PARLIAMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN GHANA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF THE FIFTH PARLIAMENT

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“THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEGREE.

LEGON
JULY, 2013
DECLARATION

I, Kenneth Okantey the author of this Thesis do hereby declare that except for references to other people’s work which I have duly acknowledged, the study herein presented is the first of its kind to be carried out in the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana, Legon, during the 2012/2013 academic year under objective supervision of Dr. Kumi Ansah Koi. This work has never been submitted in any form, whole or in part for a degree in this University or elsewhere.

Signature of Student: ………………………………

Name of Student: Kenneth Okantey

Date…………………………………………………

This work has been submitted for examination with my approval as a supervisor.

Signature of Supervisor………………………………………..

Name of Supervisor: Dr. Kumi Ansah-Koi

Date…………………………………………………………………
DEDICATION

I dedicate this work first to the almighty God by whose grace I continue to live and to the loving memory of my late beloved sister, Marjorie Naa-Akuyea Okantey who served as a source of great inspiration and also taught me the values of hard work, commitment and discipline, to never give up but aspire to greater heights even when the road gets tough. These values and words of wisdom have helped a great deal in helping shape my life and bringing me to the successful completion this work. You will be greatly missed, cherished and forever remembered.

“May your soul rest in Peace”
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My biggest thanks goes to the Lord Almighty, for endowing me with absolute health and life and strength to come close to the end of the tunnel in my education.

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My heartfelt appreciation also goes to Dr. Philip Attuquayefio and Amb. D.K Osei for their invaluable assistance at the input stage as well as for providing me with useful materials to assist in completing this work.

Not forgetting the immense role my family, friends and colleagues played for their encouragement, support, prayer’s and believing in my capabilities which impelled me to study and complete the programme successfully.

And finally I wish to give special thanks and appreciation to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Research Department) for their moral and financial support in making this all possible.

God richly bless you all.
## ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDB</td>
<td>Chinese Development Bank</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>GIPC</td>
<td>Ghana Investment Promotion Council</td>
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<td>GNPC</td>
<td>Ghana National Petroleum Company</td>
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<td>LEClAD</td>
<td>Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy</td>
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<td>MFA</td>
<td>Master Facility Agreement</td>
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<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non Aligned Movement</td>
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<td>NLC</td>
<td>National Liberation Council</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>National Redemption Council</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNDC</td>
<td>Provisional National Defence Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>People’s National Party</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCLS</td>
<td>UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf</td>
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<td>UNIPEC</td>
<td>Universal Petroleum Corporation (UNIPEC)</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>WACB</td>
<td>West African Central Bank</td>
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<td>WAMZ</td>
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The fact that no state in the world is self-sufficient cannot be over-emphasized. To the extent that states are interdependent and thus, a particular state’s policy detailing how it will relate to international actors (states, international organizations, etc.) affect the lives of its citizenry, the involvement of the Legislature in that policy formulation process should be paramount. In Ghana, the act of foreign policy making rests with the Executive and Legislative arms of government. The processes involve start from setting of the agenda through to consultations and then approval for execution. The study was aimed at analysing the role of Parliament in the conduct of Ghana’s foreign policy making under the Fourth Republic specifically between 2009 and 2012, investigating the factors that stem against the effective involvement of Parliament in Ghana’s foreign policy making as well as proffer recommendations towards enhancing Parliament’s role in Ghana’s Foreign Policy. The study involved the use of both primary and secondary data for analysis. For the secondary source the major stakeholders, thus members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs were interviewed and information collected was analyzed. Results from the study showed that in as much as the Parliament plays a monumental role in the making of Ghana’s foreign policy by scrutinizing Ghana’s foreign policy direction through constructive debating of issues, it has not fully utilized its mandate to ensure that the actions of the executive arm of government regarding foreign policy is fully examined and monitored. Implications of the study have been thoroughly discussed.
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.0 Introduction to the Problem Statement

The practice of having a political institution that is independent and having the necessary legal powers to provide oversight responsibilities over the political institution in whom the executive powers of a state is vested is a widely accepted norm in liberal democracies. This practice has been established to satisfy a cardinal tenet of liberal democracy – accountability. In that regard, the Legislature, which provides this oversight function, is expected to be representative of a state’s population. It is worthy to note that one of the reasons for having a representative legislature is to allow policy that emanates from the executive arm of government to be scrutinized by this representative institution from diverse perspectives.

This phenomenon ensures that policy perfectly suits the demands and aspirations of citizens. This is because, for instance in Ghana, the relationship between the executive arm of government and the citizens, which is a trustee-beneficiary relationship cannot be entirely adequate in ensuring that policies are responsive to the aspirations and demands of the larger citizenry. Thus, the legislature, which ought to operate in a delegate kind of representation can work to complement the effort of the executive in that regard. In expanding the point aforementioned, it is worth noting that the scenario above holds true for foreign policies too.

The fact that no state in this world is self-sufficient cannot be over-emphasized. To the extent that states are interdependent and thus, a particular state’s policy detailing how it will relate to international actors (states, international organizations, etc.) affect the lives of its citizenry, the involvement of the legislature in that policy formulation process should be paramount.
However, before any proper analysis can be done on parliament and foreign policy making in Ghana’s Fourth Republic, issues relating to what constitute foreign policy, purpose of foreign policy, activities that relate to foreign policy making and so on must first be addressed.

According to David Vital (1968)\(^1\) and later Joseph Frankel (1970)\(^2\), Foreign Policy is defined as “a formulation of desired outcomes which are intended (or expected) to be consequent upon decisions adopted (or made) by those who have authority (or ability) to commit the machinery of the state and a significant fraction of national resources to that end”. Hence, in essence, foreign policy can be understood as statements and actions taken by a state with respect to its relations with other external actors, states or non-state actors. It can also be a reaction to the actions of other states and is taken to fulfil national interests outside a state’s territorial integrity.

In that regard, in Ghana, the act of foreign policy making rests with the executive and legislative arms of government. The processes involve start from setting of the agenda through to consultations and then approval for execution. However, it is worth mentioning that some foreign policies may be formulated instantaneously. A classic example is the statement “Dzi wo fie Asem” (mind your own business) denoting non-involvement in another country’s internal affairs, by the late President Prof. J.E.A. Mills as a response to questions posed by a journalist asking him to state his position on the then Cote D’Ivoire crisis. Nevertheless, largely, most foreign policies go through due process.

Foreign policies are pursued to achieve the National Interest of a state. According to Frankel (1970)\(^3\), National Interest, as an analytical tool, is employed to describe, explain or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation’s foreign policy but as an instrument of political
action, it serves as a means of justifying denouncing or proposing policies. Both usages, in other words, refer to what is best for a national society.

Furthermore, in the view of J.C. Johari, the foreign policy of a state is primarily a matter of decisions that the rulers take to protect and foster the national interest in their dealings and interactions with other states of the world. Thus, he added that the decisions may be of three kinds:

1. Programmatic decisions: Major decisions with long-range consequences made following detailed study, deliberation and evaluation of a whole range of alternative options.

2. Crisis decisions: Decisions made during periods of grave treat; limited time in which to respond; and surprise element which requires an adhoc response in the sense that no pre-planned responses are made.

3. Tactical decisions: Important decisions that are usually derivative from the programmatic level; subject to re-evaluation, revision and reversal.

In his book “The Making of Foreign Policy”, Joseph Frankel noted that the governmental near-monopoly of foreign affairs within every state is partly historical, dating from the absolutist period, and partly due to the logic of the situation in which, as a rule, governments alone deal with other governments, command the best sources of information, and have a monopoly of legitimate and the near-monopoly of physical force.

However, the issue of exploring various avenues through which the legislature can play a major role in foreign policy making has intensified. For J.C. Johari, The paramount reason stands that in the present age of democracy two terms have gained wide recognition –
realization of the ‘nation’ as against the state, and representation of the interest of the people of a nation as a whole against the narrow and limited interests of the rulers.²

In Ghana, as it is in many countries, the Executive possesses monumental powers over the Legislature in the foreign policy making process. However, this is not a current phenomenon. All the past three republics in Ghanaian history encountered such or worse situation. However, an important issue at hand is that although throughout Ghana’s Second, Third and current republics, the Executive has possessed real legal powers to dictate the foreign policy making process, the various Legislatures had appreciable constitutional powers to, even if not dictate, influence greatly the foreign policy making process.

A towering and domineering personality like Kwame Nkrumah, who was life president and presided over a one-party state, could not have been checked by the then parliament of Ghana. Article 18 (1) of the 1960 Republican Constitution of Ghana⁸, for instance, provided for an Office of the President. This provision stated clearly how the president should execute his functions through the Cabinet by a Presidential Commission consisting of three persons appointed by the Cabinet.

The domestic legal frameworks based on which Ghana’s foreign policies were to be formulated in the Second republic were Articles 57, 58 and 59 of the 1969 Constitution.⁹ Article 57, for instance, gave the Government of Ghana the power to conduct its international affairs in consonance with accepted principles of international law and diplomacy in a manner consistent with the national interest of Ghana. The power to appoint Ghana’s representatives abroad was vested in the Executive by Article 58 of the 1969 Constitution.
However, the 1979 constitution, as provided for in Articles 61 and 62, enjoined the President to consult the Council of State when appointing Ambassadors, High Commissioners and Ministers Plenipotentiary to represent Ghana abroad.\textsuperscript{10}

Similar to the 1979 Constitution, the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana also places the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of Ghana’s international relations in the president.

The mandate of the president in this regard is stated in Chapter 8 Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana which direct the president and government in their conduct of their international relations\textsuperscript{11}. Thus, undeniably, under the 1992 Constitution of the republic of Ghana, the executive president wields a lot of power insofar as foreign policy is concerned.

\textbf{1.1 Statement of the Research Problem}

Due to the fact of self-insufficiency and in the spirit of interdependency, states all over the world formulate policies detailing how they will interact with International Actors in terms of international politics. In this case, Ghana is not an exception. Currently in Ghana, the actors that are involved in her foreign policy making process are stipulated in the 1992 Constitution. Within the executive arm of government, these actors are the president, the cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Council of State and the National Security Council. In Parliament, the Foreign Affairs committee and Parliament-at-sitting are the key actors.
The Executive arm of government is noted to possess monumental influence in the foreign policy making process in Ghana because of its enormous and powerful institutions and skewed constitutional provisions in its favour relative to the Parliament.

In the 1992 Constitution, Articles 40, 57(1), 58(1), 73, 74(1) (2) and 75(1) give the Executive arm of government overarching powers that help it in the foreign policy making process. Article 40, by its implication, establishes the Executive arm of government as the Leader in Ghana’s foreign policy. Article 57(1) confers legitimacy in the President as the Head of State, Head of Government and Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ghana. Article 58(1) thus vests the executive authority of Ghana in the President. Article 73 enables the Executive arm of government to be pre-eminent in setting the agenda in Ghana’s foreign policy making. Article 74(1) gives the President the power to appoint Ghana’s representatives abroad and Article 75(1) empowers the President to execute treaties, agreements and conventions for Ghana.

However, the constitutional provisions that explicitly establish Parliament’s involvement in Ghana’s foreign policy are Articles 75(2), 78 and 82. Article 75(2) empowers Parliament to ratify any treaty, agreement or convention executed by the President or caused to be executed by him through an Act of Parliament or a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of more than one-half of all the members of Parliament. Article 78 enables Parliament to approve or disapprove any Minister of State. Article 82 empowers Parliament to, by a resolution supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of Parliament; pass a vote of censure on a Minister of State. Article 103(1) and (2) empowers Parliament to form a Parliamentary Committee to investigate into the activities and administration of ministries and departments.
Even a cursory look at these provisions readily brings to the fore the fact that setting of agenda, relating to foreign policy making, comfortably rest in the ‘bosom’ of the Executive arm of government.

More importantly, the hybrid system of government, which combines features of both presidential and parliamentary systems of government, as practised under the Fourth Republic and the consistency of ruling parties obtaining more than one-half of the seat in parliament, which is the constitutional requirement for parliament to approve a treaty, agreement or convention, coupled with strict party discipline undermine the independence and ultimately oversight responsibilities of parliament. However, it is worthy to state that these avenues available to parliament to explore to enable it contribute or influence foreign policy making in Ghana can be said to be adequate. Through this framework, it should be safe to say that Parliament should be able to complement the executive in Ghana’s foreign policy making.

Nonetheless, it is at the heart of this study to ascertain whether parliament really complement the Executive in foreign policy making in Ghana. As a means of guiding the conduct of this study in solving the research problem, answers were sought for these questions. These are:

1. What is the Composition of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs?
2. What roles do the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs perform?
3. What is the turnover rate in the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs?
4. To what extent that Parliament apply its powers in terms of foreign policy making?
5. Has there been any Parliamentary intervention in foreign policy making?
1.2 Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the study are to:

i) Give an overview of the role of the Legislature in the making of Ghana’s foreign policy in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Republics.

ii) Enumerate and analyse the role of parliament in the conduct of Ghana’s foreign policy making under the Fourth Republic (2009-2012).

iii) Establish the factors that stem against the effective involvement of parliament in Ghana’s foreign policy making under the Fourth Republic (2009-2012) (if any).

iv) Proffer Recommendations towards enhancing parliament’s role in Ghana’s Foreign Policy.

1.3 Hypothesis

Within the Fourth Republic, Parliament does not complement the Executive in foreign policy making in Ghana.

1.4 Literature Review

Joseph Frankel in his work “The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making” analyzed the Legislatures’ internal dynamics and their value in foreign policy making. In that respect, he asserted that as large and clumsy bodies, parliament cannot effectively exercise initiative and their participation upset diplomacy.12
Intimating their powers in foreign policy making, he stated that while generally smaller in foreign than in domestic affairs, parliamentary powers are nevertheless considerable. He added that the position varies from country to country and from system to system and is determined by interplay of fairly stable constitutional elements and of more ephemeral elements, such as political climate, the strength of the parties and the character of the leading personalities involved.¹³

Again, he asserted that the party system influences the situation. In a single-party system, no fundamental difference between the government and the legislature is thinkable and the former predominates.

Thus, while in a British two-party system with a rigid party discipline, a government commands reasonable majority in the House of Commons is fairly secured from imperious interference, in the American two-party system without party discipline, fluid majorities give the Legislature great importance.¹⁴

To him, as a rule, Legislatures confirm rather than initiate foreign policy and the main legal form employed is the power of ratification of international treaties. This power, if implying merely the capacity to reject, could scarcely be considered as full participation in the decision making process. However, he added, this power usually implies the capacity to suggest amendments and often impels governments to resort to prior consultation, in order to avoid the possibility of rejection.¹⁵

Commenting on the effect of legislature’s independence on foreign policy making, he maintained that where Legislatures are truly independent of governments, they play an important role in the shaping of foreign policy on the basis of their general powers since their
concurrence is necessary to pass implementing legislation and to appropriate the required mean.¹⁶

Focusing on the quantity of numbers in Parliament and strength in Standing Committees in making foreign policies, Frankel stated that from a larger Senate and from even larger House of Representatives in the U.S., advice has now become possible on the basis of consolidation of the system of Standing Committees. The most powerful of these is the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. With less august traditions, less experienced professional staff, and a more rapidly changing membership, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives has less influence.¹⁷

Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow in their work “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis”, looked into issues concerning group processes and their effects on choices and action. They stated that Government decision is a complex multi-participant process and that policy outcomes results from multiple cases that defy simple summary and easy generalization.¹⁸

For them, a broad array of causal factors must be taken into account in explaining results of group decision making. They however summarized and illustrated some of the major findings of the import of group decision-making processes under seven headings. (1) higher quality decisions; (2) the agency problem: principles, agents and players; (3) participants: who plays; (4) decision rules; (5) framing issues and setting agendas; (6) group think; and (7) complexity of joint decisions and actions.¹⁹
Higher Quality Decisions

In their bid to reiterate the merits of group decision making, they intimated that “to the extent that a multi-person process ensures more thorough analysis of information about the situation, full consideration about the array of relevant values and interests and their operationalization as objectives; more imagination in identifying (and inventing) options; more accurate estimate of cost and benefits; and greater alertness on indications of failure and readiness to learn from mistakes, it is likely to produce better decisions”.

The agency problem: principles, agents and players

As a continuation, of the earlier point, they stated that increasing the number of participants in a decision making process beyond a single mind helps a decision maker dodge many obvious pitfalls. They will be less likely to misconceive the issue, neglect relevant interests in settling on one objective rather than another, or misestimate consequences, among other dangers.

Participants: who plays?

Drawing on the Bosnia story, they stated that results of a multi-person process for making a choice cannot be predicted without knowing who participates and in what roles.

Decision rules

To them, the impact of decision rules upon group choice is clearest where that choice is made by formal vote. Issues that would be decided one way by vote held under one set of rules can be decided differently under another set of rules. They added that because a treaty embodies
the most solemn, binding commitment of a nation, the Constitution requires that two-third of U.S. Senate vote is required to ratify a treaty before it can take effect. Further, they noted that one effect of this decision rule requiring a super-majority of the Senate to ratify treaties has been to enlarge the role of key senators during the process of negotiating treaties.  

**Framing Issues and Setting Agendas**

Here, they stated that the way a group responds to a problem, or indeed, whether it responds at all, often depends on the way the problem is framed and reaches the group’s agenda.  

**Groupthink**

Affirming the work of Janis Irving, they noted that key decisions are often made in small groups, often made up of six to twelve people, in which there is a high degree of cohesion. In addition, they indicated this cohesion produces a psychological drive for consensus, which tends to suppress dissent and the consideration for alternatives.  

**Complexity of Joint Action**

Again, they were of the view that the settings in which separate institutions share power over decisions and actions assures what Wildavsky and Jeffery Pressman call a “complexity of joint decision and action”. They added that when the Executive must win independent consent from a legislature, from other governments in a coalition, complexity grows. The number of forks in the decision tree increases; independent actors multiply; and the prospect of the results achieving any precise original intent declines.
Kofi Kumado in his work “Foreign Policy Making in the context of our National Constitution: An Overview”, examined foreign policy making in the context of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. His main area of interest lay in the role the Constitution assigns to Parliament in foreign policy making. He indicated that the sovereignty of a Nation serves as the power base for its conduct of external affairs. In that regard, he maintained that the external sovereignty seemed to be exercised by the Executive whiles the internal sovereignty is perceived to reside in Parliament. He thus added that this is because Article 1(1) of the Constitution indicate that sovereignty resides in the people of Ghana and not any arm of government.27

Ultimately, he maintained that the perception as elected representatives of the people, coupled with the other constitutional provisions provide the legal basis for Parliament’s involvement in Ghana’s Foreign Policy formulation. Basing his argument on Articles 93(2), 174(1), 178 and 179, Kumado expatiated how Parliament could use its legislative, financial control and treaty ratification powers to contribute directly or influence Ghana’s Foreign Policy Making.28

1.5 Theoretical Framework

This study is situated within the decision-making model as put forward by Joseph Frankel in his book “The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making”29. This model points out that foreign policy consists of decisions and actions. Decision, according to the model, is an act of determining in one’s own mind a course of action, following a more or less deliberate consideration of alternatives; and by decision is understood to be what is determined. By action is understood as a thing done, a deed, or the process of acting or doing. It also states that ‘State decisions’ are not made by states but on their behalf, by individuals
and by groups of individuals. It adds that usually, but not invariably, these individuals and groups are the incumbents of official positions determined by constitutions and legal systems.

In addition, within the scheme of the model, the relevant social forces are divided into a central part, included in the decision-making apparatus, and a peripheral part, included in the environment. By extension, it holds that this distinction corresponds to a certain extent with the distinction between legal power and influence; influence means participation in the decision making process without the power to make a formal decision.

It suggests that decision-making constitutes a process ending in an act of will of a person or a group of persons who choose between two or more alternatives\textsuperscript{30}. In addition, the model states, before this final act of will, many other choices are involved- of information sources, of interpretation methods, of values, of objectives, of means, etc. and that all these choices are often made by authorities subordinate to the authority making the final decision, but are at times conclusive in determining the direction of this final decision.\textsuperscript{31}

Ultimately, the assumption underlying this model is that the legally determined authorities make the actual decisions, but the approval of the decision or the final vote constitutes the core of the process. Furthermore, the model discusses decision-makers as individuals who arrive at their decisions by confronting their values with their image of the environment. Thus, the model intimates that group decisions follow three distinct patterns. These are according the constitution of the group, to the impact of personalities within it, and to the nature of the issue.

Further, it adds that in the second pattern, one member of the group leads it by virtue of his position, his or her special knowledge, or his or her personality. Thus, he or she becomes that
virtual decision-maker and the other members of the group can be accommodated as influences. Thus, the other two patterns are those of consensus, where decision is arrived at on the basis of agreement of all members or of a majority.

Finally, the model explains that the institutional setting of the decision-makers not only determines their powers but also imposes limitations upon them.

This model is suitable for a study like this not just because the research seeks to examine a decision making process, but particularly, because it focuses on issues relating to group decision-making thus parliament in foreign policy-making.

1.6 Significance of Study

Most literature on foreign policy making actors focuses on the executive arm of government. Perhaps it is because of the leading role the executive plays in that regard. However, this study focused on the legislature, a key institution in foreign policy making, to help elicit the factors that accounts for their seemingly passive role in foreign policy making in Ghana. The study, in the final analysis, sought to contribute to literature in legislature and foreign policy making and also open up a much deeper discussion and considerations.

Thus, to satisfy this need, the focus of the study was on the Fifth Parliament of the Fourth Republic (2009-2012). This time period was chosen because, in 2009, President Barack Obama visited Ghana and during his speech to the said parliament, indicated that Africa needs strong institutions and not strong men. In that regard, I reasoned that at the back of how parliamentarians and members of the executive positively received President Obama’s
statement, the Fifth parliament will ‘wake up’ and pursue a leading role in Ghana’s foreign policy making.

This idea stems from the fact that foreign policy making is very important and remains one of the key roles of the parliament of Ghana.

1.7 Sources of Data and Research Methodology

This research was partly based on secondary data. The LECIAD Research library, the Balme Library, and the Political Science Department Library were consulted for books, journals, reports and other relevant documents. The primary sources included interviews with parliamentarians who were in Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee within the Fifth Parliament of the Fourth Republic.

These parliamentarians are Hon. Yaw Owusu-Boateng, Member of Parliament for Oda Constituency and Hon. Emmanuel Bandua (Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman), Member of Parliament for Biakoye Constituency. With the interview, eleven structured questions were asked and their responses were manually documented.

1.8 Limitation of the Study

Due to the fact that most literature in this area of foreign policy in Ghana have been focused on the Executive because of its pre-eminent role underpinned by Ghana’s historical trajectories, literature in this area was extremely scarce.
1.9 Organization of the Study

Chapter 1: Research Design.


Chapter 3: Foreign Policy Making in the Fifth Parliament.

Chapter 4: Summary of findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.
ENDNOTES

3. Ibid., p15-16.
7. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 27.
19. Ibid., p. 264.
20. Ibid., p. 265.
21. Ibid., p. 271.
22. Ibid., p. 275.
23. Ibid., p. 278.
24. Ibid., p. 280.
25. Ibid., p. 283.
26. Ibid., p. 287.
28. Ibid., p. 18.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
AN OVERVIEW OF GHANA AND FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE FIRST REPUBLIC THROUGH TO THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of Ghana’s foreign policy from independence through to the fourth republic, comparing various foreign policies in both past military as well as civilian government since independence. Ghana was the first nation within sub-Saharan Africa to attain political independence in 1957 which marked a turning point in the political lives of Ghanaians or the people of the Gold Coast, as the colony was until then known, but also for the entire people of Africa and those in the Diaspora.

2.1 Ghana’s Foreign Policy at Independence

Ghana, the first nation within sub-Saharan Africa to attain political independence in 1957 which marked a turning point in the political lives of Ghanaians or the people of the Gold Coast, as the colony was until then known, but also for the entire people of Africa and those in the Diaspora.

As Nkrumah stated “The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked to the total liberation of Africa” This tells us the dream of Ghana’s first president linking the independence of Ghana to the liberation of the continent. This statement by President Nkrumah, formed the basis of his foreign policy from 1957.¹

The main objectives of Ghana’s foreign policy includes maintaining friendly relations and cooperation with all countries that desire such cooperation, regardless of philosophical as well as all forms of differences, on the grounds of mutual respect and sovereignty among each other’s internal affairs². Giving credence to Africa and its liberation as well as unity,
these were the cornerstones of Ghana’s foreign policy. As one of the major pioneers of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

The foreign policy themes of President Nkrumah clearly emphasized the expected integration role of Ghana in Africa. These were: The liberation of Africa from colonialism and restoration of the dignity of the black race; The establishment of power and influence in Africa; The pursuit of world peace and security through a policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment and; The promotion of international cooperation and development through such intergovernmental organisations as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth.

Besides these Ghana’s foreign policy involves the closest possible collaboration with her neighbours with which Ghana identifies herself with, in terms of cultural history, blood ties, and economics.

The vision of Ghana’s foreign policy also helped to strengthen the struggle by the people of Africa for the complete liberation of Africa from colonial domination and called for the necessary need to march towards the vision of the pan-African leaders at the time.³

Some of the ways Ghana helped strengthen relations with other African countries for example was Nkrumah's commitment to the liberation of the African continent in the form of financial aid to the tune of 10 million pounds to Guinea after it had broken away from France in September 1958. Additionally, he agreed to grant Mali a long-term loan after its split with Senegal. Ghana established a political association with the two countries.

Furthermore, Nkrumah also stood behind Patrice Lumumba during the Congo crisis of between the years 1960 to 1961 and extended the relations to nine other African states to
create a joint High Command to provide assistance to any other state that was found in a similar position to the one that the Congo faced.

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah had a unique understanding of the effects of colonialism and neo-colonialism and hence skewed Ghana’s foreign policy to promote continental unity in order to fight it to his possible best. As time went by Ghana was seen as the pioneer in the fight against colonialism, and the capital, Accra became the host for other freedom fighters, ten (10) years after Ghana’s independence, 31 other African countries had gained their independence largely through the enhanced support from Nkrumah. Through Ghana’s foreign policy efforts Nkrumah saw to the solution of some African problems such as poverty, persistent wars across the continent and over exploitation of its resources.

These problems necessitated the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to host a series of conferences held in Accra between 1958 and 1960, beginning with the Conference of Independent African States in Accra on April 15, 1958. The objectives of this conference were to strengthen and protect Africa’s hardly fought independence, strengthen the economic as well as consolidate cultural ties between independent African states. For Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, this particular Conference signified that Pan-Africanism had moved to the African continent where it really belonged…Free Africans were actually meeting together, in Africa, to examine and consider African Affairs.4

Ghana’s foreign policy under the Nkrumah government, apart from the political niceties of non-interference in other countries’ affairs, also included expanded bilateral trade with other African countries this bilateral trading enhanced the economic growth of participating countries since Nkrumah envisioned that a united Africa with its resources could become crucial in making the African continent an economic power in the world, and could use its
resources for development. Nkrumah realised that individually some of the independent states of Africa, were potentially rich whereas some others poor and thus only a strong political union could bring about full and effective development of resources for the benefit of the continent.

Under the leadership of President Nkrumah, Ghana played an active role in tackling the racial problems of Rhodesia and South Africa. “Concerning South Rhodesia, there was an intensified arms struggle by the people that led to independence for the territory under the new name Zimbabwe in 1980. He was equally committed to the fight against the minority regime in South Africa and its entrenched policy of apartheid. His clear-cut position at international meetings on the race question and apartheid in general compelled the United Nations to take up the issue of the Black majority on similar footing as the condition of people from Indian descent”.

Dr Nkrumah in his address the Legislative Assembly at its last session before it was prorogued by the Governor, Sir Charles Aden-Clarke, pledged a continued collaboration with the Commonwealth, and renounced a neutralist line in foreign affairs. As he further promised to encourage foreign investment in Ghana whereas their foreign policy would not be dictated by a need of seeking assistance from other countries. He suggested ways in which the Commonwealth could help Ghana - but "not on the basis of free gifts."

In a statement captured as "The Commonwealth association is of value to us because it unites us to countries that have the same system of law and the same system of parliamentary government as we have," he said. "The Commonwealth can, I believe, become a pilot scheme for developing the most effective methods by which colonialism can be ended without
revolution or violence and under conditions in which the former colonial territory still retains a close and friendly association with the former imperial power.”

Nkrumah’s foreign policy was based on his Communist ideology as his desire was to create a ‘United States of Africa’ under his leadership this created more enemies than friends for him. This ambition towards the birth of United Africa led him to create the Bureau of African Affairs, secretly known as the Special African Service and itself part of the national security apparatus to train Africans from many states, remarkably Niger, Upper Volta then (Burkina Faso), Nigeria, Cameroon, Sierra Leone and Burundi in guerrilla warfare. This idea was not only frowned upon by countries which did not share Nkrumah’s ideas but was a big threat to the Western interests in Africa.

Ghana had generally enjoyed good relations with the United States since independence, except for a period of strained relations during the later years of the Nkrumah regime. Ghana was the first country to which United States Peace Corps volunteers were sent in 1961. Ghana and the United States are signatories to twenty agreements and treaties covering such matters as agricultural commodities, aviation, defence, economic and technical cooperation, education, extradition, postal matters, telecommunications, and treaty obligations. The refusal of the United States to join the International Cocoa Agreement, given Ghana’s heavy dependence on cocoa exports to earn hard currency, is the most serious bilateral issue between the two countries.

2.2 Ghana’s Foreign Policy Making under the National Liberation Council (NLC)

In the year 1966, after the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the National Liberation Council (NLC) took over power. The NLC were preoccupied with economic issues making
foreign policy issues a background issue hence did not place much priority in Foreign policy making much of an issue. Under the NLC foreign policy was generally determined by members of the NLC, in which according to K. B. Asante, the members failed to develop any proactive policy.  

2.3 Foreign Policy Making under the Progress Party (PP)

The foreign policy of Dr. K. A. Busia was pivoted around what the then Foreign Minister; Victor Owusu termed ‘non-alignment and positive neutrality.’ After he assumed office on March 1st, 1970.

His policies were parallel to that of President Nkrumah’s, even though he was quick to add that President Nkrumah deviated from the making of non-alignment and neutrality almost improbable in Ghana’s case. He explained that the policy did not imply neither separation from international events nor interests, or detachment from productive and inventive international efforts, but then considering all the facts and circumstances of the case and all things being equal always having regard to one’s own interests.  

As article 57 of the 1969 constitution of the second republic of Ghana stated then ‘The government of Ghana shall conduct its international affairs in consonance with the accepted principles of public international law and diplomacy in a manner consistent with the national interest of Ghana.’  

The Busia administration also acknowledged the need for membership in the United Nations and described it as a more reliable and permanent mechanism to ensure continuous peace and security of the world, indicating that world peace could not be built ‘on the present balance of terror between the two superpowers’ and emphasized the need for it.
When it comes to the continent of Africa, the Busia administration explained that the total liberation of the continent from colonialism was at the crux of Ghana’s foreign policy but added that Africa’s liberation was an issue for all African states to partake thus Ghana was no exception. On the question of African Unity, the proper foundations through functional integration must be laid, at all levels hence the interest in a West African Economic Community.\(^\text{13}\)

The Busia government, then chose to be pro-Western in its foreign policy alignment, as the decision had its implication such as an economic value of foreign policy with the aim of attracting foreign investment and other forms of economic collaboration to complement domestic efforts geared at pooling of resources, strengthening Ghana’s role in the various international trade and economic bodies of which it was a member of as well as other international bodies of relevance to Ghana’s over all national interest and development such as the Commonwealth by making full use of Ghana’s Diplomatic Missions abroad.\(^\text{14}\)

Just two weeks after Dr. Busia had taken over office, he embarked on a two-week state visit to the United States to meet President Richard Nixon as well as deliver a speech at the 16th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. At the same meeting, he had talks with the representatives of the IMF and the World Bank, in addition to official visits to the United Kingdom and France in which he held formal meetings with the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson and President Georges Pompidou respectively. These events reiterated Ghana’s pro-Western alignment as well as strategies to bring the rescheduling of the country’s debt unto the agenda of those who matter in this regard.\(^\text{15}\)

On the other hand, two significant foreign policy decisions had an adverse impact on the Busia administration. First of all was the Alien’s Compliance Order (ACP) that resulted in
the expulsion of illegal aliens from the country. About 300,000 foreign nationals, mostly from countries within the West African sub-region (Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Togo, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Benin and Niger) were forced in 1969 to leave the country. Though it was supposedly towards a larger economic policy of indigenization, it was considered as an unfriendly act by sister countries and resulted in deteriorated foreign relations with other countries in the sub-region, for instance, by Nigeria in 1983.

The second was the disreputable policy of ‘dialogue with Apartheid South Africa’ that urged the OAU and African countries to open direct talks with Apartheid South Africa, targeted at forcing South Africa to end Apartheid. Ghana found itself isolated due to its decision to establish contacts with the Pretoria regime of South Africa. The overall policy recommendation of ‘dialogue with South Africa’ was out of tune with African and Third World international relations, thus meeting criticism and condemnation.

There were other African countries that believed in this approach to resolving the apartheid question, for instance, Cote d’Ivoire. But coming as it was from a country like Ghana that spearheaded the liberation struggle under President Kwame Nkrumah, it brought nothing else but serious damage to the country’s reputation and image. 16

2.4 Ghana’s Foreign Policy Making under the National Redemption Council/ Supreme Military Council I & II

After the overthrow of Busia’s Progress Party in 1972, General I. K. Acheampong took over the reins of government with a lot of task in the governance of the country. With regards to foreign policy making, General Acheampong was captured saying “Our Foreign policy will first be based on a vigorous and dynamic African policy; we also intend to foster the closest and cordial relations with all African States.”17
There were times when Ghana’s foreign policy was virtually based on self-determination of African peoples and nations, African Unity, non-alignment and solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the world. An example which was seen as one of the infamous policies under the Busia administration when Ghana’s found herself isolated due to its decision to establish contacts with the Pretoria regime of South Africa in the ‘dialogue with Apartheid South Africa.’

However, foreign policy direction changed under Kutu Acheampong as Ghana reverted to the policy of non-alignment and supported actively the liberation struggles in Africa and the world as a whole.

As an example of Ghana’s interest in regional cooperation, the country enthusiastically endorsed formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975. This organization was created specifically to foster inter-regional economic and political cooperation. It has served as a useful vehicle for contacts with neighbouring West African governments and for channelling increased Ghanaian exports to regional markets.

As General I.K Acheampong’s regime could be associated with the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). He also participated actively in the activities of the then Organization of Africa’s Unity (OAU) as well as complying to most of their policies, such as cut diplomatic relations with Israel as a protest when Israel seized the Palestine land in 1973. This was somehow a very difficult decision for Ghana since Ghana had then benefited from the benevolence of the Israeli government, benevolence such as man power training, Agriculture and most importantly the construction of the Kotoka International Airport. The then minister of Foreign affairs, Col. Roger Felli, highlighted the
importance of Ghana’s foreign policy to be central to Africa’s common position hence that decision.  

The formulation of Acheampong’s foreign policy witnessed the nationalization of some foreign owned industries as well which had its implication for the economy of the nation.  

2.5 Foreign Policy Making under the Peoples’ National Party (PNP)

Under the Limann administration, foreign policy making was in tandem with that of Nkrumah’s as Dr. Limann declared that the overall objective of his administration on foreign policy was to restore the Nation’s influence and image it once had in the sight of the outside world however this time around it was geared toward cost benefit of the nation as he puts it ‘for a successful conduct of our foreign policy, an efficient and cost-effective foreign service is required.’

The objective of Dr. Limann’s government was so overt that in one year at the presidency, he contracted the STX in South Korea to build four more brand new cargo ships for the Black Star Line.

The then Minister of Transport, Harry Sawyer, on the basis of Ghana’s foreign policy, went to India to negotiate the deal on the importation of Tata buses into the country as it was the first of its kind.

Despite all these achievements chalked by President Limann’s government on its foreign policy, Quantson still holds the view that the government of Dr. Hilla Limann had no clear policies geared towards the national interest as he believed President Limann was not a strong president with numerous problems in his party affecting the country’s foreign policy.
2.6 Ghana’s Foreign Policy under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)

Ghana’s political and pragmatic renaissance in Africa and in world affairs under PNDC leadership became apparent from the number of reciprocal visits targeted at promoting bilateral ties and cooperation. For example, some of the landmark visits to Ghana between 1987 and 1994 were visits by the Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda; Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere.

While the Limann administration vacillated between aligning with the more powerful countries whereas supporting the oppressed peoples of the world the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) regime manned by Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings assumed power in 1982, they directed their foreign policy towards the liberation of oppressed peoples such as those in Palestine.

The PNDC foreign policy aided in the restructuring of Ghana’s educational system, thus introducing great transformation in Ghana’s educational system. Ghana’s academic system saw a shift from a more academic curriculum to vocational and technical training. These were some of the major developments benefited from Ghana’s close ties with socialist countries, particularly Cuba.

As of 1985, Cuba was training about 1,000 Ghanaian school children and middle-level technicians as well as offered Ghanaians training in political leadership for “revolutionary organs” and national security. Most of the Ghanaian youths left for various countries to pursue professional and technical courses. Socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China awarded scholarships to the youth of Ghana for both academic and technical courses. Bulgaria on the other hand provided training to political organizations and leaders whereas...
the Soviet Union furnished Ghana’s education in medicine, veterinary sciences, and engineering.

The PNDC cooperation with the Cubans did not only benefit Ghana in the field of education but in such fields as health, agriculture, and education. For example Cuba trained Ghana’s national militia and helped renovate Ghana’s sugar industry.

In 1985, the PNDC signed their first barter agreement with Cuba followed by new trade protocols in 1987 and 1988. This agreement saw Cuban medical brigades working in Tamale in the Northern Region, one of the poorest areas in Ghana. With Ghanaian boxers and athletes trained by Cuban coaches and teaching Spanish in Ghanaian schools.

In 1983, relations between Ghana and Burkina Faso became both warm and close as Thomas Sankara the then president of Burkina Faso took over power. Indeed, Rawlings and Sankara began uniting Ghana and Burkina in such a way that would overturn the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union, which Nkrumah had wanted to promote as a foundation for his dream of unified continental government. Political and economic ties between Ghana and Burkina Faso, became stronger through joint cooperation and through border demarcation committee meetings.

In early 1984, relations between Ghana and Ivory Coast suffered some hitches as Ghana then directed its foreign policy towards building cooperation with Togo. The PNDC government accused the Ivory Coast of allowing Ghanaian rebels to use its territory as a base from which to carry out acts of sabotage against Ghana as well as granting asylum to political agitators wanted for crimes in Ghana. However, after 1988, relations between Ghana and Ivory Coast improved significantly. The PNDC thereafter worked to improve the transportation and communication links with both Ivory Coast and Togo despite problems with both countries.
Since 1990 ECOWAS has been engaged in peacekeeping missions in Liberia to which Ghana has contributed a large contingent of troops to aid in bringing calm to various parts of that country.

### 2.7 Ghana’s Foreign Policy under the Fourth Republic

The 1992 Constitution establishes the fundamental principles that monitor her foreign policy. In Article 40, Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution titled "Directive Principles of State Policy," it clearly stipulates Ghana's primary foreign policy objectives as follows:

1. The promotion and protection of the interests of Ghana abroad;
2. Seeking the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order.
3. The promotion of respect for international law, treaty obligation and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means; and
4. Adherence to the principles enshrined in, or as the case may be, the aims and ideals of
   i. The Charter of the United Nations;
   ii. The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (now the Constitutive Act of the African Union); - the Commonwealth;
   iii. The Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); and
   iv. Many other international organisation of which Ghana is a member.

**Core functions of the Ministry of Foreign affairs**

- Executing Ghana’s policy of good neighbourliness at both the sub-regional and regional levels, and pursuing vigorously her other foreign policy objectives;
• Dissemination of general information on Ghana within the international community;
• A coordination of the interaction between the Government of Ghana and foreign governments;
• Assistance to national security agencies in safeguarding and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ghana;
• Promotion and maintenance of international peace and security and the policy of good neighbourliness with Ghana's immediate neighbours.

Parliament and Foreign policy making in Ghana’s Fourth Republic

The Parliament of Ghana’s fourth republic has the powers to formulate a select committee constituting of the members of the house. The 1992 constitution under article 103, regulates the composition, terms, powers, functions as well as the procedures for the conduct of its business of which the select committee on foreign affairs is no exception.

Provisions in the 1992 constitution maximizes the role of the select committee in foreign policy making as they contribute tremendously in Ghana’s relation with the world and subsequently the development of the country.

Aims of the Select Committee of Foreign Affairs under Ghana’s Fourth Republic

• To conduct investigations and enquiries into the activities and administration of the ministry of foreign affairs and Ghana’s external relations.
• To examine draft budgets of the sector Ministry. It performs this function by examining the drafts budgets of the sector ministry and may call for explanations of foreign policy options and direction of sector ministers.
2.8 Foreign Policy under the National Democratic Congress (NDC)

Ghana’s foreign policy under the new constitutional rule started with the reorganisation of the structures within the NDC government, which had policies no different from that of the PNDC as the government had the same structures like that of the PNDC with the same leader as Ghana continued to participate in international peacekeeping by sending soldiers to operations of the United Nations (UN) in Cambodia in 1992-93 and Rwanda in 1993-94.²⁴

The NDC government, seemed to have been walking in the shadows of the former PNDC's government that’s to say the NDC remains committed to the principle of nonalignment in foreign policy making as they equally opposed meddling with its internal affairs from other countries irrespective of their influence which was slightly different from Nkrumah's foreign policy strategy, for example Nkrumah was often noted for undermining other African administrations, such as that of Togo and Ivory Coast, as he was seen as ideologically conventional.

On the other hand, the NDC government just like the PNDC, focused on the principle of self-governance, involving the right of people to pursue their socio-economic development free from external interference, these were the principles on the then NDC administration.

The objectives of the NDC’s foreign policy still remained maintaining friendly relations and cooperation with all countries that wished for such cooperation, regardless of ideological differences on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Since Ghana was a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the NDC according to their foreign policy deemed it necessary to adhere faithfully to its Charter.
The NDC’s foreign policy also involved creating the closest possible cooperation with neighbouring countries as a result from this cooperation included various bilateral trade and economic agreements and permanent joint commissions involving Ghana and its immediate neighbours, as well as numerous reciprocal state visits by high-ranking officials. The implications of these sub regional cooperation’s have been development, and the reduction of tension between Ghana and neighbouring countries.

Another implication of this regional cooperation saw Rawlings become ECOWAS chairman in August 1994, a position that had evaded him since the PNDC came to power. Ghana’s foreign policy then took to greater heights as President Rawlings immediately undertook several initiatives to reduce tensions and conflict in West Africa. A typical incidence was the Akosombo Accord of September 12, designed to end civil war in Liberia.25

Soon after General Sani Abacha took over in November 1993 as the new head of state of Nigeria, Ghana and Nigeria continued to consult each other on economic, political, as well as security advises and discuss problems affecting both countries even though the West Africa sub region was also on their agenda. President Rawlings visited Nigeria three times to discuss the peace process in Liberia and procedures necessary to restore democracy in that country. Mr Rawlings was known to have described the then Nigerian leader Sani Abacha as a man of Integrity whereas most people saw him as a dictator.26

Ghana’s foreign policy geared towards the Arab countries also flourished very well from PNDC era through to the NDC administration. Ghana received several economic assistance from some Arabian countries, some of which were loan agreements with the Saudi Arabian Fund for Development which aided various development projects in Ghana, many others including the promotion of Islamic education. Loan agreements totalling US$16.5 million
from the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development were signed to fund thermal power plant construction in Takoradi.\(^{27}\)

Just after the peace treaty between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in September 1993, Ghana then reinstated its diplomatic relations with Israel in August 1994 since 1973 in support of member Arab states of the OAU who were at war with Israel. In urging resumption of diplomatic ties, parliament noted that Ghana had the opportunity to have access to Israeli technology with regards to water engineering and irrigation, sewerage construction, and agriculture.\(^{28}\)

2.9 Ghana’s Foreign Policy under the New Patriotic Party (NPP)

Foreign policy making under President Kufuor, was aligned to the western world as his government declared its total support for most US and other “western” policies in Africa. Even though Ghana’s foreign policy at the time was aligned to the western policies, there were times when the Kufuor administration stood up to the US when the then administration was uncomfortable with the US policies.

President Kufuor’s foreign policy was buttressed by what he termed "economic diplomacy." As it was within the milieu of Africa in general specifically West Africa, which was a strategic foreign policy he pursued, President Kufuor’s placed much emphasis on Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau among other African states trying to restore peace. The NPP administration had actively sought to establish a just and an impartial international social and economic system at the same time promoting and protecting the interest of Ghana through bilateral and multilateral agreements. As the leader of the administration he represented a very credible spokesman for Africa which was in his
invitations to major international meetings and conferences such as the founding summit of the AU, G8 Summits in Scotland, the World Economic Forum and many others.

President Kuffour’s passion in establishing very useful bilateral and multilateral ties paid off as he was elected to serve as Chairman of the regional group, ECOWAS for two consecutive terms – 2003 and 2004. In 2007 and finally succeeded by Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania on 31 January 2008.29

On the second term of the NPP administration, Foreign Policy direction in President Kufuor's second term had built on the foundations laid in the first four years as the then administration pursued as he was described as the beacon of hope and a responsible member of the community of nations.

President Kufuor's foreign policy led to Ghana obtaining a record $500 million grant from the U.S Millennium Challenge Account for economic development. With this grant Ghana’s social vision was consolidated as it unleashed the entrepreneurial potential of many Ghanaians as a means of creating wealth and hence dealing with the social challenges facing Ghanaians which saw to the modernization of agriculture for rural development, private sector participation, enhanced social services and vigorous infrastructural development.30

At the multilateral level, Ghana participated effectively in debates on issues of international importance such as control of the movement of hazardous wastes, combating of illicit drug trafficking, and the impact of brain drain on the world's poorest countries. In all these debates Ghana sought to project her national interests, as well as those of developing countries in general.
The NPP Government's firm commitment to foreign policy especially in productive performance in, international organisations, all culminated in the positioning of Ghana on a pedestal that projected Ghana’s image on the international scene.

On its part, the NPP government confirmed commitment by ECOWAS to fulfil many of its objectives. A classic example was the transformation of the ECOWAS Fund to the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development in 2001 due to the tireless effort of the Ghanaian representatives mostly in Parliament and that of the NPP government (IDEA, 2007:68). Besides these developments the NPP government hosted a series of Summits of Heads of States and Governments of the five member states that form the West African monetary zone (WAMZ) in Accra in December 19, 2003. The critical summit signed a statute to establish a West African Central Bank (WACB), the body that was intended to issue a common currency, 'ECO' for use by the five countries with Accra as its headquarters.

The NPP as stated earlier pursue the policy of economic diplomacy through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regional Integration continued to collaborate with the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) to promote the influx of foreign investment into Ghana in which Ghana recorded totalling 417 wholly owned companies by foreign investors, In 2002 the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) recorded a total number of 138 projects valued at about $65.3 million and by the end of the third quarter of 2003 108 projects was registered which was value at about $ 89.86. 31
ENDNOTES


5. Ibid, p. 32.


15. Ibid, p. 41.


17. Ibid, p. 41.

19. Asante, K. B., op. cit. p. 44.

20. Ibid. p. 45.


CHAPTER THREE
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN THE FIFTH PARLIAMENT

3.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on foreign policy making in the Fifth Parliament of the Fourth Republic. It highlights the key foreign policy decisions during the Fifth Parliament. Also, the chapter enumerates the benefits the accrued to Ghana as a result of its foreign policy under the Fifth Parliament. Again, the chapter identified the institutions that participated in foreign policy making under the Fifth Parliament.

Furthermore, interview responses and information from various literature and documents which address the objectives of this study, the research questions and, ultimately, the hypothesis of the study with respect to foreign policy making in the Fifth Parliament were stated, analysed and discussed. In that regard, two key parliamentarians namely Hon. Emmanuel Bandua, Member of Parliament for Biakoye constituency and Hon. Yaw Owusu-Boateng were interviewed and parliamentary Hansards covering the subject matter were used. Also, Budget statement for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 together with the “State of the Nation’ Addresses” for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 were also used for the stated purpose.

3.1 Ghana’s Foreign Policy under the National Democratic Congress (NDC) 2009-2012

Ghana’s foreign policy has continued to follow the principles of President Nkrumah despite occasional shifts in paradigm over the years. And so the foreign policy of the new NDC administration continued in the light of its traditional features of very strong bilateral and
multilateral ties, international treaty obligations and a firm commitment to the principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter.

This was very clear as the NDC administration participated in international affairs with a strong proclivity for supporting the causes of economic integration, continental unity and Pan-Africanism causes that were in the light of President Nkrumah’s policies.

As stated by the then president Mills “The concept of the free movement of persons and goods throughout our respective countries must progress from mere slogans to results oriented actions that will encourage integration and economic development in our sub-region.”

Ghana continued to be engaged vigorously beyond the Africa Union to the world. As it was intended to maintain an active role in the United Nations and its specialised agencies as well as in other multilateral organisations such as the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement etc.”

In the “State of the Nation” address by President Mills he promised to honour all legitimate international treaty obligations while Ghana sought its objectives among friendly countries that shared Ghana’s commitment to democratic governance by its unflinching support for world peace as well as social and distributive economic justice.

This made Ghana's relations with countries outside the African Continent witness a further strengthening as initiative resulted in the effective mobilisation of development aid as well as technical assistance from various countries and institutions.
The NDC’s foreign policy seemed to be strongly embedded with US foreign policy as the administration allowed the establishment of an Israeli embassy in Ghana, as Israel was an ally to the US this was to increase the tie between Ghana and Israel.

The NDC’s belief in sovereignty was confirmed in President Atta Mill’s “State of the Nation” address. In his speech, he indicated that “Ghana is no longer interested in what happens around us in the world if that would mean offending some powerful countries who are bullying the less powerful nations and peoples of the world.”

This showed the position of Ghana’s foreign policy with regards to alignment to Western policies. Foreign policy with regards to regional integration under President Atta Mills’ administration was aimed at ensuring peace and eliminating tension within the sub region however this policy was in question when Cote d’Ivoire was at the brink of civil war in early 2011 when the then president Laurent Gbagbo refused to concede defeat after losing the presidential runoff vote to Ouattara.

While many nations including sub-regional bodies like the ECOWAS, expected Ghana to play its leadership role in the sub-region by ensuring peace and eliminating tension, President Atta Mills’ posture was “mind your own business”, which was his first response on the situation which seem contrary to the country’s traditional foreign policy since independence. Thus, the statement was seen to lack diplomatic exactness and also inconsistent with the broader principles of Ghana’s foreign policy towards her neighbours.
In this globalized world, it would be difficult for any country to successfully alienate itself from happenings elsewhere, especially, conflict situation in an immediate neighbouring country. If Ghana even had the intention to “mind its own business”, it still had refugees from Cote d’Ivoire to deal with. When the border was closed, passengers traveling to Cote d’Ivoire and other African nations through Ghana were stranded at the border.

During the NDC’s administration, after the discovery of Ghana’s oil in commercial quantities, this was believed to affect Ghana’s position in foreign policies. A workshop themed "Foreign Policy in Ghana's Emerging Oil Economy," was organized which saw various stakeholders such as foreign policy practitioners, researchers, and representatives of civil society organizations, to cross examine Ghana’s foreign policy direction with regards to the discovery of the emerging oil economy as well as provide a working document targeted at guiding the President and the Foreign Affairs Ministry in formulating Ghana’s foreign policy.

The then Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Alhaji Mohammed Mumuni, in his address at the said event, pointed out the link between domestic and foreign policies and hence placed much emphasis for the Ministry to forestall the influence that the forthcoming production of oil will have on Ghana’s interest abroad besides its relations with the rest of the of the world. The minister held the view that issues of such calibre were complex and needed to be cross-examined conceptually due to their relatively complex nature and the multi-disciplinary range.5

Some of the benefits Ghana derived from her foreign policies were observed through some loan agreements received from other countries these involved Bilateral trade and foreign developmental projects, A typical example was when the Parliament of Ghana on Wednesday, 29th February 2012 approved an agreement between the Ghana National
Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and the UNIPEC Asia Company Limited targeted at Jubilee oil Fields. The said agreement was a subsidiary of the Master Facility Agreement (MFA) between Ghana and the China Development Bank (CDB).

The agreement involved the purchasing and lifting of 13,000 barrels of Jubilee Crude Oil per day, amounting to five cargos a year at a cargo size of 950,000 net US barrels from GNPC, by UNIPEC Asia Company. The same agreement with the CDB, involved a loan facility to a tune of three billion dollars to undertake various infrastructural projects in the country, the MFA requires government to enter into separate subsidiary agreements with the CDB for each project to be implemented under the loan facility. 6

Another benefit Ghana got from her foreign policy was the supplier’s credit agreement between Ghana and the China International Water and Electricity Corporation for an amount of 162,000,000.00 dollars which was approved by the parliament of Ghana. Monies gotten from this deal was used for supplying as well as installation of materials and equipment under the national electrification scheme for the Volta region and throughout other regions as an extension of the Upper West Electrification project.

According to the Chairman of the Finance Committee, Mr James Klutse, who read the committee’s report on the above agreement, confirmed the credit was to finance the supply and installation of electrical materials and equipment under the National Electrification Scheme in order to extend the scope of works of the Upper West Electrification project to cover projects in the Volta and six other regions.
3.2 Data Analysis and Discussion

The interviews sought to elicit responses from these personalities regarding the capacity of Parliament in the Foreign Policy Making process in Ghana. The other documents were used as a basis to provide an empirical evidence of Parliament’s usage of its Constitutional powers and the Constitutional arrangements in the making and shaping of Ghana’s foreign policies. I reasoned that these documents will help to determine whether parliament, through its Constitutional powers and its administrative capacity complement the executive in foreign policy making in Ghana.

Areas of Emphasis

Foreign policy, in simple terms, relates to the actions and inactions of states, represented by their governments, in relation to other actors in the international system\(^7\). In this regard, activities that surround foreign policy making are the appointment of a state’s international representatives, recognizing states and governments, receiving and sending envoys, maintaining diplomatic relations with other states, making treaties and entering into international agreements.\(^8\)

In the spirit of clarity and for the avoidance of ambiguity, the points of reference set forth for analysis and discussion were the various constitutional provisions that directly relate to the making of foreign policy. Thus, these were Articles 40, 73, 74, 75 and 78(1) of the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana.

However, before these provisions are outlined in turn, it is important to establish, with reference to constitutional provisions, in whom the executive authority of Ghana resides. The executive authority of Ghana is vested in the President by Article 58(1). Meanwhile, Article 57(1) explicitly states that “There shall be a President of the Republic of Ghana who shall be
the Head of State and Head of Government and Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of Ghana. This background is key because it brings to the fore the institution that is placed by the Constitution at the forefront of Ghana’s foreign policy making.

3.3 Overview of responses from Interviews

The interview was meant to elicit responses from these personalities regarding the capacity of Parliament in the Foreign Policy Making process in Ghana. It touched on the research capacity of Parliament, usage of constitutional powers and the challenges facing Parliament.

When Hon. Yaw Owusu-Boateng was asked about how often the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs met, he responded that, the Committee meets on average every three months. Concerning the issue of the availability of research staff, he answered that yes but there were two attachés in the Select Committee for Foreign Affairs plus a few National Service Personnel. On the question of whether Parliament has really modified any foreign policy initiative from the Executive, he answered the affirmative but on the low side.

He responded to the question concerning the possibility of the Select Committee’s activities influencing the entire membership of Parliament in exercising their duties as a whole parliament that, the Select Committee submit their reports to Parliament to discussion. He added that these reports narrow the issues to enable effective discussion by Parliament.

When Hon. Emmanuel Bandua was asked about their usage of the power to summon a public official, he responded positive that they did. However, he indicated that Parliament did not initiate their powers of passing a vote of censure. When he was asked about whether Parliament has really modified any foreign policy initiative from the Executive, he responded
that Parliament did that rarely and added that Parliament does not alter international instruments like treaties and conventions because, Parliament believes that the Executive will enter into such dealings in the best interest of Ghanaians\textsuperscript{15}. Concerning the challenges, both Parliamentarians sited lack of financial support for their activities.

### 3.4 Analysis of Constitutional Provisions in the Making of Ghana’s Foreign Policy

Articles 40 and 73, which seek to give direction to any objective of Ghana’s foreign policy, state that:

“In dealing with other nations, the Government shall

(a) promote and protect the interest of Ghana;

(b) seek the establishment of a just and equitable international economic and social order;

(c) Promote respect for international law, treaty obligations and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means;… .” and

“The Government of Ghana shall conduct its international affairs in consonance with the accepted principles of public international law and diplomacy in a manner consistent with the national interest of Ghana.”\textsuperscript{16}

In addition to these provisions above, the appointment of Ghana’s Ministers, of which the Foreign Affairs Minister is no exception, is the preserve of the President as established by Article 78(1).

Another article of great importance regarding the subject matter is Article 74. It states that

(1) “The President shall, acting in consultation of the Council of State, appoint persons to represent Ghana abroad.”

(2) “The President may receive envoys accredited to Ghana.”\textsuperscript{17}

Article 75 has it that,
(1) “The President may execute or cause to be executed treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of Ghana.”

(2) “A treaty, agreement or convention executed by or under the authority of the President shall be subject to ratification by-

(a) Act of Parliament; or

(b) A resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of more than one-half of all the members of Parliament.”

These provisions as stipulated above clearly indicate that the Executive greatly dominate in the activities that directly relates to Ghana’s foreign policy making. This is because, as mentioned earlier, foreign policy making activities concerns the appointment of a state’s international representatives, recognizing states and governments, receiving and sending envoys, maintaining diplomatic relations with other states, making treaties and entering into international agreements.

Therefore, While the responsibility of sending and receiving envoys accredited to Ghana has been assigned to the President by Article 74, the power to execute or cause to be executed treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of Ghana also reside in the President as stated by Article 75(1). To complete the treaties, agreements and the conventions’ making process, Article 75(2) enjoins Parliament to ratify a treaty, agreement or convention executed by or upon the authority of the President by an Act of Parliament or a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of more than one-half of all the members of Parliament.
3.5 Analysis of the Role of Parliament in Ghana’s Foreign Policy Making

As a representative of the people, Parliament through its constitutional powers has some roles to play regarding appointing Ghana’s Foreign and Regional Integration Minister, recognizing states and governments, maintaining diplomatic relations with other states, making treaties and entering into international agreements and commitment to international, African and Ghanaian legal foreign policy statutes.


Appointment of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration Ministers

The Constitution assigns the power to appoint Ministers to the President. However, Article 78(1), which gives such powers to the President, also enjoins Parliament to first approve the nominee before swearing-in.

The Fifth Parliament in fulfilment of this provision, vetted and approved Hon. Mohammed Mumuni prior to his swearing-in. The proceedings as contained in the parliamentary hansard of Friday, 20th February 2009 show that there was serious disagreements between the Majority and the Minority sides in Parliament regarding Hon. Mumuni’s nomination. The Minority side walked out of the vetting room due to a corruption allegation labelled against Hon. Mumuni. This was detailed in the final report of the Forensic Audit of the National
Vocational Training Institute (NVTI) commissioned by and submitted to the Auditor-General in September 2004.

The Minority upon this document, referred the Chairman of the Committee to Standing Orders Number 93 and The Whistle Blowers Act, 2006(Act 720), section 1(a) and 3(1) as a basis to reject Hon. Mumuni’s nomination. However, a ruling by the Chairman Hon. Doe Adjaho caused the Minority to be angry and thus they walked out of the vetting process. On the floor of Parliament this issue was debated but in the final analysis, the Members were made to vote which saw Hon. Mumuni gaining the nod with 116 votes for and 74 votes against.

**Recognizing States and Governments**

One key activity in international relations is the act of a state recognizing another state or government. In that regard, the statement by President Attah-Mills in the State of the Nation’s Address of 2011 for the year 2010 about Government’s expectation of the creation of newly created South Sudan indicated Government’s recognition for South Sudan as a state.

**Making Treaties and entering into International Agreements**

The central vehicle of foreign policy making is through treaty, convention and agreement. Thus, on 14th February, 2012, Parliament ratified a UN Convention against Transitional Organized Crime. In addition, Parliament of Ghana on Wednesday, 29th February 2012 also approved an agreement between the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC) and the United Petroleum and Chemicals Company Ltd. (UNIPEC) targeted at Jubilee oil Fields. The said agreement was a subsidiary of the Master Facility Agreement (MFA) between Ghana and the China Development Bank (CDB).
The supplier’s credit agreement between Ghana and the China International Water and Electricity Corporation for an amount of $162,000,000.00 was approved by the parliament of Ghana. Monies gotten from this deal was used for supplying as well as installation of materials and equipment under the national electrification scheme for the Volta region and throughout other regions as an extension of the Upper West Electrification project.

Strangely, in the 2010 address representing the year 2009, no mention was made of foreign policy as contained in subsequent addresses. For that reason, Parliament did not debate any issue of foreign policy regarding the state of the nation’s address.

Meanwhile, the outlook for the 2009 budget statement had it that Government would pursue a nationwide education and sensitization of the people concerning the African Peer Review Mechanism (APR). In addition, Government also budgeted to support Ghanaians as candidates in international organizations.

**Commitment to International, African and Ghanaian Legal Foreign Policy Statutes**

In the State of the Nation’s Address in 2011 for the year 2010, it was indicated that Government would draw expertise to help Cote D’Ivoire to find a lasting solution to the political impasse there. This was in the spirit of ensuring good neighbourliness as espoused by the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. In addition, it was indicated that Government would support peace-keeping initiatives across the world and also, the pronouncement by President Mills about North Africa that Government will keep an eye on their crisis and hoping for things to simmer down, was an indication of Governments preparedness to ensure peace in that region of Africa.
In the 2010 budget for the 2011 fiscal year, the Minister of Finance indicated Governments foreign policy as, among other things, continue to show commitment to international conventions and protocols by ensuring the timely signing of, or accession to international conventions and protocols and to coordinate and monitor effective implementation of signed and ratified conventions and protocols.

In the “State of the Nation” address of 2012 for the year 2011, President Mills indicated his commitment to the usage of international institutions to settle international dispute by tasking, as he stated that, the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources will coordinate with Ghana Boundary Commission in pursuit of delineating the outer limits of the continental shelf of Ghana beyond 200 nautical miles (M) which was at the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).19

This was to address the confusion regarding the position of Ghana’s Jubilee Oil Field, which was contested by Cote D’Ivoire. This is not surprising because in the 2011 budget, the Minister of Finance, in his outlook for 2011, stated that “government will aim at establishing a just and an equitable international economic and social order, through the pursuit of economic diplomacy, respect for international law and the settlement of international disputes in collaboration with other countries and appropriate international organizations.”20

In the State of the Nation’s Address of 2013 for the year 2012, The President John Dramani Mahama indicated their support for peace and security in the West African Region. This was demonstrated by government’s policy of joining ECOWAS on seeking a permanent peaceful solution to the conflict in Mali by contributing a modest detachment of Ghana’s Armed Forces to participate in the African-led force operation in Mali, AFISMA.
3.6 Discussion

A critical look at the constitutional provisions, comparative human resource capacities of the executive, the legislature and the activities of parliament regarding their roles in Ghana’s foreign policy making under the 5th Parliament show that the Executive greatly dominates the foreign policy making process. The reasons for this phenomenon, based on the facts enumerated above and their resultant analysis, are the disproportionate constitutional powers and human recourse capabilities between the executive and the legislature.

In addition, the ultra-partisanship of the Members of parliament coupled with their strict party discipline are also factors that are attributable to this end. Also, the hybrid system of government being practiced in Ghana cannot be left out in this regard.

First, a critical look at the vetting proceedings and approval of Hon. Mohammed Mumuni as Ghana’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration best illustrate the strict party discipline and ultra-partisanship in Parliament.

This was evidenced by the votes cast in him where prior to his approval. The composition of the 5th Parliament was that the National Democratic Congress had 116 members, the New Patriotic Party had 107 members, there were 4 Independent members and the People’s National Convention and the Convention People’s Party had 2 and 1 members respectively. At the end of the voting, the AYES were 116 and NOS were 74\(^2\).

Giving the way members of parliament conducted themselves by even the minority group walking out of the vetting, there is no doubt in my mind that the 116 votes were from the Majority group.
Recognizing other states and governments is another key feature of foreign policy. Considering the rare nature of state creation in the 21st century and giving the absence of any treaty or agreement signing involved in such actions, Parliament has less control over that endeavour. The recognition of South Sudan as a state, as stated above, could not have been questioned by Parliament giving the involvement of the United Nations and other International Organizations in their gaining of independence.

The maintenance of diplomatic ties is managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration. Given how humanly resourceful this Ministry possesses regarding diplomacy, Parliament or the Foreign Affairs Select Committee cannot match their professionalism, skills and knowledge in that regard. Hence, the duty of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to oversee the activities of all Ghanaian missions is circumscribed.

Treaty, Conventions and Agreements are the major vehicles through which foreign policy is conducted. In the process of their formulation, it undergoes serious considerations by experts and key professional foreign relations experts. It is in this respect that the constitution tasks the Executive, through its institutions, to play a key role in their deliberations and signings. Thus, the powers of Parliament to ratify them are limited to the extent that most information regarding their deliberations emanates from the Executive.

This was evident by the interview with Hon. Bandua. When he was asked about parliamentarians’ powers under Article 75(2) regarding their usage to control such treaties and agreements, he said, Parliament does not alter such international instruments because, they believe the Executive will enter into such dealings in the best interest of Ghanaians.
Ghana’s urge towards contributing to the maintenance of international economic and political order has characterized its foreign policies throughout the fourth republic. In this regard, foreign policies within this framework have always received the ‘blessings’ from Parliament. In sum, the powers of parliament regarding foreign policy making is limited to controlling policies already formulated or initiated by the executive. This position is evidenced in the provisions in the 1992 Constitution of Ghana ie. Articles 75(2), 78(1), 82(1), and 103(3)(6). However, as representatives of the people, Parliament should be expected to play an active role in the initiating and making of foreign policies for Ghana. What is even striking is the challenges Parliament face in even executing their monitoring and controlling role.

An interview with both Hon. Yaw Owusu-Boateng and Hon. Emmanuel Bandua revealed that the Select committee tasked to monitor or oversee the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration is faced with serious financial constraints in such endeavour. Also, as a delicate and complex activity as conducting foreign policy initiatives, a well-resourced and professional staff are needed as a supporting institution to Parliament and ultimately, the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. However, this is absent.

Given the Constitutional provisions detailing the powers of Parliament regarding foreign policy making and challenges faced by Parliament in this regard, in terms of the making of foreign policies between 2009 and 2012, I state that Parliament does not complement the Executive in foreign policy making. Thus, their role is essentially supervisory and even that they are circumscribed by challenges that inhibit their effective performance of such duties.
ENDNOTES


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.


5. President John Evans Atta Mills. (2011) Oil production will not alter Ghana’s foreign policies retrieved July 12, 2012 from 


10. Interview with Hon. Yaw Owusu-Boateng, Member of Parliament for Oda Constituency, Accra on 17th July, 2013.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Ibid.


CHAPTER FOUR
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter details the recommendations proffered, the summary of the study and the conclusion of the research.

4.1 Summary of Findings

The practice of having a political institution that is independent and having the necessary legal powers to provide oversight responsibilities over the political institution in whom the executive powers of a state is vested is a widely accepted norm in liberal democracies. This practice has been established to satisfy a cardinal tenet of liberal democracy – accountability. In that regard, the legislature, which provides this oversight function, is expected to be representative of a state’s population. It is worthy to note that one of the reasons for having a representative Legislative is to allow a policy that emanate from the Executive arm of government to be scrutinized by this representative institution from diverse perspectives.

The point that Ghana’s foreign policy is executed by both the executive and the legislature cannot be overemphasized. However, it is instructive to note that under Ghana’s current constitutional arrangement, these organs of government have distinct roles to play regarding the formulation and execution of foreign policy making in Ghana. In Ghana, the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana places the ultimate responsibility for the conduct of Ghana’s international relations in the President.
However, within the Executive arm of government, the actors involved in the making of Ghana’s foreign policy are the President, the Cabinet, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Council of State and the National Security Council. In Parliament, the Foreign Affairs committee and Parliament-at-sitting are the key actors.

The Executive arm of government is noted to possess monumental influence in the foreign policy making process in Ghana because of its enormous and powerful institutions and skewed constitutional provisions in its favour relative to the Parliament. In the 1992 Constitution, Articles 40, 57(1), 58(1), 73, 74(1) (2) and 75(1) give the Executive arm of government overarching powers that help it in the foreign policy making process. However, the Constitutional provisions that explicitly establish Parliament’s involvement in Ghana’s foreign policy are Articles 75(2), 78 and 82. Article 75(2) empowering Parliament to ratify any treaty, agreement or convention executed by the President or caused to be executed by him through an Act of Parliament or a resolution of Parliament supported by the votes of more than one-half of all the members of Parliament.

At the instance of this disproportionate distribution of foreign policy powers among the Executive and Parliament, this study sought to ascertain whether Parliament through its marginal powers relative to that of the Executive complement the Executive in Ghana’s Foreign Policy making.

Therefore, in order to establish whether the Parliament of Ghana complement the Executive under the current constitutional arrangements specifically the 5th Parliament of the Fourth Republic, as hypothesized, the 1992 constitution, Parliamentary Hansards, Standing Orders of
Parliament and online resources, served as reference points upon which a critical analysis was done to determine the validity of the statement thereof.

In this regard, activities that were considered as relating to foreign policy making were the appointing of Ghana’s international representatives, recognizing states and governments, receiving and sending envoys, maintaining diplomatic relations with other states, making treaties and entering into international agreements.

However, responses from interviews and evidences from official documents showed that given the Constitutional provisions detailing the powers of Parliament regarding foreign policy making and challenges faced by Parliament in this regard, in terms of the making of foreign policies between 2009 and 2012, Parliament does not complement the Executive in foreign policy making. Thus, their role is essentially supervisory and furthermore they are circumscribed by challenges that inhibit their effective performance of such duties.

4.2 Conclusion

In conclusion, this study, through its methodology, analysis and discussion, has provided the key issues surrounding Parliament and foreign policy making in Ghana under the fourth republic, specifically the 5\textsuperscript{th} Parliament of the fourth republic. Conclusively, fair analysis have been made and thus, the research questions, objectives and hypothesis have been duly addressed.

Given the parameters set for the composition of foreign policy making activities, the areas of emphasis were the appointment of Ghana’s international representatives, recognizing states and governments, receiving and sending envoys, maintaining diplomatic relations with other
states, making treaties and entering into international agreements. Within this framework, the Executive were seen to be dominant in its execution. Parliament, a representative of the Ghanaian people, was seen to be passive in this noble endeavour. Even though their roles were largely based on controlling, monitoring and evaluating the actions of the Executive, they were faced with challenges that further deepened their influence and powers in such regard.

These challenges included the low level of potency in their powers as assigned by the constitution, lack of technical capacity to handle the complex nature of modern day foreign policy making, lack of a well instituted and proficient source of funds for their activities and the lack of continuity among its membership over the years.

At the instance of these problems, some measures were recommended as a way to mitigate, if not solve these problems.

These recommendations were the amendment of the 1992 constitution, the institution of a fund, which will require a 5% charge on the total internally generated revenues in parliament to support their activities and the organization of a periodic stakeholders consultative workshops with credible and well established Civil Society Organization and Think-tanks.

4.3 Recommendations

Owed to the analysis and discussions done in the previous chapter, I proffer the following recommendations as possible solutions to rectify the challenges being faced by Parliament in their foreign policy making duties.
- Amendment of the 1992 Constitution to enable Parliament play a more proactive role in Ghana’s foreign policy making process.

- Establishing a fund for Parliament which will constitute 5% of government’s total internally generated revenues.

- Establishment of a periodical stakeholders consultative workshop between the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Civil Society Organizations and Think-tanks that deal specifically with foreign policies of Ghana.

**Amendment of the 1992 Constitution**

From the discussions and findings, I am optimistic that if some provisions are added to the 1992 Constitution, Parliament will be constitutionally empowered to be effective in their work. I make this recommendation with due regard to the status of Parliament as the representative of the people. As such, Parliament ought to enjoin the President to embark on specific foreign policy initiatives.

**Establishing a fund for Parliament**

Considering the responses from the Parliamentarians interviewed, it is evident that they were financially challenged. This problem also has its bearing on the reason why they do not have a well-established research-based supporting staff. Therefore, I recommend that a 5% charge should be placed on the total internally generated funds to help Parliament function more effectively.

**Establishing a Periodic Stakeholders’ Consultative Workshop**

It is important that Parliament get policy alternatives from well-established and credible Civil Society Organizations and Think-tanks in the area of foreign policy making. I thus,
recommend that instituted periodical stakeholders consultative workshops must be established to help shore up Parliament's information on policy initiatives.
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Interview with Hon. Emmanuel Bandua, Member of Parliament for Biakoye Constituency, Accra on 18th July, 2013.
APPENDIX 1

Interview Guide for Parliamentarians

1. How often does the committee meet? (Whether monthly, quarterly or annually)
2. Does Parliament have research staff for its activities?
3. Does Parliament have the powers to adjust or modify foreign policy initiatives of the executive?
4. How does the activities of the FAC have an influence on the activities of the whole house in terms of foreign policy making?
5. Did Parliament summon the Minister of foreign Affairs and Regional Integration to provide response to questions during the period of 2009-2012?
6. If no, Why? If yes, on what issues of concern?
7. Has parliament ever intended to pass any vote of censure against any minister in its history in the fourth republic?
8. Has parliament used its budget approval powers to change the direction of Ghana’s foreign policy before?
9. In your opinion, what are the challenges that parliament face in relation to its roles in Ghana’s foreign policy making.
10. If yes, what would you recommend to be done to rectify these challenges?
APPENDIX 2

1. Hansard on vetting proceedings and approval for the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009.


3. Hansard on parliaments deliberations on the “State of the Nation Address” from 2009-2013.