SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT STATES IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF LIBERIA

BY

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DECLARATION

I, Samuel Harrison-Cudjoe, declare that with the exception of quotes, ideas and analysis attributed to duly acknowledged sources, this study is the result of research dutifully conducted under the supervision of my supervisors, Dr. Seidu Alidu and Dr Kumi Ansah-Koi. I am solely responsible for any errors which may be identified in this work.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my family; my Dad Kojo Harrison, my mum Grace Buaku, to my siblings David, Mercy and Elizabeth. This is also to two important friends in my life; my twin Danso Sampson, and to my special friend Ramatu Atswei Dua.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would begin by thanking GOD for his love, care and protection over my life during the time of my study. I would also thank a number of people who made huge contributions to this study in all manner of ways.

Firstly, I would like to acknowledge the contributions of Dr Seidu Alidu and Dr Kumi Ansah Koi who served as my supervisors for this study. Their frank comments, encouragement and calmness in times of confusion shaped this work extensively.

I would also like to thank Mr Alexander Duku Frimpong whose thesis inspired this study, and to his right-hand man Jalilu Ateku, for all those mini-supervision and advice. Special mention is also to be made of Dr Thomas Jaye of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre for his time, comments and insight into the Liberian issue of which this work greatly benefitted. I am also indebted to Mr Allimou Diallo of the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) and Mr Philip Attuquayefio of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) for their time and insights for my interviews. I would like to thank Anthony and all staff of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), as well as Elizabeth of WANEP.

To my colleagues Danso, William, P.K, Grace, Patience, Wilkas, Pabia, Matthew, Bright, Blay, Cosmos and Adade, thank you folks for the camaraderie, the lessons learnt, the prayers and the support.

Lastly, I would like to thank all staff of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana for their support.

May God bless you all abundantly.
ABSTRACT

The study analyses post-conflict Security Sector Reform (SSR) in post-conflict states in Africa with particular reference to Liberia. It posits that a robust and comprehensive SSR can be a tool for peacebuilding, and promote sustainable peace in postconflict environments. The importance of local ownership to any attempt at carrying out an SSR is also discussed in the study. This helps to make meaningful generalisations about, and contribute to post-conflict SSR as a whole.

The study finds that effective and sustainable SSR in postconflict societies is possible within the context of a multi-sectoral approach. This will involve the combined efforts of all the management and oversight bodies such as the Legislature, Judiciary and the Executive to achieve result. The role of civil society in ensuring the sustainability of any SSR program is also highlighted. The study makes the recommendation, among others, that in future the ECOWAS Mechanism should be applied as an SSR tool for sub-regional transformation to prevent a recurrence of violence.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
<td>American Colonisation Society</td>
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<td>ADP</td>
<td>Active Duty Personnel</td>
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<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<td>ASSN</td>
<td>African Security Sector Network</td>
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<td>ATU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Unit</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Accord</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ERU</td>
<td>Emergency Response Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICGL</td>
<td>International Contact Group on Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGU</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>KAIPTC</td>
<td>Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>LECIAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFF</td>
<td>Liberian Frontier Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LINLEA</td>
<td>Liberia National Law Enforcement Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNP</td>
<td>Liberian National Police</td>
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<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy</td>
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<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NACCSOL</td>
<td>National Coalition of Civil Society Organisations in Liberia</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPFL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
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<td>NPRA</td>
<td>National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTGL</td>
<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>NTLA</td>
<td>National Transitional Legislative Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAE</td>
<td>Pacific Architects and Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCRD</td>
<td>Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>PMCs</td>
<td>Private Military Companies</td>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>SSR(^1)</td>
<td>Security Sector Reconstruction</td>
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<td>SSS</td>
<td>Special Security Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<tr>
<td>ULIMO</td>
<td>United Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCIVPOL</td>
<td>UN Civil Police</td>
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UNDP          United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL        United Nations Mission in Liberia
UP            United Party
US            United States of America
WANEP        West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM
Conflicts usually go through phases. These phases include latent conflict, emergence, escalation, (Hurting) stalemate, de-escalation, settlement, resolution, and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation (Brahm, 2003). The end of the Cold War saw an increase in the number of armed and violent intrastate conflicts in the world. Knight (2004) argues that the majority of these conflicts took place in the poorest areas of the world, particularly the African continent. The flashpoints of these intrastate struggles in Africa were usually in Sub-Saharan Africa; in East Africa (especially in the Horn and Great Lakes regions), in Southern Africa (especially in Angola), and in West Africa (especially Liberia). All these intra-state conflicts consequently ended in the destruction of lives and property, as well as internal state structures. One internal structure usually destroyed in such conflicts is the state’s security sector, which broadly defined, refers to all organisations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force to protect communities, individuals and the state (Bendix and Stanley, 2008). The most affected organisations in the security sector is the state’s armed forces (including both navy and the airforce where applicable) and the Police because they are most often the target of combating groups such as rebel groups who do not have the authority of the state to perform the core functions of providing state security.

Fayemi’s (1998) study of civil-military relations in West Africa has shown the military to be occupying an uncomfortable position in the state. The military is seen as playing an important
role in conflict resolution as well as having a huge influence in the political decision-making process since they are depended upon for political survival by civilian elite who are uninformed about its setup. Fayemi (1998: 89) suggests a “politicisation of ethnicity within African armies” where the military is perceived as the “…conclave[s] of certain ethnic groups associated with the ruling elite, civilian or military”. Liberia under Samuel Doe is a perfect example because at the time of the 1989 insurrection, the Liberian army could best be described as a Krahn army (Fayemi, 1998). The overbearing nature of the military and its ethnicisation leads to an unnecessary militarism of the state which creates the tinder for violent conflict.

Questions about the loyalty of the security sector come to the fore as it increasingly loses its identity as a state apparatus, but rather as an extension of the property of either the officers or the leader of the regime. In Liberia for example, in 1989 and 1999, the military became extensions of both the Doe and Taylor regimes respectively because they had filled them with their cronies and tribesmen (Malan, 2008). In this environment, other non-statutory members of the security sector which are rebel or guerrilla armies, spring up in attempts at defending themselves from or overthrowing the dysfunctional state military. As their collective name suggests, they are non-statutory and therefore owned by a person or a group of persons, and not by the state. They are illegitimate and are violently resisted by the military which during the conflict, has come to resemble a private army. State resources are looted by both sides to prosecute the conflict as it protracts.

When the conflict ends, the state is left with a dysfunctional security sector. Agents of the security sectors are decimated and ineffective. There is also the presence of large numbers of
war veterans as well as numerous Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). This creates the grounds for an uneasy tension and the eventual relapse into conflict. “Security Sector Reform (SSR)” was thus introduced by both scholars and practitioners alike to “correct” the dysfunctional state security sector.

SSR as a term was introduced in the early 1990s as a means of rebuilding states torn apart by internecine warfare, especially in Eastern Europe. Its aim is the provision of human security and the democratic control of the state security apparatus. It involves the creation of democratic institutions to oversee the defence, intelligence, police, judicial and prison sectors of state security, as well as right-sizing of the military and the strengthening of civilian oversights and accountability. According to Junne and Verkoren (2005), for example, 44% of states which have experienced armed violence risk relapsing in the first five years of the war ending. To deal with problems posed in postconflict situations, activities such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; and anti-SALW programmes are seen by scholars and practitioners as important part of SSR capable of preventing a relapse into violent confrontations (Ebnother et al, 2007).

In Africa, there have been numerous SSRs though they have been carried out under several names. Most of these have been half-hearted and piecemeal attempts, sometimes at appealing to donors and appeasing political opponents. There have been successful ones such as in post-apartheid South Africa. Recent post-conflict SSRs are the ones on-going in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Liberia had been involved in a 14-year war from 1989 when Charles Taylor invaded from Nimba County. The war ended in August 2003 with the signing of the Comprehensive
Peace Accord (CPA) in Accra, which included articles providing for the execution of an SSR. This was due to the history of Charles Taylor’s refusal to allow ECOMOG to carry out a reform of the Liberian security sector in 1997. When Charles Taylor became President after a landslide victory of a little over 75% of the votes cast in the Liberian elections in 1997, the expectation was that Liberia was going to have peace. He was obligated to reform and restructure the security sector to “… reflect the neutrality of the government” (Malan, 2008: 8). His attempts at such security reforms failed and led to the relapse into violence in 1999 in which such armed groups as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) fought to rid Liberia of Taylor.

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf assumed office in January 16 2006. The Liberian Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA, 2003) made mandatory a restructuring of the AFL and the other security agencies under the auspices of the ECOWAS, UN, AU and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). The reform of the army became the responsibility of the US government and police reform was put under the care of UNMIL (International Crisis Group, 2009). The peace accords did not state who was to be responsible for the other security agencies such as the prisons and justice systems, thus, the reform of these ones have come under the care of the Liberian government and the UNMIL (International Crisis Group, 2009).

Some achievements have been chalked, the most notable of which is the presence currently of about 2000 vetted and well-trained privates of the AFL with 110 officers, and the establishment of the Emergency Response Unit (ERU), a paramilitary police unit. Though problems exist over
such issues as funding and local ownership, current reforms unlike Taylor’s, have not caused a relapse into conflict.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

After a series of failed peace accords, ECOWAS leaders agreed to a “proposal to restructure the armed forces, police and other security institutions to reflect geographical and ethnical balance” (Ikomi, 2007:42). The restructuring effort was supposed to be under the auspices of ECOMOG. When Taylor won the election in 1997, he refused ECOMOG the right to carry out the restructuring (Ikomi, 2007). Instead, he carried out his own “restructuring” by filling the armed forces with his NPFL militiamen (Ikomi, 2007). This partisan “restructuring” unravelled the fragile peace in the country and led eventually to the 1999 resumption of conflict.

The 1999 conflict came to an end in 2003 with the signing of the CPA. The SSR which was mandated by the CPA began in 2004 with lead taken by the US (International Crisis Group, 2009). The Johnson-Sirleaf government which assumed office in 2006 has continued with the process. Unlike her predecessor, the current government has allowed the international partners to carry out the SSR. The reform of the army has been carried out by the US government and police reform has been under the guidance of UNMIL.

The study therefore seeks to examine SSR as a sustainable peacebuilding measure. The following empirical questions will be addressed:

- What was the nature of the Liberian Security sector before the first phase of the war, and how did this contribute to the war?
• How was SSR carried out under both Charles Taylor and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf?
• What is the role of the International Community in the Liberian SSR?
• What lessons are to be drawn by other post-conflict countries from Liberia’s SSR?

1.3 OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this study is to examine SSR in postconflict societies. The Liberian crises and the SSR that followed provide a test case that allows researchers to evaluate the need and effectiveness of SSR in postconflict situations around the world. In furtherance of the main objective, the following sub-objectives have been selected:

• Examine the history of the security sector in Liberia.

• Compare the SSRs of both the Taylor and Johnson-Sirleaf governments.

• Examine the role of international partners in SSR.

• Assess the challenges of post-conflict SSR.

1.4 METHODOLOGY
The main aim of this research was to examine SSR in postconflict societies and so any data collected was deemed necessary to SSR in postconflict societies. The study was purely qualitative, relying on descriptive analysis of data and other information. The relevant data was gathered mainly from journals and publications from think-tanks who deal with SSR. An elite interview process was used to gain relevant insights from security analysts and experts with knowledge about the Liberian SSR.
For the purpose of this study, secondary sources of data were mostly used. The information was derived from official documents such as the Liberian Comprehensive Peace Agreement, scholarly articles and books written on the topic. Other useful documents were downloaded from useful websites of think-tanks and international institutions [such as the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management (Berlin), the International Crisis Group Working to Prevent Conflict Worldwide, and the United Nations], Journals (such as the Journal of Security Sector Management) and documents from experts on Conflicts and Peace Studies such as Herbert Wulf and Heiner Hanggi. The researcher also made use of books relevant to the subject from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), African Security Sector Network (ASSN), Balme and Political Science libraries of the University of Ghana.

Face-to-face elite interviews were conducted with officials from relevant institutions with a bearing on the subject matter with the help of a well-crafted interview guide. In all, three persons were interviewed; one (1) from the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC): one (1) from the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD); and one (1) from the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). The selection of institutions and persons interviewed was based on the relevance of the institution to the subject matter, as well as the interviewee’s ability to speak to the subject matter. Certain institutions who were contacted failed to give a feedback as to whether or not they were available to be interviewed. This explains why only three persons were interviewed.
The data were analysed using the content analysis method. According to Mayring (2010:2), qualitative content analysis is “...an approach of empirical methodological controlled analysis of text within their context of communication, following content analytical rules and step by step models, without rash quantification.” Content analysis however is not only about the obvious content of the material. There exists what has been termed “Primary content” which refers to the themes and main ideas of the text. There’s also the “latent content” which refers to the context information (Becker & Lissman, 1973). One advantage of this method is to keep out the researcher’s personal thoughts about the subject (Anderson, 2007: 1). In this vein, this method of interpretation aided the study by allowing the researcher to give expression to the salient arguments and thoughts that have emerged in the field of SSR in postconflict societies.

All information collected and analysed was situated in Kenneth Bush’s theory of peacebuilding. This theory of peacebuilding views it as a two-fold process of deconstructing the structures of violence, and constructing the structures of peace. In so doing, this study aims at contributing towards properly understanding and applying SSR in postconflict societies.

1.5 DEFINITION OF TERMS

The study attempted to define the key terms relevant to the study. The terms to be defined are Security, Security Sector (or system, as the case may be) and Security Sector Reform.
1.5.1 Security

‘Security’ is often deemed to be a state or feeling of safety, that is, protection from harm. The idea of ‘security dilemma’ was introduced in the early 1950s to refer to a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend automatically to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and the measures of others as potentially threatening (Buzan 1983). Before and during the Cold War, what reigned as ‘security’ was what was called ‘conventional convictions’ in which security acquired a military jurisdiction (Booth 2007). This is what has been known as the traditional concept of security. It is no wonder then that the concept of security that dominated in the Cold War era was ‘military power and strategic relationships’ (Booth, 2007: 96).

The concept ‘security’ has however not lent itself to easy definition. Most writers have shied away from an attempt at definition. ‘Security’ has been variously labelled as ‘ambiguous’, ‘an inadequate concept’ and ‘relative’ because it is easily applied to things than to people (Buzan, 1983: 4, 18).

After the end of the Cold War, the concept ‘security’ has been widened to include a host of non-military issues bordering on political, economic, societal and environmental concerns or agenda (Hanggi, 2004: 2; Omotola, 2006: 2). The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (2005) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) define security as that core governmental duty that relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes that are necessary for economic, social and political development. In
light of the current wide usage of the term, the study shall use ‘security’ in the traditional sense which refers solely to the military security of the state.

1.5.2 Security Sector (or System)

Omotola (2006) argues that the security sector can be perceived in both security and governance perspectives. Security-wise, the security sector includes the state agencies and actors who are formally charged with the safety of the state and citizens from any violence and harm (Omotola, 2006). These are the armed forces, police, intelligence and any paramilitary forces the state might have. In the governance perspective, the security sector includes ‘… elements of the public sector responsible for the exercise and control of the state monopoly of coercive power’ (Omotola, 2006: 3). This includes any government agency or actor formally mandated to exercise oversight functions such as the Ministry of Defence and the legislature.

Hanggi (2004) argues that though there are as many definitions, scholars and institutional actors of this term, there has been a seeming convergence on a general definition. Thus he defines the ‘Security Sector’ as ‘encompass[ing] all those state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion…’ (Hanggi, 2004: 3). However due to the existence of non-statutory or non-core security actors, the security sector includes statutory and non-statutory security forces (Hanggi, 2004: 3; Wulf, 2004).

The study has accepted security in its traditional form, that is, a focus on the military security of the state. Thus it shall define the security sector to include only the core or state security
institutions which are the armed forces, police, paramilitary forces, coast guards and the intelligence services.

1.5.3 **Security Sector Reform (or Reconstruction)**

A more authoritative and accepted definition of SSR is that of the OECD-DAC which states that ‘‘Security system reform’’ is another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework’ (OECD, 2005: 20). There is also Security Sector Reconstruction which is denoted SSR\(^1\) (Omotola, 2006). Omotola (2006) argues that SSR and SSR\(^1\) do not differ substantively even though they are not the same. SSR applies to developmental and post-authoritarian settings whilst SSR\(^1\) occurs in post-conflict settings. Omotola (2006: 3-4) advises against overstressing this difference stating that SSR and SSR\(^1\) should be “… seen as a continuum… whose primary objective is to see the total transformation of the security sector…” The Liberian situation has given the state features of developmental, post-authoritarian and post-conflict states (Omotola, 2006). Thus, the study shall use SSR and SSR\(^1\) interchangeably.

1.6 **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

The study would be situated in the theory of Peacebuilding, particularly Kenneth Bush’s conception of peacebuilding that views it as a two-fold process of deconstructing the structures
of violence, and constructing the structures of peace. This shall be used to explain the need for SSR.

The concept of peacebuilding has been severally defined. Boutros-Ghali (1992) cited by Keating and Knight (2004) defined Peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”. Call (2008) defined it as referring to “efforts at national, local or international levels to consolidate peace in war-torn areas”. Lambourne (2004: 3) also defined Peacebuilding as “strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur”. What is evident in all the definitions is the fact that peacebuilding is largely a long-term measure, but may also include short-term or band-aid measures, and that these measures complement each other.

Bush (2004: 25) conceives of Peacebuilding as a two-fold process of deconstructing the structures of violence and constructing the structures of peace. This arises out of how he defines peacebuilding as referring to “those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence or continuation of war” (Bush, 2005: 25). For Bush then, these two actions are “interrelated but separate sets of activities that must be undertaken simultaneously. Any intervention that includes one without the other is guaranteed not to have a net positive peacebuilding impact” (Bush, 2005: 25). The instruments required for peace construction are usually long-term and include actions such as confidence building, and is
different from the instruments of violence deconstruction which includes such short-term measures as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants.

In applying this theory of Peacebuilding to SSR, the study seeks to outline SSR’s importance to any process of building lasting peace. SSR is shown as aiding violence deconstruction through DDR of former combatants and thorough anti-SALW programmes; and contributing to peace construction by ensuring the provision of human security and democratic control of the state security apparatus to avoid a relapse into violence. SSR is therefore portrayed not as one method of peacebuilding, but as holistic peacebuilding in itself. The security sector in postconflict states moves from being a security threat to a democratically controlled security provider allowing for and actually building sustainable or lasting peace.

Bush’s theory or concept is seen as arising from the original “critical” usage of peacebuilding traced to the writing of Galtung and the Bouldings. The “critical” usage of peacebuilding shows it as “address[ing] the underlying structural causes of conflict through bottom-up processes and decentred socio-economic and political structures” (Knight, 2004:357). Conclusively, this critical usage prescribes “… a radical transformation of society away from structures of coercion and violence to an embedded culture of peace” (Keating & Knight, 2004: xxxiv). In consonance with this, a feature which is seen as the crux of SSR is proposed: addressing the legacies of past conflicts (Hanggi, 2004). This would include ensuring DDR, anti-SALW and postconflict transitional justice. When applied to postconflict situations in general, and Liberia specifically, SSR would seek to cure a perennially-malfunctioning traditional security sector to secure lasting peace.
Another conception of peacebuilding sees it as a reaction to existing conflicts. This is the reactive or “band-aid” short-term solutions. Peacebuilding measures employed are short-term, and are deployed only as and when conflicts arise. Peacekeeping and Peacemaking measures are the main measures employed. When applied to postconflict situations in general, these measures are successful in creating momentary peace, but does not secure lasting peace or prevent a relapse into violence. SSR cannot be captured under this conception of peacebuilding since this conception is not capable of preventing a relapse.

1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The study’s significance lies in the fact that it contributes to the body of knowledge concerning SSR in postconflict societies, especially Liberia. It seeks to examine the postconflict SSR process as a foundation to understanding SSR, and to encourage further studies of the SSR process especially in postconflict Africa.

1.8 LITERATURE REVIEW

This section reviews the various literature on the subject of Security Sector Reform. The section is broadly divided into four areas.

1.8.1 General Studies on Security Sector Reform

In tracing the beginnings of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Malan (2008) posits that the term and concept ‘SSR’ was first introduced to a larger public by Clare Short, the first minister of the UK’s Department for International Development in 1998 at a public speech. It was speeches
and policy statements by Short and her department respectively that brought SSR to prominence both as a term and a concept even though the need for thorough SSRs had been identified earlier (Malan, 2008; Brzoska, 2003).

According to Wulf (2004: 2-3), what has made SSR desirable is its combination of a:

“number of objectives under one intellectual roof; the reduction of military expenditures and their redirection to development purposes; security-relevant development; donor activities in conflict prevention and post-conflict situations; and improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of governance over those institutions charged with the provision of security.”

Like any other such concept, the term “reform” has been viewed warily by most scholars and has given rise to the use of various other terms such as ‘Security Sector Transition’ and ‘Security Sector Transformation’. Other terms such as ‘Justice and Security Sector Reform’ was promoted by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of the UNDP in 2003, and the OECD settled on ‘Security System Reform’ (Malan, 2008). These different uses of such differing terms shows the relativity involved in working on the security sector. The environment in which the work must be carried out and whether the security sector shall be widened to include the justice and penal systems helps to determine if what is being done is a security sector reform, transition or transformation.

A scrutiny of most works show that the most accepted definition of SSR has been that of the OECD-DAC (2005: 20) which states:

“Security system reform’ is another term used to describe the transformation of the ‘security system’ – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together
to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework.”

The key phrase considered in the definition is the term “Security Sector” (or system, as the case may be).

The term “security” itself is hotly contested. The controversy has arisen mostly because of the widening of the term – after the Cold War – to accommodate other non-military issues. This has accounted for a range of other security issues such as food security, human security, and environmental security. This notion of security is contrasted with the pre- and Cold War era traditional notion that saw security in the military sense. The OECD-DAC in “Security System Reform and Governance” (2005) defined security as that core governmental duty that relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes that are necessary for economic, social and political development. This definition accurately captures the post-Cold War widening and deepening of the term “security”. The people-centred concept of human security not only complements but often contrasts or competes with the notion of state security (Wulf, 2004).

Hanggi (2004: 2) defines the Security Sector as comprising “all those state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion”, and agrees that the sector includes both statutory and non-statutory bodies. The statutory bodies are the state’s security agencies and agents including the judicial and penal systems. The non-statutory bodes include guerrilla and liberation armies, non-state paramilitary
organisations and private military companies. These two main dichotomies are agreed upon as actors in the security sector. The OECD-DAC (2005) divides the actors into four namely:

- The Core
- Security Management and Oversight Bodies
- Justice and Law Enforcement Institutions
- The Non-Statutory Bodies.

Given that the management and oversight bodies, and the justice institutions are part of the statutory bodies, this classification is just being elaborate.

The OECD’s definition of SSR focuses on the democratic governance of the security sector (OECD, 2005). This has come about because of the widening of the security sector to include the judicial, penal and human rights institutions. Wulf (2004) agrees that democratic civilian control of the security sector is key to the provision of a people-centred security, but he also makes the point that democratic control may not be the panacea on the basis of the fact that democratisation has often, in recent times, been associated with rising political violence. To him then, the crux of SSR is not democratisation, but the development of effective civil oversight and the creation of institutions with the ability to provide security (Wulf, 2004). Hanggi however proposes three objectives of SSR, the first two of which are similar to what Wulf has outlined above. He adds a third feature as the crux of SSR; to address the legacies of past conflicts (Hanggi, 2004). This third feature is what sets SSR in postconflict societies apart from others.
1.8.2 The Reform Context

The reform context is important but there is a lot of varying reform contexts. This is what has given rise to the various attempts at analysing reforms. Wulf (2004) creates a scale to help study SSRs. At the poles of the scale are states at war and areas in postconflict situations which are labelled “impossible” and “major potentials” respectively. Between the two poles there lies five other categories:

- Areas of tension
- Failed states
- Societies under-going conflict mediation
- Transformation countries and
- Societies in transition to peace.

Hanggi (2004) also analyses SSRs using three criteria: the level of economic development; the nature of the political system; and the specific security situation. This translates into three different SSR contexts namely the Developmental context; the Post-Authoritarian context; and the Postconflict context.

In the developmental context, SSR is a donor-driven process. SSR originated from the development community who saw security as important to development when the sector is not dysfunctional, and as a major threat or even a spoiler of development. Initially it focused on reducing military expenditure but has now become more famous and accepted in the wider debate about efficient and effective development assistance.
In the Post-Authoritarian context, SSR is conducted by states transitioning to democracy, most especially, communist states. It seeks to ensure a democratic control of the state’s security sector. This kind of SSR context has been more successful in Europe because of the huge leverage wielded by NATO and the EU (Hanggi, 2004).

The Postconflict setting is the area where SSR has the most potential for practice. The Postconflict setting provides both massive challenges and opportunities as the environment may seem unsupportive due to weak institutions, political fragility and bad economies, but would also present opportunities for the practice of Security Sector Reconstruction as the Liberian example has shown. However Hanggi (2004) warns that the reconstruction works only in cases of intra-state and not inter-state wars since the former is more willing to accept donor support in a most sensitive area as security than the latter.

The differentiating factor between SSR and SSR\(^1\) is that SSR\(^1\) must address the legacies of past conflicts such human right abuses, large numbers of combatants and the influx of arms and munitions. Hanggi (2004) further adds three features to distinguish SSR from SSR\(^1\) namely;

- Immediate need of public security in postconflict environments which may weaken or delay the tackling of longer-term issues of security sector governance.
- Tensions between external imposition and local ownership of SSR
- Non-statutory security bodies questioning the state or international organisation’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
Malan (2008: 7) argues that SSR in postconflict societies:

“... involves a narrower focus than even the OECD’s “core security actors,” and is aimed simply at the training and equipping of armed forces and police agencies, with little attention or resources being devoted to the other components of the security system”.

In the light of this there exists a view that though much of current literature and policy focus mostly on DDR, reform of the uniformed security services and training of members of oversight bodies, attention should be focused on “the political economy of conflict, and to the socio-political dynamics of civil-military relations in war-torn societies” (Cooper & Pugh 2002: 5). The argument is that factors such as the environment, society and the economy play a key role in the conflict management and overlooking these factors risks over-emphasising the importance of the security-sector in conflict resolution. Any security-sector reform carried out in this way becomes independent of the wider political economy and may pose future problems. The solution to this problem lies in carrying out SSR in a holistic manner (Cooper & Pugh, 2002).

1.8.3 SSR in Africa

SSR is quite a new concept, though not unknown, to an African continent for which security thinking is dominated by traditional security. Williams (2000) argues that to understand security sector reform in Africa, it is beneficial to know the kind of military relationship Africa had with the developed states. Africa was the recipient of military assistance, especially in the Cold War era. The military assistance rendered was highly political and ideological, focused on the development of military-technical capabilities but not on organizational restructuring, emphasized state and sometimes regime security instead of the security of the citizens and
communities, and had only a selected few as players relegating civilians and civilian bodies to the background (Williams, 2000).

Hendrickson (1999) argues that SSR must also be approached from the international perspective. The contention is that some intricate military relations have developed between African states and the more industrialized western states on the one hand, and with private entities, mostly arms dealers, on the other hand. This relationship must also be tackled in security sector reforms. Hendrickson (1999) also concedes that a newer kind of military relations is developing between Africa and the West which is in keeping with African security concerns. His scepticism however lies in the degree to which Western states will be willing to support SSR in non-strategic areas.

Hutchful and Fayemi (2005) contend that fluctuating political, economic and security circumstances is what has driven African states and governments to undertake some level of reform in the security sector concerning its operations, funding and civilian relations. The idea of a security sector reform represents a shift in donor thinking in which donors neither view security sector issues as matters to be executed by their foreign ministries nor adopt a zero-sum approach to military expenditure as exemplified by World Bank SAP programmes that have simplistically maintained that reducing military expenditure inherently freed equally valuable resources for national development (Williams, 2000). Williams (2000) however feels that a reduction in military expenditure has always not correlated with development in the state concerned. He posits that the reduction in force sizes has been a key cause of the many mutinies and coup d’états in Africa in the past forty years.
The African SSR has some peculiar characteristics. It is often imposed by external forces either as part of postconflict rebuilding or fiscal reform or both, and is “… piecemeal, narrowly focused and short-term in character and rarely conform to the OECD-DAC definition of SSR” (OECD, 2005: 71). The contexts within which SSR in Africa has occurred include peace treaties to end conflicts (as in Liberia); transition from authoritarian governments (often backed by the military) to democracy; fiscal and public expenditure restructuring; the end of the Cold War and its associated change or loss of strategic environments; the growth of regional and sub-regional collective security systems; and the worsening security situation in most countries (OECD, 2005).

The kind of SSR that has largely gained grounds in Africa is SSR\(^1\), mainly due to the large number of violent conflicts on the continent. This is closely followed by the post-authoritarian SSR. Even that SSR\(^1\) has been carried out only when it is made a part of a peace agreement and this, according to Hutchful and Fayemi (2005: 79), accounts for the ‘inherent lopsidedness’ borne out of a focus on practitioner needs, the military and the formal security actors. The AU in its bid to be the lead actor in African efforts at SSR outdoored its policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in 2006, and is almost done with an SSR policy (Tadesse, 2010).

Williams (2000) argues that the concept of SSR is of European origin but its Eurocentric nature should not make it philosophically unfit for Africa. In place of Western and European formulae, Williams (2000) prescribes an indigenization or Africanisation of the concept of Security Sector Reform to avoid any unwanted suspicion from any affected or disgruntled quarters, and also as
a means of effecting local ownership. In practice, this would require strategies which will ensure that SSR is adopted into local African political and institutional discourse so as to make it more African in character and therefore easy to apply to African situations (Williams, 2000).

1.8.4 The Liberian SSR

The Liberian SSR came into being as part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (in Articles VII and VIII) that led to the end of the conflict. In addition to the CPA, the UN Security Council Resolution 1509 (2003) and the 1986 Constitution of Liberia provided the legal framework for the Liberian SSR. The conceptual framework adopted seeks the effective democratic control of the security sector, wherein the roles of the military and the police shall be clearly defined and effective oversight and management ensured (Malan, 2008). One thing the CPA did not make provision for was transitional justice (Aboagye&Rupiya, 2005). Against the background of rape, summary executions, murder and other human rights violations, this lack of transitional justice is deemed a gap in postconflict reconstruction.

There are two things that shape SSR in postconflict Liberia, and these are the nature of the society and Liberia’s concerns with local mercenaries in the Mano River Basin (Aboagye&Rupiya, 2005). The nature of Liberian society from independence – the unequal relationship between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenes – was carried into and affected Liberia’s security sector where the army and police were used by the Americo-Liberian elite to suppress the indigenes. This and other abuse of the sector by Doe and Taylor made the sector a security threat instead of being a security provider, and naturally led to the civil strife. If a comprehensive SSR is to be carried out then this history is important. As to the issue of the
roving bands of local mercenaries in the Mano River Basin, Aboagye and Rupiya (2005) inform that there are about 60,000 young rebels who offer themselves for hire in any part of the Mano River Basin, especially as seen in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire. These young mercenaries pose a threat to the weak postconflict state, as such, “[I]n undertaking any nationally focused security sector reform, the presence of the hired gangs has to be seriously considered as part of the national dynamics of insecurity” (Aboagye & Rupiya, 2005: 251).

Army Reform is the SSR’s most visible success as yet with Liberia now having about 2000 vetted and well-trained privates and 110 officers, 98 of who are Liberian and 12 from other ECOWAS countries (International Crisis Group, 2009). The International Crisis Group (2009) reports that the Liberian police underwent a lower standard of vetting and training as compared to the army, and thus, they are still ineffective and corrupt and their poor performance has gotten them blamed for a spate of armed robberies.

1.9 LIMITS
A key limitation of this study was the inability of the researcher, due to financial constraints, to visit Liberia in order to ascertain current developments through interaction with some of the locals and expatriates involved in the Liberian SSR. Another limitation was the inability of staff of the Embassy of the Republic of Liberia to grant the researcher any interviews. Nonetheless, the study made judicious use of available information with circumspection which made it possible for the study not to suffer significantly as to negate the objectives that the study set out to achieve.
1.10 LOCATION OF THE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The study seeks to examine SSR, a phenomenon in Peace and Conflict Studies. The variables being dealt with, mainly security and the State, are key components of a polity. The State, being situated in the international arena, the study falls squarely in the field of International Relations which is a key sub-field of Political Science.

1.11 ORGANISATION OF STUDY

This study shall be grouped into five chapters. Chapter 1 is the Introduction, containing the background to and statement of the problem, theoretical framework, literature review, methodology, significance, objectives and limits of the study. Chapter 2 is a history of Liberian Security Sector. The history of Liberia is recounted with emphasis on how, since independence, Liberia’s security sector has perennially malfunctioned until the ascent of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to power. Chapter 3 is titled “Liberian Reforms”. It outlines the various security reforms undertaken by Charles Taylor and how they led eventually to a relapse into conflict. This is juxtaposed with the reforms mandated by the 2003 CPA, begun in 2004 and continued by the Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf government. The aim is to draw points of convergence to enable scholars establish what must constitute postconflict SSR. Chapter 4 is also titled “Local Ownership of SSR”. It discusses the issue of the role of the international community in postconflict SSR, especially with regards to local ownership of the reform processes to ensure sustainability. It shall also outline challenges that postconflict SSR faces. Chapter 5 shall be the Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations drawing on SSR best practices all around the world.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND TO SSR IN LIBERIA

2.1 INTRODUCTION
Liberia declared independence in 1847 and for 133 years was ruled by the Americo-Liberian elite whiles the indigenous tribes occupied the lower rungs of society. The colonial militia, the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) and later the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) came to be commanded and dominated in its higher echelons by Americo-Liberians, and served to defend Americo-Liberian interests rather than provide security for all (International Crisis Group, 2009). A coup d’etat in 1980 by Samuel Doe, a Krahn Non-Commissioned Officer of the AFL, ended 133 years of Americo-Liberian rule but his own misrule led to an attempted coup and to Charles Taylor’s rebellion in 1989 which started Liberia’s fourteen-year civil war which ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in Accra in August 2003. Clearly, the Liberian security sector had become dysfunctional. The Legislature and the Judiciary had been weakened by years of strong Executive rule and thus, could not exercise any control, therefore reform of the security sector became a sole Presidential duty (Jaye, 2009). Added to these was a multiplicity of core state security organisations, about twenty of them, with overlapping functions which led to tensions among them. All these culminated in a misguided security sector that eventually crumbled in the civil war.

2.2 GENERAL DESCRIPTION
The Republic of Liberia, situated in the West-African corner, lies from 4°20’N to 8°30’N of the equator (Aboagye, 1999:1). Like all coastal West-African states, Liberia is bordered to its south
by the Atlantic Ocean. It is also a neighbour to Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. Liberia has a total land area of about 111,369 square kilometres or 43,000 square miles, and a coastline of about 340 miles (Maugham, 1920). According to the UN Statistics Division, Liberia’s estimated population as at 2009 stood at 3,955,000. A perusal of the UN data shows over 800,000 of the population lives in Monrovia alone. Administratively, Liberia is divided into 15 administrative regions or counties, with the two newest ones being River Gee and Gbarpolu which were created in 2000 and 2001 respectively.

Demographically, the Liberian population can be classified into two groups: Americo-Liberians and Indigenes (or the Indigenous tribes). There are 16 major indigenous tribes, namely Kpelle, Kissi, Gola, Grebo, Kru, Mandingo, Bassa, Belle, Dei, Gbandi, Gio, Krahn, Lorma (Buzzi), Mano, Mende, and Vai (Aboagye, 1999). These indigenes account for about 95 per cent of the population whilst the Americo-Liberians make up the rest of the population. The Americo-Liberians came to Liberia as freed slaves from the United States in the 1800s but the indigenous tribes are believed to have migrated from the ancient West-African Mali empire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Burkina Faso, between the 13th and 15th centuries (Aboagye, 1999).

2.3 HISTORY OF LIBERIA

Liberia was founded when the American Colonisation Society (ACS) successfully lobbied the U.S government and gained a $100,000 to start its back-to-Africa venture (Ranard, 2005). The first group of repatriated slaves landed in modern-day Liberia at the Cape Mesurado area near Monrovia in 1822, after a failed attempt in 1821 to settle the repatriated slaves at Sherbro Island, off the coast of modern-day Sierra Leone (Ranard, 2005). According to historical accounts, U.S
Naval Lieutenant Robert Stockton who rescued the Sherbro Island survivors, and Dr Eli Ayres an ACS agent, negotiated the acquisition of the Cape Mesurado land and an island in the Mesurado bay. The two pieces of land cost $300 worth of muskets, tobacco, gun-powder and other goods. The land was acquired from the chiefs of the Deys and the Bassas who had already settled in that area (Ranard, 2005). From this moment onwards, freed slaves from the U.S and those recaptured from slave ships were settled in the new state of Liberia.

Liberia became independent in 1847 with the aid of the ACS and held its first election in 1848. The winner of the election was Governor Joseph Jenkins Roberts of the True Liberian Party, which later became the Republican Party (Ranard, 2005). This started Americo-Liberian rule in Liberia. It must be stated that the newly-formed Liberian state was made up of both indigenous Liberians such as the Dey, Bassa, Mande and others, as well as the African-American ex-slaves or the Americo-Liberians. Relations between these two broad groups were of mutual animosity and contempt. According to various scholars, the Americo-Liberians looked down upon the indigenes creating a caste or social stratification system based on tribe and colour. The lighter-skinned Americo-Liberians ruled but excluded the darker indigenes. The only way up the social ladder was for an indigene to renounce indigenous beliefs and take on the Americo-Liberian lifestyle. Economic and educational opportunities was limited only to Americo-Liberian, and the militia which was set up existed only to defend Americo-Liberian interests as opposed to the indigenes. The Liberian Frontier Force which was established later in 1908 had its officer positions dominated by the Americo-Liberian elite (International Crisis Group, 2009). According to the International Crisis Group (2009: 3), “[T]he officer corps [of
the Armed Forces of Liberia] continued to be dominated by men of settler background until Samuel Doe’s coup on 12 April 1980”.

Samuel Doe’s coup ended Americo-Liberian dominance or rule since Liberia’s independence in 1847. The coup was staged by Doe and 16 other indigenous Liberian soldiers among who was Thomas Quiwonkpa, an ethnic Dan from Nimba County who later became an enemy to Doe. All the officers involved were of lower rank. Doe himself was a Master Sergeant in the army, and was an ethnic Krahn. He set up the People’s Redemption Council to govern and after much manipulation won the 1985 election to become President. Quiwonkpa was executed after a failed attempt to oust Doe, and Doe filled the military with his own tribesmen (International Crisis Group, 2009). Four years later in 1989, Charles Taylor rebelled starting Liberia’s long, destructive civil war.

Charles Taylor entered Liberia from Cote d’Ivoire through Nimba County on Christmas Eve 1989, and he soon gathered a large following from the county with his anti-Doe message since the county had borne the brunt of Doe’s attack following Quiwonkpa’s failed coup attempt (International Crisis Group, 2009). From 1989 to 1996, Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) fought the largely Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) on the one hand, and the Nigeria-led West African Force, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). A series of Peace Conferences and Accords led to a break in fighting, and in 1997 Charles Taylor won the elections which was organised. Attempts to carry out some Security Sector Reforms by ECOWAS through ECOMOG were foiled when Taylor invoked issues of sovereignty and supremacy of the Liberian Constitution, and this caused ECOMOG to leave
the country (Loden, 2007). Taylor’s argument was that the Abuja Accord which provided for ECOMOG to oversee a reform of Liberia’s army expired as soon as he became Head of State, which meant that reforms were his responsibility (Malan, 2008). From this period onwards, Taylor sidelined the army and instead created parallel paramilitary units – the most famous of which was the Anti-Terrorism Unit (ATU) which was headed by Taylor’s son “Chucky” – which were staffed and headed by former NPFL cohorts (Malan, 2008). From 1997 up to 1999, Charles Taylor ruled Liberia as he pleased and even exported the rebellion into neighbouring Sierra Leone where he is alleged to have helped start the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) (Ranard, 2005).

Liberia was thrown into war again in 1999 after two years of Taylor’s rule. This time rebels of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) attacked Taylor. He also came under pressure from the Bush-led US government and the UN Court in Sierra Leone which indicted him for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Ranard, 2005). These issues together led to Taylor’s resignation on August 11, 2003. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed at the same time and the All-Party Peace talks in Accra chose Charles Bryant for a two-year term as Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) to prepare the country for the elections in October in 2005 at which Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was finally elected President after a run-off with George Weah, a former Liberian football superstar (Ranard, 2005). Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was finally sworn into office on January 16, 2006.
Liberia enjoyed two Post-conflict periods; the 1997-1999 period, and the Post-Taylor period starting in 2003. Junne and Verkoren (2005) argue that “Post-conflict” refers to a conflict situation in which open warfare has come to an end. The post-conflict period could then serve paradoxically as a precursor to further warfare, or lead to a “full” resolution of the conflict and usher in a period of positive peace. According to Junne and Verkoren (2005), 44% of all post-conflict situations have wars resuming after five years, and about 50% of post-conflict countries revert to war in the immediate decade – from the time of the cessation of violence to the period of positive peace. As per the first statistic, Liberia resumed war in 1999 only two years after some semblance of peace beginning 1997; and as per the second statistic, Liberia currently has two years more (from 2003) to judge if it would be a part of the 50% post-conflict states that revert to war in the immediate decade.

Liberia’s first post-conflict period (1997-1999) led to a return to violence because of Taylor’s partisan restructuring of the security services (Ikomi, 2007) He refused to accept an ECOWAS-guided reform of Liberia’s security sector, but instead formed parallel military units of his own which he staffed with his former NPFL cohorts and supporters (Ikomi, 2007) These military units unleashed terror upon the citizenry and this forced the LURD and MODEL rebels to begin a fight to rid Liberia of Charles Taylor. The second post-conflict period (which began in 2003) has so far not encountered a return to violence. The transitional government led by Charles Bryant managed to hold elections which led to the ascendancy of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to the Presidency. The current President accepted the 2004 Security Sector Reforms, which, although facing problems, have managed to avoid a return to conflict.
The current SSR process being undertaken in Liberia came about with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) on August 18, 2003 (Jaye, 2009). Jaye (2009) posits that the inclusion of the SSR into some articles (VII and VIII) of the CPA was as a result of ECOWAS’s 1997 experience in Liberia with Charles Taylor in which ECOMOG was disallowed by Taylor from carrying out the SSR when he invoked sovereignty and supremacy of the Liberian Constitution.

Private Military Companies (PMCs) have played a key role in the Liberian SSR as they have been subcontracted by the US government to train and vet the new military and the Emergence Response Unit (ERU), a paramilitary police unit (International Crisis Group, 2009). There has also been some success, especially with Army reforms, as Liberia now has about two thousand (2000) rigorously vetted and well-trained privates and one hundred and ten (110) officers. The SSR has also been heavily criticised as being a donor imposition and faces a host of difficulties (International Crisis Group, 2009). Despite these problems, Liberia seems to have finally moved away from violent conflict and warfare.

As defined earlier, the Security Sector of any state could be defined as including all the state institutions that have a formal mandate to safeguard the state and its citizens against violence or coercion (Hanggi, 2004). This definition covers the broad spectrum of the state’s security institutions, thus the security sector would not only include the armed forces and the police, but also the judicial and penal institutions. Malan (2008) argues that in real-life situations SSR is narrow focusing only on the training and equipping of the armed forces and police whilst little attention is given to the other agencies of the security system. In this vein, a recount of the
history of the security sector in Liberia, with a focus on their perennial malfunction, shall be
the recount of the role of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and its antecedents, and the
Liberian National Police (LNP) in contributing to a dysfunctional Security Sector.

2.3.1 The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)

Aside the armies of the indigenous tribes that existed at the time, the first attempt at the
formation of an army by Americo-Liberians lies perhaps in the efforts of JehudiAshmun at
raising an army to fight off indigenous raiders in 1822 (Maugham, 1920). In 1847, twenty-five
(25) years after settling in Liberia, the freed slaves declared independence. From independence
until 1908 when the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) was formed, the only armed force in the
newly constituted state was the militia which had been in existence since 1822 to solely defend
the interests of the Americo-Liberians against attack from the indigenous tribes (International
Crisis Group, 2009).

February 6 1908 saw the transformation of the colonial militia into, or the formation of, the
Liberia Frontier Force (LFF). Its formation was necessitated mostly by pressures from the
French and British colonisers to the Liberian state to ensure peace on the borders which they
(the French and the British) had encroached (International Crisis Group, 2009). Like all frontier
forces, the LFF combined both police and military functions. It was first led by an all-British
officer corps comprising one Captain, two other officers and ten sergeants who were dismissed
a year later after being accused of meddling in local politics (International Crisis Group, 2009).
Robert Carey (2008) argues they were expelled for complaining that the force was not well
paid.
The structure of the LFF resembled the structure of the Liberian society at the time (International Crisis Group, 2009). According to the International Crisis Group Africa Report (2009), most rank and file soldiers were recruited from the interior through the clan and paramount chiefs, Loma and Kpelle tribes were disproportionately represented in the ranks, and officers were mostly of Americo-Liberian stock. Sawyerr (2005), cited by International Crisis Group (2009: 2), contends that “the Liberian military was itself a patrimonial organisation linked to both the Monrovia-based oligarchy as well as the indigenous social order”. An International Crisis Group interview with an adviser to President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf also yielded the following:

“[T]he army has always been unprofessional. In the past, its officer corps was seen as dumping ground for the wayward sons of the elite. It was a form of punishment for those who did not do well in school” (International Crisis Group, 2009: 2).

The LFF then began an “ethnicised geography of violence” where violence was unleashed against the south-eastern Kru, Grebo, Bassa and Krahn-speaking regions (2009: 3). Positions in the LFF were used and given out as rewards to chiefs and officials who supported the government and those who resisted were not likely to find positions for their sons and tribesmen (International Crisis Group, 2009: 3). The International Crisis Group (2009) also reiterates that the LFF was poorly paid and this gave rise to all manner of corruption including looting.

According to Malan (2008: 11) the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was born by the Defence Act of 1956 with the primary aim of “protecting the territorial integrity of Liberia”. The 1956 date is hotly contested by most scholars, such as those belonging to the Crisis Group, who argue that the AFL came about in 1962. Others also argue that 1962 was when the land force changed
its name to Liberian National Guard. The study does not bother much about the contested date, what must be noted is that what happened was only a change of name and nothing else.

The change of name did not mean a structural change. This is due to the fact that the officer corps continued to be dominated by Americo-Liberians whilst the indigenous Liberians occupied the lower ranks of the military. Thus the same old vices continued until a Krahn non-commissioned officer Samuel Doe and sixteen other indigenous soldiers carried out a coup d’état on 12 April 1980 and killed President William Tolbert and his family, and other Americo-Liberian members of his government (Ranard, 2007). Samuel Doe consequently promoted indigenous Liberians into influential positions most especially in the army (International Crisis Group, 2009).

The final report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia Diaspora Project (2009) reports that in November 1985, Thomas Quiwonkpa, an associate of Doe attempted a coup d’état to overthrow Doe over the alleged theft of Presidential elections the month before. Quiwonkpa was an ethnic Dan from Nimba County, and the failure of his coup led to the victimisation of the people of his home county by the Krahn-dominated AFL. It is reported that Quiwonkpa was killed along with an estimated two thousand or three thousand ethnic Dan and Mano people in Nimba County (International Crisis Group, 2009).

All the above-named factors led to the devastating fourteen-year civil war Liberia endured. It must be said that Liberia’s security sector also saw the proliferation of armed rebel groups, the most famous of which was the Taylor-led National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). When
Taylor gained control of Liberia, and later became President, the AFL was sidelined and confined to barracks whilst his rebel NPFL army became the default army. It is a well-documented fact that Taylor’s NPFL cronies filled every important security institution Taylor established, such as the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) which was commanded by his son Chucky (Malan, 2008). Again Liberia’s Security Sector has always been divided along sectional (Americo-Liberian-Indigene) lines considering that “... ethnic, class and gender inequalities continued to pervade Liberian society. These inequalities had long been part of Liberian life” (Ranard, 2005: 5). The account above gives credence to this assertion. However, the civil war also saw this division as some of the factions belonged to some of the indigenous tribes. For example, the United Liberation Movement (ULIMO) was formed by Doe supporters and former AFL soldiers but later broke into two; J and K, belonging to Krahn and Mandingo tribes respectively (Atkinson, 1997).

2.3.2 The Liberian National Police (LNP)

The LNP was created on June 6, 1975 by an Act of Legislature and its main duty was to “detect crimes; apprehend offenders; preserve law and order; protect life, liberty, and property; and enforce all laws and regulations with which they are directly charged” (Malan, 2008: 11). Little is known about the LNP especially about its importance or influence in the Liberian state until Charles Taylor’s ascendancy to power.

The LNP under Charles Taylor was a heavily politicised and armed force that acted indiscriminately against the civilian population (Gaanderse & Valasek, 2011). Taylor filled the LNP with “individuals selected for their loyalty or political desirability rather than their
Thus the police came to be filled with his NPFL cronies and Taylor’s cousin Joe Tate, a man accused of leading looters and political death squads, became National Police Chief (Malan, 2008). Former NPFL cronies of Taylor in the LNP also wielded much influence (Malan, 2008). This resulted in a police force that was corrupt and became a tool in the hands of Taylor to oppress citizens and political opponents.

2.3.3 Poor Oversight

The Liberian Constitution of 1986 (1986, Article 3) provides that Liberia’s government is composed of three separate branches: the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. The 1847 Constitutive Act with which the state was formed provided this tripartite division in line with the principles of democratic governance. However from independence, years of an almost one-party rule has ensured a strong Executive and led to the erosion of the powers of the Legislature and Judiciary (Jaye, 2009). A casual observation shows that of the 20 Americo-Liberian governments that ruled from independence until 1980, 14 were governments of the True Whig Party and in all only 2 governments out of the 20 were non-partisan.

Article 34 (c) of the 1986 Liberian Constitution provides for the legislature to have oversight control of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Liberia. Jaye (2009) argues that Party loyalty, and handpicking of Members of the Legislature through party caucuses mainly controlled by the President and his cronies contributed in weakening the Legislature. Jaye (2009: 1) again states that “[P]arty loyalty and job security considerations ensured that the Legislature would not challenge the Executive through the exercise of their oversight responsibilities, thus
removing any process that could ensure transparency and accountability.” Thus the Legislature could enforce no oversight of the security sector, and left it at the mercy of the Presidents.

The Judiciary could also not influence the Executive to ensure proper oversight. According to Jaye (2009), the removal of a judge simply required the passage of a ‘Joint Resolution’ by the Legislature. The fact that the Legislature was in the pocket of the Executive ensured that the Judiciary was constantly on its own, thus any Judge who did not toe the line was removed. This emasculated the Judiciary and left it liable to manipulation.

2.3.4 Failure of the Abuja II Accord

One feature of the Liberian Civil War has been its history of many failed or broken peace accords. There have been no less than 8 accords or treaties that failed to achieve peace. One of the accords that affected the promulgation of the current SSR was the Abuja II Accord, which contained prescriptions for a reform of Liberia’s security sector as a key to ending the violence.

A desire to see the end of the Liberian conflict led to the signing of the Abuja I accord on 19 August 1995 in Abuja. This accord expanded Liberia’s Council of State to six members comprising Taylor, Alhaji Kromah, George Boley, Tamba Tailor, Oscar Quiah and Professor Wilton Sankawulu who was nominated chairman (Ikomi, 2007). In April 1996 this accord was broken when Taylor and Alhaji Kromah attempted to arrest another warlord, Roosevelt Johnson, whose attempts at resisting the arrest led to intense warfare. It was to resolve this fighting that the Abuja II accord was introduced (Ikomi, 2007).
A key provision of the Abuja II Accord was the request by the ECOWAS for “verifiable disarmament by all factions along with the creation of new Armed Forces of Liberia on a non-tribal basis with contributions of personnel from all factions” (ECOWAS, 1997:92). The ECOWAS Ministerial Committee stated more succinctly,

“with a view to establishing a credible security apparatus for post-election Liberia, the meeting endorsed the proposal to restructure the armed forces, police and other security institutions to reflect geographical and ethnical balance” (ECOWAS, 1997: 96).

This restructuring, however, was not accomplished during the pre-election period. Ikomi (2007) proffered two reasons for this; first, that the security restructuring was not a priority of both ECOWAS and the International Community because they were more fixated on elections and; second, that the warlords were themselves unready to restructure the security until after elections since they sought to use their forces to either strengthen their positions or use them as a guarantee against any breach of the accord’s provisions.

In the post-election period, the restructuring was also not heeded. Charles Taylor reneged on the Abuja II accord by seeking that ECOMOG withdraw six months after he has been inaugurated, and by claiming constitutional right to restructure his army himself (Ikomi, 2007). Ikomi (2007: 49) is of the opinion that whilst Taylor’s actions contravened the Abuja II accord, “his [Taylor’s] claim to constitutional authority can hardly be disputed, especially since there was nothing in Abuja [II] to indicate the commitment was designed to be binding on the post-war government”.

As stated above, Taylor’s method of restructuring was to stuff the LNP with his former NPFL fighters and choose Joe Tate (a NPFL chief of police) as LNP director, establish the ATU to be
headed by his son, and gradually demobilise the Krahn-dominated AFL. Eventually in 1999, LURD, comprising many Krahns and Mandingos of the former AFL and LNP, invaded Liberia and began the second civil war.

2.4 CONCLUSION

The Liberian SSR which started in 2005 did not occur in a vacuum. Liberia’s long history of Americo-Liberian dominance and mutual animosity between the indigenes and the former affected the SSR’s promulgation. Americo-Liberian rule permeated Liberia’s security sector leading to unrest among the indigenes who occupied the lower ranks in the security sector. A strong Executive rule also hampered the ability of the Legislature and Judiciary to enforce any proper oversight. Samuel Doe’s coup in 1980 and his attempt at an indigene, and later Krahn, dominated rule brought the issue of a malfunctioning security sector to a head and resulted in the civil war from 1989 to 1997. The West African regional body, ECOWAS, attempted to secure peace through various accords which were all broken, until 1996 when Abuja II was signed. A key provision of that accord was a restructuring of the security sector to reflect geographic and ethnic balance as a means to achieving lasting peace. A fixation on elections by ECOWAS and the International Community, and the reluctance of the warlord prevented the implementation of the security reform in the pre-election period. In the post-election period, Taylor reneged on the Abuja II accord. Rather than reform to show balance, created parallel security institutions loyal to himself. This also led to war in 1999. Thus when the conflict ended in 2003 with the signing of the CPA, the SSR agenda was pushed so well to the fore and culminated in the 2004 security sector reforms being undertaken.
REFERENCES


CHAPTER THREE
LIBERIAN REFORMS

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The preceding chapter gave a background to the current SSR on-going in Liberia. A reason why the SSR was included in the articles of the 2003 CPA was the failure of the Abuja II accord because Charles Taylor would not allow external help or oversight of any Liberian SSR. It has been stated that Taylor carried out his own “reforms”, setting up institutions such as the ATU, and permeating all the other security institutions with his NPFL cronies (Malan, 2008). However Liberia returned to violence only two years after his election due to security issues. Ikomi (2007: 52) quotes Daniel Chea, Taylor’s defense minister as saying “[T]he downfall of Taylor’s government was his failure to restructure the security forces.” This chapter shall seek to compare and contrast the Taylor government’s security “reforms” with what is currently being done in Liberia under the Johnson-Sirleaf government. The motive is not to determine which reform is better, but to elicit points of convergence to enable scholars clearly establish what must go into postconflict SSR. The chapter, in pursuance of the above, will do the following;

- Give brief backgrounds to both Taylor and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s participation in Liberian politics
- Compare the domestic political and security environments in which both governments operated
- Explain the international political environment in which both governments operated and how it affected security reforms
• Compare both governments’ reform measures

3.2 THE 1997 SECURITY REFORMS UNDER CHARLES TAYLOR AND THE NATIONAL PATRIOTIC PARTY (NPP)

This section seeks to outline the various reforms undertaken by Charles Taylor and the New Patriotic Party. The section begins with a brief description of Taylor’s life, and proceeds to discuss the International and Domestic environments within which those decisions were taken.

3.2.1 Charles Taylor

Charles Taylor is of a mixed parentage with an ethnic Liberian mother and an Americo-Liberian father, and was raised in Liberia but educated and worked in the United States (Bøas 2001). His first taste of Liberian state politics – and the first time he had held public office in Liberia – was in 1980 after Doe’s coup when he was given a cabinet position as head of the General Services Agency (GSA) to oversee procurement and allocation of government property (Harris, 1999). Having run the GSA like a fiefdom, Taylor was accused of stealing about L$ 900,000 (Liberian Dollars) and escaped to the United States (Harris, 1999). He was however arrested and spent jail time at the Plymouth Corrections Institute in Boston before he escaped (Reno, 1995). He travelled to Libya where he received military training, and later came down to West Africa where he got Burkinabe and Ivorian support in the form of the 200-strong invasion army and an operations base respectively (Bøas, 2001). Thus began Taylor’s sojourn in Liberian politics.
3.2.2 The International Environment in 1997 (After the Elections)

The International environment in which the government of Charles Taylor operated was relatively favourable. Regionally, the political environment in West Africa had calmed with the demise of both Houphouet-Boigny and Babangida of Ivory Coast and Nigeria respectively because their exit “depersonalized the conflict and removed a critical obstacle to reaching a consensus” (Ikomi, 2001: 38) since both leaders supported the rebels and the state respectively.

There was obvious power-play between Nigeria and Ivory Coast for superpower status in West Africa. Babangida supported Doe because of “personal and cordial relations that developed between the two leaders…..” to the extent that both leaders were rumoured to be “close business associates” (Frempong, 1999: 94). Houphouet-Boigny considered the cordial and close relations between Liberia and Nigeria as an affront, and so sought to use Taylor’s rebellion as an opportunity to increase Ivorian influence in West Africa (Frempong, 1999). Also, Boigny’s son-in-law, A.B Tolbert had been killed by Doe even though Boigny pleaded with him to spare his son-in-law’s life (Frempong, 1999). Taylor also had Burkinabe help because Blaise Campoare, though a military leader like Doe, was related to Boigny by blood (Frempong, 1999).

Thus the exit of both Babangida and Boigny in 1993 removed a serious clog in the Liberian issue. Konan Bedie and Abacha who succeeded Boigny and Babangida respectively, wanted to concentrate on their mounting domestic political problems rather than engage in Liberia (Ikomi, 2001). Abacha had to necessarily deal with the effects of his coup, a poor economy and a poor human rights record (Ikomi, 2001). Thus, he indicated his will to withdraw his troops from Liberia. Abacha saw elections as a workable strategy for a quick peace, as well as repair some of his damaged International image (Ikomi, 2001).
The international community in general followed the West African lead, therefore, as at the time Taylor came to power, he had no constraining elements in the international arena. ECOWAS had withdrawn majority of their troops and maintained only “skeletal” troop numbers (Ikomi, 2001). This environment was just ripe for Taylor to institute any policy he wanted in Liberia. While the sub-regional and regional environment seemed favourable for the implementation of a comprehensive SSR policy under Taylor, the domestic situation was dicey.

3.2.3 Liberia’s Domestic Environment in 1997

This section shall discuss the domestic confines and conditions within which Charles Taylor’s government existed. The section shall discuss the domestic political and social contexts which will help to make clearer the decisions Charles Taylor made.

3.2.3.1 Politics

First, the political scene was very unstable. Tanner (1998) considered Taylor as a key source of instability after the elections. Taylor seemingly said the right things but acted contrary to what he said. Taylor’s political missteps began with the abduction and murder of Sam Dokie (who formed the CRC-NPFL after breaking away from the NPFL) and his wife allegedly by the State Security Service but Taylor distanced himself from the murder (International Crisis Group, 2002). There was also a repression of the press and attacks on journalists (Tanner 1998; International Crisis Group, 2002).

Taylor could also not keep his camp together. His former NPFL commanders were frustrated with peacetime politics, and the Americo-Liberian constituency was looking for opportunities
to reclaim lost political prominence and this culminated into tensions between Taylor and the other Americo-Liberians (Tanner, 1998). The issue, as explained by Tanner (1998), was that a shift from the warlord economy to peacetime “big-man politics” where the benefits flowed into the hands of one man created imbalances in Taylor’s camp of former NPFL commanders and Americo-Liberian elite.

There was also the issue of the Krahn who still filled the AFL and occupied the Barclay Training Center (BTC) with their families (Tanner 1998). Their victimization during Taylor’s insurrection had made many of them refugees and very paranoid. They still remained a potent fighting force and Taylor had to find a way of dealing with them without starting another war.

Another domestic political problem was Liberia’s lack of needed expertise to fill governmental positions. Liberia was hit with serious brain drain in all sectors including the political sections, to the extent that a civil society activist was reputed to have commented that Liberia was run by a bunch of illiterates. Tanner (1997, 143) states that “… many Presidential appointments have been disappointing; inexperience[d] candidates and factional cronies have found their way into high office. The government is disorganized and the ministries dysfunctional.” This inevitably negatively affected governmental policy implementation.

### 3.2.3.2 Social Problems

Socially, Taylor had to deal with the problem of youthful ex-fighters who still roamed the streets. Many of them with nothing to do, had no education, were not properly reintegrated into society and lived on some small jobs they could find (Tanner 1998). Many others continued to
stick together, evolving into “atomized groups” who were difficult to control, and who blamed both the government and the international community for the broken promises that had led to their condition (Tanner 1998). Taylor’s job was to create employment avenues for these youthful ex-fighters, or risk having them recruited by other groups against his government.

Taylor’s NPP government also had to grapple with widespread poverty, a poor legal and justice system and massive corruption which led to the impoverishment of the state (Tanner 1998). Taylor’s domestic problems and issues created a minefield which he had to skillfully navigate, else risk plunging Liberia into another war. It was in this unconstraining but troubling international and domestic political environments respectively that Taylor carried out his “reforms”.

3.2.4 Taylor’s Reforms

The preceding section outlined the international and domestic environments in which Taylor had to restructure or reform Liberia’s security sector. After his inauguration as President, Taylor raised issues of sovereignty and so refused to allow the ECOMOG troops to carry out the proposed reforms of the Liberian security sector. Thus Taylor set about “restructuring” the security sector. Daniel Chea, Taylor’s defense minister has been quoted as saying that “[T]he downfall of Taylor’s government was his failure to restructure the security forces” (Ikomi, 2007: 52). What he probably meant was that the fall of the Taylor government could be attributed to the “partisan…manner” in which the restructuring was carried out, and not necessarily a refusal to restructure. Ikomi (2007, 53-54) recounts some of Taylor’s restructuring efforts as outlined below;
• In November 1997, Taylor announced the creation of a 1000 man force to form “the nucleus of the new AFL” (Ikomi, 2007: 53). His argument was that Liberia’s security and economic realities did not support the existence of the then 15000 man AFL. Most of the members of the new force were recruited from Taylor’s militias.

• In January 1998, Taylor issued a “Special Presidential Order” to demobilize and retire about 2250 AFL personnel citing old age, and formed a 27 member AFL Presidential Restructuring Committee to oversee the process.

• Taylor marginalized the role of the AFL by setting up parallel bodies such as the Strike Force, ATU, Special Security Unit, Alert Force Republican Guard, Counter Force and the Special Operations Division.

Malan (2008: 12) contends that the Liberian National Police (LNP) was also tampered with when the Drug Enforcement Agency was created in December 1999 to “conceive and formulate anti-drug policies; co-ordinate, collaborate and facilitate the efficient and effective enforcement of all domestic anti-drug legislations”. These functions used to belong to the LNP and NSA, and their specialized personnel in the narcotics divisions were all moved to the DEA (Malan, 2008). There were reports of the reliance of the Taylor government on mercenaries for its security (Jaye, 2002).

What must be noted of Taylor’s restructuring was the proliferation of multiple parallel military structures all loyal to him (Ikomi, 2007). This is in line with Taylor’s trend of creating parallel organizations. For example, in October 1990 Taylor created the National Patriotic
Reconstruction Assembly (NPRA) in response to ECOWAS’s creation of the Interim Government of National Unity (INGU) (Ikomi, 2007).

Ikomi (2007: 54) argues that the partisan manner of the restructuring of the security sector “… was a pragmatic response to the prevailing security threat that confronted him [Taylor] at the time”. Taylor had to deal with the Krahn and Mandingo-dominated AFL. The creation of the many parallel units can probably be justified by arguing that it was Taylor’s means of securing jobs for his former NPFL cronies who may have become a threat to his government if they remained unemployed.

3.3 LIBERIA’S 2004 SSR UNDER JOHNSON-SIRLEAF AND THE UNITY PARTY (UP)

This section shall also outline the security reforms undertaken in 2004. It shall begin with a description of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, and proceed to discuss the International and Domestic environments within which the reforms were carried out.

3.3.1 Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf

Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was born in Monrovia in 1938 and is also of mixed ancestry. She grew and schooled in Monrovia but later attained her Bachelor’s degree in Accounting from Madison Business College, Wisconsin, US. She also obtained a degree in Economics from the University of Colorado at Boulder, before finally obtaining a Master of Public Administration degree from Harvard. Her first involvement in Liberian politics was during the tenure of William Tolbert when she was promoted into governmental position as an Assistant Minister of Finance, as were
Togba-Nah Tipoteh and George Boley (Harris 1999). She is however reported to have gone into exile after Doe’s coup, but later returned to run for senate in the 1985 elections but failed, and had to endure two arrests and detention before she went into exile (Harris 1997). She supported Taylor’s insurrection and later returned as a UN and World Bank economist to contest the presidency in 1997 under the umbrella of the Unity Party after an alliance with other parties failed (Tanner, 1998). She however lost that election to Taylor and his National Patriotic Party. She later announced that her party (UP) would protest but only for the records because they would not pursue it (Harris, 1999). Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf however returned to Liberian politics and was elected to office as President in 2006.

3.3.2 The International Environment

It is on record that the SSR began in 2004 with UNMIL’s work on the LNP before Johnson-Sirleaf took over power in January 2006 (International Crisis Group, 2009). The international environment in which the SSR began was one conducive for, and receptive to the idea of the SSR. This is clearly seen in the amount of work the international community undertook. In September 2001, an International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) – comprising the African Union, European Union, Ecowas, France, Morocco, the UN, the US and the UK – was set up by the UN and it played an instrumental role in the peace negotiations in 2003 (Nilsson, 2009; Dupuy & Detzel, 2007). There was also a lot of input from the UN and the US especially. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) formed and mandated the UNMIL to be deployed in Liberia in 2003 to perform “peacekeeping, civilian policing and socio-economic functions” (Cook, 2010: 4). The US also sent “… exploratory missions [comprising] US officials and
private military contractors” in an effort to carry out its role in the SSR (International Crisis Group, 2009: i).

Regionally, West African states and leaders played a number of roles to facilitate the Liberian peace process and the SSR. Nigeria granted Taylor asylum when he resigned the presidency and left Liberia on August 11 2003 (Cook, 2010). A former Nigerian President, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, was made chief mediator (Nilsson 2009). Ghana, which had presidency of ECOWAS, provided a venue for the peace talks. ECOWAS quickly put together the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) who deployed in Liberia to secure the peace until the arrival of UNMIL in October 2003 (Cook 2010). All these international efforts were geared towards establishing a peace – even if fragile – to ensure the start of the SSR which was one of the key provisions and constituent of the CPA.

3.3.3 The Domestic Environment

A National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was established, as per the provisions of the CPA, and this NTGL ruled from October 2003 to January 2006 when the Johnson-Sirleaf administration was sworn into office. Thus it is safe to say that the SSR which began in 2004 started in the NTGL’s era. The environment in which the SSR started was less than conducive and Grenon et al (2004: pp 1-2) clearly outlined this difficult environment as below:

• Demographically, the population had a high percentage (43.4%) of youthful persons which to Grenon et al (2004) was suggestive of unrest since high numbers of unemployed youth with fighting experience could be lured back into warfare. Liberia also had to deal with about 250,000 potentially returning refugees, 490,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and the never-ceasing ethnic antagonisms between the indigenes and the Americo-Liberians.

• Economically, the NTGL had to grapple with destroyed infrastructure, high unemployment and poverty, a huge external debt, corruption, and a heavy reliance on aid since tax collection was impossible in the midst of all the chaos.

• Politically, the NTGL faced a myriad of problems. Key among the problems was the poor political setup. Just like the 1997 post-war period, there existed a poorly resourced bureaucracy, little or no acknowledgement of rule of law and poor civil or human rights. The chairman of the NTGL, Gyude Bryant, had “little executive power” (Grenon et al, 2004: 2), and the political parties that existed had “no agenda or policy-making capacity…” (Grenon et al, 2004: 2). There also existed divisions within the leadership of both LURD and MODEL, and this directly threatened the fragile peace.

• There also existed poor social infrastructure. The conflict affected housing, education and health, and thus in the post-conflict period poor housing, high illiteracy (about 78% of the total population), and poor and minimal access to healthcare existed.

The Johnson-Sirleaf administration, which took over from the NTGL and continued the SSR, also faced domestic problems. After winning the elections, the new administration had to satisfy the huge expectations of the Liberian populace after the perceived disappointing performance of the NTGL (Cook, 2010). According to Cook (2010: 13), “[T]he public remains eager to see rapid job growth and rapid improvements in social services and the construction of physical structures, particularly in support of education, healthcare and transportation.”
3.3.4 The 2004 Reform Measures

As earlier stated, the SSR is one of the key provisions of the CPA signed to signal the end of the Liberian conflict, and it began in 2004. It has also been stated in the preceding chapter (chapter 1) that army reform, police reform and the reform of the other security agencies became the responsibilities of the US government, UNMIL, and UNMIL and the Liberian government respectively.

The US began the army reform when its Military, State Department and DynCorp, a Private Military Company (PMC) “conducted an exploratory mission to assess what was needed to reform the military” (International Crisis Group, 2009: 9). The whole AFL was disbanded and recruitment, vetting and training were carried out afresh. DynCorp, a PMC, won the contract to carry out the recruitment, vetting and training, whilst another PMC, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) won contracts to refurbish Camp Schiefflin military base and provide officer training (International Crisis Group, 2009). As at 2009, the International Crisis Group (2009) reported that the newly formed AFL comprised about 2000 thoroughly vetted and well-trained privates and about 110 officers.

Police reforms started almost as soon as UNMIL entered Monrovia and the new LNP was built on the foundation of existing personnel “often from other security forces” (International Crisis Group, 2009: 17). The International Crisis Group (2009: 17) also reports that the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) began training in 2008 and “… may in time become the front-line response unit for dealing with internal insurgency.” As at 2009 LNP numbers stood at 3661 trained police officers (International Crisis Group, 2009).
The reform of the other security agencies, namely Intelligence, Customs and Immigration, is being done jointly by UNMIL and the Liberian government. The objective is to create a more accountable security agencies, or as the International Crisis Group (2009: 21) put it “… a structure that will continue to work effectively as personnel changes over time.”

3.4 TAYLOR’S AND SIRLEAF’S SSRs: A COMPARISON

As already stated in the introduction to this chapter, a comparison shall be conducted of the 1997 Taylor-led reform and the 2004 CPA-mandated SSR, and the motive is to elicit points of convergence to lead to establishing what must constitute postconflict SSR to promote peacebuilding.

A feature which is common to both the Taylor and 2004 reforms is the fact that both SSRs focused mainly on the army (or defence) and the police, and to some extent the intelligence agencies but never beyond these to include civilian oversight bodies, judicial and penal systems. The focus of Taylor’s reforms was the security of his regime. Thus, his reforms led to the marginalization and gradual weakening of the Krahn-dominated AFL and any other security agency whose loyalty to his regime was questionable (International Crisis Group, 2002). Taylor created a plethora of paramilitary groups with overlapping functions, all loyal to his regime. The LNP was headed by Joe Tate, an NPFL crony and filled with NPFL cronies. The argument has already been made in favour of this method of security reform, that the reform was a response to the prevailing political and military conditions in which the Taylor government was situated.
The 2004 SSR also focused on the army and the police. The CPA which made the SSR compulsory clearly stated in Articles VII and VIII that the army and police be restructured. Thus the US took over the restructuring of the AFL, UNMIL took over the restructuring of the LNP, and both UNMIL and the government of Liberia took to restructuring the intelligence and other security agencies since no agency or body was tasked to them. The problem with this concentration on the army and the police is the theory-praxis gap it introduces. Conceptually, any SSR should include the security system which comprises the core, management and oversight bodies, justice and law institutions, and non-statutory security forces (OECD, 2005: 20). However, only in very exceptional cases, such as Sierra Leone, has an attempt been made to carry out a holistic SSR (Bendix& Stanley, 2008: 20). Though Malan (2008: 7) is right when he states that SSR in postconflict societies “… involves a narrower focus than even the OECD’s “core security actors”…” the experience in Sierra Leone shows that a holistic SSR is possible.

Secondly, the 2004 SSR was enshrined in the CPA and it called for international role in implementing the SSR. The NTGL and its successor Johnson-Sirleaf government acquiesced to this provision, unlike Taylor who reneged on the Abuja II provision for restructuring the AFL. As part of the Abuja II provisions, ECOWAS was to ensure “verifiable disarmament by all factions along with the creation of new Armed Forces of Liberia on a non-tribal basis with contributions of personnel from all factions” (Ikomi, 2007: 42). Taylor’s refusal to allow ECOWAS control of the reform was based on issues of sovereignty with him claiming that the Liberian army would not be trained by foreigners (Ikomi, 2007). Unlike Taylor, the NTGL that took over in 2003 and the succeeding Johnson-Sirleaf government have allowed the international partners and organizations to oversee the SSR. The international partners serve as
neutral third-parties, a phenomenon very important to postconflict environments. The third party would provide guarantees of fairness and peace, and thus would be more accepted by both sides. As seen, Taylor’s refusal of ECOWAS as a third-party for the restructuring led to his partisan reforms and later, to the relapse into violent conflict.

Following from the above, the 2004 Liberian SSR has been heavily dependent on external donors (Bendix& Stanley, 2008: 11). The UN, US and other international agencies have played key roles in the SSR. However this heavy dependence on external donors has come under criticism. Bendix and Stanley (2008: 3) state that “[T]here is no single external actor coordinating SSR but each looks after its own turf… a multiplicity of actors have been operating in a fragmented manner.” This may explain why the SSR in Liberia is not holistic but piecemeal, focusing mainly on army and police reforms but on no other member of the security system. Conceptually, the argument is that SSR in postconflict environments must be holistic, addressing the legacy of the past conflict (Hanggi, 2004: 8). This would happen when there is an overarching international body properly coordinating affairs, just as the UK coordinated Sierra Leone’s SSR.

Again the Taylor-era security reforms aimed at regime security rather than the provision of a people-centred security which has been a defining feature of the 2004 SSR. Taylor met an AFL whose loyalty to him was doubtful because it was dominated by Krahns who were opposed to him. Thus his marginalization of the AFL and the proliferation of parallel security institutions were meant to secure his regime. The 2004 reforms however seeks to provide a people-centred security. Human rights and rule-of-law courses were planned to be included in the training regime of the army by DynCorp (International Crisis Group, 2002). Conceptually, this people-
centred approach fulfills the idea in a postconflict SSR of moving from a security apparatus that threatens the state’s citizenry to one that secures the citizenry.

3.5 CONCLUSION

Liberia’s Taylor-era and 2004 security reforms took place in political environments of little difference. Domestically, the Taylor, and NTGL and Johnson-Sirleaf governments faced almost the same political and economic problems. All the governments came in the immediate post-war times, and so faced frail political and economic (especially employment) situations that threatened to move the country into war. Internationally, the political environment was receptive to both the Taylor-era and 2004 security reforms. The only difference was Taylor’s refusal to allow ECOWAS oversight of the security reforms even though the Abuja II agreement had mandated them, whilst the 2004 SSR was completely undertaken by international donor partners. The presence of the international donor partners lent the 2004 SSR an impartiality which was a credibility that Taylor’s reforms lacked. A comparison of both security reforms has yielded some criteria needed in any postconflict SSR: the postconflict SSR must be holistic, that is, encompassing all members of the security system not only the police and the army; there should be an international third-party to coordinate the SSR and this third-party should have overarching powers to ensure proper coordination; and postconflict SSR should be people-centred rather than regime-centred.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter addresses the domestic concerns in postconflict SSR, most importantly local ownership of the security reforms. The chapter shall:

- Discuss the role of the international community in postconflict environments with reference to international interventions.
- Discuss the generality of local ownership, including its challenges and benefits.
- Discuss local ownership in the Liberian 2004 security reforms.
- Discuss the challenges of postconflict SSR in general, and in Liberia particularly.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN CONFLICTS
History is replete with cases of international intervention in conflicts. According to Freedman (1994), intervention could have two meanings. On one hand, it refers to “actions undertaken in the name of international peace and security” (Freedman, 2004: 1), and these include such activities as mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, creation of buffer zones, and in extreme cases entering the conflict on the side of the most aggrieved party (Freedman, 2004). On the other hand, intervention can be understood as “interference in another country’s internal affairs” (Freedman, 2004: 1), and this includes persuading leaders to follow some policy directions, encouraging and sponsoring some political agenda, and in the extreme, attempting direct control of a state’s affairs (Freedman, 2004). It is the study’s view that persuading a
leader to follow a particular policy direction will not amount to interference unless it is a policy
direction the said leader is unwilling to take.

Crocker (2001: 229) defines intervention to “… convey the full range of methods and tools
whereby a variety of external parties… may become involved in attempts to cope with
conflicts”. Since the end of World War II, the UN has attempted to intervene in conflicts in the
“traditional peacekeeping” way. However, since the end of the Cold War, the UN and the
international community has moved beyond and contributed more to peace than traditional
peacekeeping where lightly armed or sometimes unarmed military units are sent into conflict
areas to restore peace (Fortna, 2004).

The post-Cold War period has witnessed a significant increase in intrastate conflicts judging by
the fact that the number of UN peace operations for interstate strife dropped from 9 in the 1945-
1987 period to 6 in the 1988-1994 period, whilst the peace operations for intrastate conflict rose
from 5 to 16 in the same period (Crocker, 2001). In recent times however, there is a lot of belief
in the effectiveness of international interventions in securing peace and rebuilding states after
violent conflict (Luckham, 2005). Luckham (2005) explains that conflicts after the cessation of
the Cold War have deeper and far-reaching effects in terms of human and infrastructural
destruction even if their number has not increased. Luckham (2005) however is of the view that
these costs were not enough to force the international community to intervene. He posits that
what caused the international community to focus on political stability in the developing states
was “… the fears of western governments, international firms, and Multilateral agencies that
political turmoil and violent conflicts threaten global security and the expansion of global
markets” (Luckham, 2005: 15). Luckham (2005: 16) however concedes that international involvement is “Janus-faced”, consisting not only of such selfish desires of the developed states, but also of “… normative conceptions of an interdependent liberal global order and of the role of the United Nations in preventing violent conflict and peacebuilding”. Lastly, Luckham (2005) also proposes reasons for international interventions:

1. That the international community will intervene when a government’s sovereignty is undermined by its inability to provide security and protection.

2. That international intervention is justified because the “problems it was designed to address are still with us” (Luckham 2005: 19).

The international community has a role to play in postconflict environments. The question is whether they should be at the forefront of the postconflict security reforms, or should only follow the lead of the recipient state. The answer to the question is seemingly simple. The international community should play both lead and follow roles (Field Interview, 2012). They play the lead role by championing the need for the reforms, and actually ensuring that the reforms start. They provide technical expertise, logistics and resources (Field Interview, 2012). They should also play the follow role by allowing the locals to carry out a security assessment of their own in order to ensure that the reform measures actually address their security problems (Field Interview, 2012).

In Postconflict situations, International interventions go beyond the initial peace process by undertaking actions or steps to build long-term peace such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants, and when mandated, SSR (Knight, 2010). Liberia saw
much international intervention in its 14-year civil strife. ECOWAS gathered together and sent a Nigeria-led ECOMOG that became embroiled in the war (Ikomi, 2001). When the war restarted in 1999, after Charles Taylor had come to power in 1997, there was again regional international intervention. In 2002, an International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) was formed to mediate the war to a close (Nilsson, 2009). Later in 2003, when the CPA was signed, international intervention was again sought, as the US and UN were mandated to see to the restructuring of the army and police respectively (CPA, 2003). Thus international intervention in civil strife cannot be discounted. The issue is that the intervention does not take place in a vacuum. It exists in a setting – a postconflict one. The intervention will therefore launch programmes to ensure that war does not recur, and those programmes must be sustainable, that is, even after the international agents are gone, the programmes they launched should continue to function. This will prevent a recurrence of warfare. If the programmes will be sustainable, then there must be local ownership of them.

4.3 LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF SSR

A phenomenon that has characterized international interventions in intrastate postconflict situations is SSR as part of postconflict rebuilding efforts. The SSR does not occur in a vacuum, it needs players; the purveyor and the Customer (Scheye and Peake, 2005). This brings to the fore the thorny issue of local ownership of SSR.

One of the basic working principles of the OECD-DAC is that SSR should be “… people-centred [and] locally owned …” (OECD, 2005: 12). An operational phrase in the quotation is “locally owned”. Who owns the SSR; is it the purveyor who is just about funding and leading
the SSR or is it the Customer – the country just freshly out of conflict with most of its 

institutions either weakened or destroyed? The paradox of the situation can be clearly outlined. 

“No SSR initiatives need to be locally owned if the reform is to succeed [yet] the previous actions 
of the local owners are among the reasons why a need for SSR exists…” (Scheeye and Peake, 

2005: 235). There is the “demand-side problems” (Nathan 2007: 2) which includes lack of 
governmental legitimacy, a lack of policy expertise and deep divisions that hinder a consensus 
on policies and priorities. The question of who owns the SSR must be solved in order “… that 
the concept may serve a useful function in policy formulation and pragmatic field 

programming” (Scheeye and Peake, 2005: 235).

Nathan (2007: 4) defines local ownership to mean “the reform of security policies, institutions 

and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors 
rather than external actors.” This is often misunderstood and mistaken for a situation where 

there exists local support for donor programmes (Nathan, 2007; Bryden, 2010). Scholars are 

also of the view that local ownership can be said to have occurred when the recipient state “is 

appreciative of the benefits of policy measures” (Bendix & Stanley, 2008: 95). However local 

ownership is important for sustainability, which is a measure of success of the SSR programme 

(OECD, 2005; Panarelli, 2010). This does not mean local ownership demands only locals to 
sustain it. Donais (2008: 4) is of the opinion that:

“[T]here is no consensus that an abrupt shift from “foreign” to “local” ownership of SSR would 
produce superior results in terms of long term security provision.”

To Donais (2008: 4) the paradox of the situation is that though:
“… neither outsiders nor insiders represent ideal delivery vehicles for SSR, in the vast majority of cases effective, sustainable SSR requires the consistent support of both international and local actors.”

4.3.1 Challenges of Local Ownership of SSR

One main challenge of SSR is the question of which locals actually own the SSR. Put clearly, in a postconflict environment, who are to be involved in local ownership of SSR? Is it the scared, scattered and poor remnants of the civil war or is it the surviving elite? According to Donais (2008), an adequate answer to this question has not yet been provided though attempts at answering have created a minimalist-maximalist stance along a continuum within which the answers fall. The minimalist faction considers the “locals” to be the national political elite who are deemed to possess the capacity to undertake the reforms and legitimacy to ensure public support for the programme. The maximalist side includes in its answer domestic civil society as a means of insisting on a broader local constituency for SSR.

Also, local ownership has become more of rhetoric than an actual guide for donors in SSR implementation (Scheye&Peake, 2005: Panarelli, 2010). The specific SSR programmes are planned by donors and dropped in the laps of the recipient state. Donor priorities and timelines are applied to SSR programmes and for Panarelli (2010) most of these reforms may be inappropriate for the particular environment and therefore fail to last. Panarelli (2010) backs this statement with an example from Afghanistan where the donor priorities of counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations have trumped local Afghan preoccupations of personal safety. To Panarelli (2010: 1) therefore, SSR programmes which seek to be successful
must “begin by incorporating local priorities and local ownership from the planning stage and insuring local participation in the implementation of programmes throughout.”

Local ownership is also a deeply political affair. The issue is that SSR is redistributive of power, challenging existing power relations, interests and paradigms within the recipient state (Nathan, 2007). Critics of local ownership expound this political nature of SSR by saying that proponents of local ownership assume a certain unanimity or homogeneity of intents and goals among local actors (Scheye&Peake, 2005). Panarelli (2010) sees this political aspect of local ownership as one of its obstacles, that there is a competition among various priorities but inadequate resources for the SSR. This issue arises out of a failure to properly define the “local owners”. In an intrastate postconflict situation where there exists numerous important state and non-state stakeholders, the question of who appropriately is the ‘local owner’ comes to the fore, and thus there exists as numerous intents as there are factions. Donais (2008) argues that even when local state political elites are chosen as the local owners, problems exist. Opposition to the SSR program may arise from the generals and other security sector players who may be threatened by the reform. Donais’ (2008: 9) argument is that “those that are the most dominant [local owners] are also the ones least likely to be co-operative in a reform effort because they have the most to lose.”

4.3.2 Benefits of Local Ownership of SSR

It is however not all doom and gloom about local ownership. It also has a lot of benefits it brings to SSR. Bendix and Stanley (2008: 97) outline some benefits of local ownership:
1. Local ownership is a precondition for the effectiveness of SSR and a guarantee for the sustainability of SSR measures. Scheye and Peake (2005) attest to the veracity of this notion by arguing that reform initiatives must be locally owned if reforms are to succeed. They also argue that the “central importance of local ownership to the SSR agenda is beyond dispute” (Scheye & Peake, 2005: 240).

2. In the absence of local ownership, SSR becomes “inimical to development and democracy” (Bendix & Stanley 2008: 97; Nathan 2007: 3). The reason is that “domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, resistance and inertia among local actors” (Nathan 2007: 3). Of course this is inimical to any attempt at laying the foundations of a democracy.

3. Local ownership enhances commitment and responsibility of recipients. When locals know they have control of their own reform programme, they may be more attached to it. Thus with little supervision, they become responsible for the success of the programme.

4. Local ownership confers legitimacy on reforms, helps to build trust in the security sector, and guards against criticism. Arguing from an African perspective, Williams (2010) asks for an Africanisation (or African local ownership) of SSR to avoid the creation of doubt from affected and disgruntled quarters.

4.4 LOCAL OWNERSHIP AND THE LIBERIAN SSR

Fourteen years of gruelling and cruel civil war in Liberia ended when the CPA was signed on August 18 2003 at Accra. The war left in its wake huge death tolls and destroyed infrastructure. Governmental bodies were also left destroyed or dysfunctional. The Liberian security sector
was rendered dysfunctional by the time the war ended because it had moved from being a provider of security to being a security threat to the citizens (Ikomi, 2007). Thus when the war ended in 2003, a decision to undertake an SSR was enshrined in the CPA in Part IV, Articles VII and VIII (CPA, 2003: Jallah-Scott, 2008). The SSR began during the times of the NTGL led by Charles Gyude Bryant, and later the UP government led by Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf continued with its implementation (Jallah-Scott, 2008).

4.4.1 The Reforms

Schnabel and Ehrhart (2005) outline some key tasks that should be undertaken by both donor and recipient actors in the SSR. These functions include strengthening the peacetime capacity of the military, police, judicial and penal systems; strengthening civil management and oversight; promotion of human rights, transparency and regional confidence-building mechanisms; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration; anti-SALW campaigns; and the integration and mainstreaming of SSR into political dialogue.

The CPA, in Article VII, sought the “disbandment of irregular forces, reforming and restructuring of the Liberian armed forces” (CPA 2003: Article VII). The CPA demanded that ECOWAS, UN, AU and the ICGL “provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the security reform effort” (CPA 2003: Article VII, 1b). A special request was also made of the United States to “play a lead role in organizing this restructuring programme” (CPA 2003: Article VII, 1b). Article VIII sought the restructuring of the Police Force, Immigration, the Special Security Services (SSS), Customs, and other statutory security units. A special request was made of the UNCIIVPOL (UN Civil Police) and others to “assist in
the development and implementation of training programmes for the LNP” (CPA 2003: Article VIII, 8). As of September 2008, 2113 men had been trained for the army, the police reform by UNMIL (under UNSC Resolution 1509) had yielded 3661 police officers, 344 of whom were women, and the reform of the other statutory security agencies as mentioned in the CPA is being done jointly by UNMIL and the Liberian government (International Crisis Group, 2009). Ebo (2008) contends that there has been a reform of the Judicial and Corrections system even though the process is slow. These reforms, Ebo (2008) describes, have been troubled by poor infrastructure, bad case management and incredibly poor payment for staff.

4.4.2 Problems with Local Ownership in Liberia

It has been established in the texts above in the chapter that local ownership means that locals must propose and manage SSR initiatives, and that local ownership is central to ensuring sustainability of any initiative. It has also been established above that the locals who are to own the initiative does not constitute only the surviving political elite but also the extant civil society. This section shall outline the problems with local ownership of the SSR in Liberia. The section posits that local ownership has been severely compromised in the Liberian reforms. The Executive or the Administration, the Legislature and the Civil Society shall be taken into consideration. This is because these are the groups that handle oversight and ensure democratic governance of the security sector.

4.4.2.1 The Executive/Administration

Loden (2007) is of the view that since the signing of the CPA, Liberia’s SSR has been led mainly by the Internationals with very little local input. The NTGL in whose era the CPA was
signed and the reform started, failed to conduct a thorough security review, and had some very corrupt elements in its midst in the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) (Ebo, 2007; Jallah-Scott, 2008). This created a situation where the external actors felt the need to control the SSR both in policy and implementation (Jallah-Scott, 2008). For example, when the NTGL through workshops held by the Minister of National Defence proposed the formation of a 6500-strong Liberian army, the US declined and instead, unilaterally maintained that Liberia have a 2000-strong force because technical reviews (US-funded and led) showed this number as what Liberia could maintain sustainably (Ebo, 2007; Jallah-Scott, 2008).

Ebo (2007) argues that the Johnson-Sirleaf administration, which took over from the NTGL, was shunted aside especially when the administration upheld America’s leading role. The US outsourced the defence reforms to PAE and Dyncorp, who have a questionable democratic record based on some allegation of human rights abuses in Bosnia (Jallah-Scott, 2008). Ebo (2008) argues that despite this, lessons have been learnt especially when the Minister of Defence Brownie Samukai has been reputed to have said he wished the troops would be trained by active duty personnel (ADPs) rather than by contractors.

4.4.2.2 The Legislative

Ebo (2007) is of the view that the Liberian legislature believes that it was not adequately involved in the SSR, and thus, its oversight functions have been compromised. The Legislators argue that they have no access to the contracts the security contractors signed and thus their inability to enforce any oversight (Ebo, 2008). There is also the case of the security contractors’ reluctance and refusal to appear before the Legislature when tasked to appear before the house.
Dyncorp answers that any “query… should be directed to the US Embassy or the US State Department” (Ebo, 2008: 161). Ebo (2007) argues that the Legislature is in such a position for two reasons;

- The fractious nature of both the House of Representatives and the Senate, where no party wields a proper majority. Even the ruling UP has less than half the seats in both houses.
- The impression that some parliamentarians have questionable character.

### 4.4.2.3 Civil Society

Civil Society has also not been spared of the general marginalization in the SSR process in Liberia. Their problem is especially with Dyncorp whose activity they claim, was too secretive (Ebo, 2007). Civil Society is also frustrated by the perception that they cannot participate in the SSR process since they are not paying for it. Malan (2008) argues that criticizing Dyncorp and PAE is unfair since both are not party to any agreements. He is of the view that transparency complaints should not be raised since the US government is “providing gratis assistance to Liberia in the restructuring of its Armed forces through an assistance package that the Liberian government has approved and accepted” (Malan 2008: 44). Nevertheless, Civil Society has made impacts through series of meetings, conferences and workshops organized by such groups as the National Coalition of Civil Society Organisations in Liberia (NACCSOL), and Liberia National Law Enforcement Association (LINLEA) (Ebo, 2007).

It must be noted that some analysts think that there was sufficient local ownership in the Liberian SSR (Field Interview, 2012). The argument is that the recruitment of men into the new
AFL especially, was widely open to the locals be they members of the legislature, the executive or even civil society. People who applied to be recruited into the new AFL went through a vigorous recruitment process where their pictures and names were displayed in the community, and anybody who was reported by the locals to have been involved in any abuse in the civil war was duly taken out. The analysts also perceive that in a postconflict environment where there was so much destruction and very little resources, this was how far local Liberians could be involved. They propose a constructivist approach by asking if any Liberians thought the current reforms of the AFL and the LNP could have been any better if it had been handled by locals and not the international community (Field Interview, 2012).

4.5 BARRIERS TO POST-CONFLICT SSR

The postconflict period refers to the period when open warfare has come to an end although violence may continue (Junne & Verkoren, 2005; DCAF, 2009). This is the period when open warfare has ceased to the period when positive peace has been established. Even though the postconflict period is important in allowing for peace and subsequent rebuilding initiatives to be launched, the period is also fragile and could lead to a recurrence of violence. For postconflict SSR however, the fragile postconflict period presents some very daunting challenges to its implementation.

The postconflict security environment is often unstable. There is very little to build on because of the extensive destruction of state institutions, society and its values (Field Interview, 2012). This makes security provision by external actors a top priority (DCAF, 2009). The instability and insecurity that characterize the postconflict environment make demobilization and
democratization of the security sector difficult (Nathan 2007). The instability causes a high preoccupation with operational matters whilst the insecurity fosters the conservative argument that democratization and demobilization will hamper the state’s efforts at dealing with security threats. A semblance of peace must be achieved before any postconflict programme is launched and the local security institutions that have been involved in the war and are already decimated or dysfunctional would not be able to do this. Thus the external actors would have to provide security. This leads to a situation where the external actors bypass or even sideline the local owners (Scheye&Peake, 2005). The issue is that the locals are blamed as stifling the SSR initiatives leading to little successes in postconflict SSR. The reality, however, is that local actors would have to be involved (own) in the postconflict SSR processes else risk a recurrence of violence should the external actors leave. The paradox of the situation is that even though local owners cannot provide the security needed to begin the SSR initiatives, they must be involved in the initiatives to ensure its sustainability.

The postconflict environment also attracts large numbers of external actors and this creates coordination and management problems (DCAF, 2009). A perfect example of this is the Liberian SSR of 2004. The reforms have been heavily dependent on external actors and according to Bendix and Stanley (2008), the multiplicity of external actors has ensured the absence of a single actor as coordinator leading to a seemingly disjointed and non-holistic SSR in Liberia. Having many external actors involved is good for the initiatives in terms of donor monetary and expertise input but the donors would have to be well coordinated else they may trip over each other and prevent a holistic implementation.
Also in a postconflict environment, there exists a shortage of local capacity causing external actors to assume full governance responsibilities and resulting in weak local ownership (DCAF, 2009). Capacity refers to “material resources and [to] people with the requisite knowledge and skills” (Nathan 2007: 39). The postconflict state most often lacks the expertise and infrastructure needed to govern both the state and its security sector since these would have been destroyed by the violence. Nathan (2007) argues that democratic and good governance requires the commensurate organizational capacity to ensure the successful governance of the state and the security sector. These are lacking in the postconflict environment, and this has led to the development of the perception that external actors need to be endowed with the political ability to implement robust reforms despite the wishes of the local owners (Scheye & Peake, 2005). Though it is true that local owners in a postconflict environment lack the capacity for implementing reforms, they must be trained as part of the reforms to ensure that when the donors have left, the “local owners” would have the skill and capacity to consolidate gains made by the donors. Work done is nullified if donors implement reforms but refuse to build the capacity of the locals as part of the reforms.

In postconflict environments also, priority is given to building the capacity of the security force more than improving security governance especially when the SSR initiative grew out of international peace support operations (DCAF, 2009). This fixation with prioritizing security capability can be explained as being a direct response to the insecure postconflict environment. However security governance is needed to ensure a democratic control of the security forces and avoid a recurrence of war. In Liberia, for instance, the US outsourced Army reforms to Dyncorp, a PMC and this raised many questions concerning governance and durability (Ebo,
Little has been done with reference to strengthening security governance and oversight institutions such as Parliament, and even civil society. It is instructive to note that a key cause of the Liberian civil war and the subsequent destruction of the security sector was the poor oversight of its security institutions by both the legislature and the judiciary due to an overbearing Executive (Jaye, 2009).

It can be seen that the solution to all the above-named problems lies in “local ownership”. The centrality of this to the success of any SSR program is unquestioned. Therefore it is right to conclude that any proper SSR initiative should incorporate local ownership.

4.6 CONCLUSION

The aim of Postconflict SSRs is to create a democratic security sector. The security sector should provide a people-centred security, and should be accountable to civilian oversight structures such as the legislature and the executive. However the reform initiatives should be sustainable, that is, the security measure and institutions built with the aid of external actors should continue to exist and function effectively even after the external actors have left. This brings to the fore the issue of local ownership which refers to a situation where reform initiatives from conception to implementation are by the recipient state. This ensures that the reform initiatives address local security issues which are well-known to the recipients. This does not mean that the donors have no role in postconflict SSR. They have a role to play in not only funding, but guiding and building the capacity of the local actors. Thus both local and external actors must equally contribute to local ownership of the security reform initiatives.
The Liberian 2004 SSR has however faced problems with local ownership. Even though the need for the SSR was recognized by the locals and enshrined in the CPA, the locals have not owned the reform. Army reform has been outsourced by the US to Dyncorp and PAE who have consistently refused to appear before the Liberian legislature to answer questions about the reform. The fact that various reforms are being carried out by various external actors has created a seemingly disjointed reform process that lacks a single coordinator. This has served to rob Liberian locals of an authority who could ensure a smooth reform process inclusive of local ownership.
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CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The study set out to study SSR in postconflict societies in Africa using Liberia as a case study. Liberia underwent two SSRs; one in the 1997 Charles Taylor era, and the other in 2004 under the NTGL as mandated by the 2003 CPA. The position of the study was that a comprehensive SSR leads to sustainable peace. The aims of the study were therefore to examine the history of the Liberian security sector; compare the SSRs of both the Taylor and the 2004 NTGL eras; examine the role of international partners or actors in postconflict SSRs; and assess the challenges of postconflict SSR. This concluding chapter summarises the major findings of the study with emphasis on the 2004 Liberian SSR, draws lessons from them and makes recommendations for any future African postconflict SSR.

5.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The study’s aim was to study SSR in postconflict societies using Liberia as a case study. It was found that the elements that led to the malfunctioning of the security sector lay in the country’s history and its society. When the freed slaves came to Liberia, they met the extant indigenes but the Americo-Liberians imposed themselves and their culture on these indigenes and established a society where the Americo-Liberians became first-class citizens. This societal structure was carried into the security sector where the army, police and other security agencies existed only for the protection of the interests of the Americo-Liberians, and later the ruling...
elite, and was headed only by Americo-Liberians with the indigenes occupying the lower rungs of the command structure no matter how qualified.

Another finding was that long years of a de-facto one-party rule in Liberia created a strong Executive and this emasculated both the Legislature and the Judiciary who should and could have assumed oversight responsibilities. The failure of both ECOWAS and Charles Taylor to ensure a proper restructuring of the security sector in 1997 also deepened the problems of Liberia’s security sector. Consequently, the people had no option than to turn to war as a means of correcting the system as well as protecting themselves. This is seen in the various coups and wars that took place in Liberia.

The study also revealed that both the 1997 and 2004 security reforms focused mainly on the army and the police but never beyond these security agencies to include the democratic oversight structures such as the Legislature. Taylor was obsessed with regime-security and so sought only to restructure the AFL and the LNP to secure his government. The 2004 reforms focused exclusively on the army and the police mostly because they were directly mentioned in the 2003 CPA. The security management and oversight bodies have not been part of the reforms because they were not mentioned.

Again, the 2004 SSR has been heavily dependent on foreign donors as opposed to the 1997 reforms under Taylor. Charles Taylor refused to allow any International donor a role in the restructuring of the security sector claiming it was his sole constitutional right as President to
undertake the reforms. The 2004 reforms which have been heavily dependent on foreign donors also have the problem of very little involvement by the locals.

The study also revealed that though local ownership was beneficial, it had not been fully adhered to in Liberia. The Executive, Legislature and Civil Society all complained about the fact that they had been shunted aside by the foreign partners.

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

There exist some very important lessons to be learnt and conclusions to be drawn from the Liberian SSR for the wider practice of peacebuilding and for SSR itself. First, that SSR can be adequately considered as holistic peacebuilding in itself. Peacebuilding and security are inextricably linked. One of the causes of conflicts is insecurity as a result of a disregard of the law by security agencies and agents. Peacebuilding seeks not only to bring temporary relief from conflict, but also to lay the foundations and actually construct the structures of sustainable peace. SSR seeks to ensure proper democratic governance of the security sector of the state. This means that focus is not only on the agents of security but also on the management and oversight bodies such as the Legislature, the Judiciary and even the Executive. In this way, SSR can even be said to bridge the governance gap in the management of the security sector and the state in general. As part of ensuring proper governance of the security sector, SSR ensures a proper division of roles between the police and the army, and all other security agencies. The police are restricted to the maintenance of internal law and order whilst the army is limited to the function of defending the territorial integrity of the state against external aggression. As per the Liberian situation, SSR can be said to help neutralise the marginalisation that characterised
the pre-war Liberian security sector. This is clearly seen in the fact that during the Army reforms, clear criteria were laid out for the recruitment unlike the Taylor-era restructuring that got Taylor filling the security sector with his NPFL cronies.

Another lesson learnt and conclusion to be drawn from the study is that SSR in postconflict states in Africa should be sector-wide. This means that the reforms should rope in all agencies of the security sector including the management and oversight bodies, especially when a postconflict assessment showed the complicity of the security sector in the conflict. In Liberia, it is seen that the reforms concentrated mostly on the police, the army, and some few state security agencies. Whilst these are important, the management and oversight bodies have rarely felt the impact of the reforms. The Liberian legislature and civil society especially have spoken out against their marginalisation in the reform process. Work done is nullified if the reforms concentrate on only sections of the security sector since such limited reforms in a postconflict society could easily lead to the recurrence of conflict.

Related to the above, SSR in postconflict environments should constitute a radical transformation of the whole security sector. In postconflict situations, there is the need for a radical transformation because a lot of things go wrong with the sector. When conflicts prevail, issues of human rights are no longer respected. There is tension, hatred and mutual suspicion within the state institutions. Concerns about the governance of the security sector also rear their head. Peacebuilding efforts in such an environment must therefore address the roots of the conflict by removing any suspicion, hatred and tension which could spark fresh violence later.
There is also the need to ensure governance of the sector, change most of the legislation since they are obsolete, and provide technical and professional training. When undertaking army and police restructuring in postconflict environments, “it is crucial that old structures are completely dismantled and that new institutions are built with the help of fresh recruits who have been selected in an open and transparent process and according to agreed standards” (Seraydarian 2005: 53). In Liberia, only the reform of the army adhered to a strict recruitment regime. The reform of the police however was not so since UNMIL chose to build on some of the already existing personnel. The legislature was not involved in the reforms even in their traditional oversight role because they had among them some persons with a questionable past. This can however not be prevented since it is a postconflict environment where experience was badly needed.

The international community also has a role to play in postconflict SSR. It is indeed true that most of the time postconflict SSRs have been initiated by the international community. They support it with their logistics, financial resources and experts. Whilst this is good, they need to acknowledge that the SSR is not being done for their benefit. Thus despite whatever investments they make, they need to incorporate the locals for whose benefit the SSR is being conducted. This means that local expertise and assessment of the security situation should be taken into consideration, and local capacity should be built and upgraded where possible. This ensures the sustainability of the SSR. Without local ownership, the SSR risks defeating the purposes for which it was carried out since there could be a recurrence of the violence as soon as the international community have left the postconflict environment.
Local ownership also does not mean that the international community should grant every security wish of the recipient state. Some of the demands may be unreasonable or even unsustainable in the postconflict state. For example, the US turned down Liberia’s request for a 6000-man army since the state which was just recovering from 14 years of civil war and its associated destruction could not sustain such a large army. However the US style of unilaterally deciding the numerical strength of the Liberian army was also bad. What was needed was a “calculated” compromise between the two parties to ensure that Liberia had a right-sized army which it could sustain. In all, it could be said that local ownership of the Liberian SSR has been problematic so far. Instead of having locals leading and foreign donors supporting, it has become a case of local executive support for foreign-initiated programmes.

5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following are concrete recommendations concerning SSR in postconflict states in Africa. This is to help ensure that future SSRs are more thorough and robust, helping to create more secure states that will not risk a recurrence of violence.

1. An attempt at a robust and thorough SSR in Africa must begin with a look at the continent’s colonial past. There is the need to go back to Africa’s colonial past to look at how the institutions of the security sector were constituted. Africa’s security sector was constituted to protect the interest of the state (or the colonial master) and not the citizens, and that is the major fault line that has not been addressed in Africa’s policing. The police were trained to force the people to succumb to the demands of the government. When Africa gained independence, that psychology has not been changed or corrected. Still the police think their role is to maintain law and order, which for them
means pursuing the government’s agenda and dealing with anybody who goes contrary. This explains police violence against peaceful demonstrators holding their governments to account. Leaders of the states still bear that colonial mentality that the security sector exists for the protection of their regime. Until such a mentality is corrected, the abuse of the security sector for the gains of the governing elite and their cronies will always exist, and may lead to violent upheavals as seen in Liberia’s history.

2. The capacities of the local security institutions and the oversight bodies should be strengthened in postconflict societies. In the case of Liberia, UNMIL is soon to depart and local capacity should be built to address the gaps that would be created by the departure of UNMIL.

3. SSR in fragile regions should be approached from a sub-regional perspective, not just from a national perspective (Field Interview, 2012). In Africa, states are as interlinked as the various tribes that constitute them. Thus the SSR should be approached from a regional perspective where the regional bodies shall put in place proper mechanisms to address collective human security in that sub-region. When the SSR is not sub-regional, starting it in one country only ensures that the conflict entrepreneurs divert and start havoc elsewhere as exemplified in the Mano River area where the violence spread to Sierra Leone, Guinea and the Ivory Coast. The sub-regional approach will strengthen border cooperation and collaboration.

4. This study recommends that in future, research should be conducted into the ECOWAS Mechanism as a tool of Security Sector Reform for sub-regional transformation. It may address the issue of a sub-regional approach to SSR.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEW GUIDE

Postconflict SSR & Peacebuilding

- Can SSR be adequately considered a Peacebuilding measure?
- Should Postconflict SSRs be sector-wide or limited to some institutions? Why?
- What should be the goal of Postconflict SSR, limited reform or radical transformation?
- How would you describe Liberia’s 2004 reform?

Liberia’s SSRs

- What are the internal and external factors that shaped Taylor’s reforms?
- What internal and external factors shaped the 2004 reforms?
- Were conditions more favourable to one than the other?

Domestic Consideration

- What is local ownership?
- What were Liberia’s domestic concerns about the SSR?
- Was local ownership adhered to in Liberia?
- Should the International community have a role to play in Postconflict SSRs? What role should they play, lead or follow up?

Challenges of Postconflict SSR

- What are the challenges of postconflict SSR?
- What challenges has Liberia faced in its 2004 SSR?

Lessons/Recommendations

- Are there any lessons to be drawn from Liberia’s Postconflict SSR?
APPENDIX 2 – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

- Dr Thomas Jaye, Deputy Director of Research, KAIPTC. The interview took place on 26th June 2012, at the KAIPTC Offices.

- Mr Allimou Diallo, Regional Coordinator, WANEP. The interview took place on 14th June 2012, at the WANEP Offices.

- Mr Philip Attuquayefio, Senior Research Fellow, LECIAD. The interview took place on 22nd June 2012, at the LECIAD Offices.
APPENDIX 3 – FULL TEXT OF LIBERIA’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE ACCORD
(STARTS FROM THE NEXT PAGE)