Italian troops, he later commented, "If, after his meetings in Tbilisi and Moscow, Kouchner (France’s foreign minister)96 submits a proposal to the European Council of Foreign Ministers on Wednesday, and it’s approved, we’ll take it into consideration. There are a lot of ‘ifs’, and we’d need in any case to redistribute our forces, which are finite, by redeploying
them from other international missions. Humanitarian aid for South Ossetia, on the other hand, is ready as of now.\textsuperscript{97}

Belarus

President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko stated, "Russia acted calmly, wisely and beautifully"\textsuperscript{98} Maria Vanshina, Deputy Head for Information of Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "The use of military force in the zone of South Ossetia, civilian casualties, bloodshed, economic losses, ruined peaceful life of people cause a deep concern in us. Only immediate ceasefire, peaceful and civilized manner of negotiating will secure stability in the South Ossetian region and across the Caucasus."\textsuperscript{99}

China

A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China Qin Gang said, "China calls upon relevant parties to keep restraint and cease fire immediately."\textsuperscript{100} China further called for an "Olympic ceasefire", following the tradition of ceasing hostilities during the Ancient Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{101}

One can infer from the reactions of the sovereign states that realism played a very important role in their responses to the conflict. For instance the United States of America which has fostered very close ties with the Georgia in recent years utterly condemned the Russian assault on Georgia and immediately sent relief to Georgia in the aftermath of the war. On the other hand Belarus a protégé state of Russia, welcomed the Russian action in Georgia and even praised the Russian leadership for their restraint and ‘moderate’ nature of the attack. There were however states such as China which presented a neutral view on the conflict and asked for restraints from all sides.
3.3.2 Intergovernmental Organizations

United Nations (UN)

On 7 August 2008, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed grave concern over the escalation of violence and prevailed on all parties "to refrain from any actions that might jeopardize the situation further and pose threat to stability in the region." Between 06:00 GMT on 8 August and 23:00 GMT on 9 August, Russia tabled three resolutions calling upon all sides to renounce the use of force. Each time its efforts were opposed by the United Kingdom and the United States, who sided with Georgia’s UN Ambassador Irakli Alasania. In September 2008, Miguel d’Escoto Brockmann, the president of the UN General Assembly, claimed that Georgia "committed an act of aggression against South Ossetia and violated UN Charter."

European Union (EU)

On 9 August, Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, who held the rotating presidency of the European Union, announced with American President George W. Bush that the EU and the USA would send a joint delegation to try to negotiate a cease fire. On 12 August, Sarkozy reportedly convinced Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin not to follow through with his plans to overthrow the Georgian government and "hang Saakashvili by the balls."

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

The Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb, acting as the chairman of the organisation, travelled with the EU delegation to negotiate a cease-fire. Stubb stated that OSCE was the only organisation with infrastructure in the area that could immediately deploy military observers to manage the conflict. All 56 members of the OSCE supported the plan to send 100 military observers to monitor the ceasefire. In November 2008, accounts from OSCE
monitors suggested that contrary to Georgian claims, no significant shelling of Georgian villages was reported prior to the beginning of the Georgian offensive at 11:35 p.m. on August 7, 2008.\footnote{109}

**Human Rights Watch (HRW)**

Human Rights Watch (HRW) in their report *Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia* (2009), assert that there was some evidence to suggest that both Russia and Georgia committed war crimes throughout the war. A 2009 HRW report has faulted Russia for “failing” to observe their responsibility to do everything practicable to verify that the targets to be attacked were military [rather than civilian] objects,\footnote{110} and noted that “Russian forces may have intentionally targeted civilians” in civilian vehicles.\footnote{111} HRW likewise cited Georgia for failing to distinguish between military and civilian targets, including using BM-21 rocket launchers to shell Tskhinvali and attacking Ossetian civilians fleeing the conflict in their vehicles.\footnote{112} The report condemned both sides for using cluster munitions.\footnote{113}

### 3.4 Critique of the Democratic Peace Theory

Realists argue that it is not common polities but rather common interests that can best explain the low incidence of wars between democracies. Beginning with the Cold War, they point out that democracies have been far more likely to formally align themselves with other democracies than in the century before, suggesting that common strategic interests are a more important factor than domestic political processes. Thus, the particular structure of the international political system is the key factor determining how states will act.
According to Rosato, the causal mechanisms that constitute the normative logic do not appear to operate as stipulated. The democratic norms explanation holds that "the culture, perceptions, and practices that permit compromise and the peaceful resolution of conflicts within countries come to apply across international boundaries toward other democratic countries." Democratic states assume both that other democracies also subscribe to pacific methods of regulating political competition and resolving disputes, and that others will apply these norms in their external relations with fellow democracies.

The available evidence, nonetheless suggests that, contrary to the claims of democratic peace theorists, democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution, nor do they generally treat each other with trust and respect when their interests clash. Historical record indicates that democracies have often failed to adopt their internal norms of conflict resolution in an international context.

Liberal democratic norms narrowly circumscribe the range of situations in which democracies can justify the use of force. As Doyle notes, "Liberal wars are only fought for popular, liberal purposes." This does not mean that they will go to war less often than other kinds of states; it only means that there are fewer reasons available to them for waging war. Rosato suggests that democracies are certainly justified in fighting wars of self-defence. There is considerable disagreement among liberal theorists regarding precisely what kinds of action constitute self-defence, but repulsing an invasion, pre-empting an impending military attack, and fighting in the face of unreasonable demands all plausibly fall under this heading. Waging war when the other party has not engaged in threatening behaviour does not.
Layne found further evidence that democracies do not treat each other with trust and respect in his analyses of diplomatic crises involving Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. Layne examines four prominent cases which include the Fashoda Crisis between Great Britain and France in Eastern Africa, and also the Trent Affair between Great Britain and the United States. In every single one of these crisis rival democracies almost went to war with one another and Layne asks whether the crises were resolved because of mutual trust and respect.122 His conclusion offers scant support for the normative logic: "In each of these crises, at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war..... In each of the four crises, war was averted not because of the 'live and let live' spirit of peaceful dispute resolution attributed to democratic peace but rather realist factors."123

According to Layne, if democratic public opinion really had the effect ascribed to it, democracies would be peaceful in their relations with all states, whether democratic or not. If citizens and policymakers of a democracy were especially sensitive to the human and material costs of war, that sensitivity should be evident whenever their state is on the verge of war, regardless of whether the adversary is democratic or not: the lives lost and money spent will be the same.124 Layne further posits that democratic public opinion, per se, is also not necessarily an inhibitor of war. For example, in 1898 it was public opinion that compelled the reluctant McKinley administration into war with Spain; in 1914 war was enthusiastically embraced by public opinion in Britain and France.125

In "Democracies Don't Fight Democracies" Rummel has provided a thorough analysis of how democracies especially Western ones are not in the business of waging war with one another.126 Indeed, if more countries were allowed to operate as democracies war might certainly be reduced.127 But this will never occur so long as today's powerful democracies
continue to rule the world in an extremely undemocratic fashion whereas these powerful states such as Canada, Britain, France and the United States afford their own citizens a substantial degrees of democracy. The economic and political powers of these nations are reliant on their continuing domination of global markets, international governing bodies such as the United Nations (UN), World Trade Organization (WTO) and the most powerful military organizations in the world. He also asserts that Western democracies, and their corporate partners, are the richest nations on the planet due to continuing political instability and violent conflict abroad. Multinational corporations, the international arms trade, and gunboat diplomacy make the world’s democracies strong. Rummel further posits that most democratic nations exist today because they operate undemocratically on the international stage. And their power is dependent upon the existence of dictatorships and disorder elsewhere. Hence, the relevance and usefulness of democratic peace study is unclear, if an end to war is to be our objective.

In view of these findings there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy between states causes peace.

3.4.1 The Realists Critique of Democratic Peace

In the introduction to the fall 1994 issue on the democratic peace, some proponents of International Security refer the democratic peace theory "the conventional wisdom." They contend that if it has become conventional wisdom, or seems likely to do so, we should expect to see challenges to it. The theoretical structures of realism will breakdown if the characteristics of a state’s administrative systems is shown to have a significant influence on which states it attacks or does not. If history is "just one damn thing after another," then for realists international politics is the same damn things over and over again: war, great power security and economic competitions, the rise and fall of great powers, and the formation and
dissolution of alliances. International political behaviour is characterized by continuity, regularity, and repetition because states are constrained by the international system's unchanging (and probably unchangeable) structure.134

International politics is an anarchic, self-help realm.135 The absence of a rule-making and enforcing authority means that each state in the global system is free to define its own interests and to employ its own choice of means in pursuing them in order to ensure its own survival in the international system.136 Waltz additionally adds that in this regard, international politics is fundamentally competitive and it is competitive in a manner that differs crucially from domestic politics in liberal societies, where the losers can accept an adverse outcome because they live to fight another day and can, therefore, ultimately hope to prevail.137 In international politics, states that come out on the short end of political competition face potentially more extreme outcomes, ranging from constraints on autonomy to occupation to extinction.138

Layne in “Kant or cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace, asserted that it is anarchy that gives international politics its distinctive essence. In an anarchic system, a state's first goal is to survive. To attain security, states engage in both internal and external balancing for the purpose of deterring aggressors, and of defeating them should deterrence fail. He additionally asserts that in a realist world, cooperation is possible but is hard to sustain in the face of the competitive pressures that are built into the international political system's structure. Layne further posits that the imperative of survival in a threatening environment forces states to focus on strategies that maximize their power relative to their rivals. States have powerful incentives both to seek the upper hand over their rivals militarily and to use their edge not only for self-defence but also to take advantage of others. Because military power is
inherently offensive rather than defensive in nature, states cannot escape the security dilemma: measures taken by a state as self-defence may have the unintended consequence of threatening others. This is because a state can never be certain that others’ intentions are nonthreatening; consequently its policies must be shaped in response to others’ capabilities. In the international system, fear and distrust of other states is the normal state of affairs.\textsuperscript{139}

Here democratic peace and realism part company on a crucial point. Democratic Peace holds that changes within states can transform the nature of international politics. Realism takes the view that even if states change internally, the structure of the international political system remains the same. As systemic structure is the primary determinant of international political outcomes, structural constraints mean that similarly placed states will act similarly, regardless of their domestic political systems. As Kenneth Waltz says: "In self-help systems, the pressures of competition weigh more heavily than ideological preferences or internal political pressures."\textsuperscript{140} Changes at the unit level do not change the constraints and incentives imbedded at the systemic level. States respond to the logic of the situation in which they find themselves even though this may result in undesirable outcomes, from the break-down of cooperation to outright war. States that ignore the imperatives of a realist world run the risk of perishing. In a realist world, survival and security are always at risk, and democratic states will respond in the same manner to democratic adversaries as they to non-democratic ones.\textsuperscript{141}

\subsection*{3.5 Realist Perspectives on the 2008 Russo-Georgian War}

Proponents of realism in general contend that it is not democracy or its absence, but considerations and evaluations of power, that cause peace or war. Specifically, many realist critics claim that the effect ascribed to democratic, or liberal, peace, is in fact due to alliance
ties between democratic states which in turn are caused, one way or another, by realist factors.142

Before the onset of the war, Russia, upon belief that it’s vital reputational interests affecting its regional strategic posture were at stake played diplomatic hardball, engaged in military intimidations and invaded Georgia when it became indispensable. Russia’s official account for its engagements early in the war can be deduced from an August 8, 2008 speech from President Dmitry Medvedev where he stated that on August 7, “Georgian troops committed what amounts to an act of aggression against Russian peacekeepers and the civilian population in South Ossetia.”143 Medvedev characterized this as “a gross violation of international law and of the mandates that the international community gave Russia as a partner in the peace process.”144 He further added that the majority of those who were dying were Russian citizens.145 In a news conference one week later, Medvedev appeared to draw upon humanitarian themes in stressing Russia’s role in the region: “[T]he Ossetians . . . themselves trust only the Russian peacekeepers because the events of the last 15 years have shown them that the Russian peacekeepers are the only force able to protect their interests and often their very lives.”146 In a November press conference, Medvedev further explained Russia’s actions during the August war: “[W]e had to intervene to protect people, to defend their right to exist simply as ethnic groups, and to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. Our intervention was limited and absolutely necessary given the situation. We acted in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter and the right of self-defence.”147

To explicate the realist underpinnings of the War from the Russian perspective, there is a need to understand Russian thinking with regards to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of
democracy and Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear, the Orange Revolution was a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) funded intrusion into the internal affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the encirclement of Russia. In several instances, after the Cold War, the United States through its Presidents George H.W. Bush (Snr) and Bill Clinton had assured the Russians that NATO would not enlarge to incorporate states in the former Soviet Union Empire. Nonetheless, that promise had already been broken in 1998 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union. The Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national security, as it would have rendered them indefensible and threatened to destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion as publicly stated — was that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break Russia.

According to Friedman, the second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored. From the Ukrainian
experience, the Russians became convinced that the United States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and strangulation of Russia.\textsuperscript{154}

From the Kosovo experience, Russia concluded that the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all the cards: in South Ossetia. Moscow had two motives, the lesser of which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could also be declared independent under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive as we are soon to realise was far more important.\textsuperscript{155} Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to revive the Soviet state; rather, it meant

Security was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that during the Cold War, the Russian City of St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a NATO country today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and, in some cases, China.\textsuperscript{156}
3.6 Effects of the War on Russo-Georgian Relations

August 8, 2015 marked the seventh anniversary of the beginning of the military clashes between Georgia and Russia. A few days prior to this anniversary, Russian forces in South Ossetia moved internal border 1.5 km further inside Georgia proper, threatening main road linking west and east of country just in the wake of the anniversary celebrations.\textsuperscript{157} There has been a lot of discourse concerning Russia-Georgia relations in recent times especially in light of the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. According to McFarlane, one venue is the current “Geneva Process,” established in 2008 to attempt to sort out the mess created by the Georgian-Russian war. He further states that after seventeen meetings, there is no evidence of any significant progress. There is also a substantial array of informal processes involving all kinds of well-intentioned people from London, Washington, Georgia and Russia. They haven’t had any discernible impact either.\textsuperscript{158}

On 26 August 2008, barely 3 weeks after the five day Russo-Georgian War, Russia officially recognized both South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states.\textsuperscript{159} In response to Russia’s acknowledgment of Abkhazia and South Ossetian status as independent states, the Georgian government announced that it had severed all diplomatic relations with Russia.\textsuperscript{160}

On 19 January 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed into law a decree which made it unlawful to sell, distribute, or transfer military equipment to Georgia. He also banned the use of Russian railways, waters, and airspace for military collaboration with Georgia.\textsuperscript{161} According to RIA Novosti, Russia had threatened countries or individuals found to be in breach of these regulations with economic and financial sanctions.\textsuperscript{162} These sanctions would last until December 2011. Russia had earlier pushed for an international arms embargo to be imposed on Georgia, but the initiative failed to garner global support. Georgia declared
the decree "inadequate" and also claimed that all weapons being used by the Georgian military that were of Russian Origin would be replaced by European hardware. \textsuperscript{163} Georgian military experts asserted that this retrospective decision by Russia would rather promote an illegal arms trade.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Georgia and Russia maintained steady bilateral relations and this culminated in the signing of a landmark bilateral Free Trade Agreement between both states on February 3, 1994. According to the BBC, this trade agreement made Georgian wine trade with Russia responsible for over 80\%-90\% of the total wine exports between both countries. \textsuperscript{164} The electricity grid of all Georgia is almost 100\% Russian owned. \textsuperscript{165}

On 27\textsuperscript{th} June 2014 Georgia signed a Deep ad Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU which gave it numerous hypothetical trade privileges. The new Georgian government showed level headedness by declaring that that the agreement would not affect trade with Russia. And the Russian regime downplayed any significant impacts that the DCFTA was going to have on Russo-Georgian trade. Consequently just three weeks after Russia downplayed the effects of the DCFTA agreement on Russo-Georgian trade, Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development developed a draft law to suspend the bilateral free trade agreement between Russia and Georgia, Russian media reports. This draft law had the support of several government agencies within the Russian Federation including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice. \textsuperscript{166}

Though relations between Russia and Georgia turned rocky after the war, the tense exchanges have been warming up steadily after the war.
In January 2010, Russia and Georgia reopened air traffic with the first direct passenger flight between the two countries since the war in 2008.  

In 2013 president Putin in an annual news conference told reporters that there was a possibility of re-introducing visa free regimes between both countries again. "We can see signals from the new Georgian leaders. And, as we understand development of the situation in Georgia, I believe, we could return to a visa-free regime." the president added. "We shall consider it at the level of experts."  

Gradually there is a thawing of the tense relations between the Russia and Georgia and there is hope that in the nearby future these two states will come to accommodate their mutual interests and re-establish even better relations than what existed prior to the breakout of the war in August 2008.

3.7 Conclusion

The DPT is difficult to assess. Whether or not there is a democratic peace has grave consequences for policymaking, but also for the equilibrium in international relations theory between realism and liberalism. If there is a democratic peace, the foundational assumptions of the realist school of thought are severely undermined and liberalism should surge to the forefront of IR theory. If democratic peace theory is invalid, realism triumphs over its greatest challenge from liberalism in the last twenty years. There are, however, other influences that can overcome the effect of democracy in certain cases, causing a state to be more warlike than democracy would, by itself, allow.
The causal logics that underpin democratic peace theory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace with one another because the mechanisms that make up these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's proponents. Rosato asserts that, democratic peace theorists could counter this claim by pointing out that even in the absence of a good explanation for the democratic peace, the fact remains that democracies have rarely fought one another. In addition to casting doubt on existing explanations for the democratic peace, then, a comprehensive critique should also offer a positive account of the finding.

Pitcairn, believes one potential explanation is that the democratic peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe. Second, the United States has been the dominant power in both these regions since World War II and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional peace. Therefore, the fact that states are democratic is not a guarantee that there will be peace and cooperation among states in the international system.
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2 Ibid. p. 221.


7 Ibid., p.186.

8 Ibid., pp.192-193.


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12 Soci Agreement art. 3, cl. 1. In Hafkin G.(2010)

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14 Socor, Vladimir South Ossetia Joint Control R Commission Ingrily Mothballed, EURASIA DAILY MONITOR, Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=33440&tx_ttnews[backPid]=166&no_cache=1 (arguing that the JCC membership structure “was designed from the outset to isolate Georgia, leaving it face to face with three incarnations of Russia, in the absence of international involvement”).

15 Herrberg, op. cit.


17 Nichol J., op. cit., p.3.

18 Ibid.


20 Nichol, J., op. cit., p.3.

21 Kim Murphy, op. cit.

22 ICG report p.16.

23 Nichol, J., op. cit.


26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.


31 Nichol, J., op. cit., p.5.

32 Ibid.

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CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This study sought to critique the democratic peace theory in light of the Russo-Georgian war of 2008. The study assessed the tenets of the democratic peace theory and its limitations to determine whether democracy truly promotes peace and cooperation between states in the international system. This chapter seeks to summarize the findings of the study and suggest recommendations.

4.1 Summary of Findings

In assessing the democratic peace theory in light of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the study discovered that the theory has failed to adequately explain the relations between the two electoral democracies. This is because conflicts between states in the international system are better explained by realist considerations rather than by democratic peace. This study has shown that an electoral democratic states is not likely to subordinate its interests to those of another state irrespective of whether that state is democratic or non-democratic.

The study also finds that electoral democratic states, depending on the specific circumstances under which they find themselves, are likely to engage in military conflicts with each other when they feel that their interests are being threatened or challenged in the global system.

Finally, the study also finds that the immediate cause of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 was Georgia’s military aggression into South Ossetia was what prompted Russia to intervene on behalf of South-Ossetia. The remote causes include Georgia’s continual anti-Russian stance and its incessant attempts to gain NATO membership. The Russians therefore took
advantage of the status quo in South-Ossetia to confirm their power in the region and to send a clear message to the ‘west’ that Russia was still a military force to be reckoned with in the Caucasus region and that they would therefore not tolerate any expansions of NATO to their sphere of influence.

4.2 Conclusion

The findings of the study show that democratic peace theory does not adequately explain peaceful relations between electoral democratic states. It is striking to note that in the lead up to the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, it is realism and not democratic peace theory that provides a more compelling explanation of why the Russia and Georgia attacked each other. This is due to the fact that both Russia and Georgia, were unflinching in their resolve to resort to the use of violence against each other in order to defend their interests. In the case of Georgia, it had to assert its authority over the breakaway region of South Ossetia and in effect also send a message to the other secessionist entity of Abkhazia that it had jurisdiction over all territories within its internationally defined and accepted borders. In the case of Russia, Russia believed it had vital strategic and reputational interests at stake given its position as a hegemon in the Caucasus region of Eastern Europe. Russia therefore maintained that in the face of measured ‘annihilation’ by the Georgian army of Russian citizens living in South Ossetia and also South Ossetian civilians, a failure to act to protect and safeguard the lives of its citizens and also South Ossetians from Georgian aggression would undermine Russia’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in the region.

Also during the crisis, the "live and let live”1 spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at the core of democratic peace theory should have prevailed but because of realist factors the two states could not avoid war. The asymmetric distribution of military strengths explain why Russia
overran and rolled back the Georgian gains in Ossetia in barely forty eight hours. When one actually looks beyond the result of this crisis, and attempts to understand why this war turned out as it did, it becomes obvious that the democratic peace theory's causal logic has only minimal explanatory power.

Although the democratic peace theory identifies a correlation between domestic structure and normative cultures and the corresponding absence of war between democracies, it fails to establish a causal link. This is because other factors such as military alliances, economic interdependence, non-contiguity of states and the geographic distance between states are all dynamics which can advance or prevent wars between states.²

4.3 Recommendations

An increase in the number of democratic states in the international system does not automatically guarantee peaceful inter-state relations. In order to improve peaceful coexistence between states in the global system especially between Russia and Georgia, the following recommendations should be taken into consideration.

4.3.1 Broadening Democracy beyond Elections

The popular hypothesis of the democratic peace theory which postulates that the greater the number of democracies in the international system, the greater the potential for enhancing peace and cooperation amongst states is realistic and essentially feasible if states extend the conceptions of democracy beyond the ‘basic’ organising of elections and participation in electoral processes, to include more substantive and procedural elements of democracy which include protection of individual human rights and privileges, respect for the rule of law, independent organs of government, civilian control over the military³ among others. On the
contrary, the tendency to automatically allude peaceful relations between states in the international system to the pacifying effects democracy could be fallacious.

4.3.2 Non-Expansion of NATO into Russian Sphere of Influence

After the Cold War successive American presidents promised Russia that NATO would not expand into the former Soviet-bloc. However, NATO has contravened this promise and expanded to include former Warsaw Pact countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In recent years what one observes is NATO making gradual overtures to other former Soviet republics like Georgia and Ukraine. Russia continues to oppose further expansion of NATO into its backdoor, seeing it as inconsistent with agreements between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and American and European negotiators that paved the way for a peaceful German reunification\(^4\) at the end of the Cold War. These expansion efforts by NATO are often perceived by Russian policy makers as a continuation of a Cold War attempt intended to encircle and isolate Russia,\(^5\) thereby compromising Russia’s national security.

It is recommended that the United States and its allies in the ‘West’ should acknowledge and accept Russian dominance in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region and stop expanding towards its sphere of influence. Also NATO-Russia Council should intensify its collaboration efforts to allay Russia’s fears and assure it of its security despite NATO expansionism. It is further recommended that if possible Russia should be given NATO membership that way Russia can be included in the day-to-day administration of NATO affairs and this can bring an end to Russian aggression in Eastern Europe since they would then have common interests.
4.3.3 Respect for Superpower Relations

This point was made succinctly on July 4th 2015 by president Putin of Russia in his goodwill message to President Barack Obama of the United States, on the occasion of American Independence Day. The Kremlin said: “Putin expressed the assurance that by building a dialogue based on the principles of impartiality and shared respect for each other’s interests, Russia and the United States are able to stand together and find solutions to the most complex international problems and effectively counter global threats and challenges.” Putin further noted that, despite the differences between the two countries, Russo-American relations still remain the most important factor of international stability and security in the international system.

Therefore, the United States and Russia, two global superpowers should come to accept that global security and cooperation lie in the accommodation of their respective interests and therefore collaborate more on issues that affect the security of the world rather than seeking to outdo each other in proxy wars since it’s the weaker states that tend to suffer the repercussions.
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