


UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

**INTERNAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS AND NEW PATRIOTIC
PARTY IN SELECTED CONSTITUENCIES (2000-2016)**







**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA,
LEGON IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT
FOR THE AWARD OF PHD POLITICAL SCIENCE DEGREE**

OCTOBER, 2019

DECLARATION

I, George Asekere, do hereby declare that besides the quotations and other references which have been duly acknowledged, this is a research carried out under the able leadership of Prof. J. R. A. Ayee as the Principal Supervisor and supported by Dr. Maame Gyekye-Jandoh and Dr. Isaac Owusu-Mensah. This work has not been submitted in whole or in part for a degree anywhere. I am, however, responsible for any weakness, marginal or substantial, which may be identified in this thesis.

I also declare that this work has never been submitted by me or any other person to the University of Ghana, Legon or any other University for the award of any degree.

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ABSTRACT

Internal democracy, also known as intra-party democracy, refers to the level and methods of including party members in decision making and deliberation within the party structure. The debate as to whether internal democracy enhances the performance of political parties in elections has left scholars divided. The relevance of internal democracy to Ghana's body politic lies in the fact that democracy within political parties has since the return to constitutional rule in 1993 been a reflection of how democracy is organized within the state. This study explored the extent to which internal democracy affected the performance of Ghana's leading political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), since the return to constitutional rule in 1993. Relying on mixed research methods and anchored on the philosophy of pragmatism, the study examined the subject between 2000 and 2016 in three unique constituencies, Ledzokuku, Ketu South and Kwabre East; the first, a swing constituency, and the second and third, strongholds of the NDC and NPP respectively. The rational choice and civic voluntarism theories guided the study.

The study found that the causes of internal democratic problems in the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South, and Ledzokuku constituencies were similar, and informed by multiple actors with various interests. These interests which were either personal gains or benefits to their communities or families partly explained the politics of exclusion in the distribution of financial resources, the undue influence of financiers in the selection of candidates, the imposition of MMDCEs and appointments/co-optation of people into non-elective internal positions. The study further found that the impact of internal democracy on the electoral performance of the political parties (the NPP and NDC) was largely dependent on whether the constituency was a swing or stronghold of

another political party. Also, internal party leadership accountability to the membership was found to be weak.

Theoretically, the study found that political actors and voters in the three constituencies do a cost-benefit analysis in every decision they take. This is in sync with the assumptions in the rational choice theory. Also, the findings show that the civic voluntarism theory does not offer a convincing explanation for internal party activism concerning the quest for leadership. The theory, however, best explains the deployment of money, time and civic skills such that everyone plays a role whether rich or poor in canvassing for votes (*division of labour*).

The study concludes that there is a nexus between internal democracy and the electoral performance of political parties. However, good internal democracy plays a major role in the performance of political parties in the swing constituency while party identity is the dominant determinant of electoral performance in the strongholds of the NDC and NPP. Furthermore, despite the various reforms by the NDC and NPP since 2000 to improve their internal democracy, patron-client tactics, uneven distribution of resources, the overriding influence of money and dictatorial tendencies fueled by lack of transparency and accountability are some of the factors that caused undemocratic practices within the parties.

Based on the findings, the study recommends among other things that, in order to prevent few wealthy members from continuously overshadowing the ordinary members and by extension determining the direction of internal democracy in political parties, the EC should compel political parties to disclose the identities and amount individuals donate. The only way to successfully achieve this is to amend the 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574). The leadership of both parties at all levels should desist from the practice of imposing candidates on constituents and party delegates or

asking some aspirants not to contest certain sitting MPs or party executives because the practice undermines internal democracy.

The most forceful lesson learnt is that the existence of rules and regulations governing the conduct of internal party elections is not sufficient to promote democracy within political parties. The internal party actors, the security agencies, the electoral commission, and all other stakeholders must be willing to enforce the rules without partiality to ensure transparency, fairness, and inclusiveness in the process.

DEDICATION

To God alone be the Glory

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Everything about my life has been God from day one. I am forever grateful to the Highest God for His love, favour and grace and making a dream of finishing a Ph.D. in Political Science a reality. My special gratitude goes to my lead supervisor, Prof. J. R. A. Ayee who is my mentor. He gave me articles and recommended several relevant materials to enrich the thesis. His time, patience, tolerance and effective supervision has brought me this far. Prof. with a cheerful heart, I say God bless you. I am also thankful to Dr. Maame Gyekye-Jandoh, the Head, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon and Dr. Isaac Owusu-Mensah for being the second and third supervisors respectively. God bless you. Gratitude is extended to Prof. Assuman-Johnson, Prof. Kwame Boafo-Arthur, Prof. Emmanuel Debrah, Prof. Ransford Gyampo, Dr. Seidu Alidu and Dr. Kwame Asah - Asante for their counselling and advice throughout this journey. I thank Dr. Eric Bossman Asare for recommending me for an exchange programme at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.

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I must, however, hasten to add that the persons mentioned are not responsible, in anyway, for the lapses and omissions of this thesis.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP -	Turkish Justice and Development Party
ANC -	African National Congress
APC -	All People's Congress
APRM -	African Peer Review Mechanism
CDD -	Centre for Democratic Development
CODESRIA-	Council for Scientific Development of Social Science Research in Africa
CPF -	Centre Party of Finland (KESS)
CPP -	Convention People's Party
CVT -	Civic Voluntarism Theory
DB -	Democracy Barometer
DCE -	District Chief Executive
DFP -	Democratic Freedom Party
EC -	Electoral Commission
EIU -	Economist Intelligence Unit
ERP -	Economic Recovery Programme
FH -	Freedom House
GBC -	Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
GSDP -	German Social Democratic Party
IDEG -	Institute for Democratic Governance
IEA -	Institute for Economic Affairs
II -	Ibrahim Index
IP -	Independent Party
IPAC -	Inter-Party Advisory Committee
ISD -	Information Services Department

KEEA -	Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirim
KES -	Centre Party of Finland
MCE -	Municipal Chief Executive
MCP -	Malawi Congress Party
MMDCE -	Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executive
MP -	Member of Parliament
NAP -	National Action Party
NCCE -	National Commission for Civic Education
NDC -	National Democratic Congress
NDP -	National Democratic Party
NPP -	New Patriotic Party
NRM -	National Resistance Movement
NRP -	National Reform Party
PNC -	People's National Convention
PPP -	Progressive People's Party
PRD -	Revolutionary Democratic Party
PT -	Partido dos Trabalhadores
RCT -	Rational Choice Theory
SDP -	Social Democratic Party
UDF -	United Democratic Front
UGM -	United Ghana Movement (UGM)
UK -	United Kingdom
UKIP -	United Kingdom's Independent
US -	United States
USD -	United State Dollars

CHAPTER ONE

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Ghana is considered one of the buoyant democracies in Africa, having “consolidated as a democratic society” after almost three decades of political instability as a result of military interference (Ayee, 2017, p.314). Since 1992, Ghana has made giant democratic strides on the continent by holding seven peaceful elections generally considered to be free, fair, peaceful and transparent by domestic and international observers with three smooth alternation of power (2001, 2009 and 2017) from one political party to the other (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018).

Political parties have been instrumental in all the seven elections thus helping in the process of putting Ghana on the path of representative democracy (Agomor, 2015). This affirms a pioneering view by Robert Dahl (1967, p. 203) that the “presence or absence of competing political parties can be used as a litmus paper test for democracy” in a country. Therefore, it will not be out of place to argue that political parties have been central in the organization of Ghana’s Fourth Republican political polity (Agomor, 2015).

In spite of the progress made, the two major political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), have struggled to operate acceptable levels of internal party democracy largely as a result of monetization and patronage - leading sometimes to acrimony, violence and cross-carpeting (Ninsin, 2006). The very fact that these parties have won all elections since 1992 and commanded over 80 percent of the voter population and the weakening of the smaller political parties has made Ghana “a political duopoly, that is, a two party state as seen in countries like the United States and, possibly, the United Kingdom” (Ayee, 2017, p. 322). This makes their internal democracy and performance a matter of public and academic interest, arguably, because

they are likely to dominate the country's body politic for a little longer, hence, the future of multi-party democracy largely rests on them.

Ideally, apart from being vehicles for electoral competition by organizing political rallies to mobilize voters to participate in elections, recruiting political personnel internally by selecting and nominating candidates who stand for public office, political parties also “provide a meaningful space for political/civic engagement, democratic deliberation and for policy development” and agenda setting, which are all crucial for the functioning of democratic societies (Sawer and Gauja, 2016, p. 3). As such, political parties ought to be internally democratic to be able to perform all these functions effectively in order to shape the political will of the people (Cheeseman et al., 2014).

Therefore, it is not surprising that pioneering democratic theorists including Jean Jacques Rousseau (1952), John Stuart Mill (1998), Robert Dahl (1967) and Benjamin Barber (1988) have generally argued that mass participation through political parties is critical to the survival of democratic governance (Norris, 2011). Internal party democracy is one important aspect of multiparty democracy because it helps to build a respectful attitude towards the democratic process and enhances the parties' performance in general elections (Ichino and Nathan, 2017; Lancaster, 2014).

The assertion that internal party democracy is synonymous to democracy within the wider state, with implications on the performance of political parties, is rooted in Robert Michels' seminal work, *Iron Law of Oligarchy* which postulates that if democracy is weak within political parties, it will automatically be reflected at the state level (Michels, 1915). Other approaches such as the “Jacksonian ethos” have it that political parties are means of effecting democracy. Hence, any “redesign of them have to be redirected towards participation within” (Ware, 2002, p. 255). This approach, according to Ware (2002), has since the 20th century been championed by the Progressive Movement and

remains the core of modern day demand for participatory democracy at both the state and party levels across the world. The debate remains whether institutions (political parties inclusive) that institutionalize democracy are required to be internally democratic, and to what extent, to enhance their performance (Randall, 2007).

Giovanni Sartori, for instance, is of the opinion that democracy within political parties has no bearing on democracy at the national level. He observed “that democracy on large scale is not the sum of many little democracies” (Sartori, 1965, p. 124). This assertion has been rejected because it does not apply to all cases (Cheeseman et al., 2014). For instance, in South Korea internal party democracy does not play a major role in national level governance but that role has been effectively played by vibrant civil society organizations (Heo and Hahm, 2014; McAllister, 2016).

Political parties in Ghana, Turkey, Taiwan, Malaysia, Botswana, Singapore and elsewhere have played a “central role in national stability” (Randall, 2007, p. 634). In the specific case of Ghana, internal democracy signifies maturity in multi-party democracy despite the challenges associated with it (Ichino and Nathan, 2017). Besides, Ghana’s 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act 574 (2000) enjoin political parties to be internally democratic at all levels and to promote party-based government (Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, 2008; Republic of Ghana, 1992). Ghana’s legal framework within which political parties operate, thus, recognizes a link between internal democracy and the performance of political parties since the political architecture favours party-based government.

Against this backdrop, this thesis examines internal democracy and the performance of political parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic at the constituency level (subnational) because it remains the most important organizational unit of political parties (Ninsin, 2006). In other words, the thesis argues that weak internal democracy could negatively affect the performance of political parties. The performance of each political

party is internally measured on the basis of “representativeness, accountability, equality and participation” (Lijphart, 1993, p. 149) while externally, performance is measured on the degree to which a party performs in competitive multi-party national elections and how it provides space for non-partisan political/civic engagement on developmental issues such as education, health, security and even voter education (Cheeseman et al., 2014).

More specifically, it discusses the impact of internal democracy on voter choices in three constituencies, Kwabre East (in the Ashanti Region), Ketu South (in the Volta Region) and Ledzokuku (in the Greater Accra Region), from 2000 - 2018. These constituencies were chosen for a number of reasons. First, Kwabre East is not only in the Ashanti region - the electoral stronghold of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) - but also currently the largest constituency outside the regional capital in terms of voter population and second largest in the region after Oforikrom, which was not chosen because the study focused on constituencies outside regional capitals (see Alidu, 2017). Second, Ketu South in the Volta region represents the electoral stronghold of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and is currently the largest constituency in terms of size and voter population in Ghana. Third, Ledzokuku is currently the largest swing constituency in Ghana in terms of voter population and represents the Greater Accra region which is a swing region, cosmopolitan and hosts the national capital of Ghana, Accra, where the political parties have their headquarters (see Alidu, 2017). Voter turnout in these constituencies have averaged about 74 percent since 2000 (details in chapter four). For these reasons, we seek to investigate the impact of internal democracy on the performance of the two political parties in these three unique constituencies. The period 2000-2016 was chosen because both parties have been in and out of government for eight years.

The study of internal democracy at the constituency level in Ghana at this stage of the country’s democratic rule is critical, also, because of findings that democracy is

declining across the globe (Freedom House, 2018). According to the Freedom House, 2017 was the 12th year of continued decline in worldwide democracy. The report revealed that seventy-one countries suffered overall decline in civil and political liberties in 2017, with just about 35 countries registering gains (Freedom House, 2018). Besides, once-promising countries, including Venezuela, Poland, and Tunisia experienced decline in democratic ratings (Freedom House, 2018). In addition, studies on democracy in Ghana have not provided enough basis to make conclusive claims that Ghana's democracy will not suffer a decline, particularly, when such studies have largely focused on the national and regional levels (see Iddi, 2017; Ayee, 2017; Frempong, 2017; Gyampo, 2017, Gyampo et.al., 2018; Ichino & Nathan, 2017; Debrah et.al., 2018). This has the "tendency to hide significant" multidimensional subnational variation and may not paint a reflective picture of the reality of the problem across the country (Golder, 2016, p. 491). Besides, ethnicity and political party sponsored vigilante groups, which are becoming an albatross on Ghana's body politic, could be some of the latent factors that have the potential of marring the country's democratic progress (Gyampo et.al., 2018). A case by case study is therefore critical because internal democracy as a major component of democratic governance, can manifest in multidimensional ways including the categorization of party members into a wealthy minority powerful directors and a majority financially weak grassroots whose political fortunes can be curtailed by the resource endowed minority, which could have implications on the performance of the parties (Ichino and Nathan, 2017; Michels, 2001).

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Many African countries, including Ghana, have succumbed to internal and external demands for multi-party democracy after long periods characterized by military rule in the post independent era. In the Fourth Republic beginning from 1993, Ghana has

demonstrated her commitment to multi-party democracy by conducting seven general elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016, all of which have generally been described by both domestic and international election observers as free, fair and transparent (Ayee, 2017). The 2000, 2008 and 2016 elections witnessed an alternation of political power from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) (Ayee, 2017). It is clear that Ghanaian political parties have conducted themselves well as they have and continue to seek power through democratic means in all the elections by recruiting and nurturing political leaders, organizing civic education and stimulating voter participation (Agomor, 2015).

In the Fourth Republic, the NDC and NPP have positioned themselves as constant fixtures in all elections and yet both have spawned splinter parties such as the National Reform Party (NRP), the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the Democratic Freedom Party (DFP) in the case of the NDC and the United Ghana Movement (UGM) on the part of the NPP (Agyeman-Duah, 2005; Ayee, 2008; Frempong, 2017; Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, 2008).

The 1992 Constitution of Ghana is the major framework within which political parties operate and it requires that the internal organization of political parties “shall conform to democratic principles and their actions and purposes shall not contravene or be inconsistent with this Constitution” (Republic of Ghana, 1992, p. 48). However, unequal distribution of resources and the lack or inadequate award of contracts to party members especially at the constituency level have sometimes been blamed on the internal acrimony in political parties which leads to undemocratic tendencies including people deserting their parties to contest as independent candidates (Alabi and Alabi, 2007; Ayee, 2017; Ninsin, 2017).

The number of party members who have lost primaries and contested as independent parliamentary candidates show the level of dissatisfaction with internal democracy in the NDC and NPP in the Fourth Republic. In the 1992 parliamentary election, twelve (12) disgruntled primary candidates contested the national elections as independent candidates even though the NPP boycotted that election. The number of independent candidates in the parliamentary election increased from twelve (12) in 1992 to fifty-seven (57) in 1996. In 2000 the figure shot up to fifty-nine (59). At the close of registration and publication of notice of polls for the 2004 parliamentary election the number of independent candidates further shot up to one hundred and twenty-six (126) (Ninsin 2006, p. 15-16). According to the Electoral Commission's official figures, ninety-five (95) independent candidates contested the 2008 parliamentary election, one hundred and twenty (120) in 2012 and sixty-five (65) in the 2016 parliamentary elections (Frempong, 2017). An expanded electoral college of the NPP and NDC in the run up to the 2016 elections accounted for about 45% drop in the number of independent parliamentary candidates in 2016 compared to the 2012 elections, which can be attributed to improved internal democracy (Alidu, 2017). That notwithstanding, the figures, coupled with media reports of acrimony, tensions and accusations of vote buying during internal elections of the NPP and NDC show that all is not well with internal democracy.

The smaller parties have not also been spared this phenomenon of weak internal party democracy. For instance, the founder of the All People's Congress (APC), Hassan Ayariga, contested the presidential election in 2012 on the ticket of the People's National Convention (PNC) but when he lost the bid to contest on the same party's ticket in the 2016 election, he left the PNC and formed the APC. In addition, the founder of the Progressive People's Party (PPP), Dr. Papa Kwesi Nduom, contested the presidency in

2008 on the ticket of the Convention People's Party (CPP) but left to form the PPP on grounds of undemocratic practices within the CPP (Frempong, 2017).

Over the past 25 years, scholarly literature related to internal democracy and the performance of political parties abound including those edited by various political science scholars (Ayee, 2016; Ayee, 2000; Ayee, 1998; Debrah et al., 2014; Ninsin, 2006, 2017; Ninsin and Drah, 1993) as well as individuals' independent work in journals (Alidu and Gyekye-Jandoh, 2016; Ayee, 2015, 2017; Boafo-Arthur, 2003, 2003, 2008; Bob-Milliar, 2012; Iddi, 2017; Daddieh & Bob-Milliar, 2012; Debrah and Gyampo, 2013, 2018; Fobih, 2016; Frempong, 2017; Gyekye-Jandoh, 2017; Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah, 2008; Owusu-Mensah, 2014; Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018).

Reputable think tanks, including the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD) - Ghana have through publications including Afrobarometer reports, newsletters and critical perspectives revealed in-depth studies on Ghana's democracy (Agyeman-Duah, 2005; Ayee, 2003; Diamond and Morlino, 2004; Mattes, 2008). Furthermore, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), and the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG), have distinguished themselves as major sources of information through publications and the provision of platforms for public discourse on Ghana's democracy (Abdulai and Crawford, 2010; Ayee, 2016; Gyampo, 2015).

Additionally, some students' theses have focused on various aspects of Ghana's democracy. Among such studies are: the structure and organization of political parties (Amponsah, 1999), development partners and democracy at the district level (Owusu-Mensah, 2009), internal party conflicts and prospects for democratic consolidation (Akuamoah, 2017), the changing forms of political communication and voter choices in Ghana's elections (Asah-Asante, 2015), parliamentary elections in Bongo and Bolgatanga constituencies (Ayoo, 2013), the dynamics of political party activism between the NDC

and NPP in Wa-Central and Lawra-Nandom constituencies (Bob-Milliar, 2012), voting behaviour in elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic: a study of the Manhyia South, Ho West and Ayawaso West Wuogon constituencies (Appah, 2017), political parties and democratic development (Fobih, 2008), political brand relationship with voters in Ghana (Glate, 2015) and financing political parties under the Fourth Republic (Agomor, 2015).

However, in the specific case of internal democracy and the performance of political parties at the constituency level, scholars generally agree that parties have become election machines while lacking a programmatic structure that link them with the constituencies on the basis of accountability and policy making process including manifestos and development plans (Rosenblatt and Toro, 2014; Sawyer and Gauja, 2016; Nathan and Ichino, 2017). Even though the political parties have manifestos, they do not consistently link them to the Directive Principles of State Policy, contained in Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution, which “provides the basis for a social contract between the government and the governed” just as the development plans of the country which are not necessarily based on rigorous scientific research but speculative social and economic needs of the people (Ayee, 2015, p. 92; Republic of Ghana, 1992). The literature has thus not fully exhausted the constituency specific multidimensional factors behind the parties' inability to be properly institutionalized and perform as programmatic parties (Rosenblatt and Toro, 2014).

This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge by examining the constituency specific dynamics and other factors that have militated against internal democracy and how weak internal democracy has affected the performance of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies between 2000 and 2016.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The overarching question which the study addresses is: How does internal democracy affect the performance of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies between 2000 and 2016?

The two secondary questions are as follows:

- (i) How does internal party democracy of the NDC and NPP influence voter choices in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies?
- (ii) What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the internal democracy of the NDC and NPP and how does internal democracy affect their performance in the three constituencies?

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The main objective of the study is to identify and discuss the contextual variables that cause undemocratic practices within political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic with specific reference to the NDC and the NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies.

The specific objectives are to:

- i. assess how internal democracy affects the performance of the NDC and NPP in general elections; their mandates such as development agents at the constituency level including how they "participate in shaping the political will of the masses, disseminate information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of a national character, and sponsor candidates for public elections"; and voter education particularly in the light of the high number of spoiled and rejected ballots that have consistently been recorded in every election since 1992 (Republic of Ghana, 1992, p.1);

- ii. discuss the constituency specific dynamics and other factors that influence voter choices; and
- iii. make policy recommendations based on the findings with the overall aim of contributing to the literature on internal party democracy and multi-party democracy in general.

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study is significant on three grounds. First, from the theoretical angle, scholarly studies on Ghana's democracy have not exhausted the challenges of constituency level internal democracy and performance of parties thereby leaving key questions of the constituency specific underlying factors behind undemocratic tendencies unsatisfactorily answered. Admittedly, some studies have looked at elite influences, ideology, ethnicity and manifestoes but they do not universally apply in all instances, thus, necessitating further studies on a case by case basis (see Ayee, 2015; Frempong, 2017; Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2012; Nathan and Ichino, 2017). The findings of this study will therefore provide additional relevant information on internal democracy and the performance of political parties and thus complement the existing literature. Also, focusing on three unique constituencies outside the regional capitals in Ghana can strengthen the researcher's capacity to "code cases accurately and provide firm foundation for building theories that can help explain spatially uneven nature of many processes of political dynamics" such as internal party democracy and the performance of the NDC and NPP in their strongholds and swing constituencies (Snyder, 2001, p.103).

Second, the quality of democracy cannot be divorced from constituency level (subnational) internal party democracy on comparative grounds. Findings from a case by case constituency specific study on the multidimensional factors that affect the

performance of political parties in populous and unique constituencies that are either “swing” (Ledzokuku) or strongholds of the NPP (Kwabre East) and NDC (Ketu South) are therefore necessary to make evidence based comparison between the NDC and NPP using the uniqueness of each case and avoid the reliance on national studies which have the tendency to produce national average findings that can be biased because of the dynamics of the multidimensional factors that inform voter choices in every constituency (Golder, 2016).

Third, findings from this study which is focused on three constituencies that are categorized into stronghold and swing such as Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku, can make it easier for empirical analysis of voter choices on contextual basis. Additionally, the findings could have the potential to empirically increase the probability of finding valid causal inferences relative to multidimensional factors behind the performance of the NDC and NPP in such constituencies where clearly there is evidence of rationality, among other factors, that determine voter choices in election results.

1.6 OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

The key concepts that are used in this study are internal party democracy, political parties, programmatic parties, party institutionalization, active party member, democracy, performance and subnational. These concepts are operationalized below.

1.6.1 Internal Party Democracy

According to Norris (2005) internal party democracy is determined by how much power is given to regional, district or local party structures in the process of decision making and deliberation including candidate selections and how the rules governing the political parties are fairly enforced. Section 9 (a) of Ghana’s Political Parties Act 574,

(2000) stipulates that the internal organization of all political parties must conform with democratic principles and their actions should not be “contrary to or inconsistent with the Constitution” of Ghana (Republic of Ghana, 2000, p.4). The Act, however, fell short of defining internal democracy, although it stipulates that internal organization of parties shall follow “democratic principles” (p, 4).

This thesis conceptualizes internal party democracy on the basis of the participation and voice of party members in decision making, nomination, selection and elections within a party. In other words, internal democracy as used in this study refers to the situation where all registered members of the party have equal access to all opportunities within the party regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender and financial standing which can sometimes make some rich people use money to influence voters and undermine internal democracy.

1.6.2 Political Parties

A popular definition of political parties from the rational perspective emanates from Anthony Downs. He, as cited in Lineberry, Edwards, and Wattenberg (1986) defined a political party as a group of people who are seeking legitimate political control of a state. Giovanni Sartori also defined a political party to mean any organized political group that is identified by an official label or logo “that presents candidates at elections” (cited in Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011, p. 10). These definitions are similar to the one provided in section 33 of the Political Parties Act 574, 2000 which states that a political party is “a free association of persons, one of whose objects may be to bring about the election of its candidates to public office or to strive for power by the electoral process and by this means to control or influence the actions of government” (Republic of Ghana, 1992, p. 12).

A political party as used in this thesis refers to a group of ideologically like-minded people who come together for the purpose of engaging in competition for state power to achieve development goals or contributing to the democratic exercise and is registered by the Electoral Commission of Ghana.

1.6.3 Programmatic Parties

A programmatic political party is defined by Cheeseman et al., (2014) as one that is properly-structured and has ideological commitments that form the basis for its linkage with a constituency; engages in electoral competition among parties and has a policymaking process that involves its rank and file. In fact, to be considered as ‘*programmatic*’, a political party ought to operate “in all three arenas: predominantly structuring programmatic (rather than clientelistic or charismatic) linkages to voters; seeking to implement its programme when in government; and organizing the party in ways that facilitate the construction, diffusion and reproduction of its programmatic platform” (Cheeseman et. al., 2014, p. 1). For the purpose of this study we adopt Cheeseman et al., (2014) definition.

1.6.4 Party Institutionalization

According to Mainwaring, institutionalized party systems are those in which “stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave” are not in doubt (Mainwaring, 1998, p. 68). Mainwaring and Scully (1995) agree with this assertion and have enumerated four elements as basic requirements for party system institutionalization. These include “stability in interparty competition, the existence of parties that have stable roots in society and regard elections as the legitimate” means of choosing leaders” (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 1). According to Panebianco (1988), party

institutionalization encompasses the consolidation of the organization, the passage from an initial, structurally fluid phase when a new-born organization is still forming, to a phase in which the organization stabilizes' (Panebianco, 1988, p. 18). Party institutionalization is achieved at the stage where internal rules of party competition and behaviour prevail, decision making decentralized and participatory, parties recognized by the society as legitimate democratic institutions and stability (Croissant and Völkel, 2012).

Based on Mainwaring's definition, this study conceptualizes party institutionalization minimally as a system where there is stability in electoral contest among parties, the presence of political parties' roots in the constituencies and prioritize elections as the best means of selecting leaders.

1.6.5 Active Party Member

Many questions arise when it comes to membership of political parties. For instance, does one become a member of a party if he or she has voted for the NDC or NPP, since the parties came to being? Also, is a party financier who does not want to be known publicly, a member of the party? Are people who continuously attend party rallies and speak in favour of political parties considered members of such parties?

In this thesis a political party member is considered as a registered and card bearing individual of a political party who shares the vision of the party and contributes financially or his or time to party activities. An active party member is therefore any current or former elected or appointed member including founding and council members and executives who are in good financial standing, of voting age and recognized by the party in the constituency.

1.6.6 Quality of Multi-Party Democracy

Scholars have defined the quality of democracy in different ways. In fact, some of these definitions are narrow while others are broad. For instance, Lijphart (1993) defined the quality of democracy is to mean the extent “to which a system meets such democratic norms as accountability, representativeness, participation and equality” among members in terms of decision making (Lijphart, 1993, p. 149). Diamond and Morlino (2005) have defined the quality of democracy to mean a democracy that provides its citizens with a “high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions” (Diamond and Morlino, 2005, p. 11).

This thesis adopts the definition of Lijphart (1993), hence, the quality of multi-party democracy refers to democratic norms such as representativeness, accountability, equality of membership and freedom of participation.

1.6.7 Voter Behaviour

Voting is a major way political participation in representative democratic states. Political science analyses of voting patterns have largely focused on the reasons that inform voter choices and how they arrive at certain electoral decisions. Voter behaviour as used in this thesis refers to the choices voters make during multiparty competitive elections based on multidimensional variables such as age, gender, values, political programmes, electoral campaigns, and the popularity of party leaders (Harrop and Miller, 1987). Voter behaviour and voter choices are used interchangeably to mean the same thing.

1.6.8 Democracy

Larry Diamond (1999) describes a polity as democratic when it has four key elements: first, a political system for selecting and replacing leaders through free and fair elections; second, there should be active participation of the masses in politics; third, human rights must be protected; fourth, there must be rule of law. Samuel Huntington (1991, p. 7-8) defines a polity as democratic if the most powerful actors and “decision-makers are chosen through free, fair, honest and periodic elections”.

A basic principle that is relevant to this study is that decision making should be controlled or owned by members of the political party as outlined in the parties’ constitution and other laws relating to political parties.

Democracy as used in this thesis is understood to mean a “system of collectively binding decision-making, as spelt out in law, to the extent that it embodies principles, and specific institutions or practices that enable the entity (political party) or system (society) to realize them” (Beetham, 1994, p. 159).

1.6.9 Performance of political Parties

Performance of political parties, as used in this study, refers to the degree to which a party does well or wins in competitive multi-party national elections. Party performance will be measured at two levels: internally and externally. Internally, party performance will be measured on the basis of representativeness (i.e., how gender, ethnicity, the disabled, rich and poor are considered in decision making), accountability (transparency in the use of party finances) and equality in terms of the use of laid down rules in selection of candidates, voting and appointments (Lijphart, 1993). Externally, party performance will be measured on the number of votes the political parties get in multi - party elections and how they “participate in shaping the political will of the people, disseminate

information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of a national character, and sponsor candidates for public elections’’ (Republic of Ghana, 1992, p.1).

1.6.10 Subnational

In line with the Political Parties Act 574, 2000, a political party is required to be organized as a national party with ‘‘branches in all the regions and is, in addition organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each region’’ (Republic of Ghana, 1992, p.4). Additionally, the major political parties in Ghana strive to organize branches in towns and villages in every constituency across the country. Although it is a legal requirement for political parties to organize at the district level, ‘‘political parties choose to organize at the constituency instead of the administrative district’’ (Ninsin, 2006, p. 14). This decision according to Ninsin (2006) is very strategic because it is motivated by the quest for efficient voter mobilization during general elections. The constituency and sub-constituency levels are therefore ‘‘the most important organizational unit below the national headquarters of the parties in Ghana’’ (Ninsin 2006, p. 14). Subnational as used in this thesis therefore refers to the constituency and branch levels.

1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

A study that is aimed at exploring the impact of internal democracy on the performance of political parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic should adopt a national outlook but due to practical limitations especially in the field work as a result of the limited time due to the duration of the academic programme, the researcher could only concentrate on three constituencies out of the 275 constituencies in Ghana. This could not enable the researcher to expand the study areas to capture a larger scope of respondents from all the 275 constituencies in order to come out with a more holistic picture of the

multidimensional factors that account for voter behaviour. Although similarities exist, it will not be enough to compare subnational level internal party democracy and its impact on voter behaviour, party institutionalization and the differences and similarities between the NDC and NPP relative to their manifestos.

Another limitation of this study is the aspect that restricted the researcher from making generalizations (Osuala, 2007). For instance, the use of Case Study strategy usually makes it difficult if not impossible to make any scientific generalizations. Nonetheless, it is instructive to state that, the case study approach enabled the researcher to provide detailed explanations of complex phenomena of constituency specific factors that inform voter behaviour thereby giving credence to Bassey (1981:85) assertion that the “reliability of a case study is more important than its generalizability”.

Additionally, some of the respondents expressed views that appeared to be consistent with social standards by avoiding things that made their parties look undemocratic internally. In fact, it took friends, journalists, school and church mates to disclose the reality on the ground.

Also the study was confronted with the challenge of access to some vital information and documents from the parties due to poor record keeping and unwillingness on the part of some party officials to disclose certain information considered to be vital (not for public consumption as some claimed).

It is instructive to note out that, notwithstanding the limitations identified in this study, the validity and the reliability of the findings, have not in any way been affected because the results were interpreted and analyzed with caution and circumspection. In other words, the limitations do not compromise the academic rigour and findings of the study.

1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This thesis is organized into seven chapters.

Chapter One, “Introduction” contains the introduction, statement of the research problem, research objectives, questions, significance, justification and organization of the thesis.

Chapter Two, “Literature Review” is divided into the following thematic areas: (i) internal party democracy; (ii) quality of multi-party democracy; (iii) democratic consolidation; (iv) political parties; and (v) Ghanaian politics.

Chapter Three, “Theoretical Framework”, discusses the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories upon which the thesis is grounded and how they relate to the research problem, objectives and questions.

Chapter Four, “Methodology and Research Instrument”, outlines the research design, the qualitative and quantitative methods used for data collection, primary as well as secondary sources of data collection and justifies why these are best suited for the thesis, taking into account ethical considerations. It also explains the reasons for the selection of the three case study areas, namely, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies.

Chapter Five, “Data Analysis”, is devoted to an analysis of the quantitative and qualitative data gathered from the fieldwork. The quantitative data is analyzed with the aid of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and the results will be presented in tables, charts and figures. The qualitative data is thematically analyzed.

Chapter Six, “Research Findings and Discussion”, is a detailed discussion of the findings vis-à-vis the empirical, theoretical, comparative literature and policy.

Chapter Seven, “Summary of Findings, Conclusion, and Recommendations”, highlights the summary of the findings in the previous two chapters, general conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The literature on political parties, internal democracy and democratic consolidation is quite extensive in both developed and developing countries. This chapter reviews the literature based on the following seven thematic areas: (i) studies on political parties; (ii) studies on party typology and functions; (iii) studies on party system institutionalization; (iv) studies on internal party democracy; (v) studies on the quality of multi-party democracy; (vi) studies on democratic consolidation; and (vii) studies on Ghanaian politics. The overall aim is to situate the thesis within the broader literature on internal party democracy from the global to the national perspectives by complementing existing studies and filling gaps.

2.2 STUDIES ON POLITICAL PARTIES

This section reviews the literature on political parties within the context of democratic politics.

Studies on political parties can be understood within the context of democratic politics because political parties are “historically and logically connected to democracy” (Pomper, 1992, p. 143). Cheeseman et. al., (2014) assert that there cannot be a multi-party democracy without political parties. McAllister and White (2007) agree with this view in their article that examined the role of political parties in representing the social cleavages (i.e. center-periphery/region, state-religion, land-industry/urban-rural and owner-worker/class) in established and emerging democracies. They conclude that political parties are inevitable for democracy because of the critical role they “play in emerging

democracies, by identifying, politicizing and representing social divisions'' (McAllister & White, 2007, p. 211). McAllister and White (2007) note that the success or otherwise of democratic consolidation in a country is largely dependent on the effectiveness of democratic political parties. In the view of Agomor (2015), however, the exact nature of democratic politics has been the subject of a fierce ideological debate within the context of political parties thus reiterating the invaluable role of parties in development. The views of Cheeseman et.al. (2014) and McAllister and White (2007) are relevant to this study because they emphasize the role of political parties in a multi-party democracy. Their studies, however, are unable to encapsulate the multidimensional factors that influence voter behaviour in multi-party systems at the subnational levels. This study adds to the literature on the constituency specific dynamics and other factors that shape voter behaviour in multi-party systems.

The underlying assumptions of democratic politics are that they offer the possibility of ensuring some level of fairness for a larger number of people in society and afford the people the opportunity to have a say in the governance process (Gyimah-Boadi & Debrah, 2008). This view reflects Abraham Lincoln's position that democracy is a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people" (Flanagan et al., 2005, p.193). The people, as used in the definition above, may in practice be understood to mean the majority and not necessarily everybody (Agomor, 2015). Such assertion of democratic politics reinforces Rousseau's theory of the "general will" or "collective will" rather than the "private will" (Agomor, 2015, p. 30). This extols the virtue of participation with political parties as mediums where every citizen is able to achieve satisfaction by having a say in the decisions that shape his or her life (Whitfield, 2009; Agomor, 2015). At the heart of Rousseau's argument, which is relevant to this study, is the notion of grassroots participation, which can be taken in our context to mean, the belief that political power

should be exercised at the subnational (constituency) level which is the most important organizational unit in Ghana (Ninsin, 2006). Furthermore, since it is not easy to practice direct democracy, as was the case in classical Greece, because of the complexity of modern society, people select representatives to rule on their behalf on the tickets of political parties thus reinforcing the view that it is not easy to think of democratic politics without the presence of political parties (Whitfield, 2009). This study complements the literature on the contribution of the grassroots in internal democracy and the performance of political parties.

Schwarzhoff (2010, p.72) argues that political parties are organizations that run candidates to win political power to shape the outcome of government and also to redirect public policy. According to him, rational political parties work at winning elections to control government, hence are instrumental whereas responsible parties work hard during elections in an effort to shape public policy and therefore may be referred to as ideological. This study supports the view of Schwarzhoff (2010) because political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic have shaped democratic politics through competitive multi-party elections (Alidu, 2017). However, Schwarzhoff (2010) overemphasizes the role of political parties in shaping public policy when they win political power and subordinates their role in shaping public policy when outside government. This study contributes to the literature on the performance of political parties in shaping the political will of the people beyond their mandate as election machines.

Wanyande (1988) lauds the role of political parties in national unity but argues that one – party systems are superior in ensuring national unity than multi-party systems. He claims that democratic politics flourishes in states which identify all the people with the nation but multi-party systems impede that effort (Wanyande, 1988). Thompson (2010) supports the view of Wanyande and argues that the multi-party system is alien to Africa

and is therefore incapable of tackling the complex socio-political realities of African society. According to him, the underdeveloped and multi ethnically divided nature of the African society make multi-party system prone to tensions (Thomson, 2010). Thomson (2010) claims that in line with the advantages of the one-party system, some post-independence leaders in Africa including Dr. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d' Ivoire and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania opposed multi-party systems and actually worked at entrenching one-party states. The problem with this line of thinking is that multi-party democracy with all its challenges remains the “last, best hope on earth” (Flanagan et al., 2005, p.193). This study contributes to the literature on the role of internal democracy in the performance of political parties in multi-party systems including the parties’ role as programmatic development agents.

Diamond (2005) examines the importance of competitive multi-party politics in national development. He rejects the view that one-party system is more democratic and ensures national cohesion than the multi-party system. In his opinion, a free, fair and transparent competitive election is the *sine qua non* of democracy (Diamond, 2005). Diamond (2005) further argues that free and fair elections, held regularly within lawfully stipulated periods which can lead to alternation of power, gives meaning to democracy. Agomor (2015) shares this view and argues that multi-party competition, as opposed to one-party democracy has become the most acceptable mechanism for achieving this type of democracy. Beyond competitive multi-party elections, Diamond (2005) stresses the need for sustained efforts aimed at building democratic processes through democratic institutions across the globe. He opines that there is a positive correlation between democratic principles including equality, justice, competitiveness and responsiveness and national development defined as the enhancement of the living standards of the people, improvement in infrastructure and decreased unemployment (Diamond, 2005). He

underscores the role of democratic political parties in achieving such development (Diamond, 2005). According to Diamond (2005), the literature on emerging democracies singles out elections based on political parties as a critical component of democracy. These views are challenged by the fact that they do not focus on details on internal party democracy which in the view of Ninsin (2006) is the culmination of democracy at the state level. This study contributes to the literature on the contribution of democratic political parties in consolidating multi-party politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Lupu and Riedl (2013) explore political parties and uncertainty in developing democracies. They identify three types of political uncertainties confronting political parties that are not democratically institutionalized: economic uncertainty, institutional uncertainty, and regime uncertainty. Lupu and Riedl (2013) explain regime uncertainty to mean a situation whereby undemocratic tendencies negatively affect political competition and competitors and thus pave the way for regime collapse while economic uncertainty is about economic development which suffers as a result of a collapsed regime or regimes. They refer to institutional uncertainty as “the rules of political interaction and their durability” (Lupu and Riedl (2013, p. 1343). Their position is shared by this study because undemocratic tendencies could mar the potency of political parties in democratic politics in Ghana’s Fourth Republic and cause uncertainty in the future of multi-party democracy. This study, therefore, contributes to the literature on the role of democratic parties in sustainable multi-party democracy in Ghana.

De Vreese (2006) explores the performance of political parties in national referenda and posits that internal anti-democracy, electoral volatility and low levels of information sources reduce the influence of political parties in multi-party democratic politics. According to him, “Large, centrist political parties have the worst performance record in terms of getting their voters to follow the recommendation of the party, while

smaller, ideologically strong profiled parties are more successful in aligning their voters with party policy" (De Vreese, 2006, p. 581). This view is, however, not sustainable as it refers to the practice in the study areas (Europe and America) where political parties' activities and the followers voting decisions are influenced by the ideologies of their parties. The strength of Vreese's argument lies at the individual level, where "efficacious voters are likely to disregard the recommendation of their preferred party, while politically disinterested voters are more likely to follow the party endorsement" (De Vreese, 2006, p. 581). This thesis complements the views of Vreese (2006) by exploring the individual level variables that influence voter behaviour and performance of political parties in constituencies classified as either swing or strongholds.

On the contrary, Danzell (2011) examines the role of political parties in the creation and nurturing of terrorist organizations and highlights the existence of close alliances between terrorist groups and political parties. He opines that weak political parties and extremists' ideologies by both leftist and rightist parties are fertile grounds for terrorist organizations. According to him, there seems to be no "clear, conclusive evidence that confirms why some political organizations" are prone to the use of violence to press home their demands, while others continue to use democratic means to achieve their political objectives (Danzell, 2011, p. 86). Furthermore, "majoritarian systems are more likely to generate political parties that turn to terrorist groups than proportional representation systems" (Danzell, 2011, p. 110).

Abrahms (2008) agrees with Danzell that there is a link between political parties and terrorists' organizations but argues that political parties that ultimately turn into terrorist groups or activities scarcely reverse to the use of nonviolent political means to achieve their ends (Abrahms, 2008). According to Abrahms (2008, p. 98), "the preponderance of empirical and theoretical evidence is that terrorists are rational people

who use terrorism primarily to develop strong affective ties with fellow terrorists. Norris (2004) supports the assertion that political parties can be used to stampede the development process by claiming that many of the United States' founding fathers regard political parties as organizations with "sinister interests capable of undermining, perverting, or usurping the popular will of the majority" (Norris, 2004, p. 3). This anti-party sentiment, in Norris's view, is still prevalent today in both popular commentary and public opinion. Norris (2004) claims, for instance, that excessive partisan polarization within the US Congress is attributable to the difficulties in, sometimes, ensuring legislative cooperation and collaboration on critical policy problems. Gyampo et.al. (2018) share similar views and opine that the emergence of political party vigilante groups within Ghana's body politic has the potential to mar the beauty of democratic governance in the Fourth Republic. The assertions of Abrahms (2008) and Gyampo et.al. (2018) are relevant to this study because of the emergence of militant groupings in political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic, especially within the NDC and NPP. This thesis contributes to the literature on the role of internal democracy in the performance of political parties in peaceful multi-party democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

2.3 STUDIES ON PARTY TYPOLOGY AND FUNCTIONS

In this section, the literature on typologies of political parties as they relate to their functions and performance is reviewed.

Max Weber puts together different types of political parties in the early 20th century. His party typology seemed to answer questions relating to what a party represents in society (Weber, 1965). Weber basically distinguishes two typologies of political parties. These are the party of the elites and the party of the masses (Weber, 1965). According to him the party of elites like the "aristocratic parties were the parties of notables, which

develop everywhere with the rising power of the bourgeois and organized on the basis of pre-determined political principles” (Weber, 1965, p. 13). It was built on the shoulders of knowledgeable persons including “clergymen, teachers, professors, lawyers, doctors, apothecaries, prosperous farmers and manufacturers” who prioritize politics because of their authority and influence in society (Weber, 1965, p. 16). In addition, Weber identifies the types of parties whose main organizational principles were centered on the vision of the political party leadership and the legitimacy of their power ambitions (Weber, 1965). Focusing on these elements, he came up with three types of political parties (Weber, 1965). These are the patronage party, the class party and the ideology party. The patronage party’s focus is to acquire a position of power and make decisions for its leadership. In his view, the class party represents the interest of a particular class in society (Weber, 1965). The organization of the ideology party is centered on theories of beliefs and principles held by a group of people (Weber, 1965). In addition, the parties are funded by “contributions of the members, and especially by taxing the salaries of those officials who came into office” (Weber, 1965, p.19). Simon (2003) shares Weber’s views and argues that the way a “party is financed influences its character because the financiers determine the direction of the party (Simon, 2003, p. 8). The challenge with this view is that it is Western-based and emerged at the time when many countries outside Europe were still under colonial rule. Furthermore, the nature of party financing makes room for “bribes and tips” as acknowledged by Weber himself (Weber, 1965, p.19). Weber's views are, however, relevant to this study because of his analysis of the personalities who make up a party type since it has an influence on the composition of the internal party structure as financiers may dictate the pace and terms. This study complements the literature on the diversity of party membership composition and its interplay with internal democracy and party performance in general elections.

Duverger (1964) makes a classification of political parties by distinguishing between mass-based and elite-based parties. According to him, the mass-based political parties have a strong and secured organizational structure hierarchically-arranged in the form of a pyramid (Duverger, 1964). He argues that members of mass parties identify themselves with the party's ideology as against the leader's charisma and funding is done by party members at all levels (Duverger, 1964). The elite-based parties prioritize the quality of their members as against quantity and so membership of an elite-based parties is made up of influential people at local or national levels (Duverger, 1964). Also, funding of elite-based parties is normally provided by individual sponsors. There is, however, difficulty in the application of the classification of Duverger in any particular party system around the world (Wildavsky, 1959). Duverger's description is, nonetheless, useful to this study because the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and New Patriotic Party (NPP) are organized as mass-based parties and, at the same time, are hierarchical in terms of membership classification and payment of dues. This thesis complements Duverger's work by exploring party membership at the constituency level in Ghana's Fourth Republic and how internal democracy is practiced.

Neumann (1950) primarily links the role of political parties to that of organization and representation of the interests of their members. The individual representative party is similar to Weber's elite category which is characterized by low political mobilization and participation with elections as a major priority (Neumann, 1950). He notes that the integrative category of parties turns toward those particular social groups and work to mobilize people to take part in party activities (Neumann, 1950). Simon (2003, p. 13) shares the view of Neumann and argues that the primary function of political parties is "representation of interests of various qualities and composition, the national interests, regional interests, and the individual". This study also shares the views of Neumann

(1950) because the representative function is one of the core functions of political parties in Ghana, particularly, at the constituency level. This study complements the view on interest aggregation by exploring the various interests that shape voter choices in constituencies deemed either as swing or strongholds.

Kircheimer (1966) investigates the transformation of Western European party system in 1966 and focuses on parties' mandates and performance in elections. The essence of his work is the conception that prior to the Second World War, some Western European political parties changed their focus from their ideological character to that of "catch-all" character. Kircheimer (1966, p. 190) argues that the changes also had an impact on the conservatives, liberals and social democrats who all shifted from ideology towards a more pragmatic catch-all party character. Kirchheimer (1966) holds the view that the catch-all parties are most suitable for successful elections because they are more effective in mass communication, better in building up the image of their parties and capable of representation. His view is problematic because the claim that catch-all parties are more successful at elections than mass-based parties cannot be generalized in today's world where technology plays a vital role in the success of elections. Our study contributes to the literature by situating the NDC and NPP (modern political parties) within the ambit of catch-all-parties with a programmatic focus in addition to their role as election machines.

With regards to the classification of the political party systems, the types discussed by Sartori (1966) is used frequently (Simon, 2003). He analyzes the European party systems around the 1970s and notes the following "seven party types: single-party system; hegemonic party system; dominating party system; two-party system; multi-party system; extreme multi-party system; atomic party system" (Sartori, 1966, p. 324). He argues that authoritarian regimes are characterized by a single-party system, the hegemonic party system, and the dominating party system whereas democracies are characterized by the

two-party system, the multi-party system (moderate), the extreme multi-party system which he also calls the atomic party systems (Sartori, 1966 as cited in Simon, 2003, p. 25). The weakness of this view emanates from Ware and Ware (1987) and Mair (1997) criticisms that Sartori's types are no longer sufficient to differentiate party systems, because there seems to be no polarized pluralism any more as the trend is overwhelmingly towards the category of moderate pluralism, which diminishes the discriminatory power of Sartori's typology (Mair, 1997; Ware & Ware, 1987). Besides, in rapidly evolving party systems in developing democracies, parties have multiple objectives regardless of the political system (Cheeseman et.al., 2014). Therefore, it might be possible to observe, at least for a time, individual parties pursuing significantly different strategies. That notwithstanding, Sartoris' view is relevant to this study because Ghana is a multi-party system although the two parties have commanded over 70 percent of votes in every election since 1993 (Boafo-Arthur, 2006; Frempong, 2012). As a result, Sartori's assertion is relevant to this study's contribution to the debate that multi-party systems enhance democracy more than one party systems.

It is instructive to note that the different typologies of political parties outlined have been criticized mainly because some of the types were based upon Western European parties because they existed in the latter part of the 19th century through the mid-20th century. To address this defect, Gunther and Diamond (2003) re-evaluate the prevailing typologies of political parties and defining new party types by capturing important aspects of contemporary political parties. They classify 15 'species' of parties "on the basis of three criteria: (1) the nature of the party's organization (thick/thin, elite-based or mass-based, etc.); (2) the programmatic orientation of the party (ideological, particularistic-clientele-oriented, etc.); and (3) tolerant and pluralistic (or democratic) versus proto-hegemonic (or anti-system)" (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p.167). The first criterion is

the nature of the formal organization of political parties under which some restrict membership while others are flexible as to who can join. The second is the nature of the parties' programmatic commitments where some parties have "well-articulated ideologies rooted in political philosophies, religious beliefs or nationalistic sentiments while others do not" (Gunther and Diamond, 2003, p.171). The third criterion is the strategy and behavioral norms of the party, specifically, whether the party is tolerant and pluralistic or proto - hegemonic in its objectives and behavioral style (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). In the view of Gunther and Diamond (2003), some parties are fully committed to democratic norms, tolerant and respectful towards their opponents while others are semi-loyal to democratic norms and institutions. This thesis complements the views of Gunther and Diamond by exploring the internal democracy and the performance of political parties as they contribute to deepening multi-party democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Cheeseman et.al., (2014) develop the concept of programmatic political parties for both developed and developing democracies. They note that programmatic parties are well-structured and ideologically stable which form the basis for their link with constituencies; multi-party electoral competition and the policymaking process. To be classified as programmatic, a party needs to be structured in a way that is responsive to the needs of the electorate and seeks to "implement its programmes in ways that facilitate the construction, diffusion and reproduction of its programmatic platform" (Cheeseman et.al., 2014, p.1). The work of Cheeseman et.al. (2014) is relevant to this thesis because of the rationality of the Ghanaian voter which requires political parties to be programmatic (responsive to the needs of constituents) to enhance or sustain their performance (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018).

The limitation of the programmatic party argument is that it is practically difficult to have parties in Ghana exhibiting only programmatic characteristics especially when it

comes to technical issues like policies including manifestos. For instance, the programmatic structuring of the political parties elsewhere was “triggered by the actions of long-term opposition parties. In other words, being in ‘opposition for a long time, and therefore lacking access to significant material resources, might at least partially explain the adoption of programmatic’ party strategy (Cheeseman et.al., 2014, p.25). This thesis complements the work of Cheeseman et.al. (2014) by exploring internal democracy and the performance of the two major parties in Ghana – the NDC and NPP to find out if they exhibit the characteristics of programmatic parties.

2.4 PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

This section discusses the meaning of institutionalization of political party systems. This will, however, be best understood by first defining institutions. Ayee (2019) defines institutions as entities or structures that are governed by rules and norms and have or are enforcement mechanisms. They can either be formal or informal. Formal institutions are entities such as political party systems, the legislature and judiciary that are part of the social order of society and govern the behavior and expectations of people (Leftwich and Sen, 2011). Informal institutions are referred to as the “socially shared rules that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of the officially sanctioned channels” (Paller, 2014, p. 125). Institutionalization, on the other hand, refers to the process by which organizations (including political parties) and their procedures acquire value and stability in society (Huntington, 1986). Political parties’ level of institutionalization is “defined by the autonomy, complexity, adaptability, and coherence of its organizations and procedures” (Huntington, 1986, p.12).

Massari (1994, p. 174) contends that “political participation without an institutionalized party system produces violence and instability”. For Kalua (2011, p. 43),

the degree to which a “political party is institutionalized is a central aspect that determines its effectiveness” as well as its performance in terms of contribution towards improving the quality of multi-party democracy. In his view, the institutionalization of a party is measured based on variables such as “age of a party, its electoral stability, legislative stability, volatility of its leaders, decisional autonomy, organizational capacity and autonomy” (Kalua (2011, p. 51). This thesis shares Kalua’s views because the ages, organizational capacity, electoral and legislative stability of the NDC and NPP fit into his criterion of measuring party institutionalization. The thesis thus complements the literature on party institutionalization in Ghana’s Fourth Republic.

Mainwaring (1998, p. 68) refers to institutionalized party system as one where “there is stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave”. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) agree with this assertion and enumerate four elements as the basic requirement for party system institutionalization. These are: “stability in interparty competition, the existence of parties that have somewhat stable roots in society, acceptance of parties and elections as the legitimate institutions that determine who governs and party organization with reasonably” organized structures” (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995, p. 1). In the opinion of Huntington (1968, p. 12), party institutionalization is a “process by which party procedures and activities achieve relative stability and gain sufficient significance to surpass their functions”. This study shares the views of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) because of the priority given to stable rules and structures as prerequisites for party institutionalization which are indicative that internal party democracy is critical for party institutionalization and performance in multi-party elections. This study, therefore, complements the literature by situating the Ghanaian context, which is a relatively young democracy, within the frameworks of Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Huntington (1968) and Mainwaring (1998).

Jones (2007) in a study of Latin America develops a concept of party institutionalization and measured it in four aspects - stability of internal – multi-party competitiveness, party roots in society (strong grass-roots base), the legality of the parties' internal elections and general party organization (Jones, 2007). For Jones, properly institutionalized party systems should have stable patterns in internal - party competition and also be well established in the conscience of people as the legitimate institutions that shape the political will of the people (Jones, 2007). His work is limited by his own admission that some of the indicators used do not “measure the behavioral part of party – voter - linkage, but the attitudinal aspect” of that relationship, i.e., whether voters actually identify themselves with political parties and if politicians believe their parties are distant from society (Jones, 2007, p. 9). The thesis, therefore, complements the views of Jones by exploring the constituency specific multidimensional factors that shape voter behaviour in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Randall and Svasand (2002) in a study of African party systems argue that party system institutionalization consists two dimensions - internal and external. The internal component refers to the relationship between parties themselves while the external one is measured by their external relationships with other actors in the state such as civil society (Randall and Svasand, 2002). Seeberg et.al., (2018) share the views of Randall and Svasand and argue that such systems ensure that there is legitimacy of the parties and continuity. Also, Whitfield (2009), argues that Ghana has attained both internal and external criteria for party system institutionalization. This thesis, therefore, contributes to the literature on those aspects of party organization, including internal democracy, that adds to the features of party institutionalization as well as how such features affect voter choices at the constituency level in Ghana.

According to Öney and Selck (2017, p. 223), political party institutionalization is best assessed using “internal democracy, roots in society and the legitimacy of the parties” in a country. Based on this, they conclude that most developing democracies such as Turkey still fall short of party institutionalization. Similarly, Mietzner (2008, p. 435) compares of the party systems in Indonesia in the 1950s and the post-Suharto era and argues that party system institutionalization has been threatened in both periods by ideological and religious factors. Therefore, Indonesia's post-revolutionary party system cannot be blamed on the poor institutionalization of its parties but rather other factors such as elite influence in political parties. His conclusion appears similar to what pertains in Russia (Mietzner, 2008). This thesis, therefore, adds to the literature on party institutionalization and assesses how the features (internal democracy, roots in society and the legitimacy) identified by Öney and Selck (2017) affect the choices of the electorate in Ghana’s Fourth Republic.

2.5 STUDIES ON INTERNAL PARTY DEMOCRACY

Studies on internal party democracy date back to the 1900s and have persisted to today. Scholars have increasingly centered on the promotion of internal party democracy to enhance the overall quality of democratic governance at the state level (Croissant and Chambers, 2010). Despite the increased focus on internal democracy of political parties, the debate remains whether the concept has to do with “the participation and voice of parties' rank-and-file or to the responsiveness of parties to voters in the national electorate” or not. The former sees “democratic political parties as internally democratic while the latter views party leaders as tending to dominate” (Croissant and Chambers, 2010, p. 196). In this section, we review studies on internal party democracy from the global through regional and national levels.

2.5.1 Studies on Internal Party Democracy in Western Europe and North America

In the established democracies of Western Europe and North America, it is argued that the performance of political parties is dependent on a myriad of factors. Maiyo (2008) notes that internal party democracy is central to democratic systems around the world because it encourages the culture of democratic deliberation of critical issues which results in consensus and collective ownership of decisions. He argues that decisions arrived from wider participation promote party unity and reduce factionalism, opportunistic and arbitrary use of delegated authority (Maiyo, 2008). The assumption here is that how much democracy is good for political parties and their effectiveness is desirable for their efficient performance. This assertion is shared by Debrah (2014) who argues that internal democracy has the capacity to determine the electoral fortunes of dominant parties. This assertion is also supported by Ware (2002, p. 255) who agrees that a “link exists between internal party democracy and democracy at the state level” and contributes to legislation that enhances the performance of parties. These studies, however, dwell on the subject of internal democracy from the national level which may not be the true reflection at the subnational (constituency) level. This thesis contributes to knowledge by examining internal democracy and the multidimensional factors that inform voter choices at the constituency level and by extension the performance of political parties.

Boucek (2002) argues that the patterns of internal democracy in Eastern Europe have similar features with those of Western European political parties. He notes that in many of the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, political parties have challenges with internal democracy which negatively impact on their performance (Boucek, 2002). Further, he emphasizes that internal democracy in Eastern European democracies such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia is beginning to converge with that

of Western Europe’’ (Boucek, 2002, p. 488). His study does not, however, examine the effect of internal democracy on parties’ performance at the subnational level which is the most important organizational unit of political parties in Ghana (Ninsin, 2006), thereby leaving unanswered questions on whether his findings apply to parties at the subnational level. This thesis complements the literature as it examines the subject at the subnational level though on a different continent, Africa, to ascertain any possible link.

In a similar study in Europe, Michael Courtney assesses whether variation in social background characteristics of political elites has an impact on internal democracy in Ireland (Courtney, 2015). He notes that “gender and social class are the strongest social background predictors of internal party attitudes, thus justifying a wider social focus on demographic rates of political participation” (Courtney, 2015, p. 178). Specifically, he observes “that gender is the most important social background indicator of attitude and divisions within parties” (Courtney, 2015, p. 195). Courtney (2015) and Boucek (2002) agree that internal party unity is good for the performance of political parties during general elections. They, however, disagree on the factors that are responsible for internal democracy or lack of it. While Boucek (2002) focuses on historical factors including founding principles, Courtney (2015) gives much prominence to gender and other social factors. This thesis focuses on whether the multidimensional factors that account for internal democracy and the performance of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) at the constituency level are similar in constituencies classified as swing or strongholds and thus complements the literature on the factors that determine the performance of political parties.

In a study that tests the influence of political elites in Switzerland where direct democracy is practiced at the state level, Trechsel and Sciarini (1998, p.119) argue that “elite control remains relatively powerful and this has been blamed for the inefficient

internal party structures but not the causative factor for internal party volatility''. Similarly, Ladner (2001, p.123) examines the weakening Swiss party system with focus on subnational politics and notes that the weakness of the internal organization of the parties can be blamed on the lack of incentives such as "unpaid internal party positions, the lack of internal homogeneity, different language areas, confessions and degrees of urbanization''. The study further reveals that these factors militate against the performance of internal party politics in Switzerland where there are "1800 cantonal and 5,000 local parties" (Ladner, 2001, p. 241). The findings in these studies are similar to the situation in Ghana where several factors including indirect imposition of candidates on constituents, religion, ethnicity, party financing, and gender issues account for internal democratic challenges and by extension the performance of political parties in general elections (Agomor, 2015; Debrah, 2014; Osei, 2013). This thesis, therefore, contributes to the literature on the various factors that account for internal democracy and the performance of political parties.

Kippin and Dunleavy (2016) explore internal democracy in the United Kingdom (UK) and argue that political parties in the UK are generally stable organizations but not without minor internal challenges. They note that despite the strengths of the UK's political parties, their internal issues affect their performance in elections. For instance, the Labour party's "vote in Scotland plunged from 42% in 2010 to 24%, and under plurality rule voting its MPs there fell from 41 to just one" (Kippin and Dunleavy, 2016, p. 2). According to them "the most chaotic political party has been the United Kingdom's Independent Party (UKIP) since 2015 characterized by 'party in-fighting' as a result of internal party democratic deficits (Kippin and Dunleavy, 2016, p. 3). This, they argue, reflects in the unsatisfactory performance in elections by the UKIP. Similarly, in Indonesia, Sherlock (2004) argues that party leaders see "nothing wrong in stating openly

that all parties' platforms are the same or almost the same with or without the tenets of democracy'' (cited in Randall, 2007, p. 640). According to Sherlock (2004), the ''story is not different in Cambodia and Jamaica where largely indistinguishable platforms randomly combine elements of liberal values like democracy, justice, equality and undemocratic values such as patron client tactics in internal party administration'' (cited in Randall, 2007, p. 640). This thesis contributes to the literature by exploring the contextual variables of internal democracy at the constituency level that affect the performance of political parties.

In his analysis of the United States political parties, DiSalvo (2009, p. 30) argues that parties in the US ''are neither as strong as some suggest nor as weak as others hold, it is often the case that factions are important actors within them''. He opines that internal democratic issues in the US take the form of party factions which can be formal or informal. According to him, a combination of factors such as ideological, electoral and power-base considerations drive internal party factions in political parties in the US especially the Democratic Party and Republican Party (DiSalvo, 2009). This is similar to the findings of Courtney (2015) in the case of Ireland. Furthermore, the effect of founding principles on internal democracy in Western Europe as noted by Boucek (2002) pertains to the NDC which has one man designated as its founder who chairs the council of elders (Debrah, 2014). Furthermore, in the NPP, dominant names like Busia, Danquah and Dombo, whose founding principles drive the party largely play a role in the internal organization and the performance of the party in national elections (Frempong, 2017). Moreover, cultural influence in Ghana is such that people hardly oppose the dictates of elders in society including parties hence such founding principles and personalities have an effect on the performance of political parties (Bob-Milliar, 2012). This thesis, therefore, extends the literature in this regard by linking the discourse on the underlying factors

undermining internal democracy and political party performance to the Ghanaian experience.

In their exploratory study on post-World War II developments in the internal organization of political parties and the impact on democracy in Western Europe, Allern and Pedersen (2007) assess internal democracy on three variables, namely, sustain competition, participation, and deliberation, on the performance of political parties. They observe that there is an uneven trend in internal democracy among parties in Western Europe. They also note that powerful elites influence internal democracy in political parties especially the “seriously challenged parties” which are unable to undertake wider participation among members (Allern and Pedersen, 2007, p. 77). They conclude that internal dynamics like the “decreasing membership and increasing leadership dominance” play a role in the overall decline of political parties’ contribution to democracy (Allern and Pedersen, 2007, p. 84). The findings by Allern and Pedersen (2007) are similar to the observations by Boucek (2002) and Courtney (2015) to the effect that internal democracy has a link with the fortunes of political parties in general elections. The studies are, however, not able to address the extent to which internal party democratic deficit affects the performance of parties in national elections even though that has been stated in the case of the internal organization of parties. This thesis draws a comparative link between the effect of internal democracy on party performance in multi-party elections and internal volatility of the parties.

In a study that explored the internal democracy of political parties in Finland (Eurasia), where a preferential list system is used in an election, Villodres (2003) examines internal democracy in relation to candidate selection. He relies on quantitative estimates using position effect, the Gini index of inequality and intra-partisan defeats and opines that the “application of internal democratic process leads generally to a large proportion (20

percent) of incumbents losing to newcomer candidates’’ in both the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Centre Party of Finland (KES) (Villodres, 2003, p. 55). Villodres’s (2003) findings are supported by Wilkins (2016) who observes that strict adherence to internal democracy in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in rural Uganda leads to the defeat of more incumbent party executives and members of parliament (MPs) (Wilkins, 2016). Villodres’s (2003) study is relevant to this thesis because of the link it draws between the performance of political parties and internal democracy but weakened by the use of quantitative methods which do not allow for in-depth exploration of participants’ views. Furthermore, the study fails to examine the effect of other factors on internal democracy and party performance beyond candidate selections. The strength of the study, which is relevant to this thesis, is the focus on the subnational level. This thesis, therefore, complements Villodres’s (2003) study by using mixed methods as opposed to a purely quantitative method.

Pettitt (2008) explores whether devolution, particularly, the adoption of mixed member proportional electoral system, has an influence on internal democracy in Scotland. He observes that the devolution system makes it easy for parties to “gain representation and achieve legislative influence” (Pettitt, 2008, p. 322). He concludes that the preferential system in Finland, the direct democracy system in Switzerland and the devolution system in Scotland have an impact on internal democracy and the parties’ performance in elections (Pettitt, 2008). This thesis adds to the literature by exploring the extent to which Ghana’s presidential and parliamentary system affect party performance.

In a related study that examines whether inclusiveness in internal party leadership selection determines whether parties respond the general electorate or their party members using data between 1975 and 2003 for six (6) West European countries, Ron Lehrer, notes that parties that are not internally democratic “move on average, in the opposite direction

of their supporters’’ and are therefore not responsive to their supporters (Lehrer, 2012, p. 1304). This affects the performance of parties in general elections in the case of multi-party systems (Lehrer, 2012). On the other hand, political parties that are internally democratic are responsive to their supporters and this applies in both two-party and multi-party systems and thus have a positive impact on their performance in general elections (Lehrer, 2012, p. 1306). This may, however, be dependent on the motivation behind joining political parties. Lehrer’s work, however, does not explore people’s motivation for joining or voting for parties which may play a role in party performance. For instance, in a study that investigates whether membership ballot presents a challenge to internal democracy using the German Social Democratic Party (GSDP) as a case study, Wolkenstein, notes that ‘‘in parties where members are intrinsically motivated, there is consensus in internal democratic activities because divergent views are respected’’ and this affect voter choices (2016, p. 13). He opines that ‘‘intrinsic value-justification of internal party democracy, defends internal democracy on the basis that it instantiates equal respect for persons qua self-determining agents’’ (Wolkenstein, 2016, p. 18). The reverse holds true for parties whose members are extrinsically motivated (Wolkenstein, 2016). This thesis complements the literature on the individual level incentives that affect internal democracy and the subsequent performance of political parties.

In sum, the literature on internal democracy in Europe shows that elite influence, founding principles of parties, statewide legislation on parties, gender issues, individual level motivation are among the factors militating against internal democracy and the performance of parties in general elections. Also, it is clear from the literature that the structure and dynamics of internal democracy in Western Europe and North America are similar especially in the aspects of elite influence, party funding and ideological orientation. These studies are relevant to this thesis because they have examined variables

that are similar to the situation in Ghana. This thesis complements the literature on internal democracy and the performance of parties through an examination of the contextual variables at the constituency level.

2.5.2 Studies on Internal Party Democracy in Africa

Studies on internal party democracy in Africa abound. In their study on *Candidate nomination, Intra-party Democracy and Violence in Africa*, Seeberg et. al. (2018) observe that internal democratic problems in political parties are directly linked to candidate nomination and subsequent performance of political parties in general elections. They opine that anti-democracy within political parties affects the overall performance of parties by jeopardizing the quality of democracy within the party structures “that are expected to help consolidate democracy in the longer term” (Seeberg et.al., 2018, p. 4). This challenge reflects in many hegemonic as well as multi-party democracies in Africa. The study, however, does not examine other factors that affect internal democracy such as ethnicity, client-patron-relationship, party funding, and elite influence. This thesis adds to the literature on the impact of internal democracy on the performance of political parties by going beyond candidate selection to include other factors such as gender, culture, perception and other motivations.

Some studies have shown that internal democracy in hegemonic party systems in Africa play diverse roles in the success or otherwise of regimes. For instance, scholarly works on the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda buttress this claim (Lotshwao, 2009; Wilkins, 2016). Wilkins (2016) investigates the cause, structure, and extent of self-financed campaigning, building on evidence from three traditionally pro-NRM rural districts in southern Uganda - Kyenjojo, Kayunga, and Bugiri. He notes that internal acrimony

resulting from a democratic deficit in the NRM is actually advantageous to the stability of the Museveni regime in Uganda (Wilkins, 2016). He observes that internal party competition within the NRM is keen yet many defeated parliamentary candidates including sitting MPs who have lost internal primaries blame their defeat on lack of transparency and therefore contest national elections either as “independent NRM” or “Independent challenger” or leave the party altogether (Wilkins, 2016, p. 626). He notes that out of “the 245 NRM popularly elected MPs in the 9th Parliament (2011–2016), only 104 (42%) were re-elected to the 10th Parliament” (Wilkins, 2016, p. 626). According to him, a vast majority of those defeated fell into the “independent NRM” or “independent challengers” category. This internal party problem reproduces “Museveni’s munificent image at the centre of government and is critical to his political legitimacy because it offsets unfulfilled expectations of actual distribution” of the national cake to the people (Wilkins, 2016, p. 633). The findings by this study show that while anti-internal democracy negatively affects the performance of the party in parliamentary elections, it rather enhances the performance of the party at the presidential elections and is the source of regime stability. The major strength of Wilkins’s work is how it dissected the effects of weak internal party democracy on both the presidential and parliamentary levels. His study is, however, weakened by the cases selected which are strongholds of the NRM. This thesis complements Wilkin’s work by exploring internal democracy and party performance in both strongholds and swing constituencies of the two main political parties in Ghana, the NDC and NPP, in Ghana.

Similar studies by Lotshwao (2009) in South Africa produced different results though the two countries have one dominant party. According to him, internal “democracy in the ANC functions best during national conferences and in leadership elections - and most poorly at all other times”(Lotshwao, 2009, p. 904). His findings suggest that the

ANC is characterized by a centralized style of leadership selection with individuals especially the elites dominating in internal decision-making to the neglect of other members within the party. This is further compounded by the high levels of “intolerance of debate and dissent by the leadership of the ANC” (Lotshwao, 2009, p. 901). He notes that the absence of internal democracy within the ANC poses a serious threat to the deepening of South African democracy and regime stability because the practice leaves political leaders in government unchecked and the same applies to heads of state institutions who are also party members (Lotshwao, 2009). Lotshwao (2009) concludes that internal democratic deficit affects the performance of the party in government and also in its electoral fortunes. Both Wilkins (2016) and Lotshwao (2009) agree that internal democracy affects the performance of political parties. They, however, disagree on the level of the party structure that suffers the most electorally. This thesis, therefore, contributes to the debate on the factors that affect party performance in elections and other mandates such as the political parties’ role in shaping the political will of the people.

In a related study on *Intra-party violence in sub-Saharan Africa*, Reeder and Seeberg (2018) note that the lack of internal democracy sometimes leads to internal party violence usually prior to internal party elections. According to them, the risk of internal party acrimony increases anytime undemocratic means are used to disadvantage some people (Reeder and Seeberg, 2018). The strength of their study is in its findings that show that internal democracy is usually high in a party’s electoral strongholds (Reeder and Seeberg, 2018). The relevance of this work to this thesis is the similarity of its findings to the situation in Ghana where internal acrimony is high among the NDC and NPP strongholds in the Volta Region and the Ashanti Region respectively because of the notion that whoever is elected to represent a party has a very high chance of winning elections in the strongholds (Ichino and Nathan, 2017). This thesis, therefore, complements existing

works on party performance by specifically assessing the multidimensional factors that inform voter choices in both strongholds and swing constituencies of the NDC and NPP.

In a study on inter- and intra-party relations in the formation and performance of coalition governments in Morocco (North Africa) after the 2011 elections following the Arab Spring, Szmolka (2015, p. 656) asks “whether, in spite of the existence of a decisively influential unelected actor, inter and intra-party factors are also relevant in the formation of coalition governments in political regimes which, while not democratic” make room for political participation and competition at both the party and national levels. He notes that internal democracy influences the decision of a party to either participate in government or not. He notes that lack of internal party consensus due to changes in internal party leadership in the Independent Party (IP) led to the party’s rejection of an invitation to join a coalition government (Szmolka, 2015). Szmolka (2015, p. 668), however, attributes the positive signs of internal democracy in Morocco to the influential role of the King due to “the prevailing circumstance”. He, however, admits that the outcome of his study is not enough to assert that internal democracy in Morocco is perfect but largely due to circumstances. It is important to conduct further studies in the future to ascertain whether the current cordial internal party democracy in post-Arab-Spring Morocco is sustainable (Szmolka, 2015). The present study contributes to knowledge by analyzing the impact of internal democracy on the electoral performance of political parties in Ghana.

In the specific case of multi-party East African Kenya, Elklit and Wanyama (2018) observe in a study of political parties that weak organizational structures, induced by lack of internal democracy, at all levels (national and subnational) affects the performance of the parties to the extent that it has prevented them from organizing beyond ethno-regional consideration which results in nomination violence at the party level internal elections and also during national elections. This study is clear on the negative effect that lack of internal

democracy has on parties' performance at both the party and national levels which sometimes results in violence. The ethnic factor in multi-party Kenya is similar to other countries in Africa where ethnicity plays a role in internal party structures (Wanyama and Elklit, 2018; Wilkins, 2016). Wanyama and Elklit's study is, however, weakened by its inability to examine the impact of internal democracy on voter choices and party performance on a case by case basis in Kenya. This thesis adds to the literature by attempting to link internal democracy and performance of political parties in constituencies that are classified as swing and strongholds in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

In *The iron law of Erdogan: The decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule*, Lancaster (2014) argues that internal democracy of parties “owes its existence to three indicators - inclusiveness, decentralization and institutionalization” (Lancaster, 2014, p. 1673). According to her, when these three factors erode, internal democracy also erodes and leads to *personalistic* party rule (2014). Lancaster notes that a party that has moved from *democratic* to *oligarchic* or *personalistic* internal rule performs unsatisfactorily in national elections citing the case of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) to buttress her claim. She argues that the “decreasing levels of inclusiveness, decentralization, and institutionalization in terms of policy formation and candidate selection” in a party affect its performance in general elections (Lancaster, 2014, p. 1673). This important study, however, is unable to examine the subject at the subnational level which has the potential of revealing the multidimensional factors behind voter choices during elections. This thesis complements Lancaster's study as it examines the influence of local level factors such as decentralization of party structures, inclusiveness, and other incentives, on internal democracy and its effect on the performance of political parties.

2.5.3 Studies on Internal Party Democracy in Ghana

There are a lot of scholarly works on democracy, elections, manifestos, party funding, patron-client relations and other variables that impact on internal democracy and party performance. Some of these studies pre-date the Fourth Republic but are nonetheless relevant (see Agyeman, 1988; Boahen, 1989; Jeffries, 1980; Oquaye, 1980; Chazan, 1983; Ninsin & Drah, 1987; Ayee, 1990). Scholarly works on internal democracy show that constituency level party elections including parliamentary primaries as well as how the parties' package their messages are crucial for voter choices and so affect the performance of the parties (Ayee, 1998, 2015, 2017; Frempong, 2017; Gyampo, 2015; Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Kennedy, 2009; 2006, 2017).

In a study on *Chasing the Elephant into the Bush* that gave an insider's account of how the New Patriotic Party (NPP) lost the 2008 elections, Kennedy (2009) argues that internal acrimony within the party resulting in lack of coordination, composition of campaign team without following internal party principles, the inability of elected party executives to determine allocation of campaign funds as well as the influential role of certain powerful individuals (such as da Rocha, a founding member) in the selection of a running mate, played a role in the defeat of the governing NPP in 2008. This publication, however, does not explain the factors that led to a massive win of the NPP in its stronghold of Ashanti region despite the issues raised by Kennedy prior to the 2008 elections. His work overlooks the fact that since 1993, every party that has won elections has served a maximum of 8 years in office and 2008 was the 8th year of the J.A. Kufuor led NPP regime. His work is also not constituency based. This notwithstanding, Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi (2008) agree with Kennedy on the interplay between internal democracy and the performance of the NDC and NPP in general elections. They argue that internal democratic deficit contributed to the defeat of the NDC in 2000. Even though Debrah and Gyimah-

Boadi (2014) are fully aware of other factors that affect the performance of political parties in elections, they are unable to draw any such link. This thesis complements the literature by widening the scope to constituency specific factors that affect the performance of political parties.

In his assessment of political parties as agents of democracy, Osei (2013, p. 553) notes that even though Ghanaian political parties “are comparatively strong and do mobilize large numbers of voters, they are weak in social integration and interest representation because they are largely instruments of elite control”. He opines that “members of political parties are largely mere consumers of party policies with little influence on decision-making and little chance to exercise their passive voting rights” (Osei, 2013, p. 557). According to Osei (2013), the nomination of candidates is a major cause of conflicts in internal party competition. He cites the NDC under President Jerry John Rawlings in what has become known as the ‘Swedru declaration’ where the then president, Rawlings unilaterally selected his vice-president, Prof. John Atta Mills, as his successor without recourse to internal democratic procedures of the party. In addition, he observes that the NPP had its own share of anti-internal democracy when in 2004 and 2008 the party experienced considerable conflicts in its primaries with allegations of vote rigging, vote-buying and other forms of manipulation and elite interference in candidate selection and even direct imposition of “unwanted candidates” (Osei, 2013, p. 556). Osei (2013) argues that such anti-democratic tendencies affect the performance of parties in general elections. This thesis explores whether the imposition of candidates and elite influence are part of the internal democratic challenges faced by the NDC and NPP in the Ledzokuku, Kwabre East and Ketu South constituencies and the extent to which such variables affect the parties’ performance in national elections and their civic role in relation to voter education.

In a similar study that sought to explore the impact of clienteles and internal party conflict during legislative primaries, Ichino and Nathan (2013) note that subnational level party members are crucial for voter mobilization so their overall effect on party performance especially after internal primaries is critical and varies depending on whether a party is in opposition or government. According to them, primaries for a ruling party in Ghana especially competitive constituencies are problematic because the losing aspirant(s) might have incurred heavy debts “invaluable nomination and withholding their support from the nominee in order to bargain for compensation can be electorally consequential” (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 428). Under the circumstance, exiting the party with one’s support base to go “independent may be a viable option” and that comes at an electoral cost to the party (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 428). Their claim is similar to that of Wilkins (2016) in Uganda except that in hegemonic National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, disgruntled candidates who contest as independent candidates are not dismissed from the party (Ichino and Nathan, 2013).

In the view of Ichino and Nathan (2013), the effect of internal democratic deficit affects the performance of the ruling party more than it does to the opposition party “because lower investment by primary aspirants generates less internal party conflict and exit options are less attractive for losing aspirants”, a situation they termed “bonus” for the opposition party (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 429). The problem with Ichino and Nathan’s work is that it does not address the puzzle where on several occasions the opposition party rather faces defections or independent candidature by losing aspirants than the ruling party in Ghana. The relative truth is that both defections or what Ichino and Nathan call a “*primary penalty*” for the ruling party and primary “bonus” for an opposition party does not apply in all instances (Ichino and Nathan, 2013, p. 429; see also Frempong, 2012).

The two studies (Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Osei, 2013) both agree that subnational level party membership mobilization is key to the success or otherwise of a party; in other words, there is a link between internal democracy and performance of political parties. They also agree that internal democracy is affected during parliamentary primaries because aspirants heavily invest resources and therefore conceding defeat may mean a complete financial loss resulting in either the candidate becoming an independent candidate or exiting the party altogether (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). However, since such defeated or aggrieved aspirants leave with their supporters, the spillover effect is usually detrimental to the performance of the party in national competitive multi-party elections (Ichino and Nathan, 2013; Osei, 2013). While Ichino and Nathan (2013) note that policy position is subordinated to money in the determination of victorious internal party candidates, Ninsin (2006, p. 15) observes that both play a central role in determining who wins internal party elections because “money undoubtedly plays a major role in the final choice of candidates”. Even though these studies widen the debate on the factors that influence the electoral performance of political parties, they have not been able to show the relationship between each level of the party structure (zonal, constituency, regional and national). This study seeks to complement this debate by exploring the interplay between constituency specific multidimensional factors on the part of the voters, internal democracy on the part of internal party governance and performance of political parties in elections and other civic duties such as helping to shape the political will of the people.

In a study of internal party factionalism, Bob-Milliar (2012) notes that internal democratic challenges fueled by party factionalism in Ghana occur during internal competition. He observes that in the NDC “internal factionalism hovers around disagreements between pro-and anti-Rawlings camps whereas in the NPP factionalism is usually along the Busia and Danquah historical lineage” (Bob-Milliar, 2012, p. 574).

According to him, internal factionalism of parties is dynamic and complex and that “the NDC is characterized more by cooperative factionalism which enables the various groups to retain their distinct identities” (Bob-Milliar, 2012, p.597). Debrah (2014) and Alabi and Alabi (2007) agree with Milliar (2012) that corporate identity plays a role in internal conflict such that an “attempt to promote Rawlings’ hegemony in the NDC, provoked internal conflict and violent clashes over the selection of leaders and candidates” after the 2000 electoral defeat of the NDC (Debrah, 2014, p. 68). This thesis adds to this debate but with a focus on the constituency level.

In *Political Parties and Political Participation in Ghana*, Ninsin (2006, p. 15) blames internal party democratic challenges on the “growing tendency for headquarters of political parties to impose candidates on constituency elections in complete disregard of local preferences”. This observation by Ninsin (2006) is supported by the news headlines on ‘*presidency gave me money for my campaign*’-NPP Greater Accra Chairman’ in which Divine Oto Agorme revealed during his swearing-in ceremony that he had the support of the presidency in his bid for the regional chairmanship slot of the ruling NPP (Nyabor, 2018). Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi (2008) share a similar view when they opine that many internal party practices and activities in the Fourth Republic breach democratic principles and are highly undemocratic especially when it comes to leadership selection procedures. In their view, there exists widespread use of indirect representation/delegation at party conferences and congresses and in some instances party executives or some ‘invisible hands’ pronounce consensus over who should be elected (Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah 2008, p. 64). The overall aim of internal democracy is to improve the performance of political parties since democracy within parties is a reflection of democracy at the national level (Ninsin, 2006) but Gyimah-Boadi and Debrah are

unable to explore the effect of internal democracy on the electoral fate of parties at the constituency level. This thesis, therefore, complements the literature in this regard.

Ayee (2017) attributes the defeat of the then ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) to many factors including division in the party, profligate campaign, complacency, public perceptions of corruption and internal registration of party members. It is clear from this study that internal division in the NDC affected its performance in the election. This view is shared by Alidu (2017) who argues that the outcome of the 2016 election is an indication of the rationality of the Ghanaian voter. This implies that voters can make choices rationally by looking at the state of a party vis-à-vis how internally organized it is including the composition of campaign teams, complacency and internal disunity as raised by Ayee (2017). However, these studies do not focus on specific contextual constituency variables to ascertain whether the factors attributed to the NDC's defeat in 2016 general elections apply to all constituencies, especially when 2016 was the 8th year of the NDC in government which fits into the narrative that since 1993, every political party in Ghana that has won elections has served for 8 years. The thesis, therefore, adds to the literature by exploring the various specific factors that account for internal democracy and the performance of political parties at the constituency level in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

In a similar study, Alabi and Alabi (2007) conclude that despite the many factors that contribute to the electoral performance of Ghanaian political parties, ethnicity plays a dominant role in the acceptability of political marketing approaches adopted by political parties. Their analysis show “that political parties with very strong ethnic support bases are those that have stood the test of time no matter what marketing tools or approaches are employed” (Alabi and Alabi, 2007, p.49). Alabi and Alabi's work, however, breaks down because it does not place much emphasis on internal democracy which is linked to the subject of their study; the effect of ethnicity in political marketing and the role it plays in

the performance of parties. We contribute to the debate on the various factors that affect political parties' performance at the constituency level in this study.

The literature on internal democracy in Ghana is clear that both the NPP and NDC have weak internal democracy. It is evident that “while the parties have resorted to the use of elections to choose their leaders and candidates, they were only significant for their cosmetic purposes” due to the “embourgeoisement” tendencies that have manifested in the corridors of the parties through internal manipulations” (Debrah 2014, p. 66). In as much as these studies have shown the impact of internal democracy on electoral fortunes at the national level, they do not explain the reasons behind the inconsistencies in voter behaviour in a swing constituency such as Ledzokuku and the consistency in voter choices in strongholds of the NDC (Ketu South) and the NPP (Kwabre East). This thesis, therefore, extends the literature on the interplay between internal democracy and the performance of political parties in shaping the political will of the people and elections.

2.6 STUDIES ON QUALITY OF MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY

The quality of multi-party democracy, especially in developing democracies can best be understood from a historical point of view because democracy is a process. For instance, “between 1990 and 1993 more than half of Africa's fifty-two governments had begun re-democratization by conducting presidential or legislative elections (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). In countries such as Benin, Niger, and Mali, national referenda kicked against authoritarian regimes while others were defeated in presidential and parliamentary elections from 1990 to 1994 (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). However, in countries like Ghana, Guinea, Gabon, Senegal, and Kenya incumbent authoritarian leaders succeeded in holding on to power even though multi-party elections were held (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). The progress of democracy around the world has not

been sustained as the quality undulates. According to Freedom House Report (2018), 2017 was the 12th successive year of decline in the quality of democracy. Seventy-one countries suffered a net decline in political rights and civil liberties in 2017, with only 35 registering gains with states such as Turkey, Venezuela, Poland, and Tunisia, among those experiencing declines in the quality of democracy (Freedom House, 2018).

That notwithstanding, scholars do not agree on a standardized criterion in measuring the quality of democracy. Norris (2011, p.157) notes that the quality of democracy is best measured using indicators such as “free election, civil liberties, referenda, and women's rights”. In the view of Lijphart (1993, p.149) the quality of democracy is measured based on “the degree to which a system meets such democratic norms as representativeness, accountability, equality, and participation”. Diamond and Morlino (2004, p. 22) assess the quality of democracy on the extent to which a political system that “provides its citizens with a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control over public policies and policymakers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions”. For Hogstrom (2011, p.2) the quality of democracy refers to the “level of legitimacy in a democratic system with factors such as participation, competition, equality and rule of law”. Hogstrom (2011) thus agrees with Lijphart (1993) on what constitutes the quality of democracy as they both focus on democratic tenets including participation, rule of law, accountability, competition, and freedom. Diamond and Morlino (2005) however, go beyond freedom, competition, and representation to include functioning institutions as major constituents of the quality of democracy. This thesis complements the views of Diamond and Morlino (2005) by drawing a link with the Ghanaian case because after two and half decades of sustained democratic rule, assessment of any aspect of the country's body politic including internal democracy and party performance should focus on functioning institutions.

In a study on nonviolent resistance on the quality of democracy, Bethke and Pinckney (2016) sampled 101 regimes between 1945 and 2010, using an index of polyarchy and its sub-components including free, fair and transparent elections, freedom of expression and inclusive citizenship to measure the quality of democracy. They note that initiating a democratic transition through nonviolent voter campaign does increase the rate of improvement of democratic quality (Bethke and Pinckney, 2016). However, their analysis of the sub-components of polyarchy shows that a positive effect on nonviolent “voter resistance is not uniform across all the dimensions of democracy which comes about due to improvements in freedom of expression” (Bethke and Pinckney, 2016, p. 22). Their view is supported by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). They analyzed 323 violent and nonviolent campaigns between 1900 and 2006 and note that the nonviolent campaigns succeeded 53% of the time, while only 27% of the armed struggles ultimately succeeded in “entire spectrum of severity of repressive regimes and for all regions of the world” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, p. 139). Ghana has arguably become matured after conducting seven successful elections with three alternations of power, an indication that a nonviolent approach is good for improving the quality of multi-party democracy. This thesis, therefore, contributes to the literature on quality of multi-party democracy as it relates to internal democracy and the performance of the two leading parties in Ghana in general elections – the NDC and NPP.

In sum, the literature on the quality of multi-party democracy is elaborate. It is clear that economic development, rule of law, participation, competition, respect for human right, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association are central in assessing the quality of a country's democracy. However, measured at the subnational (constituency) level, multiple factors that cannot be uniformly applied across regions exist. The present study, therefore, complements the literature in that direction by exploring the

multiplicity of variables that inform voter choices and party performance in constituencies categorized as swing (Ledzokuku) and strongholds (Ketu South and Kwabre East) in Ghana.

2.7 DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

There exists a large body of literature on democratic consolidation. That notwithstanding, scholars do not agree on a comprehensive definition of the term democratic consolidation (Rose and Shin, 2001). The literature on democratic consolidation has, therefore, left scholars divided mainly between two schools of thought; minimalists and the maximalists' perspectives (Gyampo, et.al.,2017).

Scholars belonging to the minimalists' school of thought such as Linz and Stepan define democratic consolidation as the process through which a polity attains the 'two-elections' test or the 'transfer of power' test (1996). This takes place when a political party forms a government by winning a free and fair election and is defeated in subsequent election and concedes defeat (Linz and Stepan, 1996). This practice leads to a stage when it can be said that democracy has become "the only game in town" where democratic procedures and institutions become the most appropriate channels to govern a country (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p. 2). However, this assertion of democratic consolidation has been criticized on the grounds that it is not possible to have a "democratic system that satisfies all minimum democratic standards" (Beetham, 1994, p. 130). Similarly, Huntington (1991) argues that for democracy to be consolidated a polity must attain what he calls the 'two-turnover test.' This means consolidation occurs when a "party wins an election, loses in the subsequent election and transfers power to another party that also loses an election and hands over power peacefully" (Huntington, 1991, pp. 266–267). Ghana has passed this test with alternation of power between the NDC and NPP in 2001,

2009 and 2017 (Ayee, 2017). However, Huntington's claim has been criticized by maximalists for committing the fallacy of electoralism (Karl, 2000), by "privileging elections over all other dimensions of democracy" (cited in Rose & Shin, 2001, p. 334). Even though the focus of this thesis is not on democratic consolidation, it contributes to the literature by building on the aspects of elections and performance of political parties which improve multi-party democracy.

Maximalists such as Bentham argue that democracy is consolidated when a government is able to withstand pressures and shocks, including the shock of dissent (Beetham, 1994). Also, he opines that while the transfer of power to the opposition is a necessary ingredient of democracy, robust and sustainable democracy require more than a mere procedural form of democracy (Beetham, 1994). Per this logic, Ghana's democracy may not fit properly as a consolidated one because of challenges such as intra-party violent militant groups and weaknesses of state institutions (Gyampo et al., 2018). Others on the maximalists' side tend to examine institutional arrangements including "civil society, independent pluralistic media, rule of law, the integrity of elections and its processes, the absence of political violence and political culture" as crucial ingredients of democratic consolidation (Schneider and Schmitter, 2004, p. 59). For instance, Diamond (1999) argues that a consolidating democracy requires the availability of certain mechanisms for dissent opinion, interest articulation, and influence of public policy as well as checks on the exercise of power in between election period. For Valenzuela (1990), the yardstick in measuring democratic consolidation differs among scholars because of contextual issues. Using the Chilean case in a study titled *Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings*, Valenzuela (1990) concludes that for a democracy to be consolidated there should be an abolition of tutelary powers, reserved domains, and major discriminations in electoral laws. The challenge with this argument is how regimes will operationalize

concepts such as reserved domains. The thesis, therefore, contributes to the literature on internal democracy and political parties' performance (civic and electoral) and how that affect voter choices and strengthen multi-party democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Situating the argument of democratic consolidation within four typologies of regimes, namely, authoritarianism, semi-democracy, liberal democracy and advanced democracy, Schedler (1998; 2001) concludes that a democracy is consolidated when a polity is able to avoid democratic breakdown, avoid democratic erosion, institutionalizing democracy, completing democracy and deepening democracy. A major weakness of Schedler's view is the absence of time period and what actually constitutes a democratic breakdown universally. For, Boafo-Arthur (2002, p.248), progressing from military dictatorship to democratic governance and then “sustaining, entrenching or consolidating the democratic structures” put a polity on the path to democratic consolidation. In the midst of the unresolved controversy surrounding democratic consolidation, the thesis contributes to the discourse as it extends the factors that make democracy consolidated to the constituency level, by discussing the contextual constituency factors and how they impact on internal democracy.

2.8 STUDIES ON GHANAIAN POLITICS

Much scholarship has been produced on Ghanaian politics. The studies initially focused on British, world, and Gold Coast politics and later shifted from Eurocentric to Ghanaian politics after independence (Gyimah-Boadi, 2014). Scholarly works covered themes such as political history (Austin 1964), the structure of Ghanaian politics (Chazan, 1983), political parties and democracy in Ghana (Drah and Ninsin, 1993), elections, democratic transition and consolidation (Ayee, 1998; Boafo-Arthur, 2006), governance (Agyeman-Duah, 2008; Ayee, 2007), civil society (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996) and history

(Boahen, 1989; Nugent, 1995). This section contributes to the discourse by reviewing the literature on constituency level politics, women in politics, institutional reforms, democratic governance and leadership, ethnicity and parliamentary democracy in the Fourth Republic.

Elections involving political parties in Ghana target the grassroots at the constituency level because it is the most important organizational unit in Ghanaian politics (Ninsin, 2006). The Department of Political Science of the University of Ghana has conducted surveys on voting behaviour and responses of the electorate to government policies at the constituency level periodically. Independent scholars also raise constituency level issues and most of them focus on elections and the performance of political parties, particularly the NDC and the NPP. Allah-Mensah (1998) examines voting behaviour in the Ellembele constituency in the Western region and notes that socioeconomic or demographic factors such as education, income, and socio-economic status, age and gender as well as psychological factors such as party identification and perception of candidates determine voter choices. She argues that voters in Ellembele constituency tend to be “more sociotropic voters” (voting based on their communities’ interest) although she observes elements of the “retrospective pattern of voting” (Allah-Mensah, 1998, p.265). Similarly, Ayee (1998) measures public opinion on voters’ perceptions of key national and local-level political and economic issues and pattern of voting in the Anlo and Keta constituencies in the Volta region. He notes that the good policies of the NDC contributed to the massive support base of the party (60 and 64% in the 1996 elections) in the Keta and Anlo constituencies (Ayee, 1998). He argues that the electorate in Keta and Anlo constituencies voted based on a candidate’s ability to deliver by providing infrastructural services including roads, electricity, and water (Ayee, 1998). Debrah (2006) notes that national issues do not count much among the factors that influence voter choices

in the Upper West Akyem and New Juabeng constituencies in the Ashanti region. He argues, instead, that local issues such as unemployment among the youth and economic related issues informed voting behaviour in the two constituencies (Debrah, 2006). Essuman-Johnson (2006) observes that voting behaviour in the Bolgatanga, Bongo, Komenda-Edina-Eguafo-Abirim (KEEA) and Gomoa West constituencies is dependent on constituency specific circumstances as well as local factors. He contends, for example, that apart from the Gomoa West constituency, the electorate in KEEA “voted for CPP in the parliamentary and NPP in the presidential; Bongo voted NDC in parliamentary and NPP in presidential while Bolgatanga voted the PNC in parliamentary and NPP in presidential” in the 2004 elections (Essuman-Johnson, 2006, p.62).

Additionally, Boafo-Arthur (2006, p.170) posits that voters in the Mfantseman West, Mfantseman East, and Cape Coast constituencies “seem to take voting in elections a serious civic duty”. Also, education, health, electricity and high expectations of development projects informed voter choices in the three constituencies (Boafo-Arthur, 2006). Similarly, issues such as the economy, democratic governance, unemployment, health, education, traditional attachment to political parties, level of poverty, party identity and creation of new districts were among the factors that influenced voters in voting for candidates or parties in the constituency studies undertaken by Ansah-Koi (1998), Ahiawordor (2006), Saaka (1998), Allah-Mensah (2006), Aggrey-Darkoh (2006), Ninsin (2006) and Amponsah (2006). These constituency level studies, however, do not dwell much on the influence of internal democracy on the parties’ performance. This thesis, therefore, extends the burgeoning literature by examining the influence of internal democracy on the performance of the NDC and the NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies in the Ashanti, Volta and Greater Accra regions respectively.

Allah-Mensah (2014) explores the gender dimension of the 1996 elections in Ghana. She notes that the involvement of women as against men in the democratization process in Ghana's Fourth Republic is disproportional to their numerical strength in the whole population. In her view, even though the political equation of who controls power changed with independence, the change has not been significant with respect to women, although she admits there is an increasing number of women in local government level elections especially in the number of contestants and actual elected women (Allah-Mensah, 2014). This, she argues has implications for democratic consolidation. Her study fell short of stating what exactly should be done to change the situation. Ayee (2019) shares similar views and argues that the number of women legislators does not correspond to the expansion in parliament and calls for specific reforms targeting more women to reverse the trend. This study agrees with these views and extends same because women participation in politics at all levels is critical to multi-party democracy and enhances the performance of political parties.

Ayee (2014) examines the nature and extent of governance and institutional reforms in Ghana. He traces such reforms to the 1983 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) which contributed to the enhancement of public-private partnership, political reforms and culminated in the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution. He notes the role of both formal and informal institutions in the reforms that have been achieved in many areas including finance, civil service, political parties, parliament the cabinet. According to Ayee (2014), exclusive politics deprives the country of expert contributions especially from the opposition and civil society organizations and affects the governance process. Ninsin (2006) and Boafo-Arthur (2006) emphasize the central role of electoral reforms in the Fourth Republic and its impact on democratic governance through rational choices between policy alternatives. Despite the progress made in institutional reforms, Ayee

(2019) observes that the fragmentation of state institutions leads to institutional paralysis and weakens their progress because it creates, among other things, turf wars and functional overlaps. He notes that the inefficiencies in public sector institutions negatively affect the private sector. Further, Ayee (2019) opines that the lack of continuity of policies by successive governments retards the progress of institutional reforms, citing the USD 6.3 million spent on the work of the Constitution Review Commission under the regime of the late Prof. John Evans Atta Mills in 2010, the recommendations of which have not still been implemented. The thesis supports this view because internally fragmented political parties at the constituency level could weaken multi-party governance and political parties in general as democratic institutions. This thesis, therefore, contributes to the literature on the role of institutions in a multi-party democracy.

In *Governance in the Fourth Republic*, Agyeman-Duah (2008) posits that Ghanaians have an unflinching desire for multi-party governance. According to him, Ghanaians have demonstrated this commitment through consistent opposition to undemocratic rule since independence and leading, eventually, to the return to the longest constitutional rule in 1993. Boafo-Arthur (2007) shares similar views and acknowledges the role of donor partners and other Bretton Woods institutions in the return to constitutional rule in the Fourth Republic. He admits that despite some challenges, much has been achieved in the areas of elections, rule of law, respect for human rights and transparency. Ayee (2007) encapsulates the political history of Ghana focusing on government, politics, and development. He posits that the presence of “patron-client relations and patronage” is inimical to good governance and blames it on the inclusion and exclusion of some groups in Ghana's body politic (Ayee, 2007 p.13). Another challenge to good governance is leadership which has been characterized by what Ayee (2007, p. 13) calls “transactional” leaders whose focus is on “creating implicit social exchange or

transaction over time between themselves and their followers’’ hence contributing to corruption and rent-seeking activities. This study extends the discourse as it examines internal party leadership at the constituency level and its impact on the performance of the parties in elections and multi-party politics in general.

Ayee (2015) examines how manifestos of the two leading political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic, the NDC and NPP, influence their electoral fortunes. According to him, manifestos of political parties in Ghana can ‘‘make and unmake their political fortunes’’ although he admits that the parties have not fully adhered to their manifesto promises (Ayee, 2015, p.107). Similarly, Debrah and Gyampo (2013) investigate how manifesto contents shape voting behaviour. They note that ‘‘manifestos are crucial in promoting issue-based voting’’ in Ghana’s Fourth Republic (Debrah and Gyampo, 2013, p.111). The strengths of these studies hinge on their admission of the role of manifestos in the performance of political parties in competitive elections. Their weaknesses as identified in Ayee (2015) and Debrah and Gyampo (2013) include the technical nature of the manifestos especially the use of the English language which many voters in Ghana cannot comprehend. This thesis complements the literature on the extent to which political parties’ manifestos contribute to their performance in elections.

Frempong (2001) examines the role of ethnicity in elections in Ghana. He notes that even though ethnic sentiments are sometimes hyped during elections, it is difficult to explain elections in Ghana in purely ethnic terms. Similarly, Ayee (2005, p. 90) notes that even though the considered perception is that ethnicity plays a significant role in elections, analysis of the validity of such claims amount to ‘‘uni-causal reductionism that seems to have no strong empirical basis’’. He argues that voting pattern in Ghana depends, among other factors, on ‘‘personalities, good governance, level of poverty, party ideology, programme, organization and cohesion and access to resources’’ (Ayee, 2005, p. 90). On

the contrary, Alabi and Alabi (2007) and Jonah (1998) argue that ethnicity is a salient factor that shapes voter choices more than socio-economic factors. This thesis contributes to the debate on the many factors, including ethnicity that impact on internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

Boafo-Arthur (2005) discusses Ghana's parliamentary practice in the pre-independent and post-independent periods and notes the influential role of the elites in the struggle for representation in the legislature. He examines the various components of the Fourth Republican Parliament such as the committee system, leadership and the structure of the constituencies. Boafo-Arthur (2005, p. 150) argues that a strengthened parliament is key to "accountability, transparency and democratic consolidation" in Ghana. Gyampo (2018) focuses on parliamentary representation in Ghana and argues that the "quality of representation in Ghana is weak as majority of the MPs are unable to interact regularly with their constituents" (Gyampo, 2018, p.79). He observes that constituents who go to their MPs make all sorts of demands including school fees, bride price, hospital expenses and utility bills; a practice which makes some MPs shy away from the constituents due to resource constraints (Gyampo, 2018). The weakness of the study is its inability to link the excessive demands by constituents to the performance of their parties in the general elections, particularly, in constituencies deemed swing or strongholds. This thesis contributes to the literature on the role of internal democratic practices of political parties in parliamentary representation.

2.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that the literature is extensive on political parties, party typology and functions, party system institutionalization, internal party democracy, quality of multi-party democracy, democratic consolidation and Ghanaian politics in general. The literature has shown that there is a struggle for the control of political parties by elites and financiers, weak internal democracy, nepotism, factionalism, and ethnicity. There are factors that militate against the performance of political parties in both developed and developing countries, although the prevalence is much higher in developing countries such as Ghana. Furthermore, internal party competition provides an avenue for popular frustrations with the status quo that is mostly directed against local elites from the grassroots which can be blamed on relative deprivation. Moreover, inadequate economic empowerment of the masses, the inability of civil society organizations to hold governments accountable and patronage are among the factors that influence voter choices.

However, scholarly works on internal democracy and political parties, party system institutionalization and democratic consolidation are largely focused on regional and national levels; thereby leaving the subnational, especially constituency specific, level not fully exhausted. Besides, the literature on political parties in Ghana has focused on the parties' role as election machines to the near neglect of their civic roles such as voter education, development agents and generally helping to shape the political will of the masses.

The chapter has provided relevant insights into the constituency specific factors that influence voter choices and is thus, relevant for politicians, academics, the electorate and policy-makers in their collective effort in shaping the contours of multi-party democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic. Specifically, the literature on constituency level internal democracy and the performance of political parties in the Fourth Republic is

generally not as exhaustive as in other aspects including democratic governance, decentralization, civil society organizations, gender, and elections. This study is, therefore, useful as it contributes to deepening understanding of internal democracy and its interplay with the performance of political parties at the constituency level and the factors that affect the choices that voters make. It further contributes to the literature on political parties' performance in areas such as dissemination of "information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of national character" as enshrined in Article 55(3) of the 1992 Constitution instead of the current status quo whereby political parties are "election machines" with little or no programmatic agenda.

Based on this chapter, the next chapter (chapter 3) discusses the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories which constitute the theoretical framework of the study. It is to this that I now turn.

CHAPTER THREE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories, which form the theoretical framework of the study. Specifically, the chapter discusses their origins and proponents, assumptions, strengths in view of other contributors, weaknesses and relevance and how they will be deployed in the thesis. In explaining internal democracy, political parties' performance, political participation and voter choices, a number of theoretical approaches have emerged. These include: the Rational Choice Theory (RCT), the Civic Voluntarism Theory (CVT); the Social-Psychological Theory (SPT), the Social Identity Theory (SIT), the General Incentive Theory (GIT) and Mobilization Theory (MT) (Milliar, 2012). However, due to the overlap of the central arguments in these theories and the research questions of this study, only the rational choice and the civic voluntarism theories are being used as the theoretical framework because of their relevance.

3.2 THE RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

This section reviews the origin and proponents, assumptions, contributions, strengths and weaknesses of the RCT.

3.2.1 Origin and proponents of Rational Choice Theory

The origin of the RCT and its dominance in Political Science can be traced to the late 20th century. The RCT was first propounded by William Riker, who applied economics and game theoretical approaches to develop complex mathematical models of

politics (Riker, 1962). In *The Theory of Political Coalitions*, Riker showed by mathematical reasoning how and why politicians form alliances (Riker, 1962). Riker and his followers applied this version of RCT, which they variously called rational choice, public choice, social choice, formal modeling, and positive political theories, to explain virtually everything, including voter behaviour (Riker, 1962). The theory has been praised as a universal framework of human behaviour that captures the core characteristics in explaining and forecasting the conduct of people (Roskin et.al., 2014).

However, the RCT, as it is known today was popularized in 1957 by Anthony Downs in his classical work, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Downs (1957) argued that the significant aspects of political life could be explained in terms of voters' self-interest. He compared political parties "to entrepreneurs in a profit-seeking economy" where policies "believed to gain more votes" are formulated (Downs, 1957, p. 295). Downs' study was an extension of a similar work by Arrow (1951) that attempted to draw a link between economic factors such as resources and political choices in relation to those concerned with uncertainty and those not related to uncertainty "but nevertheless have no other conceivable explanation" (Arrow, 1951, p. 407). Arrow hypothesized that the choices made by human beings have ultimate implications which could be used to explain the market and also political functioning (Arrow, 1951, p. 404). As far as the rational choice theorists are concerned, historical and cultural factors are irrelevant to understanding political behaviour (Roskin et.al., 2014). What is important, instead, is knowing the actors' interests and assuming that they pursue them rationally (Roskin et.al., 2014).

3.2.2 Assumptions of Rational Choice Theory

The main arguments of the RCT emanate from the central assumption used by Downs to the effect that “political parties in a democracy formulate policies as a means of gaining votes” (Downs, 1957, p. 4). Rationality, according to Downs, implies that in a political system “voters and political parties act directly according to their own interests” and so resort to strategies deemed appropriate to achieve their intended goals (Downs, 1957, p. 5). Therefore, since elections are the basis for choosing people who form the government, rational behavior is one targeted at winning elections (Downs, 1957). As such, political parties “formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to formulate policies” (Downs, 1957, p. 28). In view of this, a political party presents superior manifestos to the electorate with the sole aim of performing better than its competitors in elections (Downs, 1957). In a similar scenario, the electorate turn out to vote based on high expectations of the benefits that may come with the choices they make (Downs, 1957).

According to Downs (1957, p. 6), when faced with several choices, a rational man is the one who ranks all the alternatives in order of preferences and chooses the one “which ranks highest in his preference ordering” and always “makes the same decision each time he is confronted with the same alternatives” (Downs, 1957, p. 6). In view of this, a rational man who systematically makes mistakes may cease to do so if he or she discovers what the mistake is and “the cost of eliminating it is smaller than the benefits” (Downs, 1957, p. 9).

According to the RCT, information availability matters in determining voter behaviour. The theory assumes that in a state of perfect knowledge, no citizen can possibly influence another on how to vote or who to vote for since every voter knows the benefits attached to any voting decision (Downs, 1957). This implies that, an individual’s political

taste has directly led him or her to an unambiguous decision about how he/she should vote. As such, no persuasion can change the mind of a rational voter. However, as soon as ignorance sets in due to lack or inadequate information, the clear path from taste structure to voting decision becomes obscured (Downs, 1957). Relating this to internal democracy, some political party members may want a particular candidate to occupy a certain position because that position comes with benefits to the candidate for which supporters stand to gain. Others may be unsure about their fate if any of the competing candidates win. Also, because “money is required to provide information to voters, more resourceful candidates are likely to have more influence” when it comes to internal democracy and the performance of political parties in competitive elections (Downs, 1957, p. 140). However, in a world of imperfect information, candidates know that voters can be influenced so they make provision for specialists who can attract such voters (Downs, 1957). These specialists (spokespersons, campaign managers, etc.) canvass for votes in favour of their preferred candidates or parties by using resources provided to them for such purpose (Downs, 1957).

3.2.3 Other contributors to the Rational Choice Theory

There are other scholars who have written about the Rational Choice Theory. For instance, Abell (2000, pp. 7-8) summarizes the assumptions of rational choice theory in five stages. The first stage is *individualism* where he argues that only individuals take actions, whether political or social which may cause macro outcomes. The second stage is *optimality* under which individual and social actions are optimally chosen; meaning they are the best that can be achieved given the individual’s transitive preferences (Abell, 2000). The third stage is *self-regard* where individual and social actions are entirely focused on their egocentric welfare (Abell, 2000). The fourth stage is *self-regarding* in which peoples’

actions are linked directly to both personal and the immediate community's interest (Abell, 2000). According to him, although this assumption is central to the rational choice approach, it is problematic because of the existence of various group sentiments, such as cooperation and charity which could be contrary to individual optimality (Abell, 2000). The fifth and final stage, according to Abell (2000), is *rationality*. In his view, rationality is the most predominant assumption of the RCT. This is because all individuals behave or act in ways that are beneficial to themselves first before any other.

In his contribution to the RCT, Granik (2005, p. 604) argues that when faced with alternatives in political choices, only the "selective incentives" (i.e. those peculiar to the individual) will be strong enough to attract him/her. In this regard, whether an individual makes a voting decision based on personal, community or national interest is sorely dependent on some inherent interest.

Scholars in Ghana have referred to the RCT in explaining voter behaviour and actions of political parties relative to their performance in elections in the Fourth Republic. Ayee (2011) refers to the RCT in a study on manifestos and elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic. He argues that voters in advanced democracies make choices based on anticipated benefits and tried to draw a similar link to voter behaviour in Ghana. Ayee (2011) concludes that voter choices in elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic have largely based on rationality of the electorate. Similarly, Bob-Milliar (2012, p. 681) emphasizes that supporters of the NDC and NPP perceive their support for those parties as an "investment" that is expected to yield dividends in the form of "selective incentives based on the amount of one's contribution" to the political party. Agomor (2015) refers to the RCT in a study of party financing in Ghana's Fourth Republic. According to him, political party financiers have always based their decisions on rationality in various forms, including the anticipated award of contracts if their sponsored parties win general

elections. Furthermore, Gyampo and Debrah (2013) suggest that ideological posturing and choices of political parties as well as the parties' policies, including manifestos, in Ghana, are influenced by rationality. Even ethnocentric voters are rational because of the notion that voting for leaders from their ethnic group or tribal community could help "dispense patronage to them than leaders who are not" (Ishiyama, 2012, p. 764). Appah (2017) also points out that voter behaviour in Manhyia South (NPP stronghold in Ashanti region), Ho West (NDC stronghold in Volta region) and Ayawaso West Wuogon (a predominantly NPP stronghold in the Greater Accra region) is influenced by rationality on the part of the electorate.

In explaining the electoral victories of the NDC in 2012 and the NPP in 2016 (most recent elections in Ghana), Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh (2018) postulate that the dominant party model, ideological and sociological models are being gradually muscled out in favour of rational choice. According to them, narrowly structuring the rational choice explanation of voter behaviour in Ghana to economic self-interest is problematic. In their view, rational voting in the 2012 and 2016 elections in Ghana occurred in two forms: "sociotropic" rationality and "egotropic" rationality (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018, p. 110). They explain "sociotropic" rationality to mean the acceptance of benefits or the anticipation of benefits which will be advantageous to the entire community or country. These include the provision of school infrastructure, provision of health facilities, roads, and "even the election of a qualified, articulate candidate that can represent the interest of an entire constituency in a perfect manner" (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018, p. 110). "Egotropic" rationality, on the other hand, refers to the provision and acceptance of personal benefits as the basis for voting for a particular candidate or party or "doing so in anticipation of an individual benefit" (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018, p. 110). The

dominant narrative is, therefore, that the RCT is central in explaining voter behaviour and the performance of political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

3.2.4 The Strengths of the Rational Choice Theory

First, the RCT in the field of Political Science has been recognized as a framework for a more deductively inclined approach to the analysis of political actions including internal democracy, voter behaviour and other forms of political participation. It is thus not surprising that the RCT has been described as a unified framework for comprehending human behaviour in politics (Becker, 2013). In addition, it is one of the general theories of social action advanced in social science, capable of assuming the status of a universal framework in political actions (Hirschheim and Klein, 1994).

Second, the RCT's set of assumptions relate to each type of actors in a given political situation which is compatible with any set of structural assumptions about the behaviour of people (Ogu, 2013). For instance, within a political party, elements of this can be observed in manifestos, internal organization and voting behaviour. Besides, the common knowledge of rationality assumption which implies that the behaviour of voters has a "similar structure, i.e., self-regarding utility function, when measured against the rational optimization model, is advantageous because it allows rational choice theorists to treat variations in voter choices" among both core and swing electorate (Ogu, 2013, p. 94). Additionally, the "predictive nature of rational choice has made it possible for it to be used to produce a wide variety of theories, some of whose predictions about the measurable real world phenomena rule out a much larger set of outcomes than what is already generally accepted to be unlikely" (Ogu, 2013, p. 94). This makes it more appropriate to explain political actions in relation to the stronghold and swing constituencies.

3.2.5 The Weaknesses of the Rational Choice Theory

Like any other theory, the RCT has its share of criticisms. First, Whiteley and Seyd's work (2002) *paradox of participation* made the adoption of RCT to internal party competition problematic, especially when applied to conventional political participation. According to them, a rational man is likely not to participate in any political activity that benefits others apart from himself (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002). This means a “collective action aimed at the masses is likely not to appeal to individuals” in partisan politics (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002, p. 41).

Second, Akers (1990) has argued from the angle of social learning theorists that rational choice is something that can be consciously learnt. According to him, it is possible for all variables in RCT to be impacted by learning, because human beings have the capacity to learn what is rational by analyzing potential benefits and punishments (Akers, 1990). Additionally, the practical problems associated with inadequate information and uncertainty make it very difficult for individuals to make rational decisions, if we were to accept that assumption as argued by RCT (Downs, 1957). This is because in a world of pluralistic media such as in Ghana, the accuracy or otherwise of information may be dependent on the source. For instance, there are media outlets in Ghana that are owned by politicians, which implies that the information from such sources is likely to be biased.

Third, human behaviour is unpredictable thus making it difficult for the assumptions held by the rational choice theorists to be applicable to all circumstances including voter choices in swing and stronghold constituencies. Besides, the claim of the RCT to the effect that “macro level institutions (parties) or collective outcomes can be explained from the angle of the individual” is problematic because of the unpredictability of people (Ogu, 2013, p. 97).

Fourth, the RCT portrays behaviour in politics in a predictable way such that both politicians and voters are seeking to promote their interests through egocentric logical reasoning. This is problematic because it does not explain the concept of public goods which are characterized by “jointness of supply” and “impossibility of exclusion” hence universally available to everybody” (Samuelson 1954, p. 388). For instance, a voter’s access to public goods such as free public transport, education, electricity or health, in the Kwabre East or Ketu South constituencies which are strongholds of the NPP and NDC respectively, is independent of rationality.

3.3 JUSTIFICATION FOR A SECOND THEORY

The weaknesses of the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) have made it difficult to solely use it to fully address the problem under study, especially the comparative aspect of the performance of political parties in Ghana. In fact, it is possible that a party’s ability to unearth the motives of swing voters, conduct personal engagement and identify hidden recruitment network of voters, may enable it to outperform its competitors in an election. This, therefore, necessitates a supplementary theory that will help address the research objectives in a more compelling perspective.

The Civic Voluntarism Theory (CVT) fills the gap for a number of reasons. First, scholarly discussions in Ghana as demonstrated earlier show that rationality permeates the other dominant narratives, including the party identity and ideological models, in explaining voter behavior and the performance of political parties (Ayee, 2011; Gyampo and Debrah, 2013; Appah, 2017; Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018). Second, the assumptions in the two other prominent schools of thought – sociological and psychological theories, overlap with the rational choice’ when examined within the context of political participation. The sociological model, also classified as the Columbia School,

began with the publication, *The People's Choice* (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944). It basically emphasizes the effect of social factors in making political choices, including voting, while the psychosocial model, also known as the Michigan School focuses on party identification as the foremost factor that influences voter choices and by extension the performance of political parties (cited in Appah, 2017).

However, what these theories do not satisfactorily explain is the silence of some party members (including founding members) when something is fundamentally going wrong. This researcher is equally not convinced of their propriety in explaining the silence of any electorate (including chiefs and the clergy) when there are glaring evidence of disturbing developments (such as violence and hooliganism perpetuated by vigilante groups of the NPP and NDC) that have the potential of affecting the performance of political parties in their contribution to the consolidation of democracy. It is in view of these inherent issues, and the specific nature of the research questions and objectives that this thesis employed the CVT as a supplement to the RCT.

3.4 THE CIVIC VOLUNTARISM THEORY

This section examines the origin and proponents, assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of the Civic Voluntarism Theory (CVT).

3.4.1 Origin and proponents of the Civic Voluntarism Theory

The CVT was originally known as the resource model. The theory combines three factors - resources, recruitment and engagement - to explain the mechanism through which people become active in politics. The origin of the CVT can be traced to the works of Sidney Verba and Norman Nie on political participation in the United States called, *Voice of Equality* (Verba et. al. 1995). The theory was later applied by them and other scholars

to explain political participation in other countries such as Britain (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002, p. 37). Based on these factors, Verba et. al. (1995, p. 269) asked “why do people not become political activists?”. They delineated the three contributing factors that account for peoples’ unwillingness to engage in any political activity on the basis that: “they cannot; they do not want to; and nobody has asked them” to do so (Verba et.al., 1995, p. 269). In other words, people may be inactive because they either lack resources such as money and time, or they lack psychological engagement with politics in terms of their own sense of political efficacy or they are outside the recruitment networks that bring people into politics (Verba, et.al., 1995).

3.4.2 Assumptions of the Civic Voluntarism Theory

The main assumptions of the CVT as stated earlier focused on three factors, namely, resources (defined as money, skills and time), recruitment networks and civic engagement. These are the principal things that are necessary for understanding political participation for both voters and candidates of political parties. According to Verba et. al. (1995), even though time, money and civil skills are the most important component of the theory in explaining political participation, the availability of these resources to the politically significant groups vary in every society. For instance, the upper and middle class groups may have the civil skills and money but may lack the time to attend rallies and canvass for votes. On the other hand, the idle youth who may have the time, may not have the money to effectively participate in political activities (Verba et. al. 1995).

These disparities notwithstanding, time and money are most important within the resource component of the assumptions, although money is the topmost factor needed for political campaigns. Also, without “free time” it is impossible to attend political meetings, rallies and canvass for votes (Verba et. al., 1995, p. 304). Additionally, the civil

skills which are another component of the resources assumption are necessary for political participation (Verba et.al., 1995). An individual who has civil skills may find it less daunting and costly to participate in political activities, hence will most likely take part in political activities (Verba et.al., 1995). Further, the civil skills can enable voters to analyze manifestos of political parties and interrogate same on the grounds of specific policy initiatives and the feasibility of any claims (Verba et.al., 1995). Besides, civil skills can propel people to join political parties in a bid to promote or oppose certain policies of political parties (Verba et.al., 1995).

The second assumption of the CVT is “engagement”. According to Verba et.al. (1995) engagement brings out the psychological predispositions of people, which propels political activism. In other words, people’s interest in politics makes them want to be part of political events. Besides, people who engage in individual activism are more likely to engage in collective activism. Also, people who are able to contact public officials on political related issues have the tendency to contact politicians or write to media houses on similar issues (Pettie et.al., 2003).

The final assumption of the CVT is “recruitment networks”. This assumption has it that social, religious or cultural places such as churches, pubs, festivals, work places and golf clubs, stimulate recruitment of people into political activities (Verba et. al., 1995, p 272). In their view, “requests for participation that come to individuals at work, in church, or in organizations” can ignite a desire for political participation” (Verba et. al., 1995, p 272). Some of such “recruits” end up working or voting in the interest of the party that got them into politics.

Verba et.al.’s (1995) work is an extension of Verba and Nie’s (1972) study which specifically classified the electorate into six different groups based on their political activities including voter behaviour. The first group is the *inactive* and as the name

suggests, they simply do little beyond voting because they believe it is a civic requirement to vote (Verba and Nie, 1972). The second group is the *voting specialists* and they vote regularly as their contribution to the democratic process, with or without specific material expectation for the winning candidate or party (Verba and Nie, 1972). The third group is referred to as the *parochial participants*. This group is made up of people who contact party officials in relation to specific problems worthy of attention in the event of a party winning an election. Beyond voting and making such requests or complaints to candidates, this group does nothing else (Verba and Nie, 1972). The fourth group is *the communalists* and they “intermittently engage in political actions on broad social issues” (Verba and Nie, 1972, p. 118). The fifth group is the *campaigners* whose members actively take part in campaigns of various kinds with the aim of enhancing the performance of their preferred candidates or parties in elections (Verba and Nie, 1972). The sixth group is the *activists* and is made up of people who participate in all kinds of political activities (Verba and Nie, 1972).

In explaining the multi-dimensional factors that account for voter behaviour (both core and swing voters) in internal and multi-party elections in Ghana, it is possible to associate the electorate (core and swing) to each of the groups identified by Verba and Nie (1972) because people have various reasons for voting. It is also possible to associate the first three factors identified as explanatory variables for why people do not engage in political activities (money, civic skills, time psychological motivation and recruitment brackets) with party activities in relation to internal democracy and the performance of political parties in Ghana’s Fourth Republic. These factors can also account for the similarities and dissimilarities in internal democracy between the NDC and NPP. This is largely because at any point in time, a political party’s resources such as money, expertise or skills and time, the psychological motivation of its members and leaders and their ability

to identify recruitment networks can make a comparative difference in party inputs (internal democracy) and the resultant electoral outcome.

3.4.3 The Strengths of the Civic Voluntarism Theory

The strengths of the CVT are seen in the growing number of scholars who cite it in explaining political participation and its effect on party performance. First, Stromblad and Bengtsson (2017) refer to the CVT in their analysis of how resources, motivation, voluntary associations and recruitment networks affect individual level party participation and overall performance of political parties' internal organization. The theory is justified on the grounds that there is a correlation between an encouraged individual level political participation and the performance of political parties in elections (Strömblad and Bengtsson, 2017). The relevance of the CVT in this thesis is its comprehensiveness in explaining, in a comparative perspective, the impact of internal democracy and performance on elections between the NDC and the NPP at the constituency level.

Second, Nygard and Jakobsson (2013) make reference to the CVT in their examination of political participation of older adults in Scandinavia (Finland and Sweden). The theory is justified in the findings that show that older adults have the tendency to vote in one direction (core voters) while younger ones are swing voters and also willing to engage in political participation and interrogation of government or party programmes (Nygard and Jakobsson, 2013). This is relevant to this thesis which focuses on the pattern of voting of both the young and old in the stronghold and swing constituencies.

Third, Pettie et.al. (2003) stress the relevance of CVT in citizens' general involvement in political activities in Britain. To them "even when people are resource-rich, have plenty of free time and have a strong sense of efficacy, they may still fail to participate if they are unaware" of the relevance of their participation (Pettie et.al., 2003).

Therefore, being asked to participate in political activities ignites a fresh desire in some people to take part in party politics including voting (Pattie et.al., 2003). This is also in line with the thesis's objectives which include assessing the similarities or otherwise between the NDC and NPP in relation to how they reach out to voters and the effect on their performance in elections.

Fourth, Oni et.al. (2017) rely on the CVT in a study of online political participation. They observe that the theory accounts for the imperative of the democratic political culture orientation of people in developing a positive attitude towards the acceptance and use of e-democracy to make choices in elections. Also, recruitment, political awareness and efficacy were found to be significant predictors of intentions to use e-democracy to shape the political will of the people (Oni et.al., 2017). Again, this is relevant to this thesis as it aims to explain political participation in enhancing the democratic process through voter behaviour.

Even though this theory is widely cited in Political Science literature and other social sciences to explain participation in political activities, it has not been widely used in Ghana except in few instances, including the comparative analysis of political activism among supporters of the NDC and NPP in Wa-Central and Lawra–Nandom constituencies (Bob-Milliar, 2012).

3.4.4 The Weaknesses of the Civic Voluntarism Theory

First, the theory's assumption that people do not engage in political activities because they do not have money, for instance, is problematic "because many high status individuals do not get involved in active politics" although some are less busy (Whiteley and Seyd, 2002, p. 39). Second, is its theoretical underpinning. It "fails to provide a coherent rationale for the connection between the explanatory socioeconomic variables

and participation’’ (Verba et.al., 1995, p. 281). For instance, despite the intervening factors (i.e. resources, norms, stakes in the outcome, psychological involvement in politics, etc.) “there is no clearly specified mechanism linking the social statuses to activity’’ (Verba et.al., 1995, p. 281).

3.5 DEPLOYMENT OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE AND CIVIC VOLUNTARISM THEORIES

How do the theories help the study to answer its overarching question of the effect of internal democracy on the performance of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies and secondary questions? First, the theories will assist the study in dealing with the multidimensional factors that account for voter behaviour, internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections and other mandates such as shaping voter behaviour. While the RCT takes care of incentives for voter choices and actions of politicians within the context of party performance, the CVT accounts for the other multi-dimensional factors that are either individual, group or constituency specific and comparatively account for voter behaviour in relation to internal democracy and party electoral performance.

Second, the assumptions of the two theories which cover resources (defined as time, skills and money), personal interest, psychological motivation, civic engagement and recruitment networks provide the study enough theoretical basis to address the research objectives and questions. This is because the assumptions of the theories are flexible enough in explaining voter behaviour and internal democracy of the NDC and NPP at the constituency level. Further, the assumptions are elastic enough to explain the similarities and dissimilarities between the NDC and NPP in their internal organization and the

corresponding effect on performance in elections and other mandates such as shaping the political will of the people.

Third, the RCT's assumption that voters make choices based on what will promote their interest and that politicians also dole out incentives in cash and in kind in return for their votes, and the CVT's assumption of recruitment networks are wide enough to cater for voter behaviour including those who do not vote because no one has asked them to do so in multi-party elections.

Fourth, the theories will complementarily provide the needed framework through indicators to evaluate the activities of the NDC and NPP in their quest to win elections in both core and swing constituencies. This is because they apply extensively to the research objectives and questions of the thesis.


In sum, these theories are justifiably deployed in this thesis because issues that lead to anti-internal democracy at the institutional level (political party) and the factors that account for voter choices at the constituency level are varied and fit into the assumptions of the theories as discussed. For instance, while the RCT explains the actions of voters and politicians on the basis of rationality, the CVT explains the other contextual variables including the psychological factors and the recruitment networks. The latter also best explains the ability of a party to outperform others because people may have the incentives in the form of cash, but still “fail to participate in political activities” due to weak consultation (Pettie et.al., 2003, p. 446).

The framework based on the two theories is as follows: (1) voters are rational and vote based on anticipated benefits;(2) politicians dole out incentives in cash and in kind in return for votes; (3) politicians weigh the benefits and losses of losing to other parties or candidates before taking a decision to outperform competitors; (4) politicians know that internal disorganization can cause them votes hence strive to promote internal democracy;

(5) political parties appreciate the grassroots' role in their performance and hold them in high esteem; (6) parties know that voters have civil skills so they adopt superior manifestos; (7) politicians who identify other voters whose decisions are based on psychological motivation contact them and ask them to participate in election; and (8) politicians who are able to locate appropriate networks of recruitment groups and make request are likely to outperform their counterparts in elections.

This framework is illustrated below (Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Factors that foster political participation.



Source: Verba et. al., (1995, p.363).

3.6 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has discussed the origins, proponents, assumptions, contributions, strengths, and weaknesses of the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories. The comprehensiveness of the two theories and their complementarity have made it possible to use them to explain the extent to which internal democracy affects the performance of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. They are seen as an appropriate pair of theories that emphasizes political participation relative to internal democracy and the performance of the NDC and NPP in elections and other mandates including civic education. The next chapter discusses the research design and methodology of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the methodology used to examine the role of internal democracy and the performance of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in elections between 2000 and 2016, in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies in the Ashanti, Volta and Greater Accra regions respectively. Specifically, the chapter discusses the research design which encapsulates the philosophical underpinning of the thesis, methods of data collection, sources of data, the population of the study, sampling methods/techniques, sample size, data analysis procedures, ethical considerations, justification of the cases selected and a brief profile of the three constituencies.

4.2 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS

This section discusses the philosophical assumptions underpinning the thesis. The essence is to situate the thesis within a philosophical context.

According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), there are four different philosophical assumptions. These are: positivism, post-positivism, constructivism, and pragmatism. The philosophical assumption underpinning this thesis is pragmatism.

Pragmatism, according to Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003, p. 713) is “a deconstructive paradigm that debunks concepts such as ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ and instead focuses on ‘what works’ as the truth” regarding a phenomenon under investigation. Pragmatism arises out of situations, actions and consequences rather than mere antecedent conditions (Creswell, 2014). Pragmatism rejects the strictly qualitative or quantitative

methods associated with the paradigm wars and instead advocates for the use of mixed methods in research (Teddle and Tashakkori, 2003). It is rooted in the pluralistic view of things to enable the researcher to draw liberally from both quantitative and qualitative methods and their associated procedures (Creswell, 2014). It gives a better understanding of the multidimensional factors in the interplay between internal democracy and the performance of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies through the use of different methods of data gathering and analysis. This is possible mainly due to pragmatism's endorsement of relativist ontology, subjective epistemology, the existence of different methodologies and methods in scientific research as well as the recognition of the role of values and ethics in research.

Creswell and Clark (2007) have argued that ontology, epistemology, methodology, axiology, and rhetoric are all relevant assumptions in understanding how pragmatism helps in the research process. As such, these assumptions helped the researcher in a number of ways. First, ontology guided the researcher in asking questions about the nature of reality (Saunders, 2001). This prevented the researcher from letting his views or biases to interfere with those of the research participants. The ontological view of the researcher therefore helped in two forms: objectivism and subjectivism. Objectivism played a greater role within the quantitative segment of the thesis while subjectivism reflected more in the qualitative part (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). This happened because the researcher believed in both the independent reality out there that can be scientifically tested (objectivism) and the multiple ways of doing, thereby emphasizing the use of combined methods. Second, epistemology which refers to the means of acquiring authoritative knowledge and subscribes to issues of objectivism and subjectivism (Bryman, 2015), helped the researcher to draw a dichotomy between the two. This was practically addressed by resorting to the use of various research approaches. For instance, it helped the

researcher to unearth the pressure that the electorate put on politicians before voting for them. Third, the methodology informed the use of quantitative and qualitative methods. This helped the researcher through the use of both deductive (testing theories) and inductive (generating theories) approaches as and when necessary (Yin, 2006). Fourth, axiology holds the view that values are relevant in scientific studies and should not be glossed over. The post-positivists reject values while the constructivists believe values are vital (Creswell and Clark, 2007). By relying on pragmatism, this researcher considered values as critical, hence it helped in understanding the respondents' actions in politics which cannot be divorced from their intrinsic values. Fifth, rhetoric refers to the language and presentation of research findings. Pragmatism believes that both formal and informal language can be used in so much as they are within acceptable ethical standards in data gathering and dissemination. This researcher used both forms of language in the field work whenever necessary because of the unequal level of education among the electorate in the study areas.

Despite the enormous advantages in using various methods to arrive at a conclusion in research, critics of pragmatism argue that combining different methods (i. e. qualitative and quantitative) in political science involves traversing sensitive grounds (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In other words, they argue that researchers in political science require special expertise in quantitative research in order to combine it with qualitative methods. Anything short of this could lead to findings that are not credible due to perceived claims that political scientists do not have adequate knowledge in the statistics required in quantitative studies.

4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

Research design refers to the planning, structuring and execution of a research project in order to “maximize the validity of its findings” (Mouton, 1996, p. 175). Creswell and Poth (2018) describe a research design simply as the plan for conducting a study. This thesis adopted the mixed methods of self-administered questionnaires and semi-structured interviews to solicit information from respondents on how internal democracy affects the performance of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. The reason behind the choice of the mixed methods is that they involve the use of diverse approaches for collecting and analyzing data aimed at finding solutions to practical problems (Creswell and Poth, 2018). In other words, the application of the mixed methods fits into the “what works” philosophy (Creswell and Poth, 2018, p. 27). It also rejects the incompatibility thesis, which holds the view that different data types and their methods of analysis are not compatible with one another, and should, therefore, as much as possible, not be used together in the same study (Creswell and Creswell, 2017; Howe, 1988). The structure of the research design is as follows: methodological choice, methods of data collection, sources of data, population of the study, sampling methods/techniques, sample size, data analysis procedure, ethical consideration, justification for selecting the cases and a brief profile of the study areas.

4.4 METHODOLOGICAL CHOICE

A methodology is a way of systematically solving a research problem (Kothari, 2004). Methods, on the other hand, are a set of procedures and techniques for gathering and analyzing data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). This study used the mixed methods involving the combination of both quantitative and qualitative techniques, concepts, approaches and language.

Qualitative methods refer to the systematic approach used to explore and describe the life experiences, situations, and feelings of people and emphasizes the understanding of these elements (Bryman 2004). The quantitative methods, on the other hand, allow the researcher to get a broader view of the respondents with respect to the values of variables that are characterized by numbers or estimated figures (Yin, 2011). Qualitative data “tends to be open-ended without predetermined responses while quantitative data usually includes closed-ended responses such as those found in questionnaires or psychological instruments” (Creswell 2014, p. 43).

The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods helped the researcher to use both numeric data and non-numeric data to answer questions on political participation in relation to internal democracy, the performance of political parties and voter behaviour in the Kwabre East, Ketu South, and Ledzokuku constituencies. In addition, using the mixed methods is advantageous as they helped neutralized the weaknesses and biases of all methods and relied on their combined strengths.

This notwithstanding, the mixed methods have their own inherent problems. For instance, some respondents deliberately refused to give accurate information in order not to make their political parties look bad or the fear of being attacked by others for giving information. But these challenges did not, in any way, affect the credibility of the field work because adequate measures were put in place to crosscheck information from the respondents. These include observation, pictorial evidence and journalists' accounts of events (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods

Quantitative Methods	Qualitative Methods	Mixed Methods
Pre-determined	Emerging methods	Both predetermined and emerging methods
Instrument based questions	Open-ended questions	Both open-and closed ended questions
Performance data, attitude data, observational data and census data	Interview data, observation, document data and audiovisual data	Multiple forms of data drawing on all possibilities
Statistical analysis	Text and image analysis	Statistics and text analysis
Statistical interpretation	Themes, patterns interpretation	Across databases interpretation

Source: Creswell, 2014, p. 24

4.5 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

The concurrent triangulation mixed methods were used to collect data. Concurrent triangulation method is the approach where the researcher gathers both qualitative and quantitative data concurrently and then compares the two databases to determine whether there is confirmation, disconfirmation, difference, convergence or some combination of a sort (Creswell and Creswell, 2017). The advantage of this approach is that it takes separate qualitative and quantitative methods with the aim of offsetting the “weaknesses inherent within one method with the strengths of the other” (Creswell, 2003, p. 213). Its disadvantage is that it requires some time, effort and expertise to properly study a phenomenon with two separate methods (Creswell, 2003).

4.6 SOURCES OF DATA

The study relied on both primary and secondary sources for data. Primary data was gathered through the administration of questionnaires and face-to-face interviews in the Kwabre East, Ketu South, and Ledzokuku constituencies. Secondary data collection came from books, book chapters, journals, theses of students, official political party materials, statistical data, census data, graphs and charts, reports and credible media publications.

4.7 POPULATION OF THE STUDY

The population for this study is 391,770. This number is from the 2016 registered voter population register in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. The breakdown is shown in the table below (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: Constituencies and their voter populations based on the 2016 voters register

Name of constituency	Population
Kwabre East	112,697
Ketu South	141,698
Ledzokuku	137,375
Total	391,770

Source: compiled by the author

4.8 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE AND SAMPLE SIZE

The researcher adopted probability sampling for the quantitative component where the Simple Random Sampling (SRS) technique was used by providing each of the 391,770 registered voters in the three constituencies an equal opportunity of being selected to be part of the study. The SRS technique was chosen because the researcher believed it was the most appropriate technique that could provide every registered voter an equal chance of being part of the study, since every vote counts in elections (Harvey, 2011). For the

qualitative component of the study, the non-probability method was used together with purposive sampling technique.

The purposive sampling technique was adopted because the researcher targeted well-informed and politically positioned individuals who could speak on behalf of their political parties in the area of internal democracy and its impact on the performance of the political parties in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. Besides, only resource persons and key individuals who have an in-depth knowledge about internal democracy and the performance of political parties could be used for this aspect of the data (Sato, et.al., 2007). The key experts who were sampled for the study came from the academia, democracy-related civil society organizations, the media, politicians and traditional leaders. These individuals by virtue of their knowledge and positions in their areas of expertise have an in-depth understanding of how internal democracy affects the performance of political parties.

4.9 SAMPLE SIZE COMPUTATION

This study adopts the Yamane formula for calculating the sample size for the quantitative data. The formula provides a simplified way to calculate sample sizes (Yamane, 1967, p. 886 cited in Israel, 1994, p. 4).

The Yamane formula is given as: $n = \frac{N}{N+1 (e)^2}$

Where small n is the sample size, big N is the population size, and e is the level of precision. Using the 2016 voter population, the total number of:

registered voters in Ledzokuku= 137,375

registered voters in Ketu South =141,698

registered voters in Kwabre East =112,697

total voter population for the three constituencies =391,770

The researcher is working with 95% confidence level; 5% margin of error, because this is a strong precision (Israel, 1994).

Therefore:

$$N=391,770$$

$$e=0.05 \text{ (5\%)}$$

$$n=391,770 / (1+391,770(0.05)^2)$$

$$n=391,770 / 1+391,770 (0.0025)$$

$$n=391,770 / 980.425 = 399.5920$$

$n=400$; total sample size for qualitative data.

In order to get the sample size for each constituency, the researcher used proportions in relation to the voter population of the constituencies. The population of each constituency was preferred to the voter turnout because the researcher wanted to investigate internal democracy and the performance of political parties, hence the views of registered voters were considered more critical than just the voter turnout number, which is subject to fluctuations. In other words, limiting the proportion calculation to voter turnout would deny the researcher critical information in relation to why some people did or did not vote.

The proportional calculation of the quantitative sample size based on simple random sampling using the Yamane formula is as follows:

$$(i) \text{ Kwabre East} = 112,697 \div 391,770 \times 400 = 115.06$$

$$\text{Kwabre East} = 115$$

$$(ii) \text{ Ketu South} = 141,698 \div 391,770 \times 400 = 144.67$$

$$\text{Ketu South} = 145$$

$$(iii) \text{ Ledzokuku} = 137,375 \div 391,770 \times 400 = 140.26$$

$$\text{Ledzokuku} = 140$$

Based on the proportions, the sample size of Kwabre East was 115, Ketu South was 145 and Ledzokuku was 140 (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3: Quantitative sample size based on simple random sampling using the Yamane formula (1967) and the 2016 voters register

Constituency	Total voter population	Voter turnout	Proportion based on 2016 voter population	Sample Size
Kwabre East	112,697	77.0%	$112,697 \div 391,770 \times 400$	115
Ketu South	141,698	54.0%	$141,698 \div 391,770 \times 400$	145
Ledzokuku	137,375	65.0%	$137,375 \div 391,770 \times 400$	140
Total	391,770			400

Source: compiled by the author

The qualitative data was purposively gathered from a sample size of 23. This figure is more than the 15 recommended for qualitative interviews required for saturation to occur (point where additional people will not provide new information) (Bruce et.al.2006). Besides, internal democracy and the performance of political parties are more complex and can be context bound, hence a more holistic form of analysis and explanation from people with relevant expertise was needed for this study (Mason, 2002).

The selection of the 23 elites selected was influenced by a number of reasons. First, the NPP has 17 executives for each constituency while the NDC has 28. This brings the total number of executives of both parties in the three constituencies to 135. However, the executives represent the official position of their political parties hence one of them being a respondent is enough to provide the researcher with the required information. Also, a representative of the defeated primaries contestants in each constituency is in a position to provide contrary information, if any, to what the constituency executives have in relation to internal democracy. Second, even though there are currently 20 lecturers at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, the researcher chose one among four who had pioneering publications in relation to political parties and Ghana's democracy at the beginning of the Fourth Republic (see Ninsin and Drah, (ed.) 1993). Third, there are three traditional councils in the three constituencies. Therefore, a representative of each of the traditional councils was chosen to represent traditional rulers.

Fourth, a representative from an indigenous civil society organization (CSO) out of three CSOs which have distinguished themselves through series of public engagement with political parties since 2000 was selected because of the enormous amount of information it has in relation to internal democracy and the performance of the political parties. One CSO was purposively chosen from two (Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) and Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD)-Ghana) because the NDC has since 2000 publicly accused the third CSO, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) of bias against it. Interestingly, none of the parties has officially or in sustained manner publicly accused the IDEG of bias. Finally, a journalist each in the study areas, who has covered events of the political parties can provide enough information on internal democracy and the performance of the parties. The 23 elites were chosen from about 170 elites consisting of 138 (current MPs plus NDC and NPP executives); 20 lecturers at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana; 6 GBC regional correspondents; 3 Paramount Chiefs; and 3 CSOs. Accordingly, the selection of the 23 elite respondents was representative to provide the needed information for the qualitative data.

The 23 elites who were selected for the qualitative data came from a sample frame, consisting of the constituency executives of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, political scientists, traditional leaders, journalists, and current MPs. The constituency executives were chosen because they have the legal mandate to speak to issues involving internal democracy of their respective political parties. Current MPs were chosen because they were elected on the parties' tickets while defeated candidates in the parties' election primaries were added because they are positioned to discuss the internal process which they unsuccessfully went through. Journalists were included because of their daily encounter with political parties' activities while chiefs were added because they are custodians of the land and are better placed best

to discuss what the parties do beyond being election machines. A political scientists and democracy-related CSOs were also included because of their expertise in multi-party politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

The sample size breakdown is contained in Table 4.4. The respondents were chosen based on their knowledge in and practice of internal democracy and performance of political parties.

Table 4.4: Qualitative sample size breakdown

	Kwabre East		Ketu South		Ledzokuku		Total
Party	NDC	NPP	NDC	NPP	NDC	NPP	
Constituency executives	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
Defeated election primaries candidates	1	1	1	1	1	1	6
MPs/former MPs	1		1		1		4
Traditional councils	1		1		1		3
Media	1		1		1		3
Political scientist	1 from University of Ghana						1
CSO	1 from Institute for Democratic Governance						1
TOTAL							23

Source: compiled by the author

In sum, the total sample size for the entire thesis is 423, comprising 400 quantitative respondents and 23 qualitative participants. The sample size of 423 out of the voter population of 391,770 in the three constituencies is justified because it was arrived at using a scientifically approved formula for the quantitative data (Yamane, 1967). Also, the number of qualitative interviewees was based on a recommended figure in the literature (Bruce, et.al., 2006).

4.10 DATA COLLECTION/RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

The researcher used both the interview guide and questionnaire as major instruments in soliciting information from the participants of the study. Questionnaires were used to collect quantitative data. This is advantageous because it allowed the researcher to solicit information from many of the electorate, considered representative of the population. In addition, an interview guide was used to aid the researcher in the face-to-face interview to obtain qualitative data. This source of data collection is very advantageous because it allowed the researcher to ask follow up questions in cases where clarifications were needed (Harvey, 2011). This approach again made it possible for the researcher to learn a lot from the interviewees and the other participants.

4.11 DATA ANALYSIS

The quantitative data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and results presented in tables, charts, and figures. The qualitative data was thematically analyzed. The interview data was first transcribed by the researcher after which themes were developed to make meaning out of the data in line with the objectives of the study. The results were used to answer the research questions.

4.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Informed consent was sought from all the participants. Confidentiality was strictly adhered to while anonymity was resorted to for those who did not want their identities revealed. The purpose of the study was discussed with the participants while transcribed versions of the interviews were made available to those who needed them.

4.13 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CHOICE OF THE THREE CONSTITUENCIES

This study is a single case study of Ghana with a multiple-site design using data from three of the 275 constituencies across the country. The case study method adopted for this study covers three constituencies, namely, (i) Kwabre East; (ii) Ketu South; and (iii) Ledzokuku. It therefore did not cover the whole 275 constituencies, which are too large and unwieldy to be studied for methodological and logistical purposes. Also, the focus of the study (subnational) is not to make national generalizations, but to explore contextual variables and their merits or otherwise in relation to internal democracy and the performance of the NDC and NPP in specific constituencies. This is partly due to the problem of national average bias associated with national studies that make generalizations (Snyder, 2001). Besides, the time period for a PhD thesis makes it practically impossible to cover the entire country.

This notwithstanding, the three constituencies are fairly reflective of their respective constituency classifications; swing and strongholds. This is because in Ghana, there are two major strongholds of the NDC and NPP – Volta and Ashanti regions respectively (usually referred to as “world banks”). These have been the only regions that a winning party has since 2000 recorded not less 71 percent of the popular votes (EC, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 and 2016). The constituencies selected in these regions (Kwabre East for Ashanti and Ketu South for Volta) are therefore a reflection of the voting pattern in their regions as evidenced in the Electoral Commission and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s collaborative analysis of presidential and parliamentary results from 2000-2016 (EC, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017). Ketu South in the Volta region therefore represents the electoral stronghold of the National Democratic Congress (NDC). It is currently the largest constituency in terms of size and voter population in Ghana. Kwabre East is not only in

the Ashanti region - the electoral stronghold of the New Patriotic Party (NPP) - but also currently the largest constituency outside the regional capital in terms of voter population. It is also the second largest constituency in the region after Oforikrom, which was not chosen because the study focused on constituencies outside regional capitals. They are therefore well placed to provide the researcher with the necessary information in relation to internal democracy and the performance of the two political parties in stronghold constituencies. In the case of the swing constituencies, they are mainly in the Greater Accra, Central, Western and Brong Ahafo regions. Ledzokuku was chosen from the Greater Accra region because it is the largest swing constituency in terms of the voter population in Ghana. It is also cosmopolitan and hosts the national capital of Ghana, Accra, where the political parties have their headquarters. Also, no single parliamentary candidate has since 2000 won the constituency continuously more than once. It is therefore not out of place to select that constituency since it has all the features of swing voting to represent swing constituencies. The three regions from which the constituencies were selected provided a good picture of core and swing voters in Ghana (Table, 4.5).

Table 4.5: Details of registered voter population (2016) and percentage of votes by NDC and NPP from 2000-2016.

Regions	2000	2000 Run off	2004	2008	2008 Run off	2012	2016	2016 Population
MAJOR STRONGHOLDS WHERE A WINNING PARTY RECORDS NOT LESS THAN 71 PERCENT								
Ashanti	75%	80.5%	77%	73%	74.4%	71%	76.3%	2,872,619
Volta	86%	89.2%	84%	82%	86.1%	85%	80.9%	1,282,306
SWING REGIONS								
Greater Accra	NPP 53%	NPP 60%	NPP 59%	NDC 52%	NDC 54%	NDC 52%	NPP 53%	3,063,986
Central	NPP 50%	NPP 60%	NPP 59%	NDC 51%	NDC 54%	NDC 52%	NPP 53%	1,405,976
Western	NPP 49%	NPP 62%	NPP 58%	NPP 50%	NDC 52%	NDC 54%	NPP 52%	1,582,491
Brong Ahafo	NPP 51%	NPP 60%	NPP 52%	NPP 51%	NDC 51%	NDC 51%	NPP 54%	1,406,934
ALL OTHERS								
Eastern	NPP 52.9%	NPP 63.5%	NPP 60.3%	NPP 57.1%	NPP 57.5%	NPP 56.9%	NPP 62.4%	1,605,943
Northern	NDC 50.8%	NDC 51.5%	NDC 57.8%	NDC 57.4%	NDC 61.6%	NDC 58.2%	NDC 55.4%	1,427,917
Upper East	NDC 49.8%	NDC 58.4%	NDC 53.3%	NDC 56.1%	NDC 65.6%	NDC 66.4%	NDC 59.2%	648,788
Upper West	NDC 62.3	NDC 62.0%	NDC 56.7%	NDC 54.4%	NDC 62.3%	NDC 65.5%	NDC 58.1%	415,539

Source: compiled by the author using data from the Electoral Commission of Ghana

Apart from these, the three constituencies are the only ones within their respective municipal assemblies, which were upgraded recently from district to municipal status due to changes in their population sizes and other indicators. In addition, while the Ledzokuku constituency represents the urban constituencies, Ketu South and Kwabre East represent rural and peri-urban constituencies respectively, thus providing a good blend among rural, peri-urban and urban electorate in Ghana. Besides, voter turnout in these constituencies has averaged over 64 percent since 2000.

In short, the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies provided the information needed for realizing the objectives of this thesis. The sample sizes for the constituencies are representative because a scientific formula was used to arrive at the

figure for the quantitative data and a recommended number for qualitative interviews based on the literature (Yamane, 1967; Bruce et.al., 2006). The voting patterns and populations in the regions from which the three constituencies were selected are a reflection of the constituencies voting patterns (Table 4.6). The three constituencies have also recorded a sustained high voter population and turnout in all elections between 2000 and 2016 (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Registered voters and voter turnout in the three constituencies from 2000-2016

Year	Constituency	Voter population	Turnout
2000	Kwabre East	72,845	70.0%
	Ketu South	86,170	53.9%
	Ledzokuku	74,482	58.6%
2004	Kwabre East	58,981	88.6%
	Ketu South	81,186	88.0%
	Ledzokuku	91,787	84.0%
2008	Kwabre East	54,997	75.11%
	Ketu South	98,283	62.89%
	Ledzokuku	108,283	68.88%
2012	Kwabre East	95,424	86.80%
	Ketu South	126,659	70.36%
	Ledzokuku	87,917	75.28%
2016	Kwabre East	112,697	77.0%
	Ketu South	141,696	54.0%
	Ledzokuku	137,375	65.0%

Source: compiled by the author using data from the Electoral Commission of Ghana

The period 2000 and 2016 was chosen for three reasons. First, both the NDC and NPP have been in and out of government for eight years. The NDC was in opposition after the 2000 general elections up to the 2008 general elections (8 years) and was in government after the 2008 general elections until the 2016 general elections (8 years). The

NPP also came to power after the 2000 general elections and stayed in power until it lost the 2008 elections (8 years) when the party went into opposition from that year until the 2016 elections (8 years). Second, the period marked the formal practice of internal democracy using election primaries to choose parliamentary candidates by both the NDC and NPP. Hitherto, the NDC, between 1992 and 2000, used popular acclamation to select parliamentary candidates and some other key internal executives such as the chairpersons and general secretaries. The period of the formal practice of some form of internal democracy between 2001 and 2016 is important because of the comparative nature of the study. Third, the period 2001-2016 witnessed a much more pluralistic media industry in Ghana with community radio stations scattered across the country, in addition to a sustained increase in the number of newspapers, television stations and social media. This made it possible for more people to get educated on their rights within political parties' own constitutions and their internal democratic practices. Prior to this period, the state broadcaster (the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation) which had a nationwide reach, largely worked to the advantage of the ruling party (Temin and Smith, 2002).

4.14 BRIEF PROFILE OF THE THREE CONSTITUENCIES

The section is devoted to the profile of the three constituencies- Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku.

4.14.1 Kwabre East constituency

The Kwabre East constituency is located in the Kwabre East Municipal Assembly, which is one of the 23 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies in the Ashanti region. It was carved out of the former Kwabre Sekyere District in 1988. The municipal assembly is located almost in the central portion of the Ashanti region within latitudes 60

44' North and longitudes 10 33' to 1044' West. Its population, according to the 2010 Population and Housing Census, is 115,556 comprising 55,106 males and 60,450 females. It has a total land area of 246.8 square kilometers constituting about 1.01% of the total land area of Ashanti Region. The administrative capital is Mampong which is 14.5 kilometers from Kumasi, the regional capital (PHC, 2010).

The Kwabre East constituency is one of the 47 constituencies in the Ashanti region. It was originally part of the Kwabre constituency at the beginning of the Fourth Republic and was carved out in 2004 by the Electoral Commission in line with Section 5 and 6 of Article 47 of the Fourth Republican Constitution. The constituency shares borders with Sekyere South District to the north; Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly to the south; Ejisu Municipal Assembly to the southeast; Atwima Nwabiagya Municipal Assembly to the west and Offinso Municipal Assembly to the northwest (PHC, 2010).

There are currently 31 Electoral Areas in the Kwabre East constituency. The electoral history of the people of the Kwabre East Constituency points out that they are strongly affiliated to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) (Table 4.7).

Table 4.7: Electoral performance between the NDC and NPP in Kwabre East constituency 2000-2016

	NDC	%	NPP	%	Registered voters	Turnout
2000	7,5353	14.50	41,098	80.90	72,845	70.0%
2004	8,906	17.2%	42,094	81.2%	58,981	88.6%
2008	10,824	19.85%	41,454	76.04%	54,997	75.11%
2012	17,521	21.27%	62,048	75.32%	95,424	86.80%
2016	13,673	15.83%	71,757	83.08%	112,697	77.00%

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

4.14.2 The Ketu South Constituency

The Ketu South constituency is located in the Ketu South Municipal Assembly in the Volta region. The Assembly is one of the 25 Municipal and District Assemblies in the Region. The Ketu South Municipal Assembly (then district) was established by Legislative Instrument (LI) 1469 of 1989. It lies within latitudes 6° 03' north and 6° 10' north, and longitude 1° 06' east and 1° 11' east and is located at the southeastern corner of Ghana. Denu is the municipal capital. The Municipal Assembly shares boundaries with the Ketu North Municipal Assembly to the north, the Republic of Togo to the east, the Gulf of Guinea to the south and to the west with the Keta Municipal Assembly. The population of the municipal assembly is about 160,756 with 75,648 males and 85,108 females, according to the 2010 population and Housing Census (PHC, 2010).

The Ketu South constituency has been in existence since the beginning of the Fourth Republic. There are 39 electoral areas in the constituency.

The electoral history of the people of the Ketu South constituency points out that they vote predominantly for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) since the inception of the Fourth Republic (Table 4.8).

Table 4.8: Electoral performance between the NDC and NPP in Ketu South Constituency 2000-2016

	NDC	Percentage	NPP	%	Registered voters	Turnout
2000	39,169	86.10%	3,486	7.70%	86,170	53.9%
2004	48,279	68.4%	4,809	6.8%	81,186	88.0%
2008	54,720	89.69	3,446	5.65%	98,283	62.89%
2012	77,837	88.92%	4,122	4.71%	126,659	70.36%
2016	48,723	65.47%	4,148	5.57%	141,698	54.00%

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

4.14.3 The Ledzokuku Constituency

The Ledzokuku constituency falls under the Ledzokuku Municipal Assembly, which is one of the 26 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (MMDAs) in the Greater Accra Region. The Ledzokuku Municipal Assembly was established under Legislative Instrument (LI. 1865). The administrative capital is Nungua. It has a total land area estimated at 47.58 square kilometers. Its population is 227,932, comprising 109,185 males and 118,747 females (PHC, 2010).

The Ledzokuku constituency has been in existence since 1992. It is currently one of the 37 constituencies in the Greater Accra Region. The constituency is bordered to the south by the Gulf of Guinea from the Kpeshie Lagoon to the Mukwe Lagoon near the Regional Maritime University. It shares boundaries with La Dade-Kotopon Municipal Assembly to the west, Tema Metropolitan Assembly to the east, and Ashaiman Municipal Assembly to the north (PHC, 2010). There are 12 electoral areas in the constituency.

The voting history of the electorate of the Ledzokuku constituency points out that they are swing voters. In other words, they have alternated between voting for the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party since the return to constitutional rule in 1993 (Table 4.9).

Table 4.9: Electoral performance between the NDC and NPP in Ledzokuku constituency, 2000-2016

Year	NDC	%	NPP	%	Registered voters	Turnout
2000	14,981	34.4%	21,082	48.4%	74,482	58.6%
2004	32,169	42.0%	33,039	43.1%	91,787	84.0%
2008	42,087	58.88%	30,262	40.90%	108,283	68.88%
2012	32,520	49.48%	29,700	45.18%	87,917	75.28%
2016	43,092	48.32%	45,259	50.75%	137,375	65.00%

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

4.15 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided an account of how the study was undertaken. Specifically, it addresses the overall strategy adopted in the entire research design process, including the techniques used for collecting and analyzing both qualitative and quantitative data and adduced reasons for the various steps taken. It has thus encapsulated the major ingredients required in research, consisting of the philosophical assumptions, research methods and research techniques. Furthermore, the population, sample size and a clear scientific procedure adopted in arriving at the sample size with just a 5 percent margin of error have been discussed. The chapter has also shown a clear relationship between how the various research instruments were used to present the research questions to the respondents/participants to unearth answers within acceptable ethical standards. The chapter also looked at the justification for selecting the three cases considered unique as well as a brief profile of each of the constituencies.

The next chapter is a detailed presentation of the findings from the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter is devoted to the data presentation and analysis of the findings of the study, which covered 400 respondents and 23 elite interviews undertaken in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies in the Ashanti, Volta and Greater Accra regions respectively. The data presentation and analysis were guided by the civic voluntarism and rational choice theories to political participation (which jointly constituted the theoretical framework) and the objectives of the study. The main objective is to identify and discuss the contextual variables that caused undemocratic practices within political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic with specific reference to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies from 2000-2016. The specific objectives are to discuss the following: (i) the effect of internal democracy on the performance of the NDC and NPP in general elections over the period studied; their mandates such as being development agents at the constituency level, including how they participated in shaping the political will of the people, disseminated information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of national character, and sponsored candidates for public elections (Republic of Ghana, 1992;); (ii) the constituency specific dynamics and other factors that influenced voter choices; and (iii) make policy recommendations.

The structure of the chapter is, therefore, based on the theoretical framework, which is as follows: (i) background information of study respondents (ii) the impact of internal democracy on the performance of political parties (iii) the factors that caused undemocratic practices within political parties (iv) the factors that influenced voter

choices; and (v) the similarities and dissimilarities between internal democracy in the NDC and NPP.

5.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION OF STUDY RESPONDENTS

This section presents the demographic characteristics of the respondents such as age, gender, marital status, educational level and occupational status. This became necessary because the researcher needed to explore the possible relations between demographic features and how they, possibly, influenced the voter choices.

5.2.1 Age Distribution of Respondents

With regards to the age distribution, the researcher chose respondents who were from the ages of 18 and above with the main aim of targeting the voting population. The majority of the respondents from the three constituencies were between the ages of 18 and 30 (40.2%). This was followed by the ages between 31 and 40 (31.5%), 41 and 50 (16.5%), 51 and 60 (4.2%) and those above the age of 60 years (7.5%). A greater number of the respondents from the Kwabre East constituency were between 31 and 40 years representing 11.5% (46 respondents). This was followed by those between 18 and 30 years (10.5%), 41-50 years (4.8%), 60 and above (2%) and 51-60 years (0.2%) (Table 5.1). Unlike the Kwabre East constituency, the age distribution of the respondents in the Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies were relatively similar as the majority of them were within the 18 and 30 years' age brackets. For instance, 17.5% of the respondents in the Ketu South constituency and 12.2% of those in Ledzokuku constituency were between 18 and 30 years. This was followed by 9.8% and 10.2% for Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies respectively, for the age group 31 and 40 years. Also, 6.2% and 5.5% constituted the age group 41-50 years for the Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies

respectively. However, 2.5% and 1.5% of the respondents in the Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies were within the 51 and 60 years' age group respectively. Furthermore, 5% of the respondents in the Ledzokuku constituency were more than 60 years while only 0.5% of the respondents in the Ketu South were over 60 years (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1: Age distribution of respondents in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku Constituencies

			Constituency			Total
			Kwabre East	Ketu South	Ledzokuku	
Age	18-30	Count	42	70	49	161
		% of Total	10.5%	17.5%	12.2%	40.2%
	31-40	Count	46	39	41	126
		% of Total	11.5%	9.8%	10.2%	31.5%
	41-50	Count	19	25	22	66
		% of Total	4.8%	6.2%	5.5%	16.5%
	51-60	Count	1	10	6	17
		% of Total	.2%	2.5%	1.5%	4.2%
	60 and above	Count	8	2	20	30
		% of Total	2.0%	.5%	5.0%	7.5%
Total	Count		116	146	138	400
	% of Total		29.0%	36.5%	34.5%	100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019

5.2.2 Gender Distribution of Respondents

Table 5.2 revealed that out of the 400 respondents from the three constituencies (Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku), 202 (50.5%) were females, while the remaining 197 (49.2%) were males. In comparison, 63 (15.8%) of the respondents in Kwabre East were males while 53 (13.2%) were females. In Ketu South, 70 (17.5%) of the respondents were males with 76 (19%) being females and in Ledzokuku, the male

respondents were 64 (16%) while the female respondents were 73 (18.2%). The gender distribution of the respondents in the study was therefore, evenly balanced (Table 5.2).

The relevance of gender to the performance of political parties is anchored in O'Brien's (2015) assertion that women, unlike men, are more likely to come to power in minor opposition political parties as well as parties that are losing their share of legislative seats. Besides, women are likely to retain their seats or positions in political parties when elected, but most likely to quit the post when faced with unfavorable (including undemocratic tendencies) trajectories (O'Brien, 2015). This clearly shows that women and men have differential opportunities and access to leadership in political parties. As such, the performance of political parties in elections cannot be delinked from gender largely because voter choices are influenced by numerous factors including gender.

Table 5.2. Gender distribution of respondents in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku Constituencies

			Constituency			Total
			Kwabre East	Ketu South	Ledzokuku	
Gender	Male	Count	63	70	64	197
		% of Total	15.8%	17.5%	16.0%	49.2%
	Female	Count	53	76	73	202
		% of Total	13.2%	19.0%	18.2%	50.5%
	Others	Count	0	0	1	1
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	.2%	.2%
Total	Count	116	146	138	400	
	% of Total	29.0%	36.5%	34.5%	100.0%	

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019

5.2.3 Marital Status of Respondents

From Table 5.3, the majority of the respondents, 49.2 %, were married followed by 45.8% who were unmarried. Also, 2.2 % of the respondents were divorced while 2.8% were either

widows or widowers. The constituency specific details showed that the married and singles were the majority of the respondents in the study (Table 5.3).

Marital status is relevant to the performance of political parties because when various factors are held constant, married people have higher voter turnout than the unmarried (Struber, 2010). On the other hand, the unmarried are more likely to be involved in political party activism. These are necessary predictors of political party performance in elections, particularly because spouses can influence the choices of one another (Struber, 2010).

Table 5.3: Marital status of respondents						
			Constituency			Total
			Kwabre East	Ketu South	Ledzokuku	
Marital status	Single	Count	54	84	45	183
		% of Total	13.5%	21.0%	11.2%	45.8%
	Married	Count	58	59	80	197
		% of Total	14.5%	14.8%	20.0%	49.2%
	Divorced	Count	2	2	5	9
		% of Total	.5%	.5%	1.2%	2.2%
	Widow/ Widower	Count	2	1	8	11
		% of Total	.5%	.2%	2.0%	2.8%
Total		Count	116	146	138	400
		% of Total	29.0%	36.5%	34.5%	100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

5.2.4 Educational Level of Respondents

The majority of the respondents (135) constituting 33% from the three constituencies (Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku) were educated up to the tertiary level (Table 5.4). Also 114 (28.5%) of the respondents had secondary, vocational, teachers and nurses training colleges levels of education. Similarly, 20% of the respondents had attained basic education comprising of primary, middle and junior high schools. Only 17.5% of the respondents had no formal education.

The general literature suggests that political participation has a positive correlation with the levels of education. In other words, more educated people are inclined to political activism, hence the level of education is relevant in assessing the performance of political parties in elections (Croke et.al., 2014). Details of the constituency breakdown showed that, generally, the majority of the respondents were educated (Table 5.4). Our findings therefore confirm the argument by Croke et.al. (2014) that educated people participate more in political party activities than the uneducated. Also, it is in sync with the civic voluntarism theory's argument that education empowers people and equips them with the desired civic skills which position them to get the resources needed to participate in party politics and engage with the political system in general (Verba et.al., 1995).

Table 5.4: Level of Education of respondents

			Constituency			Total
			Kwabre East	Ketu South	Ledzokuku	
Level of Education	No formal education	Count % of Total	22 5.5%	21 5.2%	27 6.8%	70 17.5%
	Basic (Primary, Middle and JHS)	Count % of Total	26 6.5%	24 6.0%	31 7.8%	81 20.2%
	Secondary (SSS, Vocational and Training)	Count % of Total	26 6.5%	50 12.5%	38 9.5%	114 28.5%
	Tertiary	Count % of Total	42 10.5%	51 12.8%	42 10.5%	135 33.8%
Total		Count % of Total	116 29.0%	146 36.5%	138 34.5%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

5.2.5 Occupational Level of Respondents

From Table 5.5, 3.2% of the respondents in the three constituencies (Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku) were farmers. Also, 16.8% of the respondents were artisans, 24.2% were traders, 32% were students, 5% were teachers, 8.8% were health related workers and 10% were civil servants. Details of the constituency specific breakdown can be seen in Table 5.5. It is clear, from the overall picture that students, artisans, traders and civil servants constituted majority of the respondents in the three constituencies (Table 5.5). The relevance of this was seen in their understanding of the questions asked in the field by the researcher. Generally, it emerged that the educated people, who were more in certain occupations such as teaching, nursing and civil service than others, understood the questions better than the uneducated, some of whom needed interpreters to answer the questions. The use of interpreters could possibly have influenced the answers they provided. As such, the importance of occupation to the study cannot be underscored. For instance, we observed that people in certain occupations including teaching, nursing and the civil service generally appreciated and willingly participated more in the study than artisans and traders who were mostly reluctant. The fear is that if they are unwilling to participate in a study that asks questions relating to political activism, they may do the same in elections, which could affect the performance of parties whose strongholds are dominated by people in those occupations.

Table 5.5: Occupation of respondents

			Constituency			Total
			Kwabre East	Ketu South	Ledzokuku	
Occupation	Farmer	Count	9	1	3	13
		% of Total	2.2%	.2%	.8%	3.2%
	Artisan	Count	31	17	19	67
		% of Total	7.8%	4.2%	4.8%	16.8%
	Trader	Count	24	35	38	97
		% of Total	6.0%	8.8%	9.5%	24.2%
	Student	Count	19	67	42	128
		% of Total	4.8%	16.8%	10.5%	32.0%
	Teacher	Count	6	5	9	20
		% of Total	1.5%	1.2%	2.2%	5.0%
	Health worker	Count	17	12	6	35
		% of Total	4.2%	3.0%	1.5%	8.8%
	Civil servant	Count	10	9	21	40
		% of Total	2.5%	2.2%	5.2%	10.0%
Total	Count	116	146	138	400	
	% of Total	29.0%	36.5%	34.5%	100.0%	

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

5.2.6 Participants in Elite Interviews

In addition to the 400 respondents in the survey, the researcher engaged 23 participants in face-to-face interviews. They were made up of 3 Members of Parliament (MPs) from the three constituencies (Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku), 3 journalists and 3 traditional/opinion leaders, one each from the three constituencies. Also, 12 participants made up of 6 constituency chairmen and secretaries (3 chairmen and 3 secretaries each for the NDC and NPP), and 6 defeated candidates of the two parties' in internal primaries in the three constituencies were interviewed. A Senior Research Fellow

at the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) and a political scientist (senior lecturer) at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana were also interviewed.

5.3 THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL DEMOCRACY ON THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The analysis in this section was guided by the assertion that internal party democracy is one vital aspect of modern democracy. As such, it is integral to emerging democracies because it helps to instill a healthy attitude towards the democratic process. Besides, it enhances political parties' performance during multiparty elections (Ichino and Nathan, 2017; Lancaster, 2014). In other words, the section was motivated by the thesis's central argument that weak internal democracy could negatively affect the performance of political parties in elections and the overarching question: how does internal democracy affects the performance of political parties in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies?

The analysis of the performance of political parties was guided by the internal and external indicators proposed by Arend Lijphart (Lijphart, 1993). Accordingly, the performance of political parties is evaluated in this chapter based on external and internal indicators. Externally, we first explored the degree to which internal democracy impacted on the parties' performance in competitive multi-party elections. Second, we examined the performance of political parties on the basis of how they (in their mandate as development agents) provided space for non-partisan political/civic engagement on developmental issues such as education, health, sanitation and voter education. The internal indicators were assessed on the basis of gender representation, community participation in the parties' activities, equality of members in decision making and accountability of leaders at the constituency level (see section 5.6).

5.3.1 The Impact of Internal Democracy on the Performance of Political Parties: The Case of Multi-Party Elections

We asked our survey respondents whether internal democracy affected the performance of political parties in general elections between 2000 and 2016. Similarly, we asked the participants in the elite interviews about their views on the impact of internal democracy on the performance of political parties in elections over the period. The responses, as presented below, confirmed our central argument that weak internal democracy has a negative effect on political party's performance in the elections.

When we posed the question as to how weak internal democracy had affected the NDC and NPP in elections from 2000 to 2016, as many as 189 of the respondents (47.2%) in the three constituencies responded that it affected both parties negatively. Also, 15.8% said that internal democracy affected the NDC negatively while 9% said that it affected the NPP negatively. Interestingly, 28% of respondents said that they did not know the effect of internal democracy on the performance of the two parties in elections (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: How weak internal democracy affected the NDC and NPP in elections

			How does internal democracy affect the NDC and NPP in elections?				Total
			It affects the NDC negatively	It affects the NPP negatively	It affects both negatively	Don't know	
Constituency	Kwabre East	Count	19	10	66	21	116
		% of Total	4.8%	2.5%	16.5%	5.2%	29.0%
	Ketu South	Count	28	11	57	50	146
		% of Total	7.0%	2.8%	14.2%	12.5%	36.5%
	Ledzokuku	Count	16	15	66	41	138
		% of Total	4.0%	3.8%	16.5%	10.2%	34.5%
Total	Count	63	36	189	112	400	
	% of Total	15.8%	9.0%	47.2%	28.0%	100.0%	

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

From Table 5.6, a relatively balanced number (3.8% and 4%, respectively) of the respondents affirmed that internal democracy affected the NPP and NDC negatively in the swing constituency. However, in the stronghold constituencies, the situation was different. For instance, while only 2.5% of the respondents in the NPP's stronghold of the Kwabre East constituency perceived that weak internal democracy affected the NPP negatively, 7% of the respondents in the NDC's stronghold (Ketu South) confirmed that internal democracy affected the NDC negatively (Table 5.6).

In trying to account for the differences in the effect of internal democracy on the parties' performance in the swing and stronghold constituencies, we asked the respondents what reason(s) accounted for the consistency in the voting behaviour in the case of the

stronghold constituencies and inconsistency in the voting patterns in the swing constituency. From Table 5.7, party identity (likeness for the party) was higher in the stronghold constituencies – 4% in the Kwabre East constituency and 3% in the Ketu South constituency, compared to 1.5% in Ledzokuku constituency. Furthermore, internal democracy was higher in Ketu South (3.5%) than Kwabre East (2.5 %). This gave the impression that in the NDC's stronghold, the party needed more of strong internal democracy in addition to the members' love for their party in order to perform better in elections. In other words, from Tables 5.6 and 5.7, weak internal democracy had done more harm to the NDC in its stronghold than it had done to the NPP in its stronghold. Evidence of this could be seen in the Kwabre East constituency where party identity (love for the party) scored higher (4%) than the Ketu South (3%) and Ledzokuku constituencies where the score was 1.5%. This notwithstanding, the two topmost priorities in the stronghold constituencies were party identity and internal democracy in order of preference. Also, whereas the campaign messages were a major issue in the case of the NDC's stronghold of Ketu South constituency (3.2%), it was not an issue in the NPP's stronghold of Kwabre East constituency (0.2%). This, according to the Kwabre East NPP constituency secretary, was because the electorate like the NPP more than any other party. On the other hand, a party's track record was ranked higher in the NPP's stronghold of Kwabre East (1.2%) than the NDC's stronghold in Ketu South (1%). For the swing constituency, however, the two topmost priorities of voters were internal democracy (2.5%) and the track record of the party (1.8%) (Table 5.7). Since elections are the basis for choosing people who form the government, the reasons given by the constituents in the three constituencies could constitute rational behavior because it could be inferred that there was something they anticipated based on either their conviction on which party could best provide their needs or based on past record of performance (Downs, 1957).

Table 5.7: What reason can you give for the consistency/inconsistency in the voting behaviour in your constituency since 2000?

			What reason can you give for the consistency/inconsistency in the voting behavior in your constituency since 2000?							Total
			The party is internally democratic	The people just love the party	The people just love the candidate	The party's campaign promises	Track record of good performance	Others	NA	
Constituency	Kwabre East	Count	10	16	5	1	5	1	78	116
		% within Constituency	8.6%	13.8%	4.3%	.9%	4.3%	.9%	67.2%	100.0%
	Ketu South	Count	14	12	6	13	4	14	83	146
		% within Constituency	9.6%	8.2%	4.1%	8.9%	2.7%	9.6%	56.8%	100.0%
	Ledzokuku	Count	10	6	3	6	7	0	106	138
		% within Constituency	7.2%	4.3%	2.2%	4.3%	5.1%	.0%	76.8%	100.0%
Total		Count	34	34	14	20	16	15	267	400
		% within Constituency	8.5%	8.5%	3.5%	5.0%	4.0%	3.8%	66.8%	100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

The responses from our survey were relatively similar to those gathered through interviews, although the interviews indicated that the effect of internal democracy on the performance of the parties was constituency specific. All the NDC activists (3 incumbent executives and 3 defeated candidates in internal elections) in the three constituencies agreed that weak internal democracy had affected the party negatively in elections in their respective constituencies, but in different forms. For instance, a former NDC chairman for Ketu South (2004-2016), said that weak internal democracy led to the incidence of people contesting the parliamentary seat as independent candidates in the Ketu South constituency which affected the NDC's performance in elections, particularly in 2004, 2012 and 2016 (see Table 5.8). He disclosed that: *'It happened in 2004 when one Charles Nypson Agbagedy went independent and had 17,000 votes. It was unprecedented. He was a poet, educationist and one of the founding members of our party here, but he lost the primaries to a 'bookman' (one of those who record vehicle movements at the transport station) by name Albert Zigah by 6 votes. In 2012, Fifi Kwetey came into the scene and won the*

primaries against the sitting MP, Hon. Albert Zigah. The MP was peeved and went independent and had about 3000 votes. Again in 2016, one gentleman called Jim Yao Morti also came to the scene. He lives in Accra and all of a sudden, he wanted to contest so he came down. He was disqualified at the regional vetting and so he went independent. As usual, Hon. Zigah went independent again. This time around, Jim Yao Morti had about 18000 votes'' (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This assertion was confirmed by the sitting NDC MP for Ketu South.

On the part of the NPP in Ketu South constituency, weak internal democracy was said to have impeded the party's efforts at making gains in the elections. According to the constituency chairman, internal democracy affected the NPP's performance particularly in the parliamentary elections. He observed that because Ketu South constituency had historically been an NDC stronghold, the NPP needed to do everything possible, including internal unity, to attract some of the disgruntled followers of the NDC. He said that the NPP was formerly not attractive to the electorate prior to 2000. As a result, the people did not bother about the effect of the NPP's internal democracy in the Ketu South constituency. However, he noted that since 2004, the party's presidential candidate got more votes than the parliamentary candidates due to internal democratic challenges; an indication that the NPP was becoming attractive, but needed to work on its internal democracy (Fieldwork, March, 2019). These views are reflected in the presidential and parliamentary results in the Ketu South constituency from 2000-2016 (Table 5.8).

Table 5.8: Presidential and Parliamentary results of Ketu South constituency, 2000-2016

Year	NDC		NPP		Independent candidates
	Presidential	Parliamentary	Presidential	Parliamentary	
2000	41,381	39,169	2,418	3,4886	
2004	65,082	48,279	4,717	4,809	Charles Nypson Agbagedy (Pro-NDC), 16,241
2008	56,484	54,720	2,816	3,446	
2012	81,880	77,837	5,165	4,122	Albert Zigah (pro NDC), 3,956
					E. Delali Amegatse (pro NDC) 660
2016	65,279	48,723	7,590	4,148	Jim Yao Morti (pro-NDC) 18,643 Albert Zigah (pro NDC), 2,545

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

In the Kwabre East constituency, the NDC chairman, admitted in an interview that weak internal democracy affected the party more than the NPP because the electorate's choices were based on party identity which favoured the NPP. As such, the NDC's internal unity could help it to attract more voters. He could not recall any instance, since 2000, where internal democratic weakness had led to an NDC member defecting to the NPP or going into elections as an independent candidate in the constituency. According to him, there were however, instances where sympathizers did not vote for the party in elections. He cited the 2016 election as an example where some party members alleged that the Municipal Chief Executive used undemocratic means, such as vote buying, to become the party's parliamentary candidate, hence decided not to vote for the party in their numbers. He argued further that there were party members who were emphatic that they were not going to vote for the NDC's parliamentary candidate. However, they voted for the party's presidential candidate and that is why the NDC's presidential candidate got 15,503 and the parliamentary candidate got 13,673. Also, the NPP's parliamentary candidate got 71,757 and Nana Akufo-Addo (now president of Ghana) got 71,112. These figures confirmed the

claim that the NDC voters didn't like the party's parliamentary candidate (Fieldwork, March, 2019; Table 5.9).

The negative impact of weak internal democracy on elections was also observed in the Kwabre East constituency in the Ashanti region (the NPP's electoral stronghold). However, unlike the NDC's electoral stronghold (Ketu South), the impact of weak internal democracy on the NPP in Kwabre East was found to be minimal. In an interview, the NPP constituency secretary explained that the impact of weak democracy in the NPP was less in general elections because the voters had a tradition that always favoured the NPP. Accordingly, the electorate just voted for the NPP because they were born into the party and nothing else. He recounted an instance in 2008 where the NPP's sitting chairman defected to the NDC yet that did not affect the NPP's fortunes in the 2008 general elections. He however, revealed that some party members in the past deliberately caused problems with the aim of unseating the party executives in the future. In buttressing this point, he noted that: *'In 2008, our sitting chairman who had served for 12 years was defeated in the elections. He was peeved and so decided to join the NDC but after 8 years he came back. Sometimes, people try their best to ensure that the winner loses some votes so that in the future, it can be used as a campaign tool against him. We can say that because that person was not hard working that is why he lost or the party lost some number of votes''* (Fieldwork, March, 2019). These views are reflected in the presidential and parliamentary results in the Kwabre East constituency from 2000-2016 (Table 5.9).

Table 5.9: Presidential and Parliamentary results of Kwabre East constituency, 2000-2016

Year	NDC		NPP		Independent candidates
	Presidential	Parliamentary	Presidential	Parliamentary	
2000	7,759	7,353	41,506	41,098	
2004	9,232	8,906	42,232	42,094	
2008	10,473	10,824	43,329	41,454	
2012	18,092	17,521	64,056	62,048	Edward J.B.Dankwah (pro-NPP) 1,524
2016	15,503	13,673	71,112	71,757	

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana.

In the Ledzokuku constituency a former chairman of the NDC who served for 8 years and lost in the party's internal elections in 2018 emphasized that weak internal democracy affected the NDC in many ways during general elections between 2000 and 2016. He noted that:

“When we go into our internal elections and a popular candidate loses, sometimes the electorate vote skirt and blouse in the general elections. For instance, in Teshie, we had a very bitter experience. We lost the parliamentary seat, but our presidential candidate won, and that was because of lack of internal democracy. In fact, it is always the internal problems that lead people to vote skirt and blouse” (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

It also emerged that weak internal democracy affected the NPP in elections in the Ledzokuku constituency. The constituency secretary disclosed that the NPP lost the parliamentary seat in 2008 and 2012 because the party was saddled with many internal conflicts due to rumours of undemocratic practices within (see Table 5.10). According to him, there were accusations and counter accusations as to who was excluded from financial resources provided by the MP. The people felt there was no transparency in the party which they attributed to lack of internal democracy. He noted that: *“In 2008 and 2012, I was the deputy youth organizer. In fact, every meeting we attended was about solving problems among ourselves internally. In 2012, even in the heat of the campaign, we were solving*

internal problems. In 2016, we had a united front and we won so yes, our internal democracy has a serious impact on our performance in elections’’ (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

A critical look at the presidential and parliamentary results in the Ledzokuku constituency from 2000-2016 show that the views expressed by the NDC and NPP activists are valid (Table 5.10).

Table 5.10: Presidential and Parliamentary results of Ledzokuku constituency, 2000-2016

Year	Presidential NDC	Parliamentary NDC	Presidential NPP	Parliamentary NPP
2000	18,747	14,981	22,327	21,082
2004	37,386	32,169	38,100	33,039
2008	41,359	42,087	31,603	30,262
2012	53,710	52,524	40,662	42,038
2016	44,406	43,092	43,956	45,259

Source: Compiled by the author using figures from the Electoral Commission

The overall effect based on the activists of the NDC and NPP interviewed was that internal democracy, in one way or the other, played a significant role in determining the outcome of elections in their respective constituencies between 2000 and 2016 (see Tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10). Their views confirmed the position of the respondents in the survey that weak internal democracy affected the parliamentary results more than it did to the presidential results. The reason is that the electorate dealt directly and more closely with the parliamentary candidates than the presidential candidates. The fluctuation in the parliamentary figures, especially in the swing constituency, also affirmed the position expressed by respondents and participants that whenever a party won the Ledzokuku seat, internal challenges emerged due to uneven resource distribution. The problem caused by the uneven distribution of resources can be explained by the rational choice theory which assumes that political activists invest their time and resources hoping to reap some reward when their party wins political power to govern (Downs, 1957). It therefore makes sense

for the activists to be worried when the rewards are not evenly distributed. The volatility in the parliamentary candidates in both NDC and NPP and elected parliamentarians in the constituency attests to these views. For example, even though the NPP won the seat in 2000 and 2004, the party used two different candidates because the sitting MP was defeated in the parliamentary primaries ahead of the 2004 elections. The same applied to the NDC in the 2004 and 2008 elections. This explains why no individual from either party was able to win the Ledzokuku parliamentary seat continuously for two terms since 2000.

The views of the respondents in the survey and political party executives/defeated candidates in the interviews, on the impact of internal democracy on the performance of the NDC and NPP in elections were similar to those expressed by a senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG). According to him, it is very difficult to conclude that internal democracy affected the performance of the parties in all constituencies but it did in many instances. He indicated that since 2000, there had been instances where a breach in internal democracy resulted in a member of either party going independent and actually defeating the party's official candidate in elections. For instance, he cited the current First Deputy Speaker of Parliament Hon. Joe Osei Owusu, who was very popular in his constituency and wanted to be the NPP's parliamentary candidate. However, the party hierarchy in Accra and the hierarchy in Ashanti region got together and subverted the constituency decision. As a result, Hon. Joe Osei-Owusu went into the elections as an independent candidate and won. He added: *“(....) So Joe Osei-Owusu first got to parliament as an independent candidate. The next time he wanted to contest, the same people said ‘na ennye akoo woi na okoy3 independent’ (to wit, was it not this same guy who left the party and went independent when we said nobody should). They tried to stop him, but when they saw that if they didn’t support him again, he will still win, they yielded to him”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The impact of internal democracy on electoral performance has been re-echoed by a political scientist, with the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. According to him: *“There have been several instances where one party or the other has lost because there were divisions within the constituency and somebody went independent and cut deep into the party’s vote, giving the other party the chance to win. There were several of them in 2016. In 2000, for example, there were instances where some incumbents didn’t allow primaries and others got annoyed and went independent and won. Therefore, if you don’t make room for internal democracy, it can have an effect on your performance”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The net effect, from our findings, is that weak internal democracy affected the NDC and NPP negatively in elections between 2000 and 2016. However, the extent of the impact as demonstrated, varied from constituency to constituency, although it was more pronounced in the swing constituency than the stronghold constituencies. This notwithstanding, our findings show that there is a link between internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections.

5.3.2 The Impact of Internal Democracy on the Performance of Political Parties: The Civic Education Mandate of Political Parties

This section is dedicated to the presentation of analysis of data on the performance of political parties beyond elections. This was informed by the assertion of Cheeseman et.al. (2014) that programmatic political parties should be able to provide citizens with meaningful choices over policies and programmes by reaching out to their constituents through coherent political programmes that shape the political will of the people in totality. The civic education mandate of political parties also entails how they disseminate information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of national character. This section is therefore divided into two: (i) political parties and shaping the political will

of the people; and (ii) political parties and the dissemination of information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of national character.

5.3.2.1 Political Parties and Participation in Shaping the Political Will of the People

The 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act of Ghana, Act 574 (2000) enjoin political parties to participate in shaping the political will of the people and disseminate information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of national character. The legal framework also gives every Ghanaian of voting age the right to join a political party and to participate in political activity intended to influence the composition and policies at the national level (Ayee, 2009). Besides, Article 7 (1) of the NDC constitution stipulates that the party should promote participatory democracy and responsible government in Ghana and attain political power through democratic and constitutional means for the purpose of creating conditions conducive to ensure national development (NDC, 2019). In addition, Article 2 (1) of the constitution of the NPP stipulates that one of its objectives is to participate in shaping the political will of the people by disseminating information on political ideas, social and economic programmes without discrimination.

Empirically, there is no doubt that beyond being electoral machines, political parties in Ghana have a mandate to engage in other policies and programmes when in government, most of which are aimed at shaping the political will of the people. They also aggregate the interest of various groups in society. It can therefore be argued that the NDC and NPP have largely discharged their civic mandates while in government, which have contributed in shaping the political will of Ghanaians at the national and constituency levels. For instance, the NDC and NPP have been credited for the enthusiasm, excitement

and the increased level of participation in political activities in the Fourth Republic (Osei, 2013). In fact, their colorful activities including party primaries and general election campaigns have contributed significantly to the popular excitement over politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic (Osei, 2013). In addition, their campaigns “have provided useful platforms for their articulation of community concerns” while their electoral mobilization programmes, including clean up exercises have facilitated political socialization, civic and political education (Debrah et.al., 2014, p. 62). In the process, the parties have contributed largely to the legitimization of democratic politics in Ghana.

This notwithstanding, when we asked our respondents what the NDC and NPP had done beyond elections, a majority of them (58%) noted that they had done nothing (Table 5.11). This was followed by 11.5% and 14% who were of the view that the two parties had engaged in non-partisan development activities on voter education, health and sanitation (Table 5.11). This confirmed an earlier assertion that political parties are largely electoral machines in Ghana (Ayee, 2015).

Table 5.11: Apart from elections, what else does the NDC and NPP do in your constituency?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	They do nothing	232	58.0	58.0	58.0
	They engage in non-partisan development activities on voter education	46	11.5	11.5	69.5
	They engage in non-partisan activities on health, education and sanitation	56	14.0	14.0	83.5
	Don't know	66	16.5	16.5	100.0
	Total	400	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

Two out of the three traditional and opinion leaders interviewed in the three constituencies agreed that the political parties had mainly focused on elections and election related issues in the Fourth Republic. For instance, the secretary to the Manponteng Stool Lands Secretariat at the Manponteng Hene's Palace pointed out that political parties in the traditional area were known mainly for elections. He noted that: *‘‘As a matter of fact, I don't see their contributions to move the town forward. All they do is to come and ask for our votes whenever there are elections. When you hear them on information centre every morning, it is either NDC or NPP and who is better than the other and not Manponteng teenage pregnancies, school dropouts or sanitation. Even when they organize cleanup exercises, they are targeting votes’’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019). Similar views were expressed by the spokesman for the Teshie Maame Lenhie in the Teshie traditional area (Ledzokuku constituency). When asked what the political parties had done in his traditional area beyond elections from 2000 to 2016, he responded as follows: *‘‘Nothing. They have contributed divisions in this area. So the whole Ghana, the division is pronounced in political parties than regions. You hear more of I am NDC or I am NPP than I am a Ga or from Greater Accra region. Both NDC and NPP are the same; all they do is to deceive the electorate’’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

On the contrary, the secretary of the Some Traditional Area in the Ketu South constituency noted that political parties periodically engaged in civic activities in relation to voter education especially during voter registration exercise. This notwithstanding, he pointed out that political parties have not done much for the community because a lot of politicians are only interested in winning elections. According to him, the political parties occasionally engaged people in his community in non-partisan activities such as sanitation, clean up exercises and funeral donations, with the sole aim of getting more votes in future elections. He concluded that: *‘‘(...) As soon as they get their votes, they forget about the*

community. It is only when the four years have elapsed and they seek additional mandate that they come back to the people for their votes. I believe they could have done better than what they have done so far'' (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This shows that political activists are rational actors whose actions are motivated by what they stand to benefit as espoused by Downs (1957) in the rational choice theory.

It can therefore be argued that political parties at the constituency level have largely been reduced to electoral machines at the expense of being programmatic in nature. This reinforces the view by Ayee (2015) that even though the political parties have manifestos, they do not consistently link them to the Directive Principles of State Policy, contained in Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution, which provide the basis for a social contract between the government (represented by political parties) and the people.

At the national level, the NDC and NPP have sought to empower their followers by providing better living conditions for them, fighting corruption, empowering them through education, health and adequate provision of infrastructure (Osei, 2013). In sum, the performance of the NDC and NPP in the field of social integration and interest aggregation at both the constituency and national levels, which should ideally shape the political will of the masses, is doubtful. It is therefore not surprising that their role in shaping the political will of the people remains minimal in the opinion of the electorate.

5.3.2.2 Political Parties and the Dissemination of Information on Political Ideas, Social and Economic Programmes of National Character

The social and political education mandate of political parties in Ghana, as indicated earlier, is enshrined in the 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act, 574 (2000). As part of the mandate, the NDC and NPP are expected to disseminate information on political ideas as well as social and economic programmes of national character through

their manifestos. In line with this, the NDC and NPP have over the period engaged in information dissemination on their socio-political ideas, policies and economic programmes of national character based on their ideologies. This is done through appeal to identifiable groups such as religious, social and ethnic at both the national and local levels.

We found that the ideological disposition of the NDC and NPP is expressed in their programmes such as those in social intervention, economic and political programmes when they are in government (Table 5.12). However, when in opposition the two parties engaged in advocacy on their programmes (Fieldwork, March, 2019). Even though the NDC and NPP espouse social democracy and liberal democracy (property owning democracy) respectively, both embarked on programmes and policies that were national in character and similar in outlook (Fieldwork, March, 2019). In other words, both the NDC and NPP have preoccupied themselves with social intervention programmes and policies over the period. Besides, they have also engaged in socio-economic programmes such as the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative, the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy and Extended Credit Facility, school feeding programme and capitation grant as well as political programmes including decentralization, local content policy, legal and constitutional reforms (Table 5.12).

Both parties have sustained dissemination of information on these policies and programmes at the constituency level just as they do at the national level (Fieldwork, March, 2019). The competitiveness of elections for political power, perhaps, explains the intensive political activism between the NPP and NDC (Fieldwork, March, 2019). The manifestos of the two parties are driven by the agenda to ensure development for all Ghanaians without discrimination on any ground. In line with this, both parties have continued and expanded programmes and policies begun by their predecessors in the areas

of health, education, social interventions, agriculture, the economy, decentralization, natural resources, among others (Debrah, et.al. 2013). The ultimate aim has been to empower the people with human, social and material resources which are of national character (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The views of the three journalists on how political parties disseminate information on social and economic programmes of national character, were mixed. For instance, an Editor-In-Chief with the state broadcaster (the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation) and Head of Radio Ghana News, who covered events and edited stories of the two political parties for the past 37 years, noted that whenever political party activists appeared on state radio and television *talk shows* to discuss issues of national character, they always carried printed papers of their party's candidate and specifically spoke to them. This means they have always skewed the discussions towards their political parties (Fieldwork, March, 2019). These views were not different from the GBC's correspondent in the Volta region. These comments confirm the rational choice theory's assumption that politicians' actions are calculated based on what they expect to gain (Downs, 1957). However, the Ashanti Regional Correspondent of the GBC disagreed. In his view, political parties' role beyond elections is enormous. According to him, the fact that the NDC and NPP when in opposition resorted to criticizing government policies and programmes of national character and suggesting alternatives were enough basis to credit them for delivering on their role of disseminating information on political ideas of social and economic programmes of national character (Fieldwork, March, 2019). Similarly, when in government, they organized programmes such as town hall meetings and regular encounters with the media to disseminate information on social, political and economic ideas to Ghanaians. He added that in GBC, it had long been a practice to have a representative of both the NDC and NPP on programmes that were politically oriented.

This in his view, afforded the political parties a platform to perform their civic mandate of conditioning the minds of the people that democracy had come to stay (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This view resonates with the point that the NDC and NPP have been largely responsible for the mobilization as well as political education of the electorate in Ghana's Fourth Republic (Debrah, 2014). Such civic education related actions by the two parties in the three constituencies are in sync with the civic voluntarism theory's assumption that education equips party members with the needed civic knowledge, skills and human resources to participate in politics (Verba et.al.,1995).

In general, the ideological positions of the NPP and NDC which seem to have influenced the way they have disseminated information on political ideas, social and political programmes of national character are complementary though blurred at both the national and constituency levels (Debrah et.al. 2014). This notwithstanding, the very fact that they had provided a semblance of ideological guidance which appeared institutionalized in the minds of their activists and Ghanaians in general is significant in the country's multi-party democratic practice especially in the Fourth Republic (Ayee 2008; Osei, 2013). Table 5.12 demonstrates the similarities in the policies (long term interventions) and programmes (short term interventions) implemented by the NDC and NPP between 2000 and 2016 despite the difference in their ideological positions. These policies and programmes were the focus of information dissemination on social and economic programmes of national character by the two leading political parties in Ghana.

Table 5.12: Key Policies and Programmes Implemented by the NDC and NPP, 2000-2016

Some social, economic and political policies and programmes of the NDC	Some social, economic and political policies and programmes of the NPP
<p>PROGRAMMES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The issuance of free supplies such as uniforms, sandals, textbooks – 2009 - The Teacher Professional Development Programme-2009 - The Distribution of free fertilizers to cocoa farmers - 2010 - The construction of two new public universities in Sunyani and Ho -2011 - The creation and upgrading of MMDAs-2012 - The Construction of Community Day Senior High Schools -2014 <p>POLICIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Ageing Act-2000 - The Affirmative Action Bill-since 2010 - The Child and Family Welfare Policy-2015 - The National Gender Policy-2015 - The Social Protection Policy-2015 - The Youth Employment Act 2015 - The Justice for Children Policy-2016 	<p>PROGRAMMES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The free mass cocoa spraying exercise-2001 -The public mass transport system-2001 - The Capitation Grant-2005 - The School Feeding Programme-2005 - The National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP) - 2006 - The Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme-2008 - The Ghana Poverty Reduction Programmes I & II- 2002 - The creation and upgrading of MMDAs-2004 <p>POLICIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The National Health Insurance Act-2003 - The Financial Administration Act-2003 - The Internal Audit Agency Act-2003 - The School Feeding Policy-2005 - The Whistleblowers Act-2006 - The Domestic Violence Act - 2007 - The Female Genital Mutilation Act – 2007

Sources: State of the Nation Address, Feb.25, 2016 State of the Nation Address 14th Feb.14

2008; Abbey, 2018; NDC Manifesto, 2016; NPP Manifesto, 2016.

NB: It must be noted that both the NDC and NPP while in government continued the policies and programmes which were started by their predecessors (Ablakwa, 2018; Jafaru, 2018).

5.4 CONSTITUENCY SPECIFIC FACTORS THAT CAUSED UNDEMOCRATIC PRACTICES IN POLITICAL PARTIES

This section presents an analysis of the findings on the causes of undemocratic practices within the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku

constituencies. All the participants interviewed admitted that all was not well with internal democracy in political parties in Ghana. They also agreed that internal democratic problems were pronounced when the NDC or NPP were in government than when they were in opposition.

The study identified five major causes of undemocratic practices within political parties in the three constituencies. The first was bitterness as a result of electoral defeat, and this happened because the candidates had different motives before they contested elections. An NDC former chairman for Ledzokuku argued that some people felt that once their preferred candidate lost, some underhand dealing might have occasioned it. He remarked that: *‘‘It is a competition and everyone has an interest. I was the sitting chairman, but I lost to the current one. I have my supporters who will be peeved and may not like the current chairman for various reasons, some personal. All these can cause conflicts because some feel their candidates lost due to undemocratic practices so they also want to use undemocratic means to unseat whoever won’’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The NPP constituency secretary for Kwabre East, held the view that some candidates were bad losers and therefore resorted to deliberately cause disaffection. Therefore, in case they lost the current elections, they used it as a campaign tool to unseat the executives in subsequent elections. He disclosed that: *‘‘It starts with bitterness as a result of rancorous campaigns. Sometimes some people become so bitter that they find it difficult to forgive or they try to revenge. Another is future elections. People do their best to ensure that they prepare themselves ahead of future elections. In the course of doing that they step on the toes of others and that may degenerate into conflicts and when it is time for another election, the same people will say the executives were not unifiers and so should be voted out’’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The three MPs (NDC MP for Ketu South, NPP MP for Kwabre East and NPP MP for Ledzokuku, the swing constituency) admitted that some candidates became angry when they lost the primaries while some of their supporters had difficulty in accepting defeat.

In their view, the issue revolved around financial resources and therefore whenever a group or faction's candidate lost elections, they felt that their source of income had ended. For instance, an NDC MP for Ketu South whose candidacy made three of his contenders to desert the party and contested as independent candidates in 2016 remarked that: *“We tend to have lots of undemocratic issues because some candidates become angry when people lose internal elections. Often times, people are not prepared for the outcome. It is like I go into a race and I just like to win and if I lost I must find reasons to say this is why I lost. In effect, a lot of bad losers who just don't want to understand why delegates will go to another person”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The civic voluntarism theory helps in explaining the existence of these factions in both the NDC and NPP in the three constituencies. This is so because the individuals behind the factions at the constituency level appeared to be the educated class, founding members, council of elders and businessmen who had either the civic competence or financial resources or both to engage the voters and explain the feasibility of policy initiatives or proposed policy interventions in an effort to ignite political activism and recruit new voters (Verba et.al., 1995).

The second cause of undemocratic practices identified by the study was financial, that is, unequal distribution of resources within the parties. All the political party executives and the defeated candidates interviewed agreed that people go into politics with various interests. Topmost among these interests is money. As such, the slightest suspicion of unequal distribution of resources among party members by the executives, led to various reactions, including undemocratic ones such as open physical or verbal confrontation in

the past. An NPP chairman for Ketu South constituency noted that sometimes, the distribution of resources that came to the party led to conflicts: *‘They will say since we came to power it is only the chairman and organizer who are chopping ‘waawaawa’ (which literally means unbridled selfish spending) while in reality they may be poor, but just trying to look good so that opponents will not say that even though they are in power see how wretched they look. These together with suspicions are the causes of internal democratic problems here’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The NPP secretary for Kwabre East constituency also admitted that sometimes party executives faked their lifestyles to make the party look attractive. They did this by spending their personal resources on people they intended to recruit into the party including first time voters. This conduct, he noted, had created suspicion among members that executives had the resources but chose to ignore some of the supporters in the distribution of same. He remarked that: *‘How do you convince them that you are the same in power as you were in opposition when you promised there will be changes when you win? If you say there is nothing, it throws some negative light on the government and its prospects in the next election, but if you say things are happening, they need to see it so it then becomes apparent that things are coming but executives are sitting on them. Sometimes we use personal resources to make the party look attractive’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The dynamics of economic influence on undemocratic practices within the political parties were reinforced by the NPP MP for Ledzokuku: *‘These are people who have the power to influence voters and most of them feel something must come to them. During Easter or Christmas, you have to give them money, rice etc. It is a huge budget. You have to be smart too, because unequal giving can give you troubles. For some is not work they want; all they want is money. Once people realize that few party people are enjoying, then*

you are trouble'' (Fieldwork, April, 2019). An NDC chairman for Kwabre East constituency also argued that the problem of unequal distribution of resources was more pronounced when the party was in government than when it went into opposition. According to him, it was common practice for party supporters to feel that they had been sidelined whenever they were not given money, particularly, whenever the party executives attended meetings with the Municipal and District Chief Executives and were seen going home with packs of food. He added that: *‘‘In opposition people usually close ranks so we are more united in opposition than in government. It is usually when your party is in power and members feel some are benefiting from financial resources than others that there is real internal wrangling’’ (Fieldwork, March, 2019).* Similarly, an NDC former chairman for Ledzokuku constituency remarked that: *‘‘Some people come into politics to make money and when they come and are not able to meet the reason for which they joined politics, they refuse to follow the rules’’ (Fieldwork, March, 2019).* These views reflect one of the assumptions of the rational choice theory because if the people are unwilling to work because they feel they are not getting their fair share of financial or material resources when their party is power, it means they are in politics because of what they want to get in the form of material or financial rewards (Downs, 1957).

The third major cause of undemocratic practices identified by the study is the appointment of people into internal party positions and those of municipal and district chief executive. An NPP constituency secretary in Ledzokuku described the task of appointing deputies of constituency executives as very stressful, especially when in government. This arose because of the difficulty in satisfying the various interests which could take the form of ethnic or religious as against competence. He noted that: *‘‘May be when you were going into the election, some other candidate stepped down and rallied his support behind you with the assurance that he will be appointed as your deputy in the*

event of victory. That person would have known other candidates who also stepped down and supported others. After the elections, if one of those who stepped down is appointed as deputy and others who did similar are not appointed, it leads to serious internal conflicts. Sometimes too, you just don't like your deputy because he is not your favourite'' (Fieldwork, March, 2019). The other party activists interviewed noted that the factions in political parties were largely caused by appointments or the promise of appointments. According to them, there were power brokers, most of them known by the party as financiers and so they did wield much influence and applied same during appointments (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

Authoritarian leadership style is found to be the fourth major cause of undemocratic practices within the parties in the three constituencies. An NPP secretary in Kwabre East noted that some of the leaders were autocratic. As such, they always pushed their way through without recourse to other executives. Such leaders believed that they were very powerful, hence they manipulated the system and thus created a major problem of weak internal democracy (Fieldwork, March, 2019). Furthermore, an NDC chairman at the Kwabre East constituency, shared similar views. He revealed that authoritarian leadership style made some people felt that they were not appreciated. Such followers usually reacted through the use of all forms of undemocratic means to unseat those in authority. He argued that some autocratic leaders had in the past ignored their branches because of the suspicion that they did not support their election bid. The net effect was the feeling of exclusion by the aggrieved members, some of whom reacted violently or chose not to vote in general elections (Fieldwork, March, 2019). On the other hand, even though the NPP MPs for Ledzokuku and Kwabre East agreed that some leaders behaved in ways that made the followers to feel excluded and disrespected, they held the view that some of the followers were difficult to lead, particularly the physically or verbally abusive type.

According to them, some followers misinterpreted the actions of their leaders as disrespect or tagged them as autocratic leaders basically because they took firm decisions in the interest of party discipline (Fieldwork, April, 2019).

The fifth cause of undemocratic practices at the constituency level is the imposition of candidates by the power brokers who used patron client tactics to undemocratically favour their supporters. These power brokers were identified as party financiers, influential founding members, regional or national executives, chiefs and appointees of the government. Such external interference made some members to feel cheated and reacted using all sorts of undemocratic means to target party executives. The NDC chairman for Ketu South gave an example of such instance: *“It is usually high when it comes to MCE or DCE and other appointments. When we were trying to elect (confirm) our MCE, the executives were not in favour of the government’s nominee. The MP said he was the right person, but the party said otherwise. As a result, all the 17 government appointees were recalled and replaced because they voted against the nominee for the position of MCE, leaving the party highly divided”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The NPP MP for Kwabre East, however, argued that most of the people who had the support of the so-called power brokers were competent individuals and would ordinarily have won elections with or without the support of some unseen hands. According to her, it was normal for a few favourites of the power brokers to emerge winners in the internal elections of political parties, but overall, competence outweighed all other considerations (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

In sum, the study found that electoral, financial, power-based influence, leadership styles and patron-client relations factors as the major causes of undemocratic practices in the NDC and NPP in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. This reflects the situation at the national level where weak internal democracy, caused by similar factors

identified at the constituency level, had been partly blamed for the defections, cross-carpeting and acrimonious relations among members of both the NDC and NPP (Debrah et.al., 2014; Ayee, 2008; Ninsin, 2006). This notwithstanding, at the national level, the leadership of political parties appears to be more conscious of the 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act, 2000, which enjoin parties to promote internal democracy than it appears at the constituency level.


5.5 CONSTITUENCY SPECIFIC FACTORS THAT AFFECTED VOTER CHOICES

This section presents an analysis of data in response to the question on how internal party democracy of the NDC and NPP influenced voter choices in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies from 2000-2016. For the survey respondents, we asked two questions. The first was whether they considered internal democracy as a major reason before voting. In the second question, we explored the influence of internal democracy on voter choices against other variables such as a “liking for the party” (party identity), “liking for the personality” (candidate) and the campaign message of the political party. Even though our focus was on internal democracy, the inclusion of other variables in the second question was meant to explore the extent of the influence of internal democracy in both swing and stronghold constituencies. When a question was posed as to whether internal democracy was part of the major reasons the electorate considered before voting for a political party, 76.8% of the respondents said yes while only 23.2% said no in the three constituencies (Table 5.13; Figure 5.1).

Table 5.13: Did you consider internal party democracy (party unity) as part of your major reason before voting for any of the parties?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Yes	307	76.8	76.8	76.8
No	93	23.2	23.2	100.0
Total	400	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

Figure 5.1: Did you consider internal party democracy (party unity) as part of your major reason before voting for any of the parties?

In comparative terms, as many as 96 of the respondents in the Kwabre East constituency representing 82.8% responded yes, while only 20 (17.2%) replied in the negative. In the Ketu South constituency, 106 (72.6%) of the respondents replied that internal democracy was a major factor they considered before voting while only 40 (27.4%) said the opposite. Similarly, 105 (76.1%) of the respondents in the Ledzokuku constituency, responded yes, while 33 (23.9%) replied in the negative to the question on whether internal democracy was a major consideration before they voted in the elections (Table 5.14).

Table 5.14: Did you consider internal party democracy (party unity) as part of your major reason before voting for any of the parties?

		Did you consider internal party democracy (party unity) as part of your major reason before voting for any of the parties?		Total
		Yes	No	
Constituency	Kwabre East	96 82.8%	20 17.2%	116 100.0%
	Ketu South	106 72.6%	40 27.4%	146 100.0%
	Ledzokuku	105 76.1%	33 23.9%	138 100.0%
Total		307 76.8%	93 23.2%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

Still on the impact of internal democracy on voter choices, we posed the question: which issue(s) contained in the campaign messages of the political parties influenced you to vote? From Table 5.15, internal democracy was a major factor that determined voter choices in the three constituencies (Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku). For instance, 28.4% of the respondents in the Kwabre East constituency, replied that internal democracy influenced their choices in elections. Similarly, 26.7% of the respondents in the Ketu South constituency also noted that internal democracy affected their choices in elections. In the Ledzokuku constituency, as high as 47.1% of the respondents indicated that they considered internal democracy before voting for a party in previous elections. These findings confirm the position of Ichino and Nathan (2017) and Lancaster (2014) that strong internal democracy influences voter choices. The findings also show that although internal democracy influenced voter choices, the influence was greater in the swing constituency than the stronghold constituencies where a liking for the party was the most significant consideration of voters (Table 5.15).

Table 5.15: Which issue(s) contained in the campaign messages of the political parties influenced you to vote?

	Which issue(s) contained in the campaign messages of the political parties influenced you to vote?					Total
	Internal party unity/demo cracy	Convincing campaign message	The personality of the candidate	A liking for the party	Don't know	
Constituency						
Kwabre East	33 28.4%	30 25.9%	7 6.0%	42 36.2%	4 3.4%	116 100.0%
Ketu South	39 26.7%	29 19.9%	18 12.3%	49 33.6%	11 7.5%	146 100.0%
Ledzokuku	65 47.1%	35 25.4%	7 5.1%	23 16.7%	8 5.8%	138 100.0%
Total	137 34.2%	94 23.5%	32 8.0%	114 28.5%	23 5.8%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

The participants interviewed on the impact of internal democracy on voter choices were divided. While some responded that the Ghanaian electorate were becoming more sophisticated because of their consideration of many things including internal organization of the party before casting their votes, others thought party identity was the major factor. For instance, a senior lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, pointed out that people voted in the name of the party more in stronghold constituencies while internal democracy influenced voting decision more in the swing constituencies. He opined that: *‘In stronghold constituencies, there are areas where all the people want is who is the party’s candidate. However, you cannot say so in the swing constituencies. In 2012 the four swing regions, each gave Mahama 50% plus and Akufo-Addo 40%, but in 2016, it was the other way round. Therefore, you can’t say people in swing constituencies don’t look at internal democracy. They do. Otherwise, why will they be swinging’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The NPP constituency secretary for the Ledzokuku constituency supported the assertion that in swing constituencies, voter choices were largely influenced by internal democracy between 2000 and 2016. According to him, whenever a party was internally democratic, it reflected in the way the party did things and the ordinary voter responded accordingly. He added that: *“The electorate may not know when we are fighting within but whenever we organize a rally or an event, they get to know. In polling station meetings, we can have 100 people so if the whole Teshie NPP is doing clean up and less than 20 people come out, it easily tells”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

However, a traditional leader in the Ledzokuku constituency said that voter choices were based on deceit and the like for the party. He argued that: *“Look at Maame to police station to LEKMA, the roads have been bad since the 1990s. Every election cycle they come and promise to fix them, but see them for yourselves. Tomorrow morning (30-02-2019) NDC supporters will go for jogging. It is usual so you will see so many people joining. They do not join because NDC provides their needs. They follow the NDC in Teshie Maame, because they just love the party. They will normally gather at the orphanage and embark on their jogging after which they will be given GHS5 or GHS2”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The people interviewed in the stronghold constituencies noted that voter choices were not largely based on internal democracy. It was observed that internal democracy largely influenced voter choices when it had to do with a minority party in a stronghold constituency; NPP in Ketu South or NDC in Kwabre East. The NDC chairman of Kwabre East said voter choices based on internal democracy mattered most to potential NDC voters. He added that: *“For NDC in an NPP stronghold, people look at how you are organized internally and they may feel that this party is worth voting for, so it does”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019). According to an NPP constituency secretary for Kwabre East,

voter choices for the NPP were based on a tradition while the same could not be said of the NDC: *‘Kwabre East has a certain tradition that favours the NPP. Sometimes people just vote because they were born into the party; nothing more, nothing less’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the desire to enhance the electoral performance of the NDC and NPP through enhanced internal democracy could be explained on the basis of rationality because a significant aspect of political life could be understood in terms of voters’ self-interest as well as that of politicians. In fact, politicians’ activism could best be understood to mean an investment for which they anticipated some form of returns such as material or financial benefits or rewards when they win political power (Downs, 1957). Likewise, voters made their choices based on what they expected to get from politicians in the form of provision of goods and services and programmes that had the potential to improve their living conditions.

In sum, internal democracy played a major role in voter choices in the three constituencies (Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku). However, the effect on both parties, was more pronounced in the swing constituency (Ledzokuku). In the stronghold constituencies, internal democracy had a minimal impact on the governing or majority party, but contributed enormously to the fortunes of the minority party. At the national level, voter choices have over the years been informed by several factors, including internal democracy, corruption, unemployment, past records of political parties and campaign promises (Ayee, 2017; Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018). Specifically, the impact of internal democracy on voter choices in previous elections was much felt, generally, in the swing regions, namely, Greater Accra, Central, Western and Brong Ahafo (Frempong, 2017).

5.6 SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN THE NDC AND NPP

This section discusses the similarities and dissimilarities between internal democracy in the NDC and NPP and how they have affected their performance in elections between 2000 and 2016. As indicated earlier, this thesis explored the performance of the two parties at two levels – internally and externally using the yardstick proposed by Lijphart (1993). Externally, we assessed the performance of political parties based on competitive multi-party elections and how they provided space for nonpartisan civic engagement on voter education, health and sanitation (see sections 5.3 and 5.3.2). In this section, we explored the similarities and dissimilarities between the internal democracy of the NDC and NPP on the basis of gender representation, community and party membership participation, equality among members in decision making and accountability of leaders. These could not be detached from the organizational structure of the two parties at the constituency level, hence we first discuss the structure of the two parties briefly.

5.6.1 Organizational Structure of the NDC in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku Constituencies

In the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, the study revealed that the NDC per its constitution, was organized at three levels - the Branch, Ward (Polling Station) and Constituency, in order of ascending hierarchy. As such, the basic unit of the NDC in the three constituencies was the Branch, made up of members' resident at a polling station (Figure 5.2). The study found that, per the party's constitution, the NDC had 9 elected executives at the Branch level in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. These consisted of the chairman, secretary, organizer, treasurer, women

organizer, youth organizer and two other members of the constituency. These executives were elected about one month before the Constituency Conference in line with the dictates of the party's constitution. It also emerged that the NDC had 171 Branches in Kwabre East, 208 in Ketu South and 210 in Ledzokuku constituencies. The study also found that the NDC had 1,539 Branch executives in Kwabre East, 1,872 in Ketu South and 1,890 in Ledzokuku constituencies (Fieldwork, March, 2019). At the Branch meetings, members discussed strategies for recruiting new members. They also deliberated on how to ensure high party support and voter turnout at polls and how to respond to the concerns of members at all levels (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This function is in sync with the civic voluntarism theory's assumption that parties that are able to identify recruitment networks and recruit new members could do better in elections (Verba et.al. 1995).


The next level is the Ward, which was constituted by the Branch chairman, secretary and organizer within a given polling station. The Ward Coordinators were appointed by the Ward Committees from within their membership. The Ward Committees had the responsibility of coordinating the activities of the Branches within polling stations. The study found that the NDC had 31 Wards in Kwabre East, 39 in Ketu South and 16 in Ledzokuku constituencies (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The constituency level was noted to be the highest organizational unit of the NDC in all the three constituencies studied and the same applied to all the 275 constituencies in Ghana. The study found that, in line with the NDC's constitution, the three constituencies studied, held Constituency Conferences within twelve (12) months after the 2016 general elections and elected officers. In addition, all Ward level executives (9 from every ward), sitting and former constituency executives, the member of Parliament or the Party's Parliamentary candidate from the constituencies, members of the National Executive Committee who hailed from the constituency, members of the Regional Executive

Committee who hailed from the constituency, members of the Constituency Executive Committee and founding members of the party who hailed from the Constituency were allowed to vote. The Constituency Executive Committee of the NDC consisted of all elected and co-opted executives as well as appointed council of elders (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

In sum, out of 28 constituency executives, 23 were elected while 5 were co-opted. Between 13 and 17 people were also appointed as council of elders who mainly dealt with disciplinary issues (Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.2: Structure of the NDC in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies



Source: Compiled by the author

5.6.2 Organizational Structure of the NPP in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku Constituencies

Like the NDC, the NPP also had three layers at the constituency level: Polling Station, Electoral Area and Constituency (Figure 5.3). The party elected 5 officers as Polling Station Executives. These were the chairman, secretary, organizer, youth organizer and women organizer. All card-bearing and paid-up members in good standing in the polling station area were allowed to vote. This was noted to be in line with the party's constitution. The study found that there were 171 Polling Stations in Kwabre East, 208 Ketu South and 210 in Ledzokuku constituencies. It also emerged that the NPP had 855 polling station executives at Kwabre East, 1,040 in Ketu South and 1,050 at Ledzokuku constituencies (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The next in the hierarchy is the Electoral Area where one person was elected as coordinator by the Polling Station Executives. The coordinator oversaw Polling Stations not exceeding ten. In other words, where the Polling Stations under an Electoral Area exceeded ten (10), an additional Electoral Area was created and a coordinator elected accordingly. As at the time of writing this thesis, the NPP has 31 Electoral Area Coordinators in Kwabre East, 39 in Ketu South, 16 in Ledzokuku constituencies (Field Interview, March, 2019).

The highest organizational unit of the NPP in the three constituencies is the Constituency Executive Committee, which consisted of all elected and appointed officers of the party (Fieldwork, March, 2019). In the three constituencies, the NPP had 10 elected constituency executives and 7 others appointed. All other constituency officers were elected with the exception of the constituency financial secretary, the deputy constituency organizer, the deputy constituency women organizer, the deputy constituency youth organizer, the electoral/research officer, the Nasara coordinator, and the constituency


communications officer who were appointed. Furthermore, in the three constituencies, the Constituency Executive Committee appointed all the members of the constituency disciplinary committee, the constituency finance committee, five members each as the council of elders and the council of patrons. Where there were disagreements on who should be appointed, the executives did vote (a convention not backed by any law). The Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies had 17 executives each; 10 elected and 7 appointed for the NPP (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

It is instructive to note that the appointments of people into executive positions in both the NDC and NPP were done such that those appointed were likely to vote for the people who appointed them or support their preferred candidates in future congress or conference - patron - client relations (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This is a key feature of the rational choice theory which assumes that some political party members may want a particular candidate to occupy a certain position because that position comes with benefits or rewards to the candidate for which supporters stand to gain (Downs, 1957).

In both parties the Constituency Executive Committees were responsible for organizing all party activities within the constituencies, including implementation of decisions, supervising the Ward Committees, nominating candidates for elections and conducting electoral and other campaign related activities at the constituency level. Accordingly, issues of gender representation, accountability, participation in decisions and equality of members were found to be part of their responsibilities and they all played a role in the efforts to enhance the electoral performance of the political parties (Fieldwork, March, 2019). The structures of the NDC and NPP (as indicated in Figure 5.3) make it easier for the parties to identify recruitment networks of new voters using civic knowledge, skills, time and money in an effort to enhance their electoral performance at the

constituency level – a practice that reinforces the civic voluntarism theory (Verba et.al., 1995).

Figure 5.3: Structure of the NPP in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies



Source: Compiled by the author

5.6.3 Women Representation

The importance of women's representation in political parties' organization in this study is premised on the fact that women constituted the majority of Ghana's population. Besides, the constitution encourages all Ghanaians who are 18 years and above and are of sound mind to take part in election related activities (Republic of Ghana, 1992). As such, the thesis holds the view that the representation of women, who dominated Ghana's population, should be taken seriously in political parties' activism. To begin with, this study did not want to fall into the trap of being gender biased hence the first step taken was to ensure that the inclusion and exclusion criteria made it possible for all Ghanaian registered voters in the study areas to have equal chance of being part of the study. One such consideration was the use of the simple random sampling technique in data collection

which did not discriminate on the basis of gender or sex. Table 5.13 and Figure 5.2 show that overall, 197 of the respondents representing 49.2% were men while 202 of them, representing 50.5% were women. This was relatively balanced in terms of gender representation and a reflection of the situation at the national level (Table 5.16; Figure 5.4).

Table 5.16: Gender representation

		Constituency			Total
		Kwabre East	Ketu South	Ledzokuku	
Gender	Male	63 15.8%	70 17.5%	64 16.0%	197 49.2%
	Female	53 13.2%	76 19.0%	73 18.2%	202 50.5%
	Others	0 .0%	0 .0%	1 .2%	1 .2%
Total		116 29.0%	146 36.5%	138 34.5%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

Figure 5.4: Gender representation



Even though more women than men constituted the respondents in the survey, the study observed that more men were registered members of political parties than women. When asked whether respondents were registered members of any political party, 20.2% of the men said yes, while only 13.8% of the women said yes. This gave us the impression that more men participated in political party activities than women (Table 5.17).

Table 5.17: Gender and political participation

Are you a card bearing member of any political party?		Total
Yes	No	
81 20.2%	116 29.0%	197 49.2%
55 13.8%	147 36.8%	202 50.5%
0 .0%	1 .2%	1 .2%
136 34.0%	264 66.0%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March 2019

In terms of the constituency executive positions, the study found that out of the 10 elected and 7 appointed constituency executives of the NPP (totaling 17) in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, the NPP had only 3 women among the 17 in Kwabre East, 2 in Ketu South and 3 in Ledzokuku. Similarly, out of the 23 elected and 5 co-opted executives of the NDC at the constituency level (totaling 28), the NDC had only 4 women among the executives in Kwabre East, 5 in Ledzokuku and 8 in Ketu South. These figures notwithstanding, the question on whether the respondents believed gender representation in the political parties' constituency executive positions was fair or not, received mixed responses. From Table 5.18, 11.2% of the respondents believed gender representation was unfair while 10.5% believed it was very fair. As high as 66.8% did not answer the question (NA). Meanwhile, 8% described gender representation as 'somehow' while 3.5% said they didn't know. The overall effect as expressed in Table 5.16 was that gender representation in the NDC and NPP in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies was disproportional and therefore unfair, a reflection of the situation at the national level (Table 5.18; Frempong, 2017; Owusu-Mensah, 2017).

Table 5.18: How is gender representation in your party executives in the constituency?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very fair	42	10.5	10.5	10.5
	Not fair	45	11.2	11.2	21.8
	Somehow	32	8.0	8.0	29.8
	Don't know	14	3.5	3.5	33.2
	NA	267	66.8	66.8	100.0
	Total	400	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

The question on why women were still the minority in representation attracted mixed responses from the interview participants. It emerged that the internal arrangements of the two parties favoured women more than men due to the waivers (paying half of the fees for contesting various positions) and special positions (women organizer) exclusively for women. The publication of the Women's Manifesto for Ghana in 2004 influenced the NPP and NDC to devote more space to gender issues in their manifestos in 2008 and 2012 (Ayee, 2015). For example, the NDC in its 2008 manifesto endorsed the Women's Manifesto and promised to ensure the achievement of gender equality and equity in all facets of national development (National Democratic Congress, 2008). The National Executive Committee of the NPP in 2015 adopted an affirmative action plan which prevented men from contesting the 16 female MPs of the party, but failed to implement it due to opposition from the men (Fieldwork, March, 2019). The 2016 manifesto of the NDC made explicit commitment to have 40 percent women representation at all government levels (National Democratic Congress, 2016) while the NPP promised 30 percent of women in government (New Patriotic Party, 2016). This means that both the NDC and NPP do not discriminate against women and have demonstrated their commitment to the progress of women in politics.

The NPP MP for Kwabre East (a woman who got elected under age 25), for instance, said there was nothing discriminating against women in her party. She opined that: *‘I filed and went through the normal process. I believe if you have a message and the people trust that you can deliver, they will vote for you, regardless of gender’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019). The NPP secretary for Ledzokuku constituency said that the under representation of women was basically because women were unable to convince party delegates largely due to financial challenges. In his words: *‘As for women we have them, but they are not many like men. They contest, but they lose. This thing is all about money so if you don’t have cash, how will you even think of contesting?’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

Other study participants interviewed attributed the under representation of women to cultural and historical factors. A former chairman of the NDC for Ledzokuku argued that it was impossible to ever have equal representation of women in politics. In his words: *‘We cannot have equal representation between men and women. No, it is not possible. Even if we go to heaven, I don’t think we will have 50/50 representation between men and women. We have 5 out of 28 constituency executives who are women. It was an open election, no one stopped women from contesting and there is no law prohibiting women from contesting’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019). The NDC chairman for the Kwabre East constituency shared related comments: *‘I happened to tour the regions with a female national chairmanship contender and it was difficult. You could see clearly that the people were not ready for a woman. Even among the top three constituency executives (chairman, secretary and organizer), it was only in Tarkwa that the constituency organizer was a woman (....) We have 4 out of 28 women among our executives in Kwabre East; 2 were appointed’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The constituency chairman of the NPP in the Ketu South constituency blamed the low women representation on cultural factors. He noted that: *‘‘In Ketu South, being an NPP member is like a taboo. If you are a wife and maybe you decide to be a member of the NPP, may be, that can even cause your divorce. Some men are even leaving their girlfriends and wives because of these party issues. (...). If it comes to proportional representation in terms of equality, the men are on the higher side compared to the women. You may term it as inequality, but in terms of representation, they have equal representation’’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The views expressed by the political activists in the three constituencies were in conformity with earlier observations made by Allah-Mensah (2001) to the effect that, most women are politically conscious and also psychologically less active in issues relating to politics compared to their male counterparts. Similarly, the views on low participation of women in the three constituencies affirmed the position of Debrah (2006) that women generally have a lukewarm attitude towards issues relating to politics and governance. The civic voluntarism theory’s assumption that social, religious or cultural factors make it easier for a party to have unimpeded access to places such as churches, festivals and work places to stimulate the recruitment of people into political activities. This implies that the parties’ unwillingness to elect more women could deny them some votes in view of what women are capable of doing when it comes to access some places such as beauty salons which could be an avenue for recruitment of new voters (Verba et. al., 1995).

5.6.4. Equality

This section presents an analysis of equality of members within the context of decision-making regarding elections, appointments and disciplinary actions. These were found to be the major issues that decisions at the constituency level in both the NDC and NPP revolved around.

Article 5 of the NDC constitution refers to equality of all persons irrespective of their social, cultural, educational, political, religious and economic relations. Similarly, article 2 (12) of the constitution of the NPP prioritizes equality in relation to opportunities of all citizens without discrimination on any grounds, whether of gender, age, position, politics, religion or status. These apply to members of the two parties. We therefore assessed equality of members of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies in relation to decision making within the framework set out by the parties themselves.

When we asked the 136 out of the 400 survey respondents who said they were card bearing members of the political parties their views on how internal decisions were made in their respective political parties, 14.2% said that all branches, wards, electoral areas and polling station executives took part in decision making. This was followed by 7.2% who said that only constituency executives made decisions. Also, 5.5% of the respondents affirmed that decisions were made and sent from above, i.e., at the regional and national headquarters while another 5.5% responded that they didn't know. A low figure of 0.8% of the respondents said that only the rich and executives made decisions while 267 (66.8%) of the respondents who said that they were not members of any party chose not to answer that question (NA) (Table 5.19).

Table 5.19: How are internal decisions in your party made?

		How are internal decisions in your party made?						Total
		Only constituency executives make decisions	All branches, wards, electoral areas and polling station executives take part in decision making	Only the rich and executives take decisions	Decisions are made and sent from above i.e. regional and national headquarters	Don't know	NA	
Constituency	Kwabre East	11 2.8%	19 4.8%	0 .0%	4 1.0%	4 1.0%	78 19.5%	116 29.0%
	Ketu South	14 3.5%	15 3.8%	2 .5%	15 3.8%	17 4.2%	83 20.8%	146 36.5%
	Ledzokuku	4 1.0%	23 5.8%	1 .2%	3 .8%	1 .2%	106 26.5%	138 34.5%
Total		29 7.2%	57 14.2%	3 .8%	22 5.5%	22 5.5%	267 66.8%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

However, from the elite interviews, the study found that in all three constituencies, decisions were mainly made by constituency executives. In fact, the findings revealed that there was no equality among the party members whether at the polling station/ward, electoral area/branch or the constituency in terms of decision making except decisions relating to voting at conference/congress. In the words of an NDC constituency secretary for Ledzokuku: *“There is no such thing as equality. In your home, does everybody have equal say? It is human nature so we cannot all have equality in decision making. Some will be more than others. Yes, we try to involve everyone but practically not every view is taken seriously”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The NPP constituency secretary for Ledzokuku shared similar views. He remarked that: *“Decisions are taken by the executive committee. They are custodians of the party at the constituency level. In fact, even decisions of the disciplinary committees are like*

recommendations to the constituency executive committee. For the other members they can channel their views to the coordinators'' (Fieldwork, March, 2019). There were similar views expressed by other activists of the NDC and NPP in all the constituencies.

It emerged that equality only applied during elections, such as electing parliamentary candidates or national executives where everyone by law was entitled to a single vote. Apart from that, decisions were made in hierarchies and at each level in which executives had the final say. The study also found that the decisions of the branches/polling stations were subject to the approval of the constituency. The constituency decisions were equally subject to the approval of the region while the region's decisions were also subject to approval by the national executives (Fieldwork, March, 2019). These practices were reinforced by the assertion of a Senior Research Fellow at IDEG, who noted that there was no equality at all within the parties. According to him, some people were more influential than others. He argued, for instance, that if one needed to be a minister or be appointed to any other position, his or her qualification and experience were immaterial. What mattered most, however, was that most appointments were made on what he termed "whom you know basis" (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The study found that the evidence of inequality claims existed with the influence of power brokers, financiers and even very popular people. For instance, it was revealed that a former Kwabre East constituency chairman of the NPP who defected to the NDC in 2008 and returned to his mother party in 2012, was immediately appointed as a member of the council of elders when the rule stipulated that those who defected and returned must stay for at least 4 years before they could be offered positions (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This is in conformity with the situation at the national level where it is argued that economic, social and political factors make it difficult for non-wealthy individuals to effectively participate in internal party activities including contesting elections and

decision making thus widening the inequality gap (Ninsin, 2006; Osei, 2013; Agomor, 2015). The inequality among the membership including internal groupings within the NDC and NPP also reflected in the packages they got in the form of cash donations when a member was bereaved or had a child naming ceremony, graduation or wedding (Fieldwork, March, 2019). For the groups of supporters, their participation in political activism could be said to be motivated by rationality because they regarded it as an investment which yielded dividends - an action which is in line with the assumptions in the rational choice theory discussed in chapter three (Downs, 1957).

5.6.5 Accountability

This section presents an analysis of findings on accountability in the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. When we asked our respondents (136) in all the three constituencies, who said they were registered members of the political parties about their views on accountability of their constituency executives, they were divided. For instance, an overall 9% of the respondents replied that their constituency executives were not accountable at all and another 9% indicated that they were very accountable. This was followed by 8.5% of the respondents who noted that their executives were rarely accountable and 6.8% who responded that they didn't know. The 267 respondents who replied that they were not registered members of any political party did not answer the question (NA) (Table 5.20).

In terms of specific constituencies, respondents from Ketu South (4%) topped the group that said that their executives were not accountable at all, followed by Kwabre East (2.8%) and Ledzokuku (2.2%). Interestingly the same percentage of the respondents in Kwabre East (2.8%) also said that their executives were not accountable; thus, the respondents were equally divided on the issue. Respondents in Ledzokuku constituency

were the highest (3.2%) who pointed out that their party executives were very accountable followed by Ketu South (3%) (Table 5.20). This was, perhaps, due to the fact that political party executives in the swing constituency were conscious of the reality that they needed to do everything possible to ensure victory unlike the stronghold constituencies where victory was largely assured before the elections. Overall, an equal number of NDC and NPP respondents (16) representing 4% replied that their constituency executives were very accountable. However, 5% of the NDC respondents confirmed that their constituency executives were not accountable at all, while 3.5% of the NPP respondents indicated the same thing (Table 5.20).

Table 5.20: How accountable are your constituency executives?

		How accountable are your constituency executives?					Total
		Not at all	Very rare	Very accountable	Don't know	NA	
If yes which political party?	NPP	14 3.5%	17 4.2%	16 4.0%	6 1.5%	0 .0%	53 13.2%
	NDC	20 5.0%	17 4.2%	16 4.0%	11 2.8%	0 .0%	64 16.0%
	Others	2 .5%	0 .0%	4 1.0%	10 2.5%	0 .0%	16 4.0%
	NA	0 .0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	0 .0%	267 66.8%	267 66.8%
Total		36 9.0%	34 8.5%	36 9.0%	27 6.8%	267 66.8%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

The study found from the political party executives that issues of accountability were largely based on perception. For instance, the NPP executives argued that the party had a constitutional structure on how accountability ought to be rendered. As such, since 2000 the party had held meetings on yearly basis where accounts were rendered to the

people. Also, at each annual delegates' conference, the financial statement of the party was read to the party members (Fieldwork, March, 2019). For instance, the Kwabre East constituency secretary of the NPP explained that: *‘What is done is that we meet quarterly as executives so that the treasurer gives us the state of our financial standing. That is done in collaboration with the treasurer and the financial secretary. The financial secretary does the write up; copies are presented at the meetings. Queries are raised, questions are asked and when we are satisfied, then we push it ahead’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

These views reflected the executives of the NDC in the three constituencies. For instance, the NDC chairman for Ketu South constituency insisted that all was well with the party as far as accountability was concerned because the structure made it transparent beyond manipulation. He noted that: *‘The party structure works. I have a treasurer and her deputy. The chairman does not handle money. We have a bank account. Whatever comes into the coffers is reported to the treasurer and documented. She takes it to the bank and when there is the need for expenditure, the chairman gives orders as to what should be done’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

On the contrary, the defeated youth organizer of the NDC at Kwabre East constituency, pointed out that the lack of accountability claim is real and not a perception: *‘It is a problem. Look, in opposition there is always accountability, but when we win power, the story is different. Sometimes, they ‘chop’ the money and we know because we are all in the party’* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

In view of the fact that it is the wealthy individuals and those with “godfathers” who mostly get elected into party positions, it is very difficult for them to be held accountable even when they do not deliver on their electoral mandate (Agomor, 2015). The study found that this assertion is gradually changing. In the Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, all the three topmost executives (chairman, secretary and organizers) who

led the NDC into the defeat in the 2016 elections lost their positions at the party constituency congress. However, the situation was not the same at the national level where most of the old executives in the NDC and NPP retained their positions at their parties' national delegates congress/conference (Fieldwork, March, 2019). In fact, at the national level, accountability of party leaders to their followers through mechanisms such as party conferences/congresses is being imperfectly achieved, largely as a result of the way leaders usually conduct the affairs of their parties, which is contrary to the parties' constitutional provisions (Ayee, 2008). In sum, the NDC and NPP seem to subscribe to what Ayee (2008) calls *machine politics* with party leaders exercising control through patronage and the distribution of favours.

5.6.6 Participation

This section presents an analysis of findings in relation to participation of constituents and party members in the activities of the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. This was guided by Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) assertion that political parties become institutionalized and contribute to nurturing democracy when there is evidence of stability in multi-party competition and the existence of stable roots in society where people can freely participate in their activities. Interestingly, all political party activists interviewed indicated that their objectives were to win political power, hence they prioritized wider participation in their respective constituencies.

In trying to gauge the level of active participation of respondents in political party activism, we asked if they were registered members of any political party. Overall, the majority of the respondents in the three constituencies, responded that they were not registered party members (Table 5.21). In the Kwabre East constituency, 10.5% of the

respondents replied in the affirmative, while 18.5% replied in the negative. In Ketu South also, 15.5% responded yes, while 21% responded in the negative. In Ledzokuku (the swing constituency) as low as 8% pointed out that they were actively engaged in political party activities while 26.5% did not. This meant that more people engaged in political party activism in the stronghold constituencies than the swing constituency (Table 5.21).

Table 5.21: Are you a card bearing member of any political party?

		Are you a card bearing member of any political party?		Total
		Yes	No	
Constituency	Kwabre East	42 10.5%	74 18.5%	116 29.0%
	Ketu South	62 15.5%	84 21.0%	146 36.5%
	Ledzokuku	32 8.0%	106 26.5%	138 34.5%
Total		136 34.0%	264 66.0%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

The study also found a positive relation between education and participation in political party activism (defined as card bearing membership of political parties). From Table 5.22, the higher the level of education, the higher the percentage of participation. For instance, only 2% of those without formal education said they participated in political party activities. Furthermore, the study found that 5.8% of the respondents with basic education and 12.2% of those with secondary education participated in political party activities while as high as 14% of those with tertiary education participated in political party activities between 2000 and 2016.

Table 5.22: Relationship between level of education and political party participation

		Are you a card bearing member of any political party?		Total
		Yes	No	
Level of Education	No formal education	8 2.0%	62 15.5%	70 17.5%
	Basic (Primary, Middle and JHS)	23 5.8%	58 14.5%	81 20.2%
	Secondary (SSS, Vocational and Training)	49 12.2%	65 16.2%	114 28.5%
	Tertiary	56 14.0%	79 19.8%	135 33.8%
Total		136 34.0%	264 66.0%	400 100.0%

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

According to the NDC in the three constituencies, the participation of members and recruitment of new ones were continuously encouraged and that informed the party's constitution which made provision for the election of 9 people at the Ward level who were tasked to oversee one polling station. The constituency secretary for Ledzokuku argued that this arrangement enhanced the party's performance in elections over the years because of the large numbers involved. He remarked that: *“Our party is grassroots based, and that explains why we have more executives at the constituency level than other parties. In Ledzokuku we have 1,890 executives from the ward to the constituency level, which shows that there is wider participation. This means that before we even campaign, we have 1,890 secured votes”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

In the NPP, participation was also high at the constituency level through the polling station to the electoral area. The study found that the NPP had elected 5 people and tasked them to manage one polling station. The party also appointed more people to ensure wider participation. An NPP MP for Ledzokuku argued that his party's structure was enough to

enhance its performance in election as evidenced in previous elections. In his view, strategy was superior to mere party structure in the determination of the factors that enhance participation in a party's activities and performance in elections. He added that: *“You may have a structure which looks democratic on paper, but the effect may be terrible. It is the strategy that wins votes, but whether they have 9 and we have 5 executives at the lowest level is immaterial. You can have 20 and one (1) person will do more work than them”* (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The study found that the participation of party members was mainly on how candidates were selected to run for offices either as party executives or parliamentary candidates. In either case, participation was restricted to the relatively smaller number of people who were elected or appointed as executives (Fieldwork, March, 2019). In short, apart from election, participation in the activities of the NDC and NPP was low in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. This confirms the findings by Debrah (2005) that political participation in Ghana's Fourth Republic is low with the exception of voting.

At the national level, participation in leadership selection as well as decision-making is much similar to the situation at the constituency level. In other words, meaningful participation in politics at the national level is restricted to the elites in both the NDC and NPP, with their followers merely having little influence on decision-making and little chance of rising to the top echelon of leadership (Osei, 2013; Debrah, 2014).

In a nutshell, the data presentation and analysis have shown that people are motivated to join and participate in internal party activism by a multiplicity of factors. Central among them is personal benefits in the form of financial and material gains or rewards for one's community, family or social and religious group. This is in line with the rational choice theory's assumptions (egotropic and sociotropic rationality) (Downs 1957).

In addition, the behavioural and attitudinal traits of the NDC and NPP activists as well as their socio-economic status were enough to classify them into three groups: patron activists, platform activists and foot-soldiers for some negotiated concepts (informally agreeing on how everyone's role will be played in the execution of a parties' campaign strategies) in the deployment of resources such as time, money, and civic knowledge and skills. The activities of these groups depended on the quantity of resources available. As such, the patrons who have the resources but with little time engaged the services of the platform activists (who had the civic knowledge and skills) and the foot-soldiers (who had the time) to do the platform and field work including identifying recruitment networks of new voters to help enhance the performance of the NDC and NPP in the elections. This reinforces the civic voluntarism theory which explains the decision of political activists for organized political participation (Verba et.al.,1995).

5.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has demonstrated the dynamics and complexities of internal democracy at the constituency level and its interplay with the performance of the NDC and NPP in elections. It has also drawn attention to the impact of internal democracy on their performance in both swing and stronghold constituencies. In this regard, it became obvious that internal democracy's negative effects on elections were more pronounced in the swing constituency than the stronghold constituencies where party identity came out as the dominant variable that determined electoral performance. It also became clear that internal democracy played a major role in voter choices, especially among the people who do not vote based on party identity.

The chapter has highlighted the fact that the NDC and NPP have not provided a fair playing field for women to compete and participate at the level of leadership hence

their low representation. Beyond the special organs such as the women's wing and the financial waivers (female contestants paying half of filing fees), none of the political parties has provided any genuine opportunities to improve the representation of women. Besides, the two parties have over the years demonstrated a semblance of commitment to gender parity by appointing women to some of the topmost positions, including Speaker of Parliament, Chief Justice, Chief of Staff, Minister of Justice and Attorney General and Chairperson of the Electoral Commission. Despite all these appointments, women are still under-represented in these institutions. In Parliament, for instance, there are only 36 women (about 12%) of the 275 members.

The chapter has also discussed the similarities and dissimilarities between the NDC and NPP in internal democracy through their structural arrangements and how they have over the years impacted on accountability, participation and equality among the actors. The findings outlined in this chapter largely reflect the issues raised in previous constituency studies contained in the edited volumes of Ayee (1998), Ayee (2001) and Boafo-Arthur (2006).

In addition, the chapter has shown that the NDC had won elections in its stronghold (Ketu South) at a decreasing rate, especially at the parliamentary level. This is a reflection of the situation at the national level where lack of internal democracy appears to have undermined peace and stability in the NDC. This is in contrast to the situation at the NPP, which has not suffered such upheavals caused by lack of internal democracy in its stronghold (Ayee, 2008). Besides, the chapter has shown that despite Ghana's enviable position as one of the most stable democracies in the sub-region having practiced sustained multi-party democracy for 26 years in the Fourth Republic, the dominant parties, the NDC and NPP are still saddled with the challenges of lack of equality, accountability, gender disproportionality and elite influence in their internal organizations at both the national

and constituency levels. These findings have tended to complement the literature on electoral politics in Ghana.

The next chapter mainly discusses the findings in relation to the theoretical, empirical and comparative literature.

CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The thesis sets out to discuss the interplay between internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections and their civic education mandate such as shaping the political will of the people and disseminating information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of national character in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies in the Ashanti, Volta and Greater Accra regions respectively.

This chapter, therefore, discusses the findings of the study in the context of the empirical, comparative and theoretical literature on internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections. It also examines the degree to which the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories to political participation promoted or hindered the practice of internal democracy in the NDC and NPP in the three constituencies between 2000 and 2016. The study proceeds on the premise that if internal democracy is weak, it will negatively affect the performance of political parties in elections. As such, some of the contextual dynamics will again be highlighted and explained without necessarily repeating earlier ones in the previous chapters.

6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES THAT CAUSED UNDEMOCRATIC PRACTICES WITHIN POLITICAL PARTIES

The study revealed that despite the various reforms within the NDC and NPP to deepen multi-party democracy, at least since 2000, internal democracy is weak and ineffective. This confirms the position of Ayee (2019) that political parties have made

progress in Ghana's Fourth Republic through various reforms, but some systemic problems such as the overriding influence of money and elite capture need to be properly addressed. This view is shared by other scholars who posit that despite the progress made by political parties in Ghana, internal democratic deficits seem to be impacting negatively on multi-party democracy in general and the electoral performance of the parties in particular (Debrah, 2014; Ayee, 2017; Ninsin, 2006). However, it must be noted that the leadership of the NDC and NPP are constantly working to improve upon their internal democracy through periodic reforms, which largely entail revisions of their internal rules/guidelines on elections and amendments of portions of their constitutions usually during their annual delegates' congresses/conferences (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1: Some reforms undertaken by the NDC and NPP between 2000 and 2016 to strengthen their internal democracy.

PARTY	REFORM	YEAR
NDC	Adoption of the Electoral College method to choose its leaders and presidential candidate.	2001
	The National Executive Committee (NEC) and the presidential candidates should respectively be elected by the representatives from the constituencies, regions, affiliated organs, regional parliamentary groups and overseas branches.	2005
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Constituency Executive Committees (CECs) should be elected by two delegates from the branches and other political appointees. - Regional Executive Committees (RECs) should be elected by five delegates chosen from the CEC and a small number of political appointees such as ministers. - Constituency Executive Committee and Regional Executive Committee should elect National Executive committee and presidential candidate. - Representatives from the constituencies, regions, affiliated organs, regional parliamentary groups and overseas branches should elect the National Executive Committee and presidential candidate. 	2010

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Filing of nomination 72 hours before the commencement of congress instead of the previous 12 hours. - Deputy regional organizers increased from one to two. - Founding members empowered to attend and vote at national, regional and constituency congresses. 	2014
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Nine branch executives elected the Constituency Executive Committee. - All card bearing members should elect parliamentary candidates. - Constituency Executive Committee and present/former appointees should elect Regional Executive Committee. - All card bearing members should elect the presidential candidate. - Propaganda secretariat changed to communications directorate. 	2015
NPP	- The National Executive Committee (NEC) and the presidential candidate should be elected by Constituency and Regional Executive Committees as well as patrons and founding members; an expansion of the previous electoral college.	2002-2006
	Regional Executive Committee should be elected by two delegates chosen by the Constituency Delegates' Conference and all the Constituency Executive Committee members.	2006
	National Executive Committee should be elected by a body which comprised two delegates from each constituency, members of the National Council, representatives of patrons, founding members and overseas branches.	2010
	A larger Electoral College which was made up of ten delegates from each constituency, representatives of patrons and founding members in each region and overseas branches elected the flag-bearer at the National Delegates Conference.	2010
	<p>Only five candidates should be allowed to contest the flag-bearer slot. If more than five candidates file and are vetted to contest, a special electoral college of some 847 party executives, including all 275 constituency chairmen and all NPP MPs will vote to reduce the number to five.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Re-constitution of committees of the party including the organizing, disciplinary and legal and constitutional committees. 	2014
	An Electoral College which was made up of 17 delegates from each constituency, representatives of patrons and founding members in each region and overseas branches and National Executive Committee will now elect the flag-bearer at the National Delegates Conference.	2015

Source: Compiled by the author using various sources including field interviews, 2019.

Generally, the factors that caused undemocratic practices were numerous and primarily similar in the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South, and Ledzokuku constituencies. These included electoral, power-base, financial and patron-client tactics. These challenges were pervasive despite the conscious efforts such as undertaking a number of reforms including institutionalizing elections as the primary means of selecting leaders by the two leading political parties in Ghana to promote internal democracy (Table 6.1). These findings were not different from those identified earlier by some scholars in Ghana (Ninsin, 2017; Debrah, 2014, Ayee, 2017, Boafo-Arthur, ed.,2006). It must be noted, however, that elections *per se* do not guarantee internal democracy and they could be used as a façade or cover up to undermine internal democracy.

At the comparative level, there are similarities in the three constituencies regarding the internal divisions within both the NDC and NPP along various factions. The factions largely revolved around the Municipal and District Chief Executives (when in government) who had parliamentary ambitions and their sitting MPs or when a popular candidate was pressured to withdraw from a contest with the promise of an appointment such as the position of MMDCE. This gives credence to the assertion of Ayee (2008) that weak internal democracy could lead to a situation where an outstanding individual is pressured to withdraw from internal party elections in favour of another (sometimes less popular contender) who may represent the interests of the power brokers such as the top party executives. At the national level, people who are pressured to withdraw may be compensated or rewarded by the offer of a position in government (Ayee, 2008). This probability is higher when a party wins the general elections. Factions sometimes were formed when two or more influential party activists or financiers supported rival candidates, either on religious, ethnic or regional grounds. Interestingly, this phenomenon occurred in both parties, whether they are in government or in opposition. This is contrary

to the argument of Bob-Milliar (2012) that factionalism mainly revolves between pro-and anti-Rawlings camps in the case of the NDC, whereas in the NPP, it takes the form of divisions along the Busia and Danquah traditions. The civic voluntarism theory helps in explaining the existence of these factions in both the NDC and NPP. This is so because the individuals behind the factions at the constituency level were the educated class and businessmen who had either the civic competence or financial resources or both to engage the voters and explain the feasibility of policy initiatives or proposed policy interventions in an effort to ignite political activism and recruit new voters (Verba et.al., 1995). Rationality could not also be ruled out because the leaders believed they were best positioned to provide the needs of their constituents; *sociotropic* rationality (Downs, 1957). Similarly, the followers' actions could mainly be explained on the basis of the rational choice theory because every indication was that they were motivated by material benefits in the form of money or immaterial benefits such as appointment to public offices such as minister, MMDCEs, party and CEO positions or board membership. Material and non-material benefits are part of motivation (Downs, 1957).

The literature suggests that power based factors generally undermine internal unity of political parties because the actors are rational and will resist any move that will disadvantage them in the resource distribution or anticipated benefits (DiSalvo, 2009; Randall, 2007; Courtney, 2015). We found that power based challenges occurred when national or regional officers imposed a candidate against the wish of the constituency executives. This happened in the Ketu South constituency in the Volta region in 2016 when a nominee for the position of MCE by the president was openly opposed by the rank and file of the NDC and yet the powers that be ensured the approval of the disputed nominee. This imposition caused anger within the NDC and led to the party executives virtually refusing to be part of the MP's campaign team. The problem of the appointments of

Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) and its negative impact on party unity and electoral performance have been emphasized by some political scientists in Ghana (Ayee (ed.), 2007; Boafo-Arthur (ed.), 2006; Debrah et.al. (ed.), 2014; Ninsin (ed.), 2017). This finding also reflects the situation in Indonesia, Cambodia, Jamaica and the US where power-based influence and patron-client tactics have been noted as part of the causes of internal democratic problems in political parties (Randall, 2007). Empirically, it could be argued that our study extends earlier constituency studies in Ghana and also reveals a comparative link between the situation in Ghana and other parts of the world.

Financial factors play an influential role in the undemocratic practices within political parties in Ghana (Ninsin, 2017; Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2017; Ayee, 2017, 2019; Agomor, 2015). We noted that whenever a party was in government, the uneven distribution of financial and material resources caused most of the internal democratic conflicts in both the NDC and NPP. This confirms the positions of Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh (2018) and Bob-Milliar (2012) as well as the rational choice theory's argument, that the political actors are rational beings who are in politics because they anticipate a reward which could take the form of money (Downs, 1957). Further, the study noted that all the executives at the constituency level in both the NDC and NPP were not paid; rather they do voluntary work. Indeed, it was clear that people's actions and inactions were influenced by what they got in the form of resources either personally or for their communities; "sociotropic" and "egotropic" rationality (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018, p. 110). As such, economic interest played a dominant role in the causes of undemocratic practices within the NDC and NPP in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. This was evidenced in the findings that suggested that undemocratic practices were more pronounced when a party was in government than when

it was in opposition. It was therefore understandable that some party activists fiercely resisted any form of selectivity in the distribution of financial reward when their party won elections to govern. This is in contrast to the situation of a party in opposition whereby there is no motivation or opportunities in the selection of people for party work. At the comparative level, the economic factors relating to unpaid internal positions within political parties are not limited to Ghana. For instance, Ladner (2001) identified a similar challenge with political parties in Switzerland and South Korea. It can, therefore, be concluded that the factors that caused undemocratic practices in political parties in Ghana (2000-2016) were similar to those in other African countries, including South Africa, Nigeria and Uganda (Lotshwao, 2009; Randall, 2007; Wilkins, 2016). However, our findings were in sharp contrast to the causal factors of undemocratic practices in Europe, particularly in Ireland, where gender and social class factors have been noted as the lead causes of anti-democracy in political parties (Courtney, 2015).

The national and sub-national dynamics show that whereas pervasive undemocratic practices at the national level led to break-aways and the formation of new political parties (Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi, 2014), the effect at the constituency level was independent candidates contesting for elections, defections to other parties, voter apathy and, sometimes, physical violence. These problems did not just affect the electoral successes or failures of the NDC and NPP, but also governance because the quality of democracy in Ghana, in the view of Debrah (2014), is a reflection of the internal behaviour of political parties.

6.3 HOW INTERNAL DEMOCRACY AFFECTS THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The electoral success or failures of the NDC and NPP, at least, between 2000 and 2016, had hinged on a multiplicity of factors (Ayee, 2017; Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018). The study found that internal democracy and party identity were among the topmost factors that affected the electoral performance of the two parties in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. These factors, however, varied depending on whether the constituency was a swing one or stronghold of the parties. For instance, party identity affected the performance of both the NDC and NPP in the Ketu South and Kwabre East constituencies respectively which are their electoral strongholds. This resonates with the views of Debrah (2014), Appah (2018) and Frempong (2017) that party identity is critical to the electoral success of the NDC or NPP in their respective strongholds. On the contrary, the influence of internal democracy was the topmost factor that determined the electoral success or failure of the two parties in the swing constituency (Ledzokuku). It must be pointed out that internal democracy played a role in elections in all the three constituencies when the parties were in government than when they were in opposition. The impact was, however, minor in the NPP's electoral stronghold than the NDC's electoral stronghold because the NPP was largely united than the NDC in the Kwabre East and Ketu South constituencies respectively. These findings confirm the assertion of Ayee (2017) that even though the factors or variables that determine electoral outcomes in Ghana are many, the influence of the internal organization of the NDC and NPP continue to play a central role in either their electoral victories or defeats. However, as demonstrated earlier, at the constituency level, the performance of the NDC and NPP was influenced mostly by party identity in the strongholds and internal democracy in the swing constituency. At the theoretical level, political parties' desire to enhance internal

democracy could be explained on the basis of rationality because a significant aspect of political life could be understood in terms of voters' self-interest as well as that of politicians. The benefits in winning political power include the improvement in the politician's living standards or provision of health, educational or social services to his or her community which could be explained under *sociotropic rationality* in the rational choice theory. Similarly, voters whose choices were based on party identity could be explained on the basis of the rational choice theory because they were convinced that they stood to benefit directly or indirectly (benefit to the community) in the event of electoral victory (Downs, 1957).

The study also found that both the NDC and NPP took the issue of internal democracy very seriously with the belief that undemocratic practices could undermine their performance in general elections in the three constituencies. In fact, the unity or disunity of the parties depended on their internal organization. This finding gives credence to the view espoused by Debrah (2014) that the relative strengths of modern political parties depend on their internal democracy, especially the methods they resort to promote internal democracy. In the general literature, scholars agree that internal party democracy provides legitimacy for members to have control over the selection of candidates to run on the parties' tickets (Cheeseman et. al., 2014; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). Further, Debrah (2005) emphasizes that internal democracy guarantees a leveled ground for competition, promotes divergent views and fosters unity. The rational choice theory best explains the seriousness with which the NDC and NPP took undemocratic practices because of its negative implications on their electoral performance. This is better understood by the assumption in the rational choice theory that a rational man who systematically makes mistakes will cease to do so if he discovers what the mistake is and “the cost of eliminating

it is smaller than the benefits'' (Downs, 1957, p. 9). Certainly the cost of addressing undemocratic practices is smaller than the benefit in winning elections.

At the comparative level, internally organized and democratic parties, such as the NDC and NPP, have done better in elections in Ghana's Fourth Republic than the parties belonging to the Nkrumah tradition, such as the CPP, PNC and GCPP which are more internally disorganized (Frempong, 2017, Debrah et.al., 2018). It was therefore not surprising when the study found that, generally, internal democracy had a positive impact on the performance of political parties in general elections in Ghana. A very high number of our survey respondents (47.2%), for instance, noted that internal democracy played a critical role in the performance of both the NDC and NPP general elections. This adds to an understanding of the increasing importance of internal democracy in enhancing the electoral performance of political parties in Ghana and the role of rationality in voter choices among the Ghanaian electorate.

At the empirical level, the lack of internal democracy in the NDC in the Ketu South constituency, which led to three NDC members contesting the elections as independent candidates, caused the party about 20,000 votes in the general 2016 elections. It emerged that this phenomenon occurred because of voter apathy or people voting for a presidential candidate of one party and a parliamentary candidate of another political party due to internal disunity. This phenomenon is known in Ghana as "skirt and blouse" voting. This, as indicated earlier, had since 2004 been more pronounced in the NDC's stronghold in the Ketu South constituency than the NPP's stronghold of the Kwabre East constituency. Even though, undemocratic practices affected the parties' popular votes in elections, it had since 2000, neither led to the defeat of the NDC in its stronghold (Ketu South) nor the NPP in its stronghold (Kwabre East). This was because the electorate in Ketu South had the conviction that the NDC was best positioned to provide their socio-economic needs. In a

similar vein, the voters in Kwabre East had the belief that the NPP was better than the NDC in the provision of their socio-economic needs (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This showed that the voters were rational actors whose decisions were based on anticipated benefits which are in sync with the assumptions in the rational choice theory (Downs, 1957). This notwithstanding, it was evident that in the two stronghold constituencies, party identity (which is also a rational decision) consistently played a domineering role than internal democracy in the final determination of an electoral outcome. This confirms the position of Frempong (2017) that the electorate vote in the name of the party more in the strongholds of the NDC and NPP than any other factor. It is therefore safe to argue that the impact of internal democracy on a party's performance in elections at the constituency level is a reflection of the situation at the national level. However, the extent of the impact of internal democracy on the electoral performance of the NDC and NPP cannot be generalized because the impact was more on the swing constituencies than the stronghold constituencies.

At the comparative level, there is similarity between the impact of internal democracy on the performance of the NDC and NPP in Ghana and political parties such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe and National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda (Cheeseman et. al., 2014; Croissant and Chambers, 2010; Wilkins, 2016; Lotshwao, 2009). This confirms the argument that weak internal democracy or internal organizational inefficiency of political parties may have a negative effect on their performance in elections, particularly in emerging democracies (Ayee, 2017; Boucek, 2002; Cheeseman et al., 2014; Debrah, 2014; Lotshwao, 2009). Our findings, therefore suggest that there is a positive relationship between internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections. This reinforces the view that the electoral

performance of political parties will be undermined if internal democracy is weak on which the chapter is premised.

We also found that weak internal democracy affected the MPs more than it did to the presidential candidates of both the NDC and NPP. This was so because at the constituency level, it was easier for the rich (not necessarily competent and skillful) to get elected on their parties' tickets. This reflects the view of Ayee (2019) that there is weak democracy in political parties because the money bag has become a major determinant of who wins elections, a situation that can deny competent people access to political leadership. At the comparative level, this is similar to the findings of Wilkins (2016) which also showed that weak internal democracy caused the volatility of MPs in the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and strengthened the stability of the Museveni regime in Uganda. The main reason attributed to this situation in both the NDC and NPP in Ghana and the NRM in Uganda was that the MPs were closer to the people and therefore the electorate believed that the inability of their constituencies to attract development projects was largely due to the failure of the MPs to make a strong case to attract the attention of the president, as promised during elections.

6.3.1 POLITICAL PARTIES, POLICY FORMULATION, IDEOLOGIES, AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMMES

The political parties' role in shaping public opinion, policies and programmes is not in doubt. Through their civic education mandate, political parties can "help generate reliable information, which can raise the standard of knowledge and of the intelligence of the electorate" (Ayee, 2014, p. 130). The study found that beyond elections, the NDC and NPP occasionally provided a meaningful space for civic engagement and non-partisan activities such as debates on policy development, using either the community radio stations

or the community information centres. In the Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, topics such as premix fuel subsidy, pair trawling, education and roads were debated on radio stations while in the Kwabre East constituency, the debates centered on agriculture, roads and trading. Such deliberations were aimed at equipping the party members with the requisite information on the parties' policy interventions in various sectors of the economy including education, health, job creation and agriculture. Such actions are in sync with the civic voluntarism theory's assumption that education equips party members with the needed civic skills and human resources to participate in politics (Verba et.al., 1995). This also resonates with the view that political parties in Ghana contribute significantly in the generation of reliable information, by way of political education through the media, which enhances the standard of knowledge of the electorate (Ayee, 2014).

It became evident that the NDC in opposition focused on pro-poor government policies in line with the party's ideology while the NPP's message focused on empowering the masses to lead the agenda of development. In government, however, the two parties, provided similar political, social, economic, educational and health policies and programmes. This reflects the views that, even though the NPP claims to follow a liberal democratic and capitalist ideology and the NDC, a social democratic party ideology, the two parties are "in fact freewheeling in their adoption of ideologies and policies" (Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi, 2014). According to Osei (2013, p. 550) "some of the social policies, namely, the school feeding programme and the National Health Insurance Scheme bear more resemblance to social democracy than to radical market liberalism". Furthermore, Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi (2014) have postulated that the Kufuor-NPP government introduced far reaching social protection initiatives in health (National Health Insurance Scheme) and education (Ghana School Feeding Programme) while the NDC had "pursued some of the most radical state-enterprise privatization programmes of the post-

independence era” (Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi, 2014, p. 69). However, Ahadzie (2017) disagreed with this assertion when he noted that the NDC had over the years, demonstrated that its objectives of empowering the ordinary people, including the equitable distribution of public goods, provision of social and economic services are consistent with the values of a social democratic ideology.

The study found that the NDC and NPP had largely pursued similar policies and programmes in their manifestos. When in opposition, both parties resorted to a series of press conferences and sometimes, street protests to critique, influence or offer alternative suggestions on policies and programmes of the government. It is therefore difficult to identify the difference in the content of their messages and manifestos. This confirms the argument that the NDC and NPP have engaged in a “vague developmental ideology” without a clear difference in their manifestos and campaign messages which they disseminate on various platforms (Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi, 2014, p. 67). The similarity in manifesto contents between the NDC and NPP reflects the situation in Africa. According to Alidu (2012, p. 51), campaign messages of political parties in Africa could be a mixture of anything, including “African philosophy, culture, folklore, developmental ideas including Nkrumahism, ujamaa, harambee, ubuntu, among others”. At the theoretically level, the similarities in the manifesto contents of both the NDC and NPP were informed by their quest to attract voters whose choices were influenced by anticipated benefits. Given that elections are the basis for choosing people who form the government, rational behavior is one targeted at winning elections (Downs, 1957), hence the rational choice theory helps in understanding the behaviour of the NDC and NPP in relation to their manifestos. In addition, the civic voluntarism theory helps us to understand the strategies used to disseminate information on their manifestos as they both relied on

resources such as money, time and civic skills to identify networks of new voters to communicate their manifestos to them.

6.3.2 POLITICAL PARTIES' ROLE IN SHAPING THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE PEOPLE

The 1992 Constitution serves as the legal and institutional framework for political parties to execute their civic mandate of interest articulation and aggregation (Republic of Ghana, 1992). Specifically, Article 55(3) states that political parties are “free to participate in shaping the political will of the people, to disseminate information on political ideas, social and economic programmes of a national character”. In line with this, *The Directive Principles of State Policy* contained in Chapter Six of the Constitution provides a strategic direction to “guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, Political Parties and all other bodies or persons in applying or interpreting the Constitution for the establishment of a just and free society” (Ayee, 2015, p. 92). The political parties are expected to incorporate some of the values in the Directive Principles of State Policy in their manifestos. However, we found that the timing of the release of their manifestos (usually about three months to elections) was too short for party activists at the constituency level to read, understand and communicate the various issues to the electorate (most of whom were found to be uneducated) to fathom and make informed decisions. Kyei-Mensah-Bonsu (2019) posits that this challenge exists because some of the parliamentary candidates’ who are the touch bearers have a weak understanding of the social, economic, educational, health and political policies and programmes of their political parties. This is the basis on which some people, including Ghana’s majority leader and minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Hon. Osei Kyei-Mensah-Bonsu, had on several platforms publicly suggested that political parties should have a

direct say in those who represent them at the constituency level, at least, for the parliamentary contest. It is the position of this study that such arguments defeat the basic tenets of internal democracy within political parties and should not be tolerated.

In Ghana, civic education, particularly, plays a crucial part in the representative role of political parties and also provides a valuable means of harnessing the views of diverse groups under a common roof (Debrah, 2005). Quantitative and qualitative data from the three constituencies studied revealed that the NDC's and NPP's role of civic education focused largely on election related activities such as voter education during registration or re-demarcation of constituencies and electoral areas. This affirms the school of thought that political parties' election related activities including campaigns "have provided useful platforms for the articulation of community concerns; their electoral mobilization has facilitated political socialization, civic and political education; and their manipulation of symbols (the NDC's umbrella and the NPP's elephant for instance), traditions and memories have shaped citizen orientation to an expectation about politics and values of multi-party democracy" (Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi, 2014, p. 62-63). At the theoretical level, the inadequacy of civic education could be understood based on the assumption that the NDC and NPP feared that since information is power, no citizen could possibly influence another on how to vote or who to vote for since every voter knew the benefits attached to any voting decision (Downs, 1957). It was therefore a rational choice decision by both parties to focus less on their civic education mandate so that they could take advantage of the limited knowledge and information among the voters to secure their votes.

The study further found that the NDC and NPP had demonstrated considerable capacity by employing a myriad of skills to resist undemocratic tendencies both within themselves and the wider society. This they did vigorously through the use of parliament,

the mainstream and social media. This is in line with the assertion by Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi (2014) that when in opposition, the minority party (NDC or NPP) enthusiastically scrutinized the president's nominee for ministerial positions as well as other activities that are of national benefit. In other words, the party in opposition had criticized various programmes and actions of government through parliamentary motions and initiation of debates on issues of national character which prevented abuse of power and waste of public resources (Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi, 2014). Such non-election related activities by political parties have partly contributed to the sustained multi-party democracy in Ghana's Fourth Republic and earned Ghana the accolade of being a model democracy in Africa (Ayee, 2017). This also allows citizens to understand and appreciate the dangers of undemocratic tendencies which give the optimism that the future of the country's democratic governance will be sustained.

This notwithstanding, the study noted that the political parties had not well performed their civic duty of helping to shape the political will of the people. It emerged that the NDC and NPP were active on the ground by engaging in activities, such as clean up exercises, internal conflict resolutions and funeral attendance, in order to maintain their support base especially in-between election periods. However, these activities did not necessarily constitute their civic education mandate of shaping the political will of their followers. In the view of Ayee (2019), this problem is attributable to the general institutional weaknesses, evidenced in the fragmentations which create, among other things, turf wars and functional deficiencies. This assertion was buttressed by a traditional ruler in the Ledzokuku constituency who revealed that, the NDC and NPP organized their supporters usually for violence and not educating the constituents about the ethos of democracy such as tolerance, the rule of law and freedom of association. However, we observed that the actions and inactions of the NDC and NPP in *their election dominated*

functions had partly contributed to shaping the political will of their members, although minimally. For instance, many Ghanaians now have a fair idea of what democracy is and this is commonly expressed in the Akan language as ‘Kabi ma menkabi’ (literally meaning freedom of expression). It therefore affirms the position of Osei (2013) that, if nothing at all, political parties in Ghana provide a rough ideological guidance which has shaped the views of their followers and made them identifiable by their respective traditions. In other words, “their overall performance is not too bad. It may even be better than that in many other African countries” (Osei, 2013, p. 557). The implication is that with time, political parties in Ghana will improve upon their civic education mandate which may eventually help make democratic rule sustainable.

It is instructive to note that weak internal democracy within both parties had affected their desire to fully perform their civic functions including educating the people on issues of national character properly. The net effect is that most of their followers were polarized along partisan lines. This challenge had trickled down to ordinary voters and contributed to the divisions among Ghanaians in the constituencies along political party lines, some of which appeared pervasive. It emerged that the divisions along partisan lines were so pronounced to the extent that most people identified themselves with the NDC or NPP than their clans, ethnic or regional associations. This resonates with Ninsin’s (2006) position that political parties in Ghana basically focus on elections, a practice that can sometimes be acrimonious leading to pervasive divisions and sometimes violent confrontations. This can be attributed to the survival instinct of the political actors which finds expression in the rational choice theory. It is largely due to the personal benefits in the form of financial or material resources or service provision to their communities that will make some people to engage in all sort of activities, including political thuggery, to stay relevant in politics.

This notwithstanding, the study found that political party activists had flooded media discussions in Ghana on virtually every issue. Although some of them were noted to have little knowledge of the issues they discussed, there were experts among them, including medical doctors, lecturers and lawyers who also served as party communication team members. The experts' views of such knowledgeable party activists contributed significantly to awakening the political consciousness of party members and equipped them in taking decisions that inured to the parties' benefits including candidate selections. In the words of Fobih (2008, p. 189), the civic education mandate of political parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic particularly in shaping public opinion on "policies and programmes cannot be overemphasized because they are the main agents of organizing, contesting and providing candidates for elections".

In sum, the level of ignorance of the electorate regarding the electoral process, laws and procedures are partly due to the political parties' inability to execute their civic education mandate effectively. This gives credence to the view by Frempong (2017, p. 273) that the incidents of rejected ballots and corrupt practices "as well as rampant and pointless argument" due to ignorance on the electoral process is blamable on the political parties' failure to prioritize civic education. Theoretically, it has also contributed to the fixation on anticipated benefits among both the politicians and the electorate in every action they take. While voters expect financial reward or service provision to their communities and other benefits before they vote for a party or candidate, the politicians dole out resources to voters because of what they expect in the event of electoral victory, an assumption articulated by Downs (1957) in the rational choice theory.

6.4 CONSTITUENCY SPECIFIC DYNAMICS AND OTHER FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE VOTER CHOICES

Ghanaian voters have over the years become lightheaded about their electoral choices and the consequences on their lives. As such, many variables, including internal democracy, manifesto promises, rationality, ethnicity and party identity influence the dynamic choices of the electorate (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018; Ayee, 2015; Fobih, 2008). The study found that voter choices were constituency specific in the three constituencies if all other variables are constant in addition to the impact of four factors– internal democracy, campaign messages/manifestos, party identity, and “liking for the candidate”. The study revealed that internal democracy, party identity, campaign messages and “liking for the personality/candidate” were the order of variables that influenced voter choices in the swing constituency (Ledzokuku). In the NDC's electoral stronghold, the order of variables that influenced voter choices was as follows: party identity, internal democracy, campaign messages and “liking for the candidate”. In the NPP's electoral stronghold, the order of preference for voter choices was party identity, campaign messages, internal democracy and “liking for the candidate”. This means that the electorate's “liking for the candidate” contesting elections is not a determinant in electoral choices in all the three constituencies. Beyond that, party identity was placed first in both the NDC and NPP strongholds. The prominence of the campaign messages in the three constituencies reinforces the position of Ayee (2015) and Debrah and Gyampo (2013) that manifesto contents shape voting behaviour hence critical in promoting issue-based voting in Ghana. At the theoretical level, this could also be explained by the rational choice theory because manifestos are part of the electoral process aimed at choosing people to form a government, which entails rational behavior targeted at winning elections (Downs, 1957).

The study noted that all the other factors that influenced voter choices were constituency specific. For instance, internal democracy was the topmost factor in the swing constituency (Ledzokuku), second in the NDC's stronghold (Ketu South), but third in the NPP's stronghold of Kwabre East (Table 6.2). This reflects the position of various scholars in Ghana that local issues that influence voter choices in both swing and stronghold constituencies in Ghana's Fourth Republic include, party identity, manifestos/campaign promise and "liking for the candidates" which could be based on factors such as religion, ethnicity and rationality (Ahiawordor 2006), Ayee (2015), Debrah (2014), Allah-Mensah (2006), Aggrey-Darkoh (2006) and Ninsin (2017).

Table 6.2: Which issue(s) contained in the campaign messages of the political parties influenced you to vote?

		Which issue(s) contained in the campaign messages of the political parties influenced you to vote?					Total	
		Internal party unity/democracy	Convincing campaign message	The personality of the candidate	The liking for the party	Don't know		
Constit Kwabre East Constituency	Count	33	30	7	42	4	116	
	% of Total	8.2%	7.5%	1.8%	10.5%	1.0%	29.0%	
	Ketu South	Count	39	29	18	49	11	146
		% of Total	9.8%	7.2%	4.5%	12.2%	2.8%	36.5%
	Ledzokuku	Count	65	35	7	23	8	138
		% of Total	16.2%	8.8%	1.8%	5.8%	2.0%	34.5%
Total	Count	137	94	32	114	23	400	
	% of Total	34.2%	23.5%	8.0%	28.5%	5.8%	100.0%	

Source: Field Study, Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, March and April, 2019.

The study found that both the NDC and NPP had resorted to the use of various strategies to identify recruitment networks in an effort to maximize their numbers in all the three constituencies. Qualitative data from the three constituencies indicated that both

the NDC and NPP were aware of voter dynamism or the possibility of change in voter choices. In response to this, the political parties resorted to the use of data of all voters at the polling station level where they tracked the voting trends and did targeted campaigning including visiting voters in their workplaces or homes (door-to-door campaign). In other words, the NDC and NPP constantly checked the polling station voting trends all the time and built relationships with groups like footballers, traders, market women, churches with the aim of maintaining their support base and recruiting new entrants (voters). It emerged further that party activists who had the financial resources and did not have the time, provided resources as a way of motivation to the youth, mostly unemployed who had the time to do the leg work. The strategies by the NDC and NPP in response to the constituency dynamics and other factors that influenced voter choices may best be explained by the civic voluntarism theory which identifies resource (money, skills and time) and recruitment networks as major avenues used by political parties to shore up their numbers and enhance their performance in elections (Verba et.al. 1995). These findings reflect earlier nationwide constituency surveys in Ghana (Boafo-Arthur, (ed.), 2006; Ayee, (ed.), 2001).

6.5 SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES BETWEEN INTERNAL DEMOCRACY IN THE NDC AND NPP

This section discusses findings on the similarities and dissimilarities in internal democracy in the NDC and NPP based on their structures at the constituency level and how that affected their performance in general elections. As indicated in chapter one, the performance of each political party in this study, as borrowed from the ideas of Lijphart (1993, p. 149), was internally measured on the basis of women representation, “accountability, equality and participation”. As such, the focus here is on the structure of

the political parties and how it affected gender representation, membership equality in decision making, accountability and participation of people in various communities in the constituencies.

6.5.1 The Party Structure

The organizational structure of the NDC and NPP exude noticeable similarities. Fundamentally, the two parties have three sub-constituency structures: Polling Stations/Branches, Electoral Area/Wards and Constituencies. These flow from the national and regional branches (Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: The Structure of the NPP and NDC from lowest to highest level

NPP	NDC
Polling Station	Branch
Electoral Area	Ward
Constituency	Constituency
Regional	Regional
National	National

Source: compiled by the author

From the Table 6.3, it is clear that the two parties have structures that stretch from the grassroots (lowest level) to the national level in a manner that parallels the national electoral and local government delimitation which are layered from the lowest to the highest unit/polling station strata, constituency, district, regional and national (Debrah, 2005). This arrangement, according to Debrah (2005), ensures that the structures of political parties coincide with the centres of electoral issues thus making the constituencies indispensable in politics. The theoretical implication is that the structures make it easier for the parties to identify recruitment networks of new voters using civic skills, time and

money in an effort to enhance their electoral performance at the constituency level. This finds expression in the civic voluntarism theory (Verba et.al., 1995).

The study found that embedded in the structure of the political parties are formal institutions. The Constituency Executive Committee (CEC) is made up of partly elected and partly appointed officers in the case of the NPP and partly elected and partly co-opted officers in the case of the NDC. Comparatively, the structure of the NDC differed from that of the NPP. For instance, the NDC elected 23 and co-opted 5 while the NPP elected 10 and appointed 7 people to constitute the constituency executives. The NPP appointed 10 others; 5 council of elders and 5 patrons while the NDC appointed not less than 13 people as council of elders. In the case of the NPP, only the constituency executive committee members had voting rights at the constituency level election. The NDC, on the other hand, expanded the scope to cover, Metropolitan, Municipal and District Chief Executives (MMDCs), MPs as well as regional, national and government appointees who hailed from the constituencies in its Constituency Executive Committee. These arrangements were backed by their respective constitutions or guidelines for every internal election.

Both the NDC and NPP activists were, generally, optimistic that these arrangements enhanced their performance in the general elections. Although they were positive about this, it emerged that the involvement of regional and national officers in the case of the selection of parliamentary candidates in the case of the NDC, sometimes, caused problems which affected the party in elections because they were suspected to have occasionally influenced the vetting of parliamentary candidates at the regional or national levels. An example is the disqualification of a popular NDC parliamentary hopeful in the Ketu South constituency, Mr. Jim Morti, in 2016 at the regional level, who felt unfairly treated and went independent but lost.

6.5.2 EQUALITY OF MEMBERSHIP

One of the central features of political parties is that they involve large numbers who constitute the membership (Scarrow, 2014). Membership is critical because it provides the forum for people who are attracted to the vision, ideology, and manifestos of political parties to interact among themselves and the wider community for support, in times of elections (Ware, 2002; Scarrow, 2014). In Ghana, the size of a party's membership gives it legitimacy because they largely serve as a source of funding and campaign machines at the constituency and sub-constituency levels (Debrah, 2005).

The study found that both the NDC and NPP had administrative structures that governed membership and elections, which were enshrined in their respective constitutions. We found that in both cases, the basic qualification for membership was the payment of monthly dues. Per their constitutions, a person ceases to be a member if she or he refuses or fails to pay membership dues for a period of more than one year. A member may also donate his or her personal resources to the party. The Political Parties Act 574 (2000) endorses such but does not define donations. This notwithstanding, donations made up the highest share of funds that came to the NDC and NPP, at least, at the constituency level (Fieldwork, April, 2019). Practically one could not delineate a party's organizational capacity from its financial strength. This partly contributes to the inequality in the political parties and paves the way for the rich or financiers to largely determine who gets the nod in internal party elections (Agomor, 2015). The inequality of party members has reinforced what Abell (2000) calls the *individualism* stage of the rational choice theory where he argues that party members take decisions (for instance to pay dues or make donations) which may cause micro or macro outcomes. This view explains the disparity in the benefits people get when their party wins the general elections as contracts are usually given to people largely based on their contributions to the party's electoral victory. This rationality

mindset is in sync with the view of Ninsin (2017, p.125) that “at the lowest levels of state, that is, the district and community levels, the local elite (also called ‘foot soldiers’) fight for control over markets and toilet facilities from which they could generate an income; district level appointments at the NHIS, NADMO, National Youth Employment Scheme, and others are also appropriated by this local elite of the victorious political party”.

Qualitative data revealed that some of the defeated candidates in the internal elections in both the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies believed strongly that they lost the elections because of inadequate financial resources. The view of a defeated constituency chairman hopeful of the NDC for the Ledzokuku constituency (he was the sitting chairman from 2009 to 2017) reflects the general feeling of the defeated candidates in both parties: “Money makes the difference. Money is very key in politics. Money played a key role in my defeat. Look, Teshie is very big, if you are going to campaign at Palace Mall, you are going to meet people, you need to give them water, you need to hire chairs. If you don't have the money to do that, the one who has got the money will have an advantage over you” (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This gives credence to the view of Ayee (2019) that money bags have taken over the determination of who gets elected in internal party contests in Ghana, a situation which reflects at the national level and has the potential to deny qualified and competent people access to political party leadership. The findings of the study buttress the assumptions of the rational choice theory that some political party members may want a particular candidate to occupy a certain position because that position comes with benefits to the candidate for which supporters stand to gain (Downs, 1957).

Interestingly, although all the incumbent executives of both parties agreed that money was critical in prosecuting their campaigns, they disagreed that their electoral victories were dependent on money, instead, they attributed their success to competence.

For instance, an NDC constituency chairman for Ketu South who described himself in an interview as a “small boy” because he was in his mid-30s argued that to contest for the constituency, ward or branch level, did not depend on whether you were rich or poor, rich, male or female. Furthermore, an NPP MP for Kwabre East, who got elected on her party’s ticket under 25 years while being an undergraduate student at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST) also refuted the overriding influence of money in the internal party contest (Fieldwork, March, 2019). In effect, the domineering influence of money in electoral outcomes was alleged by all the 6 defeated candidates of both parties in the three constituencies while, specifically, all the 4 NDC activists interviewed in the Ketu South and Kwabre East constituencies conceded that money influenced the choice of the MCEs in 2013 (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The study found that there was no discrimination regarding the rights of party members to stand for elections. This gave the impression that there was equality to vote and be voted for provided a member was in good standing defined as payment of monthly dues, not an ex-convict, and an adult sound-minded citizen of Ghana. However, we found that the mere heterogeneity of the members of both parties was enough to breed discrimination. This reflects the view of Debrah (2005) that the classification of party members as ordinary, founding, elders and patrons poses a challenge to equality. The elders and the founding members were those with a historical connection to the roots, traditions, and philosophy of the parties and were major financiers (Daddieh and Bob-Milliar, 2012; Ayee, 2008). As such, an ordinary member’s attachment to them could serve as the ticket to ascend to leadership (Osei, 2013). It could, therefore, be argued that there was largely no equality among members of the NDC and NPP except when it came to general elections where everyone had one vote. This reflects the position of an official of the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) who remarked in an interview that there

was no equality at all within the NDC and NPP because some people were more influential than others (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

Similarly, it was observed that based on the political parties' structures there could not be equality among members. For instance, we noted that the NPP's organogram stipulated that the chairman was the executive chairman so he was higher in ranking than other executives. As such, he was visibly treated differently from others and he could veto any decision. The general secretary was below the chairman. Based on this structure, participation and decisions on representation naturally came in an unequal order (Fieldwork, March, 2019). This buttresses the point by a political scientist at the University of Ghana that within the NDC and NPP, there cannot be equality among members because decisions to elect the leaders of the parties are taken by the executives who are clothed with the legal authority to do it (Fieldwork, March, 2019). Comparatively, the decreasing levels of inclusiveness and lack of decentralization in decision making within the NDC and NPP are similar to the practice in the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey (Europe) and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa (Lancaster, 2014; Lotshwao, 2009).

It must be noted also that in the three constituencies studied, it became evident that some people joined political parties purely on welfare grounds. We found that welfare issues motivated some people to join the NDC and NPP. In-groups like NPP/NDC ladies club benefited from financial and material support during weddings, funerals, naming ceremonies, graduations, etc. Occasionally, the leadership of the political parties, especially the governing parties and parliamentary candidates in particular provided packages in the form of cash donations to well organized groups including Muslims ones during festive or fasting periods. For these groups of supporters, their participation in political activism was motivated by rationality because they regarded it as an investment

which yielded dividends, an action which is in line with the assumptions in the rational choice theory discussed in chapter three (Downs, 1957).

6.5.3 Women Representation

The sanctity of multi-party democracy cannot be guaranteed without the unique contribution of women's quota to the process. Undoubtedly, one major platform that can be used to increase the representative role of women in the body politic is political parties (Allah-Mensah, 2005). The activism of Ghanaian women predates the Fourth Republic and they have contributed their quota to the socio- economic and political development of Ghana (Tsikata, 2009). This notwithstanding, the study found that women were largely absent in leadership positions in the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. It was further observed that apart from the fact that, no law bars women's participation in politics in Ghana, the NDC and NPP did not have any inhibiting practices within their internal organization that prevented women's representation in the parties. In other words, there was some semblance of equality between men and women in the three constituencies, yet women barely contested and won internal elections in the two parties. This was largely because the constituency executive positions were keenly contested and the process was sometimes characterized by violence and thus discouraged most women from contesting, particularly, the topmost positions like chairperson, secretary and organizer. This situation justifies the argument advanced by Tsikata (2009, p.17) that the two leading political parties in Ghana, the NDC and NPP do not have a workable plan to rectify "their failure to select women candidates in their primary elections".

The study found that between 2000 and 2016, only two out of the 6 people from the three constituencies who got elected as MPs were women. The NPP elected a woman

under the age of 25 as its parliamentary candidate in 2016 in the Kwabre East constituency and she was eventually voted as the MP in the general elections. Similarly, the NDC in the Ledzokuku constituency elected a woman in 2011 in its primaries, who eventually won the parliamentary elections (2012-2016). Admittedly, having only two female MPs in the three constituencies between 2000 and 2016 could not be described as encouraging. Such isolated cases are highly disproportional when measured against their numerical strength in the population (Allah-Mensah, 1998). However, the very fact that the few women who made attempts and qualified through the internal vetting processes were eventually elected reinforced the view that there was no overt discrimination against women in the two dominant political parties in Ghana. This is contrary to the position of Tsikata (2009, p. 17) that “party electoral processes discriminate directly and indirectly against women candidates”.

The parties were prepared to select their parliamentary candidates based on factors including ethnicity and religion, but gender was seldom considered for such decisions. For instance, the decision by the NPP in 2015 not to allow men to contest with women was fiercely resisted by hundreds of NPP members (both men and women) who besieged the national headquarters of the party in Accra and asked the National Executive Committee (NEC) to rescind its decision, which they described as discriminatory and unconstitutional (Allotey, 2015). The male biased character of candidate selection has been largely blamed for the consistently low numbers of women’s representation in political parties’ internal positions as well as the legislature (Tsikata, 2009). At the theoretical level, Abell’s (2000) contribution to the rational choice theory which he called *self-regard* stage where certain political actions (candidate selection) are entirely focused on their (men) egocentric welfare, best explains the actions of men in both the NDC and NPP to dominate women. Furthermore, the election of candidates based on religious and ethnic grounds is in sync

with the civic voluntarism theory's assumption that social, religious or cultural factors make it easier for a party to have unimpeded access to places such as churches, festivals and work places to stimulate the recruitment of people into political activities (Verba et al., 1995). Empirically it emerged that the constituency in which a woman was fielded determined her success or otherwise in elections. For instance, women only had greater chances in their parties' electoral stronghold and the swing constituency. This is in tandem with the findings of Allah-Mensah (2005, p.35) that, while "political parties, either willingly or by legislative requirement may field women parliamentary candidates, there is no automaticity of success for the women".

The study also found that both the NDC and NPP had structural and legal arrangements that on paper gave women an upper hand to participate at all levels in their organization, yet more men were engaged in political activism than women. For instance, even though more women than men constituted the respondents in this study, it was observed that more men (20.2%) engaged in political parties' activities than women (13.8%). This was backed by the fact that in all the three constituencies, no woman was found to be among the three topmost constituency executive positions – chairman, secretary, and organizer. Qualitative data from the three constituencies indicated that in both the NDC and NPP activists held the view that elections had always been an open exercise and no one stopped women from contesting neither was there a law prohibiting women from contesting. Besides, women were given waivers in the area of filing fees in addition to the various women's wings in both parties (Fieldwork, March, 2019). Allah-Mensah (2005, p. 36) captures this assertion better when she argues that "some political parties perceive the creation of women's wings as part of the call for women's empowerment and therefore make them appear gender sensitive enough in the eyes of the

general public''. This notwithstanding, the mere creation of women's wings by the NDC and NPP does not practically make the parties' gender sensitive (Allah- Mensah, 2005).

The study found that women were underrepresented in the constituency executive positions in all the three constituencies. For instance, out of the 10 elected and 7 appointed constituency executives of the NPP (totaling 17) in Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies, the NPP had only 3 women among the 17 in Kwabre East, 2 in Ketu South and 3 in Ledzokuku. Similarly, out of the 23 elected and 5 co-opted executives of the NDC (totaling 28), there were 4 women among the executives in Kwabre East, 5 in Ledzokuku and 8 in the Ketu South constituency (Fieldwork, March, 2019). These disparities reinforce earlier findings by Allah-Mensah (2014) that the gender dimension of elections in Ghana is disproportional to their numerical strength in the whole population. The situation is similar at the national level where women have, between 2000 and 2016, not constituted more than 30 percent representation in the overall national governance (Tsikata, 2016).

The factors that hindered gender inequality in politics were varied, including the belief that men were natural leaders who should be supported by women at home as tradition demands. We noted discouraging remarks by NDC and NPP constituency chairmen which could potentially demotivate women in their respective parties. An NDC activist remarked: "We cannot have equal representation between men and women. No, it is not possible. Even if we go to heaven, I don't think we will have 50/50 representation between men and women" (Fieldwork, March, 2019). Similarly, an NPP activist noted "if you are a wife and maybe you decide to be a member of the NPP, that can even cause your divorce in this constituency. Some men even leave their girlfriends and wives because of these party issues" (Fieldwork, March). As such, the cultural factors that traditionally restricted women to the kitchen and as house wives dedicated to childbearing were evident

in the three constituencies. This reinforces the view of Tsikata (2009, p.18) that “the double standards of morality also disadvantage women who do not conform to stereotypes of ideal female behaviour and the socialization which make men appear natural leaders and women as followers” are to blame for the gender inequality in politics.

Furthermore, the study found that financial constraints and the general lack of interest by most women who saw politics as a dirty game as well as the false accusation levelled against successful female politicians of attaining such status through sexual offers contributed to their underrepresentation and participation in politics. According to Ichino and Nathan (2017, p.1), the “barriers to women’s political participation include economic and resource constraints that deny women the tools and opportunities for political action available to men”. These views also affirm the position of Tsikata (2009, p.15) that “the impact of women's position in other spheres of life as a result of the inequalities” has largely contributed to their disadvantage in the control of resources, to enable women to effectively compete with men and naturalize the inequalities in political representation. At the theoretical level, the civic voluntarism theory’s assumption that people (in this context women) may be inactive because they either lack resources such as money and time, or they lack the psychological engagement (stereotypes of ideal female behavior, for instance spending time undertaking household chores) with politics, explains the underrepresentation of women in party politics (Verba, et.al., 1995).

Comparatively, while countries like India have women representation that predates those in the United States, affirmative action is largely a recent development in most western countries including Brazil and France (Diop, ed., 2016). In Africa, women representation usually assessed on the basis of parliamentary representation and affirmative action policies is generally low. However, countries like Rwanda and Uganda have made great strides in women representation in political leadership. Additionally, at

the regional level, 19 AU Member States have so far developed and adopted 1325 National Action Plans and policies aimed at improving women visibility in public offices including guaranteeing their peace and safety. These countries are: “Ghana (2010), Gambia (2012), Burkina Faso (2012), Central African Republic (2014), Kenya (2016), Rwanda (2010), Liberia (2009), Senegal (2011), Sierra Leone (2010), South Africa (2016), South Sudan (2016), Uganda (2008), Togo (2012), Cote D’Ivoire (2007), Nigeria (2013), Guinea (2011), Guinea Bissau (2010), Burundi (2011) and DRC (2010)” (Diop, ed., 2016, p.13).

6.5.4 Decision Making

According to Norris (2005), democracy within political parties can be assessed on the basis of how they make decisions. This includes the extent to which the parties empower their members to effectively participate in the decision-making process (Diamond and Gunther, 2001). We found that decision-making at the grassroots in both the NDC and NPP was largely informal with the executives dictating the pace. Qualitative data showed that in both parties, the chairpersons had vetoed decisions, including appointment of people into non-elective positions. Such informal actions in relation to the internal decision-making process seemed normal on the part of the few constituency executives. According to Bob-Milliar (2012) the dominance of the few executives and financiers of the parties in the decision- making process, which is largely informal, is due to their perceived financial investment in the activities of their parties. But Debrah (2014) notes that real manifestation of internal democracy is based on the parties’ formalized processes of decision-making.

At the empirical level, the study found that some meetings (excluding emergency meetings) of the party executives were opened to party members and their contributions (largely on recruitment of new voters) were allowed. Such meetings were also dominated

by men. The reason could be the timing which was usually between 3 pm - 8 pm where most women would probably have confined themselves to undertaking household chores. It therefore stands to reason that meaningful participation in decision-making in the dominant parties at the constituency level has so far remained restricted to the elites while the ordinary party members are reduced to mere consumers of the ultimate decisions (Osei, 2013). At the theoretical, the low representation of women in decision – making during party meetings due to the lack of time, for instance, reflects the explanation in the civic voluntarism theory that, people may be inactive in political activities (like meetings) because they lack resources such as time, money and civic skills or psychological engagement, particularly because of the possible self - introspective feeling on why one or two women should be in the midst of many men at the time society feels they should be undertaking household chores including attending to children's education (Verba, et.al., 1995). The absence of many women during decision-making may have possibly denied the parties diverse and alternative ideas (which women could have offered) which may have been beneficial to their electoral performance considering the fact that women constitute about 52 percent of the national population which also reflects largely at the constituency level.

In fact, elections are central in Ghanaian politics and have become the most common mechanism for choosing leaders and candidates (Ayee, 2015). As such, the constitutions of the NPP and NDC have made it mandatory to use elections as the primary means for selecting constituency and sub-constituency leaders and parliamentary candidates, although appointments are allowed to cater for various interests (NDC, 2000; NPP, 1992). In both the NDC and NPP, decisions on elections, including the selection or nomination of people to run for offices and campaign strategies were made by the few elites like the executives, financiers, and council of elders/patrons at a congress/conference

of the parties. Qualitative data empirically revealed that the choice of candidates whether through election or appointments were informed by rationality because those with the power to influence the choice of sub-constituency executives favoured people who will also vote for them during the constituency conference or congress. This is a key feature of the rational choice theory which assumes that some political party members may want a particular candidate to occupy a certain position because that position comes with benefits to the candidate for which supporters stand to gain (Downs, 1957). However, the modalities on both internal party executive elections and parliamentary primaries were jointly set out by the national, regional and constituency executives. At the comparative level, despite the challenge of an undeveloped registered-membership systems, the NDC and NPP follow the registered-membership system as pertains in Western democracies. At the regional level, “a few of the African parties such as the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of Nigeria and the Kenyan National Union (KANU) follow the Western model” (Debrah, 2014, p. 63).

The study also found that in line with the Constitution of the NPP (1992), all its members in good standing (card-bearing and paid-up members) in the Polling Station Area had voting rights. The same applied to the NDC in the three constituencies, although the number of elected executives varied: 5 for the NPP and 9 for the NDC. It also emerged that the annual congresses (as the NDC calls it) and conferences (as the NPP calls it) were their highest decision-making levels. Below them, decisions were made in hierarchies, where the branch/polling station level decisions were subject to the approval by the constituency executives in the case of both the NDC and NPP. In fact, the decisions of the council of elders and disciplinary committees were technically advisory to the constituency executive committees. This practice created the impression that decisions were not fair, a view supported by ordinary party members but opposed by the executives.

This reflects the position of Debrah (2014) and Ninsin (2006) that there is no fairness in how decisions are made in the NDC and NPP. The hierarchical structure and operations of the two parties confirm the position of Nugent (1995) to the effect that the elites in political parties in Ghana dictate the pace, hence an impression is being created that the *big men and small boys* play by a different set of rules. Comparatively, though the NDC and NPP lacked a properly-developed membership registration policy at the constituency level, the two parties followed the registered-membership style of Western democracies. This had implications on their performance because numbers matter in Ghanaian elections and therefore any arrangement that ensured greater inclusiveness was advantageous to the party that does it (Fobih, 2008).

It can, therefore, be argued that both the NDC and NPP members contributed at meetings to the political agenda and were at liberty to express their views, including dissent. However, initiatives and decisions were the preserve of executives and the financiers. Even with this, decisions took the bottom-up approach.

6.5.5 Mass Participation

The integrative role of political parties largely involves the degree to which they penetrate into society to mobilize support aimed at enhancing their performance in elections (Mainwaring and Scully (ed.), 1995). A dominant feature of the NDC and NPP in the three constituencies was that they operated like *catch all* parties, as seen in some Western democracies including the United States and United Kingdom. They tried their best to embrace a larger segment of the masses in the constituencies into their fold regardless of creed, religion, ethnicity or ideological orientations. According to Norris (2011), mass participation in political parties in the form of wider community involvement in political activism can contribute significantly to promote democracy within society. This can be

attained through wider participation of the masses in political party activities (Norris, 2011). The study found evidence of mass participation in political party related activities including elections, registration of new voters and media discussions on political party issues. This affirms the assertion that the NDC and NPP have democratized internal channels for participation in all party activities including general and internal party elections (Debrah, 2014).

The thesis found that both the NDC and NPP were institutionalized in the three constituencies and considered by the constituents as the legitimate political actors. As such, the parties' structural arrangements made provisions in the interest of various groups in the constituencies to be represented. They strived to ensure a fair representation of various interest groups and communities at the policy level (constituency executive positions) hence they had legal arrangements that allowed them to appoint people to cure possible imbalances and enhance their electoral performance. This affirms the position of Croissant and Volkel (2012) that political parties that are institutionalized do better in elections and hence contribute significantly to the democratic process. However, the study found that the NDC and NPP had problems such as patron-client relationships, god-fatherism, elite capture and financial influence. These challenges stifled grassroots inclusion in participation on party matters, a situation not too different from what pertained at the national level. The findings affirm the view of Fobih (2008, p. 313) that “the predominance of patron-client relations in elections and political party organization adversely affects the practice of democratic procedures in the political parties”. It also gives credence to the position of Ninsin (2006, p. 10), that there is generally widespread “political culture of patrimonialism” which the ruling political class at all levels, liberally exploits to manipulate the election process to their advantage.

Within the parties, the study found that participation was also encouraged through various activities such as clean-up exercises, weekend joggings, football games, funeral attendance and sometimes organized extra classes for Senior High School students. By far, the youth wings of both the NDC and NPP were observed to be the most vibrant in participation in party organization at the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies. Qualitative data from the three constituencies indicated that the NDC's Tertiary Educational Institutions Network (TEIN), its Zongo Caucus and the NPP's Tertiary Students Confederacy Network (TESCON), Youth Elephants and NASARA Clubs were among the dominant groups that solidified participation in the parties' activities. The freedom enjoyed by the youth to participate in partisan activities provided them the opportunity to be nurtured as future leaders. Such freedom of participation in the view of Ayee (1998) is one way of measuring the process of multi-party governance.

The study further found that both parties had encouraged participation through the nurturing of their communication teams. The less educated ones were encouraged to either call or send text messages that favoured their parties' position of a myriad of issues on radio and television programmes. These are called *serial callers*. It was observed that the serial callers, though not well organized, held more meetings (once or more on monthly basis) than the constituency executive committees in both parties in the three constituencies. This reflects the position of Ayee (2008) that the widening of the political landscape through freedom of expression of the masses has been enhanced by the proliferation of over 100 radio stations dotted across the length and breadth of Ghana to which people call in or send text messages to express their views on issues they want without fear.

It further emerged that in the NDC and NPP, the mode of election of candidates restricted participation in terms of voting to the minority who were executives either

appointed or elected. In other words, participation of ordinary party members (the poor) was largely reduced to voting in national elections. This gives credence to the argument by Osei (2013, p. 558) that “political parties are instruments of elite competition that reinforce social closure” hence the participatory function that “political parties really perform is that of organizing and legitimizing the rotation of elites” in internal or state positions.

In sum, while mass participation in general elections and election related activities were found to be high, the opposite was the situation in the parties’ internal democratic practices. It could therefore be argued that the NDC and NPP had demonstrated their capacity to act as the major intermediaries between society, represented by the electorate and the state and represented by the parties. However, the weak participation of party members in terms of leadership selection, patron-client tactics and elite capture were observed. This affirms the view of Fobih (2008, p. 244) that “the lack of popular participation in the political parties” is one of the major problems inhibiting the progress of internal democracy.

6.5.6 Accountability

Accountability within political parties flows out of the social contract between the leadership of the parties and the electorate (Debrah, 2005). The study found that some aspects of accountability, especially financial issues were formalized in both the NDC and NPP; and yet the parties do not comply to the 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act. First, they are to declare to the public their revenues and assets and the sources of those revenues and assets. Second, publish to the public annually their audited accounts. These have not been complied with (Ayee, 2019). The thesis noted that in both parties, the executives met quarterly during which the treasurer read the state of the party’s financial

standing. The financial secretary did the write up; copies were presented at the meetings, queries were raised and when they were satisfied, they accepted it. Apart from the constituency executive meetings, there were annual meetings of delegates where the party finances were presented (Fieldwork, March, 2019).

The study also found that the two parties largely permitted dissenting views and regarded such views as part of the process to improve or perfect internal democracy. This is in sync with Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi's (2014) view that the NDC and NPP have carried out their oversight and accountability roles with increased seriousness in the Fourth Republic. This assertion was, however, not consistent with our findings which revealed several scandals in both parties when in government and also at the internal party level, usually as a result of the disproportional distribution of the spoils of victory within the rank and file of the ruling political party.

Apart from financial accountability, it was observed that the executives did not execute their part of the social contract with the party members as expected of them especially in the stronghold constituencies. For instance, the dominant feeling among the constituents was that the leadership of the political parties, including the MPs did not perform satisfactorily in their commitment to deliver on their mandate such as fulfilling key promises made before the elections. Unfortunately, the seeming elite capture made it difficult for some of such leaders to be voted out, although in some instances, some executives lost their re-election bids. In the swing constituency, however, accountability worked. Quantitative and qualitative data showed that the electorate voted against MPs who did not perform satisfactorily. As such, no sitting MP won a second term continuously in general elections regardless of whether he/she was on the ticket of either the NDC or NPP. This reflects Locke's (1963) central idea that government rests on the consent of the governed hence people who occupy political leadership positions will continue to stay in

office only if they pay heed to the wishes of the electorate (See also Appadorai, 1968, p. 26).

It became clear that there was no law or internal regulations on how campaign expenditure should be executed. As such, some party executives in the three constituencies were accused of using clandestine ways of dissipating party resources or using them for purposes other than elections. This problem was aggravated by the fact that membership dues were woefully inadequate, hence personal donations were based on personality and not the party's name was a common practice. In fact, none of the executives in the three constituencies was able to tell this researcher the amount they raised through membership dues on the excuse that it was confidential. On the other sources of revenue, for instance, an NDC former chairman for Ledzokuku remarked that donations and other sources of revenue were operational monies with specific directives on how they should be used (Fieldwork, March, 2019). In most cases, it was the parliamentary candidate who mobilized financial resources from friends and well-wishers to execute his or her campaign. The difficulty with individual donations was found to be that they were rational actors and expected something in the form of contracts in return, a confirmation of the rational choice theory to political participation (Downs, 1957). The view of the MP for Ledzokuku reflects the situation in the three constituencies: “usually most of the funding will come from the MP (thus the candidate). The candidate will find ways of getting money; go to individuals for support. You may get some support coming from the constituency, national or regional but very insignificant. Remember some of the financiers will expect something from you when you win” (Fieldwork, April 2019). In the event of an electoral victory those MPs appeared more accountable to their financiers than the constituents or party members except when elections were due and they engaged in what Ninsin (2017) calls “symbolic distribution of resources, which purports to improve the material

conditions of the poor when it is rather intended to merely mitigate their appalling material conditions’’ (Ninsin, 2017, p.128). Such situations in the view of Cheeseman et.al., (2014) prevent the parties (whose touch bearers are the MPs) from ‘‘predominantly structuring programmatic (rather than clientelistic or charismatic) linkages to voters and organizing in ways’’ that facilitate accountability at all stages.

Additionally, the political parties did not declare their source(s) of funding to their constituents, although political activities did not cease after elections. Neither did the study find evidence of the parties declaring their audited accounts to the Electoral Commission (EC) at the district level which is a serious infraction of the Constitution and Political Parties Act. Money plays a central role in how the parties’ sponsor candidates for elections (Ayee, 2019). This explained why both the NDC and NPP activists resorted to all sorts of means to raise money, whether it was campaign season or not, ahead of the next election. Political parties around the world are, largely, funded by the contributions of their members through various means such as monthly dues and taxing the salaries of those officials who are in executive positions (Weber, 1965). In the view of Simon (2003), the way a political party is financed determines its character because the financiers influence the direction of the party. Interviews with the NDC and NPP party executives confirm Simon’s (2003) view that money plays a pivotal role in the accountability dynamics because in some instances, voters could be bought. This confirms the assertion that party positions are largely offered to the highest bidder (Agomor, 2015).

In sum, accountability at the constituency level took the top-down approach where the grassroots were technically not aware of how exactly party resources were expended, which is an evidence of lack of accountability. The scenario fits into what Debrah (2005) describes as a situation where the grassroots are alienated and the executives growing in importance due to a deliberate strategy to make the ordinary members subservient to the

interest of the elites (Debrah, 2005). It however, contradicts Debrah and Gyimah-Boadi's (2014) view that the NDC and NPP have carried out their oversight and accountability roles with increased seriousness in the Fourth Republic.

6.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the findings of the thesis within the context of internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections and their civic education mandate including helping to shape the political will of the people. This was guided by the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories to political participation. The study found that there was a linkage between internal democracy and the performance of political parties in elections. The linkage has a more pronounced electoral impact in the swing constituency than the stronghold constituencies, where party identity was the topmost determinant of the parties' electoral performance.

The chapter has shown the involvement of many actors and strategies in the management of internal democracy at the constituency level in both the NDC and NPP. It has also highlighted the fact that the variables that determined the performance of political parties were numerous and constituency specific, for which internal democracy was important. In addition, the limited manner in which decisions were made and the gender disproportions in leadership in both parties denied them diverse and alternative ideas which could be beneficial to both parties.

The assumptions of the rational choice theory to political participation that the actions of politicians and responses of voters are largely motivated by anticipated benefits which could take the form of personal gains, or benefits to their communities, families, social, religious or political groups was also established. This notwithstanding, rationality was necessary but not sufficient to explain the entire process of political participation. For

instance, the seemingly negotiated process of deploying the various resources (time, money and civic skills) and the attitudinal and behavioural traits of the party activists made it possible for everyone to play a role in the identification of recruitment networks and the engagement of voters whose psychological motives and decisions were not based on rationality. For such, they possibly stayed out of political activities, because no one asked them to engage in political activism or because they lack the time, civic skills, money or psychological predispositions to engage with others, hence could best be explained by the civic voluntarism theory (Verba et.al., 1995). The use of the two theories therefore provided a better understanding of participation in the internal democracy of the NDC and NPP.

Even though participation in multi-party politics was understood to be a means of working to further the programmatic ends of the two main parties, weak internal democracy has contributed to a situation where the influence of money during internal elections and the *god-father syndrome* (a form of political corruption in which the leader handpicks his favourites who may often be less qualified) have posed a threat to meritocracy and the future of multi-party democracy because of the exclusion from leadership positions of some competent people who lack the wherewithal to contribute to the finances of the political parties.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The thesis set out to explore the dynamics of internal democracy and their implications on the performance of political parties in general elections in Ghana. The thesis also investigated the civic education mandate of political parties at the constituency level, using the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories to political participation. Specifically, the thesis explored how internal democracy influenced voter choices in the Kwabre East, Ketu South and Ledzokuku constituencies in the Ashanti, Volta and Greater Accra regions respectively. Furthermore, the thesis examined the constituency and sub-constituency structural similarities and dissimilarities in internal democracy between the NDC and NPP and how they impacted on gender representation, inclusive decision making, accountability of leaders, equality of membership and mass participation in political activism.

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the key findings of the study in line with the objectives, highlight the conclusion and make recommendations that may improve the practice of internal democracy of political parties in Ghana. The chapter ends with some lessons learned.

7.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The findings of the study are summarized based on the research objectives in the paragraphs below.

First, the study found that the causes of internal democratic problems in the NDC and NPP in the Kwabre East, Ketu South, and Ledzokuku constituencies were similar, and

informed by multiple actors with various interests. For instance, the politics of exclusion in the distribution of financial resources, vote-buying, patronage, autocratic leadership, the undue influence of financiers in the selection of candidates, imposition of MMDCs in particular, appointments/co-optation of people into non-elective internal positions, were some of the causes of undemocratic practices that cut across the three constituencies. These causal factors had significantly undermined the parties' ability to unite and enhance their electoral performance as well as their civic education mandate of helping to shape the political will of the masses. This was because the main actors were preoccupied with seeking their personal gains or benefits for their families, communities, classmates and sometimes ethnic groups. As such, those who did not benefit either worked against their parties by campaigning mostly against their party's parliamentary candidate or refused to vote, thereby reducing the number of votes for their parties. This reflects the assumption of the rational choice theory that politicians invest their resources like money, time and skills because of anticipated benefits while voters make choices based on what they get or expect from politicians; "sociotropic" rationality and "egotropic" rationality (Alidu and Aggrey-Darkoh, 2018, p. 110; Downs, 1957). In addition, it emerged that while the political parties were in opposition, the financiers, candidates and ordinary members all worked together by apportioning various tasks to members based on their skills, time and resources. The rich who did not have the time usually provided funds to the youth who were skillful and had the time to canvass for new voters by using various strategies including home visitations (door-to-door campaigns) to recruit new voters and to get back lost members. This also fits into the civic voluntarism theory's assumption on how skills, time, money and psychological motivation can be combined to enhance political participation and improve electoral performance (Verba. et. al. 1995).

Second, the study found that the impact of internal democracy on the electoral performance of the political parties (the NPP and NDC) was largely dependent on whether the constituency was a swing or stronghold of another political party. For instance, it emerged that in the Kwabre East and Ketu South constituencies which have traditionally been the strongholds of the NPP and NDC respectively, the dominant party's internal democracy (good or bad) had since 2000 been immaterial to its electoral victory. In other words, no matter how undemocratic the NDC was in the Ketu South constituency and the NPP in the Kwabre East constituency, they still won elections between 2000 and 2016, whether in government or opposition. For instance, not even the defection of an NPP sitting constituency chairman in the Kwabre East constituency to the NDC in 2012 as well as a pro-NPP member (Edward J.B. Dankwah) who contested the parliamentary elections as an independent candidate, could prevent the NPP from winning elections in the constituency while in opposition, with a margin of 45,964 votes in the presidential race and 44,527 votes in the parliamentary contest (see table 5.10). Similarly, undemocratic practices within the NDC in the Ketu South constituency caused a defeated parliamentary candidate (Charles Agbagedy Nypson) to contest the elections as an independent candidate in 2004 and polled 16,241 votes. Also, the sitting MP who served two terms (Hon. Albert Zigah) lost the party's internal primaries in 2012 and went into the elections as an independent candidate and had 3,956 votes. In the 2016 election, two prominent NDC figures, namely, former NDC MP Hon. Albert Zigah and a disqualified member during the constituency parliamentary vetting, Jim Yao Morti, went independent and commutatively had 21,188 votes; Hon. Zigah (2,545) and Mr. Jim Morti (18,643) (see table 5.8). This notwithstanding, the NDC's official candidate Hon. Franklin Fiavi Fifi Kwetey won with 48,723 votes as against the NPP's candidate Maxwell Koffie Lugudor who had 4,148 votes. The figures for the presidential race were 68,279 votes for the NDC's candidate,

Mr. John Mahama and 7,590 votes for the NPP's candidate, Nana Akufo Addo (see Table 5.8).

This did not mean that internal democracy had no impact at all in the stronghold constituencies. Comparative figures from election results between 2000 and 2016 showed that undemocratic practices in either the NDC or NPP's stronghold affected the electoral performance in relation to the parliamentary results marginally but had less effect on the presidential results. This was attributed to the rancorous campaigns and constituency level factionalism which had marginal or no effect on a party's presidential candidate. The voting behaviour in the stronghold constituency could be explained based on the rational choice theory. The voters had a strong conviction that the party they continued to vote for was better positioned to address their socio-economic needs.

Third, the study found that the electoral performance of either the NDC or NPP in the swing constituency (Ledzokuku), which is more cosmopolitan and located in the heart of the national capital, Accra, was largely a function of organizational competence anchored on strong internal democracy. This explains the inability of the constituency to have one MP serve more than one term continuously since the 2000 elections. All NDC and NPP activists (incumbent/former constituency executives and defeated candidates in internal elections) were agreeable that their victories were attributable to satisfactory internal democracy and their defeats were blamed on lack of internal democracy. This was supported by quantitative data which ranked internal democracy higher than other variables such as campaign messages and party identity in the determination of the parties' electoral performance. Like the stronghold constituencies, it was found that the effect of anti-democracy within either the NDC or NPP in the swing constituency had a more pronounced effect on the parliamentary election than the presidential one. In other words, while party identity dominantly determined the electoral victory of the NDC and NPP in

both the presidential and parliamentary elections in their respective strongholds between 2000 and 2016, the same could not be found in the swing constituency. For instance, in the 2012 general elections where internal disunity was found to be pervasive in the NPP than the NDC and largely attributed to the NPP's electoral defeat in the Ledzokuku constituency, the reverse was the case in the 2016 elections where the NPP was said to be more internally democratic and eventually won the parliamentary seat. Both the NPP and NDC activists all admitted that the NPP was more united ahead of the 2016 elections than the NDC. This meant that the internal democracy played a determining role in the electoral performance of the NDC and NPP in the Ledzokuku constituency between 2000 and 2016. Both qualitative and quantitative data showed that the actions and inactions of the NDC and NPP activists and the electorate were informed by the rational choice theory because the rational voters, who anticipated some benefits, punished elected MPs who did not fulfill their promise of making life better for them and rewarded those who promised to address their needs including the provision of potable water, education, and health facilities.

Fourth, the thesis found that internal democracy/internal unity, party identity, convincing manifestos/campaign messages and "liking for the personality/candidate" (in that order) were the factors that influenced voter choices in the swing constituency (Ledzokuku) between 2000 and 2016. In the NDC's electoral stronghold (Ketu South), voter choices were influenced by the party identity, internal unity/democracy, manifesto pledges and "liking for the personality/candidate" contesting the elections, in that order. In the Kwabre East constituency which is the electoral stronghold of the NPP, it emerged that voter choices were informed, in order of preference, by party identity, manifesto pledges, internal unity/democracy and "liking for the personality/candidate". Suffice it to say that apart from the people's "liking for the personality" contesting the elections,

which was the least factor in all the three constituencies, all other factors that influenced voter choices were found to be constituency specific. In the three constituencies, rationality, as discussed in the rational choice theory in chapter three, played a role in voter choices. Beyond that, party identity was placed first in both NDC and NPP strongholds. These confirm earlier arguments that voter choices in Ghanaian elections are influenced by numerous factors that may vary from constituency to constituency (Ayee, 2005; 17; Essuman-Johnson, 2005; Ahiawordor, 2006; Alidu, 2012; 2017; Debrah and Gyampo, 2013, Ninsin, 2018).

Fifth, the thesis found that the NDC had 28 constituency executives, one ward coordinator, and 9 branch executives while the NPP had 17 constituency executives, one electoral area coordinator and 5 polling station executives. The two parties, therefore, had three structures at the constituency level, which were found to be the same in terms of functions and administration except for their names and number of executives. The NPP used *Electoral Areas* and *Polling Stations*, for its constituency sub-structures while the NDC used *Wards* and *Branches* for its constituency sub-structures. Even though membership participation in party activism was found to be opened to all, there was notable evidence of a lack of equality among members of the two parties when it came to decision-making. In both cases, the elites who were mostly the financiers and power brokers wielded more influence than other members in virtually everything except in multi-party elections where everyone had one vote. The NPP and NDC resorted to the same methods of recruitment of new members in a manner that could be explained in the context of the civic voluntarism theory (see chapter three).

Sixth, it emerged that both the NDC and NPP were institutionalized with visible signs including party offices, party-branded buildings and party-affiliated youth meeting centres in the three constituencies. This provided an opportunity for wider participation of

the constituents in political party activities including rallies and party meetings. The NDC and NPP also strived to ensure fair representation of various interest groups and communities in their campaign activities and internal organizations at the constituency and sub-constituency levels. Both parties had provisions in their internal rules which enabled them to appoint people as executives to ensure fair representation. Per this arrangement, the thesis is of the view that the NDC and NPP are becoming increasingly institutionalized in the three constituencies and regarded as the legitimate political organizations which are contributing to deepening multi-party democracy in Ghana.

Seventh, despite evidence of very fair arrangements by the two parties in the form of waivers and the institutionalization of the women wings, the thesis found evidence of gender disparity in leadership positions in the three constituencies. This was blamed on factors such as lack of intrinsic motivation on the part of women to engage in the political party contest due to the acrimony involved, insufficient financial resources and cultural impediments.

Eighth, the thesis found that internal party leadership accountability to the membership was weak. This was so because the party delegates who were supposed to hold their executives accountable could not do that efficiently due to the influence of money and patronage. In the stronghold constituencies, the electorate did not also hold their favorite political parties accountable because of party identity. It was only in the swing constituency that the voting trend showed that the electorate held the parties accountable by voting them out anytime they failed to fulfill their campaign promises.

Ninth, the findings at the three constituencies on the various issues on internal democracy and the performance of the political parties have reinforced similar findings at national level studies as espoused in the literature (Ayee, 2017; Debrah, 2014; Ninsin, 2017).

7.3 CONCLUSION

The thesis sought to explore the interplay between internal democracy and the performance of the NDC and NPP in elections and their civic education mandates aimed at shaping the political will of the people in the Kwabre East, Ketu South, and Ledzokuku constituencies. It also sought to discuss the constituency specific dynamics and other factors that caused undemocratic practices within the parties, how lack of internal democracy affected voter choices as well as the structural similarities and dissimilarities in internal democracy between the NDC and NPP in terms of gender representation, decision making, accountability, and participation. The thesis is based on the rational choice and civic voluntarism theories to political participation. It used the mixed research methods approach and the data obtained were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) and thematic analysis for the quantitative and qualitative data respectively.

The thesis concludes that there is a nexus between internal democracy and the electoral performance of political parties. However, good internal democracy plays a major role in the performance of political parties in the swing constituency while party identity is the dominant determinant of electoral performance in the strongholds of the NDC and NPP. Furthermore, despite the various reforms by the NDC and NPP since 2000 to improve their internal democracy, patron-client tactics, uneven distribution of resources, the overriding influence of money and dictatorial tendencies fueled by lack of transparency and accountability are some of the factors that caused undemocratic practices within the parties. The major reason behind these challenges is that both leaders and followers of the NDC and NPP are rational actors who measure their investment in politics against expected returns. Also, the civic education mandate of the political parties, such as educating people on the ethos of democracy and by extension helping to shape the political

will of the masses has been prioritized. Even though the parties engaged in some form of community services such as clean up exercises, funeral attendance, and sporting games, they did so to sustain the activism of their support base with the focus on elections.

This notwithstanding, the increasing vibrancy of the media, especially community radio stations at the constituency level, is helping to imbibe the democratic consciousness of the masses and political activists have played a significant role in this regard. The constituency and sub-constituency structures of the two parties are similar and characterized by the disproportional gender ratio, lack of inclusiveness in decision making and inequality among their paid up members concerning opportunities including leadership selection. These have implications for the electoral performance of both parties. Therefore, beyond good internal democracy, a political party needs to be conscious of the rationality of the voter and also resort to effective use of civic skills, time, money and psychological motivation to identify recruitment network(s) of new voters in order to have an edge over other political parties during elections. Although this is necessary, it may still not be sufficient to make conclusive claims over the factors that determined electoral outcomes in both swing and stronghold constituencies of the NDC and NPP. In spite of this limitation, the findings of the thesis are still relevant and complementary to the literature on which to draw some recommendations.

7.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the above discussions, the following recommendations are made for the attention of academics, policy makers as well as democracy and governance experts.

7.4.1 Recommendations to Academics

1. There should be further studies on a constituency basis given the growing rationality of the Ghanaian voter. This will highlight the constituency specific issues that will help in

the comparative analysis of voting behaviour and how it responds to measures adopted by politicians. This is necessary because the Ghanaian voter is becoming more and more sophisticated largely due to the availability of information technology and the consistent holding of elections every four years in which most electorate vote based on issues. Accordingly, it may not be prudent to rely on previous data to reflect current trends and voting patterns.

2. There should also be comparative studies that target specific variables against demographic information. For example, researchers should explore how age, sex, and level of education affect voter choices when measured against variables such as manifestos, ethnicity and internal democracy in stronghold and swing constituencies.

3. Researchers should investigate the civic mandate of political parties which currently seems to have been relegated to the back burner. This is because of the need to enhance civic education in Ghana to create greater awareness of the essence of integrity in politics.

7.4.2 Constitutional-Legal Recommendations

1. Given the overwhelming evidence that political parties have not demonstrated enough capacity to develop membership-based sources of funding, there is the need to consider the public funding of political parties based on a proportional formula using the percentage of votes attained in immediate past elections. A fixed amount should be earmarked for new political parties which meet the requirements determined by the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574). There are existing models that Ghana could learn from both in Africa such as South Africa and Kenya as well as the Western countries like Germany, the US and UK.

Ghana could learn from South Africa where Parliament in 2018 passed the Political Parties Funding Act which repealed and replaced the Public Funding Represented Political Parties Act of 1997. Under the new law, two funds are created with allocation and

oversight invested in the Independent Electoral Commission for the purpose of enhancing multi-party democracy through public funding of political parties represented in parliament or provincial legislatures. The represented parties fund receives income from parliamentary appropriation while the multi-party democracy fund is funded by private donors (Political Party Funding Act, 2018 (Act 6). In Kenya, the Political Parties Act establishes a Fund but restricts the use of the money for purposes compatible with democracy such as promoting active participation of citizens in political life, organizing civic education in democracy and electoral processes, and not more than 25% of administrative expenses of the parties. In other words, the Fund can only be used for multi-party democracy and electoral processes. The Act details how money from Fund shall be shared. Other sources such as membership fees, voluntary contributions and donations are allowed but contributions from foreign governments, governmental and non-governmental organizations are banned in areas where a party has interest. There is a ceiling for individual contribution (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010, pp.27-28). In the US, campaign finance (as it is called) for political parties come from contributions of party members and individual supporters, organizations which share the views of the parties and tax payers (through grants usually referred to as state aid, government or public funding) (Norris and Van Es (2016). In Germany, political parties have since 1958 been receiving funds from government although, the Federal and Constitutional Courts have had instances to make rulings on the fair distribution of the funds. There are laws that limit the use of campaign billboards to few weeks to elections. Parties receive funds in relations to their performance in the most recent elections plus a partial matching of 0.38 Euro per donated Euro for private donations up to 3,300 Euros. The parties in turn are required to submit financial statements to the legislature yearly (Pulzer, 2001; Norris and Van Es (2016).

All these are examples that Ghana could learn from to save the country's body politic from being hijacked by only the rich and influential in society who may not necessarily be the most qualified and competent to rule.

2. With the passage of the Freedom of Information Act, which addresses some of the concerns about the accessibility of information, the implementing agency, the Ministry of Information, should ensure that there is no further hindrance to access the financial statements of political parties by students and researchers. This will further enhance multiparty democracy in Ghana because a well-informed electorate constitutes an asset to democratic governance.

3. The government should put in place legislation that will ensure that more women are elected to parliament. This could be done by, for instance, by passing the Affirmative Action Bill which has been with Parliament for the past ten years or so and also initiate legislation to introduce the proportional representation (which is inclusive) and not the first-past-the-post system which is exclusionary and promotes the winner-takes-all.

7.4.3 Recommendations to the Electoral Commission

1. The EC should ensure that people who violate electoral rules are dealt with under the laws of the land. It should no longer be enough for the Electoral Commission, for example, to leave the investigation of crime in the hands of the security agencies. Instead, all infractions must be investigated and those found guilty punished regardless of their political affiliation. The Political Vigilantism and Related Offences Act, 2019, should be fully implemented without fear or favour. The Act which prescribes between 10 and 15 years of imprisonment upon successful conviction, could likely reduce vigilantism and related offences in Ghana.

2. To prevent few wealthy members from continuously overshadowing the ordinary members and by extension determining the direction of internal democracy in political parties, the EC should compel political parties to disclose the identities and amount individuals donate. The only way to successfully achieve this is to amend the 1992 Constitution and the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574).

7.4.4 Internal Democracy Recommendations to Political Parties

1. The leadership of both parties at all levels should desist from the practice of imposing candidates on constituents and party delegates or asking some aspirants not to contest certain sitting MPs or party executives. This undermines internal democracy and breeds bitterness. Instead, the parties should put in place mechanisms that guarantee fairness, accountability, and transparency in the candidate selection processes.

2. The practice of personal attacks, hate speech and name-calling must attract sanctions by the party's leadership without fear or favour. The current acrimonious internal contestation creates room for some losers to harbor unforgiveness and bitterness thereby making reconciliation difficult. This negates the beauty of party organization and undermines the electoral performance of the political parties.

3. Apart from the council of elders and founding members, the parties should ensure that all positions are elective. This will further deepen internal party democracy since the appointing system has become an avenue for an elected official to choose their cronies and financiers who may not necessarily fit for purpose.

4. Political parties should ensure that their manifesto contents reflect the provisions in the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in chapter six of the 1992 constitution of the Republic of Ghana. As part of this, their manifestos should come out a year before

elections so that the contents could be interpreted in the various local languages and disseminated to the electorate regardless of where they live in Ghana.

5. The constituency sub-structures at the grassroots of the two parties are weak and largely operate informally, particularly at the polling station/branch level. This informality has implications on the caliber of leaders the parties nurture at the grassroots. The coordinators and polling station/ward chairpersons appear to be working on parallel grounds; sometimes giving conflicting instructions.

7.4.5 Recommendations to Political Parties on Public Education

1. The NDC and NPP should embark on an intensive public education for their members at the constituency and sub-constituency levels to build their capacity to understand the rules and regulations governing elections within and outside their parties. This will reduce internal conflicts, promote wider participation, inclusiveness in decision-making, transparency and minimize the use of unconstitutional means to protest perceived or real unfair treatment. The rank and file of both parties must be made to understand that their major goal includes helping to choose good national leaders. As such, if decisions are to be democratic at the top (national level), there should be a need to have leaders who have been elected on internal democratic principles.

2. Both parties must make it clear to their followers at the constituency and sub-constituency levels that the conventional understanding of democracy in Ghana as expressed in the Akan dialect, *kabi na menkabi* (have your say and I will also have my say), does not mean that anyone say anything and get away with it. This is because integrity is critical for multi-party democracy to triumph. Also, the practice where people with opposing views within the parties are branded as moles should be discouraged.

7.4.6 Funding Recommendations to the Political Parties

1. Economic inequality is a major challenge to the practice of internal democracy in the NDC and NPP. As such, the two parties should broaden their internal sources of income by, for instance, engaging in productive ventures such as agriculture to generate income for party activities. This will ensure regular internal sources of income, promote greater participation in income generation and help the parties to plan their activities. This should mean making the political parties solvent, in which most people are not interested.

2. The state should provide funding to the Information Services Department (ISD) and the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) to spearhead sustained nationwide education on the essence of multi-party democracy. Such education should highlight the need for the masses to willingly participate in political party activism including contributing to party funding, voting in elections and resisting the influence of money during the general election. Currently, it is public knowledge that funding is woefully inadequate on the part of the NCCE. In the specific case of the ISD, what used to be called office management fee given to district offices for operations has stopped since 2010, leaving the district offices virtually non-functional.

7.5 LESSONS LEARNT AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Based on the foregoing discussions, the study highlights the following six lessons which have implications for our theoretical, empirical and comparative understanding of internal democracy in multiparty politics and political participation in general at the subnational level in Ghana.

7.5.1 Building strong institutions

The existence of rules and regulations governing the conduct of internal party elections is not sufficient to promote democracy within political parties. The internal party actors, the security agencies, the electoral commission, and all other stakeholders must be willing to enforce the rules without partiality to ensure transparency, fairness, and inclusiveness in the process. This entails that institutions must be made strong through reform, well-resourced and depoliticized with recruitment based on meritocracy in order to perform their mandates.

7.5.2 Funding

Money plays a major role in the determination of who gets elected as a party executive or parliamentary candidate. As such, public trust in political leadership is weakening because the masses are increasingly becoming aware that politicians are basically investing their resources in anticipation of reaping a “bumper harvest” if they or their parties win elections.

7.5.3 Strong internal democracy

There is a corresponding link between higher education and participation in the internal party leadership struggle at the constituency level, which reflects the situation at the national level. This is in line with the conventional claim that higher education causes political participation, although the use of “propensity – score matching” in most developed democracies, like the UK and the US shows increasing low rates of participation among the highly educated (Kam and Palmer, 2008, p.612).

7.5.4. Public/civic education

There is a link between illiteracy among party activists at the grassroots and lawlessness. Civic education must, therefore, be intensified by political parties, the National Commission for Civic Education and the Information Services Department.

7.5.5 Promoting inclusiveness

There is a link between illiteracy among party activists at the grassroots and lawlessness. Civic education must, therefore, be intensified by political parties, the National Commission for Civic Education and the Information Services Department.

Gender representation at the constituency level, just as it is at the national level, is highly disproportional in favour of men. Ghana should, therefore, consider adopting a quota system to ensure equal representation of women in politics at all levels.

7.5.6 Reforming party structures

The uncoordinated nature of the functions of the elected and appointed executives within the NDC and NPP amounts to duplication of functions which sometimes breeds tensions. For instance, the council of elders, the patrons, and founding members do not have clearly defined roles. There is, therefore, the need for the coordination of their activities to ensure harmony.

7.5.7 Dealing with political vigilantism and polarization

The current understanding of multi-party politics at the grassroots level is weak and has implications for intolerance, mediocrity and polarization. To curb this the NDC and NPP should ensure that before they register and issue potential members with membership cards, they insist that the new entrants undergo some basic civic training on political education, the ideology of the parties, their missions, visions, and core functions.

7.5.8 Theories

1. The two theories: The rational choice theory of political participation best explains the motive behind the actions of politicians and the choices of the electorate. In other words, political actors and voters do a cost-benefit analysis in every decision they take because they are rational beings whose aims are to get personal, community, ideological, gender, and social class benefits.

2. The civic voluntarism theory does not offer a convincing explanation for internal party activism concerning the quest for leadership. The theory, however, best explains the deployment of money, time and civic skills such that everyone plays a role whether rich or poor in canvassing for votes (*division of labour*). This does not support the theoretical criticisms of the civic voluntarism theory that it does not provide a logical explanation for the link between the explanatory socioeconomic factors and participation (Verba et.al., 1995, p. 281). There is empirical evidence as discussed in chapter six that demonstrates a link between people who use their skills, time, resources to influence political participation, and anticipated economic benefit. What this means is that the rational choice theory and the civic voluntarism theories are necessary conditions for explaining internal party activism but none on its own is a sufficient condition. As such the criticisms and justification for the use of the two theories were found to be valid.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA

ETHICS COMMITTEE FOR THE HUMANITIES (ECH)

ECH 121/18-19

Ref. No.:.....

20th June, 2019

Mr. George Asekere,
Department of Political Science
University of Ghana
Legon

Dear Mr. Asekere,

ECH 121/18-19: INTERNAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS AND THE NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY IN SELECTED CONSTITUENCIES (2000-2016).

This is to advise you that the above reference study has been presented to the Ethics Committee for the Humanities for a full board review and the following actions taken subject to the conditions and explanation provided below:

Expiry Date: 20/06/20
On Agenda for: Initial Submission
Date of Submission: 24/03/19
ECH Action: Approved
Reporting: Annually

Please accept my congratulations.


Yours Sincerely,


Prof. C. Charles Mate-Kole.
ECH Vice Chair



Cc: Prof. Joseph R. A. Ayee, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana.
Dr. Maame Gyekye-Jandoh, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana.
Dr. Isaac Owusu-Mensah, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana.

Appendix 2



UNIVERSITY OF GHANA
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Ref. No.

March 7, 2019

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Dear Sir/Madam,


INTRODUCTORY LETTER: MR. GEORGE ASEKERE

This is to introduce to you Mr. George Asekere (ID No. 10289946) who is a Third Year PhD student in the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana. The subject of Mr. Asekere's thesis topic is *"Internal Democracy and The Performance of Political Parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Comparative Study of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party in Selected Constituencies (2000-2016)"*.

Mr. Asekere needs your help by way of volunteering information on this subject to enable him complete his thesis. Please, the research is purely for academic purposes and all information is treated as confidential.

Kindly give him the necessary assistance he may need.

Yours faithfully,



Dr. Maame A.A. Gyekye-Jandoh
HEAD OF DEPARTMENT

COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES

P. O. Box 10 64, Legon, Accra, Ghana.
• Telephone: +233 (0) 303 965 245 • Email: ps@ug.edu.gh • Website: www.ug.edu.gh

Appendix 3

CATEGORY: NDC AND NPP EXECUTIVES, MPs, AND DEFEATED CANDIDATES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS (NDC) AND NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY (NPP) EXECUTIVES, MPs AND DEFEATED CANDIDATES

PhD THESIS

This guide is meant to collect data for a Ph.D. thesis titled: Internal Democracy and the Performance of Political Parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Comparative Study of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party in Selected Constituencies (2000-2016). The data collection and thesis are purely an academic exercise. Therefore, any information provided will be treated as confidential. I, therefore, count on your cooperation in answering the questions.

DATE OF INTERVIEW.....

NAME OF INTERVIEWER.....

NAME OF INTERVIEWEE.....

NAME OF POLITICAL PARTY.....

OFFICIAL POSITION.....

NAME OF CONSTITUENCY.....

QUESTIONS

1. Mention two objectives of your party?
2. Have these objectives been achieved? If yes, how? If no, why?
3. Do you know how people are elected in the party at the constituency level? If yes, how?

4. Is there a document on how people are elected? If yes, has the document been followed? Do you think the procedure was followed? If yes or no, explain or give reasons
5. How were you elected?
6. What did you do before getting elected?
7. Are there qualifications for election and were they followed?
8. Can you describe the process that one needs to undergo in order to become an executive of your party at the constituency level?
 - (Probe on qualification criteria, the process of selection/election as well as inconsistency, special treatment for others, corruption in the process etc).
9. Who qualifies to contest or be appointed as a party executive?
10. Under what condition is a person disqualified to contest a party position?
11. What options are available for people who feel unfairly treated?
12. How many executives are elected and how many are appointed?
13. Can you describe how appointments are done?
 - (Probe on the powers that determine appointment/ kingmakers, links and patronage etc.)
14. What goes into the appointment; how is it done and who does it?
15. How often do minority groups (women, persons with disabilities (PWD), the poor etc.) contest for party positions?
16. How often do they get elected or not and what accounts for that?
17. How much do you charge for various constituency executive positions?
18. Do you have waivers for women and People with Disabilities?
19. Are the executives paid?
20. Under what condition is a person disqualified to contest a party position?

21. What options are available for people who feel unfairly treated?
22. How do these arrangements foster fair competition, cohesion, and grassroots involvement?
23. Who constitutes the electorate at each stage of internal elections?
24. Do all party members have the same opportunity in all decisions within the party?
25. Under what circumstances are some members given special treatment?
26. What are the accountability mechanisms within the party?
27. Do you think they have been followed?
28. How are party executives accountable to members?
29. Do you recall instances where disqualified people left the party? If yes, how often?
30. When do you normally record internal conflicts?
31. What reasons are usually given for internal conflicts?
32. Do you think the inability to follow the procedures for election or appointment within the party has had either a positive or negative effect on your party? If so, how? Give reasons.
33. Are regulations within the party enforced? If yes, how were they enforced? If no explain.
34. Apart from elections, what other things does the party do, that is, your civic role?
35. How does your party choose parliamentary candidates?
36. How different is the parliamentary candidate selection process from that of constituency executives?
37. Do you recall any instance (s) when the regional or national officers imposed candidate (s) on you, or attempted, whether constituency or parliamentary candidates?

38. How many times have you recorded independent candidates from your party since 2000?
39. How many times has your party won the parliamentary seat?
40. How many times has your party changed parliamentary candidates since 2000?
41. Do the changes affect the party in elections? If so, how?
42. Do you think the internal organization of your party affects voter choices?
43. What is the difference between how your party selects or appoints candidates or staff and that of other parties?
44. Do you think the difference affects the performance of your party in elections?
45. How many times have you had a female MP since 2000?
46. To what extent can you say there is: (i) equality (ii) participation and (iii) representation among the diverse members of your party in the constituency?
47. Do you think there is equality in your party? If so, how? If no, why not?
48. How would you rate equality in your party? Excellent; Very Good; Good; Poor. Don't know
49. Do you think there is participation in your party? If so, how? If no, why not?
50. How would you rate participation in your party? Excellent; Very Good; Good; Poor. Don't know.
51. Do you think there is equal representation in your party? If so, how? If no, why not?
52. How would you rate representation in your party? Excellent; Very Good; Good; Poor. Don't know
53. Is there any other thing about your party that you want to add?

Thank you for answering the questions. I am grateful.

**CATEGORY: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST
AND CSO REPRESENTATIVE**

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON

PhD THESIS

This guide is meant to collect data for a Ph.D. thesis titled: Internal Democracy and the Performance of Political Parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Comparative Study of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party in Selected Constituencies (2000-2016). The data collection and thesis are purely an academic exercise. Therefore, any information provided will be treated as confidential. I, therefore, count on your cooperation in answering the questions.

DATE OF INTERVIEW.....

NAME OF INTERVIEWER.....

NAME OF INTERVIEWEE.....

NAME OF INSTITUTION.....

OFFICIAL POSITION.....

- (1) How will you define internal democracy among political parties in Ghana?
- (2) Do you think that the NDC and NPP are internally democratic since 2000? If yes, how? If no, why not?
- (3) Are you aware of the policy framework on internal democracy in the two parties? If yes, do you think it has been followed? If no, why is it not followed?
- (4) Whether the two parties have followed the policy framework on internal democracy or not, do you think it has affected the parties in any way especially in the presidential and parliamentary elections at both the national and constituency levels?

(5) Taking your mind back, do you think that internal democracy has any bearing on voter choices in general elections in Kwabre East, Ketu South (stronghold) and Ledzokuku (swing) constituencies?

(6a) Comparing the NPP and NDC, which of them do you think is more internally democratic than the other? Give reasons for your answer.

(6b) How will you rate internal democracy in the NDC? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know.

(6c) How will you rate internal democracy in the NPP? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know.

(7a) Do you think that accountability of the executives to the members in either the NDC or NPP at the national level is stronger than that at the constituency level or vice versa? If yes, give reasons. If no, give reasons.

(7b) How will you rate accountability of executives to the members of the NDC at the state level? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(7c) How will you rate accountability of executives to the members of the NPP at the state level? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(7d) How will you rate accountability of executives to the members of the NDC at the constituency level? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(7e) How will you rate accountability of executives to the members of the NPP at the constituency level? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(8) Beyond elections, have the NPP and NDC offered any other thing which is worth mentioning as part of their mandates? If yes, what are they? If no, why did they not pursue any other part of their mandates?

(9a) How will you rate equality in the NPP? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(9b) How will you rate equality in the NDC? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(9c) How will you rate representation in the NPP? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(9d) How will you rate representation in the NDC? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(9e) How will you rate accountability in the NPP? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(9f) How will you rate accountability in the NDC? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know

(10) What suggestions will you make to promote internal democracy among political parties in Ghana?

Thank you for answering the questions. I am grateful.

CATEGORY: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR TRADITIONAL/OPINION LEADERS AND JOURNALISTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON

PhD THESIS

This guide is meant to collect data for a Ph.D. thesis titled: Internal Democracy and the Performance of Political Parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Comparative Study of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party in Selected Constituencies (2000-2016). The data collection and thesis are purely an academic exercise. Therefore, any information provided will be treated as confidential. I, therefore, count on your cooperation in answering the questions.

DATE OF INTERVIEW.....

NAME OF INTERVIEWER.....

NAME OF INTERVIEWEE.....

NAME OF INSTITUTION.....

OFFICIAL POSITION.....

TRADITIONAL/OPINION LEADERS

- (1) Do you know anything about political parties in Ghana? If yes, what do you know about them?
- (2) What has been the contributions of political parties to your traditional area?
- (3) Apart from elections, what else do the parties do?
- (4) How does their internal organization affect the voting decision of the people in your traditional area?
- (5) Do the parties involve chiefs and opinion leaders in some of the things they do, i.e. appointments of assembly members?
- (6) Looking at the NDC and NPP since 2000 describe the level of participation among the disadvantaged groups (poor, women, uneducated) in your traditional area.

- (7) Looking at the NDC and NPP since 2000 describe the level of equality among the disadvantaged groups (poor, women, uneducated) in your traditional area.
- (8) Looking at the NDC and NPP since 2000 describe the level of representation of disadvantaged groups in this traditional area.

JOURNALISTS

- (1) For how long have you covered events of the NDC and NPP in this constituency?
- (2) How do you define internal democracy among political parties?
- (3) Based on your definition, what are your observations over the years about internal elections (constituency executives and parliamentary candidates) of political parties?
- (4) What are the differences, if any, between the NDC from the NPP in the ways they organize their internal activities that you have covered?
- (5) Do you think the differences affect their performance in inter-party elections?
- (6) Do you feel, based on experience with the parties, that weak internal democracy affects their performance in elections in this constituency?
- (7) How do the NDC and NPP give equal opportunity (i.e. participation/ representation in internal decisions) to all paid up members including women, the disabled and the poor?
- (8a) What are your views on the internal democracy of the political parties? (4b)
How will you rate internal democracy of the NPP? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know
- (8b) How will you rate the internal democracy of the NDC? Excellent, Very Good, Good, Poor, Don't know.
- (8) Apart from elections, what other activities are undertaken by the two parties as part of their mandates? How well have they performed these activities?

Thank you for answering the questions. I am grateful.

CATEGORY: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE ELECTORATE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON

PhD THESIS

This questionnaire is meant to collect data for a Ph.D. thesis titled: Internal Democracy and the Performance of Political Parties in Ghana's Fourth Republic: A Comparative Study of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party in Selected Constituencies (2000-2016). The data collection and thesis are purely an academic exercise. Therefore, any information provided will be treated as confidential. I, therefore, count on your cooperation in answering the questions.

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

(Tick the appropriate answer)

1. Age (1) 18- 30 ☐ (2) 31-40 ☐ (3) 41-50 ☐ (4) 51-60 ☐ (5) 60 and above ☐
2. Gender (1) male ☐ (2) female ☐ (3) others ☐
3. Marital status (1) single ☐ (2) married ☐ (3) divorced ☐ (4) widow/widower ☐
4. Highest level of education: 1. no formal education ☐ 2. basic (primary, middle, and JSS) ☐ 3. secondary (SSS, training college and vocational) ☐ 4. tertiary ☐
5. Occupation? (1) farmer ☐ (2) artisan ☐ (3) trader ☐ (4) student ☐ (4) teacher ☐ (5) health ☐ (6) civil servant ☐ (7) ☐ unemployed
6. Constituency (1) Kwabre East ☐ (2) Ketu South ☐ (3) Ledzokuku ☐
- (7) Region (1) Ashanti ☐ (2) Volta ☐ (3) Greater Accra ☐

SECTION B:

8. Are you a card bearing member of any political party? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐
9. If yes, which political party? (1) NPP ☐ (2) NDC ☐ (3) others ☐
10. For how long have you been a member of the party? (1) less than 1 year ☐ (2) 1 - 5years ☐ (3) 6 -10 years ☐ (4) 11 -15 years ☐ (5) 20 years and above ☐
11. Do you hold or have you held any position in a political party? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐

12. Are you involved in internal decision making of your party in the constituency? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐

13. How are internal decisions in your party made? (1) only constituency executives make decisions ☐ (2) all branches, ward, electoral area, polling station etc. executives take part in decision making ☐ (3) only the rich and executives take decisions ☐ (4) decisions are made and sent from above i.e. regional and national headquarters ☐ (5) don't know

14. Are ordinary party members/ non-executives consulted on decision making of your party? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐

15. To what extent are women, the disabled, and the low-class party members in the remote areas involved in party decisions? (1) not at all ☐ (2) very rare ☐ (3) very often ☐ (4) don't know

16. How accountable are your constituency executives (1) not at all ☐ (2) very rare ☐ (3) very accountable ☐ (4) don't know

17. How is gender representation in your party executives at the constituency (1) very fair ☐ (2) not fair ☐ (3) somehow ☐ 4. don't know

18. Does money play a greater role in who becomes a party executive? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐

19. What goes into the appointment of people in party positions? (1) nepotism (who knows who) ☐ (2) favoritism ☐ (3) meritocracy ☐ (4) money ☐ (5) tribalism ☐ party loyalty years of service

20. Would you describe internal democracy in your constituency as inclusive? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐ (3) somehow ☐ (3) don't know

21. What reasons can you give for the consistency/inconsistency in the voting behaviour in your constituency 2000 elections? (1) the party is internally democratic ☐ (2) the people just love the party/party identity ☐ (3) "liking" for the candidate (s) ☐ (4) the party's campaign promises ☐ (5) track record of good performance ☐ (6) others ☐

22. How does internal democracy affect the performance of your party in elections? (1) it affects the party negatively ☐ (2) it affects the party positively ☐ (3) it has no impact on the party's performance ☐ (4) any other ☐ (5) don't know

(23) Do you think internal democracy influences the choices of voters? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐

SECTION C: FACTORS THAT AFFECT VOTER CHOICES

(TO BE ANSWERED BY ALL VOTERS)

24. Which issue(s) contained in the campaign messages of the political parties influenced you to vote? (1) internal party unity/democracy ☐ (2) convincing campaign message ☐ (3) the personality of the candidate ☐ (4) the love for the political party ☐ (5) don't know

25. Did you consider internal party democracy (party unity) as part of your major reasons before voting for any of the political parties? (1) yes ☐ (2) no ☐

26. Which party do you think is more internally democratic in your constituency? (1) NPP ☐ (2) NDC ☐ (3) don't remember ☐

27. Apart from elections, what else does the NDC/NPP do in your constituency? (1) they do nothing (2) they engage in non-partisan development activities on voter education (3) they engage in non-partisan activities on health, education, sanitation (4) don't know

28. What are the similarities or dissimilarities between the internal democracy of the NDC and NPP in your constituency? (1) the NDC is more democratic ☐ (2) the NPP is more democratic ☐ (3) they are all the same ☐

29. How does internal democracy affect the NDC and NPP in elections? (1) it affects the NDC negatively ☐ (2) it affects the NPP negatively ☐ (3) it affects both negatively ☐ (4) don't know ☐

END

CORRECTIONS OF PhD THESIS

- i. Student Name: GEORGE ASEKERE
- ii. Student ID: 10289946
- iii. Thesis Title: INTERNAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PERFORMANCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN GHANA'S FOURTH REPUBLIC: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC CONGRESS AND NEW PATRIOTIC PARTY IN SELECTED CONSTITUENCIES (2000-2016)
- iv. Type of degree: DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
- v. Department: DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EXAMINER	COMMENTS	STUDENT'S RESPONSE TO COMMENTS
EXAMINER ONE	General Comment: The standard of presentation is generally good and acceptable.	
	Design and relevance of methodology used: The methodology used was relevant and appropriate for the thesis.	
EXAMINER TWO	General Comment: Overall, the quality of the dissertation is high, among the best that I have read for the University of Ghana. As indicated previously, it has a broad theoretical and literacy focus, goes into considerable depth on most topics, systematically follows its research design, and outcomes to reasonable conclusions. Its presentation is considerably high. The citations and references are appropriate and voluminous, as one would expect for a Ph.D. thesis. There is no evidence of plagiarism. I would think that the possibilities for publication as professional articles or book are considerable, assuming that revisions	

	are made along the lines suggested at various points. But as a Ph.D. dissertation, it achieves a very high standard.	
	<p>i. Background information- Commendable.</p> <p>ii. Clarity of problem being investigated and rationale for the study: The problem being investigated is clearly stated, as is the rationale for the study.</p>	
	Literature review: The literature review in general is comprehensive in several different directions –comparative democracy, African political systems, and Ghanaian parties and elections as well as the theoretical models.	
	I have no idea what the godfather syndrome is.	This has been adequately catered for in the thesis (refer to page 217).
	Design and relevance of methodology used: The study design is very good for a topic of this sort.	
EXAMINER THREE	General Comments:	
	a. The abstract should mention the conclusions of the study.	The study concludes that there is a nexus between internal democracy and the electoral performance of political parties. However, good internal democracy plays a major role in the performance of political parties in the swing constituency while party identity is the dominant determinant of electoral performance in the strongholds of the NDC and NPP. Furthermore, despite the





		<p>various reforms by the NDC and NPP since 2000 to improve their internal democracy, patron-client tactics, uneven distribution of resources, the overriding influence of money and dictatorial tendencies fueled by lack of transparency and accountability are some of the factors that caused undemocratic practices within the parties.</p> <p>This has been incorporated into the abstract (refer to page iii).</p>
	<p>b. Please indicate the works of the authors being referred to, by indicating the dates of their respective publications/works.</p>	<p>Jean Jacques Rousseau (1952), John Stuart Mill (1998), Robert Dahl, (1967) and Benjamin Barber (1988). Corrections have been made (refer to page 2).</p>
	<p>c.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Michels (1915) is not listed in the bibliography. • The iron law of oligarchy is not a book but a principle or proposition. • I am uncertain about the relevance of the iron law of oligarchy in the study because the law merely underscores the oligarchical tendencies inherent in all human organization. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Michels (1915) has been duly incorporated in the bibliography (refer to page 239). • Comment noted. It is not mentioned anywhere in the study that it is a book. • It is relevant because political parties are part of human

		organizations with oligarchical tendencies.
	d. In the abstract, the study covered from 2000 to 2016, while on page 4, the study covered 2000-2018 – Which is which?	The correct period is from 2000 to 2016 as captured in the title and abstract. The period from 2000 to 2018 on page 4 was an error and has been rectified (refer to page 4).
	e. p.22: “This view reflects Abraham Lincoln’s one when he opines at his famous Gettysburg’s address in 1864 that democracy...” This sentence requires re-constructions.	The sentence has been revised to read: This view reflects the position of Abraham Lincoln that democracy is government of the people, by the people and for the people (Refer to page 22).
	f. p.28: “The patronage party’s focus is to acquire a position of power and make decisions its leadership.” This sentence is either incomplete or is missing some words; it is unclear.	For was missing in the sentence. It has been corrected (refer to page 28).
	g. p.108: “It (Ledzokuku constituency) has a total land area estimated at 47.57510 square kilometers.” The figure 47.57510 is confusing; it has to be checked.	The figure 47.57510 has been verified to be correct. It is estimated at 47.58 square kilometers. 47.58 square kilometers has been incorporated (refer to page 108).
	h. p.238: Kwame A. (ed.) (1998), Ghana: Transition to Democracy. Senegal: CODESTRIA (Everything is wrong with this reference).	The correct referencing reads: Ninsin, K. A. (Ed.). (1998). <i>Ghana: Transition to Democracy</i> . Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA. (Refer to page 238).

	<p>i. Chapters from books: pp241-245. The page numbers of particular chapter were listed before the place of publication and publishers. For example: Abell, P. (2000). “Sociological Theory and Rational Choice Theory”, in George Ritzer (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Social Theory, 223-44. Hoboken, New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing. The candidate is strongly urged to take a look at bibliographies in publications with book chapters and compare that to the format used in this thesis.</p>	<p>The entire section on Chapters from books under Bibliography has been revised accordingly (refer to pages 241 to 246).</p>
	<p>Background information</p> <p>i. Clarity of problem being investigated and rationale for the study: The candidate provided ample background information and carefully clarified the problem under investigation. Choice of three constituencies was important in testing the proposition. Justification was appropriate.</p>	
	<p>Literature review and theoretical foundation</p> <p>i. Appropriateness of theoretical/conceptual framework: The appropriateness of the theories for the study was well underscored.</p> <p>ii. Candidate’s knowledge of pertinent literature and quality of review: On the whole, the literature review was strong both in terms of depth and scope but also in terms of the quality of review.</p>	
	<p>Design and relevance of methodology used</p> <p>i. Appropriateness of design: The research design was appropriate.</p>	

	<p>ii. Appropriateness of data gathering method(s): The data collection techniques were appropriate for the study.</p> <p>iii. Appropriateness of data analysis: The processes of analyzing the data were accordingly appropriate.</p>	
	<p>Major findings from the research</p> <p>i. Relevance and importance of the findings: The findings are relevant in helping to understand the impact of internal democracy on the performance of political parties at the constituency level.</p>	
	<p>iii. Quality of discussion: Good. Arguments and assertions were well substantiated with literature, while the thesis was largely, analytical, logical, and coherent.</p>	
	<p>iv. Original contribution to knowledge: The study makes some contribution to knowledge, in highlighting the tenuous relationship between intra-party democracy and the performance of political parties especially during parliamentary elections.</p>	
	<p>Clarity and justification of candidate's conclusions and recommendations</p> <p>i. Whether conclusions address objectives of study: To a large extent, the conclusions drawn followed from the research questions and the findings of the study. In large measure, moreover, the research</p>	

	questions posed were satisfactorily answered.	
	<p>ii. Whether recommendation emanate from the findings: The recommendations to the EC appeared completely irrelevant as that institution, although a critical structure in elections and democracy was never discussed in the thesis. The recommendations to the EC were thus superfluous.</p>	<p>The supervisory role of the EC in all elections, its functions, including demarcation of constituencies, polling stations, ensuring that political parties conform to the electoral laws among others were, extensively highlighted in various parts of the thesis (refer to pages, 101,106,215).</p> <p>The recommendations to the EC were, therefore, in order.</p>
	<p>iii. Feasibility of recommendations: The recommendations are feasible and implementable.</p>	

 GEORGE ASEKERE (STUDENT)	 PROF. J. R. A. AYEE (PRINCIPAL SUPERVISOR)
 DR. MAAME GYEKYE-JANDOH (SECOND SUPERVISOR)	 DR. ISAAC OWUSU-MENSAH (THIRD SUPERVISOR)