
BY

NAMBIE ABASS DICKENS DINGGETOH

THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE.

JUNE, 2012
DECLARATION

I solemnly declare that beside documentary and other sources of material cited and acknowledge in this work, I am entirely responsible for the authorship, mistakes and omissions found in this work despite the advice and suggestions I have received from my supervisor.

I do also declare that this work has never been submitted by me or any person to the University of Ghana, Legon or any other University for the award of any degree.

MR. NAMBI ABASS DICKENS DINGGETOH
(Students)

DR. ISAAC OWUSU MENSAH
(Supervisor)
ABSTRACT

Ghana’s government, was a totalitarian government from the early 1980s until both external and domestic pressures was borne on the regime to liberalize. In 1992, the authoritarian government liberalized and fresh elections were conducted to that respect.

In view of the above, the Electoral Commission encountered difficulties in the process of managing the elections. The major challenges were: technical advice, financial constraints; material for election challenges; problems of registration; manpower challenges; equipment difficulties; electoral system bottlenecks; administrative constraints; voter education difficulties; communication problems and transportation challenges. With respect to the above, the donor community salvaged the Electoral Commission with the needed assistance.

The assistance given were technical advice; the electoral system to employ; financial assistance; communication gadgets; fuel; transportation; electoral materials; Internal measures of addressing electoral disputes; administrative training; party and candidates agents training and stipends; civic education; voter education; media assistance; political party assistance; judicial assistance to reform; and civil society organizations aid to serve as Election Observers in the elections to serve as a mechanism of international legitimacy and recognition and a bastion for the acceptance of the result.

In the research, a mixed result was revealed about the impact of the assistance to Ghana maiden elections from 1992 to 2000. The effects were both negative and positive with 1992 leading in the negative, whilst a positive and negative outcome in 1996 and the 2000 elections. However, the absolute outcome is that, the country has held three elections, with
the exception of the 1992 election, which was rejected because the election was rigged, but the 1996 and 2000 election results were accepted, there have changes of government from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party in 2000. As a consequence, there was a peaceful turnover in 2000, which resulted in the nation attaining the brink of consolidating democracy and has breed perpetual peace; development; growth and development cooperation at long last; human rights recognized; state and Para-state agencies and institutions abuses were halted; due diligence honoured and the rule of law adhered to in this regard.

In view of the above success of holding successive elections from 1992 to 2000, the nation is currently having a positive image and a beacon of democracy of democracy in west Africa.
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to God Almighty, my father and mother, Mr. W.Z.Nambie, my mother Memuna Kpoti, (RIP). and the entire Nambie family.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The task of embarking on this research work has been quite big and very challenging one, especially undertaking a pioneering work in an emerging field of research of democracy assistance in the electoral cycle approach. I therefore wish to honestly acknowledge all those whose invaluable assistance and support contributed directly or indirectly to the success of this project.

We step on the shoulders of giants to accomplish a goal in life. My thanks to God Almighty for the guidance, strength, and endless mercies bestowed upon me throughout these years. My sincerest thanks to Dr Isaac Owusu Mensah the supervisor for his abilities and tolerant manner he supervised me as well as for intellectual guidance, suggestions and inputs towards this research. Again, my utmost good acknowledgement to, Mr Kwesi Jonah the former Head of Department, Dr. Emmanuel Debrah, Prof. H. Arkosah the Vice Dean of Graduate Students/Studies for their immeasurable help during the stormy period of my study.

I am equally grateful to those who in diverse ways gave me technical assistance, the EC workers, mass media personnel, interviewees, focus group discussers, Mr Oman of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly Planning Office and his able staff for print out of most of my questionnaires, and Mr. Philip Assibit, Mr. Iddrisu Ahmed Jamal my Secondary School Teacher, George Azirigo for the financial assistance when I lost my job, became penniless and they had to monthly give cost of living allowance to keep me going, to my uncle La Franc in Wa, the Upper West, John Baloro Doughr for the sponsorship, Brother Damien
Bontii, who volunteered his laptop for me at this crucial hour of my life in the typing of my work, and Professor Raymond Bagulo Benin who paid my school fees and towards my data gathering. Joha Braimah Issaka for stipends to survive on campus, Quick Fix, Samuel of the Political Science Department for their generation of data and Samuel of Quick Fix for editing, formatting and printing of the work, and Mr. Oman of Accra Metropolitan Assembly.

The river that people benefit from it, may it banks overflow is my prayer for them, may Almighty God blessed them. May they never lack in their life, this extends to their next generation forever and ever.

God Bless You All.
#/Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECLARATION</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENT</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4. HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.1. Research design and purpose</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6.2. Sample technique</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7. PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.7.1. Self-Administered Questionnaire</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.7.2. Secondary Data Presentation ................................................................. 26
1.7.3. Data Processing and Analysis ................................................................. 26
1.8. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS ....................................... 27
1.9. LOCATION OF THE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE ......................... 28
1.10 SCOPE OF THE STUDY ............................................................................ 29
1.11. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY ................................................................. 29
1.12 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY .............................................................. 30
1.13 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................ 32
1.13.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 32
1.13.2. Democracy Assistance in the Electoral Cycle Approach to Transitional Democracies ................................................................. 32
1.13.3. Actors of Electoral Assistance ............................................................ 33
1.13.4 Election Observation and Monitors ..................................................... 34
1.13.5. Electoral Assistance to Electoral Commissions ................................. 36
1.13.6. Democracy Assistance in the Electoral Cycle Approach in Ghana. .... 37
1.13.7. Electoral Assistance to the Electoral Commission......................... 38
1.13.8. Assistant on Election Observation and Monitor Groups .................. 39
1.14. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .............................................................. 41
1.15. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY ......................................................... 46
1.16. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 47
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................................. 48

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION ................................................................................................................. 48

2.0. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 48

2.1. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND ITS DEMOTION DEBATE ............................... 49

2.1.1. The Dangers of Democracy Promotion ........................................................................... 49

2.1.2. Internal merits of democracy promotion ........................................................................... 50

2.1.3. The Demotion of Democracy ............................................................................................. 51

2.1.4. United States of America’s Foreign Policy. ................................................................. 54

2.1.5. European Union Foreign Policy on Democracy Promotion ........................................... 60

2.1.7. Factors responsible for the spread of the third wave of democratization ..................... 63

2.1.8. External Factors to democracy Promotion: The Role of the External Community’s influence ......................................................................................................................... 67

2.2. MODALITIES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION. ......................................................... 71

2.3. STRATEGIC APPROACHES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: US VERSUS EU

APPROACHES OF DELIVERY ................................................................................................................. 72

2.3.1. The Political Approach by Washington ............................................................................... 72

2.3.2. The Developmental Approach by the European Union/Commission ....................... 74

2.3.3. Methods of Democracy Promotion ...................................................................................... 76

2.3.5. Weaknesses of the Political Approach .............................................................................. 77

2.3.6. Strength of the Developmental Approach ......................................................................... 78
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................. 81
DATA PRESENTATION; ANALYSIS; INTERPRETATIONS; AND DISCUSSIONS OF
THE STUDY ................................................................................................................. 81

3.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 81

3.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................................... 81

3.2. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY ................................................................. 82

3.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY ............................................................................... 82

3.4. HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY ............................................................................. 82

3.5. FORMS OF DONOR ASSISTANCE AND ELECTIONS IN GHANA ..................... 82

3.6. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF RESPONDENTS ............................................ 84

3.6. 1. Age of Respondents. ......................................................................................... 84

3.6.2. Gender of respondents ...................................................................................... 85

3.6.3. Religion of respondents. .................................................................................. 85

3.6.4. Educational background of respondents.......................................................... 85

3.6.5. Occupation of respondents .............................................................................. 86

3.7. ELECTION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK. .............................. 86

3.7.1. Positive responses of respondents on legal and institutional framework ............. 86

3.7.2. Negative percent of legal and institutional framework ....................................... 90

3.7.3. How was the impact of the electoral timetable for the elections? ....................... 107

3.8. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ......................................................................... 135

3.9. VOTER REGISTRATION, EDUCATION AND PARTICIPATION. ......................... 155
3.10 ELECTORAL SYSTEM ........................................................................................................ 264

CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................................. 267

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION ........................................... 267

4.1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 267

4.2. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY .................................................................................. 268

4.3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ..................................................................................... 273

4.4. CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY ............................................................................. 274

4.5. RECOMMENDATION OF THE STUDY ................................................................. 275

4.5.1. Recommendation of the Study ........................................................................... 275

4.5.2 Recommendations to the Donors ........................................................................ 283

4.5.3 Recommendation to the Academia ...................................................................... 285

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 286

APPENDICES ............................................................................................................... 299

QUESTIONNAIRES ....................................................................................................... 299
CHAPTER ONE
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ghana, the beacon for the fight against colonial governance and foreign domination from the 1940s to 1960s, envisaged that, it was a paramount goal for the total liberation of the African continent. In a statement, Dr Kwame Nkrumah said this in an independent Day Celebration speech to his compatriots (Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, Ghana Television, Metro TV, 2010). Nkrumah noted that,

“The black man is capable of managing his own affairs, Ghana; our beloved country is free forever. The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent” (Kwame Nkrumah, 1957).

According to (Huntington, 1991:4-7; Fukuyama. 1986) during this era of colonialism, the African continent was characterized by pledges of hope and opportunities such as self-determination that would enable Africans to determine their own destiny; act in accordance with their aspirations for an enviable national livelihood empowerment. Again, the scholar expounded that, this period was meant for the enhancement of their socio-politico-economic development, and deliverance from the culture of tyranny that characterized the continent by then by the colonial lords. However, the author noted that some awkward practices that bedevilled the continent were meanness; superstition; curable sickness; illiteracy; poverty and malnutrition in the African continent. It was an era of great expectation for the self-administration of their domestic affairs, in which policies were formulated and implemented premised on the concept of “consensus ad idem” building.
This authority (Owusu-Mensah, 2009:1) note that the leadership in the continent were a group of kleptocrats, who amassed public wealth into silhouetted foreign Bank accounts; oppressed and suppressed their political opponents; gagged the press and trampled upon the inalienable rights and liberties of those they governed in their respective countries with impunity. This inhuman monumental phenomenon practiced by these kinds of leadership throughout the African continent gained the attention of most writers on African political literature.

Ake (2000:33-37) opined that, political independence was meant to foster management and administrative reforms in the various states of Africa. Nonetheless, the nature of these states was a remnant of the colonial legacy of non-inclusiveness of elites, and the proneness to the mobilization of citizens against imperial dominion as observed in the colonial era. It was a machinery of coercion; a culture of tyranny; replete with repression; oppression and suppression of the indigenous citizenry; with a restricted social class base formation; characterized by human rights abuses; and violence which depended largely on the afore-stated instead of authority in state governance. Citizenry inputs were ignored in state administration, with a staunched centralization on policy formulation and implementation. It imposed taxes; redistributed lands; established forced labour; decided the habitation of the citizenry; and the line of production. It could not boast of legitimacy even with its capacity to formulate and implement laws, and lawful political contestation was outlawed.
The attainment of self-determination and independent did not reverse the trend of events, but remained as an arbitrary government, in which only the managers and administrators were substituted whiles governments and governance remained tyrannical.

Ake said this:

“Its scope continued to be totalistic and its economic orientation highly statist. It presented itself often as an apparatus of violence, it has its social forces remained extremely narrow and it relied for Compliance unduly on coercion rather than authority. With few exceptions, the elites who came to Power decided to inherit and exploit the colonial system to their own benefit rather than transforming it democratically as had to contain with force” (Ake 2000:36).

According to (Ake 2000:37) a character of monolithic coercion and underdevelopment caused the rise of democracy movement across the continent. It began through the neglect and ‘marginalization’ of sectors and sub-sectors from political inclusion. This happened in two phases: Elite’s involvement and the “masses” quest for economic engagement. This was exemplified by Kwame Nkrumah with the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC); the Convention People’s Party (CPP); Sekou Troure; Julius Nyerere; and Jomo Kenyatta defence of its similarities to the African tradition of building consensus in which the citizenry communicated about domestic affairs …

According to Ake, (1996:5) democratic circumstances in Africa were an impediment to the social and economic development of the African continent. He insisted that, African autocratic governments inherited from their colonial masters a political environment
unfriendly to the development of the continent. To Ake (1996), the underlying cause of
disagreement or challenge was not that development have retrogressed or failed, but was
not a preferred priority in the mission of the political elites that governed the continent in
the post-colonial period

Youngs (2001:2) subscribed to the assertion that, democracy promotion in the 1990s
witnessed mixed results. Whilst part of Africa such as Nigeria and Ghana; and in Asia such
as Pakistan and India were formal democracies, North African states, the Arabian
Peninsula states and some Asian states were immune from the democratization syndrome.
He further asserted that, North Africa and Middle East relapsed into a state of
authoritarianism; some transitions to democracy in Sub Saharan Africa reversed into
dictatorship or at the transitional phase were short of democratic consolidation. In some of
these countries, Executive powers remained unchallenged; countervailing institutions were
ineffective and inefficient; policy formulation and implementation were extremely elite-
dominated; absence of transparency and effective accountability; Civil Society was fragile;
political parties were weak and poorly institutionalized; and the rule of law was lacking or
exercised discriminatively; and constitutional liberties were denied which gave impetus to
“illiberal democracy”.

Additionally, economic limitations coupled with failed and bitter structural Adjustment
deprived a host of people from their rights of universal adult suffrage of “effective
democracy citizenship” and the general political and Civil liberties tilted back in the 1990s
(Youngs, 2001).
Against this background, the industrialized nations embarked upon democracy promotion as an assiduous mechanism in the containment of Communism. In the light of these developments, pro-Western autocrats’ supports were abolished. These commitments were made by the US, Japan and some European nations either individually or collectively. In November 1991, The European Union democracy promotion gained heightened impetus through the Maastricht Treaty under a Development Council Resolution. Pledges of commitment in the form of technical assistance for elections and other institutional capacity of democracy was added in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the Council of Europe; the Commonwealth; the Organization of American States; and with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support for transitional democracies. Indeed, this was a conscious extension of the human rights initiatives (Youngs 2001:3).

He equally noted that, domestic factors such as socioeconomic considerations were largely responsible for democracy magnification globally. Factors such as education; urbanization; trade unionism; class structure formation and economic hardship; mismanagement; corruption and political elites amassing of wealth engendered political liberalization on the first hand. The other external causal consideration was foreign policies of rewards and coercion: provision of aid; withdrawal of aid; military interventions and the ‘snowball effect’ or the “contagion effect” led to the democratization of illiberal regimes (Youngs, 2001: 4).
In a broader dimension, perspectives of democratization have illustrated that democracy and socioeconomic development emphasized and harmonized each other for the success of democracy across the earth. However, whichever superseded the other as an ideal were unresolved and continually caused debates amongst political scholars in the African continent. In his study to democracy promotion in the continent, (Nyongo 1987: 17) consolidated his argument in the developmentalist approach to democratization. He opined that the segregation of the national alliance at independence fostered in autocratic realm, and the absence of democracy was attributable to economic recession in the continent. In furtherance to the above, he opined to the respects that, where democratic values were upheld, respected, high rate of prosperity in terms of growth and progressive form of wealth accumulation was promised and attainable.

A cynic of the study rebutted that assertion of Nyongo’s modernization conventional worldview. He envisaged democracy as a key value in itself that demands no justification on the developmentalist orientation (Mkandiwire 1995:85-87). He cited the Asian Tigers confirming McFaul’s opinion as linking democracy with economic development was unacceptable as observed in the Post-communist era. Nevertheless, that economic development; growth and wealth accumulation have taken root in Asia under authoritarian governments in Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong were examples cited.

On the other hand, Ninsin (2005:7), after an assiduous research and analysis of the Third Wave of democratization processes in the continent noted that, the major threat to democratization on the continent was impoverishment. He extended his argument by
saying poverty de-incapacitated and manifested itself into the withdrawal of the citizenry from public affairs that have engendered coldness and apathy. He buttressed that:

“The most dangerous effect of poverty is the vulnerability of the poor to tyrants and demagoguery who could easily mobilize them to subvert existing democratic institutions ... the poor participated effectively in politics and economy of their own country. They cannot participate in the processes of self-government yet democracy is about self-government, they cannot practice self-determination yet governance is a process that makes one responsible for his or her own actions and choices.” (Ninsin, 2005).

Boafo-Arthur (1998:16) on the other hand placed this in the domestic context, by unequivocally noting that, a colossal amount of support was given to the government of Ghana in the Fourth Republican transitional process as compared with previous experience in the nation. By extension, he noted that, the degree of donor support raised questions as to whether the Provincial National Defence Council (PNDC) would have plied the path of the transition project divorced of development partners’ assistance. In this, he expressed his vote of confidence of the donor community, whilst at the same time exercised vote of no confidence on the part of the PNDC government.

According to Huntington (1991, 1) the initiation of democracy and the globalization of democracy spread:

“Unleashed a huge array of popular, social, and political forces that had been effectively suppressed during the dictatorship. This wave was
characterized by an epoch of union strikes, demonstration, seizure of factories, farms and media” (Huntington, 1991, 4-7).

Consequently, therefore, parties won the general elections. Other factors that were inherent in the continent were economic crisis that plagued these states, popular social demonstrations and strikes (Huntington, 1991: 4). These precipitating factors were the main causal factors of the emerging triumphalism of democracy. In his scholarly work, Huntington identified three approaches to democracy. One was a form of government that derives its authority for government; purposes served by government; and procedures for constituting government. Here the central procedure of democracy was the selection of leaders through a competitive election by the citizens.

Secondly, the classical theory of democracy was centred on the “will of the people” (source) and “the common goal” (purpose). He noted that, the classical theory “is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Huntington, 1991: 6). Thirdly, he noted that, political systems were democratic if the powerful collective decisions formulators were chosen through credible periodic elections in which aspirants freely competed for the electorate votes and in which eligible electorate voted. Hence, democracy was defined in two kinds of dimensions: authority and participation.

Dahl Robert (1971; Huntington, 1991:8) noted that democracy entails civil and political autonomy to speech and media; assembly and associations; and mobilization that are
requisite for the conduct of electoral canvassing. In furtherance, he asserted that elections are acceptable if International Election Observer Missions certify the lower standards of the elections as fair and transparent.

In view of these developments, democracy reforms in the world during the past two decades have been enviably remarkable. For example, in 1974, there were 41 democracies amongst the existing states. By 2003, about three-fifth (90 out of 150) of all the world’s states were formal democracies (Diamond 2006).

According to Youngs (2001), he asserted that democracy expansion existed from the late 1980s to early 2000. Of these, one hundred and twenty (120) out of one hundred and ninety two (192) states were classified as democracies. Democracy however revolves around the axis of vertical accountability, in which authorities of power are selected through quality periodic elections.

In Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), forty-one (41) out of forty-seven (47) states reformed from 1989 to 1994. Of these, sixty-five (65) presidential elections were conducted involving more than one candidate from 1989 and 2000, whilst legislative elections involving more than one political party were organized in at least forty-two (42) countries (Nicolas Van De Walle &Bratton, 1994; Rakner et al (2008:2).

Lindburg (2006:127) noted that, one hundred and twenty three (123) global states of one hundred and ninety two (192) states were electoral democracies. Lindburg (2006:128) opined that between the same period quoting from the Freedom House report, that two
hundred and ten (210) elections were held, ninety-five (95) presidential and one hundred and twenty-five (125) parliamentary elections were conducted.

The catalogue of democracy assistance in the electoral cycle approach was intensive and extensive as well. They included the following:

- Electoral Assistance to the Electoral Commission precisely to support in the electoral governance processes and procedures for credible elections;
- Assistance to Parliamentarians: Reforms to other government institutions through constitutional drafting and bills drafting by Members of Parliament;
- Assistance to political parties;
- Assistance to Civil Society Organizations;
- Judicial Reforms Assistance for peaceful settlement of disputes;
- Assistance to the Mass Media; and
- Assistance to the Security Sector.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Since the attainment of independence in 1957, Ghana on four attempts experimented democratic governments through periodic general elections. In 1957, she was amongst the nations in the Sub-Saharan Africa to attain independence, a national election was held in what became the First Republic. A first reverse wave disrupted the first republic in a military coup d’état in the 1960s. Similarly, in 1970s the second republic was initiated through an election and was reversed in a military takeover through the barrel of the gun in
1972. Third Republic was born and vertical accountability was conducted to usher in the republic, it met its untimely third reverse democratic wave in a military junta in 1983. In 1992 the Fourth Republic was ushered in through a general election conducted in November and December for the Presidential and parliamentary vertical accountability respectively. In these developments, the electoral processes and procedures were plagued with problems that militated against quality elections from 1992 to 2000 the period under my academic study. The major problems encountered by the constitutionally entrusted institution, the Electoral Commission to conduct national elections were:

The Electoral Commission (EC) was bedevilled with monumental financial or budgetary constraints, and these have de-incapacitated its ability to conduct quality national elections within the stipulated era. These factors have inimically stymied its institutional delivery capacity to procure electoral logistics; pay both its permanent and temporary workers; acquire vehicles to transport electoral logistics and polling staffs; embark on voter education and other aspects of the electoral processes; and human and equipment errors are the fundamental challenges the EC has encountered. The electoral complement of national elections was election observations (Afari-Gyan, 2000).

Indeed, during the era under review, there were no domestic election Observer/Monitoring Missions in the country to observe and monitor national elections. Even the International Elections Observer Mission that arrived in the nation to observe the elections have little knowledge of the geographical electoral terrain with respect to constituencies, electoral areas and polling station in which they would observe. Additionally, the fewest number of
International Observer Missions who observed elections could not reach or access difficult terrains otherwise known as ‘overseas’ areas to observe these elections. These have brought about political elites and supporters manipulating or rigging elections in such areas on behalf of aspiring candidates and political parties altogether. The National Observer Missions deployed on the other hand in the 1996 and the 2000 elections were insufficient to adequately monitor and observer elections in Ghana (Afari-Gyan, 2000).

The success of any elections is partly contingent on voter education and information regarding the processes and procedures of a national election. This crucial role of education and information dissemination was played by the strand. In that period, the fourth estate of the realm was inaccessible to the opposition parties to engage in vigorous electoral discourse and campaign. Media censors were prevalently the order of the day; editors to media outlets were abused and incarcerated arbitrary emanating from the law of sedition and libel. The media published without any investigative journalism; media objectivity was questionable; and the media reportage was without circumspection; the unrealistic vilification of politicians, political parties, and their kin and kindred was rampant (Afari-Gyan, 2000).

Again, there was by the virtue of the non-existence of Civil Society Organizations to enlighten and disseminate information on democracy, democratic governance, good governance, and accountability of political elites. The few Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) that emerged subsequently exhibited heightened monumental political favour for some political parties; whiles at the same time became anti-political to other political
parties. Some CSOs were not neutral as required of CSOs in the democratic environment of the nation. CSOs researchers as Think Tanks were non-existent; their role as countervailing institutions in democratic governance was subjective; they hide their research document for fear of some politicians, even when publications were made in the media and internet, and were read and broadcasted in the strand, they immediately withdrew such publications. CSOs in Ghana were urban centred; their information dissemination was an equally elite centred to the neglect of the majority of rural dwellers (Crawford, 2004).

CSOs in Ghana faced a serious financial crisis to operate adequately in their respective mandated role in democracy. These funding crisis made CSOs urban centred; lack rural penetration; lacked local dialect dissemination of information on democratic elections; absence of funding media outlets to penetrate the illiterates through the local languages commentary in Ghana on elections; and to hire enough Election Observers Missions nationwide to observe the national elections as these observer required training, deployment and remuneration of trainers and trainees of election observation (gyimah-Boadi, 2001).

The judiciary was an integral part of the Electoral Governing/Management Body (EMBs). The responsibility of the judiciary was to resolve election disputes peacefully and impartially without fear or favour to any party to an electoral dispute. However, the
judiciary system in the country was met with insufficient courtrooms nationwide to mediate in election disputes (Crawford, 2004).

Election disputes were delayed due to backlog of other court cases; the magistrates were often found writing notes on election disputes thereby causing election dispute delays. The filing system in the court was remote: they used the traditional convention of cabinet filing. This made tracing of files difficulty by the court-clerks; misplacement of court-dockets were rampant; the request and the granting of adjournments by the lawyer was equally high; transfer of sitting judges in cases was a commonplace; and the manual operation of court cases delayed judicial adjudication of cases in the judiciary system in the country on election dispute resolution (Smith, 2008).

Political parties encountered difficulties in their ability to compete favourably in national elections in the period under investigation. The financial regulation of political parties in elections made it extremely challenging for political parties in the country to mobilize funds for their political activities such as campaign; and outreach programmes; institutionalization across the country. Other difficulties encountered were: hiring permanent party executives to man party offices; and to co-opt the youth in their political parties; to disseminate their ideological orientation and manifestoes; the policies and decisions to the electorates to make informed choice on government and which political parties to vote for (Carothers, 1999, 2004, 2009).
Again, party fusion and fission was rampant in the aftermath of delegate congress, and, in national elections. This frequent fragmentation made parties vulnerable to manipulation by the elite community in governance. Again, the financial regulation of the nation on party funding was flouted with impunity (Carothers, 1999).

In the light of these developments, the donors initiated some measures to ameliorate these problems. This approach was anchored on the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, its prelude being the 1980s/1990s Aid effectiveness practices.

Not all, the fourth estate of the realm had media assistance in the training of journalists; media outlet assistance and establishment; media legal personnel training; broadcast orientation; investigative journalism; professionalism in journalism; and media coverage on issues (USAID, 2004, Riordon, 1963, Becker and Vlad, 2009).

CSOs were funded by donors to monitor and observe elections; as countervailing institutions; as the voice of the voiceless; to educate the citizens of the nation on democratic governance and democratic election; to engage in research; and to give assistance to political parties (Crawford, 2008; Gyimah-Boadi, 2001; Crawford and Kearthon, 2001; Powell and Almond, 1966; Robinson; 1996).

Again, the justice system was given enough assistance as judicial reform to facilitate quick justice administration; facilities such as computers and voice recorders to speed up justice administration; magistrate training course to augment the inadequate judges in the courts;
refurbishment of court rooms and libraries; legal books to augment the existing books in law; and judicial service official training (Smith, 2008; Rocha and KilPatrick, 2005).

Political party assistance was equally given to political parties to consolidate; institutionalised; engage in outreach programs to woo in new entrants; outreach programs on fundraising exercises and exchange programs abroad (Rakner et al, 2007; Rakner and Svassand, 2004, 2005).

However, having put mechanisms in place to address these above problems in the electoral governance processes and procedures, the above problems inherently cohered as the most mitigating issues on national elections and the gamut of electoral administration in Ghana’s fourth republic elections.

In Ghana, electoral assistance to the EC dates back to 1992 to 2000. These types of support granted to the nation towards elections are: the general improvement of the organization capacity of the EC; advice on the electoral systems; electoral laws and regulations; and setting up electoral legal framework. Other interventions were general inputs to the EC; assistance for the electoral processes and procedures; party and voter registration; balloting and ballot boxes; vote counting; dispute resolution (Inter-Party Advisory Committee, IPAC); support for election administration; technical training of the EC administrators; voter education; training of party’s agents; training of local observer Missions; training of electoral journalism. The total commitments of funds are (¢598,737,077,819); plus £500,000.00, FF2,000,000.00; 1,000,000.00 Canadian US$25,000.00; 5 Iveco trucks;
240KVA generator sets; document shredders; PABX equipment, and 13 fax machines in 1992. In 1996, the total Aid commitment to the EC was $121,348,229,899.00 and £500,000.00. In the election year 2000, direct funds to the EC were US$313,071.08. The indirect funds to the EC for equipment and materials supplied were US$476,248.03 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012).

That notwithstanding, the Government of Ghana’s (GoG) funding of the election were ₦1,655,777,585.93 for 1992. In 1996, her financial commitment for the election was US$11,693,867.11, and in the year 2000 election, the GoG gave US$5,764,227.00 for the election management in the nations’ elections (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012).

In lieu of the above, the significant questions the research asked and addressed in an attempt to elaborate on these issues above on the research. The study explores the following research questions:

(1). How was the impact of electoral assistance to the Electoral Commission of Ghana and the country’s electoral process from 1992-2000.

(2). How was the effects of the development partners financial injected to the EC?

(3). How was the impact of the internal Electoral support of elections in Ghana (1992-2000)?

(6) How was the effect of the media on the elections?

(7). How was the effect of CSOs on the elections?

(8). How was the effect of the judiciary reforms on the elections?
(9). How was the effect of political parties on the election?

1.2. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

- To assess the impact of donor funding of the conduct of quality general elections in Ghana.

1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To assess the impact of electoral assistance to EC on the general electoral processes and procedures of Ghana’s election from 1992-2000 and its credibility.

- To assess the impact of the impact of CSOs on the elections in Ghana (1992-2000)

- To study the impact of judicial reforms in the country’s electoral process from 1992-2000.

- To evaluate the extent of impact of the media on the elections.

- To examine the effects of political parties on the elections in Ghana’s fourth republican elections.

1.4. HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY

Donors’ electoral assistance significantly led to the consolidation of democracy in the Fourth Republic.
1.5. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

The methodology for assessing donor support in the electoral cycle approach and elections continues to elicit considerable challenges to researchers in the field of electoral assistance. According to (Burnell 2008: 1-2) the nature of donor support in elections is in fluctuation. After a decade and a half of donors’ assistance to facilitate the promotion of democracy in that era increasingly, coupled with numerous activities to several organizations and resources, but uncertainties surrounded democracy assistance, and its contemporary performance and future prospects were a prime concern for all. Previous decades witnessed the birth of the public goods theory, offering current analytical approaches on serious issues in geopolitical affairs such as peace, security, development (economic, social and political) and environmental sustainability. Donor assistance is determinable primarily by the realities of the “political market place” in nations on both sides of the relationship. However, can these recent approaches of theories about this public goods theory of assistance judge its current conditions, and identify democratic peace as global public goods, capable of strengthening international cooperation in democracy promotion as a mechanism to accomplish that end. He further noted that, in the light of the above, donors deserve an “insight” into current conditions and future prospects of international democracy assistance in the demand and supply sides through evaluation of the impact of democracy assistance. Robinson (1996:6) candidly asserted, “Donors lack a systematic approach to evaluate democracy assistance and political aid and there was no generally accepted methodological approach or indicators for such assessment”.

19
That notwithstanding, in the recent period, a duo field of contrasting methodological approaches has emerged in the experimental design or randomization control design and the non-experimental or quasi-experimental design. Researchers in the developed world and development partners variously employed it in the assessment of both bilateral and multilateral support towards democratic development. In the present, research evolitional designs have emerged in the public opinion survey: a blend of external validity advantage of representative public opinion with internal validity strengths of randomized multifaceted experiments.

In this respect therefore, two measures of impact assessment design approaches were employed in this research: the control group and the treatment group. The control groups other words known, as the baseline of the research was 1992, whiles the treatment group of the study were the 1996 and the 2000 elections. I selected the 1992 as the baseline because in that year, only the Electoral Commission had AID, but the amount was minuscule as compared to subsequent elections. The other auxiliary institutions never had any assistance from the donor community or were non-existent. In the analysis, raw data in percentage terms are analysed. This was followed by finding the respective qualitative impact added to the study.

It took the researcher six months on the field to gather data for this project. Of the total questionnaires administered were one thousand eight hundred (1800), of which Eighty five percent (85%) of the questionnaires were obtained from respondents constituting (1530), bringing the total number of questionnaires gathered as one thousand five hundred and
thirty; and interviews and focus group discussions were (85) responded to the questionnaires. The total questionnaires deemed as non-responded to was two hundred and forty three (247).

The researchers approaches adopted on the field in the administration of the research were as follows:

- Questionnaire Administration (Structure questionnaire)
- Executive Interviews (Structured questionnaire)
- Focus Group Discussion (Structured questionnaire)

The breakdowns of questionnaire administered for the research were as follow:

**Questionnaire Type.**                                                      **Number Administered.**

Electoral Commission-EC Focus Group Discussion and interview               25

Students as the respondent Group (in each group of questionnaire)             1530

Interview with Journalists                                                   20

Interview with Civil Society Organisations                                   20

Interview with judges                                                        20

**The overall aggregate of respondents was**                               **1615**
1.6. METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

In this research, I employed both probability and non-probability technique for data collection. It was an explorative work combining both experimental and non-experimental research. This was to overcome selection and respondents biases associated with each of the individual technique. The researcher triangulated: blending both qualitative and quantitative research design.

1.6.1. Research design and purpose

The study employs a non-experimental evaluation designs, specifically a cross-sectional study. It studies the phenomenon by undertaken a cross-section of the population at a time (Babbie 1989:395-397). The project studies different elections held in the nation, and the electoral assistance received from the donor community. The project investigated seven (7) regions out of ten (10) regions, covering one hundred and fifty constituencies in Ghana. With donor support to institution linked to elections to ensure the credibility of national elections. This was an evaluative study as it assessed the impact of electoral assistance as an intervention using a (group of beneficiary institutions) specifically to ensure the effectiveness and the accomplishments of electoral support in terms of accountability, and the period of democracy assistance.

This required the application of both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods to meet the desired research objectives. The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research are connected to the purpose of the study, the type of data involved, and the question of subjectivity and objectivity in handling data. There was the possibility to think that, quantitative data are more objective because it consists of
“hard facts”, whilst qualitative data are more often likely subjective to the individual bias of the person collecting the data and respondents (Conyer and Hill 1984:13-25).

The nature of a research and analysis and findings poses further difficult questions as to whether they are ideal or practical situations and cases exclusively quantitative and qualitative. In this regard, a mixed design (both qualitative and quantitative research design) was employed in the research. In overcoming the issue of subjectivity and to obtain maximum objectivity, the blended design used for both the qualitative and quantitative techniques which complements and reinforces each other (Conyers and Hill 2006:323-331).

1.6.2. Sample technique

Both probability and non-probability sampling technique was used in the selection of the final respondents. These included a proportional stratified sample; purposive sampling; cluster sampling; and multi-stage sampling techniques. Three purposes prompted the purposive sample. The first was only people who benefited from electoral assistance can be recruited for the study of the impact of electoral support. On the second account, the focus of the study was the electorate. The third was the benefactors of electoral assistance. After the purposive identification of the beneficiary institutions and the target respondents, the simple random sampling method was used to select some of the respondents of the study, as their number were high for complete coverage due to resource limitations, time and space factor, and the access of respondents as well as the nature of the design.
Proportional stratified sampling technique was used to select the constituencies within Ghana, students are the respondents within the project, institutions and donor Agencies. This was in relation to the fact that, only the constituencies, institutions, and donors are relevant to and could contribute to the objectives of the research by responding to the research questions. In each constituency, a proportionate representation of students across the seven (7) regions in Ghana were the target population was recruited as a sample size of one thousand five hundred and three respondents on the EC, and eighty five for the other auxiliary institutions in order to overcome bias and narrow the representation of respondents. The reason for the large coverage was to make the work representative.

A total of one hundred and fifty constituency as enumeration areas out of the two hundred and thirty constituencies were covered by the researcher to gather data for the analysis and discussion of the research. In each constituency, a total of between ten (10) to twelve (12) respondents was targeted to answer the questionnaire.

In order to give equal opportunity to all the electorates a sample frame was identified; respondents were selected by proportionate stratified sampling techniques. For the electoral assistance project the targets institutions were recruited, a simple random sampling technique was employed on students across the nation. The proportionate stratified sample was used on the part of constituency level, and simple random sample in the ranks and files of the institutions was blinded to the target group; this brought into the equation of a multi stage sampling.
The entire Ghana was stratified into three electoral cluster zones enumeration areas, with each cluster zone consisting of three regions: northern cluster electoral zone; central cluster electoral zone and coastal cluster electoral zone, of which two regions were selected on simple random bases. They included:

- Northern Cluster electoral zone: (Northern region and Upper West Region);
- Central Cluster electoral Zone: (Brong Ahafo and Ashanti Region);
- Coastal Cluster electoral Zone: (Cape Coast and Eastern Region).

Greater Accra Region was selected premised on purposive sample selection. Making an aggregate of seven regions (7) in all. The constituency coverage was one hundred constituencies in all.

1.7. PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION

This constitutes first-hand information or raw data collected from the population of the study. The method used in this research includes interviews, focus group discussions and questionnaire administration.

1.7.1. Self-Administered Questionnaire

The other set of questionnaire was administered to the benefactor agencies; the beneficiary institutions and students of the University of Ghana; University for Development Studies; Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology; University College of Wenneba; Polytechnique student in Sunyani; Tamale Poly technique; and Kumasi Poly technique. It was self-administered. These self-administered questionnaires were used to collect data from the student on the EC, media, judiciary, CSOs and political parties In this instance,
the respondents were educated and can read, interpret and answer the questions in the questionnaire correctly by themselves.

In this vein, the questionnaires were given to them to fill by themselves. This will bring the total responded self-administered questionnaires to one thousand five hundred and thirty (1530) on the EC, but one thousand eight hundred questionnaires were administered (1800), of which 85% of the questionnaires were gathered constituting 1530 questionnaires gathered on the EC, plus 60 interviews and 25 respondents as focus group discussion. However, even under these circumstances, the face-to-face facilitated contacts in order to get respondents cooperation if the necessity arose as a mechanism of informed consent. The other questions were interview and focus group discussions.

1.7.2. Secondary Data Presentation

Secondary data about the study was obtained from books, journals, reports, agencies, institutions (beneficiary and benefactors) on electoral support for Ghana’s elections. Each source used was accordingly acknowledged in the study. The use of secondary data necessitated the understanding of the magnitude of the problem studied, putting the research in its perspective, and which complemented the data.

1.7.3. Data Processing and Analysis

Data gathered from the field was processed by using the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) now called the Statistical Product for Social Solution. The data were entered into the templates, and the analytical and interpretational tables were generated. Thereafter, the data were interpreted and analyzed personally.
On the other hand, qualitative data which comprised of interviews and focused group discussions were recorded, played seven (7) and was transcribed into themes. This was followed by a discussion of the thematic information in the study according to the themes. The tables or diagrams were omitted from the study due to space.

In the research, the baseline was the 1992 election. The major reasons for selecting this particular year’s elections were based on four accounts. They were:

- The elections were under funded by the donor community;
- The independence of the electoral commission was not absolute;
- The Electoral Commission’s labour were inexperienced; and
- The 1979 election voter register was used with a supplementary voters register.

1.8. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

**Donor support:** This is any form of assistance given by the development partners in the administration of elections in the period under review.

**Electoral assistance:** This is assistance provided by the donor community to the various institutions involved in elections, its processes and procedures by the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) and other auxiliary institution engaged in elections.

**Democracy assistance in the electoral cycle approach:** These are aided, either in the forms of grants, loans and technical assistance delivered by the industrialized nations to transitional governments for their political (democratic) development.
**Vertical accountability:** This is simply elections. It is the process of selecting members of government through the polls; it either retains or removes government from power and served as the source of authority.

**Credible elections:** Elections are credible when the entire processes and procedures for elections are devoid of all illicit electoral practices, and are accepted by all stakeholders.

**Elections:** It is the process and procedure of going to the polls to cast votes by the electorate in order to select the leaders (government or authorities) of a country periodically. In short, it involves selecting the authority, and participations by the citizens in selecting their leaders of the nation.

### 1.9. LOCATION OF THE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The study falls within the ambits of three key areas in political science.

The first is good governance and democracy. Essentially, democracy was under development politics.

The second was aid, which was an intervention, and was located under geopolitics (diplomacy or foreign policy) which is under development politics and international politics.

The third and final part fall within public administration, where public policies were formulated and implemented by the authorities voted into power, state bureaucracies on behalf of their nation and warrants accountability.
1.10 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The research is on donor assistance to Ghana’s election from 1992-2000. The scope covers three national election and seven regions in the country.

1.11. LIMITATION OF THE STUDY

The research is on donor assistance for Ghana’s election from 1992-2000.

- This was a setback to the research: the scope of the topic was by itself broad and served as a limitation in terms of coverage in data gathering, time and space of the study.

- Time and space provided for the study was inadequate and served as another challenge to the study.

- Location of respondents: it was difficult accessing respondents of the target population of the study as they were disperse nationwide. They were apathetic and sluggish in responding to the questionnaire. This made the retrieval of questionnaires somehow difficult. In some circumstances, questionnaires were missing and the researcher had to print out fresh questionnaires to the respondents.

- Financial constraints was another limitation of the study: It was extremely difficult to outsource funds to meet the coverage; printing of questionnaires; travelling; accommodation and data processing of the research as intended to cover in the study.


1.12 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of any academic work that is reachable has been set into its perspective by Marshall and Rossman (1995:23-78) in three core areas: the linkage of the study to larger practical and theoretical problems, concerns of practice; and social policy matters. This study was vital in all three respects:

Essentially, this research sought to answer a series of questions arising from democracy/electoral assistance as an intervention in terms of their accomplishment among the Ghanaian electorates the Electoral Commission, Donors and workers of these institutions have often engaged in critical thinking about their actions. Inputs such as personnel, material resources and activities committed to elections must lead to results that they by themselves have outputs. These yields have an impact on the citizens, institutions, and donor in this respect. In order to demonstrate to themselves, the donor and their supporters that operate proceeds as planned and to ascertain outcomes, these development practitioners endeavour to evaluate the impact of their support. A democracy assistance community in particular would like to establish that impact assessment was vital in enabling them to continue their mission: poor quality impact evaluation will much likely leave them vulnerable to co-optation by others (Carothers 2002:5-21). This study partially contributes to these concerns, with an examination of the impact of the work of the donors.

The provision of development, transformation (liberal ideologies: economic liberalism, political liberalism and social liberalism) for all under the rising population coupled with dwindling resources as one of the contemporary and tropical issues confronting donor governments and development practitioners recently. It was in cognizance of this fact that,
development assistance (democracy and/or electoral support) was provided for a national election to reduce arbitrariness of governments and its linkages to poverty.

Again, this arbitrariness of authorities to their citizens obstructs citizens from contributing (private business, private ownership of properties, and participation) of their quota to national development (liberal ideology). This was observed as a measure to the enhancement of development in liberal principles. At the same moment, it reduces development burden policies and to bridge the inequalities in development in all of its facets. It was in this respect that, this study will provide insight into the need for democracy assistance among democracies. It will leave clues to incite donors and leading pro-development projects to call for more commitment and practice. Additionally, it was hoped that, donors will not give promises and pronouncements to democratization, elections and its attendant assistance to ensure credible elections.

Ultimately, this will give citizens all their rights they deserve; negative rights, positive rights and electoral or representation rights (Doyle, 1983; Kant, 1795:23-56). According to these scholars, the granting and guarantee of the above liberties and rights will inevitably result in the establishment of durable democracy. Once democracy was rooted, the tendency was that, it would result into perpetual peace and arrest or reduce interstate and intrastate protagonist amongst and between democracies. This will intend breed lasting social, political and economic development across the world, characterized by a mutual benefit (positive sum-game) amongst and between democratic nations for a better world (Doyle, 1983; Kant, 1795).
1.13 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.13.1 Introduction

This part of the thesis deals with one aspect only, subdivided into two phases. The first facet deals with democracy assistance globally and the second assistance to Ghana. The major issues discussed relates to donor assistance in the electoral cycle approach to Ghana, such as assistance to the EC, the fourth estate of the realm, CSOs, political parties and the judiciary. This sets the stage to reinforce the first chapter of the thesis, and throws more light to subsequent chapters.

1.13.2. Democracy Assistance in the Electoral Cycle Approach to Transitional Democracies

Elections play a crucial role in transitional democracies in the last decades, and credible elections were a requisite requirement for the exogenous legitimacy of any government (Bjornlund 2004). Consequently, the conduct of elections has gained both international and domestic attention. The most glaring expression of such an attention is funding from the international donor communities to enhance the organization and coordination capacity of the Electoral Commission officials and its auxiliary institutions engaged in elections and the electoral process, availability of election observation on the election and the international public acceptance or condemnation of elections (Burnell 2000). In both political and financial terms, assistance for elections was the most significant sector of democratic support.
Again, electoral assistance is the technical or material support given to the electoral process. It embraces a wider range of activities such as support and advice on electoral systems; laws and regulation; aid to create legal electoral frameworks; overall inputs to national Electoral Commissions (ECs). Again, democracy assistance for electoral procedures such as party and voter registration; balloting; voter education; vote counting and dispute resolutions; assistance to election administration and the training of election administrators. Aid to Civil Society in voter education; training of local observers and media monitors form a constituent part of donor intervention. The political complement of election administration assistance is election observation. It is the “purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral process, and the making of informed judgment on the conduct of such processes on the basis of the information gathered by persons who are not inherently authorized to intervene in the process” (Rakner et al 2007:28; Moncatal and KilPatrick, 2005).

1.13.3. Actors of Electoral Assistance

There are two folds of actors involved in this form of democracy assistance globally. These interventionists are bilateral governments and multilateral institutions. The longest bilateral donor to this vital role is the USAID support for programs of electoral support. The Democratic and Governance Office of USAID, aid regional programs of electoral assistance through Non-Governmental Organization (NGOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES); the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the American Party Institutions; National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI).
Other bilateral nations also assist electoral processes as their democracy and governance activities (Ibid).

Besides direct assistance, several donors have set up organizations for democracy promotion and democracy assistance in the electoral cycle approach. Some of these national institutions are the British Westminster Foundation; Netherlands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy and political party foundations in Sweden, Norway, France and Austria. Other multilateral organizations involved exclusively in democracy assistance are the International Institute of Election and Democracy Assistance (IDEA). In the past decade, IDEA was an NGO focused on information assembling; gathering expertise development and skills transfers in electoral assistance. Others are the UNDP, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); Organization of American States (OAS); Commonwealth of British colonies; the African Union (AU) just to mention but a few. The complement of election is election observation and Monitoring (Ibid).

1.13.4 Election Observation and Monitors

International monitoring of elections was a precondition in the era of the Cold War; it was one form of the democracy assistance and unanimously accepted worldwide. From 1989 to 2002, International Election Observers were present for 86% of general elections in emerging democracies or semi-authoritarian regimes. Election observation is widespread globally (Rakner et al 2007:29).

Election Observers describe the scope of activities concentrated on making controversial elections acceptable or exposing their loopholes. Three main forms of election observation
were identified: International observation of transitional or exceptional elections conducted by missions sent by governments such as NDI, multilateral organizations such Carter Center, or International NGOs (Larry, 1984).

Domestic monitoring of election by national organizations, specifically non-partisan NGOs such CODEO and Ghana Alert observation of elections in Ghana’s 1996 and 2000 elections. International supervision of national elections by Intergovernmental organizations in post-conflict nation’s elections was another. Under such circumstance, an international body, for example, UN role in Liberia and Sierra Leone’s elections (Ibid), often supervised/conducted these elections.

The negating effects of election assistance programs were related to a larger quantum of funds allocated to election monitoring exercises. Election observers/monitoring spent a larger proportion of the funds that avails democracy assistance. Again, experiences revealed that, the pragmatic and compromising behaviour of observers and donor agencies assumed to support democracy and the due process compromises with the rules and principles in favour of some political and economic benefits (Abbink & Hesseling 2000:8). More so, election monitoring is executed with little sensitivity to domestic context. Elections are monitored on the premise of freeness and fairness whilst neglecting the underlying structural prejudices against quality election (Geisler 1993:613-637, Bjornlund 2004). In this regards, donors should send short-term, medium-term and long-term observer missions’ months before an election, such that, the long-term observers will enlighten the short-term observer missions about the electoral environment.
Again, the mandate, interest and limitations of election monitoring bodies mirror the national interest of sponsoring government or agencies. It is an international customary rule to accept International Election Observers. This novel activity is not a concise science, and the information on observers’ statements suffer from sampling problems and imprecision. Irrespective of the fact that, set standards and norms exists, it is both difficult and impossible to attain common standards that are democratically satisfactory, and lawful election easily translated into practical standards for examining real global elections (Rakner et al 2007:30). Assistance in the administration of the electoral processes in vertical accountability.

1.13.5. Electoral Assistance to Electoral Commissions

Furthermore, support to electoral governance entails a scope of activities such as support to legislative reforms; technical equipment; organization and logistics; voter registration; and monitoring and observation. Some larger part of assisting with elections concentrated on capacity building of the electoral commission through funding; training; technical support and equipment provision. This assistance has improved the conditions for conducting credible elections, raising the legitimacy of the electoral processes and its outcomes (Lopez-Pinto 2000, 2006). Nevertheless, donor assistance has been often unsustainable of the electoral processes. The enormous donor-driven elections in post-conflict and transitional regimes were expensive. Consequently, assistance to democratic processes have set in motion an unsustainable model of the manner in which elections were held in the midst of these sophisticated voter registration systems, transparent ballot boxes and ballots printing abroad.
According Ottaway and Chung (1999:1-27, 99-113), the challenge arose when donors support initial or maiden elections, but the future duty of conducting subsequent elections became the responsibility of host government with limited and overburdened budgetary constraint. A vivid example was Mozambique’s election from 1994 to 2004, the international community funds amounted to US$150 million for five elections and abandoned assistance to subsequent elections. However, critics posit that elections were not equated with democracy. This practice is a fallacy of electoralism. Nevertheless, donors must not underestimate the prominence of elections in democratization (Elklit 1999:28-51). Successful credible elections were the continued vital roadmap towards democratization, much as flawed elections led to significant impediment. However, eternal electoral commission institutions were created to manage elections processes. Analyst of election management in sub-Saharan Africa has suggested that small institutional learning was known in several states from one election to another (Rakner and Svasand 2004:49-68, 2005:85-105). Some key parts of election governance were “outsourced” to international firms given electoral based support services, and this has reduced institutional learning. Again, there are too many expectations emanating from elections and election monitoring. For example, the exogenous community looks to elections to spearhead nation-building processes in post-conflict states such Iraq, Bosnia, Angola, Rwanda, DR Congo, Liberia and Somalia. The other form of assistance given to democracies in transition is political party assistance.


In transitional and fledgling democracies, these democratic values, institution, and standards were lacking or was poorly resource. Hence, it became imperative as a matter of
democratic expediency for donors to grant democracy assistance in the electoral cycle approach to ensure that, elections and these normative democratic features of elections are operational and implemented for the credibility of elections held, and to promote a functioning democracy with its attendant democratic values adhered to by all the citizenry.

Again, in the inclusive parameters of the cycle, electoral intervention works in an isolated manner from other vital elements of external democratic intervention to ownership as specialized at the technical realm that requires conscious implementation was far from other aid efforts conceived as political. The broader fulfilment of the cycle needs renewed efforts to explore and develop a communally emphatic overlap between electoral support and the larger collection of democracy support (Carothers, 2009:8-9). There were the impartial fulfilment of election cycle approach by both providers and recipient nations. There was an incomplete adherence to the principles of aid effectiveness and inadequate anchorage of policies. This research acknowledges the role of democracy/electoral assistance to Ghana’s nascent democracy and specifically on its elections. In this regards, the research was to investigate the impact of donor support for Ghana’s national elections in the fourth republic from 1992-2000 (Crawford and Kearthon, 2001).

1.13.7. Electoral Assistance to the Electoral Commission

This democracy assistance to the EC enhanced its capacity for the electoral governance processes and procedures. Such were the general improvement of the organizational capacities of the EC. Again, the donors Supported on advice to the EC on the electoral systems; laws and regulation formation; support to set up legal frameworks; and general inputs to the EC. Support for the electoral processes and procedures; party and voter
registration; balloting; vote counting; dispute resolution; assistance to election administration; technical training of the EC administrators; support of the EC in voter education; training of local observers and media monitoring. This was another area of the study. It explored on how the EC has conducted its constitutionally mandated role on the complete electoral management processes and procedure in ensuring quality elections (Afari-Gyan, 2011).

1.13.8. Assistant on Election Observation and Monitor Groups

The democratic complement of electoral governance was election observation. This is the:

“The purposeful gathering of information regarding an electoral process, making of informed judgment on the conduct of such processes on the basis of the information gathered by persons who are not inherently authorized to intervene in the process” (Mackenzie, 1964).

Additionally, election observation and monitoring was a significant phenomenon of the Cold War period, an aged form of democracy assistance, and was normally and generally an acceptable values the world over. Election observation/monitoring were widespread in Europe, Soviet Union, Latin America and Africa. It described a variety of activities concentrated on making controversial elections more acceptable or exposing their flaws. The core kinds of election observation were categorized into: first, international observation of transitional or exceptional elections held by missions sent by governments, multilateral organizations or international Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for example the Commonwealth Observer Mission, the Carter Center Observer Mission, and European Union Observer Mission. Secondly, the domestic monitoring/observation was
done by national organizations, specifically non-partisan NGOs and CSOs such CODEO, NODEO, Forum for Religious Bodies, Ghana-Alert, Ghana Legal Literacy Resource Foundation of Ghana. Together they recruited (mobilized) trained and deployed 15,000 observers who covered 20,000 polling stations in the first round of the 2000 election. On the run-off CODEO revised its work by posting two observers at each of the 200 constituencies collation centres to observe and monitor the electoral processes (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001:103-117, Crawford, 2004:10-38; Rakner et al, 2007a, 2007b). The Observer Missions cover pre-election activities such constituency democratization, voter registration, voter education, media coverage of political parties from May-December 1996 and 2000 elections. On Election Day (eDay), they monitored the elections, ballot boxes and the entire national election activities nationwide. Subsequently, they wrote reports and make recommendations about the election, essentially, the report was meant to improve upon later elections, the reports were printed out, which were made up of all kind of representation of political parties, media organization, which outline the loopholes and limitations in the performance, and have set out corrective measures (Ibid and Op.cit). Additionally, this area sought to investigate the three cardinal electoral roles of International and Domestic election Observer Mission played in the pre-elections days such as constituency demarcations, election Day (eDay) election observation, and post eDay activities such as report and recommendation writing and the imminent emergence of post-election conflicts and intimidations (Moncal and KilPatrick, 2005).
1.14. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The research employs four theoretical frameworks: the modernization theory and agency theory; coercive theory; financial transfer. It was the belief among academic literature about democracy that, democracy expansion through modernization and the agency theory. Scholars of the 1960s and 1970s underscored the modernization theory as a causal factor of democratization (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; O’Donnell, 1979; Moore, 1966; Almond and Verba, 1963; Lipset; 1959).

According to them, democracy emerged in nations with social progress, such as the provision of social welfare; social infrastructure; social class formation; economic and commercial development and growth (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; O’Donnell, 1979; Moore, 1966; Almond and Verba, 1963; Lipset; 1959).

Others have outlined cultural and religion underpinnings, and historical legacies as the lever behind the ubiquitousness of democracy. The structuralist and modernization approach of democratization understood the emergence of democracy as an upshot of the formation of social structures: the wealthy; economic development; rising urban drift and settlements as preconditions that engendered democratic expansion. For example, these authorities cited Korea; Taiwan; Thailand; and Chile in Latin America to buttress their point (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; O’Donnell, 1979; Moore, 1966; Almond and Verba, 1963; Lipset; 1959).

The third wave of democratization defies these traditional theories. The third wave of democratization expanded on low level of economic development and other social factors of democratization in the 21st century without plying on modernization and the agency trajectories. Most democracies that liberalized were in the bottom third of the Human
Development Index. The cultural debate about democracy was incompatible with some religious faith and values. Such as the Persian Gulf nation’s democratization was unacceptable and rejected by the democratic theories of the third wave of democratization in the 21st century (Rakner et al, 2007a; 2007b). Cynics espoused the inherent weaknesses in the agency theory to democracy enlargement in the literature.

The weaknesses of the agency theoretical approach emphasized on contingent preference that led to “excessive voluntarism” and the “assumption” that actors are autonomous of any political, economic and social strata or historical context. However, cognizance of the structural dominance was paramount to have explained individual choices; relative negotiations, and differences of interest over time. Concentration of agents and processes was influential during the nascent phase of democracy promotion (Rakner et al, 2007a; 2007b). Following these developments, in the 1990s, the structural and agency theories were blended as factors responsible to spur the transition to democracy (Rakner et al, 2007; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Huntington, 1991; David, 1995).

Many scholars have assessed the conditions for regime reforms or political systems by the fact that, the political elites were a building block to democratic reforms globally. They emphasized on internal and external factors as influential to democratic pluralism. A tabular representation of the factors that explained the promotion of democracy were:
### Domestic Factors

**A. Structural Theory**

**B. Cultural Theory**
- Parochial culture
- Subjective culture
- Participatory culture

**3. Process theory**

### External Factors

**1. Military intervention theory**

**2. Financial Transfer theory**
- Foreign Direct Investment
- Foreign Aid

**3. Sanctions and Withdrawals of AID.**

Many of these theorists have used either one variant or the structural characteristics of a nation to espouse the ‘level of democracy’. These theoretical underpinnings noted that the prevalence of prerequisites disposes any society towards democracy enlargement. Granted that such conditions were met, democracy was imminent. The unavailability of these fundamental preconditions undermines the expansion of democracy. Arguably, the development of several nuance aspects of economic and social structures accelerated political systems towards the development of democracy (Oslon, 1999, 1993; Midlarsky, 1997; Oslon, 1993; Vanhanen, 1990, 1997; Lipset, 1959).

Another school of political scientist (Diamond, 1994; Almond and Powell, 1993 Inglehart, 1988 Almond and Verba, 1963) has employed the cultural theories to explain the emergence and growth of democracy in many countries.

The above authorities (Ibid) identified three *political cultures*, namely: *parochial culture*: it referred to a condition in which citizens were not aware of and non-participant in the political system. *Subject culture*: when citizens are knowledgeable in the political process, but are non-participant in the system. The final was *participatory culture*, when the
citizens are aware of the political process and participates vigorously in the system and the political process. The total blend of the above forms the Civic culture of a society. These cultures formed their associated behaviour, tolerance; and interpersonal trust.

The culturalists believed that cultural acquisition over a period of time affects societies’ governance, and forms a society’s political culture. Their conclusion was that, certain cultural practices promote democracy whiles others mar democratic enlargement (Ibid).

The Huntingtonian, Rustowian, and the Przeworskian employed the process theory to espouse the degree of democracy as an end outcome of many developmental stages (Huntington, 1993:5). The elites in modernization are necessary building blocks in the democratic process. These elites respond to the conditions of society and demand for new rules of alteration.

The military interventionist explained that, democracy promotion was discredited in the democratic literature. States were rational actors in the external milieu and were unexpected to employ coercion without discretion to accomplish their objectives. Militarism was used by the industrialized nations against satellite states to woo or coax them to act in the interest of the rich nations of which the advance nations felt was permissible in the international milieu (Youngs, 2007).

The US was a country associated with this coercive power device as a foreign policy mechanism. For example, US used it in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s and Philippine in 1998, but the result was negligible (Youngs, 2007). There are two types of financial
transfer theories of modernization in the literature of democratization, namely, the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Aid theories of democratization.

The FDI theory said there are correlations between FDI and democratization. Foreign investments are investments made by foreign individuals or multilateral corporations in the productive activities of other nations. It involved the transfer of assets or intermediary products within the investing enterprises without change of ownership or sometimes collaborates with domestic investors. Countries' attractiveness for FDI was dependent on the nature of its political system of governance. They believe FDI cannot initiate democratic change, but facilitates the process of the development of democratic institutions as a dividend of good governance (Youngs, 2007).

Again, Foreign Aid comes in different forms: financial, material and technical; capital resources given by one country, organization or institution in another country abroad. Williamson and Haggard (1994:526) saw foreign aid as external inducement to woo countries to liberalize and eventually democratize, and gave democracy assistance in the early stages. Apodaca and Stohl (1999:185-198) noted that Foreign Aid was a dependent variable and human records as independent variable. He examined the relationship between human rights and foreign aid in the long-term. Conclusively, with the exception of the Clinton administration, human rights played a benign role in the determination of a country's eligibility as a good candidate to receive aid and the size of aid provided.

According to Burnell (2004), industrialized nations employ Soft power and coercive power as a leverage to coax or woo aid dependent illiberal democracies to democratize. These were nations that depended mostly on foreign aid for survival. Therefore, its withdrawal
led to economic hardship to the citizens. On the other hand, sanctions on political leaders or a nation makes it impoverished, which automatically encounters a serious economic downturn with its attendant hardship. In this respect, basic need were unavailable, engenders inflation, led to high exchange rates, and low per capita income emanated from poor economic performance.

1.15. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This research consists of four chapters:

- The first chapter consists of the background, statement of the problem; objective of the study; methodology; theoretical framework and literature review. Indeed, the preference for the 1992-2000 was that, the 1992 election was a transitional election, whilst the other elections, especially the 1996 elections brought Ghana’s national election to the brinks of consolidation of democracy, and the 2000 elections consolidated democracy in Ghana’s fourth republic.

- Chapter two was on democracy promotion. This included review of literature on democracy promotion and demotion debate; strategies for democracy promotion; foreign policies employed in democracy promotion; merits and demerits of democracy promotion; and US versus European Union democracy assistance approach.

- The chapter three constituted data processing; data presentation and data analysis of the thesis. That was a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the study.

- The final chapter incorporates summary of the study, conclusions and recommendations of the study.
1.16. CONCLUSION

The notion is that all elections globally require the funding of politics. This is ascertainable through public funding, contribution from firms, members of political parties and in transitional democracy international assistance. A more independent, neutral, non-partisan and impartial electoral commission must exist. A systemic prevalence of an electoral system, voter turnout is equally significant. The strand plays a paramount role in educating the electorates on the electoral process and procedures, and for political canvassing by politicians. The right of representation is important as well, constituency demarcation aid in credible election. The judiciary resolve election conflicts peacefully and quickly, the security force protects and prevents insecurity. In transitional democracies, democracy assistance in the electoral cycle approach is given to the EC, political parties, mass media, CSOs, the judiciary, parliament and the security sector to foster; strengthen and consolidate democracy.

However, no-one has written about the correlation between democracy assistance to the EC and its auxiliary institutions and elections in Ghana, this is where my research is situated. In the above literature, it is evident that all these scholars have written extensively on donor support. However, they have left out the effects of donor support and elections in Ghana. In addition, most of the authorities looked at the short-term Election Day activities whilst at the same time neglecting the pre-elections events and post-election activities of all the above sectors outlined. This thesis seeks to add these relegated areas to the studies. I will explore/ investigate/ assess the impact of donor assistance (support) and elections in Ghana. A case of Ghana’s Fourth Republic (1992-2000).
CHAPTER TWO

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

2.0. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the researcher looks at the components of democracy enlargement globally. These encompass issues such as whether democracy should be promoted or demoted, and its merits and demerits. Additionally, The chapter discussed two forms of democracy practiced globally (the minimalist and substantive democracy), the third wave of democracy spread and factors responsible for democratization globally was equally taken into cognizance of domestic and external causes. It also outlined the modalities of democracy promotion, methods of democracy promotion and strategic approaches of democracy assistance in fledgling democracies. Indeed, in this chapter, democracy promotion was a precursor and democracy assistance is the successor as discussed in chapter two, it was only when democracy was promoted coupled with democracy assistance that elections was held to usher in electoral democracy and its subsequent democracy consolidation.

Here, in the literature of democracy are these factors democracy promotion and democracy assistance are different. Democracy promotion meant strategies employed by interventionists to spread democracy globally in the 21st century. However, democracy assistance or donor support in the electoral cycle approach was assisted to the various institutions engaged in elections to make them much more capacitated to perform creditably. The former preceded the latter; however, democracy assistance was a subset of democracy promotion.
2.1. DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND ITS DEMOTION DEBATE

The adherents of democracy promotion argue that, democracy should be promoted because of its geopolitical realms’ underpinnings and the benefits it accrued to global politics. It fosters perennial national security interest between and amongst democratic nations. For example, democracy helped build Alliance in Europe and Asia to counter rogue nations and other autocratic leaders. This phenomenon has reduced the menace of security threats to democracies. It equally fosters geopolitics and development cooperation among and between like-minded states. Furthermore, the role of democratic institutions; citizen’s participation; and the responsibility of governance restrained prospective danger from enemies. For instance, the operations of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Gaza were mitigated because of the democratic activities in such states and its proximity to other countries. In addition, it increased regime legitimacy; diminish anti-systemic groups such Al-Qaeda; the genocide in Rwanda; intrastate conflicts; and war crimes committed against humanity in Liberia, Somalia and Sierra Leone in Africa (Fukuyama and McFaul, 2007:24-25; Fukuyama and McFaul, 2004). Moreover, in the short-run, democracy promotion boost internal stability within democratic countries; reduces interstate conflicts; reduces the demand for weapons of mass destruction; weaponry; and the balance of power globally (Fukuyama and McFaul, 2008:1-5; 2007:24-26; McFaul 2004:147-160).

2.1.1. The Dangers of Democracy Promotion.

In the short-term, democracy promotion causes instability; the development of democratic institutions failed to establish stable governments; and a growing economy. Its consequences were the eruption of insurgence as exemplified in the Taliban activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Korean Peninsula and Libya recently. Democracy promotion stymied
democratic governance; the effectiveness of state or the consolidation of democracy. Resultantly, democracy promoters are unsecured and unsafe in the Gulf States, specifically Washington, Britain and its allies in the war against terrorism. This zest for democracy promotion has heightened tension and soured the relationship between US-Egypt relationships during the W. George Bush’s administration (Fukuyama & McFaul 2008).

That notwithstanding, the practice of promoting democracy has its domestic merits.

2.1.2. Internal merits of democracy promotion

First, it provided an institutional form for both vertical accountability and horizontal accountability to the citizenry. Secondly, competition for popular support to retain power or ouster an existing government makes governments open to the inclination of the governed. Thirdly, democratic institutions eschew abusive governments or rulers; countervailed bad governments and gave corridors to ouster corrupt and ineffective rulers. Fourthly, competition between competing leaders; ideas; and organizations produces better leaders; ideas and organizations which served as a bastion for bridging the foreign policy divide projects of states (McFaul 2007:1-5;26;147-160).

Not all, democracies establish stability and welfare of the populace of any nation than autocratic regimes (Carothers, 2004). It circumvents the worst threat to personal welfare, for example, genocide and famine. It protects the emancipation for property ownership thus causing economic growth and development than authoritarian regimes. Again, its vitality was that, it protected and provided political freedom and steady economic prosperity. Finally, from international public opinion, democracy is a demanded form of government and is an appeled form of government universally than repressive or illiberal
democracies (Fukuyama & McFaul 2007:1-26). That notwithstanding, exponents of
democracy promotion have rebutted it critically in their literature on nuance philosophical
background.

2.1.3. The Demotion of Democracy.

Democracy sceptics have assigned several reasons for its demotion. The first rationale was
on normative factors. These authorities perceived democracy as a culturally spread
doctrine, but not a universal good, in other words, it was not a preferable goal for all
cultures. Postmodernist and relativists opined that, it was not a universal valid political or
institutional order because, it is impossible to produce a philosophical certainty of
democracy and its promotion was contingent on cultural background. In addition,
democracy is culturally rooted and societies with diversity of cultural heritage have a right
to select other forms of government they wanted undeterred (Huntington 1968, 1996,

democracy may be good for America and other Western European nations that are
Christian oriented communities because it emanated from Christianity, which upheld the
“doctrine of universal dignity of man made in God's image” (Fukuyama and McFaul
2007:27). Arguably, scholars such as Tocqueville to Nietzsche observed, democracy as a
secularization of western values (Fukuyama &McFaul, 2007:27). They noted that, every
civilization with other cultures can practice other forms of government, for example, China
and some East Asian leaders and thinkers argued on their abstinence to practice democracy
premised on their cultural variations (Fukuyama &McFaul, 2007). Again, the assumption
that, human rights and democratic institutions are universal is misleading. Tocqueville cited in (Fukuyama & McFaul, 2007) noted that, human equality is experiencing an enlargement:

“Providentially from the previous 800 years, and encompasses beyond the western culturally Christian norms to places such as India, Japan, Korea and South Africa” (Tocqueville, cited in Fukuyama & McFaul, 2007).

In the opinion of international realist, the world order is dependent on states acceptance of the Treaty of “Westphalia consensus for the respect of national sovereignty and mutual pact to evade meddling into domestic affairs of other nation’s sovereignty”. It therefore implies that, territorial non-interference in each nation’s affair was a precondition in geopolitics. Kissinger (1973, 1996) postulated that, this unrealistic concern with domestic character of other governments leads to a “Messianic crusade which in the long-term provokes resistance and undermines world order” (Kissinger, 1996). For example, Tsar Alexander I, delayed the deterioration of Europe initiated by the French revolution was vivid in the minds of scholars’ literature. Indeed, global peace, order, and stability reigned from 1815 to 1845 because of the efforts of the “arch-conservative Metternich” to promote a balance of power in Europe irrespective of ideological anxieties (Kissinger, 1996).

In furtherance, the absolute pursue of democracy promotion; human rights; political reformation and elections in the Middle East have succeeded in fostering power blocs there. For example, Hamas activities in Palestine and Hezbollah operations in Lebanon and
the work of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, of which all are illiberal associations and hostile to democracy promotion in the Persian Gulf Peninsular (Kissinger, 1996).

Another argument in the literature against democracy promotion is the progression of democratic transformation; election; state building and the establishment of the rule of law and democracy in political development (Carothers 2007:4-7). State building and the creation of the rule of law are crucial for economic development and democracy fostering. Snyder and Mansfield (2007; Snyder 2000) noted that, democratization’s initial phase poses special challenges of promoting nationalism and illiberal politics. Huntington (1968, 1996) and Zakaria (2003) are of the verdict that, US foreign policies should concentrate on broader domestic governance agenda and postpone or delay democracy promotion until it attains a heightened economic growth and development. Not all, external pressure for democracy have unsuccessfully created the emergence of democratic political parties, but lacked of the same groups responsible for conflicts and failed states. This amounts to a return of authoritarian leaders who are corrupt, incompetent and self-serving as in Asia, Russia and Africa. It is noteworthy that, democratization in the 21st century was championed through three key models, such as coercive models, positive models and public diplomacy.

Youngs (2008:1-2, 2001:17-45) termed such foreign policy measures as positive incentive engagement and partnership, punitive, diplomatic pressure, and forceful or coercive democratization. This form of democracy promotion and assistance served as an incentive for political liberalization. The EU rose substantially to authoritarian governments and semi-authoritarian regimes, however, little efforts were made to tie aid allocation to
democratic reforms in the 1970s and the 1980s. Coercive measures were military intervention and sanctions. Economic Cooperation provided aid, for example, to Turkey, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro’s accession to the EU as benchmarks for entry. Whether democracy should be promoted or demoted in the debate, it is obvious from above that both philosophers of the debate arrived at a consensus. They accept it enlargement but based on socio-cultural heritages of each nation (Youngs, 2008:11, 2003, 2001:41-53).

2.1.4. United States of America’s Foreign Policy.

The United States of America’s foreign policy on democracy promotion dates back to the 1960s. This policy was adopted first by the Kennedy Cooper Resolution of 1959 to initiate the development needs of developing nations globally, such as social and economic development programs, this initiative established the USAID and the Peace Corps based on the modernization theory. The agency shaped government institutions in developing states, strengthen public administration of decolonized nations; budgeting; project developments; personnel management; organizational issues and to enhance governments financial capacities (Carothers, 2007).

In 1961, the “Alliance for Progress” foreign policy was set up to champion the cause of diplomatic assistance to temperate civilian reforms against repressive military governments globally as an anti-Communist policy directive. Subsequently, Title IX was introduced under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a legislative directive to USAID. Its aim was economic development to democratic private and local government institutions. However, Title IX was a failure on two accounts of assisting democratic institutions; ensured greater participation in economic development rather than democracy promotion as intended; as a
result. The USAID desisted from political operations due to international laws on sovereignty. Other goals of Title IX were socio-economic development projects such as health; agriculture; education; and housing projects. Nevertheless, this effort never led to Aid programs designed for democracy promotion globally. Title IX was amended by a Congressional enactment in 1978 of section 116(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act to expand USAID’s scope of operations to cover human rights; legal aid outfits; civic education; legal education; citizens’ voluntary participation in diverse social, economic and cultural activities with the mind-set that, such activities were benign contributors to development (Carothers, 2007,2009).

Again, assistance was given to Labour Unions strengthening, for example US assistance to the American Federation of Labour Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) to undermine leftist regimes and their activities, CIA covert funding of the military and insurgent groups to topple the leftist government and elections manipulations (Carothers 1999:19-29). Returning to the basics, both the Nixon and Carter Administration focused primarily on human rights and needs; basic needs services such as food, shelter and medicine. On human rights, issues like the violation of rights, torture, political murder and repression. This foreign policy made the USA a meddler in the domestic affairs of other nations. The administration also aided free and fair elections, for example, in the Dominican Republic in 1973, this contributed to democratic reforms in Latin America. The Helsinki process concentrated on human rights issues, scrutinizing the erstwhile Soviet Union’s records which extinct communism in the 1970s. The new wave in the 1980s
focused on the democratization to contain communism entirely as a Foreign Policy of the Ronald Reagan administration in Latin America and Asia (Carothers, 2007,2009).

In 1981, the US government as a foreign policy initiative launched the “Project Democracy”. Consequently, they organized international conferences on democracy; exchange programs to expose foreigners to U S democracy; translation programs of books; increased radio broadcast into communist states as a gray propaganda machine. These foreign policies were known as “Public Diplomacy”, it was a cultural outreach program of the arm of the foreign policy bureaucracy of the “U S Information Agency”, and as a result, various private foundations were established to spearhead the course of democracy promotion globally (Carothers, 2007).

In this regard, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was set up akin to the German Foundations, the “Stiftungens” termed as AFL-CIO which championed the course of democratic liberalization in Spain and Portugal in the mid of the1990s as a U S democracy foundation to substitute the U S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support in the 1960s. It was the first democracy assistance initiative of the Reagan Administration. Consequently, NED had a fund of $18 million, NED was officially inaugurated in December 1983 (Ibid: 32). Some Officials holding passion for this public diplomacy concept pronounced for a narrow domestic orientation campaign to garner Americans public support for an administration’s anti-Sandinista, and Pro-Contra policy towards Nicaragua. During that period, the NED’s aggregate budget was $30 million, with several main grantees. These were: the Centre for International Private Enterprise; the American
Centre for International Labour Solidarity; the International Republic Institute; and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs affiliated to the U S Chambers of Commerce; the AFL-CIO; the Republican Party; and the Democratic Party, each of these organizations was an autonomous institution with its own scope of operation (Carothers, 2007).

The Centre for International Private Enterprise fostered free market economic policies externally; the motive was that, such policies mutually reinforced each other for democratization to developing nations premised on the modernization theory as a requisite tool for democracy. The American Centre for International Labour Solidarity assisted the development and strengthened independent Trade Unions overseas with the acknowledgement that independent Unions were influential to democracy. Again, the duo political party Institutes worked on promoting democratic processes overseas, through projects for promoting free and fair elections; strengthen political parties; develop civic education; and strengthened parliaments worldwide within democrats (Carothers, 2007).

In sum and conclusively, NED’s activities were anti-Communist democracy promotion movement. AFL-CIO executed devious programs and values in spurring democracy aimed at containing leftist intellectuals or political activists in Western Europe through labour organizations for lecturers and students in France as a counter propaganda efforts to left wing organizations professors active in universities. The Republican Institute launched an anti-communist program in Europe and Latin America in private enterprise solutions to economic challenges in Portugal that were pro-communist (Carothers, 1999:19-29).
Additionally, there was a crucible of the Central America region. In the mid of the 1980s, democracy assistance became a U S policy towards Latin America and Central America based on Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s earlier article in the 1979 termed as a “Dictatorship and Double Standards?” In this article, he requested the U S to assist anti-communist dictatorship regimes in developing nations, otherwise, they risk losing such countries to totalitarian leftists. In this background, America and the UN created cordial relations with authoritarian anti-communist governments in South America, critiqued by Jimmy Carter as having bad human rights records. In Central America, the Reagan’s administration observed leftist insurgency in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Sandinista, and government in Nicaragua as the Soviet Union sponsored arm bandits to target U S strategic interest (Carothers, 1999).

The U S counter-responded by sponsoring the Salvadorian military opponents to oust the leadership in that nation. This activity spurred democratic reforms in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and other Central American states. In 1993, the Reagan regime congratulated Raul Alfonse on his election triumph in Argentina’s presidential elections, and applauded the democratic course in South America. Apart from the above, democracy promotion efforts were embarked upon by the U S government (Carothers, 1999).

The US government promoted democracy in various regions of the world from the 1980s to the 1990s. The government institution provided assistance on elections; judicial reforms in El Salvador as a key Reagan regime’s foreign policy in Latin America. The regime also provided prominent American Election Observer Mission to observe the Salvadorian
elections funded by the State Department with USAID on balloting, and reported to the government. The agency equally provided computers and voter registration systems to facilitate credible elections in El Salvador (Ibid).

The NED financed on election aid projects in Guatemala and Honduras in 1985; Haiti in 1987; Chile in 1988; Paraguay in 1989; and Nicaragua in 1990, and established the Inter-American Centre for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL), a Latin American organization working to facilitate free and fair elections in the region. NDI intervened in the National command for the No’s campaign to the Philippines’ first election observation project (Carothers, 1999).

In the Asian Peninsular regions, the Reagan regime sponsored democratization in South Korea when President Chun Doohwan was dedicated to political liberalization and credible election. The administration called for a peaceful turnover in South Korea, the release of political prisoners and credible election (Youngs, 2008).

In Africa, especially in South Africa, US government granted an amount of $ 1.5 million annually as grants to NGOs working on civic education; grassroots organizations; right advocacy as well as in Soviet bloc; Sub Saharan Africa; Eastern Europe; Asia and Middle East with the collapse of communism. The George Bush Senior administration and congress Supported Eastern European Democracy (SEED) programs on socio-economic and political issues with a sum of $300 million seasonally. Again, the Freedom Support Act and Defence Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program had an amount of $2 billion per annum about 50% of its aid budget. The Eurasia Foundation was created in
1993, which funded activities in the defunct Soviet Union Asian states with an aggregate amount of $5 million and $10 million as aid and grants (Youngs, 2008).

In Africa, the African Electoral Assistance Fund (AEAF) was set up under USAID in 1992 to assist the continent’s elections was implemented by the African-American Institute, NDI, IRI and the USAID assisted democracy promotion too. In the Middle East in the 1990s, democracy promotion comprised of economic and security interest to both autocratic and semi-authoritarian governments. The New democracy consensus in the US was primarily premised on democracy promotion and democracy assistance that resonated on two confluence of factors: global trend towards democratic reforms; and ending the Cold War was the new priority of thoughts about development (Carothers, 1999:19-29).

2.1.5. European Union Foreign Policy on Democracy Promotion.

The European Union/Commission (EU/C) adopted different foreign policies in their geopolitics in the promotion of democracy globally. The first policy employed in Eastern European countries was the Eastern Neighborhood Policy (ENP). This policy indicated that, for any former Soviet nation or Eastern European state to gain accession to the European Union because of its economic advantage, it must first democratize, and practice all the tenets of democratic governance before it can gain access to the EU/C. Again, the EU/C adopted the East-Mediterranean Policy (EMP) to coax Eastern Mediterranean nation to democratize before accession, and to have access to foreign Aid from the EU/C. In Africa, the Lome Convention IV and the Cotonou Agreement of the African Pacific and Caribbean nations AID and Trade Pact was the cornerstone for gaining access to the
EU/C’s aid. Again, the Barcelona Process was another policy lever in the enlargement of democracy (Youngs 2001, 2003, 2008). These were the precipitating factors to democracy enlargement globally.

In furtherance, based on “The Copenhagen Criteria” Europe has promoted democracy in nuance ways. This authority termed it as democracy gained and democracy lost (Burnell 2006:1-3). Europe consciously applied democracy conditionality’s in both post-communist states, Central and Eastern Europe to democratize. The core area of assistance was the rule of law; Civil Society Organizations/Civil Society Institutions (CSOs/CSIs), and accountability of governance. He identified typologies of democracy promotion and its subset democracy assistance as Active and Passive democracy assistance; Direct and Indirect promotion; and, Active and Passive activities pursued democracy promotion and democracy assistance, which have both by the EU/C respectively (Ibid:3).

The active senses of democracy promotion were deliberate activities pursued to achieve a democratic goal. In the passive realm, it implies the degree of democratic development and the prospects of emerging democracies. He examined whether exogenous forces and external events influence such trends. To this scholar, an interconnectivity was a cornerstone to the active sense of democracy promotion, whilst “Snowball effect” was a primacy in the passive sense pursued by the EU/C in their democracy promotion agenda (Burnell 2006:4-5). This authority distinguished between direct democracy promotion and indirect strategies employed by the EU/C to promote democracy. Direct democracy promotion entails political strategies aimed at direct political objectives. The indirect approach has a general objective of democracy promotion through mediated channels. The
indirect approaches of providing aid were economic and social development, economic liberalization or “marketization”. The active direct approach employs influence and persuasion, otherwise termed as social learning or soft power; a form of pressure such as drifting from engagement to diplomatic dialogue with diplomatic pressure; threats or negative economic and financial conditionality’s and penalties for non-compliance (sanctions); leverage (hard power) physical coercion, these methods were applied in combination or in isolation (Burnell 2006:4). He noted that, democracy assistance is a direct way of democracy promotion, for example, political; technical; financial and other forms of assistance for democratic progress. This in his verdict is termed as linkage as noted by Levitsky and Way cited in (Burnell, 2006: 4). Other considerable factors were Perverse Assistance and Perverse Promotion. Perverse promotion is well-intended but misguided and unproductive or counterproductive democracy promotion. Perverse assistance is ill judged, technically flawed, badly planned or poorly executed, for example, International election observation measures elections premised on free and fair. Perverse assistance is assistance to institutions without cognizance in the domestic context of their effective functionality (Burnell, 2004:3).

2.1.6. The Third Wave: Democratization in the 21st Century

The third wave of democratization in the 21st century emerged with its genesis from southern Europe, such as Spain, Greece and Portugal in the 1970s, and extended to other developing nations in the 1980s. This wave swept across Latin America, Eastern Europe, and beyond to Asia and Africa. These reformations of governments were enviably commendable (Huntington 1991, Fukuyama 1989,).
Quantitatively, in 1974, the aggregate democracies were 41 amongst 150 existing states, by 2003, almost three fifth of the world’s nations were formal democracies, irrespective of their imperfection (Diamond 2006). Democracy enlargement did not emanate from an empty vacuum certain factors precipitated its spread.

2.1.7. Factors responsible for the spread of the third wave of democratization.

From the academic literature, democracy expanded due to the modernization and agency theory. Mainstream scholars of the 1960s and 1970s underpinned the modernization factors as the causal factors of democratization. They buttressed that, democracy emerged in nations with social progressiveness like the provision of social welfare, social infrastructure and class formations; economic and commercial development and growth. Others have outlined cultural variables such as: religious; and historical legacies as the brain behind the ubiquitousness of democracy. The structuralist and modernization approach of democratization comprehended the emergence of democracy as an upshot of the formation of social structures: the wealthy; economic development; rising urban drift and settlement as the conditions that engendered democratic expansion (Lipset 1959, Almond and Verba 1963, Moore 1966, O’Donnell 1979, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).

Moreover, the third wave exponent of democratization challenged the proponents of modernization and agency theorists of the preconditions for democracy enlargement. However, the modernization proponents cited democratization in the Asian continent, such as Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Chile in Latin America as examples. Democratic reforms in other parts of the world plied on the road of liberalization premised on low level of economic development and other social factors for democratization in the 21st century
without taxing on modernization and agency path. Several nations were in the bottom third of the Human Development Index. Again, the third wave has broken the myth of the cultural debate which stipulates that, democracy was incompatible with any religious faith and values. The only region in the world that remained undemocratic were selected nations in the Persian Gulf states (Rakner et al 2007a, 2007b). Not all, cynics espoused the inherent weaknesses in the agency theory to democratization in the annals of scholarly literature.

The weaknesses of the agency approach are its overemphasis on contingent preference that led to “excessive voluntarism” and the “assumption” that actors were autonomous of any political, economic and social strata or historical context. However, cognizance of the structural dominant was paramount in espousing individual choices, relative negotiation and the differences of interests over time. The concentration of agents and processes was influential during the nascent phase of democracy promotion (Rakner et al 2007a, 2007b).

In a related development, from the 1990s, attempts were arrived at blending the structural and agency theory as unified factors that spurred transition to democracy (Rakner et al 2007, Huntington 1991, Bratton and Van De Walle 1994). These hybrid regimes were considered as consolidated democracies with a functioning government, paradoxically, others were enmeshed with:

“Precarious middle ground between outright authoritarianism and full-fledged democracies, and others are partially or reversals to authoritarianism” (Rakner et al 2007).
Several emerging democracies were classified as, “illiberal”; “delegative”; and *hybrid regimes*”; respectively (Zakaria, 1997; O'Donnell, 1996; and Diamond, 2002).

Again, other constituents of the incomprehensible system were mixed with a “*rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy*” coupled with the existence of democratic institutions, granting of civil liberties, and political rights with delegative characteristics (Ottaway 2003). The inherent problems diplomats and scholars grapple with was the dilemma in the “*gray zone*” of “*feckless electoralism*” democratic governments encounter in the transitional phase.

The first was political participation and government accountability. Such regimes are characterized by populist politics, with illiberal leaders engaged into gloomy policy-decision-formulation processes, mostly a small number of the political elites (Technical Team). Its outcome was the marginalization of political participation, electoral malpractices; poor government accountability has led to public dissatisfaction of the output of democracy, its delivery and achievement through formal and informal institutions (Rakner et al 2007:34-43).

Secondly, the rule of democracy opined that, competition was a precondition, coupled with the coexistence of both formal and informal institutions complementarily. These rules were formal normative standards that facilitated political interaction, make political actions transparent, predictable, and the equitable application guaranteed. However, informal neo-patrimonial networks set up by state authorities pave way for corruption, whilst Anti-Graft
institutions were manipulated to the whims and caprices of political leaders with great impunity (O'Donnell 1996).

Thirdly, popular expectations and state capacity was fragile. These states were impeded by the absence of institutions and administrative capacity to satisfy the rising demand for the development and the improvement of the service sectors; enhancement of accountability; and an inclusive decision formulation process as a propelling lever of democracy. Its outcome was disillusioned with the potential of destabilization of the state. As an example, several elections held in Latin America in 2006 were characterized by this disillusionment, which led to incomplete democracy, with a re-emergence of populist officials (Rakner et al 2007b).

Finally, elite reversal of democracy to authoritarianism was experienced; political elites rather than public impatience motivated this reversal. Most of these democracies attempted or succeeded in amending the tenure of office term imposed on them by the statute in the 1990s. For example, in Russia, elites solicited citizenry consents for the reversal of democracy, same in Kenya and Nigeria under Moi and Obasanjo. Democracy reversal was the result of state fragility and incapacity. In such states, citizens associate democratization with anarchy; rancorous and acrimony (Youngs, 2008).
2.1.8. External Factors to democracy Promotion: The Role of the External Community’s influence.

The major external causes of democracy promotion, and the transition to democracy concentrated on the domestic dynamics of reforms, but neglects the role played by external actors, and their leverage on the transition to democracy in emerging democracies. In the third wave of democratization, external governments and institutions, actions influenced the spur of democracy, especially the role of the Catholic Church in Spain, Greece and Portugal (Huntington 1991, Fukuyama 1989). For example, the establishment of democracy of the erstwhile Eastern European nations of Communism gained entrance to the European Union because of the economic benefits they derived from the European Union. Again, Mickael Gorbachev’s policies of Perestroika and Glasnost inevitably engendered the extermination of communism, and the end of the cold war politics were contributing factors which initiated democratic reforms in Eastern European nations of the defunct Soviet Union (Youngs n.d).

Furthermore, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Washington and European nations, especially the European Union’s (EU’s) diplomatic and economic pressure significantly brought about the transition to democracy of numerous states globally such as Bolivia, El Salvador, Kenya, Korea, Nigeria and Ghana. These complementary roles of coercive, positive, and diplomatic pressure were indeed responsible for democratic transition in Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Gulf States. Transitions to democracy were the outcome of both domestic policy players and external pressure motivated by the international community, especially the withholding of aid, grants and loans from illiberal regimes was the clarion call for democratization globally in the 1990s (Youngs, n.d).
Moreover, the international community’s intervention was driven by multiple motives: foreign policy; geopolitics, and development policies. Even though external partners sought to democratize their development partners, they played a double standard by assisting illiberal authoritarian regimes elsewhere. For example, Egypt, Pakistan, DR Congo, and permitted restricted democratic progress in Vietnam. The international community never favored democratization in Non-DAC donors such China, Russia and Saudi Arabia (Youngs, n.d).

Besides, such deliberate conditionality’s, the snowball effect, otherwise termed as the diffusion effect or the contagion effect played a benign role in the democratization process. Observation in Eastern Europe and Latin America are vivid examples. Geographical proximity triggered the ushering in of the transition to democracy premised on Georegional nearness or spill over effects of adjacent countries. The justifiable rationale for regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Organization of American states (OAS) acted as a medium of positive political reformations in their respective regions. In Africa, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was an ample example of such democratization motive initiated as a continental pressure body to democratization progress of member states participation towards achieving a mutually consensual goal to political liberalization, democratization and political governance (Ibid).

In furtherance, there were serious interactions between internal and external actors that spurred democracy. A distinction between Western Influence such as diplomatic influence; aid dependency; political conditionality; coercive (military) intervention; and the density of
countries relationship to the developed countries engendered democratization were interconnected reasons. For example, Washington, EU cum western multilateral institutions were forced to reckon with in the democratization agenda (Levitsky and Way 2005 cited in Fukuyama and McFaul, 2008). The leverage employed were coercive, whilst linkage was a form of soft power, which were termed as coercive (punishment or stick) and soft power as positive or reward (Youngs 2003, 2008). This authority opined that,

"The mechanism of leverage... [Are] by themselves rarely sufficient to democratize... [Hybrid regimes]. Instead, subtle and diffused effects of linkage contributed... more consistently to democratization" (Youngs 2008, 2003).

This interconnectivity led domestic actors with core incentives to democratization and relationship to the external community were crucial in the struggle for political reforms globally (Youngs 2003, 2008).

In a related development, some states applied a duo mixture of the leverage and linkage to the international community for political reforms. Leverage was an easier factor for the external community to manipulate than linkage in the short-term. The linkage was a structural variable, a product of geographic proximity; colonial and historical factors; Geo-strategic alliance; and the long-term process of socioeconomic integration spurred democracy promotion in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Indeed, all SSA was impoverished and aid dependent, and consequently, leverage played a key role efficiently and effectively towards democratization than linkage. Paradoxically, in Central Europe and Latin
America, linkage to the west by virtue of proximity to Europe and America promoted democracy there (Youngs, 2003, 2008).

Again, one neglected, but significant in the literature of democracy promotion was the assumption of the poor state condition of state fragility. The perception was that the transition to democracy in the third wave of democratization was constructed on a sound foundation of consistency, and a functioning state. Several states were stuck in the incomplete democratization process were not democratizing, but also seriously grappled with state reconstruction of a functioning state. External democracy promotion considered the possibility of reconstructing a functioning state as an integral part of the democratization process, yet assuming that democracy promotion and state building were the same. On the paradox, the “conflation” of democracy promotion and state building neglected these inherent challenges. State construction demands the strengthening of state institutions; solidifying them and centralizing state power; whilst democracy promotion requires substantial delegation/devolution of state power. One key challenge encountered by the donor was how to bridge the gap between assistance programs directed at promoting democracy and those aimed at fostering effective state, and socioeconomic development (Carothers, 2002).


In Africa, political liberalization was caused by some confluences of factors, such as the spread of national conferences was one of the models of democratic transition; and the coalition of leaders across all sectors of society to advocate for democratization was another. For example, elders and leaders of women groups in society; ethnic and religious
organization demonstrations and advocacy role; labour unions boycotts and symposiums; student activism culminating from subsidy withdrawals on school fees and facilities championed the course of democratic reforms, and, finally, ruling party and opposition demand for political reforms led to democratization in the continent (Schraeder 2005:23-24).

2.2. MODALITIES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION.

The promotion of democracy operated through three models. These were the coercive model, positive models and diplomatic pressure. Youngs (n.d:2-8; Fukuyama and McFaul 2006.2007:41-43) noted that, these models were equally termed as a stick and carrot in the literature of democracy promotion.

Even though the US has strategic and moral interest in democracy enlargement, the US cannot expand democracy alone, and this meant the US required other actors in that respect. Domestic factor, not external pressure championed the cause of democratization in several states in the millennium. Resultantly, like the case of Iraq, democratization should be promoted naturally. It is, however, incumbent to realize that US policies were significant in democratic development. The employment of coercive diplomacy (Army) has been rarely the best in regime change, it was an ineffective tool for democratic development, and it created the impression that democracies were warmongers as in the case of Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. The best measure was the use of peaceful diplomatic mechanisms such as the carrot to promote democracy abroad by altering the balance of power between democracies and illiberal regimes, only when there are
evidential proofs of progress towards democratization and liberal institutional building (Fukuyama and McFaul 2007:8-9).

Additionally, the last modality was the use of positive (carrot or incentives). Under this condition, rewards such as: aid, loans, grants, development projects and programs used to promote democracy was regarded as the best model, effective and a sustainable strategy of transforming the balance between pro-democracy forces and autocratic leaders. This is better only when there were progresses towards democracy, and the building of liberal institutions in the states can democracy flourish, a model mostly employed by the European Union/Commission (Youngs 2003, 2008).

2.3. STRATEGIC APPROACHES OF DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: US VERSUS EU APPROACHES OF DELIVERY.

2.3.1. The Political Approach by Washington.

There are two types of democracy promotion, strategic approaches pursued in democracy promotion between Washington and the European Union/Commission; they are the political approach and the developmental approach, respectively. These approaches are compared based on multifaceted levels, such as the value put on democracy; the conceptualization of democracy and democratization; the degree of preference placed on democracy; and the method of democracy promotion. Amongst other things, there were however, the weaknesses associated with each approach, at the same time similarities and differences between the approaches.
Democracy deserves promotion above all positive political values. Its promotion entails granting both respect for basic political rights; civil liberties; and a political dignified principle. These are the rationale behind its promotion in the political approach. In their conviction, promoting democracy contributes to social and economic development rooted in the adage “all good things go together” (Carothers 2007).

Additionally, the concept of democracy is the focus. These are anchored on the Huntingtonian minimalist conception of democracy. It buttresses on the significance of true competitive elections; respect for political rights and civil rights that enhance participation in the democratic political process, institutional features; an independent judiciary; vibrant and efficient legislature; free and independent media that is crucial to democracy (Carothers, 2007).

Furthermore, the conception of democratization comes to mind. Democratization is a process of political struggle in which political activist identifies democratic contents with autocratic forces. However, democratization became victorious and declined when political activists withdraw. This concept goes through a “juncture”, breakthrough, reversals, crisis and resolutions. Democracy is often promoted through some methods (Carothers, 2007).

The political approach supports pro-democracy activists against authoritarian regimes. This direct pursuit is in the training, advisory; moral support; funding political activists; Civil Society Organization in advocacy; political parties; politicians and like-minded Non-governmental Organizations. Indirectly, democracy promoters support key institutions: independent Electoral Commission; an independent judiciary; independent and free media,
for example the development of free level field by securing and guaranteeing fair procedures for domestic actors; and countervailing the powers of undemocratic actors (Carothers, 2007, 2009).

Not all, challenging host nation’s government was a major concentration of the international community. In authoritarian environment, exogenous actors support political dissidents; exile opposition groups; and embark upon offshore political broadcasting into host nations. In semi-authoritarian settings, political campaign training for a coalition of opposition parties contesting against an entrenched incumbent autocrat in the impending national election was championed. Such pro-democracy assistance to the opposition were often mixed with support to active Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) operating to mobilize citizens to participate in upcoming elections, cum support to the fourth estate of the realm to broaden access to political information was earmarked. In other countries, however, intervention goes to strengthen all sectors of troubled democratic processes. In countries emerging from conflicts, democracy promotion was lent to domestic and external actors that facilitated to state reconstruction of domestic politics, aiding all progressive political parties and party system to be more institutionalized, assisting Electoral Commissions (ECs); and sponsoring civic education programs was executed (Carothers 2006).

2.3.2. The Developmental Approach by the European Union/Commission

The proponents of the development approach promoted democracy based on their belief in the basic tenets of: democratic governance; transparency; accountability; responsiveness that are constituent contributors to socioeconomic development broadly. Adherents value
democracy as a contributing process of democratic development. In their verdict, they accept democracy as valuable in its own merits for political standards that protect, but also serve as secondary of the developmental reasons. They assert that, if emerging democracy is capable of sustainable progress in socioeconomic realms divorced from democracy promotion, citizens will inevitably struggle for democracy; however, there are gross limitations on democratic liberalization (Youngs 2003, 2008).

Additionally, the conception of democracy is next. The EU assists beyond exclusive political perspective of democracy to a comprehensive sector entailing socioeconomic reasons. They concentrate above political procedures to key outcomes like equality; welfare and justice sector development. Their main concentrations are on, economic and social rights, which they see as more consequential than political and civil liberties (Carothers, 2007,2009).

Finally, the concept of democratization comes to focus. This approach envisage democratization as sluggish, a more iterative process, with a long-term measurement characterized by a gradual accumulation of minuscule dividends. Democratization in this philosophy meanders in a “double helix of causality” with socioeconomic development, akin to the accomplishment of the basic canons of democratic governance that contributes to socioeconomic gains immensely to democratization. Developmental proponents believe in the “sequencing” to eliminate the complex causal factors”. They ponder on the preparedness of some countries to democratize. It was held amongst development providers that, it is best to accomplish certain measures of socioeconomic development
cum effective state building and the rule of law before embarking on the road of democratization (Carothers, 2007).

2.3.3. Methods of Democracy Promotion.

In this form of assistance, democracy was promoted based in the belief that socioeconomic development was a means of democracy assistance. Additionally, interveners’ attention was paid to political institution; corruption; state capacity building; good governance in the technocratic field in an apolitical manner; institutional building; political contestation and openness. They stress on building partnership with the grassroots people; and champion activities that are politically confrontational or too political. They assist CSOs in development; local-level development projects geared towards resolving social and economic challenges; whiles relegating national level political advocacy or vigilante work to CSOs (Carothers, 2006).

Aid interveners often related their operations on democracy; human rights; and couch their operations of democracy assistance into sub-divisions of human right work. Their concentration if often on human rights was anchored on the universal statute than democracy. Reasonably, it was intended to defend themselves against breach of international treaty on state sovereignty, non-interference and non-interventionism. Human right aid was a conduit for integrating the political, social and economics through parallel classification of political and civil liberties. The strength of each approach was outlined in the next paragraph (Carothers 2006, Youngs 2008).
2.3.4. Strength of the Political Approach of Democracy Promotion.

Moreover, democracy assistance community lent their attention to the realm of political competition; institutional framework for competition; political freedom; capacitating domestic and exogenous actors engaged in democracy advancement. Indeed, this domain was cardinal to democratic progress in several states. For example, power holders redirect outside attention by politically reforming in other areas such as socioeconomic development. These motivated and encouraged democracy interventionist to source out and respond to critical stages. Under such circumstance, the approach assists democracy, communities to find mechanistic roles to support the organizational bases of democratic institutions for broader civic activists to halt manipulation of elections. That notwithstanding, there are inherent weaknesses associated with these approaches (Carothers, 2007).

2.3.5. Weaknesses of the Political Approach.

In some contextual perspective, concentration on political competition was inadequate, disincentive and limited. Fledgling democracies have managed to achieve liberalization and credible political competition, but remained stuck in patterns of weak representation, and continual disconnection of the citizenry from the political system. This narrow focus on the basic institutions of political competition, narrows aid providers’ should search for means of broadening inclusion, representation and participation (Op.cit).

Furthermore, attentiveness to junctures was inconsequential and not a “reflexive basis”. These approaches encourage short-term and intermittent support whiles neglecting the
needs in many commitments to assist long-term sustainable processes of political alteration. In a much broader perspective, exponents of the political approach opined that, if pursued in this confrontation and partisan manner, it could incite serious setbacks and lose access. Though the approach was good, some providers of democracy promotion asserts that rejection from authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes are inevitable and remark that, democracy promotion was progressive (Ibid).


The over emphasis on this snail-pace reforms and less on the political sector permits democracy interventionists any entry into serious, restrictive political conditions where the opposite approach provided a closed door. Under some domestic context, some progressive signs of reform dynamics availed, the long-term direction of fundamental to the developmental approach encouraged substantial involvement needed for reforms in several sectors such as the rule of law development, where the short-run efforts seldom yield outcome. Finally, pursuing a broader participation of democracy, the developmental approach opened the corridor to the identification of growth useful and a linkage between economic and social change, and political transformation (Carothers, 2007).

Not all, exponents postulated that the developmental approach brought democracy promotion programs that are indirectly unproductive. These programs allow democracy promoters to the conviction that democracy assistance was geared towards aiding burnish the spacious reformist credentials of the entrenched strong men”. This developmental approach like any other approach has its inherent weaknesses of democracy assistance to transitional democracies (Carothers, 2007).
2.3.7. Weaknesses of the Developmental Approach.

Penultimate, the developmental approach allows democracy interveners to justify a “grab bag” of assistance programs by rationalizing that they contribute to democratization without actively examining the non-assertive activities that evolved in the wider political reforms. It equally encounters ignorance about how and where indirect efforts were concentrated on socioeconomic reforms that bridged all sectors and facilitated or enhanced political pluralism. For example, the rule of law developmentalists has a conviction that, commercial law reforms were motivators of key rule of law standards in the economic realm will spill over into other sectors of legal arena that can generate political reforms. This argument was impressively premised on stages, but not on an experience. It was argued that, it was misleading to uphold one approach; instead, it was prudent to deal concurrently with both approaches. The nuances in these approaches of democracy promotion compared with the political approach (U S A) and the developmental approach (EU) approach was a serious concern (Carothers, 2007).

Ultimately, their difference was contingent on the nuance organizations; government agencies; government funded Non-profit organizations; profit development consulting firms and the private foundations engaged in democracy fostering in the U S and in the EU/C. Washington’s institutional heterogeneity WAs due to several parts of its foreign policies machineries engaged in democracy support. In the EU, actors multiplied because of the quantity of states involved cum the multilateral Pan European players in the EU. These nuances imply no simplified, unified approach in democracy promotion (Carothers, 2007).
2.4. CONCLUSION

In the discussion, these factors discussed are mutually inclusive and reinforced one another in achieving democracy promotion and its associated democratic elections globally. The thesis therefore seeks to assess the impact of donor support and elections in Ghana: The Case of the Fourth Republic from 1992 to 2000 general elections.
CHAPTER THREE
DATA PRESENTATION; ANALYSIS; INTERPRETATIONS; AND DISCUSSIONS OF THE STUDY.

3.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the analytical part of the data collected. It blends both qualitative and quantitative approaches of data analysis of impact of donor assistance and elections in Ghana from 1992-2000. The thesis employed both cross tabulations and discussion altogether.

The objective of the study delved at the forms of donor assistance and election analysis itself. In this discussion, Donor support was the independent variable whilst election was the dependent variable.

3.1. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study explores the following research questions:

(1).How was the impact of electoral assistance to the Electoral Commission of Ghana on the entire national elections from 1992-2000?

(3).How was the impact of the internal Electoral support on elections in Ghana (1992-2000)?

(6) How was the effect of the role of media assistance on these elections?

(7).How was the effect of the role of Civil Society Organizations on these elections?

(8). How was the effect of the role of judiciary reforms on these elections?

(9). How was the effect of the role of political parties assistance on these elections?
3.2. GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

- To assess the impact of electoral assistance on the conduct of general elections in Ghana.

3.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

- To assess the impact of electoral assistance on these general elections.
- To assess the impact of Civil Society Organizations on the national elections in Ghana (1992-2000)
- To investigate the impact of judicial reforms on these general elections.
- To evaluate the impact of media assistance on the elections.
- To examine the impact of political parties assistance for the national elections in Ghana’s fourth republican elections.

3.4. HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY

Electoral assistance significantly consolidated democracy in Ghana’s Fourth Republic.

3.5. FORMS OF DONOR ASSISTANCE AND ELECTIONS IN GHANA.

Assistance to the Electoral Commission (EC) anchored in a wider set of democracy support activities available in the state. They incorporate media freedom, political parties’ development, Civil Society Organization and judicial reforms. These approaches were anchored on the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005, it preludes the earlier version of Aid effectiveness cooperation in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In Ghana, electoral assistance to the EC dates back from 1992. These types of support granted to the nation towards elections were the general improvement of the organizational capacity of the EC; advice on the electoral system; electoral laws and regulation formation; and the setting up of an electoral legal framework. Other forms of assistance were: general inputs to the EC; assistance for the electoral processes and procedures; party and voter registration; balloting, ballot papers and ballot boxes; vote counting; dispute resolution (Inter-Party Advisory Committee, (IPAC); support of election administration; technical training of the EC administrators; voter education; training of party agents; training of local observer Missions; training of electoral journalism (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012).

The total commitments of funds were (¢598,737,077,819); plus 500,000.00 pounds, FF2,000,000.00; $1,000,000.00 Canadian; US$25,000.00; 5 Iveco trucks; 240KVA generator sets; document shredders; PABX equipment, and 13 fax machines in 1992. In 1996, the total Aid commitment to the EC was $121,348,229,899.00 and 500,000.00 pounds. In the 2000 election, direct funds to the EC were US$313,071.08. The indirect funds to the EC for equipment and materials supplied were US$476,248.03 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012).

That notwithstanding, the Government of Ghana’s (GoG) funding of the election were ¢1,655,777,585.93 for 1992. In 1996, her financial commitment for the election was US$11,693,867.11, and in the year 2000 election, the GoG gave US$5,764,227.00 for election management in the nation’s elections. Even though this was unnecessary as it was captured in the literature review, it sought to unravel the contradiction between Gyimah-
Boadi; Jeffries and MAP Consult cited in Crawford on the figures of electoral assistance in the nation.

The major supporters of these elections were: Canada; Netherlands; Italy; Germany (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung); Denmark; United Kingdom; France; Canadian International Development Agency; United States of America; Sweden; The European Union; IFES/USAID; UNDP; Japan, DANIDA; UNDP Trust fund: Netherlands (Presidential Run-off); Switzerland and UKDFID (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2010).

3.6. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA OF RESPONDENTS

3.6.1. Age of Respondents.

The ages of the respondents constituted 12.5% of respondents. Those with the age bracket of 26-35 years had a corresponding percentage of 60.7%. Again, the ages range of 36-45 years percentage of respondents was 23.2%. Not all, the age brackets of those between 46-65 yrs. In percentage was 3.6% of the respondents.

The percentage ratio of respondents was 12.5%; 60.7%; 3.2%; 3.6%. The implication was that the target population of highest respondents was between the ages of (26-45) representing a corresponding percentage of 60.7%, followed by the age between (36-45 years) with a related percentage of 23.2%; (18-25 years), and a correlated value of 12.5% in percentage. The final was those of the age of (46-65 years) with the percentage of 3.6%. These were the active eligible voters’ group of the nation.
3.6.2. Gender of respondents

The gender of respondents comprised of male and female. The percentage of sex distribution of respondents indicated 69.0% of the respondents for male and 31.0% of respondents for female. The implication was that most males responded to the research questions than females of the valid questionnaires administered in the research. The ratio rates in percentages were, 69: %; 31.0%; 0% of the respondents respectively. This implies that more male than female respondents to the questionnaire.

3.6.3. Religion of respondents.

The corresponding respondents in percentages of religions of respondents were Moslems was 46.6%, and Christians are 53.4% respectively. The correlated respondents in ratio terms of percentages were, 46:6%: 53.4% respectively. The implication was that, more Christians than Muslims responded to the questions in the research.

3.6.4. Educational background of respondents.

Additionally, the researcher factored in the educational background of respondents. From statistics in percentages, it is visible that the valid distribution of the respondents was those with higher educational backgrounds. In percentages, tertiary education was 100% of the respondents. The percentage ratios were 100%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that, all the respondents were elites and had a higher understanding of the electoral process and procedures before, during and after the elections in 1992, 1996, and the 2000 election. They could decipher all aspects of the elections, analyze events on elections, and respond to the questions satisfactorily in the questionnaires.
3.6.5. Occupation of respondents

From the statistical figures, the percentages of respondents were 46.3% of the respondents which constituted teachers population, 31.5% of the respondents comprised of security personnel, and 22.2% of the respondents consisting public/civil servants respectively. Their attendant percentage ratios of respondents are 46.3%: 31.5%: 22.2% respectively. The implication was that, the entire cross-section of the population responded to the questionnaires in the research. More teachers responded to the questions than the other occupational groups. In the electoral processes and procedures in Ghana, most of the temporary electoral officials employed by the Electoral Commission were mostly teacher. Therefore, they have in-depth knowledge of the electoral processes and procedures.

3.7. ELECTION: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.

How was the impact of the Government of Ghana's support for international Treatises brought into compliance with national treaties on democracy and election from 1992-2000?

3.7.1. Positive responses of respondents on legal and institutional framework.

The related positive percentage of respondents in 1992 was 35.2%, in 1996, the positive percentage of respondents was 37.0%, and in 2000, the positive percentage of the respondents was 27.8%. In percentage terms, the percentage ratios of respondents were 35.2%:37%: 27% percentage respectively.
If positive, how was the rate of impact of the legal and institutional framework Compliance with international statutes and its enforcement in Ghana’s elections?

The positive percentage of the effect size of very low of the respondents was 100% in 1992, the percentage of very low of the effect size of respondents was 0% in 1996, and, 0% Percentage of very low of the effect size of respondents in the year 2000. The percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect sizes of the respondents were 100%: 0%; 0% of respondents.

The percentage rate of low of the effect size of respondents was 25% in 1992, the respondents’ percentage rate of low of the effect size was 25% in 1996, and the percentage rate of low of the effect size of the respondents in 2000 was 50% respectively. The percentage ratio rate of low of the respondents of the effect sizes was 25%: 25%: 50% in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections respectively.

The average percentage rated effect sizes of respondents in 1992 was 47.8%, the rated average of the effect size in percentage of respondents in 1996 was 43.5%, and that of 2000 respondents in the average percentage of the effect size was 8.7%. The percentage ratios of the average of the effect size of respondents were 47.8%:43.5%:8.7% for the years 1992, 1996, and 2000 election respectively.

The percentage rated effect sizes of high score size was 13.8% of respondents in 1992, 40.9% of respondents in 1996, and 45.5% of respondents rated high effect size in 2000 election respectively. The high percentage ratios rated effect size were 13.8%:40.9%: 45.5% of the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections respectively.
The very high percentage effect size of the respondents in 1992 was 35.2%; 37.0% of respondents’ rate of the very high effect size in 1996, and 27.8% of respondents rated very high effect size in the 2000 election. The ratios of the very high percentage rate of the effect size in 1992; 1996 and 2000 election of the respondents were 35.2%:37.0%:27.8% respectively.

The implications were that in 1992 the rate of the effect size was very low consisting of 100% respondents. In rating low, the year 2000 had both high and very high respondents with a par in the 1992, and the 1996 election The average effect sizes rate in 1992 was the highest, followed by 1996, and 2000. It meant that, the rate was average. At the rate of high, 2000 was higher, followed by 1996, and 1992.

**Qualitative Effects:** Fundamentally, inalienable human rights emanated from Cicero’s idea which emphasized that human rights are natural creation, and not from the state, they existed independently and post-dated and founded on naturally created law; their basis was on morality; commonly located to, and in men; universal; everlasting; and above all unchangeable. Natural was derived from nature’s gift to men and must never be created or recreated by men. Ultimately, therefore, any human law that is in contravention of these rights with natural law, the human law is null and void (Oquaye, 1995a).

The reasons for these disparities in responses were that, the above electoral tenet mentioned were non-existent or minimally enforced: the media, which was the state’s radio and TV station was manipulated by the ruling government relative to the legal and institutional framework’s compliance with international treatises and its enforcements.
Furthermore, freedom of association and assemblage was minimal applied; judicial independence was questionable; civic rights and liberties was denied; and the authoritarian remnants of the ruling government extended throughout until in 1996 and 2000 whereby political consciousness arose and eventually paved way for compulsory electoral transformation (Interviews, 2012).

However, the Electoral Management Bodies undertook successive improvements after the 1992 flawed elections. Additionally, more assistance was gained from the international community in Ghana to improve upon her transitional and fledgling elections; and law reforms on elections were earmarked, embarked upon and applied to the latter. The rated implications vary due to reforms in policy implementations, and the halting/reduction of multiple registrations in successive election and its attendant multiple voting, which defied the electoral principle of one-man one vote (Interviews, 2012).

The average, high and very high rates were due to the improvements of the election environment, and the provision of election materials for elections in Ghana overtime. Additionally, the acceptance and enforcement of the recommendations of election monitors and Observer Mission as captured in their reports was a force to reckon with in this election's credibility. The report captured issues such as the re-registration of voters; the use of the voter’s photo ID Cards; expunge of minor names from the voter register; cleaning of the voter register off multiple voter register; deletion of ghost names from the voter register; and beefing up the security to halt voter intimidation (Focus Group Discussion, 2012).
In a focus group discussion with some EC workers in the seven (7) regions visited during data collection, coupled with some interviews with Mr Yahaya in Wa, and Mr George Ockraine in Tamale, they noted that, political parties’ exhibited strong unwillingness for quality elections which was the major causes of the low rates leading to higher electoral volatility. Political party’s supporters and sympathizers engage in intimidations, ballot box stuffing, ballot snatching and all manner of rigging of the elections. Again, bad timing for the 1992 election accounted for the flawed election. The period for the interviews and Focus Group discussions was from (2011-2012).

3.7.2. Negative percent of legal and institutional framework

The negative percentage distribution of respondents was 100% of respondents in 1992; 0%, in 1996, the number of respondents was 0% in the 2000 election. The negative percentage ratios were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that, donor assistance had a negative impact on the elections comparing the 1992 election years. With the exception of the 1996 and the 2000 elections where the implication was positive. It was only in 1992 that the respondents indicated that, the rated election effect size of respondents was negative constituting a negative of 100% of the respondents respectively.

If negative, how was the rate of the impact of the legal and institutional framework compliance with international statutes and its enforcement in Ghana’s elections?

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 30% in 1992 of the respondents; in 1996, the respondents view indicated 25% of negative percentage of very low rate of the impact size.; and in the 2000 election, the response of the respondents was
35%. The very low percentage of the impact size scores were 40%: 25%; 35% of the respondents respectively.

Again, the negative of low rate of the effect size score of the respondents in 1992 was 45.3%; in 1996, the responses of the respondents for a negative rate of low of the impact size was 53.2%; and in the 2000 election, the respondents’ opinion of the rate of low of the effect size score was 7.5% respectively. The negative percentage rate of the flow rate ratio of the effect size scores was 45.3%: 53.2%; 7.5% of the respondents.

The opinion of respondents for a negative percentage rate of an average of the impact size scores was 20.7% of the respondents in 1992. The responses of the respondents in the 1996 election on the percentage rate of the average of the impact size was 67.5% of the respondents; and in the 2000 election, the respondent's response of negative percentage rate of an average of the impact size score was 11.8%. The negative percentage ratio rate of an average of the impact size scores was 67.7%: 20.5%; 11.8% of the respondents respectively.

The negative percentage of the high rate of the impact size grade was 56.3% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage of the high rate of the effect size mark was 35% of the respondents; and in the 2000 elections, the negative percentage of the high rate of the impact size score was 8.7% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the effect sizes were 56.3%: 35%: 8.7% of the respondents respectively.
The negative percentage of very high rate of the effect size grade was 70% of the respondents in 1992. The negative percentage of very high rate of the effect score was 15% in the 1996 election; and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size mark was 15% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size scores were 70%: 15%: 15% respectively.

**Qualitative Impact:** The effects was that it gave Ghanaians the right of representation; media freedom or freedom of information; access to court for a peaceful settlement of election disputes. Other rights enjoyed by the citizens were freedom of assembly; political participation; formation of varied organizations; and access to alternative information from the political party leaders’ policies from their manifestoes, and political parties’ ideologies.

Again, the presence of democratic institutions served as countervailing forces to abuse of the incumbent administration; rights of representation; the formation of alternative governments by the citizenry through their vote; and political accountability paved way to quality election. Not all, the controls over governments’ decisions about policies were constitutionally vested on elected officials. Last and essentially, Ghana’s election/electoral democracy canons were gauged by these maximum standards as the basis of conducting a free, fair, and transparent (quality) election. These features reinforced its legal framework and institutional settings reforms that were in complete consonance with international law on democratic governance as outlined by international organizations’ Charter on Democracy (AU Charter 2000; the United Nations, 1948:1-2; the Constitution of Ghana 1992).
Juxtaposing these international laws with the domestic laws of Ghana revealed that they were in consonance with each other. These laws granted the citizens, both their negative rights and liberties, their positive rights, and the fostering of perpetual peace in the nation. It serves as the best standard of gauging quality election as noted by (Goodwill-Gill, 2004:38-40; 1998:52-68; 56-73; Kriegler, no date).

On the paradox, several allegations and counter allegations were made by the incumbent regime and the opposition with respect to the legal and institutional framework of the electoral rules, regulations and arrangements (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The outset of the discussions on the democratization processes in Ghana until November 1992 was enviable and remarkably smooth. This smoothness was as a result of trust, mutual respect of the ongoing consultation process between the Provincial National Defense Council (PNDC) and the opposition leaders. This commenced the process since July 1990 throughout to the end of 1992. The duo sides talked to each other in disparaging conditions, but kept an arm's length with each other. The outcome was that no mutual consensus on observing the rules of the electoral game were developed (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

This mutual cynicism and dislikeness steered, and intensified political rivalry. First, Rawlings saw the opposition leaders as non bona fide campaigners of the republic, and also as exploiters and fraudsters of the common man, as radicals who pursued to derail the revolutionary process, and intended to win power to reverse the accomplishment of the
PNDC. Contrarily, the opposition leaders envisaged Rawlings as a callous authoritarian with the worst form of human right record in the annals of Ghana, and resolute to sustain power everlastingly. There was stark lamentation and criticism of the elite class and liberal democrats about the keen desire for retribution over the loss of lives, the brutal dishonor of relatives and friends in the era of the revolution. Additionally, to this hatred was the outrageousness in Ghana under the governance of a junior military official, partially educated, and indifferent Rawlings (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

It was creditable though, to comment that, the Political Parties Decree promulgated and the timing of the 1992 election contributed tragically towards the abysmal performance of the Nkrumaist candidates, this lacked of popularity and entreaty was due to their in-house shortfalls and strategic errors. Their continuing splinter and factional fission made them unpleasant. The segregation of the Nkrumaist was due to the enticement of the PNDC members lobbying, through the NCP to woo or coax part of the Nkrumaist vote, however, the division of the remnant Nkrumaist parties was not engineered by any machination. The results were a blatant demonstration of ego-centricism of the Veteran Nkrumaist politicians’ refusal to put party unity at the forefront above their competition for dominance as political brokers. The public showoff of such competitive brokerage made voters more vivid of the neglected features of the PNP rule (1979-81), and party politics in general (Ibid, 1993).

The cleanness and quality of the presidential candidates’ public facade did little to overcome this. Not all, several people admitted the difficulty Limann found himself in to
move and to get hold of the “Kingmakers”. Erskin and Darko were not decisive presidential aspirants. There was this heightened sense of suspicion that Erskin would run into difficulties in the election if chosen as a presidential aspirant (Ibid, 1993).

There was the remnant of the most affected and the most absurdity about George Darko suspicion that Erskin would find it challenging to preserve domestic peace in Ghana than the riotous approach exemplified in the Middle East in the Persian Gulf States. Both Darko and Erskin showed an imprint political incompetence comparative to Rawlings and Adu Boahen. It was mistaken to level attributable evidence of their poor performance to these personalities. Hilla Limann, was unpopular outside the jurisdiction of the Upper West Region and the Upper East Region in 1979, however, a unified reformed CPP party device managed to turn to Limann merits. Paradoxically, the Nkruamaist disunity was a cardinal consideration in 1992. Hilla Limann performed better than the triune Nkruamaist because of his retention of an extensive support, technically because of the concentration of hope for regional economic improvement in the Upper Region (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The voters of the Nkruamaist turned out to support Rawlings due to the unimpressive and the appealing public image of the triad independent Nkruamaist parties, but owed itself to certain likeness in the political style between Rawlings and Nkrumah was not amazing. The least unclarity point was the extent of the modification that happened between the NCP-NDC alliance through an alternative Rawlings direct usage of the Nkruamaist populist strategies to join the NCP and his electoral alliance with NDC splintered the
alternative direction of the NCP. Making a candid judgement on the NCP’s poor performance in the ensued parliamentary election, it revealed an alternative unrealistic and unreliable yardstick of an unlikelihood that NCP solicited more than a negligible proportion of the Nkrumaist votes into the electoral alliance. Significantly, the NDC’s self adoption of Nkrumaist chant and slogans at their rallies with Rawlings’ cultivation of a personal image of reverence for Nkrumah in several public ceremonies over the past generation of years gave him a better influence in the election (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

Contrary to the Nkrumaist faction, the Busia-Danquah faction’s political class united formidably, disciplined and above all properly organized. In the observers opinion, the NPP campaign activities penetrated all localities. In certain precincts, its machineries and activities were more ubiquitous than the NDC. The NPP was the only alternative party which presented itself as a core credible substitute to the NDC. Adu Boahen represented a powerful contender to Rawlings. Those voters who were opposed to Rawlings due to perhaps their past history of affiliation to the Progress Party of the 1969-1972 or the Popular Front Party of the 1979-1981, Adu Boahen became the logical tactical vote. Adu Boahen successfully gain majority of votes amongst certain sections of the residents whose affiliation was with the NLM-PP-PFP with a historical strength of the Western intelligentsia and the Akans (Ibid, 1993). What accounted for such a line of action?

One was tempted to answer that, there existed a reason besides the outdated attachment to the NL-PP-PFP. Why were these section of the electorate strongly fans of the NPP and anti-Rawlings? These intelligentsia felt irritated by the P(NDC) bad governance; intolerant
to criticism; and lack of public debate under the P(NDC) rule. Other expert groups such as, the lawyers piloted a perpetual long-struggle with the PNDC. The formal sector business corporations hated the PNDC economic policies; felt suspected; irregularly reproached; and disappointingly stimulated or engaged in dialogue with the Rawlings government. Additionally, the intelligentsia had cause to be afraid of the PNDC practice of political detension, and human rights abuses. But these objections were not entertained by some alternative section of the inhabitants at all, such as the urban and rural impoverished dwellers. On behalf of many normal Ghanaians, human rights issues were inconsequential in their electoral imagination than the issues of economic management, and economic reasonable supply of the national cake (Oquaye, 1995).

In the same vein, several Asantes voted for the Adu Boahen essentially because of the lengthy historical affinity to the NPP supporters, and they were inclined to conceive Rawlings’ government as a repressive Ewe mischief. It is a common knowledge among many Ghanaians that, the prolonged Asante hatred towards and suspicion of the Ewe was premised on prejudicial factors shared in a minuscule extent by members of the Akan cultural fraternity have intensified contemporary and shadowed the Asante’s perception of the PNDC government. There were specific old experiences for such actions by the Akans. For instance, the punishment met out to the smugglers Asante business men and women in the revolution period, and the unfortunate explanations of Kojo Tsikata in March 1993. Tsikata implied that, the Asantehene’s convening of a meeting with the United State of America’s Ambassador was a sinister and a representation of treachery. As a result, the reasonably Rawlings’ most trusted duo friends and advisors were his fellow Ewes, and the
mention that Ewes were inexplicably best represented in the senior ranks and files of the armed forces, are perceived as being more significant than the Asantes sincerely was necessitated by members of other ethnic groups. As a consequence, the Ewes voted massively in the Volta Region in comparison as a solidified ethnic composition in favor of Rawlings’ leadership. This was undeniable to the fact that many Asantes favored Adu Boahen and the NPP out of genuine compassion for their liberal ideological underpinnings. However, this conception of Rawlings’ government as coercive was undoubtedly fortified by the concomitant perception of an Ewe-led regime (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

It was projected by many observers who considered the antique familiarity, at certain times, it engendered political association between the Asantes and the Bonos of Brong Ahafo Region would be won by Adu Boahen. Indications revealed that, the NDC played its card prudently, worked relentlessly to ensure that Rawlings had a majority of the votes in the Brong Ahafo region, whiles the Busia-Danquah tradition accused the election as being rigged intensively and extensively in the Brong Ahafo region. The NPP certainly was suspicious in this respect because it was caused by the reason that the region’s electoral roll was exhibited at a far ahead period than other regions without any real enlightenment for this action. However, for most Bonos, raising cocoa price, the extension of electricity to the sector accounted for their choice of vote than ethnic origins of the Rawlings’ closed advisors. The Bonos viewpoint towards the Asantes in genuineness was the deep held uncertain situation. The Nkrumah’s entire policy to contain the Asantes opposition revitalized on the refinement of peculiar Bono identity. The NPP’s leaders' confidence of victory in that region was constructed on the Asantes perception of a realistic
reflection of the Akans unity in action. The Bonos accorded Rawlings an applauded reception whenever he made an unexpected tour of rural villages in the region. There was, in fact, no discernable ethnic or regional favoritism in the PNDC’s distribution of development projects nationwide (Jeffries and Thomas, 1995).

This herculean task for Adu Boahen to win the presidential election was centered on the persuasion of other sections of the electorate that he had a superior offer on the issue of the management of the economy. Considering the PNDC’s astonishing economic accounts, it was bound to become the Achilles heels to the opposition. He appealed to the converted, pointing out references to the economic policies of Busia’s government, which sent negative implications for several Ghanaians outside Ashanti and Brong Ahafo. Ghanaians realized an uncomfortable match between support of liberalism and the nationalistic attack on the Economic Recovery Program. More definitely, in his debate on micro-economic theory was incomprehensible to many of the electorate. Adu Boahen’s pledge of a prompt economic growth under his leadership was perceived as a political conduit comparatively to Rawlings’ offer of continuity as a formidable force of progress was noted as reliable (Jeffries and Thomas, 1995).

The most admitted subjective impression gained by the opposition NPP aspirant Adu-Boahen on television was an over-confident and excessively intellectual perspective than practicality. The Rawlings’ contrast from an opposition newspaper indicated that the charismatic, hardworking, non-discriminating, and his penchant antipathy for corruption and laziness “down to earth sense of humor and the easy-going approach” cum frankness
and absolute integrity left several potential pro-Boahen voters felt uncomfortable. A number of initial interested NPP supporters affirmed they decided to act unfathomably and switched their votes from Boahen to Rawlings. Another concern for others was the growing understanding of Boahen as an Asante nationalist, a perception that toughened than softened by his reference jokes to Rawlings as “akonta” (our in law). Observers acquiesced amazingly for the university lecturer proved as a mediocre public speaker (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

Rawlings on the contrary, fought a relentless, dexterous election campaign to the admiration of many Ghanaians, and proved that, he was full of the capacity to inspire and coax the illiterate audience to his side of the election. A research survey conducted of Ghanaians revealed their popular support opinion of a great majority of Ghanaians electorates persistently admired Rawlings personality and integrity; truths; common consideration; dedication; commitment and hard work in the service of Ghana. The ostensible risk was that he showed too much of dictatorship and unpredictable stands in his person as a character by losing his temper or attacking his opponents consistently on electoral campaigns. However, he remained cool; calm; collective; emotionally controlled; reasonable; relaxed; and undisturbed by the personal attacks from his opponents. The election was not a personality competition, critical to the Rawlings and the NDC victory was the credibility of Rawlings claim that he had fulfilled many of his promises; improved the condition of living of the majority of the rural dwellers through increased crop prices and the visible extension of the national electricity grid to rural sectors of the nation; provided incentives for seriousness and hard work; initiatives; and protected the mass of
the citizens against exploitation by the bourgeoisie and politically well connected. What a “Bonapartist platform” display. He offered many Ghanaian commentators, a spirit of continuity and hope for the future under his leadership if voted into power in the election. Undoubtedly, this was a fact, but needs to be qualified by indulgent that, the appeal honestly lay partly in the prospect of the extent of reforms; the prospect of a less attractive characteristic of Rawlings’ previous rule, the intolerance of criticism; the government’s harassment; and the moderation within the constitutional framework of the country (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

As noted earlier on, Rawlings electoral avenues were set up and he had accomplished much of his political canvass some months prior to the lifting of the ban on party politics activities. He had already established by May 1992, a strong lead in the presidential popularity amongst several Ghanaians. The opposition parties’ projection of their chance of winning was strongly over-optimistic. Rawlings had drawn his prospective victory in many ways. It was an easy detection in the last quarters of months or weeks of the campaign of an extraordinary breakthrough of the popular preference had edged Rawlings chances (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The concern was no longer with the mobilization of the vote. The NDC had engaged into a proficient operation at the local level through the PNDC organization and personnel like the CDRs, the 31st December Women’s Movement, and, the District Secretaries. Several cons and pros in working through the CDRs in certain sectors breed a consequential fact of the unpopularity which prompted an intensified movement to improve the public image in
the years before the election. The NDC’s women's wing, the 31st December Women Movement, a Non-governmental Organization, led by Mrs Rawlings energetic leadership, which received government’s assistance was believed to be a *de facto* part of the PNDC/NDC, and one of the most highly effective and efficient machinery of the incumbent government. Interestingly, the breakdown of the voting figures indicated that more women than men voted for Rawlings. The District Secretaries establishment of a partly elected District Assemblies was highly powerful, and a quasi-dictatorial wing in several localities; used all their mechanisms possible at their disposal to secure a Rawlings victory. The evidence of attempted ballot-rigging involving the District Secretaries acting with a heightened quest. Most commonly, they adopted their power of clientele patronage to the maximum. Contractors and other successful business men and women knowing where their daily bread came from played a benign role in all local branches of the 31st December Women movement of the PNDC/NDC as a mechanism of a political party’s institutionalization across the nation. The social network shape and spirit of the NDC at all local branches bore a robust similitude to those of the CPP in the 1950s (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

Additionally, Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings won due to his enjoyment of incumbency and owing to the fact that the majority of Ghanaians thought more about their material wellbeing than human rights abuses. The Economic Recovery Program had made a marginal contribution towards the improvement in rural income than the majority of the urban population. This raised a considerable level of optimism that the sacrifices and hard work of the previous years would yield dividends, a related corresponding fear that the
potentials for more concrete economic improvement would be wasted by a new government. This advantage of incumbency was highly pronounced partly because of Rawlings PNDC regimes’ improvement of the standard of living of the rural population in many parts of the country. Rawlings as an individual was more popular at the grassroots level of society because he stood for human rights in a collective perspective. He stood for the rights of the ordinary men and women in the agricultural sector, such as farmers; fishermen; hairdressers; and mechanics who he considered as equal citizens with the lawyer, lecturers; professionals and the intelligentsia community, and fought for the interest of the these marginalized groups as equally a considerable formulation of government policies. Rawlings victory in the election was flawlessly dependable on this basis, and never needed any explanation in terms of election-malpractices (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

According (Oquaye 1995) conception, the political attitude of Rawlings was revolutionary. This was an integral part of the democratization process in the 1992. In 1979, Rawlings was a reformist. He bemoaned the absolved nature of some citizens in the state. He noted, we have laws, rules and regulation in this country, hence it was right for the old regime or laws be implemented to the maximum letter. By 31st December, Rawlings appealed for an absolute reformation of the socio-politico-economic structures. To Jerry John, Western institutions such as political parties and the practice of elections had a negative democratic impact. The citizens were entitled to empowerment in their own hands to democratic practices. He unequivocally noted, “fundamental to our intentions is the desire to be masters of our own destiny. That was an inalienable right that others sought to
rob us of for their personal achievements. Rawlings delinked democracy from a system of representation of the people. He showed both a preference for populist institutions such as the Committee for Defence of the Revolution (CDRS); in late 1990, he was outspoken against party politics. This sought to be a norm amongst contemporary leaders such as Castro in Cuba and Gaddafi in Libya, whose populist agenda “temporariness” of leaders and pluralism was foreign (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

In furtherance, Rawlings disbelieved in multi-party politics, and never consented to an alternative form of government to his revolutionary process. Oquaye questioned, why the call for the 1992 election? The immediate perceived answer was that Rawlings shifted gear in diverse means to sustain power. The first and foremost convenience step of the regime as a “survival” mechanism was the application of the Washington Consensus policies. In the operation of the revolution, Rawlings attracted imperialism; multinational corporation; and capitalism style of governance associated with Castro and Ghaddafi. To ascertain massive aid, the lifeblood of Rawlings’ survival, he accepted the Washington Consensus conditionalities. Conceded that, some successes of the Economic Recovery Program in the agricultural and other sectors benefitted Rawlings in these elections. (Oquaye, 1995).

In a related development, the role of Civil Society Organizations and Civil Society Institutions in the democratization process and procedures in Ghana after the 31st December 1982 played a benign function in explaining the electoral opportunities of 1992. The lifting of the ban on party politics in 1992 witnessed a ruined Civil Society/institution
that bickered agitatedly to resuscitate multi-party democracy and its trajectories in a
limited period. As (Stepan, 1988, cited in Oquaye, 1995) noted, he distinguished between
political society and Civil Society. The political society is where the citizens compete for
power or authority of the state through political parties in a competitive election to attain
the mandate of the electorate. Civil Society on the other hand encompasses types of
collective actions akin to voluntary association which effortlessly struggle for state power.
Characteristically, in most contemporary states, officials sought control over different
organizations within the state. (Gramci cited in Oquaye, 1995) noted “a war of position” as
“Civil society” struggled against “political society”. Under totalitarian conditions, the
Civil Society struggle was a mirage against the state. (Oquaye, 1995).

Serving as the regimes control machinery and mechanisms, the PNDC promoted other
groups to advance its political agenda and interest that was a constituent embodiment of
the parallel playground during the elections. The foremost group was the CDR members
and other youthful devotees of the PNDC who engaged in active activities consisting of
sanitation; price control; arbitration; bakery/kenkey sales; border surveillance; and
checking a wider scope of undefined pro-revolutionary acts. These groups of revolutionary
activist came under the generic name “cadres”, were feared by the citizens, identified with,
distracting opposition rallies, and participated in other forms of violence during the
election. These active activities were considered as an integral embodiment of the
Ghanaian politics that diminished drastically in the 1956 of the immediate post
independent struggle of political pluralism (Oquaye, 1995).
According this writer, human rights abuses took an extraordinary toll, but which was unrecognized by these authorities under their review (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993). Again, by all continental standards, or a better comparison of the 1992 elections in Ghana, the political play-field was adjudged as unfair, but to the advantage of the NDC government (Jeffries, 1998).

The District Assemblie offices; personnel; equipment and vehicles were collectively controlled and assembled in Rawlings intervention during the campaign and the election. The political Parties law was equally unfavorable to political parties during an electioneering time in the 1992 election (Oquaye, 1995).

The legal framework that regulated the holding of the election required a serious scrutiny and a rescrutiny to understand the outcome. The Political Party Law (PNDC Law, 281) provided that, no name; symbol or color of any past political party must be used; no foreign company should contribute to political party funds; no individual should contribute beyond C 200,000. The junta supporters argued that, similar laws were passed in the 1969 and the 1979 election. It was, however, oblivion that in those elections, the military rulers were non-contestants. However, in the 1992 election, Rawlings was a keen contestant in the election, and the fathomable philosophy was that, the laws were designed to pave a higher degree of leverage to the P(NDC) and to deprive the opposition and their avowed support base in relation to their historical; identity; membership; finance; and operation. It was debated that, it would deepen the miseries of the contours of unfair playground as Rawlings would contest with state resources at his disposal. The opposition
filed legal suit in the High Court seeking an injunction on these restrictions. The petitioners of the writ of injunction were: Gbedemah; da Rocha; Adu Boahen; Limann and others vs the INEC. However, the court unequivocally declared it had no jurisdictional capacity to sit on such trial. The reason for the non-jurisdictional power was because no state institution or organ can validly question the PNDC Laws, with a crystal repercussion that the laws and the constitution could not regulate the transitional process (Oquaye, 1995).

3.7.3. How was the impact of the electoral timetable for the elections?

The positive effects of the electoral timetable for Ghana’s elections.

The electoral timetable’s compliance revealed that, the percentage of positive of the effect size of the respondents was 37.3% in 1992, another 37.3% of respondents view was a positive percentage of the effect size in 1996, and 25.5% of respondents opined a positive percentage of the effect size in the year 2000. The positive percentage ratios of the effect sizes were 37.3%: 37.3%: 25.5% of the respondents respectively.

Unlike the 1992 election, the opposition party had ample time at their disposal, and a relatively open political atmosphere to reorganize themselves this moment around. Their absence in the First Parliament of the Fourth Republic reduced their public effectiveness and efficiency in the foregoing years of the elections, they have themselves to blame (Jeffries, 1998).
The negative impact of the electoral timetable for Ghana’s election.

The negative percentage of the effect size of respondents was 57.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election, 14.3% of respondent indicated a negative percentage of the effect size in the 1996 election, and 28.6% of respondents responded to a negative percentage of the effect size in the 2000 election. The negative of responses on a negative percentage of the effect size of respondents was 57.1%: 14.3%:28.6% respectively.

Qualitative impact: However, the staggered election timetable led to a boycott of parliamentary election by the opposition parties in the 1992 election due to the flaws of the election processes and procedures in the 1992 election. The reasons for this abysmal performance were due to the short period within which the elections were held, and the inadequate supply of electoral materials. This thereby made parliament a rubber stamp for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in the first parliament of the fourth republic. The Electoral Commission of Ghana subsequently addressed these stalemates by holding both the presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously in the 1996 and the 2000 elections. In this situation, political parties could not influence their parliamentarians from the election. Again, the standing order of parliament does not warrant absenteeism from parliament beyond a month, after that period, the Clerk of parliament must inform the Electoral Commission of vacancies in parliament for parliamentary bye-election in these constituencies. It meant a Members of Parliament has forfeited his/her seat in parliament (Focus Group Discussion, 2012).
The promotion of harmony between the international timetable and domestic timetable of Ghana’s election was good for both domestic actors and external players on Ghana’s elections. Stakeholders can judge the state’s democratic elections on a singular universal standard (Goodwill-Gill, 1998). Again, it avoided the boycotts of elections by the opposition parties as exemplified in the 1992s staggered national election in Ghana’s 1992 election (Interview, 2012).

The impact of the electoral timetable’s compliance with international norms aided in the planning of elections; assisted in the policy formulation and implementation on elections; and an advocacy for policy refashioning and redirection to suit cultural context. This enabled Election Observation Missions and Election Monitors to plan adequately to monitor the legitimacy of the election, which sought to promote the acceptability of the results declared and the international legitimacy and recognition of the government in power (Focus Group Discussion, 2012).

This indeed had an extended influence on the rates. The implication was that, the rated impact size for Ghana's electoral time table’s compliance with the international obligation differs from electoral season to another. It began from very low; low; average; high and very high in terms of rating from 1992-2000 election.

If positive, how was the rate of impact of the election timetable on Ghana’s election?

The positive percentage rate of the impact of the election timetable for the election.

The positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size of the election in 1992, 1996,
and 2000 was as follows: 100% of the respondents said a very low of the impact size on the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, 0% of the respondent rated the impact of very low size on the election, and 0% of the respondents rated a very low of the impact size on the 2000 election. Additionally, the percentage ratio rates of very low of the impact size of the respondents of very low of the impact size scores were 100%:0%:0% respectively.

The percentage rate of the impact size of respondents in the year 1992 for the low rate was 33.3% of the respondents; the positive percentage rate of respondents in the 1996 for low size effect was 33.3% of the respondents, and the rate of low of the effect size of respondents in the 2000 election was 33.3% of the respondents. Its correlated positive percentage ratio rates of respondents of the impact size for the low size scores were 33.3%:33.3%:33.3% for 1992, 1996, and, 2000 election seasons respectively. The implication was that, all rates on the impact sizes were at par from an election year to another. The average rates of impact size for the electoral seasons 1992, 1996, and 2000 is next.

In relation to the positive percentage rate of the average of the effect size was 31.6% of respondents rated the effect size as average in 1992; 57.9% of the respondents rated an average of the effect size for the election year 1996. And, 10.5% of the respondents rated an average of the impact size for the election in the 2000 election respectively. The positive percentage ratio rates on average of respondents for the election years in 1992, 1996, and 2000 were 31.6%:57.9%:10.5% respectively.
The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size for the same period was 39.1% of the respondents in 1992, 26.1% of the respondents’ positive percentage rate of high of the effect size of 1996, and, 34.8% of the respondents rated high of the effect size for 2000 electoral seasons. The positive percentage ratio rates of respondents of high of the impact size were 39.1%:26.1%:34.8% of the respondents respectively.

Finally, the positive percentage rate of the very high of the impact size was 37.3% of the respondents in 1992, again, the positive percentage rate of the very high of the effect size was 37.3% of the respondents in 1996, and the positive percentage rate of the very high of the effect size was 25.5% for the year 2000. Whilst the positive percentage ratios of the very high of the effect size were 37.3%:37.3%:25.5% for the same electoral periods respectively.

**Qualitative effects:** However, the staggered election timetable led to a boycott of parliamentary election by the opposition parties, making parliament a rubber stamp for the National Democratic Congress in the first parliament of the fourth republic. This made policy formulation and implementation and voting in parliament easy and a one sided affair for the government of the day. Even in 1996, the government had a majority in parliament, parliamentary debates and votes were devoid of cross voting explosion (BBC News 2010 from Edmond Burke). The Electoral Commission of Ghana addressed this matter by holding both presidential and parliamentary elections simultaneously in the 1996 and the 2000 elections (Interview, 2012).

The implication was that, there were varied degrees of the impact sizes in all the election
with 1996 leading, followed by 1992. There were impacted differences in 1996 and the 2000 elections, the reason being that, the rational electorate had a high expectation of governments’ ability to provide public good to better their lives. However, after years of casting their votes, there was a common apathy for elections by the electorates emanating from governments’ non-performance, nepotism, mismanagement of public funds; embezzlement of national funds; “kickbacks” from contracts awarded and procurements; and political exclusion of opponents and the majority of the citizens from governance, economic and social participation (Focus Group Discussion, 2012).

The rate here vacillated, the reason was because in the 1992 election was the first election and every eligible electorate voted, in 2000, there was a burning desire for a change of government from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government of Ex-President Flt Lt JJ Rawlings to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) led by Ex-President J. A. Kuffour. In addition, most of the parliamentarians lost their seats due to their poor performance, arrogance and their non-responsiveness to their constituents; and the self-seeking nature and dynamics of politicians (Interview, 2012).

**If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The negative impact of the electoral timetable for the elections.**

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in 1992, there was a 0% of the respondents rate of very low of the impact size in the 1996 election, and a 0% rate of very low of the impact size in the 2000 election. The percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size were 100%: 0%: 0% respectively.
The negative percentage of low rate of the impact size in 1992 was 50% of the respondents; in 1996, the respondents’ negative percent of the low rate of the effect was 20%, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage of the impact rate of the low was 30% of the respondents. The negative percentage of low rate of the effect size in ratio rates size of the scores was 50%; 20%; 30% respectively.

The negative percentage rates of the respondents of an average of the effect size was 66.7% of the respondents in 1992, the negative percentage of average rate of the impact size of respondent in 1996 was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, 0% of the respondents rated average of the effect size. The negative percentage ratio rates of the impact size for average were 66.7%: 33.3%: 0% in 1992, 1996, and 2000 respectively. The implication was that, there was a negative percentage of average rate of the effect size grade in 1992 and 1996. However, the 1992 election had an average impact, followed by the 1996 general elections. For causes of the 0%, it was due to apathy for elections by the electorates.

The percentage rate of high of negative of the effect size for 1992 was 0% of the respondents, for 1996, 0% of the respondents rated negative high of the effect size, and in the year 2000, 100% of the respondents rated negative high of the effect size. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size were 0%: 0%: 100% respectively. The implication is that the 2000 election had a high negative impact as compared to 1992 and 1996 elections.
The negative percentage of very high rate of the impact size in 1992 was 80% of the respondents; in 1996, the negative percentage of very high rate of the impact size grade was 20% of the respondents; and in 2000, the negative percentage of very high rate of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the very high of the impact size scores were 80%; 20%; 0% of the respondents respectively.

**Qualitative Effects:** It meant that in 1992, the rate of low effect size existed. The cause for the low rate owes to the fact that, the election period was short (Carothers, 1999:162-167), and only the National Democratic Congress (NDC) as a party was adequately institutionalized whilst the other parties were poorly institutionalized; had a broader outreach; good party organization; best campaign strategies; better manifestoes of policies and programs; and adequate funding for the party.

Additionally, media monopoly and harassments from the erstwhile autocratic regime added to the flawed election. Other reasons were the intimidation of electorates; ballot stuffing; multiple registration and multiple voting; registration of minors characterized the election processes and procedures which eventually led to high electoral volatility on turnout (Carter Center 2001:1-5). Again, factors responsible for the high rated impact was as a result of the over-zealous quest for a change of government, cum the vigilant role of Civil Society Organizations; the fourth estate of the realm; and the peaceful nature of the NDC candidate. The role of the security services in the maintenance of peace and security before, during and after the elections and the protection of the electorates as well accounted for this robust success in the elections. The constitution was presented to
Ghanaians in a referendum on 28th April 1992 and was overwhelming endorsed by the opposition groups within the country ad sought the consent of nationals in exile to accept the constitution (Ibid,1995).

The major opposition party rejected the results of the election on three basic areas: First, the PNDC dictated the democratization process, and timetable. Secondly, the electoral playing field was favourable towards Rawlings for his earlier campaign and unfavourable to the opposition parties. In effect, for several months beforehand of the declaration of his candidature whilst at the same time his campaigned had begun at a later time, another technical issue that emerged was that the P (NDC) enjoyed the benefit of incumbency and state resources to assist his canvassing at the initial stage of the party’s campaign (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The first charge against the PNDC government was substantive, but was overwhelmingly overstated. The junta appeared to dictate the pace of the process because it refused absolutely to negotiate with the leaders of the opposition. However, the regime became determined to submit to them, but recognized the opposition’s demands and the state of popular opinions collectively. The electoral timetable was carved to suit Rawlings electoral victory. The period between the presidential and parliamentary election was created to assist divorcing Rawlings’ PNDC from becoming popular in the electorates mind. After the official lifting of the ban on party politics in 1st May 1992, the opposition parties waited about three months for their registration before they could elect their representatives and presidential candidates in Congress and thereafter commenced campaigning.
seriousness. At this crucial point, they were left with only three months before the election. Rawlings’ delay tactics disadvantaged them until the last moment in declaring his candidature (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The second substantive issue was the taking of advantage of incumbency by the regime, with the exemption of a ban on party politics as a global practice unless some month before elections. One of the leading presidential candidate, Hilla Limann, conceded that he would have performed similarly as Rawlings have done. Nonetheless, scarcely could Rawlings have employed that as an advantage over the opposition parties to make a decisive argument. For example, Kenneth Kaunda employed it, but lost an election in Zambia’s election. The opposition leaders in Ghana were trapped in-between cobwebs in a deep crevice. They never vehemently raised an objection by granting the PNDC an excuse to the postponement or a delay of the transition. Similarly, the verdict remained as so upon observing the unequal political playing-field, they went ahead to play the electoral game to those terms and prevailing conditions with the mind-set of a high confidence level of winning the election (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

Additionally, smart as Rawlings was, he never declared his presidential ambition or candidature until the official nomination date of 30th September 1992. Throughout the previous twelve months, he kept sealed lips. Upon the end of 1991, he was undecided on the contest, but clearly to others, if he is out of office, he could be assassinated in the event that he would win, coupled with the thought of uncertainty and intermittent zest for freedom from constraints and the burden of office kept him wondering. By April 1992, he
was determined in absoluteness to stand and made his mind and decision to this effect. This crystallized visibly when he embarked on a nationwide tour in December 1991 and April 1992 with a nationwide television and radio coverage accorded to the tour, one saw by the content of his speech and campaigning style that business had begun. The tour officially marked the completion of numerous projects like the extension of the national electricity grid, and television reception to the Upper West and the Upper East regions of Ghana. Jerry Rawlings took this novel opportunity to buttress on his achievement as the Head of State of Ghana under the PNDC, but launched a diatribe against the intellectuals and their craving attempts to mislead the common Ghanaian. He cautioned the citizenry to beware of these intellectuals versions of democracy, which entailed the non-identification with the interest of the ordinary man or woman. He engaged in his personal exceptional informal style of walkout after ten years in power at home speaking and listening to farmers and mechanics. He masterminded and played his populist card exceptionally perfect with words appraisal instead of criticism for the elders and chiefs of the nation in 1992 (Jeffries and Thomas (1993).

Rawlings began campaigning before the ban on party politics was lifted, this irritated the opposition. He relentlessly continued his tour of the regions until the presidential election was over. This was an indirect, covert and overt campaign designed to put him in the forefront and gain the advantage over his colleague politicians, the opponents in terms of the duration of the campaign and the resources committed to the campaign as the Head of State and as a presidential competitor. However, the opposition leaders over exaggerated the element of incumbency abuse of state recourses at the detriment of the opposition. The
opposition demanded Rawlings to resign before the election because he was not an elected president, but met death ears, and a premised of illogical and unrealistic mentality of the opposition's perspective. In addition, the public exposure of Rawlings made him have an edge over the opposition, which was a threat in their spine. The advantage was because Jerry Rawlings marvellously performed well in public and his genuine credit for the PNDC government’s achievements. He noted that, many government development projects he officially commissioned were in the pipeline. It was argued that they were initiated for political goals. In his public speeches, he admitted that he would not make extravagant promises. His campaign was much more effective on the road to continue in power. By Marc 1992, Rawlings had the presidential victory effectively at his grip (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993). The opposition pressed on in several protests about the legal framework of the timetable and other significantly key issues (Oquaye, 1995).

**How was the impact of holding elections at the same time in the general election?**

**The positive impact of concurrent election timetable in the election.**

The positive percentage of the effect size scores of the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections were 38.5% of the respondents, another positive impact of the effect size score was 38.5% of the respondents, and lastly, the positive percentage of the impact score was 23.1% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratios of the effect sizes were 38.5%: 38.5%: 23.1% of the respondents respectively.

**The negative per cent on concurrent electoral timetable for the election.**

On the negative percentage of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents, and in
2000, the negative percentage of the impact size score was 50% of the respondents. Finally, the negative percentage ratio rates of the impact scores size were 50%:0%:50% of the respondents respectively.

**Qualitative Impact:** The implication was that, 1992 and 2000 had a negative impact, whilst the 1996 had a positive impact. The cause of the negative impact was due to the staggered election; election material shortage at some polling stations; intimidation of voters; the media were gagged; multiple registration and multiple cast of votes, which defied the principle of one man, one vote was common; and the boycott of parliamentary elections (Carter Center, 1992:1-9).

The causal factors in the 1996 positive election were due to better organization of the election; availability of election materials; coverage of the election by Observer Mission by both domestic Observer Mission, and International Observer Mission. The other reasons were equitable media access due to the supreme court’s ruling for equitable state own media access to the opposition; and the court’s denial of the electoral Commission the right to refrain some electorates without Photo ID Cards from voting (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2001:65, Gyimah-Boadi, 2001:103-117).

The 2000 election brought about a contradiction between the percentages of the negative and the positive figures. The fact of the matter was that, election materials were available, media access was equitable accessed by the opposition parties from the state own media, a coalition government was formed for a peaceful change of government. In a formal conversation with Afari-Gyan, he noted that, the positive effects of average, high and very
high rated impact were because, there was ample time for the EC to engage in consultation with stakeholders in the election. The consultation was done through the National Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC), the existence of the Regional Inter-Party Advisory Committees (RIPAC), and the District Inter-Party Advisory Committees (DIPAC), which fostered transparency in the electoral governance, and led to a wind of administrative changes to the elections. This IPAC, RIPAC and DIPAC served as policy dissemination and implementation to the decentralized Units and a feedback to the centralized institution for subsequent alternative local-policy options for successful elections.

This consultative initiative created an opportunity for the EC to listen to political parties' concerns, addressed them, which in the end established transparency in electoral management of elections in Ghana in 1996 and 2000. The IPAC, RIPAC, and DIPAC initiative were a novel achievement. The national level communicated information to the decentralized administration to implement policy directive, however, the decentralized EC institutions gave feedback to the headquarters for socio-cultural context considerations and implementation. This brought about transparency in the electoral processes and quality elections that was undisputed in Focus Group Discussions.

**If positive, how was the rate of impact of the simultaneous holding of an election on the election?**

**The positive rated impact of holding elections concurrently in Ghana.**

The positive percentage of very low rate of the impact size score in holding elections on the same day was 50% of the respondents in 1992. In 1996, the positive percentage of
very low of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage of very low of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage rates of very low of the impact size ratio were 50%:50%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that the 1992, and the 1996 election had a par very low rate. The very low rate of the impact was due to arthritic voter registration, the apathy of the electorates on election; and media disproportionate access.

The positive percentage of low rate of the effect size scores in the 1992 election was 75% of the respondents, in 1996, the positive percentage of low of the impact size score was 25% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage of low rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effects size scores were 75%:25%:0% of the respondents on the elections. The implication was that 1992 had a low rate, and in 1996, the rate of effectiveness was low. The causes of these effects have been discussed above.

Not all, the positive percentage of average rate of the effects size scores in 1992 was 27.8% of the respondents, in 1996, the positive percentage of average rate of the effect size score was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage of average rate of the impact size score was 38.9% of the respondents. The scores in average positive percentage ratio rates of the impact size were 27.8%: 33.3%: 38.9% of the respondents respectively.

The positive percentage of high rates of the impact size score was 38.1% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage of the high rate of the impact size
score was 52.4% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage of the high rate of the effect size score was 9.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage rates of the ratio of high of the effect size scores were 38.1%:52.4%:9.5% of the respondents on these elections. This meant there was a very high rated impact size at 1992, 1996, but not in 2000.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 40% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 60% of the respondents. Again, the positive percentage of very high rates of the ratio of the impact size scores were 40%:0%:60% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that, a very high rate existed moderately in 1992 and at a high sight in the 2000 election.

This meant that there was an average rated impact on the election. The year 2000 led then followed by the year 1996. This was because of the improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) in the election. The EMBs had considerable time to plan and implement electoral policies in interview and focus group discussions.

The cause for the 1992 very high rate was the high expectations of citizen for democracy to produce public goods for the betterment of their lives. In 2000, it was because of the burning desire to change government from NDC led by J. J. Rawlings to NPP led by J. A. Kuffour in my opinion. Some of the reasons were due to the inefficient and the
ineffectiveness of some parliamentary candidates in some constituencies in the nation. Other causes were voter apathy in the election as a result of political parties’ in government's inability to offer public goods to the citizenry, coupled with the high rate of bribery; corruption; complacency; nepotism in employment opportunities in the country, and the bureaucracy displayed in the various institutions anytime the citizens needed a politician for consultation and assistance in an interview.

**How was the impact of the eligibility criteria of presidential candidates and parliamentary candidates in holding or running for an MP's/Presidential office at the national level on the election?**

**The positive impact of eligibility criteria in holding elections in Ghana.**

The positive percentage of the effect size scores was 43.8% of the respondents in 1992, the positive percentage of the effect size score was 37.5% of the respondents in 1996, and the positive percentage of the impact size score was 18.8% of the respondents in the 2000 elections. The positive percentage ratio rates of the impact size scores were 43.8%:37.5%:18.8% of the score marks for the same periods of the respondents.

**The negative impact of eligibility criteria in holding elections in Ghana.**

The negative percentage of the effect size of the score for the same election periods were 20% of the respondents in 1992, the other positive percentage of the effect size score was 20% of the respondents in 1996, and, the last negative percentage of the impact size score was 60% of the respondents in 2000. The negative percentage ratio rates of the effects size
scores were 20%: 20%: 60% of the respondents, respectively in the 1992, 1996 and the 2000 elections.

The implication was that there were both positive percentage of the impact and a negative percentage of the impact of the eligibility criterion to contest for national elections.. In all of these general elections in Ghana as a precondition. This aspect was incomplete without rating the level of impact on elections. The EC had candidates file in their application forms which consisted of their biographical data; residential status; the age of the candidate; balloting of candidates on ballot papers for the position of candidates on the ballot papers and academic qualification of candidates within a deadline in each election. The next part deals with the rated impact sizes (Focus Group Discussion).

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact of eligibility criteria in holding elections in Ghana.

The positive percentage of very low of the effect size rate of score was 50% of the respondents in 1992. The positive percent of very low of the impact size rated score size in 1996 was 50% of the respondents, and the positive per cent rate of very low of the effect size score in 2000 was 0% of the respondents respectively. The very low positive percentage ratio rates effect size scores were 50%:50%:0% of the respondents respectively. This meant that the 1992 and 1996 elections had very low effect due to the rush to hold elections in 1992 and in the 1996 election, arthritic voter registration and candidate registration. This was due inadequate funds to the EC to operate effectively and efficiently (Interviews and Focus Group Discussion).
Similarly, the positive percentage of low rate of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents in 1992, the other positive per cent of low rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1996, and, the positive per cent of low rate of the effect size score in 2000 was 0% of the respondents. The percentage ratios effect size score marks for low were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. This meant a low effect existed in 1992.

Not all, the positive percentage rate of the average of the effect sizes score in 1992 was 46.5% of the respondents. The positive percent of average rate of the impact size score was 23.1% of the respondents in 1996, and the positive percent of average rate of the effect size score of the respondents was 30.8% in the 2000 election. The positive percentage ratio rate of an average of the effect size scores was 46.5%: 23.1%: 30.8% of the respondents respectively. The impact implication reveals a differential impact effect in these elections with 1992 leading, followed by the year 2000.

The positive percentage of the high rate of the effect size score was 39.1% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive per cent of the high rate of the effect size score was 47.8% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive per cent of the high rate of the impact size score was 13.0% of the respondents. The positive percentage rate of high ratio of the effect size scores was 39.1%: 47.8%: 13.0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that, there was a high rate of the impact size existed in all the elections in a variable proportion in 1996 leading followed by 1992.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 28.6% of the respondents in 1992, the positive per cent rate of very high of the effect size score in 1996
was 42.9% of the respondents, and, the positive per cent rate of very high of the impact size score was 28.6% of the respondents. Its correlated positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size score were 28.6%: 42.9%: 28.6% of the respondents respectively. There was a nuance rate of the impact sizes in the elections with 1996 ahead.

In May 1992, the opponents had the candid believe that Rawlings would lose in the election due to the “culture of silence” syndrome because the majority of Ghanaian would cast their vote against Rawlings, and they would be victorious in the election, however, this was a misled an a premature conclusion drawn. But they had themselves to blame for misreading the state of popular opinion, and daydreamt in an overconfidence victory for themselves. However, the opinion in Castle differed. Kojo Tsikata and Rawlings had gathered massive intelligence about Rawlings’ opportunity of winning the election from public opinion of the Ghana Private Road Transporter Union (GPRTU) as a project assessment of a sample popular opinion. The outcome of the opinion poll revealed a massive win for Rawlings in the first round of the election (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

In a related development, it never paved the way for complacency. The months leading to the election, Rawlings made every concerted effort to solicit the support of all chiefs and the churches. He made an appeal to the chiefs and elders to advise their people to make a wise choice on the ballot and to support him and the NDC in the election. The churches, represented by the Christian Council of Churches were overt critics of Rawlings and the PNDC and campaigned against him with the opposition movement of churches in the transition program. Rawlings had alternative means to calm down the waters. He unprecedentedly showed humility, addressed the congregation of the Pentecostal
Association of Ghana on 15th May 1992, made an apology for the mistakes of his pass as the leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) era and in the early 1980s. This bread a reconciliation, and calmed the nerves of the churches misgivings about him and established confidence building on his behalf during the election (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

Some months prior to the campaign, government power and resources were dexterously worked out to strengthen Rawlings campaign. There were consistent press reports about Rawlings and the NDC’s campaign at all levels run by the Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR), with assistance from the regional and district administrations. It was alleged that, local executives were cautioned of their support with the opposition groups, and government contracts were given explicitly to the effect to supporters of the NDC sympathizers; chiefs and opinion leaders received gifts from the NDC; and the critics of clientele termed as party politics practices by Rawlings. The opposition knew of these practices, but went ahead for the election. They raised a vehement objection to the practice of using state resources for political campaign such as the use of state vehicles to transport electors and materials to the NDC Congress at Cape Coast in September (Jeffries, 1998). The 1996 election was a turning point in the drift away from the end of the transitional paradigm to the brinks of democratic consolidation through the general elections.
If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative impact rate of eligibility criteria of candidates in the holding of election in Ghana.

The very low rate of the negative percentage of the effect size score was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992. The next negative percent of very low of the effect size score was 33.3% of the respondents in 1996, and the last of a negative percent of very low of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents in the 2009 elections. The percentages every low ratio rates of the effect size score were 33.3%:33.3%:33.3% of the respondents respectively. The implication is that a negative impact existed at par in all the three elections.

The negative per cent of low of the effect size score of the respondents was 25% in 1992, the negative per cent of low rate of the impact score was 30.4% of the respondents, and the positive per cent of low of the effect size grade was 49.6% of the respondents in the 2000 election. The negative per cent rate of low of the impact size marks was 25%: 30.4%: 49.6% of the respondents respectively. From the figures produced from the respondents, there was an ascending rate of the negative impact on the elections.

The negative percent of average rate of the impact size, grade was 100% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996, the negative percent of average rate of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent of average rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents respectively. The negative per cent of average ratio rates of the respondents score were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. In
this regard, there existed an average rate of the impact in the 1992 elections only.

The negative per cent rate of high of the effect size for the same period. The negative percentage rate of high of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992. In the negative per cent of the high rate of the impact size score in 1996 was 0% of the respondents, and the negative per cent of the high rate of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents in the 2000 election. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size scores were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents respectively for the same election periods respectively. Comparing the rates above, the negative per cent of the effect rate outstripped the negative impact rated size. This happened in the 2000 elections.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 50.7% of the respondents in the 1992 elections. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of the very high of the impact was 15% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 44.3% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage ratio rates of the impact score were 50.7%: 15%; 44.3% of the respondents respectively.

The opposition was restricted in their campaign by shortage of time and finance, but the opposition parties and their presidential aspirants could not complain of inadequate messages to the electorate. The private and public media outlets granted air space to the opposition as a symbol of impartiality during the elections. This served as a way of fulfilling the constitutional obligation as a fair deal with the opposition to present their
programs to the public by ensuring equal access to the state owned media and the private press daily in their columns, and all political parties were granted equal time on radio and television stations (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The ultimate adversity of the effects of these orchestrated human rights abuses on the opposition during the 1992 elections led to several arrests of leading politicians such as J. H. Mensah, a former finance minister under the Busia’s government, and Dr De Graft Johnson the Vice president to Dr Hilla Liman went on exile. (Oquaye, 1995a).

How was the nomination procedure for candidates’ impact on the national election?

The positive impact of the nomination procedures of candidates in the national election.

The positive per cent of the effect size score in the 1992 election was 44.9% of the respondents, whiles the positive per cent of the impact size score in 1996 was 33.8% of the respondents, and the positive per cent of the effect size of the respondents in 2000 was 16.3% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect size scores were 44.9%:33.8%:16.3% of the respondents respectively.

The negative impact of candidate nomination in Ghana’s national election.

The negative percentage of the effects size score was 12.5% of the respondents in 1992, whiles the negative per cent of the impact size score in the 1996 was 12.5% of the respondents, and the negative per cent of the impact size score in 2000 was 75.0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the impact size scores were
12.5%:12.5%:75.0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative per cent of the impact size score was found in the nomination procedure for candidates who contested for elections in 2000, whilst the 1992 and the 1996 effects were all positive. The next evaluation deals with the rating of the effect size scores of 1992, 1996, and 2000 for very low, low, average, high, and very high.

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The positive rate of nomination procedures of candidate in Ghana’s election.**

The corresponding positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In 1996, the positive per cent rate of very low of the impact sizes score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of very low of the impact size scores was 100% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size scores were 0%: 0%: 100% of the respondents. It meant that a positive percent of very low rates of the effect existed in the 2000 election only.

Again, the positive percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 100% of the respondents in 1992. The positive per cent of low rate of the effect size score in 1996 was 0% of the respondents, and in the election year of 2000, the positive per cent of low of the impact size score size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rate of low of the effect size scores were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents as well. It implied that a positive per cent of low of the effect size was located in the 1992 election.

Also, the positive percentage rate of the average of the effect size score was 35.7% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the positive per cent of an average rate of the
impact size score was 35.7% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive per cent of an average rate of the impact size score was 28.6% of the respondents. Its correlated positive percentage ratio rates of an average of the effect size scores were 35.7%:35.7%:28.6% of the respondents. The implication was that a positive per cent of a par rate of eligibility criteria was in the 1992 and the 1996 elections in an average rated effect, but decreased in the 2000 election.

Besides the above, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size score was 36.4% of the respondents in 1992. The positive per cent rate of high on the impact size score in 1996 was 63.6% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive per cent of the high rate of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size scores were 36.4%:63.6%:0% of the respondents. By implication therefore, 1996 had a positive per cent of the high rate of the effect size scar on the elections followed by the 1992 election.

The positive percentage rate of the very high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in 1992. The positive per cent rate of very high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents in the 1996 election, and in the 2000 election, the positive per cent rate of very high of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents. The corresponding positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size scores was 0%: 0%: 100% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that the positive percent rate of the very high of the effect size existed in the 2000 election.
If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative impact of the nomination of candidates in Ghana’s election.

The negative percent of very low rates of the effect size score was 80% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent of very low of the impact size, grade was 10% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative per cent rate of very low of the effect size score was 10% of the respondents. The negative per cent ratio rates of very low of the effect size grades were 80%: 10%: 10% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percent rate of very low of the impact size existed in the 1992 election.

The negative per cent of low rate of the effect size score was 20% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the negative per cent rate of low of the effect size score was 50.6% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative per cent rate of low of the impact size score was 29.4% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size scores were 20%: 50.6%: 29.4% of the respondents respectively. It meant the 1996 election had a negative percent rate of low of the impact size on the election on the nomination criteria of candidates in the election.

The negative percentage rate of the average of the impact size score was 25% of the respondents in the 1992 election. The negative per cent of an average rate of the impact size score was 25% of the respondents in 1996, and the negative per cent of an average rate of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents in the 2000 election respectively. The negative percentage ratio rates of an average of the effect size scores were 25%: 25%: 50%
of the respondents. This meant that a negative percent rate of an average of the effect size score existed in the 2000 elections.

The negative percentage rate of high of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992. The 1996 election of negative per cent rate of high on the impact size score was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative per cent rate of high of the effect size score was 100% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size scores were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percent rate of high of the effect size of the nomination criteria of candidates in the 2000 election.

The negative percent rate of the very high of the effect size was 67.3% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative per cent of very high rate of the impact score was 13.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative per cent of very high rate of the impact size score was 18.4% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of very high of the impact size scores were 67.3%: 13.3%: 18.4% of the respondents respectively. This meant a negative percent of the very high of the impact was prevalent in the 1992 elections. In the 1996 elections, the opposition parties were constrained to make any serious impact on the election. They all had sordid experience of acute shortage of funds as compared to the NDC the ruling government.
3.8. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION

How was the impartiality, independence, specialization of the electoral management bodies and auxiliary institutions impact on the election?

The positive impact of the EC impartiality, independence, specialization on the elections.

The positive percentage of the effect size of the respondents was 34.0% of the respondents in 1992. The 1996 positive percent of the effects size score was 38.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage of the effect size score was 27.7% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio of the impact size scores was 34.0%: 38.3%: 27.7% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a positive per cent of the impact was prevalent in the 1992 election followed by the 1996 election.

Considering the Fourth Republican Constitution provision and the Electoral Commission Act of the 1993, it contained an overt provision designed to secure the autonomy and independence of the Electoral Commission. Primarily, it was specifically not subject to any internal or external influence, control or direction of the Executive, government institution or agency whatsoever. Secondly, the seven members appointed as Chairmen enjoyed a secured tenure of office once they were appointed by the Executive (President), they could not be dismisses unless under infirmity or insanity confirmed by an independent medical board. Thirdly, the Electoral Commission’s expenses was charged from the Consolidated Fund. The procedure or the appointment of its members permitted some degree of the Presidential influence or parliamentary influence through insufficient funding of the EC for
its operations. However, their appointment was subject to the approval of the Council of
State consultative consent, partly by election and by appointment to counsel the president
and other state institutions in the execution of their functions. Relevantly, the Chairman of
the EC, formerly the Deputy Chairman of the INEC, was generally believed to be a pro-
Rawlings’-NDC sympathizer. Afari-Gyan disproved this notion to the opposition leaders
by discharging his duties responsibly. The most vital was the EC’s decision to hold the
elections concurrently rather than the staggered election in 1992 for both the presidential
and parliamentary elections as proposed by the opposition parties, but against the NDC’s
wishes (Jeffries, 1998).

The EC went ahead to decisively implement a fraud-proof processes and procedures than
in 1992, and administered these with the most improved efficacy. What factors facilitated
the above decisions? It is insufficient, to make reference to the constitutional provisions
alone, assuming the position of the frequency with which African governments have
trampled over these. The NDC government was ready to lend its support to the numerous
measures designed to make sure technically the elections were free and fair. Due diligence
of the duo key considerations was operating under these considerations (Jeffries, 1998).

The Electoral Commission salvaged its name by taking concrete steps designed to enhance
its transparency in the electoral process and procedures, guard against electoral
malpractices, and reassure the opposition parties and the nation of its capability and
maintenance of its mandate stipulated by the constitution f the nation (Jeffries, 1998).
The negative impact of the EC’s impartiality, independence, and specialization on the elections.

Additionally, the negative percentage of the effect size score was 63.6% of the respondents in 1992, the 1996 negative per cent of the effect size score was 18.2% of the respondents, and the 2000 negative per cent of the effect size score mark was 18.2% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio of the impact size score were 63.6%:18.2%:18.2% of the respondents. It meant only 1992 had a negative per cent of the impact of impartiality, independence, and specialization on the election.

**Qualitative impact:** The general implication was that, a positive and a negative impact was in existence on the EC’s impartiality, independence, and specialization. The electoral administration was efficient, effective in the formulation of its rules, rules application, and rules enforcement on the elections in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 election. There was proper coordination of activities in the administration of these elections. There was an adequate detection of ballots; incomplete and inaccurate voter rolls; voter registration; the revision of voter register; detecting counting error of votes cast (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002:5-27). Electoral governance outlined procedural certainty to ensure functional uncertainty of the election’s outcome in electoral managements. This in effect required central coordination and strategic planning. The principle of universal adult suffrage and equal participation demands accessibility to delimited boundaries nationwide; adequate staffing of EMBs; training of staffs; decentralization and devolution of powers to authorities to manage constituencies. Furthermore, Political neutrality; adherence to code of conduct; impartiality and de-politicization were the hallmark for Ghana’s credible elections. Indeed, Ghana’s electoral management was characterized by these normative principles. Ghana’s
EMBs practice public accountability, which constrained normative principles and public rule applications that enhanced the quality of elections. This was done through justification of actions; enforcement of rules and accountability to the public for any action taken by the EC (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002).

Paradoxically, the researcher reiterates that, the EC cannot be independent in the electoral management of the nation because the EC received its funding from an approved government budget and funds from the donor community. These domestic politicians undermine the EC’s operational capacity in electoral governance by under-funding the EC. In this respect, the EC operated under extreme harsh conditions characterized by the procurement of non-standardized election material or run short of election material. Again, the EC operated by engaging the services of temporary electoral officials who were paid wages for the services rendered to the EC on behalf nation. The bottom line of the issue goes that adequate motivation breeds job satisfaction that translates into high job performance. The most common observation is that these labor engagements under poor motivation, led to job dissatisfaction, and optimally poor job performance. Other members’ of the workers divulged electoral secrets to political parties who cheat the system in their favor (Focus Group Discussion, 2012).

Even though the donor community was interested in democracy enlargement, they have their national interest at the behest of these interventions. These latent interests underscore most industrialized nations AID policies for which they sponsored these elections. In this respect, therefore, donors meddle in the domestic politics of satellite nation with impunity.
This is because they are the core sponsors of these elections. For example, in the 2000 election, Craig Murray, the British High Commissioner to Ghana demonstrated this phenomenon in Ghana’s election (Ibid, 2012).

In 1992, an Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) was set up in November 1991 for the responsibility of conducting the referendum and the presidential and parliamentary elections in a staggered manner scheduled in November and December 1992. The Executive Chairman of the INEC (Justice J. Ofori-Boateng) and his two Deputies (Afari-Gyan, and Nana Oduro Numapau) were appointed by the PNDC regime, the opposition leaders raised no objection to the appointment (Op.cit, 2012).

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact of the EC’s impartiality, independence, and specialization on the elections.

The positive percent of very low of the effect rate size was 25% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In 1996, the positive percent of very low rate of the impact size was 34.5% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive per cent of very low rate of the impact size score was 40.5% of the respondents. The positive per cent rate of very low of the effect rates impact size scores were 25%: 34.5%: 40.5% of the respondents respectively. This meant a positive per cent rate of very low of the effect of independence, impartiality and specialization of the EC’s worker existed in the 2000 election.
The positive percentage rate of low of the impact size score in the 1992 election was 100% of the respondents. In 1996, the positive per cent of low rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive per cent of low rate of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents. The corresponding positive per cent ratio rates of low of the effect size scores were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. The implication was that there existed a positive low rate of the impact of the EC’s impartiality, independence and specialization in the 1992 election only.

The positive percentage rate of an average of the effect size score was 40% of the respondents in 1992. In 1996, the positive per cent of an average rate of the impact size score was 20% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive per cent of an average rate of the effect size score was 40% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of an average of the effect size scores in these elections were 40%:20%:40% of the respondents respectively. A par outcome of the impact assessment of the EC’s impartiality, independence and specialization existed in the 1992 and the 2000 elections.

Not all, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size score was 33.3% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive per cent of the high rate of the effect size score was 48.1% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive per cent of the high rate of the impact size score was 18.5% of the respondents. The correspondeents’ positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size score marks were 33.3%:48.1%:18.5% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a positive per cent rate of high of the EC’s independence, impartiality and specialization was prevalent on the 1996 elections.
The positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size mark was 22.2% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the positive per cent rate of very high of the effect size score was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive per cent of very high rate of the impact size score was 44.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size marks were 22.2%:33.3%:44.4% of the respondents in 1992, 1996, and 2000 respectively. The implication was that there was a different rate of responses from 1992-2000. The rationale behind this success in the 2000 elections were due to the general improvement of the electoral procedure and processes nationwide in the pre-election, election day activities, and post-election activities.

If negative, how was its rate of impact of the election?

The negative rate of the EC’s independence, impartiality and specialization on Ghana’s election.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size score in 1992 was 100% of the respondents. In 1996, the negative per cent of low very rate of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage of very low rate of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size scores were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. It meant a negative percentage rate of very low of the electoral Management Body existed in a very low note on the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992. The negative per cent of low rated of the effect size grade was 33.3% of the respondents in 1996, and the negative per cent of low rate of the impact size mark was
33.3% of the respondents in the 2000 election. The negative percentage ratio rates of low
the impact scores were 33.3%: 33.3%: 33.3% of the respondents respectively. The
implication was a par rate of low effect was prevalent in these elections.

Additionally, the negative percentage of an average rate of the effect size score was 50% of
the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of an average
rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the
negative percentage of an average rate of the impact size score was 50% of the
respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of an average of the effect size score were
50%:0%:50% of the respondents respectively. A cursory look at the figures revealed a par
negative per cent of an average of the effect of the 1992 and the 2000 on the election.

Furthermore, the negative percentage of the high rate of the effect size score was 33.3% of
the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the negative per cent of the high rate of the
impact size score was 66.7% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative per
cent of the high rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative
percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size marks were 33.3%:66.7%: 0% of the
respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percent of high of the impact
size of the independence, neutrality and specialization existed in the 1996 election. The
negative aspects of the responses were due to mass rigging; sloppy voter registration;
arthritic party registration and candidate registration (Burnell, 2004: Carter Center, 1992).

The very high rate of the negative percentage of the effect size was 70% of the respondents
in the 1992 election. The very high rate of the impact size score in negative percentage was
20% of the respondents in 1996, and the very high rate in negative percentage of the effect size was 10% of the respondents in the 2000 election. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact scores were 70%: 20%; 10% of the respondents respectively. From the above, the negative per cent rate of very highly of the effect size existed in the EC’s neutrality, specialization and independence on the 1992 election.

**How was the impact of donor assistance on the election?**

**The positive impact of electoral assistance on the election.**

The positive per cent of the effect size score in 1992 was 36.6% of the respondents, in 1996, the positive percentage score of the effect size was 36.6% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage of the impact size score was 26.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratios of the effect size scores were 36.6%:36.6%:26.8 of the respondents respectively. The general implication indicated that a tier in the positive per cent of the effect size of donor assistance on the 1992 and the 1996 election. The discussion below sought to evaluate the breakdown of such support on the elections under discussion.

**The negative impact of electoral assistance on the elections.**

On the other hand, the negative percentage of the effect size score was 53.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage of the effect size score value was 13.3% of the respondents. The negative percentage of the effect size ratio rates were 53.3%:33.3%:13.3% of the respondents respectively. The broader implication of the negative percentage of the impact of donor assistance on the election existed.
Qualitative impact: The implied effect was that a positive impact existed on donor assistance for these elections. Considering the percentage effect a negative impact existed in the 1992 election and the 2000 elections, however, a comparison of the percentage rates of respondents in this circumstance was factored in order to decide the outcome. In this respect, therefore, a positive effect was found, with some degree of negativity. The negative in 1992 was due to the time for the election as the election was rushed within a limited time frame (Carothers 1999). That of 1996 was partly due to limited funds to administer the election; unequal access to the mass media, limited existence of private media outlets for the opposition to campaign; poor campaign strategies of the opposition parties; non-institutionalization of political parties; abuse of incumbency; retail corruption; and wholesale corruption in the system in the researcher’s opinion. For example, a research conducted on access to the state owned media revealed an unimpressive outcome. According to the (Ghana Academy of Art and Science 1993:19), the proceedings of parliamentary debate have been always unpublished for the consumption of the electorate through radio, television and the print media. The electorates, like parliament are components and collaborative partners as agents of democracy. By that, the government can lose sympathy, confidence and support of the electorate and no government that came to power through the ballot can hold such loses without concern. These media reportage was supposed to be objective, fair, balance and transparent. However, the activities of the media in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections were unprofessional and non-objective. The private radios were antagonistic to the incumbent party; the state-owned media supported the ruling party (Electoral Commission 2001:64-65).
The Media organized the national forum by the Ghana Journalist Association (GJA), Freedom Forum (FF) and the GBC. It brought all political parties presidential candidate at a forum to answer questions on national issues from journalist and the general public, it was a live broadcast (Electoral Commission of Ghana 2001:68). In a focus group discussion, the local Christian Council bodies, the Ahmaddiya Moslem Groups, and other Community Based Organizations, they said that, the media reportage in the 1992 and 1996 was elite centered. They noted that, most of the information on the election was disseminated in English language in the media. This was a period when private radio stations and TV outlets were non-existent to disseminate electoral issues in the Ghanaian languages to further sensitize the illiterate population was a contributing factor for the abysmal negative impact and very low and low effect of donor assistance on election as exemplified in the rates (Ghana Academy of Art and Science, 1993). This reflected in the very low, low and the average impact rating in the subsequent section.

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

The positive percent of very the low rate of the impact size score was 56% of the respondents in 1992. The positive percent of very the low rate of the effect size grade was 15.6% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent of very the low rate of the effect size mark was mark was 28.4% of the respondents respectively. The positive percentage ratio rates of the very low of the impact size marks were 56%: 15.6%: 28.4% of the respondents. By implication therefore, only the 1992 election had a positive effect of donor assistance to the EC on the election.
The positive percentage rate of the low of the effect size value was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the positive percent of the low rate of the impact size effect was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of the low rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size score marks were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. The implied impact was a positive percentage rate of low of the effect size in the 1992 election.

Again, the positive percentage rate of an average of the size mark in 1992 was 25.5% of the respondents, in 1996, the positive percentage of an average rate of the effect size score was 25.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage of an average rate of the impact size mark was 50.0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect size scores were 25%:25%:50% of the respondents. The implication was a positive percent of an average of the impact on the 2000 elections. The reason was due to the improvement in the election environment, rooting of the decentralized Electoral Commission; and the proliferation of mass media (Iddrisu 2012).

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size score was 36.8% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, the positive percent of the high rate of the effect size mark was 52.6% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of the high rate of the effect size value was 10.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rate of the high of the effect size marks were 36.8%:52.6%:10.5% of the respondents respectively. This meant a high effect on the 2000 election.
Not all, the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 37.5% of the respondents in 1992. The value in 1996, the positive percent rate of very high of the effect size was 25% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive parentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 37.5% of the respondents. The correlated positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size marks were 37.5%:25%:37.5% of the respondents respectively. A tier of the outcome of the positive impact size of the effect was prevalent in the 1992 and the 2000 election.

**Qualitative impact:** The above reasons above were applicable in this section as well. This was due to poor political party institutionalization; a properly anchored party system, and the availability of election material. Again, domestic election Observers presence and their knowledge of the local environs and the socio-culture of the terrain enabled them to monitor and observed the election adequately. Additional to the above was the transmission of education in the English language which was further dissected and explained in the local dialects; and the springing up of Civil Society Organization as an electoral advocacy role in policy refinement and redirection to strengthen quality elections as noted by the Christian Council in Tamale and Wa in a Focus Group Discussion.

**If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The negative impact of donors’ electoral assistance in these elections.**

Also, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent rate of very low of the impact size value was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent rate of very low of the effect
size record was 100% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size records were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents. The implication was a very low of negative of the effect was observed in the 2000 election because of voter apathy.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the negative percent of the low rate of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative of low rate of the effect size mark was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size values were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage of low rate in the above was due to rigging of elections; intimidation of electorates; ballot snatching and uneven access to the media by the opposition to air out their opinions on national policies was inaccessible; coupled with multiple voter registration and multiple elections which was against the principle of one man one vote.

The negative percent of an average rate of the impact size score was 27.6% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the negative percent of an average rate of the effect size mark was 27.6% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage of an average rate of the impact size grade was 44.8% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage ratio rate of an average of the impact size score were 27.6%: 27.6%: 44.8% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage rate of an average of the impact size of donor assistance to the EC was prevalent on the 1992 election.
The negative percentage rate of high of the effect size mark was 20% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of high of the effect size value was 80% of the respondents, and in 2000, and the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The corresponding negative percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size scores were 20%:80%:0% of the respondents. The reasons have been discussed in the positive and the negative impact size column of the discussion. This meant a negative percent of high of the impact size existed in the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 75% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 25% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The related negative percentage ratio rates of very high impact size marks were 75%: 25%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that the impact declined over the election years in negative impact of donor assistance on Ghana’s elections, however, the 1992 election had a negative percent size rate of the impact on the election.

How was the impact of the competence of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) staffs on the election?

The positive impact of the EMBs competence on the elections.

The positive percentage of the impact size value was 40.8% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the effect size score was 34.7% of the respondents, and the positive percent of the impact size mark was 24.5% of the respondents in the 2000
The positive percentage ratio rates of the scores were 40.8%:34.7%:24.5% of the respondents respectively. It meant a positive impact of the EMBs competence existed in the 1992 election.

**The negative impact of the competence of the EMBs on these elections.**
The negative percentage of the impact size record was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the effect size record was 33.3% of the respondents, and the negative percent of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents in the 2000 election. The negative percentage ratio rates of the impact size marks were 33.3%; 33.3%:33.3% of the respondents respectively. The subsequent aspect analyses the rate of effect size in the very low, average, high, and very high effect size scores in positive terms expressed in percentage, and its ratio values.

The implication was that the EMBs labor force was both competent and incompetent. This brought about the efficiency, effectiveness, ineffectiveness, and inefficiency of the workforce of the EMBs on the elections, which produced both credible election and flawed elections in Ghana’s 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections. It meant the EMBs officials were properly recruited, well trained, and had most of the logistic needed for their job (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). They exhibited some degree of specialization in their operation that led to quality elections (Interview, 2012).
If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact of the EC’s competence on the election.

The positive percent rate of very low of the impact score was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of very low of the effect grade was 33.3% of the respondents and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of very low of the impact size mark was 33/3% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the very low impact scores were 33.3%: 33.3%: 33.3% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a par positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was prevalent in all the elections.

The positive percentage rate of low rate of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in 1992, the positive percent rate low on the impact size record was 0% of the respondents in 1996, and the positive rate of the low of the effect size value was 0% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of the effect size scores were 100%:0:0% of the respondents respectively. This meant a low effect in the competence of the EMBs workers in 1992. The cause was due to the short time given for the election and human errors because of their non-inexperienced on the job.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size score was 26.1% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the average rate of the impact size value was 56.5% of the respondents, and the positive percent rate of the average of the effect size figure was 17.4% of the respondents respectively. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect size records were 26.1%: 56.5%:17.4% of the respondents respectively. This implies that a positive percent of an average of the impact in 1996 election existed.
This was due the fact that most workers had gained some degree of savvy in their work, which brought about efficiency in their duties.

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size mark in 1992 was 60% of the respondents, in 1996, the value of the positive percent rate of high of the impact size was 26.7% of the respondents, the positive percent rate of high of the effect size score was 17.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size marks were 60%; 26.7%:17.4% of the respondents respectively. This meant a high competence level of the positive percent of the impact of the EMBs workers in 1992.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact rate value was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992. The positive percent of the very high rate of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1996, and the positive percent value of very high rate of the impact size was 66.7% of the respondents in the 2000 election. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size records were 33.3%: 0%: 66.7% of the respondents respectively. It meant a positive percent rate of very high of the impact of the EC workers competence was translated on the election.

**Qualitative Impact:** This meant the EMB labor had a very high competence rate in the 2000 election. The major causes were due to the experience gained in the field; adequate funding; available of logistic to hold elections; and availability of transport to cart electoral materials to decentralized centers. Also, the elimination of human error and equipment errors due to experiences gained on the job; and the long time frame to plan on how the election should be conducted in an interview Mr. Yahaya in Upper West Region and in the
Northern Region with Mr. Ockraine on 28th December 2011 in Tamale, and 14 January 2012 in Wa.

If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative percent rate of the competence of the EC workers in the election.

The negative percentage rate of the very low of the effect size marks was 0% of the respondents in 1992. The negative percent of the very low rate of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents in 1996, and in 2000, the negative percent of the very low rate of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the very low of the effect size scores were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that in the 2000 election, there was a low effect size.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size record was 0% of the respondents in 1992, the negative percent of the low rate of the effect size mark was 100% of the respondents in 1996 and in 2000, and the negative percent of the low rate of the impact size record was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the low of the effect size scores were 0%:100%:0% of the respondents respectively. This meant that a negative percent of a low rate of the effect of the competence of the EC labor was located in the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of the average of the effect size value was 50% of the respondents in 1992. The 1996 negative percent rate of the average of the impact size was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, and the negative percent of the average rate of the effect size value was 16.7% of the respondents in the election year. The negative
percentage ratio rates of an average of the impact size scores were 50%: 33.3%: 16.7% of the respondents respectively. From the figures above, a negative impact of the EC’s labour’s competence was in the 1992 election.

The negative percent of the high rate of the impact score was 0% of the respondents in 1992, the negative percent of the high rate of the respondents was 25% of the respondents in the 1996 election, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent of the high rate of the effect mark was 75% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rate of the high of the impact size grades were 0%: 25%: 75% of the respondents respectively. Only the 2000 election had a negative impact of the ECs’ competence on the election.

The negative percentage rate of the effect of very high rate was 20% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of the very high of the effect size was 25% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent of the very highest rates of the impact mark was 55% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the effect size marks were 20%: 25%: 55% of the respondents respectively. In meant only the 2000 election had a negative percent of competence in the election.

**Qualitative impact:** There were varied impact sizes in all the three elections as an implication with 1992 ranked as the most average impact rate. This was followed by 1996. The causal factor owes to the inexperienced nature of the EC labor; and poor logistical availability. This was perhaps due to the run-off election. The labor forces of the EC were
tired as a result of the workload emanating from the holding the election on 7th December and 21st December. This led to some degree of job burnout; poor motivation; poor job satisfaction; poor performance emanated from stress and job burnout, and its attendant depersonalization experienced by the election officials. The next level studies the reliability, updating of the voter register’s effect of positive and negative size scores for the elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000 respectively (Interview and Focus Group Discussion, 2012).

3.9. VOTER REGISTRATION, EDUCATION AND PARTICIPATION.

How the update and reliability of the voter was register impact in the election?

The positive impact of voter registration updates, and the reliability of voter registers of the election.

The percentage positive of the effect value was 37.2% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the effect size score was 41.9% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent of the effect mark was 20.9% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect size values were 37.2%: 41.9%: 20.9% of the respondents respectively. From the table above, only 1996 had a reliable update of the voter register on the election.

The negative impact of the update and reliability of the voter registers on the elections.

The negative percentage of the impact size score was 46.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the impact size score was 13.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent of the effect size score was 40% of the respondents. The
negative percentage ratio of the effect scores were 46.7%:13.3%:40% of the respondents respectively. The implication was a negative effect of the update and reliability of the voter register existed in the 1992 and the 2000 election. The next table discusses the positive rate of very low; low; average; high; and very high impact size scores of the positive impact analyzed above. The reliability and update of the voter register for the period under review.

There existed an opposition public outcry of accepting the outcome of the election results. The opposition leaders noted that, there was a massive vote rigging in favor of Rawlings and the NDC. However, this was inconceivable to many observers because of the processes and procedures employed by INEC to halt such electoral malpractices. On April 7th, 1993, the famous “Stolen Verdict” presented an evidential compilation of ballot rigging to the advantage of Ft Lt Jerry John Rawlings. However, these evidences were frivolous, unsubstantiated; but with a minimal margin of impressiveness; unrealistic, unjustifiably and inconclusive. The opposition public outcry of a penalty play, centered on the size of the voter register, and of which, they submitted two distinct complaints (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The first was that, several eligible voters with an anti-PNDC sympathies have not registered because the voter register was drawn out of the District Assembly elections of December 1988 to March 1989, and prayed that, those voters who wished, and by abstention to protest against the refusal of the P(NDC) regime to democratize completely. In October 1991, prior to the election, and in the preparation of the referendum on the proposed constitution, the INEC sensitized that the voters register was exhibited for
verification and authentication of names, eligible voters whose names were omitted, committed in errors; ambiguity of biographical data was constitutionally mandated as a civic responsibility to register. Numerous exile Ghanaians were disenfranchised before their return to Ghana to participate in the election. This begs a wonderful question. Was it the fault of the Electoral Commission or Rawlings’ P (NDC) for the late return of exile returnees? The answer was obviously No. Every election and its activities are time bound, and if those dissident never reported early enough to register, then, sorry to mention that they exhibited maximum irresponsibility in the highest sense of nationalism; civic responsibility and patriotism (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive impact of the update and reliability of the voter register on the elections.

The very low rate of the impact value in positive percentage was 35.7% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percent of the effect of rate of very low score was 27.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent of the impact rate of very low mark was 37% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the very low of the impact grades were 35.7%: 27.3%: 37% of the respondents respectively. It meant there was reliability on the update of the voters register in the 2000 election.

The positive percent rate of low of the effect size record in 1992 was 0% of the respondents, in 1996, the positive percent of low rate of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of low rate of the effect size mark was
66.7% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size values were 0%: 33.3%: 66.7% of the respondents respectively. The implication was a low rated impact of low was prevalent in the in the 2000 elections only.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the effect size record was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of average rate of the impact size score was 87.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of average rate of the effect size value was 12.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the average of the impact size scores were 0%: 87.5%: 12.5% of the respondents respectively. This meant that there was an average rate of average impact of the update and reliability of the voter register on the election in the 2000 election.

The positive percentage rate of high on the impact size score was 46.2% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive rate of high of the effect size value was 38.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive on the high rate of the impact size record was 15.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size records were 46.2%: 38.5%: 15.4% of the respondents respectively. This meant that a rated positive of the effects of voter register update and reliability was in the 1992 election, followed by the 1996 election.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size records was 60% of the respondents in 1992, the positive percent rate of very high of the effect size in 1996, was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of very high rate of the impact size effect was 40% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of very high of the
effect size values were 60%:0%:40% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a very high rate of the effect of voter registers’ update and reliability was present in the 1992 election, followed by the 2000 elections.

The EC employed diverse designed measures to enhance the entire electoral process, guard against electoral malpractices, and to reassure the opposition parties, donor communities and the nation of holding a quality election in 1996. To achieve the above, the EC compiled a fresh voter register in October 1995, the registration was strictly monitored by party and parliamentary candidates and their agents with the list subsequently exhibited at the registration center for examination by the voters and political parties. This brought the voter register to an aggregate of nine million and twenty three thousand (9.23 million) names. A subsequent supplementary registration exercise in August was conducted in 1996 for those who were not eligible at the age of 18 years to register as at 1995, for some good reasons were incapable to register in 1995. This registration exercise of voters’ registered was twenty five thousand (25,000) names, making a summation of the registered voters to 9.27 million. However, the opposition party raised a suspicious eye browse about the necessity and purpose of the supplementary registration; they finally declared themselves content with the register (Jeffries, 1998).

If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative impact of the update and reliability of the voters register.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size score was 25% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of very low of the impact size record was 25% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative
percent rate of very low of the impact size of the respondents was 50% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low impact size scores were 25%:25:50% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative impact on the update and reliability of the voters register existed only in the 2000 election.

The negative percentage rate of low rate of the impact size was 100% of the respondents in 1992, the negative percent rate of low of the effect size grade in 1996 was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent rate of low of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size records were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a low negative impact of the update and reliability of the voters register existed in the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of the average of the effect size mark was 75% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the negative percent of the average rate of the impact size of the respondents was 0% of the respondents, and the 2000 election the negative percent rate of the average rate of the effect size record was 25% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the average of the impact size records were 75%:0%:25% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that an average of the impact was found in the 1992 election on the update and reliability of the voters register on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of the high rate of the effect size score was 42.9% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of high of the impact size mark was 28.6% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent rate
of high of the effect size score was 28.6% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high on the impact size records were 42.9%: 28.6%: 28.6% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative impact of the update and reliability of the voters register existed in the 1992 election.

The negative percentage of very high rate of the effect size score was 30% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of very high of the impact score was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect marks was 70% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the very high of the effect grades were 30%:0%: 70% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative of very high rate of an impact existed in the 2000 election on the reliability of the update of the voters register.

**Qualitative impact:** The next area of discussion dwells on the use of the Optical Magnetic Ray (OMR), which scanned the Certified Marks Recognition (CMR) form of the electorates’ biographical data information and was onward processed for the election, and the other equipment in the computerization of voter register from 1992-2000 election years. The positive aspect of the impact was due to the early detection of internal deficiencies; errors and inaccuracies. Additional to the above was, a good coordination of established stability frameworks for electoral competition; experience of workers of the EC; easy mobility and access to inaccessible terrain by the EC; good observer Mission's role during the registration of voters; cleaning of voters register; and updating of the voter register of ghost names. In addition, political parties and the EC unacceptability of minor’s
registration and adequacies of electoral material were the major cause as hinted in an interview in the Ashanti Region and Brong Ahafo Region by the regional Director in February and March 2012 (Interview, 2012).

The negative effects on the election were due to internal deficiencies; errors and inaccuracies; bad/poor coordination of established stability frameworks for electoral contests; inaccessibility to polling stations known as overseas; human and machine errors. Furthermore, mass rigging; sloppy voter registration; intimidations of voters; poor education of the electoral processes; elites centered voter education; non-use of local dialect in the educational processes and procedures of the elections; delays in funding the EC; and the insufficiency of funds to the EC led to the negative impact of the elections (Burnell, 2004; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002).

The opposition claimed inflation of the statistical figures of the electoral voters roll led to double registration for the District Assembly election and the referendum, and to a minimal degree from registration officials bloating up their local population to gain advantage for district status and the provision of services. The cleaning of the voter register by the INEC was obviously incomplete and left several inaccuracies. The International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) based in Washington visited Ghana in April to May 1992, made a feasibility study, and concluded in their report that errors were due to misinformation rather than attempts to affect the results, a verdict which gain the support of COG. INEC’s refusal to undertake a re-registration of all eligible voters in order to draw up an entirely fresh voter roll was premise on the huge cost and the consequences and impracticability of the exercise (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).
How the voter register was inflated was not the salient argument. The paramount consideration was how it could have affected the election process and procedures. Unfortunately, eligible voters were not issued with Identity Cards to protect and prevent any for impersonation, in the major towns such as Accra and other cities (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The flawed electoral voter register compiled in 1987 by the NCD was approximately 5.9 million voters. The request for a fresh voter register was met by NCD allowing eligible voters who never registered in the previous registration to register. This gave an estimated registered electorate to a sum of 8.4 million voters. The International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) questioned the reflectiveness of the voter register, pointing among other things: ghost names in the 1987 voter register were not deleted; omission of eligible names that brought their registration slips were omitted from the voter register; and the voter register was bloated. The IFES recommended that, a correction of the voter register was impossibly “impracticable”. The IFES therefore called for a re-registration exercise altogether of all eligible voters as a matter of electoral expediency in the democratic electoral management of the election. The INEC took steps to expunge 200,000 names from the voter register leaving an estimated over-bloated and over-registration of 1.4 million. As Folson had noted, the voter register and the handling of the transition amounted to rigging akin to what actually transpired on the Election Day. The PNDC rebutted that, the exercise was much expensive and would delay the transition process in the 1992 elections (Oquaye, 1995)
How was the measure to the prevention of fraud impacted on the election?

The positive impact of the prevention of fraud in the election, such as in voter registration, and the cast of votes in the election.

The record of a positive percentage of the impact size mark was 43.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the effect size score was 37% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of the impact grade was 19.6% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of positive percent of the effect scores size were 43.5%:37%:19.6% of the respondents. The implied impact was that a positive of the effect of fraud prevention was found in the 1992 and elections, but a lesser effect on the 2000 elections.

The negative impact of fraud prevention in the elections.

The percentage of negative of the impact size grade was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the effect size value was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent of the effect size value was 33.3% of the value. The negative percentage ratio of the effect size value were 33.3%:33.3%:33.3% of the respondents respectively. There existed a par negative impact size in all the elections in the prevention of electoral fraud in the elections.

The transparency of the votes cast, ballots counted of votes was so effective a safeguard against any possible widespread illicit electoral practice of the poll. The ballot boxes and polling station were habitually opened in the full view of the public, the counts were conducted in the open space for every person present to see and the general public were available when the results were collated at each constituency level. Several instances of
electoral irregularities of the presiding officer’s failure to abide by the stipulated procedures undoubtedly were recorded. There were many instances in which ballot papers were found discarded. The flawed electoral register disenfranchised several electorate who could not trace their names or incapable to cast their votes in time before the polls closed for the election (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact of fraud prevention in the elections.

The positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size record was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of very low of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent of very low of the effect size grade was 100% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the impact size marks were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents. It implied there was a very low positive of the effect on fraud prevention in the 2000 elections.

The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of low of the effect size mark was 33.3% of the respondents in 1996, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of low of the impact size grade was 66.7% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size marks were 0%:33.3%:66.7% of the respondents. There was a positive of low rate of fraud prevention in the 2000 national elections in Ghana.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size mark was 27.8% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of average of the effect size mark
was 61.1% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of average of the impact size was 11.1% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the effect size records were 27.8%:61.1%:11.1% of the respondents. This meant that a positive of average of the impact size was prevalent in the 1996 election on fraud prevention in the election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size mark was 66.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of high of the impact size mark was 23.8% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage of high rate of the impact size score was 9.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size grades were 66.7%:23.8%:9.5% of the respondents. There was a positive of high of the impact of fraud prevention in the 1992 election than the other elections.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size mark was 25% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 75% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size marks were 25%:0%:75% of the respondents. In the 2000 election, a positive of very high rate of the effects of fraud prevention worked efficiently and effectively as the implication. The next evaluation is the rated effects in negative terms of the impact on the elections.
If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

**The negative impact of fraud prevention in the election.**

This part evaluates the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size score was 25% of the respondents in 1992. In 1996; the negative percentage of very low rate of the impact size value was 25% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of negative very low of the effect size scores were 25%:25%:50% of the respondents. The rated comparison implied a tier in the effects in all but the 2000 election. Only in 1996 was there significant average impact electoral fraud prevention.

The negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 33% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size record was 47% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 20% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size marks were 33%: 47%: 20% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative rate of low of the effect on the prevention of fraud in the elections was prevalent in the 1996 election only.

The negative percentage rate of average of the effect size grade was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage of average rate of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size score was 50% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the effect size marks were 50%:0%:50% of the respondents. The implication was that a par
rate of average of the effect size rate of was prevalent in the 1992 and the 2000 elections in negative terms in fraud prevention on the elections..

The negative percentage rate of high of the effect size grade was 0% of the respondents in 1992, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size mark was 100% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage of high rate of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size scores were 0%; 100%:0% of the respondents. There was a negative of high rate of the impact size of fraud prevention in the 1996 elections.

The negative percentage of very high rate of the impact size grade was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect mark was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size grades was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size scores were 100%:0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative of very high rate of the impact was prevalent in the 1992 election on fraud prevention.

**Qualitative impact:** The fact was that, several minors and ineligible voters registered for the election. The reasons were that, voter ID cards were used for other purposes either than elections. Political parties’ encouraged their members and sympathizers to register and to cast their votes, and to assisted the EC in cleaning the voter register off multiple registration; minors names; ghost names and all forms of illicit election practices in an interview (2012).
Despite numerous mechanism put in place to halt illicit electoral practices, the voter register was bloated with ghost names that were not expunged from the voters register; minors registered and cast their votes. Additionally, multiple registration in the same polling station and cross polling station were present, and voter intimidation during voter registration and the day of voting were the causal factors of the negative impact of fraud prevention in the elections (Focus Group Discussion, 2012).

**How was the impact of the eligibility criteria of voters in the election?**

**The positive impact of eligibility criteria voters in the election.**

The positive percentage rate of the impact size was 35.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the effect size score was 35.6% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent of the impact size grade was 26.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio figures of the impact size scores were 35.7%:35.6%:26.8% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percent of the impact of eligibility criteria on the election.

**The negative impact of eligibility criteria of voters in the election.**

The percentage negative of the outcome of the impact size value was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the effect size grade was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percent of the impact size record was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio values of the impact size were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative effect of eligibility criteria existed in the 1992 election.
If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact of eligibility criteria of voters in the election.

The positive percent of very low rate of the effect size mark was 15% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of very low rate of the impact size mark was 25% of the respondents and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of very low of the effect score was 60% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rate of very low of the impact size grades were 15%: 25%: 60% of the respondents respectively. It meant a positive percent of very low rate of the effect size prevailed in the 2000 election on eligibility criteria on the election.

Additionally, the positive percentage rate of low of the effect size mark was 50% of the respondents in 1992, the positive rate of low percent of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents in 1996, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of low of the effect size grade was 50% of the respondents. The positive percentage rates of low of the effect size figures were 50%:0%:50% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that, there was a positive rate of low of the impact size of eligibility criteria in the election in 1992 and 2000 elections. This led to the ushering in of the NDC government into power in 1992, and peaceful turnover in 2000.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size mark was 30.4% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of the average of the impact size score was 47.8% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of the average of the impact size mark was 21.7% of the respondents respectively. The positive percentage ratio rate of an average of the impact size scores were 30.4%:47.8%:21.7% of
the respondents respectively. The implication was that in 1996, there was a positive percent of average rate of the effect size on the eligibility criteria of candidates for the election.

The positive percentage distribution of the rate of high of the effect size score was 45.8% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of high on the impact size score was 29.2% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of high of the effect size score was 25.0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size grades were 45.8%:29.2%: 25.0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that in the year’s 1992 election, the positive percent rate of high of the impact existed on the eligibility criteria for the elections.

Furthermore, the positive percentage rate of the very high of the impact size record was 20% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the very high rate of the impact size score was 40% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of the very high rate of the effect size value was 40% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the very high of the effect size grades were 20%:40%:40% of the respondents respectively. There was a par positive rate of the very high of the impact size mark in 1996 and the 2000 election.

This meant a positive percentage of the impact size was prevalent in the 1996 and 2000 elections on the eligibility criteria of the electors for the election. The presence of international observer missions and domestic observer mission; detection of sloppy registration; arthritic voter registration and political party registration accounted for this effects.
This meant a negative response was eminent in the 1992 election. The main causal factors of this negative effects size was because of the absence of Civil Society Organization to monitor the election; and to serve as advocates for a peaceful and transparent electoral processes and procedures. The absence of media watchdog role in the electoral processes and procedures and the remnant of the military regime in the nation led to the flawed election. The National Peace Council Ag Secretary (Alhassan Bashiru 2012) in Sunyani noted this on the 3rd of February 2012 in an interview.

Again, this was because of the presents of domestic observer mission on the election from 1996 to 2000; the justice system upheld the rule of law by respecting the canons of majority rule and minority rights; the right of representation; cum the ruling that all eligible voters without photo ID card must cast their vote. Another consideration was the judiciary administrations’ respect for media freedom and equal access to the state owned media (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001:102-117). This retained the ruling government (NDC) in power for an Eight years mandate, but ouster in a peaceful turnover in the 2000 election.

This meant that there existed a very high rate on the eligibility measures for candidates and the electorates during the electoral processes and procedures. The 1992 retained the government of the NDC, whilst the 2000 very high effect brought about a peaceful turnover of the NPP, equally, some parliamentary candidates lost their seat to new parliamentarians in the 1996 and the 2000 elections.
If negative, how was its rate of impact of the election?

The negative impact of eligibility criteria of voters in the election.

Its negative percentage of very low rate of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent rate of very low of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent rate of very low of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size scores were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents. The implication was a negative of very low percent of the effect size in the 1992 election on eligibility criteria in the elections.

The negative percentage rate of low of the impact size grade was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of low of the effect size was 75% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent rate of low of the effect size was 25% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio of low rates of the impact size marks were 0%: 75%: 25% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative of low rate of the impact size existed in the 1996 election on eligibility criteria on the election.

The negative percent of average rate of the effect size score was 23.6% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of the average of the effect size grade was 43% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent rate of the average of the impact size score was 34.4% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of an average of the impact size figures were 23.6%: 43%: 34.4% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative rate of an average of the impact size existed on the eligibility criteria in the 1996 election.
The negative percent of rate of high of the effect size score was 30% of the respondents, in 1996, the negative percent rate of high of the impact size mark was 15% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent rate of high of the effect size was 55% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of high of the impact size marks were 30%: 15%: 55% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative rate of high of the effect was present in the 2000 election about eligibility criteria in the election.

The negative percent rate of very high of the impact size mark was 23.3% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the rate of very high of the effect size mark was 33.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the rate of very high of the impact size score was 43.4% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size scores were 23.3%: 33.3%: 43.4% of the respondents respectively. The implied positive of the effect was prevalent on eligibility criteria of voters in the 2000 election.

**How was the impact on ensuring that all eligible voters cast their vote in the election?**

**The positive impact of eligibility criteria of voters in the votes cast in the election.**

The percentage of positive grade of the impact size was 38.9% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the respondents score mark of positive percent of the effect size grade was 37% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent of the impact size outcome was 24.1% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the impact sizes values were 38.9%:37%:24.1% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive of
the impact size record was prevalent on eligibility criteria of the vote cast in the election on
the 1992 election.

The negative impact of the eligibility criteria of votes casts on the election.
The percentage of negative of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in
1996, the negative percent of the effect size grade was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000,
the negative percent of the impact size mark was 50% respectively. The Percentage ratio of
negative percent of the effect size scores were 50%:0%:50% of the respondents
respectively. It meant a tier of a negative percent of the impact was present in the 1992 and
the 2000 elections.

Qualitative effects: The EC did ensure that eligibility criteria of the voter on their votes
cast was monitored on the election. These included the deletion of multiple registration;
expunged minors names; engaged political parties in cleaning the voter register off illegal
voter register; the use of indelible inks during voters register; the use of finger thumbprints
before and during election sought to prevent illicit electoral activities .The negative effects
were that, irrespective of the above, eligibility electorates, voters still engaged in multiple
registration, minors registration; cleaning off the indelible ink of their thumb; wipe off ink
from the thumb eluded the electoral governance of the elections (Interviews, 2012).

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive impact rate of eligibility criteria of votes cast on the election.
The positive percent rate of very low of the impact size score was 26% of the respondents
in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of very low of the effect size score was 34% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of very low of the impact size figure was 40% of the respondents. The positive percent ratio rates of very low of the effect size marks were 26%: 34%: 40% of the respondents respectively. This implied that a positive percent rate of very low effect was available in the 2000 election on the eligibility criteria of votes cast in the election.

The positive percentage rate of the low of the effect size value was 30.8% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of low of the impact size accounted for was 53.8% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent of low rate of the impact size grade was 15.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size figures were 30.8%:53.8%:15.4% of the respondents respectively. On the overall effect, it implies that there was an amount of the positive rate of low of the effect in the 1996 election on eligibility criteria in the election.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the effect size score was 41.2% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of average rate of the impact size record was 29.4% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of average rate of the effect size grade was 29.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the effect size grades were 41.2%:29.4%:29.4% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percent of average, of the effect size was prevalent on the 1992 election on the eligibility criteria for the 1992 election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents
in 1992, the positive percent rate of high of the effect size mark was 38.1% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of high of the effect size grade was 28.6% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size marks were 33.3%:38.1%:28.6% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a positive rate of high of the effect size was available in the 1996 election on eligibility criteria for the election.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size values was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of very high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of very high of the effect size grade was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size scores were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. It further implied that a positive effect of eligibility criteria prevailed in the 1992. The next is a presentation of negative impact size grades on the elections. The report indicated with evidence of INEC connivance in pre-programming the result.

In a related development, most of the evidence gathered by the NPP in the Stolen Verdict never significantly changed the electoral picture. Even though several instances of attempted electoral malpractices by NDC supporters was cited by the NPP, this judgment was based on utmost bad faith to indicate NPP’s intimidation of NDC supporters and other illicit electoral practices in their strongholds. All the allegation was on a small scale, and transparency of the processes and procedures initiated ensured and eschewed most malpractices, any attempted malpractices were discovered and the culprit halted from
casting their vote interviewees noted (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

**If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The negative rated impact of eligibility criteria of votes cast in the election.**

The negative percent of the very low rate of the impact size mark was 45% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of the very low of the impact size score was 55% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent rate of the very low of the effect size mark was 0% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rate of very low of the effect size records was 45%: 55%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It implied that the 1996 election had a very low of the impact size grade on the eligibility criteria on votes cast in the election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the low rate of the effect size grade was 40% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percent rate of low of the effect size was 60% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size marks were 0%:40%: 60% of the respondents respectively. It implied a negative percent rate of low of the impact size score existed on the eligibility criteria of votes cast in the 2000 election.

The negative percentage rate of the average of the effect size score was 28% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent rate of the average of the impact size mark was 20% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent rate of the average of the impact size mark was 52% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of the
average of the impact size figures were 28%: 20%: 52% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percent of average rate of the impact size mark was present on the eligibility criteria of votes cast in the 2000 election.

The negative percent rate of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent rate of high of the impact size mark was 20% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percent rate of high of the effect size mark was 80% of the respondents. The negative percent of high ratio rates of the impact size grades were 0%: 20%: 80% of the respondents respectively. It implied a negative percent rate of high of the impact size was found in the eligibility criteria on votes cast in the 2000 election.

The negative percent rate of very high of the impact size score was 26% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent rate of very high of the effect size mark was 64% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent rate of very high of the impact size mark was 10% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size scores were 26%: 64%: 10% of the respondent respectively. This implies a negative percent of the very high rate of the effect size scores was available in the 1996 election on the eligibility criteria on votes cast in the election.

**Qualitative Impact:*** It meant that a negative effect was predominant in 2000. From the above, it implied that a negative impact was eminent in 1992 and the 2000 election on how all eligible voters cast their votes. In 1996 however, a positive effect was present in ensuring that all eligible electors cast their votes. The major causes of the negative impact
on the election were political intimidation of political party opponents during the registration of voters; intimidation of voters during the Election Day; poor publicity; publicity in English language; and lack of education of the illiterates of when, why and how to cast their votes. In an interview with some members of a local Community Based Organizations, they noted that, retail corruption such the delivery of wax clothes; sowing machines; and grinding mills was the order of the day. Other factors were largesse distribution of boxes of fish; cooking vegetable was also endemic in soliciting votes from political parties candidates and parliamentary candidates; and the purchases of voters’ ID cards were the core problem of this negative phenomenon. Wholesale corruptions that exist were the commissioning of road networks for graveling; tying of road network; commissioning of the national electricity grid; pipe borne water, schools and hospitals. That notwithstanding, it brought about an end of a transitional paradigm, and a change of government in Ghana’s Fourth Republic.

The positive effect was because of the improvement upon the flawless election in 1992. In 1996, an ample time existed for planning of the election by the EC, they tried and corrected some of the lapses that were available in the 1992 election, and this was coupled with the Commonwealth Observer Missions and Carter Center Observer Mission recommendation taken into considerations. The presence of the Center for Democratic Developments (CDD) Coalition of Domestic Election Observer (CODEO) Missions monitoring of every aspect of the electoral process accounts for its success (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). Indeed, these have reflected in the subsequent election and led to a peaceful turnover of government.
In another development, the 1996 election led to a high rate of the impact of ensuring that all electors cast their secret ballots. This corresponds with the positive effect responses, which retained the incumbent government through the will of the people. The 1992 high rate ensured that all eligible electorate who cast their vote ushered in a metamorphosed authoritarian government to a democratic civilian government, and led to an end to coercion and repression of the erstwhile autocratic elements and their abuses of power. Though the 2000 figure was the lowest in terms of higher rate, it brought about a peaceful turnover of government from NDC government to NPP government. It meant the negative effect was predominant in 2000. The discussion below accounts for the positive and negative effects of public debates on the election from 1992-2000.

Taken the Fanteakwa constituency for example, the Returning Officer announced the election outcome on the afternoon of 5th November by assigning to NPP 19,090 votes against 17,661 for the NDC. The INEC explained that, it was a simple initial error in 6th November 1992, INEC changed the figure to 10,673 for NPP as against 13,404 for NDC. This error of omission and commission was a miscalculation and unlikely in such circumstance. The NPP candidate for the constituency, Mr Jones Ofori Atta claimed on the morning of 4th November 1992 before the polling station were closed, the returning officer had declared the election result, later, INEC had declared the results for Fanteakwa with NPP at 10,673 and NDC at 13,404. The exact tally of the final results was alleged as evidence of pre-meditated programming of the election results. The INEC Deputy Executive Chairman challenged him to give details of his claim of the result on 4th
November 1992, in the best interest of the nation. The INEC Deputy Executive Chairman’s best of knowledge of the writers denied any such occurrence. Dr Ofori Atta reneged to respond as a rebuttal. Subsequently, doubts were cast on Dr Ofori-Atta’s comments and his reference to the votes counted and recounted at the constituency and regional centers, but the Returning Officer testified that such an event never occurred. The results from each polling station were accepted as valid and collated. Finally, INEC published the details of the results for the constituency, polling station by polling station, summing up the figures declared. Per adventure that any of the polling station results was falsified, the NPP polling agent would have provided evidence of the certificate they signed, however, such an occurrence or evidence was produced. It was factual that, the INEC explanation was simply the truth (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

The second issue was Adu Boahen’s home constituency, Ejisu-Juaben, there Adu Boahen won the election, but nine stuffed ballot boxes were found in the home of an NDC supporter some six weeks after the election. In the Stole Verdict, the fact was made that Ben Ephson, the BBC correspondent stringent in Accra was informed by an unknown person at the INEC on 4th September 1992, that Adu Boahen had lost, but the conclusion drawn was that the INEC planned fraud had failed to materialize. The common implication was that, many of the machination designs materialized and decisively affected the general result. The other reason was that Ben Ephson was misinformed, because he could not give detailed source of his information. Doubtfully, as expected, some NDC supporters strategized to humiliate Adu Boahen in his home town constituency. However, no sound minded inference was drawn of a similar conspiratorial event happening in the
constituency. In effect this planned never worked out because the electoral process and procedures rendered it unfeasible. It was indisputable that, the INEC declared the results for the constituency was the real result. The conclusion drawn from the *Stolen Verdict* was a manufactured stolen verdict premised on absolute bad faith, and opposite to its purported claims (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

In view of this shift from the substantiated or unsubstantiated and the impossibility of the allegations leveled by the opposition, it was challenging to fathom any central focused plan to rig the presidential election. Even though many circumstances of procedural illicit activities were in the election, but uniting these facts, it was highly difficult for the combined effect is large enough to upset the general results (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

**How was the impact of public debate on the election impacted on the election?**

**The positive impact of public debate on the election.**

The percentage positive of the effect size mark was 38.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent figure of the effect size was 38.5% of the respondents and in 2000, and the impact of positive percent size outcome was 23.1% of the respondents respectively. The positive percent ratio effects size scores were 38.5%:38.5%:23.1% of the respondents. It meant a positive effect of presidential public debates impacted on the election

**The negative impact of public debates on the elections.**

The percentage of negative of the impact size figure was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the effect size grade was 0% of the respondents and in
2000, the negative percent of the impact size score was 50% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio of the effect size scores was 50%:0%:50% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative effect of public debates prevailed in the 1992 and the 2000 election.

The implication was that, there were negative impacts of public debate on election issues, this owes to the fact that such debates were non-existent in the 1992 elections, but in 1996, there was a positive effect of public debates on the political, economic and social matters of the election. The implication of the negative impact in 1992 was that there was no media house to organize such debate. The state own media outlet was monopolized by the incumbent government and their cronies in favor of the NDC.

The positive effect of the debate was because the Supreme Court ordered for equal access to the media for all political parties, hence the opposition parties’ participation on national electoral issues in the media that belonged to the state. Again, the State Print media equally gave space to the opposition to air out their views on national issues about the political environment, and other socioeconomic matters that are of prime concern to the citizenry. In the election 2000, the negative impact owes itself to the fact that, all debates were elite centered, with a paltry of private media outlets available for the opposition to dissect the debates into the local languages. Those radio and TV stations that existed were urban based. The print media was expensive for the indigenous people who live in the hinterland and below a dollar per a day to purchase and read. Again, the abstinence of the incumbent governments’ presidential candidate in the press debate made the situation worse.
However, it brought about elections that led to the usher in of the NDC as a government, the retention of the NDC in 1996 and an ouster of the NDC government in 2000 and some parliamentarians through the mandate of the people for the NPP government.

Additionally, the fact of the matter was that, the politically ignorant voters in elections made prudent use of relevant cues in the socio-political environment. The citizen requires information relating to their nation and political party’s ideology to make informed decisions in elections. This was termed as the *reasoning voter, reasoning choice* and the *rationale public decision making* (Bartels, 1998:210-230). Even though there was a negative impact, yet the rationale political animal took cues to successfully vote in ending a state of a transition paradigm in Ghana. The next part deals with the rate on the impact of public debates on the elections. The rankings are very low, low, average, high, and very high respectively.

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

The positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of very low rate of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of very low of the effect size grade was 50% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the impact size scores 50%:0%:50% of the respondents. The implication was that, a very low positive percent of the effect rate existed in 1992 and the 2000 elections relating to public debates bearing on these elections.

The positive percentage rate of low of the impact size score was 12.5% of the respondents.
in 1992, in 1996, the positive rate of low of the effect size mark was 87.5% of respondents, and the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of low of the impact size record was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size marks were 12.5%:87.5%:0% of the respondents respectively. In 1996, it meant a low rate of the effect was prevalent on public debate effect on the election, with a minuscule impact rate of low effect in 1992 and 2000 election. The low rate impact in 1996 was in a crescendo, and then diminished in 2000.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size score was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size score was 38.9% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of the average of the impact size grade was 11% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the average of the effect size outcomes were 50%:38.9%:11% of the respondents respectively. The implication here was that, a diminuendo of values of the rate of the effects was observed from 1992-2000. The a positive percent rate of the average of the effect size was in the 1992, then 1996 and 2000 as the least on the elections with respect to presidential public debates on election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size mark was 38.9% of the respondents in 1992, the positive percent rate of high on the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of the effect size rate of high value was 27.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size scores were 38.9%:33.3%:27.8% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percent of high rates of the impact size were prevalent concerning presidential
race public debates on the election.

The positive percentage rate of the very high of the effect size outcome was 25% of the respondents in 1992. In the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size mark was 0% of the respondents in 1996, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 75% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size grades were 25%:0%:75% of the respondents respectively. This meant a positive percentage of very high rate of the effect size was eminent in 2000 and 1992, with the 2000 election leading of the presidential race public debate of the election. Indeed, these factors contributed to the democratization processes and change in government within the era under consideration.

**If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The negative percentage rate impact of presidential debate on the election.**

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size mark was 22.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size mark was 11.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effects size grade was 66% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the impact size scores were 22.5%: 11.5%: 66% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage of very low rated effect was prevalent in the 2000 election on the presidential public debate.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size rate was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size grade was
30% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size score was 70% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size scores were 0%: 30%: 70% of the respondents. It meant a negative percentage rate was a low of the effect was prevalent in the 2000 election year pertaining to presidential public debates on election.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size grade was 32% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of average of the effect size mark was 15% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 53% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size marks were 32%: 15%: 53% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage of an average rated impact on the 2000 election relative to the presidential public debate on the election.

In negative percentage rate of high of the effect size mark was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact grade was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of high of the effect size figure was 0% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size marks were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. This implies in the 1992 election, the presidential public debate had a complete negative rate of high impact on the election.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size mark was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size mark was
score was 33.3% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size figures was 33.3% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size scores were 33.3%:33.3%: 33.3% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage rate of very high of the impact was par in all the election concerning the presidential public debate on the elections.

How was the impact of voter education on voter turnout on the election?

The positive impact of voters’ education on turnout in the elections.
The percentages of positive about the impact size was 38% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the effect size mark was 32% of the respondents and in 2000, and the positive percent of the impact size score was 30% of the respondents. The percentage of positive of the effect size scores are 38%:32%:30% of the respondents. It meant a diminishing impact on voter education on voter turnout from 1992 to the 2000 election occurred.

The negative impact of voters’ education on turnout in the elections.
The percentage of negative of the impact size mark was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percent of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents. The ratio of negative percent of the impact size marks was 50%: 50%: 0% of the respondents respectively. This implies that voter education on voter turnout was negative in 1992 and 1996, but positive in the 2000 election.
Qualitative Effects: The negative turnout emanated from the outcome of voter education on turnout was partly due to the short period for conducting the election in 1992; voter volatility was one of the factors that caused a high turnout; multiple registration; minor’s registration made the voter register bloated, and with its attendant multiple voting (Carter Center, 1992).

The positive aspect of voter education on turnout was due to the media’s vigilant role; electoral mobile phones journalism in which certified the results of the votes cast were announced to the media outlets to avoid rigging or manipulation of results at the polling stations and any other quarters of the election. The strand also played the benign role of reporting trouble spots for security beef ups; savvy of the EC labor force; availability of candidates and political party agents to monitor the activities in each polling station; availability of transport and motorable road networks to penetrate overseas by the polling officer made the positive effects of the elections. Additionally, other actors such as the presence of party agents; and media professional duties on the elections created this positive impact. The impartiality and neutrality of electoral commission; the independence of the EC as an institution; the application of uncertainty of outcome by the EMBs promoted uncertainty of outcome accounted for this robust accomplishment of the positive results. This was in an interview with the National Secretary of the Ghana Journalist Association (GJA) and Cheryl Guppel of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) at the interviewees’ offices on 20th July 2011 at 10:40-2:30pm and 29th July 2011 and Cheryl Guppel’s interview was on a mobile phone.
The Ghana Journalist Association Secretary noted that this electoral Mobile phone journalism played a benign role in the peaceful change of government. He noted that, these mobile phones were donated by Civil Society Organizations, media houses, political parties and individuals. Again, the presence of election observer mission such as the Network of Domestic Election Observers (NODEO), cum Election Monitors of the EC played a remarkable role in these successful electoral activities. These election observer mission and election monitors observed every facet of the election from the opening of the poll to the end of the polls was noted in an informal conversation with the field officer of elections of the CDD in Accra on 28 June 2010. The implementation of the Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) as a complimentary domestic election observer body and International Observers Missions’ recommendation embellished upon the election from 1996 to 2000.

According to some Community Based Organizations (CBOs) which was interviewed at the local levels of the regions the data was gathered, the role of CODEO and NODEO in the election was significant in these elections. NODEO subsequently termed as CODEO recruited their election observers from the local communities because of the versatility of the socio-cultural backgrounds of their communities and their prowess of the geographical terrain of the nation was an added advantage to the positive effect of the quality of election in Ghana from 23 January- 5th March 2012).

One interviewee of the local branch of the Christian Council in Wa in a formal interview bemoaned of the lavish organization of workshops for CSOs workers and sharing the funds
within themselves at the expense of their duty for which the funds were meant for has played an adverse role in these elections (Anonymity of name, January, 2012). He equally lamented woefully of the nature of CSOs advocacy or debates on election as being elitist, and that some of the CSOs are political. Some Regional Secretaries interviewed also launched a diatribe against CSOs pro-political nature at the detriment of neutrality that was a hallmark of CSOs. For example, Al-Hajj Umar of NDC said CDD for example for some time past became more pro-NPP that led to NDC’s boycott of all of its activities until recently (Al hajji Umar, December 2011).

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The positive effects of voter education on turnout of these elections.**

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage of very low rate of the effect size was 100% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect sizes figures were 0%:100%:0% of the respondents. This meant there was a positive percent of very low rates of the impact of voter education on voter turnout in the 1996 election.

The positive percentage rate of low of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of low of the effect size mark was 22.2% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of low of the impact size grade was 44.4% of the respondents. The positive percent rate of low of the impact ratio rates size grade were 33.3%:22.2%:44.4% of the respondents. This implies that, a positive percentage of the average rated effect of voter education on voter turnout existed in all the
election seasons in varied degree, however, the 2000 election led, then 1992 and 1996 were the last.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the effect size mark was 46.2% of the respondents’ in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of the average of the effect size grade was 53.8% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the average of the impact size marks were 46.2%:53.8%:0% of the respondents. The implication was that at the nascent election, a positive percent of the average of the effects of voter education was in existence in the 1996 election, followed by the 1992 election, but declined in the 2000 election.

The positive percentage rate of high on the impact size score was 35.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of high of the impact size figure was 11.8% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of high of the impact size record was 52.9% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact sizes scores were 35.3%:11.8%:52.9% of the respondents. On the high rated impact, it meant there was a positive percent of high rate of the effect in the 2000 election about voter education on the turnout in the election, followed by 1992, with 1996 being the least on the analysis.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 20% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of very high of the impact size grade was 60% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of very high of the effect size score was 20% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very
high of the impact sizes records were 20%:60%:20% of the respondents. In addition, the implication was that, there was a positive percent of very high rated impact of voter education on turnout in the 1996 election.

If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of voter education on turnout of the elections.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size grade was 36% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size mark was 22% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size score was 42% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size scores were 36%: 22%: 43% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percent of very low of the effect size of voter education on turnout existed in the 2000 election.

The negative percent of low of the impact size score was 17% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size mark was 35% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size grade was 48% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size grades were 17%: 35%: 48% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative of very low rate of the effect size was prevalent in the 2000 election concerning voter education on turnout.
The negative percent rate of average of the impact size score was 25% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent rate of average of the effects size mark was 33% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative rate of average of the effects size figure was 42% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the effect size scores were 25%: 33%: 42% of the respondents respectively. From the figures above, it is evident that a negative percentage rate of average of the effects was prevalent on voter education on turnout on the 2000 election.

The negative percentage rate of the effect of high size score was 66.7% of the respondents in 1992, the negative percent rate of high of the impact size was 33.3% of the respondents in 1996, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent rate of high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact sizes grades were 66.7%:33.3%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a high of negative percent rate of the impact of voter education on turnout was available in 1992 election, followed by the 1996 election. The observation is that decreasing rates of the impact of voter education on turnout have decreased from each election year to another on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election, the negative percent rate of very high of the effect size grade was 100% of the respondents in 1996, and in 2000, the negative percent rate of very high of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect sizes were 0%:100%:0% of the respondents respectively. There was a negative percent of very high rated effect of voter education on turnout in the 1996 election. I direct
the reader on the evaluation of the positive and negative effects of donor funding of voter education on the election.

The turnout was impressive at 77.9% of the total registered voters in the 7th December 1996 election. This phenomenal success was due to the competitiveness of the campaign, the high level of popular confidence in the conduct of the ballots and all efforts made by the incumbent government to solicit the support of its supporters in the rural areas to go and cast their vote on election day. This paved no way for suspicion and to the entertainment of a kind of worry by the opposition in the 1992 election, that the voters register was inflated, the real voter turnout was better. It became unlikely that the opposition and their supporters were by any means disenfranchised by selling their Identity Cards to NDC activists for any reason and on any scale (Jeffries, 1998).

How was the impact of donor funding in voter education?

The positive impact of electoral assistance of voter education on these elections.

The percentage of positive of the effect size score was 39.6% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percent of the effect size grade was 35.8% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent of the effect sizes mark was 24.5% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of the positive impact sizes scores were 39.6%:35.8%:24.5% of the respondents. It meant a positive percent of voter education on turnout was prevalent in the 1992 election. A direction of the reader to an assessment of the negative effect of funding in voter education.
The negative impact of electoral assistance of voter education on turnout of the election.
The percentage of negative of the impact score size was 66.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of the effect size record was 33.3% of the respondents and in 2000, and the negative percent of the impact size grade was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratios of the negative impact scores were 66.7%:33.3%:0% of the respondents. It meant that a negative of the effects of electoral assistance of voter education on turnout existed in the 1992 election. However, the figures declined over the election period with 1992 leading in the responses, followed by 1996 and the final was 2000 giving credibility to voter education on the election.

Qualitative impact: The negative impact was due to media monopoly of the state own media houses; the elitist nature of voter education at the detriment of local dialects; voter intimidation; and an apathy for election. The positive effects in the 1996 and the 2000 elections was due to the democracy assistance to the media; media independence and freedom; professionalism of journalists; and access to state own media after the 1996 lawsuit against the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation in the Supreme Court on non-access to the state owned media. Furthermore, the prevalence of private media houses coupled with media commentaries in the local dialect for the sensitization and consumption of the illiterates in Ghana on national and electoral matters. The effect was that these robust initiatives promoted enlightenment to most of the citizenry, government and electoral policies at any given time. The excess of government’s performance either retain or oust a government after its mandate (Judicial Service of Ghana, 2008). The interpretative discussion below was the positive rate effect size of low, average, high and very high
effect. In effect, there was a negative impact of donor funding of voter education on the elections in 1992 only, whilst positive in 1996 and 2000

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The positive percent rate of the impact of donor assistance in voter education on the elections.**

The positive percent of very low rate of the impact size score were 25% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of very low of the effects size mark was 33% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of very low of the effects size figure was 42% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the effect size scores were 25%: 33%: 42% of the respondents respectively. From the figures above, it is evident that a positive percent of the effects rose in each election year. It implied an improvement on voter education on the election.

The positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 28.6% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of low of the effect size score was 71.4% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size scores were 28.6%:71.4%:0% of the respondents. The implication was that some amount of a positive percentage of low rates of the effects of voter education funded by the donor community worked positively on the election outcome. This was because the figure rose and declined seriously to a zero outcome.
The positive percentage rate of the average of the effect sizes was 41.2% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size was 29.4% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size was 29.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the average of the impact size were 41.2%:29.4%:29.4% of the respondents respectively. It means there was an existence of some degree of a positive percentage rate of the average of the impact of donor funding of voter education on the elections. A perusal of the figures indicated a decline on the impact of 1992, and a tally of the figures in the 1996 and the 2000 voter education on the election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 45.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 40.9% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 13.6% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effects scores size were 45.5%:40.9%:13.6% of the respondents. It implies there was a positive percentage of the high rate of the effects of donor funding of voter education on the elections. By implication, the rate of high of the effects rates declined overtime on voter education on the election.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 16.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 88.3% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size scores were 16.7%:0%:88.3% of the respondents. This meant that a positive
percentage rate of very high rated impacts of donor assistance for voter education was present even though the figure on the elections.

The actual voter turnout in the 1992 election was sixty percent (60%). This was a very honorable statistical figure by international standard, and a generally agreed number in the Ghanaian electoral environment and logistical condition. This does not explain the necessitated support of why many never voted because of intimidation of opposition supporters by NDC activist and the public apathy of Rawlings electoral victory. Though the Stolen Verdict raised concern about 30 instances of attempted intimidation of voters in the northern part of the country by District Secretaries and the local CDR officials, attempting to and succeeding are nonetheless two nuance things of an effective and efficient secret ballot (Jeffries and Thomas, 1995). The official turnout figure of the 1996 elections was 77.9% as suggested by the EC of Ghana, however, this figure could not be widespread (Jeffries and Thomas, 1993).

If Negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of donor assistance of voter education on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size mark was 20% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size score was 40% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size grade was 40% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rate of very low of the impact size scores were 20%: 40%: 40% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percent rate of very low of donor assistance on voter education was prevalent on the 1996 and the 2000 election.
The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election; in 1996, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 100% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage negative rate of low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the low of the impact size grades were 0%:100%:0% of the respondents. This implied that the figures have reinforced the negative percentage position of the effect of donor funding of voter education on the elections in the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 66.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative rate of average of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative rate of average of the impact size was 33.3% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size scores were 66.7%:0%:33.3% of the respondents. This meant a negative percentage of average rate of the effect was in the 1992 election on voter education on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 37.5% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the negative percent of high of the effect size was 37.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, and the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 20% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 37.5%:37.5%:20% of the respondents. It meant a negative percent rate of high existed in the 1992 and the 1996 election with a par outcome in both elections.

The negative percentage distribution of very high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage of very high of the effect size was
20% of the respondents and in 2000, and the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 30% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size were 50%:20%:30% of the respondents respectively. It meant a very high rate of the impact of negative was prevalent in the 1992 elections relative to donor support of voter education in the election.

How was the impact of the election logistics, Computer equipment, and technical assistance for voter education, exhibition of voter register and election on the election?

The positive impact of election logistics, computer equipment, technical assistance; and exhibition of voter register on the election.

The percentage of positive of the effect size was 37.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percent of the effect size was 35.7% of the respondents and in 2000, and the positive percent of the impact size mark was 26.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio of the impact sizes was 37.5%:35.7%:26.8% of the respondents. This meant that the provision of election logistic to the EC had a positive impact on the 1992, 1996 but reduced in figure in the 2000 elections. This aided in making the retention of NDC as a legitimate government in winning credible elections in 1996 in the first round of the elections, and subsequently in the presidential run-off that eventually the NPP won credible election.

In the 1996 election, both the 1995 voter register and the supplementary register were exhibited to the general public and political parties to verify and make their inputs for
corrections, at the end, the voter register was broadly accepted as clean and valid by all stakeholders of the 1996 election (Jeffries, 1998).

The negative impact of election logistics and technical assistance for the elections. The percentage of negative of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the negative percent of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percent of the effect size grade was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of negative effect size were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. The negative implication was that election logistic assistance of the election was due to the shortness and the rush to hold an election in 1992; coupled with the rigging of the election in 1992 a “feckless pluralism” culminated from flawed election (Carothers, 2002:5-21; Carothers, 1999).

Qualitative effects: The support got from the donors on electoral logistic and technical assistance played an important role in ensuring that the elections were held successfully. It led to the printing of ballot papers; purchase of transparent ballot boxes; voter screens to prevent rigging of the election through multiple cast of voters. Again, it facilitated the compilation of the voters register; marking of the thumbs of voter to eschew multiple cast of votes; indelible ink and finger thumb print to check arthritic voter registration; and the technical assistance led to the worker of the EC to gain an in-depth savvy on elections said by interviewees.

The negative impact was that, political parties and their supporters abused the system by engaging in multiple registrations and multiple casts of votes; ballot stuffing; ballot boxes
snatching; and the destruction of ballot boxes through vandalism. Additionally, the voter screens never helped in checking rigging of the elections; the compiled voters register was marred with ghost names; minors’ names; multiple registrations and multiple casts of votes; shortage of electoral materials; and the supply of under standardized indelible inks as noted by interviewees.

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The positive rated impact of electoral logistic and technical assistance on the election.**

The percentage of positive rate of very low of the impact size mark was 20% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 40% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 40% of the respondents. The positive percent ratio rate of very low of the effects size scores were 20%:40%:40% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that positive percentage of a very low rate in existed in the 1996 and the 2000 election in a tier rate of very low.

The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 28.6% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of low of the impact size was 71.4% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size were 28.6%:71.4%:0% of the respondents. This meant that there was a low positive rated impact on the provision of logistic and technical assistance on the 1996 elections.
The positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 38.1% of the respondents in 1992, the positive percent rate of average of the impact size was 33.3% of the respondents in 1996, the positive percent rate of average of the effect size was 28.6% of the respondents in 2000. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 38.1%: 33.3%: 28.6% of the respondents. There was a positive percent rate of average of the effect of the logistic provision and technical assistance on the elections in a declining fashion as observed from the figures with 1992 election having a negative impact.

The positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 43.5% of the respondents in 1992, its immediate positive percent of high rate of the impact size was 30.4% of the respondents in 1996 and in 2000, and the positive percent rate of high of the impact size grade was 26.1% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 43.5%:30.4%:26.1% of the respondents. It implied a positive percent of high rated effect was prevalent on logistic supply and technical assistance on the elections. But the outcome of the figures kept declining from election season to another.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 20% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent rate of very high of the effect size was 20% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 60% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact sizes were 20%:20%:60% of the respondents. There existed a positive percentage of very high rated effect of logistic assistance and technical support to the EC on the elections. There was a tier between the 1992 and the 1996 election, but rose in the 2000 election. The researcher looks at the negative rate impact size values high effect size.
If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of logistic support and technical assistance on the election.

The negative percentage of very low rate of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effects size scores were 0%: 0%: 100% of the respondents’ respectively. It meant a negative effect was determined on the 2000 election regarding technical and logistic assistance on the election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of low of the respondents was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of low of the impact size were 0%: 0%: 100% of the respondents respectively. It meant an absolute negative percentage of the effect was determined on the election in 2000.

The negative percent rate of average of the impact size score was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size mark was 50% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size grades were 50%: 50%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It meant there was some level of a negative percent of average rated effect in 1992 and 1996 election about technical and logistics assistance on the 1992 and the 1996 election, but none in the 2000 election.
The negative percentage rate of high of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent rate of high of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percent rate of high of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage rate of high was available on the effects in 1992 concerning electoral and technical assistance on the election.

The negative percentage rate very high of the effect size was 36.4% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 18.2% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size mark was 45.5% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rate of very high of the impact size scores were 36.4%; 18.2%; 45.5% of the respondents respectively. The implication was a vacillation of figures on the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size grades on the election relative to logistics and technical assistance on the election. Below is an evaluation of the negative values of the impact of democracy assistance in the form of fuel, motorcycle, and transport effect on the election.

How was the impact of the provision of fuel and motorcycle on the election?

The positive impact of fuel assistance on the election.

The percentage of positive of the impact size was 44.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percent of the effect size was 27.7% of the respondents and in the 2000 election, the positive percent of the impact size effect was 27.7% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect sizes were 44.7%:27.7%:27% of the
respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive impact existed on the provision of fuel and motorcycles on the election in 1992, but a par impact of fuel and motor cycle provision on the election.

**The negative impact of the supply of fuel and motorcycles on the elections.**

The negative percentage of the effect size was 18.2% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative of the effect size was 63.6% of the respondents and in 2000, and the negative of the impact size was 18.2% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of negative impact size were 18.2%:63.6%:18.2% of the respondents. The impact implication was that, there was a negative of the effects on the supply of fuel and motorbikes on the 1996 election.

**Qualitative impact:** This helped the electoral officials to penetrate the corridors of non-penetrable terrains to perform their duties, which obviously led to electoral democracy in 1992, retention of government, and a change in government in the 2000 election. The negative outcome was due to ignorance on the difficulties of these difficult terrains. The next was the rate of positive very low, low, average, high and very high of the impact size. Again, it facilitated the transportation of election logistics to overseas terrains, security assistance to halt intimidation of voters; voter education; participation in the political development of citizens; and election observation in such terrains in an interview.

The negative outcome was that even though the facilitated the above-mentioned positive outcome, the voter register was bloated culminating from sloppy voters’ registration; late
reporting of the EC officials to polls on the opening of polls in such areas. Furthermore, intimidation of voters by party sympathizer and supporters; electoral malpractices, and the nature of the area and roads disenfranchised some voters from the engagement of political participation in the democratic development of the nation in a Focus Group Discussion.

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The positive rated effects on the provision of fuel and transportation on the elections.**

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size score was 23.7% of the respondents in 1992. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size mark was 41% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size grade was 35.3% of the respondents. The positive percent ratio rates of very low of the impact size were 23.7%: 41%: 35.3% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a relative positive percentage rate of very low existed in the 1996 elections on fuel and transport provision.

The percentage positive rate of low of the effect size mark was 62.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size value was 37.5% of the respondents and in 2000, and the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size scores were 62.5%:37.5%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implied positive rated effect of low on the supply of fuel and transportation was observed in the election 1992 elections.

The positive percentage rate of average of the impact size grade was 36.4% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the positive percent rate of average of the impact
size score was 45.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of average of the effect size value was 18.2% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size scores were 36.4%:45.5%:18.2% of the respondents respectively. It meant a positive percentage of average rated impact was eminent in the 1996 elections about the supply of fuel and transportation on the election. It meant on average, the provision of funds to purchase fuel to transport electoral officials and logistics to the decentralized offices played an average benign impact on these elections.

The percentage of positive rate of high of the effect size score was 28.6% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the percentage of positive rate of high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size value was 71.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size scores were 28.6%:0%:71.4% of the respondents respectively. There was a positive percentage of the high rated effect of fuel and transportation provision on the 2000 elections.

The percentage of positive rate very of high on the impact size score was 60% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percent rate of very high of the impact size mark was 40% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size grades were 60%:0%:40% of the respondents respectively. This meant there was a positive percentage of a very high rate of the impact of fuel and transportation supply on the 1992 elections only. The first initiated the establishment of democracy and the incumbent government of P (NDC) and the 2000 election exited an incumbent
government NDC for a new government by a coalition of NPP and the other opposition parties.

If negative, how was the rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of fuel and transportation supply on the elections.
The percentage of negative rate of very low of the effect size score in 1992 was 100% of the respondents, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size grade was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the rate of very low of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rate of very low of the impact size value was 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. There was a negative percentage of very low rate of negative of the impact on the provision of fuel for the election only in 1992 as an implication.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size mark was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size grades were 0%: 100%: 0% of the respondents. There was a negative percentage of low rate of the impact of the fuel supply on the election in 1996 only it meant.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size mark was 60% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of average of the effect size mark was 40% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of
average of the impact size scores were 0%:60%:40% of the respondents respectively. There were however, a negative percentage of high rates of the effect on the provision of fuel for the elections in 1996.

The negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 37.5% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of high of the effect size was 37.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, and the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 20% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 37.5%:37.5%:20% of the respondents. It meant a negative rate of high existed in the election with a par figures in 1992 and the 1996 election, but reduced in the 2000 election.

The negative percentage distribution rate of very high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 20% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 30% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size were 50%:20%:30% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage of very high rates of the impact were prevalent in the 1992 elections.

**How was the impact of the payment and training of party and candidates agents' stipend on the general election?**

**The positive impact of the role of party and candidates’ agents on the elections.**

The positive percentage of the impact of the presence of party agents’ stipends was 37.5% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage of the impact on party agents training and stipend was 37.5% of the respondents, in the 2000 election, the
positive percentage of the impact was 25% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratios of the payment of stipends and training were 37.5%: 37.5%: 25% of the respondents respectively. It meant there was a positive effect on the payment of party and candidates agents’ stipends on the elections in the 1992 and the 1996 elections.

In the October 1995, the voter registration for example, party agents monitored the entire process of the voters and parties. The EC exhibited a list of the voter register for cross-examination at each center by the electors, political parties and candidates’ agents. The outcome was that all political parties declared satisfaction of the voter registration exercise and the validity of the voter register in the 1996 elections (Jeffries, 1998).

The negative impact of the role of party and candidates agents on the elections.

The negative percentage of the impact of party agents’ stipends was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996; the negative percentage of the effect was 20% of the respondents and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage of the effect was 30% of the respondents. The percentage of negative ratios of the effect scores were 50%: 20%: 30% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative effect was available in the 1992 on party and candidates agents on the elections. The figures of the impact varied in a reduced manner.

Qualitative impact: The implication was that from the 1992 to the 2000 elections, the role of the stipends paid to party agents had a negative effect, but positive in the 1996 election. Party agents and candidates’ agents ensured that the elections were not rigged. They
signed every document of the voter register forms and the declaration of election results on behalf of their party or candidate as a symbol of satisfaction and certification of the true reflections of the results. The negativity of the outcome was because in 1992 they were non-existent, in the 2000 elections, the NDC lamented that the results were rigged. Additionally, in the 2000 election, with their presence, the voter register was bloated with ghosts’ names; multiple registration; multiple cast of votes; ballot stuffing; ballot snatching and intimidations that stymied the reality of the election. The 1996 result was positive because the NPP agents used tally cards to verify every outcome of the election process. This eschewed the rigging of the elections as members of a Focus Group Discussion noted.

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the elections?

The positive rated impact of party agents on the elections.

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that, there was a positive percentage rate of very low of the impact of the funding of candidates' agents on the outcome of the election.

The positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 33.3% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the effect size value was 46.7% of the respondents and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 20% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates
of low of the effect sizes were 33.3%:46.7%:20% of the respondents. There was a positive percentage of the effect rate of candidates’ agents’ stipend on the outcome of the election.

The positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 15.4% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 46.2% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of average of the effect size value was 38.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the effect size were 15.4%:46.2%:38.5% of the respondents respectively. This meant a high positive percentage rate of average of the effect existed on candidates’ agents’ stipend on the election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 60% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996; the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size score was 40% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high ratio rates of the effect size were 60%:0%:40% of the respondents. There was equally an implied positive percentage of high rate of the effect of candidates’ agents’ stipend on the election.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, its positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect sizes were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. There was absolutely a very high rate of the effect of candidates’ agents’ stipends on the election as implied.
If negative, how was the rate of impact of party and candidates agents on the elections?

The impact of the role of party and candidates agents on the elections.

The percentage of negative rate of very low of the effect size score in 1992 was 100% of the respondents, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size grade was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the rate of very low of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The percentage ratio rate of very low of the impact size value was 100%:0%:0% of the respondents. There was a negative percentage of very low rate of negative of the impact on the provision of fuel for the election only in 1992 as an implication.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size mark was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size grades were 0%:100%:0% of the respondents. There was a negative percentage of low rate of the impact of the fuel supply on the election in 1996 only it meant.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size mark was 60% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of average of the effect size mark was 40% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size scores were 0%:60%:40% of the respondents respectively. There was however, a negative percentage of average rate of the effect on the provision of fuel for the elections in 1996.
The negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 37.5% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of high of the effect size was 37.5% of the respondents, and in 2000, and the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 20% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 37.5%:37.5%:20% of the respondents. It meant a negative rate of high existed in the election with a par figures in 1992 and the 1996 election, but reduced in the 2000 election.

The negative percentage distribution rate of the very high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of the very high of the effect size was 20% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of the very high of the impact size was 30% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the very high of the impact size were 50%:20%:30% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage of very high rate of the impact was prevalent in the 1992 elections.

How was the impact of the standby power plants provided to power the equipment in the event of power failure on the elections?
The positive impact of standby generators provided to provide electricity current to the EC equipment in the elections.

The percentage of positive of the effect size was 35.8% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, its positive percentage of the impact size was 37.7% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage of the impact size was 26.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratios of the effect size were 35.8%:37.7%:26.4% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a positive percentage of the effect was prevalent with the use of standby power plant on the elections in 1996. However, a perusal of the figures revealed a declining positive impact on the use of standby generators on the election.
The negative impact on the use of standby generators on the election.
The percentage of negative of the impact size was 80% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percent of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percent of the impact size was 20% of the respondents. The negative percent ratios of the effect size was 80%:0%:20% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percent of the impact was available on the election in the use of electric standby generators in the 1992 election.

If positive, how was its effect?
The positive rated impact on the use of standby generators in the election.
The percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents respectively. There was a positive percentage rate of very low of the impact on the use of generators in the 2000 elections as an implication. The cause was that by then almost the entire nation was connected to the national electricity grid and was of no essence in using such generators. However, the use of these generators complemented in the generation of electricity to power some of the polling stations when electricity power outage occurred.

The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 14.3% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 57.1% of
the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 28.6% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size were 14.3%:57.1%:28.6% of the respondents respectively. It meant a positive percentage of low rate of the impact on the use of standby generator existed in the 1996 election.

The positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 57.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of average of the effect size was 14.3% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 28.6% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 57.1%:14.3%:28.6% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage of average rate of the impact size was found in the use of standby generator on the election in 1992.

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 38.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 45.2% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 16.1% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size were 38.7%:45.2%:16.21% of the respondents respectively. It meant that the use of standby generators was beneficial to the 1992 and especially higher in the 1996 elections, but minimal in the 2000 elections.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 25% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size
was 25% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size were 50%:25%:25% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage rate of very high of the effect on the use of generators was significant on the 1992 elections.

**Qualitative impact:** This implied that, a negative impact existed on the use of standby generators on the elections. The reason was that, such equipment was non-existence in the 1992 election. However, there were positive effect on the use of standby generators in the 1996 and 2000 elections. The reason was that, they supplemented power fluctuations and power outage under extreme circumstances. This aided in bridging the quality of elections during the whole election periods. The implication was that, a low rate of the effect on the use of standby generators existed in the 1996 election. The reason was the same as power fluctuation was non-existence or minimal used. This meant an average effect on the use of standby generators on the election was experienced. The cause was that, some communities were not connected to the national electricity grid; hence, the EC used the generators effectively for the elections.

**If Negative how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The negative rated impact of standby generators in the elections.**

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The negative percentage
ratio rates of very low of the impact size were 0%: 0%: 100% of the respondents. The implication was that a negative percentage of very low rate of the effect on the use of generators was found on the 2000 election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 80% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 20% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size were 80%: 0%: 20% of the respondents respectively. This meant a negative percentage of low rate of negative of the impact on the use of standby generators exited on the election in 1992.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 50% of the respondents, in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 50%: 50%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It implied a par outcome on the use of standby generator in the election in the 1992 and the 1996 elections.

The negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996; its negative percentage rate of high of the effect size was 100% of the respondents, and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of high of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 0%:100%:0% of the respondents respectively. This meant a high negative percentage rate of the effect on the use of standby generators on the election in 1996 existed.
The negative percentage rate of the very high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of the very high of the impact was 25% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of the very high of the impact size was 25% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of the very high of the effect size were 50%: 25%: 25% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative percentage of very high rate of the effects on the use of standby generators existed in the 1992 election with a par result in the 1996 and the 2000 election.

How was the use of educational posters for voter register exhibition and training manual for election staffs impacted on the election?

The positive impact of educational poster on voter registers exhibition and training manual on the elections.

The positive percentage of the impact size was 35.8% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996; its positive percentage of the impact size was 39.2% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage of the effect size score was 25.5% of the respondents. The percentage of positive ratio rates of the effect size marks were 35.8%:39.2%:25.5% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage rate of the effect was found on the election in the 1996 on these logistic posters on the election.

The negative impact of the use of poster on voters register and exhibition on the elections.

The percentage of negative of the impact size was 71.4% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its negative percent of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, and the negative percent of the impact size was 28.6% of the respondents. The negative percentage
ratio rates of the impact size were 71.4%:0%:28.6% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage of the effect existed on the use of educational posters; voter register exhibition; and training manual on the election. The subsequent discussion looks at the rated impact size of the respondents in terms of very low, low, average, high and very high.

**Qualitative impact:** These materials actually aided in the voter educational and exhibition processes and procedures in the election. It helped in the cleanup of the voters register in the election; updated the voter register; enlightenment of the voters on the processes and procedures of these elections; directed the voters to the polling stations during voter registration and during election day on the election in some focus group discussions.

The negative impact was that, the electorates were not well sensitized enough on the processes and procedures of the elections. The directions of voters to their polling stations were improperly captured in such circumstances when the polling stations were far (ibid, 2012).

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The positive rated impact of these materials on the election.**

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 50% of the respondents, and in the 2002 election the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 50% of the respondents respectively. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect size scores were 0%: 50%: 50% of the respondents.
respectively. It meant that a positive percentage of par rate of very low of the impact was prevalent in the 1996 and the 2000 election.

The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 50% of the respondents, and in 2000 the positive percentage rate very low of the impact size was 50% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size were 0%:50%:50% of the respondents. There was a tier in the 1996 and 2000 election on the low rate of the effect on the use of educational posters on the election.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the effect size was 25% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996; its positive percent of the average of the effect size was 75% of the respondents and in 2000 the positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size were 25%:75%:0% of the respondents. There were a positive percentage of average rates of the impact in the use educational posters on the 1996 election greatly, but a quarter in the 1992 election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, its positive percent rate of high of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of the average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percent ratio rates of high of the impact size were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implied outcome was that a positive percentage of high rates of the effect were found in the 1992 election on the use of those facilities on the election.
The positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 31.3% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percent rate of high of the impact size was 46.9% of the respondents, and in 2000 the election, the positive percent rate of very high of the effect size was 21.9% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size were 31.3%:46.9%:21.9% of the respondents respectively. The meaning was that a positive percentage of very high of the effect of posters for exhibition on the election existed.

If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of these materials in these elections.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 89% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 11% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size scores were 89%:11%:0% of the respondents respectively. The overall implication was that a negative percentage of very low rates of negative impact on the use poster and voter register exhibition were in the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, its negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 50% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size was 50%:50%:0% of the respondents respectively. The outcome implication was a tier effect of a negative percentage of low rates of the impact on the use of posters on the 1992 and the 1996 election.
The negative percentage rate of average impact size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of the average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, its negative percentage rate was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rate of an average of the impact size was 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. This meant negative percentage rate of the average of the impact of the use of the poster for the election.

The negative percent rate of high of the effect size was 80% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 20% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 80%: 20%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a negative percentage rate of high of the effect on the use of these electoral materials was in the election.

The negative percentage rate of the very high of the impact size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of the very high of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the very high of the impact size were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage of very high rates of the impact were eminent on the 1992 election about these materials in the elections.
Qualitative impact: The implication was that, a negative impact existed in 1992 and the 2000 national elections, whiles a positive effect was found in the 1996 elections. The problem of the posters was due to the languages of education, most of them were written in English and other non-local dialect that could not be read or understood. Other reasons were that, most of these posters on the processes were without any explanation to the illiterates’ indigene. The positive aspect of the 1996 was because of cue taken from the rationale well-informed electorates. This included both direct cue taken and indirect cue taken. The direct cue taken by the rationale voter was the employment of previous knowledge in the processes and procedures in earlier elections. Whilst the indirect cue taken of the electorate was observing the processes and procedures instantly when in the queue during election period. That notwithstanding, it played a role in promoting elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000 where successive regimes and governments were altered through the popular choice of the electorates.

How was the impact of radio communication gadgets on the election?

The positive impact of the use of radio communication gadgets on the election. The percentage of positive size of the effect was 38.9% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996; its positive percentage of the effect size was 33.3% of the respondents and in 2000, its positive percentage of the impact size was 27.8% of the respondents respectively. Their correlated positive percentage ratio rates of the impact sizes were 38.9%:33.3%:27.8% of the respondents respectively. The existed a positive percentage of the impact on the use of radio communication gadgets on the election in 1992 but decreased in the subsequent election.
The negative impact of the use of radio communication gadgets in the elections.
The negative percentage of the effect size was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its negative percentage of the effect size was 50% of the respondents and in 2000, and the negative percentage of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio of the effect sizes were 50%:50%:0% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a negative percentage of the effect existed in the election relative to the use of radio communication gadgets in the election. The next interpretative description is an evaluation of the rate of very low, Low, average, high and very high impact size of the positive effects.

Qualitative impact: The radio communication gadgets of the electoral commission officials was used to transmit information between and among the various decentralized units of the electoral commission on electoral management; the planning, policy formulation and implementation; policy feedback on the elections. Other reasons included: the dispatch of electoral material to the various units; problems encountered in the electoral process and procedures; electoral logistics constraints for a backup and the security situations in the electoral process and procedure in Ghana in some interviews with interviewees.

The negative impact was that, irrespective of the afore-discussed positive effects, the radio communication gadgets broke-down or malfunctioned for its purpose. The gadgets even though were available communication gap existed between the centralized Electoral Commission and the decentralized units. The dispatch of electoral logistics were sent late for inspection, this led to challenges on some of these logistics for the inspection by the
RIPAC and the DIPAC as a transparency measure of preventing suspicion in the election of electoral malpractices in some focus group discussion.

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact on the use of radio communication gadgets in the election.

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996; its positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate very low of the effect size was 100% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the impact size were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents respectively. The positive percentage rate of very low of the effect was prevalent in the 2000 election about the use of these materials in the election.

The positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size scores were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. This meant that a positive percentage of low rates of the impact size were exercised on the use of radio communication gadget on the election in the 1992 election.

The positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 66.7% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of average of the effect size was 33.3% of the
respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 0\% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 66.7\%:33.3\%:0\% of the respondents respectively. There was a positive percentage of average of the effect in the 1992 election as an implication. However, the 1992 election had the highest outcome as compared to the 1996 election on the use of radio communication gadgets of the election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 32.1\% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 46.4\% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 21.5\% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size were 32.1\%:46.4\%:21.5\% of the respondents. There was relatively a positive percentage rate of high of the impact on the use of radio communication equipment on the election as an implication.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 11.1\% of the respondents, in 1996, the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 11.1\% of the respondents and in 2000, and the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 77.8\% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size were 11.1\%:11.1\%:77.8\% of the respondents respectively. It meant a positive percentage of very high rates of the impact were found in the use of radio communication gadgets on the election. The next table rates the negative rates of very low and average impact size of the election. The implication is a very high effect of the use of poster in the 2000 election.
If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of radio communication gadgets on the election.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, and in 1996, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low effect size were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage very low of rated impact of radio communication gadgets was on the 1992 election.

The negative percent of low of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 34% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 16% of the respondents. The negative percent of the ratio rates of low of the size were 50%: 34%: 16% of the respondents. Its implication was the existence of a negative percentage of low rated impact on the use of radio communication gadgets on the 1992 election followed by the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 100% of the respondents in 1992, and in 1996; its negative percentage rate of average of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The impact implication
was a negative percentage of average rates of the effect were in existence in the 1992 election concerning the use of radio communication gadgets.

The negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 37.5% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 37.5% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the effect size was 25% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of high of the impact size scores were 37.5%: 37.5%: 25% of the respondents respectively. The implication was the existence of a negative percentage of high rated effect on the use of radio communication gadgets was prevalent on the election.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size figures were 100%;0%:0% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative percentage of very high rated impact on the use of radio communication gadgets was prevalent on the election in the 1992 election.

The implication was that, there was a negative impact on the use of these radio communication gadgets on the election in 1992 and 1996, but a positive effect in 2000 elections. In 1992, the usages of these gadgets were not employed. In 2000, these gadgets were used to transmit results and other electoral activities to the Returning officers, in the
various decentralized Electoral Commission Office. One of the reasons for its positive effect was the change of government from NDC to NPP. The negative in 1996 was the retention of the old guards in power (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000).

How was the refurbishment of the EC's office with computers impacted on the elections?

The positive impact of the refurbishment of the EC office with computers

The percentage of positive about the impact size was 37.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percent of the impact size was 35.7% of the respondents and in 2000 the positive percent of the effect size was 26.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the impact size were 37.5%:35.7%:26.8% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that some level of positive impact on the refurbishment of the Electoral Commission offices with computers had an impact on the election.

The negative impact of the refurbishment of the EC computer laboratory.

The percentage of negative of the impact size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in 1996, its positive percent of the effect size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the impact size were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. In the overall impact, a negative impact on the refurbishment was exercised in the 1992 election.
Qualitative impact: The result was a mixed outcome on this part; there is a negative impact in 1992, but a positive impact of the refurbishment of the EC computer laboratory. This implication has led to the provision of and editing of ghost names, multiple voters; storing voter register; registering political parties; and the filing of electoral documents for the election. This inevitably brought an improvement upon the 1996 election as credible because stakeholder accepted the result in utmost good faith, and a peaceful turnover in the 2000 election.

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact of the refurbishment of the EC offices.

The positive percentage rates of very low of the impact size of the respondents was 0% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the positive rate very low of the effects size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 100% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size were 0%:0:100% of the respondents respectively. The implication was a very low effect on the computerization of the EC office in the election was prevalent.

The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 60% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 40% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percent of the ratio rates of low of the effect size were 60%:40%:0% of the respondents respectively. There was a low rated impact of computerization networking of the EC offices on the elections of 1992 and 1996 in a declining mode.
The positive percentage rate of average of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 50% of the respondents, and in 2000, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percent of average ratio rates of the impact size scores were 50%:50%:0% of the respondents. This meant a positive percentage of average rate of the effect of computerization network on the election in 1992 and 2000 was found.

The positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 20.8% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 41.7% of the respondents and in 2000, its positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 37.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 20.8%:41.7%:37.5% of the respondents respectively. The implication was a positive percentage rate of high rate of the impact of high on the computerization of the EC offices on the elections in all the election years.

The positive percent rate of very high of the impact size was 54.5% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, its positive percent rate of very high of the effect size rate was 9.1% of the respondents and in 2000, the positive percent rate of very high of the impact size was 36.4% of the respondents respectively. The positive percent ratio rates of very high of the impact size scores were 54.5%:9.1%:36.4% of the respondents. There was a rate of positive percentage of very high of the effect on the computerization network of the EC offices in 1992 and the 2000 elections.
If negative, how was its rate of impact of the election?

The negative rated impact of refurbishment of the EC office with computers on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 83% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size mark was 17% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size were 83%: 17%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage rate of very low was in the internet computerization of the EC’s office had a negative impact of very low on the election.

The negative percent of low of the effect size was 67% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 20% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 13% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size were 67%: 20%: 13% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a negative percentage rate of the low of the impact prevailed in the refurbishment of the internet of the EC’s computerization program was in the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of average of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in 1992, in 1996, the negative percent of average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent of average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rates of average of the effect size
were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was the existence of a negative percentage rate of average of the impact of the refurbishment of the EC office with internet computer network in the election in 1992.

The negative percent rate of high of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percent of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percent ratio rate of high of the effect size scores was 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percent of high of the impact size existed in the refurbishment of the EC office with computers on the election.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 50% of the respondents’ in 1992, in 1996; its negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents and in 2000, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents. The ratio rates of very high of the impact size score were 50%:0%:50% of the respondents respectively. There was a par outcome of 1992 and 2000 election on the refurbishment of the EC office in the election

**Qualitative effects:** The implication was that there was a negative impact on the use of the refurbishment of the EC office with computers on the election in 1992 and 1996, but a positive effect in the 2000 elections. In 1992, this refurbishment of the EC’s with computer network was unused. In 2000, this equipment were used to transmit results; registered
voters; compilation of the voter register; transmission of other electoral activities to the Returning Officer in Accra and the decentralized units of the EC offices. Its ultimate positive effect was the change of government from NDC to NPP. The negative in 1996 was the retention of the old guards in power (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000).

**How was the replacement of the use of photo ID cards and voter registration impacted on the 2000 election?**

**The positive impact of voter Photo ID Card's replacement in the elections.**

The positive percentage of the effect size of the respondents in the 1992 election was 38.9% , in the 1996 election, its positive percentage of the effect size was 33.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, and its positive percentage of the effect size was 27.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio of the impact size was 38.9%:33.3%:27.8% of the respondents respectively. From the statistical figures given above, it meant that a positive percentage of the impact on the use of photo ID card and voter registration on the election existed, but a reduction in figures of positive percentage on the subsequent elections declined.

**The negative impact of the replacement of photo ID Cards in the elections.**

The negative percent of the effect size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the negative percent of the effect size was 50% of the respondents and in 2000, its negative percent of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. Its negative percent ratios of the impact size scores were 50%:50%:0% of the respondents respectively.

**Qualitative effects:** The implication was a negative impact of re-registration of voters in
1992 and 1996 because it had little impact on the election, which was characterised by multiple registrations and multiple elections, and the retention of the NDC. Paradoxically, the positive effect was in the 2000 election as it changed a government from NDC to a coalition government under the NPP. The EC again granted the opposition parties their request by providing all eligible voters with Voter Identity Cards. However, due to inadequate funds, only voters in the ten regional capitals and ten selected districts received voter photo Identity Cards, the remainder used thumbprint cards for the 1996 election (Jeffries, 1998). Essentially, this mechanism was a protective measure against multiple voter registration and multiple casts of votes in the pre-election and the Election Day.

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

The positive rated impact of re-registration with Voters photo ID Cards on the elections.

The positive percent rate of very low of the impact size mark was 70% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size grade was 20% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 10% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of positive of the impact size scores were 70%: 20%: 10% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage of very low of the impact size was prevalent in the 1992 election on the re-registration with voters photo ID cards.
The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the effect size 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the impact size were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents respectively. This meant a positive percentage of low of the effect rate was found in the 2000 election on the use of photo ID card for the voter registration in the 2000 election.

The positive percentage rate of average of the effect sizes were 38.9% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of average of the effect size was 33.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 27.8% of the respondents respectively. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 38.9%:33.3%:27.8% of the respondents respectively. This meant an average of positive percentage rate of average of the effect on the use of photo ID Cards exists in all the elections but in a reduction manner.

The positive percentage of high rate of the impact sizes was 41.7% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size score was 8.3% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high impact sizes were 41.7%:50%:8.3% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a high positive percentage rate of average of the effect size in the use of photo ID Cards was present on all the election 1992, but reduced in the next election.
The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact sizes was 44.4% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents, in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 55.6% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high effect size were 44.4%:0%:55.6% of the respondents respectively. This meant that a positive percent of very high rate of the impact was prevalent in 1992 and 2000 elections on the use of photo ID Card.

If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of the re-registration with Voters photo ID Cards on the election.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 20% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 60% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 20% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size were 20%:60%:20% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative impact on the use of photo ID Cards on voter registration and on the election was prevalent in the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 70% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size mark was 10% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size mark was 20% of the respondents. The negative percentage
ratio rate of low of the impact size scores were 70%: 10%: 20% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage rate of low of the impact on the use of photo ID Cards was in existence in the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact sizes was 0% of the respondents in the 1992, election, in the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 0%:0%: 100% of the respondents respectively. The implication was a negative percentage rate of average in the use of photo ID Cards was in the 2000 election.

The negative percentage rate of high of the effect sizes was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, in the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rate of high of the effect sizes were 100%:0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It implied that the use of Photo ID Cards had a negative impact on the election in the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size on the use of photo ID Cards was 95% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size grade was 5% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size scores
were 95%; 5%; 0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage rate of very high on the use of photo ID Cards existed in the 1992 election.

How was the impact of training of party agents and their presence in the elections?

The positive impact of training of political party’s agent on the election.

The positive percentage of the impact size scores were 41.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage of the impact size score was 32.1% of the respondents. Moreover, in the 2000 election, the positive percentage of the impact size mark was 26.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratios of the effect size marks were 41.1%:32.1%:26.8% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive impact on the training and presence of political party agents was in existence in the 1992 election in a descending manner, with 1992 leading followed by 1996 and the 2000 election respectively.

The negative impact of training and present of political party agents in the elections.

The negative percent of the effect size value was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent of the effect size score was 100% of the respondents. In addition, in the 2000 election, the negative percent of the effect size grade was 0% of the respondents. The negative percent ratios of the effect size scores were 0%:100%:0% of the respondents respectively. There was a negative impact in the training and presence of political party’s agents, and candidates’ agents on the 1996 elections.

Qualitative Impact: Irrespective of the above discussion, party agents training facilitated in the arrest of multiple registration and its attendant multiple voting the rejection of
minors’ registration in these election processes, as a result, making the final results declared by the EC in the 1992 election valid. It also facilitated in eschewing multiple registration and multiple voting during the elections. The party agents signing of the declaration of result forms was indicative of the credibility of the certified result in each polling station and constituencies, hence their acceptance by stakeholders. These activities of party agents helped in cleaning the voter register against excessive multiple registration and multiple elections in the 1996 and the 2000 elections.

That notwithstanding, the negative effects of party agents were that they advocated on behalf of minor who engaged in voter registration in the polling station. In the final analysis making the voters register bloated with ghost names, minors’ names, and names of multiple registrants and its associated multiple voting which contradicts the principle of one-man one vote. These agents also engage in practices that were against the ethics of secret balloting. For example, agents co-opted minors to climb trees in polling stations in order to identify which party or candidate a particular voter cast their vote for in an election in some focus group discussion. The next table examines the positive rate impact sizes of average, high. And very high effect size scores.

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact of training and presence of party agents in the elections.

The positive percent of very low of the impact size score was 33.3% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size mark was 33.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of very low of the impact size grade was 33.3% of the respondents. The
positive percent ratio rates of very low of the impact size scores were 33.3%: 33.3%: 33.3% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a par outcome on the presence of political party agents was present on their use on the elections.

The positive percent of low of the impact size score was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percent rate of low of the effect size mark was 50% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of low of the impact size score was 50% of the respondents. The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size scores were 0%: 50%: 50% of the respondents respectively. It meant there was a par in outcome in the rate of low in the training and presence of political party agents on the 1996 and the 2000 election.

The positive percentage rate of the average of the impact sizes was 65% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size was 15% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of the average of the impact size was 20% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the average of the effect size were 65%:15%:20% of the respondents respectively. The meaning was that a positive percentage rate of average of the effect on the training and presence of political party agents was eminent in 1992.

The positive percent rate of high of the effects size was 24.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percent rate of high of the impact size was 48.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of high of the effect size grade was 27.6% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the
high of the impact size score were 24.1%:48.3%:27.6% of the respondents. Evidently, the implied rate of high of the impact was available in the 1996 election.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 42.9% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percent rate of very high of the effect size was 14.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent of average of the effect size score was 42.9% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect size rates of very high impact size score were 42.9%:14.3%:42.9% of the respondents respectively. The meaning was that there was a negative effect in 1992 and 2000 the elections, but a positive impact on the 1996 election about the computer network on the election.

Again, party agents witnessed the counting of votes, and collation of results at the constituency center, they were encouraged to countersign the result form at each stage in a conspicuous place before they were sent to the district Returning Officer. Thereafter, the constituency Returning Officer had publicly announced the results and posted a copy of the declaration of results at a conspicuous place before they were sent to the District Electoral Officer for onward transmission to the Regional Electoral Officer, and finally to the EC’s National Headquarters in Accra. This was a technical safeguard against the manipulation of results at the EC headquarters (Jeffries, 1998).

**If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The negative rated impact of training and presence of party agents in the elections.**

The negative percent rate of very low of the impact size score was 78% of the respondents
in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size score was 22% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percent rate of very low of the effect size score was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the impact size marks were 78%: 22%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It meant a very low rate of the impact in the training and presence of political party agents was available on the 1992 election.

The negative percent rate of low of the effect size score was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent of low of the impact size mark was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent rate of low of the impact size grade was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rate of low of the effect sizes were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percent of low of the effect size on the presence of political party agents presence in the election according to the respondents’ opinion.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size Mark was 65% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent of the rate of average was 10% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size mark was 25% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 65%: 10%: 25% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage rate of average on the presence of political party agents existed on the election in the 1992 election.
The negative percentage rate of high on the impact size score was 36% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 38% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 26% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of impact size scores were 36%: 38%: 26% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative effect on the use of political party agents was in existence in the 1996 election followed by the 1992 election.

The negative percent of very high of the impact size score was 60% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percent rate of very high of the effect size mark 25% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size grade was 15% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of impact sizes marks were 60%: 25%: 15% of the respondents respectively. It meant a negative percentage rate of very high existed on the use of party agents on the election in the 1992 election.

**How was the impact of the use of cameras and Laminators impact on the election?**

**The positive impact of the use of cameras and laminators on the elections.**

The positive percentage of the impact size was 38.9% of the respondents in the 1992 election on the use of cameras and laminators on the election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage of the impact on the use of cameras and laminators was 37% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage of the effect size score was 24.1% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio of the effect size rates were
38.9%:37%:24.1% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a positive percent on the use of cameras and laminators in the election existed in the 1992 and the 1996 election. However, the 1992 election led in the positive impact on the use of cameras and laminators on the election.

The negative impact of the use of cameras and laminators on the elections.

The negative percentage of the effect size score was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percent of the effect size was 50% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio of the effect size rates were 50%:0%:50% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percent of par on the use of party agents was in use on the 1992 and the 2000 election.

Qualitative effects: The use of cameras and laminators had a negative impact in 1992 and the 2000 elections, but a positive impact on the 1996 elections. The cause of these cameras effect in the 1996 election were that, most of the electorate had re-registered for Photo ID Cards to vote, only a negligible quantity of the electorates actually registered in the 2000 election. It was, the improvement upon the voters register with Photo ID Cards that helped reduce multiple registrations and multiple voting in the elections that made the 1996 and 2000 elections credible. This novel initiative led to the peaceful turnover in the 2000 election. The use of cameras and laminators negative impact was that most of the pictures were blurred and made it difficult in the identification of the electors during verification, thereby denying some voters their right of representation in some interviews and focus group discussions.
If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated impact on the use of cameras and laminators on the elections.

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. Furthermore, in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rate of very low of the effect size grades were 0%: 0%: 100% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a positive percentage on the use of cameras and laminators existed in the 2000 election.

The positive percentage rate of low of the effect size score was 60% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the size was 40% of the respondents. Moreover, in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size scores were 60%:40%:0% of the respondents respectively. This meant that a positive percentage rate of low of the impact was located in the 1992 and the 1996 election on the use of cameras and laminators.

The positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 40.9% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size score was 31.8% of the respondents. In addition, the positive percentage rate of average of the effect size grade was 27.3% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the effect sizes were 40.9%: 31.8%:27.3% of the respondents respectively. The meaning was that a positive percentage rate of average of the impact was
found in the 1992 election followed by the 1996 election in the use of cameras and laminators on the elections.

The positive percentage rate of high of the effect size value was 26.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 47.8% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size was 21.6% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact sizes were 26.1%:47.8%:21.6% of the respondents. There was a positive percentage rate of high of the impact on the use of cameras and laminators in the 1996 election as an implication on the elections.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size score was 75% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 25% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact sizes were 75%:0%:25% of the respondents respectively. This implies that a positive percentage rate of very high of the impact on the use of cameras and laminators was located in the 1992 elections. The first ushered in an end of a transitional paradigm and the second election brought about electoral democracy and the 2000 election led the consolidation of democracy and a peaceful turnover of government from NDC to NPP.
If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of the use of cameras and laminators on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in the 1996 election. In the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect size scores were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. There existed a negative percentage of very low rates of the impact size on the adaptation of cameras and laminators on the 1992 elections.

The negative percentage rate of low of the impact size score was 89% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 8% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 3% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of low of the effect size scores were 89%: 8%: 3% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a negative percentage rate of low of the impact size on the use of cameras and laminators existed in the 1992 election only.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size value was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the effect size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the impact sizes were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. There were a negative percentage of average rates of the effect on the use of
cameras and laminators on the 1992 election. It implied that a negative percentage on the use of cameras and laminators existed in the 1992 election. The reader is directed to the examination of the impact of scanners and photocopiers on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the effect size were 50%: 50%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The general implication was that a negative percentage rate of high of the impact on the use of cameras and laminators was in the 1992 and the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 65% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 25% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 10% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size scores were 65%: 25%: 10% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage rate of very high of the impact on the use of cameras and laminators was in the 1992 election.

How was the impact of using scanners and photocopiers on the election?

The positive impact of the use of scanners and photocopiers on the elections.

The positive percentage of the effect size was 41.7% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage of the effect size was 37.5% of the
respondents in the 1996 election, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage of the impact size were 20.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect sizes were 41.7%:37.5%:20.8% of the respondents respectively. The implication was a positive percentage of the effect on the use of scanners and photocopiers on the 1992 election, followed by the 1996 election.

**The negative impact of the use of scanners and photocopiers on the elections.**
The negative percentage of the effect sizes score was 30% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage of the impact size was 20% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage of the impact size was 50% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of the effect size were 30%:20%:50% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a negative percentage of the effect on the use of scanners and photocopier was available in the 2000 election.

**If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?**

**The positive rated impact of scanners and laminators on the elections.**
The positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 19.5% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low was 27.5% of the respondents, In addition, in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size score was 53% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very low of the effect sizes were 19.5%: 27.5%: 53% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage rate of very low on the use of scanners and photocopier existed in the 2000 election.
The positive percentage of low rate of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. Furthermore, in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the impact sizes scores were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage rate of low of the impact size on the use of scanners and photocopiers was located in the 1992 election.

The positive percentage of average rate of the effect size was 43.5% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 39.1% of the respondents. Moreover, in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of average was 17.4% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size marks were 43.5%:39.1%:17.4% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a positive percentage rate average of the effect on the use of scanners and photocopiers existed in the 1992 election followed by the 1996 election and the 2000 election scored last.

The positive percentage of high rate of the effect size was 23.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size grade was 38.5% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the effect size mark was 38.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the impact sizes figures were 23.1%:38.5%:38.5% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was prevalent in a tier on the use of scanners and photocopiers in the 1996 and the 2000
election with equal figures on the impact size grades.

The positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 40% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 10% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact sizes were 50%:40%:10% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a positive percentage rate of very high of the effect size on the application of the scanners and photocopiers existed in the 1992 election, followed by the 1996 election.

If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The negative rated impact of the use of scanners and photocopiers on the elections.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size grade was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 100% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low effect sizes were 0%:0%:100% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size existed on the use of scanners and photocopiers on the 2000 election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the effect size was 100% of the respondents in the 1993 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the effect size mark was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of
low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rate of
low of the effect sizes scores were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. It meant
that a negative percentage ratio rate of low of the impact on the use of scanners and
photocopiers existed on the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of average of the effect size was 0% of the respondents in the
1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact
size was 66.7% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate
of average of the impact size was 33.3% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio
rates of average of the impact size scores were 0%:66.7%:33.3% of the respondents
respectively. It meant that a negative percentage rate of average of the effect size score was
available on the use of scanners and photocopiers on the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of high of the effect size was 23% of the respondents in the
1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size
was 20% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of high
of the impact size was 57% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high
of the effect sizes were 23%:20%:57% of the respondents respectively. The implication
was that a negative percentage rate of high of the effect on the use of scanners and
photocopiers was in existence on the 2000 election. The use of finger thumbprint pads and
indelible inks evaluation is next on the election.

The negative percentage rate of very high of the effect size was 33.3% of the respondents
in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the
impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 66.7% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect sizes were 33.3%:0%:66.7% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage rate of very high of the effect on the use of scanners and photocopiers was in existence on the 2000 election. The use of finger thumbprint pads and indelible inks evaluation is next on the election.

How was the impact of the use of thumbprint pad and indelible ink on the election?

The positive impact of the use of thumbprint pads and indelible ink on the elections.

The percentage of positive of the impact size score was 38.9% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage of the effect size was 33.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage of the impact size was 27.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect sizes were 38.9%:33.3%:27.8% of the respondents respectively. The meaning was that a positive percentage of the effect size on the use of thumbprint pads and indelible ink was in the 1992 election, followed by the 1996 election.

The main factor worthy of explaining the NDC’s landslide victory was that, it provided public goods and services to most of the rural population who have never had such opportunities after the demise of Nkrumah and his CPP in Ghana’s multi-party democracy. This public goods delivery of the NDC, led by Rawlings was sufficient to secure their votes for Rawlings for tenure of office. Rawlings’ fame and firm image as a strong leader who never failed in his promise was influential in this respect. The contrasting prospect of
a new government made up of antagonizing faction under the leadership of weak personalities of rural values and priorities frightened many rural voters. Hence, trust worked effectively as a decisive measure. The simple basis of the Rawlings’ NDC victory was premised on the grounds of its economic and developmental policies deigned to redress urban prejudices against the rural folks through the Structural Adjustment Program and its domestic policy implementation (Jeffries, 1998).

In the final place, the nuances in the pattern of voting were crystal than a mirrored image of the relative distribution of economic benefits from structural adjustment. It played an equally reflected differential in the culture between the elites in the urban centers, the middle class, and the upper class of the social strata one hand, versus the lower social strata, both rural dwellers and urban settlers on the other hand. The urban middle and upper strata prospered under the NDC, however, they voted predominantly for the NPP. This typical class struggle between the two opposing class formation and the exhibition of their constitutional right to participate in the political development of their mother Ghana was evidential in these elections. The Rawlings and the NDC parliamentary candidates won massively in rural constituencies of Greater Accra Region. Educational level and relative social status exerts a vital influence on the conception of Rawlings as either the man of the people, or a self-constructed dictator with lots of blood stained all over him, and of NPP leaders as society’s most suitable and desirable rulers or untrustworthy self-interested and egoistic elites (Jeffries, 1998).
The negative impact of votes cast using thumbprints pads and indelible inks on the elections.

The negative percentage of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage of the impact size was 50% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage of the effect size ratio rate size was 50%: 50%: 0% of the respondents respectively. The negative percentage of the impact size on the application of thumbprints and indelible ink was in the 1992 and the 1996 election.

The use of indelible ink to mark the thumb of voters provided an effective safeguard mechanism against multiple registrations unless otherwise in cross polling stations, registration, and multiple cast of vote thereby affecting the outcome of the results. However, a number of claims were made that certain substance was used to erase off the ink, these were verified or tested by COG and found it invalid.

If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

The positive rated effects on thumbprint pads and laminators in the elections.

The positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of the effect sizes were 100%:0%:0% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive rate of very low on the use of thumbprint
and indelible ink was in the 1992 election.

The positive percentage of low rate of the effect size score was 60% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 40% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of low of the effect sizes were 60%:40%:0% of the respondents respectively. This implied that a positive percentage rate of low of the impact size on the use of thumbprint and indelible ink was located in the 1992 election.

The positive percentage rate of average of the effect size was 47.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of average of the effect size was 41.2% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of average of the impact size was 11.8% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size values were 47.1%:41.2%:11.8% of the respondents. This meant a positive percentage rate of average of the impact on the use of thumbprints pads and indelible ink was in the 1992 election, followed by the 1996 election.

The positive percentage rate of high of the impact size grades was 35% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 30% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of high of the impact size was 35% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of high of the effects sizes were 35%:30%:35% of the respondents. It meant that a positive percentage rate of high of the impact size on the use of thumbprint pads and indelible ink
was in the 1992 and the 2000 election.

The positive percentage of very high of the impact size score was 18.2% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 27.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 54.5% of the respondents. The positive percentage ratio rates of very high of the impact size marks were 18.2%:27.3%:54.5% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a positive percentage rate of very high on the use of thumbprint pads and indelible ink was located in the 2000 election.

If negative, how was its rate of impact of the election?

The negative rated impact of the use of thumbprints and indelible inks in the elections.

The negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was 50% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 50% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very low of the effect size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very low of the impact sizes were 50%: 50: 0% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative percentage rate of very low of the impact size was in existence on the use of thumbprint pads and indelible ink on the election in the 1992 and the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of low of the impact size score was 100% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the positive percentage rate of
low of the impact size was 0% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rate of low of the effect size scores were 100%: 0%: 0% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative percentage rate of low of the impact size on the application of thumbprint pads and indelible ink was in the 1992 election.

The negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 47.1% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate average of the impact size was 41.2% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of average of the impact size was 11.7% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of average of the impact size were 47.1%: 41.2%: 11.7% of the respondents respectively. The implication was that a negative percentage rate of average of the impact size on the use of thumbprint pads and indelible ink was in the 1992 election followed by the 1996 election.

The negative percentage rate of high of the effect size was 35% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the impact size was 30% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of high of the effect size score was 35% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of high of the impact size were 35%: 30%: 35% of the respondents respectively. It meant that a negative percentage rate of high of the effect size on the use of thumbprint pads and indelible ink was in the 1992 and 2000 election.
The negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size score was 18.2% of the respondents in the 1992 election. In the 1996 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size mark was 27.3% of the respondents, and in the 2000 election, the negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size was 54.5% of the respondents. The negative percentage ratio rates of very high of the effect size were 18.2%: 27.3%: 54.5% of the respondents respectively. It implied that a negative percentage rate of very high of the impact size with the use of thumbprints pads and indelible ink was in the 2000 election. Elections in Ghana were not divorced from ethnic politics as discussed below.

3.10 ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Electoral systems are the parties in a state; party systems; and electoral disproportionality. They are employed for coalition building; government instability; macroeconomic outcomes; similarities between voter choice and policy outcomes. Electoral institutions are domestic/indigenous variables. Electoral systems are a set of rigid election rules and regulations under which single or successive elections are conducted in democracies (Golder, 2005). The Electoral system are classified into Assembly size; District levels; Degree of Electoral Formula; Presidential elections and the number of electoral “tiers”. The determinants are the alteration in district size; Assembly magnitude in most electoral systems. This is common in both presidential round of elections and run-off of electoral system (Golder, 2005).

In legislative elections, simple majoritarian or proportional representation formula was employed in the parliamentary election in electoral systems in Ghana. This majoritarian or proportional system applied single electoral formula in electoral tiers. The threshold for the
presidential election is 50% plus one votes, if no candidate wins an election held. Mostly, the top two winners contest in the run-off election. The candidate that wins the majority votes is declared the winner in Ghana’s election, as exemplified between NDC presidential aspirant J E A Mills and NPP J A Kuffour in the fourth republic in the 2000 election. This was noted in an interview in Tamale by Mr. Ockraine.

For example the electoral delimitations in Ghana are: the delimitation exercise of electoral boundaries of the organizational structure in conducting national elections and district elections is two-hundred and thirty constituencies proportionately distributed amongst the ten regions in Ghana. This was aimed at promoting macrocosmic representation of members of the legislature. There are five thousand (5000) electoral areas divided among one hundred and fifty eight districts of the nation, and twenty one thousand and four (21,004) polling stations across the nation, this was to facilitate access to polling stations and make electoral governance closer to the citizenry. It was in these constituencies and polling stations where the electorates cast their votes and the place of voter registration; voters’ register exhibition; and voters’ are permanently assigned to these polling stations. The demarcation of constituencies for elections is termed delimitation or delineation of constituencies by Expert staff of the EC. They perform the art of delimitation of these constituencies (Afari-Gyan, Electoral Commission of Ghana "Election 2000"). The nation adopted the Plurality or Majoritarian system in all its national elections. The threshold for winning an election is 50% plus one (1) vote for presidential elections. However, if no political party’s presidential candidate attains this threshold, the top two leading candidates go in for a runoff, the winner of the runoff becomes the president elect for the nation. On
parliamentary elections, the simple majority formula was applied. Any parliamentary
candidate who gets majority of vote is declared the winner of the election, the electoral
system for parliamentary election is the First Pass the Post (FPTP). The basic features of
the electoral system are universal adult suffrage (18 years and above); voters registration;
non-compulsory registration of voters; secret ballot; registration of political parties;
however, political parties are not to sponsor candidates for district or local level elections;
and a permanent electoral commission exist for election management (Electoral

The political parties which contested for election in 1992 were the National Democratic
Party (NDC), the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the People National convention (PNC), The
People Heritage Party (PHP), the National Independent Party (NIP), the Convention
People Party (CPP), the Democratic People’s Party (DPP), the Great Consolidated
People’s Party (GCPP), the United Ghana Movement (UGM), and the National Reform
Party (NRP) were the registered political parties in the electoral system in the country.

According to Afari-Gyang, the electorsl system adapted in Ghana sought to promote good
governance and accountability. Good governance because it brought governance to the
people, by the people and for the people. Accountability because any Member of
parliament and political party that is inept or poor performing is ouster after the tenure of
office. The three Arms of government serves as a check and balance to each other. The
names of political parties and their candidates were:
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

4.1. INTRODUCTION

From the outset of the Fourth Republic, the donor community has supported the electoral development of the nation in many ways. In this chapter, it is revealed that electoral assistance to the Electoral Commission, the media and the Civil Society Organizations at the national level have helped to enhance the capacity of the Electoral Commission to become more efficient and effective in the conduct of elections in the nation. The central thesis of the study was that the Donor Communities’ electoral assistance to the electoral processes and procedures of national elections have consolidated electoral democracy, and have facilitated the conduct of elections through the activism of these institutions engagements with grassroots participation in the political development of Ghana.

This implied that this electoral assistance (financial and logistic resources) were capable of changing ideas, normative values of the citizens to participate effectively in elections, and eliminate all constraints which militate against effective and efficient operations and participations in the elections, and all electoral processes and procedures of the nation. The capability of foreign aid to spearhead the electoral process was dependent on factors that inhibit good governance and accountability in elections; democratic socio-politico-economic process; the provision of social goods for the betterment the citizenry’s live.
4.2. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

The first chapter dealt with the issues of repressive governments in the era before 1992 and the quest for democratization based on both internal and external pressures for transition to democracy. In view of the above, donors assisted the Electoral Commission in technical support; electoral material assistance; legal framework drafting; electoral administration; voter education based on the challenges of the Electoral Commission.

The theoretical framework was premised on the development theory of support in transforming the development of developing nation on the ground of the new partnership agreement of donor assistance, local ownership of policy formulation and implementations of good governance.

The literature review looked at assistance to the Electoral Commission globally and locally to run general elections. These are technical assistance; advisory support; logistic aid; legal framework; transportation; civic education; internal dispute committees; and electoral systems employed in order to accomplish success in elections.

Chapter two discussed democracy promotion which fosters national security interest amongst democracies; promotes geopolitics and development cooperation; institutionalization of democratic institutions; nation building; citizens participation; restrains governments abuse of power; regime legitimacy; diminish anti-systemic groups; reduces intrastate and interstate conflicts; and war crimes against humanity were reduces.
Its dangers are its instability; the development of democratic institutions and economic growth.

The Foreign policy used by the US governments was the Title IX Act in 1961; Foreign Assistance Act of section 116 (e) on human rights; legal outfits reforms; civic education; legal education; social, economic and political participation in national development. The European Union’s Foreign Policies were: the Eastern Neighborhood Policy; Eastern-Mediterranean Policy; the Copenhagen Criteria; the Barcelona Process for the Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean countries, and the Lome Convention and the Cotonou Agreement to coax or woo authoritarian countries to democratize in Africa. The USA used the soft power or carrot of AID to lure most African nations into democratization in the 21st century.

The study reveals that the modalities employed for democracy enlargements was coercive power, military power or coercive power; embargoes; sanctions and aid withdrawals also known as hard power or stick. The other modality was positive power termed as incentives like loans; aid; grants for development projects and programs to coax nations into democratic governance.

Again, the US democracy assistance is purely on political grounds such as respect for positive rights. Negative rights and civil rights. The European Union/Commission assisted in the developmental approach, such as democracy; good governance; transparency;
accountability; responsiveness that contributes towards socio-economic development and judicial reforms.

The study further assesses the financial and material commitment of the donors to the electoral development in the Fourth Republic with priority and emphasis on the Electoral Commission, Civil Society Organization, and the mass media empowerment at the national level. Through these projects funds were channelled to these elections;

The Electoral Commission’s capacity building and logistic enhancement were paramount in the elections. The sub-sector assistance was: Elections: legal and institutional framework compliance with international laws; Election Administration; Voter registration; voter education; and voters’ participation. The Electoral system in the nation to foster good governance and accountability; Other factor includes Election observation as a complement for the legitimacy and acceptance of results; validity of election results; the declaration of election results; and the role and impact of the security services in these elections.

In view of the above assistance granted to the nation’s electoral commission, the core objectives of the study are:

➤ To assess the impact of electoral assistance to the Electoral Commission in the elections.

➤ To investigate the impact of the mass media assistance on the elections.

➤ To evaluate the impact of Civil Society Organizations’ assistance in the elections.

➤ To evaluate impact of judicial reforms in the elections.
➢ To investigate the impact of Election Observer Missions in the elections.

➢ To evaluate the impact of Security Assistance in the elections.

In lieu of the researcher’s quest to achieve these objectives of the study, the hypothesis of the study was that electoral assistance significantly supported Ghana to consolidate democracy in the Fourth Republic.

Indeed, for any researcher to accomplish the objectives of a study, a methodology of the study is significant in that respect. Therefore, the methodology the research used was based on experimental design or randomization control design and non-experimental or quasi-experimental design. These are the methods employed by both external and domestic researchers on impact evaluation of both bilateral and multilateral support for democratic development. This was applied based on the evolving design of public opinion survey: a blend of external validity advantage of representative public opinion with internal validity strengths of the randomized multifaceted experiment premised on:

➢ Questionnaire Administration;

➢ Structured Interviews; and

➢ Focus group discussion.

To ascertain the above objectives, the target groups were the:

➢ The Electoral Commission labour force was engaged into focus group discussion and interviews.

➢ The mass media officials and journalist were involved in interviews.
➢ The Civil Society Organizations were interviewed coupled with focus group discussions.

The methods of data collection employed both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. It used both experimental and non-experimental study. Essentially, this was purposive designed to arrest or reduce biases associated with respondents, and qualitative and quantitative research in seven regions out of the ten regions in Ghana was made.

The country was stratified into three electoral cluster zones (Northern Ghana electoral zone, Central Ghana electoral Zone, and Coastal Ghana electoral zone) and two regions were selected from each electoral zone based on a simple random design.

This was to ensure that any region within the cluster zones had a probability of being selected. The seventh region selected were: Accra was selected based on purposive sampling as the headquarters of the electoral processes and procedures where the funds were given to the office at the centralized level to plan on the elections. Questionnaires were self-administered to students across the nation. As elites, they have an insight of almost every activity of the elections under-review.

Secondary data were gotten from books; journals; reports; agencies/institutions or beneficiaries on elections. In all, 85% of the respondent cooperated in responding to the questionnaires out of 1800 questionnaires administers, the aggregate questionnaires
retrieved were 1530, however, all interviewees and Focus Group discussion participant attended to the discussion.

4.3. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The central goal of the study was to measure the effects of election management of the nation vis-à-vis the efficiency and the effectiveness of Electoral Commission workforce inter-alia international laws on the right of representation. The findings of the work had a mixed results hitherto with the injection of technical; financial; logistic assistance given for the elections. However, the majority of respondents asserted a positive outcome to the respect that Ghana’s laws complied with international laws on elections.

Primarily, the Electoral Commission’s labour was competent, impartial, independent and exhibited division of labour and independence. This gave rise to participation and representation due to their ability of being efficient and effective to mobilize the electors to vote. This also have a a mixed outcome between positive and negative impact in the elections in the period under review.

Additionally, on voter education, registration and participation, most respondents gave positive and negative responses. The negative effect outnumbered the positive impact of the respondents. However, these have led to the development of ushering in democracy, participation; good governance and peaceful turnover in the 2000 elections, and have enhance peace and development in the nation.
Finally, the electoral system developed and employed in the national elections had a positive effect, as it has promoted accountability and good governance in Ghana, and has brought about a change of successive governments and parliamentarians in 2000. The national security agencies were instrumental in these election in promoting the protection of both public and private properties; elections materials and staff of the Electoral Commission; halted voters’ intimidation; protected both election monitors and election observers; and the consulates and Ambassadors within the nation.

Additionally, on the validity of election results, it also had a mixed outcome between negative in the maiden elections and positive outcome in the 1996 and the 2000 election. On the declaration of election results, a mixed outcome was observed. The nascent election results declaration was negative whilst the subsequent declaration of election results declaration were positive

4.4. CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY

The study was premise on the hypothesis that electoral assistance significantly supported Ghana to consolidate democracy in the Fourth Republic. It was apparent from the research results that, financial injections, technical assistance and logistical provision have empowered the Electoral Commission, Civil Society Organization and the mass media activities on national elections from 1992 to 2000 positively. These supports have immensely contributed to the formations of efficient and effective Electoral Commission, Civil Society advocacy and election observers as beneficiaries. The year (1992) was the baseline of the study that never benefited enough from assistance project. Consequently, the EC,
CSOs and the media never performed well and as a result had a negative impact on national elections vis-à-vis assistance.

The large support granted in 1996 and 2000 towards these general election greatly enhanced voter education, voter registration and participation in the elections. The existence of private media, mobile phone journalism, radio commentary; Civil Society advocacy; equal access to the media by political parties; civic education in local languages has a robust impact on these elections in the post 1992 elections. This has led to credible elections in 1996 and the 2000 elections where the stakeholders unanimously accepted the declared results of the elections.

The central point of the research was that electoral assistance to Ghana significantly consolidate democracy in the Fourth Republic.

4.5. RECOMMENDATION OF THE STUDY

Following the findings of the study based on the objectives, methodology and hypothesis, the following recommendations are made.

4.5.1. Recommendation of the Study

Following the findings of the study based on the objectives, methodology and hypothesis, the following recommendations are made for considerations.
Donor support is unsustainable, even in the event of consistent support the inflow fluctuates. It is recommended that, because of the above, the government/state should endeavour to establish an electoral basket fund to meet the needs of the national elections of the state in the event that donor support inflow stops or fluctuates in the possible future. This fund should be accessible by the EC, and, the EC must be accountable to the nation for all funds spent. The financial audit reports should be made available in the internet and other media houses annually for financial experts outside the Auditor General Department to comment on the reality of income and expenditure records provided for the necessary monitoring and corrections of the EC’s double entry records, and their balance sheet annually and corrected suspense accounts.

Again, parliament should be proactive in ensuring that funds requested for elections are immediately provided. Debates on the floor of parliament on electoral funds should be premise on cross voting explosion instead of the partisanship syndrome approach practiced in Ghana. The EC should not renege in punishing politicians when they under fund elections. To achieve this novel demand, when parliament refuses to make funds available on due course, or under funds an election, the EC should allow parliament to be dissolved without an election. In this respect, all politicians would come to understand and respect the referee in which their destiny of survival is contingent on the referee. This will make them more proactive towards funding elections.

Another major problem of the electoral commission was equipment failure and errors. These machine failures or errors are caused by the weather of the nation. The weather as at
when voter registration and elections are held is always hot because Ghana is a temperate zone coupled with severe wind that carries dust into the equipment, thereby causing such equipment failures. This affects the efficient and effective functioning of this equipment. To ameliorate the above, the Electoral Commission should always house their open polling stations in tents and back up the cooling system with external coolants that will reduce the rate of heat exerted on these equipment causing equipment failures and errors.

The additional recommendation is that, the reversal of democracy could erupt following rigged or flawed elections or disobedience to the electoral rules and regulations. It is recommended that, all actors in elections should abide by the rules and regulations of elections to avoid the occurrence of the third wave reversal. This is achievable through the EC making publications of the rules and regulations available to the public to learn in the media, journals and books. This sensitization program will enlighten the citizens on the code of conduct of the citizens and election officers and penalties attached to the norms governing elections. The EC, the mass media and civil society organizations who flout the laws should be prosecuted or their jobs terminated, tried in a court of the unbiased and competent court of law. As the adage says, ‘ignorance of the law is not an excuse’, making the laws available is helpful to salvage electoral flaws in Ghana and the third wave reversal.

Again, the EC must pilot test their entire temporary electoral official to make them competent in their operation. These pilot test projects should base on the District Assembly elections, Political party Congresses election, and other elections. In this respect, their
experiences will be enhanced, and their competence level on their operation raised. This will to an extent eliminate or reduce errors thereby halting the dispute of election results emanating from elections. The most common errors in an election are:

➢ Ambiguity of figures and words; this is where the figures entered in the voter register or declaration of results form in figures are at variance with the entry in numbers. For example, one hundred and thirty seven thousand, five hundred and sixty in words. However, in numbers, it is written as 130, 560. These types of typographic or written errors are dangerous and could lead to elections disputes.

➢ Errors of commissions; Errors of Commissions are error in which the officials of the EC may enter in the declaration of results form. These forms of errors are inimical to elections. The EC officials commit certain errors unknowingly in this situation.

➢ Errors of omissions; errors of omissions are circumstances in which a number is omitted from the entry in the declaration of results forms, or the entire space provided for such an entry in the declaration of results form is missing entirely. For example 345,985 becomes 345, 98.

➢ Errors of compensation; Errors of compensation on the other hand is where a number is added to a figure to inflate the election results. For example, 780,375,264 as a votes cast in an election is written as 780,735, 624 in the declaration of results form.
Errors of transposition of figures; transposition of figures mean exchanging the election results figures of one candidate for another candidate in an election. For example, if NPP had 894,339,100, whilst NDC had 467,987,342. The results are transposed by exchange as NPP 467,987,342, and NDC as 894,339,100. This petty could result in election disputes and litigations.

Ambiguity of names: This when the name of an elector is wrongly spelt in the ID Card for usage during elections. This can deny a voter from casting his vote entirely in an election. For example, Nambie Abass Dickens Dinggetoh becomes Wumbie Abass Dickson Dingetoh. In this technical condition, polling agent could dismiss the elector from casting his vote in an election especially when the candidate was known by his name. The identity of the voter is changed completely and makes him a ghost or an impersonation.

The EC must also embark upon post-election period voter registration and voters’ education. They should start from the post-election day voter registration to November of every election year when voters register exhibition will be made for correction on ambiguity of names. In this vein, it will eliminate stress and pressure mounted on the EC and its other auxiliary bodies on election season. In doing so, the EC must make it a cardinal point to encourage people who will attain the voting age by the day of the election to also register and cast their votes to avoid non-participation in the political development.
of the nation. The reason is that such eligible voters are denied their right of participation in the political development of their nations.

On the other hand, the donors require more from the Electoral Commission and its auxiliary agencies/institutions. Therefore, the Electoral Commission, media, Civil Society organizations and political parties should be transparent in their dealings on elections to gain the necessary support from donors in subsequent elections. The establishment of diffidence will mar election management and their outcomes if due diligence is not applied, coupled with electoral transparency. As Woodrow Wilson puts it, “open covenant openly arrived at” in democracy should be the hallmark of Ghana’s elections.

The equipment producers must also endeavour to carry out feasibility studies on the temperate zones, and produce equipment that are conducive for use in such temperate areas of the world. The weather causes harm to these equipment making them ineffective and inefficient in function. The inbuilt fans should be several in order to be able to cool down the excessive heat generated by the equipment. Again, the Optical Magnetic Ray machines produced should incorporate an identification facility that identifies multiple voters’ registered biographic data for deletion to avoid higher electoral volatility on turnout of elections.

On the issue of the mass media, they must be circumspect in their reportage, avoid biases and imbalance selections of commentators in their studios. The National Media Commission and the Ghana Journalist Association should endeavour to strictly apply the ethics of professional journalism and broadcast of news items based on investigative
journalism, equal access to the media by all stakeholders in the elections be it state owned media or private media outlet.

Again, the Institutions mentioned above should encourage community based media establishment in Ghana. This will in the end promote the sensitization of the citizens on government policies, which will enhance grassroots participation, determination of the political ideologies of each political party in Ghana, and this will woo in floating voters to make an informed choice on election as to who should govern them and reduce voter apathy.

Successive governments must eschew the winner takes it all syndrome, retail corruption and wholesale electoral corruption in elections, and provide public goods to the citizens to eliminate voter apathy in politics especially in elections. The reason is that, all citizens must be encouraged to participate in the development of their national politics.

The EC must monitor the funding of political Parties, especially during election period. The revelation is that, Political Action Committees sponsor political parties during general elections. Political Action Committees are firms that funds politics. These political Action Committees are both Domestic Political Action Committees and External Political Action Committees. The activities of political Action Committees are pejorative to national interest, as politicians will compromise national interest for such Political Action Committees interest. To succeed in this endeavour, all political parties’ contributions should be paid directly into the parties Bank Accounts. No cash should be handles at all.
The accounts of each political party should be directly linked to the database of the EC’s office for closer monitoring and auditing periodically. Again, no politician should sell his or her property to finance his political career. The continuation of this act makes politicians desperate in winning elections at all cost to recoup or reap the cost of funding the election. In the unlikely event that a politician loses an election, he/she finds it difficult to accept the election results and often resorts to alternative mechanisms of challenging the results of the election in court, which by itself scares investors away from investing in the nation. The consequence of such an action is economic hardship, and inflation in the nation. Again, the EC should endeavour to always let the media follow politicians when they are on a trip outside the country to monitor and report on their external sources of funding of politics in the country.

Election Observer Missions should not rush in departure after an election. They should stay and carry out an evaluation of how the counting of votes and the entry of election results are entered into the declaration of results forms before compiling their recommendation to the stakeholders of an election. In this respect, they will identify minor errors and recommend better ways of addressing such errors in subsequent elections to avoid the dispute over election results.

To the Civil Society organizations, they should eschew partisanship, and be impartial in their duties on elections, use the funds given to them for the core purpose of their establishment instead of using it for workshop for themselves, whereby they pay themselves fat salaries at the expense of the society they seek to advocate for.
Again, Civil Society Organizations should encourage the establishment of Community Based Organizations (CBOs). These CSOs should also establish cordial relations with CBOs. It is when this happens that emerging issues at the local level will breed the duo effect such policy dissemination and policy feedbacks of information at local levels to the national level CSOs to advocate on behalf of the nation entirely.

4.5.2 Recommendations to the Donors

Due to the unsustainability of donor support, it is recommended that the donors should sustain their support to the Electoral Commission. It is therefore recommended that the donor community should help set up an electoral basket fund to cater for all electoral issues in the country to meet unforeseeable circumstance that might bedevil the donor in any moment in time. This was ascertained by their contribution towards the establishment of such a fund.

When such an event happens, there should be international accountability to the donors from the EC and other auxiliary institutions of Ghana annually on funds income and expenditure, with a certified audit report. This is because; these funds are international citizens’ funds that need to be accounted for by policy makers at the international level to build international taxpayers confidence and their readiness to subsequent assistance.

The International Community should empower the decentralized EC Offices with all needed logistic to make them more efficient and effective in their operations. The various
Diplomats should at least try to visit some of the decentralized institutions as a monitoring mechanism as the EU Ambassador did in January 2012. This will help them understand the development needs of such communities, this aid them to refashion and redirect their commitments to the local level to meet the needs of the citizens in the political participation towards their national development.

The donor community should also assist the government, media houses, the National Commission on Civic Education and the Information Service Department of the state to enable them carry out a wider civic education for the citizens to comprehend why and how to vote, and ensure or avoid rigging of elections, and to engage in peaceful elections. These institutions penetrate the four corridors of the nation to embark upon civic education. They for example, educate the citizens on peaceful elections, and the need to avoid post-election conflict with video shows of such occurrences in other neighbouring countries.

The role of Civil Society Organizations is benign to elections in Ghana. They engage in advocacy, peaceful elections and domestic election Observer Mission. The donor should encourage and fund like-minded Community Based Organizations who can educate the electorates in their respective local languages through advocacy to the understanding of the indigenes, instead of funding Civil Society Organizations in urban areas alone. On the other hand, donors can mandate urban CSOs to have at least five offices at the local level covering the entire nation before any CSO can have funds for their operations.

The mass media are significant on electoral issues such as voter education on the processes and procedures of election. The donors must encourage the establishment of a Community
Based media houses to enable them advocate, comment, and educate the citizens to know more about government policies, performances, and political parties’ ideological orientations to make informed decisions on elections as to who to cast their vote for to govern them and building a peaceful post-election society.

4.5.3 Recommendation to the Academia

To the academia, there are more to be accomplished by the engagement on impact assessment of donor assistance to government agencies and institutions. It is only when students and other intellectual work are done with donor support that, the donor would comprehend the *ex-post* and *ante-post* effects of their assistance project’s outcome to be either successful or a failure. With this backdrop, the donor community, government agencies and institutions will understand their shortcomings, and refashion their policy directions to such institutions/ agencies to accomplish donor-recipient agenda project’s success.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


CDD Field Officer, interview by Nambie A.D.Dinggetoh. "The Role of CODEO and NODEO in Ghana's Elections" (20 June 2010).


Elklt, Jorgen. “"Election Institutional Change and Democratization: You Can Lead a Horse to What, but You cannot Make it Drink".” Democratization, 1999: 28-51.


Emmanuel, Kant. “"Perpectual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch."” 1795: 23-56.


General Secretary of The Ghana Journalist Association, interview by Nambie Abass Dickens Dinggetoh. "*The Role and Impact of the Media on Ghana’s Elections*" Accra, (20 July 2011).


George, A., interview by Nambie Abass Dickens Dinggetoh. "*The Role and Impact of Civil Society Organizations in Elections*" Wa, (7 January 2012).


Ghana Broadcasting Corporation “Independent Day New Item” 2010


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Kant. Emmanuel “"Perpectual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch.” 1795: 23-56.


Lindburg, Steffan I. “Opposition Parties and Democratization in Sub Saharan Africa”.


Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Some Social Inequalities of democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy.” *The American Political Science Review*

Democracy Assistance: Key Lessons and Challenges.” *Overseas Development

and the Challenges of Democracy Deepening: Assessing International Democracy
Assistance and Lessons Learned: Good Governance. Aid Modalities and Poverty
Reduction: Linkages to the Millienium Development Goals (MDGs)*. Advisory
Board of Irish Aid, Ireland: "Board of Irish Aid: Irish Aid Advisory Board, 2007,
23-47.

Lopez-Pinto, Rafael “Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance” Bureau
of Development Policy, United Nations Development Programme, 2000, 2-96.

Lopez-Pinto, Rafael, “EC Methodological Guide on Electoral Assistance, European

147.

Marina. Ottaway and Chung.T. “Debating Democracy Assistance: Towards a New

Marshall G.B and Rossman C. “Designing Qualitative Research.” (SagePublication) "1995:
23-78.

Quarterly* (The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the

Members of Civil Society Organizations, interview by Nambie Abass Dickens Dinggetoh.
*Civil Society Organization's Role on Elections in Ghana* (23 January 2012).


Oquaye, Mike “Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC in Ghana”


Schraeder, Peter. ““The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion”.” Foreign Affairs (Frank CASS) 9, no. 20 (2005): 21-43.


Thomas, Carothers and Marina Ottaway. ““Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion”.” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) 2000: 11-16.


Umar, Alhajj, interview by Nambie A.D.Dinggetoh. "*The Role of Political Parties and CSOs on Elections*" Tamale, (18 December 2011).


APPENDICES

QUESTIONNAIRES

APPENDIX A

Electoral Commission.2000

INTRODUCTION

I am a student of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, undertaking Graduate Studies. This research is executed on democracy assistance impact on Ghana’s elections from 1992 to 2000 elections. This is in partial fulfilment of my postgraduate course (M PHIL Political Science). This questionnaire is a major component of the academic work. It is not intended to probe or pry into your private or personal lives, neither is it intended to gather information for the government, its agencies, nor the Donor community and their agencies, and departments. It is an independent academic research initiated, designed and conducted by the aforementioned purpose. I diligently hope you will cooperate with the researcher and respond to the questions without an iota doubt. The researcher assures of absolute confidentiality and that all protocols regarding such studies will be adhered to strictly in this research. Information gathered from the study will be protected from third parties. Thanks for your cooperation.

NB: The impact assessment questionnaire is made up of positive, negative and a follow up question. Responds to any positive question should skip the negative question, on the other hand, if you answer a question as negative then skip the positive question. In short, never answer both positive and negative on the questionnaire, respond to only one, either positive or negative, and its follow up question only (AfriMAP, 2005)

A. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA.

A1. Age of respondent.

A2. Gender of respondent
(1) Male (2) Female (3) Hermaphrodite

A3. Religion of respondent
1. Moslem (2) Christian (3) African Traditional Religion (4) Others……………..

A4. Educational background of respondent………………………………………………………

A5. Occupation of respondent……………………………………………………………………………

A6. Nationality of Respondent………………………………………………………………………………

Q. Election; Legal and institutional Framework.

Q237. How has the government of Ghana’s support for and bringing domestic laws into compliance with international treaties on election in 2000 impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
Q132. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the 2000 election?
Q133. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the 2000 election?
Q134. How has the legal framework and timetable for the 2000 election compliance with that election impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
Q135. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the general election?
Q136. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the 2000 election?
Q137. How was the holding of the 2000 election at the same time impacted on the general election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
Q138. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
Q139. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?
Q140. How has the eligibility criteria in holding or running for an office at national level impacted on the 2000 election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
Q141. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
Q142. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
Q143. How was the nomination procedure for candidates impacted on the national election in 2000?
1. Positive 2. Negative
Q144. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
Q145. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R. Electoral Administration.
R146. How has the impartiality, independence, specialization of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBS), and auxiliary institutions impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
R147. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
R148. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?
R149. How was the impact of donor assistance on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
R150. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
R151. How has the prevention of electoral fraud impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
R152. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
R153. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?
R154. How was the impact of competence of the EMB’s staffs on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
R155. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
R156. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S. Voter Registration, education and participation.
S157. How was the updating and reliability of the voter register impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
S158. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
S159. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?
S160. How has the computerization of the voter register impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S161. If positive, How was the rate of impact of on the election?

S162. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S163. How has the measures for the prevention of fraud impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S164. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S165. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S166. How was its rate of impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S167. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S168. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S169. How was the impact of the update of the voter register impacted on the national election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S170. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S171. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S172. How was the impact of the eligibility criteria impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S173. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S174. If negative, How was its rate in effect on the election?
S175. How was its impact of ensuring that all eligible voters voted in the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S176. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S177. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S178. How was the impact of public debate on the election impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S179. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S180. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S181. How was the impact of voter education impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S182. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S183. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S184. Was was the impact of voter education on voter turnout on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S185. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S186. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S187. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?

S188. How was the impact of donor funding of this voter education?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S189. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?
S190. How was the impact of the election logistics, computer equipment, technical assistance for voter education, exhibition of voter registration and election affected the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S191. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S192. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S192. How was the impact of the provision of fuel and motor cycle impacted on the election

1. Positive 2. Negative

S193. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S194. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S195. How was the impact of the payment and training candidates stipend impacted on the general election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S196. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S197. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S198. How was the impact of the use of OMR scanning machines to scan voter personal data on registration forms affected the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S199. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S200. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S201. How has the use of voting screens, voter tamper evident envelop for conveyance of election material impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S202. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?


S203. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S204. How was the impact the use of transparent ballot boxes impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S205. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S206. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S207. How was the impact of civic education impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S208. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S209. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S210. How was the impact of the use of a standby generator on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S211. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S212. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S213. How was the use of educational posters for voter register exhibition and training manual for election staffs impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S214. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S215. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S216. How was the use of radio communication facilities impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S217. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S218. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S219. How was the refurbishment of the EC office with computers impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S220. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S221. How was the replacement of photo ID Cards and voter registration impacted on the 2000 election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S222. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S223. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S224. How was the impact of the training of party agents in the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S225. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S226. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S227. How was the impact of using cameras and laminator on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S228. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S229. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S230. How was the impact of using scanners and photocopiers on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S231. If positive, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S232. If negative, How was its rate of impact on the election?

S233. How was the impact of thumbprint pad and indelible ink on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S234. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S235. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S236. How was the impact of the TV and radio advertisement about the election on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S237. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S238. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S239. How was the impact of computer networking equipment and the training of IST subscription of the EC on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S240. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S241. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S242. How was the impact of the procurement of extra radio communication equipment in the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S243. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S244. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S245. How was the impact of the presence of District Inter-Party Advisory Committee (DIPAC) on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S246. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S247. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T. Election Observation.

T248. How was the impact of election observers on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

T249. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T250. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T251. How has election observers abiding by domestic and international code on election observation impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

T252. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T253. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T254. How was the implementation of election observers recommendation impacted on this election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

T255. If positive, how was the rate of impact on the election?

T256. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T257. How was the existence of Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) Impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

T258. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T259. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T260. How was the existence of the Regional Inter-Party Advisory Committee (RIPAC) impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

T261. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T262. If negative, how was its impact on the election?

U. Validity of Results.

U263. How was the impact of the acceptance of the 1996 election result of the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U264. If positive, how was the rate of impact on the election?

U265. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U266. How has the system for adjudication of electoral disputes and the acceptance of rulings impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U267. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U268. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U269. How was the impact of justice delayed in justice delivery on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U270. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U271. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U272. Is there a correlation between donor assistance to the EC and credible election in the 1996 election?
1. Yes 2. No

U273. If yes, how was its impact on the credibility of the 1996 election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U274. If positive, how was its impact on the election?

U275. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
APPENDIX B

Electoral Commission 1992

INTRODUCTION

I am a student of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, undertaking Graduate Studies. This research is executed on democracy assistance impact on Ghana’s elections from 1992 to 2000 elections. This is in partial fulfillment of my postgraduate course (M PHIL Political Science). This questionnaire is a major component of the academic work. It is not intended to probe or pry into your private or personal lives, neither is it intended to gather information for the government, its agencies, nor the Donor community and their agencies, and departments. It is an independent academic research initiated, designed and conducted by the aforementioned purpose. I diligently hope you will cooperate with the researcher and respond to the questions without an iota doubt. The researcher assures of absolute confidentiality and that all protocols regarding such studies will be adhered to strictly in this research. Information gathered from the study will be protected from third parties. Thanks for your cooperation (AfriMAP, 2004)

NB: The impact assessment questionnaire is made up of positive, negative and a follow up question. Responds to any positive question should skip the negative question, on the other hand, if you answer a question as negative then skip the positive question. In short, never answer both positive and negative in the questionnaire, respond to only one, either positive or negative, and its follow up question only.

A. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA.

A1. Age of respondent.

A2. Gender of respondent
(1) Male (2) Female (3) Hermaphrodite

A3. Religion of respondent
(1) Moslem (2) Christian (3) African Traditional Religion (4) Others

A4. Educational background of respondent

A5. Occupation of respondent

A6. Nationality of Respondent
**Q. Election; Legal and institutional Framework.**

Q131. How has the government of Ghana’s support for and bringing domestic laws into compliance with international treatises on election in 1996 impact on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q132. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?


Q133. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?


Q134. How has the legal framework and timetable for the 1996 election compliance with that election impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q135. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the general election?


Q136. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?


Q137. How has the holding of the 1996 election in the same time impacted on the general election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q138. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q139. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q140. How has the eligibility criteria in holding or running for an office at national level impacted on the 1996 election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q141. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q142. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q143. How has the nomination procedure for candidates’ impact on the national election in 1996?
1. Positive 2. Negative

Q144. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

Q145. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R. Electoral Administration.
R146. How has the impartiality, independence, specialization of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBS), and auxiliary institutions impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R147. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R148. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R149. How has donor assistance impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R150. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R151. How has the prevention of electoral fraud impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R152. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R153. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R154. How was the impact of competence of the EMB’s staffs on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R155. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R156. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

**S. Voter Registration, education and participation.**

S157. How was the updating and reliability of the voter register impacted on the election?
   1. Positive 2. Negative
S158. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S159. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S160. How has the computerization of the voter register impacted on the election?
   1. Positive 2. Negative
S161. If positive, how was rate of impact on the election?
S162. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S163. How has the measures to the prevention of fraud impacted on the election?
   1. Positive 2. Negative
S164. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S165. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S166. How was its impact on the election?
   1. Positive 2. Negative
S167. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S168. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S169. What was update of the voter register impacted on the national election?
   1. Positive 2. Negative
S170. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S171. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S172. How has the eligibility criteria impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S173. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S174. If negative, how was its rate of effect on the election?

S175. How was its impact of ensuring that all eligible voters voted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S176. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S177. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S178. How has the public debate on the election impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S179. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S180. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S181. How has voter education impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S182. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S183. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S184. How was the impact of voter education on voter turnout on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S185. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S186. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S187. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S188. How was the impact of donor funding of this voter education?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S189. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S190. How was the impact of the use of election logistics, computer equipment, technical assistance for voter education, exhibition of voter register, and election affected the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S191. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S192. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S192. How has the provision of fuel and motor cycle impacted on the election
1. Positive 2. Negative

S193. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S194. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S195. How has the payment and training candidates stipend impacted on the general election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S196. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S197. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S198. How has the use of OMR scanning machines to scan voter personal data on registration forms affected the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S199. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S200. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S201. How has the use of voting screens, voter tamper evident envelop for conveyance of election material impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S202. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S203. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S204. How has the use of transparent ballot boxes impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S205. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S206. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S207. How was the impact of civic education impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S208. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S209. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S210. How was the impact of use of standby generator on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S211. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S212. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S213. How has the educational posters for voter register exhibition and training manual for election staffs impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S214. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S215. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S216. How has the use of radio communication facilities impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S217. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S218. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S219. What has the refurbishment of the EC office with computers impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S220. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T. Election Observation.

T221. How was the impact of election observers on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

T222. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T223. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T224. How has election observers abiding by domestic and international code on election observation impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
T225. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T226. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T227. How has the implementation of election observers recommendation impact on this election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
T228. If positive, how was the rate of impact on the election?
T229. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T230. How has the existence of Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) Impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
T231. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T232. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T233. How has the existence of Regional Inter-Party Advisory Committee (RIPAC) impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
T234. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
T235. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
U. Validity of Results.

U236. How was impact of the acceptance of the 1996 election result on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U237. If positive, how was the rate of impact on the election?

U238. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U239. How has the system for adjudication of electoral disputes and the acceptance of rulings impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U240. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U241. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U242. How has delayed justice delivery impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U243. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U244. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U245. Was there a correlation between donor assistance to the EC and credible election in the 1996 election?
1. Yes 2. No

U246. If yes, how was its impact on the credibility of the 1996 election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U247. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U248. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?
APPENDIX C

Electoral Commission 1996

INTRODUCTION

I am a student of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon, undertaking Graduate Studies. This research is executed on democracy assistance impact on Ghana’s elections from 1992 to 2000 elections. This is in partial fulfillment of my Post-Graduate course (M PHIL Political Science). This questionnaire is a major component of the academic work. It is not intended to probe or pry into your private or personal lives, neither is it intended to gather information for the government, its agencies, nor the Donor community and their agencies, and departments. It is an independent academic research initiated, designed and conducted by the aforementioned purpose. I diligently hope you will cooperate with the researcher and respond to the questions without an iota doubt. The researcher assures of absolute confidentiality and that all protocols regarding such studies will be adhered to strictly in this research. Information gathered from the study will be protected from third parties. Thanks for your cooperation (AfriMAP, 2004).

NB: The impact assessment questionnaire is made up of positive, negative and a follow up question. Responds to any positive question should skip the negative question, on the other hand, if you answer a question as negative then skip the positive question. In short, never answer both positive and negative in the questionnaire, respond to only one, either positive or negative, and its follow up question only.

A. SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA.

A1. Age of respondent.
(1) 18-25 (2) 26-35 (3) 36-45 (4) 46-65 (5) 66 and above.

A2. Gender of respondent
(1) Male (2) Female (3) Hermaphrodite

A3. Religion of respondent
1. Moslem (2) Christian (3) African Traditional Religion (4) Others

A4. Educational background of respondent

A5. Occupation of respondent

A6. Nationality of Respondent
Q. Election; Legal and institutional Framework.

Q131. How has the government of Ghana’s support for and bringing domestic laws into compliance with international treatises on election in 1996 impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q132. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?


Q133. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?


Q134. How has the legal framework and timetable for the 1996 election compliance with that election impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q135. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the general election?


Q136. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?


Q137. How has the holding of the 1996 election in the same time impacted on the general election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q138. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q139. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q140. How was the eligibility criteria in holding or running for an office at national level impacted on the 1996 election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

Q141. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q142. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


Q143. How has the nomination procedure for candidates impacted on the national election in 1996?

1. Positive 2. Negative
Q144. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

Q145. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R. Electoral Administration.

R146. How has the impartiality, independence, specialization of the Electoral Management Bodies (EMBS), and auxiliary institutions impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R147. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R148. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R149. How was donor assistance impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R150. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R151. How has the prevention of electoral fraud impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R152. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R153. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R154. How was the impact of competence of the EMB’s staffs on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

R155. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

R156. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S. Voter Registration, education and participation.
S157. How was the updating and reliability of the voter register impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
S158. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S159. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S160. How has the computerization of the voter register impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
S161. If positive, how was the rate of impact of it on the election?
S162. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S163. How has the measures to the prevention of fraud impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
S164. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S165. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S166. How was its impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
S167. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S168. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S169. How has update of the voter register impacted on the national election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
S170. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
S171. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S172. How has the eligibility criteria impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S173. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S174. If negative, how was its rate of effect on the election?

S175. How was its impact of ensuring that all eligible voters voted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S176. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S177. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S178. How has the public debate on the election impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S179. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S180. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S181. How was voter education impacted on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S182. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S183. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S184. How was the impact of voter education on voter turnout on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative
S185. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S186. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S187. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the 1996 election?

S188. How was the impact of donor funding of this voter education?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S189. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S190. How was the impact of election logistics, computer equipment, technical assistance for voter education, exhibition of voter register and election affected the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S191. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S192. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S192. How has the provision of fuel and motor cycle impacted on the election
1. Positive 2. Negative

S193. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S194. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S195. How has the payment and training candidates’ stipend impact on the general election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

S196. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S197. If negative, how was it rate of impact on the election?
S198. How was the use of OMR scanning machines to scan voter personal data on registration forms affected the election?

1. Positive  2. Negative

S199. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S200. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S201. How has the use of voting screens, voter tamper evident enveloped for conveyance of election material impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S202. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S203. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S204. How has the use of transparent ballot boxes impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S205. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S206. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S207. How was the impact of civic education impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S208. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S209. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S210. How was the impact of use of standby generator on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S211. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

S212. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S213. How has the educational posters for voter register exhibition and training manual for election staffs impact on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S214. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S215. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S216. How was the use of radio communication facilities impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S217. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S218. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


S219. How was the refurbishment of the EC office with computers impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

S220. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


**T. Election Observation.**

T221. How was the impact of election observers on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

T222. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T223. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

T224. How has election observers abiding by domestic and international code on election observation impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

T225. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T226. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T227. How has the implementation of election observers’ recommendation impact on this election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

T228. If positive, how was the rate of impact on the election?


T229. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T230. How was the impact of Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

T231. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T232. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T233. How has the existence of Regional Inter-Party Advisory Committee (RIPAC) impacted on the election?

1. Positive 2. Negative

T234. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?


T235. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U. Validity of Results.

U236. How was impact of the acceptance of the 1996 election result on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U237. If positive, how was the rate of impact on the election?

U238. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U239. How was the system for adjudication of electoral disputes and the acceptance of rulings impact on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U240. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U241. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U242. How was impact of justice delayed justice delivery on the election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U243. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U244. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U245. Is there a correlation between donor assistance to the EC and credible election in the 1996 election?
1. Yes 2. No

U246. If yes, how was its rate of impact on the credibility of the 1996 election?
1. Positive 2. Negative

U247. If positive, how was its rate of impact on the election?

U248. If negative, how was its rate of impact on the election?