DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN AFRICA AND THE PROBLEM OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE: A CASE OF COTE D’IVOIRE AND GHANA

BY

JOHN DOE
10395183

THIS DISSERTATION IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DEGREE

LEGON APRIL, 2014
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that except for acknowledged references, this work is the result of my own research under the supervision of Dr. Emmanuel Kennedy Ahorsu. It has not been presented anywhere either in part or in its entirety for the award of a degree.

Student:
John Doe

........................................ Date .....................................

Supervisor:
Dr. Emmanuel Kennedy Ahorsu

........................................ Date .....................................
DEDICATION

The work is dedicated to the Almighty God for his abundant grace showered on me throughout life and especially the period spent at the University of Ghana - Legon.

I also dedicate this work to my parents; beloved mother, Madam Florence Abbey and my late dad Daniel Doe who did not live to see this day.

*To God be the glory great things he has done.*
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to acknowledge the assistance received from everybody who in diverse ways made it possible for me to complete this dissertation.

First and foremost I thank my able Supervisor, Dr. Emmanuel Kennedy Ahorsu for his tutelage that has led to the successful completion of this work. I am also thankful to Mrs. Rhoda Acheampong for final proof reading of my work to ensure that it makes more meaning to its readers. I further wish to express my sincere gratitude to my colleagues whose recommendation of reading materials aided this research.

Finally, I am grateful to all Research Fellows at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) for the part they have played in shaping my academic capabilities. Indeed, their efforts have aided my understanding and progress in the research area.

My gratitude will be incomplete if I do not acknowledge the support received from my colleagues at the National Commission for Civic Education, Headquarters, Messrs Samuel Asare Akuamoah (Director of Programmes), Clifford Thompson and Ms. Ophelia Ankrah who readily come to mind. The enormous encouragement and moral support I received from Madam Ransolina Letitia Mensah throughout the period of the Research also needs mentioning.

However, I am solely responsible for any short coming, whether marginal or substantial which may be associated with this dissertation.
ABSTRACT

The Africa continent is rife with deep scares of undemocratic changes in government since the attainment of political independence by most Sub-Saharan African countries. These chequered and abrupt changes in government have been partly blamed for the slow pace of development on the continent. After long periods of ‘dancing chair military takeovers’, democracy has generally become an accepted means of governance across the continent. But the practice of democracy has not come easy at all. Specifically, some democratic elections in Africa have experienced violence with dire consequences. Others have also escalated into violence that has taken international dimensions. Electoral violence has therefore partly soiled the democratic success story of the continent, sometimes creating the impression that the practice of democracy is not the best for Africa. This research therefore sought to investigate the problem of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Africa, with Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana as case studies. It was conducted within the theoretical framework of democratic peace which asserts that democracies do not naturally go to war with each other due to their peace assuring nature. In this regard, democratic states will therefore develop the necessary institutions of peace in order to avoid the consequences of war and conflicts which are a threat to the survival of the regime and state. The study revealed that Huntington’s ‘two-turn over test’ for measuring democratic consolidation is insufficient, especially in the case of some African countries such as Botswana and South Africa. Considering the unique situation of many African countries in which there are elections without all the essential elements of a democracy (as discussed in this study), this insufficiency is deepened by Huntington’s overemphasis on the primacy of elections in a democracy. Another major finding was that democratic consolidation in Africa, following the ‘Third Wave’ can be attributed to what can be describe as a ‘reverse parallel development’ following the usage of democratization as conditionality for economic aid in Ghana and other African countries during the implementation of Economic Recovery Programs (ERPs) and Structural Adjustment. The study further found out that the problem of electoral violence is generated from among others, the patrimonial nature of African politics and its ‘winner-takes-all’ system. Despite these challenges, civil societies have played an enormous role in the success story of some African elections, like in the case of Ghana. The research therefore concludes that the establishment of independent governance institutions (IGIs) has helped promote civic education and democratic temperance which are key elements of democratic peace. Ghana’s novelty example of the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) is commendable. By contrast, the relative under-development of these institutions is a major flaw in efforts at democratic consolidation and the prevention or resolution of electoral violence in Cote d’Ivoire. The Author therefore recommends among others, the creation and sustenance of effective civil society organizations (CSOs) and IGIs as a safeguard to democracy on the continent.
# TABLE OF CONTENT

| DECLARATION          | i          |
| DEDICATION          | ii         |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENT      | iii        |
| ABSTRACT            | iv         |
| TABLE OF CONTENT    | v          |

## CHAPTER ONE

### RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Background to the Problem  
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
1.3 Objective of the Research  
1.4 Hypothetical Statement  
1.5 Rationale of the Research  
1.6 Review of Existing Literature  
  1.6.1 What is Democracy?  
    1.6.1.1 Introduction  
    1.6.1.2 Definitions of Democracy  
  1.6.2 The Concept of Sustainable Democracy  
  1.6.3 Essential Elements of Democracy  
  1.6.4 Politics under Authoritarian Regimes  
    1.6.4.1 The Necessity of Democracy  
  1.6.5 Democracy in Divided Societies and the need for Institutional Engineering  
    1.6.5.1 Constitutional Design and Conflict Management  
  1.6.6 Institutional Malaise associated with Ghana’s Political Process  
  1.6.7 Structural Violence and Origins of the 2010 Political Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire  
1.7 Theoretical Framework  

CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION IN AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

2.1 Origins of Democracy and Elections in Africa

2.1.1 Pre-Colonial Period

2.1.2 Colonialism and its Legacy

2.1.3 Post-colonial Africa

2.2 Socio-Economic Underdevelopment and Political Crisis in Africa

2.2.1 The Crisis of Governance

2.3 The Electoral Process, Peacemaking and Conflict Generation in Africa

2.4 The State of Democracy in Africa

2.5 State-Society Relationship in Africa

2.6 The Role of Civil Societies in Governance in Africa

2.7 Origins of Electoral Violence in Africa

2.8 Causes of Electoral Violence in Africa

2.9 Effects of Electoral Violence on Democratic Consolidation in Africa

2.10 The Africa Union and Peace in Kenya’s 2013 General Elections

2.11 Causes of Democratization in Africa and an Evaluation of the ‘Two-turnover elections test’

2.11.1 The Causes of democratization in Africa: Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana

2.11.2 Evaluation of the ‘Two-turnover election test’ of measuring democratic consolidation
CHAPTER THREE

ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN COTE D'IVOIRE AND GHANA

3.0 Introduction to Electoral Violence 54

3.1 Triggers of Electoral Violence in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire 54

3.2 Manifestations of Electoral Violence and the Electoral Cycle in
Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire 57

3.2.1 Introduction 57

3.2.2 Electoral Violence and the Electoral Cycle in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire 58

3.2.2.1 Pre-Election Violence in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire 59

3.2.2.2 Election Period Violence in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire 61

3.2.2.3 Post-Election Violence in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire 63

3.2.3 Ghana’s Pass Mark of the ‘Two-Election Test’ 68

3.3 Comparative Political Development in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire 69

3.3.1 Post Independent Economic Paths, Demographic Pressures and the
Opportunity to Democratize 70

3.3.2 The Post-Cold War Political Landscape and the Influence of
Ethnicity on Electoral Violence in Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire 71

CHAPTER 4

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 75

4.1 Introduction 75

4.2 Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions 75

4.3 Recommendations 79

References 84
CHAPTER ONE

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

The African continent, before its partitioning and colonial rule, was generally regarded as ‘terra nullius’ since its inhabitants were poorly organised.\(^1\) The inhabitants of most parts of the continent did not have well established administrative and governance systems. These areas were subsequently partitioned and colonized among the major European Powers (save a few portions) at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.\(^2\)

Colonial systems of governance that were instituted in African countries generally remained till the attainment of political independence. They include the political governance systems (parliamentary, presidential or mixed), the territorial areas of a state, the involvement of the institution of chieftaincy in governance, political elitism, among others. These political governance systems were bequeathed African states at the dawn of independence. Colonialism therefore affected the governance arrangement on the continent by providing the framework within which contemporary Africa was to be governed.\(^3\) Colonialism also negatively affected the development of the continent thereby affecting the prospects of democracy in Africa.\(^4\)

Thus, even though the end of colonialism and the attainment of political independence in Africa may have been an optimistic opportunity for self-governance on the continent, this optimism was not however realised. Rather, most of the newly independent countries metamorphosed into undemocratic and one-party political systems leading to economic mismanagement, corruption, political instability and human rights abuses. This situation coupled with the oil shocks of the 1970s, draught and unfavourable terms of trade, created
sharp economic decline and mounting debts leading to what is referred to as the 'lost decades of Africa.'\textsuperscript{5} The unfavourable terms of trade was contributed to by Western countries’ excessive use of synthetic substitutes in place of raw materials which were hitherto imported from Africa. The increase in competition for Western markets by other regional trade areas such as Latin America and Asia was also a contributory factor. These factors led to a fall in foreign exchange earnings for most African countries.

The resultant effect of the unfavourable terms of trade was mounting political and socio-economic pressures. In order to remedy the situation, Economic Recovery Programmes (ERPs) and Structural Adjustment were adopted by some African countries such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, etc. The ERPs were initially an economic response to the debt problems of developing countries during the early 1980s, following the collapse of the global commodity prices and economic mismanagement policies. It was an ‘austerity-like’ set of policies meant to help developing countries manage their debts and resolve their persistent dual gap syndrome of foreign exchange and budgetary gaps.

The resultant economic hardships generated by the mounting debts and the remedial actions of ERPs led to political upheavals which, in some cases, became the basis for civil wars. Political reforms were then incorporated into the ERPs to help resolve the resultant political challenges. The political components required implementing states to reform their governance system by instituting multi-party democracy and also develop independent governance institutions that would facilitate good governance. Multi-party democracy was therefore made conditionality for the offer of economic assistance especially, towards the end of the Cold War. This conditionality led to an increasing number of countries accepting multi-party democracy as a system of government. This situation is described by Huntington as the Third Wave of Democratization which marked the third major upsurge in democracy in the World.\textsuperscript{6}
Despite the gains made in democracy on the continent, results have been mixed with some countries performing better than others, and others deteriorating.\(^7\) Even for those that have done relatively well, they still have weaknesses and are unable to meet international standards sets for democratic stability such as the Failed State Index published by the Global Fund for Peace\(^8\) or the Freedom House Ratings.\(^9\)

Some of the challenges associated with African democracies have included political corruption, politics of exclusion, ethnocentrism, abuse of incumbency, administrative inefficiency and lack of economic opportunities.\(^10\) Electoral violence has also increasingly featured prominently in many elections in Africa. It has manifested in various forms such as the snatching of ballot boxes, intimidation and kidnapping of political opponents, structural discrimination/violence, among others. Although electoral violence occurs in different forms and at different periods of the electoral process, its consequences have resulted in humanitarian crisis which have led to loss of life, stagnation in socio-economic growth and in some cases, armed violence and civil war.

Ethnic politics has led to violence and marred numerous elections in Africa such as the 2007 Kenyan Elections. Joel Barkan reports that 1,333 persons died as a result of that elections and more than a half million were rendered homeless during the crisis.\(^11\) In Mali, the lack of political inclusion, characterized by the inability of the government to implement effective decentralization of governance throughout the country, among others, contributed significantly to the political crisis of 2012. Prior to the crisis however, democracy in Mali was rated free by the Freedom House despite its underlining fault lines.\(^12\)

Democratic temperance which involves the acceptance and practice of democratic values such as rule of law and political tolerance is an important virtue for the successful consolidation of democracy. Political tolerance is however not fully accepted as a way of life
among the citizenry of African states, especially the youth. Although the Youth of the continent are key players for the prospects of democratic consolidation, they have often been mobilized by political elites to perpetuate electoral violence. In this regard, economic decline and Youth unemployment have contributed to the ease with which they are mobilized.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Periodic, free and fair elections are a key component of democracy and are perceived as a medium through which democracy can be consolidated. In fact, Samuel Huntington is of the view that a democracy becomes consolidated after it has gone through the 'two-turnover elections test' of two successive and peaceful handovers of power from an incumbent to an opposition party. Although some African countries have instituted electoral democracies such as Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Senegal, etc. while Ghana has passed the two election test, democracy is not yet consolidated as election-related violence still exists in these countries. The attainment of benchmarks and recognised International Standards for democratic stability (such as the Failed State Index and the Freedom House ratings) by some African countries has not necessarily translated into the consolidation of their democracies.

Pre-election periods have also become anxious moments for stakeholders. Almost everywhere elections have been conducted on the continent, it has experienced some form of electoral violence. The abuse of incumbency, use of thugs and 'macho men' to intimidate political opponents (and sometimes prevent them from voting), snatching of ballot boxes, disruption of the electoral process (especially at polling/voting centres), manifestation of violence as a result of disagreement with election results have all featured prominently in most elections in Africa.
Research into democratic consolidation in Africa has not exhaustively considered the critical importance of governance institutions and civil society as essential element of democratic consolidation in Africa. Little attention has also been paid to the negative effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Africa. While the resultant effect of colonialism (which includes creation of divided societies) have often been blamed for electoral violence on the continent, the ‘winner takes all’ electoral system and ‘political patrimonialism’ have received less attention.

How can democracy then be consolidated on the continent in the light of these challenges since the mere institution of democracy has not engendered peace? This work will therefore delve into electoral violence as a challenge to democratic consolidation in Africa.

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH

Among others, the objectives of the Research are:

1. To assess the causes of electoral violence in Africa and how they affect democratic consolidation on the continent.

2. To investigate best practices and success stories in democracy management which have helped to forestall some possible electoral conflicts from escalating in Africa?

3. To explore the trajectory of political developments of Sub-Saharan African states and its consequence in generating electoral violence with specific emphasis on Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.
1.4 HYPOTHETICAL STATEMENT

The work is situated within the hypothesis that the occurrence of electoral violence is a threat to democratic consolidation in Africa.

1.5 RATIONALE OF THE RESEARCH

African countries have generally affirmed their commitment to electoral democracy as a system of governance. It is therefore important to find appropriate means to resolve the challenges that confront democratic consolidation on the continent.

It is against this backdrop, that research into ‘Democratic Consolidation in Africa and the Problem of Electoral Violence’ is important in augmenting existing literature in the subject area. The Research is also in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of a Master of Arts degree in International Affairs.

1.6 REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

1.6.1 What is Democracy?

1.6.1.1 Introduction

The concept of democracy has been illusionary both in definition and practice but its origin can be traced to the ancient Greeks about BC 500. Indeed democracy is an extract from the Greek words ‘demos’, meaning the people, and ‘cratis’, meaning to rule. Two contending viewpoints by Plato and Aristotle have acted as the basis for contemporary debates on the essence of democratic governance. Plato was of the view that a ‘philosopher king’ who was knowledgeable and has a council of advisors should be the nucleus of government. Aristotle, on the other hand believed that mass participation of the citizenry was important for
democratic governance. Plato therefore regarded democracy with some suspicion although preferring some manifestations of it to others, while Aristotle theorized its importance.

1.6.1.2 Definitions of Democracy

A popular definition of democracy is given by U.S President Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) as “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” This definition does not seek to prescribe any preferred form of its practice; rather, it seeks to put people and individual welfare at the centre and purposes of the existence of government.

Bingham Powell defines democracy largely on the lines of competitive elections in which most of the citizens are eligible to participate in the process that involves alternatives in the form of political parties. This definition does not take into account the importance of rules and regulations in the process. It also limits civil liberties to electoral rights.

Adam Przeworski recognises the importance of rules in his definition of democracy. He therefore defines it as a rule based competitive system with divided interests and alternation of power. This definition is also flawed to the extent of alternation of power required as a prerequisite for democracy. This is because there are instances of countries that have been rated as a democracy without the alternation of power between or among political parties. South Africa in the post-Apartheid era is an example. Despite the African National Congress (ANC) being in power since 1994, democracy in South Africa has been consistently rated as fair by the Freedom House Ratings. The situation is also not different from Botswana where the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has ruled since independence in 1962 without power swinging to the opposition.
Andreas Schedler emphasises the importance of democratic culture as an important factor for the consolidation of democracy. The varied definitions and understanding of the concepts of democracy has created a setback in effective setting of priorities for in its promotion. This definitional haziness has created the wind upon which ‘anti-democracy’ proponents have set their sails.

However, Dan Snodderly provides a comprehensive definition of democracy as:

“a state or community in which all adult members of society partake in a free and fair electoral process that determines government leadership, have access to power through their representatives, and enjoy universally recognised freedoms and liberties”.

This definition encapsulates the essential elements required of a democracy such as the existence of civil liberties, free and fair elections, political pluralism, representative and participatory governance.

1.6.2 The Concept of Sustainable Democracy

Joseph Osei discusses the concept of ‘sustainable democracy’ using a horticultural model in the book The Challenge of Sustaining Emergent Democracies. Sustaining democracy, according to the Author, requires genetic engineering through the conduct of citizen's education, development of civil society organisations and legislative reforms. This will see democracy develop a defence mechanism against potential abuse. Osei therefore concludes that democracy cannot be sustained without the support of political elites, intellectuals and civil society. The Author however fails to recognise the negative repercussions of electoral violence on sustainable democracy.
Adam Przeworski et. al. in the book, *Sustainable Democracy* discuss some conditions that make democracy work and last. They include preserving territorial integrity, providing conditions for an effective exercise of democratic citizenship, assuring a modicum of material security and allocating economic resources. The discussion is anchored on the argument of Guillermo O’Donnell, who cites institutional viability and effectiveness of state institutions as necessary conditions for sustainable democracy. The discussion by Przeworski et. al. is predicated on economic issues and structural limitations to the sustainability of democracy but devotes little attention to the need to eliminate electoral violence in order to ensure democratic consolidation.

### 1.6.3 Essential Elements of Democracy

The United Nations (UN) adopted a resolution in 2004 (A/RES/59/201) that set out some seven essential elements of a democracy to include the following:21

1. separation and balance of power
2. independence of the judiciary
3. political pluralism
4. rule of law
5. transparent and accountable governance
6. freedom and independence of the media
7. respect for human and political rights.

The separation and balance of power among the three major arms of government (the executive, legislature and the judiciary) is very important. Separation and balance of powers ensures that although each arm has its mandate and functions, it is also clothed with enough power to ensure that the other two are performing their functions within the limits of the law.
This will guarantee that one arm does not become too powerful to become a tyranny and threat to democracy. Parliament, for instance generally has the responsibility of approving the expenditure of the Executive while the judiciary also interprets the laws which are passed by Parliament and assented to by the President. This is an example of the separation and balance of power in a democracy.

In the exercise of judicial power, the judiciary needs all the assurances of independence to insulate them from any form of interference. This is closely related to another essential element, the rule of law. In a democracy, the rule of law is important to ensure that all persons are equal before the law and the law is over and above all other persons. This ensures predictability of the law and assures every citizen of fairness in the administration of justice. In so doing, institutions become very important in the regulation of social life instead of the rule of strong men.

The media is affectionately referred to as the ‘fourth estate of the realm’ or the fourth arm of government. This gives them the responsibility to act as a liaison between government and the citizenry to ensure representative and participatory governance. They are also to ensure transparent and accountable governance. To do this effectively, freedom and independence of the media in their operations is essential.

A transparent and accountable government also deepens the confidence reposed by its citizenry in it. It therefore enjoys the support of the citizenry in the performance of its functions. This is an indication of a respected ‘social contract’ and a recipe for the renewal of the mandate of government in the next election.

Political parties are vehicles through which the mandate to rule is sought in a democracy. For a democracy to be sustained, political plurality is essential in ensuring that all sides in the contest for power are given an equal and fair chance to achieve their aim. This will ensure
that the eventual victor in an election obtains victory in a free and fair manner and therefore enjoy the recognition it needs to govern. It is however important to note that political parties should not be made the only means by which an individual can have the platform to contest for public office. Individuals should also be guaranteed the right to participate as independent candidates.

The sovereignty of government stems from the people on whose behalf government exercises political authority. Individuals should therefore be freely involved and represented in government if they so desire. These are essential elements in a democracy which are important for its sustenance. All individuals and state institutions therefore have major roles to play in the consolidation of democracy.

1.6.4 Politics under Authoritarian Regimes

Milan Svolik in the book *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* makes an assessment of authoritarian rule in the world and is of the opinion that “dictatorships come in many shapes and sizes.”²² The Literature continues that although some leaders come into power through elections (which may be flawed), or conduct elections while in power, they may actually be practising dictatorship. Dictatorship may therefore exist in all political systems from monarchies, military rule to parliamentary systems. Despite the presence of governance institutions under authoritarian rule, violence becomes the ultimate means of resolving political conflicts. Svolik therefore concludes that institutions are not really of much importance in an authoritarian regime since transitions are mostly violent in nature unlike democracies which have established institutions responsible for the smooth transfer of political power.
Under authoritarian rule, there is therefore a lack of respect for institutions of peacemaking such as an independent judiciary, independent election management bodies and governance institutions. This lack of respect for institutions therefore exposes authoritarian regimes who may even institute elections to electoral violence. This is because the citizenry are generally left with the option of violence in electoral dispute resolution.

Bonny Ibhawoh in the article “Structural Adjustment, Authoritarianism and Human Rights in Africa” discusses human right record of authoritarian regimes during the period of implementation of SAPs. Despite the plausibility of Structural Adjustment Programmes, it became unattractive because of the financial hardships it brought upon the inhabitants of implementing countries. Authoritarian rule during the implementation of SAPs is traced to two phenomena which are the authoritarian nature of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and secondly the tendency of African governments to turn against their own people in their quest to fulfil SAP conditionality.

Ibhawoh asserts, that SAPs had enormous effects on human rights on the continent and therefore concludes that SAPs implemented in Africa was incompatible with the promotion of human rights. In an analysis of the state of Human Rights in three countries (Nigeria, Ghana and Guinea) during the implementation of SAPs, Ibhawoh observes that after an initial relaxation of restrictions under military rule, the obvious strategy was the adoption of violence as a means of resolving conflicts and agitations when they emerged.

1.6.4.1 The Necessity of Democracy

Considering the negativities associated with authoritarian rule, there is the need for a more peaceful and better system of governance, thus the necessity for democracy. William Douglas
in the book Developing Democracy traces the current state of political weakness in developing countries to their inability to modify the political structures that were bequeathed them at independence.\textsuperscript{24} Douglas also discusses the necessity of democracy and asserts that “a well-running democracy will be less prone to corruption than a well-running dictatorship.” Periodic elections however provide the opportunity for peaceful change in political leadership which is absent in a dictatorship. The absence of this opportunity therefore makes the use of violence an option in the quest to change government.

\subsection{1.6.5 Democracy in Divided Societies and the Need for Institutional Engineering}

Tribalism and ethnic divisions are attributed reasons for the argument of the incompatibility of democracy to heterogeneous societies (of which African countries are not excluded). Benjamin Reilly in the book Democracy in Divided Societies, Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management observes that this situation is arrived at due to the Political elite’s practice as ‘outbidding’ on ethnic issues, a situation where they exploit ethnic identities for purposes of political mobilization.\textsuperscript{25} The author also discusses the importance of institutional engineering, in the form of the introduction of electoral systems which aids in dispute resolution. Institutional engineering involves the design of formal and informal rules and systems within which the governance arrangements in a society operates. This helps promote moderation and help contain the possible divisive effects of politics within the governance arrangement of a divided society.

Donald Horowitz in the book The Architecture of Democracy, Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy agrees with the need for institutional engineering.\textsuperscript{26} Horowitz argues that institutional design in divided societies can help minimize the effects of ethnicity and other ascribed identities that lead to divisive politics.
However, the literature by Reilly and Horowitz fails to recognise that institutional engineering without appropriate safeguards such as democracy education on the need for peace and tolerance will not automatically translate into elimination of conflicts in the democracy of a divided society. The acceptance of the tenets of democracy (such as rule of law, majority rule with respect for the rights of minorities) as a way of life is therefore essential in this regard. Also, kinship ties permeate African societies and are very difficult to separate from. This creates room for political patronage and nepotism which have conflict generating tendencies and are difficult to completely eliminate in a divided society.

1.6.5.1 Constitutional Design and Conflict Management

Constitutional engineering is one of the forms of institutional engineering that can help reduce the possibility of conflict generation in a democracy. Despite the possibilities that can be achieved with constitutional engineering, Horowitz concedes that “the process of constitutional choice is fraught with the prospect of bias and distortion.”27 The two main sources of this bias are the relative attractiveness of alternative constitutional models across states. The second point is the interpretation of constitutional experiences within states.28 A country may therefore be biased towards a particular type of constitutional design without due cognisance of its own unique social arrangements. The constitutional experiences of a particular country may also lead to bias towards accepting certain constitutional arrangement that may not be very effective for conflict management and democratic consolidation.

For constitutional designs to be helpful in the prevention of electoral violence, term limits must be set and made an entrenched provision. This will help reduce the ease with which ‘undemocratic’ incumbents attempt to extend their stay in office beyond their mandate.
Clearly spelt out laws for the demarcation of electoral boundaries are also possible safeguards against gerrymandering.

Reilly again makes the assertion that democracy is a tool for managing the inherent conflicts that exists in all societies and therefore concludes that conflicts in democracies cannot be completely resolved, rather they are accommodated through the process of democratic engineering. Amartya Kumar Sen disagrees with this assertion and is of the opinion that democracies have the ability to resolve conflicts completely and has achieved a universal value status as the most significant event that occurred in the 20th century.

1.6.6 Institutional Malaise Associated with Ghana’s Political Process

Kwaku Danso and Ernest Lartey discuss institutional malaise associated with Ghana’s Electoral process in the book Managing Election Related Violence for Democratic Stability in Ghana. They argue that democratic consolidation will be difficult to achieve without the creation of institutions of peacemaking which can set ground rules for the behavior of stakeholders within the context of elections. The book therefore dwells on the relationship between elections and democratic consolidation and also makes a case for building strong formal institutions that will help tackle electoral violence in Africa.

Since Ghana’s return to constitutional rule in 1992, the country has attained the ‘two election test’ (after the successful 2008 General Elections). Danso and Lartey further observe that significant advancement in democratic governance has been made by key state institutions such as the Electoral Commission, the Judiciary and Security Services. The role of the vibrant media and multiplicity of civil society organizations is also commendable. In spite of this advancement, the challenges of election-related violence that have accompanied most elections have to be grappled with. The authors are critical of the diplomatic community’s
assessment of Ghana as a ‘bastion of democracy’. They state that this assessment is an attempt to set Ghana as an example for other African countries to follow and not really a fair assessment of its status.

A weak argument is made by Danso and Lartey about an emerging trend of ‘oil politics’ in Ghana. The tendency to ‘red flag’ all resource rich countries as potential conflict zones is however worrying. Oil for instance is not a lotable resource which can easily fund rebellion. Also, according to the 2013 Resource Governance Index, Ghana has a partially strong regime for resource governance and is ranked 15th out of 58 countries surveyed, making it the best in Africa.32 On the specifics, Ghana has satisfactory regimes in terms of institutional and legal setting, safeguards and quality control in the extractive industry.

Another phenomenon that has plagued African politics and generated electoral violence is ethnocentric politics. While ethnic sentiments have been used by some politicians as a point for mobilizing electoral support, it has not generally assumed a major violent proportion in Ghana as compared to Cote d’ Ivoire and Kenya. In Ghana, the major players involved in many ethnic conflicts have found means of sustaining the conflicts through politicizing them. The Dagbon, Bawku and Kandiga-Nankani chieftaincy conflicts of Northern Ghana, for instance, are discussed by Ayelazumo as examples of conflicts that have been politicized in the past.33

1.6.7 Structural Violence and Origins of the 2010 Political Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire

After the attainment of political independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire was hailed as a success story in Africa during the early stages of the reign of its first president (Félix Houphouet-Boigny). Unlike most independent African states, it quickly adopted capitalism after independence and its economic success blotted its underlining structural deficiencies. These
structural deficiencies included the lack of a political system that stimulate effective citizen representation and participation in governance and also respect for minority rights and ethnic differences. The 1995 World Development Report states that market-based economies are better at delivering the gains of growth than centrally planned or protectionist economies.\(^{34}\) Côte d’Ivoire’s economic success after independence (partly attributable to a rise in exports earnings) despite the absence of democracy was therefore regarded as no economic wonder.

The receipt of economic assistance from its former colonial master (France) as payment for political patronage contributed to the concealment of these deficiencies. Rodriguez maintains that aid giving which was associated with the new attempts at democratization following the end of the Cold War was in itself a drawback to the democratization process in Africa.\(^{35}\) Following this line of thought, Côte d’Ivoire’s shoring-up by the French with economic assistance despite the absence of a democratic culture could be a contributory factor to its hesitance to democratize after independence. The hesitance to democratize subsequently contributed to the post-Cold War political crisis in the country.

The country made some attempts at democratization with the conduct of elections in 1990. The election was won by the incumbent, Félix Houphouët-Boigny (who had ruled since independence in 1960). Following his death in 1993, the realities of the country began to surface with a winding twist of political instability. The opportunity at democratization in Côte d’Ivoire became slim following what Daniel Chirot describes as the debacle of the 1995 Elections.\(^{36}\)

The political system, prior to the 1995 elections, apart from being bitter and polarized, also saw structural violence perpetrated against perceived foreigners (who were mainly northerners). This situation was arrived at following the introduction of discriminatory citizenship laws and the concept of ‘Ivoirite’. Francis Akindes confirms this assertion in the
analysis of the policy of ‘Ivoirite’ as a re-invention of Ivorian identity in response to the dwindling economic opportunities following more than three decades of economic prosperity. The conclusion drawn in the analysis is that the socio-political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire in the 2000s was as a result of the policy of exclusion associated with ‘Ivoirite’. This identity crisis was not completely resolved and therefore replayed itself in the electoral violence that ensued in the country following disputed elections in 2010.

Tobias Koepf discusses the fragility of electoral democracy in Cote d’Ivoire. Despite recent economic recovery which was supported by the donor and international community through debt forgiveness and loans, Koepf laments the inability of President Ouattara to ensure transitional justice. This inability is a potential ‘landmine’ for the political reconciliation process considering the fact that former President Gbagbo’s Party (the Front Populaire Ivorien) boycotted the December 2011 Parliamentary Elections.

A report on Cote d’Ivoire by the Human Rights Watch also stresses the need for transitional justice following the Ivorian electoral crisis of 2010. The report observes a sharp contrast between the prosecution of implicated persons on Gbagbo’s side and the inability of any member of the Republican Forces to be arrested. The Human Rights Watch makes this observation on their belief that both sides committed gross violation of human rights during the conflict. The report further bemoans the fact that the inability to ensure justice may lead to impunity which can be detrimental to political reconciliation and democratic consolidation in the country. A United Nations Development Programme brief on the possible negative impact of the Ivorian post-election crisis on West African countries attempts to identify some difficulties of the crisis on the country. The brief however grounds its analysis largely on an economic integration perspective and concludes that the impact of the crisis is uncertain.
1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study will adopt the democratic peace theory as its theoretical framework. This theory has its philosophical underpinning from the works of Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace written in 1795 and Thomas Paine’s Common Sense in 1776. It is supported by proponents like R.J. Rummel. This theory asserts that democracies do not often go to war with each other and therefore are relatively stable, freer to live in and in the long run aids economic growth and development. It therefore argues that the more democratic countries are, the more peace there will be in the world.

Russett and Maoz are of the opinion that although democracies are as conflict prone as non-democracies, democratic states rarely go to war with each other. They partly attribute this trend to the practice of democracy and anchor their defence on normative and structural explanations. The normative explanation suggests that the existence of ‘norms of compromise and cooperation’ have prevented conflicts from escalating into uncontrollable levels. These norms include the rule of law, fundamental human rights and respect of the rights of minority groups. On the other hand, the structural explanation suggests that the complex nature of political mobilization in democracies acts as a restrain on open confrontation between democracies. This restraint is contributed to by the weight of public opinion which is measured by government before decisions are made.

States can therefore help prevent internal conflicts and violence through the acceptance of democratic norms. Also, participatory governance can be achieved through public consultation and consensus building before government decisions is made. The respect of the verdict of the citizenry during elections will also contribute to peace and the avoidance of violence and conflicts within democratic states. This will in the end help reduce the occurrence of electoral violence.
After the end of the Cold War, the theory of democratic peace has been adapted and localised in conflict studies to explain the reasons and motivations behind the quest for democratic consolidation in emerging democracies. In the post Cold War era, conflict among states, which previously was the main concern of International Organisations has lessened. What exists today is largely internal strife and civil wars which pose a threat to the inhabitants of a state, especially women and children.

Issues which are a threat to internal peace such as human right abuses, civil wars, ethnic conflicts, religious strife and electoral violence are now being viewed within a larger contest of international peace and security. This is because of the recognition of their possible spill-over effect on other states. Such a spill over of conflict will negatively affect international peace and security. The United Nations affirms its commitment to international peace and security as it strives to avoid another World War. This commitment is made by all member states of the United Nations (UN) as seen in the preamble to the UN Charter. In line with this, the UN has established comprehensive security architecture for the maintenance of international peace and security. It includes preventive diplomatic efforts, democratic and electoral support, and the use of force as a means of peace enforcement when necessary.

Various regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have followed this pattern and have also established Protocols on democracy, elections and governance. The AU for instance has the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. ECOWAS has a protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. The application of these protocols has sometimes been inconsistent with the very values they are meant to protect. Sekai Saungweme observes that despite the possibility of protection of human rights, the provision on ‘unconstitutional change in government’ in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance has offered protection for regimes instead of democratic norms.
Democracy serves as a helpful means to prevent the occurrence of conflict due to its inherent mechanism for conflict resolution. The concept of good governance puts government on its toe to treat minorities with respect and also ensure development and respect for fundamental human rights. Third World countries that are democratic are friends with each other and therefore promote democratic tendencies despite the heterogeneous nature of their societies.

The concept of democratic peace therefore suggests that governments will be keen on ensuring internal stability in order to benefit from the gains of democracy and also avoid the spleen of the citizenry in the next election. Publicly accountable leaders are therefore more appreciative of establishing resilient democratic institutions for resolving conflicts (internationally) and avoiding them internally. Political leaders in elected democracies are therefore conscious of possible challenges to their tenure in office, thus a conscious effort is made to avoid civil strife and electoral violence. The theory will therefore provide a framework within which the institutionalization of democracy is analysed and also provide an insight into the occurrence of electoral violence in Africa.

Spenser R. Weart is one of those against this theory. Opponents of this theory often argue that conditions that create internal peace why democracies do not go to war include existing alliances, wealth and political stability. They also claim that definitions of democracy and peace can often be manipulated to suit the desires of the proponents of this theory. David Spiro also challenges the democratic/ liberal peace theory on the basis of its statistical and quantitative inclination and asserts that the mere institutionalization of democracy in a country does not lead to conflict prevention.44
1.8 METHODS AND SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

This work is a qualitative research and as such secondary sources of data will be utilised for analysis. Completed Research works will be studied for inferences. Studies in strategies for preventing electoral violence will be done. This will aid arrive at appropriate conclusions and recommendations for the Research.

1.9 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS

The Work will be arranged in four Chapters as follows:

Chapter one will encapsulate the Research Design. It will introduce the work by giving a Background to the Problem, followed by the problem Statement, Objectives of the Research, Hypothetical Statement, Rationale of the Research and Review of Literature. It will also include the Theoretical Framework, Methods and Sources of Data Collection and Arrangement of Chapters.


Chapter three will discuss the substantive issue of electoral violence in Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. It will begin with an introduction to electoral violence and triggers of electoral
violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. The manifestation of electoral violence and the electoral cycle in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire will be discussed into details. The chapter will then conclude on a comparative political development in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire.

**Chapter four (4)** will be dedicated to Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations.
End Notes

8 Published Annually by the Global Fund for Peace, Washington D.C. www.fundforpeace.org
9 Published Annually by Freedom House, http://www.freedomhouse.org
13 ibid 6 above
14 Refer to ratified protocols such as African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Protocol on African Peer Review Mechanism.
21 United Nations, ‘Enhancing the role of regional, sub regional and other organizations and arrangements in promoting and consolidating democracy,’ Resolution adopted by the Fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly (2005), pg 1
27 Ibid, 25 supra.
28 This can be restated in other words as “path dependency” a situation that arises out of the unique historical experiences and experimentations of a country (which African states have in abundance)
31 Having retained power since 1992, the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) lost the 2000 General Elections and handed over power to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). In the 2008 General Elections, the incumbent (NPP) Government also lost the elections and handed over to the (NDC).


CHAPTER TWO

OVERVIEW OF DEMOCRATIC DISPENSATION IN AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

The chapter will discuss the origins of democracy and elections in Africa and socio-economic underdevelopment and political crisis in Africa. The essence of the electoral process as a peacemaking mechanism in Africa will be analyzed. The contemporary state of democracy in Africa will be discussed after which the state-society relationship and the role of civil societies in governance in Africa will be assessed. The origins, causes and effects of electoral violence in Africa and the role of the African Union (AU) in engendering a peaceful 2013 Kenyan elections will also be discussed. The chapter will finally discuss the Causes of Democracy in Africa and an evaluation of the relevance of the ‘two-turnover elections test’ within the Literature of Samuel Huntington’s ‘Third Wave of Democratization in the late 20th Century’.

2.1 Origins of Democracy and Elections in Africa

2.1.1 Pre-Colonial Period

Before the advent of colonial rule, African societies were communal in nature. While some like Ethiopia were organized administratively, others were not so well organized. Thomson is of the opinion that because of the abundance of land and the sparse population of the continent, African societies became non-hegemonic in nature. The effect of kinship also led to a communal spirit which was developed across most societies on the continent.
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja and Margaret Lee perceives pre-colonial African societies as repository of democratic values and therefore concludes that democracy can thrive on the continent. Before the advent of colonial rule, most African countries experienced some form of the elements of democratic practice under chieftaincy rule.

Under chieftaincy rule, power was seen as emanating from the people on whose behalf it was exercised by traditional authorities. There were also procedures for de-skinning/ de-stooling traditional leaders no matter how powerful they may seem. Although their office is mostly hereditary in nature, there were some form of internal competition and consensus building associated with their selection process. In most cases, more than one candidate was eligible to be selected by the king makers. Also, decisions were usually made in consultation with advisors or sometimes the entire community.

These traditional practices and values cannot be said to be entirely against the principles of democratic governance. Traditional African societies therefore had some forms of democracy no matter how crude it may seem. This situation was however not the same throughout Africa since not all societies on the continent were colonized. Also, not all African societies had well established traditional governance arrangements. According to Harold Marcus, Ethiopia was a Dynasty between the 16th to 18th centuries, became a feudal state during the 19th century, and later a consolidated unitary state during the reign of Haille Sellassie (between 1916-1974).

A major challenge of the traditional institution of chieftaincy is that it does not make way for popular participation in the selection of leaders. In most cases, the eligible leader’s power emanates from hereditary and conquest and not based on competence. Another challenge is that there are no clear separation of power since in most situations, the traditional leader controls all the three (3) major arms of government. The traditional leader, according to
Acquah, mostly acts as the legislature, judiciary and executive. This situation therefore creates the rule of strong men under chieftaincy instead of stimulating institutional development.

2.1.2 Colonialism and its Legacy

Early European contact with sub-Saharan Africa led to trade relations. This relation later led to the establishment of colonial rule across most parts of the continent. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 oversaw the partitioning of Africa. It was then followed by the scramble for Africa among the major European interests and later culminated into consolidation of colonial power and dominance in Africa.

The post-World War II era saw a change in the dynamics of colonial relations across the world. This was due to the stance of the victorious super-powers of WWII. The emerging victors and superpowers of the war influenced and called for change in the international system, especially those relating to colonialism. Russia for instance embarked on a campaign against colonial rule in the Republic of Congo. Internally, the quest for independence grew louder as a crop of World War II veterans contributed to such mobilization through demonstrations and support for mass actions in their countries. To maintain state security, the colonial powers used force against such rebellion. The enormous state power which was accumulated by the colonial authorities was bequeathed the newly independent African leaders.

Towards the end of colonialism in the 1950’s and 1960’s the colonial authorities began to grant some civil liberties and institute some participatory system of governance. In the then Gold Coast (now Ghana), elections were conducted in 1951. The purpose of the election was to select some representatives into the National Assembly. The process of self governance then began from this period until the attainment of independence in 1957. The period
between 1951 and 1957 then saw some form of ‘power-sharing’ political arrangement between the colonial administrators and local representatives.\(^6\) During this period, Kwame Nkrumah (the first President of Ghana) was leader of Government Business and later Prime Minister following the 1951 Election victory obtained by his Convention Peoples Party. Similar power sharing arrangements existed in other pre-independence African countries such as Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria. For instance, in Cote d’Ivoire, Félix Houphouet-Boigny was initially a cabinet minister in France before becoming president.

In most cases, the governance systems that were introduced at the end of the colonial period were mostly done with the consent of Africa’s political elites. Eligibility to participate in the process was sometimes linked to access to property and sometimes economic well-being or educational attainment. The legacy of colonial rule in Africa was a system of lawless political competition without any ideology leading to disenchantment of the populace about the prospects of a better future.\(^7\) The modern origins of democracy in Africa can then be traced to colonial rule since it was during that period that the current political governance structures present in Africa were developed.

### 2.1.3 Post-colonial Africa

Colonial rule brought together several tribes into a single state. Most African states at independence were therefore ethnic heterogeneous in nature. A ‘hot-pot’ of ‘tribal states that were weakly glued together within a sovereign entity of a state meant divided allegiance to the new political and old traditional authorities.\(^8\)

Edward Azar attributes the perceived weakness associated with the creation of African states to the disparity in the levels of socio-economic development between European settled areas
of the continent and agrarian and non-European settled areas.\textsuperscript{9} Barry Buzan arrives at the conclusion that sub-Saharan African States are generally weak due to the absence of a sense of statehood among its citizens.\textsuperscript{10} This is attributed to the lack of resources at the disposal of African States to determine and dictate their development priorities. Mohammed Ayoob disagrees with this assertion and rather attributes it to the lack of independence for African societies to develop into the kind of state they desire.\textsuperscript{11} Steadman discounts ‘the colonial legacy’ as the root cause of conflict in Africa but rather attributes it to other ‘post-independence factors’.\textsuperscript{12}

2.2 \textbf{Socio-Economic Underdevelopment and Political Crisis in Africa}

Colonial rule in Africa was different from experiences in other parts of the world. In Africa, it was predatory in nature while in Latin America it served the interest of territorial expansion for European populations. According to Adam Smith, the success of nations depended on their level of accumulation of wealth.\textsuperscript{13} Capitalism and free market economies therefore serves as an avenue for wealth creation and accumulation which can be relied on for socio-economic development. Unemployment and lack of economic opportunities emanating from bad governance in African states led to state weakness thereby creating a looming threat of conflict.

The Cold War era of political patronage distorted political realities of countries in Africa. Human right abuses and economic stagnation were glossed over by largess from the ‘East’ and ‘West’, depending on which side one stood. Most conflicts during this period were then interpreted as ‘turf wars’ brought about by the East-West rivalry.

A combination of both economic and political crisis in Africa contributed to the near collapse of African states. The collapse of global commodity prices and the oil crisis of 1979
deepened the economic woes of African states. ERPs were then introduced to help African countries manage their debt problems. ERPs later took on political components to address the vicious cycle of indebtedness and bad governance, especially of African countries.

2.2.1 The Crisis of Governance

Africans took over the reins of government in their country at independence. Opposing internal groups then saw it as an opportune time to vent open the capped up grievances of their limitations in political participation. This is because promised political freedom and economic prosperity associated with the campaign for independence were not fully met.

Civil liberties and political rights were not widely extended in the post-independence governance system although the inherited political systems experienced some modifications. The intensification of internal conflicts and challenges to political authority led to consideration to extend political participation in some countries. Weak political institutions came about as a result of the rush to organize multi-party elections by the colonial authorities in order to hand over political power.

Politics based on ethnic divisions then became a major problem that post independent political leaders had to grapple with. Political competition became intensified and sometimes assumed a zero-sum status. Corruption and inefficient political leadership gradually attracted armed groups and later on the military to intervene in political governance partly because of their dissatisfaction with the performance of governments. This was followed by a period of alternating democratic and non-democratic regimes on the continent till the early 1990s. Rent seeking politics and political violence has also contributed to the breakdown in the political patrimonial nature of Ugandan politics in its post-independence era. Following the 3rd Wave of democratization globally that has spread across Africa, some countries such as Nigeria,
South Africa, Botswana and Mauritius have held three successive elections. This, according to Steffan Lindberg reduces the possibility of a breakdown in governance.\textsuperscript{17} Ghana has however surpassed this and has passed the ‘two-turnover elections test’.

Political patrimonialism is a system of governance in which all political power flows from the leader and all officials owe allegiance to the leader instead of the state. Ethnicity has been used by political elites in African countries for political mobilization with the intention of economic gain. Recent power-sharing political arrangements in Africa have therefore yielded little results since they failed to go beyond an ethnic-centered approach to conflict resolution.

2.3 The Electoral Process, Peacemaking and Conflict Generation in Africa

Academic scholars in democracy have varied opinions on what democracy is or ought to be. However, one generally accepted element of democracy is free, fair and periodic elections. Elections can put into practice representative and popular participation in governance and provide a peaceful means for the exercise of political rights such as voting. Elections determine the allocation of economic resources in a country. It also helps promote peaceful transfer of political power. Yet, elections, by themselves may not necessarily promote democracy unless they are participatory, competitive and legitimate in nature. The link between elections and democracy can then be made with regards to its peace assurance nature.

The 2011 World Bank Report underscores the linkages between conflict, security and development.\textsuperscript{18} The report observes the negative effect of violence on economic progress and notes, that despite the history of political instability in most parts of Africa, a number of countries such as Ghana, South Africa and Mozambique have made significant progress towards eliminating the threat of violence to development. Countries in which violence have
been reduced substantially or non-existent usually have a higher propensity to economic
development. Electoral conflicts, which have become an undesired output of elections on the
continent, are examples of such conflicts which have the tendency to derail the progress of
democratization and development that has been achieved in Africa. Actions that will
therefore lead to conflict and create instability must be prevented to avoid rolling back the
gains of democracy made on the continent.

The electoral process provides a rule-based system of competition for political authority and
the resolution of grievances when they occur. The process can also be used for the resolution
of general issues of conflict when they occur through a referendum. Further to this, the
electoral process, if accompanied by popular participation can be a means of legitimizing the
rule of the government. This will grant the government the confidence it needs to implement
popular policies and programmes. The choices that the citizenry make (such as the candidate
they elect) act as an endorsement of the campaign policies and programmes of that candidate.
A vote for that candidate automatically translates into a mandate for implementation of
proposed political policies or agenda.

On the other hand, due to the competitive nature of the electoral process, politician
sometimes highlight differences that may exist between or among them for purposes of
political mobilization. If not done cautiously, it leads to the deepening of unhealthy identity
divisions that may be in existence. This creates the potential for violent conflicts. Also,
during periods of economic hardships, the institution of democracy which is perceived as an
expensive process by the citizenry can also lead to conflicts. Consequently, the unpredictable
nature of elections which is associated with democracy has conflict generating potentials.
This is because contesting candidates knowing very well that they are heading to defeat in the
process may employ all forms of tactics including electoral violence to mare the process.
Also, others who may be uncertain about the prospects of democratization may put impediments in the way of the process.

2.4 The State of Democracy in Africa

Although Africa experienced periods of one-party rule after colonialism, democracy has now gained much prominence even among former dictators.\(^\text{19}\) The promotion of democracy and good governance have become one of the top Agenda on the African Continent with development partners, the regional body of Africa Union (AU) and the various sub-regional bodies placing much premium on it.\(^\text{20}\) This stems from their realization of the negative effects of electoral violence on democracy as a tool of peacemaking which if not contained, may lead to widespread political instability across Africa.

The importance of democracy to regional organizations cannot be stressed in better terms than the statement of the former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas. During a Lecture on the Founders’ Day of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, the then Executive Secretary stated that “ECOWAS places a high premium on political governance, evolution and democratic institutions and respect for human rights and the rule of law.”\(^\text{21}\) This commitment to democracy is also manifest in the adoption of protocols on democracy and good governance such as the ‘ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance’\(^\text{22}\) and the ‘African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance’\(^\text{23}\).

However, the 2012 Annual Report of ECOWAS observes a lack of progress in good governance and democracy within the sub-region in the year 2012 despite some progress made in other sectors.\(^\text{24}\) The report points out that political instability occurred in a majority of member states but acknowledges that preventive diplomatic efforts by the highest Authority of the Commission has helped contain the escalating effects of these conflicts.
However, the policies of ECOWAS in preventing unconstitutional change in Government have been in the form of application of sanctions which have not been very effective.\textsuperscript{25}

The 2013 Freedom House Assessment of electoral democracies in the world reveals that Sub-Saharan African countries are generally one of the volatile regions in the world.\textsuperscript{26} Between 2008 and 2012, there was a general decline in the performance of democratic governance on the continent despite some marked improvements in some sub-regions such as West Africa. Out of 49 countries surveyed, 11 (22\%) of them were classified as Free, 18 (37\%) as Partly Free and 20 (41\%) as Not Free.

According to the 2013 edition of the ‘Failed State Index’, Mali was the most worsened country for 2013 as it moved up from a rank of 79\textsuperscript{th} to 38\textsuperscript{th} on the instability index.\textsuperscript{27} This was as a result of the series of compounding political and security threats it faced following a coup de tat and armed conflict that began in early 2012.

The Economist Intelligence Unit reports that Sub-Saharan Africa has only one full democracy with ten (10) flawed democracies, nine (9) hybrid regimes, and twenty-four (24) authoritarian regimes and also observes a decline in coup de tats in Africa since the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{28} It however observes a sharp rise in the number of elections in African countries but recognises that some are still flawed. The report also emphasises the importance of citizen’s participation on a free basis in a democratic dispensation without which democracy cannot be sustained. Electoral violence has a tendency to reduce or limit voter participation and therefore should be a major concern at democratic consolidation in Africa.

Sanctions have been the general punitive measure meted out by Regional Organisation for unconstitutional change in government. The sanctions have often included suspension of the country from the activities of the organisation. This practice has not been punitive enough since some sanctioned countries have continued being undemocratic and survived the
sanctions anyway. Although regional integration bodies in Africa recognise the possibility of the use of force to restore unconstitutional change in government, they have been hesitant to do so. The conclusion drawn is that despite the commitment to democracy by African countries much has not been done to ensure its consolidation, especially through the elimination of electoral violence.

2.5 State-Society Relationship in Africa

Joel S. Migdal provides a theory in the explanation of the success of states in realizing the vision of leaders which is linked to the capabilities of state institutions. The deliberate undermining of these institutions has limited their ability to complement the efforts of leaders in their quest to govern. In Africa, the practice of undermining the independence or autonomy of state institutions responsible for engendering representative and participatory governance have limited good governance, especially during periods of undemocratic rule.

The assertion is made by Migdal that strong states are those that have high capabilities and capacities to “penetrate society, regulate social relations, extract resources and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.” Migdal further takes the side of the ‘weak states’ in the strong-weak state debate as he states that the lack of regulation of social relationship and appropriation of resources in self-determined ways is attributable to the predicaments of Third World Countries. This is more suggestive of the current governance situation in Africa.

The lack of regulations of electoral systems in terms of the formation and operation of political parties, funding of political parties, transparency and accountability of office bearers have all contributed to this weakness. Examples of these practices include the formation of political parties on ethnic lines, hijacking of the funding of political parties by individuals,
political office given as reward for political patronage or nepotism. One of the end results of these practices is political patrimonialism, a situation in which office bearers hold their allegiance to the leader instead of the state. This underlines the inability of state institutions to deliver in the interest of the entire nation.

Nepotism also breeds corruption since political office then becomes an opportunity for self-aggrandisement and accumulation of wealth which in the end raises the stakes involved in elections. As a result of this, elections have become hotly contested and conflictual in Third World Countries. Political office holders being aware of this, use their period in office not only to serve but also to consolidate their hold on power, while the opposition also views the next elections as their ‘last shot’ at power. All sorts of tactics are then employed by both incumbent and opposition to either wrestle power from the incumbent (in the case of the opposition) or hold on to it (in the case of the incumbent). The tactics employed include the threat or use of violence before, during and after elections, scrapping off term limits, bribery and monetization of electoral campaigns. Sabotage by political opposition is also employed while both parties attempt the politicization and patronage of state institutions.

The end result of this is a weakened state without the capability of its institutions to aid the political leadership to deliver on good governance. Democratic peace therefore becomes threatened as institutions of state are unable to perform functionally on their peace assuring nature. Rather, these institutions become part and parcel of the conflict generating ‘game of power struggle’.

2.6 The Role of Civil Societies in Governance in Africa

Civil societies were significantly involved in the decolonization process of the continent and continue to make immense contribution to the democratization process in Africa, especially
in the post-Cold-War era. Their role in democratization is however very crucial since their independent and autonomous nature puts them in a better position to ‘police the state’ and call for open, accountable and transparent governance.

John Harbeson, in a discussion on the nature of civil societies and its relations to the state observes that civil society can be defined as an intersection between the state and family and further remarks that both the state and civil society are complementary in function. Civil societies can therefore provide the platform for individuals to come together as a ‘family’ to pursue stated goals which includes to shape political ideology, demand transparent and accountable governance, and call for passage of effective governance policies in the general good of society.

During periods of undemocratic rule in Africa, governments had the tendency to ban political parties and activism. Other civil societies however emerged in place of political parties. They include religious groupings, labour movements, student movements and professional associations.

John Bratton is of the belief that civil societies are important in African countries undergoing transitions because there is a tendency for veteran politicians in previously undemocratic regimes to “reclaim leadership positions.” Bratton continue that civil societies can therefore ensure that the political ambitions of such persons are checked since their commitment to the democratization process is questionable. This assertion is however a bit problematic since the practice of political exclusion during political transitions on the continent has not made those democracies sustainable. In Ghana, political participation in the 4th Republican era by veteran officials involved in previous autocratic regimes (as a result of constitutionally granted amnesty) has not led to retrogression in Ghana’s democracy. Also, the situation of political
exclusion in Cote d’Ivoire, after the transition from the 2010 electoral conflict has not led to deepening peace and democracy in the country.

Civil societies are very important agents in the call for a return to democracy. Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, in a discussion on totalitarian regimes and civil associations in Ghana is of the opinion that various hegemonic seeking regimes have used various justifications for curbing civil liberties in the past.\textsuperscript{33} Despite the rhetoric of respect for civil liberties and freedom of association, most regimes prior to the 4\textsuperscript{th} republican government had similar tendencies. They have in various ways influenced civil societies to pursue their political agenda and in some cases incorporated them as political wings. The post-Cold War era has however experienced a rise in the involvement of civil societies in Ghana. In the agitation for a return to democratic rule and its sustenance these have included labour movements (such as the Trades Union Congress – Ghana); professional associations (such as the Ghana Bar Association); and student movements (such as the National Union of Ghana Students).

In Ghana, the effect of these agitations led to the formation of the National Commission for Democracy (NCD) mandated among others to inquire into the ripeness of the nation to return to constitutional rule and if so which form it should take.\textsuperscript{34} Upon the return to multi-party democracy in 1992, the NCD was replaced with two constitutional bodies with complimentary functions which are the Electoral Commission (EC)\textsuperscript{35} and the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE).\textsuperscript{36} The EC has the mandate of conducting free and fair elections while the NCCE is responsible for civic/ democracy education. Other independent governance institutions include the Commission for Human Right and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) and the National Media Commission (NMC). Together, these institutions complement the efforts of civil society in the democratization effort in Ghana.
2.7 Origins of Electoral Violence in Africa

The origins of electoral violence in Africa can be categorized under two broad factors; structural factors and the electoral process.\textsuperscript{37} Structurally, the neo-patrimonial nature of politics in Africa, the practice of exclusionary politics, power asymmetry and prevailing socio-economic inequalities are high ranking causes.\textsuperscript{38} Secondly, the electoral process if not properly designed risks engendering electoral violence. Consequently, weak electoral management bodies and ineffective electoral laws are contributory factors. On the other hand, strong electoral systems if not managed by ‘democrats’ may also lead to flawed elections.

Democracy can promote representative governance and also institutionalize conflict resolution. For this to happen, strong institutions are needed, especially, in post-conflict states. There is therefore the need to put in place a strong and independent media, rule of law, and an impartial bureaucracy. This is not however to suggest that democracy cannot be sustained in countries that have not built such institutions. The strength of such institutions are however an indication of how resilient democracy can be.

The latest ‘Wave of African Democratization’ has been characterized by some form of electoral violence in an unprecedented proportion. This has acted as a barrier to the survival of democracy and its consolidation. As stated earlier, some of the causes include the neo-patrimonial nature of African politics, lack of democratic culture, the nature of politics as a ‘battleground’ for the contestation of political power, the residual effect of previous military/authoritarian regimes. Weak institutions of democratic governance, weak internal democracies in political parties, weakness in election management and political bias of electoral officials are other contributory factors.
2.8 Causes of Electoral Violence in Africa

Violence, it is argued is an output of the culture of a society. Most African states have a culture of violence which is depicted sometimes in the tolerance for instance justice. Despite the previous waves of democratization in Africa, more needs to be done to stamp out the culture of impunity on the continent since it risks becoming a moral hazard. The culture of impunity can be attributed to the lack of legitimate institutions of law and accountability in African countries. This culture is also contributed to by the hangover of military and authoritarian regimes of the past. The inability of the state to effectively adjudicate disputes and punish offenders of the law has contributed to infractions of laws in general and specifically of electoral laws. The use of violence in elections has also featured prominently; arguably because of the belief of perpetrators of violence that they can get away unpunished.

Secondly, African states are also totalitarian in nature in that the state dominates all aspects of society. Access to economic resources and opportunities, educational attainment, political rights, among others, are generally determined by the state. This is contributed to by the traditional communal arrangements of African societies and the hangover of communism. This scenario engenders electoral violence to the extent that political opposition averse with the totalitarian nature of government is encouraged to use violence to attain political ends.

Related to the problem of totalitarian nature of African countries is the high stakes associated with elections in Africa. This is because for most part of Africa, the victor in an election is given all powers to distribute and allocate the nation’s resources. Iddi Ziblim observes three factors that contributed to the high stakes in the 2008 General Elections in Ghana. He contends that three major reasons raised the stakes which includes the recent discovery of oil in the country, the existence of political equality where the two major political parties had all won two major elections apiece under the 4th Republic. His final factor is the high
expectations of the International Community on the success of Ghana as a result of the spate of political violence in other African countries.

Fourthly, African states are generally fixated on the usage of force and ‘hard power’ to ensure compliance to laws which includes electoral laws instead of ‘soft power’ in the form of diplomatic and conflict transformation efforts. This has the potential to generate open confrontation with the political authority should there be major disagreements with government policies on the electoral process.

Furthermore, the exercise of absolute power by incumbent leaders to perpetuate their continuous grip on power is another major cause of electoral violence in Africa. Attempts by some African Heads of State to centralize political authority and further attempts to extend term limits have sometimes led to electoral violence. Baron Lord Acton (1834–1902) observed how absolute power can sometimes turn great men into bad men. He states that "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely". Examples of such display of absolute power include Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdulaye Wade of Senegal when they attempted to extend their term limits. In the case of Senegal, the subsequent election in which President Wade participated in experienced some isolated incidence of electoral violence.

Weak institutions of governance, especially those related directly to the electoral process such as Election Management Bodies (EMBs), Independent Governance Institutions (IGIs) and the judiciary have the effect of generating electoral violence. The politicization of election management in Cote d’Ivoire prior to the 2010 elections had the effect of generating the ensuing post-electoral violence. The fact that the representative of the various political parties that form the election management body was dominated by opposition parties was used as an argument by the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo in refusing their certified
results. His argument was based on suspicions of electoral manipulation in favour of his opponent Alhassane Ouattara. The attempt at politicisation has led to a lack of confidence and trust in Election Management Bodies (EMBs). The lack of confidence has created the lack of preparedness to accept the result of EMBs thus the resort to violence mostly by loosing parties after the announcement of results.

Additionally, the inability of the judicial system to adjudicate electoral disputes on time also serves as an incentive for electoral violence. This is because most of the time, cases pending before the courts are not dispensed off quickly and in order to avoid a political vacuum, the certified winner according to the Election Management Body is sworn in. This may result in the abuse of incumbency to direct the outcome of the petition or sometimes delay the possible outcome till the tenure is completely served. This leads to a possible situation of denied justice. The fear of this happening in states that do not have clearly spelt out electoral dispute resolution mechanisms and lack of the culture of democratic temperance may result in the resort to violent means of electoral dispute resolution. This situation is aggravated by the availability of ‘power sharing’ mechanisms that encourage aggrieved parties to resort to violence in order to mare the victory of the challenged candidate or to procure a ‘power sharing’ deal.

In Ghana, despite the slow nature of electoral adjudication prior to the 2008 Elections, the Judiciary has made a conscious effort since 2008 to dispense of electoral cases on time. The Chief Justice of Ghana has published two frameworks in this regard. This framework on election adjudication has helped with the judicious adjudication of the post 2012 Election petition at the Supreme Court instituted by the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) on 29th January, 2013 after disputed election results.
Poverty is another contributory cause of electoral violence in Africa. Omeiza chronicles some causes of political violence in Nigeria during the 2003 and 2007 General Elections. Underdevelopment and political disenchantment played a major role in River and Gombe States respectively. Whereas unemployed youth, lacking opportunities in the abundance of oil resources in River state resort to violence to press home their demands, their compatriots in the Gombe state, referred to as ‘kalare boys’ formed loosely organized criminal gangs who turn to violence to make a living. Their activities become more intensified during elections as their labour is made available for hire, possibly by the highest bidder.

2.9 Effects of Electoral Violence on Democratic Consolidation in Africa

Electoral violence has numerous effects on both individuals and the political system. The effects may sometimes threaten the survival of the state as the risk of political implosion is real. It may even spill-over into an international conflict. A general discussion of the effects of electoral violence is as follows:

1. Physical and psychological injury

One obvious effect of electoral violence is inflicted injury which may be physical or psychological in nature. The resort to violence by contending parties may lead to intimidation, destruction of properties, physical injuries and death. Survivors of violence may still be left with psychological pain and trauma to deal with. This may be the result of lost of property, loved ones or the witness of violence unleashed on others. Physically, perpetrators of electoral violence may unleash wounds on people, chop off limbs or even kill their victims. Victims of electoral violence may also become homeless because of the burning or
destruction of their properties. The destruction of the livelihoods of such victims may also lead to hunger.

2. Political apathy

Another effect of electoral violence is political apathy. The fear of reprisal attacks or the possibility of resurgence in violence may therefore lead to political apathy. Qualified voters may even be afraid to vote on the day of elections due to news of attacks elsewhere. They may also become disenchanted in the prospects of elections and the democratic process to their well being. This progressively creates political apathy in the system and a reduction in representation and participation of the citizenry in the decision making process.

3. Low human development

Most proponents of democracy have argued for its usage as a means of attaining human development. The emergence of electoral violence therefore retards the ability to attain this goal. A vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment can be set rolling as a result of emerging violence. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) observes a linkage between violent conflicts and human development as it states that election violence, like other forms of violent conflict, can mean ‘development in reverse’. Incidents of violence undermine government legitimacy, scare away domestic and foreign investors, and result in low levels of social trust.\textsuperscript{44} Electoral violence may impact on the economy by discouraging potential investors from investing in a country due to fear of insecurity of investments. It may also lead to a drop in revenues from tourism as a country experiencing violence becomes unattractive for potential tourist. The retardation of development may also be related to the cost of repairs of destroyed infrastructure to be borne by the state after a protracted conflict.
4. Mockery of democratic values

Power-sharing agreements as a means of resolving some electoral crisis that have erupted in Africa risk making a mockery of democratic values such as political tolerance and respect of the verdict of the populace. The 2007 Kenyan post electoral crisis and the 2008 Zimbabwean post-electoral violence were resolved by a ‘power sharing agreement’ between bitter political rivals. In Kenya, the Incumbent Mwai Kibaki and his opponent Raila Odinga were put in a political marriage of convenience as a result of no alternate solution in sight. In Zimbabwe, the ‘polygamous political marriage of convenience’ among President Robert Mugabe, Prime Minister Morgan Richard Tsvangirai and Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara was neither helpful. This assertion is made because during the tenure of the power-sharing government, democratic values were held to ransom due to deep-seated political divisions. This phenomena of power sharing coalitions as an appeasement of disagreeing factions encourages bitter rivalry among contesting candidates. This is because of the perception that when there is no solution of a political crisis in sight, power will be shared. The values of tolerance, free and fair competition, honesty and majority rule is therefore dealt a big blow. This is complicated by the inability of the power-sharing government to prosecute their supporters who are implicated in the post electoral violence.

5. Distortions in the political system

The emergence of political violence creates distortions in the political system. The extermination of perceived political rivals creates unfilled vacuums which have the potential to lead to the re-emergence of violent conflicts. The killing or running into exile of heads of key state institutions such as the Electoral Commission, Judiciary, and Independent Governance Institutions may put the political system into a limping mode after violence.
2.10 The Africa Union and Peace in Kenya’s 2013 General Elections

Post electoral violence was associated with the botched 2007 elections in Kenya. However, some measures were put in place to forestall it reoccurrence. These measures partly explain the peaceful nature of the subsequent Elections in 2013. The measures include a National Accord which created a coalition Government and a review of the Kenyan Constitution. The National Accord was spearheaded by the African Union Panel of Eminent Persons which was headed by the Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. The Panel of Eminent Persons was able to impress upon the stakeholders involved in the conflict to seek the path of peace and national reconciliation which led to a pledged commitment to national reconciliation. The main thrust of the National Accord was to establish a coalition government with cabinet ministers appointed from all sides of the conflict.

Bekoe discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the National Accord by observing that the display of a commitment to peace and the far reaching nature of the Accord aided to address deep seated sources of political violence in Kenya. The National Accord therefore dealt with deep seated opposition grievance which included the excessive powers of the President and ethnic marginalisation. The weaknesses of the Accord included the disincentive for the governing Party of National Unity (PNU) to enter a coalition with the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The role of armed militia such as the Saboat Land Defense Forces (SLDF), which was formed in response to Government land redistribution policy were also a threat to the Peace Accord.

However, some structural changes in the status quo ex ante engendered peace in the 2013 Kenyan elections. They include a strengthened Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission, Independent Supreme Court, Judicial and police reforms and a restricted Legislature with devolution of power. Cross communal dialogue on peace, the International
Criminal Court indictments of Kenyan politicians, the role of civil society organizations have aided the course of peace in the 2013 Kenyan elections.

The conclusion is that the African Union (AU) as a Regional Organisation helped play a major role in instigating political reconciliation in Kenya, following its 2007 post-election violence. Despite this external effort, the lack of political commitment by the government has led to some issues of injustice, and political inequalities remaining unresolved. These unresolved issues have the potential to engender the re-emergence of electoral violence in the future.

2.11 Causes of Democratization in Africa and an Evaluation of the ‘Two-turnover elections test’

The discussion here will be done within the Literature of Huntington’s ‘The Third Wave: democratization in the late twentieth century’. The literature discusses some of the causes of democracy associated with the ‘Third Wave’ and further proposes a theory for the measurement of democratic consolidation. The discussion will therefore analyse the causes of democratization in Africa with specific reference to Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana within Huntington’s literature. It will also include an evaluation of the relevance of the ‘two-turnover election test in measuring democratic consolidation in Africa.

2.11.1 The Causes of democratization in Africa: Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana

Huntington’s explanation of the ‘Third Wave’ of democracy discusses a number of causes of democratization, which includes parallel development. This situation according to Huntington occurs when similar causes of democratization occur simultaneously in a number
of countries. The discussion alludes to argument by some theorist that democracy is likely to occur when a country attains a certain level of socio-economic development. Huntington refers to assertion by Seymour Martin Lipset and other scholars that the level of economic development is strongly correlated to democratization. Huntington therefore argues that transitions to democracy should occur when countries are at middle level of economic development.

This situation was however not so for most sub-Saharan Africa countries, especially Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire. The transitions to democracy or democratization in the case study countries neither occurred at the realization of increased socio-economic development nor the attainment of middle-level socio-economic development.

Despite high socio-economic development at independence, Cote d’Ivoire did not democratize. Ghana on the other hand attempted some form of democratization as a colonial legacy and later became undemocratic. Following economic mismanagement policies and socio-economic decline, most African countries had to salvage their economies by implementing Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The implementation of SAPs came with conditionality of democratizing. This single policy forced most Sub-Saharan African countries to democratize. This was the situation of Ghana during the late 1980s and early 1990’s, culminating in the return to democratic rule in 1992. The situation is similar in Cote d’Ivoire who also had to implement SAPs with a conditionality of democratization.

The conclusion therefore drawn is that a reverse parallel development of democratization occurred in Sub-Saharan African countries, for the purpose of this study Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana as a result of socio-economic decline and the usage of democratization as a conditionality during the implementation of SAPs.
Huntington’s parallel development is qualified with the word reverse to explain democratization in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire since in these cases it did not occur because of the attainment of middle level socio-economic development, but rather a result of economic decline and the usage of democratization as conditionality for economic aid.

2.11.2 Evaluation of the ‘Two-turnover election test’ of measuring democratic consolidation

Huntington in the literature is of the opinion that democracy becomes consolidated to the extent to which change of power becomes institutionalized.48 The writer continues that democratic consolidation can be measured using the ‘two-turn over test’; a situation in which during a transition to democracy one party wins an election, then looses to another party and later regains power.

Huntington states that the first electoral turnover is significant and further stresses that there are two significant importance of the second turnover. This includes an indication of the willingness of political leaders to win and give up power in a peaceful manner and secondly signifies the confidence reposed by both the citizenry and political elites in the political system. The trust in the political system further shows the readiness to change the managers of the political system when things go wrong rather than overthrow the democratic system, he asserts.

There is however some flaws when one dwell solely on the ‘two-turn over test’ as the yardstick for measuring democratic consolidation. This is due to the fact that some African democracies such as Botswana and South Africa have had about twenty years of continuous and uninterrupted democratic practice without passing the ‘two-turnover test’ of elections.
required by Huntington. Another major weakness of this approach is seen in Huntington’s over emphasis of the primacy of elections as a sine qua non in a democracy. This over emphasis is done to the neglect of other essential elements of democracy as espoused by the United Nations (UN) resolution in 2004 (A/RES/59/201), already discussed in this study.

According to the 2013 Freedom House Ratings, 118 (61%) of the 195 countries and territories surveyed globally are electoral democracies. With regards to civil liberties, the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that out of the 49 countries surveyed, 11 (22%) were rated free, 18 (37%) as partly free and 20 (41%) as not free. Further, out of the 49 sub-Saharan African countries, 19 (38%) were designated as electoral democracies. Out of these 19 electoral democracies, 13 representing (68%) of electoral democracies and (26%) of Sub-Saharan African countries were designated as free. The other 6, representing 32% of electoral democracies and 12% of sub-Saharan African countries were designated as partly free. The analysis drawn from the data shows that in terms of civil liberties (which is one aspect of democracy), all electoral democracies in sub-Saharan Africa in the year 2012 were either designated as free or partly free.

The Freedom House data points to a positive relationship between electoral democracies and civil liberties. However, the importance of other essential elements of democracies cannot be gainsaid.
End Notes

22 ECOWAS Protocol A/SP1/12/01, Done at Dakar on 21st December 2001
23 Adopted by the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 30 January 2007
30 Ibid 29 above.
34 Established by the PNDC Establishment Proclamation of 1981.
46 Ibid 45 above
48 Huntington, S.P, the Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, (Vol. 4) University of Oklahoma Press (1993)
CHAPTER THREE

ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN GHANA AND COTE D'IVOIRE

3.0 Introduction to Electoral Violence

Electoral violence can be defined as:

“any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical assault, forced protection, blackmail, destruction of property, or assassination”.

Apart from its comprehensiveness, this definition offers a joint definition of electoral violence and electoral conflict as they are mostly used interchangeably.

Electoral violence is not only targeted at humans but also a wide range of phenomena which includes places, things and data. Violence or conflicts can be manifested on a national, regional and community level. The targets of violence are varied and includes inanimate objects such as building and also animates such as ethnic, gender or political groups.

3.1 Triggers of Electoral Violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Despite the underlining causes of electoral violence, a number of factors have triggered its escalation at various periods of the electoral cycle. Most Elections associated with the Third Wave of Democratization in Africa have experienced some form of violence. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have had its fair share of electoral violence on the continent. Structural inequalities or unresolved grievances are key underlining triggers of electoral violence in the two countries. Although one cannot always distinctively attribute a particular electoral violent
incidence to a particular reason, land, economic marginalization and ethnic marginalization are among the topmost triggers of electoral violence.\(^2\)

Land-related disputes reemerged in Cote d’Ivoire during the period of economic decline and mounting demographic pressures in the 1980s. Dispute over farming rights in fertile lands of the country led to hostilities towards non-indigenes leading to their economic deprivation and marginalization. This later contributed to the post 2000 electoral violence and attempted coup de tat in 2002 by Northern army personnel. Land right issue continues to be a major issue in Cote d’Ivoire, especially in the Central and South Western fertile areas. Immigrants were not permitted to hold land in these areas. This practice exacerbated the already tensed political situation during the 2010 General Elections in Cote d’Ivoire. During the 2010 election period, some immigrants in these areas faced intimidation and were prevented from exercising their voting rights. The volatility of the situation prompted the European Union Election Observer Mission to the Elections to withdraw some of its representatives in such areas at some point.\(^3\)

The situation in Ghana on land dispute as a trigger of Electoral violence has not been markedly different. Land right disputes between the Kusasi and Mamprusi ethnic groups in Bawku of the Upper East Region of Ghana have occasionally triggered electoral violence, especially considering the fact that politics in Ghana have sometimes taken ethnic lines. During the December 7, 2000 General Elections in Ghana, there were reported cases of political rivalry in the area which resulted in bloody clashes.\(^4\) In ‘Asutsare’ in the Eastern region of Ghana, political differences exacerbated land disputes and triggered violent clashes between supporters of the two main political parties in Ghana (National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party). As a result, about thirty persons were reported to have sustained various degrees of injuries.\(^5\) During elections, some immigrant settler farmers in cocoa growing areas are also occasionally given ejection notices by the chiefs of those communities. This is because the chiefs are of the opinion that the continuous presence of the
immigrants in their community affects the political fortunes of their preferred political parties.

Secondly, economic marginalization and deprivation, especially among the youth as a result of unemployment and underemployment has contributed to the cheap availability of labour for the political elites to hire during the heat of elections to perpetrate violence. The Youth of Ghana have played a significant role in politics and elections in Ghana. Not only have they contested competitive Parliamentary Elections, but also provided the needed energy and exuberance for political campaigning. Despite their positive roles, they have also been involved in violent behaviour which is inimical to democratic consolidation in Ghana.⁶

In Côte d’Ivoire, the concept of ‘relative deprivation’ can partly explain the involvement of the youth in electoral violence. Relative deprivation is a phenomenon in which there is deficit between the expectations of what groups are capable of attaining and what they actually receive.⁷ The sudden change in the economic fortunes of the country to the worse instigated a wave of disaffection for the Governments in the early 1990s. The origins of the ‘Young Patriots’, a pro-Gbagbo Youth group can be linked to this. They were deeply involved in xenophobic and anti-opposition political violence such as illegal arrests, abductions and assassinations during the 2010 post-electoral crisis.⁸ They were also involved in rampaging and looting during the crisis that ensued after the disputed elections of 2010.⁹

Thirdly, ethnic marginalization has triggered political violence in both countries, considering the ethnic heterogeneous nature of their societies. In Ghana for instance, ethnic conflicts between the Mamprusi and Kusasi groups of the Upper East Region predates independence. The two main political traditions in Ghana represented by the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) are perceived to have aligned themselves with either side of the conflict. The NDC for instance is perceived to be aligned with the Kusasi while
the NPP with the Mamprusi. Considering the eight-year alternation of power between these two parties since 1992, the political victory of one party is interpreted as a victory for its aligning ethnic group and as such an opportunity to display dominance over the rival group. Similar undertones are observed in the ‘Abudu-Andani gate’ inheritance-related conflict in Dagbon in the Northern region of Ghana. A careful analysis of these electoral violence trends show that although some incidences of electoral violence can sometimes be attributed to a particular cause, they are mostly multi-causal in nature as a number of related factors usually come to play.

3.2 Manifestations of Electoral Violence and the Electoral Cycle in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

3.2.1 Introduction

Electoral violence can manifest itself physically, psychologically and structurally. Physical violence includes burning of ballot boxes and electoral materials, beating-up of electoral officials, opposing candidates and their supporters, as well as assassination of candidates.

Psychologically, it involves all strategies which are geared towards intimidating political opponents and their supporters as well as other stakeholders from getting involved in the electoral process. This may be to create voter fear and apathy among supporters of political opponents or prevent the monitoring of the process in order to have the ‘free hand’ to manipulate the process.

Electoral violence can also manifest itself structurally. Among others, constitutional and legal issues which have the potential to disenfranchise a section of society can lead to structural violence. This may potentially lead to electoral violence.
3.2.2 Electoral Violence and the Electoral Cycle in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Ghana practices a four-year electoral cycle in which General Elections (Presidential and Parliamentary) are held every four years. Although the date for General Elections is not fixed in the Constitution, other legislative requirements have generally led to a practice of December 7 becoming a de facto election date in Ghana since 1992. General elections are however conducted in a two-year alternation with local government elections which are generally required to be non-partisan.\(^{10}\) The Constitutional arrangements of Cote d’Ivoire provides for a five-year electoral cycle. Presidential and Parliamentary Elections are normally supposed to be held concurrently whilst provision is also made for lower level elections.\(^{11}\)

The potential for the electoral process to degenerate into violence exists at all stages of the electoral cycle. The ‘electoral cycle’ is the concept of all activities that are related to the elections. It is generally divided into three (3) phases which are pre-election, election and post-election periods. There are activities that are normally associated with each phase. At the pre-election phase, activities that are conducted include planning of the election process, training of electoral officers, and registration of eligible voters. During the election period, the activities undertaken include opening of nominations for potential candidates, campaigning, voting, counting and tabulation of results. Review and auditing of results, declaration of final results and electoral reforms are typical activities associated with the post-election phase.

The three phase of the electoral cycle are prone to some typical forms of electoral violence. During the pre-election phase, there are usually identity conflicts. The election phase is usually associated with campaign conflicts and balloting conflicts. In the post election phase, there always exists the risk of result conflicts and representational conflicts.
3.2.2.1 Pre-Election Violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Identity Conflicts

Identity conflicts usually occur during the registration process when refugees and displaced persons are unable to establish their identity. It may also arise when the identity of citizens cannot be established as a result of poor record management or through ultra-nationalistic policies. The electoral process is designed for only citizens to participate in the selection and election of their representatives. This makes citizenship which is a form of national identity a very important factor in the electoral process. Constitutional provisions for voter eligibility and qualification of candidates if not clearly spelt out and fair may have the potential to create structural inequalities which can be a basis for pre-election violence.

In Cote d’Ivoire, the policy of ‘Ivorite’ structurally limited the political participation of a lot of Northerners who were perceived as foreigners. In the 1995 general elections, perceived immigrants were prevented from registering. Similarly, presidential hopeful, Alhassane Outtara was strategically debarred from the election through the introduction of electoral laws which requires a presidential candidate to show proof of Ivorian nationality of both parents. This identity issues were not resolved after the elections. It was carried over into subsequent elections eventually contributing to the 2010 post electoral crisis. The initial voters register to be used for the elections contained 5.78 million registered voters. This was however reduced to 5.73 million after about 55,000 persons whose identities could not be well established were sponge from the list with their fate to be determined after the elections. Request to strike out those names sparked controversy leading to violent militant clashes.

In Ghana, identity crisis has not been a major issue that has generated electoral violence on a large scale. There is legislation on citizenship and the right to vote is an entrenched provision in Ghana’s constitution. However, a lacuna in electoral laws in relation to registration of
voters has led to isolated cases of violence during the registration process. The electoral law of Ghana requires that a qualified citizen should be ordinarily resident in the electoral area he wishes to be so registered for the purpose of elections. This provision has generated disagreements and occasionally led to violence during voter registration since 1992.

Article 42 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana guarantees the right to vote for Ghanaian citizens who are 18 years and above, and of a sound mind. Despite this guarantee, subsidiary legislation requires that qualified voters be ordinarily resident in a particular polling area before they can be permitted to register there. This generated the pre-electoral violence that occurred in the Odododiodoo Constituency of the Greater Accra region of Ghana on April 11, 2012. The incidence involved an aspiring Member of Parliament (MP) (on the ticket of the opposition New Patriotic Party) for Ablekuma South and the supporters of the aspiring MP (on the ticket of the incumbent National Democratic Congress) for the Odododiodoo Constituency. The violence was generated when persons who were perceived to be immigrants living outside the constituency were prevented from registering. The argument put forth by those denied registration was that although they did not hail from, nor live in the area, they work there and therefore spend most of the day in that Constituency. However, their defense was not taken kindly but was interpreted as a deliberate strategy by the opposition to obtain political leverage by moving persons from their political strongholds of adjoining constituencies into weaker areas to bolster their political fortunes in the 2012 General Elections.
3.2.2.2 Election Period Violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

**Campaign Conflicts**

Campaign conflicts usually occur in the periods leading to the elections when political parties or candidates are garnering for electoral support and votes. Political rivals seek to disrupt the campaign of their opponents or prevent the supporters of their opponents from voting/participating in the electoral process. The campaign process in Ghana has been marked by cases of violence since 1992. It has mainly been in the form of clashes between political opponents or preventing aspiring candidates from reaching out to the electorates. During the campaign period towards the 2012 elections, the Presidential Candidate of the opposition New Patriotic Party, Nana Akuffo Addo was prevented from reaching some areas of the Jomoro district of the Western region. The District Chief Executive (DCE) for the area was accused of masterminding the removal of a key access bridge leading to a town in the district to frustrate the efforts of the NPP Presidential candidate.

However, the Public Order Act of 1960 and other police service regulations have been used to reduce the incidence of campaign conflicts in Ghana. Political parties are generally required to give adequate police notifications before major rallies and route marches are held. Also a safe distance is required to exist between two rallies should they be held on the same day and time. The electoral laws of Ghana also require a day of reflection where all campaign activities cease before elections are held. The effect of this is to de-escalate tensions that may have been generated during the campaign process.

In Cote d’Ivoire, campaign conflicts have been often generated by deep seated political rivalry and animosity. Plans to use electronic tabulation of polling station results were dropped in the period leading to the 2010 Elections. This was because the opposition parties
made an allegation that the company (SILS Technology) was going to be biased towards the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo because of its close association with the leadership of the president Gbagbo’s FPI Party. Also, voter education was limited and educational materials were insufficient prior to the elections. Voter education was largely left in the hands of political parties and civil society organizations.\textsuperscript{14} This could explain the high percentage of spoiled ballots which ranged from 2.34 to as high as 8.58\%.\textsuperscript{15}

Campaign period for the first round October 31, 2010 Elections was generally peaceful despite uneven access to the media for all parties. During the first round campaign period, there were some reports of abuse of incumbency. Some Presidential candidates who were state officials used their political status to obtain more media coverage over their rivals.\textsuperscript{16} The campaign period for the 1\textsuperscript{st} round was relatively peaceful. Due to the inability of any Presidential candidate to obtain more that 50\% of valid votes in the first round of voting held on October 31, a run-off was scheduled for November 28.

During the second round, the contending parties were the incumbent Laurent Gbagbo’s ‘Presidential Majority’ and Alhassane Outtara’s RDR Opposition Coalition. Konan Bedie, the leader of the PDCI party that came third during the first round elections then became the ‘kingmaker’. The campaign period leading to the 2\textsuperscript{nd} round of votes degenerated into a battlefield for the votes of the supporters of candidate Bedie who obtained about 25\% of the votes in the first round. The second round campaign then became more violent, amid aggressive and radical positions taken by militant supporters of the two contending parties.\textsuperscript{17} Despite the existing tensions generated from the 1\textsuperscript{st} round of voting, a maiden televised Presidential debate was used to call for a violent free election as the two contesting candidates stressed the need to use peaceful means of attaining political ends.\textsuperscript{18} Despite this effort, violence was experienced after the elections.
Balloting Conflicts

Preventing voters from exercising their right to vote and attempts at rigging the elections are also potential issues that can generate violent conflicts during the election period. Attempts of ballot box snatching are also widespread on Election Day in Africa. The Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD Ghana) reported some violent incidences during the December 7 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections and the December 28 Run-Off Presidential Election. It reports 15 and 28 cases of violence during the 7th and 28th December, 2012 elections respectively. Anecdotal reports also indicate that there were isolated cases of Election Day violence during the December 7, 2012 General Elections in Ghana. The death is reported of an attempted ballot snatcher in ‘Ayeduase’, a suburb of Kumasi in the Ashanti region of Ghana.

In Cote d’Ivoire, voting day for the first round of the 2010 disputed elections was peaceful with few technical hitches that included delays in the delivery of election materials. However, voting day for the second round experienced some form of violence. Clashes were reported to have occurred between young party militants of both parties leading to the death of seven people on the eve of the elections and two deaths on Election Day.

3.2.2.3 Post Election Violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Results Conflict

During the post-election period, the lack of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms and of independent and trusted judiciary to adjudicate electoral petitions and disputes can also result
in violence. The inability to conduct effective civic education on tolerance and acceptance of the outcome of an election may also generate violence.

In the first round of voting in the 2010 elections in Cote d’Ivoire, candidate Konan Bedie, the leader of the PDCI Party who was the 2nd Runner up contested the provisional results released by the Independent Electoral Commission as inaccurate and fraught with election irregularities. He therefore called for a recount of ballots. This allegation further deepened tensions and set the platform for the hotly contested second round elections. Immediately after the 2nd round elections, supporters of the contesting candidates intensified their ‘hardliner’ posture of unpreparedness to accept the victory of their opponent. The headquarters of the opposition RDR Party was attacked by gendarmerie, resulting in 8 deaths and injury to several persons. This situation deepened the political crisis that eventually culminated in the escalation of violence throughout the country as a result of President Gbagbo’s rejection of the final results of the election declared by the Independent Electoral Commission. Instead, he relied on the Constitutional Council who overstepped their mandate of certification of the provisional results from the IEC.

Article 100 of the Constitution of Republic of Cote d’Ivoire fixes the function of the Constitutional Council. It is required among others to certify the provisional results of the Independent Electoral Commission. Further legislation on the Constitutional Council stipulates the parameters within which they act. In exercising their powers, Article 3, of law no. 2001-303 stipulates that irregularities affect the entire results and not the results of those regions it were found in. Article 64 of the New Ordinance 2008-133 also requires an annulment of the entire results in the case of major irregularities. However, the Constitutional Council overstepped their powers and overturned the elections in favour of Laurent Gbagbo who made allegations of irregularities in some regions of Outarra’s strongholds. About 664,405 votes were annulled, leading to disenfranchising about 16% of valid votes cast
without a fair hearing into the matter. The inability of the Constitutional Council to dispense their mandate creditable further aggravated the post-election crisis situation.

Ghana’s 2008 Election almost degenerated into violence when supporters of the two main political parties that contested the December 28 Presidential run-off sieged the premises of the Electoral Commission Head office in Accra. The disagreement over some results that came from the Ashanti region led to a call to vigilance by the then opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) who protested about the possibility of their verdict being stolen. The incidence was widely reported by both local and international news media.

Prior to the 2008 Elections, Ghana had experienced long delays in electoral dispute adjudication. The case of a contested 2004 Parliamentary Election results in the Ayawaso West Woggon Constituency was finally given a ruling when the ‘illegitimate’ MP had completed the four year tenure in office. In the 5th Parliament of the 4th Republic, the legitimacy of the sitting Member of Parliament for Bawku Central was also challenged in Court. The petitioner averred that at the time of the MP filling his nomination papers, he was not qualified to be a Member of Parliament because he held dual nationality. The case delayed in court amid numerous legal battles. A ruling was finally given towards the end of the tenure of the sitting MP in 2012. The vacancy created was so close to the end of the Parliament that no bye-election was held. This denied the constituent representation in Parliament within that period.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Ghana has before it a case of an election petition for the Presidential Elections held in December 2012. The petitioners led by the Presidential Candidate for the opposition New Patriotic Party (Nana Akuffo-Addo) are challenging the Election declaration results by the Electoral Commission. As required by the laws of Ghana, the Electoral Commission is the first respondent and the sitting President is the second
respondent. However, the party of the ruling government, the National Democratic Congress joined in as the third respondent. The petitioners aver that the election was tainted with irregularities which have the effect of compromising the final declared results. The claim of the petition is that the ruling President, John Dramani Mahama was the beneficiary of these irregularities, leading to his declaration as President. The petitioners therefore prayed the court to annul the results of some polling stations where they claim that these irregularities took place. The case was filled on 29th January 2013 and the Supreme Court had completed the hearings from the parties involved in the case and delivered its verdict in favour of the incumbent President, John Dramani Mahama on 28th August, 2013.

The landmark case at the Supreme Court, which is the first of its kind in Ghana’s history, has helped consolidate the democracy of Ghana since the verdict was largely accepted by all parties in good faith. Democratic temperance and the rule of law, essential elements in a democracy are being entrenched as all the parties involved in the case have chosen legal means of resolving the dispute instead of the resort to violence.

**Representation Conflict**

The winner-takes-all system of political competition in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana grants enormous powers to political leaders to distribute the benefits of power as they so wish. There is a lack of political consensus building and coalition governments between political parties in both countries.

Outtara’s earlier attempt at contesting the 1995 Presidential elections was frustrated by his political opponents who used the policy of ‘Ivoirite’ against him. Structural discrimination of largely Northerners contributed to the political crisis which later put the country on the path
of civil war in 2000. In protest to this discriminatory policy, both Laurent Gbagbo and Outtara urged their supporters to boycott the 1995 Elections. This led to a ‘landslide victory for candidate Bedie and the Akan dominated PDCI. Results from the November 1995 Legislative elections showed an ethno-religious pattern in voting. The ruling PDCI won 149 of the 175 seats available. The winner-takes-all system of governance and unmanaged ethnic heterogeneity further deepened the existing fault lines. This was because there was no attempt at creating an ‘all inclusive government following the elections which was tainted with accusations of ethnic discrimination.

This later re-surfaced in the 2010 Elections which saw the two main contending parties of Laurent Gbagbo and Alhassane Outtara obtaining favorable electoral results in their ethnic base and poor performance in other areas. Further opportunities at conflict resolution through forming an ethnic sensitive government did not yield much result since the question of citizenship and ethnicity remained unresolved.26 The lack of political commitment on the half of political elites to resolve the identity crisis therefore led to its resurfacing in the 2010 General elections.

Meanwhile Ghana’s relatively strong legal framework which seeks to reduce the effects of ethnicity and discrimination on national politics has contributed to relative stability in the post-Cold War era. In Ghana, political contest has acted as a medium for accumulation of personal wealth and rewards for individual cronies. This practice encourages corruption and theft of state funds.27 Politics in Ghana is described as a situation in which benefits and rewards are distributed as a result of the personal relationship one has with the sitting head of state.28 After the return to multi-party democracy, the situation has not changed much. Falling out of favour with the Head of State therefore meant falling out of the position or appointment one occupied. This patrimonial political arrangement led to acrimony after the sitting Vice President (the late J.E.A Mills) was handpicked by President Rawlings as the
Presidential candidate for the National Democratic Congress in the 2000 General Elections.\textsuperscript{29} Under the Fourth Republican Constitutional arrangement, the President of Ghana wields so much executive power. This coupled with the de facto ‘two party’ political contests between the NDC and the NPP have created little room for consensus building and coalition governments. Politics has therefore become a ‘winner takes all’ affair in Ghana. Indeed, elections results under the fourth republic reveal that any presidential victory in an election is generally accompanied by a parliamentary majority. This has further contributed to the lack of political consensus building in Ghanaian politics thereby aggravating the resort to all available means of attaining political office which includes electoral violence.

3.2.3 Ghana’s Pass Mark of the ‘Two-Turnover Election Test’

Following the return to multi-party democracy in 1992, Ghana has experienced relative political stability with the conduct of six (6) successive elections (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012). This has seen power change hands from one democratically elected government to another on two occasions in the 2000 and 2008 General Elections. Civil liberties are assured in Ghana and it has a relatively strong and independent civil society. The role of civil society in the success story of Ghana (seen as a bastion of democracy in Africa) cannot be over emphasized.\textsuperscript{30}

An ex-President of the Republic of Ghana asserts that “Democracy should reflect Africa’s culture”\textsuperscript{31}. Also, there are worrying reports in the Ghanaian media of unaccountability of campaigns funds by political parties. For instance, the 2012 Presidential Candidate together with the Chairperson of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) have faced such accusations.\textsuperscript{32} This brings to the fore the old argument of individual financing of political parties as an obstacle to deepening internal democracy in political parties in Africa.
More secure and participatory means of funding may however help deepen internal democracies since such a system will grant each contributor an equal stake in the governance of a political party. In addition, most political parties do not abide by the electoral laws that require them to be transparent and accountable in their funding. Transparency and accountability of political parties is very important since the extent of internal democracy that exists within a political party may give an indication of how democratic and transparent it may be in government.

The Chairman of the Public Services Commission of Ghana, Mrs. Bridget Katsriku has bemoaned the “gradual politicization of Ghana’s Public Service.” Politicisation of the bureaucracy of the state is detrimental to a young democracy. Among others, political neutrality and professionalism is essential in sustaining state cohesion and democratic consolidation in Ghana.

3.3 Comparative Political Development in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Introduction

Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire have much in common although they have different historical trajectories. While Cote d’Ivoire’s stable post-independence era aided economic development, the opposite was true for Ghana. Political elitism in the post-independence period limited the growth of civil society in Cote d’Ivoire while recent political stability in Ghana has been related to the rise in civic consciousness.

Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are two neighboring West African States. Ghana was colonized by the Great Britain while Cote d’Ivoire was a French colony with relatively stronger post-colonial ties with its former colonial master. The pre-colonial society of both countries was
similar as they both had chieftaincy institutions and economic trade relations with other West African tribal societies.\textsuperscript{36} Prior to independence, the governance architecture in the Gold Coast was largely concentrated in an area about half of modern day Ghana. At independence, institutions of state and governance were therefore not well established throughout the country during colonial rule.\textsuperscript{37} The situation was similar in Cote d’Ivoire.

Being a close ally of France, the political elites in Cote d’Ivoire had little resistance in their call for independence while the situation was opposite in Ghana. The elite consensus in Cote d’Ivoire made little room for the development of the role of civil societies in the independence struggle and post-independence governance of the country. Their relative inactivity gave a free hand to the government of the First President (Félix Houphouët-Boigny) to rule (from 1960 till his death in 1993) facing little internal dissent. Ghana’s situation was different as civil society played a substantive role in its independence struggle.\textsuperscript{38}

3.3.1 Post Independent Economic Paths, Demographic Pressures and the Opportunity to Democratize

Two divergent economic policies were subscribed by the post-independent governments in the two countries. Cote d’Ivoire took the line of capitalism while Ghana practiced Nkrumahism (a version of socialism)\textsuperscript{39}. Socialism however failed in Ghana, and amid mounting economic downturn, series of ‘dancing chair’ military take-over alternating civilian rule ensued. This occurred after the overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah (in 1966) up to 1992. Relatively, Cote d’Ivoire was economically successful and politically stable from independence until 1993 (following the death of its first President).
In Cote d’Ivoire, economic prosperity in the post-independence era glossed over the effect of ethnicity in the country until mounting demographic pressures in the early 1990s began to erode the economic gains attained. At independence in 1960, Cote d’Ivoire’s population was estimated at 3.56 million while that of Ghana in the same year stood at 6.7 million\(^{40}\). The UNFPA population figures for the year 2012 indicates that Ghana’s population was estimated at 25.5 million and that of Cote d’Ivoire at 20.6 million\(^{41}\). A brief analysis indicates a relatively higher demographic pressure experienced by Cote d’Ivoire, whose population was almost half that of Ghana as at 1960. In 2012 however, the figures are about leveling. Despite the mounting demographic pressures in both countries, Ghana used the opportunity to put in place the architecture for democratization (grass root participation) by conducting Local Government Elections in 1990. Cote d’Ivoire on the other hand conducted its first multi-party Presidential Elections in 1990 without much regard for local governance, and political participation.

3.3.2 The Post-Cold War Political Landscape and the Influence of Ethnicity on Electoral Violence in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire

Ghana’s first government implemented series of policies to reduce the effect of ethnicity on national politics. For instance, the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (1957)\(^{42}\) was passed to ban the formation of political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines. Also, competence was stressed in recruitment into the Public Service. The influence of Chiefs on national politics was reduced through barring them from active partisan politics.\(^{43}\) This framework has permeated the post-Cold-War political environment in Ghana.\(^{44}\)

The re-emergence of democracy in the Post-Cold War era in Africa is regarded as a response to Western prescribed solutions to the governance and economic crisis on the continent.
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire’s situation was therefore not substantially different. Although Cote d’Ivoire made some attempts at democratization in 1990, ethnic politics still played a major role in the ensuing victory and rule of the incumbent President Félix Houphouët-Boigny. His campaign included a promised right of citizenship to settled immigrants and selected a Northern immigrant with ties to Burkina Faso (Alhasanne Outtara) as his Prime Minister. Following the death of the President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, he was succeeded by the Speaker of the National Assembly who was a ‘Baole’ in the person of Konan Bedie. This led to the resignation of Prime Minister Outtara. Post independent political leaders in Cote d’Ivoire have exhibited ethnic bias in their policies.

Cote d’Ivoire’s post-Cold War political development has shown that the mere institutionalization of multi-party elections does not solve the problem of conflicts and prevent electoral violence from occurring. The inability to mend ethnic divisions, pass comprehensive electoral laws and instill a culture of tolerance and democracy among the citizenry (which can be aided by civil societies) also contributed to the political instability in Cote d’Ivoire. The current situation of fear of Victor’s justice following the electoral violence and political crisis of the 2010 Elections has also heightened political anxiety in the country. This calls into question the commitment by President Outtara to seek a fair political settlement to the crisis to ensure that it does not resurface.
End Notes

8UNHRRC, Report of the High Commissioner.
12Ablekuma South and Odododiodoo are adjoining constituencies in the Greater Accra region of Ghana.
15Ibid 14 above
17Ibid 3 above
22VOA, ‘Ivory Coast Opposition Candidate Ouattara Call for Recount,” Nov. 6, 2010.
23Lloyd Parry, “Ivory Coast fears Fresh Violence as Results Roll In,” AFP, November 30, 2010.
24Ibid 3 above.
29The incidence is famously referred to as the ‘Sweduro Declaration.’
31Keynote Address delivered by J.J. Rawlings, at a Conference on Emerging democracies in Africa organised by the Nigeria Institute of Legislative Studies, Abuja, Mon. 17th June, 2013 as reported in Daily Graphic No. 19180, Wednesday June 19, 2013, pg 17.
41 United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), ‘The State of World Population 2012’
44 For instance The Constitution of Ghana (1992), Article 276, states that “A chief shall not take part in active party politics; and any chief wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or skin.
CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter revisits the overall aim of the Research, which is to investigate the problem of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Africa with Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana as case studies. It also revisits the specific objectives of the Research which were:

1. To assess the causes of electoral violence in Africa and how they affect democratic consolidation on the continent.
2. To investigate best practices and success stories in democracy management which have helped to forestall some possible electoral conflicts from escalating in Africa?
3. To explore the trajectory of political developments of Sub-Saharan African states and its consequence in generating electoral violence with specific emphasis on Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.

The chapter also summarises the findings of this study and offers conclusions accordingly. The final section of this chapter suggests recommendations based on the findings and conclusions.

4.2 Summary of Major Findings and Conclusions

First and foremost, the study concludes that the theoretical statement of the research which is restated as “the occurrence of electoral violence is a threat to democratic consolidation in Africa” was validated.

The study revealed that Huntington’s ‘two-turnover test’ of measuring democratic consolidation was insufficient, especially, in the case of South Africa and Botswana. This
insufficiency is deepened by the over emphasis on the primacy of elections as a sine qua non of democracy to the neglect of other equally essential element of democracy such as separation and balance of power, independence of the judiciary, political pluralism, rule of law, transparent and accountable governance, freedom and independence of the media and respect for human and political rights.

Secondly, on democratic consolidation, the study further revealed that democratic consolidation in Africa towards the end of the twentieth century which marks the 3rd Wave, can be attributed to a ‘reverse parallel development’ as a result of the use of democratization as conditionality for economic aid.

On the issue of electoral violence, the research identified that although some of the causes of electoral violence are attributable to the legacy of colonialism, most of them are as a result of post-colonial factors. The identified causes include the following:

- The lack of economic opportunities and poverty.
- Weak electoral management bodies and their politicization.
- High stakes associated with African elections.
- Lack of strong and independent judiciary and the delay of justice.
- Culture of violence and impunity in African societies as a result of lack of legitimate institutions of law and accountability.
- Ethnocentrism and tribal politics
- The totalitarian nature of African states.
- The nature of African Governments as law and order states.

There are numerous effects of Electoral violence in African countries. However, the research identified the following as the key ones which have a negative effect on democratic consolidation in Africa:
• Physical and psychological trauma may be experienced by victims of electoral violence
• Political apathy resulting from the fear of resurgence of violence or disenchantment of the prospects of elections in a democracy.
• Low human development resulting from the cost of repair of infrastructure. A country also becomes unattractive to Foreign Direct Investment therefore resulting in a reduction in foreign exchange earnings. This situation is compounded by capital flight that ensues from domestic entrepreneurs transferring their investments elsewhere.
• Mockery of democratic values as a result of power sharing arrangements.
• Distortion in political system as a result of assassination and political asylum.

The Research identified that the establishment of institution of democratic development are safeguards to electoral violence in Africa. It identified that collectively, civil society organisations are a critical stakeholder in demand for government accountability and elections monitoring. This is because of their independence from government in terms of their sources of funding, management and activity programming. The prominent role of civil society in Ghana’s democratic success story also needs mentioning.

The research also identified that Ghana’s Constitutions has a mandated institution responsible for civic education which is the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE). Although part of the state machinery, it enjoys some level of independence from government in terms of mandate as well as funding which is drawn from the consolidated fund of Ghana. Also, its leadership enjoys security of tenure as their terms and conditions of office are equated to an Appeals Court Judge (in the case of the Chairman of NCCE) and a High Court Judge (in the case of the Deputy Chairmen). The NCCE since its creation under the fourth republican Constitution has also contributed immensely to the consolidation of democracy in Ghana.
through efforts towards the gradual elimination of electoral violence and the development of a culture of democratic temperance in the citizenry.

The Role of Regional Organisations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in norm creation on democratic values has also reduced the incidence of electoral violence in Africa. However, their inability to apply effective sanctions on countries that violate protocols on democracy needs to be addressed.

The research identified that in Cote d’ Ivoire, the choice of liberal economic policies at independence without democratization did not engender political stability. Political patronage of France also glossed over the stark economic realities of the country. Further to this, the policy of ‘Ivoirite’ created structural violence against perceived foreigners in the 1995 Elections. Consequently, the inability of the political elites to resolve this led to subsequent political instability and the post electoral violence of 2010.

In Ghana, ‘Nkrumahism’, a version of socialism failed after independence and was followed by series of ‘dancing chair military takeovers’ interlacing brief democratic regimes. Following the Third Wave of Democratization in the World that partly hit Africa, Ghana took advantage of the opportunity to democratize. It instituted local government elections in 1990 and subsequently, Parliamentary and Presidential Elections in 1992. Since independence, the existence of a relatively strong regime on formation of political parties has also helped limit the effects of ethnicity on politics in Ghana. The development of a strong civil society in Ghana has helped steer the country back towards the path of democracy anytime it went undemocratic or dictatorial. The activeness of civil societies has also helped reduce electoral violence since the return to constitutional rule in 1992.
4.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations have been put forward based on the findings of the study:

- Establishment of preventive and early warning mechanisms of electoral violence: The emergence of electoral conflict is always associated with agitations and disagreements on a small scale which later escalate to uncontrollable levels. The establishment of early warning mechanisms will aid experts to resolve such issues before they aggravate into large scale electoral violence.

- Restructuring and Capacity Building of Election Management Bodies (EMBs) and Governance Institutions: Most institutions of state responsible for elections and democracy lack the capacity to deliver effectively on their mandate. These institutions therefore need autonomy in terms of management and funding in order to deliver. In relation to this, staff remuneration is important to retain high calibre personnel and also reduce their propensity to corruption. This is needed in the case of Ghana where there were revealed deficiencies in the quality of ephemeral personnel used by the Electoral Commission during the 2012 General Elections. Cote d’Ivoire is also not left out as there is the need for major restructuring of its elections systems especially the procedure for appointment of members of its electoral commission and the limits of their powers vis. a vis. the Constitutional Court.

- Capacity Building of Judicial Institutions: The Judiciary has a crucial role to play in elimination of the culture of impunity through punishment of crimes. It also has a crucial role to play in adjudication of electoral disputes. Building their capacity through training and financial resourcing will ensure timely adjudication of electoral dispute which will reassure the citizenry of fairness in the delivery of justice. This is very important in healing the nation of Cote d’Ivoire as a result of the 2010 electoral
violence, not forgetting accusation of selective justice on the current President Outarra’s government.

- AU coordination of electoral assistance: The African Union after the 21st Century has shown commitment to the promotion and maintenance of democracy on the continent. This can be taken a step further to allow the mother Union to coordinate assistance to countries undergoing elections before, during and after the process through the provision of governance experts and logistical support to countries. This will help with the implementation of African solutions to African problems, such as electoral violence.

- Civic Education: Democracy should not be seen as a mere event which is manifested in the conduct of elections, rather, it should be seen as an unending process. This calls for increased civic and voter education on the essence of democracy as well as the rights and civic responsibilities of the citizenry. When this is properly done, the citizenry will take ownership of the process and thereby lead to a reduction in electoral violence in Africa. The NCCE in Ghana should lead the way in Africa by adopting Track II Diplomatic efforts in reaching out to African Governments.

- Ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance\(^1\): The ratification of this Charter by African countries will further ensure a uniformed legal regime on democracy on the continent. This will ensure that citizens can take their Governments on and seek redress in courts, thereby reducing the propensity of government to perpetuate electoral violence. It was also instructive to note that out of 54 African Union (AU) members, Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are among 46 signatories to the Charter and 23 countries that have both ratified and deposited their instrument of ratification.\(^2\) Further diplomatic efforts are therefore needed to persuade the yet majority countries that have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.
• Constitutional Amendments: Most African countries with weak Constitutions which do not support democracy should consider a holistic and non-partisan review of their Constitutions to provide increased human rights to their citizenry and also establish democratic institutions backed by law. Such amendments should also relax restrictions on the formation and activities of political parties and civil society organizations.

• Election observation and monitoring: Like the Ghanaian situation during the 2008 Elections, countries are likely to live up to expectations when the eyes of the International community are turned on them. Continuous election observation and monitoring will provide an independent perspective of incidence and also encourage compliance to electoral laws and international legal obligations. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire should therefore continue to invite and receive election observer groups/mission during general elections.

• The introduction of Parallel Voter tabulation (PVT) Mechanism on a nationwide scale by civil society coalitions can also help verify the official results of elections provided by the Electoral Management Body (EMB). This will help deepen the confidence of the citizenry in the final declared results, thereby reducing their propensity to resort to violent protests. In the case of Ghana, this is very much needed because of the dispute of official election results, and incidence which corroborated unofficial reports churned out by a collation of Local election observer groups during the 2012 General Elections.

• There is also the need to put in place anti-corruption measures to reduce the stakes that are always associated with elections in Africa. This will also help deepen the confidence of the citizenry in their leaders as well as the democratic process.
• Security Sector reforms are also necessary to fight impunity and crime. This is very important in the case of Cote d’Ivoire where the demobilization of irregular armed groups/ militia is very much needed.
End Notes

1 The Charter was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on the 30 January 2007 and entered into force on 15 February 2012.

REFERENCES

Books


Biney, A., the Political and Social Thoughts of Kwame Nkrumah, New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, (2011).


**Journal Articles**


Documents


UNHCR, ‘Report of the high Commissioner’, Abidjan, 2010


Newspaper Article


Internet Sources


