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THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF PhD POLITICAL SCIENCE DEGREE

JULY 2012
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that except for references to other publications which have been duly acknowledged herein, this work is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of the undersigned.

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ABSTRACT

One of the significant challenges confronting the international community in the post-Cold War era is dealing with intra-state conflicts in various parts of the world, particularly in Africa. In addressing this issue, it has also become essential over time, to address the question of what states must do upon the cessation of hostilities to prevent a recurrence of the conflict. Consequently, post-conflict development, including the rebuilding of infrastructure, political and social institutions, demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants and generally creating conditions for sustained development has according to Krause & Jütersonke 2005 become the ‘core business’ of the international humanitarian and development community. This has created a peacebuilding industry that seeks to prevent recidivism in violent conflicts. While there have been successes, there have also been significant failures in this regard. In 2003, Liberia brought to an end a fourteen year old civil war with the signing of a comprehensive peace accord. With a legacy of institutions shattered by war and long periods of mal-governance Liberia began a process of post conflict development aimed at addressing the human security needs of its people. The main objective of the study is to examine human security in the post conflict development of Liberia from an institutional perspective. A critical aspect of this is to interrogate the extent to which the record of human security is deepening historic socio-economic inequalities and how that threatens the sustainability of Liberia’s post-conflict development. The research hypothesised that the floundering state of institution building in post-conflict Liberia is likely to foster uneven results in human security, re-establish socio-economic inequalities, and engender negative consequences with the potential of instigating relapse into violent conflict. The research findings noted that, whilst Liberia has made tremendous efforts at building institutions to advance various components of human security, there is still a lot of
socio-economic inequality between the various counties. The continued spatial inequality is undermining the sustainability of post-conflict development. This will cause Liberia to relapse into conflict.
DEDICATION

To God alone be the Glory
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I first acknowledge God almighty, for his grace and mercy during the time of research and writing. But for the Grace I would not have come this far.

My deepest gratitude goes to Prof. Kwame Boafo-Arthur, a former Head of the Department of Political Science and a former Director of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), for adding me to his long list of protégés, setting me up on a path of academic development and encouraging me every step of the way. But for him, this thesis would have remained a mirage.

My gratitude also go to Professors Kofi Kumado, a former director of LECIAD, for challenging me to pursue higher studies and H.J.A.N Mensah-Bonsu, former Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in Liberia, who gave me an opportunity to experience the dynamics of a peacebuilding mission in Liberia and thereby stimulated my interest in post-conflict development.

I acknowledge Professor Abeeku Essuman-Johnson and Dr. Iddi Ziblim, both of the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon for serving on my supervisory committee and dropping useful hints along the way. I am also grateful to Dr. Emmanuel Debrah, Head, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, for his useful hints when I barely knew what a doctoral thesis should look like.

I am indebted to my good friend - Sam Opoku-Agyakwa of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), for tolerating me during those visits to Liberia and for responding to my numerous emails and text messages seeking clarification for one issue or the other.

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I appreciate my colleagues at LECIAD, Afua, Linda, Rita and Julie who encouraged me at times when I thought I had come to the end of the road. I also wish to acknowledge the indefatigable LECIAD Library Assistant, Eric Amarlai Amartey, for his untiring assistance.

I acknowledge the memory of my late father, Capt. Victor Nii Attuquayefio, for whom any job worth the while was worth doing well and my ever supportive mother, Lovia. I appreciate them for starting it all.

Finally, I say a BIG thank you and God Bless You to my dear wife Cynthia for keeping a healthy home that afforded me the peace of mind to pursue further studies.
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<td>ACCORD</td>
<td>African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes</td>
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<td>ACS</td>
<td>American Colonisation Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATU</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorists Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCR</td>
<td>Bureau of Corrections and Rehabilitation</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIN</td>
<td>Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIVAC</td>
<td>Bureau Inspection, Valuation, Assessment, Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARI</td>
<td>Central Agricultural Research Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>County Development Agenda</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CFSNS</td>
<td>Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey</td>
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<td>CMRRD</td>
<td>Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Accord</td>
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<td>CSSDCA</td>
<td>Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa</td>
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<td>CWIQ</td>
<td>Common Welfare Indicator Questionnaire</td>
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<td>DCAF</td>
<td>Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDRR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace Keeping Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAE</td>
<td>Pacific Architects and Engineering Incorporated</td>
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<td>ECF</td>
<td>Extended Credit Facility</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African State</td>
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<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>European Recovery Programme</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>Forestry Development Authority</td>
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<td>GEMAP</td>
<td>Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme</td>
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<td>GC</td>
<td>Governance Commission</td>
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<td>GoL</td>
<td>Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>GRC</td>
<td>Governance Reform Commission</td>
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<td>GSP</td>
<td>Generalised System of Preferences</td>
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<td>HIPC</td>
<td>Highly Indebted Poor Country</td>
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<td>ICGL</td>
<td>International Contact Group of Liberia</td>
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<td>IDDRS</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards</td>
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<td>IGNU</td>
<td>Interim Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>INCHR</td>
<td>Independent National Commission on Human Rights</td>
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<td>LAC</td>
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<td>LD</td>
<td>Liberia Dollar</td>
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<td>Liberia Employment Action Program</td>
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<td>Liberia Enterprise Development Finance Corporation</td>
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<td>Liberia National Police</td>
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<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NDPL</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Liberia</td>
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<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
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<td>National Transitional Government of Liberia</td>
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<td>NTLA</td>
<td>National Transitional Legislative Assembly</td>
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OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPIC - Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PCD - Post-Conflict Development
PRC - Peoples Redemption Council
PRS - Poverty Reduction Strategy
RIA - Roberts International Airport
RoL - Republic of Liberia
RPF - Rwandan Patriotic Front
R2P - Responsibility to Protect
SGV - Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SRSG - Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General
SSCSR - South-South Cooperation Strategy Report
SSR - Security Sector Reform
SSS - Special Security Services
SWG - Sector Working Group
TIFA - Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TRC - Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UK - United Kingdom
UN - United Nations
UNAMSIL - United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDESA - United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP - United Nations Development Programme
UNMIL - United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNICEF - United Nations Children Fund
UNSC - United Nations Security Council
US - United States of America
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
USD - United States Dollar
WHO - World Health Organisation
ZIF - Center for International Peace Operations
Chapter One

RESEARCH DESIGN

1.1 Introduction

The post-Cold War era has seen an increase in international cooperation. Evidence of such cooperation is the intensification of interstate interactions, through the strengthening of regional integrative schemes all over the world. Lepor (1997), for instance, observes that regional integration has been a distinctive feature of the post-Cold War world. Consequent to the above, there has been a corresponding decrease in interstate armed conflicts. Intrastate armed conflicts have however increased significantly (Fearon 2004 & Hegre 2004). Thus, from 1989 to 2008, the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), for instance, documented a total of 93 intrastate conflicts, 27 internationalised intrastate conflicts and 8 interstate conflicts (Harbom & Sundberg 2008). As a result, the main threat to international peace and security has been violent intra-state conflicts and their internationalising potential (Gurr 1993).

Riding on the wave of intrastate conflicts is the palpable disregard and abuse of protection standards conventionally guaranteed by international humanitarian and human rights laws such as provided under the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Such standards have traditionally focused primarily on state actors clearly identified in a given conflict (Bruderlein 2001:82). Contrary to this trend, however, one significant characteristic of contemporary intra-state wars has been the nebulous character of the contending parties. This complicates the process of ensuring compliance with international humanitarian and human rights provisions. Thus, despite some suggestions to the contrary (Melander, Öberg & Hall 2009), it is generally indicated that intra-
state wars in the post- Cold War world have witnessed a significant rise in civilian casualties than the interstate wars prior to the end of the Cold War (Smith 1997, Mawlawi 1993, Newman 2004, Collier & Sambanis 2005, Mundy 2011). This trend has changed the security considerations in times of conflict.

Relatedly, the post-Cold War era has also seen significant consideration of issues formerly perceived as falling outside the scope of security but which are have pervasively demonstrated the potential to affect the survival of people and communities. Consequently, issues such as climate change, water shortage, health challenges such as the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), drug and human trafficking, of chronic poverty and lack of effective governance are gaining some prominence in discussions on security and threat perception (Mcinnes 2006).

While submissions to the contrary may not be ignored, it may be suggested that developments within Africa in the last three decades, contributed to considerations for modifying threat perception in particular and notions of security in general. In Africa, while many of the proxy conflicts have been resolved, the post-Cold War era has seen the emergence of intra state or civil wars with high fatalities. It has been suggested, for instance, that during the last two decades of the 20th Century, about twenty-eight African countries engaged in violent conflict (Devereux & Maxwell 2001). Out of this number, the 1994 Rwandan genocide reportedly accounted for approximately eight hundred thousand deaths while the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo reportedly claimed some 4.7 million casualties. A significant number of people, most of them non-combatants, also died in the conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other African countries as a result of physical injuries, hunger and diseases (LOC 2008). Apart from the physical destruction, the wars also set back the modest economic gains that the respective
countries had made. This has, for instance, influenced the notion that, at least, nearly half of the population of sub-Saharan Africa is living below the poverty lines since the mid-1990s due to conflicts (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer 1996).

As the new threats emerged, the inability of the state to adequately protect the people living within its boundaries challenged the traditional state-centric security system. Thus, the social contract, that, in the opinion of Weber (1919), granted the government of states, legitimate monopoly over violence within the territorial boundaries of the state and in turn assured the people living within such boundaries of the security of their persons, appeared to have been challenged. It, therefore, became essential for any meaningful discussion on security to go beyond the state-centric view of security, to the security of the people living within the state – their human security. This called for an alternate paradigm, one that was holistic to adequately consider the reality of state-centric concerns for security yet offer a framework for emphasising emerging threats to the security of people.

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme in its Human Development Report (HDR) introduced the concept of Human Security into the mainstream of development and security policy. As a complement to the traditional state-centric security conceptualisation, human security encapsulates the absence of threats posed to the vital core of people by such factors as poverty, environmental degradation, diseases and pandemics as well as others that critically disrupt lives of people. It marked the beginning of conceptualising security beyond “the defense of territory from external attack to the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence” (Annan 2000:43). Thus, essentially, while recognizing the essence of territorial
security, human security reprioritises security to ensure that other threats to the survival of the people within the state are given prominence.

1.2 Problem Statement

On 18 August 2003, the 14-year civil war in Liberia was formally ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in Accra and the resignation of Charles Taylor as president of the Republic of Liberia. Among the most pronounced effects of intrastate conflict is the destruction of institutions (Lerche 2006) and Liberia was no exception. The civil war significantly destroyed institutions in every sector of state and everyday life (Vinck, Pham & Kreutzer 2011). Omeje (2009:11) aptly notes that:

> The war disfigured the fabric of Liberian society and devastated all public and state institutions. Nothing was spared. The economy was utterly destroyed and infrastructures (roads, electricity, pipe borne water, hospitals, schools, government offices etc.) in ruins. The state security forces were in complete disarray and poor morale. Large numbers of unruly NPFL rebels were infused into the security forces during Charles Taylor’s presidency and many professional servicemen were killed, dismissed, exiled or in desertion from the service.

Evidence of the state of institutions in Liberia is deductible from the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment for 2006, three years after the formal end of Liberia’s war. On the public sector management and institutions cluster, Liberia scored an overall average of 2.10 out of 6.0 (World Bank 2006). Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom (2008) have noted that on the World Bank’s rating system, a typical post-conflict country starts with a rating of 2.41. Thus, with scores as 2.10, Liberia was below the minimum mark. Effect of the breakdown was felt in every aspect of human security. The productive sectors of the economy such as agriculture and manufacturing grinded to a virtual halt and over two million internally displaced people had to contend with threats to personal security and an absence of infrastructure and basic services like electricity, pipe borne water, education and health as well as the social costs such as robbery, mob violence and sexual and gender based violence.
To remedy this anomaly, the Government of Liberia (GoL) in partnership with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and other external actors have since 2003, began reestablishing institutions towards advancing human security. Notable gains have been chalked in areas such as Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform. As a result, Liberia has, for instance, a functioning police, the Liberian National Police (LNP), who, together with the United Nations Police (UNPOL), have restored some stability to the country.

Inspite of gains made, there are some aspects of human security such as the economic aspirations of Liberians that continue to be problematic. It also appears that the development and management of institutions for advancing human security in Liberia is yielding uneven results thereby deepening the inequalities that precipitated the war in the first place. This is due to persisting disparities in socio-economic indicators of various parts of the country. The potential implication of this on Liberia’s PCD is not far-fetched. According to Collier, Hoeflter and Söderbom (2008), the potential for relapse during the ten years following the ending of a conflict is 40 percent. Goovaerts, Gaser and Belman Inbal also point to a 44 percent chance of relapse in within the first five years after peace (2006:1). Research has therefore identified the history of violent conflict as one of the key predictors of future conflict (Date-Bah 2008). Liberia therefore stands the risk of relapsing into violent conflict if the question of some conflict precipitants being created is true. This calls for an examination of the state of human security. In the absence of such an examination, gains made from years of investment in post-conflict development can be jeopardised.
1.3 Hypothesis

The floundering state of institution-building in post-conflict Liberia is likely to foster uneven results in human security, re-establish socio-economic inequalities, and engender negative consequences with the potential of instigating a relapse into violent conflict.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The study generally examines human security in the post conflict development of Liberia from an institutional perspective. A critical aspect of this is to interrogate the extent to which the record of human security is deepening historic socio-economic inequalities and how that threatens the sustainability of Liberia’s post-conflict development. In this regard the objectives of the study are to:

a. examine linkages between human security and the sustainability of post-conflict development.

b. examine the relevance of institutions to human security.

c. review Liberia’s record of post-conflict institution-building.

d. examine challenges to human security in Liberia and the sustainability of post-conflict development.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The study is conducted within the framework of neo-institutionalism and the Grievance theory. Neo-institutionalism essentially considers institutions as sets of rules that guide and constrain the behaviour of actors. This consideration is substantially influenced by Rueschemeyer & Evans (1985) and North (1990). Neo-institutionalism defines actors to include individuals and groups of all types whether social or commercial in orientation. The definition further includes States -
characterised as a special type of organization invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force (Rueschemeyer & Evans 1985: 46). Considering that post-conflict development entails a multiplicity of actors often working towards a common cause (Cox 2000), the composition of actors within the general definition of institutions provided by Rueschemeyer & Evans (1985) is beneficial as it ropes in the Liberian Government and the host of external and non-state actors contributing to advancing human security in Liberia. Furthermore, the reference to rules guiding the behaviour of such actors is useful as it provides a good benchmark for examining the activities of the multiple actors identified above. In the specific case of Liberia, the CPA of 2003 is one of such rules that offered a policy guideline to post-conflict development.

A further relevance of neo-institutionalism to this study is its attention to both formal and informal institutions. North (1990:46) perceives informal and formal institutions as depicting a “continuum from unwritten traditions and customs to written law”. Such informal institutions are handed down to successive generation through the “teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values and other factors that influence behaviour”(Boyd 2005:2). The importance of informal institutions is often seen in the fact that it overrides formal rules in certain settings. In the case of post-conflict societies for instance, it has been noted that the void left by the absence of the state and formal rules during war time, is occupied by fairly stable informal structures often facilitated by a network of social actors (Aron 2003). These structures (which can reflect or mimic traditional customs) perpetuate themselves by placating the challenges of their social networks and integrating themselves into the ‘habitual behaviour’ of members of the social networks (North 1990:83)
Despite the possibility of perpetuation, both formal and informal institutions are susceptible to change. Such change might arise as a result of the altering (often through complication) of behaviour for which the institutions were developed or evolved. The extent to which the new institutions can address challenges of the network can however not be taken for granted. In practical terms, revising formal judicial institutions to address lack of confidence in an existing system might end up benefiting just a section of the intended population. According to Hall and Taylor (1996:8), this can cause an uneven distribution of power among different groups thereby engendering inequality.

Furthermore, the general assumption in the literature has been that institutions are independent variables. Consequently, a number of analyses have sought to demonstrate that differences in institutions can affect the nature of policy (Weaver and Rockman 1993). Indeed, within the context of the present study, it is speculated that differences in the spatial nature of formal institutions are likely to influence the extent to which human security is promoted in Liberia’s post-conflict development. Inspite of this, the neo-institutionalist school, also advances the view that “institutions are not independent entities, existing out of space and time” (Marsh and Stoker 2002) but are “embedded” in particular context (Granovettor 1985). Such view is indeed critical, considering the common knowledge that formal institutions developed and operated within post-conflict settings may show signs peculiar to such a context. As regards informal institutions, as has been noted already, their origination is sometimes as a result of the crystallisation of customs and traditions handed down to succeeding generations. It stands to reason, therefore, that the constitutive factors can also act as constraints to the extent of performance or effects of the institutions. Juxtaposing it by this study, the suggestion is that the performance of informal institutions generated to address specific aspects of human security such as food and rule of law,
can be inhibited by the same customs and traditions. In essence, the “context” bears the potential to affect the nature of both formal and informal institutions. The implication of this is that institutions may also be dependent variables depending on culture and history of a particular area. This perspective is also explored in this study in relation to how factors peculiar to Liberia’s context (such as political history) influences the way institutions impact on human security in the country.

Further on the context, attempts to dismantle informal institutions by promulgating formal alternatives in post-conflict development for objectives such as human security may generate contradictions that would threaten human security. As far as North’s (1990) prognosis is concerned, the increasing complexity of societies would naturally push to the formalization of institutions as the inability of informal systems to match the complex challenges becomes evident. Within a post conflict context, this could mean a reversal or a move from informal institutions engendered during or prior to the conflict to more formalised system. Yet, Institutions that are culturally derived do not respond to change overnight. Infact, North (1990) attributes their resilience to the fact that they are embedded in habitual behaviour. So although formal institutions might have better options for addressing a particular objective, the fact is that attitudes and culture cannot be easily dismantled.

From the above, it can be suggested, in sum, that the relevance of neo-institutionalism to the study is due to the institutional approach adopted by the Government of Liberia (GoL), UNMIL and other partners, in addressing the challenges to human security in Liberia’s post-conflict development.
As indicated above, the study also relies on Grievance theory. This theory explores factors that create or sustain discontent among individuals or groups and how such discontent translates into action. In unpacking grievance, some causal variables have been identified. These are Relative Deprivation and Inequality (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009).

Relative deprivation is described as a discrepancy between expectations, defined as the goods and conditions of life, to which people believed they are rightfully entitled to, and their value capabilities which defines the goods and conditions that they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them (Gurr 1970, Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009). Aberle (1962) also defines relative deprivation as negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations and actuality. Within the context of Liberia’s PCD, there is no gainsaying that the populace has had legitimate expectations for better living conditions since the formal end to the war. Indeed von Kaitenborn-Stachau (2008:73) identifies high public expectations as one of the variables that combined into a “potentially explosive mix” at the start of the PCD. Sirleaf–Johnson, further acknowledged the reality of expectations when she admitted that Liberians “figured there would be a quick fix, a magic wand, and everyone will have a job, everyone will be wealthy” (Allen 2011:1). Gurr (1970) notes that such increase in expectations without a corresponding increase in capabilities increase the intensity of discontent. In Liberia, given the high expectation, the unavailability of social means will reduce capabilities for achieving expectations and therefore increase discontent.

Apart from relative deprivation, inequality may also be a source of grievance. Within our context, we tilt toward horizontal inequality rather than vertical. The idea of inequalities between groups, classified by ethnicity, religion, linguistic and tribal differences has been suggested as an
important cause of contemporary civil war and sectarian strife (Stewart 2008). In exploring the level of horizontal inequality in Liberia, the study contrasted Greater Monrovia with Rural Montserrado Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa and Grand Bassa. The context of this contrast is the assumption of inequality with regard to core human security components such as food, personal security and the provision of basic services.

Assuming the presence of discontent emerging from relative deprivation or inequality, the potential effect on Liberia’s PCD can be derived from Grievance-Conflict nexus which simply indicates that grievances will lead to unrests which will affect stability. Gurr’s early elaboration of this nexus substitutes ‘unrests’ with political violence and summarizes the Grievance-Conflict link as “first the development of discontent, second the politicization of the discontent and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors” (Gurr 1970:12). In the case of Liberia, the end result of such violent action can be the relapse of the PCD. Theoretically, however, whether grievances automatically lead to collective unrests has been debated between those who virtually see an automatic translation of grievances into action and others who do not. Advocates of relative deprivation have for instance suggested that inherent in deprivation-induced grievance or discontent is a general spur to action. This is based on the perception of a positive relationship between the intensity of discontent and impulse to action. Another claim of unrest directly following grievances, is based on the neurophysiological assumptions that, confronted with frustrating stimuli that cannot be avoided or overcome, people will usually act (Davies 1970). Others suggest that grievance emerging from relative deprivation is a “type of cognitive dissonance (between legitimate expectation and the belief it will not be fulfilled) which produces psychic tension, leading to tension-reduction activities such as “organized group action to change the structural source of the blockage” (Morrison 1963:103).
The above position has been criticized mainly by social movement theorists who indicate that the assumption of aggression is not the only response alternative to frustration (Park and Mason 1986). In the context of this study, the implication of this challenge is that even if the presence of grievances are established in the sample counties, a critical task would be explaining how the grievances so established, can translate into action. The key lies in recognizing an intervening variable that has to do with mobilization - an animator of some sort that translates grievances into action. In looking for this variable, I turn to Mobilisation of Discontent Model (MDM) Craig (1980).

The MDM essentially posits that the extent of open political conflict within nations is a function of three variables – popular discontent; popular disposition towards conflict; and the balance of organizational strength between challengers and the regime. The first variable, popular discontent is dependent on the extent to which grievances, whether through inequality or relative deprivation is widespread in Liberia. With regard to the popular disposition towards conflict, as has been noted already, the very fact of Liberia’s status as a post-conflict country, gives it a 40 to 44 percent chance of relapsing into conflict (Goovaerts, Gaser and Belman Inbal (2006), Collier, Hoefllr and Söderbom (2008), Date-Bah (2008). The third factor, namely the balance of organizational strength between challengers and the regime is presently not clearly distinguishable in Liberian society with the continued presence of UNMIL. Yet the history of the conflict at the least points to the existence or organizational skills within the populace.

From the above, the greater part of utility of grievance theory lies in the extent to which it can predict actions emerging from discontent. Within the context of this study, the predictive value of grievance theory is necessary in examining how uneven results and socio-economic
inequalities emerging out of the floundering state of institution-building will give vent to unbridled grievances that can cause a relapse into violence. The analyses in this study are therefore informed by postulates of the two frameworks.

1.6 Literature Review

Since its emergence into development and security parlance, some of the controversial aspects of human security have been the definitional contentions (Owen, 2004) and the extent to which the concept has or can be co-opted into the mainstream of security and development research and dialogue (Archaya 2000). This section reviews literature on the definitional contentions as well as the evolution of the concept of Human security. It further reviews the transition from State-Centric Security to Human security and its application in Africa. Finally, it reviews literature on indicators and methodologies for measuring human security as well as strategies for ensuring human security within a variety of settings.

1.6.1 Defining Human Security

In spite of the recognition of the challenges to the state-centric view of security and the prospects of re-contextualising security, defining human security itself has not been without controversy. Thus, Rothschild (1995:55), for instance, describes the process of enlarging the security spectrum as one “of dizzying complexity.”

Amouyel (2006) suggests that defining the concept requires answering three central questions namely security for whom, from what or whom and by what means. Amouyel’s (2006) attempt at providing a simplified formula for defining the concept appears generic. The identification of human security as a ‘concept’ is, however, contestable because the literature makes reference to it variously as a new theory; a starting point for analysis, a world view, a political agenda, or a
policy framework (Tadjbakhsh 2005:5). As a result, the quest for a universal definition of human security that accurately describes the concept in its various manifestations, remain generally elusive. Inspite of this, the search for a definition of human security justifiably starts from the contemporary debut of the concept in the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report (HDR).

The 1994 HDR affirmed that human security has two main facets – the safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, and the protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life whether in jobs, in homes or in communities. Based on this conception, the report suggested seven categories of threats to human security (UNDP, 1994:24). The first of this is Economic Security, which is defined as a guarantee of basic income for individuals, usually from productive work or from a public finance system. The report also identifies Food as well as Health Security. The former is defined as an assurance of physical and economic access to basic food at all times, while the latter is defined as, a guarantee of a minimum protection from diseases and lifestyles that are detrimental to the health of people. The report also identifies Environmental Security as protection from the effects of deterioration of the natural environment while Personal Security, is seen as the protection of people from physical violence. The sixth and seventh categories’ from the 1994 HDR are Community and Political Security. Community Security is defined as protection of people from the loss of traditional relationships values and from sectarian and ethnic violence, while Political Security is identified as an assurance that people live in a society that honors their basic human rights, among others.

Following the above, a number of generally helpful definitions have emerged. The respective definitions focus on one distinction or another. Some have closely mimicked the UNDP
definition by redefining the categorisations. Boyd (2005:115), for instance, defines human security as “the ability to pursue those choices in safe environment broadly encompassing seven dimensions of security- economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.

Others have focused on measures for ensuring and measuring human security (Owen, 2004, Leaning and Arie, 2000). The Commission for Human Security (CHS2003:4), for instance, describes the concept as protection of:

The vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.

A critical reading of the Commission’s usage of the ‘vital core’ suggests a reference to the very existence of human kind, sometimes described as the essence of life. This view is also observed by Chen (1995:139), who consequently argues that human security is the ‘ultimate end’ of all security concerns. Therefore, in Chen’s opinion, other security considerations, such as those that are military in nature, are not ultimate goals but merely means to achieving the ultimate end.

Ogata (1998) also presents a quadri-disaggregated definition. She observes that the first essential element of human security is the possibility for all citizens to live in peace and security within their own borders. The second essential element is that people should enjoy without discrimination all rights and obligations - including human, political, social, economic and cultural rights - that belonging to a state guarantees. The third essential element is social inclusion or having equal access to the political, social and economic policy making processes, as well as to draw equal benefits from them. A fourth element Ogata (1998) opines is that of the
establishment of rule of law and the independence of the justice system. Out of such a system, each individual in a society should have the same rights and obligations and be subject to the same set of rules.

As useful as Ogata’s definition may appear, it merely assumes the threats and offers no examples of the threats to the four essential elements. Considering that the question of what constitutes threat to human security is one of the prime sources of controversy around the concept, Ogata’s omission is noteworthy. This void is however addressed by Thakur (1997) who submits that:

Human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity. Anything which degrades their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock or resources, and so on – is a security threat. Conversely, anything which can upgrade their quality of life – economic growth, improved access to resources, social and political empowerment, and so on – is an enhancement of human security.

Thakur’s stance about the degrading and upgrading of the quality of life and the factors accounting for the two positions enlightens Bajpai’s (2000) suggestion that the promotion of human development and good governance, and, when necessary, the collective use of sanctions and force are central to managing human security. This hints that policies and programmes can be artificially managed to ensure an upgrade of the quality of life within the context of human security. Ukeje (2005) citing Sabelo, (2003:299) also describes human security as

The safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats. It is a condition or state of being characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people’s right, their safety or even their lives… It is an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on security of territory or government. Like other security concepts- national security, economic security, and food security- it is about protection. Human security entails preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action when prevention fails.

Van Ginkel and Newman (2000) also intimate that human security is an integrated, sustainable, comprehensive security from fear, conflict, ignorance, poverty, social and cultural deprivation, and hunger, resting upon positive and negative freedoms. Their characterization of human security as integrated, points to measures that deal with the combination of ‘fear’ and ‘want’ in
ensuring human security. It further justifies, to some extent, Thomas and Wilkin’s (1999:3) 
suggestion that human security has both qualitative and quantitative dimensions with the former 
including the fulfillment of basic material needs and the latter bothering on human dignity such 
as unhindered participation in the community.

The identification of qualitative and quantitative dimensions also reveals that threats to human 
security vary. The variability of threats automatically creates grades of vulnerability. Suhrke 
(1999) identifies in this regard, three categories of extremely vulnerable people as including 
victims of war and internal conflict; those who live close to the subsistence level and thus are 
structurally positioned at the edge of socio-economic disaster; and victims of natural disasters.

While the definitions may appear varied, one common element that is reinforced is the 
consideration of security in people-centered terms. Thus, at the center of all the definitions is the 
individual. Additionally, the nature of insecurity identified or implied in the definitions suggests 
the possibility of states being the agents of such insecurity. Furthermore, the nature of threats 
appears commonly as anything that threatens the individual whether military, economic, social or 
otherwise.

With its seven interdependent components, the UNDP definition offers the broadest 
conceptualisation of human security. The variegation in definition highlights the reality that 
various aspects of the human existence can be critically threatened. As will be pointed out in the 
third chapter, the needs of post-conflict populations are equally varied, spanning the scope of the 
social, cultural, political, economic and otherwise. The UNDP definition is therefore useful 
within the context of this study.
Notwithstanding the utility of the respective definitions and characterizations identified above (including the one adopted for the study), there is a general failure to comprehensively address one critical element of defining human security namely – Context. This can be defined as the set of facts or circumstances that surround a situation or event. The introduction of context within this study derives from the realisation that what constitutes human security within a particular domain is heavily influenced by the social, cultural, economic or political context of that particular domain. The fact that preferences are influenced by context has long been established (Nussbaum 2000). Yet, within the general frame of human security, definitions appear to have ignored this context, with only the CHS (2003), noting that, what people perceive as the essence of life vary from society to society. The essence of context in considering human security is however enforced in this study. In this regard, it will be revealed that human security in Liberia can only be aptly appreciated within the context of the historical inequalities between Greater Monrovia and the rest of Liberia. Any remedy to human security challenges must therefore bear in mind this context. Corollary, failure to adequately address dynamics emerging from the context (in this case inequality between Greater Monrovia and the rest of the country), can render any gain meaningless. Thus, as far as the literature on defining human security is concerned, this study suggests the element of context as critical to the literature on defining human security.

1.6.2 History of Human security

There is no doubt that human security has assumed popularity in development and security discourse since the early 1990s. Yet even before the contemporary references, there had been some allusions to the concept. Blatz (1966) is for instance, on record to have used the term in his psychological evaluation of how people develop the feeling of security throughout their lives. Falk (1971 & 1975), Medlovitz (1975) and Thomas (1985 & 1987) for instance, dilate on aspects
of human security in their respective works. This notwithstanding, the dynamics of domestic and international politics of the time prevented its full appreciation. Thomas & Wilkin (1999:5) aptly suggests that, while the concerns of human security are typically ancient in character, they have been prevented from recognition or inclusion by the overwhelming ‘ontological and epistemological’ assumptions that underpinned orthodox security and policy formulation. A review of such records, however, defines a fine trajectory of the evolution of the concept, beneficial for a contemporary appreciation of human security.

Historically, focusing on the individual as the referent object of rights on the international scene is not novel. Indeed, it has been suggested that some of the principles underlying human security are rudimentary reflections of the liberalist theologies of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Condorcet (Owen 2004:1). Similarly, a reading of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 reveals a commitment to make the individual the referent object of rights from an international perspective (Amouyel 2006).

Although it may be argued that security varies from rights, it is also averred that suggestions to change the security agenda may have emerged before the publication of the UNDP Human Development Report in 1994. Zgüç (2007), for instance, notes that one of such significant precursors to the Human Development Report was the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Palme Commission) formed in the autumn of 1980. In fact, the Palme Commission suggested that conceptions of security must move from a militaristic model to a more holistic model. However, it failed to make reference to the “human” aspect. This notwithstanding, considering that the Commission operated within the Cold War context that so

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1 Operating under the banner of Enlightenment in 18th Century in Europe, these theorists generally questioned the absolutism of the church and the prevailing monarchs of the time by stressing the fundamentals of individual liberty.
strengthened the realist perception of security, the precursory value of the Palme Commission Report to the origin of human security is noteworthy.

Similar to the Palme Commission report, the 1993 Human Development report of the UNDP also advocated a modification of the perception of security from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people’s security; from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security (UNDP 1993).

Succeeding the 1993 HDR was the 1994 HDR that is so often linked to the evolution of human security. Hendricks (2007:IV) highlights the essence of the 1994 report by intimating that though the idea of the need to broaden security had been on the margins of security discourse, the 1994 report gave coherent and systematic expression to those ideas and named the concept Human Security. Thus, the report is not just famous for its explicit use of the concept human security, but also, its contribution towards a greater understanding of the concept through offering key explanations. It argued as follows:

For too long, the concept of security has been shaped by the potential for conflict between states. For too long, security has been equated with threats to a country’s borders. For too long, nations have sought arms to protect their security. For most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime, these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world (UNDP 1994:3)

Consequent to the above position, the 1994 report categorized human security as involving two main dimensions namely, safety from chronic threats such as hunger, diseases and repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life whether in jobs, in homes or in communities (UNDP 1994:23). Perhaps, in anticipation of the definitional challenges, the 1994 HDR identified seven categories under which human security may be
considered. These were economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security and political security (UNDP 1994: 25). Subsequent HDR’s since 1994 have consistently advocated human security by stressing both its quantitative and qualitative aspects (Thomas & Wilkin 1999).

Undoubtedly, the 1994 HDR marked a conscious commissioning of human security, yet the attempt to co-opt it into the mainstream of security discourse has been challenged as fictional or largely unnecessary. Thus, while Sen (1999) sought to reinforce the concept by stressing on enhancement of people’s capabilities and quality of life, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde (1998) for instance, maintained that the individual security concerns were already included in the traditional concept of security. Buzan (2004) particularly observes that the attempt at promoting human security drives towards a reductionist understanding of security. Maclean (2001), however, opposes this on the grounds that human security does not merely "envelope" matters of individual benefit (such as education, health care, protection from crime, and the like); this is because these matters could be thought of as part of the objectives of sovereign states; rather, human security also denotes protection from the unstructured violence that often accompanies many aspects of non-territorial security, such as violence emanating from environmental scarcity, or mass migration. A third viewpoint, represented by Thakur (1999) and Axworthy (2004) argue that rather than wholesale replacement of one security concept with another, it may be beneficial to accept a pluralistic co-existence of national and human security concerns. This third viewpoint strongly influences the conception of human security in this study.

Notwithstanding the challenges above, a more persuasive rendition of human security, that appeared to have reinforced the 1994 HDR, came in the form of the Millennium Report of the
Secretary General of the United Nations in 2000 (United Nations 2000). The Report contained chapters on ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. These two ideas characterised as the Security and Development agenda respectively, reestablished the security-development nexus and in the process reaffirmed the concept of human security.

The combined effect of the Human Development and Millennium Report undeniably received a further boost in 2001 with the setting up of the Commission on Human security (CHS) in 2003. The CHS published *Human Security Now*, a survey of findings of contemporary understanding and approaches to human security in which it noted that “human security is concerned with safeguarding and expanding people’s vital freedoms. It requires both shielding people from acute threats and empowering people to take charge of their lives” (CHS 2003: IV). The CHS thus established “Empowerment” as the complementary arm of ‘Protection’ insofar as ensuring human security was concerned.

The history of human security indicates the relevance of an international or global environment to the development of ideas. Thus, from one global environment that was largely unappreciative of security reconceptualization to one that acknowledge the essence of emphasising people-centered security, human security has moved from the fringes of security studies, to being coopted into the center piece of security discourse. The implication, as far as this study is concerned, is that the co-optation of human security allows for an emphasis on human security for issues that may have traditionally been considered as falling solely within the scope of development studies.

Literature on the history of human security further highlights the fact that a global appreciation of common security challenges facilitates the development of mechanisms (including
institutions) for dealing with such challenges. The CHS (2003) Empowerment/Protection matrix, for instance, emerged from the global appreciation of human security challenges. The literature is however silent on the fact that a national appreciation of security challenges also affect the extent to which mechanisms are evolved to deal with such challenges. The study draws attentions to this viewpoint, by indicating that from a domestic point of view, the absence of mechanisms to specifically deal with human security concerns for the greater part of Liberia’s existence was due to the failure of leadership to appreciate or acknowledge the respective boundaries of security and development as well as the nexus between the two concepts. Thus, essentially, the study argues that a failure in appreciating human security can relegate its concerns to the fringes of a country’s priorities.

1.6.3 From State-Centric Security to Human Security

Conventional security concerns that pitched the State as the referent object of security, derives from the Treaty of Westphalia that invariably created the modern state system in the Seventeenth Century. As a result, the international system was conceptualised as a platform for the interaction of sovereign States, with no governing authority to enforce laws or some conception of international justice (Wilkin 1999:24). The implication of this anarchic arrangement was that States, acting as rational entities, had to necessarily operate a self-help system to ward of perceived or actual threats from other States. Thus, the international system became the realm of survival in which threats were deemed to be targeted at States and not to the people within the state. Further, the threats were deemed to be of a military nature, targeting the territorial integrity, national independence or sovereignty of States. Guaranteeing security of states (national security) against such threats therefore necessitated corresponding military-based
defense frameworks. These were identified as the predominant security concerns of States (Waltz 1979 & Buzan 1983).

Essentially, therefore, the state-centric notion of security is premised on three foundations. The first is that the State is the primary provider of security to individuals living within it. Secondly, threats are perceived to be directed to the State and not to the people within the State. The presumptive consequence being that if the State is secure, then those who live within it are secure. Thirdly, the threats directed to the State are of a military nature.

The utility of the three foundations above has been challenged in the post-Cold War era. The first challenge has been with the nature of threats, previously identified from the realist point of view as military in nature. Following the end of the Cold War, and the brief interregnum in power politics (till the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US), attention was focused on issues that were not novel but whose effects on the security of people and states were recognised as real and potent (UNDP 1993, UNDP 1994, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde 1997). Threats posed by the social and economic consequences of a depleting ozone layer and the threat of HIV for instance, questioned the rationale for placing all premium on threats of a military nature.

Secondly, considering that the threats as identified above were transnational in nature and directly affected people living within States, the conventional wisdom of considering States as objects of threats has been rendered problematic. It has therefore become more than apparent that a secure State does not necessarily guarantee the security of the individuals and communities within the state (Human Security Report 2005).
A third challenge to the foundations of the traditional notion of security has been with regard to the provider of security. Although the State is legally the primary provider of security, in practice, the various governments or regimes are the animate representatives that ensure that rights and responsibilities of the State are actualised. The first aspect of this challenge therefore emerged from the threat posed by the *de jure* providers of security to the people they were supposed to secure (Abad Jr, 2000). In cases such as in Rwanda and Sierra Leone for instance, the State, rather than ensuring the security of individuals and communities living within the state, became the potential and actual threats to the security of individuals and communities within its territory (Prunier 1995). A further challenge to the State’s ability to provide security to their citizens emerged from the weakening of the military capability of a number of states, particularly in Africa, in the post-Cold War era. This was due to the decline in the military relevance of such states following the end to the numerous proxy wars that characterised Cold War politics. As a result, a number of states have themselves been rendered susceptible to the activities of violent sub national groups (Howe 2001).

Another dimension of the nature of the emerging threats and the apparent reneging of the state and its animators on the responsibility to protect individuals and communities living within the state is the increasing recognition of the complementary role of other entities in assuring security for people living within the state. At the vanguard of such recognition were attempts by post-Modernists’ to de-emphasise the importance of the state in guaranteeing human security while projecting the role of non-state actors in the process of ensuring adequate human security. Consequent to the above, there was the need for a comprehensive approach that acknowledges that the nature of emerging threats to individuals and communities cannot be tackled through conventional mechanisms alone (OCHA 2009).
In providing a remedy to the challenges identified above, human security encapsulates the absence of critical and pervasive threats from poverty, diseases and the natural limitations of the environment as well as other factors that violently disrupt the lives of people living within states. Such factors may be economic, health related, environmental or even food based (Annan, 2000). Thus, human security, while recognising the relevance of territorial security, argues for threats to individuals living within the state to be granted priority. It also recognises threats and conditions that have not always been classified as threats to state security. Finally, it expands the range of actors providing security beyond the state.

Like many countries that descended into conflict in Africa, Liberia provides an effective justification for the move from state-centric security to people-centered security. This is because up until the end of the 14-year war, the three main foundations of state-centric security have been systematically discounted first under the Americo-Liberian oligarchy and subsequently under the Doe and Taylor regimes. From human right abuse, to food shortages and gross inequities in access to basic and social services, a significant percentage of the country’s population barely fell within the states responsibility. The security of the state of Liberia hardly translated into the security of the people of Liberia. Overtime, the *de jure* provider of security became the *de facto* threat to the security of the people. State agents such as the Liberia National Police (LNP) and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) established a consistent reputation as threat to the people of Liberia. These conditions translated into a civil war whose perpetuation and consequences (including the generation and sustenance of socio-economic and political threats to the vital core) merely crystallised the reneging of the state’s role in assuring the security of the people. The conceptual remedy afforded by human security is therefore useful for a study on Liberia.
1.6.4 Human Security in Africa

As stated in the preceding sections, the cases of human insecurity in parts of Africa such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia, presents useful leads towards the consideration of the challenges with orthodox security as well as an appreciation of the essence of human security. In this regard, Dumont (1988), for instance, avers that the history of Africa, manifested by underdevelopment, poor political leadership and the negative fallouts from Cold War politics is essential to understanding the causes of human insecurity in Africa. Citing Vayrynen (1995) Ukeje (2005) notes that by considering the threat ability of population surges, environmental degradation and destruction of indigenous culture among others, the range of security threats in Africa is widened. This triggers critical reflections regarding the shape, form and content that security discourses and practices are going to take in Africa over the next decades.

In his assessment of human security in Africa, Spears (2007) traces the challenges to the nature of the post-colonial African State. In this regard, he identifies as one of the major challenges to human security on the continent, the creation of post-colonial African states as fortification against further colonial rule, rather than as a provider of domestic order and protection for their citizens. It can therefore be derived from Spears (2007) suggestion, that the elements that constitutes human security, appears not to have been given a superlative position within the thought processes of the post-colonial African State.

A second challenge to human security that derives from the nature of the post-colonial African State is the violent conflicts that transpire in these states. Citing Chabal and Daloz (1999), Spears (2007) opines that such conflicts engender state weaknesses, which in turn provide opportunities
for predatory activities by African leaders. Such leaders therefore deliberately undermine efforts at state building, and in the process jeopardize the quality of human security in Africa.

Additional to the above, Spears (2007) notes that, the nature of the partitioning and colonization of Africa (to the extent that it disregarded existing ethnic lines), bequeathed the African state with a significant degree of internal diversity. Such diversity, according to Jackson and Rosberg (1982) has accounted for most of the conflicts in these states. Spears (2007) opines that though a number of States have maintained the system through suppression, patronage and in some cases the manipulation of ethnic tensions, these modes of maintenance have sometimes yielded consequences that have been detrimental to human security.

Spears (2007) identifies the unreliability of the international community in guaranteeing human security, in spite of the agreement on the responsibility to protect as one of the challenges of human security in Africa. Mueller (2000) writing on the Rwandan conflict, for instance, observes that in the few places where peacekeepers (representing the international community) were present, the perpetrators of the genocide did not carry out their gruesome acts. These notwithstanding, evidence from countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, point to the unsustainability of such acts. As a result of this trend, Mallaby (2002) and Rieff (1999) have advocated long term efforts at rebuilding post-conflict states. Spears (2007) is however convinced that even the long term efforts are problematic. He opines that this is because the security dilemmas in many African countries are usually long term in nature thus bearing the potential to outlive any international effort.

and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA) held in Kampala. An initiative of civil society groups, the meeting was to develop a regime regarding security stability and development in Africa (Tieku 2007). Obasanjo and Mosha (1992) note that at the heart of the conference was a conscious attempt to redefine security to include extra military consideration economic, social or otherwise in orientation and to demand certain standards of behaviour from every government in the interest of humanity. Thus the conference sought to reaffirm the linkages between security, stability and an advancement of humanity. Hutchful (2008) notes that the attempt to integrate development with concepts of security and stability was reflected in the Kampala document that:

The concept of security must be seen in its wholesomeness and totality. It must be taken beyond the traditional definition, which is largely military consideration. The security of each country and of the continent must be taken to include the security of the people to live in peace with access to basic necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of their society freely and exercising their fundamental human rights.

Tieku (2007) notes that, although the Kampala report was submitted to the OAU, there was a failure to immediately integrate its recommendations into the continental agenda. He however avers that the conference and the outcome report provided a useful platform for the consideration of human security within the ambit of the OAU. This ‘influenced the eventual adoption of the OAU Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism’ (Tieku 2007:31).

Following the CSSDCA and subsequent demarches by Mandela including a 13 June 1994 call to African leaders to empower the OAU to protect African people and to prevent African governments from abusing the sovereignty of states (Mandela 1999), the OAU, between 1995 and 1997, commenced reform processes aimed at restructuring the OAU to make it focus on human security concerns (Salim 1995, 1997). Subsequent discussions on human security within the context of the creation of the AU eventually led to the adoption of a Memorandum of
Understanding by African leaders to use the Kampala report as norms and guiding principles of security, stability and development cooperation within the continent.

Dilating on the elements of human security within the African Union, Powell and Tieku (2005) observe that the Constitutive Act empowers the AU to deal with human insecurity in Africa by preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent through such organs as the Peace and Security Council. A cursory reading of the Constitutive Act affirms Powell and Tieku’s (2005) observation. Article 4 m (Amended), for instance, empowers the Union to intervene in the affairs of member states in respect of grave circumstances namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as serious threats to legitimate order, to resolve peace and stability to the Member States of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council of the AU. It has been widely suggested that the purpose of the above article is to protect ordinary people from abusive governments (Tieku 2007: 29, Malan 2002, Cilliers and Sturman 2002, Kioko, 2003).

Beyond the above, Article 4 also highlights issues such as good health and working towards eradicating preventable diseases. This reaffirms the consideration of human security in the African Union’s scheme of things. Additionally, Article 6 of the AU Common African Defence and Security Policy, for instance, states that.

The causes (the high incidence) of intra-state conflict necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on political values, but on social and economic imperatives as well. This newer, multi-dimensional notion of security thus embraces such issues as human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development, as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against national disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation. At the national level, the aim would be to safeguard the security of individuals, families, communities, and the state/national life, in economic, political and social dimensions (African Union 2004).
It may therefore be opined that beyond the Kampala document, the AU and its institutions, binding agreements, declarations decisions and policies point to a more determined move to apply human security to Africa’s context. Tieku (2007) is therefore justified in his submission that human security concerns informed the foundation of the African Union. This notwithstanding, authors like Hendricks (2007) contend that human security remains a vague concept proliferating in policy documents but with little resonance in the daily operation of the security apparatus. This is however contested by Yapo (2007) who identifies post-conflict development as one of the areas witnessing the application of human security within Africa.

The reason for the focus on post-conflict development may perhaps derive from the nature of post-conflict development. Indeed, with regard to the context of post conflict countries where infrastructure and people are broken down (socially and psychologically), it is of insignificant value to conceptualise security only in traditional state centric terms. The presumption is that for such societies, other concerns apart from internal violence such as food rationing, are important and could in fact lead to relapses into violence. Human security, therefore, provides a more useful way to appreciate the latent security challenges in post-conflict development. Thus, a number of post-conflict recovery strategies have been designed in terms of reconciliation (at the national and local levels) operating alongside security sector reforms, economic revival and (re)building of socio-political institutions, among others. Such efforts that essentially ensure that preventing a relapse into violent conflicts is complemented by efforts at creating sustainable livelihoods promote the policy relevance of human security. This position is affirmed by the 2005 report of the UN Secretary-General on conflict, peace and development in Africa that states that:

Ensuring basic human security is critical to sustaining post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction in Africa. It requires that people from all cultural, religious and ethnic groups be protected and empowered. International organizations, especially those operating in the
humanitarian and developmental domains, need to address the diverse threats to human security in a comprehensive and coherent manner (UN 2005 par.35).

On the basis of the above, Thomas (1999) intimates that a human security approach is necessary both to understand the nature and persisting conflict in Africa and to advance solutions. Typical of every case study approach is the exploration of the potential for replication of recommendations or methodology. This study is no different, within the context of Thomas (1999), it is hoped that findings from this thesis will inform analysis in other African countries at various stages of post-conflict development.

1.6.5 Measuring Human Security: The Broad and the Narrow Approaches

As indicated above, one of the foremost criticisms of human security that has been often cited as accounting for a greater part of its analytical inaptitude relates to the measurement of human security. Van Ginkel and Newman (2000), for instance, observe that even though it represents an important conceptual leap in security considerations, it must be defined more clearly to be usefully addressed within an international framework. Stoett (1999) also suggests the need to ensure that the concept is not given a pigeonhole effects where it is expected to and actually does explain everything observing the potential for such approaches to devalue the utility of the concept. Notwithstanding the commonalities identified above, the implications of the variances in the definitions are not trivial as it has a bearing on the methodological nuances and by inference, the measurement of human security as well as its analytical relevance within a variety of contexts.

A number of proposals have been suggested to measure human security. Bajpai (2004) for instance, points to the focus on audits of threats and the capacities that exist to deal with them.
The challenges of measurement have however been greatly influenced by the ‘broad and narrow’ debate surrounding the definition of threats to human security.

The narrow definition (Krause 1998 & Mack 2004) limits human security to the absence of violence or what has been termed ‘freedom from fear’. This approach seeks to limit the practice of human security to protecting individuals from threats that may come from issues such as the drug trade, landmines, ethnic discord, state failure, and trafficking in small arms (Collier 1999).

By so doing, the definition restricts the parameters of human security to violent threats against the individual while recognizing that these violent threats are strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity and other forms of inequities. The narrow definition has been portrayed as offering a more realistic and manageable approach towards human security, by presenting the opportunity for immediate intervention, rather than the long term planning for sustainable development.

The broad definition (UNDP 1994, Leaning & Arie 2000, Alkire 2003, Thakur 2000, Bajpai 2000 Hampson & Hay 2002) on the other hand goes beyond the narrow approach described above to include ‘freedom from want’. Drawing largely from the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report as well as the report of the United Nations Human Security Commission, this school contends that chronic hunger, disease, and repression as well as sudden disasters, offer sufficient threats to the security of individuals. It therefore expands the focus beyond violence with emphasis on development and security goals. It thus advocates that a holistic approach to achieving human security must recognise such broad threats as inseparable concepts in addressing the root of human insecurity (Collier 1999).
This thesis adopts the broad definition of human security. The choice for the broad concept is influenced first by the academic neglect of the broader conceptualization in research projects. The causes for such neglect often derive from assumed analytical challenges. Krause (2007) for instance, alludes that the broad approach is simply a shopping list of bad things that can happen. This, in his opinion, robs the approach of analytical utility. Mack (2004:367) has also suggested that a concept that aspires to explain almost everything in reality explains nothing.

However, in defense of the broad approach, it may be posited that advocating a change in the referent object of security from the state to the individual must necessarily consider all the threats to the security of the individual be they military, physical or otherwise. It is posited that military threats cannot be prioritized over economic threats in a world where over 1.2 billion people live on less than a dollar a day. Additionally, even the die-hard advocates of the narrow concept concede the interrelatedness of the variables captured in the two approaches of human security. It is therefore paradoxical to concede inter-relatedness of certain variables and yet limit research to just parts, rather than the whole, on account of it being broad. Svensson (2007:6) rightly opines in this regard, that, grasping the multidimensional character of international security today, calls for the willingness to let go of analytical neatness and with specific reference to Africa, Ukeje (2005:11) avers that a more desirable type of security for Africa is the one that dwell more on human security within the context of the welfare of the individual, and by extension, the community, as against threats to regimes and the territoriality of nation states.

Further to the above, within the context of post conflict countries where infrastructure and people are broken down (socially and psychologically), it may be of insignificant value to link any study to a narrow approach. The presumption is that for such societies, other concerns apart from
internal violence such as food rationing, are important and could in fact lead to relapses into violence. Thus, such broad human security conceptualisation may provide the way to appreciating latent security challenges in post-conflict development. In this regard, post conflict recovery strategies are often based on reconciliation (at the national and local levels) operating alongside security sector reforms, economic revival and (re)building of socio-political institutions among others. Such efforts ensure that preventing a relapse into violent conflicts is complemented by efforts at creating sustainable livelihoods.

Finally, the challenges of measuring human security as advanced by the broad definition appear to have been addressed by Owen (2003). Owen’s methodology, which uses sub national data to map and spatially analyze regionally relevant human security threats, addresses the problematic of measuring the broad definition of human security.

In an effort to harmonise the two schools, Owen (2004) intimates that a ‘hybrid’ Human Security definition must recognise that there is no difference between deaths from floods or from guns; all preventable harms should be considered threats to human security. His endeavors appear to have yielded a permutation of key aspects of the two main schools. The outcome is human security defined as protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats.

Owen’s (2004) point of departure lies in setting a clear threshold, a kind of boundary within which threats to human security can be accepted as such. This is achieved through the attachment of the adjectives “critical and pervasive” to the description of what constitutes a threat to Human Security. As a result, the numerous potential threats to human security, that make the concept analytically unattractive, are expected to be evaluated along the “critical and pervasive” criteria,
in order to be considered as a threat to human security. This substantially cuts down the number of threats’ to only the most serious.

A further defining factor of the threat threshold resides in the notion of vital core, defined by the UN Commission on Human Security as what constitutes the minimum level of survival. Thus put plainly, human security according to Owen’s permutation refers to the extent to which individuals and communities are protected and empowered from the most serious of threats’ to their minimum level of survival.

Owen’s definition is no doubt significant and useful for the academic and practical treatment of human security. It must be noted however, that the threat threshold is silent on the issue of spatial context. This is because the question of what constitutes a critical and pervasive threat may not be universal (Alkire 2003). Including a spatial contextual assessment within the general assessment of “critical and pervasive” is therefore beneficial. Thomas (1999) is therefore apt in suggesting that the human security approach opens up the possibility of analyses that acknowledges the complexity of security challenges. It also tries to posit solutions more appropriate to contemporary security threats than the traditional building of military arsenals.

1.6.6 Responsibility for Human Security

That the dynamics of the post-Cold War era has engendered a review of the concept of security is without doubt. The consideration of human security however requires not just an understanding of the sources of threat but also an appreciation of the strategies necessary for eliminating or at the least ameliorating the threats. Ukeje (2005) intimates that appreciating these two perspectives, which essentially defines contemporary state-society relations, is important because the capacities required to enhance human security are quite different from those that
focus almost exclusively on the security of the state, regime or military security. Similarly, Thomas and Wilkin (1999) observe that the reorganization of the referent object of security from the state to the individual has implications not just for understanding the sources of the threats but also for elucidating strategies to improve security.

Ensuring human security must necessarily start with a consideration of the actors involved. The DCAF (2009) suggests that such actors often constitute a complex and dynamic mix of personnel, policies and agendas reflecting the state and non-state/transnational actors, intergovernmental and regional organizations among others. Dilating on the role of the State in advancing human security, Ukeje (2005), citing Oberleitner (2005), concedes to the reality of power sharing between the state and non-state actors within a globalizing word. He however advances the view that no project of human security can be accomplished without the presence and active participation of the state. A justification of Ukeje’s view may derive from the recognition of the prime role of the state in matters relating to the security of individuals and communities as concretized in the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The R2P essentially re-emphasizes the primary role of the state in protecting individuals and by extension, communities within such states. Ukeje consequently concludes that, reference to a human security approach means providing, within the state, an environment that allows for the well-being and safety of the population as an equally important goal (2005:13).

Evans (2009) similarly perceives some participation of the state in ensuring human security. In elaborating this view, he recalls the contract-like arrangement observed by social contract theorists, between states and their people and suggests that basic rights of individuals and communities do not derive from the state, but rather the state is formed and functions on the
basis of its primary role as ‘duty-bearer’. He also notes that this duty of the state has been reinforced by policy innovations such as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). As a result, states should be structured, supported, and assessed on the basis of the extent to which the duty bearers fulfill their core purpose of ensuring the respect for and realization of fundamental human rights.

Notwithstanding the above, a particularly challenging aspect of the role of the state in ensuring human security is the inherent contradiction exhibited in cases were the state or its agents are the de facto perpetrators of threats against the security of individuals or communities within these states. This is mainly the case in countries experiencing conflicts of an intra-state nature, which often pegs governments against rebels. Though conscious of this fact, scholars such as Ukeje (2005), Oberleitner (2005) and Evans (2009) have still advocated the pre-eminent role of the state in ensuring human security.

Beyond the nation-state, non-state actors are also critical to ensuring human security. Mention of non-state actors within this context includes, but is not limited to, non-governmental organisations as well as localized arrangements such as community based policing, engendered outside the scope of the nation state, but often existing not without the knowledge of the national government, to meet specific local needs. Kanbur (2002:93) recognises the critical complementary role of such players by operationalising human security in terms of “vulnerability and voicelessness” associated with poverty not just in the face of unresponsive national institutions, but also local institutions.

Also touching on the role of non-state actors, Ebo (2007) argues that the contributions of non-state actors need to be considered to facilitate sustainable peacebuilding. This can be ensured,
Ebo opines, through a comprehensive security agenda that integrates the wide variety of actors operating from different perspectives.

Baker (2007), writing on post-war security in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda also reaffirms the role of non-state actors in ensuring human security. He avers that although community based (non-state) policing predates the conflict; it survived the conflict by essentially mutating to reflect the post-conflicts needs of the people. Baker (2007) ascribes their effectiveness to their localization. He intimates that because local structures are accessible, free, offer a quick response by trusted local people, and are effective in protection, investigation and reconciliation, they are well regarded by the public.

Akin to the challenges associated with the role played by state actors in ensuring human security, the role of non-state actors may not be described as without a fault. Hussain (2004), for instance, notes that non-state actors such as party militias, private body guard units and community organizations, can support human security by protecting individuals from internal armed conflicts. He however concedes that such non state actors as mentioned above, are also capable of being the perpetrators or threats against security. Meharg and Srnusch (2010), writing on Liberia, provide a comparable dimension to the potential negative role of non-state actors in ensuing human security. Their analysis suggest that, although community-based actors and mechanisms have been filling the security gap while state-centered reform of the security sector has been underway, these same actors have threatened the process by insisting on their inclusion in the process. Hence, the success of SSR in Liberia may depend on the effective management and inclusion of non-state actors and community-based approaches.
Beyond the above, the international community can also ensure human security. As a result of the increased interaction occasioned by globalisation, systems of state governance, for instance, are being exported directly or indirectly to countries in the world. Fuelled by shifts in the global power structure following the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), an overwhelming number of countries have conveniently adopted the Western idea of liberal democracy as the most acceptable standard of governance. At the backdrop of these governance standards are purposeful or perhaps uncalculated global moves towards an acceptable human rights standard or what has been described by Lynch (2001:91) as ‘intrusive human rights norms’ that seem to guide national leaders on the importance of upholding human rights. Consequently, the orthodoxy of the principle of “territorial integrity”, as situated within the straitjacket of the concept of state sovereignty, behind which state leaders previously hid to perpetuate human rights abuses against their citizens, is rapidly giving way to an emerging doctrine of responsible governance (Attuquayefio 2008).

The above trend was buoyed up by the introduction of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Agreed upon at the UN Summit in 2005, the essential element of R2P has to do with the primary responsibility of States to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (UN 2005). The nexus between R2P and the potential role of the international community in ensuring human security is further reflected in a report by the UN Secretary General, on the implementation of R2P, issued on 30 January 2009. The report laid out three pillars upon which the implementation of R2P can be premised. Pillars two and three, titled *International assistance and capacity-building* and *Timely and decisive response* respectively, sought to communicate the responsibility of the international community to assist member states in building capacity to protect their citizens as well as the responsibility to take
timely and decisive actions when a state is manifestly failing to protect its citizens in areas specified by the doctrine of R2P.

Within the context of Africa, an interesting observation is the fact that, even prior to the concretisation and christening of R2P in 2005, the African Union, through its Constitutive Act, had assumed the primary responsibility of States in protecting their people. Consequently, Article 4m (Amended) of the Act, empowers the Union to intervene in the affairs of member states in respect of grave circumstances namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as serious threats to legitimate order, to resolve peace and stability to the Member States of the Union upon the recommendation of the Peace and Security Council of the AU. Malan (2002), Cilliers and Sturman (2002), Kioko, (2003) and Tieku (2007), among others, have thus concluded that the provision seeks to protect ordinary people from abusive governments.

Thus, notwithstanding some controversies particularly as regards who decides when a state has failed to protect its people, operating within the ambit of R2P has become, arguably, the most fashionable conduit for the international community to contribute to ensuring Human Security in Africa.

Apart from the actors involved, another elementary consideration, with regard to ensuring human security, revolves around the strategies employed by the various actors, within a variety of settings. Examining the strategies for ensuring human security, the mutually reinforcing principles of protection and empowerment, as outlined by the Commission for Human Security (CHS 2003), offers a very useful framework. The former submits the essence of integrating efforts to germinate norms, processes and institutions that thoroughly safeguard people from
critical and pervasive threats. This includes the strategies engendered by states, international agencies, non-governmental organisations and the private sector to shield people from menaces (CHS 2003). By its nature, such protection strategies are deemed as emanating from the top to the bottom in line with the recognition that people face threats that are beyond their control. 

(OCHA) Empowerment on the other hand refers to strategies that enable people to develop their resilience to difficult situations (CHS 2003:10). This includes strategies that enable people to develop their potential in order to participate in the decision making processes that affect their lives. Affirming the mutually reinforcing nature of the two principles, Ogata (2003) states that:

Protection refers to the norms, processes and institutions required to shield people from critical and pervasive threats. It implies a “top-down” approach, such as establishing the rule of law, accountable and transparent institutions, and democratic governance structures. States have the primary responsibility to implement such a protective infrastructure. Empowerment emphasizes people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their vital freedoms. This implies a “bottom-up” approach. People protected can exercise choices. And people empowered can make better choices, and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities.

Consequent to the above, the consideration of measures for ensuring human security, within a variety of settings, must necessarily include strategies that emanate from the top, such as state sponsored institutions as well as those that flow from the bottom to the top, such as locally sponsored initiatives. The CHS however states that although both are required in nearly all situations of human insecurity, their form and balance will vary tremendously across circumstances” (2003:10). Thus, fundamentally, the context within which human security may be sought can influence the blend of strategies for ensuring that security. This also suggests that inasmuch as formalised structures can ensure human security, in certain contexts, it may be more appropriate to depend on informal structures. In post-conflict settings, for instance, Harris (2004:5) propose that emphasis should go beyond rebuilding shattered or collapsed infrastructure to investing in “social capital, including the trust that creates informal safety nets” and by so doing, altering the behaviour of critical national actors.
From the above section, it may be argued that the role of the state is absolutely critical to guaranteeing human security. Beyond the state, a combination of other equally instrumental actors can, acting in concert or individually, ensure some level human security. The reality however is that, the multidimensional nature of human security, makes a multidimensional approach germane. Thus, in aspiring to ensure human security, the strategies must necessarily be multidimensional in scope. Additionally, it may be surmised that multiple strategies, congregating around the mutually reinforcing principles of empowerment and protection, may be adopted in ensuring human security. The extent, to which aspects of the two principles are blended in relative proportions, is however determined largely by the context within which human security is sought.

1.7 Methodology

1.7.1 Research Design

The study used the case study approach. According to Shepard and Greene (2003), a case study is an intensive study of a single group, incident, or community. They provide a systematic way of looking at events, collecting data and analyzing information and reporting the results. Emerging from the in-depth analysis and investigations, the results of case studies provide a sharpened understanding of why the instance happened as it did, and what might become important to look at more extensively in future research.

Within the West African sub-region, and indeed, in Africa, there are a number of countries in the post-conflict stage. It is presumed that the in-depth investigation into the dynamics of one of such countries will generate results and recommendations with the potential to be replicated in other post conflict settings.
1.7.2 Study Area

The choice of Liberia as a case study was influenced by two main considerations. Firstly, Liberia is a country emerging from a period of violent conflict. Currently in a post-conflict development stage, Liberia is investing in a number of strategies with Human Security as a primary consideration. While the Liberian Government and the international community have achieved some progress in stabilizing the country, there remain many loose ends particularly with regard to security sector reforms, infrastructural development, unemployment and challenges with the economy. Liberia thus offered a good case for testing human security within the context of post-conflict development. The second consideration was accessibility to data. Having enjoyed relative stability within the last four to eight years, there was no doubt that Liberia was sufficiently safe for the purposes of collecting data.

Out of the fifteen counties in Liberia, five were explored. These are Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Montserrado. These counties were selected for a number of reasons outlined below. Grand Kru is to the South Eastern part of Monrovia. With a population of 57,913 (GoL 2009), it is the county with the least population in Liberia. Due to the distance between the county and the capital Monrovia, it is one of the counties that have historically suffered neglect from the national government. As regards imported food for instance, the people of Grand Kru have traditionally had to pay more due to the high cost of transportation from Monrovia, a situation influenced by the deplorable roads (Owadi 2011). This influenced the selection of the county.

Maryland has a population of 135,938 (GoL 2009). It is the seventh most populous county in Liberia. Like Grand Kru, Maryland is in the south easternmost part of Liberia, in a region that
has traditionally been challenged in terms of development opportunities. The eastern part of Maryland borders Cote D’Ivoire, a country which until recently was embroiled in conflict.

Lofa is to the North of Liberia. The 2008 census quoted a population of 276,863, making it the fourth most populous county in Liberia (GoL 2009). The selection of Lofa was informed by the fact that it is one county that witnessed a lot of brutal battles during the 14-year war. Additionally, it shares its Northeastern and northwestern borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone, two countries that have had challenges to their stability in recent times.

Grand Bassa is one of the oldest counties in Liberia. It has a total population of 221,693 (GoL 2009). Although it is only the fifth most populous county, it is home to some of the country’s largest industrial concerns such as the LAC. Some of these rubber plantations have been the site of agitations by former combatants since the formal end of the war.

Montserrado is the most populous county in Liberia with a population of 1,118,241. This is approximately a third of Liberia’s population (GoL 2009). Although the county capital is Bensonville, it is also home to Liberia’s capital city, Monrovia. Due to the marked differences in socio economic indicators between the capital and the rest of Montserrado, a distinction is often made between Greater Monrovia and Rural Montserrado. This county was selected because it offers a useful case for accessing the human security contradictions in Liberia.

1.7.3 Data Collection

The study uses both secondary and primary data sources.

A. Secondary Data Sources
Since the early 1990’s when the concept of Human Security emerged, there has been extensive academic research of its theoretical underpinnings as well as its practicability within a variety of settings. To present a firm understanding of Human Security, Institutions and Post-Conflict development, extensive desktop research was conducted on books, journal articles, internet sources, newspaper publications, and etcetera.

To understand the Liberian context in order to place it in proper perspective, data was also gathered from documentaries on Liberia, history and pre-conflict politics. This was to provide a benchmark for comparing development in the post-conflict phase. Additionally, records on the conflict and the ceasefire particularly the various peace agreements and the ultimate one signed on August 18 2003 in Accra were perused. As has been indicated by Wiafe-Amoako (2010), this provides evidence on the extent to which the peace agreements *ab initio*, advocated specific institutions for advancing human security within Liberia’s post conflict development.

*Primary Data - Field Survey*

The field survey adapted the framework used by Owen (2005, 2008). Given the possibility that national-level data may not be entirely representative of all potential spatial categories (towns, villages and individual households), the three stage process of gathering the data used a sub-national (county-based) approach.

The first stage determined the specific challenges to relevant components of human security within the selected counties. These components are Economic Security, Food Security, Health Security, Environmental Security, Personal Security, Community Security and Political Security (UNDP 1994). The threats so assembled were subjected to a qualitative review under the ‘Critical and Pervasive’ criteria to ensure that only those that severely threaten the vital core in a
pervasive manner were listed for each of the seven UNDP categories. In collecting data for this stage, the study relied largely on interviews with local experts. The objective of this methodology was to trim down what would have been an endless list of threats. This stage, in effect, involved a participatory vulnerability analysis. This method has been found useful by both Hussain (2004) and Chiwaka (2005) on the grounds that local actors are more aware than any other actors of the different risks and threats to Human Security in any given context.

The second stage involved the organisation of data detailing the threats identified above. Data gathered was organised in a tabular form as below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Threat A</td>
<td>Threat B</td>
<td>Threat A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Bassa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The third stage involved the analysis of responses to the threats. A critical component of this involved the use of data from two authoritative baseline surveys conducted in the latter part of 2010. These are the Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey of 2010 (CFSNS 2010) and the Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia (Vink, Pham and Kreutzer 2011) and the County Development Agenda for the selected counties.

Other Interviews
Beyond the above, interviews were also conducted throughout Monrovia and Buchanan representing the Montserrado and Grand Bassa Counties respectively. Buchanan is the capital of the Grand Bassa County. As regards Montserrado, Monrovia was chosen over Bensonville, the capital because the former is the capital of Liberia. Two groups of respondents were
interviewed. The first category was mainly made up of technocrats working for the Government of Liberia and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Others interviewed in this category were representatives of the African Union, United Nations Development Programme in Liberia (UNDP) and other UN affiliates such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). The objective was to elicit information on policy arrangements and proposals as well as some reviews relating to the state of human security in the selected counties. The second categories of interviewees were drawn from community-based organisations, Military Observers working under UNMIL and ordinary Liberians living within the two counties. Apart from the Military observers and the community-based organisations, the ordinary Liberians were selected randomly. The objective was to elicit practical reviews of the provision of human security within the selected counties. This follows the concession that in matters of human security, the perception of people, their appraisals and responses ‘are as crucial as the facts of insecurity’ (Salman 2010:25).

1.8 Significance of the Study

After 14 years of brutal civil war, Liberia has since 2003, been the theatre for massive post conflict development by UNMIL, UNDP, the Government of Liberia, and a host of other external development agencies. Arguably, the PCD efforts have yielded some notable results not the least of which is stability. However, research has identified a history of violent conflicts as one of the key predictors of future conflict. Considering the extent of investment into Liberia and the destabilizing effect of the war in Liberia on the entire sub-region, any trend that has the potential to destabilize the process and reverse the gains made has to be urgently addressed. This is particularly because UNMIL, which continues to significantly influence the internal stability of Liberia, is in a drawdown phase pending eventual withdrawal from Liberia.
Furthermore, within the last decade a number of African countries have moved from the conflict to the post-conflict or peace consolidation stage. As indicated in the preceding sections, one of the key necessities of post-conflict development is to address human security concerns such as food, employment, health and the environment. Yet, attempts to apply the concept of human security to post conflict development have been criticized on the basis of perceived analytical imprecision. Thus, the study, while contributing generally to the discourse on human security, also provides critical insights into its applicability in post-conflict development. This is useful in enhancing the monitoring of post-conflict development assistance and ensuring that human security is advanced in a way that does not endanger the entire PCD process. By suggesting Human Security as a prerequisite for sustainable post-conflict development, this study also provides a justification for challenges and failures encountered in some post-conflict schemes around the world.

1.9 Organisation of the Study

Chapter One: Research Design

Chapter Two: Liberia: An Overview

Chapter Three: Post-Conflict Development, Institutions and Human Security: Examining the Linkages

Chapter Four: The Record of Post-Conflict Institutions Building in Liberia: 2003-2011

Chapter Five: Challenges to Human Security in Liberia: Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Montserrado

Chapter Six: Analysis of Core Components of Human Security in Liberia

Chapter Seven: Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations.
Chapter Two
LIBERIA: AN OVERVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The Republic of Liberia was created on July 16, 1847 through a declaration of independence by freed slaves from America. These former slaves had established settlements in Liberia from 1822, under the auspices of the American Colonisation Society (ACS). Prior to the July 26 declaration, the collection of settlements had amalgamated into a commonwealth under the governorship of representatives of the ACS. Over a century later in 1989, Liberia was plunged into one of the worst intra-state wars ever witnessed on the continent of Africa. Apart from an interregnum between 1997 and 2000, the war lasted till 18th August 2003 when a final peace agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), was signed in Accra, Ghana, by the warring factions, civil society and political parties from Liberia. The roots of most of the causes of the civil war as well as the challenges of Liberia’s post-conflict development, have been traced to the country’s socio-economic, cultural and political foundations as well as the anthropological nuances between the former slaves from America and indigenous Liberians thought to have inhabited the territory between the 12th and the 14th Century (Abayomi 1970).

Within this context, this chapter gives an overview of the history of Liberia from its foundation to the end of the civil war on August 18, 2003.

2.2 A Demographic Profile of the Republic of Liberia

With a land area of 111,370 square kilometers (km²), Liberia is bordered by Guinea to the north, Cote d'Ivoire to the east and Sierra Leone to the west. The Atlantic Ocean borders Liberia to the south, giving the country a coastline of approximately 579 kilometers. In terms of climate, the
country has a dry season (between November and April) and a wet season that runs from April to October. With an annual rainfall of 4650mm, Liberia is among the rainiest countries in the world (GoL 2010). Liberia is heavily endowed with natural resources. Thus, apart from abundant deposits of minerals like gold, diamond and iron ore, the country is also home to massive amount of timber, water resources and a diverse collection of wildlife. It has been noted that Liberia possesses approximately 40 percent of West Africa’s rainforest (GoL 2010). This ranks the country among the most endowed countries in Africa. Inspite of its natural wealth, Liberia is also one of the poorest countries in the world with at least two-thirds of the population reportedly living on less than a dollar a day. The 2011 UNDP Human Development Index places Liberia at 182 out of 187 countries and sixth on the list of African countries with the lowest human development (UNDP 2011).

The most recent National Population and Housing Census conducted in 2008 put the total population of Liberia at 3,476,608 with an average household size of 5.1 people (GoL 2009). Relatively more recent estimates have suggested that given a population growth rate of 2.6 percent, the population of Liberia would have reached 3,887,886 by July 2012 (CIA 2012). Americo-Liberians constitute about 5 percent of this population - the remaining 95 percent are Indigenous Liberians. Of the 16 ethnic groups that make up the indigenous Liberians, the Kpelle in central and western Liberia is the largest, making up for 20.3 percent (US State Department 2012). Apart from the two main groups, it has also been estimated that there is an economically active group of mainly Liberian-born Lebanese numbering close to 4000. Linguistically, the various indigenous groups account for between 16 and 20 indigenous languages, with some closely mimicking others. Among the generality of Liberians, however, the lingua franca is a local derivative of the English language known as “Liberia English”.

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Liberia operates a constitutional republic with a bicameral legislature made up of a thirty-seat Senate and a 73-seat House of Representatives. Administratively, the country is divided into 15 counties namely Montserrado, Nimba, Bong, Lofa, Grand Bassa, Margibi, Grand Kru, Grand Gedeh, Grand Cape Mount, Sinoe, Maryland, River Gee, Rivercess, Gbarpolu, and Bomi. The first six counties are colloquially referred to as the ‘big six’ counties. This is because they collectively account for 75.2 percent of Liberia’s population (GoL 2009). The capital city, Monrovia, is in Montserrado. The counties are subdivided into districts and clans in a top-down hierarchy.

2.3 The ACS and the Foundation of Liberia

The foundation of Liberia can be traced to the activities of the American Colonisation Society (ACS). Within the context of the abolition of slavery in the US from the late 18th to the early 19th Century, the ACS was founded on 16th December 1816 in Washington D.C., with the objective of settling freed slaves outside of the US and particularly in Africa. A prominent member of the ACS Samuel J. Mills is on record to have defined the motive of the ACS as follows:

We go to lay the foundation of a free and independent empire on the coast of poor degraded Africa. It will eventually redeem and emancipate a million and half of wretched men. It will transfer to Africa the blessings of religion and civilization.

(GoL 2009:74)

Inspite of its stated objective, there were ancillary objectives influenced by the diversity of motives of the various people involved in the foundation of the ACS. These motives included an attempt to prevent an increase in slave-rebellions within the US as well as the intention to colonize the freed slaves away from the increasingly unreceptive environment in the US, among others (GoL 2009). Subsequent events during the first 25 years of the founding of Liberia, went to prove this latter motive as representatives of the ACS technically colonized the resettled
slaves, those recaptured enroute to other slavery destinations and the indigenous population of Liberia.

Though a private organisation, the ACS had the tacit support of the US Government, which approved an initial amount of USD 100,000 for the society’s activities (GoL 2009). With that support and many more from private entities the ACS embarked on an expedition to present-day Liberia in 1822 with a company of 86 people made up of 3 agents of the ACS and 83 freed slaves drawn from Maryland Virginia Pennsylvania New York and Washington, DC. After initially settling in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the group proceeded to Cape Mesurado (near Monrovia in present-day Montserrado County) where the leaders of the ACS negotiated for a 40 mile radius of land stretching inland from the coast of Mesurado (GoL 2009:75). The process of negotiating Cape Mesurado has been variously recounted yet one common trend in all the accounts is the role coercion played in the negotiations. Reports, for instance, indicate that the negotiations were concluded at gunpoint due to the role of Captain Robert F. Stockton, Commander of the USS Alligator (GoL 2009).

With the conclusion of negotiations, Liberia was founded with its capital Monrovia, named after US President James Monroe (Benyan 1991). To a very large extent the new state considered itself the 51st state of the US and consequently adopted a flag similar to that of the US but with a lone star. Alao, Mackinlay & Olonisakin (1999:14) point to this, in addition to the massive goodwill exhibited by the US to the new state, as antecedents to the expectations of Liberians following the outbreak of the war in 1989.
Having settled in Mesurado, the Amerco-Liberians (as the settlers came to be known) and the supervising agents of the ACS, gradually expanded their sphere of influence, controlling trade, which had prior to their arrival, held the lynchpin to socio-economic development in the hinterlands. With the control of trade therefore, settlers gradually controlled the roll out of socio-economic development in a manner that ensured that the indigenous communities merely had what Mesurado desired and not what they needed (Hetherington 2009). As more freed slaves returned to the Liberia, settler communities also developed in Bassa and Sinoe. These communities and their ACS agents mimicked the early settlers in Mesurado as regards their dealings with the indigenes. With a self-determined mandate of civilization, the settlers ignored and downplayed all semblances of governance practiced by the indigenes and subjected them, albeit involuntarily, to their system of governance. Considering their encounter with governance on the slave plantations, the only system the settlers knew was that which manifested on the basis of a master-slave dichotomy (Huffman 2004). With themselves as the masters, the settlers enacted the plantation-style system in both deed and law. Early laws of the settlers such as Article 23, of the Colony’s Digest of Laws in 1824, for instance, provided that “no colonist shall deal with the natives for land” (GoL 2009:79). As expected, the effect on the indigenes of Liberia was the same the settlers had felt on the plantations – marginalization, deprivation and a sense of worthlessness. The posture of the settlers marked the beginning of the engendering of a relationship characterised by conflict and animosity between indigenes and settlers.

In 1839, Bassa and Mesurado abrogated their independent status and formed a commonwealth. This was joined by Sinoe in 1842. Together, the three territories were the building blocks of the Republic of Liberia as it is known today.
2.4 From Independence to the Coup of 1980: Institutionalising Inequality

The signs of conflict started showing up when the settlers virtually colonized the indigenes and commenced a reign that was characterized by snobbery and a kind of ‘racial discrimination’ (Huband 1998: xvii). On 16th July 1847, the Commonwealth declared independence and formally became the Republic of Liberia. The declaration of independence followed promptings of agents of the ACS influenced by increasing frequency of territorial aggression from France and Great Britain operating in Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone respectively and the realisation of the need for the Commonwealth to be more assertive of its sovereignty vis-a-vis other nations (GoL 2009).

The actions of the settlers that prior to the independence, had created and sustained the dichotomy between the settlers and the indigenes, and had heavily marginalized the latter, were reaffirmed strongly by aspects in the Declaration of Independence that completely ignored the existence of the indigenes. Part of the preamble, which states thus: “We, the people of the Republic of Liberia, were originally inhabitants of the United States of North America” (Republic of Liberia 1847) was unreflective of the indigenes (representing 95 percent of the population) who as has been noted above, did not originate from the US. A particular interesting phrase in the declaration of independence notes that: “Under the auspices of the American Colonization Society, we established ourselves here, on land, acquired by purchase from the lords of the soil” (Republic of Liberia 1847). It is striking that the settlers acknowledge the existence of “lords of the soil”, yet were convinced that these ‘lords’ had no say in declaring independence. Clearly, the perceived inequality between themselves and the indigenes was at play. Ironically, the new Republic chose as its motto “the Love of Liberty brought us here”. By not recognising the indigenes, it has been noted that the settlers ab initio “intended to establish a separate country of their own in territories now known as Liberia” (GoL 2009:83).
The post-independent period saw the strengthening of policies and strategies that affirmed that the two groups of people were not equal and even more importantly, restricted development to the benefit of the settlers. With their strategic location at the coast and their connections with the US as well as technical abilities acquired on the plantations in the US, the settlers quickly establish a wide sphere of influence. Therefore, inspite of constituting merely about five percent of the population, the settlers were dominant, thus, relegating the indigenes to the doldrums of irrelevance insofar as the new Republic was concerned.

The economic fortunes of Liberia in the aftermath of independence also provided an avenue for widening the socio-economic disparities between the Americo-Liberians and the rest of the population in Liberia. With massive investments coming from bilateral aid from the US and exploitation of natural resources by multilateral companies like Firestone Industries, one of the world’s largest rubber industries, an opportunity was presented to the governing elite to plunder the nation’s wealth in a manner that ensured that only Americo-Liberians remained economically relevant. In terms of basic infrastructure, the roll out heavily tilted against the mainly indigenous areas of south east Liberia and other areas of less economic value for the government in Monrovia. The indigenes faced a similar fate with regard to basic services like water, electricity and education.

The manifestation of the relationship between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenes was further reflected in the social hierarchy of importance. The position of the relative groupings was determined by the relative degrees of access to economic wealth, political influence and socio-cultural relevance. The effect of this hierarchy on inequality makes Dennis’ (2006) apt observation worth recounting.
...at the top were the Americo-Liberian officials, consisting largely of light-complexioned people of mixed Black and White ancestry (also known as “Mulattos”). They were followed by darker skinned Americo-Liberians, consisting mostly of laborers and small farmers. Then came the recaptives (also known as “Congos”), the Africans who had been rescued by the U.S. Navy while aboard U.S.-bound slave ships and brought to Liberia. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the indigenous African Liberians. As time passed, the separation between the Mulattos and other freed slaves became less pronounced, and all became known as “Congos” or “Americo-Liberians.” This group of individuals, comprising less than 3 percent of the population, maintained economic, social, and political control of the country until a coup d’état in 1980 (Dennis 2006:1).

Politically, from the first President, Jenkins Roberts, to William Tolbert Jr, the last leader from the Americo-Liberian Oligarchy, the Americo-Liberians operated a paternalistic system that was low on institutions but high on “strong men” effectively cracking down on dissent from indigenous Liberians (Wreh 1976). The AFL, which started out as the Liberian Frontier Force (LFF), was, for instance, used to brutally suppress perpetrators of unrest among the indigenes (Aboagye & Rupiya 2005). Aboagye, for instance, notes that the utility of the LFF was resigned to “a physical instrument for the occupation of indigenous territories, including the imposition and collection of taxes, labour recruitment and, overall, the establishment of political control over the indigenous ethnic group” (1999:11). The Americo-Liberian oligarchy also used institutions such as the judiciary and the police to suppress human rights. In the process, leaders like Tubman and Tolbert are on record to have introduced into Liberia’s politics, “the partisan use of democratic institutions, the political control of the military, the culture of extermination of political opposition, invidious destruction of lives and property, and more importantly, the rise of authoritarianism and political brutality” (GoL 2009:90).

The effect of the dichotomy created by the inequality engendered by the Americo-Liberians on Liberia has been described as follows:

Socially, Liberia constitutes two worlds: the one of the haves is characterized by affluence and an ostentatious life style. The symbols and trappings of wealth and the good life are brazenly flaunted. This is the world of Cadillacs, Jaguars, and Mercedes Benzes; a world of stripped three piece suits, sprawling mansions and video recording sets. Liberians of this world are amongst the most suave, cosmopolitan and jet-setting types of Africa—more in tune with the fashions of New
York, Paris, London and more comfortable with the trappings of western luxury living than any other group of socialites in Africa.

Existing side by side with this luxury group, and being shamelessly exploited by it, are the poor people of Liberia parched by the wretchedness of poverty, dazzled by the endless possibilities available to the affluent, languishing in the squalors of the city and the harshness and austerity of the rural village’ (GoL 2009:103).

Within the above context of simmering grievances from the majority of Liberia’s population, a trigger emerged when in July 1979, the government of Tolbert Jr attempted to increase the prices of rice, which is the staple food. Amid general economic difficulties and the perception that the increases will only benefit the Americo-Liberians dominating the importation of rice there were widespread riots. Typical of their history, the state security institutions were used to violently crush the unrests. Riding on popular dissent, a group of soldiers led by Master Sergeant Samuel Doe overthrew the Americo-Liberian oligarchy. Against the background of marginalization and repression, the overthrow the Americo-Liberian oligarchy, was reportedly perceived by the indigenes as a redemptive opportunity to finally ascribe to the full rights of free citizens (Gershoni 1985, Dixon 1992, Guannu 2009). Either operating on those same lines or merely running on popular perception, Doe formed the People Redemption Council, a fitting description for the feeling of the majority of the people at the time of the coup.

2.5 Liberia under Samuel Doe: The Dawn of State Breakdown

Doe’s years at the helm of Liberia’s governance were really troubled times. Buoyed by initial well-feeling, the new regime pursued politically correct lines of actions including establishing good relations with the US. Within the Cold War context, this was significant as it demonstrated Doe’s and the PRC’s commitment to the cause of the West contrary to some African states who were then promoting a non-aligned agenda. The goodwill showed by the PRC was reciprocated
by the US in the form of massive foreign aid. The Reagan Administration is, for instance, on record to have increased financial aid to Liberia by over 400 percent between 1980 and 1981.

In no time however, the initial widespread perception of improved governance to facilitate equity within Liberian society dissipated as Doe, launched his own brand of corruption, marginalization of sections of the population and repression that had ethnic discrimination at its core. Apart from the sheer avarice of Doe and other members of the PRC, the power vacuum occasioned by the deposition of the True Whig Party that basically opened the door for other claimants to power are thought to have influenced Doe’s shift in political outlook. The effect was disastrous as the increasingly paranoid Doe eliminated all appearances of opposition to his regime. To ensure that he had enough support base for his actions, Doe turned to his ethnic Krahn people, putting them at key positions as well as heavily infiltrating the security sector institutions with Krahns. It was therefore not surprising that the AFL was, for instance, at the vanguard of Doe’s witch-hunting agenda. The actions of Doe only deepened ethnic divisions in the country and further weakened institutions of governance and security.

In 1985, an attempt to shore up Doe’s popularity and claim some legitimacy through an organised democratic election only complicated the state of affairs. Apart from the general fraud that characterised the election day and the declaration of the final results, the pre-election environment itself was defined by harassment and elimination of political opponents. By the time the dust settled, Doe’s National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) had won 51 percent of the vote but had lost so much legitimacy that it was only a matter of time that the cracks in the socio-economic and political spaces of Liberia will start to have effect. In November of 1985, following a failed coup attempt, Thomas Quiwonkpa, a former second-in-command to Doe
during the PRC days and an estimated five hundred people (most of whom were Gios and Manos) were killed. Following his swearing into office two months later in January 1986, Doe proceeded to order even more violent crackdowns of Gios and Manos in Nimba County, Montserrado and Grand Gedeh. Many of the people in Nimba fled to Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire.

With governance, security and economic institutions undermined, a waning US investment in the country’s economic fortunes due to the declining relevance of Liberia (The Cold War was drawing to an end) and facing massive repression and marginalization, a violent uprising was unavoidable (Lyons 1999).

2.6 First Civil War 1989- 1997

On December 24, 1989, a group of rebels invaded Liberia from the southeast through the north of the country. The group was led by Charles Ghankay Taylor, a former minister in the Doe government. As an Americo-Liberian born in Montserrado County, Taylor’s opposition to the indigenous Samuel Doe may have appeared as an attempt by the Americo to reclaim what legacy was lost following the Doe-led coup in 1980. In reality, however, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), as the rebel group was known, attracted a number of volunteers particularly from Nimba County, who saw the war as an opportunity to remove a repressive “anti-Nimbadian” government (Utas 2006:164). Taylor himself appeared to have had a much broader perspective as he explained that the ‘Taylor Virus’ was to destroy military dictatorship in Africa (Taylor 1990). The way the NPFL were organized, the support they garnered from such countries as Libya, Burkina Faso and Cote D’Ivoire and the effectiveness with which they invaded Liberia (from the country’s weakest point in terms of political dissent), suggests a well-organized core of
rebels, contrary to Innes’ description of “a rag tag group with few members or material resources” (Innes 2005:289).

With their massive patronage, it was just a matter of time that The NPFL controlled large parts of Liberia. Any hope the Liberian government had of activating the mutual defense pact with the US appeared to have been dashed when Doe intensified violent actions against sections of the population perceived to be supporting the rebels. Later reports however suggest other reasons for the passive stance of US including Washington’s desire to not jeopardise Ivorian support on the UN Security Council for their actions in the Gulf region. Whatever the case, Huband aptly describes the situation as “the Politics of Abandonment” (1998: XI). Subsequent splits in the rebel leadership led to mushrooming of rebel movements including the infamous Independent NPFL (INPFL), credited with the arrest, torture and execution of President Samuel Doe.

Faced with a massive onslaught, and in the absence of US assistance, President Doe turned to countries in the sub-region. In a letter addressed to the Ministerial Meeting of the ECOWAS Standby Mediation Committee, on 14 July 1990, invited support from West African countries observing thus: “I cannot countenance Taylor’s continued mission to destroy Liberia and its inhabitants only because of his inordinate greed to become president” (Weller 1994:65). Recent accounts by Prince Johnson, leader of the INPFL, at the TRC however raises doubts about Doe commitment to getting assistance from the ECOWAS (Tonpo 2008). Inspite of that, under the leadership of Nigeria, with Ghana and Guinea as key troop contributing states, the Sub-regional body ECOWAS, initiated a novel arrangement - a ceasefire monitoring group christened ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene and enforce a ceasefire in Liberia.
Following multiple failed ceasefire agreement, the Abuja accord held sway long enough to enable elections on July 19, 1997.

Inspite of the overwhelming victory for Charles Taylor (75 percent), the timing of the elections and the suggested motive has been variously criticized as sowing the seeds for the perpetuation of the conflict. Lyons, for instance, opines that in the absence of appropriate institutions leading to the creation of civil structures, the elections merely provided the opportunity for Taylor to ratify his claim to national authority. He thus concludes that with the fear of renewed conflict shaping voting behavior, the election was more a “referendum for peace than a democratic choice between meaningful options” (Lyons 1999:2). Utas (2006), similarly suggests that in spite of the call by international observers that it was free and fair, the elections was a mere charade – one of those aimed at promoting peace at all cost. The fact that fear and need for peace played a role in Taylor’s electoral victory is also evident in the fact that his campaign was based on the undeniably indurate slogan of ”He killed my ma, he killed my pa, but I will vote for him.” (Left 2003)

Taylor’s assumption of the reigns of political power marked another period of socio-economic and political decay in Liberia’s fortunes. Generally reputed as a politically astute leader, Taylor used his history as a warmonger to destabilize the sub-region in a calculated attempt to benefit from the trade of such resources as diamond from Sierra Leone. Revelations at the ongoing trial of Taylor at Special Court for Sierra Leone sitting in The Hague confirms this view. Within the context of this study, Taylor also contributed to the decay of Liberia’s institutions, or what was left of it since the war had by that time, dealt significant blows to every sector. Those in the governance and security sectors were the hardest hit. For instance, due to the role of the AFL in
the war and given that its regional or ethnic balance had been tampered with by Doe’s somewhat covert “krahnisation” policy, Taylor, all but eliminated the AFL in name. Rather than rebuild security sector institutions, Taylor created parallel institutions like the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU) and the Special Operations Unit of the LNP (Adedeji 2002). As reflected in their names, the objectives of these units were officially amorphous and so were their modes of operation. To the extent that they enforced the whims of Taylor, these bodies were no doubt operating within the mandate assigned by Taylor. The sheer brutality of bodies such as the ATU further dampened public trust in institutions of state, particularly within the context of human security.

2.7 The Second Civil War and Thereafter

Within the context of Taylor’s own mal-governance, and with serious human security issues bothering on food, basic services, personal security and infrastructure still looming, it was not long before former rebels, mobilised mainly from neighbouring Guinea, launched an assault on the Taylor-led government in Monrovia. Operating under the banner of Liberians United For Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the rebels, akin to Taylor’s NPFL of 1989, drew significant support from deprived and marginalised communities within the north of the country. Subsequently, other rebel groups such as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) all joined the fray in a final push to oust Charles Taylor. Succumbing to pressure internally from the rebels, and externally from the international community including an arrest warrant from the international tribunal trying war crimes in Sierra Leone, Taylor went into exile on 11th August 2003. Later that month, the various rebel factions signed the Accra Accord that formerly brought hostilities to an end and committed the country to elections in 2005. The Accord also resulted in an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) as well as the introduction of a United
National Mission in Liberia – a multidimensional peacekeeping mission. Subsequently, the 2005 elections saw Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf’s election as President of Liberia.

In terms of destruction, the war produced more than two hundred thousand internally displaced persons and over a million refugees in neighbouring countries and more than 250,000 fatalities (Omeje 2009). A number of factors have been cited as causing, or at the least, sustaining the war. These can be subsumed under several categories notably the historical issues deriving from the formation of the state and the way and manner the settler prosecuted governance for over a century; the availability of vast natural resource endowment within Liberia and the rent-seeking motives of the various warring factions; and fallouts from post-independent politics of sub-Saharan African countries that was heavily dominated by paternalistic autocrats rather than democratic institutions.

Alao, Mackinlay & Olonisakin 1999 & Guannu 2000 have all traced the breakout of war to the foundations of the state of Liberia in the Nineteenth Century. The settlers, particularly the freed slaves it must be stressed, obviously implemented the kind of governance they were used to – one that clearly dichotomized the master and the servant. Alao et al (1999:14) citing Wippman (1993) sums up the structure engendered by the Americo-Liberians thus:

They created the social hierarchy they had experienced in the ante-bellum (of the United States) but with themselves as the socially dominant, land-owning class. They considered the indigenous population primitive and uncivilised, and treated it as little more than an abundant source of forced labour.

As expected, in perpetuating their kind of governance, the Americo-Liberians generated a colossal reserve of discontent among the indigenes. Once that discontent was mobilised, as happened with the 1980 Coup of Master Sergeant Doe, there was no turning back. Additionally, the form of discriminatory governance perpetrated by the Americo Liberians, who had portrayed
themselves as elites, served as a bad example for later governments. Even the reformist William V.S. Tubman, is on record to have crushed dissent from the indigenes in the most uncompromising manner. Guannu (2000), is thus emphatic that one of the causes of the conflict is political marginalization the seeds of which were planted at the establishment of the state in the nineteenth century. Another seed of conflict inherent in the foundation and early life of the state was the failure of the Americo-Liberians to emphasis the strengthening of institutions for governance rather than individual. The resulting lack of effective institutions appeared to have denied the country of any meaningful institutional evolution and experimentation, a sine qua non for sustainable development.

Apart from the challenges of autocracy and the absence of clear channels for the expression of dissent, greed appeared to have played a role in the conflict. Endowed with abundant natural resources, the quest to plunder was a motive for all the factions of the conflict. Berkeley has, for instance, suggested that “the right to loot was a recurring anthem of combatants on all sides” (2001:54). Becket similarly describes the Liberian war as an ‘economic or commercial insurgency’ in which ‘warlord groups’, the NPFL foremost among them, fought ‘to control commodities” (2003:237). The fact of greed is also stressed by Utas (2006) who observes that while the warlords aimed at gaining control of the productive geographic areas with gold, diamond, timber, rubber and coffee, the soldiers fought to obtain instant booty. Utas thus opines that looting excursions took over as the rationale for the war (2006 161). Charles Taylor is, for instance, on record to have granted informal concession to foreign firms in Liberia’s extractive industry, particularly timber, in 1990 when he gained the territory (Omeje 2009:9). This situation was also facilitated by western allies and amorphous international businesses, together forming willing allies to Warlords (Keen 1998). It has been documented, for instance, that in the early
1990, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was the third-largest supplier of tropical hardwoods to France (Duffield 1998).

Beyond the greed and grievance perspective (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2000 Collier 2003), the greed-engendered criminality that characterized the Liberian war also appears to justify Kaldor’s (1999) characterization of the Liberian war as a New War – one that involves a blurring of the distinctions between wars, organised crime and large-scale violation of human rights.

A third in the list of causal categories may be identified as deriving from the vicissitudes of an international system heavily influenced by *realpolitik*. With the end of the Cold War, Liberia’s value as a strategic ally for the US had started diminishing by the start of the war. Thus, although Doe’s violent attacks on civilians was cited as justification for the US not activating the defense pact it had with Liberia, it appears an underlying reason was the reality that Liberia no longer featured on the list of strategic allies for the US. Thus, the suggestion has been that if the war had started during the Cold War, then inspite of Doe’s violent repression, the mere fact of Libya’s association with the rebels would have influenced some US support. On the other hand, through its affiliation with the US, Liberia had over time attracted a lot of flak, overt or otherwise from anti-US countries. In a statement to Congress, former US Ambassador to Liberia, James Bishop suggested the cause of the conflict as partly as a result of Liberia’s friendship with the US. He suggested that the incursion of Libyan backed Taylor who received arms and training from Libya and Libyan backed surrogates in Burkina Faso was intended as revenge for Liberia’s outspoken opposition to Libyan aggression and subversion in Africa (US Government, 1996).
The sidelining of institutions for personal interest by leaders identified as “strongmen” in the literature is well documented by Reno (1998) and Grugel (2002), among others. In this regard, another aspect of the realpolitik-dominated international system, which may have, at the least, influenced the war, was the personalized-patriarchal politics of “strongmen” that dominated the West African sub-region in the post independent years. At the core of this politics was Felix Houphouet-Boigny. It has been suggested that the murder of A.B. Tolbert, son of the last Americo-Liberian president William Tolbert during the Doe-led coup irked the Ivorian Leader on account of the fact that the younger Tolbert was married to his adopted daughter. The eventual use of his territory to launch the attack into the north of Liberia and the constant flow of arms from Burkina Faso, at least, had his tacit support. In the case of Burkina Faso, where Taylor’s men reportedly received some of their training, Blaise Campaore was reportedly married to a daughter of Felix Houphouet-Boigny. Getting the former’s support in a region where ‘strong men’ rather than institutions predominated was no problem. With regard to the 2000 relapse into war, it has been documented that the LURD and MODEL groups, made up mainly of Mandingo and Krahn fighters mobilised in Guinea, had the express support of Lansana Conte, President of Guinea, whose ethnic group in Guinea had been a long-time ally of the Mandingos (Boas 2005). It has been suggested in that regard that the emergence of Sekou Conneh as the leader of the LURD was merely as a result of the fact that Conneh’s wife was the personal soothsayer of Conte (IRIN 2003).

The emergence of violent reprisals of an ethnic nature, into the politics of Liberia, could be cited both as part of the causes and the manifestations of the war. Arguably, the ethnic dimensions of the conflict came to the fore when, following the November 12, 1985 failed coup led by Thomas Quiwonkpa, a former ally of President Doe from Nimba county, the Khran filled armed forces of
Liberia, launched a heavy crackdown of Gios and Mano in Nimba county killing many in the process. Consequently, in 1989 when the Taylor-led NPFL entered Liberia, Gios and the Manos saw an opportunity for revenge on Doe and his support base. The result was the decimation of entire villages and populations of the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups. Again, in 2000 when the state of Liberia relapsed into war, the LURD and MODEL factions were mainly Mandingo and Khran fighters who perceived the war as an opportunity to exact revenge on Taylor.

Ethnic mobilisation in the Liberia war can also be appreciated from the perspective of sub-national mechanism for survival following a state reneging on its responsibility to protect. With the outbreak of the violence, it was more than apparent that the state could not provide security under the presumed social contract with the Liberian people. Omeje (2009:4), recalling life in John Hobbes *State of Nature*, suggested that the life of Liberians was rendered “solitary nasty poor brutish and short”. In such circumstances, it became obvious that the best guarantee of security was to identify with ethnic grouping or the ethnic-defined rebel movements.

From the above, there is no doubt that the causes of the conflict and the factors that exacerbated it are numerous. In its final report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established as part of the requirements of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2005 presented the causes of the civil war from the perspective of Liberian as including:

over centralization and the oppressive dominance of the Americo-Liberian oligarchy over the indigenous peoples of Liberia rights and culture; The lack of any permanent or appropriate mechanism for the settlement of disputes, the judiciary being historically weak and unreliable; Duality of the Liberian political, social and legal systems which polarizes and widens the disparities between the Liberian peoples – a chasm between settler Liberia and indigenous Liberia. Ethnicity and the divisive clustering of the peoples’ of Liberia; and entrenched political and social system founded on privilege, patronage, politicization of the military and endemic corruption which created limited access to education and justice, economic and social opportunities and amenities (GoL 2009: 6).
At the height of hostilities, the brutality witnessed in the war was unimaginable. Thus, catch phrases like “new barbarism” (Richards 1996) and “doomsday carnival” (Utas 2000) were used to describe the war. Although Utas (2006), later suggested that such characterisation obstructed a commendable understanding of the conflict through the media, he is however silent on the alternative phrases for describing a war that involved ‘well documented’ (US Government 1996:5) practices of ritual human sacrifice and cannibalism. Consequently, by the time Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf took over as President; Liberia was a broken country not just in terms of institutions and infrastructure but even in terms of human resources. Omeje (2003) suggests that nothing was spared from destruction. This points to the fact that by 2006, the state of human security in Liberia, viewed either from the perspective of Freedom from Want and Fear, or the seven interdependent categories of Economic, Food, Health, Environment, Personal, Community and Political (UNDP 1994) had been critically undermined.

### 2.8 Conclusion

From the above, it is arguable that at the root of Liberia’s conflict are issues bothering on inequality, inequity and institutional dysfunction which led to the abuse of human rights as well as the endangering of some of the core components of human security. The war itself, as has been noted above, brought untold destruction to Liberia’s human and physical resources. Current attempts at post-conflict development must therefore consider the context of the roots of the conflict. It is in the context of this heartrending war and the threats to human security and the challenges of post conflict development that the next chapter examines the linkages between human security, institutions and post conflict development.
Chapter Three

POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT, INSTITUTIONS AND HUMAN SECURITY: EXAMINING THE LINKAGES

3.1 Introduction

One of the significant challenges confronting the international community in the post-Cold War era is dealing with the numerous intra-state conflicts in various parts of the world, particularly in Africa. In addressing this issue, it has also become essential over time, to address the question of what states must do upon the cessation of hostilities to prevent a recurrence of the conflict. Consequently, post-conflict development, including the rebuilding of infrastructure, political and social institutions, demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants and generally creating conditions for sustained development has become the ‘core business’ of the international humanitarian and development community (Krause & Jütersonke 2005:447). Pugh (1998) suggests that this has created a peacebuilding industry that seeks to prevent recidivism in violent conflicts. Thus, essentially, the preoccupation of the numerous peace-building missions deployed under the auspices of the United Nations and various regional and sub-regional organisations is to identify and support structures which will strengthen peace in order to avoid degeneration into conflict. While there have been successes, there have also been significant failures in this regard. This chapter interrogates the context and elements of post-conflict development. It also examines the linkages between post-conflict development, human security and institutions. This is to advance the view that human security influences the sustainability of post-conflict development and institutions are critical to advancing human security.
3.2 Post-Conflict Development: A Contextual Clarification

To avert an exercise in futility, it is useful (in examining post-conflict development), to commence with certain conceptual illuminations. The first is the use of the term ‘post-conflict’. A number of observers have pointed to the fragile utility of ‘post-conflict’ because in their estimation, the fact that conflicts occur all the time, even during so called post-conflict stages, has the potential to blur the transitions from war to peace (Goovaerts, Gasser, Belman Inbal 2006 and Date-Bah 2008). Notwithstanding this objection, it is observable that in some situations since the end of the Cold War, the absence of full scale war, while not necessarily suggestive of peace, often offers an opportunity to work towards lasting peace. Thus, for purposes of policy making and academic analysis, a useful ascription to “post-conflict” will be the period following the cessation of hostilities. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) (2009) therefore describes ‘post-conflict’ as the period following a ceasefire or the signing of a formal peace agreement. Similarly, the UN Integrated DDR Standards describes post-conflict as the “time, period or events taking place in a given State or region that had experienced an outbreak of violence or conflict in its recent past” (UN 2006:16). This phase can be divided into two sub-stages: the immediate aftermath of armed conflict and the period after five to ten (5-10) years. This relatively contemporary distinction has been attributed to evidence that there is a high risk (44%) of reverting to large scale violence within the first five years after the end of hostilities (Collier 2003). Such risk however falls considerably after the first post-conflict decade.

Beyond the above, the notion of ‘development’, in a ‘post-conflict’ context, may appear anomalous considering the apparent acceptance obtained by the term “reconstruction” in post-conflict literature. The UN Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), for instance, defines...
reconstruction as “the process of rebuilding the institutions of state that have failed or are failing due to circumstances of war or to systematic destruction through poor governance” (UN 2006:18). Murithi (2006:17) also defines post-conflict reconstruction as:

The medium to long-term process of rebuilding war-affected communities. This includes the process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from a conflict. It also includes addressing the root causes of the conflict and promoting social and economic justice as well as putting in place political structures of governance and the rule of law which will consolidate peace-building, reconciliation and development.

Notwithstanding the descriptive utility of “reconstruction” as captured in the definitions above and many others, its usage within the post-conflict setting is apocryphal. Date-Bah (2008:9), for instance, avers aptly that the concept “may misleadingly give the impression of rebuilding something…in other words a return to the status quo ante or the past pre-conflict stage.” The recognition of the challenges of the term ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ no doubt derives from the plain translation of the commonly used prefix “re” to mean "back to the original state". Thus, in spite of its wide scale acceptability, it is suggested that, to the extent that development in post-conflict societies is intended to go beyond a mere return to the status quo, then, “reconstruction”, as compounded with “post-conflict” does not just lack intellectual acuity, but may prove deficient and therefore counterproductive within the context of post-conflict states. Such deficiency may, for instance, arise as a result of the possibility that the pre-conflict state of affairs may have engendered the conflict precipitants. This probably explains why the UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace describes peace-building as the construction of a new environment (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Addison (2003:4) aptly concurs that “if recovery is broad based, then policies must change as well”. Thus, the recourse to using ‘post-conflict development’ offers an opportunity to alleviate an intellectual ill, as well as render practically germane, the whole idea of development in post-conflict states.
3.3 Post-Conflict Development: Identifying the Context

One of the foremost characteristics of intra-state conflicts that have so dominated the post-Cold War environment is the disregard for rules of war, associated with inter-state conflicts. Thus, in most cases, instruments such as the Geneva Conventions, particularly the Fourth, that stipulates the protection of civilians in times of war, have been ignored with impunity. In Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and a host of other infamous theatres of intra-state conflicts, systematic rape, ethnic cleansing and genocide and other acts of brutality have been consciously deployed as strategies of warfare. The consequences have been the far more devastation of human and physical resources than has been associated with interstate conflicts. Date-Bah (1997) and Obidegwu (2004) have, for instance, identified the devastating human, social, economic, physical and psychological effects of armed conflicts on communities. Citing Stewart (2006), Date-Bah (2008:20) echoes three levels at which the human cost of war may be identified. This includes decline in the macro-economic aggregates at the macro level, the crowding out of expenditure on other areas such as social investment at the middle level and the extensive death, injuries, loss of opportunities and income that affects individuals at the micro level.

A more disaggregated analysis of the cost of intra-state wars reveals even more alarming trends. Within the economic context, for instance, there’s a prevailing hypothesis that civil war has a negative impact on economic growth (Knight, Loayza, and Villanueva 1996; Easterly and Levine 1997 and Collier 1999). Developing this hypothesis further, Weinstein and Imai (2000) suggest changes in domestic investment as accounting for the negative impact of civil war on economic growth. They opine that domestic investment, defined as including the residential structures; machinery, factories, and equipment that exist at a point in time and add to the productive power
of the economy are targeted and destroyed by competing militaries in wartime. This reduces the contribution of domestic investment to economic growth.

Date-Bah similarly points to the devastation of infrastructure and other structures such as educational institutions, health and entertainment facilities collectively referred to as physical capital (Date-Bah 2008:26). While the suggestion that only manufacturers of alcohol are spared during wars may be a humorous anecdote, it gives some indication to the reality that more often than not, any infrastructure that does not support the war plans of the combatants are invariably destroyed. This undoubtedly blights and sometimes totally wipes out the economic potential of the country. Commenting on the macro and micro level effects of conflicts, Yilmaz (2009) highlights the damage to infrastructure such as transport and communication systems, health care, education among others as representing the former. In terms of the micro-level effects, Yilmaz suggests that lengthy conflicts account for shortages in human resources and educational opportunities among others.

Ball’s (2007) tabular representation of the characteristics of post-conflict countries particularly illuminates the context of post-conflict development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutional Characteristics</th>
<th>Economic and Social Characteristics</th>
<th>Security Characteristics</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Weak political and</td>
<td>1. Extensive damage to or</td>
<td>1. Bloated Security forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>administrative</td>
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<td>institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>social infrastructure</td>
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<td>2. Non-participatory</td>
<td>2. High Levels of Indebtedness</td>
<td>2. Armed opposition,</td>
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<tr>
<td>political system</td>
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<td>paramilitary forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Vigorous competition</td>
<td>3. Unsustainably high</td>
<td>3. Overabundance of</td>
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for power at expense of attention to governing

4. Limited legitimacy of political leaders
4. Significant contraction of legal economy and expansion of illegal economy
4. Need to reassess security environment and restructure security forces accordingly

5. Lack of consensus on direction country should follow
5. Reversion to subsistence activities
5. Lack of transparency in security affairs and accountability to civil authorities and to population

6. Destruction or Exile of human resources
6. Political role of security forces

7. Conflicts over ownership of and access to land
7. History of human rights abuses perpetrated by security forces.

8. Gender imbalance

9. Environment degradation

10. Weakened social fabric

11. Poor social indicators

Kaldor (2009:1) appositely summarizes the consequences of intrastate wars as follows:

In ‘new wars’ battles are rare, and most violence is directed against civilians. This can be deliberate, as in wars of ethnic cleansing (Bosnia and Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Baghdad) or in genocides (Rwanda and now Darfur), or because it is impossible to distinguish combatants from non-combatants (as in counter-insurgency wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya and Kashmir). For this reason, the techniques of ‘new wars’ directly violate international humanitarian and human rights law. And finally, in ‘new wars’ taxation falls, and the wars have to be financed by a variety of methods that are dependent on violence. These include looting and pillaging, kidnapping and hostage-taking, skewing the terms of trade through checkpoints, the ‘taxation’ of
humanitarian aid, outside support from the diaspora, smuggling of valuable commodities such as oil and diamonds, and other transnational criminal activities.

Beyond the above, the external environment within which a country operates also contributes to defining the context of post-conflict development. This is because such external environment often influences and is influenced by the role of external actors in post-conflict development. Thus, Canada, for instance, with an avowed commitment to promoting human security within the narrow sense, is likely to add to the context of post-conflict development within particular country, a clear motive of striving to achieve human security through carefully planned actions. Consequently, the multiplicity of external actors points to a multiplicity of external influences forming a part of the external dimension. A second part of the external dimension of the post-conflict context is invariably, systemic influences from the international community. This may clearly influence a particular development paradigm or otherwise. For instance, an international systemic trend such as the dominance of liberal democracy will likely shape the context of post-conflict development in a significant way. One typical example is the Marshall Plan, which was carved out to support post-conflict development in Europe within a Cold War context and thus also sought to lure some openness within Europe. It may therefore be suggested that the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions prevailing in a country before a conflict, blends with the consequences of the conflict as well as the external influence and systemic variables to define the post-conflict context.

3.4 The Elements of Post-Conflict Development

The above features define the post-conflict context. Any attempt at post-conflict development must therefore be informed by elements that address this context. Inspite of this, the order by which such elements must unfold is not conclusive. Cliffe, Guggenheim and Kostner (2003), for
instance, advocate the need to focus on physical infrastructure as well as what they perceive as invisible war effects such as mistrust among members of the society. Barnes (2001:86) on the other hand opines that the “central question of post-conflict societies remain political namely, how to construct a stable form of domestic power sharing and governance”. Feil (2002) inclines towards security, observing that post-conflict situations, by definition, have at their core a significant security vacuum created by the inability of indigenous security institutions to provide security or operating outside generally accepted norms. This view is also reinforced by Samuels (2006) who reechoes the acknowledgement that the provision of security is the sine qua non of peace-building.

Samuels (2006) however goes beyond security to suggest the important utility of institutions to post-conflict development, observing that the building or rebuilding of public institutions is key to sustainability. Newman and Schnabel (2002) also stress the institutional requisites to post-conflict development by stating that violently divided societies are cursed by institutional breakdown, weak or non-existent political institutions and weak or non-existent civil society institutions. Kumar (1997) likewise leans towards institutions, suggesting that post-conflict reconstruction involves building or rebuilding both formal and informal institutions, including, the creation and restoration of physical infrastructure and facilities, minimal social services, and structural reform and transformation in the political, economic, social and security sectors. Inspite of the apparent logic in stressing institutions as essential elements of post-conflict development, its disregard in the past has been conspicuous. Samuels (2006), for instance observes that it is an area that has largely been overlooked by the international community in the past.
Despite the relative bias exhibited by the various authors, the above prioritization points to the elements of post-conflict development. One of the foremost in this regard relates to the reform of the security sector. Within a traditional state centric concept of security, the sector is constituted by the state institutions mandated to animate the state’s responsibility to protect the territorial integrity of the state as well as to guarantee the well-being of the people living within the state against threats of violence and coercion from internal and external sources. Consequent to the above, within the traditional conceptualisation of security, the security sector properly so called in a stable country includes the armed forces, the police, the immigration and customs and relevant ministries such as defense, interior and national security, among others. It also includes the legislature and its specialised committees particularly those relating to defence and interior. Thus, the sector generally encapsulates public sector agencies tasked with the responsibility of exercising the monopoly of the state over coercive power.

Within the post-conflict setting however, the security sector in addition to the above may also include warlords, tribal or cultural leaders and other de facto claimants to the security of the territorial boundaries of the state as well as the population living within the state. This is reflective of the reality in post-conflict countries, where in most cases, the state having lost its autonomy over coercive force, has to share such authority with de facto actors. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, for instance, beyond the challenges of rationalizing the agencies within the formal security structures such as the Liberian National Policy (LNP), the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), and the Special Security Services (SSS) among others, National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and UNMIL also had to contend with warlords, tribal chiefs, among others, all of whom had claimed, in reality, some constituencies insofar as security was concerned.
Reforming the security sector, within a post-conflict context, thus, refers to the extent to which the actions and the actors identified above can be reformed to address the challenges confronting the sector to ensure that a safe and secure environment is provided for the populace as well as for the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the state. Most importantly, from a liberal democratic perspective, it is to ensure that actors within the security sector are brought under the control of civilian leadership. A practical definition of Security Sector Reform from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2004:20), describes SSR as

> the transformation of the security system – which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions – working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework’.

The relevance of SSR in post-conflict development has been extensively identified by a myriad of authors. According to the IDDRS (UN 2006), for instance, SSR derives from the fact that it enhances “security” in a way that facilitates wider recovery. In Date-Bah’s view, the essence of Security Sector Reform derives from the fact that “a continued environment of insecurity can impede the various reconstruction efforts and prolong the conflict” (Date-Bah 2008:39). Obidegwu (2004) also notes that the involvement of the security forces in civil wars necessarily blights their objectivity and therefore suitability for the post-conflict development tasks of promoting governance based on rule of law and protection of human rights. Impliedly, the goal of SSR in post-conflict development is to re-orient the various elements of the security sector towards guaranteeing the safety of the territory and its population and in the process, create a secure platform for the perpetration of post-conflict development.

Notwithstanding its continued veracity, the above description of SSR, appear to have been amended by relatively recent developments in the security landscape. Consequently, it is argued
that the orthodoxy of state centric security, having been challenged by post-Cold War realities, has given way to a broadened concept of security that includes in addition to the traditional dimensions, non-traditional issues such as environment, food, and culture as well as other components collectively referred to as Human security. The broadened security conceptualisation, which necessarily suggests a broadened scope for the security sector, thus points to the inclusion of participants involved in the environment, healthy, food and other sectors reflective of the various components of human security identified in the UNDP definition (UNDP 1994). The African Union backs this broadened categorisation of the security sector by indicating in its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy Framework, that all activities within the security cluster must be necessarily based on the concept of human security, defined by the Common African Defence and Security Policy as

...human rights; the right to participate fully in the process of governance; the right to equal development, as well as the right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; the right to protection against poverty; the right to conducive education and health conditions; the right to protection against national disasters, as well as ecological and environmental degradation… (AU 2004)

Closely related to SSR is the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants in conflict situations. According to the UN (2006), DDR is a process of disarming ex combatants, discharging them from active service, providing them with support package and preparing them for long-term civilian life with opportunities for sustainable economic and social reintegration. Writing on the timelines of DDR, a South-South Cooperation Strategy Report (SSCSR 2010) notes that while the disarmament and demobilization, which are short-term, tend to be timely planned and implemented, the long-term reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life through productive activities is often fraught with a number of challenges including poor funding and lack of long term donor commitment. Ultimately, DDR is calculated to ensure that ex-combatants are effectively reintegrated into the society.
Another element of post-conflict development is political governance. After the end of conflicts and the cessation of violence, it is often critical for a post-conflict government or a transitional government to ensure that it is fairly visible in all parts of the post conflict country. The reason for this is not far-fetched; having reneged (as a matter of policy or sheer inability) on its responsibility of protecting its people, political governance in post-conflict development (PCD) necessarily attempts to reintroduce the whole idea of political governance as well as political participation at every level of the state. The preamble of the African Union Constitutive Act (AU 2000), for instance, notes that PCD political governance involves the devolution of power from the national to the local level as well as the promotion of good democratic governance. Consequently, the targets of PCD political governance include political accountability and transparency, decentralization and the facilitation of grassroots political participation, justice and rule of law for the entire population and good economic and corporate governance.

A critical component of political governance in post-conflict development is elections. This is because nonviolent alternation of political power is fundamental to the enhancement of a country’s political system as well as facilitating the internal sovereignty of elected governments. Due to the value of elections as a mechanism to resolve long standing political disputes and to consolidate political transitions even in relatively stable countries, its relevance for the development of political governance in post conflict countries is quite valued by the international community. This is typified by the centrality of elections in peace agreements around the world as well as the considerable interest of the international community in decisions about elections in post conflict countries. The latter appears driven by the fact that countries emerging from violent conflicts in most cases lack the institutions capacity to organise credible elections. This explains

Dilating on the interest of the international community in elections in post-conflict countries, Kumar (1998) avers three objectives linked to the ultimate objective of enhancing governance as a critical component of post-conflict context. The three are the alternation of power to a generally recognised government, the commencement of democratisation as well as the shifting of the focus to peaceful modes for conflict resolution – the election being the first example of such peaceful resolution of conflict.

Additional to the above, the pursuance of human rights, justice, and reconciliation is critical to post-conflict development. This is because abuse of human rights, ethnic or region-based marginalization or discrimination and unfairness, prejudice or any perception of such can generate grievances which can serve as activators for violent conflict. Consequently, human rights, justice and reconciliation are collectively considered as another element of post-conflict development. This element thus, focuses on protecting human right not just in accordance with national and international legal provisions, but doing so in a manner that, at the least, appears fair and across the board. It further involves the multi-level attempts at reconciling the post-conflict state at the household, community and national level.

In line with the above, the need for legal reforms in post-conflict societies is unquestionable. This necessitates the adaptation of the legal framework so that it is sensitive to the root causes of the conflict such as inequalities and discrimination, among others. Additionally, new constitutions may be drafted and labour laws and laws on gender equality may also be adopted (ILO 1999:26). Ratification of relevant international labour standards and enshrining human
rights in national laws are also integral parts of the legal reforms in post-conflict development.

Apart from the fact that war adversely affects people’s observance of human rights and other laws, it also weakens the government’s capacity to enforce the laws; this can fuel the growth of crime (Samuels 2006). In responding to such trends, governments of post-conflict states may sometimes adopt draconian measures which may be in violation of universal human rights norms. It is therefore essential for government to put in place measures for monitoring enforcement.

Another element of post-conflict development is the development of institutions. According to Addison, while aid provides essential help, success at post-conflict development ultimately depends on the capacities and actions of national actors (1998:4). Because of the weakening of existing local institutions at the different levels such as the banks, sectoral ministries, the police, and other security agencies, as well as community level ones (such as through depletion of experience, skilled manpower, institutional memory and relevant data) institutional capacity building has to be targeted in all post-conflict interventions particularly in Africa (Samuels 2006). The aim is to ensure the gradual resumption of the general functioning of public administration and the provision of social services. Furthermore, it enables local institutions to be at the helm of the reconstruction process even if it is externally supported and it contributes to enhance local sustainability of post-conflict interventions. According to Obidegwu (2004), some of the state institutions, for example “the budget, central banking revenue management, and even the public administration can be rebuilt quickly after a civil war with strong government commitment. However, rebuilding of others such as trade institutions often takes time as it involves prescriptions of many different agents and institutions outside the country.
A study of institutional capacity by the World Bank in 2003 has identified challenges associated with the options for overcoming post conflict local institutional capacity constraints. The options often adopted by post-conflict aid and other actors include: investing in building local capacity; buying capacity; building temporary capacity; or bypassing weak government capacity. Because building governmental and other local capacity takes time, aid agencies sometimes bypass local institutions to employ the services of more expensive external firms such as those from their parent countries. This can however generate some challenges. It has been suggested, for instance, that the recipient country bureaucracy may refuse to corporate with external firms; the external firms may lack cultural sensitivity; and local resentment can build up against the aid agencies (Date-Bah 2008). There may also be conflict of interest if the foreign firms are expected to build local capacity in the course of carrying out their assignment since doing this would mean that their engagement would end early.

Further to the above, conflicts often negatively impact on gender roles and relations. From enlisting both male and female child soldiers to the forced elevation of women as the head of households (following the absence of the men), traditional gender roles are violently disrupted. This creates a platform for child abuse and sexual and gender-based violence. Additionally, it distorts the traditional family setting in a way that robs the family as a unit of social acculturation and development. This makes gender one of the elements of post-conflict development. Depending on the duration of the conflict, this situation can lead to a corps or generation of youth with no sense of social responsibility or the boundaries of socially permissible behaviour. Consequently, any meaningful post-conflict development must incorporate gender relevant strategies.
The ultimate aim of post-conflict development is to engineer a return to socio-economic and political development. It may thus, be surmised that socio-economic reconstruction and development is one of the instructive elements of post-conflict development. To guard against lop-sided development, a meaningful PCD must have the development of the people at the core of all strategies. Thus, for instance, improving economic indicators without reflecting in human development can be disruptive to the PCD process. What makes this element even more challenging is the expectation of the post-conflict community for speedy peace dividends. This has the potential of creating an expectation gap that can be manipulated to destabilize the PCD process. To confront this challenge, it is important, while addressing hardware issues like infrastructure, to also facilitate initiatives for livelihoods. This calls for a variable geometric approach to tackling sectors such as health, education, water and electricity almost in a simultaneous fashion. In Liberia, for instance, some of the processes of rebuilding the hard facilities were rolled out in a way that created some employment for the Liberians. While this may not have been significant, considering the capital intensive nature of infrastructure provision, the mental picture generated – one that suggested that people were resuming work was invaluable to this element of post-conflict development.

Integrated into the above element is the development of physical and infrastructural development. Undoubtedly, among the worst targeted sectors during conflicts are physical and infrastructural provisions such as houses, hospitals, roads and bridges. As a result, the rehabilitation and development of new infrastructure and physical projects is an important element of post-conflict development. This can facilitate the flow of funds into the rural community to jumpstart rural markets as well as open up rural communities to social and economic activities. Such infrastructural development is critical to developments in other sectors.
of the country. According to Date-Bah (2008), the infrastructure can be categorized into construction of productive infrastructure (such as access roads, land development, irrigation schemes, among others), as well as social infrastructure such as schools, health centers and water supply schemes destroyed by the civil wars.

Due to the costly nature of infrastructural projects, there has been some advocacy for emphasis on reconstruction of physical infrastructure that will also benefit communities socially and economically (Obidegwu 2004:28). The reason for this is not far-fetched. Post-conflict developments in the rural areas generally have to receive priority attention due to the fact that such areas are often the hardest hit during conflicts. Contributing to the debate on how to make infrastructural projects beneficial, the ILO has persistently attempted to promote the fact that the realistic solution to developing post-conflict infrastructure in a way that benefits the people is to rely on what is already available such as locally available material and human resources. According to Ioannides (2010), this labour-based approach to infrastructural development also emphasizes social acceptance of the programmes and therefore can contribute to deal with some root causes of conflict such as access to water, land or other disputed resources.

Though seldomly acknowledged, another sector that is often disrupted by internal armed conflicts is community relations and trust developed over centuries in most communities. War deepens the polarization between community members. This can be between opposing factions of the war, between those who remained in the community and returnees form internal and external displacement at the end of the war and between perpetrators and victims of atrocities committed in the midst of the war. Without reconciliation and rebuilding of social capital, economic recovery can be undermined as the lack of social capital could prevent cooperation
between the community members and the formation of other social and business networks. It can also generate risks such as growing tensions and possible resurgence of the war. In recognition of this, post-conflict development must include efforts to heal rifts in community social relations, eroded trust and fragmented relations generated by conflicts as these are vital for sustaining development.

A number of channels have been suggested for building social capital after conflicts. These include the promotion of participatory dialogue which can enhance mutual understanding and contribute to “weave a stronger fabric of social relations” (UNDESA 2007:XV); local economic development and community driven development which all emphasize community-led participatory approaches; “pursuing development agendas through empowering beneficiaries and given local stakeholders control over decisions and resources, while building community capacities for collective decision-making and action” (Goovaerts, Gasser and Belman Inbal 2006:10). A major challenge to local economic development and other community based development approaches is how to reconcile the long period required for the initiatives “to bear fruit, in particular where conflict has severely eroded social capital and levels of trust between community members” and the need for quick tackling of post conflict needs. (Goovaerts, Gasser and Belman Inbal 2006:13).

Notwithstanding the above prioritizations and some recognizable commonalities in post-conflict countries, as the root cause, nature and effects of intra state conflicts vary from state to state; post conflict development must be adjusted to suit the peculiar context of respective post-conflict states. Additionally, since the generally limited resources for post conflict development are not rolled out uniformly in all contexts, ‘prioritization of needs’, reflective of particular contexts,
becomes essential (Date-Bah 2008:31).

3.5 Challenges to Post-Conflict Development

International organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations have been significantly involved in post-conflict development for upwards of two decades. With regard to the UN, the organisation’s role in peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding was given additional prominence with the adoption in 2000, of the Brahimi Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The Panel essentially assessed shortcomings of past UN peace operations and made recommendations relating to doctrine, operational and organizational dynamics of UN peace operations (Durch, Holt, Earle & Shanahan 2003). The formation of the Panel was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that although UN interventions have led to cessation of hostilities, they have not necessarily resulted in sustainable peace nor have they fully addressed the factors that led to the conflict in the first place. Consequently, the record of post-conflict development is quite chequered, with notable achievements and significant failures (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). This notwithstanding, the “time frame” for assessment as well as the ambiguity on what constitutes “success” appear to weigh significantly on the assessment of post-conflict development. Beyond this, however, the recognition that post-conflict development is fraught with challenges is not likely to meet any significant opposition.

The wide spectrum of challenges to post-conflict development may be summarized under three broad categories namely those emerging out of the physical manifestations of the conflict such as the destruction of human resources and infrastructure, those challenges emerging from efforts at peacebuilding particularly the challenges of co-coordinating efforts by a wide array of mostly external organs, and those emerging out of an expectation gap engendered by raised expectations.
of the post-conflict community for quick manifestations of post-conflict development.

The relationship between external and internal actors undoubtedly defines actors in contemporary post-conflict development. Yet in some cases, the creation of parallel institutions sponsored by donors and other actors largely external to the post-conflict country pose challenges to the sustainability of the post-conflict development. In Rwanda, Sierra Leone and other post-conflict arenas, several institutions have been created from scratch. While the creation of these institutions have been influenced (in some cases justifiably) by the destruction of institutions often associated with the conflicts, in some instances, it has generated parallel institutions that invariably compete with national institutions that, though weakened by the conflict, still maintain some basic elements of functionality. Beyond questions of sustainability of such externally motivated institutions, the potential for such institutions to act as conduits for the destruction of localized or indigenous institutions which could have been strengthened often challenges the principle of ownership that is widely recommended for post-conflict development strategies. Donais (2009) and Brahimi (2007) also suggest the potential of such parallel institutions to undermine local authority, engender competition thus hindering coordination.

Related to the above are the challenges of harmonizing needs of the post-conflict community with the political needs of the external agencies. Tschirgi (2004) describes this phenomenon as the chronic inability of international actors to adapt their assistance to the political dynamics of the war-torn societies they seek to support. In his study of the conflict in Northern Uganda, Larok (2007) suggested that aid organisations operating within the rubric of external support to post-conflict development, in some instances, sacrifice the needs of the post-conflict country in exchange for political expediency. He defined political expediency as the need for visibility
among others, and in some cases, political culture of the mother countries of these aid agencies. Similarly, in his assessment of the post-conflict peacebuilding in Angola, an ACCORD report (2008) suggests that although, to a very large extent, external actors sought the overall reconstruction of Angola, in some instances, it was clear that the needs of the post-conflict country were carefully submerged to the political dictates of the aid agencies.

This phenomenon appears to have been strengthened in the post-Cold War era, with the confirmed triumph of liberal democracy. Consequently, even in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, with very minimal history of the practice of democracy, external actors and the many agencies they work through, more often than not, operate with the mindset of affecting the post-conflict communities with the liberal democratic tradition often highlighted as presenting the best probability for peace. According to Paris (2004), the liberal peace derives from a long tradition of Western liberal theory and practice that considers political and economic liberalization as antidotes to violent conflicts. Thus, promotion of human rights, democracy, elections, constitutionalism, rule of law, property rights, good governance, and neo-liberal economics have become part and parcel of the international peacebuilding strategy. In promoting this normative agenda, external actors sometimes appear to challenge the oft-advocated post-conflict development principle of local ownership of the process. While the reason for promoting such liberal ideologies has often been cited as the need to establish a non-violent political authority which can legitimately guide a country's post-conflict reconstruction (Tschirgi 2004), destabilizing effects of such liberalizing attempts has often pointed to the contrary. It may be surmised, for instance, that given the platform created for multiple demands through the recognitions of various interest aggregation organs, the mismanagement of liberalization may well lead to instability. Such ill or mismanagement may arise as a result of the absence of certain
vital prerequisites for harnessing liberalization towards sustainable politico social and economic development. Huntington (1994) aptly identifies institutions as one of such prerequisite suggesting that under conditions where the institutional foundation of democracy is weak and popular demands are huge and not met by the state, instability leading to political decay or disorder becomes the end-result. Thus, irrespective of the relevance of liberalization in a particular context, the absence of socio-political institutions is likely to generate or, at least, sustain instability.

Examining whether political and economic liberalization strategies promoted by the international community contributed in any discernible way to the resurgence of fighting or to ameliorating the conditions that had led to war in eleven cases namely Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, Croatia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Namibia and Mozambique, Paris (2004) concludes that the process of political liberalization, or economic liberalization, or both, produced destabilizing side effects that worked against the consolidation of peace in some of the countries. This reality strongly suggests that the approach to peacebuilding that prevailed in the 1990s, and which was, as it appears, based on optimistic assumptions about the effects of democratization in the immediate aftermath of civil war, appears to challenge the prospects for post-conflict development.

Reflecting on the state formation argument, Krause and Jutasonke (2005) also note that far from minor insertions of actors in the host country, post-conflict operations represent major activities in state formation. This is because it involves an attempt to reorganize political and socio-economic power as well as reshape institutional terrain on which political competition occurs. They therefore opine that once a post-conflict peacebuilding intervention is under way, the
process of state-building can no longer unfold along whatever paths it might have followed before the slide into violent conflict. Krause and Jutasonke observe that the challenge gets murkier because of the flaws in the assumption that “a sophisticated, yet still utopian “social engineering” approach could replace, or accelerate a process of state formation that occurs rather more organically” (2005:448).

Notwithstanding the benefits of liberal democracy and some other trends associated with it, it has been suggested that such superimposition may sometimes distort the evolution of indigenous systems in ways that threaten the livelihood of people within post conflict societies. Infact, such attempts at superimposing systems based on political expediency and the challenges thereof is not a new phenomenon. An article on the fundamentals of post-conflict reconstruction in the 1940 edition of Nature (Anon 1940:500) noted thus:

if acute unrest and dislocation in the social organism is to be avoided, any attempt to promote the well-being of the people, whether by the introduction of a more advanced and efficient system of government or by raising the general standards in mode of life, must be adapted to the cultural stage of the community and must be in harmony with what, it might be anticipated would be the natural trend of social and cultural development.

Another challenge to post-conflict development is the lack of/or inadequate co-ordination among the various actors and stakeholders (de Coning 2008). As has been established already, the process of post-conflict development involves a myriad of actors and interests. It therefore goes without saying that effective co-ordination is absolutely necessary for the success of the entire development project. Inspite of this, co-ordination also appears to be one area where the international community and NGOs, have been confronted with major challenges. Date-Bah (2008) notes that co-ordination or the lack of it, continues to be one of the significant challenges in post-conflict development efforts around the world.

The challenge of coordination manifests in two dimensions. The first is the horizontal
coordination among the various external actors. Even in cases where the United Nations has been at the forefront of reconstruction work such as in Liberia, there have still been reported cases of lack of coordination leading to duplication and inefficiency. Nagba (2008) opines:

While appreciating the efforts of the UN Mission in Liberia, perhaps we will do ourselves some good, if we were to communicate with some of our external benefactors that in reality, they do our country more harm than good if they proceed on the largely uncoordinated manner we have witnessed so far.

The success of post-conflict development is also hampered by the extent to which the process in a particular country can be delinked from the regional context within which that country is situated. Observing the impact of regionalization on post-conflict development, Tsirgi (2004: 18) opines that focusing on peacebuilding efforts in a country may be exclusively narrow and is unlikely to yield much result if the regional dimension is ignored. This is the case in regions where conflicts have interlocking political, security and economic dynamics (Sriram and Nielsen 2004). One of the most enduring conflict-prone regions in the world today that somehow confirm the above challenge is the Great Lakes region in Africa, where the perennial ethno-political conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, often affect the stability in post-conflict countries like Rwanda, Burundi and Angola.

Forman and Patrick (2001) have also demonstrated that without timely, sustained, and well-targeted resources, external support to post-conflict peacebuilding is unlikely to make a significant difference on the ground. Infact, the UN Security Council (UNSC 2009), in a statement issued on 22 July 2009 also affirmed the essence of funding to post-conflict development by calling for more rapid and pointed efforts to build peace in the period immediately after strife-torn countries emerged from armed conflict. This notwithstanding, the inadequacy of funds, which invariably affects its disbursement in a timely fashion, continues to plague post-conflict development efforts around the world. Comparing the Marshall Plan with
the Sierra Leone experience, it can be suggested strongly that one of the challenges that confronted the latter, one that perhaps affected the pace of post-conflict development, has to do with the availability of funds.

The complex yet peculiar challenges of respective post-conflict settings makes it essential for actors in post-conflict development to prioritise the various elements bearing in mind the respective local as well as external dynamics relating to that particular context. With regard to the Marshall plan for Europe, for instance, it is undoubted that the presence of established and functioning institutions within the local context required a strategy that involved an infusion of capital into already functioning institutions. Thus, what has been tagged as effective post-conflict intervention was clearly strategy drafted with insight into the local and external context. This includes the respective peculiar needs of the populace as well as bearing in mind the funds available for the perpetuation of the post conflict development agenda. Beyond this, it is also absolutely essential within the context of sustainability, for actors in the development effort to promote local ownership of the strategies. Such ownership must not be resigned to public durbars but actually they should drive the process.

Yet another realization is the need for post-conflict development to be clearly differentiated from development within stable societies. As has been established, the post-conflict context combines a number of factors that differ from stable societies. Any attempt to pursue post-conflict development with the same rubric as that of stable societies is not just bound to fail, but capable of derailing the peace efforts. With regard to institutions, for instance, informal institutions in post-conflict settings may even possess a lot more utility than formal institutions. Again, combining the need for development with the quest to prevent a relapse into violent conflict
necessarily ascribes a significant dose of politics to the process. A failure to recognise the political aspects of it is bound to negatively impact on the peacebuilding process.

Finally, the task of post-conflict peacebuilding is indeed enormous. Thus, the necessity of external assistance goes without saying. It is, however, essential for the needs, expectations and motives of the respective internal and external stakeholders to be harmonized or at worst synchronized. This will eliminate or, at the least, minimize the element of incompatibility within post-conflict development. It may also be deduced that in spite of the recognition that peacebuilding and development is lengthy, it is important to assign appropriate timelines to the various components.

3.6 The Record of Post-Conflict Development: An Overview of Selected Cases

Following from the above, this section highlights some of the practical manifestations of post-conflict development. Although the rationale for this section is not to compare, slight tints of comparison emerge. Considering the differing contexts (which as indicated above affects the post conflict strategy) and periods within which the various programmes were exacted, it would be counter-productive to attempt a strict comparative review. While highlighting some of the practical challenges of post-conflict development, the section also identifies the handling of human security issues in the various examples as a precursor to Section 3.7 on the relevance of human security to the sustainability of post-conflict development.

3.6.1 The European Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan)

Arguably, the most acclaimed post-conflict development plan in post-World War II era is the European Recovery Programme (ERP), better known as the Marshall Plan. Consequent to the
Second World War’s devastation of Europe, the US committed itself to assist in the post-conflict development efforts. The Marshall Plan animated this commitment by ensuring the provision of financial and technical assistance to Europe (Hogan 1987). The Marshall plan officially lasted for a little over four years, from April 1948 to September 1951. Even by the standards of the United States of America (US) (one of the foremost benefactor countries in terms of foreign assistance), the plan has often been described as the largest and most successful program of foreign assistance ever undertaken by the US government (Krieger 2001). Other commentaries however suggest that the success claims of the ERP are overrated (Milward, 1984).

The main target of the ERP was restoring Europe’s pre-war industrial base to serve as the backbone for the post-conflict development efforts. The Marshall plan therefore focused some attention on rebuilding Europe’s industrial centers, particularly fixing the infrastructure that had been destroyed during the war. In the process, it helped the productivity of Europe to exceed the pre-1939 average by 25% two years after it launch. This tripled by 1952, resulting in the revival of intra-European trade. Between 1950 and 1960 the annual rate of growth in the output of goods produced in Europe jumped to 3.9 per cent making it possible for Europe not to only have a swift economic recovery but also the greatest economic boom in the whole world.

While it has been suggested that the US$ 13 billion provided in grants and loans to seventeen European countries was the main factor in reviving the respective economies and stabilizing their political structures, other historical analysis have pointed to the coalescing of a number of factors (Roberts 1994). The presence of skilled manpower has been cited as one of these. This was due to Europe’s pre-war state of industrial advancement. Thus, the fundamental skilled manpower requirement for post-war reconstruction was available after the war.
By providing capital to combine with the other factors of production, most importantly, the skilled manpower, The Plan also made it possible for European plants which had produced war items to be easily converted to producing peace-time items after the war ended. Infact, it has been suggested that Industrial equipment purchases amounted to 14 percent of the Marshall plan funds (Bossuat 2008: 20). Scientific and technological advances also helped economic recovery as both chemical and electrical engineering industries made rapid advances during and after the war. There were varieties of electrical and chemical consumer goods like washing machines, refrigerators, radios and television-sets produced in large quantities and sold at low prices. The demand for these new products ensured continuing prosperity in the post-war years.

Beyond the above, changes in policies of some European countries especially from the laissez-faire policy to a stimulated economic growth through government investments has also been identified as accounting for the rapid post conflict development. Abel-Smith (1992), for instance, notes that the British government made heavy investment in developing its welfare services through the *Beveridge Report*, which proposed widespread measures to address the costs of want, diseases, lack of education and unemployment in the United Kingdom. In France, the Plan for the Reconstruction of Key Industries provided the framework for the French government to provide financial resources for setting up a new transport system, for modernizing the machines of the basic industries, for constructing more houses and for improving farming facilities. Government investment encouraged private investment, created full employment and led to continuing economic growth of Europe in the long run.

Additionally, growth in world trade saw many European countries realizing the disastrous effects of tariffs on inter-European trade. To rectify this, they began to co-operate economically and
tried to lower their tariffs. This brought about the establishment of the European Economic Co-operation (1948) and the European Economic Community (1958) to work at reducing tariffs between European states. Not only did intra-European trade increase as a result of the reduction in tariffs, but also trade with developing countries in Asia and Africa (Manna 1957).

Beyond the above, one of the significant points attributed to the success of the Marshall Plan was the existence of institutions. According to Lowly (1977) the presence of economic and political institutions provided a useful conduit for utilizing injections into the European economy. Gurtz (2000) equally observes that the most prominent defining character for the post conflict development of Europe was the presence of institutions that had survived the war. Thus, unlike the largely intra state conflicts that have characterised the post-Cold War era, and which supervises in most cases a destruction of both formal and informal institutions, the Marshall Plan benefited heavily from the presence of structures that were functioning to a significant degree and as such merely needed funds to be activated. As indicated above, German industry was still the strongest in Europe and was therefore penned as the engine of growth for the planned resuscitation of European industry (Berghan 2008). A further benefit of the presence of already functioning institutions meant that the injection of funds was not invested in developing parallel institutions that sometimes compete with indigenous institutions in ways that derail the post-conflict development process. The injection of funds itself was massive. Between April 3, 1948 and June 31, 1951, participating countries accessed close to 11.8 billion USD, with the least case infused represented by the 23.7 million USD accessed by Iceland (Bossuat 2008: 4).

Related to the above, the Marshall Plan also thrived because of the absence of the fault lines between political expediency and needs often witnessed with some post-conflict development
plans implemented in Africa and some other parts of the world. With its clearly-stated objective of facilitating the post-war development of Europe, and with the establishment of the European Co-operation Administration, based in Washington as the overall coordinating agency of the Marshall Plan, it has been noted that the objectives and programmes of the various implementing agencies of the Marshall Plan were heavily synchronized (Schain 2001). This clearly engendered adequate co-ordination - a critical ingredient of effective post-conflict development. Related to this is the regional focus of the Marshall Plan. Berghan (2008:59) characterises the plan as “nation building within a regional economic integration framework”. Suffice it to say that the Marshall Plan was at the root of the formation of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operations. The relevance of a regional approach to post-conflict development can best be appreciated from a contrast with some of the post-conflict development programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, among others. In these examples, local approaches/country wide approaches have eventually reaped minimal benefits because of the deep socio-cultural interactions between states in a particular sub-region. – what has been often described as Regional Conflict Complexes. Weis (2009: 59) points out that in such complexes, conflicts in individual countries can “no longer be understood independently from each other or without reference to the region as a whole” this essentially defines the ability of regional dimensions to negate the benefits of any country wide gains. Wallenstein and Solenberg (1998:221), for instance, observe that more than half of the conflicts that occurred in Africa between 1996 and 1997 were as a result of conflicts in neighbouring states.

Apart from the physical infrastructure and the industrial base, the Marshall plan, as a post-war effort, implemented a number of programmes related directly or indirectly to human security such as food and social accommodation. Commenting on the relevance of these issues, Barry
Bingham, head of the ECA mission in Paris highlighted the psychological advantages to be gained in “providing tangible benefits of immediate interests to the average Frenchman” (Bingham 1950). Further indications of human security at the root of the Marshall plan are observable in the June 5, 1947 speech of Secretary of State George C. Marshall who noted that “the American aid has to support a united Europe and to fight misery” (Bossuat 2008:15). The suggestion of “misery” apart from falling within the US objective of making Western Europe attractive to counter communism, was to some extent an indication of a wider perspective of security from the traditional state centric security. Indeed, this appears to have been confirmed by a statement attributed to George Kennan when he noted that the difficulties of Europe were not linked to communism but to “hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos” (Bossuat 2008:15). It was therefore not surprising that food and raw materials accounted for 15.7 percent of the Marshall Plan’s imports to European countries from 1948 to 1949.

3.6.2 Sierra Leone

From 1990 to 2002, the Republic of Sierra Leone was embroiled in one of the most devastating civil wars Africa has ever witnessed. The war resulted in the destruction of human resources and along with all the basic socio-economic and political institutions of a functioning state (Bojanic, 2008:1). The causes of the war have been attributed to a number of reasons. These generally fall within the greed and grievance framework advanced by Collier and Hoeffler (2000).

With regard to the former, the extent to which revenue from diamonds was looted and used to finance the war by the various factions has often led commentators to conclude that the greed for diamonds was the cause of the conflict (Kabia, 2008). Other studies have, however, cited deficiencies in the socio-economic and political landscape of Sierra Leone which induced
grievances that ignited the war (Baker and Roy, 2004). Such deficiencies included bad governance, economic mismanagement, and breakdown of public service institutions, abuse of human rights, chronic underdevelopment particularly in the rural areas, absence of basic services such as education and health, pervasive unemployment and the lack of opportunities for the youth. The particular case of the youth has often been highlighted because of the view that The RUF attracted youth who lacked social incentives and were economically and politically marginalized by poverty and the failure of state institutions.

In 2002, Sierra Leone commenced the implementation of a post-conflict development strategy with the active participation of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the US and UK governments and a variety of local and international non-governmental organisations. Central to the strategy was the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former combatants. Considered as critical to the stability of the post-conflict environment, the DDR process led to the return of over 300,000 internally displaced persons and the disarmament of over 70,000 ex-combatants (Freeman, 2008). Apart from the DDR process, the various partners invested substantial money into areas such as police training and military restructuring, building of schools and health facilities as well as advancing central and decentralized governance systems such as national elections and the restoration of the “Paramount Chief” system. Inspite of the stability arising out of these actions, later reviews of the state of the post-conflict development have pointed to some challenges to the sustainability of the process. Prime among these are vestiges of the old governance systems that facilitated abuse of human rights and perpetrated the grievance-generating exclusionary politics. Freeman (2008) has, for instance, criticised the re-establishment of the Paramount Chief system, noting that the fact of the system’s facilitation of abuse of human rights dates back to 1955. Thus, the system’s resuscitation as part
of efforts at post-conflict development was tantamount to sustaining “injustice and unaccountability of governance that will continue to alienate the youth and other segments of the population” (Freeman 2008:1).

Additionally, in spite of the creditable investments in putting up structures for the judiciary and other arms of government as well as public service facilities like schools and health posts, significant institutional challenges such as massive bribery and corruption in the judiciary, attracted negative public opinion regarding the rebuilding of these institutions. Furthermore, despite the construction and repair of many school facilities, the educational system remains in crisis. The pupil-to-teacher ratio in some parts of the country is an astonishingly high 118:1 (Freeman, 2008). The challenges in the educational sector are also reflected in the agricultural sector where in spite of the fact that it accounts for three fourths of the jobs in Sierra Leone, the DDR programme by omission or commission concentrated on other sectors. Thus, despite, the semblance of stability, key human security institutions particularly in the economic and rule of law spheres appears to be severely challenged.

The reason for this trend may not be far-fetched. Considering the structure of the post-conflict development plan, it appears that DDR and not human security was put at the core of the post-conflict strategy. Thus, while the former was justifiably considered as fundamental to the transition from civil war to stable society (Mackenzie 2009), it appeared to have been projected as an end in itself rather than means to an end – that end being sustainable post-conflict development. Inarguably, some of the initiatives had rippling down positive effects on human security. The ‘Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development’ (CMRRD) was, for instance, set up to manage the exploitation of diamond
and gold with the resources saved scheduled to go into human security variables like public education, public health, infrastructural development, among others. Yet the fact that human security as an integrated concept was not at the core of the post-conflict efforts challenged the process. Thus, although structures were built for health and education, among others, the absence of the integrated human security motive meant that the structures and institutions merely manifested the old order.

The above challenges mean that the prewar status quo characterised by elite corruption, state sponsored oppression, pervasive impoverishment and the breakdown of human security (Zack-Williams, 2001) and which according to Denoy (2010:798) created a context of structural violence that resulted in chronic economic stagnation and high unemployment, among others, is emerging in the post conflict environment. Hull (2006) observing the affinity in the pre-and post-war environment notes that:

Young people everywhere have considerable anxiety about their future, and if they do not find educational and employment opportunities, they naturally despair. This leads to feelings of exclusion and resentment that in the extreme can produce lawlessness, violence, and even anarchy as Sierra Leone witnessed during your civil conflict. The conditions that exist today are some of the same conditions the led to that conflict, and they must be addressed.

Thus, inspite of the massive attention given by the network of actors, international reconstruction effort in Sierra Leone more and more appears to have failed with regard to addressing the critical issues at the root of the conflict.

The consequence of this breakdown in the sustainability of the post-conflict development is reflected in relatively recent reports of fresh concern for renewed violence. Maconachie and Hilson (2011) note that the concern is due to the ever-growing numbers of unemployed youth throughout the country, the mobilisation of whom proved instrumental in prolonging the civil war in the 1990s.
3.6.3 Rwanda

Beginning from the early 1990s, Rwanda experienced ethnic conflict. The highlight of this was the genocide of approximately half-a million ethnic Tutsis and moderate Hutus over a 100-day period in 1994. The mere numbers and the brutality earned the title as one of the worst atrocities of the century (Straus and Waldorf, 2011:3). Following the capture of the Rwandan capital, Kigali in July 1994 by the rebel movement-Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) an interim government was put in place. Although relatively low-level disturbances manifested after July 1994, the imposition of the interim government undoubtedly launched the country into a post-conflict development phase.

For a country that had its economic base and human capital severely decimated during the genocide, the improvement of Rwanda’s economy and social indicators is notable. In addition to the relatively stable security environment qualitative indicators for other components of human security have registered some positive results since the end of the genocide. These positive results followed clear policies and programmes instituted by the Rwandan government with assistance from external partners.

A key programme credited with the positive results in health security, for instance, has been the Mutual Health Insurance Scheme known as *mutuelles de santé* in 1999. Based on a yearly premium of approximately 2 dollars per family member, the scheme was introduced at a time when access to health services was challenging for the greater number of Rwandans. Backed by a national policy that made it mandatory for every Rwandan to maintain some form of health insurance, the Mutuelles has ensured that majority of Rwandans adequate access to health services. External backing from such organisations as the Global Fund to fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria, ensured that premiums for about 1.5 million vulnerable Rwandans were settled. Consequently, it has been noted that Rwanda is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa in which 85% of the population participates in mutual insurance programmes for their health coverage (Twahirwa 2008). The end result has been the increase in accessibility to health care and by implications, an improvement in health security. Indeed data from the WHO suggest that Rwanda is one of the few countries in sub-Saharan Africa with 85 percent of population enrolled in insurance programmes for health coverage.

A World Bank report of 2009 for instance documented an increase in primary school enrollment from 67 percent in 1990 (just about the time the war started) to 95 percent in 2008. This improvement in education, arising out of a conscious governmental policy of free basic education, was itself used as a conduit to addressing other human security components such as personal and community security. Following the post-conflict analysis of the causes of the genocide, it was concluded that education, particularly at the primary level, played a key role in politicizing Rwanda’s ethnic divisions. King (2005) for instance notes that interviews with Rwandans who schooled during different periods prior to the war revealed a number of trends that suggested a perversion of ethnic relations in a way that fractured social relations between the Tutsis and the Hutus. Such trends included “a classroom structure that often ensured that all students knew each other’s ethnic background; the teaching of history and civics curriculum that focused on divisions and historical enmity between Hutu and Tutsi and - discriminatory access to higher levels of schooling based on ethnicity” (King 2005:3).

Thus is engendering education, the post-conflict government of Rwanda sought to improve social relations and by implications improve personal and community security. This has been
approached through a curriculum that emphasizes past co-operation in Rwanda— one that strongly advocates a “we are all Rwandan” mantra. This has been useful to the sustainability of Rwanda’s post-conflict development.

Unlike Sierra Leone, the Rwandan post-genocide government has practically sought to implement a well-designed plan to steer the country away from the fundamental causes of the conflict - ethnicity. It was therefore not surprising that in a very autocratic manner, the government of Rwanda in the immediate post-genocide period issued a ban on ethnic identity. (Straus and Waldorf, 2011:4). Other measures such as reeducation of the population and the redrawing and renaming of the territory all form part of what has been described as a reengineering of the socio, economic and political spheres of Rwanda life. According to Straus and Waldorf (2011:5), these political changes were advanced within the political context of “transformative authoritarianism” which though conflicted with some of the principles of liberal democracy, were framed in politically correct language of donors such as “good governance, decentralization, gender mainstreaming, poverty reduction, rule of law and transparency”.

While recognising that liberal democracy necessary demands freedom of association and free societies, it was certainly controversial for a country so violently destroyed by ethnic differences and elements of democracy such as free press to grants an absolute concession to such freedom. Thus, at the early stages of the post-conflict efforts, when the question of what takes priority for a post genocide state came to the fore (that is between a stable developing polity with some developments in governance, or a western kind of democracy with it free speech and all) the Rwandan government appeared to have used conventional wisdom by standing on the side of a stable polity at least within the first few years.
The gains from post-conflict development (manifested in key human security components in the economic sector for instance, was initially tagged by some observers as a media blitz (Pottier 2002). Yet a decade onwards and it’s still more than apparent that Rwanda is still advancing its post-genocide development.

One lingering challenge, however, is with political security and the extent of political freedoms within Rwandan society. Although it is generally accepted that the key to ensuring “integrity of political competition and participation” lies in freedom of expression, the press and association (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1990). Longman (2011) asserts that the Government of Rwanda has through coercion cowed all avenues of free expression into submission. Longman (2011:27) thus opines that Rwanda’s persistent authoritarian rule may ultimately prove disastrous for the country’s long term stability, as it prevents the public, from expressing its interests through productive, peaceful political means.

3.6.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Another case that provides useful lessons for human security within the context of post-conflict development is Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). After a protracted ethnic-based civil war, BiH went into a post-conflict development phase with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995. Acknowledging the necessity of assuring some level of stability and security, the aim of the international community in the immediate post-Dayton period, according to Cox (2001), was to contain the threat of renewed violence as a result of military hostilities and to reconstruct key infrastructure to facilitate movement. This was achieved with the deployment of the 60000 NATO implementation force (IFOR) as well as the “train and equip” programme
carried out by US contractors (outside NATO) which elevated Bosniak and Croat armies to the
level of the Serb forces. This created some balance in the military power of the feuding parties.

With the attainment of stability, at least militarily, international partners led by the World Bank
were confronted with the challenge of implementing other components of the post-conflict
development strategy. In the absence of functional institutions (owing to their destruction
throughout the duration of the war), the international peace mission was confronted with the
challenges of evolving new institutions to advance the development efforts. According to Cox
(2001:10), this (together with the fact that the various conflicting parties could not agree on
issues relating to state reconstruction), resulted in the external actors having to determine the
priorities for the post-conflict efforts.

With personal security relatively improved through the stabilization efforts described above, the
World Bank prioritised housing, health, education and other components of human security
among others. Consequently, the bank sponsored the repair of a third of housing, substantial
urban infrastructure, electric power generation, supply of water and basic education (World Bank
1999)

The human security priorities of the World Bank were further reflected on the portfolio of
emergency projects launched by the World Bank during the initial stages of the reconstruction
efforts. With regard to food security, there was an emergency farm reconstruction programme
designed to jumpstart agricultural production, improve food security, and create employment and
income through agricultural imports for war damaged farms. Within the context of human
security, the farm reconstruction/restocking programme was particularly critical to food and
economic security in the post-conflict development of BiH. Under the programme, the Government and its affiliates set up a USD 330 Million programme for agriculture and rural development. The programme sought to restore and improve food security among beneficiaries. It further sought to enhance economic security by helping beneficiaries generate additional income and employment. To avoid wastage and improve efficiency in the utilization of investment, the programme targeted households with prior experience in farming as well as access to land areas ranging from 1 hectare to 5 hectares. Priority was given to refugees, returnees and farm families who suffered substantial damage during the war, including the loss of all or the greater part of their livestock. At the end of the implementation period, the programme had among other things, expanded farm production, engendered on-farm employment and incomes; created several avenues for off-farm rural employment opportunities and increased food security among others.

Having exerted some presence with regard to addressing some critical human security variable, the international community undoubtedly attained some legitimacy in the post-conflict environment. It was therefore not surprising that reconstruction appeared to have entered another phase with the exertion of some political power by the United Nations High Representative. Cox (2001) suggests that the UN High Representative acquired power to impose laws and dismiss public officials. In a particular case of public broadcasting networks used by the nationalist parties to advance ethnically-parochial interest, it’s been noted that in May 1997, with the authorization of the Peace Implementation Council, the UN High representation took action curtailing or suspending “any media network or programme whose output is in persistent and blatant contravention of either the spirit or letter of the Peace Agreement.”
It has been noted that with the initial success of the UN high Representative, pressure was mounted from both external and internal sources for an expansion of the oversight role. The pressure from the internal sources was inarguably informed by the record of the external forces in addressing human security issues critical to the existence of the post conflict population. Thus beginning from 2000, the peace implementation committee, it has been noted, advanced a post-conflict state building strategy giving priority to rebuilding state institutions, mobilising public finances (which until then had been dominated by the three ethnic groups) and breaking down ethnic monopolies in other areas of national life. The strategy further promoted the establishment of professional state bureaucracy and a state treasury. In general terms, the strategy no doubt advanced the move towards restoring BiH to a functional state.

The chronology of the post conflict development efforts in Bosnia confirm some facts relating to the relevance of human security in sustainable post conflict developments. It has been suggested that in the specific case of BiH, considering the fragmentation of political power owing partly to the provisions of the Dayton Accord, and the “ethno-competitive destabilization especially at a time when the various ethnic groups were benefiting from the breakdown of national institutions any attempt to follow the stabilization efforts with the rebuilding of national institutions could have backfired. Proceeding with critical human security concerns was therefore notable.

3.7 Human security in Post-Conflict Development

From the above, there is no gainsaying that the complexities inherent in the post-conflict context makes development challenging. Inspite of this, at the core of post–conflict development are human beings. The above case studies reflect some linkages between human security or its absence thereof and the sustainability of post conflict development. Thus, any meaningful
strategy must have at its core, rehabilitating individuals and communities affected adversely by years of violent conflict. The mode for achieving this has been unidimensional. With post-conflict development in the past two decades dominated by the liberal democratic paradigm and traditional notions of security (that stress the security of the state often above the security of the individuals living in the state), the focus has been on improving macro-economic indices, organizing democratic elections and building democratic institutions in a manner that make these institutions look like ends rather than means to an end. Although these ultimately trickle down to individuals and communities in some cases, the reality of human security being the by-product rather than the core is striking. It is therefore not surprising that a number of countries have suffered relapse even after the signing of peace agreements (Date-Bah 2008). Collier, Hoefller and SÖderbom (2008:461) have put the potential for relapse during the ten years following the ending of a conflict at 40 percent. Goovaerts, Gaser and Belman Inbal also point to a 44 percent chance of relapse in the first five years after peace (2006:1). Date-Bah (2008:4) citing Stewart (2006) thus suggests that history of violent conflict is one of the key predictors of future conflict.

This section argues that human security is critical to the sustainability of post-conflict development. The veracity of this fact is not farfetched. For many years, economists focusing on economic aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding that translate into aspects of economic security such as employment, have pointed to a positive relationship between economic policies relating to aid and employment creation to a reduction of the vulnerability to renewed conflict. Collier, for instance, indicates that such aid have a potential, depending on the quantum infused in the post-conflict country, to reduce the potential for relapse from 40 percent to 31 percent (2008:461).
As has been suggested in the preceding sections, state-building is central to the objectives of post-conflict development. In its basic form, state-building refers to the processes of enabling post-conflict states to function like stable societies. The objectives of state-building (as deducible from some features of stable societies), therefore, include attempts to get post-conflict states to provide to the people living within that territory, security, justice and rule of law. It also includes the creation of adequate platforms for meeting the health and education needs of the population, as well as an enabling environment for the pursuance of economic, political and cultural aspirations. The corollary for these responsibilities is for citizens to accept the legitimacy of the state by meeting obligations such as taxes as well as accepting the States monopoly over coercive force.

While the reciprocity involved in state-building, it has been suggested, necessarily requires “the existence of inclusive political processes to negotiate state-society relations” (OECD 2008:2), the absence of human security as a core objective of post-conflict development can reinforce the creation of sub-state boundaries that inhibit such inclusiveness. Theije & Bal (2010) writing on state formation and silent resistance among the Berbers of the Middle Atlas, for instance, note that in the absence of the state’s provision, individuals get used to advancing their own human security. Venema and Mguild (2010:45) similarly point out that any feeling of economic and political insecurity by cohesive groups can lead to “the affirmation of autochthony resulting in boundary-making and a sense of belonging and exclusion.” The implication of these perspectives on the sustainability of post-conflict development is that in the absence of the national authorities advancing human security, sub-state actors or platforms fill the gaps in a way that inhibit state-building at the national level. In a number of the contemporary intra-state wars for instance, ethnicity (as a sub-state platform) has played critical roles in offering the platform
for collective grouping, not just for repelling threats to the security of members of that grouping, but in some instances, launching attacks of their own (Appadurai 1996). While some observers have suggested that such sub-state collectives provide security to all (Salemink 2003 and Scott 1976), it is posited that this can be counterproductive to post-conflict development as some of these practices, (while appreciative within an indigenous context) may be detrimental to the vicissitudes of the modern state.

Additional to the above, the relevance of human security to the sustainability of post-conflict development can also be traced to the trajectory of institutions before and during civil wars. The fact that civil wars contribute to institutional collapse has been established (Murshed & Tadjoeddin 2009). Yet even more important to post-conflict development of institutions is the reality that, in some cases, the destruction of institutions is preceded by the undermining of these institutions (particularly those that directly represent the legitimacy of the state such as the law enforcement agencies) prior to the war. Thus, basically, corruption, unaccountability and poor civil-military relations mean that individuals and groups overtime build perceptions of these institutions which are carried forward to the post-conflict period (Yılmaz 2009:239). The resulting lack of faith in state institutions can be remedied by putting human security at the center of these institutions, and by such institutions engaging in activities that are directly related to the human security needs of the people. This can engender favourable public perception which is critical to the success of post-conflict development. In Kosovo for instance, results of an opinion poll about public perception of the police led to strategies to expand public trust and engage communities through consistent conversation about ways to improve levels of safety and security (UNDP 2004:13).
Additionally, the pre-conflict environment for most countries engaged in civil wars has been described as unstable with poor social-economic and political indicators (Yilmaz 2009:239). In the case of Liberia for instance, corruption, mal-governance and ethno-racial discrimination prior to the war ensured that significant parts of the country were deprived. Since some of these challenges contributed to the conflict, it has been suggested in that regard that conventional wisdom demands the need to address the supposed contributors to the causes of the conflict (Collier 2008:464). In terms of sustainable post-conflict development, however, Walter (1999) and Hartzell and Hoddie (2003), examining a subset of post conflict situations namely those that ended with a negotiated settlement argue that credible guarantees on the terms of the agreement make it more likely for peace to last.

A linkage between human security and improvement in the perception of government accountability in post-conflict development is also worth noting. Lessons have been drawn from the health sector in post-conflict settings like Cote D’Ivoire, Iraq and Mozambique and Sierra Leone (Betsi et al 2006, and Dyer 2003). Kruk et al (2010) and Rushton (2005) have also reinforced the view of health as a superordinate value ascribed by all, to advance the view that the design of the health system by national governments and their collaborators within the external community can facilitate some reliability in the delivery of vital health services, while demonstrating a assurance to fairness and political accountability to citizens. Brinkerhoff (2005:5) similarly observes that delivering human centered services (in addition to reducing inequities combating corruption and introducing contestability) is critical to reconstituting legitimacy, the absence of which is a recipe for state failure.
Citing Weber’s characterisation of the state (as having monopoly on the legitimate use of violence obtained by offering security to it citizens) Krause and Jutersonke (2005:450) also highlight the provision of personal security as one of the preeminent responsibilities of the state. Antecedents of this responsibility was famously elaborated in Thomas Hobbes suggestion of a movement from the state of nature where the life of man was nasty, poor, brutish and short, to a civil state that insulates the citizens from the war of all against all.

If the definition of security as reprioritised in human security is conceded to, then the state’s cumulative performance in the various components of human security (including health) will influence the assessment with regard to the extent to which it (the state) is fulfilling its side of the social contract. Such assessment can affect the claim to monopoly of violence which is one of the critical benchmarks for assessing the sustainability of post-conflict development.

The nature of contemporary civil wars also point to the relevance of human security in post-conflict development. The context of post-conflict development, as elaborated above, depicts among others, the decimation of social and political institutions most of which are responsible for advancing the human security needs of the people. The void created by the decimation arguably explains the appalling conditions of illiteracy, malnutrition, and high mortality rates registered by post-conflict countries. This, coupled with the reality that civil wars create newly vulnerable groups (such as orphans and victims of abuse and the unemployed) makes a good case for mainstreaming human security in Post-Conflict Development.

Central to conflict theories such as Grievance (Gurr 1970) and Frustration/Aggression (Dollard, Miller et al 1939) is the view that individuals, given other prevailing circumstances, will react to threats to existential variables like personal and food security. Thus from the various examples of
liberation wars, throughout history, to political unrest and ethnic based uprising, the reality is that people are willing to react (even to the point of violence) in the face of challenges to human security. In the case of Sierra Leone, for instance, it is widely accepted that the persistent failure of the ruling elite to provide public services as well as opportunities by which the people can meet their economic aspirations, created and sustained the discontent that eventually led to the conflict. The implication of this on post-conflict development is not farfetched. It merely suggests that people are more likely to engage in unrests or to protest against direct threats to their livelihood than the somewhat abstract national security (which is often labeled as the sole concern of governments or regimes). The reverse is true – that people will support their livelihood. In the case of the Marshall Plan as discussed above, for instance, Bossuat (2008) quoting Barry Bingham, head of the European Cooperation in France during the implementation of the Marshall Plan, highlights the belief that the provision of tangible benefits of immediate interest to the average Frenchman has psychological advantages. In the case of Liberia, for instance, it took a human security element such as food (rice) to induce the revolution that effectively abolished the Americo-Liberian oligarchy of over a century. Salman (2010) affirms this view in his study of Bolivians resisting their state and its economic policy. It is therefore posited that in the absence of tangible human security arrangement, threats to human security can cause or at least induce unrests that can derail efforts at PCD.

Related to the above is a fact that even after conflict has officially ended, there are vestiges of the conflict which influence the post-conflict environment. The extent to which these are managed can arguably influence the success or otherwise of post-conflict development. An example is the continued dominance of destabilising figures in certain parts of the post-conflict country. This category may also include warlords and tribal leaders who garnered enough credibility and
respect during the period of the war and whose activities can be detrimental to the post conflict efforts of the country. Cox (2001), writing on post conflict reconstruction in Bosnia observes this phenomenon and notes that at the time of the Dayton Agreement, five years of war had effectively given rise to ethnic-based power structures with strong vested interests opposed to the normalisation of the political life of the state. While such figures may have run aground as a result of victor’s justice or the conclusion of democratic elections following the terms of a peace agreement, their continued relevance can be influenced by their interventions in areas, such as community security, the national government is perceived as failing. Collier et al 2008:463 aptly describes this system as typifying power struggles in the post conflict environment which must be managed. Yilmaz (2009:240) argues that by focusing on human security, which as indicated is closest to the heart of the population, challenges from such power brokers and their potentially destabilizing efforts are at the least minimized.

The positive links between economic recovery and sustainable post-conflict development is due to the fact that economic recovery addresses a component of human security – economic security- which sometimes dovetails into other components like food and health. However, there is the need to move beyond an expectation of some overlap or coincidence. Putting human security at the core appears the most favourable strategy for the sustainability of post conflict development.

3.8 Institutions and Human security: A Review of Some Linkages

Institutions refer to a set of rules that guide and constrain the behaviour of actors within a particular context. It also reflects the structures that often manage these rules for the purposes of shaping action (Rueschemeyer & Evans (1985), North (1990). Institutions further help create and
shape interests, influence the goals of actors, and constrain the options open to individuals to achieve those goals. Beyond formal organisations such as bureaucracies, institutions also reflect informal rules that govern behaviour (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). From a neo-institutional point of view, actors include individuals and groups of all types whether social or commercial in orientation. The definition further includes States - characterised as a special type of organization invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force (Rueschemeyer & Evans 1985: 46).

In achieving the goals of human security, the Commission for Human security advanced the mutually reinforcing strategies of Protection and Empowerment. The former involves the norms, processes and institutions required to insulate people from the critical and pervasive threats to human security. According to Ogata (2003), this calls for a top-down approach involving elements like the establishment of institutions for rule of law, public accountability and democratic governance structures, among others. Empowerment on the other hand suggests the creation of platforms to enable people self-implement strategies to insulate themselves against critical and pervasive threats to their security. Key in this regard is education and other opportunity-equalising measures. This brings institutions into the mainstream of the discussion on human security and post-conflict development. Touching on the state of human security in Eastern Europe, for instance, a research report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) cited low institutional capacity of states in the region as the underlying cause of a “widespread lack of human security”. The obvious corollary is that human enhancement of institutional capacity can ameliorate human insecurity. Operating within this context, a number of authors have established specific linkages between institutions and various components of
human security such as economic security (Williamson, 1985), education (Bardhan 2005) and the development of social capital (Kornai et. al. 2004).

One of the components of human security, where the relevance of institutions is deeply felt is the environment. Although the nexus between the environment and security may have been recognized over two decades ago, the concept of Environmental Security seems to have originated with the early work of Norman Myers (1986, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1996, and 2001). Following a report submitted to the Organisation of African Unity on the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Mid 1970s. Myers wrote in an article published in 1986 as follows:

...national security is not just about fighting forces and weaponry. It relates to watersheds, croplands, forests, genetic resources, climate and other factors that rarely figure in the minds of military experts and political leaders, but increasingly deserve, in their collectivity, to rank alongside military approaches as crucial in a nation’s security (1986:251)

The concept of environmental security may also be traced to Thomas Malthus’ (1992) suggestion that hunger was inevitable because human population grows exponentially while food production could only be made to grow in a linear fashion. Similarly, a number of authors have suggested, and indeed, anticipated water stress due to the reality that finite amount of freshwater will have to be shared by an ever increasing population (Falkenmark, 1990).

Following the general concession to the security dimension of the environment, a number of definitions have been offered. Pachauri (2000:1), for instance defines environmental security as the “minimization of environmental damage and the promotion of sustainable development, with a focus on transboundary dimensions”. Gleditsch (2007:178) defines Environmental security as the freedom from environmental destruction and resource scarcity. He further sees the concept as the relationship between security and environmental factors such as water, soil, vegetation, climate, and others that influence socio economic and political activities and are thus considered
to be parts of the environmental foundations of states. The degradation of such environmental resources results in a decline of security. What is noteworthy about Gleditsch’ definition is his emphasis on direct relationship between security and environmental resources.

The elementary definition of the environment as “the totality of surrounding conditions” points to waste management, land use, afforestation and deforestation as well as sustainable management of water bodies, as elements of environmental security. With regard to waste disposal, for instance, in many parts of the world particularly Africa, it has been often highlighted that the inadequate disposal of solid and liquid waste constitutes an environmental security issue. A typical example found in parts of Ghana and which appears to have the tacit permission of the city administrators is the disposal of fecal matter in the sea. With regard to fresh water supplies, it has been suggested that globally, supply per person has fallen by 60 percent. While ordinarily this may not strike a security chord, the fact that the global demand for such water has increased by 180 percent obviously suggest the possibility of shortage sooner than later especially as consumption is expected to increase by 40 percent within the next two decades (Myers, 1995).

Environmental security also concerns managing the challenges to land use for both agricultural and other purposes, from factors such as deforestation, desertification and soil erosion. The security implications of such challenges to land have to do with its ability to cause famine and mass population displacements leading to internal and international migration.

Apart from the above, climate change is another element of environmental security. Sometimes expressed as global warming, climate change is often considered as one of the key aspects of

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2 One particular area where this practice is rife is Korle Gonno, in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana. The place is nicknamed “lavender hill”, a cynical reference to the stench that emanates from that part of the coastline.
environmental security. Climate change is said to be as a result of high concentration of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide (CO$_2$), in the Earth’s atmosphere (Starke & Bright 2003). Elements of climate include; temperature, humidity, air pressure, winds, and rainfall or water cycles. Global climate change, therefore, refers to how these elements change, throughout the world, as a result of natural and man-made causes. Human activities such as urban expansion, forest clearing, road building and forest fires account for the release of the greenhouse gases in to the atmosphere. Other factors are the burning of fossil fuels and the rearing of farm animals; whose digestive processes produce greenhouse gases like methane and nitrous oxide. If global warming continues, the problem of desertification is likely to worsen, particularly across West Africa, and sea levels may rise causing floods generally and particularly in coastal and lowland areas.

A casual reading of the above elements of environmental security, undoubtedly point to the relevance of institutions in addressing the challenges of environmental security. With regard to global warming, for instance, a typical example of the facilitating role played by institutions can be seen in the global agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to cut global emissions of greenhouse gases so as to stabilize or regulate their concentration in the atmosphere in order to reduce the incidence of anthropogenic interference with the climate system. It seeks to establish a legally binding international agreement, whereby, all the participating countries commit themselves to tackling the issue of global warming and reduce the emission of six greenhouse gases - carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, hydro fluorocarbons, per fluorocarbons, and sulphur hexafluoride – due to human activities. Under the Protocol, parties committed to it are expected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the energy and agriculture sectors. They are also expected to reduce emissions through industrial processes,
solvent and other product use, waste, and emissions from fuels. The relevance of the Kyoto Protocol as an institution is further enforced by the fact that, national parties also create domestic institutions to facilitate actions against climate change. In Ghana, for instance, Parliament on the 26th November, 2002, passed a resolution to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and actually deposited its final document of ratification at the United Nations Headquarters in New York in March 2003. By that act, Ghana, acceded to the Kyoto Protocol and became a party to it.

Beyond the international and national institutions adopted to address climate change, other challenges to environmental security also appear to have their solution, or at least, attempt at minimizing their effects, in institutions as defined in the introduction of this chapter. For instance, with regard to the use of chemicals for fishing and its potential to contaminate and destroy the water bodies as well as kill all inhabitants of the affected water bodies including fingerlings, Bates indicates that the only way this can be addressed is through the elaboration of rules and regulations as well as the creation of bodies to ensure that the rules are enforced. Other challenges to environmental security such as sand winning, illegal quarrying and indiscriminate disposal of waste all appear to have their solution in the elaboration of rules and the creation of bodies – invariably institutions, to ensure the effective implementation of the rules and regulations.

The relevance of institutions to human security is also seen in efforts at ensuring food security. Food security generally relates to the quantity and quality of food as well as the access to this food by the people who need it. According to the World Bank (1986), food security is the "access by all people at all times to enough food for an active and healthy life." (World Bank 1986). This definition encompasses many issues. It deals with production in relation to food
availability; it addresses distribution in that the produce should be accessed by all; it covers consumption in the sense that individual food needs are met in order for that individual to be active and healthy. In addition, the availability and accessibility of food to meet individual food needs should be sustainable.

The lynchpin for addressing the challenges of food security lies in institutions. Whether it is about the quality or quantity of food, it indeed rests on the elaboration of formal or informal yet clear rules and procedure for addressing these issues. Offering an insightful perspective to this issue, Sen (1981), opines that famines are rarely caused by a lack of food, but are more likely to be a consequence of the sudden collapse of purchasing power and other unpredictable ‘exchange and entitlement’ failures. Sen (1981) argues that some institutions such as food markets function normally, but populations unable to afford food starve while their regions are exporting food staples elsewhere. Given the actual per capita availability of grain in most countries experiencing famines, these problems can be averted through timely interventions by governments and other organizations. A mechanism of accountability to vulnerable populations is essential for this process to take place. Sen (1981) showed that famines have never occurred where democratic governments exist, in the presence of such institutions as opposition parties, a strong civil society, and a free press.

Institutions are also relevant with regard to economic security. According to the UNDP (1994) economic security “requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from productive and remunerative work or, as a last resort, from a publicly financed safety net.” The absence of this is tantamount to economic insecurity.
Within the discipline of economics, the relevance of institutions in creating the platform for the assurance of the economic aspirations or a guarantee of economic security is recognised through that branch of the discipline known as institutional economics. This basically focuses on the role of institutions in shaping economic behaviour. Such institutions include states, markets, and international regimes such as the World Trade Organisation. It also includes manufacturing and marketing entities, financial markets and the regulations that enable the operation of markets. While the list is not exhaustive, it is the case that the interaction of these institutions is the very essence of economics. Within the context of economic security, the relevance of institutions therefore derives from the overwhelming state of unpredictability that will jeopardise economic security, in the absence of the relative certainty engendered by the presence of institutions and the rules and regulations that shape their action.

Apart from the destruction of physical infrastructure, civil wars are also associated with the destruction of economic institutions. The causes of such destruction vary. This may include the inability of people to engage in productive and remunerative work due to threats to personal security and the superimposition of war economies on formal economies by warmongers. In the case of the latter, through the exertion of fear, warmongers invariably lay claim, albeit illegitimate, to resources that would have accrued to the benefit of the country as a whole. It is therefore not surprising that countries involved in civil wars have been associated with poor economic growth rates including low per capita incomes. In addressing this aspect of post-conflict development therefore, the target has often been the rehabilitation of economic and financial institutions and the empowerment of markets, among other things, to restore the normal functioning of these institutions.
The relevance of institutions can also be seen within the context of political security. This component of human security refers to the extent to which the human rights of people are honoured (UNDP, 1994). Apart from the various components of human rights, political security also relates to the relative freedom by which people determine issues relating to how resources are allocated and controlled within a state. In terms of institutions, there is no gainsaying that the post-Cold War triumph of the West has enhanced the acceptance of liberal democracy, as holding the key to the development of institutions crucial for advancing political security. One of the critical institutions in this regard are democratic free and fair elections, rule of law characterised by constitutionalism, independent judiciary and a free legislature as well as state agencies relating to law enforcement.

As a result of the increased interaction occasioned by globalisation, systems of state governance, for instance, are being exported directly or indirectly to countries in the world. Even at the international level, through the activities of international regimes and organisations, state interests’ in governance appear to be converging towards what appears to be a consensus of a global standard of governance. At the backdrop of these governance standards are purposeful or perhaps uncalculated global moves towards an acceptable human rights standard or what has been described by Lynch (2001:91) as ‘intrusive human rights norms’ that seem to guide national leaders on the importance of upholding human rights. Consequently, the orthodoxy of the principle of “territorial integrity”, as situated within the straitjacket of the concept of state sovereignty, behind which state leaders hid to perpetuate human rights abuses against their citizens, is rapidly giving way to an emerging concept of responsible governance (Attuquayefio 2008). Thus, institutions of governance, both internationally and in the domestic sphere, are critical to advancing political security.
3.9 Conclusion

From the above, it has been established that linkages, indeed, exist between institutions and human security. Collier, however, suggests that the extent of influence is dependent upon the strength of the institutions. An additional issue in appreciating the linkage between institutions and human security to post-conflict development resides in the neo-institutionalist school. It also advances the view that “institutions are not merely independent entities, existing out of space and time” (Marsh and Stoker 2002) but are “embedded” in particular context (Granovettor 1985). The implication of this is that institutions may also be dependent variables. Such view is, indeed, critical to this study, considering the argument that institutions developed and operated within post-conflict settings may show signs peculiar to such a context. In essence, the “context” bears the potential to affect the nature of the institutions. In strengthening governmental capacity for addressing human security, institutions have been highlighted as key. It is however important that the development of institutions are geared towards human security and not made to look like ends in themselves.
Chapter Four


4.1 Introduction

The Commission for Human Security (2003) has emphasised that the mutually reinforcing principles of Protection and Empowerment are *sine qua non* to advancing human security. As suggested in the preceding chapter, the functionality of institutions for the twin principles, make an understanding of prevailing institutions in a particular environment, relevant in appreciating the state of human security. It is therefore not surprising that a number of studies have attributed the quality of human security prevailing in a particular environment, to the availability or lack of institutions (Williamson 1985, Bardharn 2005). Notwithstanding their relevance, institutions and the processes by which they are sustained are often confronted by a variety of factors. In some parts of Africa, the process has been historically challenged by the ‘strong man syndrome” – a loose characterisation of the desire and actions by political leadership to maintain dominance of state power in their persons rather than institutions. According to Musah (2002), by yielding to their instincts of self-preservation, such leaders block any moves towards democratic institution building.

Liberia has had a long history of such personalised power politics. From the century-plus oligarchy of the True Whig Party, through Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor, successive leaders of Liberia have blatantly perpetrated strategies to personalise state power. With the formal end of the 14-year war in August 2003, Liberia, in collaboration with UNMIL, UNDP and other actors, has been investing in the development of institutions. As a prelude to examining the state of human security in some of Liberia’s counties, this chapter reviews the record of institution building.
building in segments of Liberia’s national life, from 2003 to 2011. These segments include security, justice and rule of law, basic services and others identified in the TRC report (GoL 2009) as having caused or, at the least, stimulated some of the causes of the civil war. However, as institution-building is not conducted in a vacuum, this chapter commences with a review of Liberia’s post-conflict context.

4.2 Liberia’s Post-Conflict Context

The socio-economic and political conditions prevailing in a country before the outbreak of a conflict, coalesces with the consequences of the conflict as well as other external variables to define the post-conflict context. This was intimated in the preceding chapter. In the case of Liberia, prior to the outbreak of the war in 1989, the country had seen over a century of mal-governance characterised, for the better part, by successive racially-insensitive Americo-Liberian governments (Huband 1998). Operating through the True Whig Party, the governments effectively cracked down on dissent from indigenous Liberians (Wreh 1976). Therefore, notwithstanding the 16th July 1847 declaration of independence, the majority of Liberians continued to live under a system of repression, socio-economic deprivation and systematic exclusion from the formal institutions of governance, whether as passive or active participants. Such was the case that until 1963, over 90 percent of Liberians were not permitted to vote or contest for any position. The continuous domination of 95 percent majority by a 5 percent minority earned the country the infamous tag of ‘Black Colonialism’ (Gershoni 1985).

Apart from the political and economic insecurity created by the elitist governance style of the True Whig Party, the settling Americo-Liberians also engendered variable degrees of tension with the indigenous population, by confronting indigenous norms and introducing Christianity
with the aim to civilize the indigenes. Consequently, communities that held on to perceived uncivilised practices had to amend those practices to obtain any recognition from the Americo-Liberians and the True Whig Party. Over time, this created a tension between descendants of the Americo-Liberians steeped in the American legacy and indigenes bent on advancing or, at the least, maintaining what was left of the status quo. Additional to this, the urban-biased policies of the True Whig Party further resulted in the marginalization of large parts of the population and the country (RoL 2008:14). These tensions arguably sustained threats to community security as defined by the UNDP (1994).

Within Liberia’s prewar context, the structure of the economy also led to massive dependence on foreign revenue. To meet these targets, vast concessions of territory were handed over to foreign industrial and manufacturing concerns. According to Ebo (2005:4), the ease with which the True Whig Party ceded the concessions earned Liberian the nickname “Firestone Republic” – a moniker ostensibly derived from Firestone Industries, one of the vast rubber plantations in Liberia. Typical of colonial exploitation, the managers of such concessioners implemented minimal environmentally regenerative policies beyond what was directly linked to the objects of extraction. Some operations in the mining sector, for instance, resulted in the contamination of the fresh water supply of entire villages. This threatened environmental security.

Another consequence of the absolute power wielded by the True Whig Party was the personalization of the security institutions. As a result, the security services, used as tools to suppress dissent, slid into decay amidst mistrust from the majority of Liberians. Against this background, the coup de tat of April 12, 1980, that toppled the Amerigo-Liberian oligarchy and ushered in the Doe-led regime, can been described as a logical fallout from the lack of
democratic space for changing or, at the least, alternating the political leadership of the country. The coup was therefore perceived by indigenous Liberians, as an opportunity to finally ascribe to the full rights of free citizens (Gershoni 1985, Dixon 1992, Guannu 2009).

Inspite of its initial appeal, the post-True Whig regime brought minimal, if any, positive changes in terms of creating the conditions for the development of all Liberians. Taking advantage of the popular support, Doe soon unleashed his own brand of ethnic-based corrupt and repressive governance, coupled with economic mismanagement, that did little to ameliorate over a century of inequality and underdevelopment that Liberians had experienced under the True Whig Party. This deepened the long-standing feeling of marginalization and repression among large sections of the population. To the ordinary Liberian, the imaginary social contract they had entered into with their respective governments had been breached once again and as Jaye (2003:2) notes, the Liberian state had not been a “watch-keeper” over the security of its people. The consequence of this was a further lack of trust in the institutions of state and the governance processes. Therefore, by the time the civil war broke out in 1989, Liberia was a nation heavily deficient politically and economically with little to show for infrastructure and the provision of basic services. It is therefore not surprising that deprivation and inequality have been cited as one of the reasons for the outbreak of the civil war (Hegre, Østby & Raleigh 2009). It is, however, noteworthy that once the war got into full swing, economic motivations for the combatants faded relative to security concerns such as self-preservation and family protection.

In addition to the pre-war environment of deprivation, inequality and underdevelopment, the 14-year civil war significantly destroyed every aspect of Liberia’s social, economic and political life. As Jaye (2003:3) notes, the first casualty as in most civil wars, was the Liberian state,
“which collapsed as the country was carved between rival armed factions”. Governance systems across the board including traditional institutions were completely destroyed as families and community leaders all fled the war. The economic consequences of the war included a cessation in productive sectors of the economy such as agriculture, mining and manufacturing. The effect of this was a decline in Real GDP by 65.6 percent between 1987 and 2005 (See Table 1). In terms of human resources, apart from the loss of an estimated 250,000 people, over two million people were reportedly displaced internally (Omeje 2009). For these internally displaced people, the total collapse of infrastructure and provision of basic services such as electricity, pipe borne water, education and health as well as social costs such as prostitution, armed robbery and general societal indiscipline, defined a life of insecurity in all aspects of human endeavour.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Decline in Key Sectors of Liberia’s Economy</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
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<tr>
<td>REAL GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
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<td>Cocoa</td>
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<td>Rice</td>
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<td>Cassava</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Logs &amp; Timber</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charcoal &amp; Wood</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINING AND PANNING</td>
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<td>Iron Ore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Thus, by the time the war officially came to an end through the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 18th August 2003\textsuperscript{3}, the state of human security in Liberia, viewed either from the perspective of Freedom from Want and Fear, or the seven interdependent categories of Economic, Food, Health, Environment, Personal, Community and Political security (UNDP 1994:24) had been gravely undermined.

### 4.3 Liberia’s Post-Conflict Institution-Building

In terms of institutional building, the CPA provided the first blueprint of what had to be done to arrest the deteriorating security situation in Liberia and to put the country back on the path for sustainable development. Within the context of human security, top on the list of institutions needing restructuring were the security services including the Armed forces of Liberia, the

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{MANUFACTURING} & 86.9 & 51.7 & 40.5 \\
\hline
Cement & 23.0 & 14.9 & 35.5 \\
Beverages & Beer & 52.5 & 33.7 & 35.9 \\
Other & 11.4 & 3.2 & 71.8 \\
\hline
\textbf{SERVICES} & 529.9 & 112.3 & 78.8 \\
\hline
Electricity & Water & 18.2 & 2.7 & 85.3 \\
Construction & 39.0 & 8.0 & 79.4 \\
Trade, Hotels, etc. & 71.5 & 19.2 & 73.1 \\
Transportation & Communication & 89.5 & 27.6 & 69.2 \\
Financial & Institutions & 141.8 & 10.0 & 93.0 \\
Government & services & 129.0 & 31.5 & 75.6 \\
Other & services & 40.9 & 13.3 & 67.4 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Source: Republic of Liberia PRS Statement (2008)}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{3} The CPA was signed on August 18, 2003 in Accra, between the Government of Liberia and the Liberians United for Reconstruction and Development (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and eighteen political parties
Liberian National Police, Justice and Rule of Law and institutions relating to the economic aspirations and the provision of basic services such as health and education to the people of Liberia. On the governance front, the CPA also provided for the establishment of a Governance Reform Commission to “promote good governance in Liberia, to develop and monitor public sector reforms as well as ensure transparency and accountability in governance in all government institutions and activities, among others” (CPA 2003:12). Most significantly, the CPA laid out a roadmap for returning Liberia to a democratic state. This included the conduct of democratic elections to elect a government. This was to have been preceded by electoral reforms particularly as regards the restructuring of the National Electoral Commission and the re-demarcation of constituencies.

To supervise the implementation of the CPA and to coordinate initial internal efforts at stabilization and post-conflict development, the CPA created a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL). Thus, after a brief transitional arrangement during which the vice-president of Charles Taylor, Moses Blah, acted as president of Liberia, a National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was inaugurated on 14th October, 2003, to oversee the transition from conflict to a democratic state. Drawing its mandate from Article XXII of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the NTGL coordinated the implementation of the provisions of the CPA and contributed to the preparation and conduct of Liberia’s democratic elections in October 2005.

To give political power to the NTGL the CPA, under Article XXXV suspended provisions of the 1986 Constitution of the Republic of Liberia that did not conform to the institutions and the provisions of the CPA. This included the statutes relating to the establishment of the executive,
legislature and judicial branches of governance. The suspension was to end with the inauguration of the elected government on January 2006.

In lieu of the state institutions under the 1986 constitution, a Cabinet, a Transitional Legislative Assembly and a Judiciary were formed to operationalise the NTGL. The Cabinet assumed the role of the executive branch of government and thus initiated policies for consideration by the transitional chairman. As a reflection of the compromise by the parties to the CPA, the cabinet positions were filled by representatives of the parties to the agreement. The Transitional Legislative Assembly had a similar composition. Members on the Assembly represented the various parties of to the CPA. Its role from the 14 October 2003 to the swearing in of the new government in January 2005, included granting approval for the policies and programmes of the NTGL and encouraging and facilitating a democratic platform for the deliberation of issues confronting Liberia’s post-conflict development. The third organ under the NTGL was the Judiciary. Considering Liberia’s poor record in terms of rule of law, the inclusion of the judiciary in the NTGL was to ensure that the business of the state runs smoothly, and to demonstrate the future of Liberia as a country hinged on democracy and rule of law.

Although in relative terms its achievement was minimal, obviously due to its short tenure, from a human security perspective, the NTGL commenced some noteworthy post-conflict institutional development. These included reforms in the security sector as well as demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating combatants. Furthermore, as the first reference in terms of post-conflict governance, the NTGL, heavily supported by UNMIL was significant in restoring some level of political security. These efforts were crowned with the successful holding of democratic elections in 2005.
By the time Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was sworn into office on 16 January 2006, she was confronted by significant insecurity in almost all aspects of the life of Liberians. Describing the volatility of the situation, von Kaitenborn-Stachau (2008:73) notes that the complexity of the challenges offered by the post-conflict context, combined with high public expectations for speedy reconstruction to form a “potentially explosive mix”. This could have been exploited to derail the peace process. Johnson-Sirleaf herself later described the expectation of the population as follows: “they figured there would be a quick fix, a magic wand, and everyone will have a job, everyone will be wealthy” (Allen 2011:1).

Appreciating the legacy of institutional decay it had inherited as well as the crucial linkages between institutions and human security, the Government of Liberia (GoL), together with its partners, plunged into serious efforts to develop institutions cutting across the Protection/Empowerment spectrum in order to address the crisis of human insecurity. Prominent among the initiatives were security sector reforms, institutions for governance and rule of law, those geared toward the restoration of the provision of basic services such as health and education and those on restoring the economy. Specific actions and general policy directions adopted for revitalizing the institutions have been discussed below. Furthermore, from a neo-institutional perspective, beyond the institutions developed or reconstructed under the auspices of the legal and policy frameworks of the government, the general direction of reconstruction also created a platform for the restoration of traditional or social arrangements operating outside the formal recognition of the state (such as the Poro and Sande cultic arrangements for adjudicating disputes) that had been severely damaged by the war.
At the vanguard of institution building efforts was the Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee (LRDC) which basically served as the coordinator for the efforts of both internal and external parties in post conflict reconstruction (See Figure 1). According to Radelet (2007) the LRDC was to ensure that the approaches adopted between the government and key donors, were consistent across government agencies.

Figure 1

![Liberia Reconstruction and Development Committee](source)


### 4.3.1 Security Sector Reform

One of the first set of institutions the new government focused on were those within the security sector. The reasons for reforming the security sector as part of post-conflict development is not far-fetched. Indeed, this has been addressed in the preceding chapter. Suffice it to state that, under circumstances where security services actively participate in internal armed conflicts, public trust in these institutions often plummet. It is therefore important to reform security sector institutions to, among other things, regenerate public trust in them as agents for protection rather than abuse of the fundamental rights of citizens. This is a prerequisite for the sustainability of
post-conflict development. Besides the issues of public trust and the safety and security of the civilian population, Aboagye and Rupiya (2005:260) note that the “symbiotic nature” of democracy and civil military relations make the democratic control of security sector institutions through clearly defined civil-military relations critical to democracy.

In the specific case of Liberia, Jaye (2008) notes that the context of security sector reform is rooted in both the civil war (1989-2003) and defective security sector governance and management that plagued Liberia for over a century. Malan (2008:20) also notes that “in view of the role played by ill-governed and predatory security institutions in the Liberian Civil wars (1989-96 and 1999-2003), the success and sustainability of rebuilding Liberia depend, to a large extent, on a security sector that is informed to operate effectively, ideally within the framework of effective democratic control.” Thus, the role of democratic institutions such as the legislature in ensuring accountability of security institutions through parliamentary oversight is crucial not just for the sustenance of peace and stability, but for the consolidation of democratic principles in Liberia (Jaye 2003).

Although institutions that operated in Liberia’s security sector prior to the end of the war included the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), the Special Security Services (SSS) and other organisations some of which had demonstrated amorphous identities over the years, the Armed forces of Liberia and the Liberia National Police dominated rebuilding efforts in the sector. (Gompert, Oliker, Lawson, Crane, Riley 2007:25) suggests that the emphasis on the two was because they constitute the “largest and most crucial” parts of Liberia’s security sector; their roles and missions were therefore perceived to largely influence how the new state provides security.
The relevance of reforming the AFL and the LNP as components of the security sector was affirmed by the fact that the two institutions were headlined in the CPA in Article VII and VIII respectively. Article VII (b) on the AFL, for instance, states that:

The Armed Forces of Liberia shall be restructured and will have a new command structure. The forces may be drawn from the ranks of the present GOL forces, the LURD and the MODEL, as well as from civilians with appropriate background and experience. The Parties request that ECOWAS, the UN, AU, and the ICGL provide advisory staff, equipment, logistics and experienced trainers for the security reform effort. The Parties also request that the United States of America play a lead role in organising this restructuring program.

Article VIII (1) similarly states that

There shall be an immediate restructuring of the National Police Force, the Immigration Force, Special Security Service (SSS), custom security guards and such other statutory security units. These restructured security forces shall adopt a professional orientation that emphasizes democratic values and respect for human rights, a non-partisan approach to duty and the avoidance of corrupt practices.

The importance of the two sectors to security in Liberia was re-affirmed by the fact that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1509 that mandated the UN Mission in Liberia, under the subject of security sector reform highlighted the Liberian National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia. Article 3 (n) and (o) under Security Sector Reform in Liberia stated thus:

(n) to assist the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and interested States;

(o) to assist the transitional government in the formation of a new and restructured Liberian military in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations and interested States.

Thus, within the context of security sector reform, institutional rebuilding mainly sought to restore trust in the AFL and the LNP, through the restricting of their unit as well as the restoration of democratic control.

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL)

The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was created for the primary purpose of protecting the territorial integrity of Liberia. Despite its mandate, the AFL had prior to the outbreak of the 14-
year civil war in 1989, been controversially involved in the domestic activities of Liberia. This history is relevant to the understanding of the character of the AFL and by extension, post-conflict attempts at reforming it.

The AFL is a contemporary manifestation of what set out as a colonial militia in the 19th century in Liberia. According to Sawyer (1992), the militia was formed in response to fears of a possible attack on Cape Mesurado. The militia subsequently transformed into the Liberia Frontier Force (LFF) with the primary objectives of securing the borders of the hinterland against British and French aspirations of territorial expansion for Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast as well as preventing unrests within the hinterlands (Aboagye & Rupiya 2005). The latter objective assigned to the LFF, a police role that together with their mode of operation, earned the LFF, a reputation of brutality and indiscipline over time.

In terms of its mode of operation, it has been noted that beyond the brutality it meted out to perpetrators of unrest, the LFF also looted and pillaged the communities they were dispatched to (Aboagye & Rupiya 2005). The conduct of the LFF has sometimes been attributed to the fact that they were poorly paid and basically had to live on what they find from the hinterland (Sawyer 1992). Considering that their actions were hardly reprimanded, it was considered that they had the tacit support of the governing elite. By their actions, however, the LFF built an enduring legacy, albeit infamous, as an abusive institution, one whose utility was resigned to “a physical instrument for the occupation of indigenous territories, including the imposition and collection of taxes, labour recruitment and, overall, the establishment of political control over the indigenous ethnic group” (Aboagye 1999:11).
The change from the LFF to the AFL in no way blighted the unprofessionalism that had germinated within the ranks of the military. If anything, the unprofessionalism was boosted by the quality of recruits. One authority commenting on the unprofessionalism of the AFL, for instance, suggests that for many years the officer corps was “a dumping ground for the wayward sons of the elite who did not do well in school” (International Crisis Group 2009:2). In the latter part of the 20th Century, the AFL has been credited for violent crackdown on civil dissent such as the 1979 Rice Riots. They were also notable as personalised willful appendages of the Samuel Doe-led government from 1980 to 1996. In so doing, the AFL effectively lost all semblances of neutrality and more importantly, lost the trust of the people. From a human security perspective, the AFL became noted as an institution for repression and abuse – a true agent of insecurity. It is therefore not surprising that some recruits to the reconstituted AFL following the signing of the CPA in 2003, emphasised their affiliation to the “new AFL” and not the AFL (Johnson & Kortu 2008). While this classification may appear trivial, juxtaposed by the reputation of the AFL, it hints at the extent to which ordinary Liberians dissociate from the old AFL.

In accordance with the CPA the United States assumed leadership for the restructuring of the AFL by pledging $210 million dollars and signing an MOU with the National Transitional Government of Liberia to formalise its commitment to the SSR program (Malan 2008:28). The US government contracted two private entities, DynCorp International and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) to develop 2000-man Armed Forces for Liberia. The former was contracted to mainly vet, recruit and provide basic training and equipment for the new AFL. PAE on the other was contracted to provide specialised training, equipment, logistics and the construction of bases. The contractors, in collaboration with the NTGL, then proceeded to demobilise members of the old AFL, who though not in active service, had not been legally demobilised.
On assumption of office, President Johnson Sirleaf sought to keep the momentum of Security Sector Reform by prioritizing it under the *Enhancing Peace and Security Pillar* of the 150-day plan (this detailed action plans in priority areas for the first 150 days after her inauguration). Yet, one of the persisting challenges to the new force had to do with the demobilization of the old order. A Minister of Defense, Brownie J. Samukai, was appointed to provide leadership for the redevelopment of the AFL and facilitate the cleaning of the old system by completing the payment of severances to about one hundred old AFL soldiers with cases still under review. The rationale for prioritising the demobilisation is not far-fetched. Less than a year prior, in June 2005, some members of the Armed Forces had, in protest over salary arrears (for April and May 2005) and severance benefits, looted the Barclay Training Center in downtown Monrovia. If their action was deplorable, the ultimatum issued by the disaffected soldiers following their action was even disconcerting. One Captain War Face reportedly summarised it thus:

> We need our money now or else we will continue to cause disturbance in the city. This government is spending a lot of money on expensive vehicles and leaving out our salary payments and if they do not pay us within five days, we will attack all government vehicles (African Times 2005:1).

On 25th April, 2006, a group of over 400 former AFL soldiers again engaged in a violent protest around the Ministry of Defense over unpaid severance packages. In a report to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General noted that the protesting ex-soldiers “used sticks, stones and petrol bombs to attack UNMIL troops, as well as personnel of the Liberian Police Support Unit who were protecting the Ministry” (UNSC 2006:3). The threat posed by the disaffected soldiers is not unique to Liberia. Aboagye and Rupiya (2005:249) have noted that in post-conflict contexts, former rebel groups retaining ‘residual military capacity’ are quick to employ this capacity to back mostly economic demands from generally weak central governments. While the AFL is by law not a rebel group, its history and the role played in the conflict had as a matter of
fact tainted its neutrality. Consequently, the potential for using such residual power to destabilize the post-conflict efforts at development was justifiably handled cautiously. In this regard, much of the year 2006 was used to demobilise the soldiers in the AFL.

On August 21, 2008, the rebuilding of the AFL was further strengthened with the passage of the National Defense Act of 2008. The new Act repealed and consolidated the spirit of three prior acts relating to the AFL namely – the National Defense Act of 1956, the Coast Guard Act of 1959 and the Navy Act of 1986. Under the new legislation, the AFL is primarily mandated to defend the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Liberia including against external aggressions, insurgency, terrorism and encroachment as well as respond to natural disasters and engage in other civic works as may be required or directed.

As far as the new legislation is concerned, other ancillary responsibilities of the AFL include the participation in international peace operations as stated under section 2.3B, provision of command and logistics in times of natural or man-made disasters as stated in section 2.3C and support to national law enforcement agencies following the request of such support and its approval by the president, stated in section 2.3E.

In recognition of the negative history of the AFL, and as a reflection of international trends in the democratic control of armed forces, the new Act also makes it obligatory, under Section 2.5, for members of the AFL to perform their duties at all times in accordance with democratic values and human rights. It further obliges the AFL to obey lawful orders from superior officers in ways that command citizen respect and confidence and promotion the respect for the rule of law (National Defense Act of 2008).
Recruitment into the new AFL started on 18 January 2006. To ensure regional and ethnic balance and to avoid the discriminatory practices, that characterised recruitment into the AFL in the past, the process was open and sought to draw people from every ethnic group in all 15 counties of Liberia. The commitment to ensure this balance was evident from the recruitment missions by DynCorp to each of the fifteen counties. According to Malan (2008), this concerted effort to avoid discriminatory recruitment practices has been critical to enhancing the legitimacy of the AFL. The response to the call for recruits suggested the desire by Liberians to be part of the recreating of what was, in their opinion, a totally new institution. The enthusiasm to join the new army was captured thus:

…queues of hundreds of young men and women began forming from early morning as authorities kicked off a countrywide recruitment drive for the new AFL… An extensive news media campaign drew villagers by foot, car, and bus to take part in the process (Malan 2008:30).

Given the history of the AFL, the recruitment drive for the new AFL placed emphasis on building an AFL that is not just professional but lends itself to civilian control. Consequently, as part of the criteria for enlistment, potential recruits were screened for past human rights abuses. The process of screening administered by DynCorp was quite extensive and involved representatives of UNMIL, the Liberian government, civil society organisations and community leaders. Considering the unavailability of documentary records, the process depended a lot on the publication of the pictures of recruits and the encouragement of people to come out if they felt a particular candidate was unsuitable to join the new AFL (Zaizay 2011).

In line with the post-conflict institution building in the security sector, there have also been attempts by the US to enhance the capacity of staff at the Ministry of Defense. Although the process has not been consistent due to the shortage of funds, it has, at least, ensured the demobilization of some 450 employees and the retraining of over 100 of the staff of the Ministry.
DynCorp and PAE have also restored the Barclay Training Camp in downtown Monrovia, the Sandee S. Ware Military Barracks at Caresburg and the Edward B. Kessely Military Barracks.

Basic training of the first two battalions of the new AFL was concluded in December 2009 after the group underwent the Army Readiness Training Evaluation Program (ARTEP). Subsequently, on 1st January 2010, the Liberia Ministry of Defense, on behalf of the government and people of Liberia, assumed formal control of the new AFL. Experience–transfer programmes, particularly with regard to the specialised units are however ongoing. UNMIL and the US are in the forefront of these efforts. The State Department has, for instance, commenced a Defense Sector Reform (DSR) programme to run for five years, during which military personnel drawn from the US Marine Corps, will progressively mentor personnel of the new AFL. The DSR has been complemented by a US-Sponsored Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) which is being implemented to enhance the capacity of the MOD and help improve Liberia’s defense policy structure (Cook 2010).

At the last count in mid-2011, there were effectively two battalions of the new AFL made up of 2,012 personnel. Experts have however noted that there is still much to be done in terms of specialist training for middle level and command level positions (Owusu-Afrifa 2011). As at the end of 2011, a number of top and mid leadership positions were still filled by personnel from other West African countries. It has been noted that the challenges of getting the officer corps of the new AFL ready and the delays in equipment procurement means that it will not be independently operational before 2014 (UNSC 2011:7). It can be reasonably averred that, although the new AFL still has challenges, considering its historical path, the institution building process has been positive.
The Liberia National Police (LNP)

As noted above, the LNP is the second arm of the two security institutions considered most critical to the security needs of the Liberia. The LNP was established in 1956 by a legislative Act in line with Section 180 (Chapter 13, Sub-Chapter A) of the Executive Law as specified in Volume 2 of Liberia’s Code of Law. It was subsequently revised under Section 22.70 of Executive Law on June 12, 1975. Under the Act, the LNP was mandated to, among other things, preserve the peace of the Liberian State, protect life, limb and property, recover lost and stolen property, prevent crime and enforce laws and ordinances within the state of Liberia (LNP Strategic Plan 2009).

Notwithstanding its preeminent role in the security of the people, public trust of the LNP as an institution has over the years been severely damaged by systematic abuse of the rights of Liberians, corruption and extortion among the ranks of its officers, and the personalization of policing by successive regimes. Under the True Whig Party, for instance, the LNP was noted to have dealt brutally with dissenting voices. One notable instance was during the 1979 Rice riots where many protestors lost their lives through the force adopted by the police. It was therefore not surprising that following the Doe-led coup in 1980, the police appeared challenged in enforcing law and order. The disorder this created basically saw the military taking over the law and order functions of the LNP. The LNP were effectively relegated to the background of law enforcement as Samuel Doe entrusted much of the security of his regime (camouflaged as the security of Liberians and the Liberian state), to his ethnic Krahn-dominated AFL.

Away from the capital Monrovia, riding on their infamous record of abuse and knowledge of local conditions, demoralised personnel of the LNP widely engaged in rent-seeking ventures and
influence peddling to survive economically. Extortion, intimidation and general corruption became the defining character of officers of the LNP (Zaizay 2011). With the outbreak of the war in 1989, LNP fractured and its personnel took sides with respective factions, using their local knowledge to the benefit of their forces (Mensah, 2008). If the LNP under Doe was rendered irrelevant, then under Taylor it was even worse. With the interregnum in the civil war and the assumption of political power following the elections of 1997, President Taylor created a number of institutions parallel to the LNP and charged with various aspects of internal security. This included the notorious Anti-Terrorist Unit. Relatively better equipped and motivated than the LNP, the LNP were effectively consigned, once more, to the abyss of irrelevance insofar as the internal security matters of Liberia were concerned.

Thus, apart from unprofessionalism leading to extortion and abuse, among others, the progressive development of the LNP over the years have been arguably, plagued by the formation and empowerment of parallel institutions by successive political leaders. Thus, by the end of the war in 2003, though the LNP as an institution existed in law, in actual fact, it had self-disbanded. Public Safety and by extension personal security had therefore been jeopardised considerably. Following the deployment of UNMIL in Liberia, the UN Police (UNPOL) took over the domestic policing functions of the LNP to restore some law and order particularly within Monrovia. However, in areas where UNMIL was visibly absent, robbery, rape and mob violence became rampant.

In line with Article 3(n) of UNSC Resolution 1509, and Article VIII (1) of the CPA, the United Nations Police (UNPOL) made up of 1,115 police officers, commenced a process of rebuilding the Liberian National Police in 2004. However, the challenges of internal security in Liberia,
coupled with the lack of the powers of arrest (which was invested in the LNP by law) meant that the sustainability of the activities of UNPOL was inherently linked to the speed with which it can bring the LNP into the mainstream of policing in Liberia. While designing a comprehensive recruitment and training programme, the UN police recruited on short notice, about four hundred former LNP personnel. Wearing “police marked t-shirts”, this initial corps of police commenced joint patrols with the UN police (Malan 2008:49). Although the number was low relative to the population of Liberia and in any case the patrol concentrated in Liberia, it nevertheless marked the first real reintroduction of the LNP unto the policing terrain in Liberia. Considering their history and the loss of public trust, it also commenced the trust-building exercises critical to the rebuilding the LNP. Through such joint patrols, setting up of outlying teams and collocation of UNPOL advisors with LNP personnel, as well as joint crime analysis, UNPOL set an Operations Section to essentially facilitate law enforcement within Liberia.

Following discussion with the National Transitional Government of Liberia, UNMIL, in fulfillment of its mandate to retrain the LNP, pegged the recruitment numbers at 3500 personnel. Considering the absence of a budget line for fulfilling its mandate, this number was thought to be realistic. However, subsequent to the approval of the UNMIL proposal, the United States Government committed an initial amount of half a million dollars towards LNP. Similar bilateral deals with Norway, Netherlands and Belgium saw the renovation of a Police Barracks at Paynesville, and the provision of side arms for some category of LNP officers. In implementing their strategy, UNPOL first registered about 4000 personnel who claimed to have been part of the LNP. To ensure that recruits for the LNP had no criminal records, UNMIL established an “integrity bank”, which compiled related information on candidates that can be used to assist in their screening by the Liberian National Law Enforcement Association (UNSC 2004:10). After
the initial screening, 2700 of the initial number registered failed the selection criteria for admission into the Police Academy and had to be formally asked out of service. According to Baker (2007), the implication of this was that they returned to the street to engage in their corrupt activities until late in 2005, when the UK provided the money for their deactivation. However, for those selected, the training process began in batches. Following the reopening of the National Police Academy on 12 July 2004, training of the first group of 132 cadets commenced.

Inspite of stabilizing the security landscape with the help of the military component of UNMIL, UNPOL was still limited in providing policing services to Liberia. On July 2006, the UNSC by Resolution 1694 increased police component of the mission by 125 to a total of 1240. With the increase in the number of UNPOL personnel, joint patrols and co-location mentoring of the LNP were intensified. On 8th September, 2006, in response to public concerns over the volatile state of insecurity in Monrovia and surrounding areas, a joint team of UNMIL, UNPOL and LNP launched operation “Sweeping Wave” that intensified day and night patrols as well as “cordon-and-search operations” as a way of improving the security situation in Monrovia (UNSC 2003:10). This further contributed to reestablishing the legitimacy of the LNP on an incremental basis, while training continued to enhance the number of LNPs.

By 30th June 2007, 3,500 LNP officers had graduated from the National Police Academy (UNSC 2008). With the numbers of LNPs enhanced, the year 2008 saw the deployment of LNP to 29 Zones and Depots in Monrovia and 32 areas in all 15 Counties across the country (Malan 2008:43). The effect of the deployment on policing across the country has however been generally ineffective due to the lack of basic police equipment and infrastructure. Thus, simultaneously with the deployment of LNPs across the country, a number of police stations
destroyed during the war have been reconstructed. While some of these projects have been accomplished through the UNMIL Quick Impact Project Scheme (QIPS), the rest have been through bilateral assistance from such countries as Norway and the UK. In his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General listed the following counties and towns as having benefited from the construction of police posts include Lofa (Zorzor, Voinjama, Vahun, Foya), Montserrado (Arthington town and Soul Clinic Internally Displaced Persons Camp community), Grand Cape Mount (Robertsport and Sinje), Nimba (Ganta and Tappita), Sinoe (Greenville), Bopolu, Gbarpolu (Bopolu) and Margibi (Unification town).

Currently, the LNP has three special units: the Police Support Unit (PSU); the Emergency Response Unit (ERU); and the Women and Children’s Protection Unit. The ERU was formed in 2008 to combat armed robbery and other forms of crime that may demonstrate some violence. Essentially, they deal with issues of armed violence that the regular LNP or the PSU cannot deal with. Although it initially targeted 500 personnel, as at the middle of 2011, it had about 344 officers (Crisis Group 2011). The PSU on the other hand lie between the regular LNP and the ERU. They are expected to deal with collective action incidents such as mob riots and events that draw large crowds such as sports and political party activities and other interest articulation such as civil protests marches. Beginning from 2009, the LNP has sought to expand the PSU. While the need for more police personnel goes without saying, the effectiveness of the PSU since its formation has informed the quest to enlarge the strength of the unit. The Women and Children Protection Unit was one of the first Units created within the LNP in 2005, to handle the issues of sexual and gender based violence (SGV). Because of widespread incidents of SGV, UNMIL found it strategic to set up this unit to effectively deal with cases of such nature. Together with a specialised court, this unit of the LNP continues to chalk modest successes.
The process of rebuilding the LNP was enhanced in January 2009 with the launch of a Five-year LNP Strategic Plan. Introduction to the plan summarised the challenges of the LNP and the way forward thus:

The LNP remains weak at a time when Liberians need a national police that can deliver; and deliver with equal treatment and access for all citizens. Poverty and insecurity remain considerable challenges to peace and security. Public confidence in the LNP to deliver effective and equitable policing is met with skepticism at best…… crime – particularly robbery, rape, theft and drug abuse; and police misconduct pose significant challenges to consolidating peace and security in Liberia. The LNP must embrace a strategy to rebuild and sustain a national police organization that can meet these challenges. (LNP 2009:6)

With the assistance of UNMIL and other external partners, the LNP is still implementing the strategic plan (UNSC 2009). The plan itself identifies critical issues relating to the level of policing in Liberia in particular, and the challenges of democratic policing in general. As expected, one aspect of institution building that has occupied the focus of the LNP apart from tactical effectiveness is restoring public confidence in the police. In terms of crime prevention for instance, the plan acknowledged feelings of insecurity and mistrust in the police and criminal justice system. It notes that the mistrust induces citizens to take the law into their own hands, and also creates a climate of impunity with respect to police misconduct which is left unreported out of fear of perceived retribution” (LNP 2009:21). To address these issues, for instance, the LNP (since the plan was rolled out in 2009) has intensified training to ensure that police patrols are adept with community networking skills. Additionally, community police forums have been established in all the fifteen counties to enhance interaction and build networks between the LNP and local communities across the country.

The process of rebuilding the LNP has also witnessed developments in other areas. This includes the introduction of a nationwide personnel appraisal system. In April of 2010, the LNP Professional Standards Division Policy and Procedure was signed into law (UNSC 2010:7). This
is also expected to encourage professionalism and sanction all acts of omission and commission that are not in line with democratic policing in the 21st Century.

4.3.2 Justice and Rule of Law

The process of state collapse in Liberia also had significant effects on the state’s capacity to ensure justice and rule of law (Aboagye and Rupiya 2005). Prior to the war, this manifested in the inability of the state to guarantee the rights and liberties of the people of Liberia even from state appendages like the LNP and the AFL. The destruction of infrastructure related to justice and rule of law such as courts and documents on decided cases as well as the forced migration of skilled labour during the war has crystallised into a far worse situation in the aftermath of the conflict. The post-conflict situation has been defined by the lack of qualified legal personnel, shortage of courts and general infrastructural challenges, corruption and inefficiency as well as a palpable disconnect between components of the justice system such as law enforcement agencies, judiciary and correction systems. Persistent political interference particularly from the executive has also affected public perception of the judiciary’s independence (GoL 2011).

Considering that abuse of human rights engendered by the lack of rule of law as well as absence of independent adjudicative institutions significantly influenced the conflict precipitants, the need for justice sector reforms has been justifiably tied to the potential for Liberia to relapse into conflict, and by extension, the long term sustainability of post-conflict development. In an assessment visit to Liberia in July 2005, barely two years after the formal end to the 14-year war, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise Arbour, observed Liberia’s justice system, as “the weakest link” in the country’s transition to stability (UNSC 2005:11). Evidence of threats to lasting peace in the absence of impartial justice sector institutions is seen
in the outbreak of wars in many parts of the world including Sierra Leone and Cote D'Ivoire (Crisis Group 2004). As a result, rebuilding and reforming institutions for justice and rule of law has been one of the priorities of Liberia’s post-conflict development.

**Formal and Customary Justice Systems**

From its foundation, Liberia has operated a dual justice system which represented the specific needs of the settlers and indigenous Liberians particularly those in the hinterlands. A couple of reasons have been suggested as explanation for the existence of the two streams. One line of thought suggests that it was borne out of the resistance of the indigenous Liberians to ‘foreign’ ways of adjudicating disputes (Zaizay 2011). Considering that other systems were also ‘foreign’ yet successfully transferred to the indigenous people, it can be argued that the settlers could have implemented foreign justice systems if it had, indeed, been a prime objective. A more plausible explanation, however, is that during their civilizing drive in Liberia, the settlers, perceiving the indigenes as uncivilised, sought to grant them (indigenes) an opportunity to maintain a system they were familiar with, and which is easily managed by a traditional leader of some sort. The fact of traditional leadership of the customary process was particularly important to the settlers because typical of the strategies of indirect rule that pervaded the colonies in other parts of Africa, traditional leaders served as conduits through which the settlers exerted control over the people in the hinterlands (Crisis Group 2006).

Consequent to the above, on one side of Liberia’s justice system is a statutory arrangement at the apex of which is the Supreme Court of Liberia. Reflective of the American origins of Liberia, the system involves statutory courts descending from the Supreme Court of Liberia to Circuit Courts, Magistrate Courts and Justices of Peace Courts. It also involves legal representations and
other trappings of formal justice systems. At the other side of the continuum is a customary justice system that mimics long-standing cultural adjudicative practices in the hinterlands yet is presented in a form prescribed by the Government of Liberia and recognised as Customary Law under the Rules and Regulations Governing the Hinterland of Liberia (Revised) 2000. Actors within this system include local, clan and paramount chiefs with the latter acting as point of referral for complex cases from the first two. Beyond the various paramount chiefs, the district commissioners, county superintendents and even circuit courts all have some appellate function.

Over the years, the two arrangements existed side by side, manifesting challenges that collectively outlined a justice system that hardly promoted rule of law or guaranteed impartial justice to all. The formal system was, for instance, noted to be expensive relative to the economic power of most Liberians. The fees associated with pursuing justice on that platform has been documented as including “registration fees, gas money for police investigators, requirements that victims pay the cost of food for the detained accused, lawyers’ fees, bribes, transportation and time spent away from livelihoods” (Isser, Lubkemann, N’Tow 2009:3). Apart from the cost element, historically, the formal courts have been noted, to be practically inaccessible to many people in the hinterlands. Circuit and magistrate courts have, for instance, been rare in most parts of the hinterlands, even where they have existed; the manpower needed to operate almost always did not exist.

Although all the levels of the formal justice system attracted reports of corruption and unprofessionalism such as late attendance to court hearings, extortion and interference from Liberia’s social and political elite, none was cited as frequently as the Justices of the Peace Courts headed by the Justices of Peace (JPs). In terms of ranking, they were the least yet in terms
of influence on the populace, the JPs often came across as second to none. This was arguably due to their proximity to the populace. Apart from acting beyond their scope, the JPs are also on record to show such incompetence. The JPs originated from attempts to enhance access to the judiciary in communities that were far from magistrate and circuit courts (Crisis Group 2006). With time, the JPs took advantage of their proximity to the people to act beyond their scope. Apart from this, a good number of the JPs were also notably incompetent.

The Magistrate Courts and Circuit courts have also being associated with lack of infrastructure and inadequate financial investment. This made it difficult for the formal justice system to attract and retain qualified legal professionals. The decay in the criminal justice system at the start of post-conflict development in 2003 was, for instance, described as follows:

The entire prosecution system had only two fully qualified prosecutors available, six of Liberia’s fifteen counties had no prosecutors at all, and several counties did not have any functioning criminal court. There was exactly one juvenile court in Liberia with one trained lawyer who had some experience with juvenile justice cases. Clearly, the greatest obstacle to making the criminal justice system accessible to all Liberian citizens is the lack of qualified legal personnel (Von Gienanth & Jaye 2007:10).

On the basis of the above, the formal justice systems have not been too attractive to an overwhelming number of people. Findings from a comprehensive study on Liberia’s customary justice system notes that Liberians, particularly those at the local levels are overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the formal justice systems. They further conclude that “even if the formal justice system were able to deliver affordable, timely, and impartial results, it would still not be the forum of choice for many rural Liberians” (Isser, Lubkemann, N’Tow 2009:3).

The customary justice system has not been immune from issues that affect the general quality of Liberia’s justice system. A number of these issues emerge out of traditional leaders exceeding their mandates in adjudicating cases. It has been noted, for instance, that they routinely preside
over criminal cases and “sentence people for crimes the statutory courts should handle” (Crisis Group 2006:8). They have also been cited for incompetence with some reports noting that they preside over criminal cases yet award civil remedies. In the absence of adequate oversight as well as financial compensation for their duties by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, local chiefs are on record to mete out excessive fines as judgement debt (Crisis Group 2006). As expected, this goes to service the expenses of the local chiefs.

Similar to the formal justice mechanisms in Liberia, the traditional mechanisms have also been vulnerable to various degrees of manipulation by influential individuals. Such individuals shuffle between the formal and customary systems exploring avenues to peddle influence. Another challenge with the customary justice system derives from its subsumption under Liberia’s Interior rather than the Justice Ministry or the Judiciary. By this, the judicial control that ought to be exercised by the judiciary is lost. The implication is that matters that could have been appealed to the level of the supreme court of Liberia are effectively truncated.

Another challenge emerges from those justice systems that still operate completely outside the guidelines of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. Beyond the element of state authorization, which this latter one does not have nor indeed seek, they both thrive on traditional practices. However, because some of these such as the Poro (and its female version Sande) power associations are also organised as secret societies or cults, there have been some cultic influences in their mode of adjudicating conflicts. Some of these practices have been at variance with basic norms of human rights. The customary justice system is, for instance, marked by rampant use of trials-by-ordeal. This refers to a collection of potentially fatal practices meant to reveal the responsibility for an offence. These include, Sassywood Tree, Hot Cutlass, Banana Tree and Needle and Sitting
among Driver Ants. The exposure to harm prior to confirmation of guilt put these strategies at variance with human rights norms.

On the basis of the above, the idea of institution building in the justice and rule of law sector was to enforce rule of law, facilitate judicial independence, enhance accessibility and build confidence in the justice system for all Liberians. From a human security perspective, accessibility and confidence building necessarily translates to the secure environment for personal and economic development, as opportunities are afforded for the peaceful resolution of disputes. This also ensures that critical threats to the vital core of human existence – threats such as rape, murder and assault among others, are adequately dealt with.

A significant part of institution-building within the justice and rule of law sector has been attributed to the UNMIL human rights monitoring and protection activities throughout the country. Through the field officers, useful input has been gathered into policy making and advisory services. Those that have needed immediate attention such as the high rate of sexual and gender-based violence have been prioritised and advanced.

As part of the UNMIL’s mandate to help the GoL reform the judiciary, a Legal and Judicial System Support Division (LJSSD) was created within UNMIL, to collaborate with what was left of the justice sector institutions of Liberia as well as other external agencies interested in assisting in the justice sector, to restore Liberia’s judicial system to some relevance. Within the first two years of its existence, the Arthur Grimes School of Law at the University of Liberia was refurbished and reopened to help train county attorneys. As noted above, one of the significant challenges of the justice and rule of law sector after the war was the dearth of legal personnel, the reopening of the School of Law was therefore calculated to churn out graduates to reduce this
deficit across Liberia. Within the first three years after reopening the school of law, it recorded a turnout of over one hundred trained attorneys. As at August 2011, county attorneys have been assigned in all 15 counties. Efforts to develop personnel for the formal justice system have also extended to magistrate. At the forefront of this is the James A.A. Pierre Judicial Training Institute. In March 2010, the Institute commenced a Professional Magistrate Training Programme (PMTP). As the first of such programmes in over twenty years, it produced 61 magistrates in June 2011 (Judiciary SWG 2011).

To complement the developments in other sectors of the justice system and to facilitate accessibility to formal justice systems, the GoL/UNMIL also moved to increase the spread of court structures in the various counties. As a first step, the UNMIL Quick Impact scheme facilitated the rebuilding of thirteen county court structures destroyed during the civil war were rebuilt within the first three years of PCD (Africa Report 2006). Beginning from September 2006, UNMIL also started “Community Court”, a radio programme “to sensitise public on the operations of the justice system and fundamental rights” (UNSC Report 13 2006:9). The programme aimed at addressing public perceptions about corruption and other negativities within the formal justice system, however, it also addressed significant challenges in the customary justice system, particularly those relating to ‘Trial by Ordeal’, and the positive options offered by the formal system. This was calculated at encouraging a lot more faith in the formal system.

Apart from “Community Radio”, there have been some attempts to also strengthen institutions in the customary justice system. Although this was critical given that it serves an overwhelming number of Liberians in both the rural and urban areas, attempts to reform has been relatively modest. Thus, for instance, although trial by ordeal was outlawed in 2006, the practice is still
practiced across most of Liberia as the enforcement mechanisms to ensure that it is complied with have been generally non-existent (Opoku-Agyakwa 2011). Compared to the formal system however, this has been generally modest. A significant point however, was the outlawing of Trial by Ordeal in 2006. This notwithstanding, the practice still goes on in almost all the counties. It is also on record that due to the lack of supervision, some chiefs in operating within the customary justice system hand out custodial sentences in makeshift prisons (at the houses of chiefs) merely for inability of people to pay fines. Between 2003 and 2006, a number of such illegally detained people were reportedly freed through the instrumentality of UNMIL human rights officers (Crisis Group 2006).

Between 2003 and 2011, Liberia has also invested in a number of institutions for ensuring rule of law. Indeed, the roots of post-conflict initiatives for human rights can be found in the CPA, which mandated the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR). With regard to the former, Article XIII (1) of the CPA called for a TRC to be established to “provide a forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation” (CPA 2003). In line with this, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) on 12th May 2005 passed a TRC Act to implement Article XIII of the CPA. The TRC Act (2005) mandated the commission to investigate human rights abuses dating as far back as 1979.

The processes of the TRC (from 20th February 2006 to 22nd June 2009) and the publication of its final report have been critical to re-engendering respect for human rights in Liberia. This is
because by investigating and highlighting the abuses that occurred during the period of the conflict, the TRC went beyond merely offering a cathartic avenue for victims, to identifying loopholes in legislation and enforcement mechanisms that permitted such abuse and offering a platform for discussing options for redress. In its recommendations, for instance, the report suggested the creation of “Palava Hut”- a traditional approach to “foster peace dialogue and rebuild broken relationships in fostering national reconciliation, and healing beginning at the grassroots” (GoL 2006:12). The recommendations touched on other areas for the guarantee and enforcement of human rights including gender equality, socio-cultural, economic, civil and political rights (GoL 2006). Although the implementation of the recommendations have subsequently been dogged by politics including a January 2011 Supreme Court of Liberian Decision on the Unconstitutionality of some of the recommendations), it nevertheless communicated a sense of ‘breaking away from a culture of abuse’, to the generality of Liberians.

Further within the ambit of rule of law, a number of existing laws have been amended and new ones promulgated, to particularly deal with issues concerning human rights. Some of these amendments include the Amendment to Section 14.70 and 14.71 (Chapter 14) of the Penal Code of 1976 on Rape which set the punishable term for acts of rape to a maximum of life imprisonment. This came into force in January 2006. In July 2008, an amendment was effected on Chapters 14 and 15 (Sub-Chapter C, Title 26) of the Penal Law of 1976. Citing an increase in the crimes of armed robbery, terrorism and hijacking within Liberia, the amendment upgraded the magnitude of the offenses to a capital nature and therefore indicated punishments commensurate to capital crimes including the non-entitlement to bail. Other amendments concerned issues like gang rape and sexual and gender based violence. Influenced by the findings of the TRC, these amendments have generally aimed at limiting the scope for abuses.
Correction Services

Another institution within the justice system that has been characterised by substantial decay particularly prior to the commencement of post-conflict development is the Bureau of Correction and Rehabilitation (BCR). Established under Chapter 42.1 (Part IV) of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) of Liberia 1973-1979, it is responsible for the operation of all correctional institutions in the Republic of Liberia as well as the suitable treatment of all prisoners. As a key component of the justice system, it is subsumed under the Division of Correction at the Ministry of Justice and is legally bound by provisions of Liberia’s Criminal Procedure Law in its handling of prisoners. With regard to the medical and dental needs of prisoners for instance, Chapter 34.8 of the CPL expects the BCR to ensure that each prisoner has access to regular dental and medical care. Prisoners suspected of having infectious or contagious conditions are also expected to be segregated from other prisons. In terms of food, chapter 34.10 of the CPL stipulates that each prisoner “be provided with good and wholesome food, properly prepared under sanitary conditions, and in sufficient quantity and reasonable variety”.

Notwithstanding these provisions, for the better part of 1979 to 2004, conditions in Liberia’s correctional facilities plummeted and with it, the relevance of the BCR within the context of justice and rule of law. The interrelated reasons included overcrowding and deterioration in sanitary conditions at the various facilities.

A number of the challenges have arisen with the management of the facilities. These include inadequate staff, inadequate logistics, inadequate security at prisons, lack of medical facilities and juvenile detention centers (Attuquayefio 2011). Some of the challenges were compounded by lapses in the other components of the justice system. Lapses in the formal justice system, for
instance, resulted in a significantly large number of pre-trial detainees crowding the limited correctional facilities. Due to the lack of space, the provisions on segregation of women and children under the age of 21 were flouted. Aboagye & Bah (2004:11) describing the challenges with Liberia’s corrections facilities note that:

In addition to overcrowding and the lumping together of men, women and children, accused persons were often held in detention for an indefinite period, owing to lack of prosecutors and defense lawyers … as a result of the conflict, most legal professionals either fled the country or moved into private practice, which is considered more lucrative … while the LNP was dutifully arresting criminals, there was an acute shortage of judges, prosecutors and lawyers to bring them to trial … therefore [being] denied the right of a speedy trial.

The combination of inadequate facilities, overcrowding, squalid conditions, reduced the country correctional facilities to facilities for abusing the rights of inmates. Together with few, lowly motivated officers; the BCR could hardly guarantee the secure incarceration and rehabilitation of convicts. Thus, by the official end of the conflict in 2003, the corrections facilities throughout Liberia were completely bereft of their complementary role to the entire justice process and the BCR soon became symptomatic of the challenges of the justice sector in particular and national institutions in Liberia as a whole. The implication on human security has been the difficulty in ensuring that secure prisons safeguard Liberians from those threatening the vital core of human security, while rehabilitating those convicts for eventual reintegration into society.

Reactivating the provision of correctional services in the aftermath of the war has been entirely masterminded by the Correction Advisory Unit (CAU) of the UNMIL. The overall objective, under article 3 (q) of UNSC Resolution 1509 has been to consolidate correctional institutions, among others, in Liberia. Within this broad objective, the CAU, in support of the BCR, beginning from 2004 set out to provide strategic and technical advice on correctional issues, provide expertise on penal reforms; support the development and expansion of correctional facilities and facilitate the development of modern correctional staff through training and
mentoring (UNMIL 2011). For a correction institution that has reportedly not seen any formal training since 1979 (DPKO 2011:18), the task of rebuilding has been slow.

With assistance from such countries as United States, Norway and Switzerland, as well as the UNMIL Quick Impact Project funds, a number of correctional facilities were re-opened across the country between 2004 and 2010. This included Buchanan Prison, Harper Prison, Kakata Prison, Tubmanburg Prison and the Monrovia Central Prison. The relatively modest gains achieved in restoring a number of correctional facilities across the country were set back when three of the facilities namely the National Palace of Correction in Zwedru, the Monrovia Central Prisons and the Voinjama correctional facility all witnessed prison breaks between 2008 and 2009. While it showed the persisting vulnerability of the facilities in the wake of the rebuilding, the success rate at re-arresting convicts pointed to some efficiency in personnel standards at the facilities. Apart from the main infrastructure, all the facilities have also seen massive improvement on the living facilities including bathrooms and cell blocks.

With regards to manpower, since 2004, the BCR in collaboration with the CAU of UNMIL has consistently trained correction officers at the National Police Training Academy in Paynesville. At the last count in August 2011, there were over 259 fully trained national correction officers serving in the various correction facilities across the country. (UNMIL 2011) A critical component of the 12-month training course for the correction officers is human rights, counseling, and the use of non-lethal force in dealing with prisoners. The latter has seen close collaboration between the government of Sweden and the BCR (DPKO 2011). In addition to the training courses, the CAU of UNMIL has since 2004 deployed correction advisors to all correctional facilities in Liberia. By co-locating with the national correction personnel, there has
been the transfer of operational skills and strategies. To further augment the skill of the national correction officers, the CAU as at August 2011 initiated in-service training at a number of correctional facilities including the Monrovia Central Prisons, Kakata, and Tubmanburg prisons. To sustain the training and development drive and within the contest of UNMIL eventual withdrawal, the CAU has developed programmes for training trainers. The idea, according to staff of CAU is to ensure that whatever gains they make are not negated when UNMIL finally brings its activities to a close.

To reduce the number of pretrial detainees crowding the prisons, and in line with attempts to facilitate coordination between the various components of the justice system, a mobile Magistrate court has been set up at the Monrovia central prisons to speed up consideration of pre-trial detainees. The results of this, though positive, appears to be a drop in the ocean as the national percentage of pretrial detainees crowding the correctional facilities as at August 2011 is still pegged at a high of 80 percent (UNSC 2011:8).

4.3.3 Economic Revitalization, Infrastructure and Basic Services

Another segment for post-conflict institution-building has been the economy and the structures for providing basic services such as education, health, potable water and electricity. These have been highlighted in Section 3.1 above. To move Liberia into the path of a functional state responsible for the needs of its people, institution –building in the post-conflict phase has also included policies and actions geared towards revitalizing Liberia’s Economy and providing basic services such as potable water, health and electricity to the generality of Liberians. Within the context of human security, the economy and basic services are critical to facilitating freedom from want.
Economic Revitalization

Typical of any post conflict context, apart from the stability and physical security, the next big goal often on the priority list of the people is the economy and the extent and speed with which it can facilitate the pursuit of individual and collective economic aspirations. Given that some level of security and stability is a prerequisite for economic activities, it wasn’t surprising that security issues were the focus in the first thirteen months of PCD. However, with the achievement of some measure of stability attention has had to be widened to cover the economic challenges of PCD.

Due to the history of corruption and mal-governance in the economic affairs of the country, one of the prime areas identified for institutional rebuilding has been the management of the financial resources of the state. A notable strategy rolled out for the economic governance interests of Liberia was the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP). Implemented from 2005 to 2009, the GEMAP generally sought to enhance efficiency and accountability in the management of public resources (Agyemang-Dua 2011). It had five interlocking components. These were financial management and accountability; managing government budget and expenditure, enhancing processes for public procurement and the granting of concessions, controlling the loopholes that influence corruption particularly in the public sector and building the capacity of some state-owned organisations (SOEs). The GEMAP worked according to a principle of co-location of some sort. Thus, international experts were contracted and situated within key SOEs to streamline activities and lead some kind of change process within the context of the five interlocking components. Under financial management and accountability for instance, a number of international experts were contracted and deployed at key state revenue points such as the National Ports Authority (NPA), the Bureau of Maritime
Affairs (BMA), and the Liberian Petroleum Refining Corporation. Carrying a recognised co-signatory mandate, these experts influenced accountability in their host institutions. Therefore, by 2009 when GEMAP ended, the SOEs had modestly streamlined financial management and administration. A 2011 Liberia Investment Statement, for instance, emphasised the GEMAPS contribution to improving financial and operational performance at “several state owned enterprises including the National Port Authority (NPA) and the Forestry Development Authority (FDA) and the Roberts International Airport” (Liberia Investment Statement 2011:8).

Post-conflict attempts at economic revitalization have also focused on jumpstarting extractive sectors of the economy that virtually ceased operations during the war (See Table 1). Under the Liberia Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI), the GoL has made strides in streamlining the granting of concession for its extractive industry. Furthermore, to revitalize and strengthen forestry and mining activities, the GoL, in collaboration with the European Commission also initiated actions to strengthen the Forest development Authority. Activities under this sector included, complete audit of FDA from October 2003 to January 2006 and recruiting forest economists to support the FDA. A number of these forest economists have been recruited through a number of external non–governmental and governmental agencies such as the USAID, FAO, the IMF and the EC operating within the context of the Liberian Forest Initiative launched in 2004 (FAO 2012).

The above efforts in the extractive industry have been complemented by the Lifting of UN sanctions on timber and diamond in 2006 and 2007 respectively. In the case of the latter, Liberia’s admittance into the “Kimberly process”, an international certification scheme to get proscribe sale of diamonds to fund civil wars, reopened opportunities for Liberia’s diamond
trade. In 2010, the GoL signed a three year oil-prospecting agreement with US oil giant Chevron. The discovery of oil in Liberia’s offshore waters will further enhance revenue from Liberia’s extractive industries.

A typical effect of war on host countries and sometimes entire regions is the reduction and in some cases, outright collapse of trade and investment. This is because of the insecurity that will plague any such investment. The effects of this trend on economic security include loss of jobs and opportunities for wider markets for local commodities. Liberia has not been an exception to these challenges. Therefore, to boost the prospects for economic security, a number of institutions have been revitalized as gambits to strengthening Liberia’s trade and investment climate.

The GoL has secured the country’s restoration into the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) privileges as well as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) coverage from the US. Liberia has also signed the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) with the United States to reduce trade and investment barriers (Liberia Investment Statement 2011). In terms of legislation, the revision of the Investment Incentives Code of 1976 and the promulgation of the Investment Act (2010), has reestablished Liberia’s desire to attract trade investment from the international community. The new investment incentives code revises the 1998 ‘Liberianisation Policy’ that was generally regarded by the donors and foreign business interests as discriminatory and an affront to foreign investment. It also offers tax incentives such as tax relief to support investment in transportation infrastructure, communication technology, energy, health care, housing and banking. A critical novelty of the new investment incentive code has been its recognition of significant underdevelopment of those areas outside Monrovia, particularly in the
south-eastern counties of Grand Kru and Maryland. Consequently, the code offers further incentives for investments projects in those parts of the country (Liberia National Investment Commission 2012).

Under the OPIC, for instance, USD 20 million was granted to the Liberia Enterprise Development Finance Corporation (LEDFC) to promote SME’s in Liberia by improving access to capital. USD1.67 has also been invested in over twenty-five project in Liberia by The United States African Development Foundation (USADF). These projects have been directed at job creation, food security and general management training for enterprises and farmer cooperatives (Liberia Investment Climate Statement 2011:8)

Results from these efforts have been impressive. From 2004 to 2009, foreign direct investment in Liberia has been estimated at USD 641 million, and in 2010 alone, approximately USD 175 million was recorded as having been invested in Liberia, with 70 percent of this amount going into the services sector (Liberia Investment Climate Statement 2011). The increase in foreign direct investment has also reflected in 24 percent increase in registration of foreign business entities for 2010 over the 2009 figure. Between 2009 and 2010, domestic business registration has also increased by 4.2 percent. While registration does not necessarily translate into employment creation, the unemployment challenges in Liberia are so grave that any modest change has been encouraged by the GoL.

Efforts at post-conflict institution-building have also been extended to the revitalisation of Liberia’s shipping industry. Widely regarded in the late 1960s as the largest shipping registries (Flags of Convenience) in the world, Liberia lost some ground during the civil war (Pike 2008). With the return to peace, the reputation of the registry is back on the ascendancy and it currently
second only to Panama. Maritime traffic has also increased in Liberia’s seaports in Monrovia (Montserrado County) and Buchanan (Grand Bassa County). A one-stop shop for customs clearing system is also in operation at the Monrovia port.

While laying the foundation for increased employment, post-conflict institution building for economic revitalization has also included the development of legislation and policies towards protecting Liberia’s labour force from being exploited. One of the challenges in Liberia’s post-war environment has been the abuse of labour through generally unfavourable labour practices. This is because in the absence of adequate jobs, the mainly unskilled labour forces have been left at the mercy of employers, sometimes creating violent labour unrests. This was particularly the case on rubber plantations such as the Liberia Agriculture Company (LAC) in Buchanan in Grand Bassa County were workers are hardly protected from the harsh production conditions in the plantations and processing plants (Attuquayefio 2009). To curb this problem, the Liberian Senate in 2007, revised parts of the Labour law that prohibited workers from embarking on industrial actions. The revision also expunged provisions that allowed room for employers to dismiss employees without cause. Subsequently, in 2010, a Decent Work bill and Code of Conduct was introduced to safeguard work conditions and enhance respect for the rights of workers. The bill was passed in July 2011 as the New Labour Law of Liberia. Among other conditions for decent work, the new labour law also guaranteed collective bargaining mechanisms and set USD6.40/day as the minimum wage for private sector employees particularly those in the agricultural sector. The relatively smaller proportion of the workforce in the public sector has also seen some reforms in the administration of public sector wages. Since taking office for instance, it been widely reported that the government of Johnson-Sirleaf have increased salaries in the public sector by some 200 percent. While the present starting level of
USD80 per month is still inadequate, it has, indeed, communicated the willingness of the government to shore up the standard of living for its workers.

Institution building for economic revitalisation has also been extended to the agricultural sector. In recognition of the collapse of agriculture mainly as a result of the pervasive displacement of farming communities and destruction of farms, the GoL, in collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) and other external agencies, conducted a Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) for about 60 percent of the population of Liberia in rural and semi-rural areas in all the fifteen counties from February to June 2006. The main aim of the survey was to assess the level and causes of food insecurity, vulnerability and malnutrition and identify livelihood patterns and agricultural constraints. Following the survey, the GoL has invested in policies and action plans towards revamping agriculture. Apart from food, the focus on agriculture is also due to the fact that a significant percentage of Liberians are engaged in agriculture or fisheries. Development in the sector has therefore been critical to “overall economic recovery, ensuring that growth is inclusive, promoting peace and stability and sustaining poverty reduction” (RoL 2008: 60).

In the latter part of 2006, for instance, the Ministry of Agriculture provided seeds and tools to at least 141 beneficiaries in some of the most food insecure enclaves in Liberia. In addition to this, the GoL, through the Ministry of Health has consistently engaged farming communities on training activities in food crop, livestock and fish production. In February 2007, the MoY&S and the MoA set up a core center modeled after the Center Songhai of Benin for training in agriculture technology in support of the Liberian Integrated Rural Development Programme. Again, between February and December 2007, the MoA established five regional seed centers
and the provision of seeds and tools to 95,000 vulnerable smallholders. In June 2007, as a further step in creating institutions for food security, the Ministry of Agriculture in collaboration with the Liberia Institute for Statistics and Geo-Information Systems set up a food security monitoring system and unit within the Ministry of Agriculture. In December 2007, for instance, the ministry of Agriculture together with its partners commenced activities to revitalize the Central Agricultural Research Institute (CARI) through the renovation of 20 percent of the buildings, the provision of equipment and the recruitment of some essential staff to man the facility. The Ministry of Agriculture also reactivated the national agricultural extension system in 2007. Under this scheme about 59 percent of agricultural staff moved from Monrovia to the counties and districts. Notwithstanding the fact that a third of the population of Liberia live in the capital Monrovia, this extension services has been critical to disseminating relevant information throughout the countryside.

**Infrastructure and Basic Services**

Another area that was substantially destroyed during the war was the infrastructural base of the country. Consequently, at the end of the war in 2003, most Liberian had no access to motorable roads and bridges among others. These infrastructural challenges did not only undermine income generation but also limited the GoL ability to provide basic services such as health, water and housing and indeed access to the limited facilities by the people. Since 2003, the GoL with the active support of UNMIL and a host of other development partners have invested in improving the situation. The importance government of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf attached to it is reflected in the fact that within the first 150 days of assuming power, it started highly significant road projects such as the Voinjama-Foya road, the Buchanan-River Cess Road and the 180 Km Zwedru-Greenville Road.
Within the health sector, through UNMIL’s quick Impact Projects, and further collaboration with the World Health Organisation, there has been the rehabilitation of over 50 health facilities; most of them being clinics. The QIPS have been extended to other basic services such as water lines and public latrines in some parts of Liberia. The record of development in infrastructure and basic services are presented in Table 2.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>GoL Infrastructure and Basic Services (2008-2011)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Status</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>Communications</td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Storage</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>31%</td>
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</table>

Source: Final Report of Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (GoL 2011)

### 4.4 Conclusion

On the basis of the above, it can be stated that arguably, for a country that is still picking up the pieces, the Liberian government with help from the international community have created and revitalized institutions that cut across the protection and empowerment spectrum insofar as advancing human security is concerned. Challenges still exist. In the security sector for instance, there are still claims of harassment and corruption by the LNP. Challenges also exist as regards efficiency. While the presence of UNMIL has contributed to stability, it appears that the LNP is
still attached heavily to UNMIL’s umbilical cord. Similar challenges exist in terms of justice and rule of law, economic revitalisation, infrastructure and the provision of basic services. This notwithstanding, for a country that has very little history of efficient institutions, it can be reasonably argued that the record is appreciable. It is, however, important to interrogate how the record in institution building has translated into human security in some of Liberia’s counties.

With regard to the security sector for instance, historically, apart from the abuse of rights perpetrated by the security agencies, their complicity and ineffectiveness created a platform for other threats to security such as armed robbery, mob violence and sexual and gender based violence. It is therefore critical, to examine how the record of building security sector institutions, for instance, have positively minimized or limited some of these challenges. This can be approached from two dimensions. The first is the objective performance of the institutions in terms of their respective mandates. This basically refers to how they provide and guarantee the security of individuals from threats that emanate from third party sources. The second involves a subjective determination of the extent of public trust in the AFL and LNP as agents of protection rather than abuse. With regard to justice and rule of law, years of justice sector inefficiency and one that was heavily tailored to the capital town meant that most people resided in the customary justice system. Together with this, this have over the past engendered a situation of mob action and the recourse to vigilante justice. In examining the relevance of institution building in the justice and rule of law sector to human security, the studies explores the situation in some of Liberia’s counties, and from a participatory vulnerability assessment, see the relevance of the developments on human security. This will also apply to the relevance of economic revitalisation and provision of basic services on human security in the counties. These issues are explored in the next chapter.
Chapter Five

CHALLENGES TO HUMAN SECURITY IN LIBERIA: GRAND KRU, MARYLAND, LOFA, GRAND BASSA AND MONTSERRADO

5.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter, I highlighted Liberia’s post-conflict context and explored the record of institution-building since 2003. Against that background, this chapter identifies challenges to human security in five counties namely Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Montserrado. As noted in chapter one, these challenges have been identified through a participatory vulnerability assessment as well as data from two authoritative baseline surveys conducted in the latter part of 2010. These are the Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey of 2010 (CFSNS 2010) and the Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Security, Dispute Resolution, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Liberia (Vink, Pham and Kreutzer 2011). The study also used data from the County Development Agenda (CDA) of the sample counties. The CDAs were themselves arrived at through participatory vulnerability assessments. The challenges have been classified under the seven components of UNDP human security definition, depending on which is critical and pervasive in a particular county. The definitions adopted for the seven components are as follows: Economic Security as the guarantee of basic income for individuals from productive or remunerative work or through public finance; Food Security as the assurance of physical and economic access to basic food at all times; Health Security as the guarantee of minimum protection from diseases and lifestyles that are detrimental to the health of the people; Environmental Security as the protection from the effects of deterioration of the natural environment; Personal Security as the protection of people from physical violence; Political Security as the assurance that human rights are upheld in all
situations and Community Security as the protection of people from the loss of traditional relationships from ethnic violence (UNDP 1994).

5.2 Grand Kru County

Grand Kru County is in the southeastern part of Liberia. It covers an area of 2,298.78 square kilometres (Grand Kru CDA 2008). It is bordered by Maryland to the East, Sinoe to the West and River Gee County to the North. Its southern border runs along the Atlantic Ocean. Grand Kru was created in 1984 through a fusion of Sasstown and Kru Coast in Sinoe and Maryland County respectively. The history behind its creation suggests a case of political patronage rather than administrative expediency within the Doe-led People’s Redemption Council (PRC). In this regard, it has been noted that the county’s creation followed a direct request by Major General Nicholas Podier, speaker of the PRC, that his home region be elevated into a county status (Liberia Districts 2012).

The county covers an area of 2,298.78 square kilometres (Grand Kru CDA 2008). With a population of 57,913, it is the least populated county in Liberia. Grand Kru has 8 districts. Out of this number, 6 are regarded as administrative districts. These are Sasstown, Trehn, Barclayville, Buah, Jloh, Dorbor and Forpoh. The highest populated district is the county capital of Barclayville with a population of 11,573. The least populated district is Buah with 643 people. The average household size in Grand Kru is 5.3 as against a national average of 5.1. Historically the most neglected county in Liberia (Grand Kru CDA 2008), Grand Kru continued to witness neglect in the post war environment due to inaccessibility as well as insignificant population displacement during the war.
5.2.1 Challenges to Human Security in Grand Kru County

As indicated above, Grand Kru has historically been at the shallow end of Liberia’s development priorities. Inspite of this, not all the myriad of development challenges confronting the county qualify as threats to human security in the county. From a participatory vulnerability assessment (using the critical and pervasive criteria), the following were identified as threats to human security in Grand Kru county.

Food Insecurity

The two staple foods in Grand Kru County are cassava and rice. With regard to cassava, cultivation is usually on a subsistence basis and the food is seasonal. With the absence of adequate storage facilities and given the rainfall pattern characterised by heavy rains for almost 8 months in a year, what is left on the farm is quickly destroyed while what is brought home is usually consumed within six months of harvest. This leaves a deficit of five to seven months, during which the people of Grand Kru have to rely absolutely on the market. Consequently, it has been estimated that 58 percent of food in Grand Kru is sourced from the market (CFSNS 2010:70). The higher percentage of food sourced from the market; relative to what is grown locally in the county, is a source of food insecurity. This is due to bad roads and the distance between the county and Monrovia. As a result, the cost of transporting imported rice from the capital to the county is higher (sometimes 90 percent more) than the price in Monrovia. During the dry season for instance, it cost 2,198 Liberian Dollars to have access to the market in Monrovia. This increases to 3,012 Liberian Dollars during the wet season (CFSNS 2010:64). This is the highest transport cost from any county in Liberia to the capital Monrovia. The result is that compared to markets in Monrovia and other central parts of the country, the markets in southeastern areas like Grand Kru are the most expensive (Owadi 2011).
Considering the county’s reputation as one of the poverty endemic regions in Liberia, the resulting food price hikes from the high cost of transport critically jeopardises access to food in Grand Kru County. In an attempt to mitigate this threat, the people of the county often rely on markets and supplies from Cote d’Ivoire. Ordinarily, this has proven quite useful inspite of the fact that the people of Grand Kru are unable to take advantage of food subsidies offered by the Government of Liberia. The challenge the Ivorian option presents to food security in the county is that supply is rendered susceptible to stability and other security dynamics in Cote D’Ivoire. During the recent violent conflicts following the disputed election results for instance, although Liberia was relatively stable, the people of Grand Kru had their food lines and market lines disrupted.

Although the massive destructions of livestock during the war was cited as threat to the nutritional needs of the people in grand Kru, it was determinable, on the basis of focus group discussions, that the threat to nutritional needs arising out of the destruction of the livestock was not pervasive within the entire sixteen districts of the county. Generally, however, access to food was identified as the most preeminent threat to food security in the Grand Kru County. This is consistent to findings from independent researches undertaken in the region. In September 2006 for instance, results from a Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) conducted under the auspices of the Government of Liberia in collaboration with the World Food Programme, the Food and Agricultural Organisation and other external organisations cited 72 percent of people in Grand Kru County as food insecure. In 2010, while acknowledging a general improvement in food security, the CFSNS again identified Grand Kru County as among the most food insecure counties with 78 percent of households threatened (CFSNS 2010). The trend again was identified in results from a November/December 2010 baseline survey by the
Human Rights Center of the University of California, The research results noted that 62 percent of respondents had weak or very weak access to food and 31 percent had medium access to food. Only 7 percent of respondents had good access to food.

**Economic Insecurity**

Economic insecurity, defined as the absence of a guarantee of basic income for individuals from productive or remunerative work or through public finance is characteristic of most of Liberia. This notwithstanding, it is particularly chronic in Grand Kru County. Typical of counties in the south eastern part of Liberia, Grand Kru has significant natural reserves for mining and logging yet since its creation, the county has hardly witnessed any meaningful economic activity on a commercial scale. The economic landscape has rather been defined mostly by petty trading, inland fishing, low-scale artisanal work, minimal public service appointments and subsistence agriculture, which averagely accounts for 63 percent of economic activities of the entire county, 20 percent of more than the national average of 43 percent (Vink et al). In the absence of roads, petty trading has hardly gone beyond neighbouring counties. Those that have had to make the over three hours walk to Cote d’Ivoire have had to deal with the prospects of losing income whether through thefts on the road or even in Cote d’Ivoire. Such traders have also had their incomes tied to political and security considerations in the Cote d’Ivoire. Most inland fishing and agriculture are done on a subsistence scale. Thus, very often, what is harvested is hardly able to address domestic need, not to talk about its commercialisation. In the absence of any storage facilities such as silos and cold stores, as well as high yielding varieties of crop and fish stock and finance, the people of Grand Kru have hardly moved beyond subsistence agriculture, to producing for commercial purposes (See Table 2).
Table 2 Challenges to Agriculture in Grand Kru County

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</table>

Source: Grand Kru County Development Agenda

Apart from petty trading, fishing and agriculture, a minute percentage of skilled labour in Grand Kru County have access to some public sector jobs in the county and district offices. For such people, apart from the fact that the 30 dollars monthly payment is hardly able to sustain their households for a month, the distance between the county and Monrovia, combined with the poor state of decentralization in Liberia means that the salaries do not often come when needed. Economic insecurity in Grand Kru is also traced to the high level of food insecurity noted above. According to CFSNS (2010), households in counties that are food insecure incur a lot more expenditure on food sourced from the market at a relatively higher cost. With a higher share of disposable income spent on food, there is barely enough for other essentials like clothing and housing.

The economic insecurity in Grand Kru is affirmed by results from the baseline survey that note that 74 percent of respondents from Grand Kru thought they had no access to work opportunities. This marked against a national average of 79 percent (Vink et al 2011). While this in itself is detrimental to the sustainability of post-conflict development, it offers further complications to PCD because 32 percent of people in Grand Kru (against a national average of 26 percent) blame the state of economic insecurity vis-à-vis jobs, on the inability on the part of Government of Liberia to create jobs. This is inspite of the role of the private sector in creating jobs; Evidence of the chronic economic insecurity is seen in the pervasive poverty registered throughout the
county. Thus, for instance, compared to a nationwide average of 68 percent, 79 percent of people/households in Grand Kru had a per capita of less than or equal to 0.5 USD per day (Vink et al 2011).

**Health Insecurity**

Similar to other indicators of underdevelopment, Grand Kru has historically been one of the most deprived counties in terms of basic services. In fact, it has been noted that even prior to the start of the civil war, the county capital, Barclayville, had very limited access to basic services. This situation is characteristic of all the other districts in Grand Kru. With regard to health security, there are critical threats to both ends of the health chain namely: supply of health infrastructure and services and access to health services. These threats principally trace to the same source, namely, the lack of pliable roads. With regard to the former, the deplorable road conditions in Grand Kru county has perennially limited the extent to which medical services and infrastructure have been deployed in the county. Currently, there are about eleven inadequately equipped health facilities in the County. Using population estimates from the 2008 population and housing census, this represents a ratio of one inadequately equipped health facility to over 5000 people. Even in terms of this, some districts such as Forpoh have no health facility.

In the absence of roads and basic services, many public health practitioners have also found the region unattractive to practice even without remuneration being the main concern. The few pseudo health workers left in the region are inadequately trained and sometimes cause more problems with unprofessional diagnoses. Apart from the poor supply of health infrastructure, access to health care is undermined by the lack of public transportation, and limited health facilities is further jeopardised by the lack of roads and consequently, absence of public
transportation. Residents in the various districts therefore have to trek everywhere on foot. With the thin spread of health posts, it is suggested that on average, residents have to walk a long distance to get access to any form of health care. While this situation pervades the whole county, it is even more critical in the largely inaccessible districts of Buah, Forpoh, Jloh, Dorbor and Sasstown. Under the above circumstances, health security, basically defined as the guarantee of a minimum protection from diseases, is critically compromised in Grand Kru. Basic health services such as immunization is also very low across the county and virtually nonexistent in some districts. It is therefore not surprising that the county has one of the highest child mobility rates, scoring 81 percent for all illness (CFSNS 2010:123).

**Personal Insecurity**

Threats to the personal security landscape in Grand Kru County have mainly been in the form of armed robberies, domestic violence and child abuse in the illegal mining areas of the county. The situation is compounded by the inadequate and therefore ineffective performance of the LNP in the county. For a county with a population of 57,913 covering an area of 2,298.78 square kilometres (Grand Kru CDA 2008), the allocation of 35 LNP personnel is not just inadequate but counterproductive to any attempt at ensuring personal security as it ascribes a figure head character to the LNP while emboldening prospective criminals in the county.

**Table 3 State of LNP Deployment in Grand Kru County**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of LNP Stations</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Personnel at post</th>
<th>Status of Station</th>
<th>Vehicles/Motor Bikes for LNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Barclayville</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Under Construction</td>
<td>1 Pick-up patrol / 1 Motor Bike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Grandcess</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>No structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dorbor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Behwan</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No structure</td>
<td>I Motor Bike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sasstown</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gee City</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>No structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Grand Kru County Development Agenda

In terms of assuring personal security, the irrelevance of the LNP in Grand Kru County, is worsened by the lack of office space and inadequate transport. The whole county as at the time of collecting data had been allocated a single pick-up vehicle and two motor cycles. Added to this is the fact that none of the security forces carry arms. Consequently, protection of people against criminality is a mirage. It is not surprising that 64 percent of people in Grand Kru indicated that they had no access to the police. Considering a national average of 54 percent, this is quite high.

Beyond the obvious challenges with the LNP, personal security in Grand Kru County is further dampened by a formal justice system that is anything but active. Following reforms, attorneys have been posted to every county including Grand Kru. With regard to the judiciary, 28 magistrates, one circuit court, and other specialised courts for debt collection and traffic have been formally allocated to Grand Kru. Inspite of this, a combination of inaccessible districts, lack of court structures and basic services in the county as well as the fact that salaries are still paid in Monrovia, has resulted in assigned judges hardly staying at their post within the county. In 2007 for instance, it was noted that a judge assigned to Barclayville, the county capital, was unable to reach his base because of a physical blockade on what was left of the Plebo-Barclayville highway. Consequent to the challenges of the formal justice system, have had to resort to the traditional justice systems. These systems themselves threaten personal security through their adoption of trials by ordeal as well as their adjudication of criminal matters. In the case of the
latter, by fining people and giving other remedies for grievous criminal acts such as rape and domestic violence, the traditional justice systems have hardly elaborated the deterrence effect on offenders for committing such crimes. It is therefore not surprising that serious incident of child abuse and other threats to personal security occur on a daily basis in Grand Kru. Under the above circumstances, there has not been any meaningful deterrent to threats against personal security in Grand Kru County. 54 percent of respondents from Grand Kru County blame the precarious state of personal security to the inability of the government to reduce crime in the county.

Most of the threats to human security in Grand Kru County are influenced by the lack of roads and other infrastructure. In terms of economic security for instance, the inability of people in Grand Kru to move beyond subsistence farming has been attributed to lack of roads. Lack of roads also affects inadequate food supplies as well as the supply of and access to health and other basic services. It has been noted, for instance, that even efforts by non-governmental organisations to provide health and other basic services such as water have often been thwarted because of the inability to get to the various districts at Grand Kru. Thus, arguably, threats to the vital core of people in Grand Kru County owe their roots to the lack of roads and infrastructure. This is hardly surprising as the county is historically referred to as Grand “Walking County” and the “Most neglected county” (Grand Kru CDA 2008: ix) Thus, since the start of post-conflict development, the topmost priority of Grand Kru County has been articulated as roads and infrastructure. In December 2010, the people of Grand Kru reaffirmed the palpable link between their human security and roads when an overwhelming 97 percent, in response to threats to their living conditions, cited bad roads (Vink et al 2011).
5.3 Maryland County

Maryland is in the south-easternmost part of Liberia. It is bordered by Grand Kru to the West and River Gee County to the North. Its southern border runs along the Atlantic Ocean. The eastern part of Maryland County borders the Republic of Cote D’ Ivoire. The area referred to as Maryland County was created by the US-based Maryland State Colonisation Society in 1834 for freed American Slaves. In 1854, the territory was granted independence and became the Republic of Maryland. Following some military assistance requested from and granted by Liberia in their wars with the Kru and Grebo tribes in present day Grand Kru County, the Republic of Maryland established friendly relations with Liberia. On 18th February 1857, Maryland entered into a permanent union with Liberia, becoming the fifth county. Maryland covers an area of approximately 2297 square kilometers, has a population of 135,938 and an average household size of 7.8, which is above the national average of 5.1 (GoL 2009). Due to its population size relative to its land mass, it is described as one of the densest counties in Liberia and the densest in the historically deprived south eastern Liberia. It has 7 districts namely, Gwelekpoken, Harper, Karluway Number 1, Karluway Number 2, Nyorken, Pleebo/Sodoken and Whojah. The county capital is Harper.

5.3.1 Challenges to Human Security in Maryland County

Usual of most counties in the southeast region of Liberia, Maryland is one of the most deprived areas in Liberia. It generally lacks infrastructure and basic services such as electricity, health services and water, among others. Although the absence of some of these services merely expose people in the county to various levels of vulnerability, others actually fall within the threshold of critical and pervasive threats to the survival of people in significant parts of Maryland County. This reflects the same scenario of deprivation and heavy inequities that precipitated the
agitations that eventually led to the 14-year civil war. What makes the situation in Maryland even more critical is its proximity to the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire, a country infamously noted for serving as a training and mobilisation ground (together with Libya) for rebels and subsequently, as a launching pad for the Charles Taylor-led NPFL into Liberia.

**Personal Insecurity**

Apart from the threat posed by armed robberies, the limited access to justice and the usually reconciliatory nature of traditional justice forms has resulted in widespread cases of mob-based justice, trials by ordeal and illegally long periods of pre-trial detention. Inspite of the promulgation of laws against sexual and gender-based violence, there are still widespread cases including rape, sexual molestation and domestic assault cases. Additional to the above are cases of ritual killings in Maryland’s most populous city, Harper. These cases have critically threatened personal security. The ritual killings have, for instance, been touted as a resurgence of the county’s troubled past with ritual killings in the late 1970s. In a recent case in January 2011, 18 suspected ritual murderers including a prominent government official, Counselor Fulton Yancy were arrested following a tip-off by a witchdoctor. This and other incidents of suspected ritual killings are reportedly creating tension throughout Harper and other parts of the Maryland County with people living in a state of fear. This is a threat on personal security.

The almost irrelevant state of the LNP in the county is one of the factors that in the opinion of Maryland county residents fuel these threats. A number of factors account for this irrelevance. This includes the inadequate number of police personnel at post throughout the county and the woefully inadequate transportation and communication equipment available to the police.

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4 In 1977, Allen Yancy, Vice President and Chair of the True Whig Party was found guilty for the ritual murder of Moses Tweh and hanged. Tweh was one of the many people that disappeared allegedly through ritual killing in Maryland County during that period.
Table 4). It has been noted, for instance, that despite the potential for violence in border towns, there are only two police personnel stationed at the border crossing point with Cote Ivoire at Pedebo. Considering the inadequate communication facilities, the possibility of calling for reinforcement in situations of disturbances becomes difficult. This obviously indicates the level of unpreparedness of the police to assure personal security.

**Table 4 State of LNP Deployment in Maryland County**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of LNP Detachments</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Personnel at post</th>
<th>Status of Station</th>
<th>Vehicles/Motor Bikes for LNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 county headquarters</td>
<td>Harper</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>constructed</td>
<td>2 vehicles &amp; 2 motor bikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pleebo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>constructed</td>
<td>1 Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Karloken</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gedertabo</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>No structure</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pedebo (Border) (also in Harper)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Maryland County Development Agenda*

The challenges with the LNP are reproduced on an even greater scale with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalisation. As noted above, Maryland County shares its eastern border with the Republic of Cote D’Ivoire. As a result, in addition to the main border post in Pedebo, there are 13 other points of entry including 9 foot paths in areas like Gborlobo, Debleken, Wessiken and Kunokudi. This points to a high state of porosity which in turn indicates vulnerability especially in times of instability in Cote D’Ivoire. Inspite of the consequences of this trend on personal and community security, the deployment of BIN officers along the County’s borders is nothing short of appalling (See Table 5).
Table 5: Status of BIN in Maryland County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of BIN Detachment</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of BIN in situ</th>
<th>Status of Posts</th>
<th>Vehicles for BIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Central Office</td>
<td>Harper</td>
<td>Under construction (building to be shared with LRRRC)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Harper</td>
<td>Port Needs construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Duokodi (Pedebo)</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Jelebiaken</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Fish Depot</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Karblaken</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Pleebo</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Karloken</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Debleken</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Gborlorbo</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Daykay Town</td>
<td>Needs construction</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Post</td>
<td>Yobloken</td>
<td>Needs construction (Patrolled by personnel from Karloken)</td>
<td>0 (Patrolled by personnel from Karloken)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Maryland County Development Agenda

Apart from the fact that the 34 officers are too thinly spread along the border line, the limited capacity of the LNP in a border town awash with small arms means that the people of Maryland hardly have an idea of what types of weapons enter the county from Cote D’Ivoire. Having been involved in conflicts in the not too distant past, they, however know that the mode of some of the vigilante style crimes that happen in the county are most likely committed by vestiges from violent conflicts. This is one of the threats to the security of the county and its residents.

**Economic Insecurity**

Although there are opportunities for investment in industrial concerns in Maryland County, agriculture continues to be the highest employer of the people. The overconcentration in agriculture (farming and fishing) and the inability of residents of Maryland to go beyond
subsistence and petty trading also happens to be the single most significant threat to economic security. In terms of the inability to go beyond subsistence, it is noted that the continuous reliance on traditional and somewhat primitive farming methods and the lack of access to credit facilities have been causes of the status quo. These challenges have been compounded by the absence of extension services to update local farmers on new developments in farm implements, seeds, fertilizers and insecticides (See Table 6 below)

Furthermore, given the fragmented markets, weak local demands and virtually no value addition, there has been few, if any, motivation for cash crop farming. Although a number of incentives have been provided for in Liberia’s investment policy to encourage investment in Maryland and other south eastern counties, such efforts have yielded minimal results for Maryland. Thus the people of Maryland can barely generate income, meaningful enough to address economic insecurities.

**Table 6: Challenges to Agriculture in Maryland County**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13%/34%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Grand Kru County Development Agenda*

In addition to the above, there are cross cutting issues that are having an impact on the state of human security in Maryland County. Prime among this is the state of roads and other infrastructure. Symptomatic of the deprivation of Liberia’s southeastern region, roads in Maryland County are significantly deteriorated. There have been efforts to rehabilitate some of these roads in a bit to attract investment into the area; however, relative to the extent of deterioration, these efforts have been merely visible. The implication of this is that some of the districts in the county are totally cut off during the rainy seasons. The state of deterioration of
roads also impacts, directly, on the provision of basic services as well as its accessibility by residents of the county. Furthermore, the lack of pliable roads continues to affect the state of personal security within the county as law enforcers cannot use their already limited resources within the harsh terrain of the county.

Another significant challenge in the County, one which bears directly on economic security is education. The education system in Maryland that was completely shattered during the war has barely recovered. Unavailability of education facilities in areas like Behwan, Geetugbaken, and Dwekhen and Karluway Numbers One and Two, is clearly affecting access to education in the county. In the few places such as Harper, it is on record that only a third of the teachers have been trained. Thus, although the County is host to the Tubman University, lower level education to feed into the University is severely lacking. Considering the linkage between education and poverty the state of education in the county is reflective of the state of economic security. This is because, in its current state, the education system in Maryland is not making any meaningful contribution to development of the county.

**Food Insecurity**

Residents of Maryland are also part of the most food insecure population in Liberia with 72.5 percent of households in the county classified as food insecure (CFSNS 2010). Due to the food production cycles and the rainfall pattern akin to the situation in its neighbouring county, Grand Kru, Maryland is barely able to produce food enough for itself and even the little that is produced barely goes beyond the first six months after the harvest period. The result of this is that the market heavily dominates sources of food with 71 percent, 13 percent more than Grand Kru but 19 percent less than Greater Monrovia (CFSNS 2010:70). However, unlike Greater Monrovia
and other counties closer to it, Residents of Maryland have to pay more for the same commodities due to a relatively higher cost of transportation, arising out of the absence of pliable roads connecting Maryland with the central market in Monrovia. During the dry season, for instance, this cost is marked at 1817 and at 2776 Liberian dollars during the wet season; compared with 376 and 543 Liberian Dollars for Grand Bassa county, the cost of accessing the market for Maryland is on the high side (CFSNS 2010:64). To reflect the high cost of transportation, sellers adjust the prices in the markets in Maryland, making prices in Pleebo market in Maryland, for instance, more expensive than that of Monrovia. Considering the rather precarious economic security situation in Maryland relative to Montserrado, more people in Maryland County are unable to afford and are therefore resigned to less nutritious alternatives in a bid to survive. It is therefore not surprising that Maryland County is one of the counties with noticeable numbers (between 6000 to 16000 people) suffering from chronic malnutrition (CFSNS 2010:17).

5.4 Lofa County

Lofa County is located in the northwestern part of Liberia. It shares its northeastern and northwestern borders with Guinea and Sierra Leone respectively, and its southern border with Gbarpolu County. Lofa County was created in 1964 by an act of the Liberia’s Legislature. It currently covers an area of 9982 square kilometers. Thus, in terms of expanse, it is the fourth largest county in Liberia after Nimba, Grand Gedeh and Sinoe (GoL 2009). Administratively, Lofa is divided into seven districts namely, Foya, Kolahun, Quardi-Bondi, Voinjama, Zorzor, Salayea and Vahun. The largest of these districts in terms of population is Voinjama. Voinjama is also the county capital. Lofa County has a total population of 276,863, making it the fourth
most populous county in Liberia (GoL 2009). It has an average household size of 4.4 persons per household.

Traditionally, Lofa County was known as the bread basket of Liberia. This is because for many years prior to the war, it was the most productive rice growing zone, and therefore at the heart of Liberia’s aspirations for food sufficiency. During the 14 year war, however, a number of rebel factions at various periods used various locations in Lofa County as a launching pad. This included the Guinea-backed United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO-K), Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Lofa Defense Forces (LDF).

Again, as a multi-tribal and bi-religious county, a significant number of the youth in Lofa joined various rebel movements depending on the tribal backing or religious affiliation of respective rebel groups. The result of this was the destruction of infrastructure, basic services and even some agricultural projects as well as the mass displacement of the population into neighbouring Guinea and Sierra Leone as well as elsewhere in Liberia. This earned Lofa County ill-repute as the epicenter of the war and the scene of some of the most violent confrontations during the entire war period.

5.4.1 Challenges to Human Security in Lofa County

As noted above, apart from the destruction of infrastructure and basic services, Lofa was also the worst hit county in terms of population displacement. Consequently, in the aftermath of the war, the county saw the most activity in terms of efforts at resettling, reintegrating and reestablishing livelihoods. Up until June 2007, the reintegration process was actively facilitated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), through sensitizing host communities in the county and liaising with other development actors to enhance the provision of basic services
(Lofa CDA 2008). The effects of the war and challenges emerging from the post-conflict development (PCD) have generated and sustained a variety of threats to various components of human security in Lofa County. Unfortunately, shortcomings from the PCD process, particularly as regards building of security and justice sector institutions, have failed to comprehensively address the challenges to human security. These are addressed below.

**Food Insecurity**

One of the oft-cited consequences of Liberia’s civil war is the paradox of Lofa County - that a county that used to be the bread basket of the entire country is presently the county with the highest percentage of food insecure people. In 2006, for instance, results of the Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey conducted by the GoL in collaboration with the World Food Programme and others saw a very high prevalence of food insecurity. The report essentially noted that 70 percent of the populations have poor or border line consumption. Subsequently, a major process of revamping Lofa’s agricultural capabilities was championed by the GoL and the international community (particularly the FAO and the WFP). Although this led to the restoration of farmer co-operatives and some pre-war loose associations of farmers, significant challenges such as the lack of infrastructure and credit facilities threaten food security in Lofa. The result is a change in the county’s status from chronic insecurity to transitional food insecurity. The later implies that the residents of Lofa County are food insecure during certain periods of the year. This usually arises when subsistence farming leads to the consumption of all that is harvested within the first three to six months after harvest leaving the people with virtually no food in the next three to six months. In those circumstances, the people of Lofa have had to depend on rice imported into the country through the capital Monrovia. In the absence of pliable roads, this imported rice often gets to Lofa at prices higher than in most of the counties in
Liberia; and is second only to the counties in south eastern Liberia. During the dry season, for instance, it cost 1,322 Liberian dollars to get to the market in Monrovia compared to 367 and 376 for Bomi and Bong Counties respectively. During the wet season, cost of transport from Lofa to Monrovia is 1658 Liberian dollars compared to 507 and 543 for Bomi and Bong counties. The Foya market in Lofa, is therefore one of the most expensive in the whole of Liberia. This also means that hikes in global market prices of food are directly passed on to consumers in Liberia. Within the context of the pervasive poverty in most of the rural districts in Lofa such as Vahun, most of the rural folks can hardly afford the cost of the rice, which is the staple food. In late 2010, this state of affairs (in terms of food insecurity) was affirmed by 39 percent of the residents of Lofa who identified access to food as one of the critical threats to their livelihood (Vink et al 2011).

**Personal Insecurity**

Personal security is one of the components of human security that has witnessed enduring challenges within Lofa County since the formal end of the war in 2003. To manage this situation, a relative sizeable number of UNMIL troops deployed to Liberia since 2004 were stationed in the various districts of Lofa County. This included formed police units and military observers. However, since the start of the drawdown phase of UNMIL’s withdrawal between 2007 and 2008, most of the responsibility for security in Lofa County has been entrusted to the LNP, the ERU and other national units. These institutions have, however, been characterised by significant weakness in structure, command and equipment at the county level (See Table 7).
Table 7: State of LNP Deployment in Lofa County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Stations</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of Personnel at post</th>
<th>Status of Station</th>
<th>Vehicles/Motor Bikes for LNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Voinjama</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>1 Pick-up truck / 3 Motor Bikes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zorzor</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Foya</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>1 pick-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kolahun,</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>1 Motor Bike</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Salayea</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Vahun</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Office of Superintendent and Circuit Court</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lofa County Development Agenda

Compared to places like Maryland and Grand Kru Counties, Lofa shows some numbers in terms of police deployment, yet in practice, their capacity constraints has rendered them ineffective and blighted their significance within the scope of security provision in Lofa County. Apart from the obvious inadequacy of transport which most often leads to reliance on private transport (and by implication increases the susceptibility of the police to manipulation from influential members of the society), there is also the lack of detention facilities outside of the capital Voinjama. Thus, even in cases were suspects are arrested for various crimes, processing such suspects for court and other aspects of the justice and law enforcement chain are critically compromised. The life blood of every effective policing – the communications system – is also lacking in significant terms. Individual police officers have therefore been resigned to using personal cell phones rather than radios to relay information and call for back-up when necessary. An even more pronounced defect of the LNP, as it is presently organised in Lofa, is the absence of an amoury. As a result, none of the personnel have access to weapons. Considering the county’s history as one of the main spots for battles during the war, as well as its location to two previously unstable countries (Sierra Leone and Guinea), this greatly increases the vulnerability of the police and
reduces their prompt responsiveness to call for re-enforcement. This scenario was played out during the 18th February inter communal conflict in Voinjama, during which the Emergency Response Unit of the LNP and UNMIL troops had to make an eight hour plus journey from Liberia to manage the violence in Voinjama.

Consequent to the above, a number of threats to personal security persist. In Voinjama and Zorzor for instance, there are several cases of assault, arson, mob justice and murder. Threats within Lofa County have also included disappearances often associated with ritual killings and sectarian violence. Some of these incidents of sectarian violence (such as occurred in Voinjama in February 2010) has been attributed to ethno-tribal envy, and hatred (nurtured by the war); unemployed and idle youths without programs of engagement. Many of such people have been trained in criminality as a mode of making a living and readily resort to it.

Related to the above, the formal justice link in the rule of law chain critical for personal security is also ineffective for a combination of reasons. First, given the incapacity of the police as observed above, investigating alleged crimes and competently processing suspects for the magistrate courts in Lofa is merely theoretical and hardly happens in practice. Secondly, as a legacy of institutional decay in Liberia’s governance structure, the judiciary has a long history of corruption which unfortunately, has not been completely shelved in the post-conflict era. This, together with palpable challenges with the formal judicial system in Lofa such as absence of magistrates at courts and lengthy adjudication periods, has reduced public confidence in the formal justice systems.

In the absence of effective formal policing, challenges of controlling mob violence and other threats to human security have been shouldered in some districts, particularly Voinjama, by
informal institutions such as traditional leaders, community leaders, and loose associations such as the commercial motor cycle riders association in Voinjama and Zorzor. While these groups have done considerably well in some instance, the non-statutory nature reduces the element of accountability and introduces a paradox in which the security providers themselves sometimes by their actions, become the greatest threats to the security of the people in Lofa. It has been noted, for instance, that inspite of their relevance in maintaining some order among their adherents and non-adherents alike, the Poro and Sande secret societies, often demonstrate some impunity in their mode of operations. An example is their claim of dominance over certain “sacred forests” in the outlying areas. Thus, even in cases of disappearance attributed to ritual killing, the police and other formal institutions for law enforcement are inhibited from investigating the possibility of crimes in the Poro and Sande enclaves. By their actions therefore, these informal institutions sometimes threaten personal security mentally and physically. For a county recovering from massive trauma during the 14 year war, any threat to personal security whether mental or physical is significant.

**Economic Insecurity**

Economically, Lofa is one of the most deprived counties away from those counties in south eastern Liberia like Grand Kru and Maryland. Prior to the war, 80 percent of the people in Lofa County were engaged in profitable agriculture. The general destruction of the county also affected mechanized and semi mechanized agricultural systems reducing the county’s agricultural ability to a predominantly subsistence level. This has brought with it typical challenges of small scale agriculture such as lack of credit facilities, storage facilities and improved varieties of crops (see table 8).
Table 8: Challenges to Agriculture in Lofa County

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Source: Lofa County Development Agenda

While the county is experiencing some minimal improvements, they are too insignificant to affect income levels. Residents in Lofa, particularly those in Vahun, therefore continue to be generally economic insecure. Apart from the agriculture sector, like many parts of the country, Lofa is well endowed with logs and mineral resources such as iron ore, gold and diamond. However, in the absence of adequate roads and railroads, it has been economically challenging to tap into those resources as conveying these resources from Lofa (a landlocked county) to the nearest port in Montseraddo appears to have so far deterred any meaningful foreign investment in the sector. In the absence of major investment, exploitation of the mines has been reduced to small scale generally unlicensed mining and logging activities. Together with challenges in the agricultural sector, income has been insignificant enough to lift the people of Lofa out of economic insecurity. The most recent survey by Vink et al (2011), for instance, noted that 76 percent of people in Lofa county lived below the less than or equal to 0.5 dollar/ a day per capita mark, as against the national average of 68 percent.

Community Insecurity

Lofa is one of the multi-ethnic counties in Liberia hosting six ethnic groups spread in various districts in the county. These are the Lorma, Gbandi, Mende, Mandingo, Kpelle and the Kissi. While some of the districts like Kalahun and Kissi are dominated by single ethnic groups, others such as the capital Voinjama is multi-ethnic. Within these multi-ethnic settings, there have been threats to community security. According to some opinion leaders in Voinjama, the causes of
these inter-ethnic tensions include land disputes occasioned by the widespread displacement during the war and the rather speedy resettlement since the end of the war. They suggest that in the absence of genuine land documentation (whether lost, destroyed or never existed), presumed squatters on lands have claimed ownership, sometimes attributing their claim to allocation by area chiefs or the rather untenable cliché of ‘first return first serve’. In the absence of effective governance institutions for addressing such issues (such as surveyors and the judiciary), such claims and counter claims have threatened community harmony. A fieldwork conducted by international alert in 2010 however noted the contribution of other factors apart from the contest for land. These include religious dichotomy between the majority and main minority ethnic groups (the Loma, Gbandi and Mandingo), the perceived origin of some of these ethnic groups (Liberia or Guinea) and the sides of the conflict the respective groups fought during the conflict. On 26th February 2010 three of the largest ethnic groups clashed in Voinjama and Zorzor. The predominantly Christian Loma, the predominantly Muslim Gbandi and Mandingo produced what was the most pronounced violent conflict in Lofa since the end of the war. By the time the violence subsided, the county had counted 4 dead, over 25 injured and the destruction of a number of residential and commercial structures including mosques, churches and schools. The conflict was reportedly precipitated by the discovery of the body of a missing female student by a mosque. Subsequent protests by Christian students who suggested complicity by Muslims were incorrectly relayed to Voinjama as having resulted in the burning down of a mosque. The result was a counter demonstration by Muslim youth in Voinjama. Inspite of this, it has been suggested that the roots of the conflict trace to unresolved issues of land ownership and undying animosities cultivated during the conflict when the mainly christian ethnic group of Loma and the mainly Muslim Mandingo fought for opposite ends of the rebel divide: the Gbandi for
ULIMO and later LURD and the Loma for the LDF. A research by International Alert (2010) aptly noted that the conflict manifested ethnically between Mandingo and Loma peoples, religiously between Muslims and Christians, generationally between youth and elders, and internationally between Liberians and Guineans.

Apart from the destruction that came with it, it dealt a huge blow to community security and reiterated the fact that some of the underlying tension created by Liberia’s civil war had not dissipated. The violence and the difficulties in managing it also highlighted lapses in post-conflict institution building in the security sector and justice/rule of law sectors. With regard to the security sector, it took the arrival of UNMIL and the ERU to bring some law and order. The mal-equipped LNP in Lofa reportedly looked on helplessly. In terms of the latter, it can be suggested that the resort to violence points to a vote of no confidence in a justice system that can address grievances as well as a disregards for institutions of rule of law.

Apart from the above, there are some cross-cutting issues that deepen the vulnerability of Lofa County to threats to human security. The lack of roads, though not as bad as those in south eastern Liberia, cannot support any meaningful development whether socially or economically. During the raining seasons a number of districts in Lofa are physically inaccessible. Vahun district, for instance, is hardly accessible through Liberia. Indeed, it is best accessed through the Republic of Sierra Leone. As noted above, this is having a negative toll on ensuring economic and personal security. The County is also bereft of education, health, sanitation and potable facilities. These are collectively having a negative impact on food security and the physical survival of the people of Lofa.
5.5 Grand Bassa County

Grand Bassa County is situated in the south central part of Liberia. It shares its northern, eastern and western borders with Bong, Rivercess and Margibi respectively. Its southern border lines the Atlantic Ocean. It was founded in 1839, and was one of the first three counties to form Liberia. It has a total population of 221,693 and covers an area of 7936 square kilometres (GoL 2009). Administratively, the county is divided into eight districts namely Districts Numbers one to four, Commonwealth, Neekreen, Owensgrove and St. John River City. The Capital of Grand Bassa County is the port city of Buchanan. In terms of natural resources, it is one of the most endowed counties in Liberia. This, combined with its littoral advantage made it a base of several large foreign industrial concerns like the Liberia Agricultural Company (LAC) a vast rubber concession and the Liberia American Mining Company (LAMCO). Inspite of its economic value to Liberia, for many years development was skewed to the production sites as were economic activities. Food, employment and basic amenities were all tied to the large industrial concerns and what they provided. Thus, beyond those staying and working on the concessions, residents of the outlying rural areas of Grand Bassa rarely saw significant infrastructure or the provision of basic amenities. The large concessions and what was left of the already impoverished systems all bore the brunt of the 14-year conflict. In the case of the former, most of the companies were destroyed. The limited infrastructure such as the Buchanan ports and the Buchanan-Yekepa railroad were also destroyed.

5.5.1 Challenges to Human Security in Grand Bassa County

One of the first counties to witness some activities after the formal end of the war was Grand Bassa. Due to the availability of the concessions, respective concessioners soon revitalized the concessions. Unfortunately, it was also one of the counties that witnessed some of the vestiges of
the conflict as ex-combatants occasionally went on rampage demanding benefits. One of such incidents occurred during the first graduation ceremony after an eight-month skill-training programme for ex-combatants in the county in July 2005. These occurrences created a general sense of insecurity within the county. The county’s proximity to the capital Monrovia, as well as the presence of the industrial concerns and relatively large number of ex-combatants attracted significant and consistent numbers of UNMIL troops. This secured sustained reasonable stability for post-conflict development activities. Therefore, since 2008, the county has witnessed some useful development and improvements in the security indicators. Although in terms of human security, it is not as challenged as the south eastern counties of Grand Kru and Maryland, the state of human security in Grand Bassa is by no means perfect.

Economic/Personal Insecurity

As noted above for many years prior to the war, the guarantee of basic income among the population in Grand Bassa County was linked to the large international companies like LAMCO and LIMCO. Additional to the income they provided their employees, they also ensured that basic essentials such as housing, food and even health needs of the people working in their respective concessions were all met. As a result, there was virtually no economic life outside the concessions. While this provided some stability for the workers in the various concessions, it alienated those outside of the concessions from any development opportunity. Within the context of successive governments that also undermined national unity and pursued policies that created inequities among Liberians, the approach of the owners of the concessions were hardly criticised. In the aftermath of the 14-year conflict, post-conflict development within Grand Bassa County is proceeding on the same trajectory, with the various international concessioners virtually determining the direction of economic and other development opportunities. For instance, apart from offering employment on
their concessions, both the Liberian Agricultural Company (LAC) and Arcelor Mittal Steel are renovating houses for employees as well as providing key infrastructure, such as the Buchanan-Nimba railroad, linking their concessions to other counties. Those people, communities and districts outside the concessions scheme of economic motives are once again being alienated from developments in the county. For such communities such as the slum area in District Number 3, Geegbahn and Jecko Town, human security continues to be undermined while socio-economic development essentially remains a mirage.

The fact that key infrastructure is tied to the concessions also mean that the communities in the rural parts of Grand Bassa, with no present economic value to the concessioners are deprived of any meaningful access to other parts of the country. This includes access to purchase food from Buchanan and other urban centers due to the insufficiency of subsistence farming, access to health, electricity, potable water and even education. Thus, within the abundance of Buchanan and other urban areas in Grand Bassa County, an enclave of underdevelopment is gradually forming again. One interviewee in Grand Bassa summarised it thus:

Other counties leaders prioritize their citizens for jobs in their counties in order to improve the economy of their county and empower their citizens, but for us it seems very impossible for our leaders…We the ordinary people are always the victims of the circumstances. We are still living in the 16th and 17th centuries while others are moving ahead with speed.

This form of lopsided development is dangerous to the stability of the county for a number of reasons. Suffice it to say that it is a micro reflection of the inequities engendered on the national scene by years of mal-governance – one that is often suggested as the most significant of all the conflict precipitants. What makes this threat worth considering is the evidence of disquiet from residents of Bassa that following the general unemployment in the country, jobs that could have been done by residents are being offered to people from other counties. Rallying under a call for returning Grand Bassa to “Bassanians”, the seeds of conflicts appear to be strewn all around.
Apart from the potential long-term effect, there is an immediate threat to security that erupts from time to time. This derives from some clashes between workers of some of the concessions and locals – clashes that invariably have their roots in animosity generated by “you have all/ we have nothing” dichotomy in the County. In July 2007, for instance, a case involving an alleged murder of a local by workers of LAC for stealing from the rubber plantations resulted in threats of reprisals and actual revenge actions on some workers on the plantations. Although an UNMIL battalion stationed in the county was able to bring the situation under control, it pointed to growing animosity undoubtedly influenced by the kind of lopsided development in the county. The cultivation of grievances from the “other side” of Grand Bassa County is a threat to human economic, personal and community security in no mean measure.

5.6 Montserrado County

Montserrado County is situated in the northwest region of the Republic of Liberia. It is enveloped by Bomi and Margibi counties to the west and east and Bong County to the north. Its southern border runs along the Atlantic Ocean. Montserrado is one of the two oldest counties in Liberia, having been founded in 1839, almost eight years before Liberia’s declaration of independence in 1847. With a population of 1,118,241 (GoL 2009) approximately representing a third of Liberia total population, Montseraddo is by far the most populous county in Liberia. However, in terms of space, it is the smallest country, covering an area of 1909 square kilometers. The consequence of the incongruity between the area and population, relative to other counties, makes Montserrado the densest, county in Liberia.
Administratively, Montserrado has two statutory districts namely, Todee and Caresburg. The latter is host to Bentol City, the capital of Liberia. Apart from the two statutory districts, there are two sub-units namely, Greater Monrovia and St. Paul. Although the county capital is Bentol City, Montserrado is most populous city is, Monrovia, the national capital and by far the most well-known area in the entire country. Due to the marked difference in socio-economic indicators between the capital Monrovia and the rest of Montserrado, a distinction is often made between Greater Monrovia (representing the area covered by Monrovia and the immediate towns and cities surrounding it) and Rural Montserrado (representing the rest of the county). Over 85 percent of the population of Montserrado lives in Greater Monrovia (GoL 2009). The facts surrounding this distinction present the clearest case of a paradox of inequity that has defined Liberia since its independence in 1847.

5.6.1 Challenges to Human Security in Montserrado County

Notwithstanding which areas of a particular country that insurgencies start, all the contending parties invariably aim at sacking the prevailing governance status quo be it a regime or a constitutionally elected government. The location of such a regime or government is therefore one of the main targets in intra state wars. Suffice it to say that it is also perceived to be the most guarded and in the case of Liberia, the most developed. Typical of this scenario, Montserrado position as the host of the capital and the seat of government made it one of the main battlegrounds during Liberia’s war. As expected, the consequence was massive destruction of public infrastructure, decimation of lives and mass displacement those that were fortunate enough to avid death. With the official end of the war, PCD efforts have also focused on Monrovia in particular and Montserrado as a whole. Inspite of this, there are palpable
shortcomings some of which are potentially threatening to various components of human security. These are addressed below.

5.6.2 Rural Montserrado

Inspite of its proximity to the capital Monrovia, Rural Montserrado is one of the most economically insecure counties in Liberia since the return to normalcy after the war. One of the reasons that has accounted for this is the nature of economic activities undertaken by close to 90 percent of the people in that part of the country; that is agriculture which features prominently in the economic portfolio of the people. Farmers in rural Montserrado have barely been able to produce enough to meet fifty percent of their consumption, let alone trade. As far as the people are concerned, the low level of agricultural production is attributable to the fact that the Rural Montserrado have perennially fallen on the shallow end of government assistance in terms of seeds, capital and the provision of extension services (See Table 9) For the people of St. Paul River city for instance, the whole concept of agricultural extension officers is totally lost to them as they have never witnessed such technical assistance even prior to the war. In addition to the challenges in Table 9, the deteriorated infrastructure between rural Montserrado and Greater Monrovia continues to complicate the processes of getting goods to the market. Consequently, producing at subsistence levels appears to be the logical option for most farmers. Unfortunately, this has not been able to provide the needed economic guarantees for the people in that part of Montserrado County.

Table 9: Challenges to Agriculture in Rural Montserrado

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Source: Montserrado County Development Agenda
Another item on the economic portfolio of the people in Rural Montserrado is working as labourers on the firestone rubber plantation and depending on the plantation for basic needs and economic fulfillment. Following a recent decision by the concessioner to reorganize large parts of the concession, a number of these labourers have since 2007 being virtually redundant between 2007 and 2009. This has further worsened the state of economic security. The link between the replanting exercise of Firestone and Economic security has been confirmed by Owadi (2011).

Closely related to the erosion of economic livelihoods is the threat to access to food in rural Montserrado. Ordinarily, on the basis of other counties, the distance between a county and the market in Monrovia influence cost of prices. Yet, inspite of its proximity to Monrovia, Rural Montserrado is one of the most insecure regions in Liberia when it comes to food. With a household food insecure percentage of 73.6 percent, compared to 7.8 percent for Greater Monrovia, the county is in the same food insecurity league as Grand Kru and Maryland Counties (CFSNS 2010). Several factors account for food insecurity in Rural Montserratado, one of this is the decline in economic livelihoods due to economic insecurity. With market purchases accounting for 60 percent of the sources of food (CFSNS 2010:70), the threat to livelihoods as discussed above, invariably translates into the threat to food security. Owadi (2011) confirmed the direct relationship between the uprooting and replanting of rubber trees and the decline of food security in Rural Montseraddo for two years leading to 2011 when data for this work was collected.

Apart from the above, there are certain deprived communities within Rural Montserratado that are real antinomies in terms of their location and level of socio-economic deprivation. One of the
most deprived in this regard is Todee district. With a population of 33,998 (GoL 2009), the district is effectively cut off from relative ‘civilization ‘in the rest of the County during the raining seasons. It also lacks many of the basic services taken for granted in Monrovia such as water, health and education. A similarly deprived community is the St. Paul River city. With a population of 79, 699 people, the district has virtually no access to basic services. Even the inadequate facilities are rendered white elephants due to the absence of roads. It is therefore not surprising that 83 percent (Vink at al 2010) of residents in Rural Montserratado cited bad roads as the most serious threat to their survival. And in terms of child morbidity, Rural Montserratado registered 86.7 percent compared to 36.3 for Monrovia (CFSNS 2010:92).

The deteriorated and in most cases non-existent roads also inhibits access to rule of law institutions. While criminal behaviour in rural Montserratado is not as pronounced as in Greater Monrovia, the neglect of the area has created an environment for criminal behaviour as well as populist actions aimed at curbing such criminal activities. Mob justice, for instance, is one of the threats in this regard. Human rights abuse through the use of the banned trial-by-ordeal traditional adjudicative mechanism is another predominant challenge. In sum, the lack of good roads is negatively affecting the general welfare and security of the citizens in Rural Montserratado by increasing poverty, mortality rates, among others. Given its location close to an area of abundance, the imbalance is indicative of challenges in other parts of the country.

5.6.3 Greater Monrovia

Generally speaking, human security statistics for food, health and other components are better in Greater Monrovia than any other part of Liberia. Therefore, the challenges of livelihood in Rural Montserratado are by no means representative of the situation in Greater Monrovia. This
notwithstanding, as a result of the sheer population size and density as well as it being host to the highest number of internally displaced persons and deactivated combatants exploring ways to make a living, Greater Monrovia is confronted by significant challenges to personal security (Montserrado CDA 2008).

The challenges to personal security in Greater Monrovia have its roots in the pervasive economic security by an overwhelming 80 percent of the population. The preeminent constituencies in this regard are the thousands of ex-combatants who are neither in school or gainfully employed. Following the end of the DDRR process in 2007, the post conflict camps for internally displaced persons were officially closed. Inspite of this, the inability of ex-combatants and IDPs to eke out livelihoods, have seen such groups of people maintain their residence in these camps. It is therefore not surprising that an overwhelming 82 percent of people in greater Monrovia, the highest percentage in any county, cite bad work opportunities as the greatest threat to their survival. For many of these unemployed who roam the streets of Monrovia, in the absence of a reliable source of income, they are unable to access food and other basic services like health, education and housing. As far as this group of people are concerned, the frustrations of coming out of a war where a gun could guarantee everything, to living in squalor in peace time, points to a dysfunction in the Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. A lot of these unemployed have turned to crime, in particularly, robberies and property theft. Indeed, compared to a nationwide average of 24 percent, 43 percent of respondents in Greater Monrovia cite crimes and robberies as threat to insecurity. The closest county to this situation is Grand Bassa with 26 percent (Vink et al 2011).
While the relatively most visible presence of the LNP and the UNMIL troops contend with this threat and actually maintain some level of security, in the absence of solutions to the root cause of the problem, the unemployment situation merely offers a “ticking time bomb” situation to security and stability in greater Monrovia. This was affirmed by 8 percent (compared to a national average of 4 percent) of residents in Greater Monrovia who saw the presence of unemployed ex combatants as a threat to personal security (Vink et al 2011). Even more threatening to Monrovia is the fact that they nest the same grievances that made them easily mobilisable during the period of the war (Zaizay 2011).

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter identified challenges to human security in Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Montserrado. On the face value of the data presented, there are vast inequalities between the various counties in terms of the state of the various components of human security and the extent of political commitment towards protecting and empowering people. The next chapter presents a comparative analysis of this data with the aim of identifying the inequalities and its implication for the sustainability of Liberia’s post-conflict development effort.
Chapter Six

ANALYSIS OF CORE COMPONENTS OF HUMAN SECURITY
IN LIBERIA

6.1 Introduction

Of all the suggested causes of Liberia’s war, none has received so much attention as the socio-economic inequalities created by years of mal-governance. This was perpetrated, first, by the Americo-Liberia True Whig Party and subsequently by both the Doe and Taylor-led governments. Against this background, and the fact of the weighty linkage between the state of human security and the sustainability of PCD, the study hypothesised that the floundering state of institution-building in post-conflict Liberia is likely to foster uneven results in human security, re-establish socio-economic inequalities, and engender negative consequences with the potential of instigating a relapse into violent conflict.

The previous chapter presented data on challenges to human security in Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Montserrado counties. This chapter analyses trends in the state of human security in the five counties and its potential implications on the sustainability of Liberia’s PCD. For purposes of analysis, the chapter utilizes the distinction in Montserrado County between Rural Montserrado and Greater Monrovia.

6.2 Food Security

One of the most projecting components of human security is food security. Undeniably, most of the early justifications of human security highlighted the fact that there is no difference between death through violent conflicts and death through hunger as both constituted critical threats to the vital core which is the survival of individuals and communities. In Liberia, the prospects of
attaining food sufficiency, one which came closest to fulfillment in 1976/1977 harvest year, was completely eroded with the civil war (Owadi 2011). At the start of the post-conflict development, efforts at achieving food security were elaborated through formal and informal institutions. As noted by Rueschemeyer & Evans (1985:46), this includes states - characterised as “a special type of organization invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory, and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force”. Thus, at the vanguard of formal institutions was the Republic of Liberia, animated through the Government of Liberia (GoL). Within the context of PCD institution-building, initiatives for food security coalesced under economic revitalisation. As noted in the fourth chapter of this study, these food security initiatives included the setting up of a training center for agricultural technology to support the Liberian Integrated Rural Development Programme, in addition to five regional seed centers and the provision of seeds and tools to 95,000 vulnerable small scale farmers. They also included the setting up of a food security monitoring unit within the Ministry of Agriculture and the reactivation of the national agriculture extension system which essentially targeted the rural areas. Even more importantly, food security initiatives were preceded by the first Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey (CFSNS) which as expected, highlighted the challenges to food security in the country. Marked against the starting point of PCD in 2003, the aggregate statistics suggest a year on year general improvement in food security. Record of this improvement has been noted in the 2010 CFSNS with the only period of brief decline being the year 2008 when rice, the country’s staple food, was badly affected by increases in global commodity prices.

Inspite of the general improvement in Liberia’s food security situation, data from the five counties examined suggest persisting threats which place the respective counties at various levels
of insecurity insofar as food is concerned. Figure 2 below notes the percentage of households facing food insecurity in Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Montserrado (Rural Montserrado and Greater Monrovia).

**Fig. 2: Percentage of Household Food Insecurity**

![Percentage of Household Food Insecurity](image)

Source: CFSNS 2010

Figure 2 shows that the southeastern county of Grand Kru and Rural Montserrado are the most food insecure areas in Liberia. This is followed by Maryland, Lofa and Grand Bassa. By far, Greater Monrovia is the least food insecure area in Liberia. Therefore, as regards food insecurity, the areas with the top three percentages of food insecure households are the so called red states, depicted in Figure 3 below.

A number of interrelated factors were discovered as accounting for the lopsided picture in food security. The first has to do with lack of adequate investment in agriculture systems and processes within the PCD. In the aftermath of the war and the destruction of the pre-war moderately organised systems, the people in the food insecure areas have been resigned to small-
scale subsistence farming. Typical challenges to small-scale farming such as lack of improved variety of seeds, use of archaic methods and inability to effectively deal with common pests continue to plague most of the farms thereby affecting yield. The rural focus during the deployment of extension officers in 2007 was useful yet the failure of the state, as an institution, to sustain the deployment affected consistency, a critical component in agricultural extension systems. The result has been that the people in the food insecure regions maintained their proclivity to more fancied, yet less efficient traditional means of production. The provisions of seeds for some food insecure households was also conducted as a one-off activity, obviously due to the expectation that part of initial harvests would be converted into seeds for subsequent planting years. However, the harvest could hardly sustain the food needs of the people in the hardest hit food insecure areas. It was therefore deduced that within a post-conflict context where survival is key, the preoccupation of the farmers was feeding themselves and their families rather than planting for another season.

Fig. 3: Food Security Map

Source: CFSNS 2010
The failure to reserve part of the harvest for succeeding planting seasons was also fueled by an attitude of “constant expectation” that predominated sections of the Liberian population in the aftermath of the war. The source of this “constant expectation”, it was deduced, was the combination of the massive external investment and visibility of external actors in Liberia as well as the feeling of “entitlement” from Liberians. In one particular case for instance, residents of one of the food insecure rural areas in Tubmanburg, having been assisted to cultivate some crops by a battalion of UNMIL troops from Nigeria, reportedly sent a message to their benefactors at the time of harvest, to come and assist them to harvest (Mensah 2008). As far as attitudes for PCD is concerned, among sections of the Liberian population, this and like cases demonstrated not just a dependency syndrome, sometimes witnessed among post-conflict societies, but also an inexplicable feeling of ‘entitlement” quite antithetical to the oft-heard post-conflict mantra of “Liberians must develop Liberia”. This attitude, in some cases, redefined the relevance of institution as independent determinants of the state of human security to dependent variables, with their impact on food security influenced by the attitude-dictated context they operate in.

Other sources of food insecurity derived from the portfolio of food sources and access to food. According to Sen (1981), famines (which are part of the manifestation of food insecurity) are rarely caused by lack of food, but are more likely to be a consequence of the sudden collapse of purchasing power and other unpredictable ‘exchange and entitlement’ failures. Sen’s view is apt in describing the challenges about access to food in certain parts of Liberia. Following the limited food produced within the five counties, all the food is usually consumed within the first five months after harvest. This leaves between six to seven months of no food. Under this situation, the options left are hunting and gathering, receiving food gifts from other relatively
secure households and purchasing from the market. The market has traditionally dominated these food sources in the respective counties (see figure 4).

**Fig. 4: Sources of Food**

![Bar chart showing sources of food in different counties](chart.png)

Source: CFSNS 2010

In Grand Kru for instance, 58 percent of food sources and 71 percent of food sources in Maryland are purchased from the market. Greater Monrovia has the highest percentage, with 97 percent of its food sources coming from purchases from the market. With this development, food security in the various counties is overwhelmingly tied to the vicissitudes of the market. Apart from rendering cost of food susceptible to world food prices, for those counties relatively far from the capital Monrovia which acts as a first transit point for food imported into Liberia, the combination of unusable roads and inadequate public transportation increases the cost of transport and by implication market access. This automatically marks up the price for the same commodities. The price differential which varies between dry and wet seasons (see table 9) ranges from 90 percent to 120 percent (CFSNS 2010) (See Table 9).
Consequent to the price differentials, the markets in the southeastern parts of Liberia in particular Grand Kru and Maryland, and Lofa County are much more expensive than those in Monrovia and other counties close to it. In the case of Rural Montserrado, which is just in the backyard of Greater Monrovia, food insecurity is a result of low production. As far as the people are concerned, the low level of agricultural production is attributable to the fact that the Rural Montserrado has perennially fallen on the shallow end of government assistance in terms of seeds, capital and the provision of extension services. As a classic case of lack in the midst of abundance, for the people of St. Paul River city for instance, the whole concept of agricultural extension officers is totally lost to them as they have never witnessed such technical assistance even prior to the war. Additionally, the deteriorated road infrastructure between rural Montserrado and Greater Monrovia continues to complicate the processes of getting goods to the market. Consequently, producing at subsistence levels appears to be the logical option for most farmers. Added to this is the close link between food security and economic security. In Rural Montserrado, the economic insecurity following the replanting exercise of Firestone Plantations has robbed most people of the guarantee of income. With the challenges of food production, most people in the area are unable to purchase food from the market.

It is deductible from the above, that one of the most enduring challenges of food security in the sample counties is the absence of good roads. Yet, institutional attempts to improve food security hardly addressed the issue of infrastructure, particularly in the southeastern and northwestern
parts of Liberia. While admittedly, issues concerning road are considered under the infrastructure and basic services pillar of PCD, the fact that they were considered in a detached manner meant that their effects on other sectors and subsectors were consciously or unconsciously ignored by the institutions concerned with rolling out road infrastructure. It appears they hardly consider the link between road and food. As will be established later, the most food insecure counties also happen to be part of the most economically insecure counties. In terms of quality, the people in these counties turn to the less favoured option of cassava in the absence of rice. The fact that greater Monrovia is the least food insecure area in Liberia cannot be taken for granted. Historically, the largely urban Greater Monrovia has been the poster city of Liberia, hardly experiencing any of the challenges of the outlying counties. Aside good roads and the best proximity to imported food, a lot more households in Greater Monrovia are relatively more economically secure than other counties and so have the best access to food on the market. Inspite of this, it still receives a lot more attention in food related institutions such as government price controls and other monitoring systems. The resulting inequality can hardly go unnoticed.

As far as the people of Grand Kru, Maryland and Lofa are concerned, this is a situation they are almost used to. While recollecting that this has been the trend in the past, they are quick to suggest that the national government is addressing the issue and thus, they are expectant of attracting the needed attention sooner than later. Notwithstanding this expectation, it is more than apparent that the GoL is hardly sustaining institutions for food security in the above areas. This is because, apart from attitudinal dynamics noted above, the precipitants of food insecurity are all rooted in institutional inadequacies relating to empowerment or protection. In the case poor yield, for instance, increasing and maintaining the momentum of agriculture extension activities past the initial rolling out stages can empower the people to look beyond outmoded agricultural
practices to modern and efficient ways. Similarly, an appreciation of the linkages between food and infrastructure in the food insecure counties could have influenced the realisation of the need to activate institutional linkages between respective institutions in charge of food and infrastructure. This could have at least ensured that roads critical to food supply in food insecure areas are prioritised. The persistence of these lapses; can negate the prospects of meeting the expectation of people in Grand Kru and other food insecure areas. Apart from damaging the reputation of the present government like others before it, unmet expectations can generate grievances with the potential of being exploited for unrests. The location of Grand Kru, Maryland and Lofa (close to Cote D’Ivoire and Guinea) and their history as being used as launching pads for the civil war, makes the generation of any grievance in these counties challenging to the sustainability of PCD. If food needs and other necessities to meeting food needs are not met overtime, threats to the sustainability of PCD will not even be formed from neighbouring Cote Ivoire or Guinea. Such threats will be home brewed. Suffice it to say that the first coup de tat witnessed in 1980 rode on the back of food insecurities.

6.3 Economic Security

To revitalize the economy as a way of ensuring economic security for Liberians, a number of structures have been put in place. As elaborated in the third chapter, this has included, creating the environment for resuscitating manufacturing and industrial concerns as well as investment opportunities, among others. Results from these efforts have been generally positive. From 2004 to 2009, for instance, foreign direct investment in Liberia was estimated at USD 641 million. In 2010 alone, approximately USD 175 million was recorded as having been invested in Liberia, with 70 percent of this amount going into the services sector (Liberia Investment Climate Statement 2011). The increase in foreign direct investment has also reflected in 24 percent
increase in registration of foreign business entities for 2010 over the 2009 figure. Between 2009 and 2010, domestic business registration has also increased by 4.2 percent.

Inspite of the generally positive indications of economic revitalisation, disaggregating the data points to a lopsided economic advantage by Greater Monrovia relative to Rural Montserrado and the four counties. Thus, in Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa and Grand Bassa, for instance, basic income for individuals for productive or remunerative work is still hardly guaranteed. Evidence of this is seen in a number of results from the baseline studies conducted by Vink et al (2011). In terms of percentage of people living on USD 0.5 or less a day, Grand Kru registered 79 percent, followed by Lofa with 76 percent and Rural Montserrado with 74 percent (See figure 5). Typical of the trend in PCD, Greater Monrovia has the least percentage of people living on five cents or less a day.

**Fig. 5: Percentage of People Living on USD 0.5 or Less per Day**

![Bar Chart: Percentage of People Living on USD 0.5 or Less per Day](source)

Results from the poorest income per capita also affirms the lopsided gains in favour of Greater Monrovia scoring 16 percent compared to 34 for Grand Kru, 27 for Maryland and 26 for Lofa.
County. Rural Montserrado scored 20 percent (See figure 6). As economic security is also measured in terms of assets, the baseline study by Vink et al (2010) also looked at the poorest asset quintile. Again, the results showed the advantage of Greater Monrovia relative to other areas with only 13 percent of its population falling within the poorest asset quintile compared to 42 for Grand Kru, 24 percent for Maryland and 25 percent for Rural Montserrado (See figure 7)

**Fig. 6: Poorest Income per Capita**

![% Poorest Income per capita](source)

**Fig. 7: Poorest Asset Quintile**

![Poorest Asset quintile](source)
It is worth noting that the above trend, on the basis of data from latter part of 2010 hardly differs from the norm. Data collected in 2007 for the 2008 Core Welfare Indicator Questionnaire (CWIQ) confirmed what can be aptly described as historical inequities in development and wealth creation in Liberia. Thus, poverty is highest in the southeastern (Grand Kru, Maryland, and River Gee) and the northwestern counties of Lofa, Gbarpolu and Bomi (see Figure 8).

**Fig. 8: Regional Poverty Picture 2007**

The lopsided trend in economic security has it causes in a number of factors. Fallout from food insecurity is one of the factors accounting for economic insecurity. As noted above, a number of food insecure counties like Grand Kru, Lofa and Maryland, have close to 60 percent of their food sources coming from the market. With a predominant part of their income going into food
purchases, increases in the prices of foods on the market directly affects the quantum of household resources invested in food purchases. This directly affects the quantum of disposable income left with the various households for other economic decisions.

Additionally, even a casual observation of the challenges to economic security in the various counties, as noted in the previous chapter, point to the lack of adequate infrastructure, especially roads, as the prime cause. In Grand Kru and Maryland counties for instance, it has been noted that in spite of a significant reserve of minerals and logs, they have hardly witnessed any meaningful investment and activities on a commercial scale due to the lack of roads. The result is an economic landscape dominated by petty trading and subsistence farming. Similarly, in land-locked Lofa County, substantial logging and mineral prospects have been minimally exploited due to the absence of adequate roads to facilitate the transportation of inputs and outputs to the nearest port in Montserrado (see Figure 9). In the absence of major investment, exploitation of the mineral and logging resources has been reduced to small scale generally unlicensed activities.

In spite of these palpable links between infrastructure and economic security in a number of counties, there remains a disconnect between respective institutions for economic revitalisation and infrastructure. This is in spite of political pronouncements to the contrary. Figure 9 below, for instance, points out the overwhelming road advantage of Liberia and counties close to it like Grand Bassa, relative to outlying counties like those in the southeast and northwest.

From Figure 9, what looks like a unidimensional road agenda will hardly complement institutional advances in promoting investment incentives and increasing minimum wage levels. The implication of the lack of roads on human security in various counties is not lost to the residents. In response to a question on challenges to living conditions, Vink et al (2011) note that
97 percent of respondents in grand Kru, 96 percent from Maryland and 98 percent from Lofa cite road conditions as one of the challenges. This compares with 74 percent for Greater Monrovia and 83 percent for Rural Montserrado (see Figure 10).

Fig. 9: Road Network in Liberia

![Road Network in Liberia](image)

Source: Ministry of Public Works

Fig. 10: Bad Road Condition as a Challenge to Living Standards

![Bar Chart: Road Conditions](image)

Economic security is further threatened by the unemployment level in the various counties. As noted in the fourth chapter of this thesis, one of the pronounced consequences of the war was the collapse of the productive sectors of Liberia’s economy and with it, the ability of the state and the private sector to generate employment. In the post war era, unemployment has been further worsened by the lack of employable skills among most of the active population of Liberia due to the termination of education and acquisition of employable skills during the civil war. The CWIQ 2007, for instance, noted that more than half of the country’s youth between the ages of 18 and 35 are not educated or trained for absorption into the labour sector (CWIQ 2007). In Rural Montserrado, Greater Monrovia and Grand Bassa, a significant number of these unemployed youth running into thousands also happen to be ex-combatants, thus, deepening threats to personal security. While the agricultural sector in areas like grand Kru, Maryland and Lofa has absorbed a significant number of the unemployed, the absence of elements of modernization within the agricultural sector makes it unattractive to the average Liberian youth, to whom such jobs are inferior. The result is the increasing number of unemployed forming along the major streets of the urban areas in Greater Monrovia, Lofa and Grand Bassa and other counties.

The unemployment situation is also complicated by the enclave like nature of investment by the large-scale agricultural and industrial concerns like firestone and the LAC and its result on economic indicators. While the GDP and other economic indicators point to an improving economy, the contribution the output of the large concerns make to Liberia’s GDP does not correspond to the relatively few number of employment opportunities created, and the concentration of such opportunities in enclaves. As noted in the previous chapter, in Grand Bassa
County for instance, this trend has secured employment for a few people leading the masses in the fringes of the County to feel neglected.

With 79 percent of Liberians indicating they have no access to work, it is only a matter of time before unrests starts (Vink et al 2011). While this in itself is detrimental to the sustainability of post-conflict development, it offers further complications to PCD because inspite of the fact that employment creation is a joint effort by both public and private sector, a good number of Liberians blame the state of economic insecurity with regards to job creation to the inability on the part of the GoL to create jobs. This is inspite of the role of the private sector in creating jobs. The responsibility assigned to the GoL can generate grievances among the mass of unemployed particularly those ex-combatants who prior to the end of the war had access to economic resources by merely wielding weapons. This can ignite disturbances which can threaten PCD.

Furthermore, inspite of the challenges of economic security in the sample counties, there is an enclave of prosperous Liberians within Greater Monrovia. These consist mainly of Liberian-born Lebanese, heavily involved in the importation of the country’s rice needs and Liberians from the diaspora some of whom were allegedly absent during the civil war but who have returned to occupy important positions in the country. While relatively small in number (approximately 2000), the extent of wealth and the demonstration of opulence by this group is largely fueling claims of corruption and inequity in the distribution of national wealth. Given the historical wealth gulf between the Americo-Liberian elite and indigenous Liberians, the fact that accusations of unfair wealth accumulation have been directed at this group of people is worrying. Considering the reality that both fact and fiction or perception is equally relevant in political governance, such perceptions appear to be providing a foundation for claims of wealth inequity
among the greater number of Liberians. Proven or not, this view has the potential of refocusing the minds of Liberians on the challenging days of the 1960’s and 70’s when inspite of steady economic growth averaging four to seven percent a year (CFSNS 2010), most of the country’s resources were concentrated in the elite.

As will be addressed later, the perceived and actual economic inequality coalesces with observable inequality in terms of the provisions of social infrastructure to clearly demarcate Greater Monrovia as an enclave of socio-economic development, in a post conflict country that has parts of the roots of the conflict to socio-economic inequality. The resultant fragility of the state of Liberia and its sustainability of its PCD is aptly captured by the September 2011 report of the UN Secretary-General on Liberia part of which cites limited employment and livelihood opportunities particularly among youth as one of the enduring factors affecting security (UNSC 2011).

6.4 Personal Security

After the war ended, one of the first set of institutions the new government focused on were those within the security sector. The reasons for reforming the security sector as part of post-conflict development is not far-fetched. Indeed, this has been addressed in the preceding chapters. In the specific case of Liberia, it has been noted that under circumstances where the security services collectively perpetrated abuses against the populace over a long period of time and actively participated in the civil war, and with a justice system that has long being associated with corruption and inequity, both public trust in these institutions as well as their ability to provide the public with a secure and just society, had plummeted by the start of the PCD process. The reform of the security sector was therefore essential to, among other things, regenerate
public trust in security sector institutions as agents for protection rather than abuse and to ensure the security and stability of the volatile state and its people. This is a prerequisite for the sustainability of every post-conflict development agenda. As noted in Chapter Four, key in reestablishing security was the remodeling of the LNP and the Armed Forces of Liberia and reforms within the justice and rule of law sectors. From rebuilding the LNP, a complete recreation of the New AFL and rule of law reforms leading to the deployment of county attorneys and judicial officers to the various counties, attempts have been made by the GoL in collaboration with external actors, to enhance the personal security of Liberians and provide access to justice.

Notwithstanding the above, a review of the state of personal security, including access to justice in the sample counties reveals a cocktail of deficiencies. Considering the institutions charged with security and rule of law, the evidence is that they are under performing. A primary deficiency in this regard is the thin spread of the LNP in all other places except Greater Monrovia, where the seat of government resides. On the basis of data from the four counties and Rural Montserrat, LNP units in the various counties normally range from 35 in Grand Kru to about 200 in Lofa with responsibility for between 2,298.78 square kilometres (Grand Kru CDA 2008) to 9,982 square kilometers (Lofa CDA 2008) respectively. This suggests a very thin spread of LNP across the various counties evidence of which is seen in the nearest time it takes residents in the various counties to get to the police station (see Figure 11).
Fig. 11: Shortest Time to Nearest Police Station


The inadequate numbers of law enforcement officers in the respective counties is worsened by woefully inadequate resources put at the disposal of the various county units. In terms of transport for instance, allocations to the sample counties do not exceed one vehicle and a couple of motor cycles some of which are rendered ineffective due to the delay in disbursement of funds for the running of these vehicles. Additionally, in the absence of offices, detention facilities like overnight cells, as well as the lack of skills to professionally gather and preserve evidence for subsequent prosecution in the law courts. This has reduced the LNP to figure heads or mere exhibition officers. They hardly deter crime but maintain light visibility in areas they find comfortable.
As a consequence of this, the various counties all report threats to personal security in the form of armed robberies, gender-based violence and mob actions sometimes directed to the police themselves. In Grand Kru and Lofa for instance, threats to security have also included child abuse in the illegal mining areas and ritual murders. The situation is no different in Lofa, where in spite of its reputation as one of the theatres for brutal conflict during the war, the deployment of LNP officers and the equipment allocated to them hardly matches up with the size of the county. In the well documented February 2010 riots in Voinjama and Zorzor, it took the detachment of UNMIL and ERU officers from Monrovia and a travelling time in excess of 3 hours to help quell the riots. Deriving from the above trend, many Liberians do not feel secure in their communities and hardly ask the police to help ensure security (see Figure 12).

**Fig. 12: Ever Asked the Police to Help**

![Bar Chart](image)

From figure 12, 43 percent of people in Monrovia have ever asked the police to help compared to relatively low percentages of 16 to 31 in Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Rural Montserrado. It is not coincidental that greater Monrovia has the largest presence of LNP. It is therefore suggested that the inadequacy of the LNP in the outlying counties is responsible for the low trust in them. This is affirmed by the percentage of people who ascribe their security to other sources rather than the police as Figure 13 shows.

Fig. 13: Who is in Charge of Your Security?

![Bar chart showing security sources by area and category.]


From figure 13, again it is no coincidence that in areas like Grand Kru, Maryland and Grand Bassa, where police presence is thinly spread, a greater percentage of people ascribe their security to ‘Nobody’ and ‘God’ rather than the activities of the LNP. This just shows a vote of no confidence in the LNP’s effectiveness at protecting security of people. In Greater Monrovia, the overwhelming presence of LNP has hardly achieved any independence as the remnants of the
UNMIL force still carry out effective law enforcement. This notwithstanding, the capital has still been granted the advantage in terms of deployment.

In terms of personal security realm, there is also a challenge with justice and rule of law. With most Liberians still mistrusting the formal justice systems of the country, relatively fewer people outside greater Monrovia know about how the system operates (see Figure 14).

**Fig. 14: Knowledge of Formal Justice System**

![Knowledge of Formal Justice System](http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh)


Apart from allegations of corruption leveled against the judiciary and county legal officers, issues of inaccessibility and affordability relative to the traditional justice mechanisms have also been raised. Following the reform of the justice sector, a number of county attorneys, magistracies and circuit courts were for instance revived in the five counties with Greater Monrovia again getting the largest number while large areas in Rural Montserrado had none. Furthermore, Greater Monrovia has access to a number of specialised courts unheard of in other
counties. This includes criminal courts on sexual and gender based violence as well as juvenile courts. Thus in terms of accessibility to formal justice systems, Greater Monrovia dominates.

Efforts to reform the justice system as an institution also fell short of offering any meaningful reforms to the traditional justice systems. Beyond outlawing trials by ordeal like Sassywood on paper, the GoL has done very little to ensure the enforcement of the ban. The practice therefore persists. Non-governmental organisations like the US-based Carter Center have held sensitization campaigns in areas like Grand Kru, Lofa and Rural Montserrado on the challenges of the traditional justice system. Nonetheless, in the absence of accessible and affordable formal justice mechanisms, the justice system in the various counties except Greater Monrovia is overwhelmingly dominated by the traditional mechanisms which are assessable and affordable (see Figure 15).

Fig. 15: Accessibility to Traditional Justice Mechanisms

As far as post-conflict rule of law professionals’ are concerned, the inequalities in the citing of courts in addition to socio-economic inequalities and the role out of infrastructure and basic services is fast reestablishing the dichotomy between Greater Monrovia and the rest of the country as two separate entities socio-economically. Within the context of a PCD system that best thrives on holistic reforms, and against the background of a conflict precipitated on inequality and a feeling of ‘us’ and ‘them’, any such attempt at regionalizing everything including rule of law can only generate and sustain a sense of injustice and have a negative effect on the sustainability of PCD. The insecurity generated by the combination of ineffective LNP and inadequate justice systems is also influencing a trend of mob or vigilante justice that can easily ignite further violence especially in the urban centers of Harper, Buchanan and Voinjama.

### 6.5 Infrastructure and Basic Services

The spread of infrastructure and basic services has been one of the areas where the inequalities in Liberia’s society have been most prominent. This has been compounded by a post-conflict development approach that appears to project development from a viewpoint of a Greater Monrovia that is the whole Liberia. As figure 9 above shows, the road network in and around Greater Monrovia relative to other areas is the best network of roads in the whole country. Yet, in areas like the southeast and the northwest, the lack of basic roads inhibits the access to health and education. Again as noted above, these infrastructure challenges are at the root of some of the worst economic and food security challenges in the counties as well as rural Montserrado. Data obtained from the Ministry of Public works, documenting the status of various projects towards the provisions of basic services notes some modest gains in Liberia as a whole (see Table 2). Yet disaggregating the data points to an inequitably high number of the projects earmarked for Greater Monrovia.
Table 11: Status of Projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Total # of deliverables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy(electric)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Storage</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water &amp; Sanitation</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Public Works

In terms of health, for instance, while residents of Greater Monrovia have access to health facilities, residents in Grand Kru, given the deplorable road conditions, cannot even access the inadequately equipped health facility in the county. As was pointed out, the threats to health security in a place like Grand Kru is not only limited to access but even the supply line of health services in the form of drugs and healthcare professionals. In the inaccessible districts of Buah, Dorbor and Sasstown, for instance, the concept of adequate healthcare can only be illusionary. Basic health services such as immunization is also very low across the county and virtually nonexistent in some districts. It is therefore not surprising that the county has one of the highest child mobility rates, scoring 81 percent for all illness (CFSNS 2010:123). Similarly, Todee district, situated at the back yard of Greater Monrovia yet retaining its status as one of the most deprived localities in the whole Liberia, has barely any access to health care beyond what is provided through the generosity of NGO’s like Merci. The trend in the rolling out of health care is seen in Figure 16 which details child morbidity for any illness.
The above paints a picture of the extent of healthcare available to the various counties. Ironically, Rural Montserrado has the highest rate of child morbidity at 86.7 percent inspite of its location close to the capital. This goes to support the fact that strengthens the suggestion that basic services are hardly provided for those outside the enclave of Greater Monrovia. The situation with health is closely mimicked in the educational sector, where residents outside Greater Monrovia have to struggle for substandard educational facilities. Any ascription to better education must be in Monrovia. Given the fact that those outside Greater Monrovia fall within the poorest quintiles, this aspiration can be elusive. As a result, there is an education gap between the poor in the outlying counties and the wealthy in Greater Monrovia (see Figure 17).
From Figure 17, only 50 percent of the respondents in Grand Kru County have the ability to read and write compared to 65 percent in Rural Montserrado and 78 percent in Greater Monrovia. The inequalities in education is further seen in respondents with secondary or higher education with Greater Monrovia leading by as high as 73 percent compared to under 50 percent of all the other counties. These inequalities feed into the dichotomization of Liberians.

6.6 Conclusion

Inspite of modest gains made, there are still a number of threats to human security in Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Rural Montserrado. While Greater Monrovia is also confronted by threats to personal and to a minimal extent, economic security, in terms of human security as a whole, it is miles apart from the other counties. Most of the threats to the sample counties excluding Greater Monrovia arguably have roots in the poor infrastructure particularly in the southeastern and northwestern region of Liberia, others have to do with what appears to be
a disconnect between respective institutions for infrastructure, basic services and economic revitalisation, among others.

In terms of human security within PCD, Liberia has made gains, generally speaking. However, disaggregating the data shows a spatial imbalance in human security gains between Greater Monrovia and the four sample counties as well as Rural Montserrado. Within Liberia’s context, this is a replay of a long history of socioeconomic inequality between Greater Monrovia and the rest of Liberia. The fact that such inequalities can facilitate grievances goes without saying. These grievances over inequalities can crystalize and depending on the availability of triggers, explode into full-scale war. As noted in the third chapter, there is a direct relationship between pursuing human security and the sustainability of PCD. However, in the particular situation of Liberia, giving that the conflict has its roots in socio economic inequalities between the elite, mainly in Greater Monrovia, and the rest of the country, any advances in human security that is uneven in nature, or perpetuates inequalities will negatively affect PCD by causing a relapse into violent conflict. The present trend in human security is strongly proceeding on the course for a relapse into conflict.
Chapter Seven

SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

Since the formal end to Liberia’s war in August 2003, the country has been in a post conflict development phase. In appreciation of the inexorable links between human security and post-conflict development, the focus of post-conflict institution building has been geared towards advancing human security in Liberia’s counties. Inspite of gains made, there are some aspects of human security such as the economic aspirations of Liberians that continue to be problematic. It also appears that the development and management of institutions for advancing human security in Liberia is yielding uneven results thereby deepening the inequalities that precipitated the war in the first place. Considering Liberia’s potential, as a post conflict country, to relapse into violent conflict, it was essential that the state of human security be examined to interrogate assertion of uneven results in the various counties. The study proceeded on the hypothesis that the floundering state of institution-building in post-conflict Liberia is likely to foster uneven results in human security, re-establish socio-economic inequalities, and engender negative consequences with the potential of instigating a relapse into violent conflict. On the basis of the hypothesis, the study sought to interrogate the extent to which the record of human security through institution building is deepening socio-economic inequalities and how that threatens the sustainability of Liberia’s post-conflict development. Consequently, the objectives of the study were to examine linkages between human security and the sustainability of post-conflict development; to examine the relevance of institutions to human security; to review Liberia’s record of post-conflict institution-building and how it translates into human security and to
examine challenges to human security in Liberia and the sustainability of post-conflict development. This chapter summarises the findings of the study and draws conclusion on the state of human security and the future of Liberia’s post-conflict development. The chapter also outlines modest recommendations towards advancing human security in Liberia while safeguarding the integrity of post-conflict development.

7.2 Summary of Research Findings

The findings of this study are summarised below according to the objectives set in Chapter one. It starts with the supporting objectives and works up to the main objective of the study.

7.2.1 Human Security and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Development

The study sought to examine the linkages between human security and the sustainability of PCD using four case studies namely, the European Recovery (Marshall Plan) and the post-conflict development plans of Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the case of the Marshall plan, it was noted that apart from the physical infrastructure and the industrial focus, the Marshall plan, as a post-war effort, implemented a number of programmes related directly or indirectly to human security such as food and social accommodation. Commenting on the relevance of these issues, Barry Bingham, head of the ECA mission in Paris highlighted the psychological advantages to be gained in “providing tangible benefits of immediate interests to the average Frenchman” (Bingham 2008:20). Further indications of human security at the root of the Marshall Plan, it was noted, were observable in the June 5, 1947 speech of Secretary of State George C. Marshall who noted that “the American aid has to support a united Europe and to fight misery” (Bossuat 2008:15). The suggestion of “misery” apart from falling within the US objective of making Western Europe attractive to counter communism, was to some extent, an
indication of a wider perspective of security from the traditional state centric security. Marshall’s view on human security was confirmed by a statement attributed to George Kennan when he noted that the difficulties of Europe were not linked to communism but to hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. It was therefore not surprising that food and raw materials accounted for 15.7 percent of the Marshall Plan’s imports to European countries from 1948 to 1949. Human security was therefore at the heart of the Marshall Plan.

In the case of Sierra Leone, it was noted that the war had its roots in grievances which crystalised as a result of bad governance, economic mismanagement, and breakdown of public service institutions, abuse of human rights, chronic underdevelopment particularly in the rural areas, absence of basic services such as education and health, pervasive unemployment and the lack of opportunities for the youth. The study noted that the post-conflict development system, in an attempt to restore the broken down institutions in Sierra Leone, ended up restoring some of the old governance systems that facilitated abuse of human rights and perpetrated the grievance-generating exclusionary politics. Explaining this trend, it was noted that the structure of the post-conflict development plan put DDR and not human security at the core. As a result, it was noted that although structures were built for health and education among others, the absence of the integrated human security motive meant that the structures and institutions were merely manifestations of the old order. This meant that the prewar status quo characterised by elite corruption, state sponsored oppression, pervasive impoverishment and the breakdown of human security (Zack-Williams, 2001) and which according to Denoy (2010:798) created a context of structural violence that resulted in chronic economic stagnation and high unemployment, among others, is emerging in the post conflict environment. It was noted that the return of the conflict precipitants pose a threat to the sustainability of the PCD by creating the potential for a relapse.
In the case of Rwanda, the study found that unlike Sierra Leone, the post-conflict development strategy was structured to address the root causes of the conflict. The post-genocide government therefore sought to implement a well-designed plan to steer the country away from the fundamental causes of the conflict - ethnicity. It was therefore not surprising that in a very autocratic manner, the government of Rwanda in the immediate post-genocide period issued a ban on ethnic identity. It was noted that other measures such as reeducation of the population and the redrawing and renaming of the territory all formed part of a reengineering of the socio, economic and political spheres of Rwanda life. It was suggested that through a process of “transformative authoritarianism” (Straus and Waldorf 2011:5), human security was blended with other motives relating to the root causes of the conflict, to ensure that a relapse to conflict is avoided.

The study noted that the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina also typified the linkage between human security and post conflict development. This was seen in the strategy of the World Bank, leading the effort at post-conflict reconstruction. It noted that with personal security relatively improved through initial stabilization efforts, the World Bank prioritised housing, health, education, food and other components of human security. The study noted that the human security approach (which galvanized popular support for the World Bank’s efforts) steered the country away from the predominant ethno-competitive politics that would have blighted an attempt at state building from the liberal democratic approach.

On the basis of the review of the four cases, the study presented concrete linkages between human security and post-conflict development. The first link was traced to aid policies in post-conflict countries. It was noted that, on the balance of evidence, depending on the quantum
infused in post-conflict countries, aid can reduce the potential for relapse from 40 percent to 31 percent (Collier 2008). It was determined that the effects of aid on PCD sustainability was due to the fact that it translates into aspects of economic security such as employment and food security thereby reducing of the vulnerability to renewed conflict.

Additionally, it was noted that the corollary for post-conflict states to provide to the people living within that territory, security, justice and rule of law, among others, is for citizens to accept the legitimacy of the state by meeting obligations such as taxes as well as accepting the State’s monopoly over coercive force. It has been suggested that the reciprocity involved in state-building necessarily requires inclusive political processes that enhance the negotiation of relations between the state and the society. Furthermore, absence of human security as a core objective of post-conflict development can reinforce the creation of sub-state boundaries that inhibit such inclusiveness. It was therefore suggested that in the absence of the national authorities advancing human security, sub-state actors or platforms fill the gaps in a way that inhibit state-building at the national level.

Further on the link between human security and PCD, it was noted that the destruction of institutions during conflicts is often preceded by the undermining of the institutions (particularly those that directly represent the legitimacy of the state such as the law enforcement agencies) prior to the war and is carried forward to the post-conflict period. The study suggested that the resulting lack of faith in state institutions can be remedied by putting human security at the center of these institutions, and by such institutions engaging in activities that are directly related to the human security needs of the people. This, it was noted, can engender favourable public perception critical to the success of post-conflict development.
Another link between human security and PCD derives from the pre-conflict environment for most countries engaged in civil wars. This environment has been described as unstable with poor social-economic and political indicators (Yilmaz 2009). It was therefore suggested that since some of the challenges emerging from this environment contributed to the conflict, conventional wisdom demands the need to address the supposed contributors to the causes of the conflict most of which are human security issues.

The nature of contemporary civil wars, it was noted, also point to the relevance of human security in post-conflict development. In this regard, it was suggested that given a post-conflict context that is often characterised by the decimation of social and political institutions most of which are responsible for advancing the human security needs of the people, any attempt to address the appalling conditions of illiteracy, malnutrition, and high mortality rates affecting the population must proceed with human security in mind. This factor, coupled with the reality that civil wars create newly vulnerable groups (such as orphans, victims of abuse and the unemployed) makes a good case for mainstreaming human security in post-conflict development.

Linkages between human security and PCD was also identified on the basis of conflict theories such as Grievance (Gurr 1970) and Frustration/Aggression (Dollard, Miller et al 1939) that advance the view that individuals, given other prevailing circumstances, will react to threats to existential variables like personal and food security. Juxtaposing these theories with historical data, it was concluded that liberation wars, political unrest and ethnic-based uprising have all pointed to the trend that people are willing to react (even to the point of violence) in the face of challenges to human security. The implication of this on post-conflict development, it was suggested, is that people are more likely to engage in unrests or to protest against direct threats to
their livelihood than the somewhat abstract of national security (which is often labeled as the sole concern of governments or regimes). The reverse is true – that people will support their livelihood. It is therefore posited that in the absence of tangible human security arrangement, threats to human security can cause or at least induce unrests that can derail efforts at PCD.

Related to the above, it was noted that the extent to which vestiges of conflicts are managed in the post-conflict context influence the success or otherwise of post-conflict development. It was noted in this regard that, one way to manage the continued dominance of destabilizing figures such as warlords and tribal leaders, who garnered enough credibility and respect during the period of the war, and whose activities can be detrimental to the post conflict efforts of the country, is to focus on human security, which as indicated is closest to the heart of the population. Through this, challenges from such power brokers and their potentially destabilizing efforts are, at the least, minimized. On the basis of the above, it was concluded that advancing human security is critical to the sustainability of PCD.

7.2.2 Relevance of Institutions to Human Security

In meeting this objective, the study proceeded with a clarification of institutions. It noted that institutions refer to a set of rules that guide and constrain the behaviour of actors within a particular context. It also reflects the structures that often manage these rules for the purposes of shaping action. In terms of its utility, it was noted that institutions help create and shape interests, influence the goals of actors, and constrain the options open to individuals to achieve those goals. Beyond formal organisations such as bureaucracies, institutions also reflect informal rules that govern behaviour. It is in this context that it was hypothesised that floundering institutional building process could impact on human security and give birth to grievances whose outcome
can be detrimental to Liberia’s PCD. In clarifying the composition of actors from a neo-institutional theoretical perspective, it was noted that they include individuals and groups of all types whether social or commercial in orientation as well as States - characterised as a special type of organization invested with the authority to make binding decisions for people and organizations juridically located in a particular territory and to implement these decisions using, if necessary, force.

The study noted the Commission for Human Security’s (2003) mutually reinforcing principles of Protection and Empowerment as *sine qua non* to advancing human security and pointed out the relevance of institutions to empowerment for or protection of human security. It noted that within this context, a number of researches have established specific linkages between institutions and various components of human security such as economic security (Williamson, 1985), food security, environmental security and political security. The study then proceeded to identify the relevance of institutions to specific components of human security. On environmental security, it was noted that the definition of environment the totality of surrounding conditions points to waste management, land use, afforestation and deforestation as well as sustainable management of water bodies and climate change as elements of environmental security. The study noted that the identification of the elements of environmental security point to the relevance of institutions in addressing the challenges of environmental security. With regard to global warming for instance, it was noted that a typical example of the facilitating role played by institutions can be seen in the global agreement to the Kyoto Protocol which seeks to cut global emissions of greenhouse gases so as to stabilize or regulate their concentration in the atmosphere in order to reduce the incidence of anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
In terms of food security, the study also noted that whether it is about the quality or quantity of food, ensuring security depends on the elaboration of formal or informal yet clear rules and procedure for addressing these issues. Sen’s (1981) insightful perspective on food security and institutions was recounted. In this regard, Sen notes that famines are rarely caused by a lack of food, but are more likely to be a consequence of the sudden collapse of purchasing power and other unpredictable ‘exchange and entitlement’ failures. He argues that some institutions such as food markets function normally, but populations unable to afford food starve while their regions are exporting food staples elsewhere. Thus, addressing a challenge to food security which lies in the deficiency of an institution like the market, necessarily calls for addressing the institutional deficiency.

The relevance of institutions can also be seen within the context of political security. This component of human security refers to the extent to which the human rights of people are honoured (UNDP, 1994). Apart from the various components of human rights, political security also relates to the relative freedom by which people determine issues relating to how resources are allocated and controlled within a state. In terms of institutions, there is no gainsaying that the post-Cold War triumph of the West has enhanced the acceptance of liberal democracy, as holding the key to the development of institutions crucial for advancing political security. One of the critical institutions in this regard are democratic free and fair elections, rule of law characterised by constitutionalism, independent judiciary and a free legislature as well as state agencies relating to law enforcement. Thus, institutions of governance, both internationally and in the domestic sphere are critical to advancing political security. On the basis of the above, it was concluded that indeed, institutions are relevant to human security.
7.2.3 Liberia’s Record of Post-Conflict Institution-Building

A third supporting objective was to review Liberia’s record of post-conflict institution building and how it has translated into human security for Liberians. These segments include security, justice and rule of law, basic services and others identified in the TRC report (GoL 2009) as having caused, or at the least, stimulated some of the causes of the civil war. In the case of the security sector, the study focused on the Liberia National Police and the Armed Forces of Liberia. It was explained, that although institutions that operated in Liberia’s security sector prior to the end of the war included the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (BIN), the Special Security Services (SSS) and other security organisations some of which had demonstrated amorphous identities over the years, the Armed forces of Liberia and the Liberia National Police dominated rebuilding efforts in the sector because they constitute the largest and most crucial parts of Liberia’s security sector, their roles and missions were therefore perceived to largely influence how the new state provides security.

As regards the Armed Forces of Liberia, it was noted that as at mid-2011, there were effectively two battalions of the new AFL made up of 2,012 personnel. Despite the successes of building the AFL from scratch, it was indicated that as at the end of 2011, a number of top and mid leadership positions were still filled by personnel from other West African countries. It has been noted that the challenges of getting the officer corps of the new AFL ready and the delays in equipment procurement means that it will not be independently operational before 2014. With regard to the LNP, it was noted that there is currently, in addition to the regular LNP, three special units namely the Police Support Unit (PSU); the Emergency Response Unit (ERU); and the Women and Children’s Protection Unit dealing with specialised disturbances and crime. Due to the challenges the LNP had in the past with corruption and professionalism in general, it was noted
that the process of rebuilding the LNP has also witnessed developments in staff appraisal systems including the signing into law of the LNP Professional Standards Division Policy and Procedure. This is expected to encourage professionalism and sanction all acts of omission and commission that are not in line with democratic policing in the 21st Century.

The review of Liberia’s post-conflict institution building record also delved into Liberia’s Justice and rule of law sector. It was noted that considering that abuse of human rights engendered by the lack of rule of law as well as absence of independent adjudicative institutions significantly influenced the conflict precipitants, the need for justice sector reforms has been justifiably tied to the potential for Liberia to relapse into conflict and by extension the long term sustainability of post-conflict development. The study reviewed both the formal and informal or traditional justice systems in Liberia. Within the formal systems, it noted developments geared towards improving the visibility and effectiveness of the justice system in the various counties. This includes the deployment of county attorneys and magistrates as well as other judicial and rule of law staff. It noted the challenges of keeping justice staff in the counties due to the lack of infrastructure and basic services in some of the counties. With regard to the informal justice system, the study noted the fact that it accounts for close to 85 percent of the justice needs of Liberians yet hardly saw any institutional development beyond the outlawing of trials-by-ordeal.

In terms of economic revitalisation, the study noted that due to the history of corruption and mal-governance in the economic affairs of the country, one of the prime areas identified for institutional rebuilding has been the management of the financial resources of the state. To address this, it was noted that the implementation the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP) from 2005 to 2009, enhanced efficiency and accountability in the
management of public resources through its five interlocking components namely, financial management and accountability; managing government budget and expenditure, enhancing processes for public procurement and the granting of concessions, controlling the loopholes that influence corruption particularly in the public sector and building the capacity of some state-owned organisations (SOEs). The study also noted that post-conflict attempts at economic revitalization in Liberia have focused on jumpstarting extractive sectors of the economy such as the mining and logging sectors that virtually ceased operations during the war. Efforts in this regard, it was noted, have been complemented by the lifting of UN sanctions on timber and diamond in 2006 and 2007 respectively.

The study also noted, in line with the above objective of economic revitalisation, that there have been the creation and revitalisation of a myriad of institutions as gambits to strengthening Liberia’s trade and investment climate. This includes the revision of the Investment Incentives Code of 1976 and the promulgation of the Investment Act (2010). A critical novelty of the new investment incentive code, it was noted, has been its recognition of significant underdevelopment of those areas outside Monrovia, particularly in the south-eastern counties of Grand Kru and Maryland. Consequently, the code offers further incentives for investments projects in those parts of the country.

While laying the foundation for increased employment, it was also noted that post-conflict institution building for economic revitalization has also included the development of legislation and policies towards protecting Liberia’s labour force from being exploited. One of the challenges in Liberia’s post war environment has been the abuse of labour through generally unfavourable labour practices. This is because in the absence of adequate jobs, the mainly
unskilled labour forces have been left at the mercy of employers, sometimes creating violent labour unrests. This was particularly the case on rubber plantations such as the Liberia Agriculture Company (LAC) in Buchannan in Grand Bassa County where workers are hardly protected from the harsh production conditions in the plantations and processing plants (Attuquayefio 2009). To curb this problem, the Liberian Senate in 2007, revised parts of the Labour law that prohibited workers from embarking on industrial actions. The revision also expunged provisions that allowed room for employers to dismiss employees without cause. Subsequently, in 2010, A Decent Work bill and Code of Conduct was introduced to safeguard work conditions and enhance respect for the rights of workers. The bill was passed in July 2011 as the New Labour Law of Liberia. Among other conditions for decent work, the new labour law also guaranteed collective bargaining mechanisms and set USD6.40/day as the minimum wage for private sector employees particularly those in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, in recognition of the significant role of agriculture to livelihoods, post-conflict institution building has also covered agriculture. Significant developments in this regard are the setting up of seed centers and revitalisation of national agriculture extension system.

The review of the record of post-conflict institution building also delved into the infrastructure and basic services sector. It was noted that since 2003, the GoL with the active support of UNMIL and a host of other development partners have invested in improving roads, access to health, education water and sanitation services throughout the country. The UNMIL-inspired quick Impact Project Scheme was identified as a critical component in terms of rebuilding the infrastructure and basic services sector.
On the basis of the above, it was argued that, for a country that is still picking up the pieces, the Liberian government with help from the international community have created and revitalized institutions that cut across the protection and empowerment spectrum insofar as advancing human security is concerned. Granted that there were still challenges, the study opined the need to interrogate how the post-conflict institution building record has translated into human security in five of Liberia’s fifteen counties namely, Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa and Montserrado.

7.2.4 Human Security and the Sustainability of Post-Conflict Development in Liberia

Having reviewed Liberia’s record in post-conflict institution-building, the study sought to interrogate how the record has translated into human security by examining challenges to human security in Grand Kru, Maryland, Lofa, Grand Bassa, and Montserrado. On the basis of this, the study sought to analyse trends in human security in the selected counties to examine how they promote the sustainability of PCD or otherwise.

With regard to the first part of this objective, challenges identified generally had to do with food security, economic security, personal security, and community security. On face value of the data accessed, the study concluded that there are significant inequalities between the various counties in terms of the state of the various components of human security and the extent of political commitment towards protecting and empowering people. On the basis of this, the study sought to analyse the inequalities with the aim of examining its prospects for sustaining PCD.

In terms of food security, the study discovered persisting threats to security which by implication places the respective counties at various levels of food insecurity. The most threatened in this
regard are the southeastern counties of Grand Kru and Maryland, and to some extent, Lofa County in the northwestern part of Liberia. Although Greater Monrovia is the most food secure area in Liberia, Rural Montserrado, situated within the same county with Greater Monrovia is also one of the most food insecure areas in Liberia. The study identified a number of interrelated factors accounting for the unevenness in food security. These included the lack of adequate investment in agriculture following the destruction of previous agricultural systems during the war. It was also deduced that a combination of massive investment and visibility of external actors in Liberia as well as a feeling of entitlement was to some extent accountable for the continuous dependence of the agricultural sector in food insecure areas on handouts of seed and other inputs.

Further on the causes of food insecurity, the study observed that in the absence of adequate production to meet food needs, the sources of food in Liberia are dominated by purchases from the market. This ties access to food to prices on the market. It was noted in this regard that for those counties away from Greater Monrovia, the combination of deteriorated roads and lack of public transport increases the cost of market access which marks up the prices of goods from the market. Given that the most food insecure counties are also the most economically insecure, household have to spend a significant part of their disposable incomes acquiring food. Others cannot afford and so depend on less desirable substitutes like cassava.

On the basis of the analysis, it was suggested that the single most enduring challenge of food security in the sample counties is the absence of good roads. Yet, attempts to improve food security, it was noted, hardly addressed the issue of infrastructure, particularly in the southeastern and northwestern parts of Liberia. The study noted that the fact that greater
Monrovia is the least food insecure area in Liberia cannot be taken for granted as historically, the largely urban Greater Monrovia has been the poster city of Liberia, hardly experiencing any of the challenges of the outlying counties. Aside good roads and the best proximity to imported food, a lot more households in Greater Monrovia are relatively more economically secure than other counties and so have the best access to food on the market. Inspite of this, it still receives a lot more attention in food related institutions such as government price controls and other monitoring systems. The resulting inequality can hardly go unnoticed. It was suggested that although residents in the food insecure areas are quick to suggest that the national government is addressing the issue, it is an expectation which if not met, could damage the reputation of the present government like others before it. The grievance thus formed, it was noted, is capable of been exploited. It was further noted that in the specific cases of Grand Kru, Maryland and Lofa and their history as being used as launching pads for the civil war, makes the development of any grievances in these counties challenging to the sustainability of PCD. Furthermore, it was opined that given Liberia’s history of food riots, if food needs and other necessities to meeting food needs are not met overtime, threats to the sustainability of PCD will be home brewed.

In terms of economic security, the study again found that for all the indicators such as poorest income per capita, poorest asset quintile and employment, Greater Monrovia had much more favourable statistics than the four remaining counties and Rural Montserrado. Counties in the southeastern part of Liberia were again highlighted as the most economically insecure in the whole of Liberia. Comparing the data to the national poverty picture of 2007, it was seen that insofar as poverty is an indication of economic insecurity, the present trends are just affirming historical trend in economic security in Liberia, as Greater Monrovia has always been the most economically secure area relative to other counties. Similar to the challenges of food security, the
causes of economic insecurity were also traced to the road and infrastructural disadvantages of the four sample counties as well as Rural Montserrado. Thus it was noted that inspite of prospects in the extractive industry for instance, Maryland, Lofa and Grand Kru have all not attracted any significant investments in these sectors. In the absence of such investments, the economic landscape, it was noted, has been dominated by subsistence farming petty trading and small-scale and mostly illegal mining and logging activities. These activities have been hardly able to guarantee basic income needed for economic security. Fallouts from food insecurity were also noted as part of the reasons for which a predominant part of their income goes into food purchases. Increases in the prices of foods on the market directly affect the quantum of household resources invested in food purchases. This directly affects the quantum of disposable income left with the various households for other economic decisions.

The study noted that inspite of the challenges of economic security in the sample counties, there is an enclave of prosperous Liberians within Greater Monrovia. These consist mainly of Liberian-born Lebanese, heavily involved in the importation of the country’s rice needs and Liberians from the diaspora some of whom were allegedly absent during the civil war but who have returned to occupy important positions in the country. While relatively small in number it was noted that the extent of wealth and the demonstration of opulence by this group is largely fueling claims of corruption and inequity in the distribution of national wealth. It was noted that this view has the potential of refocusing the minds of Liberians on the challenging days of the 1960’s and 70’s when inspite of steady economic growth averaging four to seven percent a year most of the country’s resources were concentrated in the elite. Such economic inequality, it was noted, coalesces with observable inequality in terms of the provisions of social infrastructure to clearly demarcate Greater Monrovia as an enclave of socio-economic development, in a post
conflict country that has parts of the roots of the conflict in socio-economic inequality, the situation is creating a corps of discontented individuals grieving over the disproportionate distribution of wealth. In the event of any trigger, Liberia’s PCD will be derailed.

All the counties selected for the study have threats to personal security with armed robbery, ritual murders, domestic violence, child abuse and mob actions, being overly pronounced. While this is an expected legacy of a post-conflict country battling with lopsided economic security, the response of the State as an institution is rather reaffirming social inequalities in Liberia. With the exception of Greater Monrovia, where a mass of LNP assisted by the remaining UNMIL and UNPOL officers, a primary deficiency in the protection of personal security in Liberia is the thin spread of the LNP. This has largely reduced the police to figure head roles with their visibility hardly inspiring. The analysis therefore revealed that in all the areas with the exception of Greater Monrovia, a significant number of people ascribe the responsibility of their security to “nobody” and to “God” rather than the police. While professionalism within the police has been enhanced, the inadequacy in areas where they are most needed has resulted in a vote of no confidence in the police. The situation of the police also shows some institutional dysfunction. This is because in Greater Monrovia, the overwhelming presence of LNP has hardly achieved any independence as the remnants of the UNMIL force still carry out effective law enforcement. This notwithstanding, the capital has still been granted the advantage in terms of deployment. This further goes to establish the inequalities in the allocation of the country’s resources to favour Greater Monrovia.

As regards personal security, the study notes challenges with regard to justice and rule of law. The lack of roads and basic services as well as persisting mistrust of the formal justice system,
means that relatively fewer people outside Monrovia know how the formal justice system works. With very minimal attempts made to develop institutions in the traditional justice system, the majority of Liberians who patronize it have to do so in spite of its inherent challenges. It was noted that the inequalities in the citing of courts in addition to socio-economic inequalities and the role out of infrastructure and basic services is also reestablishing the dichotomy between Greater Monrovia and the rest of the country as two separate entities socio-economically. Within the context of a PCD system that best thrives on holistic reforms, and against the background of a conflict precipitated on inequality and a feeling of ‘us’ and ‘them’, any such attempt at regionalizing everything including rule of law can only generate and sustain a sense of injustice and have a negative effect on the sustainability of PCD. It was further noted that the insecurity generated by the combination of ineffective LNP and inadequate justice systems is also influencing a trend of mob or vigilante justice that can easily ignite further violence especially in the urban centers of Harper, Buchanan and Voinjama.

The analysis also revealed inequalities in the distribution of basic services. Whether it is health, electricity, potable water or education, Greater Monrovia is far ahead of other areas in Liberia. Added to the lack of roads, other counties have to contend with gargantuan hurdles to access very limited facilities sometimes afforded by NGOs. Highlighting child morbidity rates and literacy and education, the study nodded home the fact of socio-economic inequality in Liberia’s PCD.

Within the context of the literature on human security and post conflict development, the case of Liberia highlights two areas for considerations. The first has to do with the general absence of “context” in the appreciation of human security. By disaggregating the reality of human security
in Liberia’s PCD, for instance, it has been noted that inconsistencies in Liberia’s peculiar context (manifested in inequalities between Greater Monrovia and the rest of the country) have not been effectively addressed. The disregard of this ‘context’, it has been noted, has a bearing on the sustainability of PCD. Context is therefore critical to the definition of human security.

Secondly, the absence of mechanisms to specifically deal with human security concerns for the greater part of Liberia’s existence was due to the failure of leadership to appreciate or acknowledge the respective boundaries of security and development as well as the nexus between the two concepts. The international environment that was generally unresponsive to the co-optation of human security into security discourse also appears to have had a bearing, however minimal, to the relegation of human security to the fringes of security discourse and consequently, the absence of mechanisms to address challenges. Within Liberia, this affected the consideration of institutions to specifically address human security challenges.

Liberia’s PCD, is unfolding within a domestic environment that is much more alive to the relevance of human security. While the post-conflict government of Liberia has chalked some modest successes in addresses human security concerns, there are still some challenges as a result of an inadequate appreciation of the boundaries of human security. This has manifested, for instance, in the inability to adequately tap into the linkages between supposed developmental priorities like road and components of human security like critical and pervasive threats to the food security of the people in southeastern Liberia. Within the literature of institutions for human security, it is therefore essential to highlight the direct relationship between an appreciation of human security and the proclivity to evolve institutions to address challenges.
7.3 Conclusion

In spite of modest gains in its post-conflict development, the study has established that socio-economic inequalities still persist in Liberia. Although very few countries can lay claim to equal stages of development for all the population, the case of Liberia is peculiar. Apart from recently emerging from a conflict partly caused or triggered by socio-economic inequalities, the present uneven human security results are reflective of a historical neglect of segments of Liberia’s population. For over a century, the only areas that really benefited from development opportunities were greater Monrovia and the areas of the country like Grand Bassa, which provided the central government with royalties from the large-scale agricultural and industrial concerns. Overtime, the grievance generated by these socio-economic inequalities crystalised and exploded into a 14 year war, which was destructive in the true sense of the word. As noted in the literature review, a number of the rebel forces including the Taylor-led National Patriotic Front of Liberia, all found fertile grounds for recruitment in disgruntled youth along the outlying areas of Liberia.

As noted already, the floundering state of institution building has meant that these inequalities have been hardly addressed. By omission or commission, the present trend is a recipe for disaster. By virtue of it being a post-conflict country, Liberia already has 40 to 44 percent chance of relapsing into violent conflict. This chance of relapse is even enhanced by the state of uneven human security that is not only detrimental to segments of the population, but is also reigniting causes of the conflict which in any case have been merely terminated and not resolved. The present trend in Liberia is, to some extent, a replay of the pre-conflict environment. With the UN mission in Liberia in its final stages, unless a drastic trend is re-engineered placing emphasis on opening up other parts of the country, Liberia can hardly sustain its post-conflict development.
7.4 Recommendations

Strong, viable, and functional state institutions provide the best option for addressing human security in post-conflict development. However, Liberia is currently treading a risky part insofar as its post-conflict development is concerned. To avoid any destabilizing effects, stakeholders must relentlessly pursue institution building in a spatially holistic manner. In this regard, there is the need to shift some attention from greater Monrovia to other parts of the country. This is essential to equalize the present disparities through facilitating investments in other parts of the country. By opening up other counties through the prioritization of roads, the current influx of people to Monrovia in search of greener pastures can be ameliorated.

Within the general context of institutions, human security and post-conflict development, the study recommends the following:

a. Although it has been established that advancing human security is essential for sustaining post-conflict development, as the case of Liberia has proven, the quest for human security can also threaten PCD, particularly, when the outcome is uneven and reestablishes inequities. It is therefore recommended to stakeholders in post-conflict countries that human security should be advanced in a manner that does not replicate the causes of the conflict, but also addresses the causes of the conflict.

b. Inspite of the contribution of both formal and informal institutions, sometimes, the parochial outlook of some informal institutions blight their relevance to human security. As a result, from an institutional point of view, the state remains the preeminent actor in advancing spatially holistic human security within PCD. It is therefore recommended that
efforts at post-conflict institution-building must invest heavily in formal institutions, particularly those operating within the formal state structure.

c. While national data generally showed an improvement in the general state of human security since the start of Liberia’s PCD in 2003, a spatial disaggregation of the record did not just paint a different picture but also highlighted the potential threat to PCD. Therefore, to obtain a relatively more accurate picture of the state of human security in post-conflict countries, the use of disaggregated (spatially specific) data, obtained through participatory vulnerability assessments is highly recommended.

d. The discussion of linkages between human security and post-conflict development indicated that people are more likely to engage in unrests or to protest against direct threats to their livelihood than the somewhat ‘abstract’ national security (which is often labeled as the sole concern of governments or regimes). The reverse is true – that people will support their efforts at enhancing their livelihood. Prioritising issues concerning the livelihoods of the population in the planning of post-conflict agendas is therefore recommended.

e. Related to the above, in the aftermath of intra-state conflicts, one sure way by which post-conflict governments can regain legitimacy over the coercive use of force is through the human security approach. By addressing human security, governments would have already assured the performance of its side of the social contract. This creates room for the citizens in the post conflict state to acquiesce to Governments claim to legitimate coercive force. This is critical for the stability of post-conflict development and is therefore recommended.
f. The absence of human security as a core objective of post-conflict development can reinforce the activities of sub-state groups that claim or are perceived to be addressing the critical human security issues. Particularly in conflicts that attract ethnic, tribal or other sub-state dimensions, this can lead to the creation or resurrection of sub-state boundaries that will inhibit inclusiveness needed at the national level for successful PCD. It is therefore recommended that post-conflict governments and other external stakeholders win the legitimacy war by making human security a core objective of PCD.

g. Despite its components, human security is an integrated concept. As the case of Liberia shows, economic security is linked to food security and health security, which are all linked to the provision of infrastructure and basic services. It is therefore recommended that attempts to enhance human security from an institutional point of view proceed in an integrated manner. Any disconnect between the respective institutions for addressing the various components will churn up lopsided results.
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Chapter One

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APPENDIX
MAP OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA