STATECRAFT IN GHANA UNDER KWAME NKRUMAH: A CASE
STUDY OF GHANA’S ROLE IN THE CONGO CRISIS

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DECLARATION

I declare that this dissertation is the product of a research that I undertook under the supervision of Dr. Iddi Ziblim. This work has never been submitted partially or wholly elsewhere for any award.

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Date…………………..                                                                    Date…………………….

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DEDICATION

To my late father Mr. Wuni Maasu, my mother Madam Samata Salifu and the entire Wuni Maasu family, for their love and support.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincere thanks go to my supervisor Dr. Iddi Ziblim, for his enormous support and guidance, without which this work would not have been successful. I also thank my lecturers at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) and the staff of the LECIAD library for their various contributions to this research.
ABSTRACT

When the Congo went into crisis a few weeks after independence from Belgium in 1960, Ghana under President Kwame Nkrumah was the first country to come to the aid of the troubled state. Nkrumah’s deep involvement in the crisis was motivated by his grand Pan-African design to negotiate political union with as many states as possible to serve as the starting point for his proposed United States of Africa. He set out to support Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba to restore order in his country so Ghana and Congo would become a single political union. Nkrumah contributed troops to the United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC) and joined other states to find a diplomatic solution to the situation. The crisis presented Nkrumah with an opportunity to exhibit his statecraft in an international issue of that magnitude. In his bid to help resolve the crisis he ended up getting entangled in the Cold War politics of the ideological divide led by the then two super powers, the US and the USSR. His manner of conducting statecraft in the Congo also incurred the wrath of some of his fellow African leaders and turned them against him. His Congo policy was also characterized by the elitist approach to foreign policy formulation. This work concludes that Nkrumah’s Congo policy failed mainly because of weaknesses in his statecraft.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background

Every state, either large or small, has used resources and tools at its disposal to influence others in the community of nations to its advantage. When Ghana became independent in 1957, it was normal that it would join other sovereign states in the international system to negotiate in its national interest and to promote cordial relations with others.

Ghana’s role in the international system was very crucial because of its status as the first African state south of the Sahara to gain independence. At independence, it had the best civil service in sub-Saharan Africa, and a lot of natural resources. According to W. Scott Thompson, it had been a “model colony”, and so the whole world had high expectations of it. Other African states looked to Ghana for inspiration, so it had the responsibility to be a beacon of hope for them. “Ghana played a larger role in the international system than might be expected of a state of its size”.1 It was expedient for the state to demonstrate to the international community that the black man was capable of taking care of his affairs. Ghana’s role in the international system during this period was very active such that W. Scott Thompson referred to Ghana as ‘the diplomatic cockpit of Africa’.2

Ghana’s first president, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah made a commitment to liberate all other African states still under colonial rule. He saw Ghana’s independence not as an end in itself but as a means to the total liberation of the African continent.3 He decided on the foreign policies of Pan Africanism and non alignment as far as the two super powers of United States of America and the Soviet Union were concerned.4 Nkrumah was aware that, for the country to pursue its Pan
African policy independently it had to avoid getting involved in the Cold War politics of the super powers.

S. E. Quarm defines diplomacy as ‘the implementation of foreign policy and the conduct of relations between states’. Since diplomacy is the implementation of foreign policy, the degree at which Ghana could achieve its foreign policies of Pan Africanism and non alignment would depend to a large extent, on its statecraft and the diplomatic skills of its officials.

1.2 Statement of Research Problem

At Ghana’s independence, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah made a declaration that ‘the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked to the total liberation of Africa’. This declaration gave the country a huge task of championing liberation movements throughout Africa. It meant that Ghana’s statecraft had to be conducted in a way that would foster cordial relations with her sister states. Failure to have cordial relations with other African states would defeat Ghana’s goal of helping others to attain independence and the unification of the African continent.

However, by the time Ghana’s first president left office, the country’s relations with most of the African leaders, especially the country’s immediate neighbours of Togo and Ivory Coast were anything but cordial. They had deep rooted suspicion towards the country. Ghana played a key role in the Congo Crisis. Nkrumah saw that, it was in the interest of his African policy to act swiftly to confine the crisis, so that Congo would not be used as a Cold War proxy battle ground by the super powers (United States of America and the Soviet Union). He sent troops, technocrats and supplies. He sent a special fact finding mission even before the
United Nations got there. He also wrote to the UN Secretary General expressing Ghana’s readiness to send a radio link for his use in the Congo.\textsuperscript{7}

Ironically, Nkrumah’s pursuit of African unity would be the source of division among African leaders. The passion with which he pursued his African policy made African leaders to see him as a different kind of imperialist hiding under the cloak of Pan-Africanism to snatch from them their newly acquired sovereignty.\textsuperscript{8} His Congo policy did not go down well with other African leaders, who were not ready to seat back and allow Ghana ‘to steal the show’. They also wanted to have more influence in the Congo. One of Ghana’s strongest African opposition was from Guinea. According to Scott Thompson, “They disagreed with every Ghanaian proposal at meetings, as if on principle.” For example, in their competition against Ghana, they promised to give Lumumba their entire armed forces.\textsuperscript{9}

Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo led to the formation of the conservative Brazzaville group which, according to James Mayall, “saw the real enemy in the Congo as international communism and identified the African radical states as the main agents of disorder and subversion”.\textsuperscript{10} By the end of the Congo crisis, Nkrumah had accumulated a lot of enemies who were convinced that he was stirring up subversive activities against them, so that, he could have them removed and install his ideological allies.\textsuperscript{11}

The failure of Ghana’s intervention in the crisis was the beginning of Nkrumah’s external woes. His Congo policy also irritated the west, especially his decision to accept Soviet help without approval from the United Nations.\textsuperscript{12} They begun to see him as a communist agent and sought to have him removed. US secretary of State Christian A. Herter in his statement to the press stated that, Nkrumah was definitely moving towards the eastern bloc.\textsuperscript{13}
1.3 Research Questions

It is against this background that this study seeks to explore the following questions:

- How did Kwame Nkrumah conduct his statecraft?
- What was the nature of Ghana’s role in the international system?
- What was the perception of other African states about Ghana?
- What went wrong with Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo intervention?
- How did Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo affect his relations with the super powers?

1.4 Scope of Study

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s statecraft and intervention in the Congo Crisis is used as a case study. The study explores mostly the nuances of the Congo crisis, and the way Ghana under Nkrumah conducted its relations with other states in resolving the crisis.

1.5 Research Objectives

The study set to achieve the following objectives;

- Explore some of the diplomatic styles Ghana adopted in the Congo crisis;
- Analyze some of the successes and failures in Nkrumah’s statecraft;
- Explore the nature of Ghana’s relations with the international community, especially with other African states during the period under review;
- Identify some of the lapses in Ghana’s diplomacy during the Congo Crisis.
1.6 Significance of the Study

- This research seeks to throw more light on what went wrong in Ghana’s statecraft, as well as some of the successes that could be useful to people in the Foreign Service.
- It could be useful to students interested in Ghana’s diplomatic options.
- The study also adds to existing knowledge on Ghana’s statecraft and provokes further research in the area of Ghana’s diplomacy in the Congo crisis.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework of this study is Realism. Realism is a theory that focuses on what actually happens in the international system and not what ought to be. Realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin and Kenneth Waltz argue that, the ultimate goal of every state in the international system is security and power.\(^{14}\) They describe the interstate system as anarchical because there is no central authority to regulate the behaviour of states. All states are egoistic and self-seeking and always struggle to maximize their gain. Because the international system is a self-help system, each state has to struggle for its survival.\(^{15}\) Realists argue that, states only cooperate for their own gains and would withdraw their cooperation if their national interest is at stake.\(^{16}\)

Realism is based on the following assumptions:

- Realists argue that the international system is a state centric one, because states are the dominant actors in the system.
- They also argue that, states are rational actors. States do cost benefits analysis of foreign policy options available to them and decide on those that would yield the best results.
Another basic assumption of realism is that, states act authoritatively. They speak with one voice on behalf of their citizens.

Last, but not the least, realists argue that states prioritize in terms of hard power which has to do with the military-security nexus, and soft power that includes a state’s diplomatic skills and natural resources. The survival of a state in this anarchical system to a large extent would depend on its ability to be tactful in its relations with others so as to be able to negotiate for its benefits.

There are some criticisms against the realist theory. The major challenge to realism is idealism, the theory that believes in the application of norms, standards and rules in resolving common international problems. Liberal functionalists reject the realist view of the centrality of the state and argue that, the key actors in the system are specialized agencies and technocrats.

The realist view of the state as a unitary actor has also been criticized. Its critics argue that, state authority is decentralized with a multiplicity of actors and issues in the system. They emphasize the role of non state actors who also play a key role in the system. They also emphasize the multiplicity of issues such as economic and environment issues, which are equally important as the military-security nexus.

The rationality of the state is also challenged because of the possibility of misperceptions and misrepresentation in the decision making process of states.

The realist theory is the appropriate theory for this study because the Congo crisis was a manifestation of the realist view that states are the dominant actors in the inter-state system, and that, they always pursue their national interest which is defined in terms of power. The crisis was cast in a power play of state actors as suggested by the realists.
Nkrumah overestimated the power Ghana had, and so, became a victim in the high politics of the Cold War. In the end, it came down to survival of the fitters, those who wielded more power exerted more influence. According to Scott Thompson, Ghana became a model for demonstrating the limitation of the amount of influence a small state can exert in the international system.19

1.8 Literature Review

In W. Scott Thompson’s book “Ghana’s Foreign Policy, 1957 – 1966: Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State”, he throws light on the nature of the international system at the time of Ghana’s independence. He discusses some of the diplomatic opportunities available to Ghana at the time and how Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and his able ministers and foreign service officers made use of those opportunities. According to Scott Thompson, Ghana’s status as the first African state in Sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence presented her with the opportunity of championing African affairs.20

Chapter two of the book discusses some of the diplomatic initiatives undertaken by Ghana in the early years of independence. He talks about Nkrumah’s conference diplomacy which included the conference of independent African states that was held in Accra in 1958, where African leaders decided to cooperate and have one voice in the international system.21 The chapter also discusses some of the issues that cropped up in the way of Ghana on its pursuit of African unity. Scott Thompson’s work is very significant to this study because it presents Ghana’s diplomatic styles and the international setting in which the country found itself. The fourth and fifth chapters elaborate on the enormous role Ghana played in the Congo Crisis and how it affected her relations with other states22 as well as her domestic affairs.23 In chapter nine, Scott Thompson
talks about some of the consequences of Ghana’s diplomacy such as the ‘anti Nkrumah diplomatic offensive launched by West African leaders such as Presidents Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Hamani Diori of Niger and Maurice Yaméogo of Upper Volta to sabotage the 1965 OAU summit that was scheduled to take place in Accra.\textsuperscript{24} According to Scott Thompson, “in 1965, Ghana’s trade with African states decreased by about 50 percent because of strained relations with neighbors…and corruption in import licensing.”\textsuperscript{25}

Scott Thompson blames the failure of Ghana’s Congo policy on the overestimation of the country’s power by President Kwame Nkrumah. According to him, Nkrumah “failed to see where his influence could be wielded; and the Congo crisis was rapidly becoming too complex for Ghana to solve…. “ He also blames his failure on the contradictions in his strategy. On the one hand was his British Chief of Staff, General H.T. Alexander, and on the other, his diplomats in the Congo, headed by Ambassador Andrew Djin. Alexander and Djin gave Nkrumah contradictory advice, and from all indications, Nkrumah trusted Alexander more than his diplomats. According to Thompson, the Alexander factor was a source of embarrassment to the Ghanaian contingent because he was white; and other African states used that against Ghana. It was the Alexander factor and the presence of white officers in the Ghanaian Army that led to the demand of the Congolese that, the Ghanaian troops be sent home.\textsuperscript{26}

Scott Thompson’s work is a good piece for any study in Ghana’s role in the Congo crisis. However, even though he mentioned that “on the outcome of the crisis depended his plans for the unity of Africa;”\textsuperscript{27} he did not focus on Nkrumah’s African policy. This study takes a different view from Thompson’s in the sense that, it takes a critical look at Nkrumah’s African policy and how that influenced his involvement in the Congo crisis. It also throws more light on how Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo crisis contributed to the failure of his African policy. Some
aspects of Nkrumah’s unorthodox diplomacy that are missing in Thompson’s work, such as the use of radio to broadcast inspirational messages are discussed.

Another book of relevance to this study is Charles Hayman’s book “The Politics of African Diplomacy and Decolonization: The African experience in Cold War Diplomacy”. The author talks about some aspects of Ghana’s diplomacy under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. He discusses some of the unorthodox diplomatic methods which, according to Hayman ‘most of his African leaders considered as subversion against their states’. Chapter three of the book discusses Nkrumah’s introduction of labour attaches in the Foreign Service. He gives us his personal experience as a trade union diplomat under Dr. Nkrumah. He explains how the initiative generated conflict between the trade union diplomats and career diplomats.

The author also throws more light on some of the challenges Ghana faced in the Cold War international system and the strategies the country adopted to overcome them. Chapter six of the book talks about how the west infiltrated the national security network of the state and how the Cold War ideologies affected Ghana’s diplomacy.

Heymann’s work is relevant to the work because it brings to light some aspects of Nkrumah’s statecraft and the international environment within which he operated. However, this study focuses on Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo crisis and how his statecraft impacted positively or negatively in his Congo intervention. Also, Heymann does not seem to find any shortfall in Nkrumah’s diplomacy. This study attempts to explore more on some of the lapses of Nkrumah’s diplomacy and how that affected his Congo intervention.

In his book “Peace without Power; Ghana’s Foreign Policy 1957 – 1966”, Kwesi Armah discusses the general principles of Ghana’s foreign policy at the time of independence in chapter two. The chapter talks about the country’s policies of African unity and non alignment. He also
Armah says that, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suffered as a result of the Congo crisis. According to him, the crisis brought about interdepartmental rivalries because of the creation of the Congo Co-coordinating Committee at the presidency. He explains how the creation of the Committee led to the dispatch of some competent staff of the Foreign Ministry such as the Principal Secretary Michael Dei-Anang and Deputy Principal Secretary Richard Quarshie to the Congo, leaving the ministry deprived of “direct participation in the Crisis.”

Kwesi Armah gives us an insight into some of Nkrumah’s informal diplomacy. He gives us information on some of the public diplomacy tools that Dr. Nkrumah used to influence and to inform African leaders and the public. Public diplomacy tools such as the African Affairs Secretariat, Bureau of African Affairs, scholarships and material aid to freedom fighters and the all African Peoples Conference of 1958, are discussed by the author. He also explains the kind of relations that existed between Ghana and some of the major powers such as the United States of America, the Soviet Union, and China.

In chapter four of the book, the author talks about the Ghanaian approach to African unity. According to him, Ghana served as the key centre for the Pan-African movement, and provided both the organizational basis and monetary support for it. He explains how the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana made provisions for the advent of United States of Africa. According to him:

In the preamble, the people of Ghana declared that they enacted their Constitution “In the confident hope that by their actions this day might help to further the development of a Union of African States”. Article 2 provided that “In the confident expectation of an early surrender of sovereignty to a union of African states and territories, the people now confer on Parliament the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana.

He discusses Nkrumah’s dedication to African unity and how he formed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union, as a nucleus of the Union of African States, which would be subsequently joined by other
states. Special committees were set up to identify practical ways of achieving the objectives of the union. He also discusses the opposition to Nkrumah’s concept of African unity and the nuances of the rival groupings, namely the Casablanca, Brazzaville and Monrovia groups.

Armah’s work is relevant to this work because it gives the constitutional basis for Nkrumah’s pursuit of African unity and the measures he put in place to achieve it. The author goes further to explain how some of his actions brought about rivalry in the departments. However, Armah does not give us an insight into Ghana’s shuttle diplomacy in the Congo crisis and how it affected Nkrumah’s foreign policy. This study seeks to throw more light on that.

S. E. Quarm’s book “Diplomatic Offensive: An Overview of Ghana’s Diplomacy under Dr. Kwame Nkrumah” offers very relevant information on some aspects of Ghana’s statecraft and diplomacy during the period under review.

The second chapter discusses some of the diplomatic ways and means that are employed by diplomats. The author also touches on some tools of informal diplomacy that are used to influence and inform the general public of other states. He gives some insight into Dr. Nkrumah’s public diplomacy instruments such as the external department of Radio Ghana, the African Affairs Bureau and the Ghana Trade Union Congress, sources of soft power which Nkrumah used to his advantage, since he lacked credible military and economic might, as compared to the big powers at that time. According to him, Nkrumah used the External Department of Radio Ghana as a public diplomacy tool to broadcast inspirational messages of African liberation and unity in different languages such as Swahili, Portuguese, French and Arabic to freedom fighters and liberation movements in Africa and beyond.

The third and fourth chapters discuss Ghana’s pursuit of African liberation and unification. Some of the strategies Ghana employed and the resistance that sprung up out of suspicion of some
African leaders of Ghana’s real intentions in African unity are also discussed by the author. Quarm says that, “all the freedom-fighters who were later to lead their countries to independence and become prime ministers and presidents were present” at the All-African Peoples conference that Nkrumah organized in Accra in December 1958. He attributes the success of the liberation struggle all over Africa to the inspiration, motivation and moral support freedom fighters got from the conference, coupled with financial and military assistance Ghana gave them. He laments how Nkrumah’s opponents and “imperialist/colonialist West” labeled his liberation activities as subversion and how the liberation training camps were opened to the West as evidence of his subversion, after the overthrow of Nkrumah.38

Quarm’s work is relevant to this study because he discusses some of the instruments of Nkrumah’s statecraft. He also explains how Nkrumah contributed to the success of the liberation struggle. However, his work focuses on his experience as a trade union diplomat under Nkrumah. He does not discuss Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo. His work also falls short of the lapses in Nkrumah’s diplomacy.

Chapter two and three of Richard D. Mahoney’s “JFK: Ordeal in Africa” gives a lot of information on the nuances of the Congo crisis. Mahoney talks about how Congo became a Cold War proxy battle field for the super powers.

In chapter two, Mahoney talks about how Patrice Lumumba’s call to America for help to end the Katanga rebellion fell on deaf ears, and how that compelled the desperate Lumumba to turn to the Soviet Union which was ready to help.39 Mahoney says that, America misunderstood Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and exaggerated his communist tendencies, which led to the decision of the US to incite and support Joseph Mobutu to stage a military coup and the CIA plot to assassinate Lumumba. Mahoney explains how CIA Director Allen Dulles cabled American
representatives in the Congo for the assassination of Lumumba. According to him, “CIA Director Allen Dulles sent a cable to CIA Station Chief Lawrence Devlin in which he stressed that, in the view of “high quarters here”, Lumumba’s “removal must be an urgent and prime objective.”

He goes on to attribute this misunderstanding to bad reporting on the part of American diplomats in the Congo who according to him, lacked diplomatic expertise because they were appointed based on their contributions to political party and not on merit.

The author also discusses the meeting between President Kwame Nkrumah and the American president Eisenhower. He explains how Nkrumah tried to persuade Eisenhower to support the United Nations (UN) operation in the Congo but was not satisfied with the assurances he got. Consequently, in his address at the UN General Assembly, he attacked the west as being imperialist and working to prevent Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu from reconciling. This marked the beginning of his troubles, because, in reaction to his remarks, the US Secretary of State Christian A. Herter told the press that “Nkrumah was definitely moving toward the Soviet Bloc”.

Chapter three throws more light on the assassination plot of American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In this chapter, Mahoney explains how the plot to poison Lumumba failed. He also discusses the change of government in the US that led to the coming into office of President John F. Kennedy, and how that affected the Congo situation. He explains how the change in government brought about a change in American Congo policy. Mahoney says that President Kennedy was faced with whether or not to release Lumumba and allow him participate in the Congolese government. According to him, “the Kasavubu-Mobutu government began to consider the Kennedy administration a threat to its very survival”. This chapter also gives some
information on how Lumumba and two other prisoners, for fear of a possible liberation from the Kennedy administration were put on aboard a plane to Kasai and how they were subsequently murdered in Elisabethville.\textsuperscript{43}

Mahoney’s book is of immense relevance to this work because it discusses some of the details of the Congo Crisis. The work also throws more light on Nkrumah’s problems with the Cold War super powers, especially the United State of America which began to see him as a communist agent. However, Mahoney’s work does not talk about Nkrumah’s Africa policy and its relation to his involvement in the Congo. The focus of his work is on how President John F. Kennedy’s government handled the Congo Crisis.

Chapter two of K.B. Asante’s book “Foreign Policy Making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century” is also very relevant to this study. In this chapter, the author says that, Nkrumah’s Africa policy of a free, proud, confident, and united Africa informed Ghana’s foreign policy of African liberation, African unity and non-alignment.\textsuperscript{44} He also shows how Nkrumah religiously pursued his foreign policy of African unity and liberation by helping Guinea with ten million pounds sterling when it became independent, the formation of the Casablanca group, opening the doors of Ghana for the training of freedom fighters, providing hostels for refugees and African students in the country and the establishment of the African Affairs Secretariat and Bureau of African Affairs under his direction. According to K.B. Asante, the African Affairs Secretariat was a duplication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which overshadowed the ministry, and rendered it incompetent in the formulation and execution of African policy. The author also brings to light some of the inconsistencies in Nkrumah’s African policy. On the one hand, Nkrumah formed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, and on the other hand, he “thought federation
was a stumbling block to African Unity and he actively worked against the East African Federation.”

The author also briefly mentions the role Ghana played in the Congo crisis and how the crisis became a turning point in Ghana’s relations with the Cold War super powers. He explains how the crisis led to the formation of the Casablanca group by the so called radical African states. According him, Nkrumah’s determination to help Lumumba led him to lean towards the East which was more sympathetic to Lumumba. This was further accelerated after the murder of Lumumba. His leaning toward the East was demonstrated by his invitation of President Brezhnev of the Soviet Union to Ghana and Nkrumah’s visit to the Soviet Union, China and other Eastern European countries in 1961 which convinced him that socialism was the best approach to Ghana’s development. K.B. Asante however concludes that, Ghana managed to maintain good relations with both the East and West and reaped benefits from both. He says that, “Nkrumah played the political game well and gained from the East – West conflict.” He cites Nkrumah’s ability to get the Americans to support the World Bank funding of the Akosombo Dam on one hand, and the building of the Bui Dam and an atomic energy complex funded by the Soviet Union on the other hand, as a demonstration of Ghana’s benefit from both super powers.

Coming from a former Senior Assistant to Nkrumah and Principal Secretary of the African Affairs Secretariat, K. B. Asante’s book serves as a good reference to this study. The author gives an insider’s information on the inconsistencies in Nkrumah’s Africa policy and how his statecraft incapacitated the foreign ministry. However, his work does not focus on Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo crisis, which this study provides.

Another work that is of immense relevance to this study is James Mayall’s Article in the International Relations Series Volume 4, entitled “Africa: The Cold War and After”, (1971). He
discusses Nkrumah’s concept of African unity. Mayall says that, Nkrumah did not see any alternative to African unity, since he believed that the only way to prevent neo-colonialism was the political integration of Africa. He saw no need for the colonial heritage of artificial boundaries. Mayall observes that, even though Nkrumah’s concept of African unity “was a doctrine with an almost irresistible appeal to most African leaders”, most African states did not buy into it because they were not ready to sacrifice their newly won sovereignty. Their dependence on foreign aid, internal rivalry and neo colonial influence compounded this problem. The author identifies the principle of African unity as the source of division among African leaders at the time. Arguably, the timing was not right for Nkrumah’s idea of African unity, because the core elements which facilitate integration such as transport infrastructure, common language and common sense of identity were woefully inadequate. Mayall says that, Nkrumah’s diplomacy was misinterpreted because it defied the aforementioned underlying realities. His contemporaries did not share his interest, so they saw him as an over ambitious man trying to rob them of their newly won sovereignty. They were convinced that he was encouraging subversive activities in their states in order to unseat them and put into power his ideological allies.  

According to Mayall, the Congo and Algerian crises were the major sources of conflict among the African leaders and that they had a dramatic influence in the development of African diplomacy. He explains how most of the Francophone countries who “owed their independence to the generosity of General de Gaulle” and who still had their troops in the French army in Algeria considered their close relations with France a priority and therefore could not risk supporting the exiled Algerian government. The so called radical states which included Ghana, Guinea, Mali and others, however, supported the Algerian government and invited Algeria to the Casablanca Conference of 1961.
Mayall explains how the differences between these French speaking conservative states and the radical states were played out in the Congo crisis. He says that the emergence of the three groups (the radicals, the conservatives and the moderates) in the Congo was as a result of differences in their positions on how to resolve the crisis. The radicals’ position was that, the United Nations should be used to quash the Katanga secession and consolidate the legitimacy of the Lumumba government. The conservative position was that, the Congo problem should be resolved “through the medium of a round-table conference between the competing Congolese factions without interference from outside powers.” The moderates, consisting of African states that did not belong to either of the two extreme ends, as far as resolution of the Congo was concerned, maintained their troops in the UN and looked to it to resolve the conflict.51

The study draws a lot from Mayall’s work because he discusses some of the nuances of intra African rivalry in the resolution of the Congo crisis. He also explains some of the reasons why Nkrumah’s concept of African unity was opposed by most of the African leaders. However, the study differs from his work because explores more on Ghanaian statecraft in the Congo and how the crisis affected Nkrumah’s relations with the super powers.

In Boni Yao Gebe’s Article “Ghana’s Foreign Policy at Independence and Implications for the 1966 Coup D’état” (March 2008), in the Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol. 2 No. 3, he discusses how Dr. Kwame Nkrumah’s foreign policy contributed to his overthrow in February 1966. He throws light on how the CIA, annoyed by Nkrumah’s “anti-Western rhetoric” sponsored Ghanaian dissidents to oust him from power, and how his exit constituted a huge loss to the Pan-African agenda.52

Gebe supports the argument that, there is no clear cut difference between foreign and domestic policy, because the outcome of one affects the other. This conclusion is demonstrated by how
Nkrumah’s foreign policy led to his overthrow. He also discusses how forces in the international system and personal idiosyncrasies of leaders affect foreign policy choices. In Nkrumah’s case, the Cold War environment and his radicalism, coupled with his disregard for the opinion of his fellow leaders were determining factors in his foreign policy choices. Gebe traces the origin of Nkrumah’s Pan African agenda to his association with the Fifth Pan-African Congress of London in 1945, in which he participated. The author disagrees with critics that Nkrumah neglected the economic development of Ghana to pursue his Pan-African agenda. He cites negotiation for the construction of the Akosombo Dam and Volta River Project as the evidence of Nkrumah’s commitment to the economic development of Ghana.

He also brings to light the inconsistencies in Nkrumah’s Pan-African agenda. The contradiction he observes, laid in his anathema for federalism while he initiated political unions with Mali and Guinea, as the starting point of his proposed United States of Africa. This led to the belief of some people that he had hegemonic ambition to be the leader of Africa. Gebe concludes that, Nkrumah left covetous legacy on Africa as a result of his “concept of African personality” and commitment to uplifting the image and dignity of the Africans who had been exploited, marginalized and dehumanized.

Gebe goes further to show how the American CIA engineered the ousting of Nkrumah from power. He brings to light how a staff of the National Security Council, in 27 May 1965, briefed President Lyndon Johnson about “a pro-Western coup d’état” brewing in Ghana, and how the coup plotters were keeping the CIA updated. He quotes: “We may have a pro-Western coup d’état in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana’s deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark. The plotters are
keeping us briefed and the State Department thinks we are more on the inside than the British. 

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Gebe’s work is relevant to this study because, it shows how Nkrumah’s statecraft affected his relations with the United States of America. The relationship between Nkrumah’s role in the Congo crisis and the CIA sponsored coupe d’état that overthrew him cannot be denied; however, Gebe’s work does not focus on Ghana’s role in the Congo crisis, neither does it explicitly establish a relationship between Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo and the CIA sponsored coupe d’état. This study explores the effects of Nkrumah’s involvement in the Congo on US-Ghana relations and how that contributed to the CIA sponsored military take over.

1.9 Methodology and Sources of Data

The research is a qualitative one and the methodology used is content analysis. Published books, articles and internet sources that are of relevance to the topic are analyzed.

The sources of data are secondary. They include published books, journal Articles and other materials that are of relevance to the study.

1.10 Organization of Study

The study is organized into four chapters. Chapter one constitutes the Research Design. Chapter Two discusses diplomacy and the practice of statecraft (introduction, meaning of concept, history of statecraft and diplomacy, and types of diplomacy). Chapter Three is devoted to Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo (Nkrumah’s Africa policy, background of the Congo crisis, Nkrumah at the United Nations, diplomacy in the Congo, and caught between two super powers). Chapter Four is made up of the summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations.
Endnotes

2 Ibid. p. 125.
5 Ibid. p.23.
7 (Thompson 1969), op. cit. pp.124, 133.
8 (Mayall 1971), op. cit. p. 111.
10 (Mayall 1971), op. cit. p. 121.
11 Ibid. p. 111.
16 (Grieco 1990), op. cit. p. 217.
17 ( Viotti Paul R. and Kauppi Mark V. 1999), op. cit. pp. 55-57.
18 (Grieco 1990), op. cit. pp. 4-6.
20 Ibid. p. xvii.
21 Ibid. pp. 32-37.
22 Ibid. pp. 123-149.
23 Ibid. p. 187.
26 Ibid. pp. 126-130.
27 Ibid. p. 126.
29 Ibid. p. 37.
30 Ibid. pp. 121-123.
32 Ibid. p. 28.
33 Ibid. pp. 21-23, 57-63.
34 Ibid. p. 90.
35 Ibid. p. 91.
36 Ibid. pp. 96-108.
40 Ibid. pp. 39-41.
41 Ibid. p. 52.

20
42 Ibid. p. 50.
43 Ibid. pp. 60-70.
46 Ibid.
48 (Mayall 1971), op. cit. p. 111.
49 Ibid. p. 112.
51 (Mayall 1971), op. cit. pp. 116-123.
53 Ibid. p. 163.
54 Ibid. pp. 165-168.
55 Ibid. p. 171.
56 Ibid. p. 174.
CHAPTER 2

DIPLOMACY AND THE PRACTICE OF STATECRAFT

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores how statecraft has been practised over the years. It attempts to explain the concept of statecraft by looking at diplomacy and the use of force as the instruments of statecraft. The chapter gives a brief history of how statecraft has evolved, from the ancient times, through the renaissance, to the Twenty-First Century. The latter part of the chapter takes a brief look at the types of diplomacy.

The practice of statecraft has evolved over the centuries. In ancient times, even though diplomacy existed, war, military might, and covert activities such as spying, sowing of dissent and bribery, were the major instruments of statecraft. The Greek city-states, the Byzantium Empire, Hindu Indian kingdoms, the Chinese empire and the Islamic empire of Baghdad all relied on the use of force and or covert activities as the major instruments of statecraft. Classical doctrines such as the Arthasastra by Kautilya of India and the doctrines of Han Fei Tzu and Lord shan of China influenced Niccolo Machiavelli’s doctrine of raison d’état in the Renaissance era. In his work “The Prince”, Machiavelli advises rulers on how to attain and maintain power. He advises rulers to do whatever they can do for the security of their states. According to Machiavelli, the end, which is power, justifies the means.

The use of diplomacy in international relations gained more momentum after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 that vested sovereignty on states, with defined boundaries. This era ushered in modern diplomacy. The end of the Second World War that saw the formation of the United
Nations and the emergence of new states in the system resulted in an evolution in diplomacy with the increase of summits and ‘conference diplomacy’.\textsuperscript{5} Diplomacy as the preferred instrument of statecraft has gained grounds in the Twenty-First Century. The Twenty-First Century has witnessed the proliferation of non state actors and non professional diplomats in the conduct of international relations.\textsuperscript{6} The century has also witnessed an increase in the codification of international agreements and the conduct of relations among actors in the international system. The rules governing diplomatic relations and the conduct of diplomats are codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963)\textsuperscript{7}

\subsection*{2.2 Meaning of Concept}

Dennis Ross defines statecraft as “the use of the assets or the resources and tools (economic, military, intelligence, media) that a state has to pursue its interest and to affect the behaviour of others, whether friendly or hostile.” Statecraft requires good judgment, understanding and sound assessment of issues, and discernment of which issues pose a threat or are opportunities to the state and how to counter them or utilize them to the benefit of one’s state. Statecraft includes, but is not limited to diplomacy. It involves the use of both hard and soft power; hard power involves the use of military might to safeguard a state’s security and to coerce or threaten others to behave in a way that will promote the interest of the state. Soft power on the other hand, involves the use of economic assets to sanction or reward others in order to influence their behavior to one’s advantage. It also includes the use of intangible resources such as diplomatic skills, to influence others in the international system. Statecraft involves both the use of force and negotiations,
depending on the capability of a state, either force or negotiations could be used. A good statesman is one who is capable of discerning which strategy (either hard or soft power) should be used to yield optimum results, given its capabilities and the situation at hand.8

Diplomacy falls under soft power. The term has been variously defined. According to Ivor Roberts in “Satow’s Diplomatic Practice”, “Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their relations with dependent territories, and between governments and international institutions; or more briefly, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means.”9

Charles Heymann defines it as “a crafty pursuit of national self-interest, through internationally fostered relationship which is governed by accords and principles of enlightened reciprocal interests of states.” He goes on to further explain that, it is “an exercise of statecraft, in which the particular interacts with the general without the former losing its basic character in the interaction of international forces.”10 S. E. Quarm defines it as the “implementation of Foreign Policy and the conduct of relations between states.”11 Simply put, diplomacy is the conduct of relations among representatives of states, international organizations, and multilateral corporations through negotiations aimed at achieving mutually beneficial results. The goal of diplomacy is the achievement of foreign policy objectives. Diplomacy does not include the use of force; force is often used as the last resort, when attempts to resolve issues by peaceful means fail. War or the use of force is therefore, the result of failure of diplomacy.

Both diplomacy and war are tools of statecraft. The nature of an issue, the actors involved, the environment and the capability of a state, determine whether war or diplomacy should be used.
In the contemporary international system, diplomacy has been preferred as the means of resolving issues and conducting international relations. This is due to the development of sophisticated weapons which makes every state feels vulnerable, and the nature of new actors in the international system, such as terrorist organizations which are difficult to identify and target, and which use unconventional means to target their enemies.

2.3 History of Statecraft and Diplomacy

Statecraft has been practised since antiquity; men have always negotiated for peaceful resolution of disputes or gone to war against each other for their preservation. In the Third and Fourth Centuries BC, ancient Indian statecraft was guided by the policy of Mandala. According to this policy a kingdom can be an ally and at the same time an enemy, based on the geographical location and the possibility of conquest. The Indian kings regarded their closest neighbours as natural enemies and those next to their natural enemies as natural friends. Hindu kingdoms often formed alliances to destroy those between them.

Book seven of the Arthasastra talks about six major instruments for the advancement of a kingdom. They include war and peace through negotiations. The book advocates the use of force as the best instrument for powerful kings. It recommends negotiation for weak kings, warning them that the world is not friendly towards peace seeking kings. According to the book, “The whole world stands in awe of a king ready to strike. If you have no power, you are a conquered king. Only rulers who have no other remedy should seek peace. Only weakness calls for conciliation and alliances. Like a snake devouring a mouse, the Earth devours a king who is inclined to peace.” It advises kings to use soft words before using force. It recommends any
means to destroy ones enemies, including war, bribery of the allies of enemies, gifts and spying. Hindu kings made use of female spies who seduced and killed male spies from other kingdoms. They also sowed the seed of dissent in enemy kingdoms and hired savage tribes to destroy them.  

The statecraft of Classical China also centered on the organization and maintenance of a strong military. The Chinese practised deception in their foreign relations. According to Hsu Tzu, “The nature of man is evil and his goodness is acquired.” The imperialist Islamic government of Baghdad (3rd AD-7th AD) also employed effective military force, diplomacy and intelligence gathering in their statecraft. The king’s spies often disguised themselves as beggars, merchants or travelers to gather information about what is going on in the kingdom. Emissaries entering the kingdom had to be investigated and the king informed of their mission. Emissaries also doubled as spies as they had to survey the terrain of the kingdoms they visited for assessment of its military might for possible invasion.  

More complex and sophisticated statecraft was developed by the ancient Greek city-states in the Fourth and Fifth (4th and 5th) Centuries BC. The Greek city-states sent and received special emissaries with due accreditation who conveyed messages to rulers of city-states. These emissaries were accorded diplomatic immunity. For example, in 432 BC, when the Peloponnesian League met in Sparta to deliberate on whether or not to go to war with Athens, Athenian envoys who happened to be in Sparta were accorded diplomatic immunity and requested to stay in Sparta, even though Sparta had declared war on Athens. This was one of the earliest examples of diplomatic immunity and conference diplomacy. The Greek city-states also had resident representatives called the ‘proxenos’. The proxenos were wealthy and influential
business men who looked after the interests of other city-states in their states. This practice is the origin of honary consuls in modern diplomacy.

Statecraft was taken to another level during the Byzantine era. The Byzantines made good use of soft power, since they lacked military might. Some of their strategies included inciting their neighbours to fight against each other to keep them engaged, so that, they would not wage war against them. They also bribed people in their neighbouring territories for information. The Byzantines also sent skillful orators and negotiators to negotiate on their behalf. Ivor Roberts attributes their conversion of pagans to Christianity as demonstration of their diplomatic skills.

The Venetians are credited with passing Byzantine diplomatic practice to the West. With the emergence of the Renaissance in Italy in the late Middle Ages, which led to the separation of state from church, credentials of ambassadors started to become a requirement by sovereigns. Except for the presence of the papal representative in the emperor’s court in Constantinople, called the “apocrisiarius”; who served his post for a period of time, there was no evidence of resident missions during this period. According to Ivor Roberts, the practice of resident missions dates back to the second half of the fifteenth century BC, when Nicodemo de Pontremdi was sent by the ruler of Milan, Francesco Sforza, as his confidential agent to Cosimo de’ Medici, the most influential citizen of Florence. Upon becoming a Duke, Sforza upgraded his representatives with regular accreditation as “orators” of Florence.16

Renaissance statecraft and diplomacy was characterized by the principle of raison d’état or Realpolitik. This was the concept of “the end justifies the means”; that a state must do whatever it has to do for its survival. This was in sharp contrast with morality. It placed national interest above morality.17 Niccolo Machiavelli in his work “The prince”, advises princes to use every
means possible for the survival and security of their states. His work is a handbook on how to acquire power, expand and maintain it.\(^{18}\) The Italian style of diplomacy was spread to other parts of Europe, partly because of the need for the Italians to gather intelligence on what was happening in the capitals of other countries that could have an impact on them, especially countries like France, Spain and Austria, which were likely to encroach on Italian territories.\(^{19}\)

According to Henry Kissinger, France in the seventeenth century formulated the principle of *raison d’État* comprehensively. Cardinal de Richelieu, First minister of France is credited as the principal agent of the French policy of *raison d’État*. Even though, a catholic, in pursuit of the national interest of France, Richelieu signed treaties with the Protestant Swedes and Muslim Turks.\(^{20}\)

Modern diplomacy began after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty years war and established a new order of relationships, vesting sovereignty on states with clearly defined territories. Diplomacy at this time was conducted by members of the ruling class who were guided by “well defined rules and civilized conventions.” The Congress of Vienna (1815) “established agreed basis for diplomatic representation” and the recognition of the foreign services as a distinct profession in the public service. After the Napoleonic wars, the Great powers of Europe; Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and later France, engaged in multilateral diplomacy in the form of the Concert of Europe; a balance of power system whereby they met periodically to discuss issues on continental Europe, aimed at preventing any one of them from becoming too powerful, selfish and ambitious and put them back in a Napoleonic situation.\(^{21}\)
Diplomacy in the Twentieth and Twenty-first Centuries has evolved. After the end of the Second World War, and the emergence of new states in the international system, multilateral diplomacy has gained grounds as the means of resolving international disputes to prevent a third World War. The formation of the United Nations arguably, has brought about something that resembles international central authority and a platform for states to iron out their differences.

The Cold War international system made diplomacy more complex, since it reorganized diplomacy along ideological lines. The bipolar nature of the system drew states to either the United States of America (USA) or the Soviet Union. Diplomacy during this period was characterized by formation of allies, and support for third world states which took the form of financial support, assassinations and sponsoring of military takeovers of ideological opponents. This was the kind of system that Nkrumah found himself in. He saw that, for Africa to be truly independent and develop, the continent had to avoid getting involved in Cold War entanglements and become united. This necessitated his involvement in the Non-aligned Movement, and the tremendous role he played in the Congo crisis. However, with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, and the implosion of the Soviet Union, resulting in the emergence of USA as the international hegemon, diplomacy has become less ideological. The end of the Cold War marked a shift from ideology to liberal democratic values.

The emergence and consolidation of regional economic communities has also brought about an increase in multilateral diplomacy. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations codify the rules governing states in their interactions with each other. The proliferations of actors and issues have also brought about an evolution in diplomacy. Diplomacy is no longer the preserve of states. Non state actors such as international organizations, multilateral corporations, terrorist organizations, and individuals now play...
important roles in the international system. Also, non career diplomats now engage in diplomacy.23

2.4 Types of Diplomacy (Bilateral, Multilateral, and Public)

There are several categorizations of diplomacy. They include shuttle diplomacy, military diplomacy, summitry diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy, economic diplomacy, and so on. For the purpose of this study, I discuss diplomacy under the categorizations of bilateral diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, and public diplomacy. Each of the earlier mentioned categorizations can fall under either one of the above.

2.5 Bilateral Diplomacy

In his speech at a workshop organized by the Legon Centre for International Affairs in 2003, A.N. Abankwa, a former ambassador of the Republic of Ghana defined bilateral diplomacy as “the conduct of regular or day-to-day negotiations by diplomatic missions or representatives for the cultivation and maintenance of good and friendly relations between two nations.” Bilateral diplomacy is diplomacy conducted between two states. It involves the exchange of diplomatic representations with the establishment of embassies or high commissions and consuls, headed by Ambassadors/High Commissioners and Consul-Generals. States open diplomatic missions and consulates by mutual consent. The rules governing the conduct of diplomats and consular staff, including their privileges, inviolability and functions are codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963.24
The work of resident diplomats is to represent their countries in the host state by defending and explaining their foreign policy to the host state. Their duties also include negotiating on behalf of their home states, gathering of vital information on political, economic and social issues, which may have an impact on their home countries, and reporting to their governments through monthly, quarterly and annual reports, together with recommendations on foreign policy choices.  

2.6 Multilateral Diplomacy

Multilateral diplomacy is conducted among three or more states or actors in the international system. The practice of multilateral diplomacy is not a new thing. It dates back to antiquity. Examples of multilateral diplomacy in the past include the Conference of Sparta, the Concert of Europe, the Congress of Vienna, and the Versailles Conference. The aim of multilateral diplomacy is to find common solutions to general problems. Multilateral diplomacy gained more momentum after the Second World War, which was followed by the emergence of new states and the creation of the United Nations Organization, now United Nations, an international platform for the deliberation of issues and collective decision making, to prevent the outbreak of a third World War.

There are various forms of multilateral diplomacy: they include conference diplomacy, summity, and what R. P. Barston calls associative diplomacy. Associative diplomacy is the conduct of diplomatic relations between or among regional groupings, international institutions, individual states, and group of states. Examples of associative diplomacy include European

Conference diplomacy is a type of multilateral diplomacy whereby more than two states come together to deliberate on an issue or issues of general concern aimed at arriving at a consensus. Conference diplomacy can be ad hoc, where a conference is convened to deal with a pressing issue or permanent like in the case of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), where serial conferences are held. 

Summitry is diplomacy conducted at the highest level by heads of state and government. Summitry could take a bilateral form involving two heads of state and governments, or a multilateral form involving three or more heads of state and government, like in the case of the Group of Eight (G8) summit. Examples of multilateral diplomacy in Ghana under Nkrumah included the Conference of Independent African States, the All-African Peoples Conference, and Ghana’s membership of the UN, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Non-aligned Movement.

2.7 Public Diplomacy

Public diplomacy is the conduct of international relations whereby governments, individuals, and organizations and corporate entities employ means to communicate with foreign publics and governments aimed at influencing them to change their attitudes and foreign policies in favour of their countries. R. P. Barston calls it “white propaganda”, because it admits its sources of
information. The term was first used by American President Woodrow Wilson in his ‘Fourteen Points’ address to Congress when he talked of “open agreements, openly arrived at”, for preventing war and restoring peace in the international system, as against secret diplomacy.31 But Wilson did not mean it in the manner used in modern times. The modern term was coined by Edmund Gullion, a former US Foreign Service officer and Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1965. Gullion defined it as “the means by which governments, private groups and individuals influence the attitudes and opinions of other peoples and governments in such a way as to exercise influence on their foreign policy”.32

The most extensive definition of public diplomacy is by the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy. According to the Murrow Center:

Public diplomacy … deals with the influence of public attitudes on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond traditional diplomacy; the cultivation by governments of public opinion in other countries; the interaction of private groups and interests in one country with those of others; the reporting of foreign affairs and its impact on policy; communication between those whose job is communication; as between diplomats and foreign correspondents; and the process of inter-cultural communications.33

The instruments or tools used in public diplomacy are radio broadcasting, television, motion pictures, cultural and educational exchanges. The aim of public diplomacy is to inform foreign public by providing them with information of one’s foreign policy so that they will effect change in their governments in the interest of the state doing the public diplomacy.

Public diplomacy is predominantly an African phenomenon. America has used it extensively over the years. It was used during World War II, the Cold War era and after September 11, 2001. After 9/11, America has intensified its public diplomacy efforts to inform foreign publics about American foreign policy.34
Endnotes

3 (Viotti Paul R. and Kauppi Mark V. 1999), op. cit. p. 59.
4 (Roberts Ivor 2009), op. cit. p. 1.11.
5 Ibid. pp. 1.21-1.22.
9 (Roberts Ivor 2009), op. cit. p. 1.1.
10 (Heymann 2009), op. cit. p. 1.
11 (Quarm 1997), op. cit. p. 3.
13 Ibid. p. 60.
14 Ibid. pp. 53-55.
15 (Roberts Ivor 2009), op. cit. pp. 1.4-1.5.
16 Ibid. pp. 1.7-1.9.
18 (Viotti Paul R. and Kauppi Mark V. 1999), op. cit. p. 59.
19 (Roberts Ivor 2009), op. cit. p. 1.9.
21 (Roberts Ivor 2009), op. cit. pp. 1.11-1.12.
22 (Heymann 2009), op. cit. pp. 6-8.
25 (Barston 1988), op. cit. p. 2.
26 (Roberts Ivor 2009), op. cit. p. 1.21.
30 Ibid. p. 179.
34 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3

NKRUMAH’S STATECRAFT IN THE CONGO

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo is examined by looking at his Africa policy and how that influenced his Congo policy. The chapter takes a brief look at the history of colonial Congo and how historical events contributed to the crisis. It also sheds more light on the sequence of events in the crisis and the strategies Nkrumah employed to resolve the crisis. It brings to the fore how Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo affected his relations with the two super powers of the ideological divide, and how that eventually led to the failure of his Congo policy.

3.2 Nkrumah’s Africa Policy

Nkrumah’s foreign policy within Africa was aimed at implementing his Pan-African agenda, which were the twin-policies of African liberation and African unity. Having taken part in Pan-African activities abroad, especially the 1945 Pan-African Congress in Manchester where he closely worked with George Padmore, Peter Milliard and others, he is credited with bringing Pan-Africanism to Africa with a new phase, and making Accra the Mecca of Pan-Africanism. Pan-Africanism, a movement which began in 1900 by Henry Sylvester Williams and later propagated by W.E.B. Du Bois and others as a movement against racial subjugation and discrimination was then brought to Africa as a panacea for African independence and unity.

As mentioned earlier, Nkrumah’s African policy was implemented through the pursuit of African liberation and African unity. In the midst of the Cold War between the super powers, he realized
that for the success of his Africa policy, he had to distance Ghana from the ideological crusade of these super powers. This led him to join the Non-aligned Movement. He said that “We face neither the east nor the west, we face forward.” Nkrumah referred to non-alignment as “positive neutrality.” It meant that Ghana would deal with the super powers on neutral basis for the promotion of world peace and justice.³ For an understanding of his Africa policy, Nkrumah’s pursuit of African liberation and unity needs to be examined.

His famous declaration that, “the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked to the total liberation of Africa” sums up Nkrumah’s commitment to African liberation. It served as a forecast of the length at which he would go to help Africans still under colonial rule, to gain independence. In December 1958, Nkrumah organized the All-African Peoples Conference in Accra to strategize on the liberation movement. This conference was attended by sixty two (62) delegates from liberation movements all over Africa. They included Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika, Karume of Zanzibar, Kenneth Kaunda and Nkumbula of Northern Rhodesia and Banda of Nyasaland. These freedom fighters later became the leaders of their countries at independence. According to Charles Heymann, it was the moral boost, military training and financial support that those freedom fighters received from Ghana that invigorated them to fight till the end of the struggle.⁴

Nkrumah also used public diplomacy to his advantage. Radio Ghana was one of his public diplomacy instruments. An External Department was established in the Radio Station to broadcast inspirational messages in Arabic, Swahili, Portuguese and French to Freedom fighters and liberation movements across the length and breadth of Africa. The radio also promoted cultural and historical programmes to restore pride in indigenous African values and shape the African personality, and to free the people of Africa from what Heymann calls “colonial
intellectual enslavement and the inferiority complex it entails.” Through this medium, the
Ghanaian high-life music was “lifted to new heights of rhythmic excellence and became adopted
throughout most of black Africa as Standard music and dance.”5

Nkrumah set up the Bureau of African Affairs, to manage and coordinate the activities of the
liberation struggle of African freedom fighters. Freedom fighters from African countries still
under the shackles of colonial rule, including South Africa and Mozambique flocked to Ghana
for motivation, training and strategizing on the liberation movement. According to Kwesi
Armah:

It was also part of the Bureau’s responsibility to organize seminars, conferences and workshops for the
freedom fighters. Such activities offered them opportunities for political education and training. Exchange of ideas with various freedom fighters helped the co-ordination, formulation and direction of
strategy of the Liberation Movement.6

Nkrumah also established hostels for African students and refugees, and gave out funds to
leaders and political parties who subscribed to his Pan African ideas. K. B. Asante, a former
senior assistant to Nkrumah, is of the view that, it was the influence of Nkrumah that made the
UN to move from its primary concern “with the problem of treatment of people of Indian descent
in South Africa” to addressing the “fundamental problem” of racial discrimination and
apartheid.7

In line with his Pan-African agenda, Nkrumah established the African Affairs Secretariat in 1961
to solely coordinate African affairs. It was sort of, a ministry in charge of African affairs. The
secretariat was headed by Michael Dei-Anang, with K. B. Asante and Harry Amonoo as senior
assistants to the president. Kwesi Armah explains that their job was to formulate Ghana’s
African policy and process reports of African heads of missions for further policy formulation.8

The creation of the Secretariat was duplication since it performed the functions that were
supposed to have been the task of the Foreign Ministry. The Secretariat had more power in
foreign policy formulation than the ministry. This affected Ghana’s foreign policy because the professional diplomats at the ministry had no influence on Nkrumah; those at the Secretariat told him what he wanted to hear, for fear of incurring his displeasure and thereby losing their job. The foreign ministry, in Scott Thompson’s words, “was reduced to helplessness”. 9

According to K. B. Asante, the Secretariat was under Nkrumah’s personal direction and undermined the foreign ministry by encroaching on its area of competence. 10 This development had an impact on the Foreign Service. According to Scott Thompson, of the 57 diplomatic missions Ghana had abroad, only 10 of them were headed by professional diplomats. They stopped sending regular reports, because they realized their reports were not being read. Scott Thompson reveals that, according to Kojo Botsio, one embassy stopped reporting for one whole year.11

An excerpt from Nkrumah’s book “I speak of Freedom” summarizes his concept of African unity:

The political situation in Africa today is heartening and at the same time disturbing. It is heartening to see so many new flags hoisted in place of the old; it is disturbing to see so many countries of varying sizes and at different levels of development, weak and, in some cases, almost helpless. If this terrible state of fragmentation is allowed to continue it may well be disastrous for us all.12

Nkrumah’s concept of African unity was a political and economic union whereby the individual African states would surrender their sovereignty to a United States of Africa. He wanted an African union with common economic policy, monetary union and a Joint Military Command. He was advocating for the abolishment of the artificial boundaries created by the colonial powers, so that the weak, fragmented, small and underdeveloped African states can come together as one strong state so that Africa can make meaningful impact in the community of nations.
The objectives of his proposed union was for African states to pool their resources together for
the industrialization of Africa, the adoption of a common foreign policy to give them one voice
in the international arena, and for Africa to have a strong military force to deter any foreign
aggressor.\textsuperscript{13} James Mayall noted that, “For he assumed not only that no African state was fully
independent and that constant vigilance was necessary to maintain even what had been achieved,
but that the only effective means to prevent outside interference was by the assertion, and
political institutionalization, of African solidarity.”\textsuperscript{14}

The first Republican Constitution of Ghana was fashioned in such a way that it made provisions
for Nkrumah’s grand plan of a Union of African States. Kwesi Armah throws light on the
Constitutional provisions that supported African union. According to him, Ghanaians declared in
the Preamble that, “in the hope that by their actions this day might help to further the
development of a Union of African States”. According to Article 2, “In the confident expectation
of an early surrender of sovereignty to a union of African states and territories, the people now
confer on Parliament the power to provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the
sovereignty of Ghana.” Article 13 provided that, “the union of Africa should be striven for by
every lawful means, and when attained, should be faithfully preserved, that the independence of
Ghana should not be surrendered or diminished on any grounds other than the furtherance of
African unity.”\textsuperscript{15}

3.3 Background of the Crisis

Prior to 1908, Congo was the personal property of King Leopold II of Belgium. This was as a
result of the failure of European leaders to reach a consensus on a cooperative exploration of the
mineral rich Congo in the 1876 Brussels International Conference. Their competition for the
exploitation of Africa resulted in the Berlin Conference of 1884, where they shared Africa among themselves, thereby creating territorial boundaries in the continent. Without the official recognition of the Belgian government, King Leopold II carved out an empire for himself in the Congo. Through Henry Morton Stanley, he negotiated treaties with the Congolese traditional leaders for the exploitation of the natural resources of the area.

During the reign of Leopold II, the Congolese went through a lot of humiliation and torture. His mining activities got some of the people displaced. He enforced ivory and rubber quotas on these displaced people and those who could not pay were tortured, mutilated and executed. Wives and children of rubber tappers were held hostage until they brought their quotas. He established force labour camps and submitted the people to torture and slavery in his rubber plantations. According to Abayomi Azikiwe, eight to ten (8-10) million Congolese perished between 1876 and 1908.16

The Belgian government took over the administration of Congo after 1908. Belgian colonial authority adopted the policy of paternalism in the Congo. Paternalism as a policy meant that, the political and basic rights of Africans could be denied them as long as their spiritual and material needs were provided. Under this policy, the Congolese were treated like children who needed to be disciplined by colonial authorities with authority and dedication. The policy was coordinated at three levels, in what was called “colonial trinity” which consisted of the colonial administration, the Catholic Church and the private companies. The natives were made to do forced labour. They were only allowed to engage in agriculture and cultivate cash crops.

Another feature of the policy was to deliberately keep the Congolese illiterate so that they would not challenge the colonial rule. The education they received was only to enable them occupy lower ranks in the civil service, the military or the clergy.17
The Belgians had no plans of handing over power to the Congolese. This explains why they did not give them the requisite training needed to rule a country. This was due to the natural endowment of the state. The country is rich in minerals, ivory, and has the biggest river in Africa with hydro electric potentials. The Belgians wanted to stay and continue exploiting the resources of the state.¹⁸

The Congolese began to put pressure on Belgium for independence in the 1950s. They began to form political parties. Initially, these parties were formed based on ethnic lines, associations of educated middle class urban dwellers called the cercles and alumni associations. Some of them later grew into full blown political parties. The parties included Association des Bakango (ABAKO) created in 1950 with Joseph Kasavubu as its leader, Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) founded in 1958 with Patrice Lumumba as its leader, the Fédékaléo and the Liboke lya Bangala.¹⁹

Motivated from the All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) in Accra, which Kwesi Armah describes as “a baptism of fire in the liberation struggle”, on his return Lumumba organized a mass meeting on January 3, 1959 and stressed the need for immediate self government. The result was a mass demonstration of about 30,000 people, mainly unemployed, the next day, January 4 demanding independence.²⁰ The effect spread throughout the country and on January 12, 1959, Kasavubu was arrested as a result of rioting in Léopoldville from 4th to 7th of that month. The colonial authorities announced that he would be released in three months, and that there would be constitutional reforms for more inclusion of Congolese in the government that would eventually lead to independence. The hope for independence saw the proliferation of political parties in the Congo. According to the Congo Forum, a website that provides information on the Congo, over fifty political parties were registered. There was another riot in
Stanleyville in October as a result of a meeting of Lumumba’s party, the MNC. This resulted in the arrest of Lumumba. The increasing demands for independence compelled the Belgians to hold a roundtable conference in Brussels with the major political parties. At the conference Belgium tried to negotiate for three more years before granting independence, but the Congolese only agreed to give them a few months. They decided that elections would be held in May, and independence granted in June.21

On May 10, 1960, the Belgian Senate passed a law known as ‘La loi Fondamentale sur les structures de Congo’, making the Congo a Republic with a new constitution that spelt out the form of government it would have. It provided for a unitary government with federal features. It made provisions for provincial governments with presidents and provincial legislatures. It also provided for a prime minister as head of government and a president as head of state. The legislature consisted of a Senate and Chamber of Representatives. The law was signed by King Baudouin a day after it was passed.22 After the May elections, Patrice Lumumba was made the prime minister and Kasavubu, the leader of ABAKO became the president.

The Congo became independent officially on June 30, 1960. At the Independence Day celebrations, the king of Belgium king Baudouin I gave a speech in which he hailed the ingenuity and “tenacious courage” of his great uncle, King Leopold II. This did not go down well with the Congolese because of the atrocities their ancestors suffered when the Congo Free State was the personal property of Leopold II. Lumumba who was not scheduled to make a speech got up and delivered a speech condemning the colonial regime and the suppression and humiliation that the Congolese suffered under it.23 He recounted the colonial experience:

We have known ironies, insults, and blows which we had to undergo morning, noon, and night because we were Negroes … Who will forget the rifle fire from which so many of our brothers perished, or the jails into which were brutally thrown those who did not wish to submit to a regime of injustice, suppression, and exploitation?
He told King Baudouin that the Congolese were no longer their monkeys – “Nous ne sommes plus vos macaques!” This speech triggered anti Belgian feeling throughout the country.

The Congo crisis started a few weeks after independence. On July 5, the Belgian Military Commander, General Emile Janssens assembled troops of the Leopoldville garrison to remind them of their duty to the state. This was necessitated by restlessness among the black troops who occupied the lowest ranks of the military. Without much tact, General Janssens wrote on a blackboard that, after independence is equal to before independence – “Avant indépendance = Après Indépendance.” Already angry for lack of promotion and poor conditions of service, the African troops mutinied. They attacked the white officers and went into town looting and assaulting Europeans.

With the excuse of trying to protect its 85,000 nationals, the Belgian government launched a military intervention by airlifting paratroopers into the Congo. They seized the Leopoldville and Matadi airports. In the ensuing unrest, many Congolese lost their lives. To promote its mining interest in the mineral rich Katanga Province, the Belgian government provided financial and military assistance to the Katangese leader, Moise Tshombe to secede the Province from Congo. The Belgian government owned and operated a Katangese mining company called Union Minière du Haute Katanga. On July 10, Moise Tshombe announced the secession of Katanga. He claimed Katanga was seceding from chaos. He used Belgian troops to perpetuate his secession.

On July 12, Lumumba and Kasavubu jointly wrote to the United Nations requesting for military assistance against the Belgian intervention. The Congolese government regarded the Belgian military intervention as an act of aggression because it went against the terms of the Treaty of Friendship that was signed between the governments of Congo and Belgium on June 29, 1960.
Under the treaty, Belgian troops could only enter Congo upon an express request of the Congolese government. Since the Belgian troops were there without a request from the government of Congo, it was considered external aggression. The United Nations responded by passing Security Council Resolution 143, that called for the removal of Belgian troops from Congo. A United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Congo (ONUC) was established. The mandate of ONUC was “to take the necessary steps in consultation with the government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the government with such military assistance as may be necessary to enable them to meet fully their task.”

Both America and the Soviet Union voted for the UN intervention in the Congo, though for different reasons. The Americans did so because they knew UN intervention would prevent Soviet subversion more effectively than unilateral American action. They also feared that a unilateral action would invite Soviet retaliation. The Soviets, on the other hand, voted for the resolution because it was going to expel Belgium, a western ally. They were also happy that ONUC was dominated by African troops, with the other troops being from neutral countries. The super powers agreed to transport the troops from their home countries to the Congo.

Problems soon began between Lumumba and UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold over the mandate of the UN force in the Congo. Lumumba wanted to use ONUC to crush down the Katanga rebellion but Hammarskjold insisted ONUC did not have the mandate to do that. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 146 on August 9, preventing the use of ONUC in the internal affairs of Congo. According to the resolution, “the United Nations Force in the Congo will not be a party to … any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise.” The Soviet Union shared the view of Kwame Nkrumah and his radical African allies that, ONUC should be used to support Lumumba to suppress the Katanga rebellion since the Congo was a unitary state and
Lumumba’s government was the legitimate government. The USA and its western allies were of the view that, the mandate of ONUC was to maintain law and order in Congo but not to interfere in its internal affairs. In August 8, Albert Kalonji also declared the secession of south Kazai. A conference of independent African states was organized at ministerial level in Leopoldville from 25-30th August 1960. It was attended by delegates from thirteen African states. Lumumba failed to get majority of the delegates to endorse a military aid to the Congo outside of the UN command. Even though they supported the unity of the state, they knew that they needed the support of the UN to prevent any outside intervention in the Congo.

With no success in his efforts to get the UN troops to stop the Katanga secession, Lumumba took a three-day visit to the US in January to solicit help from America to get the Belgian troops out. Unfortunately for him, the US did not help him. President Eisenhower did not attend to him. The president stayed in Rhode Island throughout the period of Lumumba’s visit. The Americans had already made up their minds that Lumumba was a communist agent. CIA Chief, Allen Dulles said that it was safe to assume that Lumumba had been “bought by the communists.” Out of desperation, Lumumba turned to the Soviet Union that was willing to help. He accepted Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s offer for military assistance. In August, the Soviet Union sent 11 Ilyushin 18 planes with crew, about 100 trucks with spare parts and over 100 technicians to Congo to help Lumumba.

Lumumba’s acceptance of Soviet help marked the beginning of serious Cold War proxy battle in the Congo. On August 18, the CIA headquarters received a cable from its Leopoldville station that the Congo was experiencing a “classic communist” take over, and that if action was not taken, Congo would be “another Cuba.” By accepting Soviet help, Lumumba had signed his own death warrant. The American National Security Council conveyed an urgent meeting in
which Eisenhower authorized the assassination of Lumumba. Allen Dulles cabled the CIA station in Leopoldville that, “in the view of “high quarters here”, Lumumba’s removal must be an urgent and prime objective.” A deadly poison comprised of anthrax and toxic viruses was prepared by CIA scientists and sent to Leopoldville in September, to be put into Lumumba’s food.37

The CIA also collaborated with the Belgian government to topple Lumumba. According to Mahoney, In August alone, Allen Dulles approved the disbursement of 100,000 dollars for political operations in the Congo. The CIA also recruited a group later known as the ‘Binza Group” to get rid of Lumumba. This group was made up of President Kasavubu, Colonel Mobutu, Commissioner of Finance Albert Ndele, Sûrété Chief Victor Nendaka and Foreign Minister Justice Bomboko. With CIA encouragement, in September, Kasavubu announced on radio that, Lumumba had been dismissed from government. However, Lumumba was reinstated by parliament.38

In the midst of the conflict between Kasavubu and Lumumba, with CIA and western backing, Colonel Mobutu announced on September 12, that he had taken over power to neutralize Kasavubu and Lumumba. He, however, maintained Kasavubu as the president. He asked all Soviet troops and technicians to leave the country immediately. Lumumba was subsequently put on house arrest after failed assassination attempts by the CIA. On January 17, 1961, he was put on board a plane bound for Bakwanga with two of his ministers. The plane was redirected to Elizabethville where they were beaten and executed by Katangese authorities.39

After the death of Lumumba, the Security Council passed a resolution in February 1961, authorizing “the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort” to bring order to the Congo. This resolution was eventually used to end the Katanga secession.40 At the time of Lumumba’s death,
there were four governments in Congo. Antoine Gezenga, a Lumumba supporter had set up a government in Stanleyville, there was the illegitimate Mobutu government in Leopoldville, the Tshombe government in Katanga and the Albert Kalonji government in his dissident South Kazai state. Tshombe was arrested in April 1961 but he was released two months later after promising to stop the secession and reunite Katanga with Congo. Cyrille Adoula was elected as the new prime minister, restoring the legitimacy of the Leopoldville government. On December 30, 1961, the Leopoldville government brought an end to the South Kazai secession by reconquering the area and arresting its leader Albert Kalonji. Antoine Gezenga was also arrested in January 14, 1961, bringing an end to the Stanleyville government.41

Meanwhile, Moise Tshombe refused to fulfill his promise of ending the Katanga secession. He still held on to the foreign mercenaries who he used to perpetrate his secession. UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold perished in a plane crash en route to Ndola, in the process of trying to negotiate a seize fire with Tshombe. The Katanga secession was finally brought to an end in 1963. Tshombe later succeeded Adoula as the Prime Minister of the Congo. On November 25, Mobutu made a second coming by staging a second coup d’état, toppling the Tshombe government. He ruled the country until October 1996 when he was toppled by Laurent Kabila.42

3.4 Nkrumah at the United Nations

As a newly independent state in the Cold War international system, Ghana had so much faith in the United Nations. Nkrumah, like all leaders of the newly independent states, was very protective of Ghana’s sovereignty. He was in constant fear of neocolonialism and imperialism. The UN as an international forum for all member states to express their views, served as the right platform for Nkrumah to preach his message of world peace. Ghana not being a military and
economic giant, it was in its interest to advocate for peace and order in the international system. Despite the shortfalls of the UN, Nkrumah still believed in it as the only forum that offered the possibility of working for world peace.\textsuperscript{43} He preferred multilateral decisions and solutions to international problems at the United Nations level to unilateral actions by USA or the Soviet Union.

When the Congo crisis started, Nkrumah wrote to Dag Hammarskjold informing him about Ghana’s readiness to send two battalions and materials. He also offered Hammarskjold a radio-link for his use. When Hammarskjold made a request to Ghana for a third battalion, Ghana Airways flights were cancelled for transportation of troops to Congo.\textsuperscript{44} Ghana was one of the major contributors of troops in ONUC. Nkrumah knew that, without UN backing his influence in Congo would be very limited. According to Thompson, one of the members of Ghana’s Congo Coordinating Committee said that, “We felt that if we could attract the United Nations into the crisis, Ghana’s stature would be augmented, because all the world would be focusing on us; more important, we could wield influence within the UN.”\textsuperscript{45} Nkrumah was worried when Lumumba became antagonistic towards Hammarskjold. He instructed Djin to get both Kasabuvu and Lumumba to understand the need for co-operating with the UN, because any hostility towards the UN would thwart his objectives in Congo. He said that, “I would like to point out that African solidarity … is not sufficient unless it is backed by the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{46}

Even when his other strategies started conflicting with the UN, he maintained his commitment by keeping the Ghanaian troops in ONUC. Nkrumah’s support for Lumumba began to contradict his commitment to ONUC. Nkrumah wanted to use the Ghanaian contingent to support Lumumba but he could not do so because the contingent was under ONUC command. However he did try to take some unilateral decisions that contradicted his commitment to ONUC. The UN
Secretary-General was not happy when the Ghanaian police contingent acted on orders by Nkrumah to protect Lumumba without authorization from ONUC. This made the Secretary-General to request that the government should instruct all Ghanaian contingents to act only with command from the UN.47 Subsequently, when Ghanaian troops were used to prevent Lumumba from broadcasting on the radio in Leopoldville, Nkrumah could not order them to allow him access, even after Lumumba wrote to him to do so.48

As the Cold War theme deepened in the Congo, Nkrumah’s efforts to canvass support for Lumumba in the UN saw little success. When the issue of who should represent Congo in the UN was put to vote, Nkrumah and his radical allies were overcome by the Francophone states (Brazzaville Group) and their western friends. The Casablanca group and the Soviet Union wanted Lumumba’s delegates to occupy the Congolese seat. The Brazzaville group and western states wanted the Kasavubu delegation to seat. The Kasavubu delegation won the vote by 53 to 24 with 19 abstentions.49

Nkrumah had good representatives at the UN who were negotiating on his behalf. Ghana’s permanent representative to the UN, Alexander Quaison-Sackey even became president of the UN General Assembly. As Scott Thompson puts it, “Quaison-Sackey represented Nkrumah’s commitment to the United Nations.” When Lumumba travelled to the US, Nkrumah telegraphed asking him to ensure that Lumumba did not do anything outside the confines of his important mission to the UN. The aim was to prevent Lumumba from inflaming Cold War passions there. However, Quaison-Sackey could not stop Lumumba, as the latter went ahead and contacted the Soviet diplomats in Ottawa.50

When there was a problem over the UN mandate in the Congo, Nkrumah called on Quaison-Sackey to lobby for a stronger UN mandate in favour of Lumumba. According to Scott
Thompson, “He instructed Quaison-Sackey that, if he was unable to obtain backing in the African Group and Security Council for a strengthening of ONUC’s mandate, he should seek to postpone the issue until after the Leopoldville conference.”

When the other Casablanca members withdrew their troops from ONUC for UN’s failure to put an end to “Mobutu’s lawless gangs”, Nkrumah refused to withdraw his troops. Despite the fact that withdrawing his troops was a condition the other Casablanca members gave him in exchange for their agreement to establish an African high command, he chose to maintain his troops in ONUC. He urged the others to “continue to work within the United Nations for a stronger mandate.”

3.5 Diplomacy in the Congo

Ghana played a very important role in the Congo crisis. The role played by Ghana in the crisis was uncharacteristic of a state of its size. It was this unprecedented role that made Scott Thompson to describe Ghana as “the diplomatic cockpit of Africa.” Ghana had influenced the independence struggle in the Congo. Lumumba was a participant in the All-African People’s Conference organized by Nkrumah in Accra in December, 1958. It was the inspiration Lumumba got from the Conference that made him to convene a meeting in January 1959, spreading the message of the need for immediate self government. This resulted in nationalist agitations for independence, speeding up the handing over of power from the Belgians.

When the Congo went into crisis, a few weeks after independence, it was only predictable that Nkrumah would play a role in resolving the crisis, taking into consideration his Africa policy. Since he wanted a united Africa, it was in his interest for Congo to be a peaceful state. As part of his Pan-African designs, Nkrumah signed a Ghana-Congo union secretly with Lumumba in
Accra in August 1960. Congo’s situation was even more peculiar because of the Cold War environment. Nkrumah did not want Congo to become a proxy battle field for the super powers, he sought to have the crisis resolved as quickly as possible.\(^{55}\)

When Congo became independent, Nkrumah appointed Andrew Djin as his ambassador to Congo. Before independence was officially proclaimed, Djin was sent to help the Congolese to ensure a smooth transition to independence. Nkrumah perceived the Congolese as inexperienced and unsophisticated people who needed his guidance to manage their independence. According to Andrew Djin:

> My job was of course to insure a smooth independence, like ours – and to apply the reins of Lumumba. These Congolese were very unsophisticated, compared with the Ghanaians; they knew nothing of socialism, or politics in general; they were rowdy, and out of touch with the modern world. I had to convince them that they were on a stage, and that if their independence didn’t go well, it would set back the fate of all Africa.\(^{56}\)

Given the nature of their colonial educational policy, it does not come as a surprise that, the Congolese politicians were not as politically mature as their Ghanaian counterparts. At independence, there were less than 20 Congolese who had had higher education. Also they were the lowest of the low in the civil service ranks and army. In the words of Richard D. Mahoney, “the Congo’s civil service was staffed at the middle and upper levels by Belgians.”\(^{57}\) Ghana, on the other hand, according to Scott Thompson, had the best civil service in Sub-Saharan Africa. Eight outstanding Ghanaians including Alex Quaison-Sackey, F. S. Arkhurst, and Major Seth Anthony were chosen from the administrative grade of the civil service by the Advisory Committee on Defense and External Affairs and sent abroad for training. They received training at the London Foreign Office and the London School of Business. They were also sent to British missions abroad and the Gold Coast Commission in London, for practical experience.\(^{58}\)

However, in Scott Thompson’s view, Andrew Djin was not equal to the task entrusted to him in the Congo. Djin’s appointment was influenced by his loyalty to Nkrumah but not based on his
diplomatic credentials. Thompson describes him as “a clever Tammy Hall politician” who lacked diplomatic instinct.\textsuperscript{59}

When the Congo crisis started, Nkrumah set up a Special Congo Coordinating Committee made up of his information minister Kwaku Boateng, as the chairman, Eric Otoo, Attorney General Geoffrey Bing, and his white Chief of Defense Staff Major-General Alexander. The Principal and Deputy Principal Secretaries Michael Dei-Anang and Richard Quarshie were also taken from the Foreign Ministry to join the Congo team. Richard Quarshie was made secretary of the committee while his boss Dei-Anang was to help to set up a new Ghana office in Congo. Kwesi Armah attributes the formation of the African Affairs Secretariat in 1961 to the experience of the Congo crisis.\textsuperscript{60}

A few days after the crisis started, Ghana sent Andrew Djin, Lieutenant Colonel Eric Otoo, General Alexander and other diplomats to Congo. Ghana informed the United Nations about its readiness to send two battalion and “adequate stores.” Ghana also offered the UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, a radio-link for his use. Ghana was the first state to send troops to Congo. According to Scott Thompson, “Within a week of Lumumba’s first request for Ghanaian troops, 1,193 were in Leopoldville; 192 more were waiting for transport in Accra with 156 trucks and 160 tons of stores.” Nkrumah sent engineers, doctors, and civil servants. He chartered a ship to send materials. When Lumumba was taking his trip to the US in July, Nkrumah put a flying secretariat at his disposal. Nkrumah even went as far as providing Lumumba with his own personal plane. For transportation of more troops to the Congo, all Ghana Airways flights were cancelled by July 19, 1960.\textsuperscript{61} The Ghanaian troops were part of the United Nations Congo Force (ONUC). Other African states that contributed the bulk of the ONUC troops were Morocco,
Egypt, Liberia, Guinea, Nigeria, Tunisia and Sudan. According to James Mayall, by the end of 1960, 17,500 ONUC combat troops were in Congo. Scott Thompson identifies three strategies in Nkrumah’s Congo policy. One of the strategies was his commitment to the UN. The others were his diplomats in Congo and his trusted British Chief of Staff, General Alexander. Before the arrival of the ONUC commander, General Van Horn, Alexander had played a very important role in the Congo. He had succeeded in disarming the Congolese army in Leopoldville. This act increased Nkrumah’s confidence in Alexander, who he believed was capable of restoring order in Congo. However, as Thompson notes, Nkrumah’s three strategies began to contradict each other.

A cursory look at Nkrumah’s diplomats in Congo reveals that, Nkrumah did not make good use of Ghana’s wealth of trained diplomats in his Congo mission. None of the eight outstanding Ghanaians who were sent abroad for diplomatic training was part of the Congo Coordinating Committee. The foreign minister, Ako Adjei is reported to have declined membership when he was not made chairman of the committee. According to Thompson, apart from Geoffrey Bing who had experience from the Spanish civil war, the rest of the committee members had no clue on how to assess major developments in the crisis.

The separation of the African affairs from the Foreign Ministry deprived the ministry from actively participating in the Congo crisis. Kwesi Armah recounts that, “after 1961, Ghana Ambassadors in Africa ceased to be under the administrative control of the Foreign Ministry. Their reports were sent direct to the African Affairs Secretariat. As a result of these arrangements, by 1961, there were virtually two independent official heads in charge of foreign affairs at the Foreign Ministry and at the African Affairs Secretariat.” The result was lack of
coordination and exclusion of the wealth of skilled diplomats at the Foreign Ministry from participating in resolving the Congo crisis.\textsuperscript{65}

Nkrumah only sent those who shared his views to Congo. Some of them were his CPP stalwarts and those who told him what he wanted to hear, for fear of losing their job. According to Thompson, going to Congo was what politicians and civil servants did to increase their influence in Ghana.\textsuperscript{66} Andrew Djin was a treasurer of the CPP, board member of the Bureau of African Affairs and managing director of the Cocoa Purchasing Company, which Thompson describes as “a notorious CPP adjunct.”\textsuperscript{67} His replacement in the Congo, Nathaniel Welbeck, was also a CPP loyalist whose diplomatic endeavour in Guinea the previous year had been a failure. He carried his love for addressing political rallies in Ghana to Congo, an attribute which is uncharacteristic of a good diplomat. He was eventually declared \textit{persona non grata} by Kasavubu because of his interference in Congolese politics.\textsuperscript{68}

General Alexander’s presence in the Congo soon became problematic in Ghana’s Congo intervention. He had problems both with the UN commander in Congo, General Van Horn and Djin. The Congolese people were not happy about the presence of white officers in the Ghanaian contingent, so Alexander’s presence annoyed them. Their concerns were understandable since the Congo issue was a matter of African pride. Given the anti white sentiments in the country that resulted in the mutiny and looting, and also taking into consideration that the Congolese were fighting against Belgian aggression, it was normal for them to resent a white officer exercising so much power in Leopoldville, even to the extent of disarming the \textit{Force Publique}.

The Alexander factor in Nkrumah’s Congo policy was used against him by other African diplomats, who capitalized on Alexander’s lack of sympathy towards Lumumba’s policies to point out to Lumumba Nkrumah’s unreliability to him. Nkrumah had given Djin instructions to
assist Lumumba in every possible way. With Alexander and the Ghanaian troops under UN on one hand, and Djin with the responsibility of assisting Lumumba in all possible ways, there was a conflict between Alexander and Djin with his diplomats. According to Thompson, the two gave contradictory advice to Nkrumah. For Djin to have more influence with Lumumba, vis-à-vis the other African diplomats, he had to put the Ghanaian troops at Lumumba’s disposal. That, Alexander would not allow. Djin was irritated when Alexander succeeded in getting the Congolese cabinet through Ralph Bunche, UN Secretary General’s representative in Congo, to disown Lumumba’s threat of resorting to Soviet help if the UN did not get the Belgian troops out of Congo within 24 hours. Alexander, on the other hand, accused the diplomats of frustrating policy in the Congo. He accused Geoffrey Bing of preventing his messages from reaching Nkrumah. He also criticized Djin for being too eager to please Lumumba. When Nkrumah sent a message to African leaders that, due to disturbing reports about the Congo situation he had sent a special fact finding mission there, the response he got indicated that, the other African leaders were not going to welcome Ghanaian unilateralism in the Congo. Tunisia responded that, “they looked forward to cooperating with Ghana as well as other African states at the United Nations level.” According to Thompson, Liberian President, Tubman publicly expressed his displeasure at Nkrumah’s unilateral act of sending the special mission. The Guineans opposed every Ghanaian proposal at meetings.

Nkrumah had been using his police contingent in the Leopoldville to support Lumumba. When the contingent acted on Lumumba’s request for protection on orders from Ghana and without authorization from ONUC, the Secretary General instructed that all members of the Ghanaian contingent in ONUC should be under the exclusive command of the UN. With little hope of using the Ghanaian contingent to help Lumumba, Nkrumah hoped to push the idea of African
high military command in an upcoming meeting of Independent African States in Leopoldville. According to Thompson, in mid August, President Nasser of United Arab Republic (now Egypt) sent military officers to Accra for preparation for the high military command. Unfortunately for Nkrumah, African leaders decided to hold the conference at ministerial level, so his hopes of cajoling his fellow heads of state into forming a high military command were dashed. The issue of high military command was not even allowed on the agenda of the conference.\textsuperscript{72}

When Lumumba was dismissed by Kasavubu, Nkrumah made some efforts to help him, but not without making some demands. When the UN used Ghanaian troops to deny Lumumba access to Leopoldville radio on September 6, 1960, he wrote to Nkrumah demanding that he should order the troops to allow him broadcast on the radio. According to Thompson, in one of Nkrumah’s letters to Lumumba, he was ready to withdraw his troops from ONUC and put them at Lumumba’s disposal, on the condition that, Lumumba will make a public declaration of the political union of Ghana and Congo.\textsuperscript{73}

In December 1960, a group of twelve Francophone states, latter known as the Brazzaville Group, met in Brazzaville to formulate their foreign policies toward Congo and Algeria. They sent invitations to the leaders of the various factions in the Congo. The Brazzaville Group was opposed to centralism in Congo. They believed the Congo problem should be tackled in Mayall’s words, “through the medium of a round-table conference between the competing Congolese factions without interference from outside powers.”\textsuperscript{74} This was in sharp contrast with the view of Nkrumah and his radical colleagues: Guinea, Mali, Morocco and United Arabs Republic, who were interested in the re-unification of Congo under the legitimate Lumumba government. They wanted the ONUC troops to be used to quashed the rebellions and consolidate Lumumba’s power.\textsuperscript{75}
The radicals’ reaction to the Brazzaville Conference was the Casablanca Conference of January 1961. At the Casablanca Conference, the radicals adopted a resolution that they would withdraw their troops from ONUC if the UN did not put an end to Mobutu’s military rule and recall parliament. According to Mayall, the other members of the group agreed to establish the African high command in exchange for Nkrumah’s promise to withdraw his troops from ONUC if the UN failed to meet the conditions. However, when the UN did not meet the conditions, Nkrumah did not join them to withdraw their troops. Nkrumah maintained his troops in the UN because he knew that he could only make an impact within a stronger UN mandate.\(^76\)

Kasavubu and his supporters began to demand the withdrawal of Ghanaian troops. Kasavubu had declared Welbeck \textit{persona non grata} because of his meddling in local politics; however, Nkrumah refused to call him back. Welbeck’s refusal to leave resulted in an exchange of fire between the Congolese army – ANC and UN troops who were guarding the Ghanaian ambassador’s residence. A Congolese colonel, Colonel Kokolo lost his life in the fight. This incident fuelled anti Ghanaian sentiments in Leopoldville. By October 16, 1961, ONUC ordered the withdrawal of the Ghanaian contingent. The Ghanaian troops were humiliated by the manner in which they left the Congo. They had gone there as heroes but later the Congolese people did not show appreciation for their efforts. Ghana’s mission was later closed and the diplomats left.\(^77\)

\subsection*{3.6 Caught between Two Super Powers}

To avoid getting trapped in the Cold War politics, Nkrumah became a founding member of the Non-aligned Movement. He was aware that meddling in Cold War politics would frustrate his Africa policy. Nkrumah had cultivated good relations with both USA and Soviet Union. The
United States of America was one of the first countries Ghana established diplomatic relations with. America demonstrated its support for Ghana by announcement of State Department on March 5, 1957, that “the US Government has officially recognized the new state of Ghana, which becomes independent and a member of the British Commonwealth on 6 March.” US Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the dignitaries at Ghana’s independence party. The US consulate was changed into an embassy and Senate confirmed Wilson C. Flake as the ambassador to Ghana on May 20, 1957. Ghana established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union later than the US. It was not until in 1960 that Ghana established a diplomatic mission in Soviet Union. According to Kwesi Armah, one of Ghana’s objectives of opening an embassy in Moscow was “to create a diplomatic posture whereby, at appropriate moments, Ghana would be well placed to understand East-West relations and be able, together with other non-aligned states, to interpose between East and West …”

Nkrumah’s involvement in the Congo crisis was the beginning of his Cold War woes. His decision to accept Soviet planes without authorization from the UN was the beginning of his problems with the US. Dag Hammarskjold felt “Nkrumah had been too hasty in demonstrating Ghana’s non-alignment.” Even though Nkrumah explained that it was not fair to refuse Soviet help while accepting help of US, America did not take it kindly.

While the Soviet Union shared the view of the radical African states that ONUC troops should be used to put an end to the Katanga secession and consolidate Lumumba’s power, the US shared the view of the conservative Brazzaville group that, the UN should not interfere with the internal conflict of Congo. Given that the Soviet Union was more sympathetic to Nkrumah and his friend Lumumba’s needs, one could predict that it was only a matter of time before Nkrumah started leaning towards the East.
However, Nkrumah was tactful so as not to incur the wrath of the US. He tried to please the US and to appeal to the Americans to come out with a solution in the Congo. In September 1960, Hammarskjold called a special session of the General Assembly to work out a solution of restoring order in Congo. While in the US, Nkrumah had a meeting with President Eisenhower. According to Mahoney, Nkrumah informed Eisenhower that he had declined to have an appointed with Nikita Khrushchev the previous day because he wanted to meet Eisenhower first. However, Eisenhower did not give him convincing assurance. He only told Nkrumah that, their policy is to solve problems through the UN. Nkrumah was not impressed with the outcome of their meeting.

A day after this meeting, Nkrumah made a speech that was taking by the Americans as a declaration of his communist affiliation. In his address to the General Assembly, he accused the West of preventing the reconciliation of Kasavubu and Lumumba. He said that “imperialist intrigue, stark and naked, was desperately at work” in the Congo to prevent the reconciliation of the two Congolese leaders. This made the Americans to conclude that Nkrumah was surely on the side of their enemy. American Secretary of State, Christian Herter remarked to the media in a statement cleared by the White House that, “Nkrumah was definitely moving toward the Soviet bloc.” Even though Nkrumah later suggested privately to Edgar Kaiser about his willingness to explain his position to Herter, it did not change the White House view of him.82

After the murder of Lumumba in 1961, Nkrumah began to lean more towards the East. He invited Soviet President Brezhnev to Ghana. He also took a trip to China and other Eastern European states; where he became convinced that, socialism was the best approach to Ghana’s development.83
America never forgave Nkrumah for leaning towards the East. They dealt with him later. A few years later, the CIA sponsored a coup d’état that ousted Nkrumah from power in 1966. According to Gebe, declassified documents from National Security Council and CIA prove that, the government of President Lyndon Johnson had a hand in the coup. Nkrumah’s anti-Western radicalism and pro socialist views turned the West against him. His commitment and determination to see a diplomatic solution to the Congo crisis proved to be his undoing in the West-East super power struggle.84
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CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter summarizes the research findings by outlining the lapses in Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo as well as the positive outcomes. It concludes that Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo failed because of the strategies he used. The latter part of the chapter offers recommendations for the consideration of African leaders and diplomats.

4.2 Summary of Findings

Nkrumah’s intervention in the Congo crisis was influenced by his Pan-African agenda. He wanted to help Lumumba to resolve the crisis so that, the latter would unite Congo with Ghana politically. Prior to the crisis, Nkrumah had taken upon himself a duty to help the unsophisticated and politically immature Congolese leaders to manage their independence. It was for this reason that he sent his diplomats to the Congo with the instructions to teach Lumumba the ropes of diplomatic manoeuvring and the tenets of socialism. He assumed he was entitled to some level of influence in Congo since he had inspired the Congolese in their nationalist struggle.

The study revealed the following findings:

- Nkrumah’s Congo policy failed because of his use of the elitist approach to foreign policy formulation. Instead of making good use of the experienced bureaucrats at the Foreign Ministry, he relied more on his political elites and party stalwarts who only told
him what he wanted to hear. His exclusion of the professionals from the formulation of his Congo policy was a major factor in the failure of his statecraft in Congo.

- Secondly, the inclusion of white officers in the Ghanaian contingent in the Congo also contributed to the failure of his Congo policy. The presence of these white officers, especially his Chief of Staff, General Alexander, turned the Congolese against Ghana because of the anti-white sentiments that characterized the crisis. Since the Congolese were fighting for the withdrawal of Belgian troops in their country, the presence of white officers in African contingents annoyed them. This was part of the reason they called for the withdrawal of the Ghanaian contingent.

- Moreover, the study found that, Nkrumah’s radical and passionate approach to his Pan-African agenda also contributed to the failure of his Congo intervention. His radical approach to issues in the crisis turned most of the African states against him. His unilateral decisions in the Congo made them suspicious of his intentions, as they tagged him as a communist agent who was the real problem in the Congo. His radicalism in Congo led to the formation of the Brazzaville Group, which opposed him and voted against his position on Congo at the UN. The other African leaders became convinced that Nkrumah was set to pursue the policy of unilateralism in Africa, which they were not ready to tolerate. They were not ready to sit back and watch him embark on his ambitious Pan-African project.

- Furthermore, the study revealed that Nkrumah’s relations with the superpowers also led to his failure in Congo. Nkrumah’s desperation to demonstrate his support for Lumumba made him incur the wrath of the US. As if being Lumumba’s supporter was not enough to become America’s enemy, he balanced his weight towards America’s rival the Soviet
Union. The repercussion was that the West turned the Congolese politicians and some African leaders against him. Kasavubu, a western ally, declared his ambassador persona non grata and called for the withdrawal of the Ghanaian contingent. The West punished him by engineering a coup d’état that ousted him from power in 1966.

Finally, the study discovered that, Nkrumah was willing to do anything to see to the success of multilateralism in the Congo. He committed his policy to the mission of the UN in Congo, and devoted his troops to the success of the UN mission.

4.3 Conclusions

This study has examined Ghana’s intervention in the Congo crisis. It traced Nkrumah’s involvement in the crisis to his African policy of forming a United States of Africa through the negotiation of political unions with African states on bilateral basis. The study gave a background of the crisis and examined Nkrumah’s statecraft in the resolution of the crisis. The following were some of the instruments of Nkrumah’s statecraft in Congo: Firstly was his commitment to the UN for stronger mandate by maintaining his troops in ONUC; Secondly, he provided financial assistance and other facilities to Lumumba in order to increase his leverage. Thirdly, he counted on his permanent representative to the UN, Alexander Quaison-Sackey, to negotiate in his favour at the General Assembly level. Fourthly, was his Congo Coordinating Committee and finally, his diplomats in Congo; headed by his political cronies as ambassadors, whose job was to provide the necessary assistance to Lumumba.
Nkrumah’s statecraft in the Congo was a failure. His elitist approach to foreign policy formulation contributed to the failure of his Congo policy. He entrusted the delicate work of negotiation and diplomatic manoeuvring in the crisis to his political cronies and sycophants.

The international environment at the time also dictated the amount of influence Nkrumah could exert in the crisis. Cast in the Cold War politics of ideological rivalry between the East-West super powers, Ghana’s role was overshadowed by the super powers.

However, even though his Congo policy failed, Nkrumah’s role in the crisis did put Ghana on the map. The fact that a small state like Ghana was able to play such unprecedented role in international politics demonstrated the leadership role that Ghana was ready to assume in Africa. Nkrumah lived up to Ghana’s description as the “beacon of Africa”. The fact that Nkrumah committed so many resources to help a fellow African state in need is an example for African leaders to emulate. With such commitment, Africans can demonstrate to the world that, they are capable of solving their own problems. Ghana will forever be remembered for its leadership role in Africa, and many still look up to Ghana to assume certain leadership positions in African politics.

In the final analysis, even though Nkrumah’s failure in the Congo demonstrated the limitation of the amount of influence a small state can exert in the international system, it did also demonstrate that, with determination, small states can play bigger roles than expected of them in the community of nations.
4.4 Recommendations

The following are recommendations for the consideration of African leaders and diplomats:

- For proper formulation of foreign policy, heads of state should avoid overreliance on the elitist approach. A combination of the elitist and bureaucratic approaches, with more emphasis on the bureaucratic approach would yield more results. Leaders should leave much of foreign policy formulation to the professionals who are trained to do so. Trained bureaucrats are more likely to give advice from professional point of view than party elite and sycophants, who are only interested in praising the leader for their own personal gains.

- Secondly, ambassadors should avoid meddling in the internal politics of their host countries. They should apply tact and caution at post so as not to lose their credibility. The diplomatic embarrassment Ghana faced as a result of Welbeck being declared persona non grata in Congo could have been avoided had he applied tact. To avoid such embarrassments and diplomatic failure, career diplomats, not political appointees should be posted to delicate and troubled areas.

- Moreover, leaders should do situational analysis of issues before deciding on the best cost of action. By so doing, they would be careful on how to handle sensitive issues. Had Nkrumah done proper situational analysis, he would have known that, it was a bad idea to send white officers to an area where the most pervading issue was getting white people out of the country.

- Furthermore, small states should do an analysis of the players and possible players in a crisis or conflict, so as not to overestimate their influence. With the super powers in mind
Nkrumah should have known the limits of his influence and for that matter, been tactful in dealing with them so as not to turn one of them against him.

Finally, African leaders should always consult their fellow leaders and take collective decisions before embarking on any international intervention where all of them have a common interest. Proper consultation would give African leaders a common and stronger position. Unilateralism in international issues will always turn African leaders against each other for fear of dominance or self aggrandizement.
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