GHANA ARMED FORCES
-INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
AS A TOOL OF DIPLOMACY

BY

M’BAWINE ATINTANDE

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY
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DECLARATION

This is to certify that this Dissertation, GHANA ARMED FORCES - INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING AS A TOOL OF DIPLOMACY, submitted by M’Bawine Atintande in partial fulfillment of the requirement for a Master of Arts Degree in International Affairs and Diplomacy at the University of Ghana, is a bonafide record of the research work done by me under the supervision of Dr Ken Ahorsu, my Research Supervisor, during my period of study at the University for the Master of Arts Degree, and that it has not previously formed the basis for the award of any degree, diploma, associateship, or any other similar title, and that it is the independent and original work done by me.

M’BAWINE ATINTANDE
Student

Date:

DR KEN AHORSU
Research Supervisor

Date:
DEDICATION

To Mary Assibi Atule and all Ghana’s peacekeeping troops (dead and alive)
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study is my way of drawing attention to the secondary but very important role of Ghana’s international peacekeeping troops in the regions they operate in and how these activities can contribute to Ghana’s diplomatic relations abroad. It has indeed raised the hope that one day this invaluable role of our peacekeepers would be recognised and supported fully.

I wish to deeply acknowledge the invaluable support of many persons who have contributed significantly towards this work and to say that Insha Allah all will be well with them. I should first thank the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College which provided me the opportunity to undertake this post graduate degree programme. I obviously must acknowledge the role of my supervisor and lecturer, Dr Ken Ahorsu, who I have no doubt is a very fine gentleman and teacher par excellence.

I should also state unreservedly that I take full responsibility for any lapses in this work.
ABSTRACT

The study looked at the activities of Ghana’s peacekeeping troops and whether these activities contribute anything to Ghana’s diplomatic relations abroad. The study found out that some of the activities of Ghanaian troops in international peacekeeping operations are beneficial to the workings of Ghana’s diplomatic missions abroad. It also found out that some diplomats have tended to use peacekeeping soldiers to good effect. The study also identified the need for close collaboration between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Ghana Armed Forces on the one hand and Ghanaian contingents and diplomatic missions on the other, especially in countries where Ghanaian troops are taking part in peacekeeping operations. The study nevertheless identified difficulties in the attempt to employ peacekeeping troops in roles not cut for them in such peacekeeping areas.
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CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.0 Background

Ghana deployed its first troops to the Congo\(^1\) in 1960 for peacekeeping under the auspices of the United Nations’ first major peacekeeping operation. At one time, it was the largest single troop contributing country world-wide to United Nations-sponsored peacekeeping operations. For well over twenty years it was the only African country providing troops to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon\(^2\) (UNIFIL) in the Middle East. Ghanaian troops have participated in all peacekeeping operations in Africa sponsored by the United Nations (UN) and presently it is contributing troops concurrently to four missions, three of these on the continent.\(^3\) By their operational commitments, these Ghanaian peacekeeping troops have contributed to international security\(^4\) and in furtherance, among others, of the national and foreign policy objectives of Ghana.\(^5\)

Ghana’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations has been very beneficial in many ways. Ghana has benefited politically and economically from these peacekeeping missions. The political benefits are in the direction of the peace and stability that the soldiers maintain at home. They are not inclined to replay the chaotic conditions they witness in the conflict areas they serve in.\(^6\) Economically, Ghana earns foreign exchange while the soldiers themselves make extra income and enhance their own welfare status. Institutionally, peacekeeping affords training for the troops. UN peacekeeping has therefore not only enhanced professional expertise and the standards of living of the troops but has reduced the risks to Ghana’s political stability, by helping mainly to reduce the incidence of coups d’état.\(^7\)
One area however that has not been appreciated or looked at in relation to Ghana and international peacekeeping has been the diplomatic role played by the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF) in its participation in international peacekeeping operations and how this fits into Ghana’s foreign policy.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

Ghana often holds peacekeeping as an important achievement of its foreign and defence policies. But somehow it seems we have lost sight of the significance of the role of its peacekeeping troops in another area - diplomacy. Is there collaboration between the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and other identifiable stakeholders in the use of Ghanaian troops in peacekeeping from pre-deployment to deployment and post deployment/end of mission stages? What level of emphasis is placed on the relations between GAF and diplomatic missions abroad, particularly in areas or countries where peacekeeping operations are taking place or about to take place and where Ghana also has diplomatic representation?

This researcher has been concerned over the years as he participated in some peacekeeping missions that often times it was important to realise the significant role that these Ghanaian peacekeeping troops play in the attractive image of the country in the international arena. And so one believes that Ghanaian troops have in no small way contributed to the workings of Ghanaian diplomacy abroad. It is therefore considered that this impressive role of the peacekeepers should be acknowledged and recognised. But how recognisable is the participation of Ghanaian troops in these international peacekeeping activities in terms of Ghana’s foreign policy? Does international peacekeeping contribute anything to Ghana’s diplomatic offensive abroad? The
study sought to interrogate the theory that Ghana’s international peacekeeping troops do contribute to Ghana’s foreign diplomacy.

1.2 Research Objectives

This study seeks to examine the following objectives:

(a) Overview of international peacekeeping.

(b) Overview of the role of the Ghana Ministry of Defence in foreign policy formulation and implementation.

(c) Look at the role of the Ghana Armed Forces in promoting Ghana’s foreign diplomacy by looking at the structures and relationships between the Ministry of Defence and the Ghana Armed Forces (including peacekeeping missions) on the one hand and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and Ghana’s diplomatic missions abroad on the other hand.

(d) Look at challenges to the efficient and effective use of the peacekeeping troops in the international arena.

1.3 Significance of the Study

It is important to place value on the efforts of the Ghana Armed Forces in the direction of international diplomacy. It is indeed imperative to identify, acknowledge and recognise the specific role that Ghana’s peacekeeping soldiers play in Ghana’s foreign policy and diplomacy abroad. It is also essential to identify the appropriate collaborative relationships between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Ghana Armed Forces to enhance Ghana’s foreign diplomacy.
1.4 Scope of the Study

This study is limited to the activities of the Ghana Armed Forces relating to international peacekeeping operations. Specific missions the study considered are the international and or regional peacekeeping missions in Africa and elsewhere from 1973 to 2011.

1.5 Hypothesis

The Ghana Armed Forces, through international peacekeeping, has a role to play in Ghana’s foreign diplomacy.

1.6 Conceptual Framework

This study is based on the concept of preventive diplomacy. Preventive diplomacy is the ability to identify an impending conflict and take practical steps to prevent the conflict starting in the first place or expanding. According to former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his “Agenda for Peace”, preventive diplomacy is “the action required to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” Preventive diplomacy is therefore relevant as a key concept of peacekeeping which serves to explain the action required to prevent the escalation of conflict. Conflict is simply defined as escalated competition at any level between groups whose aim is to gain advantage in the area of power, resources, interests, values or needs, and at least one of these groups believes that this dimension of the relationship is based on mutually incompatible goals. While conflict may be positive or negative, it is rather the destructive nature of conflict that attracts the attention of this study, the situation that engenders distrust, fear, hostility and crisis and lends itself to preventive diplomacy.
Preventive diplomacy is not an end in itself and as a conflict management activity the UN has used it to good effect. UN peacekeeping operations were therefore born out of necessity and as a practical response to a problem requiring active action. They evolved essentially to stop hostilities and to control conflicts so that these would not develop into broader conflagrations. It is contended that most writing on the subject of peacekeeping has been done by diplomats and military people with field experience.\textsuperscript{11} This has tended to limit the accumulation of knowledge to case histories, often interesting in themselves but with little general value beyond a tentative list of “do’s and don’ts” in peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{12} Some studies therefore point that there was not, and still is not, any particular theory or doctrine behind peacekeeping.

However, a critical study of peacekeeping shows that there are indeed several concepts relevant to peacekeeping, even though attempts over the last decade have focused primarily on presenting peacekeeping in terms of either conflict management or conflict resolution. Of interest to this study is therefore the concept of preventive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{13} Even though peacekeeping in some cases may be far removed from the reality of international diplomacy and military operational activity, peacekeeping is to be welcomed as a way of further promoting the use of diplomacy and military action to serve peaceful and positive ends. Peacekeeping forces are therefore primarily engaged in preventive diplomacy (as exemplified in their operational activities), to prevent conflicts escalating, stopping them completely or creating space for the underlying causes to be resolved peacefully as a means of ending the conflict.

Inevitable as it may seem, conflict is manageable and preventable and in most cases third party mediation and intervention seems more likely to be more effective even in complex situations.
Conflict can therefore be prevented on some occasions and managed on others, by the use of various approaches and tools of preventive action. As a concept preventive diplomacy can result in the pre-emptive satisfaction of demands before they become the basis of violence. Preventive efforts may focus on long-term strategies to prevent conflict from the grassroots, by promoting democracy, good governance and human rights and by reinforcing pluralism and dialogue among and between the parties/factions. Other preventive efforts may also be in the area of placing inter-positional forces, such as peacekeeping forces, to separate the contending parties and by that to create the enabling environment for the underlying causes of the nagging conflict to be resolved peacefully and amicably. Preventive diplomacy could also be seen in terms of probabilities, predictions and possible short term courses of action, the goal of which is to discern the intentions of major players in any potential conflict. This is all aimed to directly provide early warning and support for diplomacy.

The flip side of preventive diplomacy, for instance as an early warning system or activity, may by implication be perceived to be infringing on a state's sovereignty or showing partisanship and could be rejected as an unwelcome form of foreign intervention or partisanship. Also the complex causes of conflict and the difficulty of processing and analysing different pieces of information require a coordinated and concentrated intelligence effort, most of which is often absent, a situation which, for instance, hampers the work of peacekeeping forces engaged in preventive diplomacy. The coordination of any initiative combined with a rapid response to an impending crisis is the key to success. However, the willingness of the protagonists to accept external intervention is essential and this is sometimes not forthcoming. In the ideal case, preventive diplomacy should not be an imposition and crisis negotiators should rather lead
negotiations for a peaceful diplomatic settlement. Notwithstanding the negatives of preventive diplomacy, the best chance of managing and resolving conflict satisfactorily is when action is taken early; hence the value of preventive diplomacy, as demonstrated by peacekeeping forces, and the significance of the concept.

1.7 Literature Review

Shelton contends that since the termination of the Cold War in the early 1990s and the resulting alterations in the global and regional power balances, the world has witnessed a proliferation of low intensity conflicts. The international response to this, mainly through the UN, has been to promote preventive diplomacy and, in a number of cases, to implement peacekeeping operations. He thinks that this new world order trend is obviously a most welcome and positive development and adds that through peacekeeping, military assets that have been originally designed and deployed to destroy human life, are now being used, though on a limited scale, to prevent conflict and to save lives. Peacekeeping is therefore a significant step towards increased human cooperation and the development of a peaceful functional international society, often seen as cornerstones of international relations.

In his paper titled “Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping: Keys for Success,” Shelton sees post-Cold War conflicts as largely divided into two categories. The first category includes civil wars caused by long-standing historical differences, or new nationalism; whilst the second category, which dominates on the African continent, covers conflicts based on ethnic, national or religious divisions. Agreeing that the specific nature of each dispute consequently requires appropriate responses in order to limit or to prevent conflict, Shelton also thinks that there is a growing international consensus that conflicts could more easily be prevented or resolved.
through regional initiatives with rapid deployment capabilities. However, the UN plan to establish a standby force intended to accelerate the deployment of forces to trouble spots, has only met with five positive responses from its 191 members.\textsuperscript{17} He then calls for attention to a number of central issues by promoters and supporters of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. Without dealing adequately with these issues, he points out, no decision-maker could realistically be expected to make a major contribution to crisis diplomacy, or to undertake an even more risky peacekeeping operation.

These key issues Shelton identifies as funding for peacekeeping and the number of casualties acceptable. He believes that the potential costs of such operations and the massive logistic commitment for long distance operations are key factors in any decision-making process and that developing countries cannot rush into any peacekeeping venture without careful consideration of the financial implications. Also a clear estimate of the number of casualties which would be acceptable is essential for any military operation, peacekeeping included, since high casualties could have long term effects on a nation's willingness to participate in future operations. Finally, Shelton stresses that adequate preparation for a peacekeeping operation should include detailed and quality intelligence, an issue emphasised by Boutros-Ghali in his “An Agenda for Peace” report.

Shelton concludes that preventive diplomacy is the best response to growing regional low intensity conflict, especially in Africa where the political, social and geographical complexities make peacekeeping unattractive. At the same time, preventive diplomacy requires adequate early warning and the speedy response to a crisis. Early warning should be provided by national governments and international information networks. This should be supported by the developed
countries and international organisations such as the UN and the AU. Individual states should, however, be encouraged to initiate preventive diplomacy, in consultation with regional neighbours and organisations, as well as the UN, in order to begin peace negotiations before conflicts escalate.

According to a United States Department of Defence (DOD) report, the UN also undertakes peacekeeping operations to help maintain or restore peace and security in areas of conflict. Such operations have been employed most commonly to supervise and maintain ceasefires, assist in troop withdrawals, and provide buffer zones between opposing forces. The main objective of peacekeeping operations, according to the DOD, is to reduce tensions and provide a limited period of time for diplomatic efforts to achieve just and lasting settlements of the underlying conflicts. Writing in the report titled “Peacekeeping: The Military and National Security - Military Administration, Peacekeeping As A Defense Strategy,” the DOD explained that the US in 2004 was the twenty-sixth largest troop contributing country to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide. Even though it contributed only 427 mostly civilian police, of the over 58,741 UN forces, many American commanders agree that US participation in peacekeeping was "in our national interests and will be a key ingredient in the war against terrorism." 18 While some Americans believe that the US should maintain a policy of non-involvement and refuse to get drawn into conflicts that do not directly threaten US interests, many others argue that the stability of the entire world does, in fact, directly relate to US national security, so peacekeeping in distant nations was in the best interest of the US.

The report identifies that peacekeeping missions inherently required military skills to allow a quick and appropriate response to unforeseen risks. In addition, if the purpose of peacekeeping is
to prevent conflict, who better to deter conflicts from starting than well-trained soldiers? The report therefore indicates that the demands of peacekeeping, though these differ from those of actual combat participation, requires that troops engaged in peacekeeping activities may be able to expand their skills. The report also points out that, peacekeeping missions, despite their name, often take place in volatile locations, with the personal safety of the peacekeeping forces often at risk as that of actual combat troops. In UN peacekeeping operations, for example, 1,965 people have died since 1948.\textsuperscript{19} The report outlined some of the reasons the US participated in peacekeeping missions, mentioning national interests, to include humanitarian interests. While the report acknowledges that the high cost of peacekeeping was one reason likely to affect US participation in UN peacekeeping operations, there were no better substitutes. US policymakers therefore support the country continuing these operations because, in their view, they help to stabilise conflicts that could threaten US foreign policy objectives. In their judgment, ending these operations, or even modifying them substantially, would risk renewed conflict and damage future peacemaking efforts. The report also welcomes preventive diplomacy as it aims to keep disputes or violence from arising.

Writing in his “An Agenda for Peace” in 1992, Boutros-Ghali also reported that since the creation of the UN in 1945, over 100 major conflicts around the world as at the time had left some 20 million people dead.\textsuperscript{20} And with the end of the Cold War, the Security Council had emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. It was therefore the aim of the UN to seek to identify at the earliest possible stage situations that could produce conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of such danger before violence resulted. Where conflict erupted, the UN was to engage
in peacemaking aimed at resolving the issues that led to the conflict; and through peacekeeping
to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting had been halted and to assist in
implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. The UN was also to stand ready to
assist in peace-building in its differing contexts.

Boutros-Ghali believes that whereas peacemaking and peacekeeping were required to halt
conflicts and preserve peace once it was attained, preventive diplomacy sought to resolve
disputes before violence broke out. To him the most desirable and efficient employment of
diplomacy was to ease tensions before they resulted in conflict - or, if conflict broke out, to act
swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy may therefore be
performed by the Secretary-General personally or through senior staff or specialised agencies
and programmes, by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by regional
organisations in cooperation with the UN. Preventive diplomacy therefore requires measures to
create confidence and it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or
formal fact-finding. It may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations,
demilitarised zones.

It was time, he emphasised, to plan for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which
could take place in a variety of instances and ways. For example, in conditions of national crisis,
there could be preventive deployment at the request of the Government or all parties concerned,
or with their consent; in inter-state disputes such deployment could take place when two
countries felt that a UN presence on both sides of their border could discourage hostilities, as for
example the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Furthermore, preventive
deployment could also take place when a country felt threatened and requested the deployment of an appropriate UN presence along its side of the border alone. In each situation, the mandate and composition of the UN presence would need to be carefully devised and be clear to all. In conditions of crisis within a country, he sees preventive deployment helping in a number of ways to alleviate suffering and to limit or control violence. The delivery of humanitarian assistance, impartially provided in this situation, could be of critical importance in assisting to maintain security, whether through military, police or civilian personnel, and could save lives and develop conditions of safety in which negotiations could be held. Calling peacekeeping the invention of the UN, Boutros-Ghali agrees that it has brought a degree of stability to numerous areas of tension around the world. This has seen as many as 26 peacekeeping operations established between 1945 and 1992 with an estimated 528,000 military, police and civilian personnel serving under the UN flag up to January 1992.21

For peacekeeping operations, and peacemaking, to be truly successful, Boutros-Ghali believes these two must include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. He is therefore convinced that the concept of peace-building as the construction of a new environment should be viewed as the counterpart of preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. This is because when conflict breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peacekeeping come into play. Once these have achieved their objectives, only sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. He finally stresses that while post-conflict peace-building is to prevent a recurrence, preventive
diplomacy is to avoid a crisis. And so, peace at home and the urgency of rebuilding and strengthening individual societies necessitate peace abroad and cooperation among nations.

Discussing the concepts and evolution of international peacekeeping and Canada’s role in UN peacekeeping operations, a report of an inquiry into Canada’s participation in the UN Mission in Somalia in the early 1990s emphasises that peacekeeping mainly refers to any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of long-standing disputes. It also identifies preventive diplomacy as a more precise term to describe diplomatic or other peaceful activity taken to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into armed conflict and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. It therefore sees preventive diplomacy as involving the peaceful resolution of disputes before they developed into armed conflict. The report nonetheless acknowledges that for traditional peacekeeping, the interrelated and mutually reinforcing principles of consent, non-use of force, and impartiality must all usually be present before peacekeeping operations were launched. Even though the report concedes that peacekeeping operations in traditional peacekeeping were largely reactive, and that such operations did not create the conditions for their own success, it however agrees that strict adherence to these traditional principles of traditional peacekeeping were nevertheless paramount, and that missions were more likely to succeed if all these conditions were present.

However, with the changing nature of peacekeeping, following the end of the Cold War, and what has become known as second generation peacekeeping, the characteristics of peacekeeping have changed tremendously. Internal conflicts were now the most prevalent, irregular forces with no clear front lines or ceasefire lines were now the protagonists rather than
states and the nature of conflict was now more complex with greater impact on civilians. Peacekeeping operations were therefore no longer required to exclusively conform to these traditional principles and peacekeeping military forces were now no longer to only carry out military tasks to deter the resumption of hostilities between parties that had agreed to stop fighting. This, however, subjects the involvement of national armed forces in multinational peacekeeping operations to scrutiny by host nations and belligerent factions in the conflict as certain actions by the peacekeeping forces may tend to affect their impartiality and neutrality in the conflict. And so the report argues that even though consent of the parties and impartiality of the peacekeeping forces may have to be sacrificed at one time or another to contain the dynamic nature of internal conflict situations, it is nonetheless essential that peacekeeping forces are mindful of the need to be circumspect in the use of force in maintaining the peace between belligerents. After all, impartiality is partly the rationale for having UN as the sponsoring institution, as opposed to a member state.

The report therefore suggests effective collaborative efforts and consultation between national policy- and decision-makers and international and regional actors to effectively use national armed forces for peacekeeping. It specifically suggests the following:

- That there is an effective process of consultation between the troop contributing country and mission partners in the deployment and operation of peacekeeping forces.
- That the mission must have an enforceable mandate.
- That the principal antagonists agree to a ceasefire and to a contributing country's participation.
• That the arrangements are likely to serve the cause of peace and lead to a political settlement in the long term.

• That the size and international composition of the force are appropriate to the mandate.

• That the contributing country’s participation in the operation will not jeopardise its other commitments.

• That in missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there must be a recognised focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures.

• That with the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend, for example member states of regional organisations (such as NATO for instance), in missions that involve personnel of contributing countries, the participation of such countries in the peacekeeping operation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.

• That there is a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement.

Any decision-making process should also be guided by a clear reflection of the changing nature of peacekeeping and which should form a significant component in the decision-making process. These guidelines and other criteria for deploying national peacekeeping forces should eventually form the basis of national policy and should involve politicians, military officers, and foreign affairs officials.

The report fully recognises Canada’s foreign policy as being committed to multilateralism and the active role of international institutions, an aim peacekeeping fully supports. To this end, Canada is said to favour a cooperative collective approach to security and has thus supported the
UN as an investment in security. After the Cold War, the UN was considered the most appropriate institution to deal with the increase in regional conflicts, and maintaining its effectiveness was therefore more important.

According to the report, during the Cold War, Canada's paramount strategic concern was that hostilities could escalate to a superpower confrontation which would threaten national security through direct or collateral attack. In addition to Canadian forces’ involvement in collective defence arrangements for Europe (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and North America (North American Air Defence (NORAD), Canada's participation in peacekeeping was justified by the view that any threat to global peace and security was considered a threat to national security. The end of the Cold War eliminated concern over superpower confrontation and the threat of war as a rationale for Canada's involvement in peacekeeping. However, even without the fear of superpower confrontation, concern about regional conflicts as threats to international peace and security ensured that peacekeeping was maintained as a national objective. Canada’s foreign policy goal should therefore be supported fully by a credible defence policy, which should embrace peacekeeping as a primary mission of the armed forces.

According to Matt Armstrong, since 2001, more than half of all UN peacekeeping forces have come from seven countries, namely Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Jordan, Nepal and Ghana. Alluding to a subtle evolution of UN peacekeeping lately, Armstrong believes that several countries, the seven among them, now use peacekeeping operations to advance their foreign and economic policy agendas and to raise their global profile. This, he says, creates opportunities to increase the reach and the potential impact of peacekeeping, for as the geographic reach of a peacekeeping mission extends further beyond its immediate area of
operations, the effects of success, or failure, increasingly shape perceptions of the contributing nation and the mission. Through what he terms “this public diplomacy component of peacekeeping”, the general public and leaders alike are connected with peacekeeping becoming potentially transformative and empowering for a country’s agenda. Increased contact creates awareness of culture, language, and narratives. This in turn facilitates greater understanding, as well as personal and institutional connections, and potentially opens markets and access to resources through the development of formal or informal relationships. Armstrong therefore contends that the UN’s image, credibility and, ultimately, its effectiveness have often been tied to its peacekeeping activities.

But while that image may potentially be tarnished by peacekeeping scandals, with peacekeeping forces facing increasing transparency and accountability, he acknowledges that the potential for peacekeeping to build up the “brand” of a country may increase dramatically. Armstrong, however, fails to elaborate on Ghana’s involvement in peacekeeping even though he discusses to some detail the involvement of some of the other countries, notwithstanding that Ghana has been in peacekeeping since the 1960s.

Murithi also provides us with a clear understanding of the AU’s foray into peacekeeping and how this affects its effectiveness in maintaining security and peace on the African continent. In an article titled, “The African Union’s Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in Darfur”, the author discusses in detail the paradigm shift in peacekeeping as seen in the hybridisation of peacekeeping operations on the continent and the collaboration between the UN and AU in deploying peacekeeping troops to conflict areas. Murithi further assesses whether
the hybrid mission represented a paradigm shift in peacekeeping, based on the way that it was launched and how it was currently operated, or whether the hybrid mission could serve as a model for future peacekeeping operations in Africa.

He points out that the AU’s solitary efforts in Somalia left the organisation mired in an open-ended complex emergency with no easy remedy. However, the organisation’s joint effort with the UN in Darfur, for example, was similarly constrained by the absence of a peace to keep. The UN-AU hybrid mission therefore falls short and it is suggested that UN intervention following an initial AU peace operation was not necessarily a panacea to the continent’s peacekeeping challenges. Referring to the UN’s own criterion for peacekeeping, Murithi notes that peacekeeping could help bridge the gap between the cessation of hostilities and a durable peace, but only if the parties to a conflict had the political will needed to reach that goal. The realities on the ground, he says, required the evolution of peacekeeping to include both military tasks such as monitoring ceasefires and patrolling buffer zones between hostile parties, and non-military tasks such as civilian policing, oversight of political and civil affairs, monitoring and protecting human rights, ensuring the promotion of the rule of law and providing access for humanitarian assistance, among many others.

Murithi chronicles the AU’s experiences with its peacekeeping operations in Burundi, Chad, Darfur and Somalia and concludes that the AU’s foray into peacekeeping on the African continent has been defined by the absence of a fully articulated framework for peacekeeping. This issue of a lack of capacity and ability to effectively undertake peacekeeping was evident in the AU’s peacekeeping exploits and that all of its missions to date have been under-funded, ill-
equipped, and therefore inadequately deployed. He nonetheless believes that the AU’s initial foray into peacekeeping was in many respects the only alternative to a dithering, detached and disengaged international community as, paradoxically, it is usually when the situation was even more untenable that the international community, mainly under the tutelage of the UN, intervenes to “mend” the broken continent. He is convinced that the financial resources that are deployed to conduct these missions (for example totaling US $ 1.7 billion) would have been more wisely spent strengthening the continental mechanisms for preventing and resolving conflict at an early stage, prior to the outbreak of violent confrontation. This discrepancy in the UN’s security agenda, he contends, has to ultimately be remedied if the world is to witness fewer complex humanitarian calamities like the situation in Darfur.

Reflecting on the hybrid mission, Murithi confirms it embodies a paradigm shift in the way peacekeeping operations are inaugurated, in terms of the joint AU and UN decision-making process, and the way it is operationalised. There are nevertheless political constraints in ensuring an effective collaboration between the UN and the AU, particularly when there is insufficient communication between the political leadership of both organisations. If adopted as a future model of peacekeeping, particularly in Africa, Murithi sees the hybridisation heralding a novel approach to managing Africa’s intractable crises. Ensuring that this conceptual paradigm shift coheres with the reality on the ground would certainly be the challenge confronting future AU-UN partnerships in peacekeeping operations. In particular, at a strategic decision-making level there would need to be more dialogue and open communication between the AU and the UN, while at the tactical and operational level there would need to be a convergence in terms of in-house capacity to implement. In the absence of this conceptual and operational coherence,
Murithi sees that the AU’s foray into peacekeeping may continue to appear as a foraging exercise and an elusive quest for continental security.

1.8 Sources of data and methodology

Data gathered for this study were from primary and secondary sources. The secondary sources included published works – books and journal articles – and other library material. The primary sources were unstructured interviews. Twenty-six persons were interviewed. These were:

✓ Five Ghanaian military personnel (three officers and two other ranks) who have served in international peacekeeping operations and who have had unique field experience in military diplomatic efforts in the UN system.
✓ Five Ghanaian ambassadors or high commissioners who have had some experience dealing with peacekeeping forces in their areas of responsibility.
✓ Five Defence Advisors/Attaches of selected foreign diplomatic missions in Ghana whose countries also deploy international peacekeeping forces.
✓ Five Ghanaian Defence Advisors in foreign countries and whose countries of accreditation encompass areas where there are international peacekeeping missions Ghana is participating in.
✓ Six other persons, because of the nature of their responsibilities, were interviewed. These were the Chief of Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces, who is the link between the General Headquarters and the various Ghanaian Defence Advisors and Attaches in foreign missions and is deeply involved in decisions relating to international peacekeeping operations; the Military Advisor (MILAD) at the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York, United States of America and
the Director General in charge of International Peace Support Operations at the General Headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces. The others were the Chief Directors at the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Director Army Peacekeeping Operations (DAPKOP) at the Army Headquarters. All these individuals were selected purposively for the unstructured interviews.

1.9 Arrangement of the chapters

The chapters of this dissertation are structured as follows. Chapter 1 is the introduction. Chapter 2 gives an overview of international peacekeeping and summarises peacekeeping operations the Ghana Armed Forces has been involved in. Chapter 3 discusses the role of Ghana’s peacekeeping forces in promoting Ghana’s foreign policy. The final chapter, Chapter 4, covers the summary, conclusion and recommendations. There is a bibliography as well as an appendix which contains the interview guide used to generate the data for this study.
Endnotes

1 Formerly Zaire and now Democratic Republic of the Congo.

2 The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

3 The UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) wound up December 2010.

4 This includes Regional Security.

5 1960 Constitution of Ghana, Part IX, Article 54 (1). The 1960 Constitution for instance specifically provides that the Armed Forces may engage in operations for the defence of Ghana or for any other purpose appearing to the commander-in-chief to be expedient.


12 Ibid.

13 After the Cold War, the UN was considered the most appropriate institution to deal with the increase in regional conflicts. Maintaining its effectiveness therefore became even more important. The term peacekeeping comes with the concept of ‘preventive diplomacy’. It was first discussed by UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.


17 At the time Shelton was writing there were 185 UN member states.


19 Ibid


21 Ibid


23 The term “traditional peacekeeping” is used to describe only those operations based on the following principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defence. Traditional peacekeeping, therefore, refers to UN operations under the command and control of the Secretary General of the United Nations, conducted by military troops provided by member states on a voluntary basis, with the costs met collectively by member states. Because such missions are authorised and carried out by the UN, troops enjoy the appearance of impartiality, which they require.

24 John MacKinlay and Jarat Chopra coined the term to describe their vision of a new approach to peacekeeping. They suggest that between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement actions, the military is likely to be involved in second generation tasks such as supervising ceasefires between irregular forces, assisting in the maintenance of law and order, protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and guaranteeing rights of passage. In all these cases of second generation peacekeeping, the consent of the parties is likely to be elusive and dynamic. Consequently, these missions require a humane, but more proactive, concept of operations, and forces must be able to choose from a range of military responses as situations escalate and de-escalate. In other words, they must be ready to respond with force when necessary, using only the minimum force necessary to control the situation.
26 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING

2.0 Peacekeeping at a Glance

Following the end of the Second World War, it became apparent that since all international disputes were not at once to be resolved by peaceful means, there was need for some mechanism to stop or contain those which escalated into armed conflict between the parties.\(^1\) It was out of this need that peacekeeping operations evolved, as essentially a “holding action”.\(^2\) Peacekeeping is not explicitly provided for in the UN Charter, but it was not to replace the voluntary settlement of disputes contained in Chapter VI of the Charter nor the enforcement action envisaged in Chapter VII. It was rather to seek to supplement the purposes and intent of both chapters and be supplanted in between them, a sort of Chapter VI and half.

Born out of necessity and thus becoming a pragmatic novel concept, peacekeeping was initially developed as a means to ease tensions and help resolve conflicts between states by deploying unarmed or lightly armed multinational military personnel but without enforcement powers, under the command of the UN. It was to separate the armed forces of the former warring parties and to maintain or restore peace in conflict areas. As envisaged in the UN Charter, peacekeepers could be called in by the UN, authorised by the Security Council, and tasked to observe the ceasefires or separation of forces arrangements in order to maintain international peace and security. At the onset, peacekeepers were not expected to “fight fire with fire”\(^3\) as they were as a general rule deployed when a ceasefire was in place and with the consent of the parties to the
conflict. Peacekeeping was therefore expected to give time and breathing space for diplomatic efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict.

The genesis of UN peacekeeping in the 1950s can be credited to two personalities – the UN Secretary General then, Dag Hammarskjöld, and Canada’s Secretary for External Affairs, then Lester Pearson. This was in respect of the creation in 1956 of the UN’s first major peacekeeping force, UNEF 1, whose first force commander was incidentally Major General (later Lieutenant General) ELM Burns, also of Canada. This historic development is said to have been made possible through the vision, resourcefulness and determination of Hammarskjöld and Pearson.

The UN’s first major crisis erupted in October 1956 between Israel and Egypt. Relations between the two countries following the General Armistice Agreement of 1949 began to deteriorate and this was compounded by the decision of the Egyptians to deny passage through the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and to unilaterally impose dues on all shipping through the canal.

At the UN General Assembly’s first emergency session in November 1956, it was Canada’s explanation of its abstention in respect of the Assembly’s Resolution 997(ES-1) that subsequently led to the creation of the UN’s first peacekeeping force. Pearson had argued that the resolution had not gone far enough to “provide for, alongside with the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops, any steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace settlement, without which a ceasefire would be only a temporary nature at best.” Before the session, Pearson and Hammarskjöld had had extensive discussions on the need to establish some sort of UN police force to help resolve the crisis. Pearson subsequently presented a draft proposal on the establishment of an emergency international UN force. The Canadian proposal was adopted as Resolution 998 (ES-1) of 4 November 1956. The proposal called on the General Assembly to
request, “…as a matter of priority, the Secretary General to submit to it within forty-eight hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the aforementioned resolution (997(ES-1).”

Hammarskjöld’s report to the General Assembly defined the concept of the new force and guiding principles for its organisation and functioning, including its financing, terms of reference, command structure and composition as well as guidelines on how the force’s functions were to be performed. Pearson has often been credited with the creation of the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF 1) and in recognition of this he was in 1957 awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Peacekeeping operations have since become tested methods for maintaining the delicate balance of international peace when the peace is threatened by a regional conflict in which there is the likelihood of great-power involvement. It should be noted that peacekeeping forces are not occupation forces. They characteristically fulfill the role of an impartial and objective third party to help create and maintain a ceasefire and form a buffer between conflicting states or parties. Several countries now use these operations to advance their foreign and economic policy agendas and to raise their global profile.

Since 1948, the UN has sponsored or established about 47 peacekeeping missions, deploying hundreds of thousands of uniformed military and police personnel, both armed and unarmed. The contingents remain part of their respective national armed forces, but during their assignment
with the peacekeeping missions owe international allegiance to and are placed under the operational control of the UN. This control is exercised through the various national contingent commanders (that is, commanding officers) who receive their instructions and orders from the force commanders, the latter appointed personally by the Secretary General. In the early 1990s, at the end of the Cold War, there was a dramatic shift as the UN deployed larger and more complex peacekeeping missions, in many cases involving more and more non-military elements so as to ensure its sustainability. The UN has since recognised that regional arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilised in serving the functions of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building.

Even though under the UN Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, regional action as a matter of decentralisation, delegation and cooperation with UN, efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs. Regional organisations such as the African Union (AU) and sub-regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have complemented efforts of the UN in joint undertakings and when authorised by the Security Council have taken the lead in addressing crises within their jurisdiction. This arrangement has been carried forward in the spirit of the UN Charter, and as envisioned especially in Chapter VIII. The next section looks at the procedure for generating and deploying international peacekeeping forces. Even though this is based on the UN model, similar procedures are being adopted by the other regional organisations – AU and ECOWAS – for the same purposes.
2.1 UN Procedure to Generate and Deploy Peacekeeping Forces

The military personnel required for UN peacekeeping operations are provided by member states on a voluntary basis. Requests for troops are usually made by the UN to a troop contributing country through its Permanent Mission. The Charter of the UN grants the Security Council the sole right to establish and deploy peacekeeping forces. The Charter provides that all disputes between states should be peacefully resolved within the context of preventive diplomacy to deal with threats to peace and acts of aggression. In Article 43, the Charter also enjoins all member states to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security and to make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

In general terms the procedure by which the UN generates and deploys peacekeeping forces in line with the provisions of the Charter starts with the identification of the conflict. There must first be a conflict that warrants the UN’s intervention on the scale of a peacekeeping operation. The UN’s action could be at the request of a party or the parties to the conflict, as in the case of the first Congo operation, ONUC, or by a member-state of the UN raising concern on the security situation in a particular area of conflict. The Secretary General frequently and regularly seizes himself of the general international security situation and may also be in a position to identify conflict areas requiring the Security Council’s attention. The Secretary General, as mandated by the Charter, shall then formally bring the matter with recommendations to the attention of the Security Council for the necessary action.
When the Security Council deliberates over the issue and deems it fit to set up a peacekeeping operation, it passes a resolution to that effect. It should be noted that setting up such an operation should be agreeable to all members of the Security Council. Any one of the permanent members vetoing the decision scuttles the idea. The Security Council’s Resolution must spell out clearly the characteristics of the peacekeeping force, beginning with the mandate, then formulate a memorandum of understanding (MOU), the rules of engagement (ROE) of the force to be constituted and finally the status of force agreement (SOFA). While the MOU is between the parties to the conflict, the SOFA is between the UN force and the host nation spelling out the privileges and immunities of the peacekeeping force and the responsibility of the host nation to the force.

While the Security Council is deliberating on the crisis and there are indicators that a peacekeeping operation is needed, the Secretary General then initiates certain actions in order to reduce delay time in deployment, and commences negotiations with member states for personnel, financial and logistics contributions. The Security Council’s approval signals the authorisation of the operation and the Secretary General then sends a technical team on reconnaissance of the proposed selected area to be familiar with the situation and conditions of the area and to identify requirements for the mission. Following the visit of the technical team the operational plan for the mission is prepared from the results of the technical team’s report. The operational plan informs the preparation of a provisional budget. All these are presented in the Secretary General’s report to the Security Council for approval of the operation and to the General Assembly for approval of the budget.
The Secretary General is then tasked to raise the force, after he reports on how he intends to implement the Security Council’s Resolution. The Secretary General’s report outlines the principal objectives of the force, spells out its terms of reference in full and defines the chain of command.\textsuperscript{21} The report also provides details of the force level and the budget. The General Assembly’s approval of the mandate and the budget is then followed by the appointment of the Force/Field Commander and a civilian Head of Mission (the latter often referred to as Special Representative of the Secretary General) in consultation with the parties to the conflict who must agree to the appointments before the public is informed. Direct requests are then subsequently made by the Secretary General to member states for the contribution of troops, equipment and services.

Before the force assembles, the Force/Field Commander issues his directive which specifies the standing operating procedures (SOPs) for the peacekeeping force. However, until the host nation accepts or indicates its willingness to accept the peacekeeping operation or its composition, the force cannot be mounted. Strategic and operational considerations rather than political sensitivity should guide the deployment of contingents in the operational theatre.\textsuperscript{22} But there are practical political considerations that may be taken into account in troops deployment, such as troop contributing countries (TCC) insisting on deploying their contingents to particular areas of the theatre of operations or they insisting on the assumption by their nationals of specific mission headquarters staff appointments,\textsuperscript{23} or interference by the TCC which places a limited authority to act on their contingents.
The deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation falls into six distinct phases – standby, warning, mounting, deployment and reception, execution and sustainment and redeployment phases. The standby phase initiates the operational cycle of the peacekeeping operation and this begins when the Secretary General considers the political and diplomatic negotiations to resolve the conflict and which are likely to lead to the establishment of a peacekeeping operation. The warning phase is initiated when the Security Council passes the resolution authorising the creation of the peacekeeping operation and the mandate and budget estimates are submitted to the General Assembly for approval. The mounting phase commences when the financial resources for the operation are accessed by the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD) of the UN Secretariat. This is when, among others, the air and sea lift is secured, local and international procurement of logistics and services for the mission commence, an implementation team is deployed to the mission area and training and administrative preparations of the national contingents are undertaken.

The deployment and reception phase involves the movement of personnel and equipment into the mission area while the execution and sustainment phase covers the implementation of the logistics arrangements initiated at the UN Headquarters in New York or in-theatre. This is when the actual tasks are performed in line with the concept of operations and the mandate. The redeployment phase concludes the cycle and this is at the end of the mission when all components and individuals of the mission, except those specifically authorised by the UN to remain, are repatriated. The redeployment phase is solely under the control of the UN.
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is the UN body that directs and manages the peacekeeping missions on behalf of the Secretary General, who himself reports to the Security Council on the progress of these missions. Peacekeeping troops or the formed contingents take part in UN peacekeeping missions under terms and conditions carefully negotiated by their governments and remain under overall authority of those governments while serving under UN operational command. But senior military officers, military observers and staff officers (usually known as experts of mission) serving on UN missions are directly employed by the UN (usually seconded from their national armed forces). The authority to deploy peacekeepers, however, remains with the government that volunteered them, as does responsibility for pay as well as disciplinary and personnel matters. The AU and ECOWAS have similar structures for the generation and deployment of peacekeepers, even though with slight modification. The next section shall now discuss the summary of international peacekeeping operations Ghana has been involved in since 1960.

2.2 Summary of International Peacekeeping Experiences of the Ghana Armed Forces

Ghana has over the years participated in many international peacekeeping operations. This section shall look at this participation in broad thematic areas relating to UN operations, AU or regional operations and ECOWAS or sub-regional operations.

2.2.1 United Nations Operations

The Ghana Armed Forces has participated in several UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations in three main areas of the world. These are Africa, Middle East and the Far East. While both armed contingents and experts of mission (military observers and staff officers) have been involved, the
focus of this discussion is on the armed contingents. In the African setting, the missions involved are the first UN Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (ONUC) from 1960-1964, the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 1993-1996, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from 2000-2005, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) from 2004 to date, the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) from 2004 to date and the UN Mission in Chad and Central African Republic (MINURCAT) from 2009-2010. Ghana is also participating in the second UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) which has since transformed into the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Congo (MONUSCO) from 2003 to date. In the Middle East, the missions are the second UN Emergency Force in the Sinai, Egypt (UNEF II) from 1973-1979 and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) from 1979 to date. In the Far East, the mission has been the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 1991-1993. These missions are discussed below under broad thematic areas – African, Middle East and Far East Missions.

2.2.1.1 African Missions

The African missions were in the main internal conflict situations, where the UN intervened to separate warring factions in the same country and to create an enabling environment to resolve the conflict. In some cases it was to restore civil authority and address unfolding humanitarian crises. In the case of the ONUC, following inconclusive elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo), civil war broke out necessitating the intervention of an impartial international force. Being the first such conflict on the continent and this happening at the height of the Cold War, some African leaders, such as President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, preferred an African solution to what was termed an African
problem. This did not sit down well with some international power brokers. ONUC was however established with majority of troop contributing countries from Africa. Ghana was one of the first countries to send troops and the motivation for such reaction was the pan-African and non-aligned orientations of the Ghanaian government then. Ghana’s foreign policy was driven by the need for African countries looking inward to resolve their problems and decolonisation. This was also the time the UN itself was fashioning out peacekeeping and the dynamics of the situation were to prove challenging. Ghana contributed several battalions to the force and the opportunity also helped to shape Ghana’s commitment to international peacekeeping as this was also the first time that Ghana was getting involved in international peacekeeping. Ghana’s senior military and civilian officers in the mission were also involved in UN diplomacy, with some of them becoming advisors to the UN office as well as the Congolese government. Robert Gardiner, for instance, was eventually appointed Special Representative of the Secretary General for the mission.

After 1964, when ONUC folded up, the next UN peacekeeping operation in Africa Ghana took part in was UNAMIR, from 1993-1996. This was another civil war situation. Fighting between the Rwandan Government Forces (RGF), the national armed forces, and the rebel Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) broke out in October 1990 across the border between Rwanda and its northern neighbour Uganda. A number of ceasefire agreements followed, including one negotiated at Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, on 22 July 1992, arranged by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU). In October 1993, the Security Council established UNAMIR, to help the parties implement the agreement, monitor the implementation and support the transitional government.
UNAMIR's mandate and strength were adjusted on a number of occasions in the face of the tragic events of the genocide in 1994 and the changing situation in the country. There was a demilitarised zone which was controlled by Ghanaian troops. Ghana featured prominently in the mission, contributing more than half the total force, 2,741 of the 5,200 troops.26 Brig. Gen. H. K. Anyidoho of Ghana served as the Deputy Force Commander and Chief Military Observer of the mission from the start to the end. Apart from their contribution to the maintenance of security in Rwanda, Ghanaian troops played a key role in managing the humanitarian crisis. And with them remaining in the mission throughout the genocide period and beyond, the profile of the country was greatly improved as the accolade from many quarters, including the mission’s first force commander, Gen Romeo Dallaire, testify.27 For instance in all the rhetoric about the Rwandan genocide, the bravery and courage of Ghanaian troops stand out clearly with many lessons for future peacekeeping very evident. Rwanda was a solid example of Ghana’s contribution to collective security and humanitarianism.

After Rwanda, Ghana’s next missions were in West Africa. Here, it is significant to mention that all the three missions in the sub-region have similar strands – devastating civil war or internal conflict, gross human rights abuses and great humanitarian challenges. The other similarity is the re-hatting of regional peacekeeping troops into UN forces. Sierra Leone, from 2000 to 2005, experienced a devastating civil war which left thousands of people dead and thousands more displaced. At the height of the conflict, prior to the UN peacekeeping force operating in the country, gross human rights abuses were committed by the warring factions, who in some cases hacked off limbs of innocent citizens including babies. The
conflict started with the invasion in the early 1990s of the country by rebels who quickly over-run some areas, eventually igniting a civil war which lasted until 2005.

Ghanaian troops were part of the UN force (UNAMSIL) at its onset having been earlier deployed as part of the West African intervention force, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Having been witnesses to how professional Ghanaian soldiers have performed in the mission, the Sierra Leone Armed Forces and the Ghana Armed Forces have a wonderful working relationship which sees Ghana providing training and other opportunities to strengthen the former. Ghana, for instance, is providing a senior military officer as part of the International Military Assistance Training Team (IMATT) which is helping build the capacity of the Sierra Leonean armed forces. So, in terms of foreign policy objectives, the peacekeepers have in a way contributed to Ghana’s effort at building good relations with its neighbours and helping to restore normalcy to a sisterly country. By the time the mission was winding down, Ghana had contributed quite close to 8,000 troops to the force and undertaken significant humanitarian work, all of which uplifts the good image of the country not just to the UN mission but also the local population.

The situation in Liberia next door was similar. After a devastating internal conflict which lasted seven years, Liberia in 1997 went to general elections which Charles Taylor, a former warlord in the civil war, won the presidency. Not long after, Liberia slid back into civil war attracting ECOWAS troops once again to intervene. In 2004, it became necessary for the UN to take over from the West African troops and UNMIL was formed. After having spent so much effort earlier as part of the West African troops, it was natural that Ghana took part in
the UN effort. Relations between Liberia and Ghana date back several decades and any
cortribution to the stability of that country as part of the sub-region is indeed in the interest
of Ghana. Moreover, since the end of the civil war Ghana is contributing military assistance
to help build up the Liberian Armed Forces. A total of about 10,000 Ghanaian troops have so
far served in Liberia. Ghana has additionally provided two Deputy Force Commanders for
the mission and a Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General.

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, ONUCI\textsuperscript{28} was established for an initial period of 12 months,
from 4 April 2004, when the mandate of the small political mission, the UN Mission in Côte
d'Ivoire (MINUCI), and its West African counterpart, ECOMICI, ended. ONUCI's objective
was to facilitate the implementation by the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by
them at Marcoussis, France, in January 2003 which aimed at ending the Ivorian civil war. Its
mandate was subsequently extended on several occasions and the mission is yet to end. In
2011, the strength of ONUCI was increased by an additional 2,000 following renewed post-
elections fighting.\textsuperscript{29} Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire are three neighbouring countries
in the West African sub-region. They all belong to the Mano River Union.

As conflict in these countries affects the sub-region, every effort is required to be made to
stem this in order to engender peace and tranquility in West Africa. Ghana participating in
these operations is therefore aimed at contributing to the security of the sub-region. As a
neighbour, Ghana also finds itself in a unique position to contribute to the stability and peace
of Côte d'Ivoire by participating in the ONUCI operation. Since 2004, Ghana has contributed
an infantry battalion on rotational basis to the mission, which is ongoing. As at the time of
writing, Ghanbatt 15 joined the operation. Ghana is additionally contributing an Aviation Unit (Ghana Aviation) and a Level 2 Hospital (Ghanmed), both located in Bouake, the second largest city in the country. In August 2011, following the post-election fighting in the country, Ghana was requested to provide additional medical personnel to be deployed in Abidjan. Ghana has so far contributed a total of 8,000 troops to the mission. As at 31 August 2011, there were seven fatalities.\(^{30}\)

The other mission, MONUC, was established in 1999 (UNSC Resolution 1565) with an authorised strength of 16,700 uniformed personnel. Ghanaian troops did not join MONUC at the onset of the operation. The mandate of the mission was to help implement the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement signed by the regional leaders on 10 July 1999 in Lusaka, capital of the Republic of Zambia, and return DR Congo to peace and normalcy.\(^{31}\) MONUC had a strong and robust mandate. In July 2010, the mission was renamed the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DR Congo (MONUSCO)\(^{32}\) with a mandate more humanitarian than before. At the time of writing the 21\(^{st}\) Ghanbatt was deployed to the mission. With this operation in the DR Congo, Ghanaian soldiers were getting back to the country since the infamous incident at Port Francqui (now Ilebo) in which over forty Ghanaian troops died in the early 1960s. Notwithstanding this unfortunate incident, Ghana has returned to the DR Congo. This underscores its commitment to international peace and security, an interest that has informed its participation in peacekeeping operations.

The final mission in this section is MINURCAT. In February 2003, guerilla groups in the western Sudanese region of Darfur took up arms against the Sudanese government accusing
it of oppressing the non-Arab population. Nearly 240,000 Sudanese refugees fled to eastern Chad from war-ridden Darfur, joined by approximately 45,000 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR). With 180,000 Chadians displaced by the civil war in the East, this generated increased tensions among the region’s communities. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1778 (25 September 2007), in consultation with the authorities of Chad and the CAR authorising the deployment a UN civilian and police operation, known as MINURCAT, and a European Union military force (EUFOR). These forces were to contribute to the protection of civilians, promote human rights and the rule of law, and promote regional peace. In January 2009, the Security Council again authorised the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT in both Chad and the CAR at the end of EUFOR’s mandate in March 2009. MINURCAT completed its mandate on 31 December 2010, barely a year and a half of taking over from EUFOR. Ghanaian troops joined the MINURCAT in March 2009 and during the period contributed only three contingents to the force. MINURCAT provided Ghana another rare opportunity to operate in a desert region. In the 1980s the AU, then the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), deployed its first peacekeeping mission to Chad but this was short-lived. Ghana did not take part in this mission. Its presence in Chad and CAR this time therefore serves to underscore the point that with its commitment to international and regional peace and stability, it will contribute anywhere its services are needed.

A cursory glance at peacekeeping missions in Africa points to the fact that the challenges facing African countries are similar as these conflicts relate to governance, human rights and humanitarian crises. With good democratic and governance credentials, Ghana stands tall in
the African landscape and its participation in these missions is testimony of its influence, not only in the sub-region but the entire continent. Ghana’s participation in these operations also demonstrates its commitment to contributing to solving African problems by Africans, which is a fundamental part of its foreign policy. All these boost Ghana’s image abroad.

2.2.1.2 Middle East Missions

There have been only two missions in the Middle East that Ghana has been involved in. The region is a hot bed of tension that has been going on for decades. UNEF II, Ghana’s first mission in the region, was a sequel to an earlier mission. UNEF I was established against the backdrop of conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours and by the time it was winding down in 1967 there was still tension in the area. It was forced by the Egyptian authorities to withdraw. But from then until October 1973, there was still insecurity in the area as after the war both Israel and Egypt still occupied their positions across each other. On 6 October 1973, in a surprised coordinated attack, Egyptian and Syrian forces attacked the Israeli positions, Egypt from across the Suez Canal and Syria across the Gholan Heights. The Security Council met immediately and called for a ceasefire and the implementation of an earlier resolution which required the withdrawal of the contending forces to their pre-war positions then. With the Suez Canal being an important international shipping route, the UN’s quick response to the crisis was imperative. Ghana was therefore joining the UNEF II mission that did not only aim to maintain peace and security in the region, but free the waterway from any hindrances. Ghanaian troops first joined UNEF II in 1974 and by August 1979 they were on their way out.
As the conflict between Egypt and Israel was ending and UNEF II folding up in the Sinai, another de-stabilising condition was unfolding between Israel and its northern neighbour, Lebanon. Civil war, fueled by a constitutional crisis, had broken out in Lebanon in April 1975 with the two dominant groups – Muslims and Christians - engaged in armed conflict. The electing of a new president in 1976 and the creation of an Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) did not resolve the conflict. In the ensuing confusion, on 11 March 1978, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) launched a commando raid into Israel near Tel Aviv which resulted in 37 people dead and 76 wounded. Israel retaliated swiftly, invading Lebanon on the night of 14 and 15 March and occupying the entire South Lebanon from their common border up to the Litani River in a matter of days. The Security Council subsequently adopted Resolutions 425 and 426 (1978) to address the conflict to include the creation of UNIFIL. The force was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon back to the internationally-recognised common border, return Lebanese government authority to the south and prevent armed attacks into Israel from Lebanese territory.

The Ghana contingent which was then withdrawing from the Sinai was redirected to Lebanon. UNIFIL is by far Ghana’s most consistent international peacekeeping operation. Most members of the Ghana Armed Forces have served in UNIFIL at one time or another and the operation has been the biggest training ground for Ghanaian peacekeepers where much of the field experiences and expertise have been nurtured and imbibed. UNIFIL’s first force commander was Lieutenant General Emmanuel Erskine. He and the Ghanaian contingent played significant roles in the heady days of the mission to bring diplomacy to the fore as a means of easing the tension between the protagonists. Even though as a member of
the now defunct OAU, Ghana had acceded to the organisation’s decision to act in solidarity with the Arab countries in the oil crisis of the 1970s, it nonetheless joined the operation as a neutral partner in global politics. It continued to maintain diplomatic presence both in Beirut and Tel Aviv and Ghanaian troops operated freely between the two capitals.

2.2.1.3 The Far East Mission

UNTAC so far is the only operation in the Far East Ghana has participated in. UNTAC's aim was to restore peace and civil government in a country ruined by decades of a devastating civil war and Cold War machinations. It was to hold free and fair elections leading to a new constitution and to kick-start the rehabilitation of the country. It was also to exercise supervision or control over all aspects of government, including foreign affairs, national defence, finance, public security and information, and to supervise, monitor and verify the withdrawal and non-return of foreign military forces. It was additionally to canton, disarm and demobilise Cambodia's fighting factions, confiscate caches of weapons and military supplies, promote and protect human rights, oversee military security and maintain law and order, assist in mine clearance and awareness and to serve as the de facto government of the country until after elections.

As a complex mission, the over 22,000 strong force included human rights, civil administration and military components, as well as some 3,600 police monitors. It was established on 15 March 1992. Ghanaian troops joined UNTAC from October 1992 with the first elements being military observers. Subsequently, throughout the duration of the mission, Ghana contributed two infantry battalions, 30 military observers, 15 staff officers, a
military police platoon and a civilian police detachment. The Ghanaian contingent was deployed in the capital Phnom Penh as a security battalion. The Cambodia mission was one that considerably enhanced the experience and expertise of Ghanaian troops in mine warfare, election monitoring and restoration of infrastructure. Then preparing to return to constitutional rule, Ghana and the Ghana Armed Forces were therefore well poised to contribute to the transition to established civil rule in that country. Ghanaian soldiers had fought in the region during the world war and were therefore returning to play a significant role in restoring peace to the region.

In all these UN missions, Ghana is mainly at the receiving end, long after the decision had been made at the UN HQ before invitations are extended to the country to provide troops. The only time probably that Ghana gets involved in decision-making in relation to peacekeeping by the UN is when there is need to negotiate the number of troops to provide. Here Ghana may have the opportunity to state what strength of troops and equipment it can provide. In any case, with the introduction of the “Wet Lease” arrangement for the sustainment of peacekeeping forces, logistics support is pre-determined even though this may be negotiated and included in the memorandum of understanding. In terms of foreign policy decisions, Ghana’s peacekeeping forces are largely implementers of Ghana’s foreign policy and in the process perform a lot of diplomacy on behalf of the country. By participating in these UN peacekeeping operations, Ghana also seeks to enhance its global image capacity to negotiate with other countries on more friendly terms. It has also fully established its commitment to international law and international humanitarian law, as decisions by the UN are binding on it and are duly carried out.
2.2.2 African Union/ECOWAS Operations

The AU, when it was the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), deployed its first peacekeeping force in the 1980s. Against the backdrop of growing insecurity on the continent, the OAU then, in 1979, considered forming an inter-African military force (OAU Defence Force) to support member states in the event of an aggression from outside the continent, assist liberation movements in their war of independence, provide peacekeeping and observer forces in the event of conflict between member states and to cooperate with the UN in matters of defence and security affecting OAU member states. A Defence Council was to be set up with an advisory committee to be formed consisting of Chiefs of the Defence Staff of selected countries to advise it. OAU member-states were required to place at the disposal of the organisation military forces specially trained and kept in readiness in their countries. 39

Hardly were these arrangements concluded when the organisation was faced with an urgent and practical problem of peacekeeping. Libyan forces had invaded Chad to oust Hissene Habre and install his rival Goukouni Wouedeye in December 1980. 40 The crisis was compounded when Libya and Chad later decided to merge into one country. This turn of events necessitated the OAU to, as a matter of urgency, compose its first peacekeeping force. 41 This first African peacekeeping force was short-lived but it was testimony of the commitment of African states to the overall security and peace of the continent and the world at large. In 1999 the OAU was transformed into the AU and with the collapse of the Cold War, the nature and scale of conflict on the African continent have changed dramatically.
In 2004, the AU found space to re-invent its peacekeeping culture and has since deployed peacekeeping troops either alone or in conjunction with the UN, the latter known as hybrid peacekeeping. In 1990, ten years after the failed OAU attempt at ensuring collective security on the continent, ECOWAS was to launch its first intervention and peacekeeping force when the Liberian civil war broke out. Ghana did not provide troops to the OAU force in Chad. It was nevertheless represented on the OAU Defence Commission which spearheaded discussions on and contributed to decisions in relation to the formation of the force. Ghana was, however, fully involved in the ECOWAS initiative in all its facets. Since this study is about peacekeeping and diplomacy, the graphic involvement of Ghana in peacekeeping on the continent under the aegis of the ECOWAS is the focus of the following discussion. The ECOWAS operations in the sub-region are outlined under the thematic areas represented by the countries where the peacekeeping operations have been conducted – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire.

2.2.2.1 Liberia (1990-1997 and 2003)

ECOWAS deployed multinational troops to Liberia on two occasions – 1990 and 2003. In the first instance, on 24 December 1989 a Liberian armed dissident group, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), invaded the country from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. The aftermath of the invasion unsettled the entire sub-region. An estimated 15,000 – 20,000 people were killed and over 700,000 fled into neighbouring countries as refugees. As civil war broke out in the country, ECOWAS, in the attempt to take military measures to stem the conflict, established the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was to create a corridor to evacuate the distressed and enforce a ceasefire to allow diplomacy to resolve the conflict. ECOMOG started as a peace enforcement force but later became a
very effective peacekeeping force. The mission stayed in Liberia up to 1997 when general elections were held and Charles Taylor, the NPFL leader, won the presidency. ECOMOG withdrew early in 1998. But Liberia soon slipped back into civil war within a year.

By 2003, new armed factions had taken control of vast areas of Liberia and began to close in on the capital Monrovia. In August Taylor resigned and went into exile, taking advantage of an offer of asylum in Nigeria as part of an ECOWAS–brokered peace deal. The deal included the deployment of an international inter-positional force known as the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). ECOMIL was to help secure the ceasefire and facilitate the delivery of badly needed humanitarian and relief supplies to affected populations. In October 2003, however, the UN had to take over from ECOMIL, hence the establishment of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

Ghana contributed substantially to the ECOWAS effort in both instances. The first field commander of the first ECOMOG force was Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo, then the General Officer Commanding the Ghana Armed Forces and member of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). At the end of the operations in Liberia in 1998 Ghana had contributed a total of 13,000 troops and suffered 33 fatalities. Ghana contributed only one contingent to ECOMIL which was re-hatted as part of UNMIL.

2.2.2.2 Sierra Leone (1999-2000)

The ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone was rather short. The circumstances in Sierra Leone were similar to those in Liberia. In March 1991 an armed group of exiled Sierra
Leonean dissidents known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded the country from Liberia. A civil war ensued. Even though ECOWAS member states were stretched with the operation in Liberia, some countries managed to deploy a small number of troops in Sierra Leone. From 1992 through 1999, Nigerian and Guinean troops contributed significantly to the war effort in Sierra Leone. But this was mainly on bilateral arrangements to help the Sierra Leonean government fight off the RUF rebels. Following Major Johnny Paul Koroma’s coup in 1997 against the elected government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabah, ECOWAS resolved to drive out the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and re-instate President Kabah. There were reinforcements of the West African troops, hence the establishment of ECOMOG 2 in Sierra Leone. ECOMOG eventually succeeded in restoring President Kabah to office but elements of the AFRC and the RUF constituted themselves into a joint force against the Sierra Leone Armed Forces and ECOMOG.

Ghanaian troops formed part of the reinforcements to Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1999. Then Ghanbatt 15 in Liberia redeployed to Lungi in Sierra Leone by January 1999 with the task to defend the international airport. A second battalion, direct from Ghana, relieved Ghanbatt 15 and this was later re-hatted into the UN Mission (UNAMSIL) which took over the ECOMOG operation in 2000. The ECOMOG troops were initially an enforcement force but later adopted a peacekeeping stance before the transition.

2.2.2.3 Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2004)

In 1993, the long-reigning octogenarian president of Côte d’Ivoire, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, died. In 1999 General Robert Gueï staged the first military coup in the country. The junta
organised elections which excluded some contestants on the basis of their origin. General Gueï himself was a candidate. There was no clear-cut winner but in the ensuing confusion, the General was ousted and the runner-up in the elections, Laurent Gbagbo, became president. In September 2002, civil war broke out triggered by a mutiny by elements of the Armed Forces of northern extraction that quickly snowballed into a coup attempt against President Gbagbo. The coup in Abidjan failed but the mutineers withdrew and took control of the northern part of the country and formed the Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI) with an armed wing known as Forces Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire/New Forces (FN).

It was expected that a national government which meanwhile had been formed would take steps toward healing the conflict in the country and bridging the divides ahead of elections in 2005. ECOWAS sent its fourth ceasefire monitoring mission, ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), made up of troops from Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal and Togo, operating alongside French forces (LICORNE). ECOMICI operated in the country until April 2004 when the force was re-hatted into the UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (ONUCI).

In all these operations, whether peace enforcement or peacekeeping, Ghana and the Ghana Armed Forces played significant roles in the formulation and implementation of the ECOWAS policies and diplomacy generally in the sub-region. The ECOWAS intervention in the first Liberia conflict was a novel concept. Even though ECOWAS was then largely ill-prepared for the military engagements, the effort nevertheless shows the commitment of the sub-regional organisation to address the politico-military challenges of the community. Through its creative engagement of these challenges it has proved to be a model for regional peacekeeping and the
maintenance of international peace and security by regional organisations as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. On the part of Ghana, participation in these sub-regional operations served to deepen its commitment to regionalism and pan-Africanism and the use of its resources, political and military, towards building and nurturing bondship between African countries. It is recalled for instance that in 1959 Ghana and Liberia combined in what was then known as the Sanniquellie declaration\textsuperscript{50} which championed the political emancipation and unification of the continent. President Nkrumah met with the then Liberian President Tubman in the Liberian northern city of Sanniquellie for the negotiations. It is also recalled that Sierra Leone and Ghana (then the Gold Coast) were actually one country headed by one Governor-General who was resident in Freetown, the Sierra Leonean capital.\textsuperscript{51} These antecedents only serve to buttress the solidarity between Ghana and Liberia and Sierra Leone and contributing to the peacekeeping efforts in these countries reinforces Ghana’s diplomatic efforts in the sub-region.

Ghana’s foreign policy as determined at independence and under the First Republic - pan-Africanism, solving African problems by Africans and non-alignment, among others - set the benchmark for its involvement in efforts to maintain peace and unity in the sub-region and participation in the ECOWAS initiative. The intervention was certainly not inconsistent with the relevant protocols of the UN, AU (OAU) and ECOWAS itself. In 1981, following the challenges faced by the OAU in Chad, ECOWAS, largely an economic union, foresaw the need for such intervention and made provisions for it in its Revised Treaty under the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defence Matters.\textsuperscript{52} But as indicated in the AU experience above, these provisions were directed at dealing with external attacks on the continent or a member of the
organisation and not for domestic matters. Adapting the provisions to the realistic situation served a useful purpose. One may also state that even though the first ECOMOG operation had difficulties, these resulted from the perception that it may have been illegal. But the wisdom of the leadership of the sub-region was endorsed as the AU and the UN backed these actions subsequently. In his “Agenda for Peace”, former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali approves of regional organisations’ involvement in peacekeeping at their level. UN legitimacy is required of such operations. The world body taking over these operations after they had started therefore served to legalise them and thereby gave due recognition to the efforts of the sub-regional authorities.

At the policy formulation level, these military matters broadly informed the crafting at the highest political level of the relevant provisions and protocols to deal with crises, in Liberia and the other places, and future planning. At the onset of the first Liberia operation, a four-member Standing Mediation Committee (made up of Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) was constituted and this was to steer the ECOWAS effort at addressing the crisis including military action, in the absence of general consensus of the entirety of the member states. At the series of talks and negotiations on the crisis, military chiefs of the SMC countries and others subsequently contributed to the significant decisions to engage in military operations to stem the crisis. Representatives of the Ghana Armed Forces were very much involved in these engagements and discussions. Also throughout the course of the operations, the Committee of Chiefs of Staff (Military Chiefs) of the Armed Forces of the various member states met regularly to deliberate on the situation and made recommendations to the political authority for the appropriate actions. Ghana chaired a few of these meetings but was involved in all of them.
General Arnold Quainoo, then member of the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) junta in Ghana and General Officer Commanding the Ghana Armed Forces, and Brigadier General FA Agyemfrah, then Chief of Staff at the General Headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces, as well as Capt Kojo Tsikata (rtd), also a member of the PNDC and national security chief, among others, participated in some high level political meetings on the crisis in Liberia. They provided insight into and background information that informed the decisions of the political authority. They often accompanied the then Chairman of the PNDC and head of state of Ghana, Flt Lt JJ Rawlings, to these high level meetings. In 1996 in particular following renewed fighting among the warring factions in Monrovia, Liberia, it was Capt Tsikata, representing Flt Lt JJ Rawlings, then Chairman of ECOWAS, and leading a special team which included senior Ghanaian military officers, who negotiated an end to the fighting, spending many days meeting with various stakeholders and the leaders of the factions in Monrovia.\textsuperscript{54}

At the operational level, information and intelligence from the field in Liberia was often provided the political authority through the regular situation reports from the mission headquarters and through the various national contingents to their national governments. Regular operational conferences were also held in-theatre from which information was passed on for the relevant decisions to be taken at the highest possible levels of the Community. All this helps to provide the relevant inputs into policy formulation at the strategic level and the Ghana Armed Forces contributed significantly towards these efforts. It is significant to underscore the fact that the Ghana Armed Forces was heavily relied on during the ECOMOG operations both in Liberia and Sierra Leone and subsequently in Côte d'Ivoire. Being the only country which consistently operated in Rwanda during the genocide, its experiences and exploits were a source of detailed
information and instruction on peacekeeping trends. A number of senior Ghanaian military officers, both serving and retired, have often been consulted and coopted in relation to planning and strategy at the ECOWAS level. General Seth Obeng, former Chief of the Defence Staff of the Ghana Armed Forces and a force commander of two UN peacekeeping operations, is an eminent person whose expertise and experience the UN and ECOWAS continue to benefit from.\(^{55}\)

2.3 Other Missions

Apart from the operations discussed above, Ghana has also been seconding military officers to the UN Headquarters in New York to fill some key positions. Major General Timothy Dibuama was one of the first of such officers. He was seconded as a Major and remained in New York long enough to rise to the rank of Major General and to take up the high level appointment of Military Adviser to the Secretary General. In addition to contributing armed contingents to the operations mentioned above, Ghana has also consistently provided un-armed military observers, staff officers and civilian police personnel to several other UN, AU and ECOWAS smaller peacekeeping missions. Some of these missions are still operational. Table 1 below shows some of the other peacekeeping missions that Ghana has contributed and is still contributing experts of mission to.

Table 1. Other Peacekeeping Missions Ghana has been/is involved in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration/Year</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>Closed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>UNTSO</td>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>1948-current</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Lt Gen Erskine became its COS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>UNMOGIP</td>
<td>India &amp; Pakistan</td>
<td>1949-current</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 The value of international peacekeeping

International peacekeeping in general is seen to have some value, both to Ghana and the Ghana Armed Forces. Cursorily, it may be said that Ghana has benefited politically and economically from this activity. For instance, the political stature of the country has been enhanced. Ghana can be said to be an island in the sea of turmoil, in the West African sub-region, at least. Over the
last three decades or so, Ghana has been very stable unlike some countries in the sub-region. It could also be said that having been witnesses to the ravaging effects of war and chaos in the countries they serve in, Ghanaian soldiers by and large would rather not be party to acts that may tend to destabilise their country. The commitment of the GAF in general and the soldiers particularly in maintaining political stability and peace in Ghana is therefore no understatement.

Additionally, the soldiers represent Ghana wherever they serve. They are worthy ambassadors as they fly the Ghana national flag. Ghana was one of the two African countries which took part in UNEF II in the Sinai in Egypt. In UNIFIL it remained the sole African troop contributing country for over two decades until the expansion of the force in 2006. Since independence Ghana’s commitment to international peace has been clearly stated and pursued over the years. Ghanaian soldiers have actualised this commitment and have contributed in no small way to the attainment of this goal. The foreign policy objectives of the country have thereby been enhanced by the participation of Ghanaian soldiers in these international peacekeeping operations.

International peacekeeping has served to establish the Ghana Armed Forces as a credible and professional force capable of effectively and efficiently maintaining security at home and playing a much more determined and focused role in international security. By taking part in international peacekeeping, in a professional and efficient manner, the Ghana Armed Forces has proven to the world that Ghana is capable of taking care of its internal security and could additionally be a potent force to assist in maintaining international peace and security. No wonder the UN has relied so much on the experience and expertise of Ghanaian troops and senior officers in prosecuting its peacekeeping operations for decades.
End Notes
2 ibid.
3 Formerly called Zaire under President Mobutu and now Democratic Republic of the Congo as at the time of independence
5 Lester Bowles "Mike" Pearson, *PC, OM, CC, OBE,* was born on 23 April 1897 and died on 27 December 1972. He was a Canadian professor, historian, civil servant, statesman, diplomat, and politician. He was the 14th Prime Minister of Canada from 22 April 1963, until 20 April 1968. As a diplomat in Washington, senior foreign affairs bureaucrat, foreign affairs minister and a prime minister in Liberal governments from the 1940s to the 1960s, Pearson figured prominently in the shaping of Canadian foreign policy in the post World War II period.
7 In 1947 the future of Palestine, which was being administered by Britain as a trust territory was to be determined. In 1948 at the unilateral creation of Israel conflict broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Largely as a result of the UN’s intervention and especially with the efforts of its chief mediator into the conflict general armistice agreements were signed between and all the other feuding countries – Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria – in 1949. The agreements provided for a ceasefire, withdrawal of national forces to what was termed armistice demarcation, the establishment of demilitarised zones and the return of refugees and displaced persons to their original places of abode as well as the establishment of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). The agreements were meant to be temporary arrangements to be followed by the conclusion of peace treaties.
9 Ibid., pp.43-44.
10 Ibid., p.44.
11 Ibid., pp.45-47.
12 In 1957, for his role in defusing the Suez Crisis through the United Nations, Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The selection committee claimed that Pearson had "saved the world." The United Nations Emergency Force was Pearson's creation, and he is considered the father of the modern concept of peacekeeping. The UN itself was also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.
13 Ibid.
14 The soldiers were dissatisfied with the decision to relocate them from Leopoldville to Kasai, and also because while they were out on the international assignment their families back home were to be moved from Accra to Tamale.
15 Ghana had earlier deployed a token platoon led by its British Chief of the Defence Staff, Lt Gen HT Alexander, under the operation code-named Operation Full Cock. Nearly 31 countries contributed troops to ONUC.
18 While the MOU is between the parties to the conflict, the SOFA is between the UN force and the host nation spelling out the privileges and immunities of the peacekeeping force and the responsibility of the host nation to the force.
20 Ibid.

22 Ibid. p.28.


24 Ibid


26 The mission folded up in June 1964.


28 With an authorised strength of 7,000 as at 2005.

29 Following the 2010 Presidential election and the ensuing political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, UNOCI has remained on the ground to support the new Ivorian Government.

30 Ghana provided a 200-strong aero-medical surgical team to deploy in Abidjan where the UN had no credible medical facility and at the time relied on a civilian hospital which it designated the Level III hospital. The fatalities were suffered between the start of the mission in 2004 and 2011. Source of the information is the United Nations.

31 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement attempted to end the Second Congo War through a ceasefire, release of prisoners of war, and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force under the auspices of the United Nations. The heads of state of Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe signed the agreement in Lusaka, Zambia on July 10, 1999. The key highlights of the agreement was the creation or a political committee and a joint military commission to work towards a ceasefire, restoring central government authority in the country and the provision of humanitarian assistance, among others.


33 This was to respond to the activities of armed groups based in eastern Chad and Darfur, including cross-border attacks.

34 The transfer of authority between EUFOR and the military component of MINURCAT took place on 15 March 2009. The authorised strength of the expanded MINURCAT was then to be 300 police officers, 25 military liaison officers, 5,200 military personnel, and an appropriate number of civilian personnel.

35 The first opportunity was in 1974 in the Sinai in Egypt.

36 Forces of neighbouring Syria which were part of the ADF decided to deploy to the south of Lebanon and this Israel objected to and threatened to employ counter-measures against the move. As sporadic fighting continued in the area, Israel supported the Christian militias and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), the dominant armed and militant force in South Lebanon, also lent support to the Lebanese resistance movement, a loose association of a variety of Moslem and leftist parties in the country.


38 “Wet lease” is a contingent-owned equipment (COE) reimbursement system where the troop/police contributor assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting major and minor items of equipment deployed. The troop/police contributor is entitled to reimbursement for providing this maintenance support. “Dry lease” is also the COE reimbursement system whereby the troop/police contributor provides equipment to a peacekeeping mission and the United Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment or the United Nations arranges with a third party for maintenance of the equipment.


40 Ibid.

41 This decision was said to have been taken without much thought of the financial, logistic and other problems associated with peacekeeping. See Amate, C.O.C., *Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice* London: Macmillan. 1986. p.181.
The hybrid mission embodies a paradigm shift in the way peacekeeping operations are inaugurated, in terms of the joint AU and UN decision making process, and the way it is operationalised. There are nevertheless political constraints in ensuring an effective collaboration between the UN and the AU, particularly when there is insufficient communication between the political leadership of both organisations. See Murithi, Timothy, The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005, pp.91-95. In http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/Issue%2014%20Article%2015%20Revised%20copy%201.pdf. 2005. Accessed on 15 January 2012.


44 The troop contributing countries included Ghana, Nigeria, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Mali. Others joined in later and in the mid 1990s ECOMOG was expanded to include countries such as Uganda and Zambia.


46 President Ahmed Tejan Kabah was elected president in 1996.

47 After successful elections and substantial peace returning to Liberia, ECOMOG drastically scaled down its forces in Liberia. Nigeria repatriated a number of its battalions and redeployed a significant force to Sierra Leone. Ghana repatriated one battalion with the other remaining in the mission area. Some of the lesser TCCs pulled out completely while others, Burkina Faso and Niger in particular, retained only token forces.

48 Ghana’s contribution was about 200 personnel.


54 Exodus 2Vol 11 Dec. 95-Oct. 96 p8. The publication is the news magazine of the Ghana contingent which served in ECOMOG in Liberia during the period. See article written by Major M’Bawine Atintande entitled “Nightmare in Monrovia”. The researcher sat through some of these meetings.

55 Interaction between researcher and Lt Gen Seth Obeng, in Accra in January 2012. Gen Obeng was force commander of the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) and UNIFIL.


57 Ghana and Senegal were the only African countries that participated in the UNEF 2 operation.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF GHANA’S PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN PROMOTING GHANA’S FOREIGN POLICY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter broadly looks at the role of the Ghana Armed Forces in promoting Ghana’s foreign policy and diplomacy through peacekeeping. It also discusses the core structures and arrangements either in place or absent in relation to the generation and deployment of Ghanaian troops for international peacekeeping operations as well as the nature of the relationship between the agencies that collaborate in this direction. The purpose of this chapter is to establish the fact that Ghana’s peacekeeping forces abroad are useful tools for Ghana’s foreign policy and diplomacy.

The data discussed here have been generated from relevant documents and structured interviews. The interviews covered 24 personalities associated with or working in the subject area. It was intended to interview 26 persons, but two were however unavailable for reasons of assignments outside their usual places of residence. Those interviewed were senior military officers and diplomats employed at the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Ghana’s diplomatic missions abroad as well as Ghanaian contingents in selected UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions, among others. The interview guide used for the study is attached as Appendix I.

The discussion is under the following thematic areas:

a. Brief outline of Ghana’s Foreign Policy
b. The national interest set up
c. The importance of peacekeeping as a tool of international diplomacy.
d. Practical arrangements in Ghana to select, train and deploy peacekeeping troops.
e. Collaboration between the stakeholders dealing with aspects relating to international peacekeeping operations.
f. Activities of Ghanaian international peacekeeping troops in their areas of responsibility that contribute to Ghana’s diplomatic relations abroad.
g. In-theatre use by Ghana’s foreign diplomatic missions of Ghanaian peacekeeping contingents for their diplomatic activities.
h. Challenges in the use of international peacekeeping forces for international diplomacy.

3.1 Brief Outline of Ghana’s Foreign Policy

Ghana’s foreign policy, even though dynamic, has remained consistent since independence. This foreign policy has been shaped by the circumstances Ghana found itself at independence, its environment and interests. At independence, Ghana was surrounded by mainly countries under colonial rule. It was born into the Cold War and though richly endowed with vast natural resources for instance it was still impoverished. It had no might, economic or military, and there were no allies. Ghana is a member of the UN, the Commonwealth, the AU, ECOWAS and many other international bodies. The broad tenets of this foreign policy have therefore remained unchanged with only shifts in implementation as applied by successive governments.

The broad features of the foreign policy are the following, as spelt out in the 1992 Ghana National Constitution:
- Promote and protect the interests of Ghana;
- Seek the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order;
- Promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means;
- Adhere to the principles enshrined in or as the case may be, the aims and objectives of the UN, AU, Commonwealth, ECOWAS and any other international organisation of which Ghana is a member.

Apart from the president and the constitution there are other sources from which this foreign policy may be derived. These are, for example, the manifestoes of the political parties when they form the government and various treaties and protocols entered into by the country, among others. The objective of foreign policy is to serve the national interest. Ghana’s foreign policy therefore aims to achieve the following, among others:

- National self-preservation or national survival.
- The emancipation of Africa and the redemption of the dignity of the black race.
- Establishment of power and influence in Africa and the world.
- The pursuit of world peace through a policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment.
- International cooperation for development through inter-governmental action.

Throughout the years Ghana has expressed faith with and manifested these in its contribution of ideas and resources to the solution of world problems, maintained consistent presence in world bodies, including the UN, maintained presence in several peacekeeping missions, and many
others. Ghana has benefited tremendously from its foreign policy activities. It is worthy to note that Ghana’s foreign policy impacts on the country in growing relations with its neighbours, a stable and secure country, rising political and economic stature at least in the West African sub-region and attraction to investors. As noted earlier, the thrust of a nation’s foreign policy is to serve the national interest. National interest by itself is a complex structure. Ghana’s national interest is discussed in the following section.

3.2 Ghana’s National Interest Set-up

“National interest” may be defined as “the interest of a state”.\(^2\) It is usually defined by government. Politicians often use the term to seek support for a particular course of action, especially in foreign policy. Given the widespread attachment to the nation as a social and political organisation, national interest is a powerful device for invoking support, especially for domestic policy objectives. In foreign policy, the term invokes an image of the nation, or the nation-state, defending its interests within the anarchic international system where dangers abound and the interests of the nation are always at risk. National interest may therefore be used as a tool for analysing foreign policy, indicating what is best for the nation in its relations with other states.

National interest is so varied and extends into so many corners of our daily lives that sometimes it is hard to define only one area unless it is a glaring area. It is subject to varied interpretations. The definition however is often narrowed to the following:

- National defence
- National security
- Economy
- Inter-state and foreign commerce
- Foreign relations
- And the state of general national affairs.

National interest is part of the decision-making calculus, so states claim legal legitimacy when they claim to act in the national interest, especially when acting in self-defence. A state’s defence policies are formulated based on the state’s political plans in relation to its foreign policy. The totality of these plans and policies reflects the national goals and dictate the national interests. So, for instance, before a nation commits its troops to peacekeeping, its national interests must be the fundamental consideration. It is expected that the political and military strategies should therefore work in tandem, as the national contingent’s operations in the theatre should impact on the state. The national interest set-up should therefore consist of the National Security Council, with the top political and military hierarchy represented, as harmonisation of the national interest and the involvement of troops in peacekeeping are very vital. The Council is chaired by the President. As peacekeeping fits well into the national defence policy, Ghana’s defence policy should be based on a clear definition of Ghana’s national interest, which can then be based on the role the Ghana Armed Forces must play in Ghana’s foreign relations.

This study being about peacekeeping and diplomacy, it is significant to underscore the point that the thrust is to look at these two areas as they impact on Ghana’s foreign policy. Even though the three facets of foreign policy, namely, how issues are determined as national interest, how foreign policy is formulated, and how foreign policy is implemented, are not represented in
watertight compartments, the Ghana Armed Forces does not only play particularly an implementing role but this role touches on all these aspects of the foreign policy spectrum. The next section looks at the importance of peacekeeping to international diplomacy.

3.3 The Importance of Peacekeeping as a tool of International Diplomacy

Since 2001, more than half of all UN peacekeeping forces have come from seven countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria, Jordan, Nepal and Ghana. The UN's own Human Development Report labels each of these top contributors as having "medium human development." At any given time over the last decade, the top five contributors individually provided more peacekeeping forces than the combined total of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. It is noted that contributing nations can increase their global image, international prestige, and soft power. This could be done through a smart application of traditional and public diplomacy, even though this could lead to increased selectivity of peacekeeping missions based on potential payoffs to national interests, at the expense of the collective interest that peacekeeping operations are primarily meant to serve. Admittedly, the hard truth is that peacekeeping offers greater risks for the advanced countries and greater payoffs for developing countries, such as Ghana. Public diplomacy advantages of peacekeeping promise to raise the overall quality and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, and that collective security in today's deeply interconnected world of markets and diasporas only stands to be furthered if peacekeepers accept the full responsibility of participation, even if the purpose appears to be self-serving.
But linking peacekeeping to diplomacy brings to the fore the dilemma of insecurity in Africa and the world as the hallmark of a global crisis. Conflict and security are linked to the reconstitution of the national, continental and global political order. As the UN Secretary General’s High Level Panel has warned, even the strongest states today are vulnerable and there is need for collaboration of the community of states to ensure global security. Peacekeeping is therefore being seen as one likely answer to a diplomatic offensive aimed at managing insecurity at the regional and global levels.

Former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, in his “Agenda for Peace” in the 1990s, considered the world body strengthening its capacity for preventive diplomacy. Since peacekeeping can be akin to preventive diplomacy, UN peacekeepers are soldier-diplomats who would be frequently called upon to exert a mediatory rather than a military influence and be required to display unusual self-restraint often under extreme provocation. Peacekeeping therefore is an instrument of international diplomacy that cannot be ignored.

Finally, one considers the use of peacekeeping operations as a typical example of states quietly extending their influence around the world to improve both their image in and access to the world instead of more cultural and economic connections. This is notably true in regard to the declared target audiences of the state’s public diplomacy. In this direction, countries such as China have increased their commitment of skilled and disciplined troops to peacekeeping and have since began to reap diplomatic pay-offs, for instance winning UN accolades which have raised its profile in the quest for a permanent seat at the Security Council.
3.4 Practical Arrangements in Ghana to Select, Train and Deploy Peacekeeping Troops

Ghana has been committed to international peacekeeping for decades. The Congo operation in the 1960s was the first true test of Ghana deploying troops to international peacekeeping operations. In President Nkrumah’s own words when sending Ghanaian troops to the Congo, he accepted to send an infantry battalion as part of a UN force to help quell the disturbances that broke out in the country.\(^6\) This seems to suggest that the involvement of the President or the government is essential in Ghana accepting to deploy and actually deploying troops to international peacekeeping operations.

Once the political decision has been taken to commit troops and the strategic discussions at the UN Headquarters in New York concluded, this is then communicated through the appropriate chain to the appropriate agencies required to actualise the commitment. Currently, the Ghana Armed Forces has deployed a Military Adviser (MILAD) in the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York in the rank of a Brigadier General to help coordinate issues relating to the Armed Forces and peacekeeping. The MILAD deals directly with the office of the Chief of Staff as well as the Department of International Peace Support Operations (DIPSO), both at the General Headquarters of the Ghana Armed Forces in Accra. The communication from the MILAD is not to replace official diplomatic communication from the Permanent Mission, where this is to be followed, but to complement the bureaucratic route which may hamper early and effective planning and timely passage of information.

Peacekeeping desks have also been set up in the respective headquarters of the three Services of the Ghana Armed Forces – Army, Navy and Air Force. Army is the lead Service responsible for
international peacekeeping operations and in particular the land-based operations and the Department of Army Peacekeeping Operations (DAPKOP) at the Army Headquarters is the section assigned with this task. As at the time of writing, the Ghana Air Force was maintaining an Aviation Unit in the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI). Even though the Ghana Navy contributed personnel and ships to the Naval Task Force in ECOMOG in Liberia in the 1990s, the Navy is yet to deploy an integral component in UN peacekeeping operations. This is however anticipated. So far all the contingents deployed to international peacekeeping operations, aside from the aviation unit mentioned above, are mainly infantry units.

It is the responsibility of the Army Headquarters therefore to compose the contingents and generate the troops for the operations. Army Headquarters nominates the unit or elements to form the contingent, including the commander, and allocates vacancies to other units and departments/directorates as well as the other two Services, depending on the specific roles to be performed. These are contained in detailed instructions issued by the Army Headquarters. There are specific criteria for nomination. For example, among other reasons, prospective troops would not have been sanctioned from participating in any UN operations or earmarked for other assignments within the period and for which they would not be available for deployment. Nominated personnel are considered only nominated until they would have successfully passed through a number of mandatory steps and confirmed suitable for deployment. The entire contingent would then assemble and encamp at the relevant location for documentation and pre-operational training.
Several years ago pre-operational training used to last almost three or more months. As most members of the Ghana Armed Forces had prior peacekeeping experience the period was shortened and currently it is just about four weeks. The training venue has also moved from one location to another and today there are two main camps for this. These are the Bundase Training Camp (BTC) in the Greater Accra Region for troops in the Southern Command and the Daboya Training Camp (DTC) in the Northern Region for Northern Command troops. The latter, however, needs more structures to be fully utilised. The training is conducted by the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), which provides both tactical training for the rank and file and leadership and specialist training for persons holding specific command and staff positions in the contingent or the main force. In the case of the West African interventionist force in Liberia, the rigid selection criteria for UN operations were not applied and for the first contingent in ECOMOG Liberia, there was hardly any pre-operational training.

On receipt of the “warning order” for deployment in the peacekeeping theatre, the designated commanding officer together with his operations officer, military information officer and logistics officer will travel to the operational area for a reconnaissance of the specific area of deployment. This is to enable them be familiar with the terrain and other important areas and conditions that will impact on the contingent’s operations. It affords the team the necessary updates on the current situation in the mission area which would inform adequate preparation, including areas to concentrate training and specific logistics requirements, towards the operations.
The reconnaissance team often joins the government delegation attending the medals presentation parade of the contingent to be relieved. This is to save cost and provide the team better opportunities to assess the situation very well. At the time of writing, the general trend was that the reconnaissance team is now only composed of the designated commanding officer and his operations officer who doubles as the deputy commanding officer. The team may also not join the medals presentation delegation into the mission area but travel separately and at a more convenient time. Prior to the troops encamping for training, briefing notes from specific appointment holders in the contingent in the mission area are forwarded home for the information and action of their counterparts before deployment. These are valuable pieces of information, the importance of which cannot be overstressed. These serve to ensure continuity in the operations of the various contingents in the mission area.

All UN missions have different peculiarities. So, in addition to training in minor tactics and basic peacekeeping skills, the encamped troops are provided information on the peculiar nature of the mission area, such as history, geopolitics, geography and background to the conflict situation. The troops are also taught issues along the lines of the standard generic training modules of the UN with specific emphasis on conduct and discipline among others. While training is ongoing, the logistics and administrative issues are sorted out and travel arrangements concluded. At the end of the pre-operational training, troops break camp to re-assemble at a determined date at an embarkation point, usually in Burma Camp, Accra, for insertion into the mission area. Based on the total number of troops involved and the aircraft capacity, insertion is done in batches (appropriately referred to in military parlance as chalks). The first chalk usually consists of an advance party, which is to commence take-over procedures once in the mission area, and the
command elements. Ghanaian armed contingents are usually deployed for only six months duty tour. Only in exceptional cases do these contingents serve beyond the period mentioned. In the case of the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, contingents served much longer than the six months. This often affected the morale of troops and their upkeep.

It should be noted that there are separate arrangements for the generation and deployment of experts of mission, such as military observers and staff officers. The Department of International Peace Support Operations at the General Headquarters forwards the vacancies received through the MILAD to the respective services to nominate prospective staff officers or military observers who then file their personal history forms and medical reports direct to the UN Headquarters through the Department for processing. While awaiting travel authorisation from the UN Headquarters, the individual(s) undergo basic training to include briefing on the specific mission and other requirements. Pre-deployment training for military observers and staff officers is conducted by the Department in conjunction with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. The Department has since introduced regular training in this respect for potential experts of mission so as to cut down preparation time and enhance the competencies and ability of all Ghanaian military officers. It is currently being strengthened with the requisite capacity to enable it discharge its onerous tasks professionally, especially in this era of wet lease arrangements in which the TCC is expected to fully maintain its troops in the mission for appropriate reimbursement. The Department, now firmly established, should see the Ghana Armed Forces and the nation derive maximum value from international peacekeeping operations.
3.5 Collaboration Between the Stakeholders in Respect of International Peacekeeping

Ghana’s peacekeeping (now often referred to as peace support) operations policy is drawn from the principle of peaceful coexistence. This is strengthened by its resolve to effectively participate in the collective security mechanism adopted by the UN. It has the obligation and responsibility under international law as well as regional and sub-regional treaties and protocols, and as a member of the world body, to contribute to the UN maintaining peace and security in the world. A number of stakeholders have been identified to be involved in the decision-making process when it comes to the preparation and deployment of peacekeeping troops outside the country. These stakeholders include the following:

- The Office of the President through the Office of the Chief of Staff at the Castle
- The National Security Council
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration.
- The Ministry of Defence
- The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
- The Ghana Permanent Mission to the UN in New York
• Parliament. However this is only the case in relation to budget approvals especially for equipment and logistics for contingents earmarked for start-up missions and does not affect the day-to-day running of the peacekeeping affairs.

• Other stakeholder agencies are the AU Commission/Secretariat and the ECOWAS Commission/Secretariat.

• Ghana’s diplomatic missions abroad.

• Friendly countries.

There are three levels of activity relating to the deployment of peacekeeping troops. Troops are earmarked for UN operations, African Union operations and ECOWAS operations. While ECOWAS is not at the moment running any peacekeeping missions, both the UN and AU have missions in several areas. The AU for example has missions in Burundi, Darfur in western Sudan, Sudan itself and Somalia. The UN has many more. Ghana is yet to contribute contingents to AU missions, even though it has deployed some military staff officers to a few missions. As explained elsewhere in this study, Ghana was involved in the ECOWAS missions from 1990-2004. Decisions and activities relating to the generation and deployment of the peacekeepers occur at the three levels, as well as at strategic, operational and administrative levels. It does not matter where the request for peacekeepers is coming from, the various stakeholders are expected to apply themselves to the procedures and processes to facilitate the generation and deployment of the troops.

During our interaction with officials\textsuperscript{12} at the various areas as reflected in Appendix I, it was evident that some amount of collaboration goes on between and among the various stakeholders
when it comes to deploying peacekeepers. However, it was revealed that for running missions
the number of stakeholders is limited to the Ministry of Defence, the Permanent Mission and the
Ghana Armed Forces, with the Ministry of Finance and the Accountant-General’s Department
playing their part in helping and facilitating the release of funds for emoluments and other
expenses related to the maintenance of the troops, and especially contingents. Even though there
is some working relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (represented by the
Permanent Mission), the Ministry of Defence and the Ghana Armed Forces, in this respect, there
does not seem to be a standing arrangement for effective collaboration between them and the
other stakeholders.

After this general introduction, the findings of the research are discussed below under the
following thematic areas:

- Decision-making. This is discussed under strategic, operational and administrative.
- Generation and deployment of troops
- Operations in-theatre
- Mission sustainment
- Post deployment

3.5.1 Decision-Making

At the strategic level, it was learnt that at the United Nations, there is no provision for specific
national authorities to be involved in decisions regarding peacekeeping matters. The UN has its
own structure for deliberating on which missions to establish and where and how to maintain
them. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is solely responsible for
peacekeeping operations and there are no definite national representatives there to be engaged in this discourse. It is when the planning is over that the relevant information is passed on to nations to provide troops and/or other resources. Even the strength of a nation’s force is decided by the DPKO. For instance, at the time of writing this dissertation, the UN had decided to cut down the strength of the Ghana Aviation Unit in Côte d’Ivoire as well as the Ghanaian contingent’s expanded strength in UNIFIL before prior discussion with Ghana. In the case of the latter Ghana had made a substantial investment to migrate to wet lease for the expanded contingent and had therefore written to the UN through the established channels of communication on the issue.

National authorities are therefore only to express their willingness and readiness to accept to contribute troops for a designated peacekeeping operation. The UN’s requirement is then passed on to the Permanent Mission which is then passed on either through the established diplomatic channel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Accra or by the Military Advisor at the Permanent Mission to the Office of Chief of Staff at the General Headquarters. So, at the strategic level at the UN Headquarters, Ghana does not have any specific role to play in the planning of peacekeeping operations involving the participation of its troops in any mission. It was however noted that in order for Ghana to be able to influence decisions at that level in its favour there was need for a permanent ‘mole’ also in the Headquarters who will regularly seek Ghana’s interest in these matters. It was explained that General Timothy Dibuama, who served in the UN Headquarters in the 1970s and rose from Major to Major General served Ghana well with his insight into the workings of the UN system.
Still at the strategic level, at the AU and the ECOWAS commissions, the scenario was virtually similar in that in the normal workings of the Peace and Security Commission which oversees the planning and requests for peacekeeping operations, Ghana is not represented. It was however pointed out that Ghana had very senior military officers in strategic appointments in the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and ECOWAS Headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, such as Major General Charles Okae (rtd), and they play a helpful role. Moreover, the Chief of the Defence Staff is a member of the Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the various Armed Forces at the continental and sub-regional levels and is therefore privy to discussions at a high level, to include deliberations on peacekeeping matters. While it was thought that at the AU/ECOWAS level Ghana stood to gain more in influencing decisions in its favour, it was nonetheless expressed that this was not substantial to reverse any significant decisions at that level in respect of peacekeeping matters.

At the operational level, where decisions to actually commit troops for peacekeeping are taken, it was evident that this involved mainly the national authorities. Here there was some amount of collaboration between the Ministry of Defence, the National Security Council Secretariat and the Ghana Armed Forces. For instance, when a request for peacekeeping troops is received at the Ministry of Defence, this is passed on to the Ghana Armed Forces for comment. Such a comment should include whether troops are available for commitment, the security situation and the logistic state of the Armed Forces which can support the deployment. The request is discussed at the Defence Staff Committee and the appropriate response is passed back to the Ministry of Defence. This is forwarded to the National Security Council with a recommendation as indicated
by the Chief of the Defence Staff’s response. Usually, the Armed Forces recommendation is endorsed and the President’s approval is passed down through the appropriate channel.

There does not seem to be any definite collaboration at this level, even though consultation often goes on before decisions are made. It seems that the only decision-makers in this case are the Presidency, represented by the National Security Council, and the Ghana Armed Forces, with the Ministry of Defence being merely an interface. At National Security Council level, the decision to commit troops is informed by political rather than tactical and operational considerations. It was clarified that when it comes to selection of troops for peacekeeping operations all the decisions are made at the General Headquarters with both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Ministry being more or less conduits. Approval for committing troops is made at the National Security Council level and the selection of troops made by the Chief of the Defence Staff or the respective Service Headquarters as the case may be, depending on which service personnel are involved or required. It was expressed that this level of collaboration and consultation was adequate for the purpose and that if any financial encumbrances were involved then the Finance Ministry and the Accountant-General’s Department needed to be roped into the loop to facilitate the necessary decisions.

At the Administrative level, which is a tactical level, collaboration between the various stakeholders in the Armed Forces was thought to be essential. These are the Office of the Chief of Staff, the various Service Headquarters, the Department of International Peace Support Operations, the Department of Logistics and the Department of Plans and Development, the last three all at the General Headquarters. There is a good working arrangement between all these
offices. However, it was noted that decisions in the main are taken by the Chief of the Defence Staff in consultation with the Chief of Staff and the various responsible directorates and departments.

Finally it was explained that at the strategic and policy formulation level, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Defence serve on the Armed Forces Council, which is chaired by the Vice President. The council is entrusted with the management of the Armed Forces with the day-to-day administration of the military vested in the Chief of the Defence Staff. It was noted, however, that beyond passing on information, there is no clear cut structure of consultation and collaboration in the generation and deployment of peacekeeping forces between the two ministries. But even though the primary decision to participate in any peacekeeping mission is the responsibility of the political authority, planning and deciding on Ghana’s participation in any peacekeeping operation must see government and the military working in tandem to ensure that both troops and the nation derive the best out of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{3.5.2 Generation and Deployment of troops}

Troops are generated along the lines of the initial request by the UN, the AU or ECOWAS as the case may be. The decision as to how to call up troops for peacekeeping operations is more or less pre-determined. Army Headquarters, for instance, has a roster of commanding officers designated for specific missions. There is also a roster regarding which unit should form the nucleus of the Ghana battalions. These alternate with task forces, that is Ghana battalions which are not based on particular existing units. Based on the strength of the Ghana battalions provided, Army Headquarters allocates vacancies to various units and establishments of the Armed Forces
to provide the personnel and in some cases the equipment. For existing missions mainly troops are generated. For start-up missions, that is new missions just starting, generating troops and the necessary equipment and stores takes some time.

Decisions on these issues at this level are not difficult to take. There are clear cut responsibilities regarding the generation and deployment of troops. The collaboration is between Army Headquarters, the Department of International Peace Support Operations, the unit in question providing the nucleus of the headquarters of the peacekeeping battalion due to be inserted into the mission, and the training institutions, especially the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). The others are the Directorate of Ordnance which provides kitting for embarking troops and the Directorate of Supply and Transport which provides the transport lift capability. We also have the Ghana Military Police which ensures all rules pertaining to embarkation to the mission are abided by as well as the Department of Defence Intelligence. The Department of Medical Services conducts the mandatory medical examination on all those selected for the mission and establishes their medical fitness before they assemble for training and marrying up, prior to deployment. Army Headquarters has the overall responsibility of land-based operations and therefore key decisions at this level are made by the Headquarters.

On local routine maintenance, that is the provision of logistics and other services for the troops during the pre-operational training period, the various logistics directorates and departments are responsible for taking those decisions that would enable them provide adequately for the troops. However, decisions in respect of logistics support for the troops for the operations in-theatre are the preserve of higher headquarters, that is, the General Headquarters headed by the Chief of the
Defence Staff. In respect of training, this is also pre-determined. The training module for peacekeeping operations has already been determined and this is implemented by the battalion at the pre-operational training ground. Consultation and collaboration are between the Army Headquarters, the Department of International Peace Support Operations and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre. It is significant to mention in the case of the Air Force operations in Cote d’Ivoire, the same arrangement is followed except that because this is a special operation, decisions on training and other special logistics matters are made by the Air Force Headquarters in consultation with the Office of the Chief of Staff and the Department of International Peace Support Operations.

So, it seems that the major decisions at this level are taken by the Army Headquarters which has sole responsibility for arrangements for land-based peacekeeping operations and Air Force, for now, for the air operations in Côte d’Ivoire. There is however constant and regular consultation and collaboration between all relevant departments and directorates at the level of both General Headquarters and Service Headquarters to enable successful generation and deployment of troops for external peacekeeping operations. It was noted however that there are some setbacks in the decision-making process with unclear relations between the Department of International Peace Support Operations and the Directorate of Army Peacekeeping Operations at the Army Headquarters. While the former is responsible for policy and other strategic matters relating to peacekeeping in general, the latter is responsible for the day-to-day administration of peacekeeping units both at home and abroad. A few lapses were identified, such as the delay in providing logistics for the troops, the slow and bureaucratic nature of communication and inappropriate training modules for the troops.
It has therefore been suggested that there must be more harmonisation of procedures and standards between the two set ups to ensure a smooth generation and preparation of troops embarking on peacekeeping operations. Also the creation of one unified structure responsible for international peacekeeping operations at the Ghana Armed Forces level is most essential, so that Army Headquarters will only be responsible for local-based operations to include internal peacekeeping operations in conjunction with the Department of Joint Operations at the General Headquarters.

Another point that came up for discussion was the problem of acquisition of visas for Ghanaian troops deploying as experts of mission in areas such as Sudan. At the time of writing, Ghana had been waiting for the Sudanese government to grant visas to some military officers earmarked for the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Visas are required for such deployments. Even though the UN had provided these officers their travel authorisation (TA) and their plane tickets were purchased, they could not depart Ghana because of the lack of visas. The Ghana Armed Forces seemed helpless in such situations. It was therefore suggested that in such cases, the diplomatic services of the Ghana mission responsible for such areas were required to facilitate the acquisition of these visas. Collaboration between the Office of the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Department of International Peace Support Operations, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York and the Ghana Mission in or accredited to the host nation (and in particular the Defence Advisor) was absolutely necessary in such a situation.
3.5.3 Operations In-theatre

Once the troops have departed Ghana and arrived in the mission area they are now the responsibility of the UN mission headquarters. As mentioned elsewhere, the UN exercises full control over its peacekeepers. While the mission headquarters, representing the UN, has sole responsibility for operations, determining what has to be done, where and when, there is shared responsibility in respect of administration of the troops between the UN and the troop contributing country. This section looks at the management of operations, administration of the troops and communication.

Regarding operations, it was mentioned that all operations in the mission area are planned and managed by the mission headquarters. The troop contributing country therefore has no responsibility for operations of its troops in the peacekeeping theatre. Operational planning is at the headquarters level but there is regular consultation and discussion on operations to conduct among stakeholders in the mission and inputs from the bottom are often welcome and considered in the planning. Tactical planning of operations at the contingent level is factored into the overall operational plan. Plans on how to execute operational directives from the headquarters are prepared and submitted by the contingents to the headquarters for approval suggesting that all operations are determined from the headquarters. There is no direct input required and welcome from the troop contributing country. It was however mentioned that there have been instances when troop contributing countries were interested in the operations conducted by their troops and in some cases decisions on how the troops could get involved in certain operations in the theatre communicated to either the contingent or the mission headquarters itself. It was explained that
even though the UN had sole responsibility for the troops the troop contributing country was interested in the safety and security of its troops.

Additionally, troops are provided by countries to also serve the national interest of the contributing country and therefore it was necessary to be concerned about how the troops were used in the mission area. Examples were cited of ECOMOG in Liberia where contingents were directed from the home country to accept or reject certain operations. It was also said that Ghana has for instance insisted that its contingent in ONUCI in Côte d’Ivoire continue to be deployed along its common border with Côte d’Ivoire as this will help it manage security along the border. It was nonetheless suggested that there was need for the UN to have flexibility over the use of peacekeepers. The UN mission could, however, consider certain issues which were blatantly inimical to the interest of the troop contributing country but still be the one to take the decision to assign the troops in the mission area.

On administration, it was mentioned that administration of the troops in the mission area is the responsibility of both the UN and the troop contributing country. The UN provides fuel and lubricants, water and food for the troops. The troop contributing country takes care of matters relating to discipline and welfare. It is the responsibility of the contingent to ensure the troops are well behaved and well motivated and that the UN’s guidelines on conduct and discipline are adhered to. These administrative matters are handled by the commanding officer and the contingent commander. Minor offences are treated very easily but major ones, such as alleged murder and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) cases, require repatriation home and Army
Headquarters decision is required. It is however standing operating procedure that matters of SEA attract immediate repatriation for further action.

There does not seem to be need for the home country authorities to be directly involved in the issues mentioned. It should be that the contingent commander and the commanding officer should be able to exercise that full authority over the discipline of their troops. As the conduct of the troops affect the image of the troop contributing country, issues of discipline should be dealt with speedily and the authorities at home should give the two officials free hand to manage this aspect of the troops administration. There have been instances however when authorities at home interfered with some decisions in the mission area. The example was given of a commanding officer who was repatriated on the orders of home authorities against the decision of the contingent commander and the recommendation of a board of inquiry into an incident involving the commanding officer and his soldier.  

Communication, which also involves coordination, raised some major issues. The nature of the network was explained in detail. In the operational theatre, the contingent, and by this referring to the battalion and not the entire body of troops of the troop contributing country in the mission area, has direct communication and coordination with the mission headquarters. The battalion, or the armed unit, also has a direct link with the Army Headquarters (in the case of infantry elements). Usually a contingent commander is deployed in a separate substantive role in the mission and only has the additional responsibility as the national senior for the contingent (the entire body of troops). He, however, lacks the ability and capacity to have direct communication with the Army Headquarters as there is no direct relationship between him/her and the Army
Headquarters in relation to the substantive appointment. There is also a direct communication link between the UN Headquarters and the mission headquarters in the operational area. There is however no direct link between UN Headquarters and Army Headquarters nor General Headquarters. The link is rather between UN Headquarters and the Permanent Mission in New York and in some cases with the UN country office in Accra.

From the Permanent Mission there is communication at two levels with the home country. One is from the head of mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Military Advisor (MILAD) to the General Headquarters (Office of the Chief of Staff, with information copy to the Department of International Peace Support Operations). The MILAD has no direct communication with Army Headquarters which is responsible for external operations of the peacekeeping contingent. Within Ghana, there is no established signal communication for instance between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence even though this exists between the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters. The channel of communication and coordination, however, is maintained between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence on the one hand and between the Ministry of Defence and the General Headquarters on the other. There are however no formal communication or coordination channels between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the General Headquarters. In the mission area, however, the contingent itself (that is, the established battalion or armed unit) has communication only with Army Headquarters at home. It does not seem there is a well structured arrangement to facilitate communication, coordination and collaboration by and between all these identifiable stakeholders dealing in peacekeeping matters.
It was explained that in this situation, with unclear and/or inadequate lines of communication, coordination is hampered, timely passage of information suffers and critical decisions are delayed. This hydra-headed network does not augur well for effective and efficient management of peacekeeping in the Ghana Armed Forces. For instance the simple issue of replacement of a small worn out part of a major equipment in the mission area which attracts huge reimbursement for the country was cited as having been seriously affected by this kind of communication system being maintained. The commanding officer makes the request for replacement of the part only to Army Headquarters. Army Headquarters is not responsible for such matters but because the only line of communication with home is through Army Headquarters it has to be routed through it. Army Headquarters forwards this request to the Office of the Chief of Staff as it cannot deal directly with the Department of International Peace Support Operations which is responsible for coordinating logistics support to the contingents. The Chief of Staff forwards the request to the Department of International Peace Support Operations for staff comments and action required and then seeks approval of the Chief of the Defence Staff. The Department of Plans and Development is then brought into the loop to look for and purchase the part through the normal channels. By the time that this small part is ready to be shipped to the mission area time has lapsed and the entire nation suffers a lack of full reimbursement for the deployment of the small major equipment part.

It was further explained that it was largely to enhance coordination and the timely passage of information to the Armed Forces that the Office of the MILAD was created at the Permanent Mission and the Office of the Contingent Commander was also created in the peacekeeping mission. The work of these offices, however, was still hampered by the many stakeholders in the
Armed Forces responsible for peacekeeping matters and the unclear, independent and bureaucratic lines of communication and coordination between them. It has therefore been suggested that there is need to have only one functional unit to be solely responsible for all matters relating to international peacekeeping in the Ghana Armed Forces. This unit, probably of the status of a service, should be responsible also for all the coordination and communication in respect of international peacekeeping operations. It is hoped that creating such a unit will improve decision-making and collaboration among stakeholders contributing to the operation of Ghana’s peacekeeping forces.

The relationship between the contingent in the mission area and Ghana’s various diplomatic missions, especially where peacekeeping operations are conducted, was also mentioned. It was thought that in this communication and coordination labyrinth use could be put of the structures and resources provided by the embassies to supplement contact with the home country. There currently is no defined relationship between Ghanaian peacekeepers in any peacekeeping theatre and the Ghanaian embassy or high commission as the case may be. More about this is discussed in subsequent sections.

3.5.4 Mission Sustainment

Mission sustainment is a big challenge in the Ghana Armed Forces. This researcher recalls his participation in some peacekeeping missions in the past. Before 2000 Ghana was not very much encumbered by its contribution to UN peacekeeping operations. All it had to do was to provide the troops. The UN bore all the burden of their maintenance, from pocket money, direct kitting to heavy equipment. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Ghana provided some armoured personnel
carriers and artillery weapons for its contingents in UNIFIL in Lebanon. This attracted some reimbursement. In 1996, the UN introduced a system to push the greater part of the burden for the maintenance of its troops to troop contributing countries who were to be reimbursed for their responsibility. Ghana started with the system in 2000, beginning with its contingent in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

According to the UN, the system is a major departure from previous practice as it is focused on management rather than accounting for contingent-owned equipment (COE). It is performance driven, and provides for transparency of deployment as well as accountability. It enables member states to appreciate their commitment to peacekeeping at the outset, thus leading to simplified budgeting and reimbursement. A further key benefit is that missions will be able to implement an integrated management structure in the field. The basic principles of this system are simplicity, accountability as well as financial and management control. This is accomplished by reducing the administrative burden on troop contributors, the UN Secretariat and peacekeeping missions; standardisation of reimbursement rates on an equitable basis; and harmonisation of common standards to be applied to equipment and services to be provided. Furthermore, accountability and control are ensured by the system relying on an a priori agreement between the United Nations and the troop contributor for the leasing of equipment and the provision of services to personnel.

The UN responsibility is to ensure that the peacekeeping mission has the personnel and equipment required to fulfill its mandate, that the troop contributors provide personnel, equipment and services as detailed in the specific memorandum of understanding (MOU), and
that the contingents perform according to the established standards. Reimbursement to troop contributors is made on the basis of a “wet lease”, whereby troop contributors would provide major equipment and maintenance, or a “dry lease”, whereby troop contributors would provide only major equipment, with the UN or a third party assuming responsibility for maintenance.

As said earlier, Ghana adopted the wet lease arrangement with the UN but it has been very challenging providing major equipment and sustainment of the peacekeeping contingents. Respondents assigned many reasons for the current poor state of mission sustainment arrangements for the peacekeeping troops. These include poor coordination arrangements, poor communication lines and the unclear responsibilities by the various stakeholders managing peacekeeping in the Armed Forces. Procurement headaches have also been noticed as equipment purchased for use in the missions are of poor standard and often broke down and shortfalls are not made up early enough. For instance, in terms of coordination and communication in respect of sustainment of the troops, it was wondered why requests for logistics support often took too long to respond to. One respondent revealed that in one instance it had to take the Chief of the Defence Staff to personally visit the troops in Côte d’Ivoire next door for some minor equipment to be sent to the troops when the request had been made through the established channel of communication for over six months.

The bottlenecks created by the poor coordination and communication system coupled with the lack of clear responsibility for peacekeeping matters within the Ghana Armed Forces have been cited as the main causes of this state of affairs. The suggestion of having a particular unit with all the powers and orientation to handle all peacekeeping matters was again made as the only best
way for Ghana and the Ghana Armed Forces to make the maximum and best use of peacekeeping as a major source of foreign exchange and administration of troops. It was also suggested that the private sector in Ghana should be encouraged to contribute to this effort by providing major equipment for the peacekeepers for reimbursement. This will help strengthen private sector-military relations and considerably improve the national economy.

3.5.5 Post-Deployment

There were no substantial issues raised in respect of post-deployment of peacekeeping troops. The arrangement is that when troops return from peacekeeping they simply return to their units and that ends it. It was, however, suggested that there is need for some form of debriefing of all troops returning from peacekeeping operations. This is to establish any difficulties they would have faced individually and collectively which may impact negatively on the armed forces, their families and the society at large. If it is a specific unit that formed the nucleus of the Ghanbatt it may be easier to follow up on issues. If it was a task force this may prove difficult as the command and control structure would wither away on the return of the battalion home. The suggestion is to establish a unit that will be responsible for debriefing and employing those mechanisms necessary to address the concerns that may arise from the troops’ participation in the operation and enable the Armed Forces as a whole to benefit from best practices.

As Army Headquarters is the lead agency responsible for land-based peacekeeping operations it may be the case that it should take up the matter. But in view of the suggestion that a separate capable unit or service be formed for managing peacekeeping operations in the Armed Forces, this task could well be handled by the latter. Here collaboration is required between the
contingent commander in the mission area, the military medical service, the Department of Psychology of the universities (one should be identified for this purpose) and the General Headquarters. Findings from such engagements would be useful as lessons learnt which could serve as policy for successive peacekeeping operations and for the guidance of new troops embarking on such operations.

As political imperatives are very much considered in Ghana agreeing to contribute troops to any international peacekeeping operations, the political and military strategies are expected to operate in concert as the operations of the national contingent abroad should impact favourably on Ghana and serve to protect the national interest.\textsuperscript{18} Though foreign and defence policies are dynamic and are often dictated by the national interest, the overall strategic direction is good neighbourliness in the international arena and Ghana being able to derive maximum benefit from its association with other countries. To the extent that the national defence policy today is directed towards building an effective deterrent capacity of the Ghana Armed Forces as well playing a determined role in sub-regional dynamics,\textsuperscript{19} collaboration between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs is desirable. In view of the fact that the peacekeeping troops are still deployed abroad and it is necessary that the contingents and diplomatic missions cooperate and collaborate regularly to serve the national interest, it may be required that the two ministries – Defence and Foreign Affairs – as well as the Ghana Armed Forces and other identifiable stakeholders collaborate more regularly in a structured manner in order that Ghana’s interest internationally is better served.
3.6 Activities of Ghanaian International Peacekeeping troops in their Countries of Deployment that contribute to Ghana’s Diplomatic Relations Abroad

Diplomacy is said to be the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or states. The practice usually refers to the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peacemaking, trade, war, economics, culture, environment and human rights, among others. While it is recognised that peacekeeping in itself may not entirely fall within this practice, the activities of peacekeeping soldiers in the countries of their deployment in some sense could foster diplomatic activity and contribute to the objectives of a nation’s foreign policy. Foreign policy is also described as “a range of actions taken by, on behalf of, or in the name of, a Government or a State in its relations with other bodies similarly acting in the international stage to achieve the national interest.”20 If this is so, then it is safe to see Ghanaian peacekeepers abroad as acting on behalf of Ghana and liken the range of activities they undertake in relation with the United Nations and other international and national bodies, including the receiving nation, as in support of Ghana’s foreign policy and diplomacy.

During this research work, a number of activities of the Ghanaian peacekeepers in the mission areas were identified to be useful avenues for promoting Ghana’s foreign image. These are discussed under the following topics (the list is however not exhaustive):

- Humanitarian assistance to the local community.
- Provision of entertainment for communities distraught and fatigued by war and others.
- Representing the image of Ghana especially where embassy officials are not visible.
• Professional posture of the Ghana professional soldier

• Trade promotion

### 3.6.1 Humanitarian Assistance to the Local Communities

Ghanaian troops, aside their core operational duties, engage in humanitarian work in their areas of deployment which endear not only them but the country as well to the local people. This raises the profile of Ghana in the mission. In such places, the local infrastructure is destroyed, utilities are non-existent and social life is broken. Every Ghana battalion undertakes or initiates a project. In most cases they build school blocks for the children who would then be out of school. Such infrastructures are essential to normalise the situation. Where this is feasible, they also organise special classes for the children. In Lebanon for instance, the battalion provides English language and music lessons to the pupils, they provide computer lessons and information technology maintenance guidance for others. Engineers build bridges where crossing of rivers is essential.

Additionally, the soldiers engage in environmental activities where they clean up the community. In Sierra Leone, for instance, even in the heat of fighting the soldiers found it necessary to encourage and team up with the local people to tidy up their town. This was indeed greatly acknowledged by the people who could not have thought of such a thing having been traumatised by the war. Related to this, in Liberia at the onset of the first war in the early 1990s, Ghanaian soldiers had to scout the neighbourhoods to collect corpses for burial which stemmed the outbreak of serious diseases. Medical and dental care forms part of the activities of the troops. These are provided to all who have need for them. Sometimes the troops travel far from
their area to attend to communities in far flung places. They also make donations to orphanages and care centres and provide water and sometimes food to the local population.

The list of activities the peacekeepers engage in is endless but suffice it that they are offered from a pure humanitarian point and they certainly do endear the contingents to the local population. All these are termed civil-military coordination (CIMIC) activities and currently there is a limited budget for the contingents to provide these services and especially projects under what is broadly termed Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to win the hearts and minds of the people. The importance of these projects cannot be overstated. It was explained in one instance that Ghana’s image was dented in one case where a new Pakistan battalion arriving in UNAMSIL had quickly repaired a terribly bad road in an area Ghanaian troops had earlier been occupying and which the Ghanaians did nothing about. The Pakistanis were easily the toast of the communities and the image of their country soared.

3.6.2 Provision of Entertainment for Communities Distraught and Fatigued by War and for Other Purposes.

In such broken communities social life is completely missing. The contingents also provide some entertainment to locals. In 2001, for instance, shortly after a devastating and terrible battle in one district in Sierra Leone the Ghana battalion found it necessary to organise a tombola night for the community. It proved a useful exercise as the weariness of war wore out and this brought back smiles to the traumatised people. Music plays a key role in relaxing traumatised people and the bands that these battalions carry along to the mission areas are often used to good effect. These bands play good repertoires and sometimes the popular tunes of the country. All this helps the local people to dance away their sorrow and uplift their spirits. Live band music by the various
dance bands deploying with the contingents provide another very important mechanism for improving relations with the local communities as well as selling Ghanaian music and repertoires abroad. These bands, for instance, play local tunes of the host nation which no doubt endears the people to the Ghanaians and Ghana as a whole. Additionally, in playing Ghanaian music for the entertainment of the public, the soldiers in another breath are promoting Ghanaian music abroad as in many cases the locals are attuned to Ghanaian repertoires and with time this raises Ghana’s profile in the host nation.

Sports is one of the many activities also organised by the battalions. It was recalled that in 1996, the Ghana battalion held a soccer tournament in Grand Bassa County in Liberia. Ghanbatt fielded a team against the local first division club. It was said that soccer brings unity and peace and the battalion could not lose that opportunity to nurture solidarity among the people. Much earlier in 1991, a similar match was held at the Samuel K Doe stadium in Monrovia which provided an escape for the people from the trauma of war. That match was more or less an international game. The troops therefore use entertainment in these conflict situations to bring people together and help them out of their predicament.

3.6.3 Representing the Image of Ghana Especially where Embassy Officials are not Visible

It was mentioned that because of the precarious nature of the situation in conflict areas, even where there are Ghanaian diplomatic officials it is often difficult for them to travel to those areas. The Ghanaian troops therefore fill that void created by the absence of these diplomats. The Asantehene, Otumfu Osei Tutu, it was recalled, lauded the Ghana Armed Forces when he addressed Ghanaian peacekeeping soldiers in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) acknowledging the
ambassadorial role being played by the peacekeepers thus, “We know the role you are playing for Ghana, the peacekeeping role that you’ve been playing, the international acclaim that you’ve gained for Ghana in terms of peacekeeping. We know that you’ve been good ambassadors of Ghana ever since the peacekeeping role started here in Sierra Leone, in Liberia and other places, Lebanon and others…”21 The local people and even Ghanaian nationals abroad therefore see the face of Ghana in these soldiers, a job that the soldiers do so well.

3.6.4 Professional Posture of the Ghana Professional Soldier

The professional posture of the Ghanaian soldier on peacekeeping also serves to portray the country in a good light. The soldiers also attract accolades of commendation for their good turn-out, professionalism and results-oriented activities. All these go to paint a good image of Ghana in the mission area, not just among the local population but also other mission elements, especially the leadership of the mission. One observer confirmed that everywhere he went, at all levels, the quality of the work of the Ghanaian peacekeepers was always touted. To him, the activities of the soldiers on peacekeeping duties in Côte d’Ivoire where he resided have served Ghana well.

3.6.5 Trade Promotion

This is one area which has been used to effect by the soldiers but which the nation itself has not been able to take advantage of. During all medal presentation parades of Ghanaian battalions, the soldiers display a variety of Ghana-made industrial and cultural items during an exhibition. These exhibitions have been constant. The soldiers buy these items themselves and effectively portray Ghanaian industry. Many foreigners at these parades buy the items. Demand for these
items has always been high. There is therefore the need for close collaboration between the Ministries of Tourism and Trade and the Ghana Armed Forces to promote trade with and sell Ghana abroad. Painfully, it seems the idea is yet to catch up with these state institutions.

It is however noted that, of late, some private companies in Ghana have since woken up to the reality that the troops are providing a rare service to them as they help to advertise and/or market their products in these peacekeeping theatres, almost free of charge. Kasapreko Distilleries and Accra Breweries Ltd (ABL), in particular, have since recognised this invaluable contribution of the peacekeepers. Kasapreko recently presented an amount of GHC5000.00 to one Ghana battalion for promoting their products outside the country through the peacekeepers. Similarly, ABL for some time now has been supporting these troops while they are on pre-operational training at the BTC with their products and other forms of assistance, including providing free products of their export brands for troops embarking outside the country.

Though these activities may not conform to the activities of diplomats, nonetheless they play a kind of informal diplomacy which no doubt boosts the image of Ghana in their countries of deployment. This definitely complements efforts made at many levels to improve Ghana’s standing on the international stage. These soldiers providing such vital humanitarian assistance to the needy and flying the Ghana flag on the ground have brought diplomacy to a new level. These activities of the troops should, however, not just be aimed at fostering close relations with the communities in their areas of deployment but should feed into the diplomatic mission’s range of activities in the international stage to achieve Ghana’s national interest. It has been suggested therefore that the soldiers should be provided with more wherewithal to enable them discharge
this onerous but highly useful venture very effectively. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could for instance support these activities by contributing some money to enable the soldiers carry out these CIMIC activities which they could find time to take part in and thereby visibly be seen to be carrying out their own diplomatic activity. The activities of the soldiers should also fit into a grand plan by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist the diplomats achieve their mission.

3.7 In-theatre use of Ghana’s Peacekeeping Contingents by Ghana’s Foreign Diplomatic Missions for their Diplomatic Activities

An Ambassador is a high ranking diplomat who represents a nation and is usually accredited to a foreign sovereign, or a government, or an international organisation. Ghana maintains diplomatic missions in some of the countries Ghanaian troops are serving. There is a high commissioner in Sierra Leone where UNAMSIL operated. There are ambassadors in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire where the UN maintains peacekeeping operations (UNMIL and ONUCI respectively) and an honorary consul-general in Beirut, Lebanon where UNIFIL operates in the south. There is also an ambassador in the DR Congo where the UN maintains a peacekeeping force (MONUSCO).

Ambassadors have their work cut out for them. But as one ambassador has pointed out, the modern ambassador should not be a laid-back diplomat only interested in diplomatic speeches and etiquette. Handling effective consular matters and engaging in humanitarian activities form an important role of the ambassador if he/she is to be successful and effective as a diplomat. In this light, it was said that some of Ghana’s missions engage the Ghana contingents in some activities and in a manner which was seen to enhance their visibility and help them carry out their functions. The following were mentioned as some of the activities:
• Consular activities
• Information gathering and reporting
• Trade promotion
• Humanitarian activities

3.7.1 Consular Activities

In some countries, the military community of Ghanaian peacekeepers constitutes the Ghanaian diplomatic mission’s largest constituency of Ghanaians. As the ambassador and his/her staff engage with these peacekeepers, visiting and interacting with them, they serve as an attraction to the Ghanaian nationals domiciled in the country. In some instances Ghanaian nationals are illegal residents and therefore are unable to access the kind of help they would otherwise have. The contingent locations are therefore rallying points for them to seek information about home, among other assistances. Most diplomatic missions are located in the national capital but the contingents are sited far away from the capital. Diplomats therefore are unable to travel to these places regularly. The peacekeepers therefore serve to fill the void created by the absence of the diplomats. The diplomats therefore tend to seek the assistance of the peacekeepers in carrying out some consular activities they would otherwise be doing themselves. Here examples were given of Lebanon and Eritrea. The ambassador finds this a crucial part of his/her job which the peacekeepers undertake commendably.24

3.7.2 Information Gathering and Reporting

One duty of the ambassador is to report back to the home government on trends in his/her country of accreditation. To be able to do so, the ambassador needs information and intelligence.
A regular contact with the peacekeepers can provide the ambassador information and intelligence he/she desires to carry out this task. The soldiers have a fair knowledge of many things throughout their area of operation and other areas because of the system of information sharing maintained in the mission. The soldiers, for instance, pass on information and intelligence through their regular situation reports to the home authorities but these are often not available to those not looped in their communication chain. One ambassador for instance confirmed that with the regular visits he pays to the peacekeeping troops, he sees and expects a complementary role for the peacekeepers in supporting information gathering by the mission and the preparation of his regular reports to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This, he believes, should open a kind of working relationship between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs in a manner that would serve well Ghana’s interests in his station.

3.7.3 Trade Promotion

Trade promotion has been discussed above, but this was seen as an activity undertaken by the soldiers themselves. It was said by one ambassador that he had encouraged companies in Ghana to supply their products for the consumption of the peacekeepers and this opened a corridor through which trade was promoted between Ghana and that country. It was also said that in Sierra Leone in particular, alcoholic beverages “imported” by the soldiers for their own welfare had quickly taken over the market even among foreigners serving in the UN mission. It had reached a point that everybody relied on the battalion for the supply of this product, which they sold in their Post Exchange (PX) shop. Another example was cited of the use of the soldiers during a trade fair where the soldiers exhibited many of their products brought from Ghana for their own upkeep. But as said earlier, it seems the national authorities have not yet identified the
potential that the peacekeeping soldiers can provide for the promotion of trade between Ghana and the country where they serve and to other nationals operating with them. The trade section of the diplomatic mission could therefore take advantage of this potential in facilitating its work. These diplomatic missions for example could use these medals presentation occasions to promote trading with Ghana. For instance, they could invite Ghanaian companies and traders to be part of these ceremonies as well as endeavour to exhibit Ghanaian products during such occasions, and not just let the soldiers do so on their own.

3.7.4 Humanitarian Activities

The diplomatic missions were also said to have the opportunity to benefit from the humanitarian work of the peacekeeping soldiers. In one case, for instance, the initiative by an ambassador to generate money in the country he was stationed for humanitarian work was facilitated by the soldiers. The soldiers contributed generously and gratuitously and the amount generated was used to provide essential items to schools and rural health posts in that country. The contribution by the soldiers was an impetus to other Ghanaian nationals in the country to come onboard.

From the above discussion it seems clear that Ghana’s peacekeeping troops play a great role in complementing the activities of regular diplomats in seeking Ghana’s national interest through their activities in their country of deployment. There is the need for Ghana’s diplomatic missions in countries with conflict and where Ghanaian troops are serving in a peacekeeping role to collaborate effectively with the Ghanaian contingents to achieve the national goal. It has therefore been advocated that the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs jointly should institute regular levels of consultation between the Ghana contingent commander, for instance,
and the head of the diplomatic mission where one exists to formally support each other in promoting Ghana’s image in those countries. There is therefore the need for an agreed national policy to foster that kind of close collaboration and cooperation between Ghana’s peacekeeping troops and Ghana’s diplomatic missions in countries where they serve and operate together, but without jeopardising the position of the peacekeepers as an integral part of the UN system.

3.8 Challenges in the use of Peacekeeping Forces for International Diplomacy

There are political imperatives in the generation and deployment of peacekeepers. The decisions to deploy and operate peacekeeping operations are therefore informed by these political imperatives. Troop contributing countries are definitely mindful of their interests that must be served in providing troops for the peacekeeping operation. The host nation is equally concerned about the effect of the presence of peacekeeping troops in the issue of its sovereignty and the legitimacy of its governing authority. The UN itself is also concerned about resolving the conflict effectively and preventing it from escalating. Even though this may be unwritten, many peacekeepers see their involvement in peace support operations as a means of boosting the reputation of their countries in the operational area. Issues relating to the interests of their countries are therefore taken seriously and in some cases this is made known to the authorities of the UN mission in-theatre.

The first challenge in the use of peacekeeping forces for any national diplomatic initiatives therefore is in the general understanding that UN peacekeeping forces come directly under the control and administration of the UN, and may therefore not be used directly by troop contributing countries for purposes other than allowable by the UN mission in the theatre of
operations. There have been instances when national contingent commanders have refused to carry out instructions or orders from field force command and have rather sought directives from their own home governments.\textsuperscript{28} This situation often creates a conflict in the command and control structure of the UN force as the troops may tend to be influenced by instructions and orders from their country rather than the UN mission headquarters. Such activities may be misconstrued and may affect relations between Ghana and the UN and could lead to withdrawal of the contingents. This could well be the reason national delegations to contingent medals presentation parades in the mission area are no longer allowed to pin medals on their soldiers. This duty is reserved only for UN officials.

Another challenge may well be with the local population, and especially the contending parties. These often are suspicious of the UN forces as they often consider them not impartial or may be interfering in the domestic affairs of the host nation. The activities of members of the UN force are therefore carefully followed and scrutinised to identify any linkages to their opponents. In a situation like this peacekeepers may be unable to undertake any activities that are not related to the activities and operations of the UN force. The example of some tribesmen in the DR Congo who assaulted Ghanaian peacekeepers in the 1960s because some Ghanaian peacekeepers bore facial marks that resembled those of their opponents comes easily to mind.\textsuperscript{29}

One other challenge is the unethical behaviour of the peacekeepers themselves, what has been referred to as “soldier-wrongdoing”.\textsuperscript{30} The UN has often come under scathing attack for the bad conduct of its peacekeepers. Examples of this abound in almost all peacekeeping missions where peacekeeping soldiers engage in misconduct, such as sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA),
human trafficking, exploitation of natural resources and other human rights abuses. All these seek to dent the reputation of the UN as an impartial and friendly organisation genuinely seeking to resolve conflict. In a situation like this the diplomatic role of the peacekeeper in support of the contributing country is jeopardised and the effectiveness of the UN endangered.

Lastly, the capability of peacekeeping forces either undermines or enhances the credibility of the troop contributing country as a serious nation that is interested in genuinely helping out. Many developing countries are less capable of taking care of their troops as they are heavily challenged in providing logistics and other support for their troops in peacekeeping operations. In a situation where a contingent is less likely to be self-sufficient, it is highly impossible or impracticable that such a TCC can influence anybody in the mission area, least of all the fighting parties. It is reported for instance that in 1993 Ghanaian peacekeepers in Rwanda were ridiculed as probably being incapable of helping out in the conflict in that country because it was thought they could not even contain the ethnic conflict in their own country. This was in reference to the Konkomba-Nanumba fighting in Northern Region, said to have resulted from haggling over a guinea fowl.

In the light of the above, among other reasons, the authorities of UN peacekeeping missions are always wary of the relationship between their forces and TCCs. Indeed these activities expose the UN to many challenges that may at the end affect the effectiveness of its operations and the success of its troops. Also these situations discussed above can pose serious challenges on TCCs willing to use their peacekeeping troops for diplomatic activities to serve their national interest in the mission area outside the UN’s authority. If Ghana should have a role for its peacekeepers in
its foreign diplomatic activities in countries where the UN maintains these peacekeeping operations, then Ghana should device more subtle means to use the troops so as not to negatively affect the employment of the troops by the UN.
End Notes

7 The latter is however yet to be fully developed. There is therefore a heavy reliance on the former.
8 This is the formal notice/instruction alerting a particular unit of commanding officer to standby for deployment.
10 The small Directorate of International Peacekeeping Operations (DIPKOP) at the Department of Joint Operations at the General Headquarters was upgraded to a full-fledged Department of International Peace Support Operations (DIPSO) in 2000 and tasked with the responsibility of coordinating all international peacekeeping activities in the Ghana Armed Forces. This was to include force generation and training of peacekeeping troops and their maintenance in the operational area.
11 This system is the basis upon which Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) provide personnel, equipment and services to a UN peacekeeping mission and are reimbursed by the UN. Reimbursement rates are approved by the General Assembly.
12 Interview with Ambassador Kabral Blay-Amihere on 16 February 2012.
14 Interview with Ambassador Kabral Blay-Amihere, in Accra on 16 February 2012.
15 Interviews separately with Brig Gens Tetteh-Akunor and Oppong-Otchere on 20 February 2012.
17 “Wet lease” is a COE reimbursement system where the troop/police contributor assumes responsibility for maintaining and supporting major and minor items of equipment deployed. The troop/police contributor is entitled to reimbursement for providing this maintenance support. “Dry lease” is also a COE reimbursement system whereby the troop/police contributor provides equipment to a peacekeeping mission and the United Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment or the United Nations arranges with a third party for maintenance of the equipment.
19 Statement by the Minister for Defence, Lt Gen JH Smith (rtd) at a durbar of troops in Accra on 30 September 2011. See Armed Forces newspaper (AFNEWS), No. 112 Third & Fourth Quarters 2011, back page in report titled “Government will modernize GAF – Defence Minister”.
20 Professor Reynolds’ definition of foreign policy as quoted by Ambassador E.M. Debrah in a lecture at LECIAD on the topic “AN ENCOUNTER WITH A PIONEER: THE GHANA FOREIGN POLICY MAKING PROCESS” on 6 October 2010.
21 Interview with Col W. Omane-Agyekum, former Commanding Officer UNAMSIL Ghanbatt 11, by telephone on 15 January 2012.
23 Interviews with H.E. Michel Haddad, Ghana’s Honorary Consul-General in Beirut, Lebanon, via telephone on 15 November 2011 and with Ambassador Kabral Blay-Amihere, in Accra on 16 February 2012.
24 Interview with Lt Col EKT Donkoh (rtd), Ghana’s ambassador to La Cote d’Ivoire, in Abidjan on 8 January 2012.
25 Interview with Ambassador Kabral Blay-Amihere, in Accra on 16 February 2012.
26 ibid.
27 Interview with HE Michel Haddad, Ghana’s Honorary Consul-General in Beirut, Lebanon, via telephone 15 November 2011.

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29 2 Bn was on its second tour and commanded by Lt Col NA Aferi. The Baluba tribesmen in the area where the Ghanaians were stationed believed that the Ghanaian soldiers with facial marks resembled their tribal enemies the Lulua.
CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Summary

While UN peacekeeping operations were born of necessity and are a practical response to a problem requiring active action, they evolved essentially to stop hostilities and to control conflicts so that these would not develop into broader conflagrations. So, even though peacekeeping in itself may not entirely fall within the practice of diplomacy, the activities of peacekeeping soldiers in the countries of their deployment in some sense could foster diplomatic activity and contribute to the objectives of a nation’s foreign policy. Ghana first deployed its modern-day peacekeeping contingents in 1960. Today, Ghanaian soldiers and police personnel are involved in several UN and AU peacekeeping missions. Ghana’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations has been very beneficial in many ways, particularly politically, economically and diplomatically.

Aside from their mandated military operations, Ghana’s peacekeeping soldiers undertake a variety of non-military activities that could for instance improve relations between Ghana as a whole and the receiving nation. They also play a great role in complementing the activities of regular diplomats in seeking Ghana’s national interest through their activities in the countries where they are stationed. As it is imperative to identify, acknowledge and recognise the specific diplomatic role played by the Ghana Armed Forces in its participation in international peacekeeping operations and how this fits into Ghana’s foreign policy, it is important to place value on the efforts of the Ghana Armed Forces in the direction of international diplomacy.
By participating in these international peacekeeping operations, Ghana seeks to enhance its
global image capacity to negotiate with other countries on more friendly terms. It has also fully
established its commitment to international law and international humanitarian law, as decisions
by the UN are binding on it and are duly carried out. Ghana stands tall in the African landscape
and its participation in these missions is testimony of its influence as they serve to demonstrate
its commitment to contributing to solving global security problems, deepening its commitment to
regionalism and pan-Africanism and building and nurturing bondship between African countries.

International peacekeeping in general is seen to have some value, both to Ghana and the Ghana
Armed Forces. Ghana’s peacekeeping operations policy is drawn from the principle of peaceful
coexistence. This is strengthened by the country’s resolve to effectively participate in the
collective security mechanism adopted by the UN. The Ghana Armed Forces does not only play
particularly an implementing role but this role touches on all these aspects of the foreign policy
spectrum. The foreign policy objectives of the country have been enhanced by the participation
of Ghanaian soldiers in these international peacekeeping operations. International peacekeeping
has also served to establish the Ghana Armed Forces as a credible and professional force capable
of effectively and efficiently maintaining security at home and playing a much more determined
and focused role in international security.

Ghanaian peacekeepers abroad do act on behalf of Ghana and the range of activities they
undertake in relation with the United Nations and other international and national bodies,
including the receiving nation, are in support of Ghana’s foreign policy and diplomacy. Where
there are Ghanaian diplomatic officials it is often difficult for them to travel to those conflict
areas where peacekeeping operations are taking place. Ghanaian peacekeeping troops therefore fill the void created by the absence of these diplomats in these countries.

During all medal presentation parades of Ghanaian battalions in peacekeeping missions, the soldiers also display a variety of Ghana-made industrial and cultural items during an exhibition. Many foreigners at these parades buy these Ghana-made products. Demand for the items has always been high. There is therefore the need for close collaboration between the Ministries of Tourism and Trade and the Ghana Armed Forces to promote trade with Ghana abroad. Some of Ghana’s missions engage the Ghana contingents in some activities and in a manner that enhances their visibility. In some countries, the military community of Ghanaian peacekeepers constitutes the Ghanaian diplomatic mission’s largest constituency of Ghanaians. The contingent locations are therefore rallying points for Ghanaian citizens seeking information about home, among other assistances. The diplomats therefore tend to seek the assistance of the peacekeepers in carrying out some consular activities they would otherwise be doing themselves. There is the need for Ghana’s diplomatic missions in countries with conflict and where Ghanaian troops are serving in a peacekeeping role to collaborate effectively with the Ghanaian contingents to achieve the national goal.

In deploying Ghanaian soldiers on peacekeeping, even though consultation between and among stakeholders often goes on before decisions are made, it seems that the only decision-makers in this case are the Presidency, represented by the National Security Council, and the Ghana Armed Forces, with the Ministry of Defence being merely an interface. Planning and deciding on Ghana’s participation in any peacekeeping operation must see government and the military
working in tandem to ensure that both troops and the nation derive the best out of peacekeeping. There, however, is no clear cut structure of consultation and collaboration in the generation and deployment of peacekeeping forces between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. It does not seem there is a well structured arrangement to facilitate communication, coordination and collaboration by and between all the identifiable stakeholders dealing in peacekeeping matters.

It is nevertheless noted that there is constant and regular consultation and collaboration in the Ghana Armed Forces between all relevant departments and directorates at both the General and Service Headquarters levels to enable successful generation and deployment of troops for external peacekeeping operations. But there are some setbacks in the decision-making process with unclear relations between the Department of International Peace Support Operations at General Headquarters and the Directorate of Army Peacekeeping Operations at the Army Headquarters. Poor coordination and communication coupled with the lack of clear responsibility for peacekeeping matters within the Ghana Armed Forces have created bottlenecks for the effective administration of troops on peacekeeping operations. There must be more harmonisation of procedures and standards between the two set ups to ensure a smooth generation and preparation of troops embarking on peacekeeping operations.

Ghanaian peacekeepers see their involvement in peace support operations as a means of boosting the reputation of their country in the operational area. Issues relating to the interests of Ghana are therefore taken seriously. The activities of the peacekeepers definitely complement efforts made at many levels to improve Ghana’s standing on the international stage. These soldiers providing
such vital humanitarian assistance to the needy and flying the Ghana flag on the ground have brought diplomacy to a new level. It is therefore essential to identify the appropriate collaborative relationships between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Ghana Armed Forces to enhance Ghana’s foreign diplomacy.

4.1 Conclusion

Ghana is a member of the UN, the Commonwealth, the AU, ECOWAS and many other international bodies. The broad tenets of its foreign policy have remained unchanged with only shifts in implementation as applied by successive governments. Even though the three facets of foreign policy, namely, how issues are determined as national interest, how foreign policy is formulated, and how foreign policy is implemented, are not represented in watertight compartments, the Ghana Armed Forces does not only play particularly an implementing role but this role touches on all these aspects of the foreign policy spectrum.

Ghana’s involvement in international peacekeeping operations, seen as part of Ghana’s foreign policy, has been very beneficial in many ways. UN peacekeeping has not only enhanced professional expertise and the standards of living of the troops but has reduced the risks to Ghana’s political stability. Ghana often holds peacekeeping as an important achievement of its foreign and defence policies. It is therefore important to place value on the efforts of the Ghana Armed Forces in the direction of international diplomacy.

Even though peacekeeping in some cases may be far removed from the reality of international diplomacy and military operational activity, peacekeeping is to be welcomed as a way of further
promoting the use of diplomacy and military action to serve peaceful and positive ends. Peacekeeping forces are therefore primarily engaged in preventive diplomacy, to prevent conflicts escalating, stopping them completely or creating space for the underlying causes to be resolved peacefully as a means of ending the conflict. There are therefore practical political considerations to be taken into account in deploying Ghanaian troops for international peacekeeping operations or deploying them to particular areas of the theatre of operations.

In the Ghana Armed Forces, peacekeeping desks have been set up in the respective headquarters of the three Services of the Ghana Armed Forces – Army, Navy and Air Force. Army is the lead Service responsible for international peacekeeping operations and in particular the land-based operations and the Directorate of Army Peacekeeping Operations (DAPKOP) at the Army Headquarters is the section assigned with this task. A number of other stakeholders have been identified to be involved in the decision-making process when it comes to the preparation and deployment of peacekeeping troops outside the country. These, among others, include the Office of the President through the Office of the Chief of Staff at the Castle, the National Security Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration and the Ministry of Defence. There is some amount of collaboration between and among the various stakeholders when it comes to deploying peacekeepers.

Even though there is some working relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (represented by the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York), the Ministry of Defence and the Ghana Armed Forces, in this respect, there does not seem to be a standing arrangement for effective collaboration between them and the other stakeholders. At the strategic level at the UN
Headquarters, Ghana does not have any role to play in the planning for peacekeeping operations involving its participation in any mission. It may be that in order for Ghana to be able to influence decisions at the UN Headquarters level to its favour there is need for a permanent ‘mole’ in the Headquarters who will regularly seek Ghana’s interest in these matters. Planning and deciding on Ghana’s participation in any peacekeeping operation must also see government and the military working in tandem to ensure that both troops and the nation derive the best out of peacekeeping.

It has been suggested that there must also be more harmonisation of procedures and standards between the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs to ensure a smooth generation and preparation of troops embarking on peacekeeping operations. Though the UN has sole responsibility for its peacekeeping troops, Ghana must also be interested in the safety and security of its troops. There is need therefore for the UN to have flexibility over the use of peacekeepers, but still consider certain issues which may be blatantly inimical to the interest of the troop contributing country, even though it may still be the one to take the decision on the employment of the troops in the mission area.

There are unclear and/or inadequate lines of communication between the various stakeholders and with this, coordination is hampered, timely passage of information suffers and critical decisions are delayed. It has therefore been suggested that there is need to have only one functional unit to be solely responsible for all matters relating to international peacekeeping in the Ghana Armed Forces. Such a unified structure responsible for international peacekeeping operations at the Ghana Armed Forces level is most essential. This unit, probably of the status of
a service, should be responsible also for all the coordination and communication in respect of international peacekeeping operations. It is hoped that creating such a unit will improve decision-making and collaboration among stakeholders contributing to the operation of Ghana’s peacekeeping forces. In respect of the relationship between the contingent in the mission area and Ghana’s various diplomatic missions, especially where peacekeeping operations are conducted, use could be put of the structures and resources provided by the embassies to supplement contact with the home country. There currently is no defined relationship between Ghanaian peacekeepers in any peacekeeping theatre and the Ghanaian embassy or high commission as the case may be in the area of operations.

It is also noted that mission sustainment is a big challenge in the Ghana Armed Forces. Ghana has adopted the wet lease arrangement with the UN to sustain and maintain its troops in the peacekeeping theatre; but it has been very challenging providing major equipment and sustainment of the peacekeeping contingents. One reason has been poor coordination arrangements, poor communication lines and the unclear responsibilities of the various stakeholders managing peacekeeping in the Armed Forces. The suggestion of having a particular unit with all the powers and orientation to handle all peacekeeping matters is seen as the only best way for Ghana and the Ghana Armed Forces to make the maximum and best use of peacekeeping as a major source of foreign exchange and administration of troops. It is also suggested that the private sector in Ghana should be encouraged to contribute to this effort by providing major equipment for the peacekeepers for reimbursement, among other reasons. This will help strengthen private sector-military relations and considerably improve the national economy.
Ghana may continue to contribute troops to UN-sponsored peacekeeping operations as long as it is necessary and the troops are available for such missions. These troops will continue to be of service to Ghana wherever they will be serving. For Ghana to benefit much from the employment and deployment of its peacekeeping troops abroad, there should be a greater role for the soldiers in Ghana’s diplomatic overtures abroad. Diplomacy may be one important area that the troops can play a role in to foster Ghana’s relations abroad. There is therefore need for greater collaboration and cooperation between the peacekeeping troops and Ghana’s diplomatic missions on the one hand and the Ministry of Defence, and especially the Ghana Armed Forces, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration on the other hand.

4.2 Recommendations

There is every indication that Ghanaian peacekeeping forces can be used in several roles while on operations. One of such roles is diplomacy, even though this may be informal. It is necessary that the contingents and diplomatic missions cooperate and collaborate regularly to serve the national interest. It may be required that especially the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, as well as the Ghana Armed Forces collaborate more regularly in a structured manner in order that the national interest is better served.

The following recommendations, it is expected, could help in effectively using Ghana’s peacekeeping troops in fostering the nation’s diplomacy abroad:

- There should be a national policy to foster that kind of close collaboration and cooperation between Ghana’s peacekeeping troops and Ghana’s diplomatic missions in
countries where they serve and operate together, but without jeopardising the position of the peacekeepers as an integral part of the UN system.

➢ The Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs should jointly institute regular levels of consultation between Ghana’s permanent envoys abroad and the Ghanaian contingent commanders to formally support each other in the cause of the nation.

➢ There should be a further study in this area to identify the major drawbacks that will inhibit the full and effective use of Ghanaian troops in the area of diplomacy.
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With Brig Gen K. Oppong-Otchere, former Director Army Peacekeeping Operations at the Ghana Army Headquarters, in Accra on 20 February 2012
APPENDIX 1
INTERVIEW GUIDE

MILITARY OFFICERS WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ABROAD AND WHO HAVE HAD UNIQUE EXPERIENCE IN MILITARY DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AT HIGH LEVELS IN THE UN SYSTEM IN THE FIELD

PROPOSED INTERVIEWEES

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<td>Col F Vowotor</td>
<td>Dir Comm GHQ</td>
<td>Staff offr UNDPKO</td>
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INTERVIEW AREAS
1. Can peacekeeping troops be used in a diplomatic role?
2. Have Ghanaian peacekeeping forces been used in this role to your knowledge?
3. If yes, when, where and how?
4. If no, why not?
5. How can Ghanaian peacekeeping troops be used in a diplomatic role? And for what reasons?
6. Do you see Ghana using its peacekeeping forces for diplomacy?
7. How can this be done, or how has it been done?
8. What role has Ghanaian peacekeepers in the country of your deployment contributed to better relations between Ghana and that country?
9. Did they even play any such role?
10. How was this done?
11. The contacts were between which institutions or persons?
GHANAIAN DIPLOMATS WHO HAVE HAD SOME EXPERIENCE DEALING WITH PEACEKEEPING FORCES IN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

PROPOSED INTERVIEWEES

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<td>5.</td>
<td>Mr Joe Felli</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
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INTERVIEW AREAS

1. In your appointment, did you have any direct contact with Ghanaian troops on peacekeeping operations in your country of accreditation?

2. What was the nature of your relationship with them?

3. How will you evaluate their performance?

4. Do you consider peacekeeping forces as playing a diplomatic role?

5. If yes, how was this manifested in your country of accreditation?

6. If no, could they have played that role in any case?

7. How can peacekeeping forces contribute to a troop contributing country’s diplomatic relations?

8. As a diplomat could you have used Ghanaian peacekeepers in your country of accreditation for any diplomatic role or in support of your diplomatic duty?

9. If yes, how could you have used them?

10. If no, how could they be used?
DEFENCE ADVISORS AND/OR ATTACHES OF SELECTED FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN GHANA WHOSE COUNTRIES ALSO DEPLOY INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING FORCES

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<td>Lt Col Miquel</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>French Liaison Officer in Accra</td>
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INTERVIEW AREAS

1. Have you ever been part of your country’s international forces?
2. Now that you are a military diplomat, do you see armed forces playing a diplomatic role?
3. Could the international force you were a part play that role?
4. How do you expect armed forces to play a diplomatic role?
5. What kind of role should this be?
6. Does your country have a structure to allow your armed forces to play any diplomatic role?
7. What would you say is the relationship between your ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of defence and the armed forces?
8. Does this structure support your armed forces playing any role in diplomacy?
9. What is the nature of the relationship between your ministries of defence and foreign affairs in support of the deployment of your armed forces for peacekeeping roles?
10. How practical is this relationship?
GHANA'S DEFENCE ADVISORS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND WHOSE COUNTRIES OF ACCREDITATION ENCOMPASS AREAS WHERE THERE ARE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS GHANA IS PARTICIPATING IN

PROPOSED INTERVIEWEES

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<td>Cdre Osei Sarfo</td>
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<td>Brig Gen Musah</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>UN HQ, OTHERS</td>
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INTERVIEW AREAS

1. In your appointment, did you have any direct contact with Ghanaian troops on peacekeeping operations in your country/area of accreditation?

2. What was the nature of your relationship with them?

3. How will you evaluate their performance?

4. Do you consider peacekeeping forces as playing a diplomatic role?

5. If yes, how was this manifested in your country of accreditation?

6. If no, could they have played that role in any case?

7. How can peacekeeping forces contribute to a troop contributing country’s diplomatic relations?

8. As a diplomat could you have used Ghanaian peacekeepers in your country of accreditation for any diplomatic role or in support of your diplomatic duty?

9. If yes, how could you have used them?

10. If no, how could they be used?
SPECIAL SENIOR OFFICERS WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY INVOLVES INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PROPOSED INTERVIEWEES

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<td>Col AK Asare</td>
<td>DAPKOP</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>Mr E Ofosu-Appeah</td>
<td>CD MOD</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Amb Kpodo</td>
<td>Dep Min MFA</td>
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INTERVIEW AREAS

1. Chief of Staff
   a. What is the nature of the relationship between the Ghana Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence in the deployment of troops on external peacekeeping operations?
   b. Is there any definite structure for this relationship? If yes, what is like? If no, why not?
   c. Who makes the ultimate decision in generating and deploying troops for external peacekeeping operations?
   d. What role does the office of the Chief of Staff play in the generation and deployment of peacekeeping forces for external operations?
   e. What is the relationship between the office of the Chief of Staff, the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York and the three services in generating and deploying peacekeeping troops?
   f. How are the office of the Chief of Staff, the Department of International Peace Support Operations and the Department of Army Peacekeeping Operations related in respect of the generation and deployment of Ghanaian troops for external peacekeeping operations?
   g. Is there any definite diplomatic role for Ghana’s peacekeeping forces in international peace support operations? If no, why not? If yes, how is this manifest?
h. What challenges are there confronting the generation, preparation and deployment of Ghanaian troops on UN sponsored peacekeeping operations?

i. How do you expect this to be remedied?

2. Director General International Peace Support Operations
   a. How are Ghanaian troops for external peace support operations generated?
   b. Who makes the ultimate decision in the generation and deployment of Ghana’s peacekeeping forces externally?
   c. How is this decision made?
   d. Is there any definite structure in place for the generation, preparation and deployment of Ghanaian forces on external peacekeeping operations?
   e. How is this structure like, if there is one?
   f. What institutions, organizations and ministries are involved directly in the generation, preparation and deployment of Ghanaian troops on external peacekeeping operations?
   g. What are the individual roles that they play in this arrangement?
   h. How are these institutions related to each other?
   i. How is IPSO related to the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations?
   j. How is IPSO related to the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?
   k. What challenges are there confronting the generation and deployment of Ghanaian troops on UN sponsored peacekeeping operations?
   l. How do you expect this to be remedied?

3. Military Advisor (MILAD) at the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York
   a. What is your role in the generation and deployment of Ghanaian peacekeeping forces on external peace support operations?
b. How are you related with the UN DPKO in this regard?

c. Which department or outfit at General Headquarters do you deal with in relations to deploying Ghanaian forces on external peacekeeping operations?

d. What is the relationship between the office of the Chief of Staff, the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York and the three services in generating and deploying peacekeeping troops?

e. Is there any definite structure in place for the generation, preparation and deployment of Ghanaian forces on external peacekeeping operations?

f. How is this structure like, if there is one?

g. How is IPSO related to the Ghana Permanent Mission in New York and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations?

h. What are the steps usually to be taken to deploy Ghanaian forces for UN peacekeeping operations?

i. What challenges are there confronting the generation and deployment of Ghanaian troops on UN sponsored peacekeeping operations?

j. How do you expect this to be remedied?

4. Director Army Peacekeeping Operations (DAPKOP)

a. What is your role in the generation and deployment of Ghanaian peacekeeping forces on external peace support operations?

b. How are you related with the UN DPKO in this regard?

c. Which department or outfit at General Headquarters do you deal with in relations to deploying Ghanaian forces on external peacekeeping operations?

d. Is there any definite structure in place for the generation, preparation and deployment of Ghanaian forces on external peacekeeping operations?

e. How is this structure like, if there is one?

f. What are the steps usually to be taken to deploy Ghanaian forces for UN peacekeeping operations?

g. How are Ghanaian troops for external peace support operations generated?
h. Who makes the ultimate decision in the generation and deployment of Ghana’s peacekeeping forces externally?

i. How is this decision made?

What exactly is the role of the DAPKOP in generating and deploying troops on external peacekeeping operations?

j. What is the nature of the relationship between DAPKOP and IPSO?

k. What challenges are there confronting the generation and deployment of Ghanaian troops on UN sponsored peacekeeping operations?

l. How do you expect this to be remedied?

5. Chief Director Ministry of Defence

a. How are requests for deployment of peacekeeping forces come to the Ministry and where do they come from?

b. How are these requests treated or processed in the Ministry?

c. How is the structure in the Ministry like for dealing with the deployment of peacekeeping forces?

d. Are there any guidelines or procedures for handling these requests in the Ministry? If yes what are these and how have they worked so far?

e. What is the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the generation, preparation and deployment of peacekeeping forces?

f. Who takes the ultimate decision, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

g. Is there any direct relationship between the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ghana Armed Forces? If yes, how is this relationship structured and how does it work?

h. Do you see peacekeeping soldiers being used to promote Ghana’s international diplomacy?

i. If yes, how has this been done to your knowledge?

j. If no, how can they be used in this direction?
6. Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration

a. How are requests for deployment of peacekeeping forces come to the Ministry and where do they come from?

b. How are these requests treated or processed in the Ministry?

c. How is the structure in the Ministry like for dealing with the deployment of peacekeeping forces?

d. Are there any guidelines or procedures for handling these requests in the Ministry? If yes what are these and how have they worked so far?

e. What is the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the generation, preparation and deployment of peacekeeping forces?

f. Who takes the ultimate decision, Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

g. Is there any direct relationship between the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ghana Armed Forces? If yes, how is this relationship structured and how does it work?

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