THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY

BY

EBENEZER OFOSU ASIEDU

AN ORIGINAL RESEARCH PRESENTED TO THE LEGON CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (LECIA) IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF ARTS (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS) DEGREE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GHANA, LEGON

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SEPTEMBER 2000
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this Dissertation, except the identified quotations which have been duly acknowledged, is the result of an original research conducted by me under the supervision of Dr. A. Bonnah Koomson, and that no part of it has been submitted anywhere else for any other purpose.

EBENEZER OFOSU ASIEDU
(STUDENT)

DATE: 22nd September, 2000

DR. A. BONNAH KOOMSON
(SUPERVISOR)

DATE: 22nd September, 2000
DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my darling mum and sister for their wonderful support, understanding and kindness. Also to Miss Gynah-Bediako for her display of loyalty and support all these years.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest appreciation to the Almighty God for seeing me through the entire period of the course. Many thanks to the senior members of LECIA especially to Dr. V. Antwi-Danso and Dr. B.Y.D. Gebe. To Dr. Gebe, I express my profound gratitude for the interest he stimulated in me. His timely assistance, invaluable suggestions, fatherly advice, care, and his major role as the 'unofficial' supervisor, allotting to me most of his time reading through the entire work, really contributed to the successful completion of this work. I am greatly indebted to him for his immense support.

My next appreciation goes to my mum and sister who, together, have shown immense interest in my education. They have never wavered in their confidence and trust in me and have, thus, continued to offer their total support to me in all ways possible within their means. I deeply appreciate the help they have given me all these years. To them I say Ayekoo! I am also grateful to my course mates' in-the-struggle, especially Elsie, Felix, Nunoo, Eric, Serwaa, Tijani, Abdul-Samed, Linda and everyone for their encouragement given me in times of trying moment.

I am equally grateful to Mr. Eric Amarley Amartey, the assistant Librarian of the Legon Centre for International Affairs, LECIA, for his immense assistance. My final appreciation to all those who in one way or the other have contributed to the successful completion of this work but whose names cannot be mentioned. I say a big thank you to you all. May the good Lord richly bless you.

It must, however, be indicated that I lay no claim to excellence. In view of this, it is not entirely impossible that in sharing some thoughts with me or using other people's views, some of such thoughts or views may have been misrepresented. Thus, if while reading this work readers discover such misrepresentation, please accept my apologies, for it was never intended.

To God be the Glory.
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<tr>
<td>AAPC</td>
<td>All African Peoples' Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Australian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>CDU</td>
<td>Croat Democratic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>Convention Peoples' Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investments</td>
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<td>GBA</td>
<td>Ghana Bar Association</td>
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<td>GJA</td>
<td>Ghana Journalist Association</td>
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<td>GNA</td>
<td>Ghana News Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAS</td>
<td>Independent African States</td>
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<td>IGOs</td>
<td>International Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>ITN</td>
<td>Independent Television Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NLG</td>
<td>National Liberation Council</td>
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<td>NUGS</td>
<td>National Union of Ghanaian Students</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Progress Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movements</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUC</td>
<td>Trade Union Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>TV</td>
<td>Television</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USC</td>
<td>United Somali Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WAJA</td>
<td>West African Journalists Association</td>
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ABSTRACT

The media have often been identified as one of the major competing domestic interests that impact on foreign policies of states. This recognition of the media is seen through the contribution they make to foreign policy. This work takes a look at the media’s role and their contribution to foreign policy in the CPP, NLC, PP and the NDC regimes. It also looks at how they helped in shaping foreign policies and their influence on these regimes.

The work relied mainly on secondary sources of data in analyzing the media’s contribution to foreign policy in Ghana under the above stated regimes. It sees the media as not initiator of foreign policy making but as a mouthpiece that most policies of the governments become known and discussed by the public, thereby helping to shape some of such foreign policies. It further played the role of proselytizing and sensitizing people on government’s foreign policies especially during the CPP regime under Nkrumah from 1957-1966.

The findings of the research point to the fact that for the public to be very active in enriching government’s foreign policies and for the nation to benefit from that, the media need to be proactive in their contribution to the decision-making level of foreign policies of governments.
CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND STATEMENT

The foreign policy of states makes it possible for one to understand how countries relate to each other. Foreign policy determines a country’s foreign relations with the outside world. However, fundamental to the making of foreign policy of any country is the national interest. The national interest of any country, therefore, becomes the underpinning factor in the formulation of foreign policy. It is in this light that Kegley and Wittkopf see foreign policy as “the goals that officials, representing a state, seek to achieve abroad, the underlying values of the set goals, and the means that are used to obtain these goals”\(^1\). This means foreign policy must necessarily conform to a country’s national interest and goals. As Kuleke\(^2\) contends, national interest becomes the starting point and the guiding compass of a state’s foreign policy formulation. The determination of the national interest is, however, constrained by the flux of domestic politics as well as the structure of the prevailing international politics. Thus, the interplay of internal and external politics influences the charting of what constitutes a country’s national interest. In a paper, Ambassador Cleland\(^3\), for instance, contends that in the process of foreign policy-making in Ghana, Ghanaian policy-makers have to contend with both internal and external pressures.
Ghana's foreign policy can be seen as constituting her conducts on the international scene in relation to the interplay of national interest of other states, in an attempt to realize her own interests. In relation to Ghana's foreign policy-making, like all other states, apart from the government of the day, that is, the incumbent, internal pressures from civil society and other pressure groups represented by the Trade Union Congress (TUC), the Ghana Bar Association (GBA), the National Union of Ghanaian Students (NUGS), and the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), among others, “can be cited as actors that influence the formulation of foreign policy, however minimal.”

In the United States, for instance, the formulation and implementation of foreign policy are said to be influenced largely by the Congress, private and public interest groups, as well as the press and public opinion, though it is said the president is the most powerful force in determining foreign policy. Indeed, America’s engagement and disengagement in Somalia, and Bosnia for instance, are said to have been influenced by the media. Madeleine Albright, the US Secretary of State told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “television’s ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure on both immediate engagements in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan.” The extent to which the media could be influential in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy depends largely on the country concerned. For instance, by far, the media in the US and Great Britain perform
better in terms of their contribution to foreign policy making and implementation. This means that technological advancement, special training and expertise of journalists and access to information by the media, may contribute immensely to the role the media can play in foreign policy formulation and implementation.

The same, however, cannot be said of the media in Ghana. Kabral Blay-Amihere, the President of the West African Journalists Association (WAJA) and a former President of the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA) rightly observed that whereas the 1992 Constitution of Ghana guarantees press freedom, there exists a number of factors that inhibit that freedom. He mentioned, among others, the unfavourable legal regime, which, according to him dates back to the colonial and early times of Ghana's independence. Another inhibiting factor is the increasing cost of production. He also mentioned the lack of high-level technological capacity as a factor inhibiting the media from performing, as it should.

These notwithstanding, the press in Ghana, for instance, is seen by Asamoah and Cleland as playing a significant role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. Apart from informing the citizens on government's intended policies the media also contribute to the shaping of the final product of foreign policy. There is, therefore, the need to study the role the media play in Ghana's foreign policy.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

In Ghana, foreign policy-making is a major preoccupation of the government, and this amply finds expression in the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana – (Articles 73, 74 and 75). Article 73, for instance, among others, states that “the Government of Ghana shall conduct its international affairs in consonance with the accepted principles of public international law and diplomacy in a manner consistent with the national interest of Ghana”⁹. Articles 74 and 75, on the other hand, seem to invest in the executive, represented by the President, and to a limited extent, parliament, the power to determine and formulate foreign policy in the country.

Indeed, works by Ghanaian media practitioners and scholars, of which there are many,¹⁰ deal tangentially with foreign policy. The impression one gets from this is that the role of the press in foreign policy is more often assumed than investigated. This is but to say that little effort has been made to establish empirically the nature of the behaviour that shapes the content of foreign policy, or the character of the mechanisms by which media coverage/report has had an effect on foreign policy-making and implementation.

This study is, therefore, an attempt to explore the impact if any, which the media have on foreign policy in Ghana, and to identify some of the constraints that intervene between the media and foreign policy. In other words, it seeks to look at how the media, by their work, help in the shaping of Ghana’s foreign policy,
both in formulation and implementation. To do this the study addresses the following questions:

- Do the media constitute a domestic source of foreign policy-making in Ghana?
- Does the press influence foreign policy through the shaping of foreign policy?
- What role does the press play in the implementation of foreign policy?

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study has the following objectives:

- To explore the contribution of the media to Ghana's foreign policy;
- To explore the influence of the press on foreign policy; and
- To advance an understanding of the way the Ghanaian media operate in relation to foreign policy.

1.4 HYPOTHESIS

This work is guided by the hypothesis that:

- The political environment, both external and internal, often determines the media's role in Ghana's foreign policy.

1.5 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

The media, no doubt, play a major role in foreign policy-making in most advanced democracies such as the US, where free expression and public opinion are maximally respected and accommodated. For instance, the media,
together with public opinion, in the US have often influenced and helped shape some aspect of America’s foreign policy especially regarding humanitarian interventions. Examples of some of these include Operation Restore Hope of 1992 in Somalia, and the US intervention in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1994. In the Bosnia Herzegovina’s conflict, for instance, it was after graphic images of the effects of a mortar shell, which had killed about 68 people and injured nearly 200 others, had been shown on the television, via ‘CNN’, that prompted quick reactions from the NATO member states. This has been made possible through empirical studies that have been conducted on the press and foreign policy in America.

However, in Ghana the contribution of the press to the shaping of foreign policy, by way of its formulation and implementation, is often assumed than investigated. In other words, such contribution by the press is seen as apparent than real. The danger, however, is that whenever one makes any such assumption, very little effort is made to unearth what really is the case. J. D. Kennamer (1992) vividly captures this scenario that, “when one assumes something, one does not have any reason to study it, ... and certainly allows no possibility for the discovery that perhaps it does not work”. This study is thus premised on the motivation that the press in Ghana is one of the vital components in the process of foreign policy-making. The media can be considered as vital in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in the sense that apart from informing and sensitizing the citizenry on policies of government, the media can also be seen
as setting the agenda that whip up interest and mould the opinions of the citizenry towards the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. As has been indicated earlier, the charting of foreign policy takes into consideration the interest of the nation, which the citizenry has a stake in. Hence, the more one can comprehend this web of relationship existing between the press and foreign policy the clearer would the role of the press in foreign policy become. This, therefore, calls for a study into the role of the media in the formulation and implementation of Ghana’s foreign policy.

1.6 LITERATURE REVIEW

In one of the major and pioneering works of the media and foreign policy in the US, Cohen\textsuperscript{13} assesses the influence and the role the American press makes on foreign policy-making through media report on foreign affairs and their sources of information. He holds two sets of conceptions of the role the press plays, or should play in foreign policy-making process. One set perceives it as a neutral reporter, providing information that enables others to play a part in the fashioning out of policy. Another set defines the press as an active participant playing effective role in the policy-making process.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Cohen, foreign policy in the US originates in the executive branch of government, in the White House, the Department of State, or the Department of Defense. Explaining the pattern of foreign policy in the US, he says from the executive branch it moves to the press, or it is picked up by the press, which has
the task of reporting it to the public. Then, after a careful deliberation the public makes up its mind on the issues and communicates its preferences to Congress. The Congress then will be in a position to act on the issues, or to react to them by letting the executive branch know what it thinks. In Cohen’s view, the only variation in this pattern excludes the stage of public consideration; in this view the press reports directly to Congress, which then is in a position to act or react as before. In each of these patterns, Cohen (1963) sees the press as occupying the strategic center from which it “neutrally transmits” the facts about foreign policy from one part of the political system to another, that is, from the government to the governed.

Cohen (1963) concludes that the Executive in the US is the initiator of foreign policy proposals, and the Congress reacts to them, taking into consideration public feelings as they may have been shaped by press coverage. Though this work bears semblance to the proposed topic in the sense that it talks about the press and its role in foreign policy, it is largely written in the American setting. Notwithstanding, this work will be relevant to the topic in the sense that it gives empirical support to the role the press plays in foreign policy.

On the other hand, Warren Strobel (1996), a correspondent at the White House in America, in an article, has sought to challenge the notion that the media influence the shaping of the final product of the U.S. foreign policy, especially in areas of military interventions. Citing instances of U.S. interventions in wars in
former Yugoslavia; the famine in Somalia, the ethnic slaughter in Rwanda and its resulting mass movement of refugees; and the refusal of coup leaders in Haiti to relinquish power, Strobel challenges the perception of the "CNN Effect". According to him "the notion of the 'CNN Effect' carries with it the idea that the news media independently point out problems and set the government foreign policy agenda, especially regarding crises that call for potential U.S. intervention".16

Making his argument and using the "Operation Restore Hope" in Somalia as an example, Strobel challenges the widely held belief of the "CNN Effect" on three accounts. First, according to him, the levels of television coverage were incompatible with the types of pressure usually associated with the "CNN Effect": sharp increases in the levels of television reporting tended to follow administration actions, rather than precede them. Second, the television coverage (and other media attention) that did take place was almost always a result, not of media initiative and agenda setting, but of deliberate and successful attempts by others - such as the US government relief officials, interested members of Congress, and representatives of NGOs and IGOs - to stir up media interest in Somalia in order to move policy. Finally, Strobel contends that interviews with numerous Bush administration officials made it clear that they intervened in Somalia largely because they expected it to be an exercise with low costs and high political benefit17. In short, Strobel does not see the press as wielding any influence or having impact on the outcome of a policy. He concludes
that, “the case most often held up as an example of the “CNN Effect” – in Somalia – falls apart under close examination. It was not the media that set the agenda in the fall of 1992, but the Bush administration itself, the Congress, and the relief officials in and out of government”. He intimated, however, that the horrible images did have an effect, though a narrow one.18

It should, however, be noted that in as much as Strobel tries to challenge the impact of the media on America’s foreign policy, he was not oblivious of the immense role the media play in foreign policy. For instance, though Strobel alludes to the fact that it was President Bush who set the media’s agenda regarding the intervention in Somalia, he, however, admitted and recognized the role of the media in this regard. According to him, “it remains possible that a relatively small number of dramatic television news reports moved Bush and his advisors sufficiently to prompt the dispatch of thousands of American combat troops...Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and other senior officials spoke of news media pressure as one factor that went into their decision”19. The news media is seen as one other agent that plays a significant role in foreign policy. This, therefore, makes Strobel’s work relevant to the topic.

In a paper20 Brandful looks at how one could differentiate between Ghana’s foreign policy with regards to ECOWAS and the role played by President J.J Rawlings as the then Chairman of the ECOWAS. He begins his exposition with a
reference to an article entitled, *Foreign Policy Formulation – A Diffuse and Complicated Process*. Brandful observes that in the United States of America, the President is the most powerful force in determining foreign policy. However, powerful as he is, the President is far from being able to make foreign policy on his own. The President takes into account the diffuse nature of power in the US, and the considerable influence that Congress, private and public interest groups, as well as the media and public opinion play in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. According to him, however, this intentional reference to American foreign policy is meant to serve as a backdrop to the discussion of some of Ghana’s procedures through which policy is formulated.

Focusing on Ghana, Brandful contends that it appears, from a careful reading of Ghana’s Constitution, that the President alone has the constitutional power and authority to initiate any formal action in the area of foreign affairs. This, in his view, contrasts with the practice in the US. He contends, however, that a variety of factors influence the actions, which result in the formulation of foreign policy in Ghana. He says, for instance, that even though the 1992 Constitution does not mention the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by name, it is known that this is the ministry responsible for coordinating the conduct of Ghana’s relations with other countries and the implementation of her foreign policy.

Ambassador K.B. Asante\(^2\) has also traced the trend of foreign policy in Ghana from Nkrumah’s regime till Rawlings’. He looks at the need for Ghana to chart
policies that are of priority to the nation in order to take advantage of the current wave of international politics, reminding readers of the external pressures. He also touched on cooperation as a priority to be considered, as he thinks that sovereignty is not absolute anymore, not even for the major powers in this shrinking multilateral world. However, much as Asante was placing more emphasis on the external factors affecting foreign policy-making, he was rather quite silent on other internal factors that play an equally important role in foreign policy-making. These, therefore, make it imperative to study the media’s role, as one of the internal factors that affect Ghana’s foreign policy formulation and implementation.

1.7 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to Antwi-Danso, international relations studies offer two basic approaches to understanding the foreign policies of states. These are: the constraints and opportunities of the international system; and the economic, social, and political characteristics of states. This means that foreign policies of states are heavily influenced and determined by both external and internal factors. The combination of the above approaches as proposed by Antwi-Danso, in practice constitute the explanations for the understanding of national foreign policies. He, therefore, proposes a framework within which foreign policy may be moulded or understood, and this includes: the international system; the flux of domestic politics; orientation of the incumbent; and the time in history. He believes that these factors act in concert to produce a foreign policy for a state.
Thus taking into consideration the approaches to the understanding of foreign policies of states, and for the purpose of this work we shall work within two theories – the pluralists' and the globalists' theories. Pluralism, alongside realism, was a theory that was in vogue in the 1970s. The pluralists' theory rejects the realists' assertion that the state is a unitary actor. The pluralists are of the view that "the state is not a reified entity – an abstraction to be treated as if it were physical being that acts with single minded determination, always a coherent manner". The pluralists, instead, see the state as composed of individual bureaucracies, interest groups, and individuals that attempt to formulate or influence foreign policy. In their view, for instance, to speak of a 'US foreign policy' is to speak of a number of foreign policy decisions determined by competition among a number of actors such as the Executive branch, represented by the President, the Legislature, the public, the media, and other individuals and interest groups. The pluralists, therefore, see the state as disintegrated made up of different component parts as opposed to the view held by the realists that the state is an integrated entity.

The pluralists further challenge the usefulness of the realist assumption that sees the state as a rational actor. According to Viotti and Kauppi, this challenge "follows logically from the pluralist image of the disaggregated state in which the foreign policy decision-making process is the result of clashes, bargaining, and compromise between and among different actors". From the foregoing, the
theory of pluralism seeks to make intelligible the notion that the state (represented by the government in power – incumbent) is not the sole determining factor in foreign policies of states. Rather, the state is composed of different components such as individual bureaucracies, interest groups, and other individuals, among others that attempt to formulate, influence or play a role in foreign policy. This, therefore, sees foreign policy choice as occurring in an environment of multiple and competing interests, that is to say, the flux of domestic politics and the orientation of the incumbent. The media’s role is seen as one of the competing interests that influence foreign policy.

Another theory worth looking at, and which is relevant to this work is that of globalism. Unlike pluralism, it is only recently that attention has been focused on the globalist perspective.27 Globalists assume that the starting point of analysis for international relations is the global context within which states and other entities interact. This theory emphasizes the overall structure of the international system. In other words, in order to be able to explain the behaviour of states, one must first grasp the essence of the global environment within which such behaviour takes place. This is a dominant theme within the globalist image/perspective, although some realists and pluralists share this view as well. According to Viotti and Kauppi, understanding the external behaviour of states requires more than merely examining factors internal to the state28 such as the Executive, the Legislature, the media and public opinion, and individuals or groups of individuals or organisations. That is to say, the structure of the system
at a particular time determines or influences largely the kind of foreign policies states make. For instance, the tight bipolar regime of the Cold War era influenced largely foreign policies of states. Nkrumah's policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment was necessary and appropriate at the time during the peak of the Cold War. Similarly, Finland's neutrality in the Cold War helped ensure her survival in the face of a powerful and threatening neighbour, Soviet Union, which was an active player in the systemic structure at the time. The structure of the international system may include alliances (be they military or economic), international law, membership of international organizations, international treaties and conventions, among others.

The globalists assume further that, it is not only useful but also imperative to view international relations from a historical perspective. This is because, it is contended, it is only through an examination of history that one can understand the current environment within which politics takes place. The use of the above theories of international relations as the theoretical framework will help us understand the nature of foreign policy formulation and implementation and the competing roles that other interest groups; both internal and external; and individuals, beside the state, play. As it is succinctly captured by Russett and Starr, "the menu for any state is constrained or affected not only by its own capabilities, goals, policies, and actions but also by those of the state with which it interacts". The effective role of the media is seen within the interplay of both internal and external influences on foreign policies of states. This is because, just
like the decision-makers, the media’s role in foreign policy is constrained by the influences of both the internal and external environments.

1.8 DEFINITION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Among the key concepts that are used in the work include the following:

- **Media/Press:** - These are used interchangeably to refer to the print and the electronic media, that is, newspapers, television and radio stations.
- **Foreign Policy:** - It refers to that policy evolved by a state in its relations with other states.
- **Foreign Policy-Making:** - This refers to the process of evolving a principle of action by a state in relation to other states.
- **Decision-Making:** - A process being adopted to achieve a desired course of action.
- **National Interest:** - This refers to that interest of the state that can never be compromised, no matter the government in power, such as the protection and enhancement of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, national security, and the enhancement of the socio-economic well being of the citizenry.
- **Economic Diplomacy:** - This refers to the foreign policy designed by the PNDC/NDC government that seeks to maintain friendly relations with all countries and create the enabling environment for foreign capital inflows.
- **Cold War:** - It refers to the ideological rivalry that existed between the USA and her allies on one hand, and the former Soviet Union and its
allies on the other. This period was often punctuated by proxy wars and exchanges but never did the two opposing blocs engage each other in a military war.

- **Non-alignment and Positive Neutrality:** It represents non-commitment to the world's dominant ideological blocs, and the preservation of the right and freedom to judge world issues on their own merit. It entailed staying off clearly from any military or political alliance with any of the powers in the Cold War era.

- **Non-Aligned Movement:** It refers to an organisation of mostly developing countries that came into being during the period of the Cold War. Its purpose is to ensure that members stay neutral during the Cold War and at the same time fosters a closer relations and cooperation between member states as a way of attaining world peace and economic development.

- **Neo-Colonialism:** This was seen by Nkrumah as a situation representing imperialism in its final stage. According to him, a state subject to neo-colonialism in theory is independent but has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty – with economic system and, consequently, its political policy controlled from outside.

- **Imperialism:** This term was originally used as an invective against the expansionist policy of Napoleon I, and a little later against the expansionist policy of Britain. It is used in this context to refer to political
and economic exploitation of the developing nations by the capitalist countries.

- **Pan-Africanism**: This is used to refer to the ideals of liberation, unification, and development of the African continent.

### 1.9 SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

This study was conducted using secondary sources of data collection.

- The *Daily Graphic*, the *Ghanaian Times*, the *Evening News*, *The Spark*, the *Pioneer*, the *Chronicle*, the *Sunday Mirror*, and the *Legon Observer* were sampled for editorials, features, and articles on aspects of Ghana's foreign policy for analysis.

- Journals, Articles, Books, Pamphlets, and other scholarly works and publications relevant to the topic were used and consulted where appropriate.

### 1.10 LIMITATIONS

It should be noted that this work is an exploratory attempt and as a result not much work has already been done on the topic. As a result, there seems to be lack of adequate literature on the topic. Moreover, it was the original plan of the work to trace the role of the media in all the regimes – from independence to the present regime – this could not be done looking at the volume of the work and the time constraint. The study was, therefore, limited to some selected regimes of government - the Nkrumah regime (1957-66), the NLC regime (1966-69), Busia regime (1969-72) and the NDC regime under President Rawlings (1993-2000).
Consequently, the eight newspapers sampled for the work were largely limited to the periods of the selected regimes.

1.11 ARRANGEMENT OF CHAPTERS

There are Four Chapters. Chapter One, which is the introduction, consists of the background statement, problem statement, objectives, rationale, literature review, theoretical framework, limitations and the arrangement of chapters,

Chapter Two looks at the press and foreign policy in the USA. It takes a look at the role of the press in some selected instances of the US military interventions and humanitarian aid as a case study.

Chapter Three looks at the role of the press and Ghana's foreign policy on epochal basis. The regimes selected for study include the Nkrumah, Busia, NLC, and the NDC regimes.

Chapter Four, which is the concluding chapter, consists of findings, summary and conclusion of the work.
END NOTES


6 Source: Internet@DIA.interview.htm, (DIA interview with Richard P. O'Neill, Deputy Director, Strategy and Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, USA. (August 26, 1997).


9 See the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, p. 62


14 Ibid. Pp.19-20


16 Ibid. p. 364
17 Ibid. p. 360
18 Ibid. p. 366
19 Ibid. p. 364


21 Asante, K.B., Foreign Policy Making in Ghana, Gold-Type Ltd., Accra, 1997

23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. p. 8
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid. p. 9


CHAPTER TWO

THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE U.S

This chapter focuses on the role of the press in America's foreign policy. It discusses briefly, among others, the role of the press in either influencing or helping to shape America's foreign policy especially in the areas of military interventions and foreign aids/assistance. The chapter seeks to put in focus the role that the media play elsewhere, as a prelude to the main work, which looks at it from the perspective of Ghana. In doing this it should be emphasized that this chapter is not meant to presuppose any comparative analysis between the foreign policies of Ghana and US. Instead, it is meant to bring to the fore the role that the media play in the US as a way of sharpening our understanding and appreciation of what pertains in Ghana. It is also meant to emphasize our point that the media really play a role in foreign policy.

The making of foreign policy in America involves a host of agencies. Beside the executive branch of government that often initiates foreign policy, the legislature, private and public interests, and the media, to an extent, contribute to the making and implementation of foreign policy. The role of the media in America's foreign policy is well recognized and acknowledged. According to Cohen, "the most obvious external impingement on the governmental foreign policy making process" for instance, "is that of the press: day after day, with great persistence, the press invades the official circle of policy-makers, while other segments of the
public try with indifferent success to get just an occasional hearing.¹ According to Cohen, the impact of the media in the USA is felt in the sense that foreign policy making officials such as those in the State Department get information sooner through the press than through official routes. Besides, the press is seen as providing an independent report, outside of the diplomatic channel, on what is happening around the world. Cohen, therefore, sees the press in America as providing access to officers/specialists and other agents or officials of foreign policy-making agents of information, and thus these officials eventually become dependent on the media for their broader knowledge of international developments.² It is further said that Ross Perot declared in his 1992 US presidential election campaign³ that instantaneous world-wide communications have rendered embassies and their inhabitants relics of the days of sailing ships. What this means is that with the availability of modern news media technologies that can instantaneously transmit video signals to and from virtually every corner of the globe, the work of officials of embassies that involves, among others, supplying the US government of intelligence reports that previously helped in the formulating of foreign policies is really in peril. This is due to the fact that more sophisticated news media have heavily established the needed on-the-spot information that are often reliable and even more effective than the previously undue delay experienced in coding and decoding of intelligence reports from officials of foreign embassies.
Furthermore, Eban⁴ contends that in the late 1960s, American public, via the media, exercised greater pressure on US negotiators against persistence in the Vietnam War. According to him, Henry Kissinger has recorded that the Nixon administration’s bargaining position was weakened by evidence that the public settled for unconditional withdrawal without making any demands on Hanoi for reciprocal concessions. Making references to recent developments and the role of the press, Eban further contends that the intervention in Sarajevo was made possible with graphic images by the media. He, for instance, believes that it was only when visual portrayal of terrorist bombardments with dozens of dead and maimed finally became unendurable in the living rooms of officials of the Western countries – via television - that NATO countries brought up aircraft carriers and bomber squadrons, in a bid to stem the mayhem. He is of the opinion that “it was only when the outrage of ethnic cleansing became visual on television screens, with pitiful portrayals of masses moving away from their homes toward uncertain destinies, that negotiated settlements became possible”⁵

For the role of the media in America’s foreign policy to be clearly seen this chapter is focusing on some instances of America’s interventions that the role of the media made outstanding.

### 2.1 US INTERVENTION IN THE VIETNAM WAR (1964-1973)

America became militarily involved in the Vietnam War in 1961, according to “The Media Report”⁶, when as part of US strategy for South East Asia President
The US untimely withdrawal from the war as a result of intense domestic outcry, however, is often attributed to the role the media reports played during the war. Vietnam was the first ever televised war, which was largely uncensored, and as a result the media could report the war with vivid detail back in the US. According to *The American News Media in Vietnam*<sup>⁹</sup>, the media could not be censored in Vietnam largely because Congress never officially declared it a war and that the US were “formally ‘guest’ of the Vietnamese government...so for the first time in the twentieth century the media were able to cover a war with nearly the freedom they have covering political news in the United States”. As a result of this situation the American news media coverage of the war served as a catalyst for helping to shape American public opinion, resulting in political pressures that forced the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam. The televised and graphic images and the horrified stories of the war carried by the major newspapers and television stations were enough to incite public outcry and anger at the US government to pull out of the war. According to *The Media Report*<sup>⁹</sup>, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Armed Forces in Vietnam (General William Westmoreland) was of the view that television, for instance, presented special problems and brought the war into American homes. Consequently, the war that Americans saw via television was almost exclusively violent, miserable, or controversial - guns firing, men falling, helicopters crashing, buildings toppling, huts burning, refugees fleeing, and women wailing. According to the General, "a shot of a single building in ruins could give an impression of an entire town destroyed. The propensity of cameramen at Kasan to pose their commentators
before a wrecked C130 and deliver reports in a tone of voice suggesting
doomsday was all too common°.10 Furthermore, recounting a nightmarish
experience about the war, Lawrence Lichty, a Professor from the North Western
University of Illinois, says that "when I watched the NBC one night and saw what
we now describe as the Louan shooting, seeing General Nuoc Louan with a
pistol in his hand in the streets of Saigon... and shot a captured Viet Cong
suspect right through the head, ...that story on Friday night on American
television was witnessed by 25-million people***. These picturesque scenes
during the war, provided by the media, spurred a public outcry and later alienated
the American government, forcing an end to the war. It can, therefore, be said
that the role of the press in the Vietnam War helped put an end to American's
involvement in the war, as the public back home could no longer contain their
emotions on the horrific images being televised on the screens and the horrible
stories read in the newspapers.

2.2 US INTERVENTION IN THE GULF WAR – OPERATION

DESERT STORM (1990–1991)

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 was the first major crisis of the
post-Cold War era. At the beginning of the crisis, 140,000 Iraqi troops and 1,800
tanks moved into Kuwait, including two Republican Guard divisions - the
Hammurabi and the Medina.12 The origin of the invasion by Iraq of Kuwait,
according to Razali and Kikim, can be traced to the Iran-Iraq War, fought
between 1980-1988. At the end of this war, Iraq was burdened with massive
allied states overran the forces of Saddam, and by March 3 1991, Iraq had accepted UN Security Council Resolution 686, which dictated to Iraq the terms of her defeat.

With this victory, the coalition forces, made up, largely, of US forces, achieved completely the first three of the four goals, as elaborated above, and achieved the fourth in part. It cannot be doubted here that even though the initiative was taken by the Bush administration to intervene in Kuwaiti invasion, the role played by the media in this is well recommended. Through the media, even long before the outcome of the war was certain, public opinion was enough to convince the Bush administration that Americans would support the intervention effort. This can be attributed to the fact that the extensive media coverage of the crisis itself – via CNN - and later the war, solidified public opinion and kept it as it developed. According to Strobel, the media “was seen most vividly during the Persian Gulf War when the Bush White House, knowing that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s top aides were reluctant to bring him bad news, got into Saddam’s living room via CNN”. Thus the media played a dual role in this regard, helping both in the formulation and implementation of the policy of intervention in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The media succeeded in marshalling support, both domestically and internationally for *Operation Desert Storm*. 
2.3 US INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA - OPERATION RESTORE HOPE (1992-1993)

Somalia, often referred to as the Horn of Africa, which is situated along the East Coast of Africa, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, progressively slid into anarchy two decades earlier with the military overthrow of the constitutional government of Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. According to Razali and Kikim, “the logic of military dictatorship compelled Barre to rely on the use of force to settle political disputes”. But the end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s assured the irrelevance and consequent weakening of client-authoritarian regimes such as Barre’s in Somalia, which according to Powers had previously been dependent on the USSR. With the end of the Cold War, and, therefore, lack of support from the USSR, it took only a minor push by Somalian opposition forces to overthrow the once formidable dictator, Siad Barre.

Opposition to Barre’s regime came from two major sources – the Somali National Movement (SNM) and later the United Somali Congress (USC), which was based in the south around Mogadishu and later joined the SNM in opposition to Barre’s regime. These two groups, realising the weakness of Barre, in 1990 launched increased guerrilla attacks on government facilities in both the north and south. This led to the lost of power by Barre who realising danger fled to Nigeria in December 1991, after his army had been routed by the opposition forces. But the unfortunate happened when the USC, which controlled Mogadishu, splintered
into competing factions. This splintering of the USC is seen as largely responsible for the subsequent scale of mayhem that attracted international attention. In the struggle for supreme political power between the two key figures in the USC, General Mohamed Farar Aideed and Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Mogadishu was laid waste by the armed activities of the two warlords and their sub-clans – the Habre Gedir-Hawiye and Abgal-Hawiye.\textsuperscript{22} The death and famine, which spread throughout Somalia due to the conflict, via media reports especially the CNN, prompted the widespread demands for international efforts to restore order and contain the human tragedy in the Horn region. This was the time when the Persian Gulf War had barely ended.

The US became concerned and decided to intervene in Somalia on humanitarian grounds to restore hope by providing humanitarian needs such as food, medicine and other services to curb the death, especially, of infants, and famine that was spreading throughout Somalia. This was one instance of US intervention that the media have been seen to have played an immense role both in the formulation and implementation of the humanitarian policies of the US government. According to Strobel, for instance, there were exactly fifteen television reports on Somalia prior to Bush's August 1992 decision to begin an airlift. He is, however, of the view that the decision of August 1992 rather resulted in a burst of reporting.\textsuperscript{23} Notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that the graphic pictures shown on the CNN and other Television networks at the time of the carnage and the consequent famine played a great role in the US's intervention. Indeed, most
often than not reportage of journalists of events are not basically meant to influence or impact on decision-making, but are rather meant to inform the viewing or reading public of what is really going on as they happen.

Either way one views it, the media played a role in America’s intervention in Somalia, both in the formulation and implementation of the government’s policy on intervention. In helping to formulate policies of intervention and withdrawal, the initial graphic pictures of starving children, and the later televised image of a dead American soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, via CNN pictures, respectively prompted the sending of American soldiers, and at the same time created an outcry for the return of the soldiers. By this, the media can be seen as helping in the shaping of foreign policy-making. It is in this light that Madeleine Albright’s pronouncements that “television’s ability to bring graphic images of pain and outrage into our living rooms has heightened the pressure on both immediate engagements in areas of international crisis and immediate disengagement when events do not go according to plan”24, becomes palpable. On the other hand, televised and graphic images of humanitarian suffering and horrible conditions of people, with images of mass violence among others, contributed to people’s appreciation and, even justification, of American intervention.25 In a sense, the media played a great role in the Somali crisis and the subsequent intervention by the US.
2.4 **US INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA (1994-1995)**

Bosnia, formerly Bosnia-Herzegovina, became officially independent on April 7, 1992, after it had declared its independence, from the Republic of Yugoslavia, in March 1992. It was accepted as a member of the UN on May 22 1992. In the first multi-party election in the history of the republic, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (PDA) won 86 seats, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) took 72 seats, and the Croat Democratic Union (CDU) won 44 seats in the new parliament. According to Razali and Kikim, between 1991 and 1992 the governing coalition of the three national parties became polarised over the issue of secession from the Yugoslavia federation. Although supported by Croats and Muslims, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s drive for independence was faced with enormous obstacles. In the wake of European Community’s recognition of an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs launched a massive civil war with the support of the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia National Army. The strategy was to carve out ethnically homogenous territories that could then autonomously relate to the truncated Yugoslavia state. “The conflict led to the establishment of detention centres by Serbian groups and others in which some captives were mistreated and hundreds killed.”

Meanwhile, the US government had remained adamant to the plight of the Bosnians in the face of media reports and “even pressure from Congress and the UN for the US government to do something to stop the outrages perpetrated against the Bosnia’s Muslims”. According to Strobel, in August 1992, for
instance, *Newsday* reported the existence of a string of detention camps where Bosnian Serbs were torturing, raping, and killing. Within few days, August 6, 1992, Britain’s Independent Television Network (ITN) confirmed the worst when it showed images of emaciated men trapped behind barbed wire.\textsuperscript{28} But a day after the ITN televised report, Bush demanded that the Serbs opened the camps to international access, and a week later, with US support, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 770, demanding outside access to the camps. This decision was, however, not effective as the Resolution 770 was never implemented.\textsuperscript{29} Bush’s apprehension could be understood from the statement he made on August 7 1992, a day after the ITN televised report. According to Strobel, Bush recalled Vietnam saying, "I do not want to see the United States bogged down in any way into some guerrilla warfare. We lived through that once".\textsuperscript{30}

Understandably, the US could not risk committing her troops to Bosnia, for fear of casualties that was considered as high cost to America. Moreover, the experience of Somalia, where the image of an American soldier was being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, in October 1993 under the full blares of TV cameras, was very recent in their minds.

However, the February 5, 1994 ITN, and later CNN, report of the *marketplace massacre* bombing that killed 68 civilians and wounded about 200 in Sarajevo changed the previously held policy of the US government. In the words of Strobel, "in the aftermath of the attack and the public outcry, the United States abandoned its hands-off policy toward the Balkans conflict. It led the NATO in
issuing an ultimatum to the Bosnia's capital... Sarajevo's enjoyed a bit of normalcy after nearly two years of siege.\textsuperscript{31} Public opinion, with regards to the US involvement in Bosnia crisis increased from a low of 26% in January 1993 to about 73% in April 1994.\textsuperscript{32} It can be deduced that the televised images of horrifying scenes in Sarajevo market after the February 1994 incident spurred on the public to demand the US government to “do something” about the crisis. This clearly seems to be the case where graphic images of happenings in Sarajevo led the US government into, or at least toward, intervention. It also reinforces the role the press plays in foreign policy either in helping to shape the final product of a government policy at its formulation stage or help in the implementation of it.

So far this chapter has been able to chart a trend that indicates the immense role the media play in foreign policy especially in the US, in areas of intervention. Undeniably, this work has succeeded in showing the immense contribution the media make by looking at its role in America’s foreign policy. In doing that it became clear also that the media, by their reportage, have had to, in one way or the other, influence to a large extent the decisions of policy-makers in either being prompted to act faster than would otherwise have been expected, or at times even have to compel decision-makers to take actions they would not have taken in the first place. For instance, Lt Gen. Anthony Zinni of the US Marine Corps is of the view that television has captured the initiative in defining the context in which events take place, how they are proceeding, and how the military, for instance, is performing. He says, “we have to tune in to CNN to see
how we are doing”, adding that, “instantaneous coverage puts enormous pressure on the military commanders because their tactics and casualties are scrutinised immediately and what the media reports impacts on the morale of the troops.”. On the other hand, Strobel is of the view that, in playing its role, the press seems to have an impact when policy was weakly held, was already in the process of being changed, or was lacking public support. In a nutshell, no matter how one looks at it, the role of the media in foreign policy cannot be underemphasized. The media really help in the shaping of foreign policies.
END NOTES


2 Ibid. p.138


5 Ibid. p. 88


7 Ibid.

8 The American News Media in Vietnam, January 23, 1999 (Downloaded from the Internet)


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Yetiv, 1991:10, quoted in Razali & Kikim, Intervention Issues in the Post-Cold War, 1998 (downloaded from the Internet)

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Blair, 1992, quoted in Razali and Kikim, op. cit.

16 Ibid.
17 Strobel, W. P., *The CNN Effect*, in *JOUR/IR 246: International Communication Online* (Downloaded from the Internet)

18 Razli & Kikim, op. cit.

19 Tim Powers, *The Post-Cold War Experiment*, 1999 (Downloaded from the Internet)

20 Razali and Kikim, op. cit.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Strobel, W.P., op. cit.

24 Madeleine Albright, DIA Interview with Richard P. O'Neill, USA, August 26, 1997

25 Intervention, which amounts to interference in a country's internal affairs, is an affront to the Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, but this action could be justifiable or permissible on grounds of provision of humanitarian services/assistance.

26 Razali & Kikim, op. cit

27 Ibid.

28 Strobel, W.P., op. cit.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid. p. 367

31 Ibid. p. 371

32 Razali and Kikim, op. cit


34 Strobel, W.P., op. cit.
CHAPTER THREE

THE MEDIA AND GHANA'S FOREIGN POLICY

this chapter, an attempt is made to trace the role that the media play in hana's foreign policy. In doing this, specific political regimes, which governed hana, are selected to analyze the media’s role in the promotion of their foreign policies. The regimes selected for study are the Convention People's Party (CPP) government of Nkrumah - 1957-66, the National Liberation Council (NLC) under General Ankrah- 1966-1969, the Progress Party (PP) government of Busia- 1969-1972, and the National Democratic Congress (NDC) government of Rawlings - 1993-2000.

hana's foreign policy, since independence, has been heavily influenced by economic and security imperatives in advancing the national interest, and by the nature of the leadership of the regime, as well as the constraints and challenges of the prevailing structure of the international system. This notwithstanding, hana's foreign policy can be said to reflect four major themes. However, there have been differences in form and approach as well as discontinuities along the way due mainly to such factors as priorities of the regime or government of the day, changing issues in world politics, flux of domestic politics, historical antecedents, and responses to the imperatives of the African continent.

The four major themes that have dominated the agenda of foreign policy
decision-makers include:

- Emancipation of Africa and the restoration of the dignity of the Black Race;
- Pursuit of world peace through the policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment;
- International cooperation through intergovernmental organisations such as the UN, ECOWAS, OAU, NAM, and Commonwealth, among others;
- Establishment of Africa’s power and influence in global affairs.

There is, however, another prevailing theme, that is “Economic Diplomacy”, which is a characteristic feature of the current regime/government (the NDC government). “Economic Diplomacy”, as a foreign policy of the NDC government, is a policy response to the prevailing international imperative of post-Cold War era and the wave of globalisation. This policy, according to J.A. Laryea (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs),¹ emphasises trade and investment promotional activities and the active involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its Missions abroad. “Economic Diplomacy” is not, however distinctly divorced from the major themes above, in the sense that it involves cooperation and multilateralism, the pursuit of security, stability and peace within the sub-region as a recipe for attracting Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), as well as the establishment of influence in Africa, by Ghana, as a ‘gateway’ to Africa.
3.1.0 THE MEDIA AND NKRUMAH'S FOREIGN POLICY (1957-1966)

3.1.1 NKRUMAH'S FOREIGN POLICY

As the first nation, south of the Sahara to attain political independence, Ghana under Nkrumah set the tone for the direction of Ghana's foreign policy with his historic pronouncement and often quoted dictum that "we are going to see that we create our own African personality and identity...we again rededicate ourselves in the struggle to emancipate other countries in Africa; for our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of African continent". With this statement came the direction of Ghana's foreign policy. Consequently, the concept of a free, proud and confident Africa was to dominate the foreign policy of Ghana.

From the time he made his historic pronouncement on the total liberation of the African continent, Nkrumah never looked back in his efforts to see to the realisation of his vision of emancipating the continent from colonialism and to ensure a united Africa. This became his major task. Indeed, Nkrumah saw that the only route to a true African independence – economic as well as political - was through the creation of a continental Union Government of Africa. Thus for Africa to remain free and enjoy the full benefit of the continent's resources, Nkrumah saw the answer to be in an United Africa. To demonstrate a practical commitment to the course of decolonization and Pan-Africanism, Nkrumah organised the first Conference of Independent African States (IAS) in April 1958, in Accra. This was followed by the All African People's Conference (AAPC) in
December the same year in Accra. The AAPC conference, which was successful particularly in attendance, brought together 62 delegates from Liberation Movements in Africa and other parts of the world. Most of the participants of the conference were later to become leaders of their own countries. These included Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika (Tanzania), Robert Mugabe of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Lumumba of Congo DR, Odinga-Odinga of Kenya, and Kamuzu Banda of Nyasaland (Malawi).6

After the conference Nkrumah further provided material assistance in the form of money, arms, and military training to the liberation fighters to give practical meaning to his vision of total decolonization of the African continent. Seeing the liberation struggle and the eventual independence of African continent as a necessary condition for African Unity, Nkrumah waged a relentless war "against apartheid and the illegal regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia".7 With the independence of Guinea, Nkrumah formed a union with Guinea in May 1959, which was later extended to Mali to constitute the nucleus of an African Union concept.

In pursuance of his African policy, Nkrumah saw the need not to align Ghana to any of the camps of the prevailing bipolar structure at the time. Nkrumah, for instance, viewed it as suicidal for emerging states in Africa, especially, to ideologically align themselves to either the East or the West. Non-alignment and positive neutrality8 was, therefore, seen by Nkrumah as the most rational policy
option for the emerging nations as a counterbalance to the prevailing bipolar structure in order to achieve the African Union policy. Non-alignment can, therefore, be seen as a measure adopted to avoid being caught up in the cross-fire between the USSR and the USA. Nkrumah succeeded in maintaining a balance in his government's relations with the ideological blocs during the first part of his rule. However, Nkrumah's pro-Eastern foreign policy in the 1960s made most pro-Western politicians to doubt his sincerity to non-alignment.

With the policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality came the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It comprised developing countries, which wished to avoid the politics of the Cold War. The founding members of the NAM, which included Nkrumah, felt that it was too dangerous for any developing country to try to align with any of the major powers in the Cold War. Its formation was to identify countries which shared common interest with the founders. In preference for multilateralism, Nkrumah never saw the NAM as an end in itself but rather as a means to an end. According to K. B. Asante (1997), the NAM and the Commonwealth came to be regarded by Nkrumah as "instruments for the prosecution of his African policy". As a member of the Commonwealth, Nkrumah's foreign policy was, for instance called to question by some of the radical African leaders. Lumumba and Toure in particular were very much against Ghana's membership in the Commonwealth and thus called Nkrumah to withdraw. Nkrumah, however, had his own plan. He explained that "the Commonwealth was to be used to help African states still under British
domination to attain independence". For instance, at the 1965 Commonwealth Conference, Nkrumah introduced a Plan of Action for the independence of Rhodesia, and was able to achieve a consensus on it. The plan provided for the repeal of all repressive laws, the release of all political prisoners, the convening of a constitutional conference to draft a new non-racial constitution and free elections based on universal adult suffrage. This plan was accepted, and endured, even after Nkrumah's exit, and eventually saw Rhodesia to independence.

Nkrumah further saw the UN as an avenue for the maintenance of world peace. In an address to Parliament, Nkrumah stressed the importance of the UN and the Commonwealth. Though he realized some shortcomings in the UN Security Council, Nkrumah never lost faith in the UN. In Nkrumah's contention, "in spite of the imperfections, the UN provides the surest guarantee of world peace." Indicating his confidence and preference for the UN as a multilateral organisation, Nkrumah had earlier written to President Soekarno of Indonesia on the latter's decision to withdraw from the UN. Nkrumah, in his letter, reminded Soekarno that his withdrawal meant the influence and solidarity of the Afro-Asian states would be greatly impaired. He told Soekarno that "there are other ways in which you can register your protest rather than complete withdrawal from the UN". Thus, Nkrumah preferred multilateralism, as he saw Ghana's membership in such organisations - UN, NAM, OAU, and Commonwealth - as providing the platform for the realisation of his African liberation policy.
Nkrumah's foreign policy made him very influential in Africa and the world at large. As a pan-Africanist and advocate of decolonization, and world peace, Nkrumah became a world figure, thereby putting Ghana on a higher stature in international politics. It was, therefore, of no coincidence that Ghana was seen as the 'star of Africa'. Boafo-Arthur (1989), sums it up thus, "with an avowed commitment to fight the eradication of the 'last vestiges' of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism on the African continent, Ghana pioneered black Africa's entry into international affairs". Undoubtedly, Ghana under Nkrumah's leadership accomplished a great deal in world politics and also set the broad foreign policy parameters which have really influenced the choices made by the successive regimes in Ghana.

3.1.2 THE MEDIA IN NKRUMAH'S FOREIGN POLICY

Nkrumah's government nurtured Ghana's major foreign policy issues. According to Boafo-Arthur (1989), "the person who did a great deal to fashion...foreign policy for Ghana is Dr. Nkrumah". It was the period that the pan-African sentiments were so high, and that such words like neo-colonialism and imperialism were used to refer to what were seen as external influences and interference. Within this environment the media's role in foreign policy can be seen as mainly that of propaganda. With the pan-African sentiments so high the media sought to sensitise and educate the citizenry on Nkrumah's foreign policies.
The media under Nkrumah can be seen as championing Ghana's foreign policies, in the sense that they sought to propagate and to a large proselytize Nkrumah's foreign policies. Nkrumah’s policy statements were, for instance, widely covered by the media, and in some instances, they defended some of Nkrumah's foreign policy positions that had become a matter of concern to other countries. For instance, in defence of Nkrumah's policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment the *Ghanaian Times* of May 24, 1964 was of the view that in so far as it was proper, and was considered right for the US and Britain to trade with the then Soviet Union, it was equally proper for Ghana to also trade with the Soviet Union, without being regarded as commitment or alignment. This was at a time that some of Nkrumah's foreign policies were considered as pro-East, and, therefore, a betrayal of his non-aligned stance. The paper wondered why “if Britain or America trades with Russia this is not regarded as commitment or alignment’ but when Ghana trades with the Soviet Union it is considered to be alignment or non-neutralism”.

The media defended some of Nkrumah's policies to the extent that they sought justification for some of Nkrumah’s “hostile and unfriendly policies toward some of his African neighbours”. For instance, on accusations by the Afro-Malaghasy Joint Organisation (OCAM), comprising Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) that Nkrumah had been fomenting subversive activities against them and, therefore, threatened to boycott the impending OAU Summit in Accra, some sections of the Ghanaian press were of different views, brushing aside the accusations. The *Ghanaian Times*, for instance, claimed that the real objective of the OCAM countries was to
destroy the OAU, with Ghana being the convenient scapegoat since the next summit Conference was to be held in Accra. The *Daily Graphic* and the *Evening News*, on the other hand, rather accused the USA of being the instigator of the anti-Ghana campaign by the French-speaking African states. The *Daily Graphic*, for instance, considered the CIA of the US to be the principal financier of the OCAM countries.20

Furthermore, in trying to sensitise and educate majority of the citizenry on Nkrumah's foreign policy, some of the newspapers – *Evening News* and *The Spark* - published in other local as well as foreign languages, beside the official English language used, for a wider reading public. Besides publishing in English, as the official language, the *Evening News* published in the same issue in about five local languages (Ga, Fanti, Twi, Ewe, and Hausa), pidgin English, and in French as well. During Nkrumah's twelve-day state visit to Nigeria in January-February 1959, the *Evening News*, seeing the visit as a positive step towards the march to African Unity, published in all the languages cited above the messages of the African union concept.21 To widen further the reading and its campaign towards African Unity, *The Spark* also began publishing in Portuguese. The first edition of this issue was published on July 22, 1965, about three months to the hosting of the OAU Summit in Accra. In a message on the front page President Nkrumah said "the unassailable case for the continental political union of Africa" was to be one of the tasks before the newspaper.22 Thus by Nkrumah's statement it is clear that the media were seen to be the avenue of
reaching out to people and educating them on the foreign policies of the government. The contention that the role of the media in Nkrumah’s foreign policy can be seen as propagating and educating people on his policies is further buttressed by other instances. In a New Year message to African Journalists, Kofi Batsa, Secretary General of the Pan-Africa Union of Journalists, urged the African Press to wage a struggle in support of a continental union government for Africa, which was a brainchild of Nkrumah. Also at a sod-cutting ceremony on June 24, 1964, where the foundation stone of the Ghana News Agency (GNA) building was laid, the chairman of the Board of Directors, C.V.M. Ford, said among other things that, “in addition to its normal duties, the Agency will contribute to and support Dr. Nkrumah’s hope of an early realization of a Union Government in Africa”.

Beside the fact that the media were largely sensitising and educating people on the major foreign policies of Nkrumah’s government, and also at times defending some of the government’s policies, the media also influenced the government in some of the decisions it made. On February 8, 1964, the CPP government announced the deportation of four Americans, a British and a French (all staff of University of Ghana) on accusations of subversion. These deportations only came after strong attacks on the deportees in some of the newspapers. The *Ghanaian Times*, for instance, in its previous edition before the deportation, had called for the “elimination of”, what it termed, “pockets of subversion” in the University. As a sequel to the deportation action, the government decided to
discontinue the services of the US Peace Corps volunteers at the expiration of the contract with the US government. This action resulted in a diplomatic hitch between Ghana and the US. But the decision of the Nkrumah government was later to be seen as contradictory as barely three months after the deportation of the American Professors and the eventual strain in relations with the US government the CPP government turned around to seek economic support from the US government. This became imminent when the CPP government realized that it needed to attract foreign capital from the US to help rebuild the country's rapidly deteriorating economy, due mainly to decline in world price of cocoa.26

In a nutshell, it can be said that the dominant role of the media in Nkrumah's foreign policy was that of coverage of the CPP government's policy statements, sensitizing and educating people on the government's foreign policies, and also defending and presenting forcefully the stand of the government on major international issues. This was so due mainly to the fact that at the time pan-African sentiments were extremely high.

3.2 THE MEDIA AND THE NLC’S FOREIGN POLICY

3.2.1 FOREIGN POLICY UNDER THE NLC

The National Liberation Council (NLC), which ousted the Nkrumah regime in
February 1966 had to contend with the initial problem of attaining international recognition. In the opinion of Boafo-Arthur (1989), the overwhelming popularity of the leader the NLC deposed in 1966 presented it with initial problems in the international arena. This is because the coup was generally not welcome in Africa and the early part of its rule was, therefore, devoted to legitimising it and also attaining international recognition.

The NLC's attempt at gaining international recognition was based on a strategy of reversing the militant and often aggressive foreign policy posture of the regime it overthrew. The NLC, however, in principle accepted and affirmed their commitment to the country's traditional foreign policy, as had been fashioned by Nkrumah's government. In the words of General Ankrah, Chairman of the NLC government, "...we have endeavoured to keep to our declared policies of non-alignment, balanced neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states". Emphasising the need to continue with Nkrumah's policy, Ankrah continued that "some of our detractors have erroneously stated that with the overthrow of Nkrumah Ghana would abandon her traditional role in African affairs, particularly in the anti-colonial struggle. We have by deeds and words given a lie to this". Thus the central themes of Ghana's foreign policy – emancipation of Africa, non-alignment, non-interference in internal affairs in other countries, among others – were in principle upheld by the NLC regime.

Though the external opposition to the deposition of Nkrumah from mainly African
countries and threats of subversion\textsuperscript{28} from within remained as the main constraints to the NLC regime, these never hindered it from actively taking part in African and international politics. On super power relations, the regime was generally pro-West, as it severed diplomatic relations with China, Cuba, and the USSR.\textsuperscript{29} Also in accordance with the UN Resolution, the regime imposed trade sanctions on Rhodesia, though there were no trade relations with Rhodesia during Nkrumah's regime.

3.2.2 THE MEDIA IN NLC'S FOREIGN POLICY

As it has been noted earlier, the regime spent a lot of its duration to legitimise itself and be accepted in the international arena, and also attend to problems of threats of internal subversion. As a result of the security imperative, the regime did not achieve that much in foreign policy. The reason is that though the regime claimed in principle to accept and commit itself to traditional foreign policy, as fashioned by Nkrumah, in the pursuance of it, the regime did not use "hostile strategies like subversion but through economic co-operation and political understanding"\textsuperscript{30} especially with Ghana's neighbours. The contribution or role of the media in this regard was likewise minimal.

An issue that, however, invoked reactions from the media was an allegation made against the NLC government in Dar-es-Salaam that the government intended establishing diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa. The allegation was made after President Banda of Malawi had normalised its
relations with South Africa on September 15, 1967. Though the government denied this allegation there were some reactions from the media. In its denial, a report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs retorted that “the government of Ghana wishes to refute in the strongest terms the allegation reportedly made in Dar-es-Salaam by a representative of the exiled Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa”.\(^{31}\) Notwithstanding this denial, some sections of the media had their own different opinions about the stand of the government. The *Daily Graphic* issue of September 18 1967, for instance, differed greatly from the position of the government not to establish relations with apartheid South Africa. Indeed, the editorial of the *Daily Graphic* was in support of President Banda for aligning his country and restoring relations with South Africa, and even went on further to suggest to the OAU to reconsider its position of aggression and non-dialogue with apartheid South Africa (this might have been the basis for Busia’s position of dialogue with South Africa).\(^{32}\) Commenting on Malawi’s proposed diplomatic representation in Pretoria, the *Graphic* was of the opinion that with “Dr. Banda’s violent language apart, and the insinuating Resolution of the Council of Ministers notwithstanding, the Malawí decision to establish diplomatic relations with South Africa is a realistic act of faith to gain access routes to the sea for the sale of her tobacco, tea and other agricultural products, which until then pass through ‘hostile’ territories of Mozambique and South Africa”. The paper argued that since Malawi depended so much on South Africa for her foreign exchange earnings, it would be suicidal – socially and economically – to boycott South Africa either economically or attempt to antagonise them politically. The paper saw the
decision as prudent and, therefore, urged that, “it was time African leaders changed their whole approach to the problem of South Africa...” Concluding, the paper was of the view that “… Dr. Banda has lighted a torch which might blaze the way even earlier than his detractors”.33 The paper, in this manner, viewed the NLC’s denial of the allegation as a slip-by opportunity to make Ghana proud.

The Pioneer, on the other hand, saw Malawi’s action as a betrayal of the African course and as a result supported the NLC for not towing the line of Malawi. The paper considered Malawi’s action as wrong and, therefore, “impolitical on the part of the OAU to close its eyes” on Malawi’s ‘defection’ and consequently proposed a committee to study the ‘Malawi breakaway’.34

The role of the media under the NLC regime, like the regime itself, appeared non-confrontational and non-aggressive in the pursuit of the country’s African policy issues. This was so because aggressive policies were not pursued by the regime as it was saddled with the problems of legitimising itself as well as taking security measures to ward off the ‘imminent’ threats of subversion from the ousted President. These constraints faced by the regime contributed to the silent role played by the media. At best, the media’s role under the NLC regime can be described as one that was reflective on African issues, especially on the issue of African liberation.
3.3 THE MEDIA AND BUSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

3.3.1 BUSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

The overthrow of Nkrumah's regime in 1966 affected the direction and conduct of national policy. There were also changes in the perception of national priorities, on regional and global issues. Whereas Nkrumah's personality, for instance, dominated Ghana's external relations and thus succeeded in galvanising the spirit of the African personality in international organisations, Ghana’s foreign policy under the leadership of Busia lacked vigour and dynamism. The Progress Party (PP) government of Busia, which took office in 1969 from the NLC, also pursued the quiet diplomacy of the previous regime, and continued the regime's policy of normalising relations with the country's neighbours. However, the substance of Ghana's foreign policy, as fashioned by Nkrumah's regime, remained the same under Busia's administration.

The stand of Busia's administration on Ghana's foreign policy was summarised by Victor Owusu, the Foreign Minister, when he said that “we did not oppose Nkrumah's foreign policy but his domestic policy”. This, therefore, implied that the Busia government was opposed to racism, colonialism and apartheid, and also showed commitment to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. It also meant the endorsement of African unity, non-alignment and positive neutrality, as a counterbalance to the super power relations. It further saw the UN as a platform for the promotion of world peace.
Showing its practical commitment to the traditional foreign policy of Ghana, especially on non-alignment and positive neutrality, the Foreign Minister, Victor Owusu, on July 29, 1970, said that his government would steer clear off the two main ideological blocs, indicating that diplomatic relations that had been previously severed with the East – USSR, China and Cuba – would be restored and diplomatic missions re-opened. On multilateral relations, Victor Owusu saw the UN Charter as offering "mankind the best chance of keeping the peace and improving our world environment for a meaningful life". The PP government thus subscribed to the UN. On African emancipation and unity, the PP government of Busia believed that the "total emancipation of the continent from colonial domination was and is still a cardinal principle of Ghana's foreign policy". The regime, however, differed in its approach towards African Unity. Victor Owusu contended that the PP government was "dedicated to the course of African Unity". But he was of the opinion that in as much as political union was a desirable objective, the PP government thought it was first of all "necessary to lay the proper foundations through functional co-operation particularly at the regional level". In view of this, the Busia administration was rather committed to the "early establishment of a West African Economic Community".

It is clear from the above that the Busia administration's foreign policy was not radically different, in substance, from the traditional foreign policy of the country as was pursued by Nkrumah.
3.3.2 THE MEDIA IN BUSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY

As it has been indicated above, the Busia administration followed the traditional foreign policy of the country. Similar to the Nkrumah’s regime, the media mainly covered extensively the policies of the government and in some instances sought to project the position of the country in international affairs. On June 22, 1971, the Ghanaian Times, for instance, in an editorial urged the UN Security Council to “act decisively to force South Africa out of Namibia”. In the paper’s view “there will be no excuse now for spinelessness, since the International Court’s decision strengthens the hand of the Council”. It observed that South Africa’s resistance in the past to quitting Namibia was due to the support and active “connivance of the Western powers – specifically Britain, United States and France”. It, therefore, warned that world opinion mobilised to force out South Africa of its illegal occupation would count for nothing without the influence on its side of the Western powers in addition to West Germany and Japan. The paper’s stand on this issue went to emphasise the country’s African policy of total emancipation.

Busia’s foreign policy towards South Africa, was seen as a “sharp departure from the traditional militant and active opposition to the apartheid regime”40, and drew a mixed reaction from the media. Whereas some of the sections of the media saw the decision by Busia as inconsistent with the country’s foreign policy and a betrayal of the African cause, others saw it as the best alternative line of action and, therefore, prudent.
On March 22, 1971, the National Assembly, by a majority decision, accepted the government’s policy of dialogue with apartheid South Africa\(^4\) in apparent disregard to the OAU’s position on isolationism as contained in the ‘Lusaka Manifesto’. This decision by the government led to the expression of strong opposition from many African countries. Whereas the PP government saw it as capable of giving Ghana a “more honourable image in world affairs” the opposition group in parliament described the decision as “involving the risk of objectionable compromise with racism”.\(^4\) The opposition further saw the decision as inconsistent with the country’s position. According to Obed Asamoah, the minority Shadow Minister of Foreign Affairs, “while the government was advocating dialogue with South Africa, some of Ghana’s delegates in the UN were advocating the unseating of South Africa in the UN”.\(^4\) The opposition in parliament saw the decision as a show of double standard. In fact, barely a year before the decision of the PP government, Dr. Banda was “the only member within the OAU in support of a dialogue. All the rest, whatever the differences of their political systems, were united in their total opposition to any dealing with South Africa”.\(^4\)

Like the politicians, the media also had different opinions on the issue of dialogue with South Africa. The *Daily Graphic*, for instance, agreed with the position of Busia’s administration on South Africa. Whereas the August 17, 1971 issue of the paper saw Banda’s visit to South Africa as an honest approach which in the
paper's view was "far superior to the clandestine approaches of some of the critics of South Africa", in an editorial of October 21, 1971, the paper sought to disagree with the Mogadishu Declaration adopted at the 7th East and Central African Summit Conference held in Mogadishu, Sudan, urging arm struggles to liberate Southern Africa. In the view of the paper "one would have thought that the Heads of State would have resolved to try the way of dialogue with the white racists..." Similarly, in agreement with her sister paper, the *Sunday Mirror* was of the view that it was only "logical that African countries should reappraise their policy and examine the possibility of uprooting apartheid through talks". The *Pioneer* was also of the view that dialogue was an answer to end the racist regime in South Africa. In an editorial of March 20, 1971, *The Pioneer* said "the advocates of the humane strategy of dialogue have already begun to win moral round for Africa". In the view of the paper, a new wind had started blowing over the South African issue and that however "sceptical any observers might be, they cannot close their eyes to the existing fact that a bridge of communication has taken place for the commencement of civilised and very active dialogue". Concluding, the paper believed that dialogue with apartheid South Africa might even be the greatest and most significant test of all time to be faced and conquered by all Blacks.

The *Ghanaian Times* and the *Legon Observer*, on the other hand, saw the decision as a stab at Ghana's foreign policy and the African cause. The *Legon Observer* wondered how the dialogue 'trick' was going to be pulled off, since its
success would mean the abandonment of the basis of apartheid. In the opinion of
the paper, “though one may understand the Prime Minister’s weighty reasons for
despairing of the armed fight against South Africa” the paper found it very difficult
to accept dialogue as a serious alternative worth considering. Furthermore, in a
press statement on December 15, 1971 the NUGS expressed its disgust at the
Busia administration’s decision to dialogue with apartheid South Africa declaring
that Ghana was “unwittingly dividing the African front in its support for a dialogue
with South Africa”. The GNA also reported that the Ghana branch of the
Students’ Movement for African Unity described as “betrayal of the Pan-African
cause” the proposed dialogue with South Africa. Concluding the branch called on
African leaders to reject any of such actions.

The media under Busia’s regime, apart from fulfilling the role of informing and
educating people also did well by providing people the opportunity of debating
issues bordering on Ghana’s foreign policy. The media created the platform that
spurred the ordinary citizens to express their views, especially, on Busia’s
decision to dialogue with apartheid South Africa. In the end this decision to
dialogue with South Africa never saw the light of day, as it had to be shelved as a
result, partly, of the outcry raised in the press. The reactions from the media, in
fact, opened Busia’s administration to criticisms that suddenly ended his reign.
Maxwell Owusu (1972), for instance, sees Busia’s proposed dialogue with
apartheid South Africa as one of the factors leading to his eventual overthrow in
January 1972. Karikari (1970) also sees Busia’s call for dialogue as the “most
serious blunder in the conduct of our foreign policy".\(^{50}\) In short the media provided a good platform in measuring, on the spot, Busia's foreign policy as a Prime Minister. Besides, the media, to an extent, influenced Busia's administration decision not to implement the 'dialogue' policy with South Africa even though the regime did not live long to implement it as is was overthrown shortly after the decision.

3.4 THE MEDIA AND THE NDC'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER RAWLINGS

3.4.1 NDC'S FOREIGN POLICY UNDER RAWLINGS

Ghana's foreign policy under Jerry Rawlings has not seen any sharp departure from the traditional tenets in her foreign policy. Indeed, it has been contended that the lost of Ghana's external influence, after the overthrow of Nkrumah, was to be regained under Jerry Rawlings regime in the 1980s. According to Boafo-Arthur (1993), Ghana regained her pre-eminence in African and international affairs during the PNDC era by combining an active and radical foreign policy with economic growth and development.\(^{51}\)

In 1984, emphasising Ghana's traditional African policy, Rawlings said, "our foreign policy is the eventual unification of the African continent".\(^{52}\) Also commitment to non-alignment was pledged leading to the hosting of the 10th NAM Conference in Accra in September 1991. Ghana's foreign policy and the attitude of President Rawlings to international relations have not changed since
the return to constitutional rule in 1993. In a statement to parliament after his inauguration in 1993, Rawlings said "the focus of our foreign policy will continue to be the maintenance of friendly relations with our immediate neighbours and indeed all the sister countries of Africa". Also Victor Gbeho, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a press briefing said that Ghana's foreign policy objectives have remained basically unchanged since independence with only shifts in emphasis, depending on the priorities of the government in power, responses to the imperatives of the African continent and other political, social and economic developments of the world. From Gbeho's statement, one can say that the NDC regime's foreign policy is driven by the changing economic and political realities of the time and thus emphasises economic development of Ghana. It is, in view of this, that in an address to parliament, President Rawlings stressed "economic diplomacy" as marking the "new policy objective to be pursued vigorously". This is because with the end of the Cold War and that of colonialism (with political independence of South Africa) the two cardinal foreign policies of Ghana – non-alignment and liberation struggle – now belong to history. In their place is "economic diplomacy".

"Economic diplomacy" is a policy that seeks to make Ghana a haven for investors thereby attracting foreign direct investment from all over the world. As a result there is active involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its missions abroad to 'market' Ghana as the 'gateway' to Africa. The NDC government, under Jerry Rawlings, has forcefully and aggressively pushed this
policy forward resulting in a new investment code, which seeks to create an enabling environment for investments. In doing this, the government has established a free zone policy that seeks to attract businesses to areas of priorities such as agriculture, manufacturing, and industries. By implication, it means not all sectors of the economy are considered worthy to invest in. For instance, the area of commerce is considered as choked by the government and, therefore, even if one expresses interest he/she will not be encouraged to invest in that sector.\textsuperscript{56} Besides, the President has personally involved himself in the drive to attract investors from all over the world. The President’s state visits to the US, Britain, France, Malaysia, Japan, and South Africa, among others, have often been undertaken with officials from the Ministry of Trade and Industry as well as the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre. The purpose of the inclusion of these officials is to ‘sell’ Ghana to prospective investors, outside the country, at their doorstep.

The pursuit of peace, which is a cardinal feature of Ghana’s foreign policy, has been one of the commitments of the NDC regime. Indeed, it has really been the commitment of the government of Ghana to pursue peace all over the world so long as Ghana’s human and material resources can support such missions. The UN has, for instance, commended Ghana’s role in peace support operations.\textsuperscript{57} Apart from supporting resolutions for a peaceful world, Ghana has used its military strength to back her words at the UN and other inter-governmental organisations such as the ECOWAS. In a nutshell, there have not been any
major shifts in Ghana’s foreign policy under the NDC government of Jerry Rawlings’, apart from the shifts in emphasis as a result of responses to the imperatives of the African continent (complete political independence of Africa), and other political, social and economic developments of the world, such as the end of the Cold War, and the wave of globalisation.

3.4.2 THE MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER RAWLINGS

Under the NDC regime, the media’s role has mainly been basically the assessment of the cost and its effects of the government’s foreign policies vis-à-vis the priorities of the domestic as well as national interest of the country. This is in addition to the traditional role of informing and sensitizing the general populace about the foreign policy positions of the government. In fact, the media have often had reason to question and complain about Ghana’s involvement in other peace support operations, especially with regards to ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Some sections of the media, for instance, considered Ghana’s continuous involvement in ECOMOG as amounting to the depletion of the country’s scarred foreign reserves. This is so as the cost of involvement in the peace support operations of the ECOMOG were borne by the countries contributing the troops.

This concern of the media attracted government’s response when President Rawlings on March 30, 1998, told the visiting Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), which was on its way to a fact finding mission in Sierra Leone via
Ghana, that the country does “not have the resources or personnel to do it at this time when our people are going through difficulties”. The President was of the view that dialogue and negotiation could be used as an alternative to military intervention by the ECOMOG. Moreover, in an editorial of March 31 1998, the Daily Graphic was of the opinion that “Ghana does not command the wealth to act as a policeman in the sub-region”, and that “the cost of keeping or enforcing peace in the event of a conflict could better be employed to sustain Ghana’s development and enhance the well-being of her people”. This view by the Daily Graphic had already been echoed by some individuals previously on a phone-in programme on Joy FM.

Furthermore, the media have had cause to draw the attention of the government to its investment drive, which in the media’s view rather seeks to promote the interest of the foreign investor than the domestic businesses/entrepreneurs. Some sections of the media have considered this to be a disincentive to indigenous businesses. Moreso, many have complained about the country’s investment laws that rather seek to cater for and protect the foreign investor more than the local investor. Besides, opportunities are often given to foreign firms over their local competitors thereby creating imbalance between the development of foreign and local firms in Ghana.

In conclusion, the media have been very active in their assessment of the cost and benefits that a policy is supposed to derive or affect the country’s standing
economically. In doing this, the media have often been quick in pointing out some of the overarching defects in policies that are considered inimical to the economic development of the country. Some of these policies considered as inimical to the country's development include the preference given to foreign investors and firms over the local ones, all in pursuit of a policy to attract FDIs, or making available the country's resources – human and personnel – in support of regional peace operations that eventually dissipate developmental efforts. Thus, being more concerned about the state of the economy and, therefore, the economic well-being of the people, the media have often complained about some of the government's foreign policies that in their view seem inconsistent with the well-being of the citizens. In short, the media’s role in the NDC’s foreign policy has been centred more on concerned with the socio-economic well-being of the citizenry.
ENDNOTES


2 A historical address by President Nkrumah on March 6, 1957, at the Old Polo Grounds (now the site of the Kwame Nkrumah Mausoleum)

3 Asante, K.B., Foreign Policy Making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Accra, 1997, p. 2


7 Asante, K.B., 1997, op. cit., p. 32

8 Nkrumah saw positive neutrality and non-alignment as a positive stand uninfluenced by any of the powers in the Cold War era. He believed that none of the powers could claim to be permanently right or wrong and, therefore, urged independent African states not to involve themselves in the disputes of the power blocs by taking sides.


Asante, K.B., op. cit., p. 36


Nkrumah, K., Address to Parliament, Jan. 12, 1965

Africa Diary, Jan. 1-31, 1965, p. 2163


Ibid. p. 137


Africa Diary, July 4-10, 1964, pp. 1828-29


See the Evening News edition of January 26-February 8, 1959


Ibid. January 1-31, 1964, p. 18

Ibid. June 1-30, 1964, p. 104
25 Africa Diary, March 14-20, 1964, p. 1650

26 See Africa Diary, May 16-23, 1964, p. 1753 for details.

27 Boafo-Arthur, K., 1989, op. cit., p. 142

28 See Africa Diary, pp. 2831-2, 2856, 3010, 3324, 3470, and 3480

29 See the Evening News, October 29, 1966

30 Boafo-Arthur, K., 1989, op. cit., p. 143


32 There were, however, contradictions and inconsistencies in the position of the Daily Graphic. Compare for instance the Graphic issues of September 18, 1967, November 10, 1970, October 21, 1970, and August 17, 1971. For instance, whereas the paper was, in one instance, in support of dialogue with South Africa in its editorials of September 18, 1967, October 21, 1970 and August 17, 1971, it, however, differed on this view in the November 10, 1970 edition, when the paper strongly disagreed with a call by President Houphouet-Boigny for African countries to begin dialoguing with apartheid South Africa.

33 Daily Graphic, September 12, 1967

34 The Pioneer, September 16, 1967


38 Asante, K. B., op. cit., p. 38

39 Ibid., p. 39


42 Ibid.

43 Daily Graphic, March 20, 1971, p. 16


45 Sunday Mirror, December 20, 1971

46 See Ghanaian Times, February 21; April 24 and August 21, 1971


48 Ibid. p. 2191


52 Asante, K.B., op. cit., p. 47

53 Ibid.
54 Gbeho, V., Press Briefing on “Ghana's Foreign Policy”, Accra, MFA, April 14, 1998


56 An interview with a Foreign Service Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accra

57 See the Daily Graphic, August 2, 2000

58 GTV News at 7.00 p.m., Monday March 30, 1998

59 Front Page, A Current Affair programme on Joy FM on March 21, 1998

60 See the Ghanaian Chronicle, September 14-20, 1993, p. 8
CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

4.1 FINDINGS

4.1.1 TEST OF HYPOTHESIS

The work was based on a hypothetical assumption that the role of the media in foreign policy is dependent on the political environment. The work has successfully proved that like the foreign policy decision-makers, the political environment prevailing at the time informs the media. Nkrumah's policy on African Union government and non-alignment were, for instance, carried by the media and promoted as the best option worth pursuing. At the time that pan-African sentiments were so high and, in the view of Adamafio, "the national temper was at its zenith against imperialism," the media saw emerging independent African states as a progressive development and also as a way of pulling resources together, should they come together and form a union government. Besides, some sections of the media saw the concept as laudable and achievable drawing parallel juxtaposition between the proposed United States of Africa to that of the United States of America, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). To achieve the African Union concept, the media cautioned prudence for emerging African countries to steer away from the ideological conflict between the East and the West.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Busia's proposed dialogue with apartheid South Africa was seen by some sections of the press as a betrayal of the African course and also an affront to the UN. The UN was then supportive of armed struggle and isolation of apartheid South Africa. Moreover, the domestic political environment was against the decision of the government. This is because the decision was seen as hitting directly at the heart of one of the country's cardinal foreign policies as well as a collective African policy. It is even said that some of Busia's cabinet members were against the decision.² Thus the political environment at the time provided the media the platform to react to Busia's proposed action the way they did. In the same vein, the prevailing political environment in the early 1990s, after the Cold War and the political independence of South Africa, made it tenuous for the media to raise any objection to the NDC government's effort to establish diplomatic ties and open a diplomatic mission in South Africa. In a nutshell, the political environment of the time provides the barometer with which the media play their role in foreign policy.

4.1.2 THE CENTRALISED NATURE OF FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN GHANA

The study also reveals that foreign policy making in Ghana is highly centralised and firmly controlled from the executive arm of the government. In other words, it is the government of the day that really initiates and discusses foreign policy issues. This is because most often than not, foreign policy decision making is not subjected to open debate and, therefore, not well explained to the ordinary
Indeed, the only forum where foreign policy is debated is the parliament. Indeed, the Fourth Republican Parliament of Ghana had cause to complain about the inability of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to brief the House on the direction of Ghana’s foreign policy. Thus, to the extent that the legislature, which is supposed to play a pivotal role in foreign policy of the country is left in the dark, then it goes to buttress the point that foreign policy is highly centralised in Ghana.

This situation has, therefore, made even some media practitioners ignorant on some major foreign policy issues. For instance, on a radio current affairs programme on Joy FM, the panelists, consisting of seasoned journalists and lecturers in journalism and communication studies, showed clear ignorance on important government policies regarding regional integration and the establishment of a new cabinet ministry in charge of regional integration. The main issue being discussed was whether it was prudent for the government to establish a new ministry to cater for regional planning and integration. In their contention, some of the panelists found it a waste of resources and money to establish a new ministry. In their view, the Ministry of Trade, Foreign Affairs or Finance and Economic Planning could as well cater for the duties of such a ministry. Besides, they considered the position of the government as extravagant since, according to them, no country within the West African sub-region had such a ministry solely for integration. In fact, it took some time before one of the panelists pointed out to the rest that countries like Togo, Burkina Fasso and Nigeria have such a ministry. This reference is, however, not meant to cast a slur
on media practitioners. Rather, it is supposed to bring to the fore how the non-debated nature of the country's foreign policy leaves many ordinary people ignorant, including those whose duty it is to inform and educate the larger populace of the country.

4.1.3 THE QUESTION OF THE MEDIA'S INFLUENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY

The study also showed that the media in Ghana, as far as foreign policy is concerned, wields very little influence, if any at all, on foreign policy-making or formulation. In other words, the role that the media play does not significantly impact on or influence the formulation of foreign policies in Ghana. This assertion is largely limited to the initial stage of foreign policy formulation where decisions are made. The reason, as indicated earlier, is that foreign policy making in Ghana is very much centralised and, therefore, at its formulation stage the media is kept out of it. This could be attributed, partly, to the kind of political regimes – especially the military, autocratic and authoritarian eras – that the country has had since independence. For instance, in her forty three years of independence (1957-2000), Ghana has been under military regimes for about twenty years – 1966-69, 1972-79 and 1982-93 –, with Nkrumah's reign (1957-1966) largely described as autocratic. This situation has largely contributed to the centrality of foreign policy formulation with very little effort at making foreign policy a subject of public debate. Consequently, the centralised nature of foreign policy-making, often times, makes media practitioners ignorant of the direction of the country's
foreign policy. This, thus, hinders the media from becoming actively involved in foreign policy-making thereby influencing foreign policy at its formulation stage. The agenda for foreign policy formulation can thus be said not to be set by the media.

Nonetheless, there are some few instances that the media can be said to have influenced, to an extent, foreign policy direction of government. Among these few instances include media reports in 1964, which compelled the CPP government of Nkrumah to deport the four American professors of the University of Ghana.⁷ Besides, Busia's inability to implement his 'dialogue with South Africa' could be attributed to the role the media played in whipping up people's interest and also serving as a platform for people to air their views against the decision by the PP government.

In a nutshell, the media do not generally wield great influence on foreign policy formulation in Ghana. This is not to suggest, however, that the media do not contribute to foreign policy in anyway. Indeed, the study has shown that by their role the media contribute significantly to foreign policy. This is because the media, for instance, provide the platform for open debate and discussions on major government policy positions. The contributions that such discussions and debates provide no doubt help to shape the government's policy position. Some foreign policy decision-makers have acknowledged this fact. Asamoah (1991), for
instance, is of the view that "the press and the media...continue to make enormous contribution to foreign policy".  

4.2 SUMMARY

On the whole, the work has succeeded in establishing the role of the media in Ghana's foreign policy on epochal basis. It has further succeeded in establishing that apart form its basic function of informing and educating the citizenry on government policies; the prevailing political environment determined the role of the press within the different regimes studied. The work has succeeded in advancing our understanding, and also appreciation of the media's role, as well as the constraints that intervene between the media and foreign policy.

4.3 CONCLUSION

The work relied heavily on publications and other pronouncements in the media by policy makers, public officials, some sections of the public, and also media practitioners. It became clear that the media in Ghana generally seem to react to foreign policy positions of governments rather than being proactive or initiators of the policy. This assertion, for instance, is clear in foreign policies of the various regimes studied, especially, during Nkrumah's era and the decision by the Busia administration to dialogue with apartheid South Africa. This notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that the media have generally contributed to Ghana's foreign policy in by discussing the policy after governments have taken the decision or helping to sensitize people on such decisions made by the governments. In Nkrumah's government, for instance, the press, though, did not in itself initiate
the policies; it contributed to making popular the policies of the government. By sensitising the citizenry and also proselytizing the policies of the government, the media helped in marshalling support for the policies of the government. The press even went further to defend some of Nkrumah's policies that some other African countries had considered as hostile and, therefore, tantamount to domestic interference.\footnote{9}

Furthermore, the press contributed to the shaping of Busia's decision of dialogue with the then apartheid South Africa. Even though the press did not originally initiate the policy, it did well by providing the platform for a thorough discussion on the policy by the ordinary citizen. By this role, the press contributed to the shaping of Busia's policy on the issue of dialogue and provided the platform for public discussion on the issue.

This work being an exploratory attempt, it is the hope that further studies in this area would help to establish empirically the role the media play in Ghana's foreign policy. In this way, it will give empirical meaning to the oft made pronouncement that the 'media contribute to foreign policy in Ghana'.

\footnotetext{9}{University of Ghana}
ENDNOTES


2 Asante, K.B., Foreign Policy Making in Ghana: Options for the 21st Century, 1997, p.40. Also Boafo-Arthur (1989) contends that Victor Owusu, the Foreign Minister at the time was relieved of his portfolio and instead given the portfolio of the Attorney General due his opposition to the proposed dialogue with South Africa.

3 Today In Parliament, A GBC Radio programme that reviews the day's activity in Parliament

4 See for instance, Articles 74 and 75 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana

5 News File, a current affairs programme on Joy FM (a local FM station in Accra), March 18, 2000


7 Africa Diary March 14-20, 1964, p. 1650


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