A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GHANA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DR. KOFI ABREFA BUSIA AND PROF. JOHN EVANS ATTA MILLS

BY

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(10431303)

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LEGON

MARCH 2014
DECLARATION

I, Frank Jerry Aglago, do hereby declare that this work is entirely by my personal effort. I further declare that all the work that have been consulted or quoted have been duly acknowledged. I also declare that this dissertation has not been presented either in part or in whole for any other degree elsewhere.

FRANK JERRY AGLAGO               DR. KEN AHORSU
(STUDENT)                       (SUPERVISOR)

DATE ........................................ DATE ........................................
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my beloved wife, Christiana and my children, Selorm and Selase who have tolerated me in my busy period and absence from home while pursuing my studies. Also to my mum, Agnes Agbolosu for educating me. I appreciate your effort.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All thanks to God Almighty who does all things well in His time seeing me through my studies at LECIAD. May His name be praised.

I appreciate the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College for the opportunity given me to be part of the course.

My sincere thanks to my supervisor Dr. Ken Ahorsu for the measureless support and guidance he gave me. His meticulous direction and attention to details brought out the best in me. Thank you very much.

All the lecturers and staff of LECIAD deserve thanks for their tuition and efforts in impacting all there is to know.

Thank you all my mates for being the source of my inspiration.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACO</th>
<th>Aliens’ Compliance Order</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BOP</td>
<td>Balance of Payments</td>
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<td>CF</td>
<td>Commonwealth Foundation</td>
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<td>CFTC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>CHOGM</td>
<td>Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting</td>
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<td>CIFTC</td>
<td>Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>CMAG</td>
<td>Ministerial Action Group</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention People’s Party</td>
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<td>CTCA</td>
<td>Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara</td>
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<td>DAS</td>
<td>Development Advisory Service</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>Economic and Technical Cooperation</td>
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<td>FOCAC</td>
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<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<td>GIMPA</td>
<td>Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>International Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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<td>MNCs</td>
<td>Multi-National Corporations</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
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<td>National Electoral Bodies</td>
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<td>National Liberation Council</td>
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<td>New Patriotic Party</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>PNDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defence Council</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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ABSTRACT

The research was a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of two Ghanaian leaders Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia and Prof John Evans Atta Mills. The study was aimed at determining the impact of their policies on the country’s role in the international system. The research depended on both primary and secondary data for the analysis. The constitution of Ghana over the years empowers the leaders of the country to formulate the country’s foreign policy. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah exercised this responsibility as the first president of Ghana, laying the foundation for the country’s foreign policy direction. The traditional pillars of Ghana’s foreign policy as laid down from independence include the total emancipation of Africans to include the elimination of all forms of neo-colonialism, economic independence of Ghana and Africa as a whole, the policy of non-alignment as well as allegiance of Ghana to International Organizations. The study revealed that both Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills deviated from some aspects of the traditional pillars of Ghana’s foreign policy. This resulted in the isolation of the country by the international community at their time. Although Dr. K.A. Busia alluded to the unity of the African continent, his policy on the Aliens’ Compliance Order, an Act of Parliament which required all foreign nationals without resident permits to leave the country within two weeks stained its policy of African unity. Additionally, Dr. K.A. Busia’s policy of pro-dialogue with the apartheid regime was inconsistent with Ghana’s traditional pillar of emancipation of Africans and a deviation from the position of allegiance of the country to International Organizations (in this case the OAU). Similarly, Prof Mills’ declaration of the “dzi wo fie asem” policy was also at variance with the broader tenets of Ghana’s foreign policy and a betrayal of trust of the International Organizations to which Ghana pays allegiance (particularly the ECOWAS and the AU).
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem

No state is an island of its own. States continue and may forever continue to be interdependent of one another. At the centre of the continuous interaction among states is national interest. Every country desires to enter into relations that will inure to the general good of its citizenry. This general good is basically the concerns and aspirations in the areas of security, welfare, and independence, among others, which the citizenry expect their leaders to serve through their relations with other countries in the international system. The level of interaction among countries in the international system is greatly determined by a country’s foreign policy. Leaders of states are therefore obliged to pursue such policies that will promote the realization of the primary purpose of improving the living standards of their people.

The concept of foreign policy, highlighted by globalization, indicates that the focus and the object is changing from concentration of interstate relation to the inclusion of a plethora of other actors such as Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Governmental Organizations (IGO) and Multi-national Corporations (MNCs). The effect of globalization has therefore placed tremendous challenges on the traditional view of foreign policy conveyed by classical International Relations theorists who perceived the concept to be purely a state centric affair. Foreign policy has assumed a central role in international politics more than ever before due to the gradual borderless society induced by globalization resulting in new means of interdependence emerging from the internet to satellite communications technology to global financial networks. The gradual erosion of territoriality as a result of globalization does not however advocate the
extinction of nation-states in the foreseeable future. Actions of the sovereign state remain critical to shaping global politics. States can define their level of engagement with the world (through economic liberalization and trade, as well as war or peace with other countries). As long as there are sociocultural and linguistic differences, there will continue to be distinctions that will result in the formulation of different policies.⁴

The relations of a state with other state and non-state actors in the international system require a decision making process that is of critical importance. This important national assignment is most often left in the hands of national leaders to direct. In some cases, leaders use well established institutions to formulate and implement their foreign policies while others either unilaterally decide on the foreign policy direction of the states they lead or they do so with the help of few people around them. Globally, the foreign policy direction of a state is heavily dependent on the leader of the day. This position has made leaders assume enormous power in foreign policy decision making. In Ghana for instance, Art 40 of the 1992 constitution provides direction for the country’s foreign policy formulation.⁵ Art 73 enjoins the government of the day to conduct international affairs in a manner that is consistent with the national interest of Ghana while the president is specifically mandated by Art 74 and 75 to ensure diplomatic representation of the state and execution of treaties in the name of the state, respectively. Admittedly, these provisions are replications of provisions from the first Republican constitution which empowers the president to formulate the country’s foreign policy. The president therefore remains the number one foreign policy maker of the state. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah exercised this responsibility as the first president of Ghana, laying the foundation for the country’s foreign policy direction. Two other presidents after Nkrumah, Prime Minister Dr. K.A. Busia and President Prof. J.E.A. Mills (who are subjects
of this study), equally discharged similar duties in their leadership roles as the premier policy makers.

Dr. K.A. Busia on the one hand led Ghana under the Second Republican Constitution during the regime of the Progress Party (PP). Busia as a person was diametrically opposed to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of the Convention People’s Party (CPP). After the overthrow of Nkrumah by a military and police junta led by General Ankrah on 24 February 1966, Dr. Busia became the Prime Minister of Ghana in October 1969 with 64-year-old former chief justice Edward Akufo-Addo as president. Earlier, during the three years of military rule, Dr. Busia served as vice-chairman to a 19 member political committee appointed on 1 July 1966 by the military government under General Ankrah. The political background of Dr. Busia was hence that of a liberal democrat.

Prof. J.E.A. Mills on the other hand was the third president of Ghana under the Forth Republican Constitution during the regime of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). The National Democratic Congress was formed as an offshoot of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), a military junta led by Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings from 1981 to 1993. The NDC therefore transitioned as a social democratic party from the defunct Provisional National Defence Council following the transition to democratic rule under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

The two leaders in focus have a number of variables that make them comparable. The variable of importance to this analysis is the similarities in their approach to their foreign policy decisions. It is worth noting that both leaders took over the leadership of Ghana when the country was towering as a leader in African affairs. On the one hand, the leadership image carved for Ghana by Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah did not dwindle during the National Liberation Council (NLC) regime. This image was what Dr. Busia inherited. Prof. Mills, on the other hand, inherited Ghana from the New Patriotic Party (NPP) under J.A. Kufuor at the time the country had a good image in Africa. President Kufuor served as Chairman of the African Union (AU) for two consecutive terms raising Ghana to a high pedestal in the region and to a large extent in world affairs. Dr. Busia and Prof Mills therefore had a huge reputation to protect as far as the image of Ghana was concerned in foreign relations.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The constitution of Ghana enjoins the president to be the lead actor in the country’s foreign policy decision making.\textsuperscript{6} Over the years, there has been the growing need for foreign policy decision making to include the participation of multiple actors. Although there is growing evidence of institutional approach to foreign policy making in Ghana, the president still wields some level of preponderant power and responsibility for the success or otherwise of every foreign policy decision. Two of such democratically elected leaders of Ghana, (Prime Minister Dr. K.A. Busia and President Prof J.E.A. Mills) with different political ideological backgrounds, governed Ghana under different republican constitutions, different political and economic conditions, and different international environment but seemed to have some resemblance in their foreign policy decisions.

In spite of the fact that Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills have different ideological backgrounds (liberal democrat and social democrat respectively), both presidents took some foreign policy decisions in Ghana’s relations with other states that sparked controversy among analysts. Some of their decisions were deemed to be a deviation from the “traditional foreign policy
of Ghana” towards its neighbours and the rest of Africa. These contradictions in position of the country’s foreign policy may have caused embarrassment to Ghana resulting in the decline of Ghana’s leadership role in Africa as a force to reckon with.

It is important to note that certain elements of Ghana’s foreign policy (i.e., African Liberation and unity, Good Neighborliness, Economic Relations, Relations with International Organizations etc) had become customary and a change represented a deviation from the status quo. To monitor the trend of foreign policy in Ghana, it is necessary to continuously review the foreign policy direction of the various leaders as done by previous researchers. This research work therefore attempts a comparison of the policies of the leaders under study and analyze the rationale behind their foreign policy decisions.

### 1.3 Objectives of the Research

The research sought to achieve the following objectives:

a. To analyze the dynamics of the domestic and international environment that underpinned their foreign policy decisions.

b. Compare the foreign policy objectives and methods of the two leaders.

c. To determine whether Ghana’s foreign policy reflected only the preference of the leaders during their tenure of office.

d. Offer recommendations based on the findings made.
1.4 **Hypothesis**

The foreign policy decisions under Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills negatively affected Ghana’s leadership role in African affairs.

1.5 **Rationale of the Research**

Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills have both been criticized for some of their foreign policy decisions. The research is set out to compare their foreign policies. It will serve as a yardstick to measure succeeding leaders in Ghana and the world over. It will help determine whether their style of foreign policy decision making is a better option for these succeeding leaders to adopt under similar circumstances. It will also serve as a source of reference to other researchers in similar areas of comparative study of leaders.

1.6 **Scope of the Study**

The work, is to a large extent, limited to the foreign policy decisions of Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills. It will however draw instances from other leaders of Ghana in a bid to do comparisons.

1.7 **Theoretical Framework**

This research is based on the Rational Actor Model which postulates that decision makers act to further their own interest or goals. It is a purposeful behavior designed to achieve outcomes consistent with goals of the decision maker. Rationality is therefore relative to the goals of the actor but not what is morally or ethically right. By implication, the rational actor is a single entity which can reason and make tangible choices. The actor is able to perform cost-benefit analysis in
order to arrive at the rational choice.\textsuperscript{8} As a pre-condition for determining rationality, it is first and foremost believed that all human actions can be reduced to individual choices. Again, the belief is that people and institutions can in principle determine ends and means to achieve motivated self-chosen goals when selecting options that optimize individual utility than any other available competing course of action. Existence of human preferences is hence paramount based on personal values and expected benefits. In making choices, the rational actor is believed to have existing knowledge about the potential outcomes of their choice (i.e. the likelihood and consequences). Foreign policy decisions under the rational actor model adopts an optimal behavior that makes the optimal choice in relation to the goals to be achieved by the foreign policy in question.\textsuperscript{9} The policy maker under the rational actor model will have to analyze various options available, consider the consequences of making a particular choice and rank the options before choosing the most preferred.\textsuperscript{10} Rationality is therefore relative to the preferences of the decision maker. A realist perception of rationality is different from that of a liberalist opinion.

The rational actor theory extend across the entire range of social science and is among one of the general theoretical approaches to explaining human actions. The rational actor models have been applied to a wide range of aggregate units, including firms, interest groups, political parties, and states. Leaders of nations apply the theory to identify their national interest after cost benefit analysis and pursue deliberate agenda towards the achievement of the interest so identified.

The rational actor model is based on three assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that the state is a unitary actor in the international system. The second assumption is that rational actors have coherent interests. Thirdly, it is assumed that rational actors can make cost benefit-calculations.\textsuperscript{11}
These assumptions are considered realist positions on decision making in the international system. Realists make a fourth assumption which postulate that states have “intersubjective preferences.”\textsuperscript{12} That is to say that “all states (or their leaders) have basically the same values and interests.”\textsuperscript{13} Hans J. Morgenthau, a realist claimed that states are unitary and rational actors characterized by the decision making process that lead to choices based on the national interest.\textsuperscript{14} Morgenthau stated as a belief that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract, but that they must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. In pursuit of the national interest, nation-states are governed by morality that differs from the morality of individuals in their personal relationships.\textsuperscript{15}

The liberal approach to rationality differs from the realist conception.\textsuperscript{16} According to Goldstein, “liberals believe that rational actors are capable of forgoing short-term individual interest in other to further the long-term well-being of the community to which they belong.”\textsuperscript{17} Unlike the realist position on rationality which assumes that the state is a unitary actor, the liberal position as proposed by Immanuel Kant, argue that independent states could form a federation and remain loyal to its ideals. To Kant, international cooperation with long-term goals is a rational option than the unitary position assumed by the realist.\textsuperscript{18}

Notably, both the realist and liberalist position on rationalism hold the interest of the community or nation state paramount. Although it is not the intention of this paper to apply the concept of national interest to the analysis of the foreign policies of Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills, it is important to note that the rational actor model hinges on the concept. The rational leader will seek interests without considering morality or what is generally accepted. The rational actor will
not copy what the masses do without critical examination. The rational actor will withdraw support for a group decision if such decisions do not satisfy the self-chosen goals.

A number of criticisms have been levelled against the theory. Critiques think that there is an individual limitation in the ability of the actor to relate means to ends in the most effective way.\(^{19}\) Individual limitations in knowledge of the environment, ability to process information, time available to consider alternatives etc.

Another criticism raised against the theory is the principal agent problem, thus the organizational challenge. Decisions are good when they are well implemented. A rational decision when awfully implemented by a delegated person cannot achieve the intended goal. Leaders of states are bound to delegate duties and responsibilities to get their choice of policy decisions implemented. The possibility of the personal idiosyncrasies of delegated officers influencing the desired goal at the end of the day is high. The preferences of the leader and the delegated officer may not be the same. In such situations, the delegated officer is likely to thwart the effort of the leader.\(^{20}\)

Other critiques of the theory (social aggregation critiques) think that it is difficult for a group composed of entirely rational individuals to think and behave in the same way. It is impossible to aggregate rational individual preferences in a way that guarantees that the resulting group preference would be rational in itself. In other words, groups can sometimes behave unpredictably even though they are composed of entirely rational people.\(^{21}\)
The relevance of the rational actor model to the analysis of Ghana’s foreign policy under Dr. Busia and Prof. Mills stem from the fact that, Ghana’s constitution over the years right from the first republic, enjoined the country to remain committed to the ideals of the international bodies to which the country belongs. While the leaders in focus maintained the sanctity of the constitution, there were instances in which their goals differed from the position of the international community and the constitution of the very nation they served. Both Dr. Busia and Prof Mills demonstrated rationality in their foreign policy choice, some of which drew diplomatic uproar.

1.8 Literature Review

There abound numerous literature on scholarly views on foreign policy formulation and implementation by authors in the field of international relations. These literature express various views on the subject of foreign policy as regards its formulation and implementation, the domestic factors which underpin its formation and the tools employed in foreign policy making. Some of the works the researcher reviewed include that of Gilbert K. Bluwey’s Understanding International Relations, Daniel S Papp’s Contemporary International Relations Framework for Understanding, K.B. Asante’s Foreign Policy Making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century, Olajide Aluko’s “After Nkrumah: Continuity and Change in Ghana’s Foreign Policy”, F.S Northedge in The Foreign Policy of the Powers, Howard H. Lentner in his work Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach, Charles F. Herman’s article on “Changing Course: When Governments Chose to Redirect Foreign Policy”, Kjell Goldmann’s Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente, and B.Y. Gebe in his article “Ghana’s Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup d’état.”
1.8.1 Actors in the international system, the National Interest and Foreign Policy

Gilbert K. Bluwey in Understanding International Relations set out to define the actors in the international system that dictates the foreign policy of states. According to Bluwey, occurrences in the national circle and in the international amphitheater are caused by human beings (who represent governments, private groups and so on) in the search for set goals other than their own. To Bluwey, the government is the "supreme power and mouthpiece of its people in the international sphere as derived from the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).” Various inter-state institutions and organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) among others are also endorsed agents of states that seek to attain collective goals according to Bluwey. Other groups of representatives are the quasi-state organizations which transact trade and economic relations on behalf of states (such as Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, Ghana Trade Fair Authority and Ghana Free Zone Board) as well as International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) – such as Human Rights Organizations, Religious Groups, and Multi-national Corporations (MNC) – which are equally prominent on the international scene.

Bluwey observes that states seek to exercise power in order to control and direct behaviour of other states. The state therefore seeks to pursue its own national purposes irrespective of the conditions of the international environment. Professor Paul Seabury, cited by Bluwey in Understanding International Relations, defines the national interest as “an ideal set of purpose which a nation should seek to realize in the conduct of its foreign relations .... those purposes which the nation through its leadership appears to pursue persistently through time.” To Bluwey, national interest is the desire, goals and ambitions shared throughout the nation. To him, foreign policy is the
“decisions, steps, measures and actions which the officials of a state take in their relation with other states” in pursuance of the national interest. The constituent of foreign policy therefore is the “series of interrelated decisions and actions taken by a government to enhance its own national values or attain specific and general goals in the international sphere”. Bluwey identifies the president who is the chief executive of the state as the one whose perception and intentions influence a nation’s foreign policy based on the expectations of the people being governed.23

Daniel S Papp in Contemporary International Relations Framework for Understanding writes that the nation-state which had been the leading actor in the international system is being challenged by new entrants, the non-state actors. Although the nation-state still maintains supremacy, multi-national organizations, international governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations and individuals equally have new roles in global affairs.24 D.S. Papp attempts to explain the national interest, using various criteria. According to him, some hold the opinion that any policy which enhances a state’s economic position is seen as a national interest. Similarly, power could be used to define the national interest in the light of one state trying to maintain control over the other. Military security advantage in a state that could protect its citizenry from a threat, according to Papp, constitutes national interest. Other criteria Papp identifies, include morality and legality. The national interest could be defined in terms of what is legal and morally justified.25 Papp also cites cultural affinity as an area of national interest.

The concept of national interest is central to foreign relations. It is that which make leaders of nation-states adopt policies which may be deviant to the decisions of the masses even in inter-state organizations. However, with the increasing role of other actors which constrain foreign policy,
states must equally recognize the influence of these non-state actors and inter-state organizations as they seek their interest in contemporary times. For instance, a decision by the ECOWAS or the African Union (AU) to which Ghana belongs may influence Ghana’s policy decisions. One can therefore not disagree with Bluewey and Papp that the international system is gradually losing its state centric attributes. As nation-states formulate their foreign policies with the aim of seeking the national interest first, they must constantly recognize these other actors. Inter-state organizations, according to Bluwey and Papp, are accredited representatives of states and seek the common good of the people. Therefore, the foreign policy decisions of member states of such organizations must consider the position of the organization.

1.8.2 Foundations of Ghana’s Foreign Policy

K.B. Asante, in Foreign Policy Making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century articulates his understanding of international relations which invariably influence foreign policy of states. These include the totality of economic and politico-socio-cultural interactions that embodies relations with international organizations. Asante attributes the recent change in foreign relations that influence foreign policy to the advent of multinational institutions especially the United Nations following the end of the Second World War and the demise of the Cold War. He asserts that historically, the genesis of Ghana’s foreign policy formulation can be traced to Dr Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of the republic. According to Asante K.B., Kwame Nkrumah made historic declarations in his independence speech to Ghanaians which set the condition for Ghana’s foreign policy formulation by successive governments till date. The pillars of Nkrumah’s foreign policy, first of all, is the total emancipation of Africans and the elimination of all forms of neo-colonialism. Paramount to his African agenda is the unity of the continent into a borderless
state with one parliament and one military high command. Another foreign policy agenda by Nkrumah as Asante posits is economic independence. Nkrumah implemented the policy of non-alignment which helped Ghana to benefit from both the east and west. Central to Nkrumah’s foundation for Ghana’s foreign policy, according to Asante, is his interest in International Organizations hence his allegiance to them.27

In his article “After Nkrumah: Continuity and Change in Ghana’s Foreign Policy”, Olajide Aluko sides with the position of K.B. Asante.28 Aluko identifies three components of Ghana’s foreign policy which are along similar lines of thought with K.B. Asante. These policy areas include Ghana’s relations with her neighbours and within West Africa as a whole, policy towards the rest of Africa and the policy of non-alignment. He however alludes to the fact that over the years after Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, successive governments have deviated slightly from the basic founding pillars of Ghana’s foreign policy.29

Asante and Aluko rightly put Nkrumah into perspective by crediting him as the fore bearer of Ghana’s post independent policy making. The foundation he laid remains a guide for other successive leaders. The broad aim of Ghana’s foreign policy as Asante and Aluko points out, is to eliminate the suffering of Ghanaians and Africans as a whole. It is the expectation that all succeeding presidents of the country will implement and support the implementation of any such policies as a state. Additionally, the belief is that Ghanaian leaders will cooperate at the multilateral level to eliminate all forms of division and suffering on the continent of Africa.
1.8.3 Domestic Factors Underpinning Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation

F.S. Northedge’s work in “The Nature of Foreign Policy” in The Foreign Policy of the Powers identifies pressures from within a country as being a limiting factor or as a source of freedom for a state to relate with other actors in the system. To Northedge, domestic factors which underpin foreign policy formulation include internal political situation, government machinery, constitutional provisions, public opinions, pattern of organized pressure groups and lobbies in state institutions such as parliament, the vibrancy of the media in setting the agenda for public discussion on issues of foreign affairs, among others. Northedge alludes to the fact that in relative terms, implementation of foreign policy is not similar to and as easy as the execution of domestic policy. While domestic policy is easily executed through enforcement of laws as well as positive or negative inducements and persuasive arguments, foreign policy could only employ inducement and persuasions.

Municipal laws do not necessarily have forceful influence in foreign policy implementation although to some extent, international laws and treaties serve as regulatory mechanisms for foreign policy. Foreign policy implementation is hence dependent on the cooperation of other states and institutions with which a state intends to enter into relation. Diplomacy is a major tool for governments in foreign policy implementation bringing to bear their repertoire of offers and threats. B.Y. Gebe in “Ghana’s Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup d’état” asserts that the preponderance of a country’s economy translates into what he refers to as “state capability.” The economic wealth of a state which by itself is a major domestic factor, according to Gebe, is a determinant of foreign policy direction.
Howard H. Lentner in his work *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach* supports the position of F.S. Northedge and B.Y. Gebe that foreign policy is determined by domestic factors. F.S. Northedge argues that there is a thin line between domestic and international facets of a country. Lentner’s position is that “wealth is a precondition for undertaking certain kinds of foreign policies; it conditions attitude and behavior…” Barbara Farnham, writing on the “Impact of the Political Context on Foreign Policy Decision-Making”, agrees entirely with the position of F.S. Northedge, Gebe and Howard H. Lentner. Farnham however adds that there is a political context to foreign policy decision making. He argues that there is a basic feature with the political context of foreign policy which is pervasive. To him, foreign policy decision must have domestic political consensus to succeed. Additionally, policy decision makers must balance domestic and international opinions in arriving at decisions without compromising the benefits to the nation. He conjectures that political leaders who take rational decisions do not base their policy choices only on domestic political factors but try to satisfy international imperatives. This balance he thinks will produce policies that are neither resultant from domestic or international pressure.

In “Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change: Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956 -1994”, Thomas Niklasson in his article “Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change: Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956 -1994”, supports F.S. Northedge, B.Y. Gebe, Howard H. Lentner and Barbara Farnham. Niklasson posits that foreign policies could be viewed as a one-way “interaction between domestic and foreign policy” or “as influencing one another.” “Domestic factors may impact on foreign policy interests, and events beyond the geographic borders of a state may influence developments in the domestic arena”.

16
While political leaders attempt to demonstrate a mutual benefit of the states and institutions in interaction. Ole Salmore & Salmore, as cited by Thomas Niklasson corroborates Barbara Farnham’s position on the political context of foreign policy. Salmore & Salmore hold “that the internal political structure of a country is a major determinant of its foreign policy”.

The Bible says “for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks”. By implication, whatever we say is an outpouring of what we conceive in our hearts. Similarly, whatever a nation exhibits on the international scene is influenced by what pertains domestically. A poor nation is likely to go soliciting for aid. Conversely, a rich nation could afford to give aid. The assertion made by F.S. Northedge, Howard H. Lentner, Barbara Farnham and Thomas Niklasson on the domestic influences on foreign policy of every state is relevant in analyzing the foreign policy of Ghana under Busia and Mills.

1.8.4 Continuity and Change in Foreign Policy

Charles F. Herman, writing on “Changing Course: When Governments Chose to Redirect Foreign Policy” suggests that changes in a country’s foreign policy direction is of profound interest due to the potential consequences on both the initiating country and on other countries involved in the policy change. He makes a distinction between foreign policy change as a result of regime changes and those that occur when a ruling government decides to redirect its policy. These changes could be part of the usual process of modification in nuances or a major redirection. Hermann views foreign policy changes at four graduated levels. He identifies adjustment changes as the first level where the amount of effort either increases or reduces in enforcing an existing policy. It is therefore a quantitative form of change in which the purpose of such policy remains the same. The second possible level of change according to Herman is the program change. It is
a qualitative change in which new instruments of statecraft are introduced to change the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of doing things but the purpose remain unchanged. The third level, the problem/goal changes, witnesses a complete replacement of policy with a changed purpose. The forth and most radical level is the international orientation change in which there is a shift in international role in many policy areas.45

The sources of change in foreign policy, according to Hermann, could be leader driven i.e a change that “results from the determined efforts of an authoritarian policymaker, frequently the head of government, who imposes his own vision of the basic redirection necessary in foreign policy”.46 Other agents of change Hermann identifies include bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring and external shock.47

While Hermann pays attention to change and its agents, Kjell Goldmann’s Change and Stability in Foreign Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente focuses on “stabilizers” and “détente”.48 To Goldmann, tension (détente) is inevitable in international politics, however, foreign policies are likely to remain unchanged from the past. He believes that “a change in policy has “sources”, but sources do not produce policy change directly.”49 The concept of stabilizers, according to Goldmann, intervenes with the agents of foreign policy change and the decision-making process. Goldmann’s assumption is therefore that “in the absence of stabilizers, policies are highly sensitive” to change.50 Goldmann catalogues thirteen stabilizers which may be international, political and administrative stabilizers that affect change.51
F.S Northedge posits that the determinant factors of foreign policy formulation of a state (ie economic and military development of the state, its technology and social evolution, its ethos as in believes, culture of the people of the state etc) predisposes it to a particular form of thinking. This defines its foreign policy in a particular direction.\(^{52}\) This pre-suppose that there is likely to be a kind of continuity in a country’s foreign policy formulation which is similar to the position of Goldmann on “stabilizers”. Aluko agrees to this assertion by pointing out that Ghana’s foreign policy has seen some continuity since 1966 especially in the areas of respect for her neighbours and policy towards the West African sub-region, the rest of Africa and her policy of non-alignment.\(^{53}\) Aluko attributes the factors contributing to the continuity to colonial history, geographical location and the influence of the civil service.\(^{54}\) While admitting that some changes do occur in the foreign policy direction of Ghana, Aluko attributed the causes of such changes to the state of the economy, ideological orientation of rulers and domestic political pressures.\(^{55}\)

Leaders are sensitive to the interest of the citizenry when considering the direction of a state’s foreign policy. Charles Herman, K. Goldman, F.S Northedge and Aluko all acknowledge the existence of change which could be instigated by sources. The agent of change in policy run across various spectrum of life, including ethos. In Ghana for instance, majority of the populace will be comfortable with a rejection of a gay and lesbian culture no matter the hardship it may cause the nation just because of the cultural background which frowns such acts. Hence, successive leaders will continue to maintain continuity of such policy positions no matter the pressures from international powers.
1.9 Methods and Sources of Data

The research depended on both primary and secondary data. Primary data was gathered through unstructured interviews with Ghanaian public officers who served under the leaders during their tenure of office as well as academicians in the field of international relations. The sources of secondary data included review of books from the LECIAD and Balme Libraries, articles, reports and official publications of civil society groups and political parties such as the NDC manifesto, parliamentary reports on foreign affairs among others. The research used content analysis of the data collected to do the comparative study.

1.10 Arrangement of Chapters

Chapter one constitutes the research design. It comprised the background to the problem, statement of the problem, scope of the research and the objectives. It also stated the rationale of the study, put the study in a theoretical perspective and reviewed the literature. The chapter also set the hypothesis against which the finding of the research was measured. Chapter Two examined the attributes of Ghana’s foreign policy under Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills. The chapter considered factors which influenced the foreign policy direction of the leaders such as their personal orientations, the domestic and international environment, constitutional provisions under which the leaders served and the instruments of foreign policy formulation and implementation they employed. The third chapter dwelled on the foreign policies of Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills. It analytically compared the foreign policies of the two former leaders within the framework of the instruments they employed. Chapter four gave a summary of the research findings, drew conclusions and made recommendations.
Endnotes

3 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid p. 77.
12 Ibid p. 78.
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Professor Branislav L. Slantchev., op cit.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
29 Ibid, p57.
31 Ibid pp. 28 – 33.
32 Ibid p. 35.
37 Ibid.
39 Ibid p. 4.
41 Mathew 12:34b, Holy Bible. Modern King James Version.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid p5.
50 Ibid p16.
51 Ibid
53 Aluko, O., op cit. pp. 56 -57.
54 Ibid p57.
55 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO

THE ATTRIBUTES OF GHANA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER DR. K.A. BUSIA AND PROF J.E.A. MILLS

2.1 Introduction

Chapter One established from literature the history of Ghana’s foreign policy and identified the pillars as set out after independence. In this chapter, an attempt is made at defining the term foreign policy. A critical look is then taken at the factors that enhanced or impeded Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A Mills in their formulation and implementation of foreign policies. These enabling and/or retarding factors are otherwise, termed the attributes of foreign policy. The attributes either directly or indirectly determine the orientation of a country’s relation with the outside world. The factors identified include the background (personal idiosyncrasy) of the presidents as individual or lead actors in foreign policy formulation. Additionally, other constituents of the attributes of foreign policy are the prevailing domestic conditions, the international environment, the constitutional provisions under which the leaders operated as well as the military and economic power.

2.2 Foreign Policy Defined

Foreign policy was a term introduced in the 19th century to denote the conduct of government business in external affairs.¹ At the introduction of the term, it was used to reference a state’s relation with the outside world. Although foreign policy is still viewed in this light, it is deemed to cover much more complex inter-state relations than it used to be. Many definitions of the term emerged over the period. However, no one definition satisfies the complexities of the term. Brian White thinks that foreign policy is that area of government activity which concerns its relation
with states and other actors in the international system. In a similar light, Joseph Frankel viewed foreign policy as relations between one state and others. This definition is obviously limited by the fact that governmental relations go beyond states to include relations with other actors such as multinational and international organizations. Joel Kriegel in his attempt to define foreign policy gave a distinction between government and private foreign policy. To him, foreign policy is the sum of official relations of an independent actor in its external relations. It is imperative that activities of other dependent private entities also exist which might constitute foreign relations and hence contribute to foreign policy. However, Joel Kriegel does not consider those to constitute foreign policy but laid emphasis on only independent actors. This to some extent, place some limitation on his definition.

2.3 Overview of Ghana’s Foreign Policy

Ambassador James Victor Gbeho, as cited by E.M Debrah ever said in a seminar in 1997 that “the broad tenets of Ghana’s foreign policy have in principle, remained the same over the years since the country’s independence in 1957.” According to Debrah, Mr. K.B. Asante in a paper on Foreign Policy making in Ghana for the 21st century equally noted that “significantly, Ghana’s foreign policy has not changed much since Nkrumah [but] emphasis naturally shifts from one regime to another.”

Prof. Gilbert K. Bluwey in “Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Process in Ghana: Issues, Ground Rules and Actors” identified five major themes of Ghana’s foreign policy. These themes include first and foremost national self-preservation or national survival which is a universal theme of every sovereign state. The second theme according to Bluewey, is the emancipation of Africa
and the restoration of the dignity of the black race. The third theme in Ghana’s foreign policy is the establishment of power and influence in Africa. The fourth, is the pursuit of world peace through a policy of positive non-alignment. The fifth policy to be identified by Bluwey is the nation’s international cooperation for development through inter-governmental action. Admittedly, Ghanaian leaders have over the years stuck to these policy areas. They have actively participated in ensuring peace around the globe, promoted African affairs, enhanced good neighborliness, and encouraged economic relations through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy as well as pay allegiance to international organizations. However, the level of commitment to these thematic areas shifts due to personal nuances. For instances Nkrumah was considered as a militant and aggressive person in foreign policy formulation and implementation due largely to his Pan-African orientation. The NLC went pro-west in its foreign policy decision due to its opposition to the Nkrumah government which it succeeded. The policy position of the NLC was followed by Dr. Busia and his PP government. Busia was passive in African affairs working largely through the OAU without coming to the forefront as Nkrumah did. The PNDC/NDC under President Rawlings initially proved anti-western until was compelled by economic constraints to submit itself to relations with the west. Prof. Mills and his NDC maintained the status of social democrats because Prof. Mills himself acquired the tenets of democracy from childhood and as a student of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Centre. These instances vividly prove Bluwey’s position that emphasis in Ghana’s foreign policy decisions sometimes shift from one leader to the other.

2.4 Actors in Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation

The president is identified as the main actor in foreign policy decision making. Ultimately, the president is empowered by the constitution to act in fiduciary relation with the state. The
constitution therefore remains an important instrument in foreign policy decision. Aside the president, the cabinet, council of states and a corps of ambassadors constitute a body of actors who either directly or indirectly contribute to the foreign policy decision process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister have great influence on the policy decision of government. Parliament by itself remains an immutable actor while individuals, political opposition and public opinions greatly determine foreign policy choices of governments in Ghana.

2.5 National Interest in Foreign Policy Decision Making

One of the overriding attributes of a nation’s foreign policy is the national interest. The definition of national interest is a difficult one due to how relative the term is to the user. Its meaning therefore differs depending on the context within which the individual uses it. It is considered a tool used to “describe, explain [and] evaluate the adequacy of a nation’s foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{10} The national interest is considered a tool that could either justify or denounce a policy.\textsuperscript{11} The national interest is measured as the ‘general good’ which the nation consider as paramount in its policy decision making. Professor Paul Seabury as cited by Bluwey in \textit{Understanding International Relations} defines national interest as “an ideal set of purpose which a nation should seek to realize in the conduct of its foreign relations .... those purposes which the nation through its leadership appears to pursue persistently through time”. It is the desire, goals and ambitions shared throughout the nation.\textsuperscript{12}

National interest as a concept in foreign policy decision making is heavily dependent on the goals of the rational actor. It could be defined in terms of power\textsuperscript{13}, i.e. economic, political, and military power etc. Over the years in Ghana, national interest has been viewed in terms of economic gains
for the wellbeing of the citizenry. Successive governments have over the years embarked on economic relations obviously with the interest of the state as a determining factor. Ghana has since independence maintained its political role in international relations. The nation has been active in African affairs and in global political issues. The national interest in Ghana’s foreign policy has therefore not changed but remains broadly the welfare of the nations as a whole. Ghana like other post-colonial states is primarily weak in terms of low socio-economic development, institutions, technology, and resources. Therefore, the preponderant national interest has been how to redeem these weaknesses and provide jobs and high living standards for its people.

### 2.6 Constitutional Provisions under Which the Leaders Operated

The constitution of Ghana since the first republic warrants multilateralism as one of the major pillars of the country’s foreign policy. The 1960 Republican Constitution provides, in part in Article 8 the powers vested in the presidency in acting in fiduciary relation with other actors for and on behalf of the state. Unlike the first Republican Constitution which had unlimited powers arrogated to the president to formulate and implement foreign policy, the second Republican Constitution of 1969 obliges the president to act “in accordance with the advice of Cabinet”. The authority of the state in decision making thus lies with cabinet while parliament had the mandate to determine the policy direction of government. By necessary implication, foreign policy decisions under Dr. Busia was a collective decision of state. Goldstein postulates that “government establishes various organizational structures and functional relationship to create and carry out foreign policy”. Under the constitution of the Second Republic, the main actor in foreign policy apart from the presidency are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Parliament. K.B. Asante accordingly noted that, Dr. Busia was one of the leaders who employed these established
institutions of state for foreign policy making.\textsuperscript{18} For instance, he ensured representation of the country through foreign missions and relied on parliamentary decisions on foreign policy issues. The second Republican Constitution in Articles 57, 58 and 59 directs the president in his conduct of international relations on behalf of the people of Ghana.

It is interesting to note that the position of Ghana’s constitution on international relations over the years as stated earlier has not changed. The main actors under the constitution remain the same. The constitution of the fourth republic which authorized President Mill’s relations with the outside world made similar provisions as those of the second republic. Articles 40, 73, 74 and 75 of the 1992 constitution are reproductions of the provisions in Articles 57, 58 and 59 of the 1969 constitution.\textsuperscript{19} These articles provide among others for the government to “conduct its international affairs in consonance with the accepted principles of public international law and diplomacy”. The president, as authorized by these articles in both jurisdictions, may appoint persons to represent the state in consultation with the Council of State. The president may, subject to ratification by parliament, sign treaties on behalf of Ghana. These constitutional provisions reiterate Ghana’s believe in multi-nationalism as one of the pillars of the county’s foreign policy. Both the PP government headed by Dr. K.A. Busia and the NDC government headed by Prof J.E.A. Mills gave the constitution the required attribute and meaning in formulating the foreign policy of the state.

\section*{2.7 The President and Foreign Policy Making in Ghana}

As already indicated, the constitution of Ghana mandates the president to be the lead actor in formulating the foreign policy of the country. There is no country in which there exists a comprehensive document stipulating the step by step action of the president. It stands to reason
that the constitution gives broad guidelines to the president on what to do but not how to do it. The ‘how’ therefore is a discretionary decision of the president in power. This is where the personal orientation of the president from childhood to adolescence comes to play. According to Goldstein, “individuals are the only true actors in international relations.”20 The individual decision in most cases is a reflection of the values and beliefs of the decision maker.21 Therefore the individual level of analysis of the international system remains one of the most important levels because it “concerns the perception, choices, and actions of individual human beings [and] great leaders influence the course of history as do individual citizens, thinkers, soldiers and voters.”22 The president, though a representative of the people remains an individual as far as decision making is concerned. He/she has his/her individual goals and the method of pursuing such goals. It is therefore a reality that the individual’s personality, idiosyncrasies etc influence decision making and, in the case of a president, the influence is heavy on foreign policy decisions.23 Goldstein thinks that most of these personal characteristics “reflect the subconscious influence of childhood experience”.24 Kissinger, as quoted by Partrick Yin Mahama in “Ghana-Cote D’ivoire Relations after the fall of Gbagbo: Challenges and Lessons”, explains that “a leader’s vision, personal aspirations, temperament, prejudices, force of personality, ideological persuasion, moral orientation and perception of world issues tend to have a strong bearing on the manner in which these principles are put into action.”25 It is possible therefore that Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills might have had some of their decisions rooted in their childhood life. Their decisions may deviate from national interest as a result of the personal biases of the decision.26 The person of the president at any point in time remains an important attribute of foreign policy.
2.7.1 The Person of Dr. K.A. Busia

The life story of Dr. K.A. Busia was captured vividly by her daughter Akosua Busia, a film maker, in a tribute to the father’s memory.27 Busia was born in Wenchi in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana on 11th July 1913. He was brought up at his tender age by a missionary Reverend William Whittle and his wife Alice in Wenchi and later moved to Kumasi. From this religious home and background, Busia was exposed to public platform at the age of nine when he was chosen to hand over a golden trowel to His Excellency Sir, Gordon Guggisberg, then Governor and Commander-in-chief of the Gold Coast Colony in a ceremony to lay the foundation stone for Wesley College.28 Busia’s eloquent speech at that platform made him famous in the Gold Coast as the “prodigy bush boy from faraway Wenchi.”29 Interestingly, Busia changed residence from one Reverend Minister to another at his early age. He was handed over by Reverend William Whittle to Reverend Waterworth and from Waterworth to Reverend and Mrs. Mildren and then moved to Reverend Armstrong.30 The parenting of Busia gave him the early exposure to the importance of secular education. He attended Mfantsipim Secondary School and the Wesley Teacher Training College. He went to Oxford University for his BA Honours in Politics, Philosophy and Economics in 1941. He obtained his MA in 1946 and by 1947, he was awarded his Doctorate of Philosophy in Social Anthropology all in the same university.31 His political career began in 1942 when he was appointed as one of the first two African District Commissioners of the Gold Coast Colony. He rose through the political ranks becoming the founder and leader of the Progress Party in 1969, Member of Parliament (MP) and Prime Minister of Ghana from 1969 to 1972. He was married to Naa Morkor Busia and blessed with children.32 The lifestyle of the Prime Minister from birth to adolescence, going by Goldstein’s assertion, may have influence on his decisions. Dr. Busia’s
liberal ideology is an important attribute characteristic of his upbringing. The Christian religious upbringing of Dr. Busia is suggestive of his non-violent and dialogue prone personality.

2.7.2 The person of Prof J.E.A. Mills

The autobiography of H. E. Professor John Evans Atta Mills was captured in The Journal of Pan African Studies.\textsuperscript{33} The Professor was a native of Ekumfi Otuam in the Central Region but was born in Tarkwa on 21 July 1944. He was in Achimota Secondary School and received his Advanced Level Certificate in 1963 and at the University of Ghana, Legon for his Bachelor’s Degree and Professional Certificate in Law in 1967.\textsuperscript{34} He earned his Ph.D. in Oriental and African Studies from the University of London at the age of 27 and was selected as a Fulbright Scholar at Stanford Law School (USA). He lectured at the Faculty of Law at the University of Ghana, Legon for more than twenty five years and rose in position to Associate Professor. Prof Mills has more than one dozen publications to his credit including Taxation of Periodical or Deferred Payments Arising from the Sale of Fixed Capital (1974), Exemption of Dividends from Income Taxation: A Critical Appraisal (1977), Report of the Tax Review Commission, Ghana, Parts 1, 2 & 3, (1977) and Ghana’s Income Tax Laws and the Investor, an inter-faculty lecture published by the University of Ghana.\textsuperscript{35} He was an advocate for recreation, active sportsman and sports fan supporting sporting groups such as the Ghana Hockey Association, National Sport Council of Ghana, and Accra Hearts of Oak Sporting Club. He served on several boards and committees both home and abroad. In 1988, Prof. J.E. Atta Mills became the Acting Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service of Ghana and named Commissioner in September 1996. His political life began in 1997 when he became the Vice President of the Republic of Ghana and served in that capacity with President J.J. Rawlings till 2000. Prof. Mills became the Executive President of the Republic
of Ghana on Wednesday 7 January 2009 a capacity in which he served until his demise on 27 July 2012. He was married to Ernestina Naadu, an educationist and had a son.

2.8 Prevailing Domestic Conditions

A nation’s foreign policy is determined to a large extent by the prevailing domestic conditions. K. Boafo-Arthur refers to such domestic conditions as “a nation’s attributes” which cuts across various fields, including the system of government, the level of economic and political development of the nation as well as the size of the nation, among others. Both Dr K.A Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills served Ghana under different domestic conditions which impacted on their decisions in the international system. Such conditions as governance and the state of the economy are some of the determining domestic factors that may influence foreign policy decision making.

2.8.1 The State of the Economy under Dr. Busia

The Dr. Busia government under the Progress Party inherited a country that was described by David Goldsworthy in his article “Ghana's Second Republic: A Post-Mortem” as being economically imprisoned. Busia inherited the huge legacy of foreign debt carried on from the Nkrumah regime and compounded by the regime of the National liberation Council (NLC) under Lieutenant General A.A. Afrifa, souring up to as much as over USA $800,000,000.00. At the initial stages of Busia’s governance, prices of cocoa, the main stay of the economy was quite high. This boosted trade resulting in trade surplus of 39m cedis ($38.2m) in 1969 rising to 47m cedis ($46m) in 1970. The economic downturn following the fall in world market price of cocoa from £330 per ton in 1970 to £230 in 1971 spelt the doom of the economy at the time. Economic hardship in the country was glaring in the rising food prices, rising rate of unemployment, rising
taxation and stagnation in agricultural output, leading to food deficiency. A country that was hitherto self-sufficient in food security became an importer of rice, sugar, meat and fish.\textsuperscript{40}

Dr. Busia took over at a time when the economy of Ghana was centrally planned (socialist planning).\textsuperscript{41} Based on his ideological background as a liberalist, Dr. Busia needed to veer away from this phenomenon into an economy that is private sector led, with the private sector being the engine of growth.\textsuperscript{42} Ghana’s trade before Dr. Busia was towards the east (the Soviet bloc). Ghana had a lot to do with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and other socialist countries including China, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria etc. Dr. Busia had to re-orient Ghana’s relations from the east to the west.\textsuperscript{43} This re-orientation (as a foreign policy choice) was due to the type of economy that preceded him as well as his personal upbringing as a liberalist.

2.8.2 The State of the Economy under Prof. Mills

President Mills described the economy he inherited as a crippled economy. As indicated in his first State of the Nation Address to parliament, “The fiscal deficit (the excess of expenditure over revenue) was GH\textcented 2.5 billion in 2008. This figure is over 15\% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) … The external deficit or Balance of Payments (BOP) for 2008 [was] estimated at GH\textcented 3.42 Billion, or 18\% of GDP. … The rate of inflation accelerated from 12.7 percent at the end of 2007 to 18.1 percent at the end of December 2008. … The stock of external debt increased from US$2.2 billion in 2007 to US$3.9 billion in 2008. This contributed to an increase in the overall national debt to US$7.6 billion in 2008 from US$5.3 billion in 2006. This [was] in spite of the over US$5.0 billion national debt which was written off from 2001. … The cedi has lost substantial value with respect to the US dollar which [was] attributed to the delayed effect of excessive spending and
trade imbalances experienced since 2006. To restore favorable conditions, the Mills administration imposed a number of austerity measures throughout the Government machinery aimed at achieving macro-economic stability. The measures included reduction by half the budget of State Protocol, official foreign travel, official seminars and workshops. Other measures included close monitoring of targets and dividends of state-owned companies and enterprises, revision of the exemptions regime, increasing efficiency in revenue collection and negotiation of the single spine wages and salaries regime.

Mill’s description of the state of the economy at the time of taking over was discounted by Dr. Antwi Danso, a Senior Research Fellow at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD). According to him, the NDC administration under President Mills inherited a very buoyant economy. The economy was buoyed by the oil find and its exploration as well as the gains from the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative undertaken by the NPP government under president Kuffuor. HIPC was able to take away $4.2bn out of Ghana’s total debt of $6.2bn. Therefore, Ghana at the time of Mills was relieved and not over burdened with the external debt. Again, the economy of Ghana had quadrupled GDP wise from $4bn in 2000 to $16bn at the end of HIPC.

The true state of the economy under President Mills especially at the time of taking over is subject to debate. While it is undeniable that the HIPC initiative brought some debt relieve to the country, it is equally true that the state of the economy was unstable with double digit inflation at the time President Mills assumed office. What cannot be confirmed is the actual debt of the country Prof Mills inherited. Oil find and exploration couldn’t also have made the state of the economy strong
at the genesis of Prof Mills’ administration because exploration of oil begun after change of government. What remains true though is that Prof Mills had to put in austerity measures to arrest some economic crisis such as stabilizing the cedi. It is also through that the economy of Ghana had the potential of growth following the oil exploration. This position placed the President Mills government in a better position to engage in a vibrant foreign policy.

2.9 Prevailing International Environment

The prevailing international environment during which a president governs is a determining factor in the foreign policy decision of the regime of the president in question. According to K.J. Holsti in his book *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, such factors as the international economic environment, the effects of international politics of the day (as in the purpose and actions of actors) and the geographical location, among other factors, are some of the international attributes that influence foreign policy decisions of the government of the day.49

2.9.1 The International Economic Environment under Busia

The World Economic Order during the early periods of Dr. Busia’s government was favorable. Although the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), (the international regime which governed trade during the regime of Busia) was considered to be a weak institution, merchandise trade levels grew at twice the rate of the global economy in the periods running from the 1950s through to the late 1969s. This boosted trade, resulting in trade surplus as prices of cocoa, the mainstay of the economy of Ghana soared in the world market.50 The international economic order however changed following the oil shocks of the 1970s and the collapse of the Bretton Woods in 1971. The challenges associated with the fixed exchange system to gold resulted in devaluation of
backup currencies to the dollar such as the pound sterling in 1967 and the French franc in 1968. This global monetary condition had its toll on the Busia administration. Similarly, high oil prices had an adverse impact on businesses, consumers and government budget. According to an African Development Bank Report of 2009, high oil prices had a deteriorating effect on net oil-importing countries (including Ghana) resulting in BOP disequilibria as a result of the oil shock. According to the report, governments in policy response either pass on the price increases to consumers, or absolve the increases through subsidies, tax reductions etc. Whichever response government adopts, the social impact on the citizenry is an exacerbated incidence and depth of poverty coupled with high distortion in the income distribution structures. Governments in reaction to the plight of its people are compelled to enter into foreign agreements as a result. The dynamics of the international system are therefore immutable attribute of foreign policy decisions of governments. For Dr. K.A. Busia, the international economic environment was a determinant his foreign policy decisions especially in his economic relations.

2.9.2 The International Political Environment During Dr. Busia Regime

The international political environment under the Busia regime was that of a bipolar post World War II (WWII) politics. Power struggle in the anarchical realist world compelled small states such as Ghana to make difficult political decisions to determine their alignment to the poles in other to survive in the international system. The United States of America (USA) and the then Soviet Union, the two most powerful states after WWII engaged in power struggles (in what has come to be known as the Cold War) to win the support and sympathy of smaller states in the system. Busia took over the reign of Ghana at the time the Cold War was at its height. This international political condition was an important attribute that informed foreign policy of leaders at the time.
and Dr. Busia was no exception. The clash of the socialist and liberal capitalist ideologies left world leaders to make a choice.\footnote{56}

The overthrow of Nkrumah (who was accused of going socialist) opened a chapter for policy re-orientation. The hype after the overthrow of Nkrumah was downgrading socialism and communism in Ghana and uplifting liberalism to which Busia belonged.\footnote{57} This international political environment molded Dr. Busia’s orientation towards the west in his foreign policy choice.\footnote{58} Busia was compelled to make a [rational] choice to go west due to his personal upbringing and also the international politics at the time. Although the NAM was operational at the time, member states still had their orientation to either of the poles.\footnote{59}

\section{2.9.3 The International Economic Environment under Prof. Mills}

Prof. J.E.A. Mills outlined the prevailing international economic environment at the time he assumed office. As expressed in his state of the nation address to parliament, there was “heightened anxiety and insecurity in the global economy.”\footnote{60} The international system at the time was ‘gripped by the severe global economic downturn and associated recession’ resulting in millions of job loses globally.\footnote{61} The effect on Ghana as a developing country was the instability of commodity prices at the world market. Again, there was considerable “reduction in foreign aid and in remittance flows from citizens working abroad who have lost their jobs.”\footnote{62} Additionally, the nation could no longer count on donor support for its development projects consequently slowing down economic growth.
2.9.4 The International Political Environment During Prof. Mills Regime

A bipolar world under which Ghana had served over the years gave way to a unipolar international order for the past two decades or so. The United States of America with its capitalist ideological hegemony has dominated world politics over the decades. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, no state or organization in the international system has attempted to challenge the hegemony assumed by the USA. As Stephen Walt puts it in his book *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*, the USA has enjoyed an asymmetry of unseen power since the emergence of the modern state system.\(^{63}\) The unipolar international order has become a special attribute of foreign policy formulation and implementation of states acting in the system to which Ghana under Atta Mills was no exception. Good governance and rule of law is judged globally with a yardstick of practicing democratic values characteristic of the capitalist system of governance. The voice of the masses through free, fair and transparent elections have become the order of the day. Foreign policy decisions must therefore have the tenets of democratic values consistent with the western type of governance, anything short of which could be considered undemocratic.

Prof. Mills, unlike Busia, was not forced to make a choice because world politics at the time was going in one direction i.e. the global liberalist ideology. Although Mills was a social democrat, he made a [rational] choice of embracing the tenets of liberal democracy, the rule of law, equal rights and religious pluralism.\(^{64}\) The post-Cold War unipolar political system under which Mills administered Ghana as compared to the bipolar Cold War political world of Busia therefore present different dynamic attributes for foreign policy decision making.
2.9.5 Geographical Location

Geographical location of a state remains an immutable dynamic of its international environment.\textsuperscript{65} It is empirical that Ghana is surrounded by francophone countries. The country is boarded to the East by the Republic of Togo, to the West by Cote d’Ivoire, to the North by Burkina Faso and to the South by the Gulf of Guinea. These countries, besides having colonial ties with their former colonial masters, also have mutual defence pacts.\textsuperscript{66} Ghana therefore has compelling reasons to engage in foreign policy choices that promote good neighborliness. Beside the porous borders which require cooperation to fight crime, there is also the requirement for Ghana to cooperate with its neighbors with regards the border demarcation and the exploitation of resource as pertains between Ghana and La Cote d’Ivoire. It is also a reality that colonial masters demarcated international boundaries without recourse to ethnocentric sentiments of the people. People with the same ethnic origin were politically divided by colonial demarcation. Ghana as a coastal country also serves as a seaport for many landlocked countries.

According to Dr. Boni Yao Gebe, a Senior Research Fellow at LECIAD, Ghana (due to its geographical location) has benefitted immensely from the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire due to the diversion of air and sea route of all commercial crafts and vessels bound for Cote d’Ivoire through Ghana.\textsuperscript{67} Another geographical factor making a country’s location an attribute of foreign policy making is conflict management. Ghana, by its geographical location, has been strategic in conflict resolution in the sub-region. By its position in the sub-region as one of the most stable countries and a beacon of democracy, having organized series of successful elections over the years, Ghana is compelled to work towards the stability of politically turbulent countries. This is not only because of its constitutional commitment to providing support to sub-regional, regional and
international bodies in ensuring international peace, but also as a measure of ensuring that such conflicts do not spillover into the country.

The geographical factor has seen Ghana being a very active actor in regional and sub-regional foreign policy relations independence. Geographical location will forever be one of the most influential attributes of the nation’s foreign policy decision making. Prime Minister K.A. Busia and President J.E.A. Mills considered this in their strategic foreign policy decisions when addressing some issues of concern.

2.10 Other Attributes/Instruments of Foreign Policy under Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills

The formulation and implementation of foreign policy is not only dependent on the President. Neither is it determined by only the prevailing domestic and international conditions, nor is it only a matter of statutory obligation of a country or organization’s constitution and those of international status. Rather, it is a multiplicity of attributes which include some vital instruments. The main instruments used by state in their foreign policy drive are superior military and economic capabilities. However, with the spate of globalization, other instruments such as diplomacy and propaganda have become equally important tools more than ever before within the attributes of foreign policy decision making.

2.10.1 Military Capabilities

The assertion of states (and to a large extent actors in foreign policy in general) in the international system is greatly determined by their military capability. It is empirical that the presidents of the
USA could take their country to Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan because of the country’s military might. The same cannot be said of the presidents of Ghana. The United Nations could easily authorize the use of force to bring international order because of the military power of nations that constitute its membership. The same cannot be said of the Africa union for obvious reasons. The ECOWAS was the first sub-regional group in Africa to use military force to restore order and halt the increasing humanitarian crisis in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire. This was not only because of the military orientation of the leaders who took the decision to do so at the time, but largely due to the comparative military might of Nigeria and Ghana who led the drive to use of force.

Super military powers according to Barry Hughes has a full scale of options to select from while less powerful states can only resort to what can be termed today as soft power. The formation of the League of Nations and the consequent birth of the United Nations could not eliminate the legitimacy of the use of force as idealistic as they are. As the realists put it, the international system remains anarchical and hence states as rational actors seeking their national interest will resort to the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. Ghana as a state for instance has as one of its major pillars of foreign policy the ideology of non-alignment in her external relations. This notwithstanding, in the event where the nation’s interest is at stake, it reserves the inherent right and legitimacy to the use of force. Holsti holds that no nation can renounce the use of force because “no nation is neutral with respect to its own security”. Admittedly, the use of military force as a tool for foreign policy is on the decline with the advent of alternative options which largely borders on diplomacy and other lesser military tools such as subversive activities which Feld Werner calls political warfare. Berry Hughes rightly thinks that resort to warfare must be
the failure of “statecraft” because the consequences are dire. No matter the options available to an actor in foreign policy, military power remains an important attribute. Ghana at independence displayed this attribute by leading in the Congo crisis. Although Ghana cannot be termed as a country with tremendous military might, the nation has over the years used the military to influence its relations with other actors. Till date, Ghana continues to use the military as a tool in foreign policy relations through the involvement of the military in the numerous sub-regional, regional and international peacekeeping/peace enforcement missions (under the auspices of international organizations i.e. the UN, AU and ECOWAS).

2.10.2 Economic Capabilities

The economic wealth of a state is a major attribute that determines its influence on the international scene. The granting or receipt of foreign aid in the like of loans and grants, the application of import tariffs, trade embargoes, quota restrictions or allowances, among others, are the economic instruments a state could employ in its relation with other states. These, according to Holsti, are the organized actions employed by a state to influence others. The preponderance of a state’s economy gives it what could be referred to as “state capability”. Lentner posits that “wealth is a precondition for undertaking certain kinds of foreign policies”. An economically wealthy state could use her capability to either reward or punish other states. The reward could take the form of economic benefits either given or received in recognition of interaction with other states in the system. Similarly, punishments are usually economic sanctions imposed by economically healthy states or international organizations to regulate the system.
Ghana at independence undertook one of the most vigorous economic diplomacies in the history of her foreign policy. The large reserve in the country’s treasury totaling over £200 million left over by colonial masters, coupled with the high world price of cocoa, positioned the country in an economically viable condition under the leadership of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. At independence, Ghana had low external debt, high per capita income of about £50, low inflation rate and a rapidly expanding economy at a rate of about 6 – 7%. The strength of the Ghanaian economy at the time gave Nkrumah the political capital to pursue economic policies both domestically and internationally. Nkrumah could afford a grant of £10 million to Guinea in 1958. What is evident as far as economic capability is concerned in foreign policy decision making is that, a country or organization which is an actor in the international system could be more proactive in influencing other states or organizations. For instance, the USA aid to sub-Saharan Africa reached actual figures of $8.1billion in 2012. The economic wealth of the USA, coupled with other attributes such as the strength of its military, makes it the most powerful actor in the international system. Similarly, China with an emerging economy has engaged Africa in a dynamic economic diplomacy through numerous aid programs. China created the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 1998 mainly to assist the continent economically. While China’s aid to Ghana cuts across infrastructure, education, agriculture and construction, it is especially cooperation in the infrastructure and energy sectors that has been welcomed by Ghana. Ghana has benefited from China in the Bui Dam project as a result. Although the unconcealed purpose of these forms of aid is to help eradicate the suffering of the poor, there are other covert political reasons which are mainly towards striking strategic alliances. Ghana alongside the rest of African countries will be sympathetic to USA and China in case of any world issue.
The economic capabilities of Ghana under Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills were not that healthy as they were under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah to enable her pursuit of the kind of economic diplomacy Nkrumah undertook. The Busia administration inherited a huge debt from the Nkrumah and the NLC. The nation’s debt as at 1966 stood at £400 million with external debt constituting about 80% while the high per capita of £77 was nullified by the high rate of inflation. The Prof Mills led NDC government inherited an economy that was coming out of the HIPC program. Agriculture which was the main stay of the economy and the highest contributor to GDP had declined from 41% in 1993 to 37% in 2008. Although cocoa production was on the increase with “exports [rising] from US$975.7 million in 2007 to US$1,239.65 million in 2008, which is some 67% increase … mainly on account of increases in both volumes exported and realized export prices”, the broad agriculture output was on the decrease. This state of affairs obviously is a catalyst to foreign policy relation that may not have the covert political agenda of actively influencing other states and actors in the international system like the USA will do.
End Notes

6 Ibid p. 27.
8 Ibid pp. 46 – 47.
9 Ibid p. 48.
11 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Goldstein, S. J., op cit, p. 97.
18 Asante K.B., op cit, p. 37.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid p17.
23 Ibid p. 169.
24 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
38 Ibid p. 10.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Dr. Antwi Danso V., (2014), Transcribed Interview granted to the Researcher on 6 February 2014 by Dr Antwi Danso, a Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer at LECIAD.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Dr. Dr. Antwi Danso V., (2014), Transcribed Interview granted to the Researcher on 6 February 2014 by Dr Antwi Danso, a Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer at LECIAD.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
54 Ibid p. 137.
57 Dr. Antwi Danso V., (2014), Transcribed Interview granted to the Researcher on 6 February 2014 by Dr Antwi Danso, a Senior Research fellow and Lecturer at LECIAD.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
64 Dr. Antwi Danso V., op cit.
66 Ibid p58.
67 Dr. Gebe B.Y., (2014), Transcribed Interview granted to the Researcher on 5 February 2014 by Dr Gebe B.Y., a Senior Research Fellow and Lecturer at LECIAD.
68 Hughes, Barry B., (1997), Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives, 3rd Ed., New Jersey Prentice Hall, p. 89.
69 Holsti K.J., op cit, p. 122.
70 Ibid p. 214.
72 Hughes, Barry B, op cit. p. 103.
71 Ibid p. 55.
82 Ibid.
84 Aluko, O., op cit. P. 59.
CHAPTER THREE

GHANA’S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER
DR. K.A. BUSIA AND PROF J.E.A. MILLS

3.1 Introduction

The preceding chapters identified the foundation of Ghana’s foreign policy since independence and established the extent to which previous leaders have over the years maintained or deviated from the foundation pillars of the country’s policy in the international system. The chapters identified the various factors which informed the direction of the foreign policies of Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills. In this chapter, the research is entirely devoted to discussing Ghana’s foreign policy under the two leaders as influenced by the attributes identified in the preceding chapters. This will bring to light, in comparative terms, the extent to which these two leaders either maintained or deviated from the identified pillars of the country’s foreign policy, and if there was any deviation, the extent to which the deviation might have affected Ghana’s leadership role in African affairs. The chapter therefore discusses the policy of economic diplomacy, Ghana’s West African policy, the country’s policy towards Africa and the rest of the world, the policy of non-alignment, and the policy toward international organizations.

3.2 International Economic Relations

The prevailing domestic economic condition of every country is a major determinant in every government’s economic relations in international circles. As discussed in the previous chapter, both Dr. K.A Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills served Ghana under different domestic conditions which impacted on their decisions in the international system. What seem to be peculiar to the domestic condition of both leaders is the indebted state of the economy which compelled the leaders to be proactive in their economic relations with actors in the international system. The attribute of
economic capability of Ghana at the time of the governments of Dr. K.A Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills hence underpinned their policy choice on economic relations.

3.2.1 Dr. Busia’s Economic Relations

Busia and his Progress Party, in their economic agenda, set out in the party’s manifesto to build a vibrant economy that will improve the standard of living of the citizenry. The manifesto, among other things, sought to make judicious use of foreign aid, promote trade liberalization and foreign direct investment while ensuring that the balance of payment disequilibria that was characteristic with the economy was corrected. The PP also sought in its manifesto to promote nationalism by involving the collective efforts of the citizens to salvage the economy.¹

The economic position of the PP (as reflected in the party’s manifesto) which Dr. Busia led was informed by the state of the economy which the party inherited. The economic inheritance of the PP could be traced to the Nkrumah government in spite of the intervention by the NLC led by Brigadier A.A. Afrifa. According to Brigadier A.A. Afrifa, as cited by Uwechue, R., in Africa Today, the NLC took over a total external debt (incurred by the Nkrumah administration) of about eight hundred and eighty nine million cedis (¢889,000,000.00) out of which only about two hundred and twenty million (¢220,000,000.00) cedis was paid by the NLC.² However, at the time of handing over to the PP government, the NLC, compelled by the need to run its government and to undertake developmental projects, had incurred about three hundred and thirty four million cedis (¢334,000,000.00) in external debt through borrowing, bringing the total external debt of Ghana at the inception of the second republic to about 1.3 billion cedis at an existing exchange rate at the time of less than ¢1.50 to $1.00.³
The internal situation informed the vigorous economic policy of the Busia government under the Second Republican Constitution. To help salvage the country from its economic predicaments, Busia turned to the World Bank – or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) – and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for assistance. Upon the advice of these institutions, Dr. Busia sort the assistance of the Harvard Development Advisory Service (DAS) to compose an economic advisory board in conjunction with Ghanaian officials to plan the economic recovery of the country.\(^4\) The DAS, together with its Ghanaian counterparts, composed a 12–member business advisory board to formulate economic policies for the country.

Dr. Busia’s decision to seek external technical support in taking economic policy decisions could be viewed in different lights. It could be that Dr. Busia personally lacked confidence in the capacity of the institutions of state to formulate credible economic policies to move the country forward. It could also be attributed to the pressure from creditors to satisfy a precondition for qualification for financial assistance. In spite of the internal opposition from the Minister for Finance to the decisions of DAS, Busia’s insistence on sticking to the external support could be ascribed to the discretionary powers granted him by the constitution and his personal preferences. Again, Dr. Busia’s resort to seeking support from the IBRD and IMF could be due to the internal economic pressure.

Ronald T. Libby extensively dwelled on the subject of Busia’s economic relations with the IMF and the IBRD in an article “External Co-optation of a Less Developed Country's Policy Making: The Case of Ghana”. According to Libby, the IBRD as a precondition for giving economic aid to Ghana, recommended a number of measures in solution to the economic crisis. For instance, to
help solve the budgetary and BOP challenges, the IBRD recommended, among others, that the Dr. Busia government devalue the cedi or increase import charges rather than using budgetary measures in finding solution to the BOP problem. The bank also suggested that the country should end the 180 day pay arrangement of importing goods on credit and resort to cash payment for imports. In order to gain the confidence of creditors, the country was employed by the IBRD to settle all private foreign debts while discouraging the use of Bank of Ghana credit in financing imports to cut down on government expenditure. In a similar vein, the IMF in a letter of intent, among other things, recommended a 44% devaluation relative to the dollar. It further recommended a credit ceiling of $137.2 million in the banking system and a reduction in short term arrears by $25 million by the end of 1972. Furthermore, Ghana was advised to avoid incurring medium term debts, maintain recurrent expenditure to a maximum of 5% and eliminate the entire country’s short term (180 day) debts. Additionally, the government of Ghana per the conditions was to prepare a comprehensive economic program acceptable by the IMF in other to access the support of the IBRD and other creditor countries including Britain. DAS in reaction to the IBRD and IMF demands, recommended devaluation of the cedi by 49%, a cut in recurrent and development budget, reduction in subsidies to government organizations, increased tax levels and restriction on credits. These measures were aimed at improving the image of Ghana before its creditors so as to ultimately help the country access the needed funds for development.

It is noteworthy that although Dr. Busia reposed confidence in the DAS, he did not entirely neglect the views of the advice of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Minister responsible for economic planning. Even though there was a high level of antagonism between the Prime Minister and his minister for Finance and Economic Planning, Honorable J.H. Mensah, Dr. Busia considered the
position of the Minister before arriving on his decision. J.H. Mensah, recommended higher rate of devaluation. Dr. Busia, in consultation with his cabinet and in line with the provisions of the second Republican Constitutions, on 27 December 1971, devalued the cedi up to 82% representing $1.8 to $1 resulting in a $24.5 million budgetary cut. The devaluation forced a hike of about 92% in import prices with its attendant high cost of living pegged at about 14% due to the overdependence of the country on imported goods. The reflex effect of the devaluation on the PP government showed how unpopular it became, creating the environment for political instability evidenced in the military takeover that followed in January 1972.

Dr. Busia did not limit his economic relations to only the IMF and the IBRD. In July 1970, Busia attempted negotiating with Ghana’s creditors for a refinancing of the country’s medium term debt with a 40 year loan payable with an interest rate of 2% and a 10 year moratorium. Unfortunately, the effort did not yield the needed results as creditors demanded a 100% amortization of loans the government of Ghana took under the 1966 – 1968 agreement. This failed negotiated effort compelled Busia to turn to Britain (Ghana’s former colonial master) for assistance in 1971. Heath, the then Prime Minister of Britain agreed to refinance Ghana’s debt with a loan of £3.5 million at an interest rate of 2% payable in 25 years with a 7 year moratorium and an export credit for the ensuing Christmas period.

3.2.2 Challenges to Dr. Busia’s Economic Relations

Dr. Busia faced institutional challenges as far as formulating and implementing economic policy for Ghana was concerned. He inherited a country which hitherto depended on the elitist approach to foreign policy making. Dr. Kwame Nkrumah employed this approach in his foreign policy
decisions hence, the foreign ministry was not well developed as an institution capable of assisting the newly constituted PP government. Aside Dr. Busia’s pro-west orientation, the lack of strong institution might probably have informed the IMF and World Bank decision to advise the PP government to invite DAS to provide the country with expertise economic advice. Ghana’s economic policies at the time of Dr. Busia was hence greatly influenced by foreign flavor which could not be guaranteed as far as national interest was concerned. This was amply demonstrated through the stiff opposition from Hon J.H. Mensah, the then Minister for finance and Economic Planning to most of the decisions by Dr. Busia.

Another challenge Dr. Busia faced was the conflict between him and the Minister for Finance Hon J.H. Mensah. According to Ronald T. Libby, Hon J.H. Mensah has been opposed to the Prime Minister in a number of policy areas. He was opposed to decisions of DAS, the main economic advisory body to Prime Minister Busia. J.H. Mensah was the first to oppose the World Bank and IMF recommendation for Ghana to increase import tax and devalue its currency at 44% in terms of the USA dollar. He was of the view that the devaluation will demand a $44.1 million budgetary cut. However, in a worst case scenario, he recommended a higher rate of devaluation of $1.818 = $1 which would result in a 24.5 million budgetary cut instead of 44.1 million cut which the 44% devaluation would lead to. A higher rate of devaluation he thinks would lead to increase revenue in the next budgetary year. Additionally, Ghanaians would once and for all suffer the economic difficulties associated with devaluation instead of a bit by bit devaluation. For the proposals to increase import tax to discourage imports as a solution to the BOP problem, J.H. Mensah argued that the government’s 1971/72 budgetary policies was capable of reducing exports and correcting BOP disequilibria. Mensah also disagreed with the PP government paying 100% of the debt due
under the 1966 and 1968 agreements because this would deny the government the opportunity of debt rescheduling. Mensah’s position on the 100% repayment of debt to creditors was that, Ghana should be given the opportunity to negotiate with its creditors separately instead of the blanket requirement to pay all of them. J.H. Mensah equally rejected the limit placed on the banking system because he felt that this would pose difficulties to cocoa buyers.\textsuperscript{13} These oppositions from J.H. Mensah, the Minister for Finance and Economic Planning to Dr. Busia’s economic decisions posed challenge to the PP government’s international economic relations to the extent that the Prime Minister had to relieve J.H. Mensah of the portfolio of Economic Planning leaving him with the Ministry of Finance.\textsuperscript{14}

### 3.2.3 Prof J.E.A. Mill’s Economic Relations

The NDC, in its 2008 manifesto which brought Mills to power called for the pursuit of an “activist and enabling state” that will help boost business growth and credit access. It also sought to promote Ghana’s access to international markets by pursuing efforts to gain “relief in international trade arrangements to protect domestic industry.”\textsuperscript{15} In line with its manifesto, Prof Atta Mills embarked on economic restructuring which consisted of sound fiscal measures aimed at controlling the value of the Ghanaian currency. Statistical indices show that for unprecedented three consecutive years under Prof. Mills, Ghana scored a single digit inflation.\textsuperscript{16} Consequently, a number of countries including China, Japan, Germany, USA. etc. became interested in entering bilateral business agreements with Ghana as a result of the stable economic environment.\textsuperscript{17} China under its Economic and Technical Cooperation (ETC), provided numerous assistance to Ghana. For instance, according to Mohan and Kokutse as cited in “China’s Development Initiatives in Ghana, 1961-2011”, President Mills in 2010, negotiated a $15 billion fund for oil infrastructure development.\textsuperscript{18}
Mill’s negotiation with China also resulted in the China National Offshore Oil Corporation buying exclusive rights to a portion of the Jubilee Oil Fields.\textsuperscript{19} Additionally, Ghana contracted with the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, or Sinopec, to build a natural gas processing plant in the Western region.\textsuperscript{20} Other benefits Ghana enjoyed was the offer of a $622 million loan towards the construction of a hydroelectric dam at Bui. Similarly, under the economic negotiations of Prof. Mills, Ghana under the Chinese etc was given a $99 million interest-free loan to construct landing sites for fishing communities, provide social services, build schools and hospitals, and support educational exchanges and scholarships.\textsuperscript{21}

Prof. Mill’s economic relations was not only pro-east. He maintained relations with the west, especially with the USA. The Mills administration maintained good economic relations with the USA evidenced by the visit of President Obama to Ghana in July 2009.\textsuperscript{22} “The Obama Administration regards Ghana as a stable and democratic country and as among the most trusted partners” of the United States in Africa, a sentiment that reflects broad continuity with the Bush Administration’s view of Ghana.”\textsuperscript{23} According to the State Department’s FY 2010 Congressional Budget, U.S. assistance is targeted at helping Ghana to address a number of challenges brought about by economic difficulties, including health care and education.\textsuperscript{24}

3.3 African Policy

Ghana’s foreign policy on Africa is founded on the pillar laid by its first president Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Ghana’s policy for Africa has been for the unity of the continent, emancipation of the continent from all forms of oppression, ranging from colonial rule, through tyranny of war to economic oppression. Ghana has over the years committed itself to improving sub-regional
development through maintenance of peace and economic stability. The country has also over the years maintained the policy of good neighborliness. Dr. Busia and Prof J.E.A Mill’s African policy will be viewed in this light of Ghana’s pillars to African policy. These pillars are guaranteed by the attributes enshrined in the constitution of the republic coupled with the demands of the geographical location of the country.

3.3.1 Dr. K.A. Busia’s African Policy

Kwame Nkrumah linked the independence of Ghana to the total liberation of the African continent. In one of his speeches at an OAU conference in Accra, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in pushing forward his African unity agenda said, “today we [Africans] are one. If in the past the Sahara divided us, now it unites us”. Nkrumah was of the believe that the mid-20th century was for Africa and that it was a decade of African independence. He wanted a united Africa where “an injury to one is an injury to all...” Dr. Busia made a similar declaration in continuation of the foreign policy pillar on the subject of emancipation. For Dr. Busia, “the one issue on which the circumstances of the time compelled Ghana to adopt a definite policy at independence was the issue of colonialism in Africa and the forging of closer links among African states. Total emancipation from colonial domination was and is still a cardinal principle of Ghana’s foreign policy.” For Dr. Busia, in spite of the near end of colonialism, the subject of total emancipation is still relevant and contemporary. He however differed in the unilateral approach for the struggle as adopted by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Dr. Busia felt that the leadership role of Ghana was too domineering and self-imposed rather than a collaborative effort of all African states.
Dr. K.A. Busia’s position for emancipation was the gradual and non-radical approach to the process. In the struggle against the apartheid South Africa for instance, Dr. K.A. Busia’s policy was pro-dialogue with the apartheid regime, contrary to the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) position of no dialogue. The position of Dr. K.A. Busia lends credence to the assertion by Aluko that over the years after Kwame Nkrumah, successive governments have deviated slightly from the basic pillars of the country’s foreign policy. Dr. K.A. Busia failed to go along with other African presidents, a foreign policy position which aroused diplomatic uproar, reducing Ghana’s image as the hitherto leader of the fight against oppression. Dr. K.A. Busia was largely criticized both home and abroad for his deviant position on the South African issue resulting in the international isolation of Ghana. His position on apartheid South Africa was therefore considered a major mistake, a deviation from the commitment of the OAU to liberate other African countries including South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tome etc. Dr. K.A. Busia and his PP government, although favored the subject of total emancipation, did not believe in a radical approach to the issue. This stand might be as a result of a shared opposition to Nkrumah’s approach or probably due to the background of Dr. K.A. Busia as a first class democrat. For other analysts such as Boafo-Arthur, the position of the PP government on South Africa might not only be as a result of the party’s liberal democratic tendencies but also the fact that Africa did not have what it would take in terms of military might to prosecute the use of force against the apartheid regime.

3.3.2 Ghana’s Foreign Policy towards West Africa under Dr. Busia

Busia in his foreign relations, attempted to maintain the pillar of African unity as was established by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. Victor Owusu, Minister of Foreign Affairs as quoted in Asante K.B., Foreign Policy Making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century, declared the PP government’s
support for a political union of the African continent. However, the approach to the unity the government was to adopt differed from that of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. The PP “believe that a political union of African states is a desirable objective but unlike the Nkrumah regime, we [the PP government] think it is necessary to lay the proper foundation first through functional co-operation particularly at the [sub]-regional level…”

Obviously, it was the intention of Busia to strengthen the sub-regional organizations on the continent, a gradual and incremental process that will ultimately lead to the union of the entire African continent. Therefore, according to Victor Owusu, “the Busia administration is committed to the early establishment of a West African Economic Community.”

One would therefore have expected that Dr. Busia would champion the ideals of an economic community in the West African sub-region to include free movement of personnel, goods and services. Unfortunately, the PP government stained its policy of unity with the introduction of the Aliens’ Compliance Order (ACO), an Act of Parliament which required all foreign nationals without resident permits to leave the country within two weeks. Dr. Busia, out of the economic frustrations of the country, passed this Act of Parliament at the detriment of efforts at uniting the continent. The reasons assigned to the issue of the order were that there had been increase in the crime wave in the country which was blamed on foreigners. Additionally, foreigners were alleged to be involved in smuggling activities resulting in revenue loss to the country. The fast growth of the county’s population had no corresponding job creation consequently retarding economic growth as a result of the high rate of unemployment. Busia therefore felt that the country’s economy could not support the growing number of aliens and therefore must leave. This policy choice strained Ghana’s foreign relations in the international system and made the Busia government unpopular, accounting for a decline in Ghana’s leadership role in African affairs.
3.3.3 Ghana’s Foreign Policy towards its Neighbors under Busia

Relations with its neighbors had been a major foreign policy decision for Ghana since independence primarily because of the country’s geographical location. The existing relations between Ghana and its neighbors at the time of Nkrumah was described by Boafo-Arthur Kwame as friendly.\(^{41}\) Dr. Busia at the birth of his government worked to improve Ghana’s relations with its neighbors. He paid state visits to Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, (then Upper Volta) and Togo. Relations of Ghana with its neighbor improved from mere friendship to good neighbors with the signing of a number of treaties and setting up of commissions for mutual benefits. For instance, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire set up a joint commission to resolve border issues between the two countries while a separate commission was also to exploit areas of cooperation between the two countries.\(^{42}\) Ghana under Busia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Understanding with Cote d’Ivoire aimed at strengthening relations between the two states.\(^{43}\) It was therefore not surprising at all that following the good relations between Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, the two countries had the same policy choice towards the apartheid regime in South Africa. Burkina Faso entered into a similar treaty of friendship with Ghana with the vision of establishing a permanent commission with the responsibility of implementing decisions made by leaders of the two countries.\(^{44}\) The two countries cooperated well in areas of energy, agriculture, transport and telecommunication.\(^{45}\) Unfortunately, Busia could not maintain the relations he struggled hard to improve upon from what he inherited. The passing of the ACO and the policy of dialogue with apartheid regime marred his efforts. The ACO in particular affected citizens of Ghana’s neighbors including Upper Volta, Togo and particularly Nigeria whose majority of citizens were businessmen in Ghana.\(^{46}\)
3.3.4 Prof. Mills’ African /West African Policy

President Atta Mills took over the reins of Ghana at the period when the leadership of president Kufuor put the country at a high pedestal in African affairs. After a long period of Ghana’s image as the touch bearer of Africa during the Nkrumah era diming over time, the Kufuor and the NPP government brought Ghana back into the limelight. This was evidenced in the fact that Ghana was given the mantle (at the Eight AU Heads of State and Government meeting in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa on 29th Jan 2007) to chair the affairs of the union in a unanimous decision after a widespread disapproval of the candidacy of Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir (because of his handling of the Darfur conflict). In president Kufuor’s own words, it was “an honour not for [him] but also for the government and people of Ghana.” He also served two terms as Chairman of ECOWAS in 2003 and 2007. Ghana under the aegis of Kufuor has been instrumental in the peaceful resolution of conflicts around the continent including those in Kenya, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia.

Mills inherited a towering Ghanaian image which by itself was a challenge to his attitude towards the continent. Even though Mills alluded to Ghana’s traditional pillar of foreign policy towards Africa, it was obvious from his records that he was not interested in embarking on vigorous policy towards Africa as did his predecessor. A country’s standing in the international system can be measured by a number of criteria. One such criteria is the international respect and invitations the president of a country receive from other actors in the international system. It wasn’t by accident that President Kufuor was invited during his regime to G8 summits. It was in recognition of the sterling performance of Ghana under President Kufuor that he was invited on state visit to the Buckingham Palace – London and the White House – USA. Ghana was selected as one of the
only two countries to attend the state visit in both cases.\textsuperscript{53} With this shining image of Ghana, the Mills administration was faced with raising the standard higher or in the worst case, maintaining the status quo.

Prof. Mills, since coming to power on 7 January 2009, demonstrated his commitment to anchor the core principles of his foreign policy on those initiated by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. He declared the birth day of Nkrumah as Founder’s Day after setting up the Prof. Akilakpa Sawyerr Committee to recommend fitting means of preserving the memory of Nkrumah.\textsuperscript{54} Though Mills intended to anchor his foreign policy principles on the pillars established by Nkrumah, his approach to the implementation differed.\textsuperscript{55}

Even though Prof. Mills had open declaration of support for African affairs, the kind of policy pursued by his administration did not give priority to the continent as did his predecessors President Nkrumah and President Kufuor. Similar to Dr. Busia, Prof Mills’ African policy has being described as seeking the “easier way out.”\textsuperscript{56} The easier way out because Dr. Busia and Prof Mills rejected the seemingly difficult stand of the then OAU using force against apartheid and the ECOWAS using same to result the Ivorian election crisis. In the Ivorian election dispute resulting in the civil war of 2011, one would have expected that Mills would adopt a multilateral approach to the issue which was consistent with the constitutional provisions of the country and with the shining image he inherited. The international community of nations, including the West African sub-regional body – ECOWAS, expected Ghana to play her usual leadership role in the Ivorian affair. On the contrary, Prof Mills declared the “dzi wo fie asem” (mind your own business) policy, a decision which “lacked diplomatic precision and also inconsistent with the broader tenets of
Ghana’s foreign policy … since independence.”57 Opinions differ on the “dzi wo fie asem” policy position. Dr Boni Yao Gebe asserts that the policy was a rational choice and could not have any effect on Ghana’s image because relations between Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana remains cordial. According to him, the visit of the Ivorian President Mr. A. Ouattara to Ghana to thank Mills for his support to the Ivorian people lend credence to the assertion.58 A broader view of the policy within the context of multilateralism have different opinion. The policy position came as a big surprise to the AU so much so that the Union had to send the Prime Minister of Kenya, His Excellency Raila Odinga to come to Ghana to understand her position on the Ivorian issue.59

Ghana again faced international disappointment when President Mills on a state visit to South Africa at the crescendo of the Libyan crises could not state the unequivocally state the position of Ghana on the Libyan crisis. When he was asked by the media to comment on Ghana’s position on events unfolding in the Maghreb, he replied to effect that Ghana would be watching events and at the appropriate time would take a decision that would take into consideration the best interest of the Libyan people. This indecisive stand is an indication that “Ghana’s role in Africa and world affairs is buried in the labyrinth of a muted African voice.”60

3.3.5 Ghana’s Foreign Policy Towards its Neighbors under Prof. Mills

The policy of good neighborliness remains one of the status of Ghana’s foreign policy over the years. It is worthy of note that Mills remained committed to the policy throughout his tenure of office until his death.61 The NPP administration which Mills inherited had made efforts to improve upon existing relations with Ghana’s neighbors while patching up sour ones.62 For instance, President Kufuor used his first few days in office trekking to neighboring countries, including
Togo and Burkina Faso to re-establish relations that were hitherto not in good taste. Bad neighborliness before the advent of President Kufuor led to Burkina Faso building two dams upstream the Volta River which feeds the Volta Dam in Ghana and the consequent seasonal spillage and destruction of life and property along the catchment areas of the river when valves were opened by the Burkinabe. Kufuor re-established better relations with neighbors and this good relation was to a large extent maintained by President Mills during his tenure. Prof. Mills maintained security of neighboring countries as a top priority to Ghana. He therefore maintained troops in Cote d’Ivoire to keep the peace and extended similar gestures to other countries in the sub-region, notably Liberia and Sierra Leone where military contingents and staff officers respectively work to ensure peace and security. Ghana, during the time of President Mills continued to play host to Ivorian refugees. However, in the face of this good relations came the Mills policy of “dzi wo fie asem” which introduced an element of mutual suspicion with Cote d’Ivoire and neighbors in general.

3.4 Policy of Non-Alignment

The world was divided into two poles after the World War II and controlled by the two superpowers – the Unite States of America and the Soviet Union. The two poles forming the Eastern Communist Bloc and the Western Capitalist Bloc were controlled by the Soviet Union and the USA respectively. The division came about as a result of the rivalry for superiority. The more the states on one side, the more superior support that bloc had in world affairs. The intentions of these blocs were however to promote the development of their allies. Hence, the development of states were linked to the pole to which they were aligned. This power struggle gave birth to the Cold War. A number of countries however felt that it was safer to be on the fence. These countries,
mainly of Afro-Asian in origin formed the NAM. The NAM was founded in former Yugoslavia in 1961 and the countries of the NAM represent nearly two-thirds of the UN members and made up of 55% of the world population. NAM’s purpose as stated in the Havana Declaration of 1979 is to ensure “the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the Non-Aligned countries” of which Dr Kwame Nkrumah fought hard as a founding member.

The relevance of NAM was core during the era of Dr. K.A. Busia. Consequently, Dr. Busia, informed by the position of the country’s constitution, made his position known from the onset that he was going to pursue a policy of non-alignment. The aim of this policy choice, according to Boafo-Arthur, was to allow for freedom of choice in relation with any of the blocs. However, Dr. Busia was accused on several platforms, as Libby posits, for turning pro-western in his non-alignment. This deviation in his policy was largely due to the hash economic conditions he inherited and his quest to find solutions that will better the living condition of the Ghanaian citizenry. His bias was evident in his speeches both home and abroad emphasizing that “our historical contacts and experiences have brought it about that we share more common interest with some countries at this point of time [more] than with others.”

Post-Cold War benefits of NAM to Ghana remains the fact that it offers the forum for the nation to air its views on issues pertaining to the development of small and marginalized countries that include Ghana. It also affords the opportunity to relate freely with all countries across the globe. Prof Mills therefore maintained the status quo of Ghana’s foreign policy with the NAM.
3.5 Policy towards other International Organizations

Ghana’s foreign policy towards sub-regional, regional and international organizations to which the country is a member is informed by the position of the constitution. Apart from the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the ECOWAS, and the NAM, the constitution makes specific mention of the Commonwealth and the United Nations of which Ghana has memberships.

3.5.1 Ghana and the UN

The UN, an offshoot of the failed League of Nations was formed in 1945 to unite the efforts of all peace-loving nations to prevent the recurrence of such world disasters as the WWII. The Charter of the organization outlines its objective to include promoting fundamental human rights and saving the world from the scourge of war that devastated humanity in WWII. The leadership role of Ghana was made possible when it became the 81 member of the UN after independence in 1957 and joined other organizations such as the Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa South of the Sahara (CTCA). The major benefit Ghana has derived from joining the UN over the years was the opportunity it gained to use diplomacy at the UN platform to advance her course. Belonging to the UN, first and foremost, continue to legitimize Ghana’s statehood and guarantees the assurance of continuous state sovereignty. There is the assurance that there is a savior to run to in case of any form of aggression, be it internal or external that may threaten her statehood. As a state, Ghana had the opportunity to speak to world issues such as the support of UN resolutions for the end to apartheid in South Africa, the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, support for UN declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries, support of the Kyoto Protocol on climate change etc.
Admittedly, both Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills have in line with the pillars of Ghana’s foreign policy, submitted to the UN charter provisions on ensuring peaceful coexistence among nations and respect for human right. Both Busia and Mills made open declarations in support of the objectives of the UN. Busia declared Ghana’s vision of international relations to be brotherhood of all nations and people. This is obviously inspired by the ideals of the UN. With the increasing level of conflict in Africa and other parts of the world, Ghana under Mills witnessed continuous participation in peacekeeping in conflict torn countries.

3.5.2 Ghana and the Commonwealth

The Commonwealth Charter defines the Commonwealth as “a voluntary association of independent equal and sovereign states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and cooperating in the common interests of our peoples and in the promotion of international understanding and world peace, and influencing international society to the benefit of all through the pursuit of common principles and values.”

The Charter of the Commonwealth brings together the values and aspirations which unite the Commonwealth as outlined in the 1971 Singapore Declaration, the Lusaka Declaration of 1979, the Langkawi Declaration of 1989; the Harare Declaration of 1991; and the 2003 Aso Rock (Abuja) Declaration. It commits member states to work together to uphold and promote the fundamental values of democracy, good governance, separation of constitutional powers, public accountability and transparency. Other values include prevention of corrupt practices, protection of human rights, rule of law, freedom of the press, empowerment of women and other disadvantaged sectors of the society.
Ghana joined the Commonwealth soon after its independence because membership of the Association is compatible with the freedom of member governments to be non-aligned or to belong to any other grouping, association or alliance. Since her membership, Ghana played important and active roles under the watch of successive presidents.

The Dr. Busia led PP government, in accordance with the party’s manifesto maintained “friendly relations and cooperation with all countries, particularly those of the Commonwealth…”83 Busia hence maintained the tradition and membership of Ghana in the Commonwealth as he inherited from his predecessors.84

During the government of President Mills, Ghana played an increased role in the Commonwealth and derived consequential benefits for its membership of the organization. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Hon. Alhaji Muhammad Mumuni, served as Chair of the Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) for a two-year term, from 2009 to 2011. During this period, the CMAG wrote a report on the organization which was adopted by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 2011. The CMAG made 106 “urgent” recommendations, including the adoption of a Charter of the Commonwealth, the creation of a new Commissioner on the rule of law, democracy and human rights to track persistent human rights abuses and allegations of political repression by Commonwealth member states, the repeal of laws against homosexuality in 41 Commonwealth states and a ban on forced marriage. The adoption of the CMAG’s Report was considered one of the major achievements of the CHOGM.
Mills continued to support Ghana playing host to the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CIFTC) in its annual legislative drafting courses for the Africa region, which are held at the Ghana School of Law in Accra to ensure that the region’s priority needs continue to be addressed. The hosting of this program yearly does not only give Ghana international recognition but also serves as a means of revenue generation.

In 2011, the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC), in collaboration with the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA), organized a workshop to equip Queen Mothers with skills and knowledge to enable them contribute more effectively to good governance. This was followed by a mainstream gender program where senior policy makers and implementers were given training in order to promote gender equality.85

The CFTC offered political, legal, scientific and technical assistance in the area of the establishment of maritime zones and the negotiation of agreed boundaries with neighboring coastal states. This technical advice helped Ghana in claiming areas of extended continental shelf which resulted in securing exclusive access to additional areas of seabed, which are potential grounds for the exploration of natural resources such as oil and gas and other mineral deposits.86

In May 2010, the Mills government played host to a Pan-Commonwealth Conference of National Electoral Bodies (NEBs) which was launched in Accra to advance best electoral practices in the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Electoral Network was established to provide support and assistance to NEBs, promote their collaboration, raise standards and boost the effectiveness of these institutions, all of which play a significant role in strengthening the culture of democracy in their respective countries of which Ghana was a beneficiary.87
In 2012 the Commonwealth Foundation (CF) introduced the voter education guidelines. These were used to give grants to civil society-led activities, which raised awareness about elections. Workshops which were organized discussed issues such as the monitoring of government budgeting, media reporting on elections, and voter education. In that same year, Ghana was allocated one of the “responsive” grants amounting to £687,534.00 to support flood victims through civil society organizations. Students in various universities in Ghana, especially those from the Ghana School of Law, also received their share of the grant.⁸⁸
End Notes

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9 Ibid p. 74.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid p. 76.
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64. Lieutenant General Smith, J.H., (2014), Transcribed Interview granted by Lieutenant General Smith, former Chief of the Army Staff of the Ghana Army and Defence Minister under President Mills, to the Researcher on 6 February 2014 at Spintex, Accra.
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75. Akyeampong, H.K., op cit.
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81 Akyeampong, H.K., op cit. p. 201.
82 Charter of the Commonwealth, para. 3
83 Kakraba-Quashie, R., op cit. p. 18.
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87 Ibid.
88 Charter of the Commonwealth.
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the comparative study of Ghana’s foreign policy under the leaders in focus. The chapter makes findings of the study and draw conclusions and finally makes recommendations.

4.2 Summary of Findings

The study found out that, both Prime Minister Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. John Evans Atta Mills inherited a set of foreign policy guidelines which formed the pillars of Ghana’s foreign policy from independence. The implementation of policies along the established pillars is underpinned by a number of domestic and international attributes. The implementation of Ghana’s foreign policy under the two leaders was to a large extent influenced by these attributes. The poor state of the economy inherited by both leaders compelled them to adopt policies that could help improve the economy while the world politics of the time was equally a determining factor in their policy choices. While in some policies the leaders were found to have stacked to the traditional pillars of Ghana’s foreign policy as was outlined by Kwame Nkrumah, in some areas, they were found to have departed from the tradition while in other spheres, they deviated from the normal. Specific areas worth noting include:

a. Economic Relations. Both Dr. Busia and Prof Mills employed economic relations in their foreign policy choice. This choice was informed by the domestic and international environment prevailing at the time. Additionally, the state of the economy at the time of
the inception of both governments triggered their economic policies. Dr. Busia sorted for external expertise in spite of internal opposition from his Foreign Minister, a reflection of the leader’s preference in foreign policy decision making. The domestic economic conditions greatly informed the foreign policy of both leaders. Dr. Busia sort technical assistance from the IMF and at the end of the day went pro-west in his economic policy. Mills used domestic conditions of the economy to open up the country to investors.

b. **African Policy.** The African policy of both leaders in focus stem from the traditional pillar of emancipation of the continent from all forms of slavery and suffering. Both Dr. Busia and Prof. Mills inherited power from their predecessors at the time the image of the country in the international amphitheater was that of a leader. Dr. Busia on his part promoted the struggle for emancipation and unity of Africa through sub-regional organizations which to him could graduate incrementally to a full political union rather than a radical approach to forming such a union. Hence, Dr. Busia did not put African affairs as a front burner as did his predecessors. Prof. Mills’ government equally saw an increase in Ghana’s role in ensuring sub-regional and regional peace and security to promote emancipation, unity and development. However, both Prof Mills and Dr. Busia took decisions that negatively affected Ghana’s leadership role in African affairs. Dr. Busia’s ACO (which initially was intended to be an economic policy) and policy of dialogue with Apartheid regime and Prof. Mill’s “Dzi wofie Asem” policy greatly accounted negative perception of Ghana’s leadership role at their time. In both cases, the policy of good neighborliness was dented as both the ACO and the “Dzi wofie Asem” isolated Ghana.
c. **Non-Aligned.** Busia professed to be non-aligned as far as the PP government was concerned. It was a tenet inherited from the pillars of the country’s foreign policy as established by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah under the CPP government of the first republic. Busia in a bid to address the hash economic conditions of the country was compelled to deviate from this policy choice. Busia went pro-west to seek technical assistance to recover the dwindling economy. Prof. Mills at the time of being in office had no choice of aligning himself to any of the poles as did Busia. Mills had the luxury of liberalism and a unipolar political order. Hence, he maintained the status quo as far as Ghana’s relations with NAM was concerned. Unlike Mills, Busia had a more difficult choice because of the international politics at the time of his government. Although Busia professed to be non-aligned, he leaned pro-west at the end of the day. This was partly due to the economic condition at the time of his government. Also, the overthrow of Nkrumah hyped the downgrading of socialism and uplifted liberalism. Mills’ luxury of relating to all countries and actors in the international system left him less risk of being guilty of biases.

d. **Policy towards other International Organizations.** Both Busia and Mills maintained relations with international organizations as per constitutional demands. However, they failed to take advantage of multilateralism to pursue foreign policies consistent with the provisions of the constitution. While Busia failed to go along with the defunct OAU, Mills similarly did so with the ECOWAS. Their rational policy choice ended getting Ghana isolated.
4.3 Conclusions

Within the framework of the rational actor model, a country’s foreign policy could be formulated and implemented to reflect the goals and preferences of the individual and/or the society they represent. Differences in individual preferences and the interests of society may cause deviation from what is considered generally accepted to working towards achieving set goals, deviating from the generally held belief. For a country to be effective in formulating policies which reflect its set goals and preferences, there must exist some factors. These may include the preponderance of a country’s economy, its military capability, the international economic and political environment in which the country finds itself, the geographical environment, the constitutional provisions of the country and the preference of the president in power at a point in time.

These factors referred to as the attributes of foreign policy determine how active a country becomes in the international scene. Ghana under Dr. Busia and Prof. Mills was handicapped in these attributes, hence, the resort to the use of soft power in other to survive in the system. For instance, the absence of military power, might have compelled Dr. Busia and Prof. Mills to go for dialogue with South Africa and “Dzi Wofie Asem” policies respectively. Dr. Busia solicited assistance of DAS and adopted the ACO due to lack of economic credibility. While geographical location could be of benefit in foreign relations, it could also have its negatives. Ghana’s location coupled with its history as a leader in Africa places enormous responsibility on the country in deciding on African affairs. A failure to take up such responsibilities risks international isolation. This was the awkward situation in which Dr. Busia and Prof. Mills put Ghana with their decision which was at variance with what was perceived by the international community.
The research based on the hypothesis that the foreign policy decisions under Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof. J.E.A. Mills negatively affected Ghana’s leadership role in African affairs. The research findings partially confirmed this hypothesis. It was concluded that some of the foreign policies of the two leaders negatively affected the leadership role of the country in championing African affairs. Mention can be made of Dr. Busia’s ACO and dialogue with apartheid South Africa. For Prof. Mills, his deviation came from his ‘Dzi Wofie Asem” policy. Safe these failures, the two leaders stacked to the other tenets of Ghana’s foreign policy as set out by their predecessors.

The two leaders in focus could be said to be rational actors. The Rational Actor theory could be viewed from two levels. The level of the individual and the state. Both Prof Mills and Dr. Busia acted individually in some instances to achieve their personal preferences. As the number one policy makers of the state, their actions were for and on behalf of the state. Hence, their personal preferences and orientations which reflected in the kind of decision they took was invariably considered a national decision. The effects thereof negatively affected the image of the country in the case of the decisions that were considered in a bad taste in the international circles.

4.4 Recommendations

Dr. K.A. Busia and Prof J.E.A. Mills at one time in history bore the responsibility of deciding for Ghana how her relations with other countries and actors in the international system should be. Some of their decisions at the end of the day, raised eyebrows both domestically and internationally. Though subject to debate, this research finds some of the policies of the two leaders under study inconsistent with the pillars of the country’s traditional foreign policy principle. To avert the recurrence of this in history, the following recommendations are made:
• Leaders of countries entrusted with the duty of deciding on the extent of the relationship of their country with other actors in the international system should make it a responsibility to ensure stability and strength of the economy they run. It is obvious that a country with a large and stable economy has the capacity to decide for itself and the ability to influence others. Busia had to make a difficult policy decision of adopting the ACO out of economic pressure. Similarly, he became aligned in a period of non-alignment partly due to the state of the economy he inherited.

• It is recommended that heads of states and governments should consider multilateralism in their policy choices. In this period of liberal democracy flourishing in a unipolar political world, not all policy choices may be rational enough to serve the national interest. A multilateral approach would therefore be more meaningful in achieving set goals. Both Busia and Mills failed to consider this factor in arriving at the ‘dialogue with apartheid’ and the ‘Dzi wofie Asem’ policies respectively.

• Leaders should not out of economic frustration cede the economic sovereignty of the state and the people they lead to foreigners. Busia virtually left the economic management of Ghana to the IMF. He left almost all economic policies in the hands of pro-west planners under the cover of seeking technical assistance. This did not inure to the benefit of the citizenry. The so called measures advised by DAS did not yield the expected result due to the fact that the peculiarity of the Ghanaian economy was not taken into account. This compelled him to adopt other failed policies such as the ACO.
Leaders should not fail in adopting prudent policies of their predecessors. The tendency of going opposite of one’s political opponent in ideology may be tantamount to politicking with the wellbeing of the citizenry. Both Busia and Mills failed to follow the pillars of Ghana’s foreign policy especially in the areas of emancipation of the African continent from all forms of slavery and hardship. This deviation resulted in reducing Ghana’s position as a leader in African affairs during their tenure of office.
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