EFFECTS OF MARITIME VIOLENCE ON CAMEROON’S MARITIME PASSENGER TRANSPORT TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

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JUNE, 2015
DECLARATION

I declare that this work is the product of research conducted entirely by me under supervision in accordance with the research guidelines laid down by the University of Ghana Handbook for Graduate Studies Part I. No material contained herein has been presented either wholly or in part for the award of a degree or other certificate in the University of Ghana or any other institution of higher learning. All references used in the study have been duly acknowledged. I am solely responsible for the views expressed and for any errors in style or otherwise.

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DEDICATION

To my wife AKAH Judith EWO épouse NDZE for the unimaginable sacrifice and endurance during my long stay away from home.

To my daughters Bettina, Ida, Monita and Ivy-Peace; they were a major part of the reason why I embarked on this immensely challenging enterprise in the first place.
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<tr>
<td>CAMSHIP</td>
<td>Cameroon Shipping Lines</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEMAC</td>
<td>Central African Economic and Monetary Community</td>
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<td>COPAX</td>
<td>Central African Peace and Security Council</td>
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<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
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<td>Gulf of Guinea</td>
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<td>International Maritime Bureau</td>
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<td>International Ship and Port Facility Security Code</td>
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<td>MOWCA</td>
<td>Maritime Organization of West and Central African States</td>
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<td>SOLAS</td>
<td>International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea</td>
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ABSTRACT

Seemingly unknown to many, the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea maritime space has for quite some years now been the theatre for maritime violence directed at passenger vessels plying the route linking Limbe (Cameroon) to Calabar (Nigeria) and Malabo (Equatorial Guinea). Maritime violence, it would be recalled, is a phenomenon that impacts negatively on sea transport world-wide.

This study was thus designed to investigate the effects of maritime violence on Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry. Based on maritime boundary as well as law of the sea considerations, the forms of violence most relevant for the study were ‘piracy’, ‘armed robbery’ and ‘terrorism’. The main research question was addressed along with causes of maritime violence and measures aimed at curbing it.

Without prejudice to the role of existing sources, questionnaire was used to collect data from the study population, with the target population comprising – a) the private sector of shipping in Cameroon (e.g. maritime passenger transport companies and their employees and passengers), and b) the public sector (e.g. relevant ports, Ministry of Defence, etc.). Based on guidelines from Required Sample Size (The Research Advisors, 2006) and other relevant considerations, samples were collected and analyzed.

With respect to the main question, it was found out that maritime violence has negative socio-economic impact on Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector. It affects the passenger transport companies themselves (e.g. higher costs and lower income), company employees (e.g. lower salaries and lay-offs, etc.), as well as passengers using the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo route.
(e.g. higher transport fares, low patronage, etc.). It was also understood that the causes of maritime violence in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area can best be appreciated against the backdrop of certain socio-economic and political realities concerning Nigeria and Cameroon (e.g. effects of the Bakassi conflict). Furthermore, the study highlighted the need to improve on measures currently being deployed jointly by Cameroon and Nigeria to curb maritime violence in the area.

It was thus easy to conclude that Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry plays quite an important role in terms of the socio-economic benefits it provides to its stakeholders. It brings dues to Government, provides employment to a portion of the population, and contributes to the development of cross-border informal trade between Cameroon and the two neighbouring countries concerned. All in all, therefore, the sector under consideration is an important one and efforts should be made by all stakeholders, especially the Government, to help it prosper.

**Key terms:** maritime space maritime violence route cause effect
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

The *raison-d’être* of the present background information is to help contextualize the study and set the stage for the discussion centering around its various facets. In that light, the following points are considered: a) a presentation of Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector, in terms of routes, importance, institutions and facilities (ports, companies, etc.); and b) a definition of the concept of ‘maritime violence’ and an indication as to its relevance to Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector.

1.1.1 Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector

The Port of Limbe, found in the South-West Region of Cameroon (see Figure 2, page 2), is the only Cameroonian port handling the maritime passenger transport under study. However, it is of utmost importance to make an immediate distinction between the Port of Limbe and the ‘Limbe Deep Sea Port’. The latter, which is currently under construction and earmarked for major international cargo traffic, was scheduled to be opened in 2015 (Diyen, 2013).

Passenger vessels load and discharge at the Port of Limbe - in other words, such vessels travel to and from Calabar, in Nigeria as well as to and from Malabo, in Equatorial Guinea. This statement begs three questions, viz. First, what are the facilities available for this transport, in terms of ports and vessels? Secondly, how significant a sector is Cameroon’s maritime passenger industry? Thirdly, how can the industry be appreciated historically?

In response to the first question, one may want to note that the Port of Limbe is not a major Cameroonian port in the likes of the Port of Douala or the other new ports such as the Port of Kribi, etc. Rather, it is a small traffic port composed of the Cape Limboh Terminal and Tiko
Figure 1:
Map showing Cameroon’s geographical location and the two port cities of Calabar in Nigeria and Malabo in Equatorial Guinea, respectively. Cargo/passenger vessels leaving Cameroon travel to and from the ports of these two cities. NB: Equatorial Guinea is composed of two land masses – Bioko Island where the capital, Malabo, is found and the mainland portion south of Cameroon, as map shows.


Figure 2:
Map of the port city of Limbe in the South-West Region of Cameroon. Cargo/passenger vessels leaving the Limbe Port travel to and from the Port of Malabo, in Equatorial Guinea as well as to and from the Port of Calabar, in Nigeria. However, vessels may also have other routes, such as from Calabar to Malabo, etc.


Tiko (Platform is located near Isu, a coastal location integral to Tiko).
Window indicating area of Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport.
Platform and placed temporarily under the Douala Port Authority (Press release from PM’s Office, 26th February 2014). It is noteworthy, by the way, that the Port of Douala itself is a landlord port, in line with the port management regime that currently obtains in Cameroon.

Furthermore, the Port of Limbe is basically equipped with one berthing wharf and one warehouse of 1,638 sq m each, one shed equipped with a slipway, one timber stocking yard and three fixed cranes (Ashu, Chui, Fakhiru, Sandjeu, & Yongabi, 2007). Most of its passengers trade in large volumes of assorted goods to and from Nigeria or Equatorial Guinea, so much so that the transporting vessels tend to serve as joint cargo/passenger vessels. In this regard, it is worth noting that the port’s cargo traffic stood at about 20,000 tons per year in 2007 (Ashu, et al., 2007), which, in relative terms, is pretty significant.

With respect to vessels, it is useful to mention that ownership is essentially in the hands of foreigners, especially Nigerians, while Cameroonians generally hire shipping space for their clients (Achouka, 2010). Hence, from the management perspective, and according to Achouka (2010), the companies (a total of four in 2013) operate but branch offices in Cameroon. Significantly, though, two of the companies currently have only one vessel each, and it is not uncommon to find these vessels in bad shape, which makes the two companies rather unreliable for business (Diyen, 2013). However, the other two companies are currently doing relatively well – one with a single vessel that takes off regularly from the Cape Limboh Terminal and another with three vessels currently in operation, two of which take off regularly from the Tiko Platform (Achouka, 2010). For an illustration of some of the types of vessels involved in Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport, see Figures 3 and 4, page 4.

In any event, while Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector may not currently be as buoyant as before, it is not doing too badly either. This could be seen in the fact that the
Figure 3:

Adapted joint cargo/passenger vessel belonging to the company with vessels that depart regularly from the Tiko Platform. This vessel is currently the oldest in their fleet.

Figure 4:

One other vessel belonging to same company as in figure 3 above. Christened BRENSA CORLETT, the vessel has an average passenger capacity of 133 & cargo of 20 tons.

Limbe Port itself registered about 90,000 passengers in 2013 and made a general turnover of 800 million CFA Francs (about 1,600,000 USD) (Press release from PM’s Office, 26th February 2014).

Having sort of showcased Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport facilities, it may be necessary to recall the second question, viz. How significant is Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry? Apart from obvious economic benefits for the Government of Cameroon, e.g. the port turnover of 1,600,000 USD mentioned in the previous paragraph, various segments of the population do find the industry quite beneficial in several respects.

The sector serves cross-border student travels, especially between Cameroon and Nigeria. It also serves cross-border family visits, business and visa travels to Nigeria, and especially business travels in the case of Equatorial Guinea. For example, there are currently no Swedish immigration services in Cameroon and people wishing to apply for a visa to Sweden generally have to choose between travelling to Abuja, in Nigeria, and Kinshasa, in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

It is a truism that travelling by sea, road or air is a matter of choice and expediency. However, traders involved in informal trade activities with Nigeria or Equatorial Guinea are more likely to travel by sea if they are carrying very large/heavy quantities of cargo. In this regard, it is noteworthy, for example, that the informal sector contributes about 50% to the total cross-border trade between Cameroon and Nigeria (World Bank Policy Note, 2013). Hence, although passenger travel by sea between Cameroon and its neighbours amounts to only 17% of the total traffic, with 83% going for other means of transport (Alia, Ndjana, & Nghogue, 2010), this figure cannot be said to be small. In fact, given that the majority of passengers
involved in informal trade activities tend to travel by sea, the cargo movement generated by the 17% should indeed constitute a significant portion of cross-border informal sector trade.

At this juncture, and in response to the historical question, it would be helpful to trace the root of Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport in order to understand where it came from, and perhaps where it is going as well. Maritime passenger transport in Cameroon before 1997 was State-controlled, as evidenced by the existence of the lone national maritime transport company, Cameroon Shipping Lines (CAMSHIP). However, the year 1997 witnessed the hatching of a number of maritime reform laws within the context of the fight against the economic crunch that was affecting the country (Diyen, 2013). Some of these laws led to the privatization of CAMSHIP and the full-scale liberalization of the maritime passenger transport sector. It was against this backdrop that the first major maritime transport company launched a series of vessels on 29th January 1999 to ply the Cameroon- Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea route (Achouka, 2010).

With time, a number of smaller companies gradually joined the band wagon and by 2007 there were about six of such companies, leading to the establishment of considerable joint cargo/passenger maritime transportation from Cameroon to/from Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. By way of illustration, in 2007, traffic in the Port of Limbe stood at about 20 000 tons per year in cargo and 120 000 in passengers (Ashu, et al., 2007).

It seems, however, that the above figures would be hardly attainable today. Plagued with all sorts of imaginable problems, several small transport companies did end up disappearing from the scene, while a few more have continued to function rather marginally. In essence, therefore, and in line with an earlier explanation, there are currently four companies, only two
of which are reliable. What the months and years ahead have in stock for the sector remains to be seen.

1.1.2 ‘Maritime violence’ and its relevance to Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport

The essence of this portion is to appreciate the general meaning of maritime violence and to spell out the main forms of violence applicable to this study. The relevance of maritime violence to Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector will also be examined.

- **Definition of maritime violence**

There is no international convention that defines ‘maritime violence’ *per se* (Mejia, 2003). However, the Joint International Working Group for Uniformity of the Law of Piracy and Acts of Maritime Violence (1990), has prepared a Model National Law in which the term is defined as follows:

**Article 3.** The crime of maritime violence is committed when, for any unlawful purpose, any person or persons, intentionally or recklessly:

a) injures or kills any person or persons in connection with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the offences set forth in sub-Sections 1 (3) (b) – (h); or

b) performs an act of violence against a person or persons on board a ship; or

c) seizes or exercises control over a ship or any person or persons on board by force or any other form of intimidation; or

d) destroys or causes damage to a ship or ship’s cargo, an offshore installation, or an aid to navigation; or

e) employs any device or substance which is likely to destroy or cause damage to a ship, its equipment or cargo, or to an aid to navigation; or
f) destroys or causes damage to maritime navigational facilities or interferes with their operation, if that act would be likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship or ships; or

g) engages in an act involving interference with navigational or life support, emergency response or other safety equipment, if that act would be likely to endanger the safe operation or navigation of a ship or ships or a person or persons on board a ship; or

h) communicates false information, endangering or being likely to endanger the safe operation or navigation of a ship or ships;

i) engages in an act constituting an offence under Article 3 of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; or

j) engages in an act constituting an offence under Article 2 of the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; or

k) engages in any of the acts described in sub-Sections II (3) (a) – (i), to the extent applicable, where such acts involve an offshore installation or affect a person or persons on an offshore installation.

Article 4. Maritime violence is also committed when any person (or persons), for any unlawful purpose, intentionally or recklessly endangers or damages the marine environment, or the coastline, maritime installations or facilities or related interests.

The definition given above is general and all-encompassing in terms of the commonly known acts of violence committed at sea, such as theft and pilferage, armed robbery against ships, hostage taking, sabotage, piracy, terrorism, etc. It follows that the term ‘maritime violence’
can be used to refer to any, or some, or all of these acts of violence, depending on the context. It is also noteworthy that one act of maritime violence, such as armed robbery, may be characterized by other forms of maritime violence such as hostage taking, murder, etc.

- Main forms of maritime violence applicable to this study

As subsequent explanations in this study will confirm, the main forms of violence applicable to the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo route are: ‘piracy’, ‘armed robbery against ships’ and ‘terrorism’. It would thus be instructive to begin here by considering the basic distinction between these three terms.

Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, to which Cameroon is, of course, a party, defines piracy as constituting of the following acts:

1. any illegal acts of violence or detention or any acts of depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passenger of a private ship or a private aircraft and directed: (i) on the high seas against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) against a ship or aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

2. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

3. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (i) or (ii).

Much could be said about article 101. For our purposes, however, suffice it to state that the article does indicate when an act of maritime violence would amount to ‘piracy’, one key element to that effect being that the act must be committed in the high seas. ‘High seas’ refers to "[…] all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ),
in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State" (Article 86 of UNCLOS).

The other maritime zones wherein maritime violence may occur are: ‘territorial sea’, ‘contiguous zone’ and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). When an act of maritime violence similar to piracy occurs in any of these zones, such act is termed ‘armed robbery against ship’. ‘Terrorism’, for its part, may occur in any maritime zone. It is useful to note, by the way, that: a) ‘territorial sea’ or ‘territorial waters’ refers to that portion of the sea not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the baseline (Article 3 of UNCLOS); b) the ‘contiguous zone’ may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (Article 33 (2) of UNCLOS); and c) the ‘exclusive economic zone’ shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (Article 57 of UNCLOS).

- **Specifics about maritime zones and violence around the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo route**

Coastal States do not always respect maritime zone delimitations as spelt out under UNCLOS 82, a situation termed ‘deviant State practice’ by some researchers, such as Ndze (2004). For instance, Cameroon has since 17th April 2000 claimed territorial waters of up to 50 nautical miles (Pondy, & Zang, 2000), as opposed to 12 nautical miles under UNCLOS. Similarly, Nigeria has since 1st January 1998 claimed territorial waters of 30 nautical miles (Pondy, & Zang, 2000).

In any event, deviant claims relating to maritime zones, such as those made by Cameroon and Nigeria, would only be meaningful in cases where the maritime boundary situation of the countries making them so permits. Hence, as between the Cameroonian coast and the Equato-
Guinean Bioko Island where only 18 nautical miles separate the two, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea have had to resort to boundary agreements (Pondy, & Zang, 2000).

Concerning Calabar, Figure 1 on page 2 supra shows that the city, like Nigeria itself, lies adjacent to the Cameroonian coast. This implies that a vessel that departs from Limbe for Calabar or vice-versa does not ordinarily need to get as far as the high seas. However, two exceptions would be if such a vessel were to – a) stray into the high seas, or b) deliberately sail into the high seas for reasons of navigational exigency.

Given the nature of the maritime boundary area under focus as described above, it would be safe to say that ‘piracy’ may apply only in exceptional circumstances, and that ‘armed robbery against ships’ is logically the form of violence most commonly witnessed in the area. Furthermore, it would not be far-fetched to add that passenger vessels plying the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo route are potential targets of terrorism as well. After all, is it not conceivable that a terrorist group such as Boko Haram could one day spread its ugly tentacles right into the sea? Moreover, individual acts of terrorism are known to occur in other parts of the world, and it seems no country is safe nowadays. Simply put, therefore, ‘piracy’, ‘armed robbery against ships’ and ‘terrorism’ are the main forms of maritime violence under consideration in this study.

- Pertinence of maritime violence to Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport

It is a well established fact that maritime violence is a phenomenon that impacts negatively on sea transport on a global scale. It is estimated that maritime violence against ships causes an estimated world-wide loss of 13 billion USD per year (IMB, 2009), which is one of the reasons why nations around the world, especially those most affected by the phenomenon, have been spurred into a national or international effort to curb it. As a matter of fact,
maritime violence is a major security problem that causes not only enormous damage in terms of property, but also amounts to grave threat and danger to human life (crew, passengers, etc.). One would have wished it was a dwindling phenomenon - rather, it has become quite a topical issue nowadays as we often hear of one form of it or another occurring in different parts of the world - e.g. Gulf of Aden (Somalia), South-East Asia, the Indian subcontinent, South and Central America and the Caribbean waters, the Persian Gulf, as well as the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) (including Cameroon, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea).

As concerns the geographical area under study, quite recently, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) warned that maritime violence in the West African region is of growing concern and that ships transiting the region should step up their vigilance (Maritime Risk Solutions, March 2014). The warning further underscored the dangers faced by ships transiting any area around Nigeria, pointing to the fact that in 2013 the number of acts of maritime violence in that country grew to its highest level since 2008. In fact, in 2013, Nigerian pirates accounted for 31 of the 51 attacks reported in the region and West Africa as a whole made up 19% of attacks worldwide (Maritime Risk Solutions, March 2014). What is of particular significance, though, is the fact that, over the first quarter of 2014, “pirates” did also strike beyond the shores of Nigeria, the highlight for our purposes being the kidnapping of crew members from passenger vessels in the waters off Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea (Maritime Bulletin, 2014).

In any event, this study, it should be underscored, is predicated upon the precise fact that passenger vessels plying the Camaroon-Calabar-Malabo route have over the years experienced instances of maritime violence on varying scales. It should also be recalled that maritime passenger transport on a significant scale along the said route only took shape around 1997. Hence, any information (statistical or otherwise) on acts of violence perpetrated
against passenger vessels anywhere along the said route since that year would be of particular importance to this study.

However, based on certain challenges encountered during this study, it may not be safe to dwell on statistical details aimed at highlighting any trends concerning acts of maritime violence perpetrated against passenger vessels over the said period. One such challenge was the rather ill-advised temptation, in representing IMB reports on violence against passenger vessels in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial area, to draw from certain sources (e.g. Ewo, 2008 and the Archives of the Ministry of Defence of Cameroon) which themselves purportedly drew from IMB reports. Using such an approach, one must agree, can hardly guarantee that the element of credibility in research would be fully addressed. Needless to add, the solution to that specific challenge would have been to further consult the primary source itself – i.e. the IMB website.

Be that as it may, it is also true that rarely do the official statistics (primary sources such as IMB reports) on maritime violence in the GoG region (including the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial area) show the number of attacks on passenger vessels (Reuchlin, 2012). This statement lends credence to the fact that ‘under-reporting’ is often associated with some areas such as the one under study.

The arguments and challenges presented in the two preceding paragraphs notwithstanding, one may be tempted to contend that the foremost issue concerning this study is the fact that passenger vessels plying the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo route have over the years been the target of maritime violence of varying dimensions. Accordingly, instead of trying to obtain statistical and other data “at all cost” from official sources, it may suffice at this juncture to highlight the occurrence of maritime violence in the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo area based on
less official yet recognizable sources. In that light, two incidents have been given below – viz.

1. On 28th August 2011, unidentified armed men attacked a passenger ship and took its captain hostage in Cameroonian waters close to the maritime frontier between Cameroon and Nigeria. The ship was on a regular passenger transportation business between the two countries. The criminals seized 200 000 CFA (444 USD) from the captain of the ship and asked the passengers to surrender all the money they had on them (Liangtao, 2011).

2. Armed men hijacked a passenger vessel on 3rd January 2014. The vessel was boarded by the men North-West of Bata, Equatorial Guinea, and taken to a location off Kribi, Cameroon. The vessel was then ransacked, and crew and passengers robbed of all valuables. The robbers further destroyed navigational equipment before fleeing, taking with them three hostages, namely, the master, chief engineer and welder (Maritime Bulletin, 2014).

NB: The second incident occurred as recently as January 2014, which suggests that the nightmare of maritime violence against passenger vessels around the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area is a continuing one.

1.2 Problem Statement

As stated earlier, in terms of activities, the peak year for Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry was 2007. However, as also indicated, there has since been a somewhat steady drop in terms of the number of companies operating within the sector, passenger/cargo traffic, etc. Furthermore, there is no doubt that, given its very nature, any amount of maritime violence occurring around the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route would be of concern to all the stakeholders of Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector. Hence, the two inviting
points regarding this study are: a) it is apparent that Cameroon’s maritime passenger industry is failing, and b) maritime violence seems to be a continuing problem within the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route. Given that maritime violence is undeniably a hurdle in matters of sea transport, there is, probably, some cause-effect relationship between these two points. So, for a researcher to have taken interest in an apparent problem scenario of this nature should not be considered as too far-fetched.

But there is a second problem as well. Whatever the impact maritime violence may be having on Cameroon’s passenger transport sector, if such impact needs being fixed, that would have to begin with all stakeholders having sufficient knowledge about what is happening in the region concerned (awareness), followed by adequate sensitization with respect to what should be done - hence the importance of reporting acts of maritime violence. It has already been stated that incidents of maritime violence along the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route are under-reported (see e.g. Reuchlin, 2012, *supra*). However, immediately one digs deep enough into unofficial sources, it becomes apparent that criminal attacks against passenger vessels are rife along the said route. Popularizing knowledge with regard to the existence and ramifications of such attacks could constitute a first major step towards effectively addressing the problem. Simply put, ‘lack of awareness’ and ‘absence of sensitization’ are issues that ought to be seriously considered when talking about maritime violence against passenger vessels plying the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route. That does not seem to be happening at the moment.

### 1.3 Purpose of Study

Quite apart from the fact that this study is a partial requirement for obtaining the M.A. degree in Ports and Shipping Administration from the Regional Maritime University, Accra–Ghana, its purpose is to:
- Fill a void in the literature on maritime violence against ships in the area under study.
- Sensitize and raise awareness among those who have a stake in the maritime passenger transport sector, especially the Government of Cameroon, in terms of the effects of maritime violence.
- Provide findings which, if properly diffused, could contribute towards efforts aimed at improving maritime security for, and hence the plight of, the said sector.

1.4 Research Objective

The overall objective of this study is to investigate the effects of maritime violence on Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry. The specific objectives are to:

- Identify the causes of maritime violence against vessels plying the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route.
- Investigate the effects of such violence on - a) companies that own the vessels, b) employees of such companies, and c) passengers using the said route.
- Examine any current maritime violence response measures, especially those adopted by the government, and consider ways of improving on them.
- Make suggestions and recommendations in the light of the foregoing.

1.5 Research Question

The fundamental question regarding this study may be formulated as follows: “what are the effects of maritime violence on Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry?” This key question begs the following inter-related questions:

- What are the causes of maritime violence against vessels plying the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route?
- What is the impact of this violence in terms of the survival of the local maritime passenger transport industry?
- How does the violence affect the employees of this industry?
- How does this violence affect the customers of the said industry?
- How can maritime violence affecting the said sector be effectively stemmed?

1.6 Scope of Study

The scope of this study has been circumscribed against the backdrop of factors such as time, resources, purpose of study, etc., but without sparing any efforts aimed at upholding the required standards. In that light, the study sets out to cover the incidence of maritime violence against Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport to neighbouring countries, with specific reference to transportation from the Port of Limbe in the South-West Region of Cameroon to/from Calabar in Nigeria, and Malabo in Equatorial Guinea.

By implication, all the stakeholders (public sector and non-governmental institutions concerned with the shipping industry in Cameroon) are of interest to this study. It would be recalled that Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry virtually took shape in 1999 – hence, this study is interested in the period dating from the year 1999 to the present.

However, it is useful to recall that shipping is an international activity and maritime violence is itself a world-wide phenomenon. Accordingly, issues relating to maritime violence in Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and beyond - be they legal, historical, geographical, socio-economic or political issues - are all relevant to this study as well.
1.7 Organization of Study

This study, which ends with a bibliography and an appendix, is in five chapters, presented in the following order:


- **Chapter Two** – Literature Review;

- **Chapter Three** – Research Methodology;

- **Chapter Four** – Presentation and Discussion of Research Findings;

- **Chapter Five** – Summary of Findings, Conclusion & Recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

Broadly speaking, it is a well established view that any academic contribution by way of research on a given subject can only be a “small” addition to greater existing contributions that have already been made concerning that subject. The present dissertation is obviously cast in the same mould. From that viewpoint, this chapter may be considered as demonstrating the general knowledge upon which this study is built going forward. The focus is to approach the relevant issues in terms of their complexities, as opposed to merely providing an elaborate, albeit relevant, outline of existing literature.

To understand the point, let us consider the concept of maritime violence from the legal standpoint and proceed by asking the following question: would it be sufficient for a study of this nature to allude to a multitude of relevant legal instruments (international, regional, and so on) while leaving out the complex issues relating thereto? Part of the response to this question seems to lie in appreciating some of the facts inherent in the interface between international law and national law - namely: a) There are situations where a convention often mentioned may not have even entered into force; b) Country ‘A’ may be a party to a given convention but may not have taken steps to ensure the effective application of that convention through incorporation into national law; c) A State may not be a party to a given convention and yet be bound by it by virtue of the convention having passed into customary law; d) Even where a country has actually become a party to a convention through any of the available procedures, problems of enforcement may still be rife.
The submission here is that it is important to bear in mind complexities such as the ones mentioned above when discussing the legal framework of maritime violence in the context of this study. How helpful would it be, for instance, to dwell on discussing a legal instrument without appreciating the basis upon which such instrument is applicable to Cameroon?

That having been said, it would be necessary to proceed by quickly revisiting the concept of ‘maritime violence’ as it relates to passenger transport along the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route. That will be done in a manner that allows for the proper mapping out of the rest of the discussion in this chapter. In that light, suffice it to recall that ‘maritime violence’ is a broad concept and that ‘piracy’, ‘armed robbery’ and ‘terrorism’ are the focus of this study.

The discussion in this chapter is conducted in the following order: (a) brief historical consideration of ‘piracy’, ‘armed robbery’ and ‘terrorism’; (b) legal framework of maritime violence; (c) causes of maritime violence; (d) effects of maritime violence; and (e) measures employed to curb maritime violence.

2.2 Brief Historical Background

This section is a general historical consideration of ‘piracy’, ‘armed robbery against ships’ and ‘maritime terrorism’, respectively.

2.2.1 Piracy

Maritime piracy is a traditional maritime security threat. In fact, one writer has submitted that maritime piracy is inextricably linked with man’s acquisitive nature, and that its genesis can be traced to the first instance when man realized that gain, howsoever defined, could be had from exploiting the vulnerable (Manuel, 2011). Max Mejia Jr. is of the view that the practice has existed for as long as the oceans were plied for commerce, as:
Virtually nobody of water or sea was exempt from piracy. It was present in ancient times in the eastern and southeastern fringes of the Mediterranean such as the Maghreb where privateering and captive taking (came as) a response to declining trade. It was found in the waters of the Baltic, where the Vikings were referred to as the *dani pirate*, the archipelagos of Southeast Asia […]” (Mejia, 2003).

Piracy as an act of maritime violence is known to have flourished during certain historical periods, especially between 1620 and 1720 - a period often referred to as the ‘golden age of piracy’ (Kweku, 2012). Furthermore, different varieties of piracy are known to have existed between the 16th and 19th centuries, a view well illustrated by Mejia (2003) in the following quotation:

[…] people (sometimes) imagine a sea-borne version of Robin Hood and his merry band, taunting the law and playing hide-and-seek with the sheriff. While Robin Hood had his Sherwood Forest, Blackbeard had the Seven Seas. While his bandits took from the rich and gave to the poor, the pirates of the Caribbean took from the rich and kept the loot for themselves. Piracy of the Caribbean variety is in fact a relatively recent phenomenon, having been exterminated only in the early 19th century after three centuries of depredation (pp. 157-158).

There is no intention here to dwell too much on maritime history, particularly so as the foregoing discussion should be adequate in conveying the desired message, namely, that maritime piracy, which has ancient origins, has existed in very different forms as a global phenomenon through the middle ages until today. It has become quite topical nowadays and remains a major challenge to the shipping industry.
2.2.2 Armed robbery against ships

‘Maritime piracy’ and ‘armed robbery against ships’, it would be recalled, are very similar indeed, the “high seas” being the main element that separates the one from the other. To put it differently, if there were no high seas, all acts of piracy would be called ‘armed robbery’; conversely, if the only maritime zone in existence under international law were the high seas, ‘piracy’ would be the term used to refer to all acts of ‘armed robbery’. This similarity is well reflected in the statement that ‘armed robbery’ is anything that looks like piracy, smells like piracy, and hurts like piracy, but is not piracy under the law of the sea (Mejia, 2003).

It is thus easy to infer that ‘armed robbery’ and ‘piracy’ have the same historical origin under the law of the sea. Furthermore, the history of the two concepts is inextricably linked to the continual conflict between ‘territorial sovereignty’ (mare clausum) and ‘freedom of the high seas’ (mare liberum) - first under customary international law and then under the modern law of the sea. By way of illustration, whenever the measurement of the territorial sea was small (e.g. three nautical miles at some point under customary law, or six nautical miles under the 1958 High Seas Convention), the probability that the locus in quo for many acts of violence at sea would fall within the high seas was unavoidably higher.

In any event, the signing (and subsequent entry into force) of UNCLOS 82 was to bring about two important developments that are pertinent to this study. First, for an act of violence to be considered as piracy under UNCLOS, it ought to have been committed beyond 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline of a coastal State - otherwise, ‘armed robbery’ would be the term used. Secondly, UNCLOS did not address ‘armed robbery against ships’, especially in terms of definition.
However, statistics were soon to show that the majority of acts of maritime violence rather occurred within maritime zones other than the high seas. Based on the realization that armed robbery required appropriate attention, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) began by establishing ‘piracy and armed robbery against ships’ in 1984 as a separate and fixed item in the work programme of the Maritime Safety Committee. Eventually, the Organization came up with the following definition: “‘armed robbery against ships’ is any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, threat thereof, other than an act of ‘piracy’ against a ship or against persons on board such ships, within the internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea of a State” (IMO Draft Code - MSC Circular 984, article 2.2).

Meanwhile, it is important to recall that the IMO is the specialized agency of the UN that is essentially responsible for the progressive development of international maritime law. Hence, after naturally adopting the UNCLOS definition for piracy, it was incumbent upon that UN agency to seek ways of coping with the difficulties inherent in classifying ‘piratical acts’ that did not seem to meet the criteria under article 101 (euphemism for ‘armed robbery against ships’). As a way out of the difficulty, the IMO has since resorted to using the twin expression ‘piracy and armed robbery against ships’ [emphasis added] (Mejia, 2003).

Be that as it may, the fact that the IMO found it necessary to come up with a separate definition for ‘armed robbery against ships’ obviously tends to underscore the fact that this form of violence has always constituted a major maritime security threat in its own right.

2.2.3 Maritime terrorism

Terrorism, unlike piracy, is not considered as a traditional maritime security threat. This perhaps explains, at least in part, why UNCLOS 82 did not address it, especially in terms of definition.
Furthermore, there used to be divergent views as to whether an act of terror could be assimilated to an act of piracy under article 101 of UNCLOS or even ‘armed robbery’ as defined by IMO. Such conflicting views came to the limelight in 1985 with the Achille Lauro incident.

On October 7, 1985, four Palestinian gunmen hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro as it navigated the Eastern Mediterranean with 400 people on board. In the course of negotiations the gunmen executed Leon Klinghoffer, a 69-year-old Jewish-American passenger from New York City and, while he was still in his wheelchair, shoved him overboard and into the sea. As the drama unfolded aboard the hijacked vessel, much debate was going on in the rest of the world as to whether the act would be considered piracy or terrorism.

One writer has commented on the arguments surrounding the debate, and shares the view that the differences in motive should be a major distinguishing factor. While ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery against ships’ are motivated by “private ends”, political violence or ‘terrorism’ at sea is meant to influence the political behaviour of adversaries by attacking and threatening targets that possess symbolic rather than material significance (Mejia, 2003). Viewed in that light, the numerous cases of maritime terror, such as the 1970 explosion claimed by Al-Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) that killed 19 and injured 36 in an Israeli port, the 1971 explosion of a bomb by a Mozambican terror group that killed 23 crew members on board a Portuguese cargo ship, and the 1988 Abu Nidal attack against the Greek passenger ferry City of Poros that resulted in 9 persons being killed and 80 injured, all differ from ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery against ships’ in that they were designed to elicit fear and horror, not steal cash and cargo (Mejia, 2003).
The key point to remember here, though, is that, after Achille Lauro, the international community began making a deliberate effort to address the issue of maritime terrorism under the auspices of the IMO and even beyond. Efforts in that vein were further magnified and accelerated after the attacks on 11 September 2001.

2.3 Legal Framework

‘Legal framework’ as used here necessarily refers to international and national legislation. For our purposes, though, ‘international law’ includes regional (and sub-regional) instruments as well.

2.3.1 International regime

While it may be interesting to be familiar with existing international instruments, knowing about the mechanism that leads to the finality of such instruments - namely, their effective application - is of utmost importance. This brings to light the close interrelationship between international law and national law as, ultimately, it is the responsibility of individual countries to ensure that international instruments are applied on the ground.

Accordingly, we will now proceed by understanding the mechanism for incorporating an international instrument into the body of national law before continuing with a discussion on some of the major international and regional instruments relating to maritime violence.

- **Mechanism for incorporating an international instrument into national law**

When a State becomes a party to a convention, by the process of ratification, accession, adoption or acceptance, the legal effect of this is that the State then becomes bound by the convention and is therefore obliged to implement it by incorporation into its national law (Mukherjee, 2002).
However, a State may also become bound by a treaty that has passed into customary international law, even if that State is not a party to the treaty (O’Connell, 1982). This view seems to find its basis in the Vattelian tradition of acquiescence and consent, whereby rules of international law have been promulgated by reference to the practice of states. When the rules of international law are so indeterminate that they give rise to disputes, it seems the only resolution it offers for settlement is to endorse whatever comes to prevail in practice (O’Connell, 1982). As a matter of fact, the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (UN Doc., 1969) does lend credence to this line of argument. Article 38 of that Convention provides, *inter alia*, that “nothing […] precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.”

- The role of regional instruments

At this juncture, it would be useful to relate the preceding points to a discussion on regional instruments. Regional instruments do sometimes serve as a very useful tool in terms of making sure that instruments adopted at the international level are actually given effect among member States at the regional level.

The role played by regional instruments is important in at least two ways. First, States within a region may all have become parties to a given international instrument, but may not have all achieved the process of incorporating such instrument into the national domain. Secondly, a regional instrument may sometimes serve as evidence that an international instrument to which at least one regional member is not a party has either passed into customary law or at least entered into force. In either case, a regional instrument may well serve as the needed push in terms of making sure that States within the region can effectively proceed with the process of achieving implementation. It should be recalled, by the way, that regional instruments are designed to take into account the reality of a region (legislative difficulties, economic and political considerations, and so on).
By way of illustration, a discussion on the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) - 1988 (Churchill and Lowe, 1999) may be necessary. The SUA treaty and its first Protocol, it would be recalled, entered into force on 1st March 1992, and Cameroon, it should be stated, has not yet signed (and therefore not ratified), or acceded to, or expressly adopted or accepted the treaty and its protocols (Churchill and Lowe, 1999). However, based on the workings of at least one regional instrument, namely, the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (Proceedings of the Summit of Heads of State and Government, June 2013), it could be argued that Cameroon has become a party to SUA, or at least that SUA has become applicable to Cameroon. It is now proposed to elaborate a little on this point.

Cameroon enjoys membership with a number of regional and sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), Maritime Organization of West and Central African States (MOWCA), Gulf of Guinea Commission, and so on. Member States of these organizations came together in Yaounde and adopted, on 25th June 2013, the Code of Conduct concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa. Without having to get into the legal contours of a code, suffice it to state that, the fact that some member States such as Cameroon have not yet signed (and therefore not ratified), or acceded to, or expressly adopted or accepted SUA does not prevent the Code of Conduct from recalling in its preamble, inter alia, that:

for or suspected of seizing or exercising control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of intimidation.

- **Becoming a party to an international instrument**

Based on the discussion conducted so far concerning the mechanism for incorporating an international instrument into national law, the following three conclusions may be drawn, viz. First, a State could become a party to an international instrument through standard procedures (see Mukherjee, 2002 *supra*). Secondly, a State could become bound by a treaty that has entered into force or passed into customary law notwithstanding the fact that such State may not have followed the standard procedures. Thirdly, regional instruments may well serve as evidence of the preceding point.

- **International and regional instruments relating to maritime violence**

Having discussed the interface between international law and national law, it is now proposed to proceed, however briefly, with an overview of the major international instruments concerning ‘maritime piracy’, ‘armed robbery against ships’ and ‘maritime terrorism’, in that order.

- **Maritime piracy**

UNCLOS 82, which Cameroon signed on 10th December 1982 and ratified on 19th December 1995 (Churchill, & Lowe, 1999), is an instrument that defines, *inter alia*, the responsibilities of coastal States and flag States in international waters. It addresses ‘piracy’ in terms of definition and prosecution, prescribing that every nation has the universal right to apprehend and prosecute pirates. In this regard, article 100 of the Convention is most instructive. It provides that “[all] States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.”
- Armed robbery against ships

What is most noteworthy here is the fact that the adoption by IMO of the expression ‘piracy and armed robbery against ships’ has actually led to that expression filtering into the UN system. This has made it easier for the international community to address armed robbery from the repression point of view. Thus, for example, where the UN is calling on member States to co-operate in fighting ‘piracy’ in a given region, the tendency has been to include ‘armed robbery against ships’ as well, irrespective of the difference in definition between the two concepts. International instruments that carry ‘piracy and armed robbery against ships’ abound. The following examples would be illustrative: IMO Resolution A.1025(26) on the Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships; UN Resolution 2039 (2012) recognizing the urgent need to devise and adopt effective and practical measures to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea; UN Security Council Resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) in relation to piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea; Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden (“the Djibouti Code of Conduct”).

- Maritime terrorism

Concerning maritime terrorism and related security threats, the first major convention to bear in mind is SUA 88, which aims to close some of the gaps in UNCLOS 82 in terms of maritime security. SUA 88, in its article 3, provides a list of violent offences against international shipping and, although the Convention does not define terrorism as such, the crucial point is that the list includes offences committed in territorial waters, as opposed to article 101 of UNCLOS 82 which focuses on the high seas alone. SUA empowers States to take alleged offenders into custody and extradite them for trial in any SUA country that has a
property or crew relationship to the ship and has established national jurisdiction over SUA offences.

Meanwhile, it is important to emphasize that maritime transport security has since 11 September 2001 become a vital issue, so much so that security of the whole supply chain, including ports, has become a key theme of public port policies (Pallis & Vaggelas, 2007). Under the post-September 11 dispensation, regulatory measures and initiatives aiming to minimize risk and increase the security and operational reliability of the maritime transport sector have been introduced at the national level (e.g. the USA); peripheral/supranational level (e.g. the EU); and international level (e.g. the IMO) (Pallis & Vaggelas, 2007). For a list of some of the leading measures and initiatives, see Table 2, page 31.

It would be necessary at this point to remark that, although African countries such as Cameroon may not have been at the forefront in terms of introducing the measures and initiatives previously referred to, what is important to the international community is that every nation should be able to appreciate the contemporary security challenges we all face and be willing and able to put up its utmost in meeting them.

2.3.2 National legislation

This portion of our work will be discussed in terms of general considerations as well as the specific case of Cameroon.

- General considerations

Shipping is essentially an international activity. Hence, legislation is for the most part internationally driven. Instruments of international origin may include conventions, UN resolutions, bilateral agreements, IMO soft law, etc. Ultimately, though, these instruments will have to be made to work at the national level.
Table 2  
Table showing some major world-wide security measures and initiatives taken since 11 September 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US-led</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Container Security Initiative (CSI): Programme led in the mid-2000s by U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security focused on screening containers at foreign ports. CSI is implemented on a reciprocal basis, allowing participating countries to send their customs officers to major US ports in order to inspect containerized cargo being exported to their countries.</td>
<td>1. European Council Declaration of March 2004: It called for the strengthening of the security of all forms of transport through the enhancement of the legal framework and the improvement of prevention mechanisms. The reaction to this was to decisively co-ordinate European reactions in the aftermath of the endorsement of the CSI by the US in 2003.</td>
<td>1. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code): The ISPS Code was a 2002 amendment to SOLAS and it is an International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT): Voluntary compliance programme for companies to improve the security of their corporate supply chains. This is an initiative operating on a voluntary basis with participants enjoying specific benefits as a motive for joining it. The most important one is the Green Lane award. According to which, Green Lane awarded operators are exposed to less customs inspections and consequently, decreased clearness time for cargo and customs procedures in US ports.</td>
<td>2. EU Regulation 648/2005: It details a revised EU custom code, in turn setting up common European secure custom systems. The revised customs code introduced measures to tighten security for goods entering or leaving the EU.</td>
<td>2. ISO/PAS 28000: Established by the International Organization for Standardization, it has to do with specification for Security Management Systems for the Supply Chain. It offers public and private enterprise an international high-level management standard that enables organizations to utilise a globally consistent management approach to applying supply chain security initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 24-hour Advance Cargo Declaration (ACD), 24-hour Advance Manifest Rule (AMR): Introduced under the Trade Act of 2002, it has to do with maritime transport advance information to assist targeting.</td>
<td>3. Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) status: This is a core element for enhancing supply chain security. When an operator complies with the administrative rules and supply chain security requirements, as defined by the EU Custom Code, he is awarded the AEO status and experiences reduced customs inspections (a status similar to the Green Lane award that is established in the United States under the C-TPAT regulation).</td>
<td>3. Global Trade Exchange data-mining programme: Designed to collect financial information about shipments, with the objective of determining if cargo shipments are safe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Operation safe Commerce: A richly-funded set of intelligent freight technology, it deals with e-seal, intrusion detection, radiation and biological detection sensors, non-intrusive scanners etc.</td>
<td>4. Regulation 725/2004: Tackles the issue of security at the ship/port interface.</td>
<td>4. Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade: Adopted in 2005 by the World Customs Organization (WCO), it consists of supply chain security standards for Customs administrations including Authorized Economic Operator(AEO) programmes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Directive 65/2005: Directive 65/2005 Relates to the enhancing of security in the broader port area, giving particular attention to RO/RO vessels carrying passengers and vehicles.</td>
<td>5. Pilot private sector company initiatives: In the mid-2000s some initiatives were taken by private sector companies to track and monitor the integrity of cargo containers moving around the world using technologies such as RFID and GPS.</td>
<td>5. Pilot private sector company initiatives: In the mid-2000s some initiatives were taken by private sector companies to track and monitor the integrity of cargo containers moving around the world using technologies such as RFID and GPS.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Drawn from (Lee, 2005; Pallis & Vaggelas, 2007; UNCTAD, 2004; Riley, 2006)
The journey does not end with the incorporation of these instruments into national legislation as enforcement is of the essence. The problem, though, is that countries have different realities. Some countries may have obvious difficulties in terms of implementation, the method of adducing evidence may be more satisfactory in one country than in another, the political will to repress maritime violence may be stronger in country ‘X’ than in country ‘Y’, corruption among law enforcement officials as well as the judiciary may be more rife in one country than in another, country ‘A’ may be more weary than country ‘B’ about the ramifications that go with prosecuting perpetrators of terrorism, and so on.

By implication, therefore, in terms of maritime violence, national legislation should be appreciated on a case by case basis. Little wonder that the perennial goals of ‘unification’ or ‘harmonization’ of maritime law long advocated in certain circles have continued to remain mere lofty ideals.

- **Cameroon’s legislation on maritime violence**

In terms of maritime violence, the sources of Cameroon’s legislation are as follows:

- International and regional instruments that are internalized through the dualistic method (ratification through parliament).


- The Merchant Shipping Code of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), which is an instrument of direct application in Cameroon (monistic method).

- Instruments deriving from the executive branch of government (presidential decrees, ministerial orders, etc.). An illustration would be Presidential Decree No. 2008/237 of 17 July 2008 to set up the National Maritime Security Committee. This committee is a consultative organ required to give opinions and put forward suggestions on issues
relating to the formulation and implementation of national policy relating to maritime security in accordance with the regulations in force (Archives of the Ministry of Defence of Cameroon).

One last obvious point to make here is that, Cameroon, like any other country, has its own penal code, law enforcement services and a judiciary. All these do come into play in cases where the repression of maritime violence is called for. However, such a statement can only be best appreciated against the backdrop of some general considerations as discussed under ‘2.3.2’ above.

In any event, it would be safe at this point to say that where perpetrators of maritime violence along the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route are apprehended, they are dealt with based on factors such as the kind of violence, the locus in quo of the violent act, the enforcement facilities in place, etc.

2.4 Causes of Maritime Violence

The causes of maritime violence may be based on general or specific considerations.

2.4.1 General factors

The vastness of oceans has often been referred to as being naturally conducive to the perpetration of crimes as vulnerable victims readily develop the feeling of being trapped and helpless in situations of attack. The vast expanse of waters makes the seas an ideal hiding place for all kinds of illegal activities (Jenisch, 2009). In terms of hiding places, the Limbe-Calabar route with its creeks and mangroves is a good illustration - see Figure 5, page 35.

Another general factor that explains the cause of maritime violence has to do with governance. According to Neethling (2009), the bad ocean governance facing African
countries is often a reflection of bad governance on land as well, as politics on land directly result in offshore actions, causing a hub of insecurity (p. 89). The concept of ‘failed States’ (e.g. Somalia) and the repercussions on maritime activities (e.g. maritime violence) could easily be understood in terms of governance. Violence thrives where there are weak States, as weak States are characterized by lawlessness, political disorder and impoverishment of the populations (Jenisch, 2009).

One last general factor to consider here is the wealth transiting or existing at sea. Pirates and armed robbers generally feel tempted to go anywhere only if they stand to gain in material terms. In this connection, it would be recalled that Cameroon, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea fall within the GoG which, according to one writer:

> [...] is very rich in potentials. It has a large population and abundant energy resources typified by the proximity of large oil producers (Nigeria and Angola), maturing oil producers (Congo Brazzaville), mature oil producers showing signs of decline (Cameroon and Gabon) and new producers (Equatorial Guinea and Chad) – these West African countries border an important sea lane that has a vital connectivity with energy commodities (emphasis added) (Vreÿ, 2009).

### 2.4.2 Factors specific to the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area

It should be apparent to many that African countries south of the Sahara are generally not particularly reputed for ensuring adequate security within their ports and waters. This is due to a wide range of factors which this study will not delve into. Suffice it to state, though, that Cameroon’s situation is no different. Needless to add that the inability to ensure adequate security within maritime borders is definitely a factor that tends to militate in favour of cross-border criminality.
In terms of causes of armed robbery against ships, one factor common to Cameroon, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea is that these countries produce oil. Oil attracts armed criminals who seek to draw benefit from the sector, and these same criminals have often extended their activity to passenger transport along the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo route.
Ewo (2011) has argued that the occurrence of militancy and criminality amounting to piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Niger Delta region does result in piracy on a broader scale within the entire sub-region (p. 48). It seems, therefore, that the porous nature of the Cameroon-Nigeria border has proven unlikely to prohibit the political instability and militant activity off the south-eastern coast of Nigeria from having an effect on Cameroon’s waters or even the Equato-Guinean waters for that matter.

2.5 Effects of Maritime Violence

Given the importance of the sea (international trade, transportation, exploitation of marine resources, communication, etc.), it is only normal to expect that the perpetration of maritime violence within any regional or international route will have negative effects on human life and activity. It is now proposed to proceed with the discussion in the following order: a) effects of maritime violence on shipping generally, and b) effects of maritime violence on maritime passenger transport.

2.5.1 Effects of maritime violence on shipping generally

It is obvious that acts of piracy and armed robbery are a great threat to shipping interest. Kweku (2012) is of the view that maritime transport and insurance companies do face losses due to security threats heavily hitting their business activities, in terms of increase in expedition cost and profit reduction (p. 20).

On a broader scale, Bowden (2010) analyzes the economic impact of piracy and armed robbery against ships in terms of ‘Direct Economic Costs’ and ‘Secondary (Macroeconomic) Costs’. The former comprises cost with respect to ransoms, insurance, re-routing, deterrent security equipments, naval force, piracy prosecutions and the work of piracy deterrence organizations, while the latter relates to regional trade, food price, inflation and reduced foreign revenue (pp. 8-19). While such costs (apparent or remote) may not necessarily all
apply to every given region at the same time, they are most suggestive of the negative impact maritime violence tends to have on the shipping sector.

On another note, Nincic (2009) argues that threats to security from pirates are a big concern not so much because the percentage of overall attacks is high (especially when noting how many vessels worldwide transit free from any criminal activity whatsoever); rather the main threat to the world’s maritime transport stems from two concerns, viz. First, the percentage may increase, particularly if piracy in Nigeria (and other hot spots) becomes more aggressive. Secondly, terrorist groups may begin to hijack vessels, and while there is little strong evidence to date that pirates will cooperate with terrorist groups (their goals and objectives are too divergent – pirates need the ship safe and the crew alive so the ransom will be paid), there are concerns about some pirates cooperating with militant or terrorist groups or “turning terrorist” themselves in the future (pp. 23-24).

In any event, it seems that the costs imposed by maritime violence can best be appreciated on a region by region or case by case or even sector by sector basis. Drawing from various sources, Kweku (2012) has attempted a classification by breaking up such costs as follows: human cost (loss of lives); reduction in revenue (due to interference with free flow of maritime traffic); environmental effect (maritime violence may be characterized by interference with navigation and hence collision risk that could cause pollution); effects on fishing (fishing trawlers are also targets – e.g. in Nigeria); effects on UN humanitarian assistance (e.g. Somalia where vessels transporting food aid may become targets); effects on tourism (e.g. the Kenyan cruise ship industry has suffered from the effects of piracy as fewer ships now dock in Mombasa); effects on businesses (vessels not being deployed in waters as a result of insecurity, which could in turn affect other businesses dependent on sea transport); as well as threat to energy security (attacks on crude oil carriers) (pp. 22-27).
It may be important at this juncture to highlight the effects of maritime violence using Cameroon as an example. In 2009, for instance, the Cameroon National Hydrocarbons Company (SNH) reported that oil production was averaging just 73,000 barrels per day (down 13% from 2008 levels) as spending in the oil sector had dropped by more than one-third, due in part to the international financial crisis but also as a result of insecurity in the GoG brought on by increasing piracy and armed robbery against ships (Ewo, 2011).

2.5.2 Effects of maritime violence on maritime passenger transport

The actual and potential effects of maritime violence on maritime passenger transport could take various forms (loss of life, economic consequences, policy changes, etc.).

With respect to loss of life, Riley (2006) provides an overview of the nature and magnitude of the terrorist risk to passenger ferries. The author uses certain attack scenarios to demonstrate the diversity of threats, vulnerabilities, and potential consequences that surround risks of terrorist attack on passenger ferries (sinking a ship using various devices, suicide bombing on board a ship, standoff attack on ship using artillery, etc.).

Indeed, Bateman (2006) has stated that passenger ships and ferries are a preferred target, citing the examples of the sinking by terrorists of Superferry 14 in February 2004 near Manila in the Philippines in which 116 people were killed, the February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrinx which killed forty people, and the December 2001 bombing of the Indonesian ferry Kailifornia which killed ten. The author further argues that it is not too difficult to conjure up “doomsday” scenarios for a maritime terrorist attack, but cautions that assessments of the threat of maritime terrorism (and maritime violence more generally) must be rational and should represent a reasonable balance between the likelihood of an attack occurring and the costs of providing adequate security against such an attack.
Regarding economic consequences, Reuchelin (2012) is of the view that the biggest economic impact on maritime passenger transport is possibly the fact that piracy makes it difficult to attract tourists to an “affected” region.

However, another source discusses economic consequences in terms of the high costs associated with damage to the victim vessel, including compensation for injuries and loss of life (the 1994 sinking of the Estonia in the Baltic Sea (852 deaths)), for instance, generated victim claims in excess of USD 110 million while the known legal costs associated with the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise outside the Belgian port of Zeebrugge in 1987 (193 fatalities) have been calculated at USD 70 million, with insurance claims expected to exceed 110m) (Riley, 2006).

The least one could add here is that fatalities and injuries from attacks on passenger ferries would likely expose owners/operators to large-scale compensation or liability payouts - either of which would have import for subsequent marine insurance coverage.

Maritime violence could also bring about change in a government’s maritime policy, with far-reaching ramifications in terms of financial costs, civil liberties, etc. In the Philippines, for instance, the 2004 strike against SuperFerry 14 had a profound effect on perceived domestic terrorist threat contingencies and was a central factor in subsequent moves that have been made to deploy sea marshals on all ships traveling in Philippine waters as well as promulgate heightened surveillance, investigation, arrest, and detention powers for the police and intelligence services (Riley, 2006).

It therefore seems apparent that maritime casualty events affecting lives and disrupting maritime activities in a major way are likely to have some political ramifications and may
well elicit strong domestic momentum towards the initiation of mitigation measures that extend far beyond the maritime realm.

One last point to note has to do with intangible consequences. For example, an attack on a maritime passenger vessel has the potential to cause chaos and spread fear among the population (Nelson, 2012). This could result in changes in travel-related as well as other behaviour and attitudes the precise contours of which it would be hard to determine.

2.6 Measures employed to curb maritime violence

Measures aimed at stemming maritime violence may occur at the international, regional or bilateral level. A country like Cameroon may also resort to traditional national methods of addressing the problem.

2.6.1 International, regional and bilateral cooperation

There is no denying the fact that, in terms of maritime security, threats and vulnerabilities may be mitigated through partnerships and cooperative endeavours. It is possibly in that light that Cameroon considers international cooperation in matters of maritime violence as one of the centre pieces of its foreign policy. A country may cooperate within the context of international or regional organizations, or enter into security agreements with individual countries (bilateral agreements).

As an active member of the UN system, Cameroon does cooperate with the UN itself as well as with the IMO, in terms of the fight against maritime violence. For instance, the country was involved in the adoption, on 12 December 2002 by the IMO diplomatic conference, of amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 and the introduction of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Also, UN member States (including Cameroon) have generally been cooperative in the adoption of
resolutions on maritime security - e.g. in 2008, with the adoption of UN Security Council Resolutions 1816 and 1838 which sought to address the problem of piracy by calling on States to take an active part in fighting piracy by deploying naval vessels and aircraft to the Horn of Africa region and to cooperate with the transitional Federal Government of Somalia towards this end.

Concerning regional cooperation, one writer is of the opinion that:

Regional cooperation is perhaps the only avenue through which African States can achieve order in the governance of their ocean areas. The challenges of governing ocean space can be daunting if handled unilaterally by individual States. Issues such as maritime attacks that have occurred in the waters of the coasts of Africa cannot be addressed by a single maritime State acting in its national interest: the trans-boundary nature of the challenges posed by most maritime issues call for integrated regional cooperation (Wambua, 2009).

Regional cooperation may be through military collaboration, summit dialogue or regional meetings, relevant diplomatic correspondences, and so on. In the case of Cameroon, such cooperation may be effected within the context of the African Union, West and Central African Maritime Organization (MOWCA), GoG Commission, Central African Peace and Security Council (COPAX), and so on.

As concerns cooperation among individual countries, quite apart from ordinary bilateral cooperation on security issues, such as what is currently going on between Cameroon and Nigeria, one may want to note the special arrangements that have taken place within the context of US security philosophy and global strategy in relation to Africa. In that vein, it is useful to note that it was in an effort to ensure good ocean governance and create a stable
maritime environment that the US set up the African Partnership Station in 2006. This structure is composed of persons specialized in the various aspects of ocean governance. Furthermore, it would be recalled that, since 11 September 2001, the US has been very keen on spreading the fight against maritime security. In that light, it created a single military structure for the African continent in November 2006 called AFRICOM. The aim of this structure is to cover and integrate the entire African continent under US military surveillance while including the GoG in the US global security strategy (Diangitukwa, 2010).

2.6.2 National measures

The Department of Maritime Affairs and Inland Waterways of Cameroon cooperates with other relevant institutions in the country in dealing with maritime violence from the repression viewpoint. The most important institution in that regard is the Ministry of Defence with its navy and other special forces that patrol the coast and intervene in reported cases. The point to remember here, though, is that government policy has been mainly to broaden the arm of the military to cover growing criminality more generally. It was in that light that “operation dynamite” was created as far back as 1981, an initiative that remained quite effective in fighting criminality until attention shifted to the Bakassi conflict in 1994 (Ebode, 2010). It may be worth noting that “operation dynamite” was later extended into “operation Galilee”, with the aim of fighting maritime violence, although it could be argued that this new structure was less equipped to do cope with the new task (Ebode, 2010). Today, though, the special force mainly involved in the fight against maritime violence in Cameroon is the Rapid Intervention Batallion, commonly called ‘BIR’, its French acronym.

The Cameroon government also tries to adapt its legislation to address growing maritime problems, including maritime security, as seen in the case of Decree No. 2007/290 of 1st November 2007 relating to State action at sea and in navigable waterways. This decree aims to provide the appropriate institutional and legal framework for the successful conduct of
issues such as search and rescue, protection of the marine environment and the fight against pollution, security of navigation and assistance in cases of ships in distress by the national marine forces (Archives of the Ministry of Defence).

Still in 2008, Presidential Order No. 410/CAB/PR of 17 July 2008 relating to the setting up, organization and functioning of the Port Security Committee was signed. This is a consultative organ required to give opinion and make suggestions on all issues relating to the implementation of maritime security measures in ports, in conformity with the regulations in force (Archives of the Ministry of Defence).

Meanwhile, the Cameroon Government has also had to embark on some preventive security measures as well. For example, it undertook studies to equip Cameroonian coasts and territorial waters with an integrated radar and radio surveillance system with control centre in Douala (to be subsequently extended to Yaounde) (Ebode, 2010). The same system aims at equipping the navy with an adapted nautical facility. This project is expensive and should take several years to establish.
CHAPTER THREE

3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 Location of Study Area

This study focuses on Cameroon. In terms of geographical location, Cameroon is found in Central Africa, with an area of about 465 000 sq km. Its coastline (402 km) lies on the Bight of Bony and the Atlantic Ocean, and stretches from Rio Del Rey near the city of Calabar in Nigeria to Equatorial Guinea (Ndifontah, 1979).

As Figure 1 at page 2 of this study shows, Cameroon is bordered in the West by Nigeria (1 600 km), Chad in the North (1 094 km), Central African Republic in the East (797 km), Congo (523 km), Gabon (298 km) and Equatorial Guinea (198 km) in the South (Ndifontah, 1979).

Furthermore, Cameroon is divided into ten (10) regions, with a total population of about nineteen million (19 000 000) (2009 census). The regions are: Far-North, North, Adamawa, Centre, South, Littoral, South-West, West, North-West, and East. The Port of Limbe, which happens to be the only Cameroonian port handling the maritime passenger transport under study, is located in the South-West Region.

3.2 Relevant Institutions and other Entities

Cameroon’s maritime landscape is a complex one. However, for purposes of this study, the following entities were considered:

a) Non-governmental institutions concerned with the shipping industry:
   - Cameroon’s Shippers’ Council located in Douala, Littoral Region;
   - Agents or representatives of owners of the vessels plying the route concerned;
- Shore-based and sea-faring maritime passenger transport professionals (all levels) working for the companies involved;

- Passengers travelling to/from Calabar or Malabo through the Port of Limbe.

b) **Public sector institutions concerned with maritime transport and security:**

- Department of Maritime Affairs and Inland Waterways based in Yaounde, North-West Region;

- Douala Port Authority;

- Port of Limbe;

- Ministry of Defence in Yaounde, Centre Region.

### 3.3 Data Collection Instrument

‘Questionnaire’ was deemed to be the appropriate data collection instrument for this study. The questions were essentially designed to obtain qualitative data. A few questions were also designed to obtain some related quantitative data, e.g. the longevity in service of some of the respondents. Furthermore, open-ended, closed-ended, filter and scaling questions were included.

All in all, the questionnaire was meticulously prepared in order to obtain answers as to the main question and related questions of the study, viz. - a) the causes of maritime violence along the Limbe-Calabar-Malabo maritime route, b) the effects of maritime violence on the progress of sea passenger transport companies operating in the area (including the employees and passengers of these companies), and c) measures taken to curb maritime violence in the area.

However, it is important to note that a small portion was also reserved at the beginning of the questionnaire (a kind of self-introduction) aimed at obtaining answers as to the sex, age,
knowledge and experience of the respondent. However, although age and sex may have been useful in terms of appreciating differences in perspective, there were not an important consideration. The fundamental considerations in terms of answering the research questions were ‘knowledge’ and ‘experience’ relevant to the issues being studied.

3.4 Target Population

‘Target population’ here refers to the target institutions/organizations/groups stated further below. The private sector of shipping (maritime passenger transport companies and their employees and passengers, as well as the Shippers’ Council) was targeted. The public sector (relevant ports and government ministries) was targeted as well. The entire list included:

- Agents/representatives/managers of the two main companies (‘Achouka’ and ‘Fako Ship’, respectively), as well as their shore-based and seafaring personnel.
- Cameroon Shippers’ Council.
- Passengers of ‘Achouka’ and ‘Fako Ship’.
- The Douala Port Authority and the Port of Limbe (placed under the former).
- The Department of Maritime Affairs and Inland Waterways of the Ministry of Transport of Cameroon.
- The Ministry of Defence of Cameroon.

Meanwhile, although it was pretty obvious from the beginning that there would be some discrepancy in depth and orientation with respect to the answers coming from the respondents of the respective institutions/organizations/groups, differences in perspective were considered to be a positive contribution to the study. The reasoning was as follows:

- Agents/representatives/managers of ‘Achouka’ and ‘Fako Ship’: Expected to provide an insight into the effects of maritime violence on their respective companies.
- The Port of Limbe and Douala Port Authority: These bodies should be well informed about the activities and problems of the Port of Limbe.

- Ministry of Transport: Government perspective as regards maritime affairs.

- Cameroon Shippers’ Council: Key body where shipping business in general and shippers’ problems in particular are discussed.

- Passengers of ‘Achouka’ and ‘Fako Ship’: ‘Achouka’ and ‘Fako Ship’ are the main maritime passenger transport companies over the years, and their passengers should constitute a reliable source.

- The Ministry of Defence of Cameroon: This Ministry, which deals with national defence issues in general, does intervene in the domain of maritime violence, in collaboration with the Ministry of Transport, among others.

3.5 Study Population

Personal judgment was used to determine the number of respondents to be drawn from each organization or group. The idea was to have numbers that would be convenient and practicable.

The next step in this whole process was to set criteria for determining the study population. Based on these criteria, lots of potential respondents within each institution/organization/group were eliminated. Judgment was then made with a view to determining what proportion of the respondents available could constitute the study population. The following criteria were used:

- All respondents must have ‘at least five years of experience’. This implies that workers (on-shore or off-shore) in any of the institutions/companies must have worked for at least five years with the same institution/company while passengers must have first travelled at least five years ago along the relevant route.
- All respondents must “know something” about maritime violence affecting Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport to Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea.
- No particular attention was to be paid to sex or age. Neither was any particular attention to be paid to ‘educational level’, provided that the respondent was literate enough to answer the questions, albeit with a little guidance. Attention was to be paid to rank in a few cases, e.g. representatives or managers of transport companies.

At the end of the day, the study population was worked out as shown in the table below:

*Table 3*

**Total study population and its distribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution or group</th>
<th>Study population</th>
<th>Breakdown of population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agents/representatives/managers of shipping companies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 05 from Achouka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 05 from Fako Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cameroon Shippers’ Council</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Shore-based and sea-faring professionals</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>- 10 from Achouka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 10 from Fako Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Passengers of Cameroon’s maritime transport sector</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>- 20 from Achouka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 14 from Fako Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personnel of the Department of Maritime Affairs and Inland Waterways</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Personnel of the Port of Limbe</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>- 03 from Cape Limboh Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 03 from Tiko Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Personnel of the Douala Port Authority</td>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Personnel of the Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>- 10 from Central Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- 20 from field defence forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. TOTAL</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field study 2014
3.6 Sample Sizes

Having drawn the study population from the target population, the next problem was to make sure that the resulting sample would be representative of the population to warrant accurate generalization. This meant visiting the relevant literature as well as the mathematical and statistical complexities for determining sample sizes in research. Thankfully, however, the table entitled “Required Sample Size” (The Research Advisors, 2006) turned out to be a most useful reference document (see appendix I). The following guidelines, provided by the authors of the said appendix, were found to be instrumental for this study:

- The table may be used to determine the appropriate sample size for almost any study.
- Many researchers (and research texts) suggest that the first column within the table should suffice (Confidence Level = 95%, Margin of Error = 5%).
- To use the values, one has to simply determine the size of the population down the left-most column (the next highest value should be used if the researcher’s exact population size is not listed (emphasis added). NB: This guideline was of particular importance to the present study.
- The value in the next column is the sample size that is required to generate a Margin of Error of 5% for any population proportion.
- The formula applied is the one used by Krejcie & Morgan in their 1970 article “Determining Sample Size for Research Activities” (Educational and Psychological Measurement, No. 30, pp. 607-610).

Based on the guidelines above, and given that the study population, as Table 3 shows, stood at 124, the decision was taken to use a sample size of 108. Details of the distribution of this sample size is shown in Table 4 below:
Table 4

Total sample size and its distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution or group</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Sample size breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agents/representatives/managers of shipping companies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 05 from Achouka - 05 from Fako Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cameroon Shippers’ Council</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Shore-based and sea-faring professionals</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>- 10 from Achouka - 10 from Fako Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Passengers of Cameroon’s maritime transport sector</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>- 10 from Achouka - 10 from Fako Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personnel of the Department of Maritime Affairs and Inland Waterways</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Personnel of the Port of Limbe</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>- 03 from Cape Limboh Terminal - 03 from Tiko Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Personnel of the Douala Port Authority</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Personnel of the Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>- 08 from the Central Administration - 20 from field defence forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Same</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field study 2014
3.7 Sampling Method and Techniques

The sampling method considered to be appropriate for this study is known as non-probability sampling. To illustrate the main rationale behind this choice, one may want to begin by recalling that the main research question in this study concerns the effects of maritime violence on Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector. It was then considered that the data needed to answer the relevant question(s) should be essentially ‘qualitative’ rather than ‘quantitative’.

Once the choice of sampling method was made, the appropriate techniques had to be considered. The sampling techniques adopted were as follows:

- **Convenience sampling**

A convenience sample is simply one where the units that are selected for inclusion in the sample are the easiest to access. In the case of this study, one clear illustration would be the decision to include in the sample agents/representatives/managers of ‘Achouka’ and ‘Fako Ship’, instead of the respective owners of the companies themselves. The view was that it would be more difficult trying to get to the company owners themselves. However, care was taken to make sure that units selected for inclusion in the sample would be adequate for the study.

- **Purposive sampling**

This reflects a group of sampling techniques that rely on the judgment of the researcher when it comes to selecting the units (e.g. people, cases/organizations, events, pieces of data) that are to be studied. Purposive sampling techniques include: maximum variation sampling, homogeneous sampling, typical case sampling, extreme (or deviant) case sampling, total
population sampling and expert sampling. Each of these purposive sampling techniques has a specific goal - focusing on certain types of units, all for different reasons.

The different purposive sampling techniques can either be used on their own or in combination with other purposive sampling techniques. By way of illustration, and with respect to this study, ‘total population sampling’ was used, among others. The study population for ‘shore-based and sea-faring professionals’ was 20, and it was decided that the sample size for that group would be 20 as well (total population).

- **Snowball sampling**

Snowball sampling is particularly appropriate when the population one is interested in is hidden and/or hard-to-reach. This sampling technique was typically applied in this work when it came to sampling field defence forces of the Ministry of Defence. Twenty (20) questionnaires were handed to two respondents who helped in obtaining data from 18 of their colleagues based on the snowball sampling technique.

- **Quota sampling**

With proportional quota sampling, the aim is to end up with a sample where the strata or groups being studied are proportional to the population being studied. It encourages a fair share being allocated to samples in the population relative to the group size. As far as this study is concerned, traces of quota sampling could be seen in the way sample sizes were determined relative to the group sizes (compare Tables 3 and 4 *supra*).
3.8 Problems and Issues during Field Work

As an RMU student wanting to carry out a study in Cameroon, some of the obvious challenges faced by this researcher had to do with time and cost. Some specific challenges included distance, academic schedules, and so on. For instance, the long distance separating certain cities in Cameroon where questionnaires were distributed and only collected subsequently (after several trips in certain cases) was a big challenge indeed. A case in point is the approximately 300km distance between Yaounde (for Ministry of Transport) and Limbe (for Port of Limbe). Ultimately, though, the research objective remained the constant driving force, and so it was deemed necessary to continue making the necessary sacrifice in terms of time and material resources in order to see the study through. Furthermore, it should be added that, given that the researcher is a Cameroonian, familiarity with the research environment was a facilitating element. The way to understand this is to imagine a Ghanaian RMU student, for example, who has hardly been to Cameroon before carrying out the same study.

One specific challenge concerns the accessibility of respondents. For example, some of the high ranking officials in the respective institutions were hardly on seat, military officers of the Ministry of Defence could hardly be reached in large numbers at the same time, etc. One may wonder how this challenge was met. The fact is that this specific scenario, like others, was anticipated in the research methodology, the whole idea being to minimize their impact on the study. One good example would be the targeting of agents/representatives/managers of shipping companies in place of the ship-owners themselves, the conviction being that these persons would be more accessible than their bosses.

Also, although the language used in the questionnaire was intended to reach even those within the lowest ranks of the academic ladder, some problems in this regard did arise with
passengers of Achouka and Fako Ship. Some passengers found it difficult to comprehend what was required of them, while others wanted full-scale assistance in answering the questions. But there was a way out. During one of his trips to Cameroon, the researcher chose to travel by road from Accra to Calabar, and continued by sea to Cameroon using Achouka. On returning, he did same in the reverse direction, but using Fako Ship this time. This round trip enabled the researcher to accompany those passengers needing his assistance. It further helped him reach the seafaring personnel of Achouka and Fako Ship in a satisfactory way.

Finally, in coming up with this work the researcher had to presume that certain elements being introduced, such as Cameroon’s institutions, would not necessarily be familiar to all his readers, hence the elaborate approach adopted in writing certain sections of the work.
CHAPTER FOUR

4.0 PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is a presentation and discussion of the findings relating to the main research question (and related questions) – i.e. causes and effects of maritime violence, as well as measures taken to curb it. However, the chapter begins with a presentation and discussion of some findings about the respondents, in terms of age, sex, education and experience.

Meanwhile, it would perhaps be useful at this point to recapitulate the sample sizes of the respondents used in the study, as follows:

Table 5
Total number of respondents who took part in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondents</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Agents/representatives/managers of shipping companies</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cameroon Shippers’ Council</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Shore-based and sea-faring professionals</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Passengers of Cameroon’s maritime transport sector</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Personnel of the Department of Maritime Affairs and Inland Waterways</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Personnel of the Port of Limbe</td>
<td>06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Personnel of the Douala Port Authority</td>
<td>04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Personnel of the Ministry of Defence</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014
4.2 Gender, Age, Education and Experience of Respondents

As Table 5 above shows, 108 persons took part in the study. The characteristics of these persons will be presented in terms of gender, age, education and experience, in that order.

4.2.1 Gender of respondents

As shown in Table 6 below, out of the 108 who took part in the study, 78 were men and 30 women. Furthermore, it was noticed that the majority of women came from among the passengers of the shipping companies. This could be understood in light of the fact that all the other groups from which respondents were drawn either have to do with shipping or the military profession, both of which are domains where women are generally not known to be serving in large numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Male</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Female</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

4.2.2 Age of respondents

The ages of respondents were grouped into three categories. The youngest respondents were 18 and the oldest 68. As shown in Table 7 below, the first category comprises those between 18 and 35 years of age. The second is composed of persons between 35 and 50 while the third includes people of 50 and above.
Table 7
Age distribution of respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 18-35 years</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 35-50 years</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 50 years and above</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

4.2.3 Education and experience of respondents

As far as education and experience are concerned, apart from the passengers of the shipping companies who had among them people with only the First School Leaving Certificate, all respondents had at least received some secondary school education.

Furthermore, besides sea-faring professionals, passengers and personnel of the Ministry of Defence, the vast majority of respondents had very little or no sea-faring experience. However, it should be quickly added that the main sampling criterion was ‘knowledge about maritime violence affecting Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport to Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea’. It is possible to have such knowledge without having necessarily taken to sea before. However, it was considered that such knowledge comes with some professional experience as well. See Table 8 below.

Table 8
Longevity of service in maritime transport-related domain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Longevity</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 5-10 years</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 10-15 years</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 15 years and above</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014
It was also thought that one way by which the experience of respondents could be determined was through their having witnessed or been victims of maritime violence. A significant number of respondents who had witnessed/been victims of maritime violence came from among maritime transport passengers and seagoing professionals, and understandably too. However, quite a few came from the other groups of respondents as well, especially personnel of the Ministry of Defence. See Table 9.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness/Victim</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Witness</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Victim</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Missing system</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

4.3 Causes of Maritime Violence

One of the most curious findings of this work had to do with the causes of maritime violence. Irrespective of level of education and experience, the vast majority of respondents were laconic and unanimous in their statement about the causes of maritime violence against passenger vessels in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area. To most, the culprits are militants or criminals coming from Nigeria (Table 10).

However, it must be submitted that most maritime affairs experts would hardly consider such response to the question on the causes of maritime violence as adequate in the context of a study of this nature. One may wonder where the blame lies. What is significant for our
purposes, though, is that the researcher did contemplate such challenges when designing the data collection instrument (questionnaire). This was done by introducing ‘Suggestions from respondent’ in the questionnaire, one of the “questions” under which reads as follows: Use the space below to make any other suggestions you may have within the purview of all the questions you have just answered in this questionnaire’ (see appendix II). The idea here was to multiply the chances of finding answers to the research questions raised in the study.

In the light of the foregoing, it is necessary to consider Tables 10 and 11 together in appreciating the causes of maritime violence against passenger vessels in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area. As concerns Table 11, it is important to note that only a very small number of respondents made the suggestion that Cameroon and Nigeria should continue to cooperate in giving better effect to the Bakassi peace agreements (Green Tree Agreement, etc.), in terms of socio-economic benefits for victims of that conflict on both sides, as better settlement, social amenities and employment opportunities for victims will likely water down criminality in the wider maritime area. It is useful to add that this suggestion came exclusively from high-ranking officers of the Ministry of Defence.

Meanwhile, respondents also made further suggestions concerning other research questions. However, only the suggestion relating to the causes of maritime violence was found to add something new.

On another note, a few respondents did state that criminals who operate around Cameroonian and Equato-Guinean waters by attacking off-shore installations do sometimes spread their activities around the maritime passenger transport route as well.
Finally, a very small percentage also mentioned that maritime violence in the said area is secretly sponsored by some big personalities in Nigeria and Cameroon for reasons of economic gain.

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Militants/criminals from Nigeria</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Criminals habitually attacking off-shore installations in Cameroon &amp; Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Criminality sponsored by some Cameroonian &amp; Nigerian personalities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

Table 11

Suggestions relating to Causes of Maritime violence in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestion</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cameroon and Nigeria need to continue their cooperation efforts aimed at giving better effect to the Bakassi peace agreements (Green Tree Agreement, etc.), in terms of socio-economic benefits for victims of the Bakassi conflict on both sides, as better settlement, social amenities and employment opportunities for the victims could help water down criminality in the wider maritime area.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Other suggestions</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

4.4 Effects of Maritime Violence

This portion concerns the main research question. The findings, which happen to be extensive and straightforward, are presented in the following order: effects of maritime violence on the
progress of maritime transport companies; effects of maritime violence on the employees of maritime transport companies; as well as effects of maritime violence on the passengers of maritime transport companies (Tables 12, 13 and 14, respectively).

Table 12

Effects of Maritime Violence on the Progress of Maritime Transport Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. High running cost for ship-owners, hence less incentive to stay in the business or to reinvest</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lower benefit due to expenditure on criminals at sea or security measures</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Less dues paid to Cameroonian Government, hence low motivation to support passenger transport sector</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

Table 13

Effects of Maritime Violence on the Employees of Maritime Transport Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Lower income for employees</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Loss of jobs due to actual or potential close-down of company or labour retrenchment initiatives</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Resignation of qualified employees seeking greener pastures elsewhere</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fewer job amenities and loss of social security for employees</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014
Table 14

**Effects of Maritime Violence on the Passengers of Maritime Transport Companies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Higher fares being imposed by companies to try to cope with high running cost</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Discouragement/fright and abandonment of transportation by sea and use of other means of transport</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Fewer facilities for passengers – e.g. snacks, due to cuts in expenditure by ship-owners</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Abandonment of business associated with journey by sea or adoption of alternative travel strategy to accomplish such business.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

### 4.5 Measures Taken to Curb Maritime Violence

In terms of curbing maritime violence within the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route, there is one palpable measure well known to all: the use of joint military patrol between Cameroonian and Nigerian forces. What actually happens in practice is that, depending on where a passenger transport vessel is departing from, the forces of that country escort the vessel along its waters until they get to the boundary with the other country. Then the forces of the second country continue the escort until the vessel reaches a secure area.

In the specific case of vessels leaving Cameroon for Malabo and vice-versa, the arrangement in terms of military escort is not the same. In that regard, one can only say that Cameroonian forces are responsible for the security of these vessels while they are in Cameroonian waters, while Equato-Guinean forces are responsible in terms of security when the vessels are in Equato-Guinean waters.
It was in the light of the foregoing that this study sought to find out if the respondents thought the use of military force was efficient (or not) (see Table 15). The study further sought to know if respondents had other suggestions on how to curb the violence, just in case they thought the use of military force was inefficient (see Table 16).

Table 15

**Level of Efficiency in Using Military Force**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of Military Force</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fully efficient</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Partially efficient</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Not efficient</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014

Table 16

**Possible Improvements in Use of Military Force/Other Efficient Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Improvement/Other Measure</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Improvement in cooperation and collaboration at sea between Cameroonian and Nigerian forces to avoid delays and exposure on the part of passenger vessels, and Cameroon should cooperate in similar fashion with Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. International assistance to Nigeria to fight militants in their waters in a manner similar to the mobilization over Boko Haram (terrorist group)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vessels should negotiate with criminals at sea</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. TOTAL</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Work, 2014
CHAPTER FIVE

5.0 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction
This study has conducted a discussion focusing on its main question, namely, the effects of maritime violence on Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry. ‘Piracy’, ‘armed robbery against ships’ and ‘maritime terrorism’ were the main forms of maritime violence under consideration. The term ‘maritime passenger transport industry’ was appreciated from three main angles – a) the transport companies, b) the workers of these companies, and c) the passengers. Related questions included causes of maritime violence and measures adopted to stem it. ‘Questionnaire’ was the main research tool. The discussion naturally drew from existing sources as well.

In terms of methodology, questionnaire was chosen for the purpose of collecting data from respondents from among the study population. Although a variety of aspects were covered by the questionnaire (e.g. background of respondents), the summary of findings presented in this chapter concern only the research question(s).

It may be useful at this juncture to suggest that there are at least three approaches that could be adopted by a researcher to appreciate findings obtained through the use of questionnaire. First, he may use the ‘majority wins’ approach and conclude that an opinion expressed in his questionnaire in favour or against an issue is more important than all other opinions. Secondly, just as obiter dicta in court decisions can sometimes be very important, the researcher may decide that an opinion expressed by just a very small percentage of his respondents is also very important indeed. The third approach, which happens to be the one
adopted in this study, consists in combining the first two. Simply put, this researcher is of the view that every finding counts, particularly so because the study has to do with security. In security matters the tendency is normally to maximize the use of every available information that could help in the fight against security threats.

5.2 Summary of Findings

The summary of findings presented in this section goes in the following sequence: a) effects of maritime violence on Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry, b) causes of maritime violence against vessels plying the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route, and c) measures aimed at curbing the said violence.

5.2.1 Effects of maritime violence

- **Effects on the maritime transport companies**
  - The majority of respondents (60%) were of the view that maritime violence was likely to lead to higher running cost for ship-owners, a situation that would dampen their incentive to stay, not to mention reinvest, in the business.
  - Some respondents (27%) indicated that ship-owner profit was likely to drop due to expenditure on criminals at sea or on security measures more generally.
  - A few (13%) considered that a decline in activities due to maritime violence would mean less dues being paid to the Cameroonian Government, and hence low motivation on the part of the Government to support the maritime passenger transport sector.

- **Effects on employees of maritime passenger transport companies**
  - Many respondents (65% in total) were of the opinion that the employees of these companies were likely to witness a drop in their salaries (including amenities and...
social security) as companies would tend to adopt austerity measures as a means of coping with the ramifications of maritime violence.

- Others (21%) felt that some workers may actually lose their jobs due to actual or potential company close-down or labour retrenchment initiatives.
- 14% were of the view that some employees, especially skilled labour, may take the initiative to resign and seek greener pasture elsewhere.

- **Effects on passengers in relation to the industry**

  - One major remark made by respondents (35% of them) was that management of the transport companies may want to shift the effects of maritime violence onto passengers by way of high transport fares.
  - Some (30%) thought that maritime violence was likely to discourage or frighten passengers, causing them to abandon transportation by sea in favour of other means of transport.
  - Opinions also ranged from lighter effects such as fewer facilities for passengers (e.g. loss of snacks, etc.) to radical effects such as abandonment of any business requiring journey by sea or adoption of alternative travel strategies (35% in total).

### 5.2.2 Causes of maritime violence

Much has already been discussed under literature review with regard to the causes of maritime violence more generally. The findings in this study are as follows:

- Most respondents (77%) were of the view that militants and other criminals from Nigeria were responsible, while some (16%) thought that criminals habitually attacking off-shore installations in Cameroonian and Equato-Guinean waters do sometimes extend their activities to the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route. However, among respondents who had other suggestions to make, a very small portion (7%) was convinced that Cameroon and Nigeria need to continue their
cooperation efforts aimed at giving better effect to the Bakassi peace agreements (Green Tree Agreement, etc.), in terms of socio-economic benefits for victims of the Bakassi conflict on both sides, as better settlement, social amenities and employment opportunities for the victims could help water down criminality in the wider maritime area. In a broader sense, these few respondents could be said to be making the very important suggestion that maritime violence tends to find its roots in the complex political and socio-economic realities on land associated with Nigeria (and Cameroon as well).

- Very few respondents (7%) were convinced that maritime violence is actually sponsored secretly by some personalities in Cameroon and Nigeria.

5.2.3 Measures to curb maritime violence

With respect to measures aimed at curbing maritime violence, the findings go as follows:

- The use of military force under the current arrangement to fight maritime violence is not fully efficient (35% in total).

- There should be improvement in cooperation and collaboration at sea between Cameroonian and Nigerian forces to avoid delays and exposure on the part of passenger vessels, and Cameroon should establish similar cooperation with Equatorial Guinea (83%).

- International assistance should be given to Nigeria to help the country fight militants within their waters in a manner similar to the mobilization over Boko Haram (terrorist group) (11%). However, it would be safe to add that military force alone may not do the trick, as Nigeria and Cameroon cannot afford to ignore the political and socio-economic realities on land associated with the causes of maritime violence.

- The commanding crew of shipping companies should, in exceptional circumstances, negotiate with criminals at sea to avert situations of greater danger and bigger losses
(6%). This may be useful as an on-the-spot, improvised solution, but not as a lasting remedy.

5.3 Conclusion

Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport industry plays quite an important role in terms of the socio-economic benefits it provides to its stakeholders. It brings dues to Government, provides employment to a portion of the population, and contributes to the development of cross-border informal trade between Cameroon and the two neighbouring countries concerned.

Unfortunately, the sector is confronted with challenges as well, one of which is the state of continuing maritime violence around the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo area that has been hitting the industry hard, thereby contributing in no small way to its dwindling fortunes as the years go by. Indeed, it is possible that the plight of the industry might continue to worsen if nothing is done to substantially alleviate the situation. In fact, the ultimate goal should be to help the industry attain higher heights.

Maritime violence in the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo area is not specific to passenger transport; other sectors are affected as well (e.g. off-shore installations). In short, maritime violence against passenger vessels plying the Cameroon-Calabar-Malabo route should be understood within the context of the generally volatile security situation that reigns in the entire sub-region. Hence the need to effectively implement and continue to improve on the mechanisms that have been put in place within the entire sub-region aimed at fighting maritime violence (bilateral agreements, Code of Conduct, etc.).
5.4 Recommendations

There is hardly any silver bullet when it comes to stemming maritime violence within any given geographical area. However, as Wambua (2009) has said, when a coastal State ensures good governance on land, there will be good governance at sea as well – viewed from our perspective, maritime violence comes from land. And so the most general recommendation one may want to make is that the governments of Cameroon, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea should endeavour to ensure good governance in their respective countries. That sounds naive, right? Generalities aside, here are the recommendations that stem directly from the present study:

- In matters of maritime violence, the sensitization aspect is of the essence. The ideals raised in this study should be taken up and properly diffused not just within the academia, but in the professional and decision-making circles as well. As a senior staffer of the Ministry of Transport of Cameroon, this researcher is acutely aware that it is possible to persuade the Ministry to help popularize our findings through the sponsorship of radio and television programmes, seminars, workshops, etc. One of the objectives of such effort should be to encourage the Government of Cameroon to seek ways and means of sorting out the practical difficulties that go with trying to use military means to curb maritime violence. This study could be a good starting point.

- Given the importance of Cameroon’s maritime passenger transport sector, and considering the impact maritime violence is having on it, the Government of Cameroon should explore ways of providing economic relief to ship-owners operating in the sector (lowering of taxes, etc.).

- If possible, further studies should be carried out with inspiration from the present one. For example, it could be interesting to use economic and statistical data in
appreciating company losses resulting from maritime violence. The study of trends in
terms of passengers using alternative means of transport, etc. could also be useful.

- Terrorism in Nigeria (Boko Haram) and the possibility that it could one day show its
ugly head in the maritime domain is an additional challenge that the Government of
Cameroon must take seriously. Among other things, this calls for the need to ensure
optimum implementation of international and regional instruments such as the ISPS
Code and the Gulf of Guinea Code of Conduct, respectively. Cameroon should be
prepared now and in the future in terms of being able to adequately address issues of
maritime violence (transboundary or international).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


## APPENDIX I

### Required Sample Size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Size</th>
<th>Margin of Error (5.0%)</th>
<th>Margin of Error (3.5%)</th>
<th>Margin of Error (2.5%)</th>
<th>Margin of Error (1.0%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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APPENDIX II

REGIONAL MARITIME UNIVERSITY, ACCRA-GHANA
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a student of the Regional Maritime University in Accra, Ghana, where I am conducting a study on the “Effects of Maritime Violence on Cameroon’s Maritime Passenger Transport to Neighbouring Countries”, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for obtaining a Master of Arts degree in Ports and Shipping Administration.

In the light of the above, I have the honour to present to you this questionnaire in a bid to obtain answers that would help me complete the study. Your answers shall be used for academic purposes, exclusively. You are not required to reveal your identity, and any information you provide shall NOT be distorted or misrepresented in any manner whatsoever.

Guidelines:

a) For questions with suggested answers, please tick only the answers applicable to you.

b) Where space is provided for your answer, kindly be clear and concise.

Note: ‘Maritime violence’ means any violent act at sea - e.g. piracy, armed robbery, and terrorism.
A. Background of respondent

1. Gender. Are you (a) Male or (b) Female?

2. Age. _____________________

3. What is your educational level? ______________________________________________

4. Do you have any professional qualification? (a) Yes or (b) No
   - If yes, what is your professional qualification? _________________________________

5. Are you employed? (a) Yes or (b) No
   - If yes, name your employer. _______________________________________________
   - If no, what do you do to earn a living? _______________________________________

B. Knowledge/experience of respondent

1. Are you a seafarer? (a) Yes or (b) No. If yes -
   - For how long have you used the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea route? _______
   - If you have used the Cameroon-Nigeria route alone, for how long? ________________
   - If you have used only the Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea route, for how long? _______
   - In what capacity have you used any/some/all of the said routes? (e.g. Captain, Engineer, First Officer, Cook, etc.) _________________________________
   - If you have sailed in more than one capacity, please specify. ____________________

2. If you are not a seafarer but have the habit of travelling by sea through any/some/all of the following routes – (i) Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea, (ii) Cameroon-Nigeria or (iii) Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea, please tick the route(s) that applies/apply to you.
   - In what capacity have you been using the route(s)? ____________________________
   - For how long have you been using the route(s)? ________________________________
3. During your time of travelling through the route(s) mentioned above, did you ever witness, or have you ever been victim of some form of maritime violence or attack against the vessel in which you were travelling? (a) Yes or (b) No. If yes –
   - When and where did the violence or attack occur? _____________________________
   - Briefly describe what happened. ___________________________________________
     _______________________________________________________________________
     _______________________________________________________________________
   - If you have witnessed or been victim of more than one incident of maritime violence or attack, please state when and where the others occurred. ________________________
     _______________________________________________________________________
     _______________________________________________________________________

4. You may never have sailed in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area. However, in your capacity as a maritime professional, have you ever accessed documents (official or unofficial) concerning acts of maritime violence in the said area? (a) Yes or (b) No.
   - If yes, briefly describe any case of maritime violence you have learnt about. __________
     _______________________________________________________________________
     _______________________________________________________________________

5. Would you say that maritime violence in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area is on the rise or is at least a problem to worry about? (a) Yes or (b) No.

6. State, briefly, what you think are the main causes of maritime violence in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area. ________________________________________________
     _______________________________________________________________________
     _______________________________________________________________________

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7. Explain how you think maritime violence in the Cameroon-Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea area is affecting:

a) The progress of companies that own ships transporting passengers there.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

b) The employees of companies that own ships transporting passengers in the area.
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

c) The passengers travelling by sea in that area. _________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

8. Is the current use of military force in fighting maritime violence in the area efficient?

(a) Yes or (b) No. If no –
- How can you explain the difficulties faced in the use of military force? _________
___________________________________________________________________________
- How else can maritime violence in the area be fought?
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________

C. Suggestions from respondent

1. Before the advent of the maritime transport companies that now ensure the bulk of the sea transport from the Port of Limbe to Calabar in Nigeria and Malabo in Equatorial Guinea, only canoes of various sizes were used for that purpose. Are you of the opinion that these transport companies are indispensable for passenger/cargo transport in the area? (a) Yes or (b) No.
- If yes, how do you think the Government of Cameroon should help these companies, apart from fighting maritime violence in the area? _________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________________

2. Use the space below to make any other suggestions you may have within the purview of all the questions you have just answered in this questionnaire. ___________________________
    _______________________________________________________________________
    _______________________________________________________________________

THANK YOU!